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House and Senate rules define the term ea rmark slightly differently ( Table 1 ) but generally emphasize that an y congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit be considered an earmark if it would benefit a specific entity or state, locality, or congressional district other than through a statutory or administrative formula or competitive award process. What Is the Earmark Moratorium? In the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), the House and Senate began observing what has been referred to as an earmark moratorium or earmark ban. The moratorium does not exist in House or Senate rules, however, and therefore is not enforced by points of order. Since the moratorium has been established through Republican Party rules and committee protocols and has been enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power, presumably the moratorium might be "lifted" simply by either or both chambers permitting the development and consideration of legislation that includes earmarks. The House and Senate continue to have formal earmark disclosure requirements in their standing rules that were first established in the 110 th Congress (2007-2008) with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to earmarking. Requirements for House Members Submitting Earmark Requests Under the House Code of Official Conduct, a Member requesting a congressional earmark is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes: the Member's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity should be included); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit, to the extent known to the Member; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that the Member or Member's spouse has no financial interest in such an earmark. Alternatively, Congress might choose to lift the earmark moratorium but institute any number of policies or restrictions to govern the use of congressional earmarks. Just as in the past, these policies or restrictions might be instituted through formal amendments to House and Senate standing rules or by enacting new provisions in law. Restrictions could also be instituted through party rules, leadership and committee practices and protocols, or standing order. For example, some policies could seek to add additional transparency to the earmarking process. Congress could also restrict the purposes for which an earmark might be used or prohibit certain entities from receiving earmarks entirely. Congress could also limit the amount that might be spent on an earmark. Congress could also choose to institute new policies or restrictions that would involve the executive branch.

While the term earmark has been used historically to describe various types of congressional spending actions, since the 110th Congress (2007-2008) House and Senate rules have defined an earmark as any congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit that would benefit an entity or a specific state, locality, or congressional district. In the 112th Congress (2011-2012), the House and Senate began observing what has been referred to as an earmark moratorium or earmark ban. The moratorium does not exist in House or Senate chamber rules, however, and therefore is not enforced by points of order. Instead, the moratorium has been established by party rules and committee protocols and is enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power. In recent years, some Members have expressed interest in lifting the earmark moratorium. Whether or not the earmark moratorium is lifted, the House and Senate continue to have formal earmark disclosure rules that were implemented in the 110th Congress with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to earmarking. These rules generally prohibit consideration of certain legislation unless information is provided about any earmarks included in the legislation. House and Senate rules require that any Member submitting an earmark request provide a written statement that includes the name of the Member, the name and address of the earmark recipient, and a certification that the Member has no financial interest in the earmark. House and Senate rules require that committees determine whether a provision constitutes an earmark, and committees must compile and make accessible certain earmark-related information. If Congress were to lift the current earmark ban, it might also choose to institute any number of policies or restrictions to govern the use of congressional earmarks. These policies or restrictions might be instituted through formal amendments to the House and Senate standing rules, by standing order, or by enacting new law. Such policies might also be instituted through party rules or leadership and committee practices and protocols. Some policies might seek to add more transparency to the earmarking process or prohibit certain types of entities from receiving earmarks. Restrictions might be implemented related to the purposes for which an earmark could be used or limiting the amount of federal dollars that might be spent on earmarks. Other policy approaches might potentially involve the executive branch or the congressional support agencies.

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Background The Census Bureau's release of the first figures from the 2010 Census on December 21, 2010, shifted 12 seats among 18 states for the 113 th Congress (beginning in January 2013). The reapportionment of House seats in 2010 was based on an apportionment population that is different from the actual resident population of each state. Table 2 displays the end of the "priority list" that would be used to allocate Representatives based on the 2012 Census estimates of the state populations as of July 1. Altering the size of the House would require a new law setting a different limit. The Redistricting Process The apportionment figures released on December 21, 2010, are made up of three components: total resident population figures for the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the foreign-based military and overseas federal employees allocated to each state and DC, and the sum of these numbers (excluding DC), which becomes the apportionment population. Such data, however, are available from the results of the American Community Survey for geographic areas with populations as small as 20,000 persons. These special political jurisdiction counts enable the persons drawing the district lines to assess past voting behavior when redrawing congressional and state legislative districts.

On December 21, 2010, the Commerce Department released 2010 Census population figures and the resulting reapportionment of seats in the House of Representatives. The apportionment population of the 50 states in 2010 was 309,183,463, a figure 9.9% greater than in 2000. Just as in the 108th Congress, 12 seats shifted among 18 states in the 113th Congress as a result of the reapportionment. The next census data release was February 2011, when the Census Bureau provided states the small-area data necessary to re-draw congressional and state legislative districts in time for the 2012 elections. This report examines the distribution of seats based on the most recent estimates of the population of the states (as of July 1, 2012). It explores the question of, what, if any, would be the impact on the distribution of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives if the apportionment were conducted today, using the most recent official U.S. Census population figures available. The report will be updated as is deemed necessary.

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On April 15, 2011, the President signed an omnibus funding bill for the balance of FY2011 ( H.R. 1473 that corresponded to a regular, annual DOD appropriations bill incorporated $4.4 billion worth of reductions to the President's request that were applied to broad categories of spending rather than to specific programs, including: $2.0 billion rescinded from DOD funds appropriated for prior fiscal years; A total of $1.5 billion cut proportionately from every project and program funded by the bill's accounts for Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Research and Development; $723 million from the total appropriated for civilian pay; and $125 million from the total appropriated for federally funded research and development corporations (FFRDCs) such as RAND. FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act The version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act passed May 28 by the House ( H.R. 111-491 ) would have authorized $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, which was $2.7 million less than the Administration requested. 111-201 ), would have authorized $725.7 billion, a reduction of $240.7 million from the Administration's request. Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees negotiated a compromise version of the authorization bill ( H.R. Status of Legislation FY2011 National Defense Budget Overview(Budget Function 050) The President's FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, included $738.7 billion in new budget authority for the so-called "national defense" function of the federal government (function 050), which includes the military activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities of other agencies, the largest component of which is Energy Department work related to nuclear weapons and nuclear powerplants for warships. In addition to $548.9 billion requested for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2011, the budget request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military operations, primarily funding the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD request for FY2011 to $708.3 billion. Haiti Operations Supplemental On March 24, 2010, the Administration amended its FY2010 DOD supplemental funding request to include an additional $655 million to pay for humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, which was struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake. FY2011 DOD Base Budget The $548.9 billion requested for the FY2011 DOD base budget is $18.2 billion higher than the $531.0 billion appropriated for DOD non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD's estimate, this 3.4% increase would provide a 1.8% increase in real purchasing power, after taking into account the cost of inflation. Don't Ask, Don't Tell The FY2011 DOD funding bills provided a vehicle for legislative initiatives by supporters and opponents of President Obama's decision to revise a 1993 law and DOD regulations that, in effect, bar from military service those who are openly homosexual. 5136, S. 3454, H.R. 111-491 ) would authorize $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, which is $2.7 million less than the Administration requested. The version of the bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 4, 2010, ( S. 3454 ; S.Rept. 6523 ), which dropped the provision relating to the "don't ask; don't tell" policy which was cleared for the President on December 22, 2010, and signed by the President on January 7, 2011 ( P.L. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" The final version of the FY2011 defense authorization act did not include a controversial provision, included in both the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the bill, that would have repealed the 1993 legislation barring openly homosexual persons from military service. 2965 , P.L. The House-passed bill would have added to the budget $485 million to continue development of an alternate jet engine for the F-35. This would have amounted to a reduction of $8.10 billion to the President's base budget request, and a reduction of $254 million to the request for war costs. Since an FY2011 DOD appropriations bill had not been enacted by the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010, DOD (like most other federal agencies) was funded through mid-April 2011 by a series of short-term continuing resolutions. 1473 ; P.L.

The President's FY2011 budget request, released February 1, 2010, requested authorization of $725.9 billion in new budget authority in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act. In addition to $548.9 billion for the regular (non-war) operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), the authorization request included $159.3 billion for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing the total DOD request for FY2011 to $708.2 billion. The request also included $17.7 billion for defense-related activities of the Department of Energy. The President's FY2011 DOD appropriations request, totaling $709.0 billion, was accompanied by a request for a supplemental FY2010 DOD appropriation of $33.7 billion. The supplemental request included $33.0 billion for war costs and $655 million to pay DOD's share of the cost of humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, struck on January 12, 2010, by a devastating earthquake. The $548.9 billion appropriation requested for DOD's so-called "base budget"—that is, all activities other than war costs—was $18.2 billion higher than the amount appropriated for DOD non-war costs in FY2010. By DOD's estimate, this 3.4% increase would have amounted to a "real" increase of 1.8% in purchasing power, after taking into account the cost of inflation. On May 28, 2010, the House passed H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, which would have authorized $725.9 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of less than $3 million from the Administration's request for programs covered by that legislation. The House bill would have added to the budget $485 million to continue development of the alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), despite warnings by Defense Secretary Robert H. Gates that he would recommend a veto of any bill that would continue that project. An amendment adopted by the House would have repealed a 1993 law that, in effect, bars from military service those who are openly homosexual. On June 4, 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 3454; S.Rept. 111-201), which would have authorized $725.7 billion for DOD and other defense-related activities, a reduction of $240.7 million from the Administration's request. The committee bill would have repealed the "don't ask, don't tell" law and it would not add funds for the JSF alternate engine. Controversy over the "don't ask, don't tell" repeal and other provisions blocked Senate action on S. 3454 for months. Meanwhile, informal negotiations among senior members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees produced a compromise bill, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 6523). This bill was cleared for the President on December 22, 2010, and was signed by the President on January 7, 2011 (P.L. 111-383). The enacted defense authorization bill included no provision relating to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, which was repealed by separate legislation (H.R. 2965; P.L. 111-321). Neither the House nor the Senate passed any FY2011 appropriations bills before the fiscal year began on October 1, 2010, so DOD—like other federal agencies—was funded through the first six months of FY2011 by a series of continuing resolutions. The legislative battle over the FY2011 budget wound up on April 15, 2011, when the President signed H.R. 1473 (P.L. 112-10), funding Defense and other agencies through the balance of FY2011. For DOD, the bill provided a total of $688.6 billion, which is $20.4 billion less than the President's request. The bill included no funds for the JSF alternate engine.

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Introduction On October 24, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed into law H.R. 6 , the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act ( P.L. 115-271 ; SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, or the SUPPORT Act). The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and insurance coverage. Broadly, the legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; imposes additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids, while expanding coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. The bill also authorizes a number of programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders. Related Prior Laws The SUPPORT Act builds on recent efforts by the federal government to address the opioid epidemic, including the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198 ) and the 21 st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The Cures Act also authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction and included provisions addressing various mental health and substance use activities in the Cures Act Title B, the Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Reform Act. This report summarizes the provisions in Title VII and Title VIII of the SUPPORT Act. Title VII, Public Health Provisions, includes provisions that seek to improve the information collected about opioid abuse and increase access to treatment by supporting treatment programs and providers, among other things. Title VIII, Miscellaneous, includes provisions related to child welfare, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and drug testing required by the Department of Transportation (DOT), among others. This report summarizes the budget effects of this act and also describes Section 4003, an offset included in Title IV related to individuals who seek a religious exemption from the requirement to maintain health insurance coverage.

On October 24, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed into law H.R. 6, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271; the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, or the SUPPORT Act). The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage. Broadly, the legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; imposes additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids, while expanding coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. The law also authorizes a number of programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders. The SUPPORT Act builds on recent efforts by the federal government to address the opioid epidemic, including the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198) and the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The Cures Act, enacted that same year, largely focused on medical innovation, but it also authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction and included provisions addressing various mental health and substance use activities. CRS is publishing a series of reports on the SUPPORT Act, which consists of eight titles. This report summarizes the provisions in Title VII and VIII of the SUPPORT Act. Title VII, Public Health Provisions, includes a number of provisions that seek to improve the information collected about opioid abuse and increase access to treatment by supporting treatment programs and providers, among other things. Title VIII, Miscellaneous, includes, among others, provisions related to child welfare, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and drug testing required by the Department of Transportation (DOT). It also includes several revenue-related provisions and the budget effects of this act and also describes Section 4003, an offset included in Title IV related to individuals who seek a religious exemption from the requirement to maintain health insurance coverage.

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This year marks the 50 th anniversary of the War on Poverty, launched in 1964 by President Lyndon Johnson. However, more universal social insurance programs—such as Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance—may be the nation's most important antipoverty programs. These proposals would touch upon numerous existing federal programs. To provide a framework for analyzing current and future proposals, the report then presents several overarching themes that have recurred in poverty policy debates over the course of this history. Some of the varied—and interrelated—factors that have been cited as either associated with or causing poverty are: low earnings capacity because of an individual's education, skills, and ability levels; effects of racial and other forms of discrimination in various sectors of the economy and society, such as housing, schools, and the workplace; lack of jobs, either because of a poor national economy or a poor local economy; slow growth in wage rates; growing up in a single-parent household; personal behaviors and life choices made by individuals, such as having a child out-of-wedlock or as a teenager, divorce, or substance abuse; and the design of certain assistance programs that might discourage work or marriage, or encourage out-of-wedlock births. In his legislative transmittal message to Congress, President Johnson said the act "strikes at the causes, not just the consequences of poverty." Welfare Reform and Noncash Benefits in the 1970s The Nixon Administration substantially shifted policy direction away from President Johnson's broader War on Poverty to a narrower concept of "welfare reform," specifically focusing on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program that provided cash assistance to families—primarily single mothers and their children—that met certain standards of need. Major Themes in Poverty Policy Debates Some themes can be gleaned from the history of federal policies that have addressed poverty. Universal Policies Versus Need-Tested Benefits As noted in the introduction to this report, the topic of poverty is much broader than a single program or set of programs. The terms "poverty" and "welfare" (typically thought of as cash assistance) are often intertwined in policy discussions but, in reality, poverty is affected by many aspects of public policy. A subject of ongoing debate is whether policies related to poverty should rely on "universal" approaches—that is, apply to everyone—or be targeted specifically to those with financial need. Universal approaches include the following: macroeconomic policies that affect the overall health of the economy (such as broad spending and tax policies, and monetary policies); social insurance programs that cover all or most of the population and provide benefits in the event of specific circumstances (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance); legal policies (antidiscrimination laws) and regulatory policies (such as minimum wage laws); and the provision of public goods and services (like free and universal public education) to the population at large. Need-tested benefits were provided to low-income groups who were not expected to work. Public policies now encourage and/or require parents with children to work. In addition, labor-intensive services can be costly. However, the Great Depression overwhelmed the resources of states, local governments, and private organizations in serving the poor, and the federal government fully entered the fields of social insurance and social welfare in 1935 with enactment of the Social Security Act. Policy makers disagree about the appropriate balance between levels of government in the design and funding of social programs. Spending on health care has dominated all spending for low-income assistance programs in recent years. These twin policies—work requirements and "make work pay"—continue today and, particularly with regard to cash welfare, are viewed as being effective in meeting their goal.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the War on Poverty, but poverty remains a difficult policy challenge. The Obama Administration and some in Congress have offered proposals that seek to address poverty, with the proposals differing considerably in their focus and content. However, the themes reflected in these proposals echo prior efforts to address the issue of poverty. The terms "poverty" and "welfare" (commonly thought of as cash assistance for the poor) are often intertwined, but federal policies affecting poverty are broader than a single program or set of programs. In fact, the social insurance program of Social Security may be the nation's most important antipoverty program. The incidence and character of poverty is affected by many facets of public life. Over the last century, several watershed events have affected federal policies for the poor. These include the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, creating the first federal social insurance and federal-state public assistance programs; President Johnson's War on Poverty launched in 1964 that sought to address the "causes, not just the consequences of poverty" and began a period of expansion of services and noncash benefits for the poor; the "welfare reform" debates that began in 1969 and lasted until the mid-1990s, as societal expectations for single mothers shifted from staying home with children to work; and the culmination of these debates in the mid-1990s with the twin policies of requiring parents receiving assistance to work and "making work pay" for low wage-earning parents. Most recently, the Affordable Care Act expanded health care coverage, particularly for lower-income persons. As federal antipoverty policy evolved—and some approaches were adopted, while others were not—certain overarching themes have recurred, including the following: Universal policies versus need-tested benefits: should policies be designed to benefit everyone, or be targeted on those with financial need? Income, services, or employment strategies: which of these strategies is most effective in reducing poverty? Work and other behavioral requirements: should conditions be placed on the receipt of assistance, and what behaviors should those conditions reinforce? Concepts of federalism: what is the appropriate balance between the federal, state and local governments in designing and implementing programs? Coordination and related policies: how can multiple programs work together to avoid overlap and duplication? Experimentation: how can we determine effectiveness? Budget considerations: what do programs cost, and how are these costs balanced against other federal priorities? The current congressional proposals and those of the Obama Administration, as well as future proposals, can be analyzed through the framework of these recurring major themes.

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Introduction Presidential establishment of national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 U.S.C. President Clinton used his authority 22 times to proclaim 19 new monuments and to enlarge 3 others (see Appendix ). The Bush Administration examined monument actions of President Clinton and the Interior Department is developing management plans for DOI-managed monuments. Monument supporters assert that changes to the Antiquities Act are neither warranted nor desirable, courts have supported presidential actions, and segments of the public support such protections. Issues have included the size of the areas and types of resources protected, the inclusion of non-federal lands within monument boundaries, restrictions on land uses that may result, the manner in which the monuments were created, the selection of the managing agency, and other legal issues. Courts have upheld both particular monuments and the President's authority to create them.

Presidential creation of national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 often has been contentious. Controversy was renewed over President Clinton's creation of 19 monuments and expansion of 3 others. Issues have related to the size of the areas and types of resources protected, the inclusion of non-federal lands within monument boundaries, restrictions on land uses, and the manner in which the monuments were created. The Bush Administration reviewed President Clinton's monument actions and continues to develop management plans for some of the monuments. Congress has considered measures to limit the President's authority to create monuments and to alter particular monuments. Monument supporters assert that these changes are not warranted and that the courts and segments of the public have supported monument designations. This report will be updated to reflect changes.

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Introduction Congress has long supported efforts to identify, detain, and remove noncitizens who have been convicted of crimes in the United States. This report discusses four programs operated by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify and remove criminal and other removable aliens. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) is an umbrella program for marshaling the agency's resources to identify and remove criminal and other removable aliens. CAP is guided by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP ), which represents a set of enforcement priorities that describe which foreign nationals should be removed and in what priority order. PEP also comprises a data sharing infrastructure or "interoperability" between DHS and the Department of Justice that screens for immigration violations when individuals are booked into jails. ICE's §287(g) program allows DHS to delegate certain immigration enforcement functions to specially trained state and local law enforcement officers, under federal supervision. The National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) pursues known at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens outside of controlled settings (i.e., administrative offices or custodial settings). PEP, its predecessor Secure Communities, and the §287(g) program have all contributed to DHS removing large numbers of aliens in the past decade. Yet, these programs also have been controversial. Because interoperability screens 100% of people passing through law enforcement jurisdictions, critics often charged ICE with removing many people who either committed minor crimes or who had no criminal record apart from unauthorized presence in the United States. Other critics charge that revisions to the set of enforcement priorities through PEP have since contributed to a sizable decline in the number of enforcement actions. The §287(g) program has raised concerns about the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. Inconsistent policies and practices among jurisdictions and allegations of racial profiling, among other issues, caused ICE to revise the program in FY2012 and allow certain §287(g) agreements with law enforcement agencies to expire. Since then, immigration enforcement advocates have questioned why ICE has curtailed the program's use. ICE has recently expressed interest in expanding it. For these and other reasons, Congress may be interested in measures of enforcement levels by program, the level of appropriations for different criminal alien programs, and the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. As noted above, all three of these subpopulations—criminal aliens, removable criminal aliens, and aggravated felons—comprise an unknown mix of legally present noncitizens and unauthorized aliens. This CRS report presents data on authoritative published measures that quantify one portion of the criminal alien population—the noncitizen population incarcerated in federal and state prisons and local jails. Federal, State, and Local Incarceration Data Table 1 presents CRS tabulations of the total year-end U.S. citizen and noncitizen populations in federal and state prisons and local jails publicly reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2002 through 2013 (the most recent year for which complete data are available). DHS Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens Using its enforcement priorities to guide immigration enforcement efforts, ICE operates the following programs targeting criminal aliens. Unlike the §287(g) program, which is part of CAP, NFOP is a separate program, although ICE officers working for NFOP access the same DHS databases and other information sources to select criminal aliens targeted for removal. Criminal alien : A noncitizen who has been convicted of a crime in the United States.

Congress has long supported efforts to identify, detain, and remove criminal aliens, defined as noncitizens who have been convicted of crimes in the United States. The apprehension and expeditious removal of criminal aliens has been a statutory priority since 1986, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and one of its predecessor agencies have operated programs targeting criminal aliens since 1988. Investments in DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) interior enforcement programs since 2004 have increased the number of potentially removable aliens identified within the United States. Inconsistencies in data quality, collection, and definitions prevent a precise enumeration of total criminal aliens and key subgroups such as criminal aliens convicted of removable offenses and aggravated felonies. It is also not known what portion of these groups consists of legally present noncitizens and unauthorized aliens. Noncitizens incarcerated in federal and state prisons and local jails—a subset of all criminal aliens—totaled 142,463 in 2013 (the most recent year for which complete data are available), with state prisons and local jails each accounting for more incarcerations than federal prisons. Until recently, the proportion of noncitizens incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails corresponded closely to that of noncitizens in the U.S. population, but unreported incarceration data since 2013 has hindered such comparisons. To direct immigration enforcement efforts toward the criminal alien population, ICE operates the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), an umbrella program for marshaling agency resources to identify and remove criminal and other removable aliens. CAP is guided by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which represents a set of immigration enforcement priorities that describe which foreign nationals should be removed and in what priority order. PEP also employs "interoperability," which is a data sharing infrastructure between DHS and the Department of Justice that screens individuals for immigration-related violations when they pass through law enforcement jurisdictions. PEP replaced the former Secure Communities, which many jurisdictions with large foreign-born populations had opposed. ICE also uses the §287(g) program, which allows the agency to delegate certain immigration enforcement functions to specially trained state and local law enforcement officers, under federal supervision. PEP and the §287(g) program both screen for immigration violations as people pass through the criminal justice system. The National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) pursues known at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens outside of controlled settings (i.e., administrative offices or custodial settings). NFOP is not part of CAP, although ICE officers in its workforce use the same DHS resources and databases as ICE officers working for CAP. PEP, its predecessor Secure Communities, and the §287(g) program have all contributed to DHS removing large numbers of aliens in the past decade. Yet, these programs also have been controversial. Because interoperability screens all people passing through law enforcement jurisdictions, critics often charged ICE with removing many people who either committed minor crimes or who had no criminal record apart from unauthorized presence in the United States. Other critics charge that revisions to the set of enforcement priorities through PEP have since contributed to declining numbers of enforcement actions. The §287(g) program has raised concerns over inconsistent policies and practices among jurisdictions and allegations of racial profiling, among other issues. Such concerns caused ICE to revise the program in FY2012 and allow certain §287(g) agreements with law enforcement agencies to expire. Since then, immigration enforcement advocates have questioned why ICE has curtailed the program's use. ICE has recently expressed interest in expanding it. For these and other reasons, Congress may be interested in measures of enforcement levels by program, the level of appropriations for different criminal alien programs, and the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement.

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In addition to the wind damage and electricity disruptions to 8 million customers in the Northeast, the storm's surge damaged public and private property and infrastructure in coastal and inlet areas, while the storm's precipitation swelled rivers and creeks. Although the storm was not notable for its wind intensity, the storm's significant size, its unusually low atmospheric pressure, and the astronomic high tide combined with other weather systems to amplify coastal, river, stream, and local flooding. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has extensive authorities to assist with emergency actions and recovery efforts from hurricane and flood damage. While availability of funding is unlikely to interfere with near-term emergency response activities in the case of federal response and recovery programs without significant existing balances, federal funding for these programs may become an issue. As recovery proceeds, Congress may be faced with questions about the efficacy of current federal approaches and participation in hurricane protection (and the relationship of these issues to mandatory flood insurance) and a reevaluation of how federal programs and policies influence coastal development. Which federal programs can assist with repairing damaged dunes, levees, and flood control works? What are the flood policy and funding issues that may arise during recovery from Hurricane Sandy? The principal federal agency involved in federal flood management investments and activities and flood-fighting is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibilities for federal hazard mitigation, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and disaster assistance. In addition to the Corps floodfighting authorities, the Corps has a program to repair damaged levees, dams, berms, and other flood control works. Post-Sandy demand for such repairs is likely to be extensive. In July 2012, the 112 th Congress enacted, as part of MAP-21 ( P.L. 112-141 ), an extension and a number of modifications to FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program through September 30, 2017. Flood Risk Hurricane Sandy was a reminder that, although forecasting and emergency response have improved over time and investments have been made in flood and hurricane risk reduction measures, significant flood risk remains. Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Midwest flooding in 2011 and 2008, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita renewed interest in the suite of tools available to improve flood resiliency. The challenge is how to structure federal actions and programs so they provide incentives to reduce flood risk without unduly infringing on private property rights or usurping local decision making. Tackling this challenge would require adjustments in the flood insurance program, disaster aid policies and practices, and programs for structural and nonstructural flood risk reduction measures and actions.

Hurricane Sandy was a reminder that the United States is vulnerable to significant weather hazards, and that infrequent but intense flood events can cause significant damage and disruption. In addition to wind damages and electricity disruptions, the storm's surge damaged property and infrastructure in coastal and inlet areas, while the storm's rains and snowmelt swelled rivers and creeks. These impacts contributed to public safety concerns and private and public property loss. Although the storm was not notable for its wind intensity, Sandy's significant size, its unusually low atmospheric pressure, and the astronomic high tide combined with other weather systems to amplify flooding consequences and economic and transportation disruptions. With events like Hurricane Sandy, common questions for Congress include: Which federal programs can assist with flood-fighting? Which federal programs can assist with repairing damaged dunes, levees, and other flood protection? What are the policy and funding issues that may arise during recovery? While state and local entities have significant flood-related responsibilities, federal resources are called in as these entities are overwhelmed and as presidential disasters are declared. Several agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, have authorities to respond to flood emergencies and to assist with recovery efforts. FEMA has primary responsibilities for federal flood insurance, disaster assistance, and hazard mitigation programs. In addition to its floodfighting authorities, the Corps has a program to repair damaged levees, dams, berms, and other flood control works. Post-Sandy demand for such repairs is likely to be extensive. For work performed under some of the Corps authorities, a near-term issue may be that Congress typically funds these actions using emergency supplementals. While current funding levels are not likely to interfere with emergency response activities, federal funds may become an issue in proceeding with post-disaster repair and recovery investments. After the emergency has passed and recovery has been initiated, local and federal decision makers will be faced with questions of how to rebuild and what types of flood protection investments to make. Federal policy makers will be faced with the recurring questions of whether current flood policies and projects are effective at reducing flood risk and are financially sustainable. Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Midwest flooding in 2011 and 2008, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 renewed congressional interest in the suite of tools available to improve flood resiliency. A challenge is how to structure federal actions and programs so they provide incentives to reduce flood risk without unduly infringing on private property rights or usurping local decision making. Tackling this challenge would require adjustments to flood insurance, disaster aid policies and practices, and programs for structural and nonstructural flood risk reduction measures and actions. In July 2012, the 112th Congress enacted, as part of MAP-21 (P.L. 112-141), an extension and some revisions of FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program through September 30, 2017. Otherwise, legislative action in recent years has done little to alter the broad federal approach to the nation's flood risk management.

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It had three energy efficiency titles, which addressed buildings, industry, and federal agencies. Floor action on S. 1392 was halted in September 2013. Often referred to as the Shaheen-Portman bill 2013, it was a trimmed-down version of S. 761 from the 112 th Congress. The bill contained voluntary provisions and was designed to be deficit-neutral. Virtually all debate on the bill was focused on floor amendments. The sponsor of S.Amdt. As introduced, S. 2074 comprised all the core provisions of S. 1392 , with the addition of the text from 10 floor amendments proposed for S. 1392 . S. 2262 Provisions Overview Introduced on April 28, 2014, the text of S. 2262 is identical to that of S. 2074 , except that the amount of budget offsets in section 501 was increased from $638 million to $720 million (for FY2014 through FY2018). S. 2262 includes core provisions from S. 1392 , and the text of 10 proposed amendments to S. 1392 that were incorporated into S. 2074 . Title V would provide a budgetary offset for bill authorizations. The EISA provision set a timetable to cut fossil energy use in new federal buildings (and major federal building renovations)—with a target to eliminate fossil energy use in new buildings by 2030. The provision has proven difficult to implement, and DOE has not yet issued a rule to enforce it. Section 431 would also modify other EISA requirements. Section 431 would still tighten some energy efficiency guidelines and building codes for new federal buildings. Supporters of Section 431 claim that the existing prohibition is unworkable, citing DOE's inability to develop a regulation to implement the law. Opponents to Section 431 say that the amendment would undermine federal leadership-by-example on net-zero energy buildings and on the effort to reduce federal greenhouse gas emissions. Energy Savings Estimate The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), which has publicly stated support for the bill, used a bottom-up analysis to estimate the energy-saving potential for each provision of S. 2074 . CBO Cost Estimate The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that S. 2262 would provide a net decrease in the deficit of $12 million over the period from FY2014 through FY2024. Support and Opposition11 Bill sponsors report that over 270 businesses, associations, and trade groups—from the National Association of Manufacturers to the Chamber of Commerce—support S. 2262 . The Obama Administration has not yet issued a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 2262 . However, it did issue one for S. 1392 , which expressed support for that bill. In opposition to S. 2262 , Heritage Action—an advocacy group affiliated with the Heritage Foundation—argues that the incentives in the bill would burden taxpayers and consumers alike while producing no tangible benefits. Senate Floor Action S. 2262 was introduced on April 28, 2014. Included among those five potential energy-related amendments were proposals to: (1) approve the Keystone XL pipeline, (2) facilitate approval of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, (3) prohibit EPA from requiring carbon capture technology on coal-fired power plants, (4) reduce the value of the social cost of carbon, and (5) prevent the establishment of a carbon tax. 6 . In floor action on May 12, 2014, the bill was called up for a cloture vote to close debate. Thus, the final vote tally was 55-36, and the Majority leader entered a motion to reconsider the vote by which cloture was not invoked on S. 2262 .

S. 2262 has four energy efficiency titles, which address buildings, industry, federal agencies, and certain regulatory measures. Title V would provide a budgetary offset for bill authorizations. The bill was derived directly from S. 1392, often referred to as the Shaheen-Portman bill of 2013. During the first session, floor action on S. 1392 was halted by a push for votes on controversial non-energy amendments. Many energy amendments were also prepared for S. 1392, but floor action stopped before formal consideration. In the second session, anticipating the potential for further procedural battles, bill sponsors sought to expand the S. 1392 framework. The aim of expanding the bill was to secure enough additional votes to address the potential for a filibuster by ensuring sufficient votes for cloture on debate. The expanded bill was introduced as S. 2074. It contains all the core provisions of S. 1392, and the text of 10 bipartisan amendments that had been proposed for S. 1392 in floor action during 2013. The text of S. 2262 is identical to that of S. 2074, except that the amount of budget offsets in section 501 was increased from $638 million to $720 million (for FY2014 through FY2018). This report reviews the provisions of S. 2262, highlights the most controversial bill provision, and identifies potential amendments to the bill. The most controversial provision in S. 2262 is section 431. That section is an updated version of S.Amdt. 1917 to S. 1392 (Hoeven-Manchin amendment). Section 431 would repeal an existing requirement to eliminate fossil energy use in new federal buildings by 2030. DOE has found the provision difficult to implement, and has not yet issued a rule to enforce it. In place of that requirement, section 431 would tighten energy efficiency guidelines and building codes for new federal buildings—but to a lesser degree. Supporters assert that the existing prohibition is unworkable, citing DOE's inability to implement it and the "more feasible" goals in section 431. Opponents claim that the amendment would undermine federal leadership-by-example on net-zero energy buildings and on the effort to reduce federal greenhouse gas emissions. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), which has publicly stated support for the bill, estimates an energy-saving potential of 1.8 quadrillion Btu (quads) by 2030, with an associated cost-saving potential of $16.2 billion. S. 2262 was designed to be deficit neutral. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that it would provide a net decrease in the federal budget deficit of $12 million over the period from FY2014 through FY2024. Bill sponsors reported that over 270 businesses, associations, and trade groups—from the National Association of Manufacturers to the Chamber of Commerce—support S. 2262. The Obama Administration expressed support for S. 1392, but it has not yet issued a Statement of Administration Policy on S. 2262. In opposition to S. 2262, Heritage Action—an advocacy group affiliated with the Heritage Foundation—argues that the incentives in the bill "would burden taxpayers and consumers alike while producing no tangible benefits." A cloture vote brought S. 2262 up for Senate floor action on May 6, 2014. Floor debate focused on the potential for action on five energy-related amendments, covering the issues of Keystone XL pipeline, liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, power plant carbon capture technology, social cost of carbon, and carbon tax. An effort to forge an agreement to limit amendments did not succeed. On May 12, 2014, a cloture vote to close debate failed (55-36), whereupon the Majority Leader entered a motion to reconsider the vote.

