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crs_R42990

crs_R42990_0

105-220 ) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development. In addition, Title I authorizes the establishment of a One-Stop delivery system through which state and local WIA training and employment activities are provided and through which certain partner programs must be coordinated; Title II—Adult Education and Literacy—provides education services to assist adults in improving their literacy and completing secondary education; Title III—Workforce Investment-Related Activities—amends the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 to integrate the U.S. Employment Service (ES), which provides job search and job matching assistance to unemployed individuals, into the One-Stop system established by WIA; and Title IV—Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998—amends the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides employment-related services to individuals with disabilities. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) expired at the end of FY2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108 th and 109 th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112 th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce, however, ordered reported H.R. 4297 —the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012. A legislative hearing on H.R. On June 7, 2012, the committee, after considering 23 amendments to H.R. 4297 , ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 15. No further action was taken on H.R. In the 113 th Congress, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce has ordered reported H.R. 803 —the Supporting Knowledge and Investing in Lifelong Skills Act (SKILLS Act). This bill was introduced on February 25, 2013, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training. 803 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on February 26, 2013. On March 6, 2013, the committee, after considering four amendments to H.R. 803 , ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 0. 803 was debated in the House of Representatives on March 15, 2013, and passed by a vote of 215-202. The report also compares the proposed provisions of H.R. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 career centers nationwide. 803 . 803 . 803 . H.R. H.R.

The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. 105-220) is the primary federal program that supports workforce development activities, including job search assistance, career development, and job training. WIA established the One-Stop delivery system as a way to co-locate and coordinate the activities of multiple employment programs for adults, youth, and various targeted subpopulations. The delivery of these services occurs primarily through more than 3,000 One-Stop career centers nationwide. The authorizations for appropriations for most programs under the WIA expired at the end of FY2003. Since that time, WIA programs have been funded through the annual appropriations process. In the 108th and 109th Congresses, bills to reauthorize WIA were passed in both the House and the Senate; however, no further action was taken. In the 112th Congress, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) released discussion drafts in June 2011 of legislation to amend and reauthorize WIA. While markup of this legislation was scheduled, it was ultimately postponed indefinitely. No legislation has been introduced. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce ordered reported H.R. 4297—the Workforce Investment Improvement Act of 2012, on June 7, 2012, by a vote of 23 to 15. This legislation would have amended and reauthorized WIA. No further action was taken on H.R. 4297 in the 112th Congress. In the 113th Congress, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce has ordered reported H.R. 803—the Supporting Knowledge and Investing in Lifelong Skills Act (SKILLS Act). This bill was introduced on February 25, 2013, by Representative Virginia Foxx of North Carolina, the chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education and Workforce Training. A legislative hearing on H.R. 803 was held before the full Committee on Education and the Workforce on February 26, 2013. On March 6, 2013, the committee, after considering four amendments to H.R. 803, ordered the bill reported by a vote of 23 to 0. H.R. 803 was debated in the House of Representatives on March 15, 2013, and passed by a vote of 215-202. H.R. 803 would maintain the One-Stop delivery system established by WIA but would repeal numerous programs authorized by WIA and other federal legislation, and it would consolidate other programs into a new single funding source—the Workforce Investment Fund. Adult Education and Vocational Rehabilitation retain separate titles and funding in H.R. 803. This report first provides a brief introduction to the four main titles of WIA and then compares the proposed provisions of H.R. 803 to the current law provisions by each of the four titles.

crs_RS22787

crs_RS22787_0

The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPCSC) released its "Decision on Issues Relating to the Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage" on December 29, 2007. In its decision, the NPCSC ruled out the direct election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and Legco by universal suffrage in the elections of 2012. The NPCSC's decision also included a number of guidelines for the conduct of future elections in Hong Kong, as well as possible changes in election procedures that can and cannot be made before 2017. The decision was in response to a report on Hong Kong's constitutional development and the need to amend its election methods submitted to the NPCSC by Hong Kong's current Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen on December 12, 2007. Tsang welcomed the decision as a clear timetable for democratization. Critical Issues In light of the NPCSC's decision, Hong Kong's advancement towards democracy faces three critical issues.

The prospects for democratization in Hong Kong became clearer following a decision of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPCSC) on December 29, 2007. The NPCSC's decision effectively set the year 2017 as the earliest date for the direct election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and the year 2020 as the earliest date for the direct election of all members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco). However, ambiguities in the language used by the NPCSC have contributed to differences in interpretation of its decision. According to Hong Kong's current Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, the decision sets a clear timetable for democracy in Hong Kong. However, representatives of Hong Kong's "pro-democracy" parties believe the decision includes no solid commitment to democratization in Hong Kong. The NPCSC's decision also established some guidelines for the process of election reform in Hong Kong, including what can and cannot be altered in the 2012 elections.

crs_RL30926

crs_RL30926_0

Background Budgets for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), as well as U.S.contributions toUnited Nations (U.N.) International Organizations, and U.N. Peacekeeping, are within the Commerce, Justice, StateandRelated Agency (CJS) appropriations. The Administration's budget request for the Department of State wasreleased March 12, 2001, although the Administration officially sent the FY2002 budget request to Congress on April 9,2001. The Administration's FY2002 State Department and BBG budget request totaled nearly $8 billion, more than 13% abovethe FY2001 enacted funding level ( P.L. 106-553 ). In the wake of the September 11th attack, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 107-38 )which provides State with $390,000 for Diplomatic and Consular Programs, $7.5 million for its Capital InvestmentFund,and $41 million for Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service account. These funds will be used foroverseaspersonnel evacuations, information and reward money for apprehending terrorists, and improvement of emergencycommunications technology at U.S. and overseas facilities. The House adopted the CJS appropriations conference report ( H.Rept. 107-278 ) by a vote of 411-15 on November 14th andthe Senate adopted it by a vote of 98-1 the following day. On November 28, 2001, the President signed it into law( P.L.107-77 ). The House Appropriations Committee agreed with the Administration request, but a floor amendment transferred $7million from this account and into the Small Business Administration. After the September 11th attack, Congressrecognized theurgency for immediate improvements in communication technology and passed the emergency supplemental ( P.L.107-38 )which included $7.5 million for CIF for improving emergency communications capabilities overseas and in theWashingtonoffice. The House set funding at $60.3million forInternational Commissions in FY2002. The House agreed, but the Senaterecommendedreducing the funding to $8 million for FY2002. (The North-South Center received $1.4 million from the Education and CulturalExchangesaccount in FY2001.) In addition to the annual appropriation, and in response to the September 11th attack, Congress passed the emergencysupplemental ( P.L. d An additional $12.25 million was made available by the emergency supplemental ( P.L.

On April 9, 2001, the President submitted his FY2002 budget request which included nearly $8 billion for the Departmentof State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). This represents an increase of $925 million (or 13.1%)from theFY2001 enacted level which Congress passed and the President signed into law ( P.L. 106-553 ) on October 27,2000. On June 27, 2001 the House Commerce, Justice, State (CJS) Subcommittee passed by voice vote its FY2002appropriations. The full House Appropriations Committee reported out the CJS legislation ( H.Rept. 107-139 ) onJuly 10,2001, and set State Department funding at $7.4 billion for FY2002. After transferring $15 million out of two of State'saccounts - $8 million from Diplomatic and Consular Programs and $7 million from the Capital Investment Fund- andmoving the funds into the Small Business Administration, the House passed the bill ( H.R. 2500 ) on July18th,funding State at $7.39 billion. On July 19th the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the CJS appropriations ( S. 1215 ) and filed itsreport ( S.Rept. 107-42 ). The Senate version provided $7.2 billion for the State Department in FY2002. The Senatepassedits version of H.R. 2500 , as amended, on September 13, 2001. In response to the September 11th attacks, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 107-38 )totaling $40 billion. Of that total, the State Department received $390,000 for Diplomatic and Consular Programs,$7.5million for its Capital Investment Fund, and $41 million for Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Serviceaccount. These funds will be used for overseas personnel evacuations, information and reward money for apprehendingterrorists,and improvement of emergency communications technology at U.S. and overseas facilities. Additionally, theemergencysupplemental provided $12.25 million to the BBG for increased Arabic and other language broadcast servicesrelated to thewar on terrorism. In the absence of a signed CJS appropriation, the following continuing resolutions kept the State Department running intothe new fiscal year: H.J.Res.65 ( P.L. 107-44 ) which expired October 16th, H.J.Res. 68 ( P.L.107-48 ) whichexpired October 23rd, H.J.Res. 69 ( P.L. 107-53 ) which expired October 31st, and H.J.Res. 70 ( P.L.107-58 ) which expired November 16th, and H.J.Res. 74 ( P.L. 107-70 ) which expired December7, 2001. The House adopted the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-278 ) by a vote of 411-15 on November 14th and the Senate adoptedit by a vote of 98-1 the following day. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 107-77 ) on November 28, 2001.

crs_R40125

crs_R40125_0

Introduction Historically, Central California's San Joaquin River supported large Chinook salmon populations. Since the Bureau of Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River became fully operational in the 1940s, much of the river's water has been diverted for agricultural uses. As a result, approximately 60 miles of the river is dry in most years, making it impossible to support Chinook salmon populations in the upper reaches of the river. In 1988, a coalition of conservation and fishing groups advocating for river restoration to support Chinook salmon recovery sued the Bureau of Reclamation (hereafter referred to as Reclamation), which owns and operates Friant Dam ( Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers ). A U.S. District Court judge has since ruled that operation of Friant Dam violates state law because of its destruction of downstream fisheries. Faced with mounting legal fees, considerable uncertainty, and the possibility of dramatic cuts to water diversions, parties agreed to negotiate a settlement instead of proceeding to trial on a remedy regarding the court's ruling. The Settlement calls for new releases of water from Friant Dam to restore fisheries in the San Joaquin River and for efforts to mitigate water supply losses due to the new releases. Title X of H.R. 146 , which passed the Senate March 19, 2009, contains a San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement implementation provision; the legislation had previously been considered and passed the Senate as Title X of S. 22 . Congressional authorization and appropriations are required for full implementation of the Settlement. A key legislative issue is how to finance Settlement implementation, specifically how to resolve congressional Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) issues. Other challenges are how to achieve the Settlement's dual goals of fisheries restoration and water management, and how to address concerns of stakeholders not party to the Settlement, without disrupting the negotiated agreement. The stated goals of the Settlement are twofold: (1) to restore and maintain fish populations in "good condition"—the § 5937 standard—in the main stem of the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam to the confluence of the Merced River; and (2) to reduce or avoid adverse water supply impacts to the Friant long-term water service contractors that may result from both interim flows and restorative flows provided in the Settlement. 4074 , H.R. 24 and S. 27 . While short-term (10 year) direct spending in H.R.

Historically, the San Joaquin River in Central California has supported large Chinook salmon populations. Since the Bureau of Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River became fully operational in the 1940s, much of the river's water has been diverted for off-stream agricultural uses. As a result, approximately 60 miles of the river bed is dry in most years. Thus, the river no longer supports Chinook salmon populations in its upper reaches. In 1988, a coalition of conservation and fishing groups sued Reclamation (Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers). A U.S. District Court judge ruled in 2004 that operation of Friant Dam violates state law because of its destruction of downstream fisheries. Faced with mounting legal fees, uncertainty, and the possibility of dramatic cuts to water diversions, parties negotiated a settlement instead of proceeding to trial. The Settlement reached calls for new releases of water from Friant Dam to restore fisheries, potential river channel modifications to accommodate increased flows, and efforts to mitigate reductions in off-stream deliveries lost to restoration flows. Congressional authorization and appropriations are required for full Settlement implementation. Legislation based on the Settlement (H.R. 4074, H.R. 24 and S. 27) was considered in the 110th Congress; a new version of the legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress—Title X of S. 22, an omnibus public lands bill, which became Title X of H.R. 146 and passed the Senate on March 19, 2009. A key legislative issue is how to finance the Settlement, specifically how to resolve direct spending and related congressional pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) issues. Other challenges have been how to achieve the Settlement's dual goals of fisheries restoration and water management, and how to address concerns of stakeholders not party to the Settlement, without disrupting the negotiated agreement. The region may benefit from increased recreational expenditures and investment in river restoration activities under the Settlement. For example, some communities and interests believe restoration will bring other benefits to the river and river communities, such as improved surface water quality in lower San Joaquin River reaches and enhanced recreation benefits. On the other hand, some studies suggest the Settlement would have a negative economic impact on the agriculture industry, at least in the short term. In addition, downstream interests not party to the Settlement have been concerned about increased flooding, groundwater infiltration, and competition with existing federal financial commitments. Nearby communities fear harm to groundwater quantity and quality. Some of these concerns have been addressed in the newest version of the legislation, but some may remain.

crs_R41952

crs_R41952_0

Overview: Policy Interests and Issues The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is an important autonomous actor in the world. Today, 22 countries including the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC). In what many observers consider as a model democracy, Taiwan's 23 million people enjoy self-governance with free, multi-party elections. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12 th -largest U.S. trading partner and the 7 th -largest export market for U.S. agricultural products. As a critical concern, the United States has interests in the ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait, which affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. U.S. policy seeks a cooperative relationship with a rising PRC, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other official dealings with Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs in unifying with Taiwan as a part of China. President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support, including arms sales, for Taiwan's stronger position to sustain cross-strait talks. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued a parallel, positive U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Is the Administration effectively encouraging Taiwan to play a helpful, peaceful, and stabilizing role in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas? Historical Background Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The United States has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of April 10, 1979, P.L. 96-8 , has governed policy in engagement with Taiwan in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. President Reagan offered " Six Assurances " to Taipei on July 14, 1982, that in negotiating the third Joint Communiqué with the PRC, the United States: (1) has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; (2) has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; (3) will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; (4) has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; (5) has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC. (Also see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei , by [author name scrubbed].) National Security Questions also have arisen about Taiwan's reviews of technology transfers to the PRC and any national security implications of increasing PRC investments in Taiwan, including how Taiwan's review of PRC investments compares with the U.S. security review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and how Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) is cooperating with the PRC's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Nonetheless, policy issues have included whether the Administration has ambitious objectives to achieve in engaging with Taipei, has timed arms sales and certain other actions out of concern about the potential reaction from Beijing, strengthened ties with Taiwan in the months before the elections in January 2012 to favor President Ma of the KMT, has been effective in encouraging Taiwan to invest more in defense, or has included Taiwan in the strategic "rebalance" to Asia. For years, the United States and Taiwan sought to resume trade talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks. However, Taiwan's restrictions on U.S. beef raised concerns. On the 20 th anniversary of the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, Representative Ed Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led a total of 29 Members to send a letter, on September 23, 2014, to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for expanding engagement with Taiwan. S. 1683 became P.L. 113-276 on December 18. H.R. (Also see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 , by [author name scrubbed].) Minor parties and an independent won the remaining 9 seats. Restoring Trust and Resolving Disputes (Beef and Pork) Taiwan has another window for greater attention to governance, between the local elections on November 29, 2014, and the presidential and legislative elections in early 2016. Some issues are summarized below. BIA . Legislation in the 113th Congress H.J.Res. H.R. H.R. 1151 (Royce)/ P.L. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 3979 / P.L. 113-291 . H.R. H.Con.Res. H.Con.Res. H.Con.Res. H.Res. H.Res. 3470 . H.Res. H.Res. S.J.Res. S.Res. S.Res.

This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, provides an overview with analysis of the major issues in U.S. policy on Taiwan. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in engagement with Taiwan in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements of policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the "Six Assurances" of 1982. (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.) For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12th-largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention). While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is an important autonomous actor. Today, 22 countries have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan's 23 million people enjoy self-governance with democratic elections. Democracy has offered people a greater say in Taiwan's status, given competing politics about Taiwan's national identity and priorities. Belonging to the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, President Ma Ying-jeou won elections in 2008 and 2012 against the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) candidate. The KMT also won a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY). In 2014, the Ma Administration faced challenges from the student-led Sunflower Movement in concluding a trade deal with the PRC. The KMT faced major defeats in the local elections on November 29, when many people voted against its domestic policies. Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed the need to take steps by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen cooperation to advance U.S. interests. Another approach has viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales to and other dealings with Taiwan, and Taiwan's independence. Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan cooperation. President Ma has sought U.S. support, including for Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S. strategic "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific, international organizations, talks on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Other policy issues are whether and when to approve arms sales, and how to bolster economic cooperation and resolve disputes, such as through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks (last held in April 2014). The United States has been concerned about Taiwan's restrictions on U.S. beef and pork, even as Taiwan has claimed attention to international organizations and standards. Taiwan has proposed a bilateral investment agreement (BIA). On September 23, 2014, 29 Members in the House sent a letter to the Secretary of State, calling for expanding engagement with Taiwan. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.J.Res. 109, H.R. 419, H.R. 772, H.R. 1151 (P.L. 113-17), H.R. 1960, H.R. 3470, H.R. 3979 (P.L. 113-291), H.R. 4435, H.R. 4495, H.Con.Res. 29, H.Con.Res. 46, H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 185, H.Res. 494, H.Res. 704, H.Res. 714, S. 12, S. 579, S. 1197, S. 1683 (P.L. 113-276), S. 2410, S.J.Res. 31, S.Res. 167, and S.Res. 412. (See also CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)

crs_R45426

crs_R45426_0

PAF is administered by the Office of Adolescent Health (OAH) in the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS') Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) established the program and provided $25 million in annual mandatory funding for a 10-year period from FY2010 through FY2019. PAF funding is awarded competitively to the 50 states, District of Columbia (DC), U.S. territories, and tribal entities that apply successfully. The grantees may use the funds for any of the following purposes: providing subgrants to institutions of higher education (IHEs), high schools, or community service providers to enable these subgrantees to establish, operate, or maintain pregnancy or parenting services for the expectant and parenting population; providing, in partnership with the state attorney general's office, certain legal support, hotline, and other supportive services for women who experience domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking while they are pregnant or parenting an infant; and supporting, either directly or through a subgrantee, public awareness about PAF services for the expectant and parenting population, including individuals who are victims of domestic violence and sexual violence. Through FY2018, HHS has awarded PAF funding to 30 states, DC, and 5 tribal entities. Subgrantees reported most frequently using the funds to support case management, referrals to other supports, group workshops on specific topics (e.g., pregnancy prevention), and home visiting services. Vulnerability During Pregnancy and the Postnatal Period The PAF program focuses on meeting the educational, social service, and health needs of vulnerable expectant and parenting individuals and their children during pregnancy and the postnatal period. Teenage mothers and fathers tend to have less education and are more likely to live in poverty than their peers who are not parents. Nearly one-third of teen girls who have dropped out of high school cite pregnancy or parenthood as a reason. Parenthood can also influence whether students pursue postsecondary education. For example, one analysis found that single young women who had children after enrolling in community college were 65% more likely to drop out than their same-age peers who did not have children after enrolling. The research literature indicates that approximately 3% to 9% of women experience domestic violence during pregnancy. Some studies indicate that this risk is greater among low-income women. Each purpose area specifies certain activities. Grant Requirements The PAF statute and the program grant announcements include requirements for state grantees and subgrantees in carrying out activities under the PAF program. Reporting on Expenditures and Performance The PAF authorizing law requires each subgrantee to provide an annual report to the state grantee that (1) itemizes the expenditures used to serve the expectant and parenting population; (2) contains a review and evaluation of the performance of the subgrantee in fulfilling program requirements, based on performance criteria or standards established by the grantee; and (3) describes the subgrantee's achievements in meeting the needs of expectant and parenting individuals and the frequency with which they used services. Grantees must prepare an annual report to HHS on this information provided by subgrantees, the number of subgrantees that were awarded funds, and the number of expectant and parenting individuals who were served. In FY2016, the 20 grantees served 16,053 individuals. Of these participants, 55% were expectant or parenting mothers, 37% were children, and 8% were expectant or parenting fathers. Of these participants, nearly half were white, about one-third were black, and the remaining share were another race or multiracial. Issues for Congress If Congress considers reauthorizing the PAF program beyond FY2019, it may look to the impact evaluation discussed above to determine how well the program is meeting participants' needs. Early evidence indicates that the program may be helping to keep pregnant and parenting students in the District of Columbia attending and graduating from high school. Congress may also consider whether to establish guidelines for how the PAF program should interact with other, similar federal programs.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) established the Pregnancy Assistance Fund (PAF) to assist vulnerable individuals and their families during the transition to parenthood. Specifically, the program serves expectant and parenting teens, women, fathers, and their families. This includes women of any age who are survivors of domestic violence, sexual violence, sexual assault, and stalking. The PAF program focuses on meeting the educational, social service, and health needs of eligible individuals and their children during pregnancy and the postnatal period. The research literature indicates that pregnancy has high costs for individuals eligible for the PAF program. Teenage mothers and fathers tend to have less education and are more likely to live in poverty than their peers who are not parenting. Nearly one-third of adolescent females who have dropped out of high school cite pregnancy or parenthood as a reason. Parenthood can also influence whether students pursue postsecondary education. One analysis found that single young women who had children after enrolling in community college were 65% more likely to drop out than their same-age peers who did not have children after enrolling. The research literature further indicates that approximately 3% to 9% of women experience domestic violence during pregnancy. Some studies indicate that this risk is greater among low-income women. The PAF program is administered by the Office of Adolescent Health (OAH) in the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS') Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH). HHS distributes PAF funding on a competitive basis to the states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and tribal entities. Through FY2018, HHS has awarded PAF funding to 30 states, the District of Columbia, and 5 tribal entities ("grantees"). These grantees can decide how to use funding under four purpose areas. Three of the purpose areas focus on providing services to the eligible expectant and parenting population through subgrants and partnerships. The fourth category focuses on public awareness about such services; however, HHS advises that grantees may not use funding solely for public awareness activities. In general, grantees have provided subgrants to school districts, community service organizations, and institutions of higher education (IHE) that directly serve the expectant and parenting population. Subgrantees have most frequently provided case management, referral services for other supports, group workshops on specific topics (e.g., pregnancy prevention), and home visiting services. The PAF statute and the program grant announcements include requirements for state grantees and subgrantees in carrying out activities under the program. The authorizing law requires each subgrantee to provide an annual report to the grantee about expenditures, fulfilling program requirements, and how it meets the needs of participants. Grantees must prepare an annual report to HHS on information provided by subgrantees, including participant data. In FY2016, grantees (17 states and 3 tribal entities) reported serving 16,053 individuals. Of these participants, 55% were expectant or parenting mothers, 37% were children, and 8% were expectant or parenting fathers. Most expectant or parenting participants were ages 16 through 19, and nearly half of all participants were white, about one-third were black, and the remaining share were another race or multiracial. About half of all participants were Hispanic. The ACA provides mandatory PAF funding of $25 million annually from FY2010 through FY2019. If Congress considers reauthorizing the program, it may look to emerging findings from a recent evaluation that may indicate the program is helping to keep pregnant and parenting students in the District of Columbia connected to their high schools. Among other topics, Congress may consider whether to establish guidelines regarding how the PAF program should interact with other, similar federal programs in the areas of education, health, and social services.

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In-country refugee processing refers to the processing of prospective refugees by the U.S. government from within their countries of origin for admission to the United States. In addition to the new CAM program, several ongoing in-country refugee processing programs are operating in FY2015. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee, in part, as a foreign national who has experienced, or has a well-founded fear of, persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad. Refugee Admissions Typically, a refugee being considered for resettlement in the United States is outside his or her country of origin (in a host county) and is referred to the U.S. program by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The INA also provides for the processing of refugees in their countries of origin for purposes of admission to the United States in some cases, as reflected in the second, alternate part of the definition of a refugee (INA §101(a)(42)(B)): in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Since the late 1980s, presidential determinations on refugee admissions have typically specified three or four groups as being eligible for in-country processing. These groups often included persons in Cuba, the (former) Soviet Union, and Vietnam. In exceptional circumstances, persons identified by a U.S. Embassy in any location. New Program for Certain Central American Minors For FY2015, the Obama Administration has established a new in-county processing program for the following persons: Minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with a parent who is lawfully present in the United States. Under this program, a parent who is lawfully present in the United States can request a refugee resettlement interview for an unmarried child in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras.

The Obama Administration has established a new refugee program for certain minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with a parent who is lawfully present in the United States. Created in response to the FY2012-FY2014 surge in unaccompanied child arrivals to the United States from these countries, the Administration has described the new Central American Minors (CAM) program as providing an alternative to a dangerous journey to the United States. The CAM program is an in-country refugee processing program, which means that eligible minors will be processed by the U.S. government from within their countries of origin for possible admission to the United States as refugees. Under the program, a parent who is lawfully present in the United States can request a refugee resettlement interview for an unmarried child in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee, in part, as a foreign national who has experienced, or has a well-founded fear of, persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad. Typically, a refugee being considered for resettlement in the United States is outside his or her country of origin (in a host country). The INA, however, also authorizes the President, after appropriate consultation with Congress, to specify groups for in-country refugee processing. Since the late 1980s, Presidents typically have specified three or four groups as being eligible for in-country processing in a fiscal year. In addition to the new CAM program, there are several ongoing in-country refugee processing programs operating in FY2015. These previously established programs are for designated groups in an independent state of the former Soviet Union or of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania; in Cuba; and in Iraq, as well as, in exceptional circumstances, for persons identified by a U.S. embassy in any location. This report supplements CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, which provides a broader look at the U.S. refugee program.

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On January 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) E.O. 13770 created an ethics pledge for executive branch appointees, provided for the administration and enforcement of the pledge, and revoked President Barack Obama's executive order ethics pledge that covered his Administration (E.O. 13490). President Trump's executive order shares some features with President Obama's executive order and a previous executive order issued by President Bill Clinton. Since the basis of the ethics pledges is to regulate public and executive branch interactions, this report focuses on the main features of the ethics pledges—lobbying, ethics in government, and the "revolving door"—to explore the basis and current practices for these interactions. The report begins with an overview of the relationship between the public and the executive branch, including the use of laws, executive orders, and other guidance and Administration policy to regulate interactions. A brief summary of executive orders is then provided, including a side-by-side analysis of ethics pledges from the Clinton, Obama, and Trump Administrations. This analysis is followed by observations of the similarities and differences among the three ethics pledges. Today, interactions between the private citizens and the executive branch take many forms. Laws Several laws address the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental actors. The Revolving Door Several laws govern the movement of federal employees from the government to the private sector and vice versa. Most prominently, 18 U.S.C. In the context of ethics and lobbying, guidance has been utilized to regulate contact between lobbyists and executive branch employees for certain programs. These include codifying ethics pledge provisions; amending revolving door restrictions; amending the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), or both; or taking no immediate action. Side-by-Side Analysis of Executive Order Ethics Pledges To provide a comparison of the executive order ethics pledges signed by President Clinton, President Obama, and President Trump, Table A-1 provides a side-by-side analysis of the three ethics pledges, including who was covered, the restrictions placed on covered employees, and the administration and enforcement provisions.

On January 28, 2017, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13770 on ethics and lobbying. E.O. 13770 created an ethics pledge for executive branch appointees, provided for the administration and enforcement of the pledge, and revoked President Barack Obama's executive order ethics pledge that covered his Administration (E.O. 13490). President Trump's executive order shares some features with President Obama's executive order and a previous executive order issued by President Bill Clinton. Executive order ethics pledges are one of several tools, along with laws and administrative guidance, available to influence the interactions and relationships between the public and the executive branch. The ability of private citizens to contact government officials is protected by the Constitution. As such, the restrictions placed by executive order ethics pledges, laws, and administrative guidance are designed to provide transparency and address enforcement of existing "revolving door" (when federal employees leave government for employment in the private sector) and lobbying laws. The report begins with an overview of the relationship between the public and the executive branch, including the use of laws, executive orders, and other guidance and Administration policy to regulate interactions. A brief summary of recent executive orders is then provided, including a side-by-side analysis of ethics pledges from the Clinton, Obama, and Trump Administrations. This analysis is followed by observations about the similarities and differences among the three pledges. These observations focus on the revolving door restrictions (18 U.S.C. §207), the definition of lobbying used in ethics pledges, and the representation of foreign principals by former executive branch officials. In the context of observations drawn from the ethics pledges, Congress has many options available to potentially address the relationship and contact between the private sector and government employees. These include options to amend revolving door restrictions, amend the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, and codify the ethics pledge to make executive order additions to existing laws permanent. Additionally, Congress could take no immediate action and maintain current standards.

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Introduction Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes the largest grant program in the ESEA, funded at $14.9 billion in FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of these formulas. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of these formulas. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. This report provides a general overview of the key components of each of the formulas.

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Shortly thereafter, the House passed H.Amdt.142 to P.L.107-76 , FY2002 Agriculture, Rural Development and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)Appropriations , which would have provided $250,000 to the Food and Drug Administration to beused to develop a label for chocolate products indicating that no child slave labor had been used inthe growing and harvesting of cocoa in a product so labeled. A Senate companion bill was neverintroduced, in part because after House passage of the bill, representatives of the cocoa industry, theInternational Labor Organization (ILO), several private labor rights groups, and Members ofCongress, negotiated "a comprehensive, six-point problem-solving" protocol aimed at ending the"use of abusive child labor in cocoa growing." This report provides background on the production of cocoa and discusses the issue of childlabor in the industry, efforts by Congress, including the Harkin-Engel Protocol, and those of othergovernments, international organizations, and non-governmental groups to address the problem. Italso discusses potential policy options that might accomplish that end. Child Labor in the West African Cocoa Sector(7) Reports of children being trafficked to work on cocoa farms, and stories of children workingunder abusive conditions began to emerge in 2000. The extent to which West African cocoa producers employ child labor is, in part, a functionof economic factors. According to representatives of the cocoa/chocolate industry, anti-child labor programs inCôte d'Ivoire and Ghana have made significant progress toward fulfilling the terms of theHarkin-Engel Protocol. In Ghana, a similar process hasalso been undertaken in five districts. On July 1, 2005, Senator Tom Harkin, Representative Eliot Engel, and the Chocolate/CocoaIndustry released a joint statement on efforts to address the worst forms of child labor in cocoagrowing. In the statement, the industry highlighted the positive steps taken since signing theProtocol, and committed to ensuring that 50% of cocoa growing areas would be under a certificationsystem within three years. and international support. (53) The government of Côte d'Ivoire has reportedly spent more than$1 million on countering abusive child labor in cocoa production -- largely through STCP.

Stories of children being trafficked to work under horrific conditions in West African cocoafields emerged in 2000. Shortly thereafter, in 2001, Congress passed H.Amdt. 142 to P.L. 107-76 , FY2002 Agriculture, Rural Development and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)Appropriations , which would have provided $250,000 to the Food and Drug Administration, to beused to develop a label for chocolate products indicating that no child slave labor had been used inthe growing and harvesting of cocoa in a product so labeled. A Senate companion bill was neverintroduced, in part because after House passage of the bill, representatives of the cocoa industry, theInternational Labor Organization (ILO), several private labor rights groups, and Members ofCongress, negotiated "a comprehensive, six-point problem-solving" protocol aimed at ending the"use of abusive child labor in cocoa growing." Signatories to the protocol committed to developinga certification process that would ensure that no abusive child labor would be used in cocoaproduction. It is currently being debated whether the protocol has been implemented in full by itsJuly 1, 2005 deadline. Critics contend that the cocoa/chocolate industry fell short of itscommitments, as it has only developed a pilot certification scheme in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire --which does not encapsulate the entire West African cocoa producing region. The industry countersthat significant progress has been made, the affected governments have contributed significantresources towards this endeavor, and that this is a work in progress. According to a joint statementreleased by Senator Tom Harkin, Representative Eliot Engel, and the cocoa/chocolate industry onJuly 1, 2005, the cocoa/chocolate industry has committed to expanding its pilot certification system to cover 50% of the cocoa growing areas of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana within three years. There has been a wide range of suggestions in countering the use of abusive child labor incocoa production. Some advocate revoking trade preferences. Others point to the root cause of childlabor: poverty. Those analysts suggest boosting investments in education, and boosting world cocoaprices. Still some observers assert that conflict and political instability will hinder any effort tocounter abusive child labor. This report outlines how and where cocoa is produced, discusses the use of abusive childlabor in the industry, efforts by Congress to counter abusive child labor -- including theHarkin-Engel Protocol, and initiatives by affected governments and international organizations toaddress the problem. This report also provides possible policy options that might undertaken to stopthe use of child labor in cocoa production. This report will be periodically updated.

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However, biofuels are a small, yet growing, component of U.S. fuel consumption, accounting for an estimated 10 billion gallons in 2008, or 5% of total light-duty road motor transportation use by volume. The RFS mandates that increasing volumes of renewable fuels be blended with conventional fuels through 2022. This report's discussion of ethanol presupposes the continued dominance of the internal combustion engine and the current infrastructure for petroleum fuel extraction and refining and biofuels feedstock production and refining—as opposed to the major near-term market penetration of alternatives such as plug-in-electric automobiles. Renewable Fuel Standard Statutory Waiver In April 2008, Texas Governor Rick Perry applied to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a waiver of the renewable fuel standard, citing economic damage to the livestock and poultry industries in his state. Ethanol Trade Issues Most ethanol imported into the United States is subject to a tariff of $0.54 per gallon. Several factors may generate debate on the tariff during the 111 th Congress: (1) beginning in 2009, the tariff is $0.09 per gallon higher than the blender's tax credit it was intended to offset, (2) as the RFS increases and becomes more difficult to fulfill, imports may play a greater role in reaching mandated volumes, and (3) if the price of imported ethanol was lower (without the tariff), blenders would be likely to blend more ethanol into gasoline, achieving one of the benefits of ethanol—reduced emissions. This solution is very popular with corn and ethanol producers, who claim an increase in green jobs, benefits to rural economies, and the displacement of foreign-produced petroleum. Federal Support for the Ethanol Industry12 The ethanol industry has received substantial support from the federal government. Proponents of other types of renewable energy contend that available resources could be better used supporting wind, solar, or other types of renewable energy and they will likely argue for a shift of government support away from ethanol. Ethanol is generally produced in rural areas where corn is grown, to limit transportation costs for feedstocks. The second category is "advanced biofuels," and can be fulfilled with biofuels other than corn ethanol. Many argue that a tariff on ethanol increases costs to consumers. Demand for ethanol is dependent on regulatory mandates, its price relative to gasoline, and, until 2006, its use as an oxygenate. The critical factors underlying ethanol's energy efficiency include (1) corn yields per acre (higher yields for a given level of inputs improves ethanol's energy efficiency); (2) the energy efficiency of corn production, including the energy embodied in inputs such as fuels, fertilizers, pesticides, seed corn, and cultivation practices; (3) the energy efficiency of the corn-to-ethanol production process: clean burning natural gas is the primary processing fuel for most ethanol plants, but several plants (including an increasing number of new plants) use coal; and (4) the energy value of corn by-products, which act as an offset by substituting for the energy needed to produce market counterparts. Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the aggregate quantity of GHG emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as emissions from land use changes) accounting for all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution, delivery, and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer. Although the use of ethanol has been touted by proponents as reducing GHG emissions compared with conventional fuels, some contend that the benefits are nonexistent or minimal. These rules will likely be the subject of intense debate because they will determine whether a fuel is eligible for the RFS. Federal Intervention in the Ethanol Industry The federal government provides incentives and support for the ethanol industry though tax credits, research and development, grants and loan guarantees for plant construction, import tariffs, and perhaps most important, the RFS usage mandate, which was discussed above.

Biofuels are a major source of renewable energy in the United States. Ethanol produced from corn starch accounts for 90% of the biofuels consumed, but only 5% of all light-duty motor transportation fuel consumption. Ethanol is blended with gasoline to increase octane and reduce emissions, and used as a substitute for gasoline to reduce consumption of petroleum-based fuels. Ethanol has the potential to provide many benefits. As an alternative to gasoline refined from imported oil, its use can improve U.S. national energy security, albeit marginally. Although the exact magnitude is subject to debate, ethanol is thought by many to produce lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared with gasoline. For this reason, its increased use is seen by many as playing a potential key role in reducing the contribution of the transportation sector to global climate change. U.S.-produced ethanol can also boost demand for U.S.-produced farm products, stimulate rural economies, and provide "green" jobs in rural areas. An ethanol-centric policy does have its critics. For example, ethanol has been implicated as a factor in rising commodity and food prices. As ethanol production increases, corn is diverted from feed and export markets and acreage is diverted from other crops, such as soybeans. The extent to which ethanol is responsible for these impacts has been the subject of debate and wide-ranging estimates. Also, the potential to displace gasoline and increase national energy security is limited by the land available to grow corn. Since the 1970s, ethanol has received support from the U.S. government. Presently, federal support is provided in the form of mandated levels of consumption, financial incentives such as grants and loan guarantees, tax credits, tariffs on ethanol imports, and federally funded research and development efforts. Tax credits made available to blenders of ethanol are expected to total nearly $6 billion in 2009. Incentives were initially provided to get the ethanol industry off the ground—many now argue that the ethanol industry has matured and these resources should be used elsewhere. Federal support for biofuels and ethanol in particular is likely to be an issue facing the 111th Congress. Ethanol has received more federal support than other types of renewable energy. Some argue that the market, rather than the government, should direct investment, whether it be for ethanol, wind, solar, geothermal, or other alternatives. In addition, ethanol is used in internal-combustion engines that mostly use fossil fuels, unlike alternatives such as battery or plug-in-electric vehicles, which do not consume fossil fuels directly. Other issues of congressional interest may include financial support for ethanol during the recession and the extension of the blender's tax credit and the import tariff, both of which expire after 2010. The renewable fuel standard (RFS), which mandates increasing volumes of renewable fuel use through 2022, may become an issue if biofuels production shortfalls occur and the mandate cannot be met. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is drafting rules on the calculation of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that will determine which fuels qualify for the RFS. These rules will likely attract congressional scrutiny if they exclude major stakeholders in the ethanol industry. In addition, continuation of the RFS itself may be the subject of debate.

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Introduction Section 1341 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) establishes a transitional reinsurance program that is designed to provide payment to non-grandfathered, non-group market health plans (also known as individual market health plans) that enrolled high-risk enrollees for 2014 through 2016. Under the program, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) collected reinsurance contributions from health insurers and from third-party administrators on behalf of group health plans. The Secretary then used those contributions to make reinsurance payments to health insurers who enrolled high-cost enrollees (statutes required the HHS Secretary to determine how high-risk enrollees are identified, and the Secretary in turn defined high-risk enrollees as high-cost enrollees) in their non-group market plans both inside and outside of the exchanges (also known as marketplaces , where individuals can shop for and purchase private health insurance coverage). This report provides an overview of the ACA's transitional reinsurance program. The first section of the report provides background information on reinsurance and the ACA risk mitigation programs. The second section describes the components of the transitional reinsurance program, as well as implementation of the program. The third section discusses questions, including those raised by a 2016 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, regarding the scope of HHS's authority to administer the transitional reinsurance program. Finally, the report includes a table in the Appendix that summarizes key aspects of the transitional reinsurance program. Reinsurance, thus, is an extension of insurance and further acts as a risk-transfer and risk-spreading mechanism. That is, the availability of reinsurance may be one of many factors an insurer considers in assessing potential exposure to loss in a certain market. To mitigate the financial risk that insurers face and to stabilize the price of health insurance in the non-group and small-group markets, the ACA establishes three risk mitigation programs: the transitional reinsurance program, the permanent risk adjustment program, and the temporary risk corridors program. Prior to ACA implementation, little information was available regarding health care usage and demand for the previously uninsured, as well as any pent-up demand due to the lack of health insurance coverage. Accordingly, to limit their risk exposure in offering plans on the non-group market, insurers would likely raise premiums to the extent possible to protect themselves against the potentially high cost associated with delayed care. However, some of the new ACA market reforms limit the degree to which insurers may vary premiums. The transitional reinsurance program is designed to mitigate the financial risk associated with individuals who had delayed needed health care while they were uninsured. The ACA establishes the transitional reinsurance program to be redistributive in nature in which the HHS Secretary collects reinsurance contributions from health insurers and from third-party administrators on behalf of group health plans; the HHS Secretary then uses those contributions to make reinsurance payments only to health insurers offering plans in the non-group market both inside and outside of the exchanges. Under the program, only non-group market health plans with high-cost enrollees are eligible for reinsurance payments; the program covers a portion of the claims costs for these enrollees based on payment parameters (see " Payment Parameters " section of this report) set by the HHS Secretary. The availability of reinsurance allows insurers to reduce their risk exposure and may impact whether or not to enter a market, what types of products to offer, and what premiums to set.

Section 1341 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) establishes a transitional reinsurance program that is designed to provide payment to non-grandfathered, non-group market health plans (also known as individual market health plans) that enroll high-risk enrollees for 2014 through 2016. Under the program, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) collects reinsurance contributions from health insurers and from third-party administrators on behalf of group health plans. The Secretary then uses those contributions to make reinsurance payments to health insurers who enroll high-cost enrollees (statutes required the HHS Secretary to determine how high-risk enrollees are identified, and the Secretary in turn defined high-risk enrollees as high-cost enrollees) in their non-group market plans both inside and outside of the exchanges (also known as the marketplaces). Contributions are distributive in that they are collected from most non-group and group health insurers, but payments are made only to eligible non-group market health plans. Reinsurance is an extension of insurance and further acts as a risk-transfer and risk-spreading mechanism. The availability of reinsurance allows insurers to reduce their risk exposure and can affect the availability and affordability of health insurance coverage. That is, the availability of reinsurance may be one of many factors an insurer considers in assessing potential exposure to loss in a certain market. This may affect whether or not to enter a market, what types of products to offer, and how premiums are set. To mitigate the financial risk and uncertainty insurers may face in the early years of ACA implementation as a result of the ACA's private health insurance market reforms, the ACA establishes three risk mitigation programs: the transitional reinsurance program, the permanent risk adjustment program, and the temporary risk corridors program. Prior to ACA implementation, little information was available regarding health care usage and demand for the previously uninsured, as well as any pent-up demand due to the lack of health insurance coverage. Accordingly, to limit their risk exposure in offering plans on the non-group market, insurers would likely raise premiums to the extent possible to protect themselves against the potentially high cost associated with delayed care. However, some of the new ACA market reforms limit the degree to which insurers may vary premiums. The transitional reinsurance program was designed to mitigate the financial risk associated with individuals who had delayed needed health care while they were uninsured. Under the program, the HHS Secretary collects reinsurance contributions from most non-group and group health plans and then uses those contributions to make reinsurance payments only to non-group market health plans with high-cost enrollees. The program covers a portion of the claims costs for these enrollees based on payment parameters set by the HHS Secretary. This report provides an overview of one of the three risk mitigation programs, the transitional reinsurance program. The program's aim is to offset the expenditures associated with high-cost individuals. The first section of the report provides background information on reinsurance and the ACA risk mitigation programs. The second section describes the components of the transitional reinsurance program, as well as implementation of and experience with the program. The third section discusses questions regarding the scope of HHS's authority to administer the transitional reinsurance program, including those raised by a 2016 Government Accountability Office report. Finally, the report includes a table in the Appendix that summarizes key aspects of the transitional reinsurance program.

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Recent Developments Earthquake A 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck the Central and Western Regions of Nepal on April 25, 2015. An estimated half a million homes were destroyed. A Nepal National Reconstruction Authority was established by ordinance, but reportedly has been slow to distribute the approximately $4 billion pledged for reconstruction at an international donors conference held in June 2015. New Constitution Many observers believe the devastation wrought by the April 2015 earthquake acted as an impetus for the second Constituent Assembly, elected in 2013, to reach agreement on a new constitution. United States-Nepal Relations The United States recognized an independent Nepal in 1947 and established diplomatic ties in 1948. Relations between the two nations are described by the State Department as friendly. As such, it has a great need for economic development and foreign assistance. The caucus serves as "an informal group of Members dedicated to educating the American public and policymakers on U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal including supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in South Asia, supporting Nepalese territorial integrity, and alleviating poverty and promoting development." Unrest in the Terai An estimated 45 people were killed in violent protests over the Nepali constitution in August and September 2015. This has led to severe fuel shortages in Nepal, which Kathmandu has blamed on India. Transport linkages between Nepal and China are limited at present. The view reportedly held by many in Nepal—that the agitation in the Terai is in some way backed by India—may well have the effect of delegitimizing Madhese or Tharu demands in the eyes of much of the rest of the country. In November 2006, the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists reached a peace agreement, ending a decade-old insurgency that claimed over 13,000 lives. A second CA was elected in 2013 to draft a new constitution. The Economy Nepal's economy faces the twin challenge of rebuilding after the April 2015 earthquake while also dealing with the economic impact of the political unrest in the Terai that is limiting cross-border trade with India. Rebuilding damaged and destroyed housing and infrastructure caused by the earthquake will likely take years. Hydropower Nepal's substantial hydropower potential is viewed by many analysts as an important means of stimulating economic growth and development. With 6,000 rivers of various sizes, many with steep gradient, Nepal is estimated by some to have 40,000 MW of hydropower potential. Human Rights There are a number of human rights concerns about Nepal. This led to over 100,000 Lhotshampa refugees in Nepal by 2006. Diplomatic pressure from China following a wave of protests across the Tibetan plateau in 2008 led the government of Nepal to suppress Tibetan political activism in Nepal and, according to HRW, "Restrictions on Tibetans' rights in Nepal and on the Nepal-China border have grown much more stringent since 2008." The Environment Nepal can be divided ecologically into the lowland Terai, the intermediate hill, and mountainous Himalaya regions. Global Climate Change Initiative. External Affairs Nepal is a landlocked geopolitical buffer state, like nearby Bhutan, that is situated between two Asian giants. Nepal's reliance on these two huge neighbors leads it to seek amicable relations with both, though trade, religious, and cultural ties with India have historically been closer. To some observers it appears that India will have to change its policy if it wishes to remove incentives for Nepal to seek to further develop its energy, trade, and other linkages with China. Nepal-China Relations China has in recent years made significant inroads in developing ties with South Asian and Indian Ocean littoral states.