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The CCS provisions in H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 are very similar (some sections are identical), and both bills appear to share the goal of fostering the commercial development and deployment of CCS projects as an important component of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Both bills would require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate geologic sequestration of CO 2 under both the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Air Act, and would also require that the EPA Administrator establish a coordinated certification and permitting process for geological sequestration sites. The second program would distribute emission allowances from the cap-and-trade portions of both bills to qualifying electric generating plants and industrial facilities. Although the programs in the two bills are similar in construct and scale, S. 1733 would award allowances to the first 20 gigawatts (Gw) of electricity generation that employs CCS technology via a formula that provides a significant financial incentive, as much as $106 per ton of CO 2 captured for 90% capture efficiency. In contrast, H.R. 2454 would award only the first 6 Gw via the same formula, and then employ a reverse auction scheme to allocate the rest, up to a total of 72 Gw. If so, then S. 1733 hedges in favor of CCS as a preferred technology by allocating allowances to a substantially larger proportion of electricity generating capacity in the first phase of the program, at bonus allowance values that could be significantly higher than their average market value. 2454 would require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to submit to Congress, within one year of enactment, a report detailing a unified national strategy for addressing the key legal and regulatory barriers to deployment of commercial-scale carbon capture and sequestration. The report is to identify barriers and gaps that could be addressed using existing federal authority and those that would require new federal legislation, as well as barriers and gaps that would be best addressed at the state, tribal, or regional level. Within two years of enactment, the Administrator would be required to promulgate CAA regulations to protect human health and the environment by minimizing the risk of atmospheric release of carbon dioxide injected for geologic sequestration. Thus, H.R. 2454 allows for the creation of a Carbon Storage Research Corporation that would establish and administer a program to accelerate the commercial availability of CO 2 capture and storage technologies and methods by awarding grants, contracts, and financial assistance to electric utilities, academic institutions, and other eligible entities. One possible advantage of the program, if enacted, would be the creation of a consistent funding stream—exempt from the annual appropriations process—for development of CCS technology over 10 years. Performance Standards for Coal-Fueled Power Plants H.R. Plants covered by this section include those that have a permit issued under CAA Title V to derive at least 30% of their annual heat input from coal, petroleum coke, or any combination of these fuels. In S. 1733 , similar to H.R. Chairman's Mark On October 23, 2009, Senator Boxer released the chairman's mark to S. 1733 , which contained a new provision to the emission allowance distribution program for CCS. 2454 and S. 1733 (as introduced), which would distribute emission allowances based on the total tons of CO 2 actually captured and sequestered.

The carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) provisions in H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 are similar (some sections are identical), and both bills appear to share the goal of fostering the commercial development and deployment of CCS projects as an important component of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. The bills call for a unified national strategy for addressing the key legal and regulatory barriers to deployment of commercial-scale CCS. A required report detailing a national strategy would identify barriers and gaps that could be addressed using existing federal authority and those that would require legislation, as well as those that would be best addressed at the state, tribal, or regional level. Both bills would also amend the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to require that the EPA Administrator establish a coordinated certification and permitting process for geologic sequestration sites, taking into account all relevant statutory authorities. The amended law would require regulation of geologic sequestration wells, and promulgation of regulations to protect human health and the environment by minimizing the risk of atmospheric release of carbon dioxide injected for geologic sequestration. Both bills contain identical provisions establishing performance standards for CO2 removal for new coal-fired power plants. Plants covered by this section include those that have a permit issued under the CAA, Title V, to derive at least 30% of their annual heat input from coal, petroleum coke, or any combination of these fuels. Both bills contain similar provisions that would create a program to accelerate the commercial availability of CO2 capture and storage technologies and methods by awarding grants, contracts, and financial assistance to electric utilities, academic institutions, and other eligible entities. The bills would allow the establishment of a corporation, by referendum among power industry organizations, that would derive revenue of approximately $1 billion per year via a "wires charge" on electricity delivered from the combustion of fossil fuels. One possible advantage of the program, if enacted, would be the creation of a consistent funding stream—exempt from the annual appropriations process—for development of CCS technology over 10 years. Both bills would also create a second program that would distribute emission allowances from the cap-and-trade provisions to qualifying electric generating plants and industrial facilities. Although the programs in the two bills are similar in construct and scale, S. 1733 would award allowances to the first 20 gigawatts (Gw) of electricity generation that employs CCS technology via a formula that provides a significant financial incentive, as much as $106 per ton of CO2 captured for 90% capture efficiency. In contrast, H.R. 2454 would award only the first 6 Gw via the same formula, and then employ a reverse auction scheme to allocate the rest, up to a total of 72 Gw. Thus, S. 1733 allocates allowances to a substantially larger proportion of electricity generating capacity in the first phase of the program, compared to H.R. 2454, at bonus allowance values that could be significantly higher than their average market value. A chairman's mark to S. 1733, introduced on October 23, 2009, would add an additional incentive for early deployment of CCS by allowing advanced distribution of emission allowances for CCS. In contrast to H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 (as introduced), the chairman's mark would award allowances before the plant has actually captured any CO2. In contrast, H.R. 2454 and S. 1733 (as introduced) would only distribute emission allowances based on the total tons of CO2 already captured and sequestered.

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Introduction Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes federal aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other pupils attending schools with relatively high concentrations of pupils from low-income families in pre-kindergarten through grade 12. 107-110 . Among other provisions, this act builds upon Title I-A provisions adopted initially in the Improving America's Schools Act (IASA) of 1994, which required states to adopt curriculum content and pupil performance standards, and assessments linked to these, at three grade levels in reading and mathematics; initiated steps toward identifying low-performing schools and LEAs; attempted to increase targeting of funds on high-poverty LEAs and schools; and increased flexibility. ESEA programs are authorized through FY2008, and it is generally assumed that the 110 th Congress will actively consider legislation to amend and extend the ESEA. Major ESEA Title I-A amendments adopted in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ( P.L. Relevant aspects of this Initiative are discussed below, at the end of the report section on Pupil Assessment. In addition to the requirement for assessments at three grade levels in reading and mathematics, all participating states will be required to implement assessments, linked to state content and academic achievement standards, for all public school pupils in each of grades 3-8 in reading and mathematics by the 2005-2006 school year. States will also have to develop and implement assessments at three grade levels in science by the 2007-2008 school year. P.L. All states receiving Title I-A grants are required to participate in National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests in 4 th and 8 th grade reading and mathematics administered every two years, with costs paid by the federal government. These include the following. The AYP state standards will also have to incorporate a goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or advanced level of achievement within 12 years. If a Title I-A school fails to meet AYP standards for a third year , pupils from low-income families in the school must be offered the opportunity to receive instruction from a supplemental services provider of their choice, in addition to continuing to offer public school choice options. One or more of a specified series of additional "corrective actions" must be taken with respect to Title I-A schools that fail to meet AYP for a fourth year . Title I-A schools that fail to meet AYP standards for a fifth year must be "restructured." Allocation Formula Provisions ESEA Title I-A has four separate formulas—Basic, Concentration, Targeted, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG)—for the allocation of funds to states and LEAs. Targeting on High-Poverty LEAs Under the Four Title I-A Formulas For the last several years, the primary issue regarding the Title I-A allocation formulas has been the extent to which funds are targeted on high-poverty LEAs. Finally, according to the authorizing statute, LEAs participating in Title I-A must have a plan to ensure that all of their teachers are "highly qualified" by the 2005-2006 deadline.

Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. Title I-A grants are used to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other pupils attending schools with relatively high concentrations of pupils from low-income families. Title I-A has detailed provisions regarding pupil assessment, program improvement, allocation of funds, school selection, fiscal accountability, and parental involvement, but very few constraints on such matters as the specific resources for which funds are used. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, P.L. 107-110, builds upon Title I-A provisions adopted in 1994 that required participating states to adopt curriculum content and pupil performance standards, and assessments linked to these, at three grade levels in reading and mathematics; initiated steps toward identifying low-performing schools and LEAs; attempted to increase targeting of funds on high-poverty LEAs and schools; and increased flexibility. Highlights of the Title I-A provisions of P.L. 107-110 include the following: (1) participating states are required to implement standards-based assessments for pupils in each of grades 3-8 in reading and mathematics by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, and to implement assessments at three grade levels in science by the 2007-2008 school year; (2) states receiving Title I-A funds are required to participate in National Assessment of Educational Progress tests in 4th and 8th grade reading and mathematics every two years; (3) adequate yearly progress (AYP) standards, with a goal of all pupils reaching a proficient or advanced level of achievement on state assessments within 12 years, must be developed by states and applied to each public school, LEA, and state; (4) pupils at schools participating in Title I-A that fail to meet AYP for two consecutive years must be offered public school choice options, and if a Title I-A school fails to meet AYP for a third year, pupils from low-income families must be offered the opportunity to receive instruction from a supplemental services provider of their choice; (5) "corrective actions" must be taken with respect to Title I-A schools that fail to meet AYP for a fourth year, and those that fail for a fifth year must be "restructured"; (6) Title I-A allocation formulas are modified to increase targeting on high-poverty states and LEAs under the Education Finance Incentive Grant formula, move Puerto Rico gradually toward parity with the states, and increase state minimum grants; (7) states must ensure that all of their teachers in core subject areas are "highly qualified," and that all paraprofessionals paid with Title I-A funds have completed at least two years of higher education or met a "rigorous standard of quality" by the end of the 2005-2006 school year; and (8) the authorization level for Title I-A is specified for each year, rising to $25 billion for FY2007. ESEA programs are authorized through FY2008, and it is generally assumed that the 110th Congress will actively consider legislation to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will not be updated.

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Introduction Recent tragic events in Tucson, AZ, have raised questions about the extent to which federal law outlaws crimes of violence committed against federal officials or federal employees. There are dozens of federal threat statutes relating to threats under more narrow jurisdictional circumstances.

Dozens of federal statutes outlaw homicide, assault, and threats under varying jurisdictional circumstances. Those which appear most relevant to tragic events in Tucson, AZ, are identified in abbreviated form here.

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The Campaign By the end of October 2011, all seven legal political parties had been approved by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to run in the December 4, 2011, Duma election. Additional election monitors from the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were also invited to participate. Golos criticized campaigning by the "popular front" that was not included in the spending limits of the United Russia Party and alleged that Russian security officials increasingly were harassing the NGO during the run-up to the election. The OSCE's preliminary report on the outcome of the election echoed many of the findings of Golos and other observers. The report judged that close ties between the Russian government and the ruling party, refusal to register political parties, pro-government bias of the electoral commissions and most media, and ballot-box stuffing and other government manipulation of the vote marked the election as not free and fair. On December 5, about 5,000 protesters held an authorized rally in central Moscow. When many of them began an unsanctioned march toward the CEC, police forcibly dispersed them, reportedly detaining hundreds, including some prominent dissidents. The Kremlin quickly mobilized pro-government Nashi and Young Guard youth groups to hold large demonstrations termed "clean victory" to press home their claim that minority groups would not be permitted to impose their will on the "majority" of the electorate. On December 10, 2011, demonstrations under the slogan "For Honest Elections!" were held in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and dozens of other cities. At the rally, Boris Nemtsov, the co-head of the unregistered opposition Party of People's Freedom, issued a list of demands that included the ouster of the CEC head, the release of those detained for protesting and other "political prisoners," the registration of previously banned parties, and new Duma elections. Implications for U.S. The day after the Duma election, on December 5, 2011, Secretary of State Clinton stated that the United States has "serious concerns about the conduct of the elections," as detailed in the OSCE observers' preliminary report, including ballot-box stuffing. Many in Congress have had continuing concerns about democratization and human rights progress in Russia, as reflected in calls in recent foreign operations appropriations bills as well as other legislation and hearings for added Obama Administration attention to Russian democratization. On December 2, 2011, members of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe criticized a court action against Golos just days before the election, and on December 7 criticized the balloting as the "most controversial election in decades." The Commission also raised concerns about the detention of those protesting against what the Commission termed the flawed election. Also on December 7, Senators McCain, Joseph Lieberman, and Jeanne Shaheen issued a statement condemning Russian police crackdowns on those demonstrating against the "blatant fraud" of the Duma election and calling for their release. These challenges to Russia's democratic development likely will continue to be of concern to Congress and the Administration as they consider the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation on matters of mutual strategic interest and as they monitor problematic human rights cases. A major question of U.S.-Russia relations is whether Russia can be an enduring and reliable partner in international relations if it fails to uphold human rights and the rule of law.

Challenges to Russia's democratic development have long been of concern to Congress as it has considered the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation on matters of mutual strategic interest and as it has monitored problematic human rights cases. Most recently, elections for the 450-member Russian State Duma (lower legislative chamber) on December 4, 2011, have heightened concerns among some Members of Congress about whether Russia can be an enduring and reliable partner in international relations if it does not uphold human rights and the rule of law. In the run-up to the December 2011 State Duma election, seven political parties were approved to run, although during the period since the last election in late 2007, several other parties had attempted to register for the election but were blocked from doing so. These actions had elicited criticism from the U.S. State Department that diverse political interests were not being fully represented. As election day neared, Russian officials became increasingly concerned that the ruling United Russia Party, which had held most of the seats in the outgoing Duma, was swiftly losing popular support. According to some observers, Russian authorities, in an attempt to prevent losses at the polls, not only used their positions to campaign for the party but also planned ballot-box stuffing and other illicit means to retain a majority of seats for the ruling party. In addition, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had increasingly criticized election monitoring carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and insisted on limiting the number of OSCE observers. Russian authorities also moved against one prominent Russian non-governmental monitoring group, Golos, to discourage its coverage of the election. According to the OSCE's preliminary report on the outcome of the election, the close ties between the Russian government and the ruling party, the refusal to register political parties, the pro-government bias of the electoral commissions and most media, and ballot-box stuffing and other government manipulation of the vote marked the election as not free and fair. The day after the election, about 5,000 protesters rallied in central Moscow against what they viewed as a flawed election. When many of them began an unsanctioned march toward the Central Electoral Commission, police forcibly dispersed them, reportedly detaining hundreds. The Kremlin quickly mobilized pro-government youth groups to hold large demonstrations termed "clean victory" to press home their claim that minority groups would not be permitted to impose their will on the "majority" of the electorate. On December 7, 2011, several U.S. Senators issued a statement condemning Russian police crackdowns on those demonstrating against the "blatant fraud" of the Duma election. On December 10, large demonstrations under the slogan "For Honest Elections!" were held in Moscow and dozens of other cities. At the rally, Boris Nemtsov, the co-head of the unregistered opposition Party of People's Freedom, reflected popular sentiment with a list of demands that included the ouster of the head of the Central Electoral Commission, the release of those detained for protesting and other "political prisoners," the registration of previously banned parties, and new Duma elections. Many observers have raised concerns that public unrest may continue, although security forces appear firmly in control and unlikely to permit the unrest to threaten the government. The Obama Administration has been critical of the apparently flawed Duma election, but has called for continued engagement with Russia on issues of mutual strategic concern. Some in Congress also have criticized the Duma election and the subsequent crackdown on protesters, and Congress may consider the implications of lagging democratization and human rights abuses as it considers possible future foreign assistance and trade legislation and other aspects of U.S.-Russia relations.

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The America COMPETES Act is intended to increase the nation's investment in science and engineering research, and in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education from kindergarten to graduate school and postdoctoral education. The act is designed to focus on two perceived concerns believed to influence future U.S. competitiveness: inadequate research and development funding to generate sufficient technological progress, and inadequate numbers of American students proficient in science and mathematics or interested in science and engineering careers relative to international competitors. Among its provisions, the act authorizes the following: Research Funding of research supported by NIST, the DOE Office of Science, and the NSF for FY2008-FY2010 at a rate that, if sustained, would double these agencies' research budgets over seven years; Early career and new investigator grants for science, engineering, and mathematics researchers at DOE and NSF; A new Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) in DOE that would sponsor transformational energy technology research projects; and New Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes at DOE National Laboratories, which are multidisciplinary institutes that are intended to apply fundamental science and engineering discoveries to technological innovations. The America COMPETES Act and the ACI responded to the same concern—that the United States may not be able to compete economically with other nations in the future due to insufficient investment today in science and technology research and workforce development. The STEM education programs in the America COMPETES Act include a pilot program of grants to states to help establish or expand statewide specialty high schools in STEM education; experiential-based learning opportunities, internships for middle and high-school students including hands-on learning at the DOE national labs; centers of excellence in STEM education in at least one high-need, public secondary school in each DOE National lab region, in order to develop and disseminate best practices in STEM education; summer institutes at the DOE national labs and partner universities, in order to improve the STEM content knowledge of kindergarten through 12 th grade teachers throughout the country; a newly appointed Director for STEM Education at the Department of Energy, who would also serve as an interagency liaison for K-12 STEM education; a graduate research fellowship program for outstanding graduate students, called Protecting America's Competitive Edge (PACE), in fields of interest to the DOE plus imagination, creativity, and excellent written and oral communication skills; two new competitive grant programs at the Department of Education (ED), called Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow, that would enable partnerships to implement, in STEM fields, courses of study that lead to a baccalaureate degree with concurrent teacher certification, and at the graduate level, a two- or three-year, part-time, master's degree program for current teachers to improve their content knowledge and teaching skills in these areas as well as a one-year master's degree program for STEM professionals to enhance their teaching skills and teacher certification. The act also authorizes a new program at NSF that would provide grants to institutions of higher education to create or improve professional science master's (PSM) degree programs that emphasize practical training and preparation for the workforce in high-need fields. An issue for these programs is whether or not they will receive the funding necessary to establish them. New programs established by the act would not be initiated, and authorized increases in appropriations for existing programs would not occur unless funded through subsequent appropriation acts. The 110 th Congress provided FY2008 appropriations to establish ED's Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow program, and NIST's Technology Improvement Program (TIP), which replaced the existing Advanced Technology Program. The 111 th Congress provided FY2009 appropriations to establish DOE's ARPA-E and NSF's PSM program. Although some America COMPETES Act research and STEM education programs received appropriations at authorized levels in FY2009, others did not, as described below. As Congress deliberates the FY2010 budget, an issue for Congress is what level, if any, will it provide America COMPETES Act programs an appropriation, and whether or not the President's budget request will propose to do so. Several programs newly authorized in the act have never been appropriated funds. The America COMPETES Act provides authorization levels only through FY2010. 110-69 ) on August 9, 2007.

The America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) became law on August 9, 2007. The act responds to concerns that the United States may not be able to compete economically with other nations in the future due to insufficient investment today in science and technology research and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and workforce development. The America COMPETES Act is intended to increase the nation's investment in science and engineering research and in STEM education from kindergarten to graduate school and postdoctoral education. It is designed to focus on two perceived concerns believed to influence future U.S. competitiveness: inadequate research and development funding to generate sufficient technological progress, and inadequate numbers of American students proficient in science and mathematics or interested in science and engineering careers relative to international competitors. The act authorizes funding increases for the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) laboratories, and the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science over FY2008-FY2010. If maintained, the increases would double the budgets of those entities over seven years. The act establishes the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) within DOE, designed to support transformational energy technology research projects with the goal of enhancing U.S. economic and energy security. A new program, Discovery Science and Engineering Innovation Institutes, would establish multidisciplinary institutes at DOE National Laboratories to "apply fundamental science and engineering discoveries to technological innovations," according to the act. Among the act's education activities, many of which are focused on high-need school districts, are programs to recruit new K-12 STEM teachers, enhance existing STEM teacher skills, and provide more STEM education opportunities for students. The new Department of Education (ED) Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow and existing NSF Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship programs provide opportunities, through institutional grants, for students pursuing STEM degrees and STEM professionals to gain teaching skills and teacher certification, and for current STEM teachers to enhance their teaching skills and understanding of STEM content. The act also authorizes a new program at NSF that would provide grants to create or improve professional science master's degree (PSM) programs that emphasize practical training and preparation for the workforce in high-need fields. The America COMPETES Act is an authorization act. New programs established by the act will not be initiated and authorized increases in appropriations for existing programs will not occur unless funded through subsequent appropriation acts. The 110th Congress provided FY2008 appropriations to establish ED's Teachers for a Competitive Tomorrow program, and NIST's Technology Improvement Program (TIP), which replaced the existing Advanced Technology Program. The 111th Congress provided FY2009 appropriations to establish DOE's ARPA-E and NSF's PSM program. Although some America COMPETES Act research and STEM education programs received appropriations at or above authorized levels in FY2009, others did not. As Congress deliberates the FY2010 budget, an issue for Congress is what level, if any, will it provide America COMPETES Act programs an appropriation, and whether or not the President's budget request will propose to do so. Several programs newly authorized in the act have never been appropriated funds. An issue for these programs is whether or not they will receive the funding necessary to establish them. The America COMPETES Act provides authorization levels only through FY2010.

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Previously, the FCC granted licenses using a process known as "comparative hearings" (also known as "beauty contests"), and has used lotteries to distribute spectrum licenses. Spectrum Policy Provisions in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 ) was signed into law on February 22, 2012. Many of the provisions in Title VI of the act focus on spectrum assignment within the existing regulatory framework, in which licenses for designated radio frequencies are awarded through competitive bidding systems (auctions). Specific provisions of Title VI (frequently referred to as the Public Safety and Spectrum Act, or Spectrum Act) include expediting auctions of licenses for spectrum designated for mobile broadband; authorizing incentive auctions, which would permit television broadcasters to receive compensation for steps they might take to release some of their airwaves for mobile broadband; requiring that specified federal holdings be auctioned or reassigned for commercial use; and providing for the availability of spectrum for unlicensed use. Major provisions in the Spectrum Act that are summarized in this report cover Deficit reduction; Directed auctions; Incentive auctions for television broadcasters; Reallocation of spectrum from federal to commercial use; and Unlicensed spectrum. The act also provides for the establishment of a new authority to plan and develop a nationwide public safety broadband network (FirstNet) and other measures in support of improved emergency communications. To NIST for public safety research, phase two: $200 million. New technologies are being developed by companies in various industry sectors to expand the usefulness of unlicensed spectrum without causing interference. Spectrum caps might limit the amount of spectrum available through auction to the top two carriers in key auctions such as those for repurposed television spectrum. Other policy options that may be employed to increase spectrum capacity include requiring that wireless network infrastructure be shared; changing the cost structure of spectrum access; moving to more spectrum-efficient technologies; and sharing spectrum. Activity regarding the Internet of Things, in addition to several hearings, includes resolutions calling for a national strategy for the Internet of Things.

The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96, signed February 22, 2012) contains provisions in Title VI that expedite the availability of spectrum for commercial mobile broadband. The provisions in Title VI—also known as the Public Safety and Spectrum Act, or the Spectrum Act—cover reallocation of spectrum, new assignments of spectrum rights, and changes in procedures for repurposing spectrum used by the federal government. The act establishes a process for television broadcasters to release spectrum licensed to them for auction as commercial licenses (Broadcast Incentive Auctions). The act also includes provisions to apply future spectrum license auction revenues toward deficit reduction; to establish a planning and governance structure to deploy public safety broadband networks, using some auction proceeds for that purpose; and to assign additional spectrum resources for public safety communications. Broadband capacity to support popular mobile services and devices, such as real-time viewing of video on smartphones, can be improved in several ways. Examples include (1) providing new spectrum for networks to expand; (2) investing in denser infrastructure; (3) developing new technologies; or (4) expanding opportunities for sharing spectrum. Provisions of the Spectrum Act focus on increasing the amount of spectrum as the key policy tool for spectrum management. Going forward, other policy tools may need to be considered in order to make spectrum access more inclusive. Many policy makers and Members of Congress are concerned, for example, that the current structure of auctions to assign spectrum licenses does not provide enough opportunities for competition or new entrants into mobile communications markets. The spectrum needs of the Internet of Things and other emerging technologies that some believe may be key drivers of future economic growth are not specifically addressed in the Spectrum Act. Many growth industries that are deemed to be part of the Internet of Things require reliable, affordable access to spectrum.

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Contacts between the Samoan islands and the United States developed late in the 19 th century, but they were infrequent. Fish processing is Samoa's single primary private-sector industry. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the insular minimum wage has been fixed by the Secretary of Labor through a Special Industry Committee (SIC). In early 2007, the rate for the tuna canneries was $3.26 per hour; the federal rate, $5.15 per hour. At the same time, the SIC system was abolished and the insular rate was raised, though in more extended steps, until it might coincide with the federal rate. ), little thought appears to have been given to how that act might be applied to jurisdictions that were, in significant ways, economically different from the U.S. mainland. Under Section 8 of the original enactment, the Department of Labor (DOL) was required, "from time to time," to convene an industry committee for each industry covered under the act and, through the committee, to "recommend" a rate (or rates) of wages that might be higher than those established by the act. Application to American Samoa Following World War II, an unrelated circumstance brought American Samoa to governmental attention. Among factors to be considered were the following: [c]ompetitive conditions as affected by transportation, living and production costs the wages established for work of like or comparable character by collective labor agreements negotiated between employers and employees by representatives of their own choosing the wages paid for work of a like or comparable character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum wage standards in the industry employment and labor conditions and trends ... on the mainland ... including such items as present and past employment, present wage rates and fringe benefits, changes in average hourly earnings or wage structure, provisions of collective bargaining agreements, hours of work, labor turnover, absenteeism, productivity, learning periods, rejection rates, and similar factors comparative production costs ... on the mainland, and in foreign countries, together with the factors responsible for differences financial conditions and trends ... as reflected in profit and loss statements and balance sheets Hardship testimony must be documented. 1 (1957) James Mitchell, Secretary of Labor, appointed the first industry committee for Samoa on March 20, 1957, admonishing them "to reach as rapidly as is economically feasible the objective of the minimum wage of $1.00 an hour" (the standard federal minimum). Special Industry Committee No. Improving the Quality of Evidence When establishing an SIC for American Samoa in 1956, it was assumed that the committee would operate under the same rules as committees in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 17 and suggested that H.R. The bill (with some 222 cosponsors) had two provisions: (1) to raise the federal minimum wage, in steps, to $7.25 per hour, and (2) to render the federal minimum wage applicable to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands—to take place in steps through the next several years. The bill would allow the several minimum wage increases to go into effect if, in the case of American Samoa, "the Secretary of Labor determines, based on the study required under section 8104 [the DOL study] and in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the government of American Samoa, that an increase under this subparagraph will not have an adverse impact on the economy of American Samoa...." New studies would be conducted at each two-year interval. However, during the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands graduated to a full minimum wage leaving only American Samoa under the SIC umbrella. In the early 1950s, the Department of the Interior sought a tenant for a vacant fish processing plant at Pago Pago. 2206 , P.L. 110-28 ). Under the act, the SIC system was abolished and a new insular minimum wage was mandated—to be raised each year in fifty-cent increments until the new federal minimum rate, however specified, might be reached.

In 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was adopted, Congress appears to have given little consideration as to how its provisions might affect the various possessions and territories of the United States. The first off-shore jurisdiction to request exception from the FLSA was Puerto Rico, which, in 1940, along with the Virgin Islands, was given an exception under the act. Special industry committees were appointed to visit the Caribbean islands and to recommend minimum wage rates consistent with the insular economies. In the wake of World War II, new attention was focused upon the Pacific islands. American Samoa, basically, had no industry other than harvesting of copra, the dried meat of the coconut, and an economy very different from the mainland. In the early 1950s, the Department of the Interior contracted with the Van Camp Sea Food Company to move onto the island and develop a fish processing plant. However, the FLSA minimum wage was regarded as too high to be competitive and, in 1956, Van Camp appealed to Congress to extend the Puerto Rican special industry committee (SIC) model to American Samoa. Thereafter, the Secretary of Labor would review economic conditions and establish minimum rates. The SICs were admonished to reach "as rapidly as is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment" the American standard under the FLSA. While the rates established by the committees were lower than those prevailing on the mainland, the device was regarded as temporary. During the 1980s and 1990s, special treatment of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was phased out, and those islands came fully under the FLSA. Of the three jurisdictions, only American Samoa remained under the SIC structure. Fish processing has become Samoa's primary private-sector industry. In early 2007, the minimum wage for the industry was $3.26 per hour: the federal minimum wage was $5.15 per hour. However, in late May 2007, Congress adopted H.R. 2206 (P.L. 110-28) which, through a series of step increases over several years, would raise the federal minimum wage to $7.25 per hour. At the same time, the SIC for American Samoa was abolished and the insular minimum wage was raised (through a more prolonged series of step increases) until the federal minimum level, whatever that may ultimately become, might be reached. At least since the 1950s, the companies involved in fish processing have suggested that, were the minimum wage to be raised to the national rate, they might consider leaving the island and operating out of a country where wage rates were more favorable. Now, with the new wage rate for American Samoa in effect, what will be the reaction of the tuna canning companies? Will they improve technology to raise labor productivity, change the type of production done in Samoa, absorb the new rates—or migrate? And, if they were to migrate, what alternative employment might be available for the people of American Samoa? This report will be updated as warranted.

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Introduction In December 2010, the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, the Fund), the institution's highest governing body, agreed to a wide-ranging set of institutional reforms. If enacted, this reform package would increase the institution's core source of funding and expand the representation of dynamic emerging market and developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and Mexico, within the institution. To date, the United States has not formally approved these reforms. Under U.S. law, specific congressional authorization is required for the United States to consent to change the U.S. quota, or "shares" in the Fund, which determine the United States' total voting power. Proposed Reforms Motivation for Reform IMF member countries and staff have pursued reforms to address two problems facing the IMF: (1) core IMF resources have substantially declined as a share of the global economy, while anticipated needs have increased; and (2) the voice and vote of many emerging and developing countries at the IMF increasingly under-represents their current contribution to the global economy, a development which some analysts believe harms support and buy-in for IMF policies and initiatives among critical constituencies. It also determines a member country's voting power at the IMF. Some analysts view this as evidence that IMF quota resources have not kept pace with increased economic integration and that the IMF needs more financial resources in order to remain effective in responding to economic crises, one of its three major functions. Administrations have generally been supportive of increasing representation of emerging markets at the IMF. Potential Impact on the United States If implemented, the quota reform would result in a shift in the composition of U.S. financial commitments to the IMF as the NAB is reduced and the quota is increased, but would not increase total U.S. commitments to the IMF. This shift would likely require appropriations for the entire amount of the increase but the net effect on the budget would depend on how much of the funds need to be shifted and whether there are any changes to the budgetary treatment of U.S. IMF contributions (see discussion in the " The Role of Congress " below). The United States has allowed its quota share to fall over the years, partly to facilitate realignment of IMF quota shares to reflect the increasing weight of dynamic emerging market economies in the global economy, while maintaining enough voting power to be able to veto major policy decisions at the IMF that require an 85% majority. Arguments against Reforms Opponents of the reform argue that the IMF has sufficient resources to address financial crises, through the expansion of the NAB and through the IMF's ability to coordinate bilateral contributions during periods of intense market pressure. Others are skeptical that emerging economies support the existing norms and values of international financial institutions, and question whether they would be "responsible stakeholders." There may be concerns among critics of the reform package that increasing the voice and participation of emerging markets at the IMF could result in the support of economic policies that are less aligned with the preferred policies of advanced economies. Status of Reform Although the IMF Board of Governors approved the reform package in 2010, some of the key parts of the package require additional action to take effect. With the largest voting power at the IMF (16.75%), the reforms cannot go through without U.S. support, even though a majority of IMF member countries have approved them. Total U.S. financial commitment to the IMF would not change. Any appropriations needed for the transfer would depend on the scoring by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In its budget requests for FY2014, FY2015, and FY2016, the Obama Administration has included authorization and appropriation requests for the United States to endorse and ratify the 2010 reform package.

In December 2010, the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, the Fund), the institution's highest governing body, agreed to a reform package that addresses two major concerns about the institution: (1) that the size of the IMF's resources has not kept pace with increased economic activity in the global economy; and (2) that the representation of emerging and developing economies at the IMF does not reflect their growing importance in the global economy. Key parts of the reform package cannot go into effect until a number of IMF countries formally approve the reforms. If enacted, these reforms would increase the size of the IMF's core source of funding (IMF "quota"), and increase the representation of emerging market and developing countries at the IMF to reflect more accurately their weight in the global economy. Implementing the Reform Package, and the Role of Congress IMF rules do not require formal approval of the reform package by all IMF member countries, but the support of the United States, as the largest shareholder at the institution, is necessary. Although many other IMF member countries have submitted their formal approvals for these reforms, to date, the United States has not formally approved these reforms. Under U.S. law, the Administration cannot do so without specific congressional authorization. Appropriations could also be necessary. In its budget requests for FY2014, FY2015, and FY2016, the Obama Administration has included authorization and appropriation requests for the United States to endorse and ratify the 2010 reform package. Implications of the Reform Package Arguments for Reforms: Proponents argue that the reform package is necessary for maintaining the effectiveness and legitimacy of the IMF as the central institution for international macroeconomic stability. The IMF's core source of funding needs to be increased, they argue, in order to give the IMF the resources that it needs to respond effectively to financial crises. They also argue that the under-representation of emerging economies at the IMF is broadly perceived as unfair and reduces the support of several member countries for IMF programs and initiatives. Arguments against Reforms: Opponents argue that since the IMF has found other ways to supplement its resources during economic crises, the IMF's core funding source does not need to be increased. Opponents are also skeptical that emerging economies support the existing norms and values of international financial institutions, and that these countries may prefer financial and trade strategies that are less aligned with those of the United States. Potential Impact on the United States: Implementing the reforms would not increase total U.S. financial commitments to the IMF and would have little impact on U.S. representation at the IMF. The reforms would require transferring some U.S. financial commitments from a supplementary fund at the IMF (the "New Arrangements to Borrow," or NAB) to the IMF's core source of funding (quota). This transfer could require appropriations, depending on how the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scores the transfer of funds. The share of U.S. voting power at the IMF would fall slightly, but the United States would still maintain its unique veto power over major policy decisions.

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Background Derivatives are financial instruments that come in several different forms, including futures , options , and swaps . A derivative is a contract that derives its value from some underlying asset at a designated point in time. The derivative may be tied to a physical commodity, a stock index, an interest rate, or some other asset. Such debates led, in 2010, to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. Prior to Dodd-Frank, swaps (also called OTC derivatives) were largely unregulated, whereas futures and options were regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A good example is insurance giant American International Group (AIG), which sold billions of dollars in credit-default swaps and had to be rescued by the government, thus preventing massive losses to AIG's counterparties that could have exacerbated the downward global financial spiral. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that derivatives contributed to the 2008 financial crisis in three major ways. Second, these swaps also are required to be traded on an exchange or an exchange-like electronic platform called a swap execution facility (SEF), with the goal of promoting pre-trade and post-trade price transparency. Fifth, swaps that remain uncleared, or OTC, are subject to margin and capital requirements set by the regulators to prevent large uncollateralized exposures from accumulating. Clearing Requirement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act creates largely parallel clearing and exchange-trading requirements for swaps and security-based swaps, as those terms are defined by Title VII and further clarified by the CFTC and the SEC in a joint rulemaking. Section 763 creates largely parallel requirements for security-based swaps, over which the SEC has authority. S. 2917 shares certain provisions with H.R. 22; H.R. 114-94 on December 4, 2015, removed a requirement added in the Dodd-Frank Act's Title VII that foreign regulators indemnify a U.S.-based swap data repository (SDR) and the CFTC for any expenses arising from litigation related to a request for market data. 1847 , which is substantially similar to the provision in P.L. 2289 , as in H.R. Centralized Treasury Units Exemption (P.L. 1317 , a bill to allow certain corporate affiliates to use an existing exception from the derivatives regulatory requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act. This provision means Congress must periodically reauthorize appropriations to carry out the CEA. On April 14, 2016, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry marked up and ordered to be reported a CFTC reauthorization bill, S. 2917 . 2289 as passed, and S. 2917 , would amend the short "Authorization of Appropriations" section in the CEA (7 U.S.C. Cost-Benefit Analysis (H.R. 2289 as passed includes the following 12 factors: (A) considerations of protection of market participants and the public; (B) considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures and swaps markets; (C) considerations of the impact on market liquidity in the futures and swaps markets; (D) considerations of price discovery; (E) considerations of sound risk-management practices; (F) available alternatives to direct regulation; (G) the degree and nature of the risks posed by various activities within the scope of its jurisdiction; (H) the costs of complying with the proposed regulation or order by all regulated entities, including a methodology for quantifying the costs (recognizing that some costs are difficult to quantify); (I) whether the proposed regulation or order is inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative of other federal regulations or orders; (J) the cost to the Commission of implementing the proposed regulation or order by the Commission staff, including a methodology for quantifying the costs; (K) whether, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches maximize net benefits (including potential economic and other benefits, distributive impacts, and equity); and (L) other public interest considerations. 2289 , H.R. 114-113; H.R. Changes to Definition of Bona Fide Hedging (H.R. The current definition of a bona fide hedge in the CEA specifies, among other factors, that (2) For the purposes of implementation of subsection (a)(2) for contracts of sale for future delivery or options on the contracts or commodities, the Commission shall define what constitutes a bona fide hedging transaction or position as a transaction or position that— (A) (i) represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made or positions taken or to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel; (ii) is economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise; and... 1256 , the current bill would mandate that, starting 18 months from its enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC issues a rule or order finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements are not comparable to or as comprehensive as those of the United States. Under H.R. Residual Interest (S. 1560, H.R. 2289; S. 2917) The term residual interest generally refers to capital from a futures commission merchant (FCM) committed to temporarily make up the difference for insufficient margin in a customer's account. 2289 's Section 104 would all essentially codify the deadline for FCMs to deposit any capital to cover residual interest as no earlier than 6:00 p.m. on the following business day.

Derivatives are financial instruments that come in several different forms, including futures, options, and swaps. A derivative is a contract that derives its value from some underlying asset at a designated point in time. The derivative may be tied to a physical commodity, a stock index, an interest rate, or some other asset. Derivatives played a role in the 2008 financial crisis in a variety of ways. The unmonitored buildup of derivatives positions in the largely unregulated "over-the-counter" (OTC) market led many major financial institutions into large financial losses. Possibly the best-known example of such losses was the insurance giant American International Group (AIG), whose massive losses from selling credit-default swaps ultimately contributed to the need for government assistance. OTC derivatives, prior to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), were traded bilaterally rather than cleared through a clearinghouse, and no reporting trail existed, which created uncertainty during the crisis over the web of exposures to large derivatives losses. The Dodd-Frank Act aimed to address these policy concerns by bringing the swaps market into a regulatory framework based on that of the futures markets, which had long been regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Security-based swaps tied to equities or narrow-based credit indexes were placed under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within a similar framework. Broadly, Dodd-Frank included five major reforms. It required the 1. clearing of certain swaps through a clearinghouse, entailing the posting of margin, or cash, to cover accumulating losses; 2. trading of certain swaps on an exchange or swap execution facility (an electronic trading platform), with the aim of increasing price transparency; 3. reporting of all swaps transactions to a swaps data repository (SDR) to create an audit trail and more market data for regulators; 4. registration of swap dealers and major swap participants, subjecting them to regulatory oversight; and 5. establishment of margin and capital requirements by regulators for swaps that remain uncleared. Parallel provisions were enacted for security-based swaps under the SEC. In the 114th Congress, several bills have been introduced, and two have been enacted as part of other legislation, impacting various aspects of swaps regulation largely stemming from Dodd-Frank. One of the provisions, originally in H.R. 1847 but enacted in P.L. 114-94/H.R. 22, removed a requirement added in Dodd-Frank that foreign regulators indemnify a U.S.-based SDR and the CFTC for any expenses arising from litigation related to a request for market data (with a parallel SEC provision). The other provision, originally in H.R. 1317 but enacted in P.L. 114-113/H.R. 2029, created an exception for certain corporate affiliates of nonfinancial companies, dubbed "centralized treasury units," to the clearing and exchange-trading requirements. The House has passed legislation, H.R. 2289, that would reauthorize appropriations to carry out the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA; 7 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.)—a process that historically has recurred every five years. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry marked up and ordered to be reported S. 2917 which would also reauthorize such appropriations, as well as making other changes to the CEA. S. 2917 and H.R. 2289 would each modify the definition of who is a financial entity—relevant for determining who must clear their swaps—but the bills do so in different ways. H.R. 2289 and S. 2917 would—in substantially identical ways—broaden the definition of bona fide hedging to allow anticipated, as well as current, risks to be hedged, likely increasing the number of swaps qualifying as hedges for position limits, registration requirements, and other purposes. H.R. 2289, S. 2917 and S. 1560 also contain provisions to codify the deadline for brokers to deposit residual interest (capital from a futures broker that temporarily makes up the difference for insufficient margin in a customer's account) as no earlier than 6:00 p.m. on the following business day. H.R. 2289 (but not S. 2917) includes measures that would increase required cost-benefit analysis by the CFTC in rulemakings. H.R. 2289 (but not S. 2917) would mandate that, starting 18 months from enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC were to issue a rule finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements were not comparable to U.S. requirements.

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Introduction to the IDEA The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities. The most recent reauthorization was P.L. Funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, was authorized through FY2011. Part B—Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities Part B provides federal funding to states for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a FAPE to children with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21. Current IDEA Funding Part B is the largest part of the IDEA, and it received nearly 95%, $12.7 billion, of the act's total funding in FY2018. Section 611, which covers children between the ages of 3 and 21 receiving special education and related services in public schools, received $12.3 billion in FY2018. Despite recent fluctuations in Part B appropriations, funding for the Part B grants-to-states program increased steadily for most of its first four decades ( Figure 1 ). For the past five years, appropriations for the Part C program have fluctuated. 94-142 . Part B formula grants to states are calculated based on one of two scenarios: (1) the appropriated amount available to states for the current fiscal year is greater than or equal to the amount that was available to states in the previous year, or (2) the amount available to states in the current year is less than the amount available to states the previous year. The following two sections of this report will examine how IDEA allocations are calculated in years when funding increases or remains the same, and in years when funding decreases. The maximum grant calculation is a unique component of the Part B formula. First, calculate the amount of new money provided to each state the previous year: After totaling the new money available to all states in the previous year, calculate each state's ratably reduced funding amount for the current year: Determine the final grant amount for each state by adding the state's ratably reduced new money grant amount to the state's FY1999 grant amount. Grants for IDEA Early Childhood Programs Preschool Grants Program (Part B, Section 619) Section 619 of IDEA Part B authorizes grants to states for preschool programs serving children with disabilities ages three to five. When Congress enacted the predecessor legislation to the IDEA in 1975, they strove to ensure that (1) states would provide every eligible child FAPE in the least restrictive environment, and (2) states would not take on an untenable financial burden by agreeing to provide special education and related services. Beginning in FY2007 and used for all subsequent fiscal years, the maximum amount of state grants for the purposes of full funding has been calculated as 40% of APPE multiplied by the number of children with disabilities the state served in school year 2004-2005, and then adjusted by the annual rates of change in the state's population in the age range comparable to ages for which the state provides FAPE for children with disabilities (85% of the adjustment) and in the state's population of children living in poverty in the same age range (15% of the adjustment). 108-446 , the IDEA authorized "such sums as may be necessary" for the Part B grants-to-states program. The Part B grants-to-states program was not appropriated the amounts authorized by P.L.

Since the enactment of P.L. 94-142, the predecessor legislation to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), in 1975, the federal government has played a prominent role in encouraging the principle of educational equality for children with disabilities through a permanent, broad-scale federal assistance program. The IDEA is a grants statute that provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, that states agree to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE; i.e., specially designed instruction provided at no cost to the parents that meets the needs of a child with a disability) to every eligible child. The IDEA, most recently reauthorized by P.L. 108-446 in 2004, was appropriated approximately $13.4 billion in FY2018. The largest part of the IDEA is Part B, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, which covers special education for children and youth with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21. Approximately 92% of total IDEA appropriations fund the Part B, Section 611, grants-to-states program. Part B was funded at $12.7 billion in FY2018, and in the 2016-2017 school year, 6.8 million children ages 3 through 21 received educational services under it. In addition to the Part B grants-to-states program, the IDEA contains two programs for young children with disabilities. Part C authorizes federal funding for early intervention services to infants and toddlers with disabilities ages birth to three years, and Part B, Section 619 authorizes supplementary grants to states for preschool programs serving children with disabilities ages three to five. Each IDEA program serving children and youth with disabilities has followed a similar funding pattern. Appropriations for IDEA Part B (Sections 611 and 619) and Part C increased steadily from each program's inception until the early 2000s. Since the IDEA's most recent reauthorization in FY2004, the funding for both Part B and Part C programs has fluctuated. The IDEA has two formulas for determining Part B grants to states: one for years when the appropriated amount available to states is greater than or equal to the amount available to states in the previous year, and one for years when the amount available to states is less than the amount available to states the previous year. In years when the appropriated amount for Part B increases or remains the same, each state receives its base-year (FY1999) grant amount plus a share of the "new money" (i.e., the amount above the FY1999 appropriation), based on the state's share of the national child population and national population of children living in poverty, adjusted according to one maximum and three minimum grant calculations, and ratably reduced when necessary. In years when the appropriated amount for Part B decreases, each state receives its base-year grant amount plus a share of the new money the state received the previous year, which has been ratably reduced in proportion to the total new money available for the current year. This report will examine the development of the allocation formula for the Part B grants-to-states program, the major changes to the formula over the past 40 years, current funding levels and trends, and how allocations are currently calculated. Issues concerning the funding of special education and related services will also be discussed.

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Border security has been the focus of much of this legislative activity, with the House and the Senate considering legislation on border security strate gy and metrics, border resources, and preclearance operations, among other areas of border security, and enacting specific measures on components including border infrastructure, border security vulnerabilities, and preclearance operations. The 114 th Congress has likewise enacted measures on intercountry adoption, Afghan special immigrant visas, and the Visa Waiver Program, among other issues, and has extended the E-Verify employment eligibility verification system and several other immigration programs through FY2016. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 114 th Congress. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security Border Security Metrics Act of 2015 ( S. 1864 ), as reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 ( S. 2943 ), as passed by the Senate, and the DHS Accountability Act of 2016 ( S. 2976 ), as reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, would also require the Secretary to develop metrics for the same functional zones of the border. The Border and Maritime Coordination Improvement Act ( H.R. Among the other related measures considered in the 114 th Congress, the Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 ( P.L. The Northern Border Security Review Act ( H.R. An additional bill, the Southwest Security Threat Assessment Act of 2016 ( H.R. The Border Jobs for Veterans Act of 2015 ( P.L. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. The Border Security Technology Accountability Act of 2015 ( H.R. Additionally, the Promoting Resilience and Efficiency in Preparing for Attacks and Responding to Emergencies (PREPARE) Act ( H.R. 1153 , as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee; the Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act ( H.R. 3009 ), as passed by the House; and the Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016 ( S. 1635 ), as passed by the Senate and as ordered to be reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee with an amendment. 1148 , as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and H.R. 3128 ), as reported by the House Appropriations Committee. House-passed H.R. 114-113 (Div. Several bills on electronic employment eligibility verification have been introduced in the 114 th Congress. H.R. 1148 , as ordered to be reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, would give the Secretary of Homeland Security "exclusive authority to issue regulations, establish policy, and administer and enforce the provisions of the [INA] and all other immigration or nationality laws relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting and refusal of a visa." The Department of Homeland Security Strategy for International Programs Act ( H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 1153 's proposed changes to asylum procedures applicable to unaccompanied alien children, see " Unaccompanied Alien Children .") The American Security Against Foreign Enemies (SAFE) Act of 2015 ( H.R. 114-113 (Div. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 ( P.L. The Senate-passed version of S. 2943 includes no provisions on the Afghan special immigrant visa program. 5253 , as ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security, also contains provisions related to the VWP. The House FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill ( H.R. The House FY2017 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H.R. Naturalization H.R. F, §573) extends the authorization for the special immigrant religious worker program through September 30, 2016. H-1B and L Nonimmigrant Visa Fees P.L. In the 114 th Congress, the Adoptive Family Relief Act ( P.L. (For a discussion of related provisions in H.R.

The House and the Senate have considered immigration measures on a variety of issues in the 114th Congress. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) extends four immigration programs through September 30, 2016: the EB-5 immigrant investor Regional Center Pilot Program, the E-Verify employment eligibility verification system, the Conrad State program for foreign medical graduates, and the special immigrant religious worker program. P.L. 114-113 also contains provisions on the Visa Waiver Program and certain nonimmigrant visa categories. Other enacted immigration-related measures include the Border Jobs for Veterans Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-68) on border security personnel, the Adoptive Family Relief Act (P.L. 114-70) on intercountry adoption, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 114-92) on the Afghan special immigrant visa program, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94) on border infrastructure, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) on preclearance operations, and the Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-136) on border security vulnerabilities. The House and the Senate have each passed several other immigration-related bills. Among the House-passed bills are the Northern Border Security Review Act (H.R. 455), the Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 998), the Border Security Technology Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1634), the Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act (H.R. 3009), the Promoting Resilience and Efficiency in Preparing for Attacks and Responding to Emergencies (PREPARE) Act (H.R. 3583), the Border and Maritime Coordination Improvement Act (H.R. 3586), the American SAFE Act of 2015 (H.R. 4038), the Southwest Border Security Threat Assessment Act of 2016 (H.R. 4482), and the Department of Homeland Security Strategy for International Programs Act (H.R. 4780). The Senate has passed the Department of State Operations Authorization and Embassy Security Act, Fiscal Year 2016 (S. 1635). The House and the Senate have both passed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (S. 2943), which include different immigration-related provisions. In addition, various bills on border security, interior enforcement, visa security, and asylum, among other issues, have been considered by a House or Senate committee. Border security-related measures have been reported by the House Homeland Security Committee (H.R. 399) or the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (S. 461, S. 750, S. 1808, S. 1864, S. 1873, S. 2976). Interior enforcement provisions are included in bills ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee (H.R. 1147, H.R. 1148, H.R. 1153) or reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 3128). Several of these interior enforcement bills contain key provisions on other immigration issues, such as employment eligibility verification (H.R. 1147); visa security and naturalization (H.R. 1148); and expedited removal, asylum, parole, and unaccompanied alien children (H.R. 1153). Visa security provisions are likewise included in H.R. 5203, as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and H.R. 5253, as ordered to be reported by the House Homeland Security Committee. H.R. 1149, as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, also addresses unaccompanied alien children. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 114th Congress. Department of Homeland Security appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, and, for the most part, are not covered here.

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Prominent among these policies are those promoting the capture and direct sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from manmade sources such as electric power plants and manufacturing facilities. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is a three-part process involving a CO 2 source facility, a long-term CO 2 sequestration site, and an intermediate mode of CO 2 transportation—typically pipelines. Divergent views on CO 2 pipeline requirements introduce significant uncertainty into overall CCS cost estimates and may complicate the federal role, if any, in CO 2 pipeline regulation. Nonetheless, there is an increasing perception in Congress that a national CCS program could require the construction of a substantial network of interstate CO 2 pipelines. The Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Study Act of 2007 (S. 2144), introduced by Senator Norm Coleman and nine cosponsors on October 4, 2007, would require the Secretary of Energy to study the feasibility of constructing and operating such a network of CO 2 pipelines. 110-140 ), signed by President Bush, as amended, on December 19, 2007, requires the Secretary of the Interior to recommend legislation to clarify the appropriate framework for issuing CO 2 pipeline rights-of-way on public land (Sec. This report examines key uncertainties in CO 2 pipeline requirements for CCS by contrasting hypothetical pipeline scenarios in one region of the United States. Variability of CO2 Pipeline Costs The cost of CO 2 transportation is a function of pipeline length (among other factors), which in turn is determined by the location of sequestration sites relative to CO 2 sources. The scenarios in this report illustrate how different assumptions about sequestration site viability in the MRCSP region can lead to a 20-fold difference in CO 2 pipeline lengths and, therefore, similarly large differences in capital costs. From the perspective of individual power plants, or other CO 2 sources, highly variable costs for CO 2 pipelines may have more immediate ramifications. If CO 2 pipeline costs for specific regions reach hundreds, or even tens, of millions of dollars per plant, then power companies may have difficulty securing the capital financing or regulatory approval needed to construct or retrofit fossil fuel-powered plants in these regions. The state-by-state siting approval process for CO 2 pipelines may be complex and protracted, and may face public opposition, especially in populated or environmentally sensitive areas. Since transporting CO 2 to distant locations can impose significant additional costs to a facility's carbon control infrastructure, facility owners may seek regulatory approval for as many sequestration sites as possible and near to as many facilities as possible. Because CO 2 pipeline requirements in a CCS scheme are driven by the relative locations of CO 2 sources and sequestration sites, identification and validation of such sites must explicitly account for CO 2 pipeline costs if the economics of those sites are to be fully understood. If CCS moves from pilot projects to widespread implementation, government agencies and private companies may face challenges in identifying, permitting, developing, and monitoring the large number of localized sequestration reservoirs that may be proposed. One particular concern among some stakeholders is that high CO 2 transportation costs could increase electricity prices in "sequestration-poor" regions relative to regions able to sequester CO 2 more locally. However, even as viable sequestration reservoirs are being identified, it is unclear which CO 2 source facilities will have access to them, under what time frame, and under what conditions. Given the potential size of a national CO 2 pipeline network, many billions of dollars of capital investment may be affected by policy decisions made today.

Congress is considering policies promoting the capture and sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) from sources such as electric power plants. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is a process involving a CO2 source facility, a long-term CO2 sequestration site, and CO2 pipelines. There is an increasing perception in Congress that a national CCS program could require the construction of a substantial network of interstate CO2 pipelines. However, divergent views on CO2 pipeline requirements introduce significant uncertainty into overall CCS cost estimates and may complicate the federal role, if any, in CO2 pipeline development. S. 2144 and S. 2191 would require the Secretary of Energy to study the feasibility of constructing and operating such a network of pipelines. S. 2323 would require carbon sequestration projects to evaluate the most cost-efficient ways to integrate CO2 sequestration, capture, and transportation. P.L. 110-140, signed by President Bush on December 19, 2007, requires the Secretary of the Interior to recommend legislation to clarify the issuance of CO2 pipeline rights-of-way on public land. The cost of CO2 transportation is a function of pipeline length and other factors. This report examines key uncertainties in CO2 pipeline requirements for CCS by contrasting hypothetical pipeline scenarios for 11 major coal-fired power plants in the Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership region. The scenarios illustrate how different assumptions about sequestration site viability can lead to a 20-fold difference in CO2 pipeline lengths, and, therefore, similarly large differences in capital costs. From the perspective of individual power plants, or other CO2 sources, variable costs for CO2 pipelines may have significant ramifications. If CO2 pipeline costs for specific regions reach tens, or even hundreds, of millions of dollars per plant, then power companies may have difficulty securing the capital financing or regulatory approval needed to construct or retrofit fossil fuel-powered plants in these regions. High CO2 transportation costs also could increase electricity prices in "sequestration-poor" regions relative to regions able to sequester CO2 more locally. As CO2 pipelines get longer, the state-by-state siting approval process may become complex and protracted, and may face public opposition. Because CO2 pipeline requirements in a CCS scheme are driven by the relative locations of CO2 sources and sequestration sites, identification and validation of such sites must explicitly account for CO2 pipeline costs if the economics of those sites are to be fully understood. Since transporting CO2 to distant locations can impose significant additional costs to a facility's carbon control infrastructure, facility owners may seek regulatory approval for as many sequestration sites as possible and near to as many facilities as possible. If CCS moves to widespread implementation, government agencies and private companies may face challenges in identifying, permitting, developing, and monitoring the large number of localized sequestration reservoirs that may be proposed. However, even as viable sequestration reservoirs are being identified, it is unclear which CO2 source facilities will have access to them, under what time frame, and under what conditions. Given the potential size of a national CO2 pipelines network, many billions of dollars of capital investment may be affected by policy decisions made today.

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House Rules Governing the Motion to Recommit When the House considers legislation, one of the last steps it takes is to consider a motion to recommit. The motion to recommit represents the last chance of the House to affect a measure. In practice, that means either to offer amendatory language or to send the bill back to committee. In practice, the motion to recommit, as authorized by Rule XIX, is offered after the previous question has been ordered on passage. Types of Motions to Recommit Motions to recommit are characterized as being of two types. If adopted by the House, it returns the underlying measure to committee. The other type of motion to recommit includes instructions and must be offered "forthwith," meaning that if the House adopts such a motion, the measure remains on the House floor and the committee chair (or designee) immediately rises and reports the bill back to the House with any amendment(s) contained in the instructions of the recommittal motion. Since only one proper motion to recommit is in order, this would preclude anyone else from trying to use the motion in order to defeat or amend the measure. During debate on the adoption of the rules package for the 61 st Congress (1909-1910), the previous question was defeated, allowing Representative John Fitzgerald to propose a set of rules changes, one of which guaranteed priority in recognition to offer the motion to recommit to a Member opposed to the bill. During the 1980s and 1990s the Rules Committee issued what the minority perceived to be an increased number of special rules restricting both the amending process as well as the motion to recommit In 1995, the House added language now in Rule XII, clause 6(c) prohibiting the Rules Committee from reporting a special rule that would prevent the offering of a motion to recommit with instructions, thereby preventing the Rules Committee from restricting the scope or content of the motion to recommit. Potential Procedural Effects of the Motion to Recommit A motion to recommit may have several procedural effects. "Straight" motions to recommit could also create a situation that would effectively dispose of the underlying measure, since once the measure is recommitted, a committee is not obligated to take further action. Besides providing a policy vote, the motion to recommit can have additional political effects. Recent Trends in Types of Motions to Recommit Of the 120 motions to recommit offered in the 110 th Congress, one was a "straight" motion, 72 were motions with "forthwith" instructions, and 47 were motions with "non-forthwith" instructions. There was, however, a significant increase in the adoption of motions to recommit with "forthwith" instructions offered in the 110 th Congress.

When the House considers legislation, one of the last steps it takes is to consider a motion to recommit. The motion to recommit represents the last chance of the House to affect a measure. In practice, that means either to offer amendatory language or to send the bill back to committee. The motion to recommit is typically offered after the previous question has been ordered on a measure, but before the House votes on final passage. Preference in recognition for offering a motion to recommit is given to a member of the minority party who is opposed to the bill. It is not in order for the House Committee on Rules to report a special rule that would preclude the offering a motion to recommit a bill or joint resolution prior to its initial passage, including a motion to recommit which contains amendatory instructions. Motions to recommit are of two types: "straight" motions and motions that include instructions. If adopted, a "straight" motion to recommit sends a measure to committee with no requirement for further consideration by the House. A successful motion to recommit with instructions allows any amendatory language included in the motion to be adopted immediately without the measure leaving the House floor. A motion to recommit may have various procedural effects, including amending an underlying measure, sending it to one or more committees, providing additional time for its consideration, or potentially disposing of the legislation. The motion to recommit might also have political effects. During the 110th Congress, there were three significant statistical trends pertaining to motions to recommit: an increase in the total number of motions to recommit, a disproportionate increase in motions with "non-forthwith" instructions (a type of motion to recommit that is no longer in order under current House Rules), and a rise in the adoption of motions to recommit "forthwith." When compared with the 110th Congress, the 111th Congress experienced a decrease in motions to recommit and a slight decrease in the adoption of motions to recommit. This report provides an overview of House rules and precedents governing the motion to recommit, describes procedural and political effects of the motion, and examines the use of the motion since the 100th Congress. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in House rules governing the usage of the motion to recommit.

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Cross-Cutting Regulatory Analysis Requirements The current set of regulatory analytical requirements has been established incrementally during the last 40 to 50 years through a series of presidential and congressional initiatives, including statutes, executive orders, circulars, and other documents. However, Section 6(a)(3)(C) of the executive order states that, for each "economically significant" regulatory action, agencies are to also provide to OIRA (unless prohibited by law): (i) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits anticipated from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to, the promotion of the efficient functioning of the economy and private markets, the enhancement of health and safety, the protection of the natural environment, and the elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias) together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of those benefits; (ii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs anticipated from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to, the direct cost both to the government in administering the regulation and to businesses and others in complying with the regulation, and any adverse effects on the efficient functioning of the economy, private markets (including productivity, employment, and competitiveness), health, safety, and the natural environment), together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of those costs; and (iii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned regulation, identified by the agencies or the public (including improving the current regulation and reasonably viable nonregulatory actions), and an explanation why the planned regulatory action is preferable to the identified potential alternatives. Regulatory Flexibility Act The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (5 U.S.C. However, these analytical requirements are not triggered if the head of the issuing agency certifies that the proposed rule would not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." Coverage of Analytical Requirements Varies As the above discussion indicates, the cross-cutting executive order and statutory analytical requirements vary substantially in terms of the types and amount of analysis required, and the agencies and rules that they cover: Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4 contain the most detailed requirements, and cover all rules with a $100 million annual "effect on the economy," but the executive order and the circular do not apply to independent regulatory agencies. Analytical Requirements Applicable to Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies Although independent regulatory agencies are not covered by the analytical requirements in Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, that lack of coverage may be ameliorated if the individual statutes that provide rulemaking authority to these agencies require cost-benefit or other types of economic analysis. Prior to the Dodd Frank Act, OCC was not considered an independent regulatory agency and therefore was subject to Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, as well as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. Seventeen of these 23 rules included some information on the associated costs and benefits. Regulatory Reform Legislation in the 113th Congress A number of bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress that would codify, expand, or otherwise modify existing requirements for cost-benefit or other types of regulatory impact analysis. Congressional Options Congress could decide to keep the existing analytical framework in place. Another, more comprehensive approach could be to consolidate all of the analytical requirements in one place, and perhaps expand those requirements to include more agencies or more rules, or to require different types of analysis for the rules that are covered.

Regulatory analytical requirements (e.g., cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis) have been established incrementally during the last 40 to 50 years through a series of presidential and congressional initiatives. The current set of requirements includes Executive Order 12866 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). These requirements vary in terms of the agencies and rules they cover, and the types of analyses that are required. For example, a regulatory analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act is not required if the agency head certifies that the rule will not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." The most extensive and broadly applicable of the requirements are in Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, but they do not apply to independent regulatory agencies. The statutes that provide rulemaking authority to independent regulatory agencies often require them to "consider" regulatory costs and benefits, and they often have less explicit requirements for cost-benefit analysis, if any. An OMB report indicated that independent regulatory agencies provided some information and costs and benefits in 76 of the 118 major rules they issued from FY2003 to FY2012. Cabinet departments and other agencies estimated monetary costs and benefits for some, but not all, of their rules. Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that would codify and/or expand the current requirements for cost-benefit analysis. Congress could decide to keep the existing analytical framework in place, or could enact one or more of these reform proposals. Another more comprehensive approach could be to consolidate all of the analytical requirements in one place, and perhaps expand those requirements to include more agencies or rules, or to require different types of analysis. To do so, or to simply cover independent regulatory agencies by the executive order, the President could arguably amend Executive Order 12866 and OMB Circular A-4, or Congress could enact legislation. Any such changes must be cognizant of the state of existing law and practice in this area, and the resources and data required for agencies to carry out the analyses.

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The Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, began his rule in June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since its independence. Elections for a Central Municipal Council were held in May 2011, and planned national Advisory Council elections were again delayed in mid-2013 in conjunction with the leadership transition (see below). U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including reported past support by a prominent member of the royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar's counterterrorism efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces active in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the rest of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Qatari officials are quick to point out their commitment to the general goal of regional peace and their support for U.S. military operations, even as they maintain ties to Hamas and others critical of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron explained Qatar's policy in the following terms: "I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that ideological spectrum. 682 would call on the United States government and U.S. corporations to prioritize the rights of migrant workers in dealing with Qatar, and would call on the government of Qatar to take added steps to protect and improve laborers' rights, particularly in light of preparations for the 2022 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. Qatar's financing and construction of some of the state-of-the-art air force base at Al Udeid and its granting of permission for the construction of U.S.-funded infrastructure facilitated gradually deeper cooperation with U.S. military forces. The Al Udeid airbase now serves as a logistics, command, and basing hub for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. Both Qatar and the United States have invested in the construction and expansion of these facilities since the mid-1990s, and they form the main hub of the CENTCOM air and ground logistical network in the region. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan put U.S. and partner-nation facilities in Qatar to greater use in recent years. The U.S. State Department has characterized Qatar's counterterrorism support since September 11, 2001, as "significant." To the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, Qatar has sought in recent years to mediate regional conflicts and political disputes by engaging a wide range of parties in Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Gaza, some of whom are hostile to the United States. Among the key questions for the region is whether or not Qatar's official embrace of some Sunni Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, will change significantly under the leadership of Emir Tamim. While some regional voices clearly resent Qatar's assertive diplomacy, the Qatari government's agility in the face of uncertainty and the soft power of its government-supported Al Jazeera satellite television network have made Qatar a key player in regional unrest since 2011. Reported Qatari support for Sunni armed groups in Syria has the potential to have a more lasting impact on the region, but has challenged the traditional Qatari preference for remaining engaged with all sides in regional disputes. However, Qatar has the third-largest gas reserves in the world, an estimated 25.2 trillion cubic meters (tcm). The large natural gas production and shipping facilities at the coastal city of Ras Laffan in northern Qatar serve as the main site for the country's gas development projects, including the world's largest gas-to-liquids facility. Qatar participates in and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, an assembly of major gas exporting countries that some have described as a potential natural gas OPEC.

Qatar, a small peninsular country in the Persian Gulf, emerged as a partner of the United States in the mid-1990s and currently serves as host to major U.S. military facilities. Qatar holds the third-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. Its small citizenry enjoys the world's highest per capita income. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari leaders have overseen a course of major economic growth, increased diplomatic engagement, and limited political liberalization. The Qatari monarchy founded Al Jazeera, the first all-news Arabic language satellite television network, in 1995. Over time, the network has proven to be as influential and, at times, as controversial as the policies of its founders, including during recent unrest in the Arab world. In June 2013, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani abdicated in favor of his son Tamim bin Hamad, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since it became an independent country in 1971. In a 2003 referendum, Qatari voters approved a new constitution that officially granted women the right to vote and run for national office. The constitution envisions elections for two-thirds of the seats in a national Advisory Council. However, elections have not been scheduled, and the term of the current Advisory Council has been extended to 2016. Central Municipal Council elections were last held in May 2011. Following joint military operations during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Qatar and the United States concluded a defense cooperation agreement that has been subsequently expanded and was renewed in 2013. In 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar's Al Udeid airbase southwest of Doha, the Qatari capital. Al Udeid and other facilities in Qatar serve as logistics, command, and basing hubs for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. U.S. officials have described Qatar's counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as significant, but Administration officials and some Members of Congress remain critical of Qatar's efforts to combat reported support for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups by some Qatari citizens. According to the 2013 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar, principal U.S. human rights concerns included the "inability of citizens to change their government peacefully, restriction of fundamental civil liberties, and pervasive denial of noncitizen workers' rights." Political parties remain prohibited and civil liberties remain restricted. According to the report, "The government made efforts to prevent and eliminate forced labor, although the existence of the restrictive sponsorship system left some migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation." These concerns are drawing increased attention as Qatar implements large scale infrastructure projects in preparation for hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Qatari officials have positioned themselves as mediators and interlocutors in a number of regional conflicts in recent years. Qatar's deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led operations in Libya and U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State in Syria signaled a new assertiveness, as has reported Qatari support for armed elements of the Syrian opposition. Some of Qatar's positions have drawn U.S. scrutiny and raised the ire of its Gulf Arab neighbors, including its leaders' willingness to engage Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Taliban and allegations of Qatari support for extremists in Syria. It remains unclear whether Qatar's active and—for the United States—at times vexing policies may change under Emir Tamim. To date, the Obama Administration has remained committed to military and counterterrorism cooperation with the ambitious leaders of this wealthy, strategically located country.