Nepal is a poor country of an estimated 31 million people that has undergone a radical political transformation since 2006, when a 10-year armed struggle by Maoist insurgents, which claimed at least 13,000 lives, officially came to an end. The country's king stepped down in 2006, and two years later Nepal declared itself a republic, electing a Constituent Assembly (CA) in 2008 to write a new constitution. A second CA elected in 2013 reached agreement on a new constitution in September 2015. Though the process of democratization begun in 2006 has had setbacks and has been marked by violence, Nepal has conducted reasonably peaceful elections, brought former insurgents into the political system, and, in a broad sense, taken several large steps toward establishing a functioning democracy. New provincial demarcations contained in the new constitution, along with other provisions, have met with opposition by the minority Madhese people of the lowland Terai border region with India. This has led to violent protests and disruptions to cross-border trade that have led to economic hardship and fuel shortages in Nepal. Kathmandu has asserted that the Indian government is playing a role in this unrest. Some media coverage described this as an unofficial blockade of Nepal. In part as a result of these developments, Nepal is seeking closer energy and trade linkages with China. Among the drivers of congressional interest in Nepal are the country's still-unfolding democratization process, geopolitical and humanitarian concerns, and its location as a landlocked state situated between India and China. The United States and Nepal established diplomatic ties in 1948 and relations between the two countries are friendly. U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal include supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in South Asia, supporting Nepalese territorial integrity, alleviating poverty, and promoting development. Nepal's status as a relatively small, landlocked buffer state situated between India and China largely defines the context of its foreign policy. This geopolitical dynamic is changing somewhat as Nepal appears to be the site of more intense diplomatic and economic activity by both India and China. Historically, Nepal's ties with India have been closer than its ties with China. Recent developments in the Terai, however, have encouraged Nepal to seek closer relations with China. China is developing trade, transport and development linkages with Nepal and has reportedly pressured Nepal to constrain the activities of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Nepal was devastated by a massive 7.8 magnitude earthquake on April 25, 2015. The disaster killed over 8,000 and destroyed much of Nepal's housing and infrastructure. By one estimate, over half a million homes were destroyed. Reconstruction costs are estimated by some at $7 billion. The devastation wrought by the earthquake is compounded by economic hardship stemming from the ongoing discontent in the Terai. An international donors conference held in June 2015 led to significant pledges of assistance to help Nepal rebuild. Nepal faces other challenges, as well as potential opportunities. Trafficking remains a key human rights concern. Nepal also faces challenges related to demographic and climate change driven pressures on the environment. Nepal has extensive and underutilized hydropower potential that, if developed, could hold the promise of improved economic development for the nation.

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Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S. government personnel in national security agencies, and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011, as well as the recently approved Global Security Contingency Fund, providing an integrated State Department-Department of Defense budget for certain types of security assistance. The FY2012 NDAA ( P.L. Nonetheless, despite a growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is little agreement on the solutions. This report starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and 2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives, followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure. The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1) is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must congressional reform accompany other national security measures? Soon after, the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), put the problems of interagency cooperation at home and abroad in bold relief for many policymakers and analysts. The 2010 QDDR, undertaken by the Obama Administration without a statutory requirement, embraced a number of the proposals (or variations of those proposals) for national security reform that have been advocated over the past decade. The three most commonly cited factors responsible for perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are: Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities and processes; Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for "stove-piping," with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, discouraging domestically oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority, either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any, familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and agencies. The term "National Security Council" is sometimes used to encompass the council itself, as well as NSC directorates and staff. But these coordinators do not have the power to compel interagency cooperation. Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms? Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives Some policymakers may view support for the efforts begun by the Bush Administration as a priority. Brookings/CSIS 2010 —Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. DSB 2004 —Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities , December 2004. Appendix B deals with proposals to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting. The act also provides that the NSC, "for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security," shall "consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith." In December 2011, Congress provided authority for the GSCF in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207, H.R. 1540 , P.L. 112-81 , signed into law December 31, 2011). Several of the studies surveyed recommend a wide variety of ways to enhance the State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct interagency missions and activities. H.R. Legislation currently before Congress, the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 ( S. 1268 and H.R.

Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current and recent legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314) and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011 (H.R. 3660), as well as the new Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed into law December 31, 2011). The FY2012 NDAA requires the President to submit to Congress a "whole-of-government" implementation plan. Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own. Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S. government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for "stove-piping" responses, with each agency operating independently, and to civilian agencies' reluctance to divert scarce resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions; and (3) personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies. This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures, and arrangements; and to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms. As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.

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Selected Statistics on Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt Federal debt represents, in large measure, the accumulated balance of federal borrowing of the U.S. government. The portion of gross federal debt held by the public consists primarily of investment in marketable U.S. Treasury securities. Table 1 provides December 2015 data, available as of March 2016, on estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities by type of investment and the percentage of that investment attributable to foreign investors. Data on major foreign holders of federal debt by country are provided in Table 2 . For decades, the United States has saved less than it invests. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, investor demand for Treasury securities increased as investors undertook a "flight to safety."

This report presents current data on estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities and major holders of federal debt by country. Federal debt represents the accumulated balance of borrowing by the federal government. To finance federal borrowing, U.S. Treasury securities are sold to investors. Treasury securities may be purchased directly from the Treasury or on the secondary market by individual private investors, financial institutions in the United States or overseas, and foreign, state, or local governments. Foreign investors have held slightly less than half of the publicly held federal debt in recent years, prompting questions on the location of the foreign holders and how much debt they hold. This report will be updated annually or as events warrant.

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Introduction The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides an array of benefits to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include disability compensation and pensions, education benefits, survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and burial and memorial benefits. In order to apply for these benefits, in most circumstances, the claimant will send an application to his or her local VA Regional Office or apply online. The VA has a "duty to assist" the claimant throughout the claim process. Furthermore, the VA, when adjudicating any claim for benefits, is obligated to give the claimant the "benefit of the doubt" when there is "an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding" any claim, and must also consider legal theories that a claimant fails to raise if it would help substantiate a claim for benefits. This report will analyze the VA's duty to assist claimants and the pro-claimant standard of proof used during the adjudicatory process for veterans' benefits. The VA must provide those forms and instructions to such person free of charge. Duty to Assist During the Development of a Claim Duty to Inform Claimant of Evidence Necessary to Substantiate a Claim After the VA receives a complete or a substantially complete application for benefits, the VA is required to assist in the development of the claim. Duty to Assist Claimants in Obtaining Records to Substantiate a Claim The VA is required to "make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs]." The claimant has an obligation to cooperate with the VA during the development of the claim. Thus, the VA can deny the claim only if the preponderance of the evidence is against the claimant.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides an array of benefits to veterans and to certain members of their families. These benefits include disability compensation and pensions, education benefits, survivor benefits, medical treatment, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, and burial and memorial benefits. In order to apply for these benefits, in most circumstances, the claimant will send an application to his or her local VA Regional Office or apply online. Once a veteran has filed an application for benefits with the VA, the agency has a unique obligation to the claimant when adjudicating the claim—the VA has a "duty to assist" the claimant throughout the claim process. This duty to assist imposes numerous requirements on the VA during the claim process. The VA must assist claimants in obtaining the forms and information necessary to apply for a benefit; inform claimants of any information missing from an application; explain what evidence must be obtained in order to substantiate a claim for benefits; assist the claimant in obtaining records and evidence from both private and federal entities; and provide certain claimants with a medical examination or opinion when certain conditions are met. In addition to assistance the VA must provide during the development of a claim, the VA also is required to implement other pro-claimant standards when adjudicating a claim. For example, the VA must consider legal theories that a claimant may not have argued in his application for benefits and must grant those benefits if they are supported by law. Furthermore, the VA must adjudicate a claim for benefits under a pro-claimant standard of proof—the VA may deny a claim only if the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the claimant. This report analyzes court decisions that have examined the VA's obligation to assist veterans during the claims process.

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Disagreement persists about the use of BCAs in decisionmaking, how benefits and costs are captured and monetized, and how to value future benefits and costs. The debate on how to value future benefits and costs is related to the discount rate used to value future benefits and costs in the present. The higher the discount rate, the less present value is attributed to future benefits and costs. In the Water Resources Development Act of 1974 (WRDA 1974; P.L. 97 from 1962. For FY2016, the water planning discount rate was 3.125%. This report discusses the role and significance of discount rates in the economic evaluation of Corps projects. It also discusses the history of, theoretical underpinning for, and issues and criticisms of the water planning discount rate. The discount rate applied can influence which alternative for addressing a water resources problem is deemed most economically efficient and whether a BCA indicates that a project's net benefits justify federal investment. The quality and reliability of the BCAs shape the quality of decisionmaking and the efficacy of the federal and nonfederal spending on federal water resource projects. Today, Congress is faced with more demand for Corps projects than the agency can deliver at recent funding levels. Whereas the Corps uses the water planning discount rate for project planning, in recent years, the executive branch has chosen to use a different discount rate when selecting Corps construction projects to include in its annual budget request. Since the mid-2000s, the executive branch's approach to budgeting, known as performance-based budgeting, has focused its funding requests on a limited set of projects. The executive branch uses as a principal performance metric for a project's inclusion in its budget request the project's benefit-cost ratio (BCR) calculated with a 7% discount rate (i.e., ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of costs discounted at 7%). Projects with BCRs less than 2.5 (calculated at a 7% discount rate) are largely excluded. An issue for Congress and nonfederal project sponsors is the uncertain prospects for construction for the suite of congressionally authorized projects that do not meet the executive branch's BCR threshold. The OMB federal program discount rate is intended to reflect the pretax rate of return on capital in the private sector. Since the late 1990s, the water planning discount rate has been below the OMB federal program discount rate. For many Corps stakeholders, the current interest in the water planning discount rate is less a function of these long-standing debates and more part of the concern about the uncertain construction funding prospects for congressionally authorized projects that are below the BCR (at 7% discount rate) threshold used by the executive branch. Water Planning Discount Rate History of the Water Planning Discount Rate As previously noted, since 1974, the Corps and other federal water resource agencies have evaluated water projects using a discount rate that is calculated using a formula required in law. In 1962, S.Doc. In practice, the rate is the average year yield on government securities with 15 years or more to maturity. For many Corps stakeholders, the current interest in the water planning discount rate is less a function of long-standing debates about a long-critiqued discount rate and more part of the concern over the uncertain construction prospects for the suite of congressionally authorized projects that do not meet the executive branch's BCR threshold. Corps benefit-cost analyses and their underlying assumptions, especially the discount rate, are of significance to Congress and other policymakers because of their central role in decisions currently shaping the portfolio of federal water resources assets and their benefits, costs, and risks for decades to come. Water resource projects are explicitly exempted from Circular A-94.

Since 1936, Congress has relied on benefit and cost information to justify investments of federal involvement in water resource projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Today, Congress faces more demand for Corps projects than the agency can deliver at recent funding levels. Congress also faces stakeholder concerns about how water resources issues are addressed; this brings attention to how the Corps develops and evaluates the alternatives considered for congressional construction authorization. Corps benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) and their underlying assumptions are central to decisions currently shaping the portfolio of federal water resources assets and their benefits, costs, and risks for decades to come. The quality and reliability of the BCAs shape federal decisionmaking and the efficacy of federal and nonfederal spending on federal water resource projects. Disagreement persists about the use of BCAs in decisionmaking, how benefits and costs are captured and monetized, and how to value future benefits and costs. A main element of the debate is the discount rate used to convert future benefits and costs into present values. For some projects, the discount rate applied can influence which alternative is deemed the most economically efficient and whether a project's net benefits appear to justify federal investment. The higher the discount rate, the less present value is attributed to future benefits and costs. The Water Resources Development Act of 1974 (WRDA 1974; P.L. 93-251) requires the executive branch to use an annually adjusted water planning discount rate for project planning. The Corps continues to use the water planning discount rate for planning; however, in recent years, the executive branch has chosen to use a different discount rate when selecting Corps construction projects to include in its annual budget request. The executive branch's approach to budgeting has focused its funding requests on a limited set of projects. The executive branch uses as a principal performance metric for a project's inclusion in its budget request the project's benefit-cost ratio (BCR, ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of costs), calculated with a 7% discount rate. Projects with BCRs less than 2.5 (calculated at a 7% discount rate) are largely excluded from the budget request. An issue for Congress and nonfederal project sponsors is the uncertain prospects for construction for the suite of congressionally authorized projects that do not meet the executive branch's BCR threshold. Pursuant to WRDA 1974, the water planning discount rate is calculated annually based on a formula established in S.Doc. 97 from 1962; the rate was 3.125% in FY2016. The calculation uses the average yield on Treasury securities with 15 years or more remaining to maturity, rounded to the nearest one-eighth of 1% and capped at an annual change of 0.25%. The executive branch has used a 7% discount rate for its evaluation of most federal programs since 1992, pursuant to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94. According to the circular, the 7% rate is intended to reflect the pretax rate of return on capital in the private sector. Since the late 1990s, the water planning discount rate has been below 7%. Critics of the water planning discount rate have argued for a rate that better reflects the opportunity cost of capital. Others argue that Corps projects are public investments with long-term benefits that are appropriately evaluated with a low discount rate. For many Corps stakeholders, the current interest in the water planning discount rate is less a function of these long-standing debates and more part of the concern about the uncertain construction funding prospects for congressionally authorized projects that are below the BCR at the 7% discount rate threshold used by the executive branch. This report discusses the role and significance of discount rates in the economic evaluation of Corps projects. It also discusses the water planning discount rate's history, theoretical underpinning, and related issues and criticisms.

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RS21055 -- NATO Enlargement Updated May 5, 2003 Background Congress is now considering enlargement of NATO, an issue addressed at the allied summit in Prague, in November 2002. During the last round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting Poland, theCzechRepublic, and Hungary to NATO. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting the enlargement debate. Six of the seven candidate states joined the coalition. Today, most member states couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms. The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. It also reviews NATO's mission and capabilities, relations withRussia, rolein the Balkan wars, and the Prague NATO summit.

This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement. The report analyzes the key military and political issues in the debate over seven prospective members named atNATO'sPrague summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on enlargement, citing theeffectsof the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of recentlegislation onenlargement. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RS21354, The NATO Summit atPrague, 2002,CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, and CRS Report RS21510,NATO's Decision-MakingProcedure.

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The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country, nor have they contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies, including a questioning of a seeming U.S. reliance on the institution of the Pakistani military and on the person of President Musharraf, along with a shifting of considerable U.S. assistance funds toward programs that might better engender long-term stability in Pakistan.

This report provides a summary review of issues related to Pakistan and terrorism, especially in the context of U.S. interests, policy goals, and relevant assistance. The outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful successes, have neither neutralized anti-Western militants and reduced religious extremism in that country nor contributed sufficiently to the stabilization of neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers thus urge a broad re-evaluation of such policies. Sources for this report include, among other things, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, congressional transcripts, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, regional press reports, and major newswires. This report will be updated periodically.

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The tension between the benefits and challenges of encryption is not new. It started in the 1990s and was reinvigorated in 2014 when companies like Apple and Google implemented automatic full-device encryption for mobile devices and automatic encryption for certain communications systems. Companies using such strong encryption assert they do not maintain encryption keys and therefore cannot unlock, or decrypt, the devices or communications—not even when presented with a court authorized wiretap order. Law enforcement concerns about the lack of encryption keys were highlighted by the November and December 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France , and San Bernardino, CA . Questions arose as to whether the attackers used strong encryption and, more importantly, if they did, whether and how this might have hindered investigations. Following the attack, U.S. investigators recovered a cell phone reportedly used by one of the shooters. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI; Bureau) Director James B. Comey testified before Congress two months later, indicating that the Bureau was still unable to access the information on the device. Access to San Bernardino iPhone On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple, Inc. under the All Writs Act to provide "reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data" on the cell phone for which the government had already obtained a probable cause warrant. The order directs Apple's assistance to feature three components: bypass or disable the iPhone's auto-erase after 10 incorrect passcode attempts function (even if the function has not been enabled); enable the FBI to electronically input passcodes for testing; and ensure there is no added delay between passcode attempts. The All Writs Act, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." To determine the reasonableness of the order in that case, the Court assessed a seemingly non -exhaustive list of factors, including (1) the company was not "so far removed from the underlying controversy" to avoid compliance; (2) the order required only "meager assistance" from the company; (3) the telephone company was a "highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public"; (4) the company had not proffered a "substantial interest in not providing assistance"; the use of the pen register was not "offensive" to the company; (5) the company regularly employed such devices for billing purposes: (6) the company had previously promised to provide the FBI instructions on how to install its own pen register; (7) the order was in no way "burdensome"; (8) the order provided the company be fully reimbursed for its efforts; (9) compliance with the order required "minimal effort" by the company; and (10) there were "no disruptions to its operations." read New York Tel. First, is whether a reviewing court would view the "unreasonable burden" test as including an assessment of not only the burden on Apple in creating and installing new software on this particular phone, but also the burden on Apple's business as a whole. The question here is whether the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) can be read as "specifically address[ing]" the relief the government seeks. Questions Going Forward In response to this legal debate, policymakers may ask a number of questions with respect to the order from the Central District of California and the larger ongoing encryption debate. Apple has indicated that it is possible to develop an alternate operating system for the iPhone in question that would accomplish the items in the court order. As such, the focus now has been on whether it should be done. Will doing so effectively create a "back door" to the encryption? If Apple develops an operating system update to comply with the court order, what precedent does this set for Apple and other companies' compliance with future law enforcement investigations? Would Apple now need to help international law enforcement entities with similar requests?

The tension between the benefits and challenges of encryption has been an issue for law enforcement and policymakers since the 1990s, and was reinvigorated in 2014 when companies like Apple and Google implemented automatic enhanced encryption on mobile devices and certain communications systems. Companies using such strong encryption do not maintain "back door" keys and, therefore, now cannot easily unlock, or decrypt, the devices—not even when presented with a valid legal order. Law enforcement concerns about the lack of back door keys were highlighted by the November and December 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France, and San Bernardino, CA. Questions arose as to whether the attackers used strong encryption and, more importantly, if they did, whether and how this might have hindered investigations. Following the December 2, 2015, terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA,, U.S. investigators recovered a cell phone reportedly used by one of the shooters. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James B. Comey testified before Congress two months later, indicating that the Bureau was still unable to access the information on that device. On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide "reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data" on the cell phone. The order directs Apple's assistance to feature three components: bypass or disable the iPhone's auto-erase after 10 incorrect passcode attempts function (even if the function has not been enabled); enable the FBI to electronically input passcodes for testing; and ensure there is no added delay between passcode attempts. The order is not for Apple to decrypt the device itself, something which Apple has publicly stated it cannot do. Instead, this order would enable the FBI to automate the attempts of every possible passcode for the device until the right combination of characters is hit upon by pushing a software update to the iPhone in question's operating system. Apple is contesting the order, which will require the magistrate judge, and perhaps the district and appeals courts, to assess whether the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. §1651) can be interpreted broadly to grant the relief the government seeks. The All Writs Act, enacted as part of the first Judiciary Act of 1789, provides a residual source of legal authority to federal judges to enforce the orders of their courts. Whether the All Writs Act can be read to include such an order will largely depend on two inquiries: first, whether a reviewing court would view the FBI's request as an "unreasonable burden" on Apple under the 1977 Supreme Court case United States v. New York Tel. Co.; and, second, whether such a command is consistent with the intent of Congress. This is a fact-intensive inquiry, the contours of which are uncertain. Policymakers may ask a number of questions with respect to the order from the Central District of California and the larger ongoing encryption debate. Apple has indicated that it is possible to develop an alternate operating system for the iPhone in question that would accomplish the items in the court order. As such, a main question now is whether it should be done. Will doing so effectively create a "back door" to the encryption? What precedent might be set by Apple providing the court-ordered assistance? If Apple develops an alternate operating system to comply with this order, would Apple and other companies have to comply with similar requests in other law enforcement investigations? In addition, as a multinational corporation, would Apple need to comply with requests from other national governments?

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Members of Congress nonetheless remain interested in the labor market's response to these measures to help them decide how well the legislation has worked and whether additional job creation as well as retraining legislation may be warranted in light of the pace and composition of job growth during the ongoing recovery. One way to assess the extent and nature of the recovery in the labor market is to compare employment data from the recession's end in June 2009 (i.e., the trough of the business cycle) with more recent data gathered in surveys that the government regularly conducts. Accordingly, to determine the extent of job growth thus far in the recovery, this report examines the number of jobs from the trough of the business cycle to September 2012 (the latest month for which data were available at the time of the report's preparation). A jobless recovery prevailed until October 2010, 16 months into the recovery, across all employers in the nonfarm economy. At that point, net job growth began not because public-sector employment started to rise but because it fell more slowly while private-sector employment continued to grow. A jobless recovery prevailed across firms in the private-nonfarm sector until March 2010. Despite the number of jobs at private-sector firms in September 2012 being almost 3.1 million above its level at the recovery's start, the recent pace of job growth at these employers means a few more years will likely elapse before the almost 7.7 million private-sector jobs lost during the Great Recession are recouped. In contrast, employment in the private sector did not start a sustained increase until 12 months into the recovery from the 1990-1991 recession, and until 21 months into the recovery from the 2001 recession. In September 2012, total nonfarm employment was 4.5 million jobs below its level 57 months earlier at the recession's start and private-sector employment was 4.1 million jobs below its level in December 2007. Manufacturing has been recovering much faster than construction. Three of the five states—Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio—recorded among the largest percentage decreases in nonfarm employment during the recession. Although the recession was precipitated by a financial crisis and housing market collapse, the industries that compose the financial activities industry group have been recovering at different rates. Between December 2007 and June 2009, employment declined by 51,000 (6.0%). During the Great Recession, women lost jobs to a lesser degree than men (2.4% and 5.9%, respectively, as shown in column 5) in part because men account for the majority (over 7 out of 10 employees) in the recession-wracked construction and manufacturing industries. But, women gained relatively fewer jobs than men during the recovery (1.4% and 2.8%, respectively, as shown in column 7). The oldest and youngest workers have had very different employment experiences in the past several years. Employment decreased more precipitously among 16- to 19-year-olds than any other age group. The industry is part of the leisure and hospitality group which, as of March 2012, had recouped all of the jobs it lost during the recession. The lower a worker's educational attainment, the worse they typically fared between December 2007 and September 2012.

Congress in recent years passed a number of bills intended in part to jump-start a recovery in the labor market from the recession that began in December 2007. Members are interested in the labor market's response to these measures to help them decide how well the legislation has worked and whether additional job-creation legislation may be warranted in light of the pace and composition of job growth since the recession's end in June 2009. Accordingly, employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is analyzed in this report from December 2007 to September 2012 (the latest month for which data were available at the time of the report's preparation). A "jobless recovery" prevailed across firms in the private nonfarm sector until March 2010. That is to say, the number of private-sector jobs generally continued to fall until nine months into the recovery. The recovery was jobless until October 2010, 16 months into the recovery, across all employers in the public and private sectors of the nonfarm economy. At that point, net job growth in the overall economy began not because public-sector employment started to rise but because it fell more slowly while private-sector employment continued to grow. Given the pace of job growth during the recovery, a few more years will likely elapse before the approximately 7.5 million jobs lost during the recession are recouped. The two industries hardest hit by the recession—manufacturing and construction—have been recovering at very different rates. In 2011, manufacturing employment surpassed its level at the recession's end. In 2012, construction employment remains over 400,000 jobs below its level in June 2009. Some of the states with the most depressed housing markets as well as manufacturing-dependent states have been especially slow to recover (e.g., Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, and Ohio). During the recession, women lost relatively fewer jobs than men in part because the construction and manufacturing industries predominantly employ men. During the recovery, women have gained relatively fewer jobs than men in part because women are a substantial presence in the occupations (e.g., teachers) that account for much of the local and state government workforces. The oldest and youngest workers have fared quite differently since December 2007. Workers aged 55 and older experienced job growth during the recession and recovery. The youngest age group (16- to 19-year olds) experienced the largest percentage declines in employment during the recession and recovery. The employment of Hispanic workers returned fairly quickly to its level at the recession's start, despite the ethnic group's concentration in the hard-hit construction industry. Hispanic employment also is concentrated in the leisure and hospitality industry group, which had recouped all its job losses by early 2012. The lower a worker's educational attainment, the worse they typically fared. As of September 2012, workers with less than 12 years of schooling or with a high school diploma at most did not regain all the jobs they lost since the recession's onset. In contrast, employment among workers with postsecondary education was higher in September 2012 than in December 2007.

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Introduction The November 2002 outbreak in China of a new form of atypical pneumonia, Severe AcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS) had widespread economic, political, and social effects on the PRCand presented a serious test for new PRC party leadership, named at the November 2002 PartyCongress, and for new central government officials named at the March 2003 meeting of theNational People's Congress. (1) Having firstminimized and tried to cover up the extent of the disease,PRC officials eventually were forced by circumstances to acknowledge the problem, apologize forfailure to be more forthcoming, and respond openly and aggressively to the outbreak. Thegovernment's handling of new SARS cases emerging in January 2004 differs markedly from itsearlier experience. By mid-April 2003,persistent rumors, international inquiries, and foreign press reports were bringingenormous pressure to bear on government officials, who were still reporting that SARS had beencontained in Guangdong and that only 15 more cases had been reported in Beijing, for a total of 37. WHO investigators publicly announced on April 16, 2003 that the international community did nottrust the Beijing city government's figures, and that the numbers Beijing was reporting did notinclude patients in military hospitals or those with suspected but unconfirmed cases. Officials offered a public apologyfor their "leadership failure" in addressing the SARS crisis. The Party made many early mis-steps in 2003 that damaged its credibility. According to newsaccounts, much of the information about the SARS outbreak was passed on almost instantaneouslythrough cellular phone text messages -- at times 40 million a day, according to one press report --a volume that was well beyond the government's ability to monitor or control. Chinese officials acknowledge that China's poor health care infrastructure poses a majorrisk to its future economic development. (58) SARS and Avian Flu in 2004 Some policy observers suggest that a number of PRC actions and decisions in the past yearillustrate that the government has made significant policy changes since the 2003 SARS outbreak. (61) The PRC government duly announced the emergence and confirmation of new SARS cases inJanuary 2004 -- the first in China since spring of 2003. In Guangdong, where the first new caseappeared, provincial officials immediately ordered the extermination of the province's 10,000captive civet cats -- a dinner table delicacy in southern China and suspected animal source of theSARS virus. On January 27, 2004, a WHO official stated that a "staggering" numberof birds, both migratory and domestic, were infected with the virus in at least 10 Asian countries. Some critics have seen the PRC's initial actions in the avian flu outbreak as a return to the secretive methods used in the early 2003 SARS outbreak in China. Given the nature and extent of the SARS crisis, however, Communist Party and centralgovernment officials were forced publicly to make fuller disclosure, and in doing so to embraceseveral radical concepts they had not addressed before: the right of the public to know aboutinformation that directly concerns their daily lives, and the need for government to hold officialsaccountable for their mistakes and failings. While issuing no travel restrictions, WHO said that the spread of SARS to Canada,Singapore, and Europe made it a "global health threat."

In November 2002, SARS, a new and deadly human illness suspected of having an animal origin, made its first appearance in China. Chinese leaders at first minimized the effects of the newvirus and covered up the extent of its spread. But the disease moved rapidly to other countries,prompting the World Health Organization in 2003 to label the virus a "global health threat." Underintense public scrutiny, Chinese leaders in April 2003 eventually acknowledged that people weresickening and dying, apologized for their leadership failures in addressing the problem, and launcheda series of initiatives to try to contain the disease, limit its economic damage, and protect publichealth. By July 2003, the initial SARS outbreak had ended. But global disease specialists expressedconcern that the virus could recur, like influenza, or that other similarly mutating viruses could leapfrom the animal to the human world. On January 5, 2004, China confirmed the first new case ofSARS in Guangdong Province, where the 2003 outbreak had occurred. On January 27, 2004, PRCofficials acknowledged that several flocks of birds in China were infected with the same deadlystrain of avian flu that in recent weeks had ravaged bird populations and killed humans in otherAsian countries. The emergence of SARS and other new viruses has posed a steep learning curve for a new generation of Chinese officials who had assumed office in November 2002, only weeks before theoriginal SARS outbreak. In suppressing information early in the crisis, the government lostcredibility and public confidence. More reliable information was available from foreign mediasources, the Internet, and cell-phone text messages -- as many as 40 million a day during the 2003SARS crisis, according to one report. In the 2003 crisis, Chinese leaders were forced to adjust theirstrategy by publicly embracing two radical concepts: the public has a right to know aboutinformation directly concerning their daily lives, and government officials need to be accountableto the public for their performance. Officials began issuing regular briefings in 2003 about SARScases, and several top officials were fired for covering up the crisis. Since then, the government hasrevamped emergency procedures, issued rules requiring greater government transparency, andworked to reduce the deficiencies and prohibitive costs of public health care. Some observerssuggested that "lessons learned" from the 2003 SARS outbreak could permanently influence PRCgovernance. Some change can be seen in the more open and aggressive way officials have handled SARS cases in 2004. Officials have publicly announced both confirmed and suspected cases, ordered theextermination of many civet cats -- a culinary delicacy in China but a suspected source of animal-to-human transferof the disease -- and begun human trials of a new SARS vaccine developed inChina. Still, PRC officials in early January 2004 detained and questioned journalists from a Chinesenewspaper that first reported on the new SARS cases, suggesting that the government still seeks tocontrol information flow. And global health officials have criticized official secretiveness inaddressing the new avian flu outbreak.

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Introduction This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East. It includes a brief historical review of foreign aid levels, a description of specific country programs, and an analysis of current foreign aid issues. In the Middle East, the United States has a number of strategic interests, ranging from support for the state of Israel and Israel's peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors, to the protection of vital petroleum supplies and the fight against international terrorism. U.S. assistance continues to support the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the continued stability of the Kingdom of Jordan, which signed its own peace treaty with Israel in 1994. U.S. funding also has focused on strengthening Palestinian governance and civil society, and aid officials have worked to ensure that U.S. aid to the West Bank is not diverted to terrorist groups, such as Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has established region-wide aid programs that increase the focus on democracy promotion and encourage socio-economic reform in an attempt to undercut the forces of radicalism in some Arab countries. Foreign Aid to Support Key U.S. For information on U.S. assistance for Iraqi reconstruction, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance , by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security , by [author name scrubbed]. Historical Background U.S. Assistance to the Middle East Since 1950 1950-1970 Even when adjusted for inflation, annual U.S. assistance to the Middle East in the decades following World War II was only a small fraction of current aid flows to the region. Under vastly different geopolitical circumstances, U.S. policy was geared toward supporting the development of oil-producing countries, maintaining a neutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict while supporting Israel's security, and preventing Soviet influence from gaining a foothold in Iran and Turkey. Between 1950 and 1967, the United States courted Egypt using foreign aid as a bargaining chip. After the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the Middle East as a whole began to receive more U.S. foreign aid than any other region of the world, a trend that has continued to today. Glossary

This report is an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to the Middle East from FY2006 to FY2010, and of the FY2011 budget request. It includes a brief history of aid to the region, a review of foreign aid levels, a description of selected country programs, and an analysis of current foreign aid issues. It will be updated periodically to reflect recent developments. For foreign aid terminology and acronyms, please see the glossary appended to this report. For details on U.S. reconstruction aid for Iraq, please see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]. For policymakers, foreign assistance plays a key role in advancing U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East. The United States has a number of interests in the region, ranging from support for the state of Israel and Israel's peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors, to the protection of vital petroleum supplies and the fight against international terrorism. U.S. assistance helps to maintain the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the continued stability of the Kingdom of Jordan, which signed its own peace treaty with Israel in 1994. U.S. funding also works to strengthen Palestinian institutions, and aid officials have worked to ensure that U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip is not diverted to terrorist groups. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has established region-wide aid programs to promote democracy and encourage socio-economic reform in order to undercut the forces of radicalism in some Arab countries. U.S. aid policy has gradually evolved from a focus on preventing Soviet influence from gaining a foothold in the region and from maintaining a neutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to strengthening Israel's military and economy and using foreign aid as an incentive to foster peace agreements between countries in the region. When adjusted for inflation, annual U.S. assistance to the Middle East in the decades following World War II was only a small fraction of current aid flows. However, beginning in the early 1970s, the United States dramatically increased its foreign assistance to the Middle East. After the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the Middle East as a whole began to receive more U.S. foreign aid than any other region of the world, a trend that has continued to this day.

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Introduction Individuals were first able to establish health savings accounts (HSAs) in 2004. These accounts allow people to pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses on a tax-advantaged basis. Individuals must have a qualifying high-deductible health plan (HDHP) to establish an HSA. Even though HRAs are also used to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses on a tax-advantaged basis, only employers may establish and contribute to an HRA. Data covering enrollment and/or cost sharing during the first few years of HDHPs and their associated HSAs are now available from at least five separate sources. Only one source provides data on HSAs. Two sources provide data on HDHPs whose owners are eligible to open an HSA. The remaining two sources provide data that include individuals with HRAs. The primer also provides the most recent data available from each source on enrollment, premiums, and deductible. The data from America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) are obtained from insurance plans and measure all covered lives in the plans. Four of the sources contain data on enrollment. No other data source provides breakdowns for more than one of these markets. Nevertheless, the data sources differ in the insurance markets analyzed; whether the information covers HSAs, HSA-eligible HDHPs, or HSA-eligible HDHPs and HRAs; and whether the information is provided by employers, insurance companies, or individuals. Great caution should be exercised in any attempt to combine data from these different sources. A more fruitful strategy would be to decide on a specific question and use only the source which best answers that question.

Individuals began establishing health savings accounts (HSAs) in 2004. These savings accounts are generally used to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses on a tax-advantaged basis. Any unspent money accrues to the individual. To open an HSA, the individual must enroll in a qualifying high-deductible health plan (HDHP). HSAs are tax-advantaged and provide some incentives for people to monitor, and perhaps reduce, their expenditures on health care. Data covering enrollment and/or cost sharing during the first few years of HDHPs and their associated HSAs are now available from at least five separate sources. This primer provides information on the data sources, together with the most recent data available from each source on enrollment, premiums and deductibles. Only one source, the Internal Revenue Service, provides data on HSAs. These data count the number of tax filing units that took a deduction for the HSA on their tax returns. Two sources provide data on HDHPs whose owners are eligible to open an HSA. One of these data sources, from the American Health Insurance Plans, is a census of virtually all lives covered by a HSA-eligible HDHP. The remaining two sources provide data that includes individuals with another type of health-related savings account (the Health Reimbursement Account). In addition to differing by the type of insurance plan covered, the data sources differ in the insurance markets analyzed, and whether the information is provided by employers, insurance companies, or individuals. Great caution should be exercised in any attempt to combine data from these different sources. A more fruitful strategy would be to decide on a specific question and use only the source which best answers that question.

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(1) The Committee on ForeignRelations reported its new authorization bill out on March 18, 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-248 ). On May 5, 2003, Congressman Hyde introduced the House Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 ( H.R. 1950 ). Ifenacted, the House bill would have authorized the Department of State's operations and programsat more than $27 billion for FY2004 and FY2005, and would have establish U.S. policy on theIsraeli-Palestinian peace plan, export controls, security assistance to certain foreign countries, andfunding for the U.N. Population Fund. House floor action occurred on July 15th and 16th. Background The foreign relations authorization legislation provides authority for the State Departmentand related foreign policy agencies to conduct foreign policy activities and programs in the comingyear. SinceCongress has not passed a foreign assistance authorization bill since 1985, activities such asauthorization for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as U.S.economic, development, and military assistance are also typically included in the foreign relationsauthorization legislation. The House Reportto the bill ( H.Rept. Peacekeeping Contributions Cap(15). The Senate did not complete action on S. 925 in 2003, and there is nosimilar provision in the Senate bill ( S. 2144 ) reported out by the Senate ForeignRelations Committee in March 2004. The two bills differ in several ways. Other measures contained in H.R. Defense Trade and Security Assistance Export Controls for Satellites(23) Between 1992 and 1996, responsibility for decisions regarding export of commercialcommunications satellites was transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department. 105-261 ). Terrorist-Related Prohibitions and Enforcement Measures(32) Title XI of H.R. 1950 , as amended. 1950 , as passed by the House on July 16,2003, authorizes the Secretary of State to make grants to the Africa Society of the National Summiton Africa of $1 million in FY2004 and "such sums as may be necessary" in FY2005. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) reported out S. 925 (Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2004, Senate Report 108-39) on April 24, 2003, with aprovision to repeal the requirement for a semi-annual report on extradition of narcotics traffickersfrom Andean countries; and it reported out S. 1161 , Foreign Assistance AuthorizationAct for FY2004 (Senate Report 108- 56) on May 29, 2003, with several provisions on Colombia. On February 27, 2004, S. 2144 , the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, was introduced in the Senate. Although the House International Relations Committee did not consider a broad foreignassistance authorization separately or as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, H.R. Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, FY2005. Congress passed the so-called Kemp-Kasten amendment in that year and ineach subsequent year as part of the annual Foreign Operations appropriations. TheWhite House says that the President would veto any legislation that includes a provision like theBoxer amendment. Appendix State Department Authorization History Authorization of State Department appropriations are required by law every two years. a.

The foreign relations authorization process dovetails with the annual appropriation processfor the Department of State (within the Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agency appropriation)and foreign policy/foreign aid activities (within the foreign operations appropriation). Congress isrequired by law to authorize the spending of appropriations for the State Department and foreignpolicy activities every two years. Foreign assistance authorization measures (such as authorizationfor the U.S. Agency for International Development, economic and military assistance to foreigncountries, and international population programs) have been merged into the State Departmentauthorization legislation since 1985. Since that time, Congress has not passed a stand-alone foreignassistance authorization bill. Congressman Hyde introduced H.R. 1950 on May 5, 2003. The HouseInternational Relations Committee reported the bill May 16 ( H.Rept. 108-105 , Part I). H.R. 1950 , as reported out by the Committee, contained authorization legislation forFY2004 and FY2005 and included a defense trade and security assistance title, as well as a foreignassistance title. As amended (July 15 and 16) and passed (July 16) by the House, H.R. 1950 also includes the Millennium Challenge Account and Peace Corps provisions. The legislationauthorizes about $27 billion for FY2004 and FY2005. The House bill contains the Israeli-Palestinianpeace plan, also known as the "road map" which goes beyond the President's plan by includingconditions that must be met before the United States can agree to a Palestinian state. Also includedare terrorist-related enforcement measures, munition and satellite export controls. Eliminated byamendment was a provision providing $50 million in U.S. contributions to the U.N. Population Fundfor each year that the legislation covers. House floor action occurred on July 15th and 16th. TheHouse passed the bill, as amended, by recorded vote (382-42) on July 16th. The Senate originally reported three separate bills providing authority for only FY2004: aforeign relations authorization ( S. 925 ), a foreign assistance authorization bill( S. 1161 ) which includes arms export control and counter terrorism measures, and theMillennium Challenge Account ( S. 1160 ). After political differences with unrelatedfloor amendments in 2003, the Senate gave up trying to vote on S. 925 (within whichthe other two bills had been merged). On February 27, 2004, Senator Lugar introduced the Senate'snew Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2005 ( S. 2144 ). The Senate ForeignRelations Committee reported it out on March 18, 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-248 ). Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: ALD = American Law Division; G&F = Government and Finance Division;RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division, DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division; FDT =Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), 943 pieces of legislation received House floor action. Of these, 692 were bills or joint resolutions, and 251 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 73% to 27%, respectively. Origin of Measures Of the 943 measures receiving House floor action in the 113 th Congress, 846 originated in the House, and 97 originated in the Senate. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 113 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to raise the legislation on the House floor. As noted in Table 2 , 68% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 32% by Democrats, and less than 1% by political independents. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. In the 113 th Congress, 555 measures, representing 59% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought up using the Suspension of the Rules procedure. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 75% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 113 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. Procedural resolutions reported by the House Committee on Rules affecting the "rules, joint rules, and the order of business of the House" are themselves privileged for consideration under clause 5 of House Rule XIII. In the 113 th Congress, 148 measures, or 16% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. As is noted above, all but four measures brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism were sponsored by majority party Members. In the 113 th Congress, one measure was brought to the floor via the call of the Private Calendar. Other Parliamentary Mechanisms The House of Representatives has established special parliamentary procedures that may be used to bring legislation to the chamber floor dealing with the business of the District of Columbia, a discharge process to force consideration of measures triggered by a petition signed by a numerical majority of the House, and a procedure known as the Calendar Wednesday procedure.

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress, received action on the House floor in the 113th Congress (2013-2014) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration. In the 113th Congress, 943 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 692 were bills or joint resolutions, and 251 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 73% to 27%. Of these 943 measures, 846 originated in the House, and 97 originated in the Senate. During the same period, 59% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 18% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents, 16% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure, representing less than 1% of legislation receiving House floor action in the 113th Congress, was processed under the procedures associated with the call of the Private Calendar. When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 75% of such measures receiving initial House floor action in the 113th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 20% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 5% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Less than 1% of lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the call of the Private Calendar or by virtue of being "privileged" under House rules. The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 113th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-eight percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but four of the 148 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.

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Overview Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide student financial aid to support attendance at a variety of institutions of higher education (IHEs). These institutions include public institutions, private non-profit institutions, and private for-profit (proprietary) institutions. In order for students attending a school to receive federal Title IV assistance, the school must: Be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to provide postsecondary education in the state in which it is located, Be accredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and Be deemed eligible and certified to participate in federal student aid programs by ED. The Higher Education Act Amendments of 1998 ( P.L. Among the key provisions affecting institutional eligibility were: Modification of the requirement that proprietary institutions of higher education derive at least 15% of their revenues from non-Title IV sources to require proprietary institutions to derive at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV sources, Elimination of the requirement for accrediting agencies to conduct unannounced site visits at institutions, Modification of refund policy requirements to apply only to Title IV funds and to require pro-rata refunds for all Title IV recipients who withdraw before the completion of 60% of the payment period or period of enrollment, Establishment of a distance learning demonstration program, and Addition of the requirement that any IHE with a teacher preparation program that has lost state approval or financial support because it has been designated as low-performing by the state is no longer eligible to accept or enroll any students in its teacher preparation program who are receiving Title IV aid. 109-171 ). The latter requirement is commonly referred to as the 90/10 rule. This became known as the "12-hour rule." Issues for Reauthorization While HERA made changes to the 50% rules and program eligibility requirements, additional issues related to distance education may be discussed during HEA reauthorization.

Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide student financial aid to support attendance at a variety of institutions of higher education (IHEs). These institutions include public institutions, private non-profit institutions, and private for-profit (proprietary) institutions. In order for students attending a school to receive federal Title IV assistance, the school must: Be licensed or otherwise legally authorized to provide postsecondary education in the state in which it is located, Be accredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and Be deemed eligible and certified to participate in federal student aid programs by ED. The most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education Act in 1998 resulted in several key changes to provisions affecting institutional eligibility, including: The requirement that proprietary institutions derive at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV sources (also known as the 90/10 rule), Modification of refund policy requirements to apply only to Title IV funds and to require pro-rata refunds for all Title IV recipients who withdraw before the completion of 60% of the payment period or period of enrollment, and Establishment of a distance learning demonstration program. Since the 1998 reauthorization, Congress has acted through the Higher Education Reconciliation Act (P.L. 109-171) to make additional changes to HEA institutional eligibility requirements, particularly as they relate to program eligibility, distance education, and the return of Title IV funds. ED has also made regulatory changes affecting institutional eligibility—most notably the elimination of the 12-hour rule and clarification of incentive compensation regulations. As the 110th Congress considers HEA reauthorization, several issues may become a focus of debate. These issues may include, for example, the 90/10 rule, accreditation, institutional outcomes, transfer of credit, and distance education. This report will be updated as warranted by major legislative action.

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Introduction Special order speeches (commonly called "special orders") usually take place at the end of the day after the House of Representatives has completed all legislative business. During the special order period , individual Representatives can deliver speeches on topics of their choice for up to 60 minutes. Special order speeches give Members a chance to speak outside the time restrictions that govern legislative debate in the House and the Committee of the Whole. These speeches also provide one of the few opportunities for non-legislative debate in the House, where debate is almost always confined to pending legislative business. Governing Authorities The rules of the House do not provide for special order speeches. Instead, special orders have evolved as a unanimous consent practice of the House. During the special order period, Members must abide by the rules of the House, the chamber's precedents, and the "Speaker's announced policies," in that order. The term Speaker's announced policies refers to the Speaker's policies on certain aspects of House procedure (e.g., decorum in debate, conduct of electronic votes, recognition for special orders). In practice, the Speaker's current policies on special orders (announced on January 6, 2015) govern recognition for special order speeches and the reservation and television broadcast of these speeches. To summarize, under the Speaker's current announced policies, there are generally three stages to each day's special order period: 1. five-minute special orders by individual Members ; 2. special orders longer than five minutes (normally 60 minutes in length) by the party's leadership or designee ; and 3. special orders longer than five minutes (length varies from 6 minutes to 60 minutes) by individual Member s . Reservation of Special Orders Members reserve five-minute and longer special orders through their party leadership: Democratic Members reserve time through the Office of the Majority Leader, and Republican Members reserve time through the Republican cloakroom or the party leadership desk on the House floor. Inserted Special Orders Instead of delivering a special order speech on the House floor, Members may insert their speech in either the House pages of the Congressional Record or the section known as the "Extensions of Remarks."

Special order speeches (commonly called "special orders") usually take place at the end of the day after the House has completed all legislative business. During the special order period, individual Representatives deliver speeches on topics of their choice for up to 60 minutes. Special orders provide one of the few opportunities for non-legislative debate in the House. They also give Members a chance to speak outside the time restrictions that govern legislative debate in the House and the Committee of the Whole. The rules of the House do not provide for special order speeches. Instead, special orders have evolved as a unanimous consent practice of the House. Recognition for special orders is the prerogative of the Speaker. During the special order period, Members must abide by the rules of the House, the chamber's precedents, and the "Speaker's announced policies," in that order. The term Speaker's announced policies refers to the Speaker's policies on certain aspects of House procedure. In practice, the Speaker's current policies on special orders (announced on January 6, 2009) govern recognition for special order speeches as well as the reservation and television broadcast of these speeches. Under these announced policies, there are generally three stages to each day's special order period: 1. five-minute special orders by individual Members; 2. special orders longer than five minutes (normally 60 minutes in length) by the party's leadership or a designee; and 3. special orders longer than five minutes (length varies from 6 to 60 minutes) by individual Members. Members usually reserve special orders in advance through their party's leadership. Instead of delivering a special order speech on the House floor, Members may choose to insert their speech in either the House pages of the Congressional Record or the section known as the "Extensions of Remarks." Reform proposals were advanced in recent Congresses to address both concerns about breaches in decorum during special order speeches and the costs of conducting these speeches. This report will be updated if rules and procedures change.