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However, some persons have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. People on the first are prohibited from boarding an American airline or any flight that comes in contact with U.S. territory or airspace. Revised Redress Process The original redress process was challenged by a number of individuals denied boarding, including on the grounds that it purportedly violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Select Legal Issues Implicated by the No Fly List The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The right to international travel is nonetheless a "liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Several federal courts, however, have distinguished certain challenges to placement on the No Fly list from this case and determined that placement on the No Fly list can deprive someone of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in international travel. This usually requires the government to provide the person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts will weigh the private interests affected against the government's interest. In Mathews v. Eldridge , the Supreme Court articulated the balancing test for deciding what procedural protections are required when the government deprives someone of life, liberty, or property. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Value of Additional Procedures A court would next examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Some plaintiffs who have challenged their alleged placement on the No Fly list have argued both that the current standard used to place someone on a No Fly list entails a high risk of error, and that the current procedure afforded those seeking to challenge their placement on the No Fly list creates a high risk of an erroneous deprivation. The government also has an interest in protecting sensitive national security information. The adequacy of the new DHS TRIP redress process has also been challenged as violating the Due Process Clause. In order to conduct this balancing test, courts often examine an extensive list of factors.

In order to protect national security, the government maintains various terrorist watchlists, including the "No Fly" list, which contains the names of individuals to be denied boarding on commercial airline flights. Travelers on the No Fly list are not permitted to board an American airline or any flight on a foreign air carrier that lands or departs from U.S. territory or flies over U.S. airspace. Some individuals have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. As a result, various legal challenges to placement on the list have been brought in court. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Accordingly, when the government deprives someone of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, it must follow certain procedures. Several courts have found that placement on the No Fly list may impair constitutionally protected interests, including the right to travel internationally, and that the government's redress procedures must therefore satisfy due process. Typically, due process requires that the government provide a person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. However, the requirements of due process are not fixed, and can vary according to relevant factors. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts employ the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interests affected against the government's interest. Courts applying this balancing test might consider several factors, including the severity of the deprivation involved in placement on the No Fly list. In addition, courts may examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Finally, courts may inquire into the government's interest in preserving the status quo, including the danger of permitting plaintiffs to access sensitive national security information. The government has established a redress process—known as DHS TRIP—for individuals who wish to challenge their treatment at transportation hubs. A prior version of these procedures was found by a number of courts to violate the Due Process Clause. The government has since revised DHS TRIP, although these new procedures are also being challenged in federal court. Litigation is further complicated by several legal issues, such as the state secrets privilege, that can bar plaintiffs from accessing certain information during litigation.

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Issue Overview Since Israel unilaterally dismantled its settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it has repeatedly expressed concern over the security of the Egypt-Gaza border. Israel claims that ongoing smuggling of sophisticated weaponry into the Gaza Strip could presumably shift the balance of power in Hamas's favor. Israel also asserts that Egypt is not adequately sealing its side of the border, citing the recent breakthrough of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who rushed into Egypt on January 23, 2008. Egypt claims that Israel has not only exaggerated the threat posed by weapons smuggling, but is deliberately acting to "sabotage" U.S.-Egyptian relations by demanding that the United States condition its annual $1.3 billion in military assistance on Egypt's efforts to thwart smuggling. Section 690 of P.L. 110-161 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, withholds the obligation of $100 million in Foreign Military Financing until the Secretary of State certifies, among other things, that Egypt has taken concrete steps to "detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza." The United States, which occasionally is thrust into the middle of disputes between Israel and Egypt, has attempted to broker a solution to the smuggling problem which is amenable to all parties. As a result, the U.S. government has offered to allocate $23 million of Egypt's annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) toward the procurement of more advanced detection equipment, such as censors and remote-controlled robotic devices. Although both Israel and Egypt have, at times, tried to downplay recent tensions over the border, there is some concern that Hamas's takeover of Gaza will have negative long term repercussions for the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, a relationship that has been largely considered a success for U.S. Middle Eastern diplomacy for over three decades.

Since Israel unilaterally dismantled its settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it has repeatedly expressed concern over the security of the Egypt-Gaza border. Israel claims that ongoing smuggling of sophisticated weaponry into the Gaza Strip could dramatically strengthen the military capabilities of Hamas, which seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Israel also charges that Egypt is not adequately sealing its side of the border, citing the recent breakthrough of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who rushed into Egypt on January 23, 2008 and remained for several days. Egypt claims that Israel has not only exaggerated the threat posed by weapons smuggling, but is deliberately acting to "sabotage" U.S.-Egyptian relations by demanding that the United States condition its annual $1.3 billion in military assistance on Egypt's efforts to thwart smuggling. Section 690 of P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, withholds the obligation of $100 million in Foreign Military Financing for Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies, among other things, that Egypt has taken concrete steps to "detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza." The United States, which occasionally is thrust into the middle of disputes between Israel and Egypt, has attempted to broker a solution to the smuggling problem which is amenable to all parties. The U.S. government has offered to allocate $23 million of Egypt's annual military aid toward the procurement of more advanced detection equipment, such as censors and remote-controlled robotic devices. Although both Israel and Egypt have, at times, tried to downplay recent tensions over the border, there is some concern that Hamas's takeover of Gaza will have negative long-term repercussions for the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, a relationship that has been largely considered a success for U.S. Middle Eastern diplomacy for over three decades. This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Israel, Egypt, and Hamas, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States; CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.

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On occasion, however, Congress exercises its authority regarding a specified individual, entity, or identifiable group in such a way as to give rise to constitutional concerns. In particular, the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the federal government from enacting bills of attainder, defined by the Supreme Court as a "law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." The basis for the prohibition arises from the separation of powers concern that the enforcement of a bill of attainder would allow Congress to usurp the power of the judicial branch. For instance, there was, for a time, significant controversy about bonuses paid to employees of entities that had received Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from the federal government under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. A similar situation arose in response to allegations of election law and other legal violations by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a public interest group. Here, Congress passed several appropriations bills that limited the provision of federal funds to ACORN and its affiliates. This legislation was challenged in federal court as a bill of attainder, but was ultimately upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Further, the Supreme Court has suggested that each bill of attainder case "turn[s] on its own highly particularized context." Notably, since the signing of the Constitution, the Bill of Attainder Clause has been successfully invoked only five times in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, constitutional concerns may arise in this context when Congress proposes or passes legislation that burdens specified individuals or a defined class of persons or entities. The two main criteria that the courts look to in order to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether specific or identifiable individuals are affected by the statute (specificity prong), and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those individuals (punishment prong). Rather, the Court has identified three tests to determine whether legislation is "punitive": (1) whether the burden is such as has traditionally been found to be punitive (historical test); (2) whether the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot reasonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes (functional test); and (3) whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish (motivational test).

On occasion, Congress exercises its legislative authority regarding a specified individual, entity, or identifiable group in such a way as to raise constitutional concerns. In particular, the United States Constitution expressly prohibits the federal government from enacting bills of attainder, defined by the Supreme Court as a "law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." The basis for the prohibition arises from the separation of powers concern that the enforcement of a bill of attainder would allow Congress to usurp the power of the judicial branch. For instance, in recent years, Congress proposed retroactive taxation of up to 90% of the value of bonuses paid to employees when an employer had received funds from Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Additionally, in response to allegations of election law and other legal violations by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Congress passed several appropriations bills that limited the provision of federal funds to ACORN and its affiliates. In both of these instances, suggestions were made that the legislation might be found by the courts to be prohibited bills of attainder. As regards the limitations imposed on the provision of funds to ACORN, such limitations were upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The two main criteria that the courts use to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether "specific" individuals, groups, or entities are affected by the statute, and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a "punishment" on those individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court has also identified three types of legislation that would fulfill the "punishment" prong of the test: (1) where the burden is such as has "traditionally" been found to be punitive (historical test); (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed are the "functional equivalent" of punishment because they cannot reasonably be said to further "non-punitive legislative purposes" (functional test); and (3) where the legislative record evinces a "congressional intent to punish (motivational test)." The Court has suggested that each bill of attainder case turns on its own highly particularized facts, and notably, since the signing of the Constitution, the Bill of Attainder Clause has been successfully invoked only five times in the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, there remain potential constitutional concerns when Congress proposes or passes legislation that imposes a burden on a specified individual, entity, or identifiable group.

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Introduction The renewal of military commission proceedings against Khalid Sheik Mohammad and four others for their alleged involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks has focused renewed attention on the differences between trials in federal court and those conducted by military commission. The decision to try the defendants in military court required a reversal in policy by the Obama Administration, which had publicly announced in November 2009 its plans to transfer the five detainees from the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into the United States to stand trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for criminal offenses related to the 9/11 attacks. The Administration's plans to try some Guantanamo detainees in federal civilian court proved controversial, and Congress responded by enacting funding restrictions which barred any non-citizen held at Guantanamo from being transferred into the United States for any purpose, including prosecution. These restrictions, which have been extended for the duration of FY2014, effectively make military commissions the only viable option for trying detainees held at Guantanamo for the foreseeable future, and have resulted in the Administration choosing to reintroduce charges against Mohammed and his co-defendants before a military commission. While military commission proceedings have been instituted against a number of suspected enemy belligerents held at Guantanamo, the Obama Administration has opted to bring charges in federal criminal court against many terrorist suspects held at locations other than Guantanamo. This report provides a brief summary of legal issues raised by the choice of forum for trying accused terrorists and a chart comparing authorities and composition of the federal courts to those of military commissions. A second chart compares selected military commissions rules under the Military Commissions Act (MCA), as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, to the corresponding rules that apply in federal court. This chart follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts , to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in international criminal tribunals. For similar charts comparing military commissions as envisioned under the MCA, as passed in 2006, to the rules that had been established by the Department of Defense (DOD) for military commissions and to general military courts-martial conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), see CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice , by [author name scrubbed]. Some have noted the prevalence of the charge of material support for terrorism in military commission cases to date and question the continued viability of the military commission system in light of this decision. The government did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. §175c) Participation in Nuclear and WMD Threats to the United States (18 U.S.C. §1993) Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals (18 U.S.C.

The renewal of military commission proceedings against Khalid Sheik Mohammad and four others for their alleged involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks has focused renewed attention on the differences between trials in federal court and those conducted by military commission. The decision to try the defendants in military court required a reversal in policy by the Obama Administration, which had publicly announced in November 2009 its plans to transfer the five detainees from the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into the United States to stand trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for criminal offenses related to the 9/11 attacks. The Administration's plans to try these and possibly other Guantanamo detainees in federal court proved controversial, and Congress responded by enacting funding restrictions which effectively barred any non-citizen held at Guantanamo from being transferred into the United States. These restrictions, which have been extended for the duration of FY2014, effectively make military commissions the only viable option for trying detainees held at Guantanamo for the foreseeable future, and have resulted in the Administration choosing to reintroduce charges against Mohammed and his co-defendants before a military commission. While military commission proceedings have been instituted against some suspected enemy belligerents held at Guantanamo, the Obama Administration has opted to bring charges in federal criminal court against terrorist suspects arrested in the United States, as well as some terrorist suspects who were taken into U.S. custody abroad but who were not transferred to Guantanamo. Some who oppose the use of federal criminal courts argue that bringing detainees to the United States for trial poses a security threat and risks disclosing classified information, or could result in the acquittal of persons who are guilty. Others have praised the efficacy and fairness of the federal court system and have argued that it is suitable for trying terrorist suspects and wartime detainees, and have also voiced confidence in the courts' ability to protect national security while achieving justice that will be perceived as such among U.S. allies abroad. Some continue to object to the trials of detainees by military commission, despite the amendments Congress enacted as part of the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA), P.L. 111-84, because they say it demonstrates a less than full commitment to justice or that it casts doubt on the strength of the government's case against those detainees. Others question the continued viability of military commissions in light of the recent appellate court decision invalidating the offense of material support of terrorism as to conduct occurring prior to the 2006 enactment of the MCA (Hamdan v. United States). This report provides a brief summary of legal issues raised by the choice of forum for trying accused terrorists and a chart comparing selected military commissions rules under the Military Commissions Act, as amended, to the corresponding rules that apply in federal court. The chart follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in international criminal tribunals. For similar charts comparing military commissions as envisioned under the MCA, as originally passed in 2006, to the rules that had been established by the Department of Defense (DOD) for military commissions and to general military courts-martial conducted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), see CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by [author name scrubbed].

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Recent years have been a particularly transformative period for banking. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. Meanwhile, market forces and economic conditions continue to affect the banking industry coincident with the implementation of new regulation. This report provides a broad overview of selected banking-related issues, including prudential regulation, consumer protection, "too big to fail" (TBTF) banks, community banking, regulatory agency structures and independence, and recent market and economic trends. 10 ) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act ( S. 2155 ). These "safety and soundness" regulations are designed to ensure banks are safely profitable and to reduce the risk of failure. These levels are expressed as ratios between items on bank balance sheets and are called regulatory ratio requirements . Banks have been subject to ratio requirements for decades. The largest banks are required to hold more capital than smaller, less complex banks. These ratios for large banks will be covered in the " Enhanced Prudential Regulation " section below. However, others assert the use of risk-weighted ratios should be limited. Finally, whether the benefits of prudential regulation—such as the increase in bank safety and the increase in financial system stability—are outweighed by the potential costs of reduced credit availability and economic growth is an issue subject to much debate. This section provides background on consumer protection and analyzes issues related to it, including the degree to which the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB's) authorities, structure, regulations, and enforcement actions have struck the appropriate balance between protecting consumers and the availability of credit; and whether certain mortgage lending rules have struck the appropriate balance between protecting consumers and the availability of credit. Unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices are prohibited. Supporters of raising the threshold argue it would appropriately reduce the regulatory burden on banks that are still relatively small, and "would still be examined by their primary regulators who are required by law to enforce the CFPB rules and regulations," and the change would only mean banks "wouldn't have to go through yet another exam with the CFPB in addition to the ones they already have to go through with their primary regulators." In addition, CFPB rulemaking, supervisory, or enforcement authorities could be altered or removed. A long-standing issue in the regulation of mortgages and other consumer financial services is the perceived trade-off between protecting consumers and the availability of credit. However, some observers assert that part of what makes some financial firms too big to fail is that the bankruptcy process is not amenable to resolving a large financial institution without disrupting the financial system. Other observers assert that the regulatory burden facing small banks is appropriate, and note that small banks are given special regulatory consideration to minimize their regulatory burden. Regulatory Agency Design and Independence Financial regulatory agencies are invested with the authority to regulate, and most of them are referred to as independent regulatory agencies , allowing them to operate with a relatively high degree of independence from the President and Congress. Some effects are difficult to quantify and monetize. However, experts disagree over whether greater discretion for financial regulators is appropriate. This section analyzes certain issues related to trends that may concern banks, including migration of financial activity from banks into nonbanks or the "shadow banking" system; increasing capabilities and market presence of financial technology ("fintech"); increasing interest rates in the future; and competitive and regulatory issues related to institutions with different charters but similar business models—such as banks, thrifts, and credit unions. Furthermore, some argue that the increased regulatory burden placed on banks in response to the financial crisis—such as the changes in bank regulation mandated by Dodd-Frank or agreed to in Basel III—could result in a decreasing role for banks in credit intermediation and an increased role for relatively lightly regulated nonbanks. As a result, each type of institution has a stake in proposed changes to regulation related to all charter types. H.R. S. 2155 proposes wide-ranging changes to the financial regulatory system, and it contains provisions related to banking issues, including provisions found in Titles I, II, and IV.

The financial crisis and the ensuing legislative and regulatory responses greatly affected the banking industry. Many new regulations—mandated or authorized by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) or promulgated under the authority of bank regulators—have been implemented in recent years. In addition, economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, Congress is faced with many issues related to the bank industry, including issues concerning prudential regulation, consumer protection, "too big to fail" (TBTF) banks, community banks, regulatory agency design and independence, and market and economic trends. For example, the Financial CHOICE Act (H.R. 10) and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (S. 2155) propose wide-ranging changes to the financial regulatory system, and include provisions related to many of these banking issues. Prudential Regulation. This type of regulation is designed to ensure banks are safely profitable and unlikely to fail. Regulatory ratio requirements agreed to in the international agreement known as the Basel III Accords and the Volcker Rule are examples. Ratio requirements require banks to hold a certain amount of capital on their balance sheets to better enable them to avoid failure. The Volcker Rule prohibits certain trading activities and affiliations at banks. Proponents argue the rules appropriately balance the need for safety and soundness with regulatory burden. Opponents argue that current rules are overly complex, unduly burdensome, and difficult to enforce. Consumer Protection. Certain laws and regulations protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices. Regulations promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and certain mortgage lending rules are contentious issues in this area. Observers disagree over whether CFPB authorities, structure, regulations, and enforcement actions appropriately balance the benefit of protecting consumers and the potential costs of unnecessarily burdening banks and restricting credit availability. A similar debate is about whether mortgage rules appropriately protect consumers and effectively align certain market incentives or unnecessarily reduce the availability of mortgages. "Too Big To Fail" Banks. Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with TBTF financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for TBTF banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one failed. Proponents of these changes assert they will eliminate or reduce excessive risk-taking at, and bailouts for, these large banks. Opponents assert that market forces and bankruptcy law are more effective and less distortionary than the new regulations and resolution authorities. Community Banks. The number of relatively small banks has declined substantially in recent decades. Some analysts assert market forces and removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are having a large effect, given that small banks are exempt from many recent regulations and have been consolidating for decades. Others assert small institutions have limited resources and are being unnecessarily burdened by regulation, especially because such banks are unlikely to contribute to systemic risk. Regulatory Agency Design and Independence. How regulatory agencies are structured and promulgate rules are also issues. Some assert that financial agencies' relatively high degree of independence from the President and Congress results in too little accountability in rulemaking; thus, their leadership structures, funding, and rulemaking procedures should be altered. Opponents of such measures maintain that financial regulator independence should be maintained because it allows regulations to be promulgated by technical experts with some insulation from political considerations. Recent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces may also pose issues to the banking industry. Increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated "shadow banking" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. Interest rates are likely to begin rising soon after a long period of low rates, which could present risks to banks. Competition and regulatory differences between banks and nonbanks with different charter types is an ongoing issue.

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Introduction This report focuses on the interplay between federal and state and local tax systems through the federal deductibility of state and local taxes. Generally, individual taxpayers who itemize deductions are allowed to deduct real and personal property taxes and state and local income taxes paid from federal taxable income. 111-5 ) provided for an above-the-line deduction for sales and excise taxes paid on new vehicle purchases for non-itemizers. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) summary of TRA 1986 suggested that Congress chose to repeal the sales tax deduction and not income or property taxes, because: only general sales taxes were deductible and not selective sales taxes (e.g., tobacco and alcohol taxes), which created economic inefficiencies arising from individuals changing consumption patterns in response to differential taxation; the deduction was not allowed for taxes paid at the wholesale level (and passed forward to the consumer), thus creating additional inequities and inefficiencies; the sales tax deduction was administratively burdensome for taxpayers who chose to collect receipts to justify sales tax deduction claims; and the alternative sales tax deduction tables generated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not accurately reflect individual consumption patterns, thereby diminishing the equitability of the tax policy. 108-357 ) reinstated deductible sales tax in lieu of income taxes. 112-240 ); and through the 2014 tax year by the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-295 ). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Deductible State and Local Taxes Generally, taxpayers may deduct state and local taxes paid from income. This special deduction has since expired. Deduction for Income Taxes As with local property taxes, the federal deduction for state and local income taxes is equal to the taxpayer's individual tax rate multiplied by the amount of state and local income tax paid. 114-113 ) permanently extended the deduction of state and local sales taxes in lieu of state and local income taxes. Analysis The deduction for state and local income taxes affects the distributional burden of both state and federal taxes. Due to the expiration of the alternative sales tax deduction, taxpayers in states without an income tax are more likely to be non-itemizers; thus, taxpayers in these states bear a relatively higher tax burden than taxpayers in states with an income tax. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. In contrast, in states that levy an income tax, state and local governments rely on income and property taxes for 51% of total tax revenue. Policy Alternatives and Current Legislation President Obama's FY2016 budget plan proposed limiting the tax rate at which itemized deductions would reduce tax liability. Assuming that other federal taxes were maintained after the elimination of the federal deduction for state and local taxes, the tax burden would shift toward high-tax states from low-tax states. Quantifying the magnitude of the state and local spending response is difficult, however, because many other factors influence state and local spending decisions, such as state and local political considerations and overall economic conditions. Nevertheless, most research has found that state spending declines or would decline, but by how much? Some recent tax reform plans have proposed an expansion of the standard deduction, including the "A Better Way" tax plan published by the House Budget Committee in June 2016 and H.R. For some state and local taxes and taxpayers, the fee-for-specific-services view is more accurate.

Under current law, taxpayers who itemize can deduct state and local real estate taxes, personal property taxes, and income taxes from federal income when calculating taxable income. A deduction for sales taxes in lieu of income taxes is also available. The federal deduction for state and local taxes results in the federal government paying part of these state and local taxes through lower federal tax collections. Theory would suggest that taxpayers are willing to accept higher state and local tax rates and greater state and local public spending because of lower federal income taxes arising from these deductions. In addition, there is some evidence that state and local governments rely more on these deductible taxes than on nondeductible taxes and fees for services. Repealing the deductibility of state and local taxes would affect state and local government fiscal decisions, albeit indirectly. Generally, state and local public spending would decline, although the magnitude of the decline is uncertain. And, repealing the deduction for state and local taxes would shift the federal tax burden away from taxpayers in low-tax states to taxpayers in high-tax states. Maintaining the current deductibility would continue the indirect federal subsidy for state and local spending. Expanding deductibility, such as reinstating the sales tax deduction option or allowing non-itemizers to deduct taxes paid, would likely increase the subsidy for state and local spending. The sales tax deduction option would primarily benefit taxpayers in states without an income tax that are already itemizing. The effect of allowing non-itemizers to deduct taxes paid would depend on the type of deductible tax. For example, property taxes are only paid (directly) by property owners whereas all consumers pay sales taxes in states that levy a sales tax. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-295) extended the sales tax deduction option through the 2014 tax year, but it has since been allowed to expire. Recent tax reform proposals have included changes to state and local tax deductibility. The "A Better Way" tax reform proposal published by the House Budget Committee in June 2016 included a repeal of the deductions for state and local taxes. In April 2017, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and National Economic Director Gary Cohn also indicated an interest in repealing state and local tax deductions as part of a larger tax reform proposal. The Obama Administration's FY2016 budget proposed a limit on the tax rate (generally a 28% marginal tax rate) at which itemized deductions would reduce tax liability, but did not specifically address deductions related to state and local taxes. In the 114th Congress, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) permanently extended the deduction of state and local sales taxes in lieu of state and local income taxes. In the 111th Congress, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided for an above-the-line deduction for sales and excise taxes paid on new vehicle purchases for non-itemizers, which has since expired. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant.

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Background On March 23, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 3590 , the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 ), as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, and the House on March 21, 2010. PPACA, among other changes, modified Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) statutes. On March 21, 2010, the House passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872 , the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA, P.L. 111-152 ). After being passed by the House, HCERA was subsequently amended and passed by the Senate before being approved again by the House on March 25, 2010. HCERA was signed by the President on March 30, 2010. HCERA, which amends PPACA, combined with PPACA to form the health care reform law. HCERA includes the following two titles: (1) Coverage, Medicare, Medicaid, and Revenues, and (2) Education and Health. Title I contains provisions related to health care and revenues, including modifications made to PPACA. Title II includes amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which authorizes most of the federal programs involving postsecondary education, and other health amendments, which include other changes to PPACA. This report provides a brief summary of PPACA followed by a discussion of the modifications made by HCERA to the Medicaid and CHIP provisions in PPACA. 3962 ), the health reform bill passed by the House. PPACA increases the spending caps for the territories by 30% for the second, third, and fourth quarters of FY2011, and for each full fiscal year thereafter. PPACA also modifies the definition of Average Manufacturer Price (AMP). In addition, HCERA increases Medicaid Program Integrity funds by indexing MIP funds to annual changes in the consumer price index, beginning with fiscal year 2010.

On March 23, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148), as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, and the House on March 21, 2010. PPACA will, among other changes, modify Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) statutes. In addition, on March 21, 2010, the House passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA, P.L. 111-152). After being passed by the House, HCERA was subsequently amended and passed by the Senate before being approved again by the House on March 25, 2010. HCERA was signed by the President on March 30, 2010. HCERA, which amends PPACA, combined with PPACA form the health care reform law. HCERA includes the following two titles: (1) Coverage, Medicare, Medicaid, and Revenues, and (2) Education and Health. Title I contains provisions related to health care and revenues, including modifications made by HCERA to PPACA. Title II includes amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which authorizes most of the federal programs involving postsecondary education, and other health amendments, which include other changes to PPACA. This report provides a brief summary of PPACA followed by a discussion of the modifications made to the Medicaid and CHIP provisions by HCERA. This report reflects legislative language in HCERA as passed by the House on March 25, 2010. Selected highlights of the Medicaid and CHIP amendments made by HCERA to PPACA include the following: primary care physician payment rates for selected patient treatments were increased; the definition of the average manufacturer price (AMP) was revised to help make AMP more closely reflect manufacturers' average prices; the effective date of the Community First Choice Option was delayed; state FMAP rates for newly eligible populations were changed, as were income counting rules for certain populations; the territories' spending rate caps were increased beginning with the second quarter of FY2011; additional program integrity funding was provided through indexing of the Medicaid Integrity Program for fiscal years beginning with FY2010; and Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment reductions were modified.

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The failed attempt by Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate marine terminals at some U.S. ports raises the issue of whether foreign marine terminal operators pose a threat to U.S. homeland security. Notwithstanding the sale of U.S. terminal operations by DP World to a U.S. entity, the underlying issues remain: Is the ownership of a terminal operating company relevant to the security of a U.S. port? These policy questions remain an issue because (1) many U.S. marine terminals are operated by foreign-based companies, and (2) given the global nature of the shipping business, similar transactions may occur in the future. It begins by explaining how ports work and what marine terminal operators do. Most major U.S. ports are publicly owned by a "port authority," which is a public or quasi-public organization associated with a city, county, regional, or state government. Some port authorities operate all or some of their marine terminals themselves, but most ports are "landlord" ports because they lease their facilities to terminal operating companies (the tenants). Coast Guard regulations and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) security guidelines require terminal operators to provide basic security infrastructure and follow certain security practices when handling cargo. Coast Guard Requirements The Coast Guard is in charge of the security of port facilities and vessels, under the terms of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (P.L. CBP's Requirements CBP is in charge of cargo security. Screening Port Workers A key issue in port security is the trustworthiness of the people who work in them. Security Extends Beyond the Port Port security involves much more than the measures put in place within the immediate vicinity of a U.S. port complex. Securing the cargo and ships in transit to U.S. ports is arguably more critical and consequently the bulk of security activity takes place before cargo is unloaded at U.S. ports. While U.S. ports are an acceptable place to interdict illegal drugs and enforce trade laws, not finding a terrorist weapon until after it reaches a U.S. port could be too late to prevent a potentially catastrophic event. Key elements in this layered strategy are CBP's scrutiny of U.S. bound cargo at the overseas port of loading and the Coast Guard's scrutiny of ships before they enter U.S. harbors. The Coast Guard also actively assesses the security of foreign ports that trade with the United States. A Border-centric or Systems Approach to Security Because it could be too late if a terrorist weapon is discovered after it arrives at a U.S. port, the security of U.S. ports necessarily relies on the cooperation of shippers, carriers, ports, terminal operators, and border agencies in the country of origin to begin the screening process. Should they be treated as partners and allies in securing maritime commerce? The DP World controversy refueled debate about whether the nation is doing enough, doing it with enough urgency, and spending enough on U.S. port and maritime security. An issue of likely interest to Congress is the effectiveness of these maritime security initiatives.

The failed attempt by Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate marine terminals at some U.S. ports raises the issue of whether foreign marine terminal operators pose a threat to U.S. homeland security. Notwithstanding the sale of U.S. terminal operations by DP World to a U.S. entity, the underlying issue remains because many U.S. marine terminals are operated by foreign-based companies and a similar transaction could occur in the future, given the global nature of the shipping industry. Evaluating the potential security ramifications of foreign-based terminal operators requires first understanding how ports work and who is in charge of their security. Most major U.S. ports are publicly owned by a "port authority," which is a public organization associated with a city, county, regional, or state government. A port typically contains many terminals that are each designed to handle different types of cargo. Some port authorities operate all or some of their marine terminals, but most ports lease their facilities to several different terminal operating companies. All of the cargo handling that takes place on a marine terminal is performed by members of a longshoremen's union. The Coast Guard is in charge of the security of port facilities and vessels, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is in charge of the security of cargo. Coast Guard regulations and CBP security guidelines require terminal operators to provide basic security infrastructure, such as fences, gates, and surveillance cameras, and follow certain security practices when handling cargo. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing a credentialing process for screening port workers. However, port security involves much more than the measures put in place within the immediate vicinity of a U.S. port complex. Not finding a terrorist-placed weapon until after it reaches a U.S. port could be too late to prevent a potentially catastrophic event. Thus, securing the cargo and ships in transit to U.S. ports is critical and consequently the bulk of federal security activity takes place before cargo is unloaded at U.S. ports. Key layers of security are CBP's scrutiny of U.S.-bound cargo at the overseas port of loading and the Coast Guard's scrutiny of ships before they enter U.S. harbors. The necessity of pushing the border out to counter the terrorist threat requires the cooperation of shippers, carriers, ports, and border agencies in the country of origin to take security precautions with U.S.-bound cargo. Global terminal operators like DP World may handle U.S. cargo at the overseas loading port, even if they do not handle it at a U.S. port. Thus, a key issue for policymakers is deciding under what conditions the United States should trust foreign cargo-handling entities and whether they should be treated as partners in securing U.S. supply lines. The DP World controversy refueled debate about whether the nation is doing enough, with sufficient urgency, to secure U.S. ports. In its oversight role, Congress is assessing the effectiveness of Coast Guard and CBP maritime security initiatives and faces pressing questions about the overall security of ports and maritime commerce.

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Introduction The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack. While hardening the transportation sector against terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The focus of debate is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Aviation Security1 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress took swift action to create the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), federalizing all airline passenger and baggage screening functions and deploying significantly increased numbers of armed air marshals on commercial passenger flights. Despite the extensive focus on aviation security for more than a decade, a number of challenges remain, including effectively screening passengers, baggage, and cargo for explosives threats; developing effective risk-based methods for screening passengers and others with access to aircraft and sensitive areas; exploiting available intelligence information and watchlists to identify individuals who pose potential threats to civil aviation; effectively responding to security threats at airports and screening checkpoints; developing effective strategies for addressing aircraft vulnerabilities to shoulder-fired missiles and other standoff weapons; and addressing the potential security implications of unmanned aircraft operations in domestic airspace. In addition to continued deployment and utilization of AIT, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. Risk-Based Passenger Screening TSA has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. One concern raised over the PreCheck program is the lack of biometric authentication to verify participants at screening checkpoints. In July 2012, TSA expanded the program to include flight attendants. TSA requires security background checks of airport workers with unescorted access privileges to secure areas at all commercial passenger airports and air cargo facilities. The use of explosives detection technology was mandated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. Transit and Passenger Rail Security43 Bombings of and shootings on passenger trains in Europe and Asia have illustrated the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. In an October 2015 hearing, DHS officials reiterated their opposition to a 100% scanning strategy in favor of a risk-based and layered security strategy. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) In January 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a final rule implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports.

The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) included a number of aviation security provisions designed to expand the PreCheck program to expedite screening for known travelers, enhance background checks of airport workers and strengthen airport access controls, and improve passenger checkpoint efficiency and operational performance. Until recently, TSA applied relatively uniform methods to screen airline passengers, focusing primarily on advances in screening technology to improve security and efficiency. TSA has recently shifted away from this approach, which assumes a uniform level of risk among all airline travelers, to risk-based screening approaches that focus more intensely on passengers thought to pose elevated security risks. Despite the extensive focus on aviation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including effectively screening passengers, baggage, and cargo for explosives threats; developing effective risk-based methods for screening passengers and airport workers with access to aircraft and sensitive areas; exploiting available intelligence information and watchlists to identify individuals who pose potential threats to civil aviation; effectively responding to security threats at airports and screening checkpoints; developing effective strategies for addressing aircraft vulnerabilities to shoulder-fired missiles and other standoff weapons; and addressing the potential security implications of unmanned aircraft operations. Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. Transit security issues of recent interest to Congress include the quality of TSA's surface transportation inspector program and the slow rate at which transit and rail security grants have been expended. Existing law mandates the scanning of all U.S.-bound maritime containers with non-intrusive inspection equipment at overseas ports of loading by July 2012. This deadline was not met, and DHS is opposed to that strategy in favor of a risk-based, layered approach to security screening. Implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) for port and maritime workers also appears to be experiencing continuing difficulties.