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Introduction1 Periodically, tensions flare up between Japan and China over a small group of Japanese-administered islands located in the East China Sea. Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over the islands, known as the Senkaku-shoto in Japan, the Diaoyu Dao in China, and the Diaoyutai Lieyu in Taiwan. Some geologists believe that the waters surrounding them may be rich in oil and natural gas deposits. Each time a crisis has erupted over the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai), questions have arisen concerning the U.S. relationship to the islands. This report focuses on that issue, which has four elements: 1. U.S. administration of the islands from 1953 to 1971, when the United States occupied Okinawa; 2. the application to the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) of the 1971 "Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands"—commonly known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which was approved by the Senate in 1971 and entered into force the following year (the Daito Islands lie to the east of Okinawa); 3. the U.S. view on the claims of the disputants; and 4. the relationship of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to the islands. Administrations have restated this position of neutrality regarding the sovereignty claims, particularly during periods when tensions have flared, as in 1996, 2010, and 2012. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Islands Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty stipulates that Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in his testimony, stressed that Japan would assume the "primary responsibility" for the defense of the treaty area but that the Security Treaty was applicable. China's increase in patrols around the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) since the fall of 2012 appears to many to be an attempt to demonstrate that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the disputed territory, thereby exploiting the U.S. distinction between sovereignty and administrative control. Thereafter, some observers, seeking to avoid a situation where the United States inadvertently encourages more assertive Chinese actions, called on Obama Administration officials to stop using the word "neutral" in describing the U.S. position on the issue and also to publicly declare that unilateral actions by China (or Taiwan) will not affect the U.S. judgment that the territory is controlled by Japan. In its own attempt to address this perceived gap, Congress inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 4310 , P.L. 112-239 ) a resolution stating, among other items, that "the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States' acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands," language that since 2012 has reappeared in a number of bills and resolutions concerning U.S. interests in the East China Sea. Speaking to the press with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo in April 2014, President Obama underscored the U.S. commitment in what are believed to be the first public remarks by a U.S. President stating the U.S. position on the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) dispute. In February 2017, during his first joint press appearance as President with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, President Donald Trump stated that "we are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control.... " A joint statement issued by the two governments during their summit said that the two leaders "affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands." The expanded U.S. rhetorical support for Japan on the dispute has been accompanied by increasing bilateral diplomatic coordination on responding to China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea, as well as increased bilateral security cooperation to boost Japan's maritime and island defenses.

Since the mid-1990s, and particularly since 2012, tensions have spiked between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) islands in the East China Sea. These flare-ups run the risk of involving the United States in an armed conflict in the region. Japan administers the eight small, uninhabited features, the largest of which is roughly 1.5 square miles. Some geologists believe the features sit near significant oil and natural gas deposits. China, as well as Taiwan, contests Japanese claims of sovereignty over the islands, which Japan calls the Senkaku-shoto, China calls the Diaoyu Dao, and Taiwan calls the Diaoyutai Lieyu. Although the disputed territory commonly is referred to as "islands," it is unclear if any of the features would meet the definition of "island" under international law. U.S. Administrations going back at least to the Nixon Administration have stated that the United States takes no position on the question of who has sovereignty over the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai). It also has been U.S. policy since 1972, however, that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islands. The treaty states that the United States is committed to "meet the common danger" of an armed attack on "the territories under the Administration of Japan," and Japan administers the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai). In return for U.S. security commitments, Japan grants the United States the right to station U.S. troops—which currently number around 50,000—at dozens of bases throughout the Japanese archipelago. Although it is commonly understood that Japan will assume the primary responsibility for the defense of the treaty area, in the event of a significant armed conflict with either China or Taiwan, most Japanese likely would expect that the United States would honor its treaty obligations. Since 2012, without challenging the U.S. government's position of neutrality over who has sovereignty over the islands, Congress nevertheless has expanded rhetorical support for Japan on the dispute. Congress inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239) a resolution stating, among other items, that "the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States' acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands." Following Congress's statement, Obama Administration officials began using similar language, also without changing U.S. neutrality on the sovereignty question. Most prominently, in April 2014, President Obama reiterated that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the islands and that "we do not believe that [the Senkakus' status] ... should be subject to change unilaterally." This is believed to be the first time a U.S. President publicly stated the U.S. position on the dispute. In February 2017, during his first joint press appearance as President with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, President Donald Trump stated that "we are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control.... " A joint statement issued by the two governments during their summit said that the two leaders "affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands." The expanded U.S. rhetorical support for Japan has been a reaction to China's increasing patrols around the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) beginning in the fall of 2012, moves that appear to many to be an attempt to exploit the U.S. distinction between sovereignty and administrative control by demonstrating that Beijing has a degree of administrative control over the islands. In a further effort to deter Chinese actions, the United States has increased its support for Japan's efforts to boost its maritime and island defenses. Each time tensions over the territorial dispute have flared, questions have arisen concerning the U.S. legal relationship to the islands. This report focuses on that issue.

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Moreover, today, an individual's release pending subsequent criminal proceedings is often predicated on conditions other than, or in addition to, the posting of an appearance bond, secured or unsecured. This report provides an overview of federal law in each of these areas, as well as in the area of extradition from the United States to another country. Any federal or state judge or magistrate may qualify. The decision requires consideration of four factors: "The nature and circumstances of the offense …"; "The weight of the evidence against the person"; "The history and characteristics of the person …"; and "The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release…" Conditional Release If the judge or magistrate concludes that personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond is insufficient to overcome the risk of flight or to community or individual safety, he may condition the individuals' release on a refrain from criminal activity, collection of a DNA sample, and the least restrictive combination of 14 conditions. The first consists of instances in which the accused is charged with one or more designated serious federal offenses, that themselves create a rebuttable presumption that no set of conditions will guarantee public safety or prevent the flight of the accused. In such cases, bail is available only under exceptional circumstances. It may also be imposed when the post-bail offense was a continuation of the offense that occasioned the individual's original release on bail. The judge or magistrate may also order revocation of the release order and detention of the individual after a hearing, if he finds either probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a new offense or by clear and convincing evidence that the individual has breached some other condition of his release. Forfeiture of Security The judge or magistrate may order any bail bond or other security forfeited, if the individual fails to appear at judicial proceedings as required or fails to appear to begin service of his sentence. Material Witnesses Federal law authorizes the arrest and detention or bail of individuals with evidence material to the prosecution of a federal offense. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to material witnesses arrested under Section 3144. Extradition Federal bail laws make no mention of bail in extradition cases. The federal courts instead adhere to the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court over a century ago that "bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition" except under "special circumstances." Appendix A.

This is an overview of the federal law of bail. Bail is the release of an individual following his arrest upon his promise—secured or unsecured; conditioned or unconditioned—to appear at subsequent judicial criminal proceedings. An accused may be denied bail if he is unable to satisfy the conditions set for his release. He may also be denied bail if the committing judge or magistrate concludes that no amount of security or any set of conditions will suffice to ensure public safety or the individual's later appearance in court. The federal bail statute layers the committing judge's or magistrate's bail options after arrest and before trial. He may release the individual upon his promise to return—that is, on personal recognizance or under an unsecured appearance bond. Alternatively, the judge or magistrate may condition the individual's release on the least restrictive possible combination of individual or statutory conditions. The statute, however, creates a presumption against release when the individual has been charged with a serious drug, firearms, or terrorist offense. In the case of these and other serious offenses, the judge or magistrate may deny release on bail if he decides, after a hearing, that no set of conditions will guarantee public safety or the individual's return to court. The judge or magistrate may also deny the individual bail in order to transfer him for bail, parole, or supervised release revocation proceedings. Bail is available to a more limited extent after the individual has been convicted and is awaiting a pending appeal. Federal law also authorizes the arrest, bail, or detention of individuals with evidence material to the prosecution of a federal offense. With limited variations, federal bail laws apply to arrested material witnesses. Although not specifically mentioned in the federal bail statute, bail is available in extradition cases under a long-standing Supreme Court precedent which holds that "bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition" except under "special circumstances." This report is available in an abridged version—without footnotes, appendixes, most of the citations to authority, and some of the discussion—as CRS Report R40222, Bail: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed].

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Recent Developments On September 9, 2004, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a bill makingappropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, andIndependent Agencies for FY2005 (VA-HUD appropriations bill) ( H.R. The Committee rejected the Administration's proposalto fund VHA through an alternative appropriations structure, in which the VHA budget would havebeen consolidated into two business lines: medical care, and medical and prosthetic research. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the VA-HUD appropriationsbill for FY2005 ( S. 2825 ) on September 21, 2004. (2) Under S. 2825VHA would receive $30.4 billion in FY2005. This is a $2 billion increase from FY2004, and $1.2billion more than the President's request. On November 20, 2004, both the House and Senate adopted the conference agreement toaccompany the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 ( H.R. 108-447 ). (4) Under P.L.108-447 VHAwould receive $30.3 billion in FY2005 an increase of $1.2 billion over the FY2005 appropriationrequest, and $1.9 billion over FY2004. Veterans Health Administration (VHA) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certaineligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions, education,training and rehabilitation services, hospital and medical care, and other benefits such as home loanguarantees and death benefits (including burial expenses). VA provides these benefits to veteransthrough three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the VeteransBenefits Administration (VBA) and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). 5041 recommended $30.3 billion for VA medical programs for FY2005. This is an increase of $1.2 billionover the President's request and $1.9 billion over FY2004. 4818 , P.L. (23) The bill was signed intolaw by the President on December 8, 2004. According to theconference report, the conferees continue to believe the current account structure started in FY2004,composed of four accounts -- medical services, medical administration, medical facilities, and medicaland prosthetic research -- "will provide better oversight and achieve a more accurate accounting offunds." 108-674 ; S.Rept.108-353 ; H.Rept. Among the most significant legislative and regulatory proposals in thebudget are: Increasing veterans' share of pharmaceutical copayments from $7 to $15 (foreach 30-day prescription) for all enrolled veterans in Priority Groups 7 and 8; Increasing veterans' share of copayments for outpatient primary care from $15to $20 (for each medical appointment) for all enrolled veterans in Priority Groups 7 and8; Establishing an annual user fee of $250 for all enrolled veterans in PriorityGroups 7 and 8; Ending pharmacy copayments for veterans in Priority Groups 2 through 5 withincomes between $9,894 and $16,509; this would allow approximately 394,000 veterans to receiveoutpatient medications without having to make a copayment; (28) Ending long-term care copayments for former prisoners ofwar; Authorizing the department to pay for emergency room care or urgent care forenrolled veterans in non-VA medical facilities; Ending hospice copayments. The FY2005 VA-HUD appropriations bills reported by the House and Senate Committeeson Appropriations and the final conference agreement to accompany the ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, 2005, did not include any of the copayment changes that had been proposed inthe President's budget request. Appendix 1.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certaineligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital andmedical care. VA provides these benefits to veterans through three major operating units: theVeterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and theNational Cemetery Administration (NCA). VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primarycare, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through anintegrated health care system. Veterans are enrolled in priority groups that determine payments forservice and nonservice-connected medical conditions. In FY2004, Congress appropriated $28.4billion for VHA to be spent through an account structure composed of four new accounts: medicalservices, medical administration, medical facilities, and medical and prosthetic research. For FY2005, the Administration submitted its budget request to Congress using a newaccount structure that consolidated several accounts into two "business lines": medical care, andmedical and prosthetic research. The Administration requested $29.1 billion for VHA for FY2005. On September 9, 2004, the House Committee on Appropriations reported the FY2005appropriations bill for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,and Independent Agencies for FY2005 ( H.R. 5041 ) ( H.Rept. 108-674 ). The Committeerejected the alternative appropriations structure recommended by the Administration andrecommended $30.3 billion for VA medical programs for FY2005. This is an increase of $1.2 billionover the President's request and $1.9 billion over FY2004. On September 21, 2004, the SenateCommittee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2005 VA-HUD appropriations bill, S. 2825 ( S.Rept. 108-353 ). Under S. 2825, as reported, VHA would havereceived $30.4 billion in FY2005. This is a $2 billion increase from FY2004, and $1.2 billion morethan the President's request. On November 20, 2004, both the House and Senate adopted theconference agreement to accompany the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 ( H.R. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ). The bill was signed into law on December 8, 2004. Under P.L.108-447 , VHAwould receive $30.3 billion in FY2005 -- an increase of $1.2 billion over the FY2005 appropriationrequest, and $1.9 billion over FY2004. In its budget submission to Congress, the Administration also proposed several legislative andregulatory changes to increase certain copayments and other cost- sharing charges for lower-priorityveterans and to reduce copays for certain veterans. The House and Senate Committees onAppropriations, and the final conference agreement did not accept any of the Administration'scost-sharing proposals for VHA. This report will not be updated.

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Current U.S. space policy is based on a set of fundamental factors which, according to an Eisenhower presidential committee, "give importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology." The four factors are the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation's civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives. Sputnik and America's "Sputnik Moment" On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. The USSR's ability to launch a satellite ahead of the United States led to a national concern that the United States was falling behind the USSR in its science and technology capabilities and thus might be vulnerable to a nuclear missile attack. The United States faces a far different world today than 50 years ago. No Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the nation's civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. The administration and OSTP will develop policies that will: •    Close the gap between retirement of the Space Shuttle and launch of the next generation of space vehicles to minimize any interruption in access to low-earth orbit, and take full advantage of the research opportunities provided by the International Space Station. •    Strengthen NASA's missions in space science, weather, climate research, and aeronautical research. •    Help establish a robust and balanced civilian space program, and engage international partners and the private sector to amplify NASA's reach. •    Re-establish the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which will report to the President and oversee and coordinate civilian, military, commercial and national security space activities. The results of the review are to be completed in sufficient time so that the Administration decision may consider the results of the panel's deliberations in deciding what action to take regarding human space flight by August 2009. This, in turn, might potentially help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of funding available among NASA's programs during its authorization and appropriation process. For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA's human exploration activities, such as establishing a Moon base and landing a human on Mars. If they consider scientific knowledge the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and other science-related activities as NASA's major goal. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects, including the creation of new jobs and markets and its catalytic effect on math and science education, are Congress' priorities, then they may focus NASA's activities on technological development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and expanding its role in science and mathematics education. During the 111 th Congress, policymakers may discuss another authorization bill for future years, and identify new priorities for civil space exploration. Possible U.S. Civilian Space Policy Objectives

The "space age" began on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union (USSR) launched Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Some U.S. policymakers, concerned about the USSR's ability to launch a satellite, thought Sputnik might be an indication that the United States was trailing behind the USSR in science and technology. The Cold War also led some U.S. policymakers to perceive the Sputnik launch as a possible precursor to nuclear attack. In response to this "Sputnik moment," the U.S. government undertook several policy actions, including the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), enhancement of research funding, and reformation of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education policy. Following the "Sputnik moment," a set of fundamental factors gave "importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of space technology," according to an Eisenhower presidential committee. These four factors include the compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the U.S. scientific, technological, industrial, and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system, and universe. They are still part of current policy discussions and influence the nation's civilian space policy priorities—both in terms of what actions NASA is authorized to undertake and the appropriations each activity within NASA receives. The United States faces a far different world today. No Sputnik moment, Cold War, or space race exists to help policymakers clarify the goals of the nation's civilian space program. The Hubble telescope, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters, and Mars exploration rovers frame the experience of current generations, in contrast to the Sputnik launch and the U.S. Moon landings. As a result, some experts have called for new 21st century space policy objectives and priorities to replace those developed 50 years ago. The Obama Administration has stated that the U.S. must maintain and take full advantage of its technical and strategic superiority in space. Among its proposed actions are closing the gap between retirement of the Space Shuttle and launch of the next generation of space vehicles; strengthening NASA's missions in space science, weather, climate research, and aeronautical research; helping establish a robust and balanced civilian space program, and engaging international partners and the private sector to amplify NASA's reach; re-establishing the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which will report to the President and oversee and coordinate civilian, military, commercial and national security space activities; and ensuring freedom of space. In addition, the administration has decided to conduct an independent review of planned U.S. human space flight activities. The panel's report is to be completed in sufficient time so it will serve as input for Obama Administration's decisionmaking scheduled for August 2009. During the 111th Congress, policymakers may discuss a NASA authorization bill including identifying priorities for U.S. civil space exploration. This might help Congress determine the most appropriate balance of funding for NASA's programs during its authorization and appropriation process. For example, if Congress believes that national prestige should be the highest priority, they may choose to emphasize NASA's human exploration activities. If scientific knowledge is the highest priority, Congress may emphasize unmanned missions and other science-related activities. If international relations are a high priority, Congress might encourage other nations to become equal partners in actions related to the International Space Station. If spinoff effects are of interest, they may focus on technological development and linking to the needs of business and industry, and expanding its role in science and mathematics education.

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Overview: The Environment Today When awarding franchises for the use of public rights of way to offer cable television service, many local jurisdictions have required the cable companies to set aside some of their channel capacity for public access, educational, or governmental (collectively, PEG) use and to provide financial support for those PEG access channels. PEG channels are not mandated by federal law. But the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ( P.L. 98-549 ) amended the Communications Act to explicitly allow franchising authorities to require cable operators to set aside channel capacity for PEG use and to provide adequate facilities or financial support for those channels. These PEG provisions have been a primary vehicle for fostering in cable systems the long-standing U.S. media policy goal of localism. The environment for PEG channels has been roiled by a number of public policy and budgetary changes at the federal, state, and local level and by technological changes in cable networks. More than 100 PEG access centers—which provide community groups and individuals free access to video production facilities and equipment, training, and programming time—have closed since 2005, and others are threatened by severe funding cuts. Not all PEG access centers and PEG channels are facing this bleak environment, however; many continue to have stable funding sources. In the past few years, 21 states have enacted laws allowing cable systems to obtain statewide franchises. Some of these laws have abrogated or phased out PEG provisions in existing local franchise agreements that required the franchisees to set aside channels, provide financial or in-kind support, or provide studio facilities —or cable companies have interpreted the laws to allow them to reduce or eliminate PEG support. But some local jurisdictions that have long provided such support for PEG operations are facing budget shortfalls that are forcing them to reduce their PEG funding. Traditional cable providers are migrating in stages from analog to digital transmission of their programming, so not all programming has yet been shifted to digital transmission. Some PEG advocates and local jurisdictions claim AT&T is offering PEG programming in an inferior and discriminatory fashion that does not meet the requirements of local franchise agreements or the Communications Act. AT&T responded that U-verse is not a cable service subject to those requirements, but that in any case it meets all those requirements and would be required to deploy its IP network inefficiently in order to meet requirements developed for traditional cable architecture. Legislation That Had Been Introduced in the 112th Congress: H.R. 1746 , which sought to mitigate the impact of provisions in state franchising laws that may reduce resources and support for PEG access centers and also to sustain consumer access to PEG channels. If a state enacted a law affecting cable system franchising requirements relating to support for PEG use of a cable system, a cable operator would owe to any local government subdivision in which the operator provides cable service an amount to be determined by the subdivision but not to exceed the greatest of: (a) the amount of support provided in the last calendar year ending before the effective date of the state legislation; (b) the average annual amount of support provided over the term of the franchise under which the cable operator was operating before the effective date of the state law; (c) the amount of support that the cable operator is required to provide to the subdivision under the state law; or (d) an amount of support equal to 2% of the gross revenues of the cable operator from the operation of the cable system to provide cable services in the subdivision. This would prohibit a cable operator from migrating PEG channels to a digital tier while continuing to offer commercial channels on an analog tier and then charging analog customers for a set-top box to obtain the PEG channels. NCTA claimed the CAP Act would increase cable company costs and lead to higher cable rates, and that since these requirements would not have applied to satellite operators the cable companies would have been placed at a competitive disadvantage.

The environment for public, educational, and governmental (PEG) cable channels has been roiled by public policy and budgetary changes at the federal, state, and local levels and by technological changes in cable networks. More than 100 PEG access centers—which provide community groups and individuals free access to video production facilities and equipment, training, and programming time—have closed since 2005, and more may close when provisions in recently enacted state laws that eliminate requirements for cable companies to provide funding support take effect. Many PEG access centers, however, continue to have stable funding sources. When awarding franchises for the use of public rights of way to offer cable television service, many local jurisdictions required the cable companies to set aside some of their channel capacity for PEG use and to provide financial support for those PEG access channels. Those channels are not mandated by federal law. But the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 amended the Communications Act to explicitly allow franchising authorities to require cable operators to set aside channel capacity for PEG use and to provide adequate facilities or financial support for those channels. These PEG provisions have been a primary vehicle for fostering in cable systems the long-standing U.S. media policy goal of localism. Several recent developments are affecting the amount of financial support from cable providers and local governments for the PEG channels. In recent years, 21 states have enacted laws allowing cable systems to obtain statewide franchises. Some of these laws have abrogated or phased out PEG-related provisions in local franchise agreements requiring the franchisees to set aside channels, provide financial support, or provide studio facilities. In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has adopted rules that may limit the amount of PEG financial support for non-capital costs that local franchise authorities can require of cable providers. Also, some local jurisdictions that have funded PEG operations are now facing budget deficits that are leading them to reduce or eliminate their PEG funding. Driven by technological changes, some cable operators have begun to offer PEG channels in a fashion that may reduce consumer access to, and the quality of, those channels, and may raise consumer costs to obtain PEG channels. As traditional cable providers are migrating from analog to digital transmission of programming, some subscribers must obtain set-top boxes to receive PEG programming. AT&T's U-verse service uses a different platform for PEG channels than for commercial channels. It is more difficult for subscribers, especially the visually impaired, to access the PEG channels, and PEG programming cannot be recorded on a DVR, leading some to claim the service does not meet requirements in franchise agreements or in the Communications Act. AT&T responds that it meets all requirements and it is inappropriate to require it to deploy its network inefficiently to meet rules developed for traditional cable architecture. One bill introduced in the 112th Congress, the Community Access Preservation (CAP) Act (H.R. 1746), would have allowed local jurisdictions in states that pass state franchise laws to require cable companies to provide PEG support equal to the greater of the amount required under the state law, the historical support required prior to enactment of the state law, or 2% of the gross cable revenues of the cable operator. That PEG support would not have been included in the statutory cap on franchise fees of 5% of revenues. The bill would have prohibited cable operators from charging subscribers for set-top boxes needed to receive PEG channels that are migrated from analog to digital tiers. The cable industry opposed the bill, claiming it would raise costs and rates and place cable operators at a competitive disadvantage with satellite television operators.

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Background A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of the country's 60 years in existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. Current Political Setting The year 2007 saw Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. The country is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in February 2008. Musharraf himself was reelected to a second five-year presidential term in a controversial October 2007 vote by the country's electoral college and, under mounting domestic and international pressure, he finally resigned his military commission six weeks later. Yet popular opposition to military rule had been growing steadily with a series of political crises in 2007: a bungled attempt by Musharraf to dismiss the country's Chief Justice; Supreme Court rulings that damaged Musharraf's standing and credibility; constitutional questions about the legality of Musharraf's status as president; a return to Pakistan's political stage by two former Prime Ministers with considerable public support; and the pressures of impending parliamentary elections now set for February 18, 2008. There have been numerous reports of government efforts to "pre-rig" the election. Sharif was later ousted in a bloodless coup led by his army chief, Gen. Musharraf, in 1999. As president of the PML-Q, Shujaat has been a key political ally of President Musharraf. Ahsan was arrested upon the launch of the November emergency; 33 U.S. This allowed for what many observers called an intentional marginalization of Pakistan's non-Islamist opposition parties.

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan is a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan directly for 34 of the country's 60 years in existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. The United States has supported the government of President Pervez Musharraf, whose credibility and popularity have decreased markedly in 2007. The country is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in February 2008. In 1999, the elected government of then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted in a bloodless coup led by then-Army Chief Gen. Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president (in October 2007, Pakistan's Electoral College reelected Musharraf in a controversial vote). Supreme Court-ordered parlilamentary elections—identified as flawed by opposition parties and international observers—seated a new civilian government in 2002, but it remained weak, and Musharraf retained the position as army chief until his November 2007 retirement from that post. The United States urges restoration of full civilian rule in Islamabad, expecting the planned February 18, 2008, polls to be free, fair, and transparent. Such expectations became sharper after Musharraf's November 2007 suspension of the Constitution and imposition of emergency rule (nominally lifted six weeks later) and the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto. Current political circumstances in Pakistan are extremely fluid, and the country's internal security and stability are under serious threat. Many observers urge a broad re-evaluation of U.S. policies toward Pakistan. This report provides an overview of Pakistan's political setting and current status, along with a discussion of the country's major political parties and figures. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL34240, Pakistan's Political Crises. This report will not be updated.

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Some foreign policy analystsargue that, if it continues on its current path, Poland may well emerge as a leading nation in Europe-- particularly within the EU and NATO. This report provides background information on recentU.S.-Polish relations, a summary of Poland's political situation and economic conditions, and adescription of Poland's major foreign policy initiatives, mainly with neighboring states. Poland and the United States Poland and the United States have enjoyed close relations over the years. (1) Warsaw has been a particularly reliable supporter and ally since the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11; it has aided U.S. efforts in the global war on terrorism, and has contributed troops tothe U.S.-led coalitions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the past year, however, many Poles haveconcluded that their country's involvement in Iraq has increasingly become a political liability,particularly on the domestic front. Some Poles are of the view that their loyalty to the United Stateshas gone unrewarded, and hope that the Bush Administration still might respond favorably to Polishrequests for increased military assistance, Iraq reconstruction contracts to Polish firms, and changesto in U.S. visa policy. Domestic Developments Political Situation Poland has had an eventful political scene in recent years. (12) And although it hassteered the nation into the EU, nurtured a strong economy, and weathered two confidence votes, thecurrent government's days are numbered, in the eyes of many. (13) In the meantime, Poland has been rocked by several high-profile scandals. Elections are scheduled for September 2005. Poland has set a goal of having 60% of its military be professional by 2006. Since beginning accession negotiations,Poland has sought to meet its NATO obligations. Poland has been modernizing its airfields. European Union. Warsaw was not reluctant to assert itself beforejoining the EU and will likely be even less hesitant to do so now that it is a member. To the east, Poland has soughtto promote democracy in Ukraine and to normalize relations with Belarus and Russia. The government has announced a phased troop withdrawal. Although most analysts do not anticipate major changes in Polish foreignpolicy in the near future, some believe that it is inevitable that Poland will draw closer to the EUover the long term.

Poland and the United States have enjoyed close relations, particularly since the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001. Warsaw has been a reliable supporter and ally in the global war onterrorism and has contributed troops to the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and in Iraq -- whereit assumed a leading role. Over the past year, however, many Poles have concluded that theircountry's involvement in Iraq has increasingly become a political liability, particularly on thedomestic front. With elections scheduled for September 2005, the government has announced aphased troop withdrawal. Some Poles have argued that, despite the human casualties and financialcosts their country has borne, their loyalty to the United States has gone unrewarded. Many hopethat the Bush Administration will respond favorably by providing increased military assistance, byawarding Iraq reconstruction contracts to Polish firms, and by changing its visa policy. Poland has had an eventful political scene in recent years. Since 2001, two prime ministershave fallen. Many attribute these turnovers to a series of high-profile scandals. Although the currentgovernment has steered the nation into the EU and nurtured a strong, export-based economy, pollsindicate that it may be replaced in the next elections. However, regardless of which parties form thenext government, Poland's foreign policy will not likely undergo drastic changes. Poland'sexport-dependent economy has performed relatively well in recent years; the agricultural sector inparticular has responded positively to EU membership. A NATO member since 1999, Poland has been restructuring and modernizing its military toenable it to respond to out-of-area missions -- an alliance priority. Poland has sought to nurturedemocracy in Ukraine and Belarus, and to normalize ties with Russia. Poland has been an activemember of NATO and, since May 2004, the European Union. Poland was not reluctant to assertitself in a number of issue areas before joining the EU and will likely be even less hesitant to do sonow that it is a member. Some analysts argue that, if it continues on its current path, Poland maywell emerge as a leading nation in Europe. Although most analysts do not anticipate major changesin Polish foreign policy in the near future, some believe that it is inevitable that Poland will drawcloser to the EU over the long term. This report provides political and economic background on Poland and evaluates currentissues in U.S.-Polish and Polish-European relations. This report will be updated after Poland's 2005elections. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32967 , Poland: Foreign Policy Trends ,by [author name scrubbed].

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In the 112 th Congress, legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate to improve the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the agency charged with responsibility to protect federal buildings. 176 , the Federal Protective Service Improvement and Accountability Act of 2011, was introduced on January 5, 2011. Similar legislation, S. 772 , the Supporting Employee Competency and Updating Readiness Enhancements for Facilities Act of 2011 (SECURE Facilities Act of 2011) was introduced in the Senate on April 8, 2011. The purpose of both bills is to strengthen the security of federal facilities and improve the safety of employees who work there and public visitors by enhancing the ability of FPS to provide the necessary security. The executive order directed the ISC to (1) establish policies for security in and protection of Federal facilities; (2) develop and evaluate security standards for Federal facilities, develop a strategy for ensuring compliance with such standards, and oversee the implementation of appropriate security measures in Federal facilities; and (3) take such actions as may be necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of Federal facilities, including but not limited to: (A) encouraging agencies with security responsibilities to share security-related intelligence in a timely and cooperative manner; (B) assessing technology and information systems as a means of providing cost-effective improvements to security in Federal facilities; (C) developing long-term construction standards for those locations with threat levels or missions that require blast resistant structures or other specialized security requirements; (D) evaluating standards for the location of, and special security related to, day care centers in Federal facilities; and (E) assisting the Administrator in developing and maintaining a centralized security data base of all Federal facilities. It should be noted that some Members of Congress have state and district offices in multi-tenant federal buildings and recently the FBI has coordinated with Members due to an increase in threats to Members and their offices. Legislation in 112th Congress: Federal Protective Service Early in the 112 th Congress, legislation was introduced in both the House and Senate to improve the ability of FPS to protect federal facilities, the employees who work there, and public visitors. H.R. Conclusion The federal government faces, daily, the task of securing a portfolio comprising 446,000 buildings. Accordingly, Congress could address concerns, some of which are addressed in this report, to ensure effective federal agency operations and the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public.

The security of federal government buildings and court facilities affects not only the daily operations of the federal government but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public. Early in the 112th Congress, legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate to improve the Federal Protective Service (FPS), the agency charged with responsibility to protect federal buildings, the employees who work in the buildings, and public visitors. On January 5, 2011, H.R. 176, the Federal Protective Service Improvement and Accountability Act of 2011, was introduced in the House. On April 8, 2011, similar legislation, S. 772, the Supporting Employee Competency and Updating Readiness Enhancements for Facilities Act of 2011, was introduced in the Senate. The purpose of both bills is to strengthen the security of federal facilities and the ability of FPS to provide the necessary security. For the purposes of this report, federal facilities include any building leased or owned by the General Services Administration. In FY2007, the federal government's real property portfolio comprised 446,000 buildings with an area of 3.3 billion square feet and a replacement value of $772.8 billion. Federal courthouses and facilities are also discussed in this report. Additionally, it should be noted that many Members of Congress have state and district offices located in multi-tenant federal buildings. Security of federal facilities includes physical security assets such as closed-circuit television cameras, barrier material, and security guards (both federally employed and contracted). Federal facility security practices have been subject to criticism by some government auditors and security experts. Elements that have received criticism include the use of private security guards, the management and security practices of the FPS, and the coordination of federal facility security.

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HSAs are one type of health-related tax-advantaged account that individuals can use to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (e.g., deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and services not covered by insurance). The HSA is tied to the individual, and account holders retain access to their HSAs if they change employers, insurers, or subsequently obtain coverage under a non-HSA qualified plan. Eligible individuals may make direct contributions to their HSAs, and employers, family members, and other individuals may make contributions to an individual's HSA on the individual's behalf. Unused balances may accumulate without limit, be invested, and carry over from year to year. Individuals do not need to be enrolled in an HSA-eligible HDHP to make withdrawals from the account; however, any withdrawals that are not spent on qualified medical expenses for the account holder, the account holder's spouse, or the account holder's dependents are subject to a penalty tax, with some exceptions. HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible unless made through a pretax salary reduction agreement (see " Allowable Contributors "); employer contributions (and pretax salary reductions) are excluded from taxable income and from Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes; withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses; and account earnings are tax exempt. Eligibility to Establish and Contribute to an HSA Individuals are eligible to establish and contribute to an HSA if they have coverage under an HSA-qualified HDHP, do not have disqualifying coverage (disqualifying coverage is discussed in the section, " Disqualifying Coverage "), and cannot be claimed as a dependent on another person's tax return. HSA-Qualified High-Deductible Health Plans To be HSA qualified, a health plan must meet several tests: it must have a deductible above a certain minimum level, it must limit out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits to no more than a certain maximum level, and it can cover only preventive care services before the deductible is met. These amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the nearest $50) annually. Out-of-Pocket Limit To be HSA qualified, a health plan's annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits must not exceed $6,650 in 2018 for self-only coverage. These amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the nearest $50) annually. HSA Contributions Contribution Limits HSAs have annual contribution limits. In 2018, the annual contribution limit is $3,450 for self-only coverage and $6,900 for family coverage. In addition to the annual limit, account holders who are at least 55 years of age may contribute an additional catch-up contribution of $1,000 each year, which is not annually indexed for inflation. More specifically, qualified medical expenses are defined as including the following: the costs of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and the costs for treatments affecting any part of the body; the amounts paid for transportation to receive medical care; and qualified long-term care services. In general, HSAs cannot be used to pay health insurance premiums. HDHP Enrollment and HSA Utilization Data Challenges Although it would be beneficial to study the entire HSA population, which is the population that is eligible to establish and contribute to an HSA (i.e., enrolled in an HSA-eligible HDHP) and the population that has an HSA, few available data sources provide a comprehensive understanding of the entire HSA population. The lack of available data stems in part from the fact that HSAs and HSA-qualified HDHPs are two separate products. Furthermore, these products often can be administered by two separate institutions. As a result, HSA research tends to focus on one of two populations, HSA-qualified HDHP enrollees or HSA holders. Although exact point estimates for the entire HSA/HSA-qualified HDHP population are difficult to determine, current research, when referenced collectively, can highlight various trends. Data Findings Multiple different sources have demonstrated continued increases in HSA-qualified HDHP enrollment and HSAs since the mid-2000s.

A health savings account (HSA) is a tax-advantaged account that individuals can use to pay for unreimbursed medical expenses (e.g., deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and services not covered by insurance). Individuals may establish and contribute to an HSA for each month that they are covered under an HSA-qualified high-deductible health plan (HDHP), do not have disqualifying coverage, and cannot be claimed as a dependent on another person's tax return. The account can be established with an insurer, bank, or other Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-approved trustee and is tied to the individual. Account holders retain access to their accounts if they change employers, insurers, or subsequently obtain coverage under a non-HSA qualified plan. To be considered an HSA-qualified HDHP, a health plan must meet several tests: it must have a deductible above a certain minimum level, it must limit total annual out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits to no more than a certain maximum level, and it can provide only preventive care services before the deductible is met. In 2018, HSA-qualified HDHPs must have a minimum deductible of $1,350 for self-only coverage and $2,700 for family coverage and an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenditures for covered benefits that does not exceed $6,650 and $13,300, respectively. These amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the nearest $50) annually. HSAs have annual contribution limits, which in 2018 are $3,450 for individuals with self-only coverage and $6,900 for those with family coverage. Eligible individuals may make direct contributions to their HSAs, and employers, family members, and other individuals may make contributions to an individual's HSA on the individual's behalf. In addition to the annual limit, individuals who are at least 55 years of age but not yet enrolled in Medicare may contribute an additional annual catch-up contribution of $1,000. The annual contribution limit amounts are adjusted for inflation (rounded to the nearest $50) annually, but the catch-up contribution amount is fixed. Unused balances may accumulate without limit, be invested, and carry over from year to year. Individuals do not need to be enrolled in an HSA-eligible HDHP to make withdrawals from the account; however, any withdrawals that are not spent on qualified medical expenses for the account holder, the account holder's spouse, or the account holder's dependents generally are subject to a penalty tax. Qualified medical expenses include the costs of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and the costs for treatments affecting any part of the body; the amounts paid for transportation to receive medical care; and qualified long-term care services. In general, HSAs cannot be used to pay for health insurance premiums or over-the-counter medications. HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible unless made through a pretax salary reduction agreement; employer contributions (including individual contributions made through pretax salary reductions) are excluded from taxable income and from Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes; account earnings are tax exempt; and withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses. However, individuals generally are penalized for withdrawing funds for nonqualified medical expenses and for making contributions above the annual HSA limit. Although it would be beneficial to study the entire HSA population, which is the population that is eligible to establish and contribute to an HSA (i.e., enrolled in an HSA-eligible HDHP) and the population that has an HSA, few available data sources provide a comprehensive understanding of the entire HSA population. The lack of available data stems in part from the fact that HSAs and HSA-qualified HDHPs are two separate products that can be administered by two separate institutions. As a result, HSA research tends to focus on one of two populations, HSA-qualified HDHP enrollees or HSA holders. Although exact point estimates for the entire HSA/HSA-qualified HDHP population are difficult to determine, current research, when referenced collectively, can highlight various trends. Specifically, multiple different sources have demonstrated continued increases in HSA-qualified HDHP enrollment and HSAs since the mid-2000s.

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O n July 9, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United States caused by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's retirement on July 31, 2018. Nominated by President George W. Bush to the D.C. In his role as a Circuit Judge, the nominee has authored roughly three hundred opinions (including majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents) and adjudicated numerous high-profile cases concerning, among other things, the status of wartime detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the constitutionality of the current structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB); the validity of rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act; and the legality of the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) net neutrality rule. Since joining the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh has also taught courses on the separation of powers, national security law, and constitutional interpretation at Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and the Georgetown University Law Center. Prior to his appointment to the federal bench in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh served in the George W. Bush White House, first as an associate and then senior associate counsel, before becoming an assistant and staff secretary to the President. Before his service in the Bush Administration, the nominee worked in private practice at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP for three years and served in the Office of the Independent Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Kavanaugh began his legal career with three federal clerkships—two for judges on the federal courts of appeals and one for the jurist he is nominated to succeed, Justice Kennedy. Judge Kavanaugh is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. This report provides an overview of Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence and discusses how the Supreme Court might be affected if he were to succeed Justice Kennedy. In attempting to ascertain how Judge Kavanaugh could influence the High Court, however, it is important to note that, for various reasons, it is difficult to predict accurately a nominee's likely contributions to the Court based on his or her prior experience. Because Judge Kavanaugh would succeed Justice Kennedy on the High Court, the report then focuses on those areas of law where Justice Kennedy can be seen to have influenced the Court's approach, or provided a fifth and deciding vote, with a view toward how the nominee might approach those same issues. Justice Kennedy, often described as the Roberts Court's median vote, was frequently at the center of legal debates on the High Court, casting decisive votes on issues ranging from the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states, to separation-of-powers disputes, to key civil liberties issues. Accordingly, a critical question now before the Senate as it considers providing its advice and consent to the President's nomination to the High Court is how Judge Kavanaugh may view the many legal issues in which Justice Kennedy's vote was often determinative. Finally, it should be noted that, despite having served on the federal appellate bench for more than a decade, Judge Kavanaugh has said little about some areas of law because of the nature of the D.C. Circuit's docket and, as a consequence, it may be difficult to predict how he might rule on certain issues if he were elevated to the Supreme Court. Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh is a well-known jurist with a robust record, composed of both judicial opinions and non-judicial writings, in which he has made his views on the law and the role of the judge fairly clear. Circuit, and how his opinions have fared at the Supreme Court. Judge Kavanaugh's Writing Style . Relative to his colleagues, the dearth of scrutiny by the Supreme Court of Judge Kavanaugh' s opinions is notable and could be a metric by which to gauge the nominee's work. The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules . At the same time, there are limits to Judge Kavanaugh's formalism. At a high level, this statement summarizes the three main aspects of the nominee's approach to ensuring that a judge remains an umpire, an approach that emphasizes (1) the primacy of the text of the law being interpreted, (2) an awareness of history and tradition, and (3) adherence to precedent. But that is hardly unique to the Second Amendment. As is perhaps evident in the importance the nominee places on judicial formalism and the concept of the judge as a neutral umpire, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts are two of the nominee's judicial role models. Circuit. Judge Kavanaugh's record on the D.C. law." Appendix.

On July 9, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill retiring Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's seat on the Supreme Court of the United States. Nominated to the D.C. Circuit by President George W. Bush, Judge Kavanaugh has served on that court for more than twelve years. In his role as a Circuit Judge, the nominee has authored roughly three hundred opinions (including majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents) and adjudicated numerous high-profile cases concerning, among other things, the status of wartime detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the constitutionality of the current structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the validity of rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act; and the legality of the Federal Communications Commission's net neutrality rule. Since joining the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh has also taught courses on the separation of powers, national security law, and constitutional interpretation at Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and the Georgetown University Law Center. Prior to his appointment to the federal bench in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh served in the George W. Bush White House, first as associate and then senior associate counsel, before becoming assistant and staff secretary to the President. Before his service in the Bush Administration, the nominee worked in private practice at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP for three years and served in the Office of the Independent Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Kavanaugh began his legal career with three federal clerkships—two for judges on the federal courts of appeals and one for the jurist he is nominated to succeed, Justice Kennedy. Judge Kavanaugh is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. Judge Kavanaugh's nomination to the High Court is particularly significant as he would be replacing Justice Kennedy, who was widely recognized as the Roberts Court's median vote. Justice Kennedy was often at the center of legal debates on the Supreme Court, casting decisive votes on issues ranging from the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states, to separation-of-powers disputes, to key civil liberties issues. Accordingly, a critical question now before the Senate as it considers providing its advice and consent to the President's nomination to the High Court is how Judge Kavanaugh may view the many legal issues in which Justice Kennedy's vote was often determinative. In this vein, understanding Judge Kavanaugh's views on the law is one method to gauge how the Supreme Court might be affected by his appointment. In attempting to ascertain how Judge Kavanaugh could influence the High Court, however, it is important to note at the onset that, for various reasons, it often is difficult to predict accurately a nominee's likely contributions to the Court based on his or her prior experience. That said, the nominee is a well-known jurist with a robust record, composed of both judicial opinions and non-judicial writings, in which he has made his views on the law and the role of the judge fairly clear. Central to the nominee's judicial philosophy is the concept of judicial formalism and a belief that the "rule of law" must be governed by a "law of rules." In addition, Judge Kavanaugh has endorsed the concept of the judge as a neutral "umpire." In order to achieve this vision of neutrality, the nominee's legal writings have emphasized (1) the primacy of the text of the law being interpreted, (2) an awareness of history and tradition, and (3) adherence to precedent. Applying these principles, Judge Kavanaugh's views on several discrete legal issues are readily apparent, including administrative law, environmental law, freedom of speech, national security, the Second Amendment, and separation of powers. At the same time, perhaps because of the nature of the D.C. Circuit's docket, less is known about the nominee's views on other legal issues, including business law, civil rights, substantive due process, and takings law. This report provides an overview of Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence and discusses his potential impact on the Court if he were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Kennedy. In particular, the report focuses upon those areas of law where Justice Kennedy can be seen to have influenced the High Court's approach to certain issues or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Kavanaugh might approach these same issues if he were to be elevated to the High Court. Of particular note, the report includes an Appendix with several tables that summarize the nominee's rate of authoring concurring and dissenting opinions relative to his colleagues on the D.C. Circuit, and how Judge Kavanaugh's opinions as an appellate judge have fared upon review by the Supreme Court.

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Introduction Domestic food assistance programs overseen by the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) typically make up a large portion of federal spending aimed at helping with low-income households' day-to-day needs during economic downturns. The biggest, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program), spent $53.8 billion federal dollars in FY2009. In 2009, the Administration and Congress took major steps to change food assistance program policies and increase federal funding available for domestic food aid in response to growing calls for assistance from those in need. These actions will continue to have significant effects over the next several years, and the Administration's FY2011 budget request envisions continued growth in federal spending on food assistance. Administrative Policy Changes The Administration has taken two major steps that open up access to the SNAP. It envisions substantial increases in participation and spending for virtually every USDA food assistance program.

Domestic food assistance programs typically make up a large portion of federal spending for needy households during economic downturns. The need for, participation in, and the costs of these programs—like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program)—have grown dramatically. In response to the recent downturn, the Administration and Congress have taken major steps to change food assistance program policies to open up program access and to increase federal funding. Most important, SNAP benefits have been increased across the board and eligibility rules have been substantially loosened. The Administration's FY2011 budget proposes to continue funding for most of these steps. This report will be updated to reflect action on the FY2011 budget and significant changes in participation and spending figures.

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112-10, 112th Congress On April 15, 2011, the President signed H.R. 1473 into law as P.L. This public law represents the final appropriations act for FY2011. 112-10 includes roughly $41.6 billion in non-emergency discretionary spending for the Department of Homeland Security, while mandating a 0.2% across-the-board rescission for all departmental appropriations except for narrowly delineated funding for Coast Guard "overseas contingency operations directly related to the global war on terrorism." As is often the case with continuing resolutions, P.L. 112-10 provides more limited direction than is given through a traditional bill and conference report as to how appropriations should be divided among individual programs, projects and activities, but instead requires the department to provide spending plans to outline how DHS chooses to allocate those funds. Summary of DHS-Related provisions in the Several CRs for FY20111 Congress did not enact the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011 before the end of FY2010. As a result, until P.L. 111-242 (124 Stat. 111-290 (124 Stat. 111-317 , (124 Stat. 111-322 (124 Stat. 112-6 (125 Stat. 112-8 (125 Stat. 112-4 ). P.L. Committee Action Senate-Reported S. 3607, 111th Congress, 2nd Session The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2010 DHS Appropriations bill on July 15, 2010. This report uses Senate-reported S. 3607  and the committee report ( S.Rept. 111-222 ) accompanying  S. 3607  as the source for the Senate-reported numbers. The Senate-reported S. 3607  recommends a net appropriation of $45.2 billion for DHS for FY2011. This amounts to a $195 million increase as compared to the Administration's request, and a nearly $1.3 billion increase as compared to the $43.9 billion enacted for FY2010 (not including FY2010 supplemental funding). President's FY2011 Budget Request Submitted The Administration requested a net appropriation of $45.0 billion in budget authority for FY2011. This amounts to a $1.1 billion, or a 2.4% increase from the $43.9 billion enacted for FY2010. Total budget authority requested by the Administration for DHS for FY2011 amounts to $52.6 billion as compared to $51.7 billion enacted for FY2010. Net requested appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $9,809 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), $5,524 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $5,729 million; Coast Guard, $9,867 million; Secret Service, $1,570 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $2,362 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $7,294 million; Science and Technology, $1,018 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $306 million. Background This report describes the final direction given to the Department of Homeland Security through P.L. This report will not be updated further. 112-10 and P.L. P.L. P.L. 112-6 , the sixth continuing resolution for FY2011 (125 Stat. P.L. P.L. P.L. P.L.