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The Natural Rate Concept In the 1960s, economists Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps independently developed theconcept of a "natural rate" of unemployment or "full employment" rate of unemployment or NAIRU(non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment.) (1) They posited that there was an equilibrium, market-clearing rateof unemployment determined by labor market characteristics, policy, and conditions. Although expansionary fiscal or monetary policy may be able to temporarily pushunemployment below the natural rate in exchange for higher inflation, eventually actualunemployment would rise back to the natural rate without inflation falling. This concept isconsistent with the view that monetary policy has no long-run effect on real variables such aseconomic growth or unemployment, and affects only prices in the long run. A Changing Natural Rate? The natural rate is determined by labor market conditions;economists reason that since labor market conditions change over time, so could the naturalrate. (4) If this were thecase, the unemployment rate would always return to the natural rate, as the original theory suggests,but at any given point in time, unemployment would be reverting to a unique natural rate. Actual Unemployment and CBO's Estimate of the Natural Rate,1950-2002 Source: Congressional Budget Office Potential Causes of a Falling Natural Rate in the 1990s From the mainstream perspective, the 1970s and 1980s were a period of a rising natural rate,and the 1990s were a period of a falling natural rate. Labor Market Policy Changes Some policymakers point to changes in labor market policy in the1990s as a potential cause of the decline in the NAIRU. (17) Back to the Future? Onepossible reason why is that the natural rate was rising during this time. Part of the "rational expectations" movement in the economics professionin the 1970s, this conclusion is reached by assuming that individuals are always rational and wellinformed, so that changes in the money supply instantly lead to changes in the inflation rate. The qualifiers include (1) because of business cycle fluctuations, actual unemployment willrarely if ever equal the natural rate; (2) the natural rate can change unpredictably over time; and (3)the relationship between the natural rate and inflation will not hold when other factors that alsoinfluence inflation are present. Thisis problematic for policymakers: it implies that at any given point, they cannot distinguish whethera movement in unemployment is caused by the business cycle (and should be counteracted withstabilization policy) or by a change in the natural rate (and should not be counteracted with policy). (33) Forexample, in the first quarter of 1994, they estimate a NAIRU of 5.9% using the consumer price index(CPI), with a 95% confidence interval of 3.9% to 7.6%. Despite its shortcomings, the natural rate of unemployment is arguably a concept so deeplyingrained in economic policymaking that it would be difficult to imagine how to formulatepolicymaking without it. (37) Rather than target the (unknown) natural rate of unemployment,policymakers can target sustainable economic growth, using an estimate of the natural rate as onevariable to help determine sustainability. Evenif the natural rate is relegated to one of many indicators of a fully employed economy, without theconcept of the economy moving above or below full employment, it does not seem clear howdecisions to change macroeconomic stabilization policy could be made.

A concept that is fundamental to understanding the economy is that there is an equilibrium,market-clearing rate of unemployment determined by labor market characteristics, policy, andconditions. This rate of unemployment is referred to as the "natural rate" or "full employment rate"of unemployment or the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). Althoughexpansionary fiscal or monetary policy might be able to temporarily push unemployment below thenatural rate in exchange for higher inflation, eventually actual unemployment would rise back to thenatural rate without inflation falling. This concept is consistent with the view that monetary policyhas no long-run effect on real variables such as economic growth or unemployment, and affects onlyprices in the long run. If unemployment did not return to a natural rate, it would imply that monetarypolicy could permanently affect unemployment. There are periods of U.S. history when a constant natural rate concept cannot explain thebehavior of unemployment and inflation. For example, in the 1970s, inflation rose althoughunemployment was above estimates of the natural rate, and in the 1990s, inflation fell althoughunemployment was below estimates of the natural rate. A more sophisticated theory is needed toexplain these periods. Since the natural rate is determined by the characteristics of the labor market,it is possible that changes in the labor market lead to changes in the natural rate over time. Forexample, an aging workforce, unexpectedly rapid productivity growth, policy changes, and a growingtemporary workforce are some of the factors that could have led to a decline in the natural rate in the1990s. In this view, at any given moment, there is some natural rate of unemployment, below(above) which inflation will rise (fall), but that rate may be different from the natural rate in the pastor future because of labor market changes. It is estimated that the natural rate rose during the 1970sand 1980s, and fell back to earlier levels in the 1990s. Although there is no theoretical drawback to the concept of a changing natural rate,economists have been unsuccessful in empirically predicting when changes would take place. Thisleaves the theory open to the criticism that, rather than offering a meaningful explanation of theempirical record, it does little more than offer post hoc rationalization for contradictory results. Anynatural rate estimate must be accompanied by a wide range of uncertainty -- some research suggestsa natural rate of 5.9%, with a 95% confidence interval of 3.9% to 7.6%. Yet alternative theories tothe natural rate have done a little better at explaining or predicting economic outcomes. Theunpredictability of a changing natural rate suggests that excessive weight should not be placed onthe gap between actual unemployment and natural rate estimates in fiscal and monetary policydecisions. The natural rate is probably most useful to policymakers as one of many economicindicators that can predict changes in inflation or the business cycle. Although changes in the naturalrate have not been successfully predicted, it would be difficult to make systematic policy decisionswithout some notion of full employment.

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The elderly nutrition services program, authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA), provides grants to state agencies on aging to support congregate and home-delivered meals to people aged 60 and older. The program is the largest component of the act, accounting for $814.7 million, over 44%, of the act's total FY2014 funding of $1.871 billion. The program is designed to address problems of food insecurity, promote socialization, and promote the health and well-being of older persons through nutrition and nutrition-related services. In 2006, Congress enacted P.L. 109-365 , which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations through FY2011. However, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for OAA activities. The 113 th Congress may consider reauthorization of the OAA and as a result may modify existing authorities, including those related to the nutrition services program. This report describes the nutrition services program authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act. Purpose The Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006, P.L. According to USDA analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS) data, 8.8% of U.S. households with one elderly member were food insecure in 2012, defined as households reporting low or very low food security. Nutrition Services Program The Administration on Aging (AOA) in the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the nutrition services program, which includes (1) the Congregate Nutrition Services Program, (2) the Home-Delivered Nutrition Services Program, (3) and the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP). For the Congregate and Home-Delivered Programs, services must be targeted at persons with the greatest social and economic need, with particular attention to low-income older persons, including low-income minority older persons, older persons with limited English proficiency, older persons residing in rural areas, and older persons at risk for institutionalization. Home-Delivered Nutrition Services Home-delivered nutrition services (commonly referred to as "meals on wheels") provide meals and related nutrition services to older individuals with priority to homebound older individuals. In FY2014, of the total $814.7 million appropriated for the Title III nutrition services program, $438.2 million was for congregate nutrition (54%), $216.4 million for home-delivered nutrition (27%), and $160.1 million for nutrition services incentive grants (19%) ( Table 1 ). When adjusted for inflation, the total amount of funding appropriated for OAA nutrition services has decreased substantially over the past two decades ($814.7 million for FY2014 compared to $1,052.4 million in FY1990). This decline in relative funding has been experienced by the congregate meals and NSIP programs, while funding levels for the home-delivered meals programs have increased over the same time period. Overall, this reduction in purchasing power has affected the number of meals served, which declined by 21.1 million meals (or 8.6%) from FY1990 to FY2011, the most recent year for which data are available. Meals Served In FY2011, more than 223 million meals were provided to older adults (see Table 2 ). From 1990 to 2011, the number of home-delivered meals served grew by 35%, while the number of congregate meals served actually declined by 40%. The following sections discuss several issues for congressional consideration, such as measuring unmet need for nutrition services, additional funding flexibility, and increased cost-sharing.

The elderly nutrition services program, authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA), provides grants to state agencies on aging to support congregate and home-delivered meals (commonly referred to as "meals on wheels") programs for people aged 60 and older. The program is designed to address problems of food insecurity, promote socialization, and promote the health and well-being of older persons through nutrition and nutrition-related services. In 2012, a reported 8.8% of U.S. households with one elderly member were food insecure, defined as households reporting low or very low food security. As the largest Older Americans Act program, the Title III nutrition services program received $814.7 million in FY2014, accounting for 44% of the act's total funding ($1.871 billion). In 2006, Congress enacted the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365), which extended the act's authorizations of appropriations through FY2011. However, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for OAA activities. The 113th Congress may consider comprehensive reauthorization of the OAA and as a result may modify existing authorities, including those related to nutrition services. The Administration on Aging (AOA) within the Administration for Community Living (ACL) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the nutrition services program, which includes (1) the Congregate Nutrition Services Program, (2) the Home-Delivered Nutrition Services Program, (3) and the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP). For the congregate and home-delivered programs, services must be targeted at older persons with the greatest social and economic need. Particular attention is paid to low-income older persons, including low-income minority older persons, older persons with limited English proficiency, older persons residing in rural areas, and those at risk for institutionalization. In FY2011, the most recent year for which data are available, more than 223 million meals were served to just under 2.5 million people; 61% were served to frail older people living at home, and 39% were served in congregate settings. Of the total $814.7 million appropriated for the nutrition services program in FY2014, $438.2 million was for congregate nutrition (54%), $216.4 million for home-delivered nutrition (27%), and $160.1 million for nutrition services incentive grants (19%). When adjusted for inflation, the total amount of funding appropriated for OAA nutrition services has decreased substantially over the past two decades ($814.7 million in FY2014 compared to $1,052.4 million in FY1990). This decline in relative funding has been experienced by the congregate nutrition and NSIP programs, while funding levels for the home-delivered nutrition programs have increased over the same time period. As a result, the number of home-delivered meals served has outpaced congregate meals, growing by 35% from FY1990 to FY2011; the number of congregate meals served declined by 40%. The faster growth in home-delivered meals is partially due to relatively higher growth in federal funding for home-delivered meals over that time period, as well as state decisions to focus funds on frail older people living at home. This report describes the nutrition services program authorized under OAA Title III, including the program's legislative history, purpose, and FY2014 funding level. It also provides information on service delivery requirements and program data regarding the number of meals served and program participation. The report briefly discusses former and more recent efforts to evaluate these programs. Finally, the report identifies selected issues for federal policymakers, including the status of Older Americans Act reauthorization, measuring unmet need for nutrition services, additional funding flexibility, and increased cost-sharing.

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Exclusions also apply to federal employment taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes) and to state income and payroll taxes as well. Because employment-based health insurance covers more than three-fifths of the population under the age of 65, the exclusions also result in considerable revenue loss to the government. Ending the exclusions could raise several hundred billion dollars a year, depending on exactly what would be repealed and how workers and employers adjust. The federal income tax exclusion—the focus of this report—has been targeted for other reasons as well. These attributes contribute to what many economists argue is a welfare (or efficiency) loss from excess health insurance for those with coverage. In addition, the federal income tax exclusion often is criticized as unfair because the workers' tax savings depend on their marginal tax rate. These three assertions about the income tax exclusion—that the revenues could help to reduce the deficit, that it contributes to inefficiency and rising health care costs, and that higher-income taxpayers unfairly get greater tax savings—are the principal arguments put forth for repeal. The income tax exclusion has been in the tax code for more than 50 years, and its repeal could have unintended consequences unless policy makers understand what transactions it covers and what role it has had in the development of employment-based insurance. Coverage of former employees is also included. To some observers, these tax changes and regulatory decisions largely explain the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. There is something to be said for this argument. The future of employment-based insurance was one of the most important issues in health care reform. Excess Insurance One criticism of the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is that it reduces the after-tax cost of insurance to workers in ways that are not transparent, likely resulting in their obtaining more coverage than they otherwise would. Not being explicitly capped or limited in some other manner, it does little to restrict the generosity of the insurance or annual premium increases. How repealing the exclusion would affect this welfare loss is a complicated question, however, depending on how consumers react to higher cost-sharing. It could be challenging to determine alternative tax benefits to replace the exclusion without adversely affecting people with high costs. There are other issues with potentially ending the exclusion that merit attention. For example, some might think that income should be taken into consideration. To some extent, the tax savings shown above might not be an inequitable subsidy but only a consequence of the proper treatment of losses under a progressive income tax.

Employer-provided health insurance is excluded from the determination of employees' federal income taxes, resulting in significant tax savings for many workers. Comparable exclusions apply to federal employment taxes and to state income and employment taxes. Because employment-based health insurance covers three-fifths of the population under the age of 65, the exclusions also result in considerable revenue loss to the government. Ending them could raise several hundred billion dollars a year, depending on exactly what is repealed and how workers and employers adjust. Some see this revenue as a source for financing health care reform without explicitly raising taxes. The federal income tax exclusion—the focus of this report—is criticized for several reasons. Because it reduces the after-tax cost of insurance in ways that are not transparent, it likely results in people with insurance obtaining more coverage than they otherwise would. Not being explicitly capped or limited, it does little to restrict the generosity of the insurance or annual premium increases. These attributes contribute to what some economists argue is a welfare (or efficiency) loss from excess health insurance for those with coverage and also contribute to rising health care costs and spending. In addition, the income tax exclusion often is criticized because it gives greater tax savings to higher income individuals and families, an outcome that strikes many observers as wasteful and inequitable. These arguments about the exclusion merit careful consideration, as President Obama's Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform include the tax exclusion as a recommendation for reducing the deficit. However, the arguments involve complex issues, and other points and perspectives might be taken into account. The welfare loss may be difficult to gauge considering how consumers react to higher cost-sharing. Determining alternative tax benefits that would not adversely affect people with high costs to replace the exclusion could be challenging. The larger tax savings to higher-income people might not be an inequitable subsidy, but only a consequence of the proper treatment of losses under a progressive income tax. The income tax exclusion has been in the tax code more than 50 years, and its repeal could have unintended consequences. For example, unless exceptions were made, repeal would also terminate the exclusion for employer-paid disability insurance, health care flexible spending accounts, and other benefits some consider useful. The exclusion and regulatory decisions in the 1940s sometimes are said to be the reason why employer-paid coverage is the predominant form of private health insurance in the United States. There is something to this argument, but there are other reasons why employment-based insurance arose and why it remains attractive. These reasons make it difficult to predict the effect of ending the exclusion on the future of employment-based insurance, a major policy issue.

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***** The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. One involves debating pro and con arguments to weigh the treaty's potential benefits, costs, and risks. (CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments , presents these arguments in detail.) This path has been taken in earlier nuclear testing treaties through "Safeguards," unilateral measures consistent with the treaties that the United States can take to buttress its nuclear intelligence and weapons. Safeguards may be of particular interest to Senators who have not decided how to vote on the treaty. Some Senators in this group may see pros and cons as in balance and look for something that tips that balance. Some may feel that the United States would lose little by ratifying the CTBT on grounds that this nation is highly unlikely to conduct future nuclear tests, while seeing in the CTBT debate an opportunity to gain a commitment to steps to augment U.S. security as the price for their votes. Yet an analysis of CTBT pros and cons would not address these concerns. The principal modifications from the 1963 Safeguards were substitution of "The conduct, within the constraints of treaties on nuclear testing, of effective and continuing underground nuclear test programs" for "The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs" in Safeguard A; the inclusion of the 1976 Safeguard C; and the division of 1963 Safeguard D into a Safeguard for nuclear explosion monitoring and one for intelligence. In 1999 as in 1963, the Safeguards were of critical importance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sixth, the Safeguards' focus on R&D but not plants and strategic forces was immaterial in 1963. CTBT supporters maintain that this nation has provided ample support for the Safeguards on R&D and nuclear explosion monitoring. There have been many claims that the United States has not maintained its nuclear forces and their supporting infrastructure adequately. Recognizing the Article VI commitment, President Obama said in April 2009, "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" and pledged to pursue CTBT ratification "immediately and aggressively." CTBT opponents might see revised Safeguards as a path to secure ratification of the treaty by giving supporters a structure for reaching a bargain that could alter the net assessment enough to convince 67 Senators that the treaty plus Safeguards would be in U.S. national security interests. Safeguards have been part of every past debate on nuclear testing treaties and will likely be part of a future CTBT debate. Safeguards and implementation measures have a role to play in that net assessment. Procedures for withdrawing from CTBT to conduct nuclear test ing (F, 1997) "The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard 'supreme national interests' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required."

Limitations on nuclear testing have been on the international agenda since 1954. The United States ratified one such treaty in 1963 and two in 1990 that together bar all but underground nuclear tests with an explosive yield of 150 kilotons or less. The United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992. In 1996, this nation signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. The Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999. That debate focused on such pros and cons as whether the United States could maintain its nuclear weapons without testing, whether it could verify compliance with the treaty, and how the treaty would affect nuclear nonproliferation. Another aspect to past debates was "Safeguards," measures that this nation can take unilaterally within the treaty to protect its nuclear security. To compensate for "disadvantages and risk" they saw in the treaty regime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for the 1963 treaty on four Safeguards: an aggressive nuclear test program, maintaining nuclear weapon laboratories, maintaining the ability to resume atmospheric tests promptly, and improving intelligence and nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities. Safeguards were key to securing Senate ratification of the 1963 treaty. Updated Safeguards have been part of subsequent treaty ratification efforts. In April 2009, President Obama pledged to pursue U.S. CTBT ratification "immediately and aggressively." A debate on the treaty would involve its pros and cons and how they have changed since 1999. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, examines such issues, but no prior CRS report examined the role of Safeguards in a future debate. Like pros and cons, Safeguards could affect Senators' net assessment of the treaty; unlike pros and cons, they are amenable to legislative bargaining and compromise. As such, they may play a key role in a CTBT debate. To that end, Safeguards could be updated, such as by adding Safeguards for the nuclear weapon production plants and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures. While Safeguards may be part of a future CTBT debate, both supporters and opponents of the treaty could criticize them. Supporters may see augmented Safeguards as unneeded, arguing that the technical case for the treaty is stronger than in 1999. Many supporters favor further reductions and, ultimately, elimination of nuclear weapons, and view the CTBT as a stepping-stone in that direction; they could see revised Safeguards as moving in the opposite direction by supporting U.S. nuclear capabilities. Opponents assert that this nation cannot have confidence in its nuclear weapons or the program to maintain them without testing, and that nations could conceal nuclear tests. They hold that the United States has not adequately implemented existing Safeguards, and doubt it would do better with CTBT Safeguards. In their view, both the CTBT and inadequately-supported Safeguards would jeopardize U.S. security. This report may be updated occasionally.

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Setting the Context In 2000, 189 U.N. member states, including the United States, adopted the U.N. Millennium Declaration. In the Declaration, countries made commitments to achieve a series of measurable development targets worldwide by 2015 known as the "Millennium Development Goals" (MDGs or Goals). From September 20 to 22, 2010, world leaders gathered at U.N. Headquarters for a High-level Plenary Meeting (the Meeting) to review progress toward achieving the MDGs over the past decade. There is general consensus in the international community that while there has been some progress in achieving the MDGs, the majority of Goals will not be met by 2015. The Barack Obama Administration has generally supported the MDGs. His speech was consistent with the U.S. Strategy for Meeting the MDGs , released by the Administration in July 2010, which highlights four imperatives for achieving the Goals: (1) leveraging innovation, (2) investing in sustainability, (3) tracking development outcomes (not just dollars), and (4) ensuring mutual accountability among aid donors and recipients. Nevertheless, members of the 112 th Congress may be interested in the Goals and the September High-level Meeting from several perspectives: D evelopment assistance in a tight fiscal environment —Members of Congress authorize and appropriate U.S. official development assistance. In light of growing concerns over the federal budget deficit, members may wish to reassess foreign assistance priorities and strategies; New international commitments —Congress may consider commitments made on behalf of the United States in the Meeting's outcome document, Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (General Assembly resolution 65/1); and O versight —Members may wish to conduct oversight on the overall effectiveness of the MDGs and the previous and future role of the United States in helping to fulfill the Goals. Selected questions that policymakers may consider follow: In what areas , if any, have the MDGs been successful? Are the MDGs practical? What is the role of foreign aid in the MDGs? Who or what is held accountable for MDG progress? At the same time, governments recognized that progress toward the Goals is uneven among regions and between and within countries, and expressed "deep concern" that progress toward the Goals "falls short of what is needed." First, while some MDGs are on track to be achieved, others have made no progress at all or, in some cases, have deteriorated. The United States and the MDGs The United States voted in favor of the U.N. Millennium Declaration in 2000, and some recent U.S. development policy statements allude to the MDGs as a U.S. development policy consideration, if not a guiding framework. Are the MDGs Practical? Conclusions While evidence of MDG effectiveness in advancing global development is uneven a decade after the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, the international community, including the United States, continues to use the Goals as a paradigm for development assistance.

From September 20 to 22, 2010, heads of state and government convened at United Nations (U.N.) Headquarters for a High-level Plenary Meeting to review progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are a group of measurable development targets agreed to by 189 U.N. member states—including the United States—as part of the 2000 Millennium Declaration. The Goals, which governments aim to achieve by 2015, include (1) eradicating extreme hunger and poverty; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3) promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; (4) reducing the under-five child mortality rate; (5) reducing the maternal mortality rate; (6) combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (8) developing a Global Partnership for Development. Since 2000, governments have worked to achieve the MDGs with mixed results. Experts generally agree that while some MDGs are on track to be met, the majority of Goals are unlikely to be achieved by 2015. Many have also found that progress toward the Goals is unevenly distributed across regions and countries. India and China, for example, have made considerable progress in achieving the MDGs, while many countries in Africa have failed to meet almost all of the Goals. President Barack Obama supports the MDGs and attended the September High-level meeting. In July 2010, the Administration published The United States' Strategy for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals, which identifies four "imperatives" for achieving the Goals—innovation, sustainability, measuring outcomes, and mutual accountability. Members of the 112th Congress may be interested in the MDGs and the September High-level meeting from three primary perspectives. First, Congress may wish to consider the MDGs in the context of authorizing and funding broader U.S. development assistance efforts. Second, members may wish to be aware of the commitments made by the United States at the High-level meeting. Additionally, Congress may consider conducting oversight of international progress toward the MDGs, including U.S. efforts and the future of the Goals. While evidence of MDG effectiveness in advancing global development is uneven a decade after the Millennium Declaration, the international community—and many policymakers in the United States—continue to use the Goals as a paradigm for development assistance. This raises a number of overarching questions for Congress about the role and future of the MDGs, including In what areas, if any, have the MDGs been successful? Are the MDGs practical? What is the role of U.S. foreign aid in the MDGs? Who is accountable for MDG progress? This report will be not be updated further.

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Although these patriotic celebrations are frequently referred to as "national holidays," legally they are only applicable to federal employees and the District of Columbia. New Year's Day, Independence Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day On June 28, 1870, the first federal holidays were established for federal employees in the District of Columbia. Apparently drafted in response to a memorial drafted by local "bankers and business men," the June 28 act provided that New Year's Day, Independence Day, Christmas Day, and "any day appointed or recommended by the President of the United States as a day of public fasting or thanksgiving [were] to be holidays within the District [of Columbia]." Washington's Birthday In January 1879, Congress added George Washington's Birthday to the list of holidays observed in the District of Columbia. Enactment of the Uniform Monday Holiday Act in 1968 shifted the commemoration of Washington's Birthday from February 22 to the third Monday in February. Decoration Day/Memorial Day In 1888, Decoration Day (now Memorial Day) became a holiday for federal workers in the District of Columbia. Labor Day In 1894, Labor Day became a federal holiday. Armistice Day/Veterans Day In 1938, Armistice Day was declared a federal holiday, and November 11, the date on which hostilities ceased, was chosen to commemorate the close of World War I. On June 1, 1954, the name of Armistice Day was officially changed to Veterans Day. In 1968, with the passage of the "Law," Veterans Day was designated as one of five holidays that would henceforth be celebrated on a Monday and the date was changed from November 11 to the fourth Monday in October. Inauguration Day On January 11, 1957, Inauguration Day became a permanent federal holiday in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Columbus Day In 1968, Columbus Day was made a federal holiday. Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. In November 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed legislation creating a federal holiday commemorating Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s birthday. The "Monday Holiday Law" "provide[d] for uniform annual observances of certain legal public holidays on Mondays, and established a legal public holiday in honor of Christopher Columbus." Columbus Day was also designated as a Monday holiday, to be celebrated on the second Monday in October.

The United States has established by law the following 11 permanent federal holidays, listed in the order they appear in the calendar: New Year's Day, Martin Luther King Jr.'s Birthday, Inauguration Day (every four years following a presidential election), George Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. Although frequently called public or national holidays, these celebrations are only legally applicable to federal employees and the District of Columbia, as the states individually decide their own legal holidays. The first four congressionally designated federal holidays were created in 1870, when Congress granted paid time off to federal workers in the District of Columbia for New Year's Day, Independence Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. In 1880, George Washington's Birthday was included. In 1885, Congress extended holiday coverage for some holidays to all federal employees. Although Thanksgiving Day was included in the first holiday bill of 1870, it was not until 1941 that Congress specifically designated the fourth Thursday of November as the official date. Since 1888, Congress has added six federal holidays, creating Decoration Day (now Memorial Day) in 1888, Labor Day in 1894, Armistice Day (now Veterans Day) in 1938, Inauguration Day in 1957 (quadrennially and only celebrated in the District of Columbia), Columbus Day in 1968, and Martin Luther King Jr.'s Birthday in 1983. In 1954, Armistice Day was broadened to honor Americans who fought in World War II and the Korean conflict, and the name of the holiday was changed to Veterans Day. In 1968, the Uniform Monday Holiday Act was enacted to "provide for uniform annual observances" of Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, and Veterans Day. Additionally, the Monday Holiday Law established Columbus Day to be celebrated on the second Monday in October. In 1975, Veterans Day celebrations were returned to November 11 by Congress.

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2360 includes $21.3 billionfor Border and Transportation Security (BTS) agencies as identified in this report. Border security entails regulating the flow of goods and peopleacross the nation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods or people are detected and deniedentry. Transportation security entails screening and protecting people and goods as they movebetween different locations within the country. Determining which goods and people are permitted and which are denied entry into theUnited States involves a system of sophisticated border management. This system must balance theneed for securing the nation's borders with facilitating the essential commerce and legitimate freeflow of citizens and authorized visitors. The system must be capable of a detailed examination ofthe goods and people seeking entry, but must still fit within budgetary constraints and beadministratively feasible. Improving transportation security has meant an expanded federal role in screening passengersand baggage traveling through airports and also increasing the presence of federal officers aboarddomestic and international flights. Plans exist to expand the presence of federal officers in othermodes of transportation. Finally, these management systems must accomplish their functions witha minimum of disruption of legitimate activities, and without unnecessary intrusion into the civilliberties of persons affected by them. The BTS Directorate, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, is responsible for the first line ofdefense against terrorism and for securing and managing the nation's borders. The activities for which BTS has assumed responsibility are organized into three bureaus: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP); the Bureau of Immigration and CustomsEnforcement (ICE); and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA). Our analysis in this report attempts to identify a functional classificationfor "border and transportation security." (6) The Administration's FY2006request groups the requests for the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation; US-VISIT; CBP;ICE; the TSA; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the U.S. Secret Service in Title II Security, Enforcement,and Investigations . a. Both the House-passed and Senate-reported versions of H.R. Issues for Congress. Therequest includes the following program increases (which are discussed later in this report): $125 million for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detectiontechnology; $37 million for Border Patrol staff; $31.7 million for long range radar for Air and MarineOperations; $20 million for Border Patrol aircraft replacement; $19.8 million for the America Shield Initiative; $8.2 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism(C-TPAT); $5.4 million for the Container Security Initiative (CSI); $5.4 million for enhancements to the Automated Targeting System(ATS); $3.2 million for the Homeland Security Data Network; $3 million for Border Patrol's Automated Biometric Identification System(IDENT) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Integrated Automated Fingerprint IdentificationSystem (IAFIS); $2 million for the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP);and $1 million for the Arizona Border Control Initiative(ABCI). Increase in Border Patrol Agents. State and Local Law Enforcement. 2360 and House-passed H.R. a.

A well-managed border is central to maintaining and improving the security of the UnitedStates against terrorist threats. Border security entails regulating the flow of goods and people acrossthe nation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods or people are denied entry. Transportation security entails screening and protecting people and goods as they move betweendifferent locations within the country. The overall appropriations over the past three years for Borderand Transportation Security, as defined in this report, are as follows: in FY2004, Congressappropriated $18,106 million; in FY2005, Congress appropriated $20,313 million; in FY2006, thePresident requested $19,586 million; House-passed H.R. 2360 provides $21,015million; and Senate-passed H.R. 2360 provides $21,283 million. Determining which goods and people are permitted and which are denied entry into theUnited States involves a system of sophisticated border management. This system must balance theneed for securing the nation's borders while facilitating the essential commerce and legitimate freeflow of citizens and authorized visitors. The system must be capable of a detailed examination ofthe goods and people seeking entry, but must still fit within budgetary constraints and beadministratively feasible. Improving transportation security has meant an expanded federal role inscreening passengers and baggage traveling through airports and also increasing the presence offederal officers aboard domestic and international flights. Plans exist to expand the presence offederal officers in other modes of transportation. Finally, these management systems mustaccomplish their functions with a minimum of disruption of legitimate activities, and withoutunnecessary intrusion into the civil liberties of persons affected by them. Within the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been givenprimary responsibility for securing the nation's borders and for increasing the security oftransportation, among other responsibilities. The locus of border and transportation security activitywithin DHS is in the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, which houses the Bureauof Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The U.S. Coast Guard is a stand-aloneagency within DHS but plays an important role in border and transportation security, as does theFederal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). This report includes appropriations for thefunctions and agencies of BTS, the U.S. Coast Guard and FLETC. Major issues include the numberof available detention beds and investigators at ICE; the number of Border Patrol agents in CBP; theappropriate level of funding for the Deepwater program within the Coast Guard; and non-aviationsecurity spending within TSA. This report will be updated to reflect the Conference Agreement between the House and theSenate and final passage. Key Policy Staff: Border and Transportation Security

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In the absence of enacted legislation, the Obama Administration began drafting a cybersecurity executive order in 2012. On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity , along with Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD 21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience . E.O. 13636 attempts to address both of those issues, as well as others. It uses existing statutory and constitutional authority to expand information sharing and collaboration between the government and the private sector, including sharing classified information by broadening a program developed for the defense industrial base to other CI sectors; develop a voluntary framework of cybersecurity standards and best practices for protecting CI, through a public/private effort; establish a consultative process for improving CI cybersecurity; identify CI with especially high priority for protection, using the consultative process; establish a program with incentives for voluntary adoption of the framework by CI owners and operators; review cybersecurity regulatory requirements to determine if they are sufficient and appropriate; and incorporate privacy and civil liberties protections in activities under the order. E.O. 13636 builds on the involvement of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the development of cybersecurity technical standards and its statutory responsibilities to work with both government and private entities on various aspects of standards and technology. The executive order stipulates that it provides no authority for regulating critical infrastructure in addition to that under existing law, and it does not alter existing authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security is required to establish a broad consultative process to coordinate improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. That issue is discussed below. The issuance of an executive order frequently raises questions about whether the order exceeds the scope of the President's authority, in relation to the constitutional separation of powers and validly enacted legislation. E.O. 13636 mainly addresses two of those topics: information sharing and protection of privately held CI. With respect to information sharing, the executive order does not provide exemptions from liability stemming from information sharing, which would require changes to current law. Several of the legislative proposals included such changes. With respect to protection of critical infrastructure, the provisions on designation of CI and identification of relevant regulations are related to those in some legislative proposals in the 112 th Congress. The role of NIST in developing the Cybersecurity Framework was not in the legislative proposals from that Congress, although several would have expanded the agency's role in cybersecurity. Reactions to the Executive Order Given the absence of enacted comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, some security observers have contended that the executive order is a necessary step in securing vital assets against cyberthreats. Common themes by such critics have included the following claims: The order offers little more than do existing processes. The order could make enactment of legislation less likely. Another concern of some is that the executive order could lead to government intrusiveness into private-sector activities, for example through increased regulation under existing statutory authority, while others contend that voluntary measures have a poor history of success. It appears to be too early in the implementation of the executive order to determine how effectively the concerns described above will be addressed and whether the responses will satisfy critics and skeptics.