This report describes the FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $45.0 billion in budget authority for FY2011. This amounts to a $1.1 billion, or a 2.4% increase from the $43.9 billion enacted for FY2010. Total budget authority requested by the Administration for DHS for FY2011 amounts to $52.6 billion as compared to $51.7 billion enacted for FY2010. Net requested appropriations for major agencies within DHS were as follows: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), $9,809 million; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), $5,524 million; Transportation Security Administration (TSA), $5,729 million; Coast Guard, $9,867 million; Secret Service, $1,570 million; National Protection & Programs Directorate, $2,362 million; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), $7,294 million; Science and Technology, $1,018 million; and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, $306 million. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2010 DHS Appropriations bill on July 15, 2010. This report uses Senate-reported S. 3607 and the committee report (S.Rept. 111-222) accompanying S. 3607 as the source for the Senate-reported numbers. The Senate-reported S. 3607 recommends a net appropriation of $45.2 billion for DHS for FY2011. This amounts to a $195 million increase as compared to the Administration's request, and a nearly $1.3 billion increase as compared to the $43.9 billion enacted for FY2010 (not including FY2010 supplemental funding). The House did not mark up its bill in the full Appropriations Committee, and therefore did not make public its official position on funding levels and direction for DHS. Congress did not enact the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011 before the start of the fiscal year. As a result, seven interim continuing resolutions for FY2011 became law: P.L. 111-242 (124 Stat. 2607), P.L. 111-290 (124 Stat. 3063), P.L. 111-317 (124 Stat. 3454), and P.L. 111-322 (124 Stat. 3518) in the 111th Congress, and P.L. 112-4 (125 Stat. 6), P.L. 112-6 (125 Stat. 23), and P.L. 112-8 (125 Stat. 34). P.L. 112-4 and P.L. 112-6 rescinded unobligated funds from several specific DHS programs as they continued to fund the department. On April 15, 2011, the President signed H.R. 1473 into law as P.L. 112-10. This public law represents the final appropriations act for FY2011. P.L. 112-10 includes roughly $41.6 billion in non-emergency discretionary spending for the Department of Homeland Security, while mandating a 0.2% across-the-board rescission for all departmental appropriations except for narrowly delineated funding for Coast Guard "overseas contingency operations directly related to the global war on terrorism." As is often the case with continuing resolutions, P.L. 112-10 provides more limited direction than is given through a traditional bill and conference report as to how appropriations should be divided among individual programs, projects, and activities, but instead requires the department to provide spending plans to outline how DHS chooses to allocate those funds. This report will not be updated further.

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Introduction Conventional hydropower accounted for more than 6% (258,749 gigawatt hours) of total net U.S. electricity generation in 2014. 113-24 (Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act), and P.L. However, others note that conventional large hydropower has relatively high initial capital costs, can be detrimental to surrounding ecosystems (e.g., fish and wildlife), may not be reliable during low water years and seasons, and may disrupt recreational or scenic values. Large federal hydropower projects are managed primarily by the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). When considered a renewable power source, hydropower was the largest contributor to renewable electric power generation in 2014, followed by wind and by wood and wood-derived fuels. Some interests oppose removal of hydroelectric dams, arguing that hydropower is a clean, renewable energy source. In addition to the general advantages and disadvantages of hydropower discussed earlier in this report, nonfederal projects have unique benefits. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission FERC licenses the construction and operation of nonfederal hydropower projects. For nonfederal investment, this could require Congress to consider whether to modify tax incentives or provide other subsidies and to further examine the role of FERC. Legislative Questions Federal Hydropower What Are Some of the Options to Address Aging Hydropower Infrastructure at Existing Federal Hydropower Projects? Use alternative funding mechanisms to finance hydropower upgrades . Privatize federally owned dams through divestiture of assets. Hydropower is one of the few remaining energy sources where the federal government owns a significant portion of the projects that generate the bulk of the electricity. 113-23 ), which grants small hydropower projects with a capacity of 10 megawatts or less an exemption from licensing requirements, promotes conduit hydropower projects, and requires FERC to examine the feasibility of a two-year licensing process to promote hydropower development at nonpowered dams and closed-loop pumped storage projects, among other things. Some could argue that hydropower does not need assistance in the form of tax credits because it is an established source and tax credits should be issued to ease the entry of new renewable energy sources to the market, or all types of generation should have to compete without federal support. Hydropower Legislation in the 114th Congress Several bills related to the expansion of hydropower development and modifying the regulatory process have been introduced in the 114 th Congress. The bill would designate FERC as the lead agency for coordinating all federal authorization of hydropower projects, as which it would establish and comply with a schedule for granting licenses and permits, collect all required information from federal and state agencies, and make determinations on projects. 113-23 (Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013) and P.L. Enacted Legislation in the 113th Congress P.L. P.L. P.L. 113-24 , the Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act, made changes to the process by which Reclamation permits nonfederal hydropower development at its projects (see " Nonfederal Development at Reclamation Facilities ," above). P.L. P.L. 113-121 , the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, states that the approval and construction of nonfederal hydropower at Corps facilities should be expedited. It required the Secretary of the Army to submit a biennial report describing the initiatives to encourage nonfederal hydropower development at Corps facilities as well as the status, costs, and environmental impact of nonfederal hydropower projects associated with the Corps. 113-76 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, appropriated funds to DOE to carry out a hydropower development program under Section 242 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Many of the hydropower issues Congress is likely to address in the near term are the same issues it has addressed for some time: operation of federal projects, the permitting process for nonfederal projects, and environmental impacts.

Congress continues to look at various fuel contributions to the electricity market and federal involvement with these fuel sources. Hydropower, the use of flowing water to produce electricity, is one such contribution. Conventional hydropower accounted for approximately 6% of total U.S. net electricity generation in 2014. Hydropower has advantages and disadvantages as an energy source. Its advantages include its ability to be a continuous, or baseload, power source that releases minimal air pollutants during power generation relative to fossil fuels. Some of its disadvantages, depending on the type of hydropower plant, include high initial capital costs, ecosystem disruption, and reduced generation during low water years and seasons. Hydropower project ownership can be categorized as federal or nonfederal. The bulk of federal projects are owned and managed by the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These projects are typically authorized and funded by Congress. Nonfederal projects are licensed and overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Considered by many to be an established and renewable energy source, hydropower is not always discussed alongside clean or other renewable energy sources in the ongoing energy debate due to its potential environmental impacts. However, hydropower proponents argue that hydropower is cleaner than some conventional energy sources, and point to recent findings that additional hydropower capacity could help the United States reach proposed energy, economic, and environmental goals. Others argue that the expansion of hydropower in the form of numerous small hydropower projects could have environmental impacts and regulatory issues similar to those of existing large projects. The 114th Congress may face several issues as it considers how hydropower fits into a changing energy and economic landscape. For example, existing large hydropower infrastructure is aging; many of the nation's hydropower generators and dams are more than 30 years old. Proposed options to address these concerns include increasing federal funding, utilizing alternative financing and/or customer investments, and privatizing federally owned dams, among other options. Additionally, whether to significantly expand hydropower (either through new or more efficient federal hydropower generation or through federal incentives to encourage expansion or efficiency gains of nonfederal hydropower) may require congressional input due to the role of the federal government in hydropower development and permitting. Another issue receiving attention is the rate at which FERC issues licenses for nonfederal projects, which some find slower than ideal. Others defend the licensing process due to the environmental and other statutes with which agencies must comply. Legislation related to hydropower development was enacted in the 113th Congress, including P.L. 113-23 and P.L. 113-24. P.L. 113-23, the Hydropower Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, grants small hydropower projects with a capacity of 10 megawatts or less an exemption from FERC licensing requirements, promotes conduit hydropower projects, and requires FERC to examine the feasibility of a two-year licensing process to promote hydropower development at nonpowered dams and closed-loop pumped storage projects, among other things. P.L. 113-24, the Bureau of Reclamation Small Conduit Hydropower Development and Rural Jobs Act, authorizes nonfederal hydropower development at all Reclamation projects, provides for the preference of existing project sponsors in developing this power, and makes Reclamation the lead agency in implementing this authority. Other legislation related to hydropower enacted in the 113th Congress included the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-121), part of which expedites the approval and development of nonfederal Corps hydropower projects and orders a report on the status and funding of nonfederal hydropower projects as well as a study on the implications of issuing federally tax-exempt bonds from the Inland Waterways Trust Fund to hydropower facilities. Additionally, P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, provided new funding to the Department of Energy (DOE) for the expansion of hydropower development at existing dams, as authorized under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58).

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Introduction Title V of the Housing Act of 1949 authorized the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to make loans to farmers to enable them to construct, improve, repair, or replace dwellings and other farm buildings to provide decent, safe, and sanitary living conditions for themselves or their tenants, lessees, sharecroppers, and laborers. USDA was also authorized to make grants or combinations of loans and grants to those farmers who could not qualify to repay the full amount of a loan, but who needed the funds to make the dwellings sanitary or to remove health hazards to the occupants or the community. While the act was initially targeted toward farmers, over time it has been amended to enable USDA to make housing loans and grants to owners of real estate in rural areas in general. Currently, the USDA housing programs are administered by the Rural Housing Service (RHS). The housing programs are generally referred to by the section number under which they are authorized in the Housing Act of 1949, as amended. Amendments by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 authorized the loans to be used for the purchase and repair of previously-occupied dwellings as well as the purchase of building sites. 1474) authorized loans, grants, or combinations of loans and grants to make farm dwellings safe and sanitary or to remove health hazards. Since no appropriations legislation was enacted before the beginning of FY2011, the 111 th Congress enacted a series of continuing resolutions (CR) to continue funding at the FY2010 level for most accounts in the federal budget (including all of the accounts in USDA's budget). The latest CR ( P.L. 111-322 ) is slated to expire at the earlier of March 4, 2011, or enactment of FY2011 appropriations legislation. The high demand for the program has continued, and on March 9, 2010, USDA sent a notice to USDA State Directors noting that the FY2010 funding for the Section 502 guaranteed loan program was expected to be exhausted by the end of April. As enacted on July 29, 2010, the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-212 , provided additional appropriations for Section 502 guaranteed loans for the remainder of FY2010. The act also permits USDA to charge lenders a guarantee fee of up to 3.5% of the mortgage amount. In addition, lenders may be charged an annual fee of 0.5% of the mortgage balance for the life of the loan. These changes in the guarantee fees are intended to enable the Section 502 guaranteed home loan program to operate with little or no need for positive credit subsidies in FY2011 and beyond.

Title V of the Housing Act of 1949 authorized the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to make loans to farmers to enable them to construct, improve, repair, or replace dwellings and other farm buildings to provide decent, safe, and sanitary living conditions for themselves or their tenants, lessees, sharecroppers, and laborers. USDA was also authorized to make grants or combinations of loans and grants to those farmers who could not qualify to repay the full amount of a loan, but who needed the funds to make the dwellings sanitary or to remove health hazards to the occupants or the community. While the act was initially targeted toward farmers, over time the act has been amended to enable USDA to make housing loans and grants to rural residents in general. Currently, the USDA housing programs are administered by the Rural Housing Service (RHS). The housing programs are generally referred to by the section number under which they are authorized in the Housing Act of 1949, as amended. The rural housing programs include loans for the purchase, repair, or construction of single-family housing; loans and grants to remove health and safety hazards in owner-occupied homes; loans and grants for the construction and purchase of rental housing for farmworkers; loans for the purchase and construction of rental and cooperative housing for the elderly and for rural residents in general; rental assistance payments to make rental housing more affordable; interest subsidies to make homeownership loans more affordable and to enable production of rental housing that is affordable for the target population; and loans for developing building sites upon which rural housing is to be constructed. The collapse of the mortgage market in 2007 has resulted in an increased demand for home loans that are insured or guaranteed by the federal government, including the USDA Section 502 guaranteed home loans. By May 2010, the FY2010 funding for the USDA guaranteed loan program was exhausted. As enacted on July 29, 2010, the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-212, authorized additional appropriations for Section 502 guaranteed loans for the remainder of FY2010. The act also permits USDA to charge lenders a guarantee fee of up to 3.5% of the mortgage amount. In addition, lenders may be charged an annual fee of 0.5% of the mortgage balance for the life of the loan. These changes in the guarantee fees are intended to enable the Section 502 guaranteed home loan program to operate with little or no need for positive credit subsidies in FY2011 and beyond. Since no appropriations legislation was enacted before the beginning of FY2011, the 111th Congress enacted a series of continuing resolutions (CR) to continue funding at the FY2010 level for most accounts in the federal budget (including all of the accounts in USDA's budget). The latest CR (P.L. 111-322) is slated to expire at the earlier of March 4, 2011, or enactment of FY2011 appropriations legislation.

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Introduction Seclusion and restraint have been used in various situations to deal with violent or noncompliant behavior. Because of congressional interest in the use of seclusion and restraint in schools, this report focuses on the legal issues concerning the use of these techniques in schools, including their application both to children covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and to those not covered by IDEA. Background Several reports have documented instances of deaths and injuries resulting from the use of seclusion or restraints in schools but until the Department of Education (ED) issued reporting requirements in March 2010, there was no general reporting requirement. On May 19, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in conjunction with a hearing in the House Education and Labor Committee, released a study examining the use of seclusion and restraint in the education setting, finding hundreds of cases of alleged abuse and death due to the use of seclusion and restraint. On July 31, 2009, the Secretary of Education sent letters to Chief State School Officers noting the problems identified by the GAO report and in the May 19 hearing in the House Education and Labor Committee. He noted the approach used in Illinois, which includes an emphasis on the use of positive behavior intervention and supports, and concluded by stating that the Chief State School Officers would be contacted by ED by August 15, 2009, to discuss relevant state laws, regulations, policies, and guidance. The results of these discussions are posted on ED's website. Federal law does not contain general provisions relating to the use of seclusion and restraint, and currently there are no specific federal laws concerning the use of seclusion and restraint in public schools. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires a free appropriate public education for children with disabilities, and an argument could be made that some uses of seclusion and restraint would violate this requirement. In addition, certain procedures may violate constitutional rights or state laws. 4247 , S. 2860 , and S. 3895 , 111 th Congress, has been introduced, and H.R. 4247 passed the House on March 3, 2010. Federal Legislation On December 9, 2009, legislation establishing minimum safety standards in schools to prevent and reduce the inappropriate use of restraint and seclusion was introduced in the House, H.R. 4247 , and the Senate, S. 2860 . H.R.

Seclusion and restraint have been used in various situations to deal with violent or noncompliant behavior. Because of congressional interest in the use of seclusion and restraint in schools, including passage of H.R. 4247 and the introduction of S. 2860, 111th Congress, first session, this report focuses on the legal issues concerning the use of these techniques in schools, including their application both to children covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and to those not covered by IDEA. Several reports have documented instances of deaths and injuries resulting from the use of seclusion or restraints in schools but, until the Department of Education (ED) issued reporting requirements in March 2010, there was no general reporting requirement. On May 19, 2009, in conjunction with a hearing by the House Education and Labor Committee, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a study examining the use of seclusion and restraint in the education setting, finding hundreds of cases of alleged abuse and death due to the use of seclusion and restraint. On July 31, 2009, the Secretary of Education sent letters to Chief State School Officers noting the problems identified by the GAO report and in the May 19 congressional hearing, encouraging each state to review its current policies, and stating that the Chief State School Officers would be contacted by ED by August 15, 2009, to discuss relevant state laws, regulations, policies, and guidance. The results of these discussions are posted on ED's website. Federal law does not contain general provisions relating to the use of seclusion and restraints, and there are no specific federal laws concerning the use of seclusion and restraint in public schools. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires a free appropriate public education for children with disabilities, and an argument could be made that some uses of seclusion and restraint would violate this requirement. In addition, certain procedures may violate constitutional rights or state laws. Although there are some judicial cases, they do not provide clear guidance on when, if ever, seclusion and restraint may be used in schools. H.R. 4247, and S. 2860, 111th Congress, first session, and S. 3895, 111th Congress, second session, would establish minimum safety standards in schools to prevent and reduce the inappropriate use of restraint and seclusion. H.R. 4247 was passed by the House on March 3, 2010.

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Introduction Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle questions of order and procedure. A committee's rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. This report analyzes the different approaches Senate committees have taken with their rules, focusing on additions to the overall Senate committee rules structure or unique provisions. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or that are essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report reviews the requirements contained in Senate rules for committees, then explores how each Senate committee handles 11 specific procedural issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. Also, the report looks at unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in a "miscellaneous" category. (Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Reporting.

Senate Rule XXVI spells out specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules that govern its organization and operation. Those committee rules then elaborate, within Senate rules, how the committee will handle its business. Rules adopted by a committee may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate" (Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 2). Committees may add to the basic rules, but they may not add anything that is in conflict with Senate rules. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then compares the different approaches Senate committees have taken when adopting their rules. A committee's rules can be extensive and detailed or general and short. The tables that conclude this report compare selected, key features of the rules by committee. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to, or that are essentially restatements of, the Senate's standing rules are not included. This report reviews the requirements contained in Senate rules pertaining to committees; it then explores how each Senate committee addresses 11 specific issues: meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at the unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category. This report will be not be updated.

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Domestic Situation Politics Justice and Development Party. Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP appear to be securely in power and, with its parliamentarymajority, AKP has been able to pass its legislative program. Divisions within the AKP evident onMarch 1, 2003, when parliament rejected a government resolution to approve the deployment of U.S.forces to Turkey to open a northern front against Iraq, have faded. Erdogan rejects the Islamist label, preferring to callhimself and his party "conservative democrats." (4) The priority that Erdogan and other party leaders give to beginning accession talks with the European Union (EU) aids the AKP's political repositioning. (5) There have been other controversies about AKP's supposed "Islamist agenda." Officials plan to sign a new three-year stand-byagreement to cover the period 2005-2007. Terrorism Kurdistan Workers Party. Radical Religious Terrorism. (39) Thepolice are focusing on the Kurds. (41) The Turkish parliament haspassed nine packages of reforms since October 2001-- five since the AKP took office -- to harmonize Turkish laws and Constitution with EUstandards. Iraq After the March 1, 2003 Vote The Turkish parliament's refusal on March 1, 2003, to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces to Turkey for the purpose of opening a northern front against Iraq jolted the settled U.S. view ofTurkey as a malleable strategic partner. Many of Turkey's fears about an Iraq war were not realized. Bilateral military ties still have not recoveredfrom Sulaymaniyah. Turkish Peacekeepers At the request of the United States, the Turkish government considered sending peacekeeping troops to Iraq. The motion conveyed several messages: it stressed that Turkeywould take "all necessary measures to clear out PKK-KADEK elements in Iraq and prevent Iraq'sbecoming an asylum for terrorists in the future;" it stated that "protection of Iraqi territorial integrityand its national unity and establishment of a new democratic Iraq ... carry vital importance forTurkey;" and it said that in addition to its security and stability missions, the Turkish army would"improve humanitarian aid and the economic structure." (85) The EU Factor Turkey may be attempting to conform its foreign policies to those of major European Union members in order to get a date for accession talks. position." Other Issues in U.S.- Turkish Relations U.S. NATO is usingIncirlik to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Turkey allows the use of Turkish bases, ports, and airports to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. And, as noted above, thousands of U.S. troops are rotating from Iraq via Incirlik. Turkey's role as a transit route for energy resources from Caucasus and Central Asia is being realized with construction of the long-awaited Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and of a gas pipelinefrom Azerbaijan to Turkey, with both pipelines scheduled for completion in 2005. Turkey is closely cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism. intelligence agencies. Finally, Turkey is an example of a predominantly Muslim, democratic country at a time when U.S. policy is to encourage democratization in the Muslim world. Image in Turkey Opposition to the war in Iraq and U.S. actions against Turkish soldiers at Sulaymaniyah helped to form an unfavorable image of the United States in Turkey.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) remain popular and have a firm hold on power in Turkey. The AKP is trying to recast itself from anIslamist-rooted party to a centrist "conservative democratic" party. Although some AKP actions fuelsecularist suspicions of a hidden Islamist agenda, the high priority that the party gives to attainingEuropean Union (EU) membership may mitigate fears about its intentions and support its centristambitions. The government remains focused on the economy. With the aid of the International MonetaryFund (IMF), it has undertaken major macroeconomic reforms, achieved solid growth, and reducedinflation. The IMF has reviewed the government's economic performance positively and is expectedto approve a new three-year stand-by agreement for 2005-2007. The government also has been challenged by terrorism and is dealing with both Kurdish terrorism, a radical religious terrorist threat with possible international links, and remnants of leftistterrorism. In order to obtain a date to begin accession talks with the European Union (EU), the Turkish parliament has passed many reforms to harmonize Turkey's laws and Constitution with EUstandards. The EU is expected to scrutinize implementation of the reforms carefully before settinga date for accession talks. The situation on Cyprus is not expected to affect EU decision-making. U.S.-Turkish relations were shaken on March 1, 2003, when the Turkish parliament rejected a resolution to allow the deployment of U.S. troops to Turkey to open a northern front against Iraq. Bilateral ties have been strained by other developments in Iraq. The Turkish parliament's October2003 decision to authorize the deployment of Turkish peacekeepers to Iraq helped to improve ties,even though the offer was not accepted. However, Turkey continues to be concerned about thesituation in Iraq and U.S. actions there, which fuel anti-Americanism. Turkey remains important to the United States. Turkish air bases were used in the Afghan war and its airspace in the Iraq war. Its ports, airbases, and roads are used to resupply coalition forcesand for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. U.S. troops rotate to and from Iraq via Turkey. Turkey willbe an important transit route for pipelines carrying energy resources from the Caucasus and CentralAsia to the West, and the often sabotaged oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey could be helpful to Iraq'srecovery. Turkish and U.S. intelligence agencies are cooperating closely in the war on terrorism. Turkish peacekeepers have served in many hot spots in support of U.S. policies, and commandedthe International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Finally, some U.S. officials andanalysts believe strongly that Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim, democratic country, could serveas an example to others.

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The salaries of Members of Congress and certain high-level federal officials (those paid at EX Level II) have, until recently, generally been in parity since the Executive Schedule was established in 1964. The first of these provisions provides for a quadrennial review of the salaries of federal officials by a Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation. The commission is to make recommendations to the President. A second provision in the Ethics Reform Act establishes an annual salary adjustment procedure for the Members, the Vice President, federal officials paid under the EX, and federal Justices and judges.

The salaries of Members of Congress, certain high-level federal officials (those paid at Level II of the Executive Schedule (EX)), and certain federal Justices and judges have, until recently, generally been in parity for many years. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 provides for annual pay adjustments to be established for the Members, the Vice President, federal officials paid under the EX Schedule, and federal Justices and judges. The act also requires a Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation and the President to recommend salaries in parity for these federal government positions. The commission has never been activated, and, thus, such recommendations have never been made. This report will be updated as events dictate.

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On the evening of August 7, 2008, South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching a "massive" artillery barrage against Tskhinvali, while Georgia reported intense bombing of some Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Reportedly, thousands of Russian troops had retaken Tskhinvali, occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border by early in the morning on August 10 (Sunday). President Medvedev reportedly backed some elements of the plan. The peace plan calls for all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and pull troops back to positions they had occupied before the conflict began. Other elements of the peace plan include allowing humanitarian aid into the conflict zone and facilitating the return of displaced persons. This seems to provide for possibly greater international roles in peace talks and peacekeeping, both of seminal Georgian interest. On August 15, then-Secretary Rice traveled to Tbilisi and Saakashvili signed the agreement. The Follow-On Ceasefire Agreement On September 8, 2008, visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev signed a follow-on ceasefire accord that fleshed out the provisions of the 6-point peace plan. It stipulated that Russian forces would withdraw from areas adjacent to the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by midnight on October 10; that Georgian forces would return to their barracks by October 1; that international observers already in place from the U.N. and OSCE would remain; and that the number of international observers would be increased by October 1, to include at least 200 EU observers. This assertion triggered criticism by the United States, Georgia, and others that the ceasefire accords called for the numbers of Russian "peacekeepers" to revert to pre-conflict levels, which before the build-up in Abkhazia were about 2,000 troops and in South Ossetia were 1,000 troops (500 Russian troops and 500 North Ossetian troops, whom were in actuality mostly South Ossetian). They permit Russia to establish military bases in the regions and to deploy Russian border troops to help defend the regional borders. These governments have criticized Russia for excessive use of force and peremptorily recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in violation of the principle of Georgia's territorial integrity, and Georgia for attempting to reintegrate South Ossetia by force. Some observers raised concerns that Russia's alleged attempts to bomb the Georgian sections of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus [gas] Pipeline (SCP) were Russian attempts to disrupt Caspian energy pipelines that it does not control. The BTC pipeline provides oil to Europe and the United States. The resolution condemned continuing human rights violations in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions (which are under Russia's control), and called for humanitarian aid workers and ceasefire monitors to be provided with open access to the regions. In a strong statement on August 13, former President Bush called for Russia "to begin to repair the damage to its relations with the United States, Europe, and other nations, and to begin restoring its place in the world [by meeting] its commitment to cease all military activities in Georgia [and withdrawing] all Russian forces that entered Georgia in recent days." He announced that he was sending then-Secretary Rice to France to "confer with President Sarkozy" on the EU peace plan and to Georgia, "where she will personally convey America's unwavering support for Georgia's democratic government [and] continue our efforts to rally the free world in the defense of a free Georgia." U.S. On September 3, then-Secretary of State Rice announced a multi-year $1 billion aid plan for Georgia. 110-329 ), signed into law on September 30, 2008, appropriates an additional $365 million in aid for Georgia and the region for FY2009 (beyond that provided under continuing appropriations based on FY2008 funding) for humanitarian and economic relief, reconstruction, energy-related programs and democracy activities. Several Members also visited Georgia after the ceasefire. 2638 ; P.L.

In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian "peacekeepers" to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, "forcing" Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia's Black Sea coast. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving as the president of the European Union (EU), was instrumental in getting Georgia and Russia to agree to a peace plan on August 15-16. The plan called for both sides to cease hostilities and pull troops back to positions they held before the conflict began. It called for humanitarian aid and the return of displaced persons. It called for Russian troops to pull back to pre-conflict areas of deployment, but permitted temporary patrols in a security zone outside South Ossetia. The plan also provided for a greater international role in peace talks and peacekeeping, both of seminal Georgian interest. On August 25, President Medvedev declared that "humanitarian reasons" led him to recognize the independence of the regions. This recognition was widely condemned by the United States and the international community. President Sarkozy negotiated a follow-on agreement with Russia on September 8, 2008, that led to at least 200 EU observers to be deployed to the conflict zone and almost all Russian forces to withdraw from areas adjacent to the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by midnight on October 10. On August 13, former President Bush announced that then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would travel to France and Georgia to assist with the peace plan and that Defense Secretary Robert Gates would direct U.S. humanitarian aid shipments to Georgia. Secretary Rice proposed a multi-year $1 billion aid plan for Georgia. Several Members of Congress visited Georgia in the wake of the conflict and legislation has been passed in support of Georgia's territorial integrity and independence. P.L. 110-329, signed into law on September 30, 2008, provides $365 million in added humanitarian and rebuilding assistance for Georgia for FY2009.The August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict is likely to have long-term effects on security dynamics in the region and beyond. Russia has augmented its long-time military presence in Armenia by establishing bases in Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. Georgia's military capabilities were at least temporarily degraded by the conflict, and Georgia will need substantial U.S. and NATO military assistance to rebuild its forces. The conflict temporarily disrupted railway transport of Azerbaijani oil to Black Sea ports and some oil and gas pipeline shipments, although no pipelines were reported damaged by the fighting. Although there have been some concerns that the South Caucasus has become less stable as a source and transit area for oil and gas, Kazakhstan has begun to barge oil across the Caspian to fill the oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey (the BTC pipeline) and the European Union still plans to begin construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Austria in 2010.

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3630 , the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, included a provision that would have imposed an income tax on unemployment benefits for high-income individuals. Using a scaled approach, the percentage of unemployment benefits subject to tax would have increased with an individual's Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)—beginning with AGI of $750,000 for a single tax filer and $1.5 million for a married couple filing a joint return. The final version of H.R. It did not, however, include the provision in the House-passed version of the bill that would have restricted unemployment benefit receipt based on income. This report addresses many of the questions that have arisen regarding such proposals, including the potential number of people who would be affected and the potential savings to federal and state governments. It then presents Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on the distribution of household income and unemployment benefits for two tax years: 2010, when UI receipt was at a recent peak, and 2014, the most recently available data, to shed light on the size of the group potentially affected by such proposals. This requirement is based upon a 1964 U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) decision that precludes states from means-testing to determine UC eligibility. As shown in the table, the amount of unemployment benefit income received by tax filers with AGI of $1 million or more is relatively small. For tax year 2014, however, there were no tax filers with at least $1 million in AGI who received unemployment benefits; therefore, there was $0 in reported unemployment benefit in come for this group. Policy Considerations This section addresses some of the policy considerations associated with proposals to restrict the payment of UI benefits to those with high incomes. For instance, P.L. A provision in the House-passed bill would have taxed unemployment benefit income at 100% for single tax filers with AGI of $1 million (or for married couples filing a joint return with AGI of $2 million). For example, H.R. 3630 , S. 1931 , and S. 1944 of the 112 th Congress, which are summarized briefly in the " Legislation " section, would have imposed an income tax rate (of up to 100% in the case of H.R. There may be other reasons why an eligible individual may not apply for UI benefits. Alternatively, if a restriction on the payment of UI benefits to certain high-income individuals were administered through the UI system, all applicants for UI benefits would be required to complete additional forms for the purpose of reporting income from various sources. The 112th Congress H.R. The 113th Congress S. 18 . 2448 . Like S. 310 and H.R. S.Amdt. 2714 . S. 2097 . 4415 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 , Section 106 of H.R. 4970 . 3979 , H.R. The 114th Congress As of the date of this report, no bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to restrict UI receipt based on income.

Under the federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, there is currently no prohibition on the receipt of UI benefits by high-income unemployed workers. States, which determine many of the eligibility requirements for UI benefits, may not restrict eligibility based on individual or household income. Recent Congresses, however, have considered proposals to restrict the payment of unemployment benefits to high-income individuals. These proposals define high income in a variety of ways—often prohibiting UI benefits for "millionaires." For instance, in the 112th Congress, the House-passed version of H.R. 3630 (the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act) included a provision that would have imposed an income tax on unemployment benefits for high-income individuals. Based on a scaled approach, the tax would have increased to 100% for a single tax filer with Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of $1 million (or AGI of $2 million for a married couple filing a joint return). The provision, however, was not included in the final version of the legislation that became P.L. 112-96. Several other bills introduced in the 112th Congress would have restricted unemployment benefit receipt based on income (i.e., they would change the current requirement to provide unemployment benefits to all workers without income restrictions): S. 1944, H.R. 235, and S. 310. A number of bills in the 113th Congress would also have imposed income restrictions for the purposes of UI benefits: S. 18, H.R. 2448, H.R. 3979, H.R. 4415, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4970, S.Amdt. 2714, S. 2097, S. 2148, S. 2149, and S. 2532. As of the date of this report, no bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress to restrict UI receipt based on income. To inform the ongoing policy debate, this report provides information relevant to proposals that would restrict the payment of unemployment benefits to individuals with high incomes. Three primary areas that may be of interest to lawmakers are addressed: (1) the current U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) opinion on means-testing UI benefits; (2) the potential number of people who would be affected by such proposals; and (3) policy considerations such as the potential savings associated with such proposals, particularly in terms of federal expenditures. The latter two issues are discussed because a small percentage of tax filers who receive unemployment benefit income have an AGI of $1 million or more. For example, in tax year 2010, when UI receipt was at a recent peak, approximately 0.02% of tax filers had an AGI of at least $1 million, based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data. In tax year 2014 (most recent data available), however, there were no tax filers with AGI of $1 million who received UI benefits, according to IRS data.

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Transportation congestion most likely will be a major issue for Congress as it considers reauthorization of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users ( SAFETEA), P.L. 109-59 , which is set to expire on September 30, 2009. By many accounts, congestion on the nation's road and railroad networks, at seaports and airports, and on some major transit systems is a significant problem for many transportation users, especially commuters, freight shippers, and carriers. Moreover, trends underlying the demand for freight and passenger travel—population and economic growth, the urban and regional distribution of homes and businesses, and international trade—suggest that pressures on the transportation system are likely to grow in the years ahead. A number of experts and organizations believe that congestion has reached crisis proportions. Some see it as a minor impediment to mobility, others as an unfortunate by-product of prosperity and accessibility in economically vibrant places. Indeed, this over reliance on highway transportation, they believe, leads to more important problems, such as suburban sprawl and air pollution. Furthermore, because the problem is geographically concentrated, most places and people in America do not suffer noticeable levels of congestion. This has been accompanied by several sizeable boosts in funding for public transit and traffic reduction measures directed to major metropolitan areas in an attempt to curb the negative effects of cars and trucks, including road traffic congestion. Although congestion has intensified and spread, congestion is geographically concentrated in major metropolitan areas, at international trade gateways, and on some intercity trade routes. 102-240 ), Congress has tended to leave to the discretion of the states, within certain planning parameters, the relative weight to be placed on congestion mitigation vis-à-vis other transportation priorities. Because state and local funding flexibility has been a significant feature of federal transportation policy since ISTEA, Congress may decide to continue with this approach in reauthorization. States and localities that suffer major transportation congestion would be free to devote federal and local resources to congestion mitigation if they wish. Similarly, congestion-free locales would be able to focus on other transportation-related problems, such as connectivity, system access, safety, and economic development. Alternatively, Congress may want to take a less flexible and, in other ways, more aggressive approach to congestion mitigation. Three basic elements to the problem that Congress may want to consider are (1) the overall level of transportation spending, (2) the prioritization of transportation spending, and (3) congestion pricing and other alternative ways to ration transportation resources. Transportation Congestion Remedies Transportation engineers and planners have devised a large number of potential remedies for congestion. The many different remedies form three basic strategies for reducing congestion: adding new capacity, operating the existing capacity more efficiently, and managing demand.

Surface transportation congestion most likely will be a major issue for Congress as it considers reauthorization of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act—A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA), P.L. 109-59, which is set to expire on September 30, 2009. By many accounts, congestion on the nation's road and railroad networks, at seaports and airports, and on some major transit systems is a significant problem for many transportation users, especially commuters, freight shippers, and carriers. Indeed, some observers believe congestion has already reached crisis proportions. Others are less worried, believing congestion to be a minor impediment to mobility, the by-product of prosperity and accessibility in economically vibrant places, or the unfortunate consequence of over reliance on cars and trucks that causes more important problems such as air pollution and urban sprawl. Trends underlying the demand for freight and passenger travel—population and economic growth, the urban and regional distribution of homes and businesses, and international trade—suggest that pressures on the transportation system are likely to grow substantially over the next 30 years. Although transportation congestion continues to grow and intensify, the problem is still geographically concentrated in major metropolitan areas, at international trade gateways, and on some intercity trade routes. Because of this geographical concentration, most places and people in America are not directly affected by transportation congestion. Consequently, in recent federal law, Congress, for the most part, has allowed states and localities to decide the relative importance of congestion mitigation vis-à-vis other transportation priorities. This has been accompanied by a sizeable boost in funding for public transit and a more moderate boost in funding for traffic reduction measures as part of a patchwork of relatively modest federally directed congestion programs. Congress may decide to continue with funding flexibility in its reauthorization of the surface transportation programs. States and localities that suffer major transportation congestion would be free to devote federal and local resources to congestion mitigation if they wish. Similarly, congestion-free locales would be able to focus on other transportation-related problems, such as connectivity, system access, safety, and economic development. Alternatively, Congress may want to more clearly establish congestion abatement as a national policy objective, given its economic development impact, and take a less flexible and, in other ways, more aggressive approach to congestion mitigation. Three basic elements that Congress may consider are (1) the overall level of transportation spending, (2) the prioritization of transportation spending, and (3) congestion pricing and other alternative ways to ration transportation resources with limited government spending. Congress also may want to consider the advantages and disadvantages of specific transportation congestion remedies. Hence, this report discusses the three basic types of congestion remedies proposed by engineers and planners: adding new capacity, operating the existing capacity more efficiently, and managing demand.

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On July 28, 2006, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4 , the Pension Protection Act, by a vote of 279-131. The bill was passed by the Senate on August 3 by a vote of 93-5 and was signed into law by the President as P.L. 109-280 on August 17, 2006. The Pension Protection Act is the most comprehensive reform of the nation's pension laws since the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406 ). It establishes new funding requirements for defined benefit pensions and includes reforms that will affect cash balance pension plans, defined contribution plans, and deferred compensation plans for executives and highly compensated employees. Prompted by the default in recent years of several large defined benefit pension plans and the increasing deficit of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the Bush Administration in January 2005 advanced a proposal for pension funding reform, which was designed to increase the minimum funding requirements for pension plans and strengthen the pension insurance system. In 2005, major pension reform bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the Senate, Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Finance Committee, introduced S. 1783 , the Pension Security and Transparency Act. In the House, Representative John Boehner, then Chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, introduced H.R. 2830 , the Pension Protection Act, which subsequently was renumbered as H.R. 4 . The legislation ultimately passed by the House and Senate and signed into law by the President on August 17, 2006, was based mainly on these two bills, with the final version being the result of conference negotiations between the House and Senate that began in March 2006 and continued through July. This report summarizes the main provisions of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) as they affect single-employer defined benefit plans, multiemployer defined benefit plans, and defined contribution plans.

On July 28, 2006, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4 , the Pension Protection Act, by a vote of 279-131. The bill was passed by the Senate on August 3 by a vote of 93-5 and was signed into law by the President as P.L. 109-280 on August 17, 2006. The Pension Protection Act is the most comprehensive reform of the nation's pension laws since the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA, P.L. 93-406 ). It establishes new funding requirements for defined benefit pensions and includes reforms that will affect cash balance pension plans, defined contribution plans, and deferred compensation plans for executives and highly compensated employees. Prompted by the default in recent years of several large defined benefit pension plans and the increasing deficit of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the Bush Administration in January 2005 advanced a proposal for pension funding reform, which was designed to increase the minimum funding requirements for pension plans and strengthen the pension insurance system. In 2005, major pension reform bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In the Senate, Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Finance Committee, introduced S. 1783 , the Pension Security and Transparency Act. In the House, Representative John Boehner, then Chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, introduced H.R. 2830 , the Pension Protection Act, which subsequently was renumbered as H.R. 4 . The legislation ultimately passed by the House and Senate and signed into law by the President on August 17, 2006, was based mainly on these two bills, with the final version being the result of conference negotiations between the House and Senate that began in March 2006 and continued through July. This report summarizes the main provisions of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) as they affect single-employer defined benefit plans, multiemployer defined benefit plans, and defined contribution plans. This report will not be updated.

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At their March 2007 summit, EU member states moved to boost European coordination to help secure and diversify energy supplies, increase the development and use of renewable and alternative energy resources within the EU, and reduce energy demand and consumption. Although member state governments remain reluctant to cede national sovereignty over energy-security aspects of their foreign policies, they have set binding EU-wide targets for the use of renewable energies and biofuels, and have agreed to ambitious but non-binding energy efficiency and carbon emission reduction targets for the year 2020. Europe's renewed interest in energy security has been influenced by both internal and external factors. In several hearings during the first session of the 110 th Congress, Members of Congress voiced concern about Europe's dependence on Russian energy resources, and the potential for Russian manipulation of European energy markets. Barring significant policy changes, this figure is expected to rise to 65% by 2030. In 1991, the European Union launched the Energy Charter Declaration, an initiative intended to promote energy cooperation and diversify Europe's energy supply. Despite these calls, some European countries and energy companies have continued to pursue long-term energy deals bilaterally. Europe imports about 50% of its total energy supply—slightly over 80% of its oil and close to 57% of its natural gas. An Energy Policy for Europe? European leaders have responded by renewing efforts to establish a more cohesive European energy policy. Commission officials place particular emphasis on the links between energy security, energy efficiency, and an EU-wide reduction in carbon emissions. However, bilateral energy agreements between some member states, notably Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria, and Russian firms, illuminate continued disagreement within the EU on how best to deal with Moscow. European leaders are expected to agree on a solution during the first half of 2008. Projections for European energy consumption indicate that one of the most important energy security challenges facing the EU over the next 20 years will be Europe's ability to diversify the sources and modes of transit of its energy imports. On the investment side, analysts also see Russia playing the political card. In March 2007, EU member states agreed to a legally binding target mandating that 20% of total European energy consumption be fueled by renewable energy sources by 2020. With regard to foreign policy, efforts to advance energy dialogues with Russia and other energy producing and transit regions are being pursued in a more open and coordinated manner between the EU's Office of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the individual member states, and the Commission has outlined specific foreign policy goals with regard to multilateral treaties and an expansion of the EU's Neighborhood Policy. None of these forums has convened more than twice, however, and at the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, D.C., the United States Administration reportedly rejected European calls for a commitment to pursue binding international global emissions and energy efficiency targets. Just as EU member states have expressed concern regarding a perceived U.S. reluctance to link transatlantic energy security to pursuit of a global climate change treaty, U.S. Administration officials and analysts point to a potential long-term threat to transatlantic relations arising from European dependence on Russian energy and Gazprom's growing influence in large segments of Europe's energy infrastructure.

Recent increases in energy prices and a steady escalation in global energy demand—expected to rise by nearly 60% over the next 20 years—have led U.S. policy-makers to engage in a wide ranging debate over how best to address the country's future energy requirements. Similarly, energy security has become a policy priority for the European Union (EU) and its 27 member states. The EU imports about 50% of its energy needs. Barring significant changes, the European Commission expects this figure to rise to 65% by 2030. About half of the EU's natural gas imports and 30% of its imported oil come from Russia. Europe's growing dependence on Russian energy, and long-term energy agreements between Russian firms and some European governments have fueled speculation that Moscow is using the "energy weapon" to try to influence European foreign and economic policy. The EU has traditionally exerted little if any influence over individual member state energy policy. However, in March 2007, in the face of increasing concern about Europe's reliance on Russian energy, and growing public pressure to address global climate change, EU member states agreed to forge an "Energy Policy for Europe." They have agreed on a set of EU-wide targets—some legally binding—to increase the use of renewable energy, and reduce carbon emissions. However, member states continue to pursue divergent external energy policies, particularly toward Russia, and some European countries remain reluctant to cede national control over energy markets. The United States and Europe have steadily broadened the transatlantic energy dialogue to include joint promotion of collective energy security, energy efficiency and alternative energy sources. At the April 2007 U.S.-EU summit, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic agreed to advance cooperation to develop alternative and renewable energy technologies. However, U.S. officials have expressed concern at some European member states' unwillingness to exert more pressure on Russia to comply with EU market principles. On the other hand, European leaders appear increasingly frustrated with U.S. reluctance to pursue binding multilateral regulatory frameworks to reduce carbon emissions and promote energy efficiency. Members of Congress have expressed an interest in efforts to increase European energy security, particularly vis-a-vis Russia. In the first session of the 110th Congress, committees held hearings that touched on the issue of European energy dependence on Russia, and on European efforts to increase energy efficiency and renewable energy use. The second session of the 110th Congress may also hold hearings and pursue legislation on various aspects of EU energy policy. This report examines some of Europe's critical energy security challenges and EU efforts to coordinate a common European energy strategy. It also includes an overview of broader transatlantic energy security cooperation and will be updated as needed. For additional information, see CRS Report RL34261, Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS22409, NATO and Energy Security, by [author name scrubbed].

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Since September 11, 2001, legislators,government agencies, and industry have been working to prevent terrorist attacks involvinghazardous chemicals. (2) In the 109th Congress, forexample, H.R. 2651 would establish or increase penalties for criminal or terrorist activities aroundports and marine vessels. S. 1052 includes provisions to increase general port security, includingports in foreign countries. In response to the overall security environment, Congress is likely to seeka broader understanding of hazardous chemical marine shipments and efforts to secure them. Maritime Terrorism and Hazardous Chemical Cargo Marine shipments of hazardous chemical cargo are potentially attractive terrorist targetsbecause these chemicals are acutely toxic or highly combustible, and are shipped in large volumes. This report uses the EPA/RMP chemicals as the basis for marine cargo hazard analysis. Hazardous Marine Cargo Statistics The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) maintains statistics of marine commerce in U.S. waters. Thesehazardous chemicals accounted for 2% of total U.S. waterborne cargo tonnage. Over 100,000 marine shipments of EPA/RMP hazardous cargo passed through U.S.waterways in 2003. (32) Based on these statistics,the average waterborne shipment of most of the EPA/RMP hazardous chemicals would be ofsufficient volume to require an off-site risk management plan under the EPA's rules if the samequantity of chemical was stored on land. Some port facilities producehazardous cargo. Of these 113 ports, the top 30 handledapproximately 95% of EPA/RMP hazardous cargo tonnage. The plans also address how federal, state, and local resources will bedeployed to prevent terrorist attacks. (58) The Coast Guard has used these assessments in augmentingsecurity of key marine assets and in developing the agency's new maritime security standards underthe Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA, P.L. 107-295 ). ports." Available studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that these shipments maybe attractive terrorist targets and, if successfully attacked or used as a weapon, could causecatastrophic injuries among the general public. The MTSA gives the Coast Guard clear and far-ranging authority overthe security of hazardous marine shipping. As oversight of the federal role in marinechemicals security continues, Congress may raise questions concerning terrorism risk uncertaintyand efforts by federal agencies and the private sector to rigorously evaluate that risk. Congressionalpolicy makers may also analyze whether the Coast Guard, other government agencies, and theprivate sector have sufficient resources to secure hazardous chemical cargo commensurate with thatrisk and whether current security measures will be effective against a terrorist attack. Since a marineattack is possible even under tight security, evaluating the emergency response capabilities of coastalcommunities exposed to chemical shipping hazards may be of interest as well. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S.hazardous chemicals marine security fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect the publicfrom hazardous chemicals and cargo. Reviewing how these security priorities and activities fit together to achieve common goals couldbe an oversight challenge for Congress.

Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the nation has been working to improve thesecurity of hazardous chemicals transportation. Marine shipments of hazardous chemical cargo maybe attractive terrorist targets because of their large volume and inherent toxicity or flammability. Anecdotal evidence and international events suggest that terrorists may have both the desire andcapability to attack such shipments in U.S. waters. Building on existing legislation, Congress isanalyzing the security of hazardous chemical marine shipments and deciding whether to strengthenrelated federal security efforts. H.R. 2651, for example, would increase penalties for criminal orterrorist activities around ports and marine vessels. S. 1052 includes provisions to increase generalport security, including foreign port security. Drawing on marine commerce data from the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), CRS hasanalyzed marine shipments of acutely toxic or combustible chemicals as defined underEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. According to this analysis, over 100,000marine shipments (54 million tons) of chemicals potentially capable of causing mass casualties(injuries or deaths) among the general public passed through U.S. waters in 2003. These chemicalshipments accounted for 2% of U.S. marine cargo tonnage and were shipped through 113 U.S. ports. The top 30 ports handled 95% of this hazardous chemical tonnage. Most marine shipments ofhazardous chemicals are much larger than such shipments on land; they would be of sufficientvolume, on average, to require an off-site risk management plan under EPA rules if the samequantity of chemical was stored at a chemical plant. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA, P.L. 107-295 ) and the International Shipand Port Facility Security Code give the Coast Guard far-ranging authority over the security ofhazardous marine shipping. The agency has developed port security plans addressing how to deployfederal, state, and local resources to prevent terrorist attacks. Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard hasassessed the overall vulnerability of marine vessels, their potential to transport terrorists or terrormaterials, and their use as potential weapons. The Coast Guard has employed these assessments toaugment marine assets security and develop new maritime security standards. As federal oversight of hazardous chemical marine security continues to evolve, Congressmay raise questions concerning terrorism risk uncertainty and efforts by federal agencies and theprivate sector to rigorously evaluate that risk. Congress may assess whether responsible federalagencies and private sector entities have in place sufficient resources and effective measures tosecure hazardous chemical marine cargo from terrorist attack. Congress may also evaluate theemergency response capabilities of coastal communities exposed to chemical shipping hazards. Determining how hazardous chemical marine security fits together with other homeland securitypriorities to achieve common security goals could be an oversight challenge for the 109th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Overview of 2003 Terrorist Trends On April 29, 2004, the Department of State released its Patterns of Global Terrorism report(hereafter referred to as Patterns 2003 ). (2) Revised data (3) show minimal change in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2003over 2002 levels -- an increase from 205 attacks to 208. In 2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S. attacks declined visibly, 60 anti-US attacks in 2003 as opposed to 77 attacks in the previousyear. In 2003, as in 2002, both the highest number of attacks (80) and highest number ofcasualties (159 dead and 1,268 wounded) continued to occur in Asia where the number of attacksdeclined roughly by one-fifth, and the number of casualties increased roughly 11%. (19) The final report of the 9/11 Commission, issued on June 22, 2004, recommends the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. Subsequently on August 2, 2004, President Bush announcedsimilar plans to establish such a center. The new center is envisioned as serving as a centralknowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and would be charged withcoordinating and monitoring counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies, andpreparing the daily terrorism report for the President and senior officials. (20) Presumably the functionof compiling the data for Patterns will be performed by the new National Counterterrorism Center, if and when it is established. It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandated the first Patterns report. At the time the report was originally conceived as a reference document, the primary threat from terrorism wasstate sponsored. Since then, the threat has evolved, with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and non-statesponsors increasingly posing a major threat. In light of the high level of international attention attached to the report and theincreased complexity and danger posed by the terrorist threat, some observers have suggested thata thorough Executive/Congressional review of Patterns , its structure and content, may be timely andwarranted. Patterns of Global Terrorism Data, 2002-2003 Note: Based on revised data published in Patterns 2003. More recently this function has beentransferred to the newly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).