The federal role in cybersecurity has been a topic of discussion and debate for over a decade. Despite significant legislative efforts in the 112th Congress on bills designed to improve the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure (CI), no legislation on that issue was enacted in that Congress. In an effort to address the issue in the absence of enacted legislation, the White House issued an executive order in February 2013. Citing repeated cyber-intrusions into critical infrastructure and growing cyberthreats, Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, was an attempt to enhance security and resiliency of CI through voluntary, collaborative efforts involving federal agencies and owners and operators of privately owned CI, as well as use of existing federal regulatory authorities. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of CI assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. E.O. 13636 has attempted to address such threats by, among other things, expanding to other CI sectors an existing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program for information sharing and collaboration between the government and the private sector; establishing a broadly consultative process for identifying CI with especially high priority for protection; requiring the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead in developing a cybersecurity framework of standards and best practices for protecting CI; and directing regulatory agencies to determine the adequacy of existing requirements and their authority to establish additional ones to address the risks. Among the major issues covered by the unenacted legislative proposals in the 112th Congress, E.O. 13636 mainly addresses two: information sharing and protection of privately held critical infrastructure. It does not provide exemptions from liability stemming from information sharing, which would require changes to current law. Several of the legislative proposals included such changes. With respect to protection of critical infrastructure, the provisions on designation of CI and identification of relevant regulations are related to those in some legislative proposals. In the 113th Congress, some bills would provide explicit statutory authority for information-sharing along the lines of some bills in the 112th Congress. Others would authorize activities on developing a cybersecurity framework similar to those in the executive order. The issuance of E.O. 13636, as with many other executive orders, raises questions about whether the order exceeds the scope of the President's authority, in relation to the constitutional separation of powers and validly enacted legislation. While answers to those questions are complex, the executive order specifies that implementation will be consistent with applicable law and that nothing in the order provides regulatory authority to an agency beyond that under existing law. Overall, response to the executive order has been optimistic. Given the absence of comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, some security observers contend that the order is a necessary step in securing vital assets against cyberthreats. Others have argued, in contrast, that it offers little more than do existing processes, that it could make enactment of a bill less likely, or that it could lead to government intrusiveness into private-sector activities, for example through increased regulation under existing statutory authority. Despite considerable progress in meeting the specific objectives in the executive order, especially the NIST Framework, it still appears to be too early in the implementation of the order to determine whether such concerns will be addressed to the satisfaction of critics and skeptics.

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The United States and Europe Common values, overlapping interests, and shared goals are the foundation of what is often described as the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. Many observers stress that in terms of security and prosperity the United States and Europe have grown increasingly interdependent. This report summarizes key areas of shared interest and cooperation and highlights some of the main challenges in the transatlantic relationship. Members of Congress often interact directly with European legislators and officials to discuss a wide variety of topics. In the course of legislative activities or in exercising oversight of U.S. foreign policy, Members of Congress may choose to consider the dynamics of U.S.-European cooperation in terms of benefits versus shortcomings, alignment versus divergence, or partnership versus competition. While strong bilateral relationships between the United States and individual European countries remain a vital foundation for transatlantic relations, the relationship between the United States and the EU has been taking on a growing significance. The overall tone of transatlantic relations has been mostly constructive over the past six years, and many of the broad global challenges faced by the United States and Europe have pushed the two sides toward common or cooperative approaches. The crisis and conflict in Ukraine has since caused U.S. policy makers to rethink many assumptions about European security, and the United States continues to play a leading role in NATO and managing relations with Russia. Given that much of U.S. attention is also likely to remain centered on Asia and the Middle East, general U.S. hopes and expectations are that Europe should share a significant part of the burden when it comes to its own security, take a leading role on most regional and some other international issues, and continue to act as an effective partner in addressing a wide range of common threats and concerns. Although the crisis appears to have receded, there is a sense that its underlying causes remain unresolved and that basic questions about the future of further EU integration remain unanswered. Russia also became increasingly at odds with U.S. and European foreign policy, strongly criticizing the 2011 NATO operation in Libya, supporting Bashar al-Assad in the conflict in Syria, and thwarting U.S. and European efforts to address the violence in Syria through the United Nations Security Council. The U.S. and European analyses of developments have been largely aligned, and the two sides have openly sought to maximize their influence with parallel messages and mutually reinforcing actions, including extensive sanctions. Although Europe is likely to remain Russia's main gas buyer for some years, Russia is also seeking to diversify its markets by concluding pipeline construction deals with China and Turkey. Overall, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong. European policy makers have had significant concerns over the adequacy of data privacy safeguards in a number of U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements. Iran21 Members of Congress have had an ongoing interest in U.S. and international efforts to reach an agreement that ensures that Iran's nuclear program can be used solely for peaceful purposes. Several developments in Europe's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue have fueled Israeli concerns about international "isolation" and diverged from U.S. Administration and Congressional views. Economic Relations The United States and the European Union have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Since July 2013, the United States and the EU have been in the process of negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed "comprehensive and high-standard" free trade agreement intended to boost jobs and growth on both sides of the Atlantic. U.S. and EU officials hope to initial a draft agreement by the end of 2015, but critics have raised objections that could pose obstacles. Many analysts observe that market confidence has improved considerably since 2013 and that conditions appear to have stabilized. In the aftermath of the reports, the European Parliament called for suspension of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor agreement that allows commercial data exchanges, and there have been suggestions that the purported U.S. surveillance activities may have a wider effect on economic relations, including with regard to negotiations on the proposed TTIP. In addition, especially given the potential threat posed by the Islamic State and returning foreign fighters, officials indicate that cooperation between U.S. and European intelligence and security services has continued uninterrupted despite any loss of trust at the political level. The United States will take over the two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 2015.

Due to extensive cooperation on a wide range of issues, the relationship between the United States and Europe is often called the transatlantic partnership. The two sides have many common values and concerns, and have grown increasingly interdependent in terms of security and prosperity. The transatlantic relationship and the main areas of U.S.-European cooperation and shared interest are likely to have continuing implications for U.S. policy during the 114th Congress. Members of Congress may have an interest in considering the dimensions and dynamics of current issues in U.S.-European relations in the course of oversight or legislative activities, or in the context of direct interactions with European legislators and officials. According to most observers, the overall tone of transatlantic relations during the Obama Administration has been largely positive. At the same time, a constructive tone does not necessarily translate into tangible results with regard to foreign policy objectives or other goals. With respect to certain issues, U.S. and European policies have been at odds and have generated friction in the relationship from time to time. This report summarizes key issues that both illustrate the nature of U.S.-European cooperation based on shared interests and present challenges in terms of the efficacy of such cooperation: U.S. and European relations with Russia have become more adversarial in the context of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its actions destabilizing Ukraine. The United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions that, combined with low oil prices, have harmed the Russian economy. Rising tensions with Russia have altered previous assumptions about European security and affected debates about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European energy security. The United States and European countries have been cooperating in efforts to counter the Islamic State and seek a political solution to the conflict in Syria. Recent estimates suggest that upward of 3,000 European citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join groups involved in the conflict, and the potential threat posed by returning "foreign fighters" has become a central concern. U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation has been strong since 9/11, although differences regarding data privacy have posed some key information-sharing challenges. The United States and Europe remain central actors in negotiations seeking to reach an agreement that ensures that Iran's nuclear program can be used solely for peaceful purposes. While an extensive array of U.S. and EU sanctions have worked to isolate and pressure Iran, the final outcome of talks remains uncertain. The United States and EU share broad objectives with regard to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Increased European support for recognizing Palestinian statehood, however, has diverged from the approach taken by the United States and strained Europe's relationship with Israel. The United States and the EU have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. The two sides have been negotiating a free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aimed at boosting jobs and growth on both sides, but obstacles could make it difficult to conclude a deal by the end of 2015. While the conditions that fueled the Eurozone crisis from 2010-2012 appear to have stabilized, there is considerable doubt that underlying economic problems in Europe have been fully resolved. Allegations of U.S. spying and surveillance programs in Europe have caused a sharp backlash and damaged transatlantic trust. Although tensions appear to have proven manageable and U.S. intelligence cooperation with European governments continues, data privacy concerns could complicate future talks on U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements. The United States takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 2015. The Artic is increasingly viewed as a region of potential economic and geopolitical importance. As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment, some observers assert that the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration's announced intention of "re-balancing" U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United States and Europe are likely to remain one another's closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide range of critical issues.

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O n On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, hereafter referred to as the "conference version"). The primary purposes of the ARRA focus on promoting economic recovery, assisting those most affected by the recession, improving economic efficiency by "spurring technological advances in science and health," investing in infrastructure, and stabilizing state and local government budgets. The House had previously passed its version of H.R. 1 (hereafter referred to as the "House bill") on January 28, 2009, while the Senate passed S.Amdt. 570 , an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. Under the House bill and the Senate bill, funds would have been provided to several existing workforce development programs administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), including programs authorized by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). This report provides a brief overview of the key provisions related to workforce development programs administered by DOL that were included in the conference version under Division A, Title VIII, Department of Labor. It also provides estimates of state grants for programs for which these estimates are relevant and for which data needed to produce the estimates are available. It also includes a discussion of relevant provisions that were included in the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 1 .

On February 13, 2009, both the House and Senate passed the conference version of H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The primary purposes of the ARRA focus on promoting economic recovery, assisting those most affected by the recession, improving economic efficiency by "spurring technological advances in science and health," investing in infrastructure, and stabilizing state and local government budgets. The House had previously passed its version of H.R. 1 (House-passed bill) on January 28, 2009, while the Senate passed S.Amdt. 570, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1 (Senate-passed bill), on February 10, 2009. The ARRA provides funds to several existing workforce development programs administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), including programs authorized by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). This report provides a brief overview of the key provisions related to workforce development programs administered by DOL that were included in the ARRA under Division A, Title VIII, Department of Labor, and provides estimates of state grants for programs for which these estimates are relevant and for which data needed to produce the estimates are available. It also includes a discussion of relevant provisions that were included in the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 1. The report will not be updated.

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The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act permits federal delinquency proceedings when state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction or in the case of a limited number of crimes when there is a substantial federal interest. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult. State juvenile proceedings remained the preferred alternative, but the Attorney General might instead elect to proceed against a juvenile as an adult, and federal juvenile proceedings became possible should both parties agree. Because a majority of the federal cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e. , primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings have historically involved Native Americans. For purposes of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act in its present form, a juvenile is an individual, under 21 years of age when the information is filed, alleged to have violated federal criminal law before reaching the age of 18. Once the federal courts have found a juvenile delinquent, however, a court that revokes a juvenile's delinquent supervised release may order the juvenile held until age 26. Thus, an individual under 18 who violates federal criminal law can move through the state juvenile delinquency system without ever coming into contact with federal authorities. A transfer is mandatory in the case of a violent felony, drug trafficking, drug smuggling, or arson, allegedly committed by a juvenile 16 years of age or older who has previously been found to have committed comparable misconduct. Charges that would support a mandatory transfer if brought against a 16-year-old recidivist may be used to trigger a discretionary transfer if the juvenile is 15 or older regardless of his or her prior record; discretionary transfers are also possible for juveniles 13 or older in some cases of assault, homicide, or robbery. Neither the right to grand jury indictment nor to a jury trial is constitutionally required. At sentencing, the court may dispose of a juvenile delinquency case by suspending sentence, by ordering restitution or probation, or by committing the juvenile to the custody of the Attorney General for detention. Detention authority following revocation mirrors the court's initial detention authority with two exceptions. That is, when the misconduct that resulted in the delinquency determination would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 12 years or more, the court may order a term of supervision no longer than the shorter of (i) five years; (ii) the term at the top of the sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that would apply had the juvenile been an adult; or (iii) the time before which the individual turns 26 years of age. Juveniles Tried as Adults Juveniles transferred for trial as adults in federal court are essentially treated as adults, with few distinctions afforded or required because of their age. § 5032 (Text) A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, other than a violation of law committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which the maximum authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed six months, shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act ( 21 U.S.C. Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

Federal authorities have three options when a juvenile violates federal criminal law. First, they can refer the juvenile to state authorities. Second, they can initiate federal delinquency proceedings. Third, they can petition the federal court to transfer the juvenile for trial as an adult. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act generally favors referring juveniles to state authorities, but it permits federal delinquency proceedings where state courts cannot or will not accept jurisdiction. Because a majority of the federal juvenile delinquency cases have historically arisen in areas beyond state jurisdiction, i.e., primarily Indian country, the majority of federal delinquency proceedings involve Native Americans. In the more serious of these cases, the juvenile offender may be transferred for trial as an adult in federal court. The Act applies to those charged before the age of 21 with a breach of federal criminal law occurring before they reached the age of 18. Given the preference for state juvenile proceedings and the fact that a violation of federal law will ordinarily support the assertion of state juvenile court jurisdiction, most such offenders never come in contact with federal authorities. Many of those who do are returned to state officials to be processed through the state court system. The United States Attorney, however, may elect to initiate federal proceedings if the state courts are unwilling or unable to assume jurisdiction, or the state has no adequate treatment plans, or the juvenile is charged with a crime of violence or with drug trafficking. Federal juvenile delinquency proceedings require neither grand jury indictment, public trial, nor trial by jury. The constitutional rights available to juveniles at delinquency proceedings are otherwise much like those found in adult criminal trials. Juveniles found delinquent may be released under suspended sentence, placed on probation, ordered to pay restitution and/or sentenced to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General for detention. The period of detention, if any, may not exceed the term which might be imposed upon an adult offender for the same misconduct. The period of detention may be followed by a period of juvenile delinquent supervision, revocation of which in serious cases may result in detention until the individual is 26 years of age. The U.S. district court may, and in some cases must, transfer a juvenile for criminal trial as an adult. A juvenile may request a transfer to trial as an adult. Otherwise, a court must order a transfer when a juvenile, with a prior comparable conviction or juvenile adjudication, is charged with committing a violent offense or a drug trafficking offense at the age of 16 or older. Discretionary transfers come in two varieties. A court may transfer a juvenile, who when 13 years of age or older is alleged to have committed aggravated assault, murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, or armed rape. A court may also transfer a juvenile who when 15 years of age or older is alleged to have committed drug trafficking or a violent felony. The court orders or denies the transfer petition after considering the seriousness of the offense, the age and maturity of the juvenile, the juvenile's prior delinquency record, the results of past rehabilitative efforts, and the availability of existing rehabilitative programs.

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The economic substance doctrine is one tool that the IRS has for fighting abusive tax shelters. It is a judicially developed doctrine that allows the IRS and courts to disregard transactions that were made for tax-avoidance purposes and lack economic substance. In 2006, four important tax shelter cases were decided by U.S. courts of appeals. In all four cases, the economic substance of the transaction was at issue. Legislation in the 110th Congress S. 96 (the Export Products Not Jobs Act) would codify the economic substance doctrine.

The economic substance doctrine is a judicially developed doctrine that has become one of the IRS's primary tools in fighting abusive tax shelters. The doctrine permits transactions lacking in economic substance to be disregarded for tax purposes. In 2006, four significant decisions dealing with the doctrine were issued by U.S. courts of appeals. In the 110th Congress, S. 96 (Export Products Not Jobs Act) has been introduced to codify the doctrine. This report discusses the doctrine's development and the four cases and summarizes the bill. It will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The following week, on March 30, 2010, the President signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), which amended numerous health care and revenue provisions in ACA. In addition to changes to private insurance and these federal health programs, ACA includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. Implementing ACA also is likely to affect discretionary spending, which is provided in and controlled by annual appropriations acts. It also reauthorized funding for many existing discretionary grant programs. Report Overview This report—one in a series of CRS products summarizing ACA that were issued after the law's enactment—describes the law's workforce, public health, quality, and related provisions. The summaries of the ACA provisions are grouped and discussed under the following section headings: (1) Health Centers and Clinics; (2) Health Workforce; (3) Prevention and Wellness; (4) Maternal and Child Health; (5) Teen Pregnancy Prevention and Adoption Support; (6) Quality; (7) Nursing Homes and Other Long-Term Care Facilities and Providers; (8) Comparative Effectiveness Research; (9) Health Data Collection; (10) Health Information Technology; (11) Emergency Care; (12) Pain Care Management; (13) Elder Justice; (14) Biomedical Research and Medical Products; (15) Biosimilars; (16) Nutrition Labeling; (17) 340B Drug Pricing; and (18) Medical Malpractice and Liability Reform. Each section of the report begins with a brief overview of the ACA provisions to be summarized and includes some discussion of relevant policies in place at the time of ACA's enactment as well as the intent, and, where available, projected impact, of the law. Finally, ACA modifies Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payment policy. ACA's changes to GME payments, along with a new health center grant program and a number of other provisions, are intended to promote primary care training in nonhospital settings. It amends PHSA Sec. 271 establishes a science track at academic sites selected by the Secretary, to award degrees that emphasize team-based service, public health, epidemiology, and emergency preparedness and response. Health Workforce Evaluation and Assessment ACA establishes a National Health Care Workforce Commission to undertake comprehensive workforce planning. National Prevention, Health Promotion and Public Health Council This section, as amended by Sec. Prevention and Public Health Fund The stated purpose of this section is to establish a Prevention and Public Health Fund "to provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs to improve health and help restrain the rate of growth in private and public sector health care costs." It creates a new PHSA Sec. P.L. P.L. ACA aimed to take steps to address these issues by including a series of five provisions focusing on the development of a national strategy, priorities, and strategic plan to improve health care quality; coordination of health care quality activity at the federal level; measure development and endorsement; public reporting of quality data; and the coordinated selection of measures for use in federal quality programs through a pre-rulemaking process. The general functions of this Center include, among others (1) identifying providers that deliver consistently high-quality, efficient health care services and employ best practices that are adaptable and scalable to diverse health care settings; (2) assessing research, evidence, and knowledge about what strategies and methodologies are most effective in improving health care delivery; (3) finding ways to translate such information rapidly and effectively; (4) creating strategies for quality improvement through the development of tools, methodologies, and interventions that can successfully reduce variation in the delivery of health care; and (5) building capacity at the state and community level to lead quality and safety efforts through education, training and mentoring programs. 1171-1179) instructed the Secretary to adopt electronic format and data standards for nine specified administrative and financial transactions between health care providers and health plans. Subpart A—Elder Justice Coordinating Council and Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation. 351 to create a new regulatory pathway for the FDA approval of biosimilars.

In March 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148), and a package of amendments to ACA, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-152). Health reform was one of President Obama's top domestic policy priorities during his first term, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs were seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. This report—one of a series of CRS products on ACA, as amended—focuses on the law's workforce, public health, health care quality, and related provisions. It includes summaries of these provisions, explores some of their implications for health policy, and contains an associated timeline. This report is primarily for reference purposes. The material in it is intended to provide context to help the reader better understand the intent of ACA's individual provisions at the time of enactment. The report does not track or discuss ongoing ACA-related regulatory and other implementation activities. ACA includes numerous provisions intended to increase the primary care and public health workforce, promote preventive services, and strengthen quality measurement, among other things. It amends and expands many of the existing health workforce programs authorized under Title VII (health professions) and Title VIII (nursing) of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA); creates a Public Health Services Track to train health care professionals emphasizing team-based service, public health, epidemiology, and emergency preparedness and response; and makes a number of changes to the Medicare graduate medical education (GME) payments to teaching hospitals, in part to encourage the training of more primary care physicians. The new law also establishes a national commission to study projected health workforce needs. In addition, ACA creates an interagency council to promote healthy policies and prepare a national prevention and health promotion strategy. It establishes a Prevention and Public Health Fund to boost funding for prevention and public health; increases access to clinical preventive services under Medicare and Medicaid; promotes healthier communities; and funds research on optimizing the delivery of public health services. Funding also is provided for maternal and child health services, including abstinence education and a new home visitation program. ACA also establishes a national strategy for quality improvement; creates an interagency working group to advance quality efforts at the national level; develops a comprehensive repertoire of quality measures; and formalizes processes for quality measure selection, endorsement, data collection, and public reporting of quality information. It creates and funds a new private, nonprofit comparative effectiveness research institute. Other key provisions in ACA include new requirements for the collection and reporting of health data by race, ethnicity, and primary language to detect and monitor trends in health disparities; and electronic format and data standards to improve the efficiency of administrative and financial transactions between health care providers and health plans; programs to prevent elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation; a new regulatory pathway for licensing biological drugs shown to be biosimilar or interchangeable with a licensed biologic; new nutrition labeling requirements for chain restaurant menus and vending machines.

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Introduction Part C (Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, P.L. 108-446 ) authorizes a formula grant program for infants and toddlers with disabilities (ages birth through two) and their families. In 2016, approximately 373,000 infants and toddlers received early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA. However, the IDEA covers more than special education. Since 1975, the IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights for children with disabilities. The most recent reauthorization was P.L. Part C of the IDEA requires each state to operate a public awareness program to inform state residents about (1) early intervention services available to help eligible infants and toddlers with developmental delays or disabilities; (2) the steps to take to have an infant or toddler evaluated for early intervention eligibility; and (3) who families should contact in the early intervention system, if they have a child who may be in need of early intervention services. In addition, primary referral sources must be provided with the following information: A description of the child find system (explained in more detail in the next section of this report) and procedures for referring a child under the age of three for an evaluation or early intervention services; and A central directory that is accessible to the general public (i.e., through the lead agency's website and other appropriate means) and includes accurate, up-to-date information about public and private early intervention services, resources, and experts available in the state; professional and other groups (including parent support, and parent training and information centers, such as those funded under the IDEA) that provide assistance to infants and toddlers with disabilities eligible under Part C of the IDEA and their families; and research and demonstration projects being conducted in the state related to infants and toddlers with disabilities. The family assessment and the child assessment may be conducted together or separately depending on the needs of the family. States must delineate procedures for the establishment of a transition plan for each child, including, when appropriate, steps to exit from the Part C program; descriptions of how the families of toddlers receiving early intervention services will be included in the transition plans; procedures that will be used to review each child's program options for the period from the child's third birthday through the remainder of the school year; and how the lead agency will (1) notify LEAs when each child will shortly reach the age of eligibility for preschool services under Part B; (2) convene a conference among the lead agency, the family, and the LEA, between 9 months and 90 days before the child is eligible for preschool services, to discuss any such services that the child may receive; and (3) in the case of a child who may not be eligible for preschool services, convene a conference among the lead agency, the family, and providers of appropriate services for children who are not eligible for preschool services under Part B, to discuss the appropriate services that the child may receive. The various types of procedural safeguards include parental rights to inspect and review educational records; receive timely administrative resolution of complaints; maintain confidentiality of personally identifiable information; receive prior written notice in their native language when the lead agency or an early intervention services provider proposes to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or placement of their infant or toddler, or the provision of early intervention services to their infant or toddler; receive a procedural safeguards notice, which is a comprehensive written explanation of the IDEA's legal rights and protections for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their parents; resolve disputes through a mediation process; determine whether they, their infant or toddler, or other family members will accept or decline any early intervention services without jeopardizing other early intervention services; and continue receiving appropriate early intervention services for their infant or toddler, during the pendency of any proceeding or action involving a complaint filed on their family's behalf. While funding for Part B, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, is permanently authorized, the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA authorized funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, through FY2010. Funding for Part C continues to be authorized through annual appropriations. In FY2017, $458.6 million was appropriated for Part C, representing 3.5% of total IDEA funding. Annual funding for each state for Part C programs is based upon each state's relative share of the general population birth through two. Part B—Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities Part B authorizes federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21. Part C—Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities The general purpose of Part C is to aid each state in creating and maintaining "a statewide, comprehensive, coordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system that provides early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families."

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a statute that authorizes grant programs that support special education services. Under the IDEA, a series of conditions are attached to the receipt of grant funds. These conditions aim to provide certain educational and procedural guarantees for students with disabilities and their families. The grant programs authorized under the IDEA provide federal funding for special education and early intervention services for children with disabilities (birth to 21 years old) and require, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) (i.e., specially designed instruction provided at no cost to parents that meets the needs of a child with a disability) and an accessible early intervention system (a statewide system to provide and coordinate early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families). The IDEA also outlines and requires the use of procedural safeguards pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and placement of students in special education services that are intended to protect the rights of parents and children with disabilities. These procedures include parental rights to resolve disputes through a mediation process, and present and resolve complaints through a due process complaint procedure and through state complaint procedures. Originally enacted in 1975, the IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights to children with disabilities. The most recent reauthorization of the IDEA was P.L. 108-446, enacted in 2004. The 1986 reauthorization of the IDEA created a grants program that would provide early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families, what is now known as Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities. Funding for Part B of the IDEA, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, the largest part of the act, is permanently authorized. Funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, was authorized through FY2011. Funding for Part C and Part D programs continues to be authorized through annual appropriations. Part C of the IDEA authorizes a grant program to aid each state in implementing a system of early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families. In 2016, approximately 373,000 infants and toddlers between birth and three years old received early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA. Annual funding to each state for Part C programs is based upon the state's proportion of the number of children, birth through two years old, in the general population. In FY2018, approximately $13.4 billion was appropriated for the IDEA, $470 million of which was appropriated for Part C, representing 3.5% of total IDEA funding. Part C requires each state to implement a public awareness program and Child Find activities to identify infants and toddlers who may be eligible for early intervention services. To be eligible for early intervention services under Part C of the IDEA, an infant or toddler must meet his or her state's definition of an infant or toddler with a disability or developmental delay. Once a child meets the IDEA's eligibility criteria, the early intervention system provides an assessment of the needs of both the child and the child's family. Early intervention coordinators then either help the family coordinate services for their child through outside service providers or directly provide early intervention services to the child and the child's family, depending on the design of the early intervention system in the state. Before a child receiving Part C services turns three years old, the child is assessed to determine whether he or she will continue receiving IDEA services, and, if so, whether the child will remain in an extended Part C service arrangement or transition into a special education preschool program funded by Section 619 of Part B of the IDEA.

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Background Since 1984, Congress has designated 49 national heritage areas (NHAs) to recognize and assist efforts to protect, commemorate, and promote natural, cultural, historic, and recreational resources that form distinctive landscapes. The sizeable number of existing NHAs, along with proposals to study and designate new ones, fostered interest by some Members and Administrations in establishing a standardized process and criteria for designating NHAs. Further, some opponents of NHAs believe that they threaten private property rights, are burdensome, or present other problems and challenges, so Congress should oppose any efforts to designate new areas and/or to create a "system" of NHAs. The NPS provides technical and financial aid to NHAs, but these areas are not part of the National Park System. Designation There is no comprehensive statute that establishes criteria for designating NHAs or provides standards for their funding and management. The particulars for establishment and management of a heritage area typically are provided in its enabling legislation. Administration NHAs usually involve partnerships among the NPS, states, and local interests. In establishing heritage areas, Congress typically designates a management entity to coordinate the work of the partners. The management entity usually develops and implements a plan for managing the NHA, in collaboration with partners and other interested parties. Once the Secretary of the Interior approves a plan, it essentially becomes the blueprint for managing the heritage area and is implemented as funding and resources are available. NHAs might receive funding to prepare and implement their plans from a wide array of sources, including philanthropic organizations, endowments, individuals, businesses, and governments. Some Members and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in having heritage areas become financially self-sufficient. The NPS seeks to evaluate heritage areas before the expiration of the authorization for federal funds. The law required an evaluation of the "accomplishments" of the areas; an assessment of the management entity in achieving the purposes of the law designating the area and the goals and objectives of the management plan for the area; an analysis of the impact of investments in the area; and a review of the management structure, partnership arrangements, and funding for the area so as to identify components required for sustainability. The NPS is continuing to evaluate other heritage areas. 581 . For instance, in testimony on systemic NHA legislation ( H.R. 445 ) in the 113 th Congress , a National Park Service representative stated that the Department of the Interior has "long supported legislation to establish a National Heritage Area program within the National Park Service that standardizes timeframes and funding for designated national heritage areas and formally establishes criteria for establishing new heritage areas." Appropriations for heritage areas typically have been provided in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations laws. NHAs can use funds for varied purposes including staffing, planning, and implementing projects. In recent years, Congress has provided direction to the NPS as to how the total appropriation should be allocated among NHAs. For FY2016, the total appropriation for heritage areas was $19.8 million.

Over more than 30 years, Congress has established 49 national heritage areas (NHAs) to commemorate, conserve, and promote areas that include important natural, scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational resources. NHAs are partnerships among the National Park Service (NPS), states, and local communities, in which the NPS supports state and local conservation through federal recognition, seed money, and technical assistance. NHAs are not part of the National Park System, in which lands are federally owned and managed. Rather, lands within heritage areas typically remain in state, local, or private ownership or a combination thereof. Heritage areas have been supported as protecting lands and traditions and promoting tourism and community revitalization, but opposed as potentially burdensome, costly, or leading to federal control over nonfederal lands. There is no comprehensive statute that establishes criteria for designating NHAs or provides standards for their funding and management. Rather, particulars for each area are provided in its enabling legislation. Congress designates a management entity, usually nonfederal, to coordinate the work of the partners. This entity typically develops and implements a plan for managing the NHA, in collaboration with other parties. Once approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the management plan becomes the blueprint for managing the area. NHAs might receive funding from a wide variety of sources. Congress typically determines federal funding for NHAs in annual appropriations laws for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. NHAs can use federal funds for many purposes, including staffing, planning, and projects. The FY2016 appropriation for the NPS for assistance to heritage areas was $19.8 million. The Obama Administration has expressed interest in having NHAs become financially self-sufficient. Some appropriators and other Members have emphasized self-sufficiency for these areas as well. One role of the NPS is to evaluate heritage areas at least three years before the expiration of the authorization for federal funds. The NPS has completed evaluations of nine NHAs designated in 1996 and continues to evaluate others. Each Congress typically considers bills to establish new heritage areas, study areas for possible heritage designation, and amend existing heritage areas. Bills with similar purposes are pending in the 114th Congress. Other 114th Congress measures seek to extend the authorizations for NHAs to receive financial assistance. The sizeable number of existing NHAs and proposals in recent years to study and designate new ones has fostered legislation to establish a system of NHAs, and to provide criteria for their designation, standards for their management, and limits on federal funding support. In the 114th Congress, one such measure (H.R. 581) has been introduced. The Obama Administration has supported such systemic NHA legislation. Some opponents believe that NHAs present numerous problems and challenges and that Congress should oppose efforts to designate new areas and to create a system of NHAs.

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E ach house of the United States Congress is expressly authorized within the Constitution to "punish" its own Members for misconduct. The underlying justification for legislative discipline has traditionally been to protect the integrity and dignity of the legislature and its proceedings, rather than merely to punish an individual; and such internal legislative process is additional to any potential criminal or civil liability that a Member might incur for any particular misconduct. The most common forms of discipline in the House of Representatives are now "expulsion," "censure," or "reprimand," although the House may also discipline its Members in other ways, including fine or monetary assessment, loss of seniority, or loss of certain privileges. In addition to these punishments or disciplines by the entire House of Representatives, the House Committee on Ethics—formerly called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—is authorized to issue, on its own accord, a "Letter of Reproval" to a Member when that committee disapproves of conduct but makes no recommendation for legislative sanctions to the full House of Representatives. The committee has also from time to time expressed its disapproval of particular conduct in informal letters and other communications to Members. The House may discipline its Members for violations of statutory law, including crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct which the House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution. Each house of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which has not necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach its privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or which was found to discredit the House or Senate. When the most severe sanction of expulsion has been employed or recommended in the House, however, the conduct has historically involved either disloyalty to the United States Government, or the violation of a criminal law involving the abuse of one's official position, such as bribery. The numbers of actual expulsions from the House may be small because some Members of the House who have been found to have engaged in serious misconduct have chosen to resign (or have lost an election) before any formal action could be taken against them by the House. In the House of Representatives, a "censure" is a formal vote by the majority of Members present and voting on a resolution disapproving a Member's conduct, generally with the additional requirement that the Member stand at the "well" of the House chamber to receive a verbal rebuke and reading of the censure resolution by the Speaker of the House. The House of Representatives has taken a broad view of its authority to discipline its Members. The more formalized distinction in the House whereby it is considered that a "reprimand" expressly involves a lesser level of disapproval of the conduct of a Member than that of a "censure," and is thus a less severe rebuke by the institution, is of relatively recent origin. Ten House Members have been "reprimanded" by the full House for a range of misconduct, including failure to disclose certain personal interests in official matters and using one's office to further one's personal gains; misrepresentations to investigating committees; failure to report campaign contributions; conversion of campaign contributions to personal use and false statements before the investigating committee; false statements on financial disclosure forms; ghost voting and maintaining persons on the official payroll not performing official duties commensurate with pay; the misuse of one's political influence in administrative matters to help a personal associate; the failure to ensure that a Member-affiliated tax-exempt organization was not improperly involved in partisan politics, and for providing inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable information to the investigating committee; and the misuse of official resources by compelling congressional staff to work on political campaigns. Fines for disciplinary purposes in the House, as well as in the Senate, have been relatively infrequent occurrences.