This report highlights trends and data found in the State Department's annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report , (Patterns 2003) and addresses selected issues relating to its content. Thisreport will not be updated. On April 29, 2004, the Department of State released its annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report. After discrepancies were noted in reported data, the Department of State issued revisedstatistics on June 22, 2004. The newly released data showed minimal change in the number ofterrorist attacks worldwide in 2003 over 2002 levels -- an increase from 205 attacks to 208. In2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S. attacks declined visibly, 60 anti-U.S. attacks in 2003as opposed to 77 attacks in the previous year. In 2003, the number of persons killed in internationalterrorist attacks was 625, down from 725 in 2002. In 2003, persons wounded numbered 3,646, upfrom 2,013 the previous year. In 2003, as in 2002, both the highest number of attacks (80) andhighest number of casualties (159 dead and 1,268 wounded) continued to occur in Asia. Notably,the report defines terrorist acts as incidents directed against noncombatants. Thus, attacks in Iraqon military targets are not included. Patterns , a work widely perceived as a standard, authoritative reference tool on terrorist activity, trends, and groups, has been subject to periodic criticism that it is unduly influenced bydomestic, other foreign policy, political and economic considerations. Patterns is currentlyundergoing an internal executive branch review. This year for the first time, data contained in Patterns was provided by the newly operational Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). On August 2, 2004, President Bush announced plans tocreate a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), an institutional change recommended by the9/11 Commission in its July 19, 2004 report. The center is envisioned as serving as a centralknowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and would be charged withcoordinating and monitoring counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies, andpreparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President and senior officials. Presumably thefunction of compiling the data for Patterns will be performed by the new National CounterterrorismCenter, if and when it is established. It has been some fifteen years since Congress mandated the first Patterns report. When the report was originally conceived as a reference document, the primary threat from terrorism was statesponsored. Since then, the threat has evolved with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and non-state sponsorsincreasingly posing a major threat. Given the increased complexity and danger posed by the terroristthreat, one option available to Congress and the executive branch is to take a fresh look at Patterns, its structure and content.

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This report offers context for consideration of immigration policy options by presenting data on key geographic, demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the foreign-born population residing in the United States. The foreign born have a variety of immigration statuses and include immigrants, refugees, nonimmigrants, and persons illegally residing in the United States. Interest in the U.S. foreign born stems, in part, from the changing demographic profile of the U.S. population, the rapidity of such change, and how both trends correspond to the objectives of U.S. immigration policy. Although relatively small in absolute terms, the foreign born are growing faster than the native-born population generally and specifically among young people and the civilian labor force. By 2010, the foreign-born population had increased to 39.9 million people representing 12.9% of the total U.S. population (see Figure 1 ). Geographic Distribution in the United States The geography of foreign-born population settlement in the United States can be divided between the "stock" of the existing population and the "flow" of the recently arrived foreign born. In 2010, almost 35% of all foreign-born persons in the United States had arrived since 2000, and almost 62% since 1990. However, at the other end of the education distribution, the proportion of the foreign born with at least a bachelor's degree matches that of the native born. Foreign-born male workers exhibit consistently higher labor force participation rates than native-born workers both in total and across all age and education categories. In some heavily unionized occupations such as locomotive engineers and construction inspectors, native-born workers dominate. On average, median incomes of native-born workers are higher than foreign-born workers. Concluding Observations The 39.9 million foreign born (in 2010) make up roughly one-eighth of the U.S. population, but between 2000 and 2010, they accounted for nearly one-third of all U.S. population growth. Origins of the foreign born have shifted from Europe (74% in 1960) to Latin America and Asia (81% in 2010). While many foreign-born persons have settled recently in new urban and rural destinations, two-thirds of the foreign-born population lives in California, New York, Florida, Texas, Illinois, and New Jersey. Lower education levels and differences in industrial sector and occupational distributions partly explain income and poverty differences between foreign-born and native-born workers; for those with at least a four-year college degree, earnings differences by nativity are minimal. Among the foreign born, median incomes of naturalized citizens are roughly 60% higher than those of noncitizens, reflecting higher education levels, older ages, and greater U.S. labor market experience. Poverty status is linked to the lack of citizenship, a difference that is magnified after including the "near-poor," who earn between 100% and 200% of the poverty threshold.

This report offers context for consideration of immigration policy options by presenting data on key geographic, demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the foreign-born population residing in the United States. Interest in the U.S. foreign-born population stems in part from the changing demographic profile of the United States as well as the rapidity of such change, and how both of these trends correspond to U.S. immigration policy. Although the foreign born are relatively small in absolute terms—39.9 million people representing 12.9% of the total U.S. population of 309.3 million in 2010—they are growing far more rapidly than the native-born population. Between 2000 and 2010, the foreign born contributed 32% of the total U.S. population increase and almost all of the prime 25-54 working age group increase. Almost one-third of the foreign born arrived in the United States since 2000, and an estimated 28% were residing illegally in the United States in 2010. Geographic origins of the foreign born have shifted from Europe (74% in 1960) to Latin America and Asia (81% in 2010). In recent years, many foreign born have settled in new urban and rural destinations, often in response to employment opportunities in construction, manufacturing, and low-skilled services. Yet, as in previous decades, at least two-thirds of the foreign born remain concentrated in just six states: California, New York, Florida, Texas, Illinois, and New Jersey. Several measures of marital status and household structure show little difference between the native born and foreign born. The foreign born have lower average educational attainment, but the proportion with at least a bachelor's degree matches that of the native born. In 2010, the foreign born accounted for 16.3% of all workers, with higher labor force participation rates among men and lower rates among women compared to native-born workers. With exceptions, native and foreign-born workers generally resemble each other in their distribution across broad industrial and occupational sectors. Among specific occupations, however, glaring differences occur, with native-born workers dominating occupations such as construction inspectors and librarians, and foreign-born workers dominating occupations such as agricultural laborers and tailors. Lower education levels and differences in industrial sector and occupational distributions explain in part why foreign-born workers have lower median incomes and higher poverty rates than native-born workers. Earnings differences are minimal for those with a four-year college degree. Among the foreign born, median incomes of naturalized citizens are 62% higher than those of noncitizens, reflecting higher education levels, older ages, and greater U.S. labor market experience. Poverty status is linked to the lack of citizenship, a difference that is magnified after including the "near-poor," who earn between 100% and 200% of the poverty threshold. Although foreign-born population growth and transformation often occur because of factors beyond the control of Congress—including political turmoil and natural disasters in neighboring countries and social and economic processes of globalization—how Congress crafts immigration law does influence the size and character of resulting immigration flows to the United States.

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Through HOPE VI, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides funds to rehabilitate or demolish public housing and replace it with housing that serves both the poor as well as the middle class. In the law, severely distressed public housing was defined as public housing that requires major redesign, reconstruction or redevelopment, or partial or total demolition; is a significant contributing factor to the physical decline of and disinvestment by public and private entities in the surrounding neighborhood; is occupied predominantly by families that are very low-income families with children, unemployed, and dependent on various forms of public assistance; or has high rates of vandalism and criminal activity (including drug-related criminal activity) in comparison to other housing in the area; cannot be revitalized through assistance under other programs because of cost constraints and inadequacy of available amounts; and is lacking in sufficient appropriate transportation, supportive services, economic opportunity, schools, civic and religious institutions, and public services, resulting in severe social distress in the project. Each year since, Congress has extended the program's authorization in the annual appropriations acts. The Program The purpose of the HOPE VI program is to revitalize severely distressed public housing developments and transform them into safe, liveable environments. 108-186 ) created a fourth type of HOPE VI grant, designed to promote "main street" revitalization in small communities, which is unrelated to public housing. Often, demolition-only grants are used as precursors to future HOPE VI revitalization grant initiatives. Revitalization Grants The bulk of funding provided for the HOPE VI program has been awarded through revitalization grants, which is the most well-known component of the program. They can be used for the development of new public housing, rehabilitation of existing public housing, demolition and/or disposition of existing public housing, the creation of homeownership replacement units, the acquisition of new property, the relocation of displaced residents, community and supportive services for residents, and administrative fees and costs. Up to 20% of grant funds may be used for community and supportive services programs. Over the history of the HOPE VI program, over $6 billion worth of revitalization grants have been awarded to PHAs in 36 states and territories. No demolition-only grants have been awarded since FY2003. Main Street Grants The application process for Main Street grants largely mirrors that for revitalization grants. Successes and Concerns HOPE VI has been credited with a number of successes. Another important change has come in the way that Congress provides funding to the HOPE VI program. Recent Developments Funding The Bush Administration requested no new funding for the HOPE VI program in each of his FY2004-FY2008 budget requests to Congress. Each year, Congress rejected the Bush Administration's request to eliminate funding for the program, but it contined funding at a level significantly less than the amout provided prior to FY2004. President Obama's first budget in FY2010 requested no new funding for HOPE VI, and instead, requested $250 million for a new Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (discussed later in this report). In FY2012, for the first time since the program's inception, Congress provided no new funding for HOPE VI ( P.L. 108-7 ) but later extended the HOPE VI program through the end of FY2006, as a part of a larger bill designed to make changes to a number of housing programs, including HOPE VI. Choice Neighborhoods The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CNI) was originally proposed by the Obama Administration as a replacement for the HOPE VI program. While the Choice Neighborhoods initiative has received some support for its concept of broadening the focus beyond public housing, it has also been met with concerns. Legislation to authorize the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative was approved by the House Financial Services Committee in the 111 th Congress but was not enacted before the end of the 111 th Congress ( H.R.

The Revitalization of Distressed Public Housing program, referred to as HOPE VI, has been credited with eliminating and replacing some of the most dangerous and dilapidated public housing in the country with new mixed income communities. However, the program has come under scrutiny for slow expenditure of funds and for displacing poor families. Reflecting these criticisms, the Bush Administration requested no new funding for the program in each budget request from FY2004-FY2009, and the Obama Administration requested no new funding (proposing, instead, that Congress fund a new program) in the FY2010 and FY2011 budget requests. Congress responded by continuing to fund the program, but at less than a quarter of what it had been funded at in FY2003 and prior years. In FY2012, for the first time since the program's inception, Congress provided no new funding for HOPE VI. Created in 1992 and administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the HOPE VI program provides funds to renovate or demolish existing public housing and replace it with mixed-income housing. The local public housing authorities (PHAs) that administer public housing apply for grants and use the funds to leverage other private and public resources. The main component of the HOPE VI program is revitalization grants, which can be used for demolition, rehabilitation, and new construction of public housing, as well as land acquisition, relocation of residents, and community and supportive services for residents. HUD has also provided demolition-only grants that could be used—often in conjunction with revitalization grants—for the physical destruction of distressed public housing and the relocation of its residents, although no demolition grants have been issued for several years. A third type of grant, planning grants, are no longer awarded, but could be used for technical assistance in preparing a property to go through a demolition or revitalization. Another type of revitalization grant, Main Street Revitalization Grants, was created in 2003. They are available to local governments in small communities rather than PHAs for main street revitalization projects, which may be unrelated to public housing. Over the history of the program, 268 HOPE VI revitalization grants (incluing Main Street grants) have been made to PHAs in 41 states, districts, and territories. As of June 2009, the program had been responsible for the demolition of 93,295 units of public housing and the construction or substantial rehabilitation of 78,692 replacement units. The HOPE VI program has helped transform a number of severely distressed neighborhoods, which has made the program popular with many members of Congress from both parties. The program's authorization was set to expire at the end of FY2006, but Congress has extended the authorization for the program each year in the annual appropraitions acts. Beginning with its FY2010 budget request to Congress, the Obama Administration has requested that Congress replace the HOPE VI program with a new program, the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CNI), which would expand the scope of HOPE VI beyond public housing to other assisted housing, with a greater focus on neighborhood revitalization. The House Financial Services approved authorizing legislation in the 111th Congress, but it was not enacted before the end of the session. Congress did fund a demonstration of CNI in the FY2010-FY2012 HUD appropriations act. FY2012 was the first year since the HOPE VI program began that it received no new appropriations. However, the FY2012 appropriations law (P.L. 112-55) did extend the authorization for the program.

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The U.N. Security Council has authorized the use of"force" or its equivalent on a number ofoccasions. The four instances before 1990 when the Council authorized the use of force are (1) Council Resolution 83 (1950), adopted June 27, 1950, to "furnish suchassistance...necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore...peace and security" at the start of the Korean War;(2) Council Resolution 161A (1961), adoptedFebruary 21, 1961, to "take...all appropriate measures to prevent ...civil war in the Congo, including...the use offorce, if necessary, in the last resort," anauthorization to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC); (3) Council Resolution 169 (1961),adopted November 24, 1961, "to take vigorousaction, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary" to remove foreign military and otherpersonnel not under the U.N. Command, anotherauthorization to ONUC in the Congo; and (4) Council Resolution 221 (1966), adopted April 9, 1966, "calls on the...United Kingdom to prevent by the use offorce if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels...believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia...." The Councildid not cite the Charter in these fourresolutions. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 1-2, 1990, set into motion a series of actions byU.N. In 1991 , the U.N. Security Council adopted a series of 12 resolutions that assigned anextensive set of tasks to the United Nations and imposed on Iraq an equally extensive series of obligations. On September 12, 2002, President Bush in his address to the U.N. General Assembly, had focused on Iraq and its failure to comply with various resolutionsadopted by the U.N. Security Council. He urged the Security Council to act in the face of such repeated violations: My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our commonchallenge.

On September 12, 2002, President Bush in his address to the U.N. General Assembly,focused on Iraq and its failureto comply with various resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council. He urged the Council to act in the faceof such repeated violations. On November 8,2002, the Council responded, adopting Resolution 1441 (2002) unanimously. This short report provides backgroundinformation on what the U.N. SecurityCouncil is and what it does, including the occasions when it has authorized the use of force or its equivalent. Asthe U.N. organ having primary responsibilityfor the maintenance of peace and security, the 15-member Security Council set the major international response tothe August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,authorizing the use of "force" to gain Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait in compliance with the 11 resolutionspreviously passed in 1990. In 1991, after the war,the Council adopted a series of 12 resolutions that assigned an extensive set of tasks to the United Nations andimposed on Iraq an equally extensive series ofobligations. As hostilities became imminent, U.N. activities inside Iraq were suspended. After March 19, 2003,the Council met in late March to air U.N.member concerns over the hostilities. This report ends with the start of hostilities and will not be updated.

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That agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), would come to symbolize the fierce debate that occupies campaign finance policy overall. The FEC is responsible for civil enforcement of federal campaign finance law. Scope of the Report The report provides background information about key areas of controversy and context that might be relevant for Congress as the House and Senate approach their oversight duties, appropriate funds, consider nominations, and explore options for restructuring the FEC or maintaining the status quo. As discussed throughout this report, issues ranging from minor administrative matters to fundamental changes in campaign finance law might be relevant as Congress considers the FEC. Because there appears to be little congressional consensus about how or whether to address the FEC and its functions, this report provides a resource for Congress to examine which policy questions and options are of particular interest, if any. Another CRS report discusses the FEC's role in enforcing campaign finance law and regulation. Congress most recently held an oversight hearing focusing on the FEC in 2011, as discussed later in this report. Modern campaign finance policy took root in the 1970s with enactment of FECA and related amendments—where this report begins. Today, all commissioners are presidentially appointed with Senate advice and consent. No more than three commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party. The " Deadlocked Votes " section provides additional detail. Selected Policy and Organizational Issues Throughout its history, the FEC has been controversial. Congress has not actively addressed either topic through recent legislation or oversight. Congress has not recently considered legislation on this proposal. Reorganization Proposals Since the agency's inception, some Members of Congress have proposed reorganizing the FEC to alter the number of commissioners or otherwise change the agency's structure. In these debates, commissioners do not necessarily differ on transparency per se, but on their interpretation of how and whether public input should be limited to those who are directly affected by a commission decision—such as a particular enforcement action or advisory opinion—or whether the commission also should solicit public feedback about campaign finance policy generally rather than on specific regulatory matters. "[W]hile most observers are content to dismiss the commission as a bureaucratic sideshow on the American political landscape, most also are willing to credit the agency with at least one major success.... [T]he FEC has built on earlier attempts to make campaign finance data open to public scrutiny and has made disclosure of campaign dollars an accepted and expected part of the electoral process." The IG reported that the agency nonetheless "continues to struggle with implementing IT projects" and said that it would continue to monitor the FEC's progress on IT issues. Potential Considerations for Congress and Concluding Comments The Federal Election Commission is one of the most roundly criticized agencies in Washington. These criticisms are familiar, but examining the agency's mission and the context in which it operates is less common. Does Congress want to retain the FEC's six-member, bipartisan structure?

More than 40 years ago, Congress created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and related amendments. Today, the FEC is responsible for administering disclosure of millions of campaign finance transactions; interpretation and civil enforcement of FECA and agency regulations; and administering the presidential public financing program. Six presidentially appointed commissioners, who are subject to Senate advice and consent, head the FEC. No more than three members may be affiliated with the same political party. Congress arrived at this bipartisan, even-numbered structure amid debate over how to properly insulate the campaign finance agency from political pressures. Although this structure ensures that commissioners must reach bipartisan agreement to make most decisions, it has not saved the agency from bipartisan criticism. Throughout its history, critics have alleged that the FEC fails to adequately regulate campaign finance activity or does so too stringently. Discussion of what the commission does, why it does so, and how is less common. This report provides selected information about the FEC's history and ongoing issues that are likely to be of interest to Congress for appropriations, legislative, or oversight activities. The discussion is organized around those factors that most actively shape the FEC: its structure and commission appointments; organizational issues; and debate over campaign finance policy. These selected topics represent both ongoing and recent areas of congressional activity. CRS Report R44319, The Federal Election Commission: Enforcement Process and Selected Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] provides additional information about the FEC's enforcement process—a topic that is related to some of the issues discussed in this report but also distinct from the organizational and administrative themes considered here. As the FEC heads toward a half-century of regulating campaigns, perhaps the most fundamental question facing Congress and the commission is what the agency's mission should be today and in the future. As Congress monitors the FEC, it perhaps faces a choice similar to that facing the agency itself: whether to focus on major change—if any—or to emphasize managing routine business. Recent Congresses have engaged in oversight activities surrounding the FEC's enforcement practices and agency transparency. For more than 20 years, Congress occasionally has considered legislation to restructure the agency, particularly to change the number of commissioners, thereby reducing possibilities for deadlocked votes. H.R. 2931 in the 114th Congress is the latest such proposal. This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.

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RS21815 -- Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (S. 2290, 108th Congress) Updated January 21, 2005 Payment of Asbestos Injury Claims "Any individual [or, if he is deceased, his personal representative] who has suffered from a[n eligible] disease or condition . If,however, a claimant had filed a timely claim that was pending infederal or state court on the date of enactment of the bill, such claim would have to be dismissed, and the statuteof limitations to file a claim under the bill would be four years from thedate of enactment of the bill (� 113(b)(2)). A claimant, in other words, could receiveall these amounts in addition to his award from the Asbestos InjuryClaims Resolution Fund. Defendant participants would apparently be companies that have beensued for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos, and insurer participants would be the insurers of suchcompanies. S. 2290 would establish the Asbestos Insurers Commission, which would be composed of fivemembers, appointed for the life of the Commission, by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate (�211). "Insurers that have paid, or been assessed by a legal judgment or settlement, at least $1,000,000 in defense and indemnity costs before the date of enactment of this act in response toclaims for compensation for asbestos injuries . (8) Judicial review.

This report provides an overview of S. 2290, 108th Congress, theFairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004 (or FAIRAct of 2004), as introduced by Senator Hatch on April 7, 2004 and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. S.2290 was a revised version of S. 1125, 108thCongress, as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (S.Rept. 108-188). (1) A cloture vote failed on April 22, 2004, and S. 2290 was never votedon. S. 2290 would have created the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, within the Department of Labor,to award damages to asbestos claimants on a no-fault basis. Damages would have been paid by the Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund, which would have been fundedby companies that have previously been sued for asbestos-relatedinjuries, and by insurers of such companies. Asbestos claims could no longer have been filed or pursued under statelaw, except for the enforcement of judgments no longer subject toany appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of the bill. For background information on the history of asbestos litigation and on other proposals to address the situation,see CRS Report RL32286, Asbestos Litigation: Prospects for LegislativeResolution, by Edward Rappaport.

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The Salton Sea was formed in 1905 when the Colorado River broke through a canal gate, allowing water to flow into the Salton Basin uninterrupted for 18 months. The implementation of this agreement has resulted in less water flowing into the Salton Sea, thus accelerating its ecological decline. Some contend that the Salton Sea should not be restored. They note that the Salton Sea will follow a similar process and that countering this natural process will be costly and ultimately not worth the cost. These opponents argue that the restoration funds should instead be used to restore other natural wetlands in California, such as the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers' delta confluence with San Francisco Bay (Bay-Delta). Further, they note that the value of restoring the Salton Sea lies in its ecological significance as a large wetland along the Pacific Flyway and a habitat for fish and wildlife, and its potential to stimulate economic development in the region through tourism, recreation, and energy development. Background Geological and Ecological Characteristics of the Salton Sea The Salton Sea is located in southern California and is considered the largest inland water body in the state. The Salton Basin, where the Salton Sea is located, has supported many lakes and water bodies throughout its geological history. Nearly 75% of the water flowing into the Sea comes from agricultural runoff originating in the Imperial and Coachella valleys in California, the other 25% is from rain and other surface inflows. Salton Sea and the Quantification Settlement Agreement Farmlands in the Imperial and Coachella valleys have historically been irrigated with approximately 3.3 million AFY of Colorado River water. Environmental Concerns in the Salton Sea Some contend that the most pressing issue for the Salton Sea is increasingly high salinity. water transfers and agriculture), which have decreased the potential for restoration. Since then, several federal, state, and private entities have developed proposals to restore the Sea, primarily by controlling its salinity and maintaining its water level. They also note that the Salton Sea ecosystem is important for several listed species under the federal ESA and that the Department of the Interior is currently conducting studies to evaluate proposals for restoring the Salton Sea. If Congress considers expanding the federal role in restoring the Salton Sea, there are a few factors to consider, including (1) creating authorizing legislation to create a comprehensive plan (or implement an existing plan) and governance structure for restoration; (2) funding existing authorized activities or a new effort at restoration; (3) addressing restoration under ESA; and (4) maintaining the status quo of providing assistance to the State of California. Many state, tribal, and federal agencies have a stake in the Basin and each has proposed different plans. Severe effects on the ecosystem are expected as soon as 2018, according to some models. Specifically, proponents of restoring the Sea base their arguments on the value of the Salton Sea as one of the few remaining habitats in the region for migratory birds and other fish and wildlife. However, due to the pace of change in the Salton Sea and the anticipation of severe effects on the ecosystem due to water transfers, Congress may decide to address restoration by increasing the federal role in restoration efforts. This could be done by funding existing federal authorities that address, or could address, restoring the ecosystem; authorizing federal participation and appropriations for implementing existing restoration plans; and authorizing a new comprehensive plan to be created that might involve participation from federal and non-federal stakeholders, similar to other restoration initiatives around the country. Congress might also decide not to address restoration of the Salton Sea ecosystem, or, rather, maintain the status quo of federal participation.

The Salton Sea is located in southern California and is considered the largest inland water body in the state. The Salton Basin, where the Salton Sea is located, has supported many lakes and water bodies throughout its geological history. The Salton Sea was created when a canal gate broke in 1905 allowing fresh Colorado River water into the Basin. The Salton Sea is now sustained by agricultural runoff from farmlands in the Imperial and Coachella valleys. It provides permanent and temporary habitat for many species of plants and animals, including several endangered species. It also serves as an important recreational area for the region. The Salton Sea has been altered by increasing salinity and decreasing size caused by steadily decreasing water flows into the Sea. High salinity levels and shrinking area have been linked to habitat changes and stressed populations of plants and animals, economic losses in the region, and impaired air quality. Efforts to restore the Salton Sea ecosystem have been discussed and initiated through state and federal actions. Several studies by state and federal agencies have provided baseline data about the Sea, and some restoration plans have been proposed. The State of California, the Salton Sea Authority, and the federal government through the Bureau of Reclamation have devised plans for restoring the Sea. However, none of these plans are being fully implemented. Federal authorities that address restoration of the Salton Sea are generally based on creating and evaluating proposals for restoration, rather than implementing restoration activities in a comprehensive manner similar to other initiatives in the Everglades and Great Lakes. California is pursuing restoration options, but funding for implementing them is lacking. Whether or not to restore the Salton Sea remains controversial. Proponents of restoration contend that the Salton Sea ecosystem is valuable from an ecological standpoint because it is one of the few remaining large-scale wetland habitats in California for migratory birds and fish. Further, some argue that keeping the Salton Sea intact will stimulate economic development, recreation, and tourism in the region. They note that losing the Sea could cause economic and environmental decline, and could lead to air quality problems from exposed seabeds. Others contend that the Sea should not be restored. They argue that the Salton Sea is naturally declining, as it has throughout its geological history. Further, they note that countering this process will be costly and ultimately not worth the expense. They state that limited restoration funds should be used to restore other natural wetlands in California, such as the Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay Delta. The decline of the Salton Sea ecosystem is accelerating due to water transfers from agricultural lands to municipal water districts in San Diego under the terms of the Quantification Settlement Agreement, an agreement on how to share California's apportionment of Colorado River water. The water transfers have resulted in less water flowing into the Salton Sea and accelerated increases in salinity and shoreline recession. According to some scientists, salinity levels may reach lethal levels for most fish and wildlife as soon as 2018. These predictions, along with the steadily declining ecosystem might provoke Congress to consider a larger role in restoration for the federal government. Congress may decide to address restoration by increasing the federal role in restoration efforts. This could be done by funding existing federal authorities that address, or could address, restoring the ecosystem; authorizing federal participation and appropriations for implementing existing restoration plans; or authorizing a new comprehensive plan to be created that might involve participation from federal and non-federal stakeholders, similar to other restoration initiatives around the country. Congress might also decide not to address restoration of the Salton Sea ecosystem, or simply maintain the status quo of federal participation.

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Ineffective and often corrupt police forces, weak and unaccountable prosecutors, and an overcrowded and disorganized prison system have undermined anticrime efforts. The U.S. government is providing significant support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico at a time when those reforms are at a critical juncture. Both U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing the 2008 judicial reforms is a key goal and a focus of bilateral efforts under the Mérida Initiative, the bilateral security program begun in FY2008. Under the judicial reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes should make the system more transparent, participatory (including a greater role for victims, judges, and defense attorneys), and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make them more flexible and efficient, thereby relieving backlogs and ensuring that cases that go to trial are for serious crimes. In order to be successful, Mexico's transition to this New Criminal Justice System (NCJS) will require structural, cultural, and systemic changes to Mexico's law enforcement and judicial institutions, including fundamentally retraining justice sector operators. Hearings and trials. Inaugurated in December 2012, President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI has vowed to advance judicial reforms at the federal level by introducing legislation to establish a new unified penal code (so that crimes would be classified uniformly across the country) and a code of criminal procedure that would annul all state codes. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico's 32 states (67%) had enacted new criminal procedure codes, the first major step in the reform process (see Table 1 below). The study found: Pre-trial detention rates have been reduced in reform states, while they have risen in non-reform states. Although USAID has been providing judicial reform assistance to Mexico since the late 1990s, U.S. support for judicial reform has increased significantly as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress appropriated $1.9 billion from FY2008-FY2012. That initial strategy was designed in response to the Calderón Administration's request for specific forms of U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance to help Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized crime. Funding for "institutionalizing the rule of law" (pillar two) now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance provided to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. U.S. rule of law programming is now focusing on supporting Mexico's transition to an oral, accusatorial justice system and helping Mexico address institutional weaknesses in its justice sector institutions. Congress has an oversight interest in ensuring that, as implemented, the new criminal justice system is strengthening human rights protections. Nevertheless, nearly five years into the reform process, implementation has lagged at the federal level and faced significant challenges in states that have begun operating under the new system. Congress is likely to closely monitor the actions taken by the Peña Nieto government and state governments in Mexico to advance the reform process as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico.

Fostering security, stability, and democracy in neighboring Mexico is seen by analysts to be in the U.S. national security and economic interest. Reforming Mexico's often corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and human rights in the country. Congress has provided significant support to help Mexico reform its justice system in order to make current anticrime efforts more effective and to strengthen the system over the long term. U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing judicial reforms enacted through constitutional changes in June 2008 is a key goal. Under the reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a judge to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes are expected to help make the system less prone to corruption and more transparent and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help them be more flexible and efficient, thereby ensuring that cases that go to trial involve serious crimes. More than halfway into the reform process, judicial reform efforts in Mexico are at a critical juncture. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico's 32 states had enacted new criminal procedure codes (67%), but only 12 states (36%) had begun operating at least partially under the new system. Reform states have seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial. Daunting challenges remain, however, including counter-reform efforts and opposition from some key justice sector operators (including judges). Although reform efforts have lagged at the federal level, President Enrique Peña Nieto, inaugurated in December 2012 to a six-year term, has said that advancing judicial reform will be a top priority. U.S. policymakers are likely to follow how the Peña Nieto government moves to enact a unified penal code and code of criminal procedure to hasten reform at the federal level and to increase support to states transitioning to the new system. The United States has been supporting judicial reform efforts in Mexico since the late 1990s, with assistance accelerating since the implementation of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, an anticrime assistance program for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. While the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces, it now emphasizes providing training and technical assistance to help reform Mexico's justice sector institutions. Funding for "Institutionalizing the Rule of Law" now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance to Mexico. This report provides an overview of Mexico's historic 2008 judicial reforms and an assessment of how those reforms have been implemented thus far. It then analyzes U.S. support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico and raises issues for Congress to consider as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico. Also see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed] and Kristin M. Finklea.

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Introduction Congress is again debating work requirements for programs providing need-tested assistance to low-income families and individuals. 104-193 ), which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant to replace the pre-1996 cash assistance program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Legislation before the 115 th Congress—the House-passed version of H.R. 2 —would expand work requirements in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). H.R. 5861 , reported to the House from the Ways and Means Committee, would alter some of TANF's rules regarding work. In addition, the Trump Administration is currently granting demonstration waivers for states to implement work requirements for certain recipients of Medicaid, and has proposed expanded work requirements for housing assistance programs. Work requirements for recipients of government assistance seek to achieve a variety of policy goals. What does the research evidence indicate about the impact of work requirements in meeting these policy goals? Most of the research that addresses this issue comes from a set of experiments, conducted prior to the 1996 welfare reform, on alternative approaches to the work and education provisions in TANF's predecessor program, AFDC. These programs combined work requirements with a program that provided funded employment and educational services. Both programs increased incomes. MFIP did not reduce assistance payments, and the Connecticut program did not reduce assistance payments before the time limit. Work Requirements for SNAP, Medicaid, and Housing Assistance Much of the current focus of the discussions on work requirements is on the SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance programs. SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance programs aid a broader population than did AFDC, as most recipients of AFDC were single mothers. The goals of the evaluated pre-1996 experiments involved moving nonworking AFDC recipients into work. However, as noted above, these programs also have recipients who are already working. Additionally, the Medicaid waivers are being granted with the goal of improving the health of the population covered by them, a different goal than connecting recipients to work. Different approaches to employment and education services . The accumulated evidence showed that mandatory welfare-to-work programs—the combination of funded employment and education services with mandatory participation requirements—could achieve some limited policy goals, increase employment, and reduce welfare receipt. As Congress debates work requirements in SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance, there is no large accumulated research base to draw from. Given the differences in populations, presence of those in the programs who are already working, goals, and funding structures for employment and education services, the findings of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments cannot be directly applied to the current debate. A key finding of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments was that it was work requirements and employment and education services combined with earnings supplements that both raised rates of employment and improved the economic outcomes of single mothers with children.

Congress is debating work requirements for recipients in programs providing need-tested assistance to low-income families and individuals. Legislation before the 115th Congress—the House-passed version of H.R. 2—would expand work requirements in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). H.R. 5861, reported to the House from the Ways and Means Committee, would alter some of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program's rules regarding work. In addition, the Trump Administration is currently granting demonstration waivers for states to implement work requirements for certain recipients of Medicaid, and it has proposed expanded work requirements for tenants in assisted housing. Work requirements for recipients of government assistance seek to achieve a variety of policy goals, including promoting work, reducing assistance caseloads, and improving the economic status of individuals and families. What does the research evidence indicate about the impact of work requirements? The impact of a policy is the difference it makes. Most of the research that addresses work requirements and need-tested assistance comes from a set of experiments, conducted prior to the 1996 welfare reform law, on alternative approaches to the work and education provisions in TANF's predecessor program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments provided evidence that, for mostly nonworking single mothers, work requirements combined with employment and education services could increase employment, increase wages, and reduce assistance payments. Such programs—without supplementing earnings—did not raise incomes. A subset of experiments on programs that combined work requirements, employment and education services, and continued earnings supplements found that some programs increased incomes, but when they did, they did not reduce the amount of government assistance provided to the family. However, the findings from the pre-1996 experiments cannot be automatically applied to TANF. TANF was implemented differently than the pre-1996 experiments. As Congress debates work requirements in SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance, there is no large accumulated research base to draw from that applies to these three programs. Given the differences in populations, presence of those in the programs who are already working, goals, and funding structures for employment and education services, the findings of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments cannot be directly applied to the current debate. Different populations. These three programs serve a broader population (including men, single persons, and childless couples) than did the evaluated pre-1996 experiments (mostly nonworking single mothers), with potentially different challenges. Different goals. SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance include populations that are already working. Applying work requirements to recipients who are working implies different policy goals than that of moving nonworking recipients into work. The goal of the Medicaid waivers that include work requirements is to improve the health status of recipients, a different purpose, with different outcomes, than the goals tested in the pre-1996 experiments. Different approaches to employment and education services. The pre-1996 experiments were of mandatory welfare–to-work programs, which combined a participation requirement with a program that funded employment or education services. Among the SNAP, Medicaid, and housing programs, only SNAP has an employment and training program.

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Introduction On September 9, 2015, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources reported S. 2012 , the Energy Policy Modernization Act, a major energy bill with provisions addressing energy efficiency, critical infrastructure, energy supplies (fossil, renewable, and nuclear), energy financing and markets, and critical minerals, among other topics. The Senate passed S. 2012 on April 20, 2016. On May 25, 2016, the House passed an amended version of S. 2012 which contains the text of H.R. 8 , as well as the text of several other energy and natural resources-related bills. The following day, the House moved to insist upon its amendment, and to appoint conferees to resolve the differences in S. 2012 . On July 12, the Senate agreed to the request for a conference, and appointed conferees. In addition to energy policy provisions, both versions of S. 2012 contain many natural resources and environmental provisions including provisions on fish and wildlife recreation and federal land conveyances. The Senate version includes permanent reauthorization of the Land and Water Conservation Fund and reauthorization of EPA's Brownfields Program, while the House version includes provisions on National Forest management and drought relief. The House-passed bill also includes provisions on the physical security of the electric grid. Key Legislative Developments H.R. 8—North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015 July 22, 2015: House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power approved draft text that would become H.R. 8 and several other bills) May 25, 2016: House consideration and passage, motion that House insist upon its amendment May 26, 2016: House appointed conferees July 12, 2016: Senate disagreed with House amendment, agreed to conference, and appointed conferees Selected Energy Issues Electric Grid Security6 Comparing Grid Security Provisions in the House and Senate Versions Both bills would authorize new emergency authority for the Secretary of Energy during grid emergencies, however they differ regarding the nature of the emergency threat or event. Subtitle A addresses energy delivery, reliability, and security. The most significant overlap is in energy efficiency in buildings. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Both Title X, Subtitle D (§§10301-10331) of the Senate-passed version of S. 2012 and Division C, Title I (§§1001-1135) of the House-passed version of S. 2012 address issues related to management of specific federal water projects, as well as federal water activities at regional and national levels.

Congress most recently enacted major energy legislation in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140). The 114th Congress is currently considering new legislation to address broad energy issues. On April 20, 2016, the Senate passed an amended version of S. 2012, the Energy Policy and Modernization Act. On December 3, 2015, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 8, the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015. On May 25, 2016, the House passed an amended version of S. 2012 which contains the text of H.R. 8, as well as the text of several other energy and natural resources-related bills. The following day, the House moved to insist upon its amendment, and to appoint conferees to resolve the differences in S. 2012. On July 12, the Senate agreed to the request for a conference, and appointed conferees. Both versions of S. 2012 would address a variety of energy topics, including Energy efficiency in federal buildings, data centers, manufacturing, and schools; Water conservation/efficiency; Electric grid cybersecurity; Nuclear energy and carbon sequestration research and development; Amendments to hydropower licensing provisions; Liquefied natural gas exports; and Energy workforce development. The House version also contains provisions on Electric grid physical security; A North American energy security plan; and A study of wholesale electricity markets. The Senate version also includes provisions on Review of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; Geothermal energy development on federal lands; Vehicle research and development; Electric grid energy storage; Renewable energy supply and incentives; and Loan programs. Both versions of S. 2012 also contain major non-energy provisions including fish and wildlife recreation and federal land conveyances. Differences include permanent authorization of the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) (Senate); reauthorization of the EPA Brownfields Program (Senate); National Forest management (House); and federal water project operations and drought relief (House). This report provides a short discussion of key topics addressed in the House and Senate-passed versions of S. 2012.

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Introduction Gas hydrates are a potentially huge if uncertain global energy resource. Some estimates of the global potential resource for gas hydrates are 100,000 trillion cubic feet (TCF) or more for gas-in-place (meaning every molecule of gas hydrate, not necessarily what is technically or economically recoverable). Further, gas hydrates have no confirmed commercial production to date. Given that gas hydrates offer the possibility of substantially increasing the U.S. supply of natural gas, the 113 th Congress may evaluate whether U.S. policies regarding onshore and offshore development are appropriate for the gas hydrate resource. The 113 th Congress may also consider the risks of developing gas hydrates, particularly offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill. 106-193 was enacted? Gas hydrates occur naturally onshore in some permafrost regions, and at or below the seafloor in sediments where water and gas combine at low temperatures and high pressures to form an ice-like solid substance. In a gas hydrate, frozen water molecules form a cage-like structure around high concentrations of natural gas. For perspective, the United States consumed over 25 TCF of natural gas in 2012. The Department of the Interior's U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM, formerly the Minerals Management Service, MMS) typically report only in-place estimates of U.S. gas hydrate resources. Gas Hydrates in Outer Continental Shelf of the Lower 48 United States Gas hydrates in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) represent a potential source of natural gas in addition to the considerable resource base already estimated to exist offshore the U.S. Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico coastlines. Gas Hydrate Research and Development Spending on Gas Hydrates at DOE A goal of the DOE methane hydrate research and development (R&D) program is to develop knowledge and technology to allow commercial production of methane from gas hydrates by 2015. The Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000 ( P.L. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. Authorization of appropriations for the program expired at the end of FY2010. 109-58 reauthorized appropriations for the program in 2005, DOE has spent approximately $79 million on the R&D program in eight years through FY2013. The Administration requested $5 million for gas hydrate research and development in FY2014. Field Testing Alaska North Slope DOE funded a field trial conducted by ConocoPhillips on the North Slope of Alaska to test if gas hydrates could be recovered using two methods: (1) exchanging methane in the gas hydrate formation with carbon dioxide pumped down the well, and (2) depressurizing the formation to release methane from the gas hydrate formation. Although the test successfully showed that methane could be produced using two different methods in an actual gas hydrate field and not under controlled laboratory conditions, it appears that further work is needed before gas hydrates can be commercially exploited in permafrost regions. Japan According to news reports, Japan's Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), announced that it had produced methane from gas hydrate deposits 300 meters below the seafloor in the Eastern Nankai Trough off the east coast of Japan. According to company reports, this was the first offshore production test of gas hydrates ever conducted.

Solid gas hydrates are a potentially huge source of natural gas for the United States. Gas hydrates occur naturally onshore in some permafrost regions, and at or below the seafloor in sediments where water and gas combine at low temperatures and high pressures to form an ice-like solid substance, in which frozen water molecules form a cage-like structure around high concentrations of natural gas, or methane. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management within the Department of the Interior estimated a mean value of over 51,000 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of in-place gas hydrates combined for the Outer Continental Shelf off the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts and Gulf of Mexico. However, the in-place estimate disregards technical or economical recoverability, and likely overestimates the amount of commercially viable gas hydrates. To date, gas hydrates have no confirmed commercial production. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that there are about 85 TCF of technically recoverable gas hydrates in northern Alaska. By comparison, U.S. consumption of natural gas was 25 TCF in 2012. An issue for the 113th Congress is whether gas hydrates represent a viable component of the future energy portfolio of the United States, and if federal research and development programs are appropriate and sufficient to meet energy policy goals. Gas hydrates are also a risk, representing a hazard to oil and gas drilling and production. If gas hydrates dissociate suddenly and release expanded gas during offshore drilling, they could disrupt marine sediments and compromise pipelines and production equipment. The tendency of gas hydrates to dissociate and release methane, which can be a hazard, is the same characteristic that research and development efforts strive to enhance so that methane can be produced and recovered in commercial quantities. Gas hydrates hindered early attempts to plug the Deepwater Horizon oil well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico and to siphon the leaking oil and gas to the surface. Given the potential risk associated with developing the resource, Congress may consider whether to evaluate the evolving regulatory and safety infrastructure for offshore development to determine if it is appropriate for exploiting gas hydrates offshore. Developing gas hydrates into a commercially viable source of energy is a goal of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) methane hydrate program, initially authorized by the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-193). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) extended the authorization of appropriations through FY2010. Since 2005, DOE has spent approximately $79 million on gas hydrate research and development through FY2013. The Obama Administration requested $5 million for gas hydrate R&D in FY2014. In 2012, DOE funded a field trial conducted by ConocoPhillips on the North Slope of Alaska, which successfully recovered methane from gas hydrates using two different methods. In 2013, Japan's Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, announced that it had produced methane from gas hydrate deposits 300 meters below the seafloor in the Eastern Nankai Trough off the east coast of Japan. According to company reports, this was the first test conducted of offshore gas hydrate production. Both tests represented just a few days of production, and it appears that further work is needed before gas hydrates can be commercially exploited in permafrost regions and below the seafloor.

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Barriers to Cross-Border Mergers Since the summer of 2005, a number of EU member states have erected barriers to prevent cross-border mergers and acquisitions that undermine the effort to deepen the single market. Some in the media and representatives of the European Commission in Brussels have claimed that these actions are evidence of resurgent economic nationalism in Europe. Unlike in the 1980s when the main opposition to the creation of a Single Market came from companies resistant to being exposed to more international competition, the main opposition today comes from national governments and politicians fearful of losing national prestige and jobs as a result of merger activity. Impact on U.S.

Several members of the European Union (EU) over the past two years have been erecting barriers to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, possibly in violation of their Single Market commitments. The main focus of these anti-competitive actions, often dubbed economic nationalism or economic patriotism by the press, is on corporate control, particularly in the banking, steel, and energy sectors. Unlike in the 1980s, when the main opposition to creation of the Single Market for goods, capital, labor, and services came from companies resistant to being exposed to more international competition, the main opposition to liberalization today comes from some member state governments (and or politicians) fearful of losing national prestige and jobs as a result of merger activity. This report examines the nature and significance of rising economic nationalism, as well as how U.S. interests may be affected. The report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Omnibus Water Authorization Deliberations in the 115th Congress The 115 th Congress initiated deliberations on an omnibus water authorization bill with H.R. 8 , the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (WRDA 2018), and S. 2800 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA 2018). On June 6, 2018, the House passed H.R. 8 , which was subsequently received in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW). On July 9, 2018, the Senate EPW posted on its website an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8 , titled America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018. This CRS report discusses H.R. 8 as passed by the House (referred to herein as WRDA 2018) and the Senate EPW-posted amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. The Senate did not take up H.R. Instead, House and Senate committee leadership agreed on new legislative text for an omnibus water authorization bill. On September 13, 2018, the House amended an unrelated courthouse-naming bill, passed by the Senate as S. 3021 , to include the negotiated text. The negotiated text contained provisions from various pieces of legislation, most prominently H.R. 8 , S. 2800 , and H.R. 3387 (Drinking Water Systems Improvement Act of 2017). Like S. 2800 , the House-passed S. 3021 is titled America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018. If the Senate agrees to the House amendments to the bill without proposing any further changes, the bill will be sent to the President for his signature. For information on S. 3021 , see CRS Report R45185, Army Corps of Engineers: Water Resource Authorization and Project Delivery Processes , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R45304, Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF): Overview, Issues, and Legislation , by [author name scrubbed]. Enactment of S. 3021 likely would mean that the 115 th Congress would not take further action on H.R. 8 or on the Senate EPW-posted amendment to H.R. 8 , the two legislative texts discussed in this report. 8 and Senate EPW-Posted Amendment to H.R. 8 as it was passed by the House (referred to herein as WRDA 2018) on June 11, 2018, and the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8 as it was posted by the Senate EPW on July 9, 2018 (referred to herein as AWIA 2018). Subsequent legislative actions on omnibus water resource legislation (e.g., House-passed amendments to S. 3021 ) generally are not reflected in this report. In the tradition of previous legislation with the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) title, WRDA 2018 focused primarily on authorizing water resource projects and activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and dam and levee safety programs. AWIA 2018 included not only provisions related to USACE, but also provisions involving water quality and drinking water programs administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), particularly in Title V of AWIA 2018 ("EPA-Related Provisions"). For example, both WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 would have authorized USACE to conduct new studies and construct new projects, and both WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 would have modified existing authorizations. WRDA 2018 focused on USACE water resource projects and programs and dam and levee safety program authorities; although the majority of AWIA 2018's titles and provisions also related to the USACE's water resource projects, numerous provisions of AWIA 2018 were not directly related to USACE water resource activities. AWIA 2018 included provisions addressing a range of other topics, including EPA administered water programs and regulatory authorities, and water-related activities and other authorities of the Department of the Interior and other agencies. USACE Topics Related to WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 Deliberations Provisions in WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 would have addressed the following selected broad USACE topics: information dissemination and public input; USACE permissions and permits for nonfederal activities; studies of USACE structure and efficiency; budget processes for USACE; nature-based alternatives and projects; continuing authorities programs; project and study deauthorization; independent peer review; innovative financing for water resource projects; permitting of nonfederal water storage; and pricing of storage for domestic, municipal, and industrial water supply. AWIA 2018 also called for studies on "intractable water systems" and on WIFIA accessibility for certain communities.