The House of Representatives—in the same manner as the United States Senate—is expressly authorized within the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 5, clause 2) to discipline or "punish" its own Members. This authority of the House to discipline a Member for "disorderly Behaviour" is in addition to any criminal or civil liability that a Member of the House may incur for particular misconduct, and is used not merely to punish an individual Member, but to protect the institutional integrity of the House of Representatives, its proceedings, and its reputation. The House may discipline its Members without the necessity of Senate concurrence. The most common forms of discipline in the House are now "expulsion," "censure," or "reprimand," although the House may also discipline its Members in other ways, including fine or monetary restitution, loss of seniority, and suspension or loss of certain privileges. In addition to such sanctions imposed by the full House of Representatives, the standing committee in the House which deals with ethics and official conduct matters, the House Committee on Ethics—formerly called the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—is authorized by House Rules to issue a formal "Letter of Reproval" for misconduct which does not rise to the level of consideration or sanction by the entire House of Representatives. Additionally, the Committee on Ethics has also expressed its disapproval of certain conduct in informal letters and communications to Members. The House may generally discipline its Members for violations of statutory law, including crimes; for violations of internal congressional rules; or for any conduct which the House of Representatives finds has reflected discredit upon the institution. Each house of Congress has disciplined its own Members for conduct which has not necessarily violated any specific rule or law, but which was found to breach its privileges, demonstrate contempt for the institution, or reflect discredit on the House or Senate. When the most severe sanction of expulsion has been employed in the House, the underlying conduct deemed to have merited removal from office has historically involved either disloyalty to the United States, or the violation of a criminal law involving the abuse of one's official position, such as bribery. The House of Representatives has actually expelled only five Members in its history, but a number of Members, facing likely congressional discipline for misconduct, have resigned from Congress or have been defeated in an election prior to any formal House action. A "censure" is a formal, majority vote in the House on a resolution disapproving a Member's conduct, generally with the additional requirement that the Member stand at the "well" of the House chamber to receive a verbal rebuke and reading of the resolution by the Speaker. Twenty-three Members of the House have been censured for various forms of misconduct, including (in the 19th century) insulting or other unparliamentary language on the floor or assaults on other Members, as well as, more recently, financial improprieties. A "reprimand" in the House involves a lesser level of disapproval of the conduct of a Member than that of a "censure," but also involves a formal vote by the entire House. Ten House Members have been "reprimanded" for a range of misconduct, including failure to disclose personal interests in official matters; misrepresentations to investigating committees; failure to report campaign contributions; conversion of campaign contributions to personal use; ghost voting and payroll improprieties; the misuse of one's political influence in administrative matters to help a personal associate; providing inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable information to the investigating committee; for a breach of decorum in a joint session; and the misuse of official resources by compelling congressional staff to work on political campaigns. This report has been updated from earlier versions and will be revised as events and changes in Rules or laws may warrant.

crs_R40570

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Introduction News of humans infected with Ebola in West Africa, avian influenza in China, polio in the Middle East, and dengue fever in the Caribbean are examples of reports that heighten concerns about the health screenings of people arriving in the United States. Under current law, foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa and submit to an inspection to be admitted. One of the reasons why a foreign national might be deemed inadmissible is on health-related grounds. Potential issues for Congress are at least three-fold: (1) Are the health-related grounds for exclusion updated to ensure public safety in regards to contagious diseases? The Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions, and DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with inspecting all people who enter the United States. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines those communicable diseases of public health significance that trigger inadmissibility in the INA. The relevant regulation's definition expressly lists seven diseases as a "communicable disease of public health significance": chancroid, gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, infectious leprosy, lymphogranuloma venereum, active tuberculosis, and infectious syphilis. The relevant executive order lists cholera; diphtheria; infectious tuberculosis; plague; smallpox; yellow fever; viral hemorrhagic fevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo, South American, and others not yet isolated or named); severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS); and "[i]nfluenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic." Medical Examinations for Visas The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in HHS take the lead in protection against communicable diseases among foreign nationals who come to the United States. The CDC are responsible for providing technical instructions to civil surgeons and panel physicians who conduct medical examinations for immigration purposes. Foreign nationals who are applying for visas at U.S. consulates are tested by in-country physicians who have been designated by the State Department. The physicians enter into written agreements with the consular posts to perform the examinations according to HHS regulations and guidance. Foreign nationals in the United States who are adjusting to legal permanent resident (LPR) status are tested by civil surgeons designated by USCIS. Vaccination Requirements As stated above, the INA renders inadmissible foreign nationals who are not vaccinated against vaccine-preventable diseases. Vaccinations are statutorily required for mumps, measles, rubella, polio, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, influenza type B and hepatitis B. Vaccinations against other diseases may also be required if recommended by the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP), an advisory committee to the CDC. CBP officers screened approximately 362 million individuals in FY2013 for admissions into the United States. In the context of the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa, CDC has emphasized exit-based airport screening from areas of the source, not POE screening in the United States. At this point, CDC assures that Ebola poses little risk to the U.S. general population.

News of humans infected with Ebola in West Africa, avian influenza in China, polio in the Middle East, and dengue fever in the Caribbean are examples of reports that heighten concerns about the health screenings of people arriving in the United States. Under current law, foreign nationals who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa and submit to an inspection to be admitted. One of the reasons why a foreign national might be deemed inadmissible is on health-related grounds. The diseases that trigger inadmissibility in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) are those communicable diseases of public health significance as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Currently there are seven diseases deemed a communicable disease of public health significance: chancroid, gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, infectious leprosy, lymphogranuloma venereum, active tuberculosis, and infectious syphilis. Other diseases incorporated by reference are cholera; diphtheria; infectious tuberculosis; plague; smallpox; yellow fever; viral hemorrhagic fevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo, South American, and others not yet isolated or named); severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS); and "[i]nfluenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic." The INA also renders inadmissible foreign nationals who are not vaccinated against vaccine-preventable diseases. Vaccinations are statutorily required for mumps, measles, rubella, polio, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, influenza type B and hepatitis B. Vaccinations against other diseases may also be required if recommended by the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in HHS take the lead in protection against communicable diseases among foreign nationals who come to the United States. The CDC are responsible for providing the technical instructions to civil surgeons and panel physicians who conduct medical examinations for immigration purposes. Foreign nationals who are applying for visas at U.S. consulates are tested by in-country physicians who have been designated by the State Department. The physicians enter into written agreements with the consular posts to perform the examinations according to HHS regulations and guidance. Foreign nationals in the United States who are adjusting to legal permanent resident status are tested by civil surgeons designated by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). CDC, in conjunction with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in DHS, operates 20 quarantine stations and has health officials on call for all ports of entry. From an immigration standpoint, an outbreak of an infectious disease places substantial procedural and resource pressures on CBP, which is charged with screening admissions of all travelers at land, sea, and air ports of entry (POE). CBP officers screened approximately 362 million individuals in FY2013 for admissions into the United States. CBP works in conjunction with the CDC to monitor travelers and attempt to contain any diseases that may be spread by travelers coming from abroad. In the current context of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, CDC has emphasized exit-based airport screening from areas with Ebola, and not screening at POEs in the United States. At this point, CDC assures that Ebola poses little risk to the U.S. general population. Congress has acted legislatively on the health-related grounds for exclusion several times in the recent past. Congress also plays an important oversight role, particularly when concerns arise regarding contagious diseases or potential pandemics.

crs_R40655

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Comparisons between the Great Depression and the eleventh recession of the post-World War II period have extended beyond conditions in the financial market to conditions in the labor market. Speculation that the unemployment rate could reach double digits in the coming months appears to have fueled the analogy. Little if any comparative research has been undertaken, however. This report analyzes the labor market experiences of workers during the 1930s, which encompassed the almost five years of the Great Depression. Because it was a period very distant and different from today, considerable time is devoted to examining the employment and unemployment measures available at that time. The report ends by comparing the labor market conditions of the 1930s with those encountered by workers thus far during the recession that began in December 2007. The Labor Market During the Great Depression Analysis of labor market conditions during the Great Depression is complicated by the fact that "throughout the worst years of the Depression, no one knew how many unemployed persons there were, much less their characteristics," because not until March 1940 did the federal government initiate a monthly survey of the labor force defined much as it is today. Women also fared better than men during the Depression due to the increased demand for workers in white-collar occupations (e.g., professional and clerical workers). Occupational and Industry Characteristics Lower skilled workers were more adversely affected by the Depression than higher skilled workers. Many workers were unemployed for much longer than one year. Of those fortunate to have jobs, many experienced cutbacks in hours, and hence, earnings. Men—particularly those older and black—were among the most adversely affected during a time when age- and race-based employment discrimination were not unlawful and when occupational shifts in labor demand were operating against them. Those who toiled on farms and in factories were displaced in especially large numbers. And, states whose economies were dependent upon agriculture and manufacturing reported comparatively high unemployment rates. They are shared with many of the recessions that occurred in the intervening years. Similarities There are a number of similarities between the characteristics of the unemployed during the Great Depression and the recession that began in December 2007. By 2008, the goods-producing sector's share of nonfarm employment had fallen to 15.6%. 4. At the peak of unemployment during the Great Depression (1933), one in four workers was unemployed, in contrast with fewer than one in eleven today. Between 1929 and 1933, employment on nonfarm payrolls fell by 24.3%, compared to 4.3% thus far in the recession. In the Impact of Being Unemployed The implications of being unemployed have changed substantially over time. One reason for the altered situation facing jobless persons is the increased prevalence of families in which both spouses work. Another important difference between the Great Depression and the current recession, in terms of the economic hardship inflicted by high unemployment, is the nationwide availability of public assistance programs in place today.

A good deal of commentary has addressed similarities between the recession that began in December 2007 and the Great Depression. Comparisons between the two have extended beyond conditions in financial markets to conditions in the labor market. The analogy appears to be fueled by projections that the unemployment rate could reach double digits in the coming months. Little if any comparative labor market research has been undertaken, however. To address the situation, this report analyzes the experiences of workers during the 1930s, which encompassed the almost five years of the Great Depression. Because it was a period very distant and different from today, the report devotes considerable time to examining the employment and unemployment measures then available. The report ends by comparing the labor market conditions of the 1930s with those encountered by workers thus far during the nation's eleventh recession of the post-World War II period. A labor market analysis of the Great Depression finds that many workers were unemployed for much longer than one year. Of those fortunate to have jobs, many experienced cutbacks in hours (i.e., involuntary part-time employment). Men typically were more adversely affected than women. This was especially true for older and black men at a time when age- and race-based job discrimination were not unlawful and when occupational shifts in labor demand were operating against them. Higher-skilled workers fared better than lower-skilled workers. Those who toiled on farms and in factories were displaced in very large numbers. States whose economies were dependent on agriculture and manufacturing reported high unemployment rates. There are several similarities not only between the Great Depression and the recession that began in December 2007, but also between the Great Depression and other recent recessions. They include the greater impact of economic downturns on male blue-collar workers in the goods-producing sector (e.g., construction and manufacturing), lower-skilled workers, and older workers. But, there remain substantial differences between the Great Depression and the current recession: In 1933, at the depth of the Depression, one in four workers was unemployed. In contrast, the unemployment rate had risen to 9.4% by May 2009. The number of jobs on nonfarm payrolls fell 24.3% between 1929 and 1933. Thus far during the current recession, firms have cut nonfarm employment by 4.3%. The first 17 months of the ongoing recession compare favorably with the first two years of the Depression as well. In addition to the greater magnitude of unemployment and job loss during the early 1930s as compared with today, the implications of being unemployed have changed much in the intervening years. One reason for the altered situation facing today's unemployed is the increased prevalence of families in which both spouses work. Another is the deeper drop in earnings and hours worked that occurred during the Depression. And, the social safety net that is now available to displaced workers and their families did not exist before the onset of the Great Depression.

crs_96-397

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Americans and Canadians fought side by side in both World Wars, Korea, and Afghanistan, and continue to collaborate on international political and security matters, such as the campaign against the Islamic State. The countries also share mutual security commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cooperate on continental defense through the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), maintain a close intelligence partnership through the "Five Eyes" group of nations, and coordinate frequently on law enforcement efforts, with a particular focus on securing their shared 5,500-mile border. Canada is the second-largest trading partner of the United States, with total two-way cross-border goods and services trade amounting to over $1.6 billion per day in 2017. Nevertheless, bilateral relations have been strained from time to time by individual matters, such as Canada's decision not to participate in the Iraq war in 2003 and the Obama Administration's rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline in 2015. Canadian officials have been particularly frustrated by the Trump Administration's approach to renegotiating NAFTA and other trade disputes, such as the Administration's decision to impose tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum. Trudeau and the Liberals also campaigned on a series of political reforms. Foreign and Security Policy Canada views a rules-based international order as essential for its physical security and economic prosperity. In June 2017, Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland asserted that Canada must set its "own clear and sovereign course" to renew and strengthen the international order given that the United States appeared to be withdrawing from its global leadership role. Monetary Policy Since the global financial crisis, United States and Canada have maintained an accommodative monetary policy. Over the past 30 years, U.S.-Canada trade relations have been governed first by the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and, subsequently, by the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. Whether it has been the reemergence of old irritants such as trade in softwood lumber and dairy restrictions, new disputes such as commercial aviation, or the contentious NAFTA negotiations, the commercial relationship between the two nations is facing new challenges. The dispute revolves around different pricing policies and forest management structures in Canada and the United States. Environmental protection authorities are shared by the federal and subfederal levels in both countries. Prime Minister Trudeau called President Trump's decision "disheartening," stating that "Canada stands united with all the other parties," and pledged that "Canada will continue to work with the United States at the state level, and with other U.S. stakeholders, to address climate change and promote clean growth." Federal, state, provincial, local, and tribal governments in the United States and Canada have sought to work together to address those environmental challenges and restore the Great Lakes ecosystem.

Relations between the United States and Canada traditionally have been close, bound together by a common 5,500-mile border—"the longest undefended border in the world"—as well as by shared history and values. The countries have long-standing mutual security commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and continue to work together to address international security challenges, such as the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq and Syria. Canada and the United States also maintain close intelligence and law enforcement ties and have engaged in a variety of initiatives to strengthen border security and cybersecurity in recent years. Although Canada's foreign and defense policies are usually in harmony with those of the United States, disagreements arise from time to time. Canada's Liberal Party government, led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has prioritized multilateral efforts to renew and strengthen the rules-based international order since coming to power in November 2015. It has expressed disappointment with President Donald Trump's decisions to withdraw from international accords, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, and has questioned whether the United States is abandoning its global leadership role. Such concerns have been heightened by the discord witnessed at the G-7 summit held at Charlevoix, Quebec, in June 2018. The United States and Canada maintain extensive commercial ties, with total two-way cross-border goods and services trade amounting to over $1.6 billion per day in 2017. Bilateral trade relations have grown increasingly strained, however, as old irritants, such as softwood lumber trade, have reemerged, and the countries' differing trade policy objectives have given rise to new disputes. Efforts to renegotiate the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trump Administration's imposition of tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum have proven particularly contentious. Many Members of Congress follow U.S.-Canada issues that affect their states and districts, such as Great Lakes restoration efforts and ongoing negotiations over the Columbia River Treaty. Since Canada and the United States are similar in many ways, lawmakers in both countries also study solutions proposed across the border on such issues as federal fiscal policy and federal-provincial power sharing. U.S. and Canadian domestic policies have diverged on a variety of matters over the past year and a half, including taxation and environmental protection. This report presents an overview of Canada's political situation, foreign and security policy, and economic and trade policy, focusing particularly on issues that may be relevant to U.S. policymakers.

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Disconnected youth may also lack strong social networks that provide assistance in the form of employment connections and other supports such as housing and financial assistance. The purpose of the report is to provide context for Congress about the characteristics of youth who are neither working nor in school, and the circumstances in which they live. Research since the late 1990s has sought to identify and characterize disconnected youth. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducted an analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to more fully understand the characteristics of disconnected youth, and to provide recent data on the population. Based on select questions in the CPS, the analysis constructs a definition of disconnection that includes noninstitutionalized youth ages 16 through 24 who were not working or in school at the time of the survey (February through April 2014) and did not work or attend school any time during the previous year (2013). For these reasons, the number and share of youth in the analysis who are considered disconnected are smaller than in some other studies. Still, 2.4 million youth ages 16 through 24—or 6.1% of this population—met the definition of disconnected in 2014 (disconnected for all of 2013 and between February and April of 2014). Like many other studies, the CRS analysis finds that a greater share of female and minority youth tend to be disconnected, although in some recent years rates of disconnection among females and males have been similar or converged. The CRS analysis also evaluates other characteristics that have not been widely studied in the existing research. For instance, compared to their peers in the general population, disconnected youth tend to have fewer years of education, and are more likely to live apart from their parents (except for youth ages 22-24) and be poor. The analysis finds that the parents of disconnected youth are more likely than their counterparts to be unemployed and to have a lower level of educational attainment. Rates of disconnection have ranged from about 3.9% (in 1999 and 2000) to just over 7.5% (in 2010). Methodology and Number of Disconnected Youth Across the studies, estimates of the number of disconnected youth vary because of their methodology, the age range of youth, and the period of time examined. Reasons Associated with Disconnection The factors that contribute to disconnection are not entirely clear, though some research has shown that parental education and receipt of public assistance, as well as race and ethnicity, play a role. As discussed further below, the CRS definition of disconnected youth is more narrow than most definitions employed by other studies because it captures those who are not working and not in school for a longer period of time (versus at a point in time, or for instance, over a six-month period). This definition is intended to exclude youth who may, in fact, be connected for part or most of a year, and may be between jobs or taking an extended break after school. Unlike all of the other studies, youth who are married to a connected spouse and are parenting are also excluded from the definition, based on the assumption that these young people work in the home by caring for their children and rely on financial and social support from their spouses. Disconnected youth will likely face numerous challenges as they transition to adulthood. Disconnected youth tend to have fewer years of schooling than their connected counterparts. Given the state of the current economy, youth disconnection rates would be expected to stabilize. They are also more likely to live in poverty. Interventions to connect youth to school and work depend on a number of factors. Interventions can also focus on particular institutions or systems , such as the family, community, schools, and job training programs. These interventions may help to address some of the reasons why youth are not working or in school.

In recent years, policymakers and youth advocates have focused greater attention on young people who are neither working nor in school. Generally characterized as "disconnected," these youth may also lack strong social networks that provide assistance in the form of employment connections and other supports such as housing and financial assistance. Without attachment to work or school, disconnected youth may be vulnerable to experiencing negative outcomes as they transition to adulthood. The purpose of the report is to provide context for Congress about the characteristics of disconnected youth, and the circumstances in which they live. These data may be useful as Congress considers policies to retain students in high school and to provide opportunities for youth to obtain job training and employment. Since the late 1990s, social science research has introduced different definitions of the term "disconnected." Across multiple studies of disconnected youth, the ages of the youth and the length of time they are out of school or work for purposes of being considered disconnected differ. In addition, a smaller number of studies have also incorporated incarcerated youth into estimates of the population. Due to these methodological differences, the number of youth who are considered disconnected varies. According to the research, the factors that are associated with disconnection are not entirely clear, though some studies have shown that parental education and receipt of public assistance are influential. This Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis expands the existing research on disconnected youth. The analysis uses Current Population Survey (CPS) data to construct a definition of "disconnected." This definition includes noninstitutionalized youth ages 16 through 24 who were not working or in school at the time of the survey (February through April) and did not work or attend school any time during the previous year. The definition is narrower than those used by other studies because it captures youth who are unemployed and not in school for a longer period of time. This is intended to exclude youth who may, in fact, be connected for part or most of a year. Youth who are both married to a connected spouse and are parenting are also excluded from the definition. For these reasons, the number and share of youth in the analysis who are considered disconnected are smaller than in some other studies. Still, 2.4 million youth ages 16 through 24—or 6.1% of this population—met the definition of disconnected in 2014, meaning that they were not in school or working for all of 2013 and at some point between February and April of 2014. Between 1988 and 2014, the rate of disconnection fluctuated between 3.9% (1999 and 2000) and 7.5% (2010). As expected, rates of disconnection have varied over time depending on economic cycles. Like the existing research, the CRS analysis finds that a greater share of minority youth, particularly black males, are disconnected, and that their rates of disconnection have been higher over time. The analysis evaluates some other characteristics that have not been widely studied in the existing research. For instance, compared to their peers in the general population, disconnected youth tend to have fewer years of education, and are more likely to live apart from their parents and (if they married to a disconnected spouse or are not married) to have children. Disconnected youth are also twice as likely to be poor than their connected peers. The analysis further finds that the parents of disconnected youth are more likely than their counterparts to be unemployed and to have lower educational attainment. Given the state of the current economy, rates of disconnection may remain stable or decrease. Policymakers may consider interventions to reconnect youth to work and/or school. Interventions can target children and youth at a particular stage of their early lives. Interventions can also focus on particular institutions or systems, such as the family, community, and schools.

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Introduction On May 8, 2017, Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc. announced that it agreed to acquire the Tribune Media Company for $6.6 billion. The transaction, if approved by shareholders and the U.S. government, would make Sinclair the nation's largest television broadcast company, giving it access to a far larger share of U.S. households than any other television broadcaster. It then discusses the specific matters the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) must examine in reviewing Sinclair's proposal to purchase Tribune. Sinclair reported more than $2.7 billion in total revenues in 2016. Sinclair is also the largest producer of local news in the country. In February 2017, the FCC's Media Bureau rescinded this guidance. 108-199 , directed the FCC to adopt rules that would cap the reach of a single company's television stations at 39% of U.S. television households. In April 2017, after Commissioner Pai became chairman, the FCC reinstated the UHF discount. Under that law, the purpose of DOJ's review is to ensure that Sinclair's acquisition of Tribune Media will not substantially reduce competition. 2. 3. Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rules The radio/television cross-ownership rules limit ownership of broadcast radio and television stations serving the same geographic area. The rules specify conditions regarding the proximity of radio and television stations that trigger the application of the rules, and how to count the number of separately-owned media outlets in a market, including television stations, radio stations, newspapers, and cable systems. The FCC's local television ownership rules permit an entity to own or control two television stations in the same television market so long as the overlap of the stations' signals is limited and the joint control does not violate the "top four/eight voices test" (described in Table 1 ). Sinclair could continue to operate KENV without running afoul of the FCC's ownership regulations. Sinclair-Tribune Transaction In the case of the Sinclair-Tribune transaction, both the FCC and DOJ would likely review the impact of Sinclair's acquisition of Tribune's stations in the 12 markets where Sinclair already owns stations. Secondly, the FCC's local media ownership rules would permit Sinclair to assume Tribune's sharing agreements in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News, VA, and Wilkes Barre-Scranton-Hazleton, PA, television markets. If the FCC changes or proposes to change the national television ownership rules, Sinclair would amend its application. The ability of broadcast television stations to produce and distribute local news sets them apart from other electronic media, such as online video distributors, national television networks, and MVPDs. Thus, in addition to the traditional competition analysis that both the DOJ and FCC are to undertake when reviewing the Sinclair-Tribune merger, the potential scale and scope of Sinclair's news operations post-merger will require a public interest review by the FCC.

On May 8, 2017, Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc. announced that it agreed to acquire the Tribune Media Company for $6.6 billion, including $3.9 billion for Tribune's stock, and the assumption of $2.7 billion of Tribune's debt. The transaction, if approved by shareholders and the U.S. government, would make Sinclair the nation's largest television broadcast company, giving it access to a far larger share of U.S. households than any other television broadcaster. Both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) must approve Sinclair's transactions before they can close. The DOJ is to review the transaction to ensure that it will not substantially reduce competition. The FCC is to review whether the transaction would (1) violate FCC broadcast media ownership rules and (2) serve the public interest. The Sinclair-Tribune transaction potentially runs afoul of two FCC rules regarding broadcast ownership: local television ownership rules (sometimes referred to as the "duopoly" rules), which limit common ownership of television stations serving the same geographic region; and the FCC's national television ownership rules, which cap the reach of a single company's television stations to 39% of U.S. television households. Recent rule and policy changes determining how the FCC defines ownership and television household reach, however, may allow Sinclair to own and/or operate more Tribune stations than it might otherwise. In February 2017, the FCC's Media Bureau rescinded previous guidance that it would closely scrutinize any proposed transactions that included certain types of operational and financial agreements between two separately owned stations. In April 2017, the FCC reversed a previous decision to eliminate the "UHF discount," which discounts by half the total number of television viewers reached by UHF stations for the purpose of enforcing its national ownership rule. Sinclair is the largest producer of local news in the country. If government agencies approve Sinclair's acquisition of Tribune without modifications, the 233 stations that would be owned or operated by Sinclair could reach 72% of the 114.7 million households receiving television over-the-air or via cable or satellite. The two companies own or operate stations in 14 common markets. Current FCC ownership rules address the overlaps in 12 of those 14 markets. Nevertheless, current FCC rules do not preclude Sinclair from entering into operational and financial agreements with third-party stations in two of those 12 markets: Wilkes-Barre, PA, and Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News, VA. The DOJ might preclude such arrangements on antitrust grounds. The ability of broadcast television stations to produce and distribute local news sets them apart from other electronic media, such as online video distributors, national television networks, and cable and satellite operators. Thus, in addition to the traditional competition analysis that both the DOJ and FCC are to undertake when reviewing the Sinclair-Tribune transaction, the potential scale and scope of Sinclair's news operations will require a public interest review by the FCC.

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Pursuant to this established principle of federal legal preeminence, any state law that conflicts with federal law is generally considered preempted and therefore void. In addition to the 20 states and the District of Columbia that currently exempt qualified users of medicinal marijuana from penalties imposed under state law, Colorado and Washington in late 2012 became the first states to legalize, regulate, and tax small amounts of marijuana for personal (i.e., nonmedicinal) use by individuals over the age of 21. As a result, individuals who grow, possess, use, sell, transport, or distribute marijuana, even when done in a manner consistent with state law or pursuant to a state-issued license, are nonetheless in violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and remain subject to federal criminal prosecution or other consequences under federal law. Federal Preemption of State Law The Colorado and Washington laws, which legalize, regulate, and tax an activity the federal government expressly prohibits, appear to be logically inconsistent with established federal policy and are therefore likely subject to a legal challenge under the constitutional doctrine of preemption. The Supremacy Clause, therefore, "elevates" the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations, and treaties above the laws of the states. As a result, where federal and state law are in conflict, the state law is generally preempted, leaving it void and without effect. Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act In Section 708 of the CSA (21 U.S.C. States remain free to pass laws relating to marijuana, or other controlled substances, so long as they do not create a "positive conflict" with federal law, such that the two laws "cannot consistently stand together." Application of Obstacle Preemption Principles to Washington and Colorado Legalization Measures The extent to which a state law that legalizes, regulates, and taxes marijuana for recreational purposes may be preempted by the CSA is a novel and unresolved legal question. Are the Washington and Colorado Laws Preempted by International Law? The memorandum instructs federal prosecutors to prioritize their "limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant [marijuana-related] threats" and identified the following eight activities as those that the federal government wants most to prevent: (1) distributing marijuana to children; (2) revenue from the sale of marijuana going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3) diverting marijuana from states that have legalized its possession to other states that prohibit it; (4) using state-authorized marijuana activity as a pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs; (5) using firearms or violent behavior in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) exacerbating adverse public health and safety consequences due to marijuana use, including driving while under the influence of marijuana; (7) growing marijuana on the nation's public lands; and (8) possessing or using marijuana on federal property. H.R. 499 , Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013. H.R. 501 , Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013. H.R. 689 , States' Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act. H.R. 710 , Truth in Trials Act. H.R. 784 , States' Medical Marijuana Property Rights Protection Act. H.R. 964 , Respect States' and Citizens' Rights Act of 2013. H.R. 1523 , Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2013. H.R. 1635 , National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy Act of 2013. H.R. 2652 , Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013.

May a state authorize the use of marijuana for recreational purposes even if such use is forbidden by federal law? This novel and unresolved legal question has vexed judges, politicians, and legal scholars, and it has also generated considerable public debate among supporters and opponents of "legalizing" the recreational use of marijuana. Under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana are prohibited for any reason other than to engage in federally approved research. Yet 18 states and the District of Columbia currently exempt qualified users of medicinal marijuana from penalties imposed under state law. In addition, in November 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize, regulate, and tax small amounts of marijuana for nonmedicinal (so-called "recreational") use by individuals over the age of 21. Thus, the current legal status of marijuana appears to be both contradictory and in a state of flux: as a matter of federal law, activities related to marijuana are generally prohibited and punishable by criminal penalties; whereas at the state level, certain marijuana usage is increasingly being permitted. Individuals and businesses engaging in marijuana-related activities that are authorized by state law nonetheless remain subject to federal criminal prosecution or other consequences under federal law. The Colorado and Washington laws that legalize, regulate, and tax an activity the federal government expressly prohibits appear to be logically inconsistent with established federal policy toward marijuana, and are therefore potentially subject to a legal challenge under the constitutional doctrine of preemption. This doctrine generally prevents states from enacting laws that are inconsistent with federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal law are generally preempted and therefore void and without effect. Yet Congress intended that the CSA would not displace all state laws associated with controlled substances, as it wanted to preserve a role for the states in regulating controlled substances. States thus remain free to pass laws relating to marijuana, or any other controlled substance, so long as they do not create a "positive conflict" with federal law, such that the two laws "cannot consistently stand together." This report summarizes the Washington and Colorado marijuana legalization laws and evaluates whether, or the extent to which, they may be preempted by the CSA or by international agreements. It also describes and analyzes the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) response to these legalization initiatives as set forth in a memorandum sent to all federal prosecutors in late August 2013. The report then identifies certain noncriminal consequences that marijuana users may face under federal law. Finally, the report closes with a description of selected legislative proposals introduced in the 113th Congress relating to the treatment of marijuana under federal law, including H.R. 499 (Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013); H.R. 501 (Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013); H.R. 689 (States' Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act); H.R. 710 (Truth in Trials Act); H.R. 784 (States' Medical Marijuana Property Rights Protection Act); H.R. 964 (Respect States' and Citizens' Rights Act of 2013); H.R. 1523 (Respect State Marijuana Laws Act of 2013); H.R. 1635 (National Commission on Federal Marijuana Policy Act of 2013); and H.R. 2652 (Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013).

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O riginally enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been described as a provision that is "u nlike any other in American law" and "unknown to any other legal system in the world." In its current form, the complete text of the ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Although it is only a single sentence long, the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades, as it evolved from a rarely used jurisdictional statute to a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for human rights offenses and acts of terrorism . The ATS was included among those class of jurisdictional provisions designed to provide a forum for federal courts to hear claims for violations of international law when the absence of such a forum could impact U.S. foreign relations. The United States was "embarrassed" by these incidents and by "its inability to provide judicial relief to the foreign officials injured in the United States[.]" The End of the Long Dormancy: 1980-2004 The Rebirth of the ATS: Filártiga v. Peña-Irala After nearly two centuries of dormancy, the ATS sprang into judicial and academic prominence in 1980 after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) issued a landmark decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala . But the Court also held that ATS jurisdiction is not limited to those claims. Beginning in 2013, that trend slowed after the Supreme Court recognized restrictions on the territorial reach of the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum . Interpreting Kiobel Although lower courts' interpretations of Kiobel are still evolving, many commentators see the Supreme Court's decision as having significantly limited the ATS as a vehicle to redress human rights abuses in U.S. courts. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC: Barring Foreign Corporate Liability In the Supreme Court's most recent ATS case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC , the Court granted certiorari to resolve another lingering circuit split in ATS litigation: May corporations be deemed liable under the ATS? Background on Jesner Jesner involved claims by approximately 6,000 foreign nationals (or their families or estate representatives) who were injured, killed, or captured by terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza between 1995 and 2005. The plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank—one of the largest financial institutions in the Middle East —aided and abetted four terrorist organizations allegedly responsible for the attacks. Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank maintained accounts for the organizations knowing that they would be used for terrorist actions, and played an active role in identifying the families of victims of suicide bombing so that they could be compensated in so-called "martyrdom payments." Against this backdrop of judicial caution, the Jesner Court concluded that it would be "inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations." The Court's decision arose, in part, from separation-of-powers and foreign affairs concerns. Because the "political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign policy concerns[,]" the Jesner Court concluded that the judicial caution described in Sosa warranted the creation of a bright-line rule that "foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS." Instead, the High Court placed significant limitations on the scope of viable ATS claims through decisions in Sosa , Kiobel , and, most recently, Jesner .

Passed by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been described as a provision "unlike any other in American law" and "unknown to any other legal system in the world." In its current form, the complete text of the statute provides the following: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." While just one sentence, the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades, as it evolved from a little-known jurisdictional provision to a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for injuries caused by human rights offenses and acts of terrorism. The ATS has its historical roots in founding-era efforts to give the federal government supremacy over the nation's power of foreign affairs and to avoid international conflict arising from disputes about the treatment of aliens in the United States. Although it has been part of U.S. law since 1789, the ATS was rarely used for nearly two centuries. In 1980, that long dormancy came to an end when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a landmark decision, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, which held that the ATS permits claims for violations of modern international human rights law. Filártiga caused an explosion of ATS litigation in the decades that followed, but the Supreme Court has placed limits on ATS jurisdiction in its recent jurisprudence. In a 2004 case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a "narrow set" of claims for violations of international law. And in 2013, the Supreme Court held in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that the statute does not provide jurisdiction for claims between foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising entirely outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Lower courts' interpretations of these decisions are still evolving and, in some cases, conflicting, but many observers agree that Sosa and Kiobel have significantly narrowed the scope of the ATS. In its most recent ATS case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court further limited the scope of viable claims by holding that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS. Jesner involved claims by approximately 6,000 foreign nationals (or their families or estate representatives) who were injured, killed, or captured by terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. The plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank—the largest bank in Jordan—aided and abetted the terrorist organizations allegedly responsible for the attacks by maintaining bank accounts that Arab Bank knew would be used to fund terrorism and by identifying the relatives of suicide bombers so that they could be compensated with so-called "martyrdom payments." A divided Supreme Court held in Jesner that the claims must be dismissed because ATS jurisdiction does not extend to claims against foreign corporations, including Arab Bank. Separation-of-powers and foreign policy concerns led the Court to conclude that it would be "inappropriate" to permit ATS liability against foreign corporations. The High Court's narrowing of the available avenues to raise an ATS claim in Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner has led commentators to debate whether the statute remains a viable mechanism to provide redress for human rights abuses in U.S. courts.