Omnibus Water Authorization Legislation in the 115th Congress. The 115th Congress initiated deliberations on an omnibus water authorization bill with H.R. 8, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (WRDA 2018), and S. 2800, America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA 2018). The House passed H.R. 8 on June 11, 2018. On July 9, 2018, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW) posted on its website an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8, also titled America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018. The Senate did not take up S. 2800 or the Senate EPW-posted amendment to H.R. 8. Instead, House and Senate committee leadership agreed on new legislative text. S. 3021, which the Senate passed as a courthouse-naming bill, was amended and passed in the House on September 13, 2018, to include the negotiated water authorization text. The negotiated text contains provisions from various pieces of legislation, most prominently H.R. 8, S. 2800, and H.R. 3387 (Drinking Water Systems Improvement Act of 2017). Like S. 2800, the House-passed S. 3021 is titled America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018. If the Senate agrees to the House amendments to the bill, without proposing any further changes, the bill will be sent to the President. This CRS report reflects H.R. 8 as it was passed by the House on June 11, 2018 (referred to herein as WRDA 2018), and the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8 as it was posted by the Senate EPW on July 9, 2018 (referred to herein as AWIA 2018). Subsequent legislative actions on omnibus water resource legislation (e.g., House-passed amendments to S. 3021) generally are not reflected in this report. Enactment of the House amendments to S. 3021 likely would mean that both of the bills discussed in this report would not receive further attention in the 115th Congress. The House amendments to S. 3021 are discussed in CRS Report R45185, Army Corps of Engineers: Water Resource Authorization and Project Delivery Processes, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R45304, Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF): Overview, Issues, and Legislation, by [author name scrubbed]. H.R. 8 and Senate EPW-Posted Amendment to H.R. 8. WRDA 2018 (H.R. 8) focused primarily on authorizing water resource projects and activities of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and dam and levee safety programs. AWIA 2018, as reflected in the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8 posted by the Senate EPW on July 9, 2018, included USACE and dam and levee safety provisions. It also included provisions on clean water and drinking water infrastructure programs and regulatory authorities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), tribal water-related authorities and programs, and water-related activities of the Department of the Interior. Both WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 would have authorized USACE to conduct new studies and construct new projects, modified and extended existing project and program authorizations, and altered deauthorization authorities. Both WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 included provisions requiring studies of USACE civil works structure and efficiency. WRDA 2018 also would have required a study of the agency's budget processes; AWIA 2018 would have established a five-year budget process for the agency. Both WRDA 2018 and AWIA 2018 included provisions on nature-based alternatives and projects. AWIA 2018 included a larger number and broader set of provisions related to specific USACE projects than WRDA 2018. AWIA 2018, primarily Title V, addressed various EPA-administered water quality and infrastructure programs. Title V would have amended the Clean Water Act (CWA) for various purposes (e.g., to authorize grants for sewer overflow and stormwater management projects). AWIA 2018 also would have amended the Safe Drinking Water Act. It proposed several revisions to the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund program, and it would have expressly authorized EPA's WaterSense program. AWIA 2018 would have amended the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) to authorize special terms for loan assistance provided to state Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund finance authorities. Further, it would have required a study on WIFIA accessibility for certain communities. WRDA 2018 contained none of the EPA-related provisions and generally focused on USACE and dam and levee safety authorities.

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107th Congress: Opening Day Actions The November 2000 elections caused the Senate to be tied with 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. Only once before, in 1881, had the two major parties been equally represented in the Senate. The Powersharing Agreement: S.Res. Supplemental Colloquy, January 8, 2001 On January 8, 2001, the agreement was further clarified and other new procedures were announced. The Shift to Democratic Control, May-June 2001 On May 24, 2001, Senator James Jeffords announced his intention to leave the Republican party, to become an Independent, and to caucus with the Senate Democrats. 101 and S.Res. The Senate confirmed Ziglar's nomination on August 1, 2001, and also agreed to a resolution ( S.Res. S.Res. 120 and Other Organizational Issues An agreement on committees and related organizational issues was reached by resolution just before the Senate adjourned for the Independence Day recess on June 29, 2001. 120 of June 29, 2001 provided for Democratic majorities on all Senate standing and select committees (except for the Select Committee on Ethics which always has equal party representation). The two party conferences approved new assignments for their members (including the designation of Senator Jeffords as the new chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee) on July 10. Conclusion The powersharing agreement was an experiment. The new Senate organization resolution departed as well from many established practices. Pursuant to the provisions and exceptions 18 listed above, the following additional Standing Orders 19 shall be in effect for the 107 th Congress: 20 (1) If a committee has not reported out a legis- 21 lative item or nomination because of a tie vote, then, 22 after notice of such tie vote has been transmitted to 23 the Senate by that committee and printed in the 24 Record, the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader 25 may, only after consultation with the Chairman and 1 Ranking Member of the committee, make a motion 2 to discharge such legislative item or nomination, 3 and time for debate on such motion shall be limited to 4 4 hours, to be equally divided between the two Lead- 5 ers, with no other motions, points of order, or 6 amendments in order: Provided , That following the 7 use or yielding back of time, a vote occur on the mo- 8 tion to discharge, without any intervening action, 9 motion, or debate, and if agreed to it be placed im- 10 mediately on the Calendar of Business (in the case 11 of legislation) or the Executive Calendar (in the 12 case of a nomination).

The 2000 elections resulted in a Senate composed of 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. Not since the Senate of 1881 (37 Republicans, 37 Democrats, and two Independents) had the two major parties been equally represented. An historic powersharing agreement, worked out by the party floor leaders in consultation with their party colleagues, was presented to the Senate ( S.Res. 8 ) on January 5, 2001 and agreed to the same day. The agreement was clarified by a leadership colloquy on January 8, 2001. In May of 2001, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont decided to leave the Republican party, to become an Independent, and to support the Democratic conference on organizational issues. Control of the Senate shifted to the Democratic party. The power shift annulled major portions of the powersharing agreement. After negotiations between the parties, a new organizing resolution, S.Res. 120 , was agreed to on June 29, 2001. The resolution provided for the appointment of a Democratic majority on all Senate standing committees, and also covered such issues as staffing and space assignments on Senate committees. Other issues connected to Senate organization were addressed by letters signed by relevant committee chairs and ranking members, entered into the Congressional Record of June 29, 2001. On July 10, the two Senate party conferences approved new committee assignments for certain of their members. In late July and early August, new Senate administrative and party officers were chosen. This report describes the principal features of S.Res. 8 and S.Res. 120 , as well as supplementary agreements and understandings between the parties that operated during the 107 th Congress. The report will not be updated.

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Introduction As Congress considers different approaches to reform the housing finance system, one of the major policy issues to emerge concerns the role of the federal government in supporting affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households. Much of this debate centers on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are hybrid entities, private companies with congressional charters that contain special privileges and certain responsibilities. Although the most prominent proposals to reform the housing finance system—the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act (PATH Act; H.R. 2767 , Representative Garrett), the Housing Opportunities Move the Economy Forward Act proposal (HOME Forward Act, Representative Waters), and the Johnson-Crapo GSE Reform Proposal (Senator Johnson and Senator Crapo) —agree on the need to dissolve the GSEs and eventually revoke their charters, there is disagreement on what should replace the GSEs. Some argue that the hybrid nature of the GSEs—private companies with a public mission—led to perverse incentives to lower underwriting standards in an effort to expand credit availability to low-income borrowers. Instead, they argue, in a future system the government should support affordable housing primarily through existing government programs or agencies with an explicit mission of supporting affordable housing, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and other programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Others argue that the perverse incentives can be realigned such that private companies could be encouraged to support affordable housing and broad access to credit in a responsible manner. This report explains the ways in which the GSEs currently support affordable housing and describes the different affordable housing approaches contained in the reform proposals. The GSEs' Support for Affordable Housing The GSEs' business model (see shaded box below) is intended to provide support to the broader mortgage market, but certain actions of the GSEs are geared primarily toward assisting low- and moderate-income households. First, the GSEs have been directed to provide support through affordable housing goals mandated by Congress since 1992. The goals are numerical standards in which each GSE is required to focus a certain amount of its business on specified types of low-income borrowers and areas that are considered to be underserved by the mortgage market. Under the duty to serve requirement, the GSEs are required to provide leadership to assist low-income households in the manufactured housing, affordable housing preservation, and rural markets. Duty to Serve HERA also established for the GSEs a duty to serve requirement. The Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund The third method by which the GSEs were to support affordable housing is through contributions to two new affordable housing funds, the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund. The funds were established by HERA and were intended to increase the supply of housing that is affordable to low-, very low-, and extremely low-income households. 2767 ), the Johnson-Crapo GSE Reform Proposal, and the HOME Forward Act proposal. As part of its wind down of the GSEs, the PATH Act would repeal the GSEs' affordable housing goals, its contributions to the affordable housing funds, and the statutory authorization for the Housing Trust Fund. The newly created National Mortgage Market Utility would not have a mandate to support affordable housing.

Congress is considering different approaches to reforming the housing finance system. One of the major policy issues to emerge concerns the role of the federal government in supporting affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households. Much of this debate centers on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are hybrid entities, private companies with congressional charters that contain special privileges and certain responsibilities to support affordable housing. Some argue that the hybrid nature of the GSEs—private companies with a public mission—leads to perverse incentives and, therefore, the government should instead support affordable housing primarily through existing government programs or agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Others argue that the perverse incentives can be realigned such that private companies could be encouraged to support affordable housing in a responsible manner. The GSEs' business model is intended to provide support to the broader mortgage market, but they take certain required actions that are geared primarily toward assisting low- and moderate-income households. The ways in which the GSEs currently support housing that is affordable to low- and moderate-income households provide one potential baseline to compare recent legislative proposals. This report discusses three major channels of support. First, since 1992 the GSEs have provided support through affordable housing goals mandated by Congress. The goals are numerical standards in which each GSE is required to dedicate a certain amount of its business on specified types of low-income borrowers and underserved areas. Second, in 2008 Congress also established for the GSEs a duty to serve requirement. Under the duty to serve requirement, the GSEs are required to provide leadership to assist low-income households in certain market segments: manufactured housing, affordable housing preservation, and rural markets. Third, in 2008 Congress also directed the GSEs to make contributions to two affordable housing funds, the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund. The funds were intended to increase the supply of housing affordable to low-income households. The duty to serve regulation has not been finalized and the housing funds have not received contributions from the GSEs since the GSEs were placed into conservatorship. Although three of the more prominent housing finance reform proposals—the Johnson-Crapo GSE Reform Proposal, the Housing Opportunities Move the Economy Forward Act proposal (HOME Forward Act), and the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act (PATH Act, H.R. 2767)—would repeal the affordable housing goals and wind down the GSEs, they offer different approaches to supporting affordable housing in a reformed system. The PATH Act would not have a mandate or requirement for private actors to support affordable housing and would leave the support to existing government agencies and programs. The Johnson-Crapo GSE Reform Proposal and the HOME Forward Act differ in their details but offer similar approaches; they would impose a fee on certain mortgage-backed securities and direct that fee to the Housing Trust Fund, Capital Magnet Fund, and a newly established Market Access Fund. They would also have, among other provisions, affordability requirements in their proposed multifamily finance systems. This report explains the ways in which the GSEs currently support affordable housing and describes the different affordable housing approaches contained in the reform proposals.

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For example, demand for new project services (e.g., improved navigation, new water supply, improved or new flood control facilities), protection of threatened and endangered species, and water quality concerns are common to many conflicts. Bureau of Reclamation Since the early 1900s, the Bureau has constructed and operated many large, multi-purpose water projects. Bureau-related water project and management issues that are being or may be considered during the 110 th Congress include: San Joaquin River restoration settlement legislation; examination of the Bureau's Title 16 (recycling and reuse) program; oversight of CVPIA and CVP operations; oversight of, and appropriations for, CALFED (and other Bay-Delta issues, such as Delta Smelt population declines); San Joaquin/San Luis Unit drainage issues and potential title transfer; authorization of individual water recycling and desalination projects; response to drought, and effects of climate variability on federal reservoirs; and Colorado River water management issues. Corps of Engineers Congress authorizes Corps water resources activities and makes changes to the agency's policies generally in Water Resources Development Acts, and at times in the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations acts. Corps flood control and hurricane protection projects, in particular, are receiving congressional and public scrutiny following Hurricane Katrina. A broad water resource issue significant to the water resources agencies and the nation is the changing federal role in water resources planning, development, and management.

Water resources management often involves trade-offs among user groups, environmental interests, and local, regional, and national interests. Water resources development is particularly controversial because of budgetary constraints, conflicting policy objectives, environmental impacts, and demands for local control. Hurricane Katrina brought to the forefront long-simmering policy disputes involving local control, federal financing, environmental and social tradeoffs, and multi-level accountability and responsibility for water infrastructure projects, such as levees. Construction, improvement, and management of other federal water resource projects (e.g., locks, dams, and diversion facilities) face similar challenges. The 110th Congress faces numerous issues and trade-offs as it considers water resource development, technology, water supply, and climate change legislation. These issues are likely to arise as Congress considers authorizations and appropriations for Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers projects (e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 2007, H.R. 1495), and agency policy and program changes (e.g., water reuse, federal project operations, and oversight of ecosystem restoration programs such as CALFED and Everglades). Oversight issues related to Hurricane Katrina and the federal role in hurricane and flood protection, and levee construction and management, also are ongoing.

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Introduction The federal government has funded work to address global climate change for more than four decades. A growing component has been federal planning and efforts to adapt to climate change. Federal Funding for Climate Change The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have identified approximately $77 billion of budget authority available to federal agencies from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013 for climate change activities. The large majority—more than 75%—funded technology development and deployment, mostly through the Department of Energy (DOE). More than one-third of the identified funding during this period was appropriated in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. The President's request for FY2014 contains $11.6 billion for federal expenditures on programs. In the request, 23% would be for science (the U.S. Global Change Research Program or USGCRP), 68% for "clean energy" technology development and deployment, 8% for international assistance, and 1% for adapting to climate change. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also reports energy tax provisions that may reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would reduce tax revenues by $9.8 billion. The reported initiatives are cross-agency "roll-ups" of programs and funding in the agencies, and information on some programs is available only to the degree that the agency has reported funding to OMB or Congress. Table 1 below presents estimates for direct federal funding for the USGCRP from FY2008 through the FY2014 request. Federal strategy on climate change largely reflects the aggregation of a variety of existing programs, presidential initiatives, and congressionally directed activities. Federal budget for climate change-related programs is primarily aimed at investment and tax provisions aimed at stimulating energy technologies that may reduce GHG emissions. GAO recommended that the Administration provide greater clarity and consistency of reporting on federal funding for climate change activities. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in how federal funding may reflect and enable the Obama Administration's overall strategy, and priorities within it, to address climate change. Beyond the amounts of budget authority in this report, further legislative considerations regarding the federal funding of climate change activities may include the following: the sufficiency and alignment of federal resources to support a strategy to achieve long-term climate change policy goals; the demands of climate change adaptation programming for federal agencies, their programs, and resources; whether additional and predictable foreign aid resources may be provided to support actions by low-income countries to mitigate greenhouse gases or adapt to climate change; possible legislative proposals to restructure or improve collaboration among agencies regarding climate change activities; and the incorporation of recommendations from evaluations (whether internal or external) to improve climate change programs.

Direct federal funding to address global climate change totaled approximately $77 billion from FY2008 through FY2013. The large majority—more than 75%—has funded technology development and deployment, primarily through the Department of Energy (DOE). More than one-third of the identified funding was included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). The President's request for FY2014 contains $11.6 billion for federal expenditures on programs. In the request, 23% would be for science, 68% for energy technology development and deployment, 8% for international assistance, and 1% for adapting to climate change. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also reports that energy tax provisions that may reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would reduce tax revenues by $9.8 billion. At least 18 federal agencies administer climate change-related activities, according to OMB. Federal policy on climate change has been built largely from the "bottom up" from a variety of existing programs and mandates, presidential initiatives, and congressionally directed activities; funding has largely reflected departmental missions and support for each activity. Recently, the Obama Administration, in the context of its Climate Action Plan announced in June 2013, outlined an overall strategy with programs, resources, and tax incentives in a cross-agency, inter-governmental initiative. The new Climate Action Plan and a recent OMB report required by Congress on federal funding for climate change activities outline four main components of the strategy: Climate and Global Change Research and Education Reducing Emissions through Clean Energy Investments and Standards International Leadership Climate Change Adaptation Possible Funding-Related Issues for Congress Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in how federal funding may reflect and enable the Obama Administration's overall strategy, and priorities within it, to address climate change. Legislative issues regarding the federal funding of climate change activities may include the following: the sufficiency and alignment of federal resources to support a strategy to achieve long-term climate change policy goals; the demands of climate change adaptation programming for federal agencies, their programs, and resources; whether additional and predictable foreign aid resources may be provided to support actions by low-income countries to mitigate greenhouse gases or adapt to climate change; possible legislative proposals to restructure or improve collaboration among agencies regarding climate change activities; the incorporation of recommendations from evaluations (whether internal or external) to improve climate change programs; and possible requirements for reporting to Congress of funding, budget justifications, and programmatic progress that are adequate to support congressional decision-making and oversight. Scope and Purpose of This Report This report summarizes direct federal funding identified as climate change-related from FY2008 enacted funding through FY2013 and the FY2014 request (as well as a less consistent series beginning with FY2001). It reports the Administration's estimates of tax revenues not received due to energy tax provisions that may reduce GHG emissions. The report briefly identifies the programs and funding levels, as well as some qualifications and observations on reporting of federal funding. It further offers some issues that Members may wish to consider in deliberating on U.S. climate change strategies.

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Introduction The Constitution grants Congress the power to "coin money, and regulate the value thereof...." Congress has delegated responsibility for making U.S. monetary policy to the Federal Reserve System (Fed). Quasi-public in structure, overseen by a Board of Governors whose members are appointed to long terms, and reliant on its own source of funding, the Fed possesses a degree of independence that some argue is inimical to the spirit of democracy. Although this argument (and refutations of it) may be political or constitutional in nature, it is also rooted in certain notions about macroeconomic policy. While the ability of fiscal policy to raise or lower inflation is only temporary, monetary policy can only raise or lower (inflation-adjusted) interest rates temporarily. In the long run, monetary and fiscal policy have very different influences, however. Monetary policy determines the inflation rate, fiscal policy does not. Experience teaches that this is not the case. The short-run effects of monetary policy differ substantially from its long-run effects. In the long run the Fed does not control real interest rates, and efforts aimed at controlling interest rates based on its short-run influence generally result in accelerating inflation or deflation. Independence Whereas fiscal policy is made jointly by the legislative and executive branches, monetary policy is influenced only indirectly by either. It would also tend to produce more business cycles if policy directed at reducing inflation is aborted before it is complete, only to be reintroduced again later when the renewed expansion makes inflation worse. But the economics of monetary policy is such that the cost of making the Fed more responsive to short-term public opinion would likely be an increased tendency to inflate the economy and to reverse anti-inflation policies before they have time to achieve their intended purpose. In the short run, the responsiveness of inflation to changes in monetary policy depends in part on people's expectations of the Fed's behavior. The latter would tilt economic power significantly toward the executive. It is entirely possible for monetary policy to be undoing what fiscal policy is doing with output and employment, or for monetary policy to be reinforcing the effect that fiscal policy is having on interest rates. Directed in concert, the two policies should be able to produce much more effective policy than if they are determined in isolation of each other. In particular, using fiscal and monetary policy in concert allows aggregate demand to be influenced with minimal disruption to interest rates and the exchange rate, since fiscal policy pushes interest rates and the exchange rate in the opposite direction of monetary policy. Hence, good policy can be much better if monetary and fiscal policy are coordinated, but bad policy can be made much worse. Opting for more or less coordination therefore boils down to a trade-off between maximizing the benefits that come from policy when it is well-chosen and minimizing the costs that occur when policy is ill-advised. Democracy—in this case, the potential shifting of the powers of the Fed to elected officials—is one approach to increasing accountability, but it is not the only one. It might produce better policy.

The Federal Reserve System (Fed) is charged with responsibility for making U.S. monetary policy. Quasi-public in structure, overseen by a Board of Governors whose members are appointed to serve long terms, and reliant on its own source of funding, the Fed possesses a degree of independence that some argue is inimical to the spirit of democracy. Although this argument (and refutations of it) may be political or constitutional in nature, it is also rooted in certain notions about macroeconomic policy. The power that the Fed wields is substantial. Along with fiscal policy, monetary policy is one of two kinds of policy that can be employed to influence aggregate demand. In the short run, both monetary and fiscal policy have the power to raise or lower employment. But they have opposite short-run effects on interest rates (expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates and expansionary fiscal policy raises them), so that in concert they can achieve results that neither can in isolation. The long-run effects of the two policies are quite different from their short-run effects. Fiscal policy helps determine interest rates in the long run, but not the rate of inflation. Monetary policy largely determines the inflation rate, but cannot be used to fix interest rates in the long run. Policies based on the assumption that monetary policy can fix interest rates ultimately generate accelerating inflation or deflation. Monetary policy affects inflation only after it affects employment. A policy structure that responds quickly to the immediate concerns of the public is thus more likely to generate inflation than one that allows policymakers to more easily weather bad times. A very responsive policy structure not only increases the likelihood of high inflation. It also tends to produce more business cycles if policy directed at reducing inflation is aborted before it is complete, only to be reintroduced again later when the renewed expansion makes inflation worse. On-again, off-again policies erode the credibility of the monetary authorities and make anti-inflation policy all the more costly and lengthy when it is undertaken in earnest. Reducing the independence of the Fed either means reducing the ability to engage in discretionary policy or shifting economic power to the executive branch. This is an important consideration given the difficulty in calibrating policy. Because the legislative branch is not in a position to exercise day-to-day control of monetary policy, if it wishes to reduce the Fed's discretionary powers, it must choose between establishing policy rules to which the Fed must adhere or allowing the executive to administer policy. Economists who oppose rules fear that they would be too rigid to deliver economic stability in a highly complex economy. Better coordination of monetary and fiscal policy is a double-edged sword. If "good" policy is pursued, it will be all that much better if simultaneously pursued with both tools. But if "bad" policy is pursued, using both tools to pursue it will make the result that much worse. Thus, the choice boils down to whether the policy structure should be one that maximizes the benefits that come from policy when it is well chosen or minimizing the costs that occur when policy is ill-advised. This report does not track legislation and will be update as events warrant.

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Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011 Introduction and Overview This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, background data from U.S. government sources on transfers of conventional arms to developing nations by major suppliers for the period 2004 through 2011. It also includes some data on worldwide supplier transactions. Nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 79.2% of all agreements globally from 2008 to 2011. In 2011, arms transfer agreements with developing countries accounted for 83.9% of the value of all such agreements globally. Major Findings General Trends in Arms Transfers Worldwide The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2011 was $85.3 billion. This was an extraordinary increase in arms agreements values (91.7%) over the 2010 total of $44.5 billion. In 2011, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $66.3 billion (77.7% of all such agreements), an extraordinary increase from $21.4 billion in 2010. The United States' worldwide agreements total in 2011 is the largest for a single year in the history of the U.S. arms export program. Russia ranked second with $4.8 billion in agreements (5.6% of these agreements globally), down significantly from $8.9 billion in 2010. In 2011, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $16.2 billion in such deliveries or 36.5%. General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2011 was $71.5 billion, a substantial increase from the $32.7 billion total in 2010 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 1 ) ( Table 3 ) ( Table 4 ). In 2011, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations ($28 billion) was an increase over the value of 2010 deliveries ($26.1 billion), and the highest delivery total since 2004 ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 ) ( Table 2 ) ( Table 15 ). Most recently, from 2008 to 2011, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for all four years in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2008 to 2011, the United States made nearly $113 billion of these agreements, or 54.5%. During this same period, Russia made $31.1 billion, 15% of all such agreements, expressed in current dollars. Collectively, the United States and Russia made 69.5% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during this four-year period. The United States also concluded high-value agreements with Persian Gulf states such as the U.A.E. Russia The total value of Russia's arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2011 was $4.1 billion, a substantial decrease from $7.7 billion in 2010, placing Russia second in such agreements with the developing world. In the later period (2008-2011), the United States ranked first in Asian agreements with 30.1% ($18.1 billion in current dollars), and Russia ranked second with 27% ($16.3 billion in current dollars). Saudi Arabia ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 2011, concluding $33.7 billion in such agreements. India ranked second in agreements with $6.9 billion. The United Arab Emirates ranked third with $4.5 billion in agreements. Worldwide Arms Transfer Agreements and Deliveries Values, 2004-2011 Ten tables follow.

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2004-2011, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 68.6% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 79.2% of all such agreements globally from 2008 to 2011, and 83.9% of these agreements in 2011. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2011 was over $71.5 billion. This was a substantial increase from $32.7 billion in 2010. In 2011, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $28 billion, the highest total in these deliveries values since 2004. Recently, from 2008 to 2011, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2008 to 2011, the United States made nearly $113 billion in such agreements, 54.5% of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $31.1 billion, 15% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 69.5% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations ($207.3 billion in current dollars) during this four-year period. In 2011, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with over $56.3 billion or 78.7% of these agreements, an extraordinary increase in market share from 2010, when the United States held a 43.6% market share. In second place was Russia with $4.1 billion or 5.7% of such agreements. In 2011, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $10.5 billion, or 37.6% of all such deliveries. Russia ranked second in these deliveries at $7.5 billion or 26.8%. In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2011—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $66.3 billion in such agreements or 77.7% of all such agreements. This is the highest single year agreements total in the history of the U.S. arms export program. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2011 with $4.8 billion in such global agreements or 5.6%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2011 was $85.3 billion, a substantial increase over the 2010 total of $44.5 billion, and the highest worldwide arms agreements total since 2004. In 2011, Saudi Arabia ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $33.7 billion in such agreements. The Saudis concluded $33.4 billion of these agreements with the United States (99%). India ranked second with $6.9 billion in such agreements. The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E) ranked third with $4.5 billion.

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For example, the first federal law on point, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), bars U.S. courts, both state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment for defamation unless certain requirements, including consistency with the U.S. Constitution and section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230), are satisfied. However, this may have little effect on the majority of libel cases brought against U.S. persons in Britain. Nonrecognition Provisions in State Libel Tourism Laws Although state courts have generally declined to enforce foreign libel judgments, some states enacted statutes addressing the libel tourism phenomenon. Like many other federal statutes, the SPEECH Act does not contain an express preemption provision, but its language and legislative history strongly suggest that Congress intended to preempt state laws that conflict with the accomplishment of its purpose. Implications for International Comity A decision by a domestic court pursuant to the SPEECH Act not to enforce particular foreign libel judgments could have negative repercussions on the enforcement of U.S. libel judgments in foreign courts. Similarly, in some areas, U.S. law is perceived as plaintiff-friendly, and the United States may find its diplomatic efforts to ensure that foreign countries recognize judgments pursuant to these plaintiff-friendly laws are opposed by countries' whose libel judgments are negatively affected by the SPEECH Act.

The 111th Congress considered several bills addressing "libel tourism," the phenomenon of litigants bringing libel suits in foreign jurisdictions so as to benefit from plaintiff-friendly libel laws. Several U.S. states have also responded to libel tourism by enacting statutes that restrict enforcement of foreign libel judgments. On August 10, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), P.L. 111-223, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105, which bars U.S. courts, both state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment for defamation unless certain requirements, including consistency with the U.S. Constitution and section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230), are satisfied. Although the SPEECH Act does not have an express preemption provision, it appears designed to preempt state laws on foreign libel judgments. It explicitly applies to all "domestic" courts, which it defines to include state courts notwithstanding contrary state law. Moreover, its legislative history suggests that Congress perceived a need for, and understood the SPEECH Act as establishing, a single uniform approach to the problem of foreign libel judgments against U.S. persons. The SPEECH Act may, however, implicate aspects of international comity. One concern is that foreign countries may opt to decline to enforce U.S. libel judgments or become less receptive to calls for enforcement of U.S. judgments in legal areas in which U.S. law is perceived as relatively friendly to plaintiffs.

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The Federal Minimum Wage The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the federal legislation that establishes the general minimum wage that must be paid to all covered workers. The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA have been amended numerous times since then, typically for the purpose of expanding coverage or raising the wage rate. Since its establishment, the minimum wage rate has been raised 22 separate times. The most recent change was enacted in 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ), which increased the minimum wage from $5.15 per hour to its current rate of $7.25 per hour in three steps. In addition, the FLSA provides for the payment of subminimum wages (i.e., less than the statutory rate of $7.25 per hour) for certain classes of workers. Thus, all workers covered under the tip credit provision of the FLSA are guaranteed the federal minimum wage. Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers The most recent data available (2016) indicate that there are approximately 2.2 million workers, or 2.7% of all hourly paid workers, whose wages are at or below the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The "typical" minimum wage earner tends to be female, age 20 or older, part-time, and working in a food service occupation. Arguments For Increasing the Minimum Wage17 Increases Earnings Proponents of an increase in the minimum wage often assert that raising wages can be a component in reducing poverty for individuals and families and a direct way to increase earnings for lower-income workers.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the federal legislation that establishes the minimum hourly wage that must be paid to all covered workers. The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA have been amended numerous times since 1938, typically for the purpose of expanding coverage or raising the wage rate. Since its establishment, the minimum wage rate has been raised 22 separate times. The most recent change was enacted in 2007 (P.L. 110-28), which increased the minimum wage to its current level of $7.25 per hour. In addition to setting the federal minimum wage rate, the FLSA provides for several exemptions and subminimum wage categories for certain classes of workers and types of work. Even with these exemptions, the FLSA minimum wage provisions still cover the vast majority of the workforce. Despite this broad coverage, however, the minimum wage directly affects a relatively small portion of the workforce. Currently, there are approximately 2.2 million workers, or 2.7% of all hourly paid workers, whose wages are at or below the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. Most minimum wage workers are female, are age 20 or older, work part time, and are in food service occupations. Proponents of increasing the federal minimum wage argue that it may increase earnings for lower income workers, lead to reduced turnover, and increase aggregate demand by providing greater purchasing power for workers receiving a pay increase. Opponents of increasing the federal minimum wage argue that it may result in reduced employment or reduced hours, lead to a general price increase, and reduce profits of firms paying a higher minimum wage.

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Background Social Security reform is an issue of interest to policy makers that arises in various contexts, from improving retirement security to reducing federal budget deficits. In 2011, for example, Social Security program changes were discussed by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ). The Joint Committee was tasked with recommending ways to reduce federal budget deficits by at least $1.5 trillion over the fiscal year period 2012 to 2021. Social Security program changes were among the measures considered by the Joint Committee; however, no agreement was reached on a legislative proposal by the statutory deadline. Social Security program changes could be considered in the future as part of broad deficit reduction legislation or as a stand-alone measure. Other policy makers support maintaining the current structure of the program (i.e., a defined benefit system funded on a pay-as-you-go basis), pointing to the system's projected long-range financial outlook to support their view that the system is not in immediate "crisis" and that only modest program changes may be needed to extend trust fund solvency and provide for a potential increase in benefits. Proponents of the fundamentally different approaches to reform (ranging from relatively minor changes to the current pay-as-you-go social insurance system to the creation of a "modernized" program based on personal savings and investments modeled after IRAs and 401(k)s) cite varying policy objectives that go beyond simply restoring long-term financial stability to the system. They cite objectives that focus on improving the adequacy and equity of benefits, as well as those that reflect different philosophical views about the role of the Social Security program and the federal government in providing retirement income. However, the system's projected long-range financial outlook provides a backdrop for much of the Social Security reform debate in terms of the timing and degree of recommended program changes. The trustees project that Social Security will operate with an annual cash flow deficit in each year of the 75-year projection period (2013-2087). When there are no surplus governmental receipts, the increased spending for Social Security from the general fund can only be paid for by the federal government raising taxes or other income, reducing other spending, and/or borrowing from the public (i.e., replacing bonds held by the trust funds with bonds held by the public). Social Security Trust Fund Solvency The trustees project that the Social Security trust funds will be exhausted in 2033, at which point incoming receipts will cover an estimated 77% of scheduled annual benefits. Between 2015 and 2035, the number of people aged 65 and older is projected to increase by about 65%, whereas the number of workers whose taxes will finance future benefits (people aged 20-64) is projected to increase by about 6%. The projected long-range financial outlook for the Social Security system is reflected in public opinion polls that show less than 50% of respondents are confident in Social Security's ability to meet its long-term commitments. There is a growing public perception that Social Security may not be as good a value in the future. Such concerns, and a belief that the nation must increase national savings to meet the needs of an aging society, are among the factors behind reform efforts. They point out that the trust funds are projected to have a balance until 2033, there continues to be public support for the program, and there would be considerable risk in some of the reform ideas. They contend that relatively modest changes could restore long-range solvency to the system. Legislation Introduced in the 113th Congress A number of Social Security reform bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress; none have received congressional action.

Social Security reform is an issue of ongoing interest to policy makers. In recent years, Social Security program changes have been discussed in the context of negotiations on legislation to increase the federal debt limit and reduce federal budget deficits. For example, in August 2011, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction tasked with recommending ways to reduce the deficit by at least $1.5 trillion over the fiscal year period 2012 to 2021. Social Security program changes were among the measures discussed by the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee, however, did not reach agreement on a legislative proposal by the statutory deadline. Looking ahead, Social Security program changes could again be considered as part of any future negotiations on broad deficit reduction legislation or as stand-alone Social Security legislation. The spectrum of ideas for reform ranges from relatively minor changes to the pay-as-you-go social insurance system enacted in the 1930s to a redesigned, "modernized" program based on personal savings and investments modeled after IRAs and 401(k)s. Proponents of the fundamentally different approaches to reform cite varying policy objectives that go beyond simply restoring long-term financial stability to the Social Security system. They cite objectives that focus on improving the adequacy and equity of benefits, as well as those that reflect different philosophical views about the role of the Social Security program and the federal government in providing retirement income. However, the system's projected long-range financial outlook provides a backdrop for much of the Social Security reform debate in terms of the timing and degree of recommended program changes. On May 31, 2013, the Social Security Board of Trustees released its latest projections showing that the trust funds will be exhausted in 2033 and an estimated 77% of scheduled annual benefits will be payable with incoming receipts at that time (under the intermediate projections). The primary reason is demographics. Between 2015 and 2035, the number of people aged 65 and older is projected to increase by about 65%, while the number of workers supporting the system (people aged 20-64) is projected to increase by about 6%. In addition, the trustees project that the system will run a cash flow deficit each year of the 75-year projection period. When current Social Security tax revenues are insufficient to pay benefits and administrative costs, federal securities held by the trust funds are redeemed and Treasury makes up the difference with other receipts. When there are no surplus governmental receipts, policy makers have three options: raise taxes or other income, reduce other spending, and/or borrow from the public. Public opinion polls show that less than 50% of respondents are confident that Social Security can meet its long-term commitments. There is also a public perception that Social Security may not be as good a value for future retirees. These concerns, and a belief that the nation must increase national savings, have led to proposals to redesign the system. At the same time, others suggest that the system's financial outlook is not a "crisis" in need of immediate action. Supporters of the current program structure point out that the trust funds are projected to have a positive balance until 2033 and that the program continues to have public support and could be affected adversely by the risk associated with some of the reform ideas. They contend that only modest changes are needed to restore long-range solvency to the Social Security system. During the 113th Congress, a number of Social Security reform measures have been introduced; none have received congressional action.

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Congress may continue to consider fiscal stimulus as unemployment remains high even though the economy is recovering from the 2007-2009 recession and a recent provision has been acted to avert much of the so-called fiscal cliff, a set of tax increases and spending cuts. Different types of stimulus provisions were enacted in the period 2001-2008: the 2001 tax cut was aimed at individuals, but most of its provisions, especially the rate cuts, which were phased in over a number of years, were not based on the recession that was apparent in 2000 and that appeared in the spring of 2001. When concerns about the economy continued towards the end of 2001 and in 2002, the Congress enacted bonus depreciation. In February 2008, a stimulus package containing a rebate similar to the 2001 rebate, and bonus depreciation, was adopted. Bonus depreciation was extended, but that extension was largely retroactive. In December of 2010, a package that extended the Bush tax cuts for two years and provided for a one-year reduction in payroll taxes for workers was adopted ( P.L. In recent legislation, to address the fiscal cliff, most of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were made permanent (except for very high income taxpayers), including rate cuts and dividend reductions. Bonus depreciation was extended for a year, but the payroll tax was not extended. The findings reported below suggest that one-time rebates are effective in stimulating spending, and that the effects of tax cuts are largest in lower-income households, while provisions directed at businesses and investment income may have more limited effects. Bonus depreciation was increased to 50% in 2003 and extended through 2004. Among the business tax incentives, a temporary investment subsidy should have the most "bang for the buck." They suggest several potential reasons for a small effect. The 2008 Rebate The February 2008 stimulus package included an individual tax rebate. It also included bonus depreciation of 50% for one year.

Although the economy is recovering from the 2007-2009 recession, unemployment continues to be high and further stimulus may be considered in the 113th Congress. Recent legislation in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) averted part of the so-called "fiscal cliff," a set of tax increases and spending cuts that were scheduled to occur at the beginning of 2012. Shortly a decision must be made about continuing with sequestration, a set of automatic spending cuts that were delayed by two months by P.L. 112-240. In addition, while most changes were permanent, bonus depreciation was extended for only a year. Stimulus (or avoiding contraction) could include individual tax cuts and business tax provisions. In recent years, several different types of short run fiscal stimulus measures have been enacted: an individual income tax rebate in 2001, a temporary investment incentive (bonus depreciation) in 2002, and dividend relief in 2003. The February 2008 stimulus included a rebate, bonus depreciation, and small business expensing. A stimulus adopted in February 2009 included a large component of spending, but also extended bonus depreciation and small business expensing. It also enacted an income tax credit that was spread over two years. In December of 2010, in addition to temporarily extending the expiring Bush tax cuts and unemployment compensation, a temporary one-year payroll tax credit was adopted. This payroll credit was extended through 2012, but was not extended by P.L. 112-240. Two types of stimulus provisions have been subject to specific empirical study. They suggest that the 2001 and 2008 rebates were an effective stimulus but bonus depreciation had a limited effect. They also suggest that tax cuts directed to lower-income households are more likely to be effective in stimulating spending. Bonus depreciation was extended for another year by P.L. 112-240, and a large share of other provisions affected high income taxpayers. Thus many of the tax increases averted by the legislation probably had small effects on the economy.

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This report provides data through September 30, 2006 (the end of FY2006), at which point U.S. aid to Iraq had surpassed U.S. aid to Germany and Japan during the post-World War II occupations. Aid allocations for Iraq appropriated from FY2003 through FY2006, all of which is grant assistance, totaled $35.7 billion. Of this, about $11.8 billion (33%) was for the repair and improvement of critical economic infrastructure. Initial funding, primarily under the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program was directed primarily at humanitarian relief. Some military aid grants, related to the new security environment, was provided in the last Marshall Plan years. The Marshall Plan provided the first funding for Germany with the specific objective of promoting economic recovery. Post-World War II Assistance to Japan Total U.S. assistance to Japan for the years of the occupation, from 1945-1952 was roughly $2.2 billion ($15.2 billion in 2005 dollars), of which almost $1.7 billion was grants and $504 million was loans. Over three-quarters (77%) of these funds were provided through GARIOA grants. Most of the remainder (i.e., 23%) was $490 million in related funds that Japan repaid and is classified as a loan. Of the negotiated $2.0 billion in current year dollars ($13.4 in constant 2005 dollars), $655 million ($4.3 billion in constant dollars) or 32%, went to categories that would mostly contribute directly to economic reconstruction, that is, industrial materials, including machinery and raw goods ($310 million or 15%); petroleum, oils, and lubricants ($95 million or 5%); and transportation, vehicles, and equipment ($249 million or 12%). Current U.S. Assistance to Iraq U.S. assistance to Iraq appropriated from FY2003 through FY2006 totaled some $35.7 billion. Another $8.3 billion, representing about 23% of total aid, has been allocated to assist democratization (including civil society), education and health and the expansion of the private sector. The remaining $15.5 billion in aid, nearly 44% of the total, is targeted at bolstering Iraqi security. Comparative Overview While the total amount of aid to Iraq—roughly $36 billion—now appears to be almost a fifth higher than that spent during the occupation of Germany and somewhat more than double that during the occupation of Japan, the total amounts and percentages of U.S. assistance targeted specifically at economic infrastructure reconstruction for Germany and Japan over the FY1949-FY1952 period appear to be lower than the amounts and percentages currently directed at such reconstruction in Iraq. In constant 2005 dollars, U.S. aid targeted at economic infrastructure reconstruction was some $9.3 billion in Germany, or about one-third of total U.S. assistance to that country, and some $5.2 billion in Japan, or a little under 40% of total U.S. assistance there. Food and housing shortages were critical in both Germany and Japan for several years after World War II, and early U.S. assistance focused on providing a subsistence level of nutrition. In Iraq, humanitarian aid has been a minor part of the assistance program because there was little need for food or other immediate relief assistance for most of the population. Observers may note that the Iraqi people and the international community most likely have much higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to economic reconstruction in Iraq than what the United States was expected to contribute to Germany and Japan, as the disparities are much greater between the United States and Iraq than between the United States and its World War II adversaries. The existence of an insurgency in Iraq which deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction efforts is an important consideration in comparing Iraq's economic reconstruction requirements with those of post-war Germany and Japan, which had no resistance movements.

As of the end of FY2006, U.S. aid to Iraq had surpassed U.S. aid to Germany and Japan during the post-World War II occupations of those countries. This report compares aggregate data on U.S. assistance to Iraq through FY2006 with U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan during the seven years following World War II. U.S. aid allocations (all grant assistance) for Iraq appropriated from 2003 through 2006 total $35.7 billion. About $11.8 billion (33%) went for economic infrastructure assistance. The remaining $23.8 billion was targeted at bolstering Iraqi security ($15.5 billion) and traditional political, social, and economic reform assistance ($8.3 billion). A higher proportion of Iraqi aid has been provided for economic reconstruction of critical infrastructure than was the case for Germany and Japan. Total U.S. assistance to Iraq as September 30, 2006 (the last day of FY2006), was about a fifth more than total assistance (adjusted for inflation) provided to Germany—and somewhat more than double that provided to Japan—from 1946-1952. For Germany, in constant 2005 dollars the United States provided a total of $29.3 billion in assistance from 1946-1952 with 60% in economic grants and nearly 30% in economic loans, and the remainder in military aid. Beginning in 1949, the Marshall Plan provided $1.4 billion with the specific objective of promoting economic recovery. Prior to that, U.S. aid was categorized as Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). Adjusting for inflation, the constant 2005 dollar total for Marshall Plan aid was $9.3 billion, of which 84% billion was grants and 16% was loans. (West Germany eventually repaid one-third of all U.S. assistance it received.) Total U.S. assistance to Japan for 1946-1952 was roughly $15.2 billion in 2005 dollars, of which 77% was grants and 23% was loans. Most of these funds were provided through GARIOA grants. Japan repaid $490 million of the total postwar assistance. Of the $2.2 billion in total aid, an estimated $655 million, or almost a third, went to categories that would mostly contribute directly to economic recovery (industrial materials, including machinery and raw goods; petroleum and products; and transportation, vehicles, and equipment). Most of the rest went for agricultural equipment, foodstuffs, and food supplies with smaller amounts spent on medical and sanitary supplies, education, and clothing. U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan largely consisted of food-related aid because of severe war-induced shortages and the need to provide minimum subsistence levels of nutrition. In Iraq, humanitarian aid has been a minor part of the assistance. Expectations also have changed. Countries today have much higher expectations of what the United States should contribute to reconstruction in Iraq relative to what was expected following World War II. Germany and Japan also are larger than Iraq—both population and size of their respective economies—and the extent of war damage to each country's industrial capacity was different. Iraq also faces an insurgency that deliberately sabotages the economy and reconstruction efforts, whereas there were no resistance movements in either Germany or Japan. This report will not be updated.

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Introduction The historically slow pace of recovery in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the renewed interest among some members of the public policy community in the long-term trend of growing inequality in the distribution of income. In other words, the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) began accruing unequally across U.S. households long before the late 2000s. Inequality is the label commonly applied to income distributions in which a group's share of total income is larger (smaller) than its share of the population (e.g., the top 20% of U.S. households accounted for slightly more than 50% of aggregate household income in 2011, as shown in Table 1 .) This report presents recent analysis of the distribution of income and the extent of income mobility in the United States over time and in comparison with other advanced economies. The report then compares the U.S. income distribution with the distributions of other industrialized countries and presents explanations for cross-country differences in measures of income dispersion. To the degree that a more equal distribution of income arises from policy decisions rather than market forces, the willingness of a country to incur any economic costs related to attaining greater equality may reflect varying national beliefs about the opportunity to ascend the income ladder. If aggregate income was equally divided across households with income, each quintile would account for 20% of total money income. Between 1968 and 2011, the income share of the three middle quintiles fell from 53.2% to 45.7% (see Table 1 ). Although there is no official definition of the middle class, the middle 60% of households is sometimes regarded as such. In contrast, the income shares of the top fifth and the top 5% of households generally have risen from year to year. The top 20%'s share grew from 42.6% in 1968 to 51.1% in 2011, and the top 5%'s share grew from 16.3% to 22.3%. First, many other countries devote a much larger share of their national output (gross domestic product, GDP) to income transfers, which have an equalizing effect on the distribution of income. Second, taxes in these countries vary with respect to progressivity, and thus have different effects on the distribution of after-tax income. Third, equality in the distribution of earnings, which make up the majority of household income, varies substantially from one country to another. Whereas they found that, compared with the other countries analyzed, social transfers make up a low percentage of the U.S. budget and are not as well targeted at those at the bottom of the income distribution; the researchers suggest that the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) "makes the US tax system rather progressive." The results of a study that compared the relationship between individuals' perceptions of their well-being and the extent of inequality in the United States and Europe suggest that inequality in the distribution of income is less important to people in the United States due to Americans believing that they live in a comparatively mobile society. More specifically, between 20% and 30% of children whose fathers were in the bottom fifth of the earnings distributions remained at the bottom as adults, but for the United States, about 40% of children stayed in the bottom fifth. Families, whether they started at the bottom or top of the income distribution, became increasingly less likely to move up or down the income ladder during their working lives. Concluding Remarks Measures of income dispersion show a distribution of income across U.S. households that has become comparatively more unequal over time as high-income U.S. households have benefitted disproportionately from economic growth and that is less equal compared with distributions in many other developed countries. It also appears that going from rags to riches is relatively rare; that is, where one starts in the U.S. income distribution greatly influences where one ends up.

The historically slow rebound in the labor market from the 2007-2009 recession appears to be partly responsible for the current focus of some within the public policy community on the unequal distribution of the benefits of economic growth (e.g., higher national income) across U.S. households. This report examines changes over time and across countries in the shape of the income distribution to afford Members of Congress a broader perspective when deliberating such policy issues as the progressivity of income tax rates, the generosity of social insurance programs, and the level of the minimum wage. If income were equally divided across households, each quintile (fifth) of households would account for 20% of total income. Inequality is the term commonly used to describe an income distribution in which one or more quintiles account for less (more) than 20% of aggregate income. The Congressional Budget Office and others have documented that the bottom fifth has long accounted for much less than its proportionate share (20%) of total income. The bottom quintile's share of income has remained little changed for the past few decades at less than 4%, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. The middle class, defined as the middle 60% of households, received a disproportionately smaller share of the total economic pie in 2011 (45.7%) than in 1968 (53.2%). Over the same period, the disproportionately large income shares of the top 20% and the top 5% of households have trended upward. The top fifth's share of total household income rose from 42.6% in 1968 to 51.1% in 2011; the top 5%'s share rose from 16.3% to 22.3%. Estimates derived from federal income tax data, which allow researchers to look within the top 5% of the U.S. income distribution, suggest that those at the very top have reaped disproportionately larger gains from economic growth. These, among other measures of income dispersion, have led analysts to conclude that inequality has increased in the United States as a result of high-income households pulling further away from those lower in the distribution. Based on the limited data that are comparable across nations, the U.S. income distribution appears to be among the most unequal of all major industrialized countries and the United States appears to be among the nations experiencing the greatest increases in measures of income dispersion. Three leading explanations are put forth for these cross-country differences: (1) other advanced economies devote a larger share of national output to transfers, which tends to equalize income across households; (2) the progressivity of tax rates varies by country and thus has different effects on the distribution of after-tax income; and (3) equality in the distribution of earnings, which account for most household income, varies substantially across countries. The extent to which countries undertake policies that affect their income distributions may reflect national differences in perceptions about the degree of income mobility. In the United States, a longstanding argument against redistributionary policies has been that each person has an equal opportunity to move up the income ladder. Research raises questions about whether Americans' perceptions of their likelihood of upward mobility are exaggerated. Empirical analyses estimate that the United States is a comparatively immobile society, that is, where one starts in the income distribution influences where one ends up to a greater degree than in several advanced economies. Children raised in families at the bottom of the U.S. income distribution are estimated to be especially less likely to ascend the income ladder as adults.

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This report surveys the United Nations negotiations, from a primarily U.S. perspective. Formal international negotiations were launched in December 1990 to address growing scientific and political concern about human-induced climate change. Because emissions come from all countries, only concerted reductions by all major emitters can stabilize the rising GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. The primary issues for negotiation in 1990 remain the same today: when and by how much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions globally in order to achieve the UNFCCC's objective of avoiding " dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system "; how to share " common but differentiated responsibilities " among countries taking into account " historic contributions " and " respective capacities " of different people—in particular, the acceptable degree of participation of low-income countries; what mechanisms are best suited to assuring GHG reductions at the lowest cost, respecting national sovereignty and supporting " sustainable economic development " and " the eradication of poverty "; how cooperatively to understand the risks and facilitate adaptation to climate changes, especially by those people least able to cope on their own; and how to adapt international arrangements over time as science, social conditions, and capabilities evolve. As a Party to the UNFCCC, the United States has general obligations to reduce its GHG emissions, report its emissions and be subject to international review, and assist lower-income countries, and other binding commitments. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) The international negotiations launched in 1990 culminated in the 1992 adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The UNFCCC also listed in Annex II the then-wealthiest Parties (including the United States), which committed to providing agreed new and additional financial resources to assist the developing country Parties to meet their obligations. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) As a first enforceable step toward meeting the objective of the UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol promised to reduce the net GHG emissions of industrialized country Parties (Annex I Parties) to 5.2% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period of 2008 to 2012. In Congress, however, opposition was strong. While the inter-sessional meetings during 2008 and 2009 showed little movement, public and many diplomatic expectations were high that the United States, and perhaps China and other developing countries, would come to the Copenhagen negotiations with a new willingness to change positions and agree to (1) a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol with GHG targets for Annex I Parties and (2) a new instrument that would include quantitative GHG commitments for the United States and perhaps an array of non-Annex I Parties or all Parties. Intellectual property controversies are not addressed. COP 17 in Durban, South Africa (2011) Among the decisions made by Parties at COP 17 in Durban, South Africa were two of particular note: (1) an agreement to a second commitment period (CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol, and (2) a mandate, the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (DP), to negotiate by 2015 a new agreement "with legal force" that would be "applicable to all Parties", to begin implementation after 2020. In concept, the Durban Platform mandate could eliminate after 2020 the bifurcation of countries into "developed" or "developing." These processes have given way to new paths forward focused 1. under the UNFCCC, on a. implementation of past agreements, and b. the search for a future accord to be hammered out by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP); 2. under the Kyoto Protocol, on adoption of the Doha Amendment, which established a second commitment period for GHG targets from 2013-2020, covering 37 countries and the European Union, and requiring reductions of GHG emissions to, on average, 18% below 1990 levels. Under the 2010 Cancun Agreements, more than 85 Parties—both Annex I and non-Annex 1(including China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and many others)—made non-binding pledges to abate national GHG emissions. The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol established the second commitment period, from 2013-2020 for the Kyoto Protocol, with GHG targets for 37 countries plus the EU averaging a reduction of 18% below 1990 levels. Japan, New Zealand, and the Russia Federal declined new GHG targets because all major emitters did not participate. Additional issues that may be important to Congress include the compatibility of any international agreement with U.S. domestic policies and laws; the adequacy of appropriations and fiscal incentives to achieve any commitments under the agreement; the desirable form of any agreement; and any requirements for potential ratification and implementing legislation, should a formal treaty emerge from the negotiations.

The November 2013 negotiations in Warsaw are the most recent in a series aimed at arranging multilateral cooperation to address climate change. The United Nations launched formal international negotiations in 1990 to respond to growing scientific and public concern about human-induced emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), principally carbon dioxide. This report chronicles the main milestones and issues in the United Nations process to address climate change. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): Governments agreed in 1992 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which continues to provide the principle—but not sole—framework for global cooperation on the issue. The treaty's objective is to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human-induced interference with the Earth's climate system. A 2010 political statement interpreted this as a vision of GHG cuts to prevent global average temperature from increasing more than 2°C (2.6°F) above pre-industrial levels. The United States, as a Party to the UNFCCC, has qualitative obligations to report national GHG emissions; cooperate on science and technology development; enact programs to abate emissions; and provide agreed new and additional financial resources to assist low-income countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. When the UNFCCC was drafted, the then-industrialized countries emitted two-thirds of annual GHG emissions (excluding emissions from deforestation). These Annex I countries correspondingly accepted a lead role in abating GHG emissions, though all countries agreed to "common but differentiated responsibilities." The 1997 Kyoto Protocol and its 2012 Doha Amendment: When UNFCCC entered into force in 1995, Parties agreed that enforceable obligations were necessary to prevent "dangerous climate change." The 1995 Berlin Mandate called for a new protocol by 1997 with "no new commitments for developing countries" Under the resulting 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 37 of the then-highest income countries and the European Union (EU) committed to reduce their GHG emissions on average to 5% below 1990 levels during the "first commitment period" of 2008 to 2012. The United States signed but did not become a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. The 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol established a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol for the period 2013-2020, with GHG abatement pledges from 37 countries plus the EU. Japan, New Zealand, and the Russian Federation declined to participate in the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. The 2010 Cancun Agreement: In 2010 for the first time under the UNFCCC, a negotiated agreement contained language for GHG pledges by all major emitting Parties. Many Parties, including China, pledged quantitatively to limit their GHG emissions. However, these pledges are not considered "legally binding." Currently, the Durban Platform Negotiations: The current round of negotiations is the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The Durban Platform's mandate is for a new agreement "with legal force" that would be "applicable to all Parties" and begin implementation after 2020. In concept, this mandate could eliminate the bifurcation in the UNFCCC between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, or between countries with and without binding GHG obligations. Issues for Congress: Many in Congress are concerned with the merits of a treaty, and with the goals and obligations it might embody. One concern is the compatibility of any international agreement with any U.S. domestic policies and laws, should consensus emerge on whether and how to address climate change. Additional issues include the costs and other impacts of obligations; the parity of actions among countries and effects on trade competitiveness; the adequacy of appropriations, fiscal measures, and programs to achieve any commitments under the agreement; and the desirable form of the agreement and related requirements. A new treaty would require Senate consent to ratify it as well as possible federal legislation to meet any U.S. commitments.

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C ongress has an ongoing interest in regulating the immigration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to the United States. This workforce is seen by many as a catalyst of U.S. global economic competitiveness and is likewise considered a key element of the legislative options aimed at stimulating economic growth. The challenge central to the policy debate is facilitating the migration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers without adversely affecting U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. The labor market tests for employers hiring temporary foreign workers are also summarized. Overview of the Issues Temporary visas for professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers have become an important gateway for high-skilled immigration to the United States. Over the past two decades, the number of visas issued annually for all temporary employment-based admission has more than doubled from just over 400,000 in FY1994 to over 1 million in FY2015. While the total visa numbers include some unskilled and low-skilled workers, the visas for managerial, skilled, and professional workers depicted in Figure 1 clearly dominate the trends. Specific Concerns In addition to these cross-cutting questions, policymakers and advocates have focused on two visa categories in particular: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. Managerial, Professional, and Skilled Workers When it was enacted in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorized visas for foreign nationals who would perform needed services because of their high educational attainment, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability. Today, there are several temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the INA. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions to jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. Optional Practical Training (OPT) Although foreign students on F visas are generally barred from off-campus employment, some F-1 foreign students are permitted to participate in employment known as Optional Practical Training (OPT) after completing their undergraduate or graduate studies. OPT is temporary employment that is directly related to an F-1 student's major area of study. Generally, an F-1 foreign student may work up to 12 months in OPT status. In 2008, the Bush Administration expanded the OPT work period to 29 months for F-1 students in STEM fields.

Temporary visas for professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers have become an important gateway for high-skilled immigration to the United States. Over the past two decades, the number of visas issued for temporary employment-based admission has more than doubled from just over 400,000 in FY1994 to over 1 million in FY2015. While these visa numbers include some unskilled and low-skilled workers as well as accompanying family members, the visas for managerial, skilled, and professional workers dominate the trends. Since 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has authorized visas for foreign nationals who would perform needed services because of their high educational attainment, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability. Today, there are several temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the INA. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions to jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. Policymakers and advocates have focused on two visa categories in particular: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. The employers of H-1B workers are the only ones required to meet labor market tests in order to hire professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers. Although foreign students on F visas are generally barred from off-campus employment, some F-1 foreign students are permitted to participate in employment known as Optional Practical Training (OPT) after completing their undergraduate or graduate studies. OPT is temporary employment that is directly related to an F-1 student's major area of study. Generally, an F-1 foreign student may work up to 12 months in OPT status. In 2008, the Bush Administration added a 17-month extension to OPT for F-1 students in STEM fields, and the Obama Administration recently proposed a 24-month extension for F-1 students in STEM fields. Congress has an ongoing interest in regulating the immigration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to the United States. This workforce is seen by many as a catalyst of U.S. global economic competitiveness and is likewise considered a key element of the legislative options aimed at stimulating economic growth. The challenge central to the policy debate is facilitating the migration of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers without putting downward pressures on U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market.

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Food safety in the United States is regulated mainly by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Although the FDA is the federal agency primarily responsible for ensuring the safety of a vast majority of foods under the current system, the USDA is responsible for regulating meat, poultry, and some egg products, as well as being responsible for animal and plant health. USDA's role in the food safety system is founded on its authority to regulate meat and poultry inspection and importation. Four statutes that provide the most significant authority related to on-farm activity and food safety are the Animal Health Protection Act, the Plant Protection Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Authority to Enforce Marketing Orders and Implement Marketing Programs Although the AHPA and PPA may provide more significant sources of authority for USDA to take regulatory actions on farms, other statutes provide USDA with oversight authority related to farm activities and food safety. USDA Regulation of On-Farm Activity USDA's role in the current food safety system appears to focus on inspections during production, but USDA appears to have authority under numerous statutes to regulate at least some on-farm activities. The statutory authorities discussed in this report generally require that exercise of the authority provided be linked to products in interstate commerce. In the debate over food safety regulation on the farm, some have raised arguments that on-farm activities may not be sufficiently linked to commerce to justify congressional regulation. As a result, USDA's authority to implement programs related to food safety on farms before the agricultural products in question actually enter commerce has become an issue. It is likely that any farm would be subject to USDA's regulatory authority in the context of these statutes because of Congress's broad authority to act under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

In recent years, outbreaks of foodborne illnesses and subsequent product recalls have highlighted concerns about the current food safety system. Some have argued for a more comprehensive approach to the regulation of food products. Among the questions raised in the debate on the adequacy and potential improvements for the U.S. food safety system is the appropriate starting point of federal regulation. The current system provides regulation of various food products under differing systems of inspection and oversight. Advocates of a more comprehensive approach to food safety regulation say it could be achieved by a thorough system of oversight beginning at the point of production—on farms and ranches. Opponents of this approach argue that some proposals for on-farm oversight would impose too great a burden on small farms, would be too costly to implement, and in some cases may not be sufficiently linked to commerce to constitutionally justify congressional regulation. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has a major role in the U.S. food safety system through its inspection authority for meat and poultry products, but it also has authority to regulate the agricultural industry in other ways. This report will analyze the authority of USDA to regulate on-farm activities in the context of food safety. Specifically, the report will provide an overview of USDA statutory authorities related to on-farm activities, including the Animal Health Protection Act, the Plant Protection Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Although these statutes do not provide explicitly for USDA actions taken on farms, they do provide USDA broad general authority to protect animal and plant health and to enforce and implement marketing programs related to the quality and safety of agricultural food products. The report will also analyze the scope of USDA's authority to act on farms under these statutes. Because Congress's authority to enact these statutes falls under the Commerce Clause, the report will also analyze the question of whether USDA's authority applies to farms that do not directly participate in interstate commerce.

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Experts project that if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not abated well below current levels, the Earth's climate will warm further—to levels never experienced by human civilizations. In parallel, growing attention is being given to characterizing and supporting adaptations to changes already observed or expected future changes. Domestic actions to address climate change are moving independently across many fronts. In the 110 th Congress, numerous bills have been proposed to address climate change research and policy; one bill ( S. 2191 ) that would cap and reduce greenhouse gas emissions was reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Senate agreed on June 2, 2008 to consider the bill (now S. 3036 ). Primary concerns are the costs, which could reach trillions of dollars over coming decades, depending on policy choices; the distribution of those costs; and the effectiveness of policies, with the knowledge that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions would achieve success only if sufficient international cooperation can be achieved as well. Precipitation has increased over the past century, although some regions have become wetter while some have become drier. Most scientists conclude that a majority of the Earth's warming since the 1970s is due to GHG emissions from human activities, especially use of fossil fuels, clearing of land, and some industrial processes. The long atmospheric residence also means a long lag between policies to abate GHG emissions and their full effects on the climate system. To limit future risks, many experts propose targets to cap or "stabilize" the concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere; any level of stabilization is associated with a wide range of possible temperature outcomes. Program Design and the Costs of GHG Mitigation Greenhouse gas control programs raise concerns about costs: that the costs may be large; that the costs of mitigation may exceed the benefits of mitigation; or, that the distribution of costs may not be "fair." Climate Change and Other Policy Issues: Commonality or Conflict? Many technologies and policy options can serve all or many policy objectives. Technically and politically, though, an "efficiently designed" program may not be realistic. Available for others who are considering additional actions is an assortment of policy tools that they see as stimulating further reductions of GHG emissions and reducing risks to the economy, specific populations, and natural systems. Tools to Stimulate Technological Change Achieving deep GHG reductions from projected levels—necessary to avoid most projected climate change—would require extraordinary changes in how energy is used and supplied over time. Some policy tools that could be applied, although some could encounter potential challenges under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, include border tax adjustments that would raise the prices of imports from countries without GHG controls comparable to those of the United States; "international reserve" allowances that importers of certain goods must purchase (raising the cost of imports) if the country of origin does not apply GHG controls comparable to those of the United States; giving, over some period, allowances or revenues from sales of allowances to affected industries in order to facilitate adjustment; in the process of crafting domestic policies, negotiating with potentially affected WTO Members to seeks ways to avoid imposing restrictive import measures; working within the WTO to change or clarify rules to permit the imposition of import restrictions by countries adopting trade-vulnerable GHG control requirements; and working multilaterally to have GHG emission controls applied equitably to sources internationally (see discussion below) and to avoid WTO challenges. In considering the alternatives, policy makers may wish to answer for themselves such questions as whether the risks of human-induced climate change are sufficiently certain to call for policy actions to mitigate the causes and/or adapt to perceived inevitable change; how a domestic policy package can be designed that balances the risks of climate change with costs that are accepted as reasonable and fairly distributed; how domestic policy would interact with international negotiations to avoid unacceptable climate risks while distributing the effort equitably among countries and sectors; and when and how to promote appropriate adaptation by private and public decision-makers to the uncertain climate ahead.

On June 2, 2008, the Senate agreed to consider a bill (S. 3036) to control greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. In the 111th Congress, leadership in both chambers have announced their intentions to pass bills in 2009 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These actions are indicative of the pressures Members of Congress increasingly face on whether and how to address human-induced climate change. Contentious debates scrutinize issues of science, economics, values, geopolitics and a host of other concerns. Deliberations also weigh the appropriateness of alternative policy tools and program designs. The economic stakes are potentially large—with both the costs of controls and the "costs of inaction" ranging, by some estimates, into trillions of dollars over several decades. A major international assessment released in 2007 concluded that the Earth's climate had warmed unequivocally over the past century, and that elevated levels of so-called "greenhouse gases" (GHGs) were likely responsible for a major portion of the observed warming. Elevated concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere are due mostly to human activities, especially emissions from use of fossil fuels, clearing of land, and some industrial processes. Continued population and economic growth, with dependence on fossil fuels and needs for expanding agricultural lands, are expected to drive GHG emissions and induced climate change over the 21st Century to levels never experienced by human civilizations. While benefits may accrue to some people who may experience a limited amount of climate change, the aggregate effects are expected to become increasingly adverse, with people living in dry regions or along low-lying coasts, and people with low incomes, expected to be especially vulnerable. Adaptations can moderate the impacts and expand opportunities, but at a cost. Besides the overall costs of climate change, key concerns include the distributional effects within and across generations, how to value ecological impacts, and the potential for abrupt and irreversible changes. While important uncertainties remain concerning future climate change and its impacts, many experts are convinced that the evidence calls for U.S. action to abate GHG emissions. Others argue that mandatory controls would be premature, unnecessary or too costly. For decision-makers considering actions to address climate change, an assortment of policy instruments is available; studies suggest that a combination could be most effective in achieving various climate policy objectives. Current policy attention has focused on "cap and trade" strategies to reduce GHG emissions, with additional policy tools aimed at promoting the technology development considered necessary to slow climate change significantly. In parallel, growing attention is being given to supporting adaptations to expected future changes, as well as to strategies to gain effective international engagement in reducing GHGs. One significant obstacle to consensus is concern about the potential costs of abating GHG emissions, since deep reductions would require extraordinary changes in energy use and technologies. Studies suggest that efficiently designed programs could moderate the costs of reducing GHG emissions; technically and politically, though, an "efficiently designed" program may not be realistic. Policy options can ease the adjustments required and modify the distribution of costs—or potential wealth embodied in distribution of emission allowances—across specific sectors or populations. A core challenge of policy design, then, is balancing the climate effectiveness of a policy, the economic costs, and its distributional effects.

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The U.S. government's core goals for the war have remained unchanged since March 2009: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the governments of the United States, the other NATO Allies, and Afghanistan expressed support for the full transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans by the end of 2014. In early 2011, General David Petraeus, Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, in a letter to the ISAF troops, credited the hard work of the force, together with its Afghan partners, for "halting a downward security spiral in much of the country and to reversing it in some areas of great importance." Elements of the debate that continue to attract attention include refining U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region, and a desired end-state based on those interests; determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, what resources to commit to support those approaches, and how those approaches ought to evolve over time; helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts in Afghanistan; and prioritizing the Afghanistan war versus other U.S. national security imperatives in the context of a constrained fiscal environment. On October 7, 2001, following the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harboring al Qaeda, the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and of attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime. These include—in addition to the insurgent groups—the Afghan government, NATO, the U.S. government and other bilateral partners, and key regional leaders and neighboring states including Pakistan. U.S. Strategy in 2011 In early 2011, the Obama Administration was reportedly at work on several related initiatives—further refining a description of desired conditions that ought to pertain in Afghanistan in 2014, and drafting a basic vision for the long-term U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership, to prepare for talks with the Afghan government. President Karzai has repeatedly pledged to put a stop to corruption. The Process is based on the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." Yet critical policy debates remain unresolved. The appropriate role of the international community—its nature and extent—in supporting Afghan anti-corruption efforts. U.S. Troop Drawdowns President Obama has committed the United States to begin a "responsible drawdown" of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Some suggest that progress made in developing the capacity and capability of Afghan security forces and governing structures may be able to compensate, to some extent, for slower progress against safe havens, by giving the Afghan state greater resistance to insurgent incursions.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the "other war" and suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior leaders, including the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such progress was still "fragile and reversible." In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of 2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014. Strategic vision for Afghanistan is still, many would argue, a work in progress. President Karzai has consistently stressed the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." President Obama has consistently stressed the core goals of the United States: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. Yet for the U.S. government, fundamental issues remain unresolved. These include determining the minimum essential conditions required for Afghanistan itself to be able to sustain stability with relatively limited international support; defining the appropriate combination of U.S. efforts, together with other international resources, over time, required to achieve those minimum conditions; and balancing U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region against other imperatives, in a constrained fiscal environment. This report, which will be updated as events warrant, describes and analyzes the key players in the war in Afghanistan; the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and NATO; the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people; the major facets of the current effort: security, governance and anti-corruption, development, reconciliation and reintegration, and transition; mechanisms in place to measure progress; and critical issues that Congress may wish to consider further.

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Background The following list provides the names of the independent counsels (called "specialprosecutors" until 1983) who had been appointed by the special Division of the Court for AppointingIndependent Counsels, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, upon applicationfrom the Attorney General of the United States under the provisions originally enacted in the Ethicsin Government Act of 1978. (1) The list sets out in summary fashion the areas or subjects ofinvestigation by the independent counsel and briefly highlights the results of those investigations. These investigations, according to reports from the Departmentof Justice concerning early special prosecutor and independent counsel investigations, and laterpublished audits from the Government Accountability Office, have cost, as of September 30, 2005,a total of approximately $228,712,589. Thestatutory provisions for the appointment of independent counsels expired under a five year "sunset"provision at the end of June, 1999, when the law was not reauthorized by Congress, and thus no newindependent counsels may be appointed by the Special Division of the Court. Of the 20 independent counselinvestigations that were initiated under the former statutory mechanism, in a majority of the cases-- specifically in 12 of the investigations -- no indictments were brought against anyone investigated. Of the 8 investigations which did return at least one indictment, in 3 of those instances there was noindictment brought against the principal Government official originally named as the subject ortarget of that independent counsel's investigation. (12) Thus, of the 20 independent counsel investigations initiated,although several independent counsel investigations resulted in multiple convictions of personsrelating either to the original subject matter or a peripheral matter, including the convictions offederal officials and former federal officials involved, only two federal officials who were actuallythe named subjects of the 20 investigations were finally convicted of or pleaded guilty to the chargesbrought. List of Special Prosecutors/Independent Counsels The special prosecutors and independent counsels appointed by a special judicial panel at therequest of the Attorney General, under the provisions of federal law originally enacted in the Ethicsin Government Act of 1978, have included: 1. Meese violated the law. Cost of the investigation: $15,000. The final report of the independent counsel's office was released October 27, 1998. According to the reports by the General Accounting Office, thecost of the investigations of Independent Counsel Smaltz through September 30, 2005, has been$25,157,010. The cost of investigation, including reimbursement of attorneys' fees, was$628,156.

This report lists the independent counsels (called "special prosecutors" until 1983) appointedby the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals upon application from the AttorneyGeneral of the United States, under the provisions of the law originally enacted in the Ethics inGovernment Act of 1978. The report specifies the dates of the appointments of the independentcounsels and the dates of their final reports; sets out in summary fashion the areas or subjects ofinvestigation by the independent counsels; highlights the results of those investigations; and providesthe costs of the investigations through September 30, 2005, the date through which the GovernmentAccountability Office has completed the latest published audit of the offices of independent counsels(published March 31, 2006). The information provided from public documents indicates that there have been 20 reportedindependent counsel or special prosecutor investigations initiated under the provisions of title VI ofthe Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended. Because Congress did not pass a reauthorizationof the law, the provisions of the independent counsel law expired under a five-year "sunset"provision on June 30, 1999, and independent counsels are no longer named by the Special Divisionof the Court. Investigations by independent counsels who had already been appointed before June30, 1999, however, were allowed to continue under the old provisions of the law until the mattersassigned to them had been completed (28 U.S.C. § 599). Of the 20 independent counsel investigations, 12 of the investigations returned noindictments against those investigated. Of the eight investigations that did return at least oneindictment, in three of those instances, there was no indictment brought against the principalgovernment official originally named as the target of that independent counsel's investigation; inthree other instances, the principal government official indicted was either acquitted or hisconviction was overturned on appeal. Thus, of the 20 independent counsel investigations initiated,although several independent counsels obtained multiple convictions of certain persons relating tothe original subject matter or peripheral matters (including convictions of several federal officialsor former federal officials), only two federal officials who were actually the named or principalsubjects of the 20 investigations were finally convicted of or pleaded guilty to the charges brought;in one of those two instances, that person was pardoned by the President. According to reports from the Department of Justice concerning early "special prosecutor"and independent counsel investigations, and later published audits from the GovernmentAccountability Office, it is estimated that the total costs of all 20 independent counsel investigationsthrough September 30, 2005, including unaudited expenses of other agencies assisting theindependent counsels and the government-reimbursed costs of attorneys' fees when provided, hasbeen approximately $228,712,589.

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the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). (2) On the other hand,if a communication is deemed to be "issue advocacy," it cannot be constitutionally subject to any regulation and,therefore, may be funded with unregulated or"soft money." Specifically, it would regulate political ads that: "refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate, are broadcast within30 days of a primary or 60 days of a generalelection, and are made to an audience that "includes" voters in that election. Generally, it would require disclosureof disbursements over $10,000 for suchcommunications, including identification of each donor of $1,000 or more, and such communications would beprohibited from being financed with union orcertain corporate funds. With regard to issue and express advocacy, H.R. 2356 , the "Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001," (Shays/Meehan), which passed theHouse on February 14, 2002, is similar to S. 27 : it would create a new term in federal election law,"electioneering communication," which wouldregulate political ads that: "refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate, are broadcast within 30 days of a primaryor 60 days of a general election, and (differingfrom S. 27 ) for House and Senate elections, is "targeted to the relevant electorate." H.R. With theexception of the Ninth Circuit, the prevailing view of the federal circuit courts is that Supreme Court precedentmandates that a communication contain expresswords advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate in order to be constitutionally regulated.

Issue advocacy communications have become increasingly popular in recent federalelection cycles. Theseadvertisements are often interpreted to favor or disfavor certain candidates, while also serving to inform the publicabout a policy issue. However, unlikecommunications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, the Supreme Courthas determined that issue ads areconstitutionally protected First Amendment speech that cannot be regulated in any manner. According to mostlower court rulings, only speech containing expresswords of advocacy of election or defeat, also known as "express advocacy" or "magic words" can be regulated aselection-related communications and thereforebe subject to the requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Unlike express advocacycommunications, therefore, issue ads may be paid for withfunds unregulated by federal law, i.e., soft money. H.R. 2356 (Shays/Meehan), as passed by the House, would create a new term in federal election law,"electioneering communication," which wouldregulate political ads that: "refer" to a clearly identified federal candidate, are broadcast within 30 days of a primaryor 60 days of a general election, and, forHouse and Senate elections, are "targeted to the relevant electorate." Generally, it would require disclosure ofdisbursements over $10,000 for suchcommunications, including identification of each donor of $1,000 or more, and would prohibit the financing of suchcommunications with union or certaincorporate funds. Likewise, S. 27 (McCain/Feingold), as passed by the Senate, would regulate the samecommunications as H.R. 2356 inthe same manner except, with regard to the audience receiving the communication, S. 27 provides that thecommunication be made to an audiencethat "includes" voters in that election.

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Introduction It has been three years since Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), calling for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or "drones," into the national airspace by September 2015. During that time, the substantive legal privacy framework relating to UAS on the federal level has remained relatively static: Congress has enacted no law explicitly regulating the potential privacy impacts of drone flights; the courts have had no occasion to rule on the constitutionality of drone surveillance; and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not include privacy provisions in its proposed rule on small UAS. However, this issue has not left the national radar. Congress held several hearings in the 113 th Congress on the potential privacy impacts of domestic drone use on American citizens; Members have introduced legislation to regulate both public- and private-actor use of drones; the executive branch has taken various measures to assess the privacy impact of its drone operations; and almost half the states have enacted UAS legislation. As this report will discuss, there are two overarching privacy issues implicated by domestic drone flights. The first issue is defining and understanding what the chameleon phrase "privacy" means in the context of aerial surveillance. Traditional privacy concepts such as the right to control information about oneself or secrecy do not adequately capture potential privacy concerns raised by visual surveillance; instead, privacy concepts such as personal autonomy and anonymity must be explored to get a fuller understanding about the scope of privacy interests implicated by UAS operations. Additionally, a separate set of privacy interests might be implicated by the subsequent aggregation, use, and retention of drone-obtained information. The second predominant issue is which entity should be responsible for regulating UAS privacy issues. With its power over interstate commerce, Congress has the broadest authority to set national standards for UAS privacy regulation. Lastly, some have argued that under our system of federalism, the states should be left to experiment with various privacy schemes. With this in mind, this report will provide a primer on privacy issues relating to various UAS operations, both public and private, including an overview of current UAS uses, the privacy interests implicated by these operations, and various potential approaches to UAS privacy regulation. Privacy is an ambiguous term that can mean different things in different contexts, which becomes apparent when attempting to apply traditional privacy concepts to drone surveillance. Potentially in response to this dearth of privacy regulations, President Obama recently mandated that all federal agencies evaluate the privacy risks posed by their drone operations. Executive Branch In addition to the courts, the executive branch is likely to play a significant role in regulating the privacy implications of UAS operations. Congress still has a role to play in setting strong privacy and transparency standards for drone use." Congress Several measures were introduced in the 113 th Congress that would have restricted both public-and private-actor domestic UAS operations, and reintroduction of these bills is likely in the 114 th Congress.

It has been three years since Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), calling for the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or "drones," into the national airspace by September 2015. During that time, the substantive legal privacy framework relating to UAS on the federal level has remained relatively static: Congress has enacted no law explicitly regulating the potential privacy impacts of drone flights, the courts have had no occasion to rule on the constitutionality of drone surveillance, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not include privacy provisions in its proposed rule on small UAS. This issue, however, has not left the national radar. Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation concerning the potential privacy implications of domestic drone use; President Obama recently issued a directive to all federal agencies to assess the privacy impact of their drone operations; and almost half the states have enacted some form of drone legislation. There are two overarching privacy issues implicated by domestic drone use. The first is defining what "privacy" means in the context of aerial surveillance. Privacy is an ambiguous term that can mean different things in different contexts. This becomes readily apparent when attempting to apply traditional privacy concepts such as personal control and secrecy to drone surveillance. Other, more nuanced privacy theories such as personal autonomy and anonymity must be explored to get a fuller understanding of the privacy risks posed by drone surveillance. Moreover, with ever-increasing advances in data storage and manipulation, the subsequent aggregation, use, and retention of drone-obtained data may warrant an additional privacy impact analysis. The second predominant issue is which entity should be responsible for regulating drones and privacy. As the final arbiter of the Constitution, the courts are naturally looked upon to provide at least the floor of privacy protection from UAS surveillance, but as will be discussed in this report, under current law, this protection may be minimal. In addition to the courts, the executive branch likely has a role to play in regulating privacy and drones. While the FAA has taken on a relatively passive role in such regulation, the President's new privacy directive for government drone use and multi-stakeholder process for private use could create an initial framework for privacy regulations. With its power over interstate commerce, Congress has the broadest authority to set national standards for UAS privacy regulation. Several measures were introduced in the 113th Congress that would have restricted both public- and private-actor domestic UAS operations, and reintroduction of these bills is likely in the 114th Congress. Lastly, some have argued that under our system of federalism, the states should be left to experiment with various privacy schemes. It is reported that by the end of 2014, 20 states have enacted some form of drone regulation. This report will provide a primer on privacy issues related to various UAS operations, both public and private, including an overview of current UAS uses, the privacy interests implicated by these operations, and various potential approaches to UAS privacy regulation.

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Introduction In 1996, Congress enacted the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA; P.L. 104-330 ). NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program to help tribes access private funding for housing development activities (the Title VI loan guarantee program) and funding for training and technical assistance. Tribes are largely supportive of NAHASDA and the Native American Housing Block Grant. Many of the changes that have been proposed by tribes have to do with streamlining program requirements, particularly when NAHASDA funds are used with other sources of federal funds; providing more flexibility for tribes to make their own decisions about housing programs; and requiring HUD to be more responsive to requests for approvals or waivers of certain requirements. Congress has expressed interest in certain issues related to NAHASDA beyond those raised by tribes. One such issue has been concern about some tribes' accumulated balances of unspent NAHASDA funds. Additionally, some Members of Congress have opposed reauthorization of the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant out of concerns that it could be construed to provide benefits based on race. The authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013, although Congress has generally continued to provide funding for NAHASDA programs. The reauthorization process has presented an opportunity for Congress to consider changes to the law and the programs that it authorizes as well as other housing issues affecting Native Americans. However, no NAHASDA reauthorization legislation was enacted by the end of the 114 th Congress. NAHBG Program Requirements The NAHBG provides formula funding to tribes to carry out affordable housing activities that benefit low-income Native American households living in tribal areas. Many of the changes to NAHBG requirements advocated by tribes have to do with streamlining certain cross-cutting federal requirements when multiple sources of federal funds are used in a project, providing tribes additional flexibility to set their own requirements, or requiring HUD to respond to requests for approvals or waivers in a timely manner. This can create complications for projects that use NAHASDA and other sources of funds. The NHHBG provides funds to Hawaii's Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) to use for affordable housing activities for low-income Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands. For many years, there has been ongoing litigation between the Cherokee Freedmen, the Cherokee Nation, and the United States over whether the Freedmen have a right to membership in the tribe. (The authorization for the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant expired at the end of FY2005.) During the 114 th Congress, the House and the Senate considered separate versions of NAHASDA reauthorization legislation: In the House, H.R. Both H.R. 360 and S. 710 would have reauthorized a number of Native American and Native Hawaiian housing programs, authorized certain new program demonstrations and set-asides for Native American housing, and made several changes to NAHBG requirements. Both bills addressed a number of the issues described earlier in this report, although not necessarily in the same way. 360 , as passed by the House, and S. 710 , as reported out of committee in the Senate, with each other and with existing law.

The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA; P.L. 104-330) replaced several existing sources of housing funding for Native Americans with a single block grant, the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG). Through the NAHBG, tribes and Alaska Native villages receive formula funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to use for a variety of affordable housing activities that benefit low-income Native American households living in tribal areas. NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program for tribes (the Title VI loan guarantee) and funding for training and technical assistance. In addition, NAHASDA (as amended) authorizes the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), which provides funds for affordable housing activities for low-income Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands. While tribes are generally supportive of NAHASDA, some have advocated for changes to program requirements. For example, tribes have argued for streamlining certain cross-cutting federal requirements when multiple sources of funds are used in a single project, for more flexibility in setting certain program requirements, and for HUD to respond to requests for approvals or waivers of NAHASDA requirements in a more timely fashion. Furthermore, some in Congress have expressed concern over certain NAHASDA-related issues. For several years, there has been some opposition in Congress to reauthorizing housing programs for Native Hawaiians out of concern that such programs could be construed to be based on race. Congress has also debated whether, and how, to respond to ongoing litigation between the Cherokee Nation and the Cherokee Freedmen. More recently, Congress has expressed concern about a few tribes that have accumulated large balances of unexpended NAHASDA funds. The authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013 (the authorization for the NHHBG expired at the end of FY2005), although Congress has generally continued to provide funding for these programs. The reauthorization process has presented an opportunity for Congress to consider potential program changes advocated by tribes as well as other issues related to NAHASDA that are of interest to Congress. In the 114th Congress, the House passed a NAHASDA reauthorization bill (H.R. 360), while in the Senate a different bill was favorably reported out of committee (S. 710). Both H.R. 360 and S. 710 would have reauthorized a number of Native American and Native Hawaiian housing programs, authorized certain new program demonstrations and set-asides for Native American housing, and provided for a reduction in NAHBG formula funding for certain tribes with large amounts of unspent funds (although in slightly different ways). Both bills also included a number of changes to NAHASDA requirements, including provisions related to streamlining environmental review and lease termination requirements when NAHASDA funds are combined with other sources of funding, and allowing tribes to set their own maximum rents for NAHASDA-assisted housing. Although the House and the Senate reauthorization bills addressed many of the same issues, they did not always do so in the same way. Each bill also included provisions related to certain issues that were not included in the other bill. Neither of these NAHASDA reauthorization bills, nor any other NAHASDA reauthorization legislation, was enacted by the end of the 114th Congress.

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Introduction The United States and the international community continue to rely on the central role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as coordinator of international donor activity and assistance. On December 1, 2009, the Obama Administration laid out a strategy for Afghanistan in response to a battlefield assessment from General McChrystal and reestablished previous commitments to civilian efforts in cooperation with the United Nations. In 2010, UNAMA was a central actor at a number of events and meetings that demonstrated ways in which the international community and Afghan government are engaged in Afghanistan. Some observers contend that progress has been achieved so far in Afghanistan. Still, many experts agree that the international effort in Afghanistan is at a critical period. This report provides an analysis of UNAMA's role in Afghanistan and the key policy issues it faces on civilian reconstruction. The Bonn Agreement also called for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Afghanistan and a Judicial Commission. Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010)—At the Kabul Conference, the government of Afghanistan put forward an Afghan-led plan for improving development, governance, and security. The following sections address areas where UNAMA is playing a significant role. The main issues appear to have been focused on the degree of fraud that had taken place during the election and how to deal with it. But it is also not always seen as impartial. The international donor community has put great emphasis on "ownership"—meaning leadership and control—of reconstruction efforts by the country itself. The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establish a common set of goals in order to coordinate activities and utilize donor funds most effectively. It remains to be seen how effectively this can be done. Presence in Afghanistan Appendix E. Map of UNAMA Offices Appendix F. Afghanistan International Community Donors List Appendix G. Priorities in UNAMA's 2009 Mandate The priorities below were identified by the U.N. Security Council in resolution 1868 (2009) as key areas of UNAMA's work in Afghanistan: promote more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan government; Promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government and the adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness enumerated in the Afghanistan Compact, including through mobilization of resources, coordination of the assistance provided by international donors and organizations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in particular for counter-narcotics, reconstruction, and development activities ; strengthen cooperation with ISAF; Strengthen the cooperation with ISAF at all levels and throughout the country, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to improve civil-military coordination, to facilitate the timely exchange of information and to ensure coherence between the activities of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations ; provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country; Through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country, provide political outreach, promote at the local level the implementation of the Compact, of the ANDS and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and facilitate inclusion in and understanding of the Government's policies ; provide good offices in support of Afghan-led reconciliation programs; Provide good offices to support, if requested by the Afghan Government, the implementation of Afghan-led reconciliation programmes, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and with full respect for the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) and other relevant resolutions of the Council; support efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption; Support and strengthen efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption at the local and national levels, and to promote development initiatives at the local level with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace and deliver services in a timely and sustainable manner; play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; Play a central coordinating to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and with a view to building the capacity of the Afghan government, including by providing effective support to national and local authorities in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and to creating conditions conducive to voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons; monitor the human right situation of civilians and coordinate human rights protection; Continue, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to cooperate with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to cooperate also with relevant international and local non-governmental organizations, to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State party; in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights; support the electoral process through the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission; Support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, preparations for the crucial upcoming presidential elections, in particular through the IEC, by providing technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organizations providing assistance and channeling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process; support regional cooperation in working for a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

The United Nations (UN) has had an active presence in Afghanistan since 1988, and it is highly regarded by many Afghans for playing a brokering role in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result of the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, coordinating international donor activity and assistance have been tasked to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). However, there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government, and UNAMA has struggled to exercise its full mandate. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated and, in coordination with the Afghan government, involves U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, international organizations, and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The coordinated aid programs of the United States and its European allies focus on a wide range of activities, from strengthening the central and local governments of Afghanistan and its security forces to promoting civilian reconstruction, reducing corruption, and assisting with elections. Some of the major issues UNAMA is wrestling with include the following: Most observers agree that continued, substantial, long-term development is key, as is the need for international support, but questions have been raised about corruption, aid effectiveness (funds required, priorities established, impact received), and the coordination necessary to achieve sufficient improvement throughout the country. The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establish coordinating institutions and a common set of goals in order to use donor funds effectively. The international donor community has also sought to encourage Afghan "ownership"-meaning leadership and control-of reconstruction and development efforts by the country itself. Although the Afghan government is taking on an increasingly central role in development planning and the management of aid funds, the international community remains extensively involved in Afghan stabilization, not only in diplomacy and development assistance, but also in combating insurgents and addressing broader security issues. In December 2009, the Obama Administration laid out its strategy for Afghanistan in response to a battlefield assessment, reemphasized an earlier commitment to civilian efforts in cooperation with the United Nations, and further highlighted Afghanistan as a top national security priority. In 2010, a number of events and meetings took place that taken together provide a snapshot of ways that the Afghan government and international community are engaged in Afghanistan. These include the London Conference (January), the Peace Jirga (June), the Kabul Conference (July), and the NATO Summit in Lisbon (November). In addition, on September 18, 2010 Afghanistan held its second parliamentary election, the results of which were certified by electoral commissions in November. In its Afghanistan strategy review in December, the Obama Administration cautiously stated that while progress is being made on security matters, it remains fragile and requires sustained involvement by the United States and its allies. This report examines the role of UNAMA in Afghanistan and discusses the obstacles the organization faces in coordinating international efforts and explores related policy issues and considerations for the 112th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction The United States has long sought to influence the peoples of foreign countries through public diplomacy (PD) efforts. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and with U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, interest in public diplomacy as a foreign policy and national security tool was renewed. Yet because of the increasing recognition of public diplomacy's key role in the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs, many in the executive branch, Congress, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and news media debate different approaches to improving U.S public diplomacy to respond to new challenges, determining public diplomacy authorities and responsibilities, defining and executing public diplomacy strategy, and adequately resourcing public diplomacy. 105-277 ) (Consolidation Act) abolished USIA. First, the end of the Cold War meant that the central justification for a strong public diplomacy mechanism, namely, the ideological fight against the Soviet Union, no longer existed. The United States was the sole superpower, and the spread of democracy seemed to be on the march around the world. Department of Defense Communications The Department of Defense (DOD) has focused increasingly on improving its communications with foreign publics, as well as measuring and assessing the effect its words and actions have on populations living in the areas where U.S. military operations are taking place. The Strategy identifies three public diplomacy priorities: expand education and exchange programs, "perhaps the single most effective public diplomacy tool of the last fifty years"; modernize communications, including a heightened profile for U.S. officials in foreign media, increased foreign language training for U.S. diplomats, and utilization of Internet media such as web chats, blogs, and interactive websites; and promote the "diplomacy of deeds," publicizing U.S. activities to benefit foreign populations through humanitarian assistance, health and education programs, and economic development, as well as U.S. government activities that show respect for foreign culture and history. Current Issues Concerning U.S. Public Diplomacy A number of issues currently present challenges to the future implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Several studies have considered creation of a new national strategy for communicating with foreign publics and have provided recommendations. This was a primary reason for creating the civilian USIA after World War II to lead U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Other observers assert, however, that while there have been some problems with the integration of public diplomacy into the State Department since the abolition of USIA in 1999, placing public diplomacy within the State Department structure is the best way to ensure that U.S. foreign policy is being promoted in a coordinated fashion through both official diplomatic efforts and communications with foreign publics. Although the number of foreign service officers overall have increased recently, the number of officers specializing in public diplomacy is at a significantly low level, in comparison to the apex of USIA's activities during the Cold War. Many have called for improving public diplomacy training. Because of these conditions, some argue that public diplomacy expertise and experience have been critically reduced. Such an independent public diplomacy support organization, as envisioned by some observers, would take on a number of duties, including the following, among others: conducting research on innovative techniques and new technologies for U.S. public diplomacy efforts, and leveraging and experimenting with the latest forms of new media for use by U.S. public diplomacy practitioners; strengthening U.S. government capability to formulate, coordinate, and execute strategic public diplomacy planning within individual government agencies to implement requirement of the upcoming national strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication; utilizing research data on results of public diplomacy and other communications efforts to synthesize best practices, and serve as a comprehensive clearinghouse for government public diplomacy actors to access such practices; in addition to its independent functions, contracting with government agencies to provide program-specific public diplomacy services; partnering with and making grants to private organizations to engage in new public diplomacy efforts, as well as to evaluate effectiveness of such efforts; and raising funds from outside sources to fund innovative communications initiatives that could serve dual government/business purposes. Several pieces of legislation proposed thus far in the 111 th Congress concern changes to, improvements in, and funding for public diplomacy. Interagency Coordination H.R. Agency Roles and Responsibilities H.R. Personnel/Human Resources H.R. America Centers, Libraries, and Increased Outreach S. 1707 ( P.L. H.R. International Broadcasting H.R. Research, Monitoring, and Evaluation H.R.