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The increased use of personal data assistants (PDAs) and smartphones by employees outside of a traditional work schedule has raised questions about whether such use may be compensable under the FLSA. As PDAs and smartphones provide employees with mobile access to work email, clients, and co-workers, as well as the ability to create and edit documents outside of the workplace, it may be possible to argue that non-exempt employees who perform work-related activities with these devices should receive overtime if such activities occur beyond the 40-hour workweek. This report reviews the FLSA's overtime provisions and examines some of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decisions on work. Although PDAs and smartphones provide a new opportunity to consider what constitutes work for purposes of the FLSA, the Court's past FLSA decisions, including those involving on-call time, may provide guidance on how courts could evaluate overtime claims involving the new devices.

The increased use of personal data assistants (PDAs) and smartphones by employees outside of a traditional work schedule has raised questions about whether such use may be compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). As PDAs and smartphones provide employees with mobile access to work email, clients, and co-workers, as well as the ability to create and edit documents outside of the workplace, it may be possible to argue that employees who are not exempt from the FLSA's requirements and who perform work-related activities with these devices should receive overtime if such activities occur beyond the 40-hour workweek. This report reviews the FLSA's overtime provisions, and examines some of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decisions on work. Although PDAs and smartphones provide a new opportunity to consider what constitutes work for purposes of the FLSA, the Court's past FLSA decisions, including those involving on-call time, may provide guidance on how courts could evaluate overtime claims involving the new devices.

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Among other things, they argue that the Small Creditor Portfolio QM, a compliance option under the rule that is intended to benefit small creditors that keep loans in portfolio, should be broadened. They propose modifying the rule to make it easier for a lender to comply if it keeps the loan instead of selling it to another institution. Supporters of expanded portfolio lending proposals argue that because the lender is holding the loan in its portfolio, it is exposed to the risks associated with the loan (such as the risk that the lender will not be repaid) and therefore has the incentive to ensure that the loan is safely underwritten. Critics of the expanded portfolio lending proposals argue that the incentives of holding the loan in portfolio are insufficient to protect consumers and that the existing protections in the rule are essential to ensuring that the failures of the past are not repeated. This report will briefly explain the ATR rule and will analyze the policy debate related to portfolio lending and qualified mortgages. Overview of the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act established the ATR requirement. Under the ATR requirement, a lender must determine based on documented and verified information that, at the time a mortgage loan is made, the borrower has the ability to repay the loan. Lenders that fail to comply could be subject to legal liability, such as the payment of certain statutory damages. Under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rule implementing the ATR requirement, a lender can comply with the ATR requirement in two ways. Second, a lender could originate a mortgage that satisfies the more prescriptive standards of the QM rule. When a lender originates a mortgage that receives QM status, it is presumed to have complied with the ATR requirement, which consequently reduces the lender's potential legal liability of its residential mortgage lending activities. S. 1484 , the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, was reported by the Senate Banking Committee on June 2, 2015. H.R. They differ, however, in whether the mortgage retains its QM status if it is transferred from the originating lender's portfolio and whether the mortgage must be in a lender's portfolio (either the originator's or any lender's portfolio) indefinitely or for a limited period of time. The CFPB limited the portfolio QM option to portfolio loans held by small lenders rather than to all portfolio loans because it believes that small creditors are a unique and important source of non-conforming mortgage credit and mortgage credit in rural areas for which there is no readily available replacement, that small creditors may be particularly burdened by the litigation risk associated with the ability-to-repay rules and are particularly likely to reduce or cease mortgage lending if subjected to these rules without accommodation, and that small creditors have both strong incentives and particular ability to make these loans in a way that ensures that consumers are able to repay that may not be present for larger creditors. Several policy issues related to lender restrictions are discussed below. H.R. Supporters disagree, however, with how much discretion the lender should be given. An expanded portfolio QM option may have a greater effect on credit availability at that time. Although the effect on credit availability may be minimal, an expanded portfolio QM option that has less prescriptive underwriting standards could have a greater impact on regulatory burden. The possibility of collateral dependent lending and other factors could result in a lender keeping mortgages in portfolio that may be profitable but not prudently underwritten. S. 1491 is the most similar to the Small Creditor Portfolio QM in that it would require similar loan criteria to be followed for a mortgage to qualify for the expanded QM but it would allow larger lenders to be eligible.

Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act established the ability-to-repay (ATR) requirement. Under the ATR requirement, a lender must determine based on documented and verified information that, at the time a mortgage is made, the borrower has the ability to repay the loan. Lenders that fail to comply with the ATR rule could be subject to legal liability, such as the payment of certain statutory damages. A lender can comply with the ATR requirement in different ways, one of which is by originating a Qualified Mortgage (QM). When a lender originates a QM, it is presumed to have complied with the ATR requirement, which consequently reduces the lender's potential legal liability for its residential mortgage lending activities. The QM rule has several compliance options that a lender can use to have a mortgage that it originates receive QM status, one of which is the Small Creditor Portfolio QM. Critics of the QM rule argue that the Small Creditor Portfolio QM, which is intended to benefit small creditors that keep loans in portfolio, should be broadened. They propose modifying the rule to make it easier for a lender to comply if it keeps the loan instead of selling it. Proponents of an expanded portfolio QM disagree on several policy issues, but, in general, they argue that because the lender is holding the loan in its portfolio, it is exposed to the risks associated with the loan (such as the risk that the lender will not be repaid) and therefore has the incentive to ensure that the loan is safely underwritten. The lender, the argument goes, should be allowed to follow less prescriptive underwriting criteria when the mortgage is held in portfolio, and more lenders should be allowed to avail themselves of this option than is currently allowed. Critics of the expanded portfolio lending proposals counter that the incentives of holding the loan in portfolio are insufficient to protect consumers and that the existing protections in the rule are needed to ensure that the failures of the past are not repeated. This report analyzes the policy debate related to portfolio lending and qualified mortgages, focusing on the legislation that is the subject of congressional debate: H.R. 1210, the Portfolio Lending and Mortgage Access Act; S. 1484, the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act; and S. 1491/H.R. 2642, the Community Lender Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act. The analysis in this report raises several issues: Economic theory supports different arguments that are made about whether a mortgage that is kept in portfolio is more or less likely to be prudently underwritten. The retained risk associated with keeping a mortgage in portfolio may provide the lender an incentive to ensure that the borrower is creditworthy, but increasing home prices and issues related to the arbitrage of capital requirements may provide incentives to keep mortgages in portfolio that may be profitable but not prudently underwritten. Empirical research has also led to conflicting results. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau argues that small creditors may have "strong incentives and particular ability" to make mortgages that accurately assess a borrower's ability to repay that larger lenders may not have. It is unclear, however, what the appropriate size thresholds should be and whether other factors, such as keeping the mortgage in portfolio, can compensate for a larger lender's possibly reduced incentives and ability. It is unclear how significant an effect an expanded portfolio QM option would have on credit availability, as the mortgages that would qualify for the expanded option may already receive QM status under existing options. The legislative proposals may, however, have a greater effect on reducing a creditor's regulatory burden, as the lender may be able to use less cost-intensive underwriting processes of the expanded QM option. Although the burden may be reduced for the lender, it could be borne by consumers if they have fewer consumer protections under an expanded portfolio QM.

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On May 24, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lewis v. City of Chicago , a case involving questions regarding the timeliness of disparate impact discrimination claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. In Lewis , a group of aspiring black firefighters sued the City of Chicago over its repeated use of an employment test with racially disproportionate results to hire several new groups of firefighters over a six-year period. The city argued that the applicants, who filed their claim almost two years after the employment examination was administered, had exceeded the statutory deadline for filing claims under Title VII, while the applicants claimed that the city committed a fresh act of discrimination each time it relied upon the test to hire a new class of firefighters, thus repeatedly restarting the clock on the filing deadline. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the applicants for the firefighting positions, holding that such disparate impact claims may be brought each time an employer uses the results of a discriminatory test to hire.

This report discusses Lewis v. City of Chicago, a recent case in which the Supreme Court considered questions regarding the timeliness of disparate impact discrimination claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. In Lewis, a group of aspiring black firefighters sued the City of Chicago over its repeated use of an employment test with racially disproportionate results to hire several new groups of firefighters over a six-year period. The city argued that the applicants, who filed their claim almost two years after the employment examination was administered, had exceeded the statutory deadline for filing claims under Title VII, while the applicants claimed that the city committed a fresh act of discrimination each time it relied upon the test to hire a new class of firefighters, thus repeatedly restarting the clock on the filing deadline. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the applicants for the firefighting positions, holding that such disparate impact claims may be brought each time an employer uses the results of a discriminatory test to hire.

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Background Since achieving political independence in 1943, Lebanon has struggled to overcome a series of internal and external political and security challenges. Congress and the executive branch historically have sought to support pro-U.S. elements in the country, and in recent years the United States has invested more than $1 billion to develop Lebanon's security forces. Other Members have criticized U.S. policy and sought to condition U.S. assistance to limit its potential to benefit anti-U.S. groups. Congress has appropriated more than $1 billion in assistance ( Table 3 ) for Lebanon since the end of the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 to strengthen Lebanese security forces and promote economic growth. Recent Developments The war in neighboring Syria, the influx of Syrian refugees, Hezbollah's intervention on behalf of President Asad, Lebanese Sunni support for Syrian opposition forces and a wave of sectarian violence and terrorist attacks by Sunni extremist groups have heightened tensions and complexities surrounding all of these issues. Its leaders argue that extremists will target Lebanon even if Hezbollah withdraws, and its supporters are critical of Lebanese Sunni support for extremism at home and in Syria. Echoing these concerns, the U.S. intelligence community told Congress in its 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment that, "Lebanon in 2014 probably will continue to experience sectarian violence among Lebanese and terrorist attacks by Sunni extremists and Hezbollah, which are targeting each-others' interests. …Increased frequency and lethality of violence in Lebanon could erupt into sustained and widespread fighting." The Amal movement continued as a political, social, and militia organization and disarmed following the civil war. Hezbollah's ties to Iran and its status as a defender of Lebanese security and priorities have been placed under increased scrutiny in Lebanon because of the group's military intervention in Syria on behalf of the Iran-aligned Asad government. U.S. officials report that Hezbollah has provided assistance and training to Shia militia forces in Syria, and in 2013, it overtly intervened in Syria on behalf of the Asad government. U.S. Assistance and Issues for Congress Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the George W. Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a significant increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Lebanese leaders and their U.S. interlocutors are acutely focused on the threat that potential power vacuums in executive, legislative, and security force leadership positions may pose to Lebanon's security in 2014. Broader evaluation of the direction of U.S. policy toward Syria is ongoing in both chambers and may include new assessments of U.S. engagement in Lebanon. In the interim, Lebanon is likely to remain an arena for sectarian and geopolitical competition, with political paralysis and insecurity as the result.

Lebanon's small geographic size and population belie the important role it has long played in the security, stability, and economy of the Levant and the broader Middle East. Congress and the executive branch have recognized Lebanon's status as a venue for regional strategic competition and have engaged diplomatically, financially, and at times, militarily to influence events there. For most of its independent existence, Lebanon has been torn by periodic civil conflict and political battles between rival religious sects and ideological groups. External military intervention, occupation, and interference have exacerbated Lebanon's political struggles in recent decades. Lebanon is an important factor in U.S. calculations regarding regional security, particularly regarding Israel and Iran. Congressional concerns have focused on the prominent role that Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia Muslim militia, political party, and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, continues to play in Lebanon and beyond, including its recent armed intervention in Syria. Congress has appropriated more than $1 billion since the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 to support U.S. policies designed to extend Lebanese security forces' control over the country and promote economic growth. The civil war in neighboring Syria is progressively destabilizing Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 1 million predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees have fled to Lebanon, equivalent to close to one-quarter of Lebanon's population. Regional supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar al Asad are using Lebanon as a transit point and staging ground in a wider regional conflict. Hezbollah has intervened in Syria in support of Asad, and Sunni extremist groups based in Syria are cooperating with Lebanese and Palestinian Sunni extremists in Lebanon to carry out retaliatory attacks against Hezbollah targets. The U.S. intelligence community told Congress in its 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment that, "Lebanon in 2014 probably will continue to experience sectarian violence among Lebanese and terrorist attacks by Sunni extremists and Hezbollah, which are targeting each-others' interests.... Increased frequency and lethality of violence in Lebanon could erupt into sustained and widespread fighting." In January 2014, the U.S. State Department warned against all travel to Lebanon in light of growing terrorist threats. The question of how best to marginalize Hezbollah and other anti-U.S. Lebanese actors without provoking civil conflict among divided Lebanese sectarian political forces remains the underlying challenge for U.S. policy makers. Ongoing political deadlock and the prospect of executive, legislative, and security force leadership vacuums amplify this challenge. This report provides an overview of Lebanon and current issues of U.S. interest. It provides background information, analyzes recent developments and key legislative debates, and tracks legislation, U.S. assistance, and recent congressional action. It will be updated to reflect major events or policy changes. For more information on related issues, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43119, Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

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Digital radio broadcasts over cell phones became available in Europe in the late 1990's. The FCC reported 15,433 licensed radio stations (AM, FM, or HD channels) as of September 2014. iBiquity also markets digital radios and radio chips; the primary consumer market is for car radios. The BBC reportedly is leading an industry coalition that includes the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and Commercial Radio Australia. In the United States the FM/DAB/Internet chip for smartphones is marketed as NextRadio. NextRadio requires a smartphone with the customized chip and radio tuner and uses an app that makes it possible to listen to over-the-air radio while connected to the Internet, providing a number of interactive features. As subscribers switch to smartphones, wireless service providers have the opportunity to include NextRadio as a product enhancement. Some research shows that trends favor Internet streaming over radio, although radio remains an important source for information and entertainment. The topic of using radio-enabled cellphones for emergency alerts in the United States has periodically been considered by policy makers in the field of emergency communications, but no specific actions have been taken to include this technology in emergency planning.

The concurrent developments of digital radio broadcasting and digital cellular networks have enabled hybrid products that incorporate over-the-air broadcasting into cellphones. A recent introduction (2013) is a hybrid radio/smartphone with Internet connectivity, marketed in the United States as NextRadio. NextRadio uses a chip that receives analog FM and digital radio, with enhancements such as customized radio listening; the primary radio connection is over-the-air, not through Internet streaming. On the assumption that radio broadcasting is more accessible and reliable than communications over wireless networks with Internet connectivity, some broadcasting industry leaders have proposed that FM radio chips be required—or at least encouraged—for smartphones as part of the nation's emergency communications preparedness. To give perspective on the proposal for widespread deployment of FM radio chips in smartphones as an emergency preparedness measure, this report provides information on consumer and industry trends in radio and wireless network communications. It also provides a brief overview of the role of technology in disseminating emergency alerts and information.

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Introduction Insurance is a critical piece of a modern economic system, but it often goes unnoticed until it becomes prohibitively expensive or its availability is curtailed. Such problems occurred in the medical malpractice insurance market in the first half of this decade. Many physicians experienced substantial increases in insurance premiums, and there were reports of problems with the availability of physician services because of doctors retiring or relocating from areas that have seen high premium increases. Crises have been proclaimed in the past as well; similar events occurred in the latter half of both the 1970s and 1980s. Since 2004 or so, overall losses experienced by medical malpractice insurers have dropped significantly and overall premiums have moderated as well, although not nearly to the same extent as losses. 5 ) Congresses, the House passed bills whose central thrust was to limit damages for medical malpractice tort claims. The Senate, however, did not act on any of these House bills and failed to invoke cloture on the Senate bills addressing medical malpractice ( S. 11 , S. 2061 , and S. 2207 in the 108 th Congress; S. 22 and S. 23 in the 109 th Congress). The medical liability insurance market is not currently exhibiting widespread crisis symptoms. Insurance Fundamentals Risk Transfer and Financial Intermediation The most obvious function of insurance is to allow a person or corporation facing some risk, such as the risk that a physician will be sued for medical malpractice, to transfer this risk to another economic entity. This means estimating the future return on investments as well as estimating future losses from claims. A hard market typically occurs when the investment climate worsens and returns drop. Medical Malpractice's Long "Tail" Medical malpractice liability insurance has what is known in the insurance industry as a long "tail." This unpredictability reduces the accuracy of the estimations of expected losses that are at the heart of insurance pricing. One of the particular aspects of the historical evolution of the medical malpractice insurance market, which is discussed in greater detail below, has been the proliferation of small insurers, particularly provider-owned companies. Historical Experience in Medical Malpractice Insurance Particular problems in medical malpractice insurance have been observed for many years. It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss in detail issues surrounding tort changes, but it should be noted that a cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice claims is not the only change that has been implemented at the state level. Representative DeFazio also introduced this bill, H.R. Assessing the effectiveness of any of the various policy changes over the past three decades is empirically difficult and strong conclusions have often equally been strongly disputed.

Insurance is a critical piece of a modern economic system, but it often goes unnoticed until it becomes prohibitively expensive or its availability is curtailed. Such problems occurred in the medical malpractice liability insurance market most recently in the early part of the 2000s. Many physicians experienced substantial increases in insurance premiums, and there were reports of problems with availability of physician services due to doctors retiring or relocating from areas that had seen high premium increases. This was not the first time such a crisis has been proclaimed; similar events occurred in the latter half of both the 1970s and 1980s. In the latter half of this decade, overall losses for medical malpractice insurance have dropped and premiums have moderated. Public discussion of medical malpractice has lessened as well. The fundamental purpose of insurance is to transfer an indefinite risk from one party to another for a definite premium. The pricing of this premium is critical, but determining this price is uncertain because it depends on estimates of the chance of a future loss, as well as the estimated value of that loss. The premium will also depend on estimates of future investment gains or losses because an insurer also acts as a financial intermediary and invests the capital that is held in reserve against future losses. The market for medial malpractice liability insurance has been unstable during the past three decades for a variety of reasons. Recurring market problems have provoked various policy reactions in both state legislatures and in Congress. Assessing the effectiveness of particular policy changes is, however, complex and strong conclusions have typically been equally strongly disputed. Congress has not directly addressed medical malpractice liability insurance since the 109th Congress, when the House passed a bill, H.R. 5, whose centerpiece was a limitation on tort claims for medical malpractice; similar bills passed the House in the previous two Congresses. The Senate, however, did not act on any of these House bills and failed to invoke cloture on the Senate bills addressing medical malpractice. Although the medical malpractice insurance market is not currently in the midst of a crisis, Congress has again focused on medical malpractice in the 111th Congress as a part of overall healthcare reform. This report examines the economic issues and historical experience surrounding medical malpractice insurance. It includes an explanation of the fundamentals of insurance and how these fundamentals relate specifically to medical malpractice insurance. It also includes a discussion of the evolution of the medical malpractice insurance market since the 1970s and policy changes over this time. It will be updated as major legislative events occur.

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4986 / P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option; and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease's completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. §7309 that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. yards. In a statement issued prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act, the ASA stated that The Department of Defense (DOD) is purchasing, via long-term leases, foreign-built ships to meet long-term military requirements. DOD Position DOD has argued that its leases of foreign-built ships are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question, and that limiting such leases to no more than two years would make them much more expensive and difficult to implement, and therefore less cost effective. Prior-Year Legislative Activity FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118 . Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy is directed to update its March 2008 report on the use of such leases and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding.

Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Operating under this provision, the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years used lease options and renewals to lease some foreign-built cargo ships for total periods of almost 10 years—a length of time that some observers argue effectively circumvented a legal requirement that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. shipyards. These observers, particularly the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), proposed reducing the current five-year legal limit on ship leases to two years for foreign-built ships. DOD opposed the idea, arguing that its ship leases are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question. Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option, and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease's completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. The explanatory statement on the final version of the FY2010 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118 of December 19, 2009) directed the Navy to update its March 2008 report on the leasing of foreign-built ships and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding.

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Introduction Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532, was enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The BAPCPA implemented the Model Law by adding chapter 15 to the Code. Chapter 15 replaced 11 U.S.C. This report summarizes the evolution and content of chapter 15. Although the Europeans did not implement the European Union Regulation on Insolvency until May 2002, their dual-approach of harmonizing international procedures while acknowledging differences in individual nation's substantive laws inspired three other multilateral initiatives to harmonize bankruptcy laws: (1) the American Law Institute (ALI)'s Transnational Insolvency Project, in conjunction with NAFTA; (2) the International Bar Association's Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat ; and (3) the United Nations Conference on International Trade and Investment's (UNCITRAL's) Model Law of Cross-Border Insolvency. By modifying and expanding §§ 303-306 of the 1978 Act, chapter 15 continues to focus on the role of the foreign representative and clarifies procedural cooperation in full/main, ancillary, and suspension/dismissal proceedings.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 added chapter 15 to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 15 implements the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Investment's Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. In so doing, chapter 15 (1) retains the Code's focus on the role of the foreign representative, initially introduced in 1978; (2) clarifies procedural cooperation between U.S. and foreign courts; and (3) promotes comity and reciprocity, wherever possible, with respect to the interpretation and application of substantive law. Chapter 15 applies to international bankruptcy cases involving individuals or businesses; however, multinational banks and corporations have had a higher profile. This report summarizes the evolution and the content of chapter 15. This report was prepared by Georgine Kryda, Law Clerk, under the general supervision of [author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney.

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Introduction This report provides an overview of the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). It also identifies, for the 108 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 38 organizations in the executive branch (25 independent agencies, six agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and seven multilateral banking organizations) and four agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, formerly an independent agency covered by earlier versions of this report, became part of the Department of Homeland Security when that department was established in 2003; it is not covered by this report. Another government organization, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, came into existence early in the 108 th Congress after it was established by the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003. Appointments During the 108th Congress During the 108 th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 40 nominations to full-time positions in independent and other agencies. Of these nominations, 31 were confirmed and nine were returned to the President; none were withdrawn. The President made four recess appointments during this period to positions in organizations covered in this report (the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development). Two of these appointments occurred during the 2004 Memorial Day recess and two during the 2004 August recess. All four of these recess appointments would have expired at the end of the first session of the 109 th Congress. Before this time, the Senate confirmed nominations of each of these four appointees to their respective positions. NOMINATIONS AND INCUMBENTS: FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AGENCIES Appalachian Regional Commission Broadcasting Board of Governors Central Intelligence Agency/ Intelligence Community Corporation for National and Community Service Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency to the District of Columbia Delta Regional Authority Environmental Protection Agency Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service General Services Administration Millennium Challenge Corporation National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Archives and Records Administration National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities National Science Foundation Office of Government Ethics Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Office of Personnel Management Office of Special Counsel Overseas Private Investment Corporation Peace Corps Selective Service System Small Business Administration Social Security Administration Trade and Development Agency U.S. Agency for International Development NOMINATIONS AND INCUMBENTS: FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Council of Economic Advisers Council on Environmental Quality Office of Management and Budget Office of National Drug Control Policy Office of Science and Technology Policy Office of the U.S. Trade Representative NOMINATIONS AND INCUMBENTS: FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS African Development Bank Asian Development Bank European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Inter-American Development Bank International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) International Joint Commission, U.S. and Canada International Monetary Fund NOMINATIONS AND INCUMBENTS: FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AGENCIES Architect of the Capitol Government Accountability Office Government Printing Office Library of Congress Appendix A. Alphabetical Listing of Nominees and Appointees, January 3, 2003 -January 3, 2005 Appendix B.

This report provides an overview of the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate. It also discusses nominations to full-time positions in 38 executive branch organizations (25 independent agencies, six agencies in the Executive Office of the President (EOP), and seven multilateral banking organizations) and four legislative branch agencies. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, formerly an independent agency covered by earlier versions of this report, became part of the Department of Homeland Security when that department was established during the period covered by this report. Another government organization, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, came into existence early in the 108th Congress after it was established by the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003. During the 108th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 40 nominations to full-time positions in independent and other agencies. Of these, 31 were confirmed and nine were returned to the President; none were withdrawn. The President made four recess appointments during this period to positions in organizations covered in this report (the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development). Two of these occurred during the 2004 Memorial Day recess and two during the 2004 August recess. All four of these recess appointments would have expired at the end of the first session of the 109th Congress. Before this time, the Senate confirmed nominations of each of these four appointees to their respective positions. Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, and telephone discussions with agency officials. The report will not be updated.

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Introduction This report presents data on the geographic distribution of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) tax expenditure. Tax expenditures can generally be viewed as either government spending administered via the tax code, or tax incentives that are intended to achieve particular policy objectives. Regardless of the interpretation, tax expenditures such as the mortgage interest deduction provide a benefit to qualifying taxpayers by lowering their federal tax liabilities. Additionally, understanding how the benefits of the deduction are currently distributed across taxpayers in different states may help Congress in assessing the potential impact on constituents from a particular policy change. Background Currently, a homeowner may deduct the interest paid on a mortgage that finances a primary or secondary residence as long as they itemize their tax deductions. The amount of interest that may be deducted is limited to the interest incurred on the first $1 million of combined mortgage debt and the first $100,000 of home equity debt ($1.1 million total). If a taxpayer has a mortgage exceeding $1 million they may still claim the deduction, but they must allocate their interest payments appropriately to ensure that only the interest associated with the first $1 million of debt is deducted. 99-514 ) eventually restricted the amount of mortgage interest that could be deducted and limited the number of homes for which the deduction could be claimed to two. In recent years a number of proposals to modify the mortgage interest deduction have emerged. Some proposals would reduce the maximum mortgage amount on which the mortgage interest deduction could be taken, presumably to better target potential new homeowners and moderate income taxpayers. Other proposals have suggested converting the deduction to a tax credit. A credit would provide the same dollar for dollar benefit to claimants regardless of income, and would not require itemization. Still other proposals would preserve the provision as a deduction, but limit the rate at which higher income taxpayers could deduct interest. Data Analysis The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has estimated that the mortgage interest deduction reduced federal tax revenues by $59.0 billion in FY2016. These factors are discussed in greater detail below. Home Prices Area home prices contribute to the variation in the mortgage interest deduction data in two primary ways. Thus a portion of the geographic variation in the data presented in this report is attributable to variation in state and local taxes. It is important to note that any change to the mortgage interest deduction would likely require careful consideration of how to transition to the new policy so as to minimize disruptions to the housing market and overall economy. The variation in the claims rates and benefit value documented in this report suggests that eliminating the deduction could help promote a more uniform tax treatment across taxpayers. The methodology for producing the state-by-state distributional estimates (described below) required use of the JCT's estimate of the mortgage interest deduction tax expenditure by income.

This report analyzes variation in the mortgage interest deduction tax expenditure across states. Tax expenditures, such as the mortgage interest deduction, can generally be viewed as government spending administered via the tax code, or as tax incentives that are intended to achieve particular policy objectives. Regardless of the interpretation, tax expenditures provide a benefit to qualifying taxpayers by lowering their federal tax liabilities. Recent proposals to change the mortgage interest deduction could affect how its benefits are distributed. Understanding how the deduction's benefits are currently distributed across taxpayers in different states may help Congress in assessing the potential impact on constituents from a particular policy change. Currently, homeowners may deduct the interest they pay on mortgages that finance a primary or secondary residence as long as they itemize their tax deductions. The amount of interest that may be deducted is limited to the interest incurred on the first $1 million of combined mortgage debt and the first $100,000 of home equity debt ($1.1 million total). If a taxpayer has a mortgage exceeding $1 million they may still claim the deduction, but they must allocate their interest payments appropriately to ensure that only the interest associated with the first $1 million of debt is deducted. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has consistently estimated the mortgage interest deduction to be one of the largest tax expenditures. The results of the analysis presented in this report indicate that the benefits of the mortgage interest deduction are not distributed uniformly across the states. A number of reasons that likely explain why the variation exists are discussed, including differences in homeownership rates, home prices, state and local tax policies, and area incomes. The data used in this report, however, are not detailed enough to isolate and quantify the effect each one of these factors has on the variation across states. In recent years a number of proposals to modify the mortgage interest deduction have emerged. Some proposals would reduce the maximum mortgage amount on which the mortgage interest deduction could be taken, presumably to better target potential new homeowners and moderate-income taxpayers. Other proposals have suggested converting the deduction to a tax credit. A credit would provide the same dollar-for-dollar benefit to claimants regardless of income, and would not require itemization. Still other proposals would preserve the provision as a deduction, but limit the rate at which higher-income taxpayers could deduct interest. Analysis of several of the more frequently proposed changes suggests that some of them may provide a benefit that is more uniformly distributed. For example, limiting the size of mortgages that qualify for the deduction could reduce some of the variation that is caused by regional differences in home prices. Replacing the deduction with a credit, or limiting the rate at which interest could be deducted, could reduce variation in benefits caused by differences in area incomes. Still, it is important to understand that any change to the mortgage interest deduction would likely require careful consideration over how to transition to the new policy to minimize disruptions to the housing market and overall economy.

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This has often resulted in politics resembling a game of "musical chairs." Nevertheless, due to a wide-ranging policy consensus, Estonia has followed a remarkably consistent general course—building a democracy, a free-market economy, and integrating into NATO and the European Union (EU). After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, he moved to Estonia, and later served as Ambassador to the United States and Foreign Minister. Estonians played a key role in developing software for the popular Skype Internet phone. Estonia's Foreign Policy Estonia achieved its two key foreign policy objectives when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. It has acted as an advocate for democratic and pro-Western forces in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other countries bordering Russia. Estonia's relations with Russia remain difficult.

After restoration of its independence in 1991, following decades of Soviet rule, Estonia made rapid strides toward establishing a democratic political system and a dynamic, free market economy. It achieved two key foreign policy goals when it joined NATO and the European Union in 2004. However, relations with Russia remain difficult. Estonia suffered cyberattacks against its Internet infrastructure in April and May 2007 during a controversy about the removal of a Soviet-era statue in Estonia. Estonian leaders believe the cyberattacks may have been instigated by Moscow. Estonia and the United States have excellent relations. Estonia has deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and plays a significant role in efforts to encourage democracy and a pro-Western orientation among post-Soviet countries. This report will be updated as needed.

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About HHS The mission of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to "enhance the health and well-being of Americans by providing for effective health and human services and by fostering sound, sustained advances in the sciences underlying medicine, public health, and social services." Overview of the FY2018 HHS Budget Request The HHS budget request for FY2018 was affected by two notable circumstances. Budgetary Resources versus Appropriations Readers should be aware that the HHS budget includes a broader set of budgetary resources than the amounts provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. As a result, certain amounts shown in FY2018 HHS budget materials (including amounts for prior years) will not match amounts provided to HHS by annual appropriations acts and displayed in accompanying congressional documents. In addition, the HHS budget request takes into account the department as a whole, while the appropriations process divides HHS funding across three different appropriations bills. A table of Key Policy Staff is included at the end of the report.

This report provides information about the FY2018 budget request for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It begins by reviewing the department's mission and structure. This is followed by an overview of the total FY2018 request for the department. Next, the report discusses the concept of the HHS budget as a whole, compared to funding provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. This distinction is important because certain amounts shown in FY2018 HHS budget materials (including amounts for prior years) will not match amounts provided to HHS by annual appropriations acts (and displayed in accompanying congressional documents), because they take into account a broader set of budgetary resources. The report concludes with a breakdown of the HHS request by agency, along with additional HHS resources that provide further information on the request. A table of key policy staff is included at the end of the report.

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Introduction The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $15.8 billion for FY2018. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. This report provides a detailed discussion of the four Title I-A formulas used to determine grants as modified by the ESSA. Table A-1 in Appendix A offers an overview of the key elements included in the four formulas. Appendix B provides an overview of Title I-A appropriations levels in recent years. Annual appropriations bills specify that portions of each year's appropriation be allocated under each of these different formulas. In FY2018, an estimated 41% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grant formula, 9% through the Concentration Grant formula, and 25% through each of the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. Then these maximum grants are reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. These adjustments include the following: Through FY2016, reservation of 4% of state total allocations to be used for school improvement grants; beginning in FY2017, states are required to reserve the larger of (1) 7% of state total allocations or (2) the amount the state reserved for school improvement under Title I-A in FY2016 plus its school improvement grant for FY2016; Reservation of 1% of state total allocations under all formulas for ESEA Title I, Part A, plus funds allocated under the Migrant Education Program (Title I-C) and the Prevention and Intervention Programs for Children and Youth Who Are Neglected, Delinquent, or At-Risk (Title I-D), or $400,000, whichever is greater, for state administration; Through FY2016, optional reservation of up to 5% of any statewide increase in total Title I-A grants over the previous year for academic achievement awards to participating schools that significantly reduce achievement gaps between disadvantaged and other student groups or exceed adequate yearly progress standards for two consecutive years or more; Beginning in FY2017, an optional reservation of 3% of the state total allocation for direct student services; Provision of funds to eligible charter schools or to account for recent LEA boundary changes; and Optional use by states of alternative methods to reallocate all of the grants as calculated by ED among the state's small LEAs (defined as those serving an area with a total population of 20,000 or fewer persons). Education Finance Incentive Grant Allocation Formula.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $15.8 billion for FY2018. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year's Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of the four formulas. In FY2018, an estimated 41% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grant formula, 9% through the Concentration Grant formula, and 25% through each of the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "formula child count," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and "hold harmless" provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. This report provides a detailed discussion of each of the four Title I-A formulas used to determine grants. Table A-1 in Appendix A offers an overview of the key elements included in the four formulas. Appendix B provides an overview of Title I-A appropriations levels in recent years.

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Some observers note the importance of statutory authorities and regular congressional oversight of the law enforcement-intelligence relationship. (11) Activities abroad threatening U.S. security interests may also be violations of international law