Public diplomacy is defined in different ways, but broadly it is a term used to describe a government's efforts to conduct foreign policy and promote national interests through direct outreach and communication with the population of a foreign country. Public diplomacy activities include providing information to foreign publics through broadcast and Internet media and at libraries and other outreach facilities in foreign countries; conducting cultural diplomacy, such as art exhibits and music performances; and administering international educational and professional exchange programs. The United States has long sought to influence the peoples of foreign countries through public diplomacy. After World War II, during which the U.S. military conducted most information and communication activities, authority for U.S. public diplomacy was placed in civilian hands. During the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA) led U.S. public diplomacy efforts, with a primary mission of combating Soviet propaganda and the spread of communism. Once the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, USIA's role was diminished, and its resources were reduced during the 1990s. Finally, USIA was abolished in 1999 as part of a post-Cold War reorganization, with public diplomacy responsibilities folded into the Department of State. After the 9/11 terror attacks, there was new interest in promoting effective public diplomacy, as a struggle against extremist ideologies became crucial to the overall fight against terrorism. In recent years, many observers have called for increased resources for and improvement of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. A number of challenges and questions, however, currently affect the future of U.S. government communications with foreign publics. Some argue that abolishing USIA was a mistake and that the State Department is ill-suited to conduct long-term public diplomacy. Also, the Department of Defense and the U.S. military have increased significantly their role in communicating with foreign publics. Determining public diplomacy roles, responsibilities, and coordination procedures among civilian and military actors has therefore become a central issue. In addition, with the rise and rapid evolution of Internet communications, the U.S. government must determine how to effectively communicate with foreign publics in an increasingly complex, accessible, and democratized global communications environment. A number of issues for Congress have arisen concerning U.S. public diplomacy. Determining levels of public diplomacy funding, for programs and personnel, will continue to be of central importance. Establishing capabilities to improve monitoring and assessment of public diplomacy activities, as well as to leverage expertise and best practices outside government, may be important to increasing public diplomacy effectiveness. Questions of possible reorganization of public diplomacy authorities and capabilities, through legislation or otherwise, may be considered. Requirements for effective interagency cooperation and coordination, as well as creation of a national public diplomacy strategy and whole-of-government approaches may be created to improve effective communication with foreign publics. Several pieces of legislation proposed thus far in the 111th Congress concern changes to, improvements in, and funding for public diplomacy. These bills include H.R. 2647 and S. 1707, which have been enacted into law, as well as H.R. 363, H.R. 489, H.R. 490, H.R. 2387, H.R. 2410, S. 230, and S. 894. Congressional consideration of these bills, and continued interest in U.S. public diplomacy, are expected to continue during the 111th Congress's second session.

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Introduction In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast of the United States, causing severe damage to the mid-Atlantic and northeast regions of the country. The resulting destruction led to major disaster declarations in 12 states and the District of Columbia, making those states eligible for certain supplemental federal assistance to aid in the recovery process. The damage resulting from Hurricane Sandy devastated a wide range of communities and, as a result, many individuals and organizations sought federal assistance for recovery, including churches, which, in turn, raised constitutional concerns regarding the provision of federal assistance to religious organizations. This report examines the constitutional rules governing federal funding for religious buildings and analyzes the Court's previous decisions on this issue. It also analyzes more recent lower court and administrative opinions that have distinguished the Court's decisions and allowed public funds to be awarded to houses of worship. Finally, the report discusses examples in which Congress has proposed or provided funding related to the construction and maintenance of religious buildings, including H.R. 3066 , which would authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide disaster recovery assistance to houses of worship and other buildings operated by religious organizations. While this generally means that the government cannot finance or sponsor religious activities, the constitutional analysis of public aid to religious organizations differs based on the form of assistance provided. Other Judicial Approaches to the Provision of Funds to Buildings Used for Religious Activities Although these Supreme Court decisions indicate a constitutional prohibition on the use of public funds for construction or maintenance of buildings used for religious activities such as worship or sectarian education, it is important to note the development of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the subsequent decades since the building and repair cases of the early 1970s. 3066, the Federal Disaster Assistance Nonprofit Fairness Act of 2015 H.R. Indeed, the Court has emphasized the importance of neutrality in many of its more recent cases in a variety of contexts. It may be noted that Congress has permitted religious organizations to participate in federally funded programs in other cases.

In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast of the United States, causing severe damage to the mid-Atlantic and northeast regions of the country. The resulting destruction led to major disaster declarations in 12 states and the District of Columbia, making those states eligible for certain federal supplemental assistance to aid in the recovery process. The damage resulting from Hurricane Sandy devastated a wide range of communities, and many individuals and organizations sought federal assistance for recovery, including churches, which, in turn, raised constitutional concerns regarding the provision of federal assistance to religious organizations. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits the government from sponsoring or financing religious activities. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the restrictions on federal aid provided to religious institutions in a number of contexts. In the context of providing aid to fund the construction or maintenance of religious buildings, the Court has permitted such aid if the building is not used for worship or religious instruction in a series of decisions issued in the early 1970s. Over time, however, the focus of the Court's analysis in Establishment Clause cases involving public aid to religious institutions has shifted. More recent cases arguably suggest that neutrality in the eligibility of participants competing for public funds may be paramount. At least one federal court of appeals and the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) have relied on this shift to support conclusions that funding may be permitted to provide assistance to religious facilities in some scenarios, such as urban development, emergency and disaster assistance, and historic preservation. This report examines the constitutional rules governing federal funding for religious buildings and analyzes the Court's previous decisions on this issue. It also analyzes more recent lower court and administrative opinions that have distinguished the Court's decisions and allowed public funds to be awarded to houses of worship. Finally, the report discusses examples in which Congress has proposed or provided funding related to the construction and maintenance of religious buildings, including the Federal Disaster Assistance Nonprofit Fairness Act (H.R. 3066, 114th Cong.), which would authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide disaster recovery assistance to houses of worship and other buildings operated by religious organizations.

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This report analyzes the uses of accrued profits by the five major integrated oil companies from 2004 through 2007. Although the oil industry is composed of thousands of firms involved in many different aspects of the business, these five firms represent the visible face of the oil industry to the American public. These companies also earned 90% of the total earnings of integrated oil companies, and 74% of the earnings of all the integrated oil companies, the independent oil and gas producers, and the independent refiners and marketers in 2007. The increased price of crude oil since 2004 has been attributed to the growth in demand from China, India, the United States, and other areas, as well as to hurricanes Katrina and Rita and a variety of other factors. Few if any of these factors could be influenced by the five companies. Crude oil prices began their rise toward the end of 2003, and although volatile, have remained at, or near, historically high levels since then. In addition to the increasing price of crude oil, tightness in the refining industry contributed to the increase in petroleum product prices, notably gasoline. A slower pace of capital investment is consistent with a view that the currently high price of oil might decline in the future, leading to an investment reference price below the currently observable price, or a forecast that demand growth might slow or even decline. Several years in the permitting process might be expected. This, along with other reasons, like scaling the company to an appropriate size for international competition, has led to periods of merger and acquisition activity in the oil industry. If the number of shares falls, the actual return to shareholders from dividend payments is greater. In the real world of finance, however, where bankruptcy is a potential reality, many analysts look upon debt reduction as an important way to strengthen the balance sheet of a company, improving its financial health. Cash When revenues and profits accrue quickly, and perhaps unexpectedly, there may be little alternative to holding those returns as cash balances until a strategy for using them can be developed and put in motion. In time, as corporate plans more reflect a crude oil market characterized by higher prices, long-term assets might be accumulated, supplies of both crude oil and petroleum products might be enhanced, and consumers might see a slacker market where prices may moderate from current levels.

The price of crude oil began to increase in the last quarter of 2003, and has led to the high prices observed from 2004 through 2007. The Iraq War, unexpectedly high demand growth in China, India, and the United States, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, along with a number of other factors, all contributed to the rising price. An important result of these largely unexpected events was that the oil industry, as represented by the five major integrated oil companies doing business in the United States, experienced rapidly expanding revenues and profits. Some observers characterized these profits as "windfall" gains, while others pointed to the increasing scarcity and rising costs observable in the oil industry. Some saw "price gouging" in high gasoline prices, while others saw the market working to avoid physical supply shortages. The larger profits experienced by the oil industry and the five major integrated oil companies can be used in a variety of ways. Profits might be used to expand exploration and development of crude oil resources to expand the supply of oil. Refineries might be constructed, and technology improved at existing refineries, to expand the supply of petroleum products, most notably, gasoline. Profits might also be used to provide increased returns to the owners of the oil companies, the shareholders. This end might be accomplished through dividend payments and share repurchase plans. Profits might also be used to improve the balance sheets of the companies through debt reduction, potentially improving their financial health should they face a downturn in the market in the future. Until the effects of corporate plans that reflect a market characterized by higher oil prices can be observed, profits might tend to build up as cash reserves, as experienced by some of the five firms since 2004. How the profits generated over the past four years are used will help to determine whether oil and petroleum product markets remain tight with high prices, or whether they loosen, develop extra capacity, and lead to moderating prices. This report will be updated.

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Insurance Regulation and Federal Legislation The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance in this country for the past 150 years. The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act specifically authorized the states' role, and Congress has recognized state primacy in insurance regulation in more recent laws shaping the financial regulatory system, such as 1999's Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and 2010's Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). Organizations such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) create model laws and undertake other steps to harmonize insurance regulation and laws across the country. To be legally binding, however, any models suggested by the NAIC or NCOIL must first be adopted in a state. The states may amend models to fit local circumstances or completely reject suggestions from outside groups. In the 113 th Congress, issues around licensing for insurance agents and brokers (known generally as insurance producers ) came to the fore in the form of legislation—the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Act, passed in different forms by both the Senate and the House. This legislation, which would mandate the creation of a National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB), is generally referred to as "NARAB II" legislation. 26 , which included NARAB II provisions as Title II. Aspects of insurance producer licensing include specific education or knowledge requirements, such as passage of a written exam prior to licensing and continuing education afterward, and, in some states, criminal background checks. 26/P.L. Thus, it included NARAB II provisions in Title II, but did not include the Section 335 sunset language that had been included in the Senate-passed version of S. 2244 . The House and Senate passed H.R. 114-1 , on January 12, 2015. Summary of Enacted Provisions P.L. The association will be overseen by a board of eight appointees who are current or former state insurance commissioners and five appointees with demonstrated expertise in different areas of insurance. To gain membership, insurance producers would have been required to be licensed as an insurance producer in their home state, pass a criminal background check, and meet other criteria determined by the association, which should not be "less protective of the public than that contained in the NAIC Producer Licensing Model Act." Appointments would have been made by the President with advice and consent by the Senate. Although largely similar to the original legislation, this amendment made changes to the bill, including adding the Department of the Treasury as a conduit of information from NARAB to the President; requiring that copies of the NARAB bylaws, standards, and annual report be publically available on the NARAB website; and stipulating that the annual report be made to the President and the "States (including the State insurance regulators)" rather than the President and the NAIC (the NAIC was also removed from some, but not all, of the other reporting requirements in the bill). 1155 as passed by the House with one additional section. It would be a nonprofit, private body whose members would be required to be state-licensed insurance producers but could operate across states without having licenses from the individual states. The NARAB I language in GLBA also offered the states the opportunity to avoid creation of the NARAB organization if a majority of them created among themselves systems of either uniformity or reciprocity in insurance producer licensing within a three-year window after passage of GLBA. A sufficient number of states adopted laws providing for insurance producer licensing reciprocity that the NAIC determined the GLBA standards to avoid creation of the NARAB organization were met. Original NARAB Provisions The first legislation specifically providing for the creation of a NARAB that the Congressional Research Service has been able to identify was introduced in the 102 nd Congress (Title IV of H.R.

The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance in this country for the past 150 years. Congress specifically authorized the states' role in the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§1011-1015), and state primacy in insurance regulation has been recognized in more recent laws shaping the financial regulatory system, such as the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA; P.L. 106-102) and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). The system of multiple state regulators, however, has faced criticism over the years, with frequent focus on its efficiency. One particular aspect of regulation that has been criticized by some as overly burdensome and inefficient is the licensure of insurance agents and brokers, known collectively as insurance producers. Every state requires specific licenses, sometimes with differing criteria, and insurance producers have identified the need to have multiple licenses as a significant expense. Organizations such as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) create model laws and undertake other steps to harmonize insurance regulation and laws across the country, including the NAIC's promulgation of models for insurance producer licensing. The individual states, however, are sovereign entities, and any models suggested by the NAIC or NCOIL must first be enacted by state legislatures. The state authorities may amend models or completely reject suggestions from outside groups. Often this is done with the argument that laws and regulations need to be adapted to particular local circumstances or risks, such as hurricane risks along coastal areas. Federal proposals addressing multiple state insurance producer licensing requirements through the creation of a National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB) appeared as far back as the 102nd Congress, and a version of NARAB was included in GLBA. These GLBA provisions, known generally as "NARAB I," were conditional and would not come into effect if a majority of states passed laws providing for uniformity or reciprocity in insurance producer licensing. Although a sufficient number of states met the GLBA requirements and thereby prevented the creation of NARAB, insurance producers continued to identify issues in the state licensing system. As a consequence, "NARAB II" legislation, mandating the creation of a NARAB organization, has been introduced in every Congress since the 110th. It was passed by the House in the 110th and 111th Congresses. In the 113th Congress, the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Act was introduced in both the Senate and the House and similar provisions were included in bills addressing flood insurance and terrorism insurance. Legislation including NARAB II provisions passed both the House and the Senate, but because they differed in some respects, no bill was sent to the President. In the 114th Congress, both the House and the Senate passed NARAB II provisions included as Title II of H.R. 26, which became P.L. 114-1. Under P.L. 114-1, membership in the NARAB organization will permit insurance producers to operate in multiple states without obtaining specific licenses from these states. To become a NARAB member, an insurance producer will be required to have a license from at least one state, pass a criminal background check, and meet other requirements. The law requires that these additional requirements be not "less protective to the public" than the NAIC model law on insurance producer licensing. The association is to be governed by a 13-member board made up of 8 current or former state insurance commissioners and 5 insurance industry experts. The President is to appoint the board, with advice and consent of the Senate, and retain the ability to remove the board and override the NARAB organization's rules or actions.

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C hild welfare services are intended to prevent the abuse or neglect of children; ensure that children have safe, permanent homes; and promote the well-being of children and their families. For FY2018, an estimated $9.5 billion in federal support was made available for child welfare purposes. Comparable funding for FY2017 is estimated at $9.3 billion. The increase reflects additional discretionary program funding provided by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 (FY2018 omnibus, P.L. 115-141 ) to address the impact of parental substance abuse on children and the child welfare system, to help implement the Family First Prevention Services Act (Family First; Div. E., Title VII, of P.L. 115-123 ), and to pay incentives to states that increase the rate at which children leave foster care for permanent adoptive or legal guardianship families. Additionally, mandatory funding made available under the Title IV-E foster care and permanency program is expected to increase in FY2018, primarily for support of adoption assistance. Funding for Foster Care and Permanency Support Most child welfare funding is authorized under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act for support of children in foster care, including ensuring that they are afforded certain protections while in care, and for assistance to children who leave foster care for new permanent families via adoption or legal guardianship. Specifically, the FY2018 omnibus ( P.L. 115-141 ) provided increased discretionary funding as follows: $60 million in additional CAPTA state grants funding, with instructions for states to "prioritize" development of plans of safe care for infants identified as substance-exposed; $40 million in additional Title IV-B (Promoting Safe and Stable Families) funding to (1) support state and tribal kinship navigator programs, (2) increase support for grants to regional partnerships to improve outcomes for children affected by parental substance abuse, and (3) expand the ability of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide technical assistance to states in implementing the evidence-based requirements included in the Family First Prevention and Services Act (Div. The FY2018 omnibus ( P.L. E of P.L. 115-123 ), which was enacted in February 2018.

Child welfare services are intended to prevent the abuse or neglect of children; ensure that children have safe, permanent homes; and promote the well-being of children and their families. For FY2018, an estimated $9.5 billion in federal support was made available for child welfare purposes. Comparable funding for FY2017 is estimated at $9.3 billion. At least $100 million of the FY2018 increase was provided as discretionary appropriations intended to address the impact of parental substance abuse on children and the child welfare system and to help implement the Family First Prevention Services Act (Div. E., Title VII, of P.L. 115-123). About $37 million in additional discretionary funding was provided to enable the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to provide full incentive payments to states that are increasing the rate at which children who are otherwise expected to remain in temporary foster care are placed in permanent adoptive families or with a legal guardian. Finally, mandatory funding made available under the Title IV-E foster care, prevention, and permanency program is expected to increase by some $111 million in FY2018. The bulk of this increase is expected to provide ongoing assistance to children who leave foster care for permanent adoptive or guardianship families. Spending on foster care is not projected to grow and Title IV-E funding for prevention activities (as provided for by the Family First Prevention Services Act) is not available before FY2020. FY2018 began on October 1, 2017, but full funding levels for it were not determined until enactment, on March 23, 2018, of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). In the interim, funding to continue child welfare programs in FY2018 was provided via short-term funding measures, including P.L. 115-56 (through December 8, 2017), P.L. 115-90 (through December 22, 2017), P.L. 115-96 (through January 19, 2018), P.L. 115-120 (through February 8, 2018), and P.L. 115-123 (until March 23, 2018).

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Introduction "Deeming resolution" is a term that refers to legislation that is deemed to serve as an annual budget resolution for purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for a budget cycle. A deeming resolution is used when the House and Senate are late in reaching final agreement on a budget resolution or fail to reach agreement altogether. The annual budget resolution sets forth aggregate levels of revenues, spending, the debt limit, and the surplus or deficit, as well as allocations of spending (both budget authority and outlays) by each of major functional categories of the budget. Enforcement of the budget resolution relies primarily upon points of order and reconciliation procedures. With regard to the substantive enforcement of the budget resolution (i.e., enforcement of budgetary levels), the major points of order under the 1974 Congressional Budget Act are found in Sections 311 and 302, which deal with the enforcement of budget aggregates and committee spending allocations, respectively. The term "deeming resolution" is not officially defined, nor is there any specific statute or rule authorizing such legislation. Instead, the use of a deeming resolution simply represents the House and Senate employing regular legislative procedures to deal with the issue on an ad hoc basis. Inasmuch as the form and content of a deeming resolution is not prescribed, its form and content may be shaped to meet the particular needs at hand. For example, the House and Senate have used simple resolutions as the legislative vehicle in the past, but a deeming resolution may be incorporated into a bill, such as an annual appropriations act, as a single provision. At a minimum, deeming resolutions provide new spending allocations to the Appropriations Committees, but they also may set new aggregate budget levels, provide revised spending allocations to other House and Senate committees, or provide for other related purposes. For purposes of this review, a distinction is drawn between instances in which the budget resolution was adopted in a tardy manner and instances in which no budget resolution was adopted at all. The House and Senate did not reach final agreement on budget resolutions for FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, FY2007, FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013. 477 , a special rule providing for the consideration of the Military Constructions Appropriations Act for FY199 ( H.R. The Senate Budget Committee reported a budget resolution for FY2003, S.Con.Res. On April 11, 2003, the House and Senate reached final agreement on a budget resolution for FY2004 ( H.Con.Res. 393 on March 25. On June 1, 2011, the House agreed to H.Res. The special rule included a provision deeming H.Con.Res. The Senate Budget Committee did not report a budget resolution for FY2013. (a) Budget Enforcement—(1) Pending the adoption by the Congress of a concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1999— (A) the chairman of the Committee on the Budget, when elected, shall publish in the Congressional Record budget totals contemplated by section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and allocations contemplated by section 302(a) of that Act for each of the fiscal years 1999 through 2003; (B) those totals and levels shall be effective in the House as though established under a concurrent resolution on the budget and sections 301 and 302 of that Act; and (C) the publication of those totals and levels shall be considered as the completion of Congressional action on a concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1999.

"Deeming resolution" is a term that refers to legislation deemed to serve as an annual budget resolution for purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for a budget cycle. A deeming resolution is used when the House and Senate have not agreed on a budget resolution. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 provides for the annual adoption of a budget resolution establishing aggregate levels of revenues, spending, the debt limit, and the surplus or deficit, as well as allocations of spending. Enforcement of the budget resolution relies primarily upon points of order and reconciliation procedures. With regard to the enforcement of budget aggregates and committee spending allocations, the major points of order are found in Sections 311 and 302 of the act, respectively. The term "deeming resolution" is not officially defined, nor is there any specific statute or rule authorizing such legislation. Instead, the use of a deeming resolution simply represents the House and Senate employing regular legislative procedures to deal with the issue on an ad hoc basis. The form and content of a deeming resolution is not prescribed, so it may be shaped to meet the particular needs at hand. For example, the House and Senate have used simple resolutions as the legislative vehicle in the past, but a deeming resolution may be incorporated into a bill, such as an annual appropriations act, as a single provision. At a minimum, deeming resolutions provide new spending allocations to the Appropriations Committees, but they also may set new aggregate budget levels, provide revised spending allocations to other House and Senate committees, or provide for other related purposes. For purposes of this report, a distinction is drawn between instances in which the budget resolution was adopted in a tardy manner and deeming resolutions were employed in the interim before a budget resolution was finally agreed to and, alternately, those instances when the House and Senate never reached final agreement on a budget resolution and deeming resolutions were used as an alternative enforcement mechanism instead. This report deals largely with the seven years in which the House and Senate did not reach final agreement on a budget resolution. The relevant fiscal years were FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, FY2007, FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013. The House and Senate have not yet reached final agreement on a budget resolution for FY2014 although each has agreed to a budget resolution. S.Con.Res. 8, a budget resolution for FY2014, was reported from the Senate Budget Committee on March 15, 2013, and was agreed to by the Senate on March 23. H.Con.Res. 25, a budget resolution for FY2014, was reported from the House Budget Committee on March 15, 2013, and was agreed to by the House on March 21. On June 4, 2013, the House agreed to H.Res. 243, a special rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2216, the bill making appropriations for military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies. The special rule included a provision deeming the House-passed budget resolution as enforceable in the House, pending agreement on a budget resolution for FY2014. This report will be updated as developments warrant.

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The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for health care services and medical and prosthetic research programs. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. In general, eligibility for VA health care is based on previous military service, presence of service-connected disabilities, and/or other factors. This report focuses on appropriations for VHA. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-81 ), the President's budget requested $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2013 ( Table 4 ). P.L. FY2013 VHA Budget President's Request35 The Obama Administration's FY2013 budget request was submitted to Congress on February 13, 2012. The President's budget requested $135.6 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This included approximately $75 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding ( Table 3 ). This included $41.5 billion for the medical services account, $5.7 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $5.4 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $583 million for the medical and prosthetic research account ( Table 4 ). The total requested amount for VHA represents a 4.1% increase over the FY2012-enacted appropriations. 111-163 ), and the Agent Orange and Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) presumptions established by the VA. As required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-81 ), the President's budget requested $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care appropriations (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014, an increase of approximately 3.7% over the FY2013-enacted amount of $52.5 billion for the same three accounts. 113-2) On December 7, 2012, the President submitted a $235.6 million supplemental request for VA for costs associated with Hurricane Sandy. On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a disaster assistance measure largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was signed into law as P.L. Among other provisions, this act provided funding of approximately $236.6 million for the VA as a whole. 113-6) House and Senate Action The 112 th Congress did not enact a regular Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2013 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill) prior to the beginning of FY2013, and funded most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) through a six-month government-wide continuing resolution ( P.L. 112-175 ). On March 6, 2013, the House passed the Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( H.R. 933 ). The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on March 20, 2013, and the House agreed to the amended version the next day. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( H.R. 933 ; P.L. 113-6 ) was signed into law by the President on March 26, 2013. Division E of P.L. 113-6 contained funding for the VA. P.L. 113-6 provides $133.9 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This included approximately $72.9 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). This report focuses on funding for the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Eligibility for VA health care is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions. The President's FY2013 budget request was submitted to Congress on February 13, 2012. The President's budget requested $135.6 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This included approximately $75 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding. For FY2013, the Administration requested $53.3 billion for VHA. This included $41.5 billion for the medical services account, $5.7 billion for the medical support and compliance account, $5.4 billion for the medical facilities account, and nearly $583 million for the medical and prosthetic research account. The total requested amount for VHA represents a 4.1% increase over the FY2012-enacted appropriations. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the President's budget requested $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014. On December 7, 2012, the President submitted a $235.6 million supplemental request for VA for costs associated with Hurricane Sandy. Congress did not enact a regular Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill for FY2013 (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill) prior to the beginning of FY2013, and funded most of the VA (excluding the three medical care accounts: medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) through a six-month government-wide continuing resolution (P.L. 112-175). On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, was enacted as P.L. 113-2. This Act provided approximately $236.6 million for the VA. On March 6, 2013, the House passed the Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933). The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on March 20, 2013, and the House agreed to the amended version the next day. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6) was signed into law by the President on March 26, 2013. Division E of P.L. 113-6 contained funding for the VA. P.L. 113-6 provides $133.9 billion in budget authority for the VA as a whole. This includes approximately $72.9 billion in mandatory funding and $61 billion in discretionary funding. For FY2013, funding for VHA is $53.3 billion. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), P.L. 113-6 provides $54.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2014.

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(1) Those and similar developments raise several policy issues, including the use of genetic information in the criminal justice system, the impacts of continuing technological improvements,and the effects of the technology on privacy and individual rights. It is a complex molecule, containing much information. Each person has billions of identical copies of DNA in the cells of the body. The structure of the molecule, and therefore the information it contains, varies from person to person. The structure is inherited, so the DNA of close relatives is more similar than that of distant relatives or unrelated people. DNA is easily preserved with the structure intact. How DNA Is Used in Identification Using DNA in identification requires comparing DNA whose source has not been determined(such as from a crime scene or from a child in a paternity case) with DNA whose source is known(such as from a suspect or from a putative father). Characterization The first step is to characterize or profile corresponding DNA sequences in the samples to be compared. (16) If the profiles match -- that is, if they are identical at every locus -- then they could have come from the same source. For DNA, in contrast, the science of population genetics provides in many cases a way ofestimating quantitatively the chances that the DNA could have come from another source. (22) The second kind contains profiles of persons whose identity is known. When a profile is obtained from a relevantsample whose source is not known, the database can be searched to determine if a match, called a cold hit, is found. For example, in an increasing number of cases, a suspect is identified when aDNA profile from a crime-scene sample is searched against a database containing profiles of personsconvicted of violent crimes or other felonies. Samples might come from crime scenes or unidentified remains. In 1999, a DNA profile of a malemurdered in Florida was found to match DNA evidence from nine rapes, three in Florida and six inWashington, D.C. (23) Federal Agency Programs and Activities Federal agencies with significant involvement in DNA identification activities include theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Bureau ofJustice Assistance (BJA) in the Department of Justice; the National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) in the Department of Commerce; and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology(AFIP), the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), and the Army CriminalInvestigation Laboratory (USACIL)in the Department of Defense. The laboratory also administers the Combined DNA Index System. CODIS has several indexes. However, section 811(b)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L.104-132 ) required that states, to be eligible for grants to improve their capacity to perform forensicDNA analyses and certain other activities, (25) collect DNA samples from persons convicted of sexualfelonies. DNA typing is technology intensive. In FY2000 and FY2001, funds were awardedunder a new series of grants authorized by the Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998 ( P.L.105-121 ), with half allocated by NIJ to the DNA Identification Program and half to the eliminationof sample backlogs (see below). 103-322 ), addressed quality control and privacy issues. It also authorized grants to state and local government for participation in CODIS. Several issues are associated with postconviction DNA analysis. Specifically, the DNA Identification Act of 1994 ( P.L.

DNA technology can provide useful identifying information in many situations, such as in solving crimes, determining paternity, and identifying human remains. Research is resulting inimprovements in sensitivity and power and reductions in cost. Such use and improvements areraising several policy issues. The use of DNA in identification results from its unique characteristics: It is a complex molecule, containing much information. Each person has billions of identical copies. The structureof the molecule varies from person to person and is inherited, so the DNA of relatives is more similarthan that of unrelated people. Also, DNA is easily preserved with the structure intact. Identification requires comparing DNA whose source has not been determined with DNA whose source is known. The first step is to characterize corresponding DNA sequences fromsamples. The resulting profiles are then compared. If they differ, the samples did not have the sameorigin. If they match, then they could have come from the known source, or from someone else whohas an identical profile. The science of population genetics provides ways of estimatingquantitatively the chances that the matched DNA could have come from another source. Databases or indexes are often used in DNA identification. They might contain profiles of persons whose identity is known, such as convicted felons, or whose identity is not known, such asfrom crime scene samples or unidentified remains. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS),administered by the FBI, contains both kinds. When a profile is obtained from a relevant sample,the database can be searched to determine if a match is found. Thus, a suspect may be identifiedwhen a profile from a crime-scene sample is searched against profiles of convicted felons. Congress has enacted several laws relating to DNA evidence. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 ) authorized CODIS and a grants program for state and local laboratories, andaddressed quality control and privacy issues. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 ( P.L. 104-132 ) expanded CODIS and established a grants program that required states, to beeligible, to collect DNA samples from persons convicted of felony sex crimes. The CrimeIdentification Technology Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-521 ) established a grants program that funds abroad range of activities, including several related to DNA typing. The National Institute of Justice(NIJ) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administer those and other relevant grantsprograms. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Armed Forces Instituteof Pathology (AFIP), and the Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) also havesignificant DNA identification activities. Policy issues raised by the use of DNA in identification include how best to eliminate the large backlog of samples awaiting processing for CODIS, whether to broaden the offenses that qualify,how to respond to the increasing number of requests for postconviction DNA analysis, how toaddress privacy issues, and what impacts the broadening applications of the technology may have.

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Maine's Tobacco Product Shipment and Delivery Laws In 2003, Maine passed laws that instituted requirements for shipping and delivery sales of tobacco products that attempted to end sales to minors. The Supreme Court Decision In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association , the Supreme Court held that the two Maine provisions were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). That law prohibited states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." In finding that Maine's mail-order tobacco product delivery laws were preempted, the Court relied on its interpretation of the preemption language at issue in Morales . However, the Morales Court effectively said that preemption may not occur if the state law affects carrier rates, routes, or services "in only a 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... Legislation has been introduced in the 110 th Congress, including H.R.

Maine adopted two laws regarding shipping and delivery sales of tobacco products that were aimed at preventing minors from acquiring tobacco products. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, the Supreme Court held that the two Maine laws were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). That law prohibited states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law ... related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." In finding that Maine's mail-order tobacco product delivery laws were preempted, the Court noted that federal preemption would occur if state laws had a "significant impact" on carrier rates, routes, or services and if the connection with motor carrier services is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral." Legislation related to federal regulation of tobacco products, including shipment and delivery, has been introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 1108, H.R. 4081, S. 625, S. 1027.

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Background The National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) is a database of personal information and wage and employment information of American workers. States also are required to send quarterly wage information of existing employees (in UC-covered employment) and unemployment compensation claims information to the NDNH. Original Purpose The original purpose of the NDNH was to help states locate child support obligors who were working in other states so that child support could be withheld from the noncustodial parent's paycheck. Since its enactment in 1996, access to the NDNH has been expanded, mostly to prevent fraud and abuse, to certain other programs and agencies (discussed later). The State Directory of New Hires is required to submit its new hire reports to the NDNH. The NDNH is a database that contains personal and financial data on nearly every working American, as well as those receiving unemployment compensation. In theory, all of these programs could use the employment and income information contained in the NDNH to verify program eligibility, prevent or end unlawful or erroneous access to program benefits, collect overpayments, or assure that program benefits are correct.

The National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) is a database that contains personal and financial data on nearly every working American, as well as those receiving unemployment compensation. Contrary to its name, the National Directory of New Hires includes more than just information on new employees. It is a database that includes information on (1) all newly hired employees, compiled from state reports (and reports from federal employers), (2) the quarterly wage reports of existing employees (in Unemployment Compensation (UC)-covered employment), and (3) unemployment compensation claims. The NDNH was originally established to help states locate noncustodial parents living in a different state so that child support payments could be withheld from that parent's paycheck. Since its enactment in 1996, the NDNH has been extended to several additional programs and agencies to verify program eligibility, prevent or end fraud, collect overpayments, or assure that program benefits are correct. Although the directory is considered very effective, concerns about data security and the privacy rights of employees remain a part of debates regarding expanded access to the NDNH.

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On August 5, 2004, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and trade ministers from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (the CAFTA-DR; see Appendix A , Chronology of Negotiations). The CAFTA-DR is a regional trade agreement with all parties subject to "the same set of obligations and commitments," but with each country defining its own market access schedule with the United States. It is a comprehensive and reciprocal trade agreement, replacing U.S. unilateral preferential trade treatment extended to these countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). On June 30, 2005, however, the Senate passed S. 1307 by a vote of 54 to 45. The House followed on July 28, 2005, passing H.R. 3045 by a vote of 217 to 215. President Bush signed the bill into law on August 2, 2005 ( P.L. 462). It entered into force on March 1, 2006 and was implemented for El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic within the next year. Following passage of 14 implementing bills in the Costa Rican National Assembly, the United States implemented the agreement with Costa Rica on January 1, 2009. This report discusses negotiation issues and evolution of the CAFTA-DR agreement from the time negotiations commenced on January 27, 2003 until its implementation by the last country on January 1, 2009. It will not be updated. 109-53 , 119 Stat. The first was the need for better Central American integration as part of CAFTA-DR, which historically has been hampered. Importantly, in 2003 some 80% of imports from Central America and the Dominican Republic entered the United States duty free under either normal trade relations (NTR) status or the CBI or GSP programs. These estimates are in line with expectations voiced prior to the negotiations that the marginal effects of the CAFTA-DR would be small, but positive for the U.S. economy as a whole, given the CAFTA-DR countries had small and already largely open economies. Emphasis is given to those sectors and issues expected to be most affected by the agreement, or that generated the most contentious policy debate. Each country negotiated a list of its most sensitive products for which duty-free treatment is delayed. Patents and trade secrets rules conform more closely with U.S. norms. An Enforceable Labor Chapter U.S. labor advocates have charged that "the labor provisions of the CAFTA-DR will not protect the core rights of workers in any of the six countries participating in the agreement."

The United States Trade Representative (USTR) and trade ministers from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) on August 5, 2004. Nearly one year later, it faced a contentious debate and close vote in both houses of the U.S. Congress. The Senate passed implementing legislation 54 to 45 on June 30, 2005, with the House following in kind 217 to 215 on July 28, 2005. President Bush signed the legislation into law on August 2, 2005 (P.L. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462). The United States implemented the agreement on a rolling basis as countries brought their laws and regulations into conformity with the obligations of the agreement. El Salvador was the first country to implement the agreement on March 1, 2006. Costa Rica was the last, implementing the agreement on January 1, 2009, after a lengthy procedural delay and national referendum. The CAFTA-DR is a regional agreement with all parties subject to "the same set of obligations and commitments," but with each country defining its own market access schedule with the United States. It is a reciprocal trade agreement, replacing U.S. unilateral preferential trade treatment extended to these countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). It liberalizes trade in goods, services, government procurement, intellectual property, and investment, and addresses labor and environment issues. Most commercial and farm goods attain duty-free status immediately. Remaining trade will have tariffs phased out incrementally over five to twenty years. Duty-free treatment will be delayed longest for the most sensitive agricultural products. To address asymmetrical development and transition issues, the CAFTA-DR specifies rules for transitional safeguards, tariff rate quotas, and trade capacity building. The CAFTA-DR is not expected to have a large effect on the U.S. economy as a whole given the relatively small size of the Central American economies and the fact that most U.S. imports from the region had already been entering duty free under normal trade relations or CBI and GSP preferential arrangements. Adjustments will be slightly more difficult for some sectors, but none are expected to be severe. Supporters see it as part of a policy foundation supportive of both improved intraregional trade, as well as, long-term social, political, and economic development in an area of strategic importance to the United States. Opponents wanted better trade adjustment and capacity building policies to address the potentially negative effects on certain import-competing sectors and their workers. They also argued that the labor, intellectual property rights, and investment provisions in the CAFTA-DR needed strengthening. This report discusses negotiation issues and evolution of the CAFTA-DR agreement from the time negotiations commenced on January 27, 2003 until its implementation by the last country on January 1, 2009. It will not be updated.

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Disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments are one type of Medicaid supplemental payment that states are required to make to hospitals serving low-income patients. States are permitted to make other non-DSH fee-for-service (FFS) supplemental payments, managed care pass-through payments, and waiver supplemental payments. Medicaid Background Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports, to a diverse low-income population. States must follow broad federal rules to receive federal funds, but they have flexibility to design their own versions of Medicaid within the federal statute's basic framework. This flexibility results in variability across state Medicaid programs. Medicaid enrollees generally receive benefits through either a FFS or managed care service delivery system. Under FFS, state Medicaid programs pay health care providers for each service provided to a Medicaid enrollee. Under managed care, Medicaid enrollees receive most or all of their services through a managed care organization (MCO) under contract with the state, and the MCO is primarily paid on a capitated basis (i.e., a set amount per enrollee regardless of the services used). Medicaid is financed jointly by the federal government and the states. In addition to the Medicaid payments for services provided to enrollees, states may make supplemental payments , which are Medicaid payments to providers that are separate from and in addition to Medicaid payments for services. Payments for Services For the most part, states establish their own payment rates for Medicaid providers to deliver services to Medicaid enrollees. Payment rates vary by state. Federal statute requires these rates to be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and ... sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available" to Medicaid enrollees at least to the same extent they are available to the general population in the same geographic area. This requirement is referred to as the equal access provision . Low Medicaid provider payment rates in many states and their impact on provider participation have been perennial policy concerns. Often, providers receive supplemental payments in a lump sum, and these supplemental payments are not tied to services provided to Medicaid enrollees. For example, states may provide supplemental payments to providers to support quality initiatives, graduate medical education, and certain types of facilities (e.g., rural or safety net providers), among other reasons. All states make supplemental payments under FFS. These payments are provided to many different Medicaid providers, such as hospitals, nursing facilities, physicians, and mental health facilities. For certain institutional providers, there are upper payment limits (UPLs) on the amount of supplemental payments; these limits are what Medicare would pay for the same or comparable services. States also make supplemental payments through managed care and Section 1115 waivers. Under managed care, states historically have made pass-through payments . These payments are included in the payments states make to MCOs (i.e., capitation rates), and the MCOs are expected to make the payments to providers as directed by the state. CMS also may provide Medicaid Section 1115 waiver authority to permit states to make certain supplemental payments that they otherwise are not permitted to make under Medicaid rules. Data on Medicaid FFS non-DSH supplemental payments, managed care pass-through payments, and Section 1115 waiver payments generally are limited. The remainder of the report provides an overview of supplemental Medicaid payments to providers. FFS Supplemental Payments All states make supplemental payments under FFS, and different federal regulations and requirements apply depending on the type of payment and the type of provider. FFS Supplemental Payment Expenditures30 In FY2017, states reported $40.6 billion in total Medicaid FFS DSH and non-DSH supplemental payment expenditures (i.e., including both federal and state expenditures), or 7.2% of total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures but excluding administrative expenditures). FFS Supplemental Payments as a Share of Total Medicaid Expenditures Total Medicaid DSH and non-DSH supplemental payment expenditures as a share of total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures but excluding administrative expenditures) varied widely across all 50 states and the District of Columbia, ranging from 0.4% of total state Medicaid spending in North Dakota to 19.9% of total state Medicaid spending in Alabama (see Figure 1 ). FFS Supplemental Payments by Provider Type In FY2017, nationally the majority of supplemental payment expenditures, including both DSH and non-DSH payments, were made to hospitals.

Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports. Medicaid is a federal and state partnership that is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. States must follow broad federal rules to receive federal matching funds, but they have flexibility to design their own versions of Medicaid within the federal statute's basic framework. This flexibility results in variability across state Medicaid programs. In general, benefits are made available to Medicaid enrollees via two service delivery systems: fee for service (FFS) or managed care. Under FFS, the state Medicaid program pays health care providers for each covered service provided to a Medicaid enrollee. Under managed care, Medicaid enrollees receive most or all of their services through a managed care organization (MCO), which is under contract with the state and is paid primarily on a capitated basis (i.e., a set amount per enrollee regardless of the services used). For the most part, states establish their own payment rates for services rendered by Medicaid providers. Payment rates vary by state. Federal statute requires these rates to be "consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and … sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available" to Medicaid enrollees at least to the same extent they are available to the general population in the same geographic area. This requirement is referred to as the equal access provision. Low Medicaid provider payment rates in many states and their impact on provider participation have been perennial policy concerns. Some states rely on supplemental payments to offset low Medicaid payments for services or to support safety-net providers. Supplemental payments are Medicaid payments to providers that are separate from and in addition to the payments for services rendered to Medicaid enrollees. For example, states may provide supplemental payments to providers to support quality initiatives, graduate medical education (GME), and certain types of facilities (e.g., rural or safety-net providers), among other reasons. Often, providers receive supplemental payments in a lump sum. States make supplemental payments through FFS, managed care, and waivers, but the mechanism for making these payments differs according to the service delivery system. Most states make supplemental payments under FFS. Some of these payments are federally required, whereas others are optional for states. States make supplemental payments to many different Medicaid providers, such as hospitals, nursing facilities, physicians, and mental health facilities. Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments are the only type of FFS supplemental payment that states are required to make. States also are permitted, but not required, to make other non-DSH FFS supplemental payments, which typically are limited by upper payment limits (UPLs) for certain institutional providers. These UPLs are what Medicare would pay for the same or comparable services. All states and the District of Columbia make either DSH or non-DSH supplemental payments under FFS, and these payments represent a sizeable percentage of total Medicaid spending. In FY2017, states reported $40.6 billion in total FFS Medicaid supplemental payment expenditures (i.e., DSH and non-DSH, including both federal and state expenditures), or 7.2% of total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures but excluding administrative expenditures). At the state level, total Medicaid DSH and non-DSH supplemental payment expenditures as a share of total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures but excluding administrative expenditures) varied widely across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Nationally, the majority of DSH and non-DSH supplemental payment expenditures (80% of the $40.6 billion) were made to hospitals. States also make supplemental payments through managed care and waivers. Under managed care, states historically have made pass-through payments. These payments are included in the payments states make to MCOs, and the MCOs are expected to make the payments to providers as directed by the state. Pass-through payments are not tied to services provided to Medicaid enrollees. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) also may provide Medicaid waiver authority to permit states to make certain supplemental payments that they are not otherwise permitted to make under Medicaid rules. This report provides an overview of the most prevalent types of Medicaid supplemental payments, including FFS supplemental payments, managed care pass-through payments, and Section 1115 waiver payments. The report also presents data about Medicaid FFS supplemental payment spending by state and by provider type.

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crs_R44062_0

Disagreement over the appropriate level of discretionary spending—as well as its distribution between defense and nondefense activities—significantly affected the focus of the FY2016 appropriations process. This additional spending was proposed at a higher level than the amount requested by the President. This disagreement as to the level of discretionary spending was ultimately resolved through the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 on November 2, 2015 (BBA 2015; H.R. 1314 ; P.L. 114-74 ). The BBA 2015 raised both the defense and nondefense statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2016 and FY2017 and specified an expected level for the "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism" (OCO/GWOT) spending adjustment for each of those fiscal years. 2028 ) and Military Construction-VA ( H.R. Because none of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills became law by the start of the fiscal year, a CR was enacted to provide continuing appropriations until December 11 ( H.R. The second section provides information on the consideration of regular appropriations bills. This report will be updated periodically during the FY2016 appropriations process. For information on the current status of FY2016 appropriations measures, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2016, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx . Discretionary Spending Budget Enforcement The framework for budget enforcement of discretionary spending under the congressional budget process has both statutory and procedural elements. The statutory elements are the discretionary spending limits derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). It limits both the total spending under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee, as well as spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee. Levels of Discretionary Spending Assumed by the FY2016 Budget Resolution The FY2016 congressional budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. These divisions to each subcommittee are referred to as "302(b) suballocations." 11 ). The joint explanatory statement associated with the budget resolution provides 302(a) allocations for the House and Senate Appropriations Committees that are consistent with the revised BCA levels for the statutory discretionary spending limits (see Table 2 ). Those 302(a) allocations also included a separate allocation for OCO/GWOT spending of $96.287 billion. As of the date of this report, the House Appropriations Committee has reported all 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2016 (see Table 4 ). 2029 ). 2250 ) and Transportation-HUD ( H.R. 2577 ). The Senate Appropriations Committee began consideration of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills in the same order as the House, acting first on the Energy-Water ( H.R. 2028 ) and Military Construction-VA ( H.R. 2685 ), Legislative Branch ( H.R. 2250 ), Commerce-Justice-Science ( H.R. Continuing Resolutions Because none of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills was expected to be enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year, a CR ( H.R. 719 (P.L. 114-53 ).

This report provides information on the congressional consideration of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills and the FY2016 continuing resolution (CR). It also discusses the statutory and procedural budget enforcement framework for FY2016 appropriations. It will address the congressional consideration of FY2016 supplemental appropriations if any such consideration occurs. For all types of appropriations measures, discretionary spending budget enforcement under the congressional budget process has two primary sources. The first is the discretionary spending limits that are derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The second source of budget enforcement is associated with the budget resolution. It imposes limits on both the total spending under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committees (referred to as a "302(a) allocation") as well as spending under the jurisdiction of each of the Appropriations subcommittees (referred to as "302(b) suballocations"). Certain spending is effectively not subject to these statutory and procedural limits, such as spending which is designated as "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism" (OCO/GWOT) and "disaster relief." Disagreement over the appropriate level of discretionary spending—as well as its distribution between defense and nondefense activities—has significantly affected the focus of the FY2016 appropriations process. The FY2016 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 11) that was adopted by Congress provided a 302(a) allocation for the Appropriations Committees that was consistent with the statutory discretionary spending limits set in the Budget Control Act. However, the budget resolution also allowed for those funds to be supplemented by additional OCO/GWOT spending at a higher level than the amount requested by the President. On November 2, new levels for discretionary spending were established through the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74). The BBA 2015 raises both the defense and nondefense statutory discretionary spending limits for FY2016 and FY2017 and specifies an expected level for the OCO/GWOT spending adjustment for each of those fiscal years. As of the date of this report, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have reported all 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2016. The House has passed six of these—Energy-Water (H.R. 2028); Military Construction-VA (H.R. 2029); Legislative Branch (H.R. 2250); Commerce-Justice-Science (H.R. 2578); Transportation-HUD (H.R. 2577); and Defense (H.R. 2685). The Senate has passed one regular appropriations bill—Military Construction-VA. Because none of the regular appropriations bills was expected to become law by the start of the fiscal year, a CR was enacted to provide temporary appropriations until December 11 (H.R. 719; P.L. 114-53). This report will be updated periodically during the FY2016 appropriations process. For information on the current status of FY2016 appropriations measures, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table: FY2016, at http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx.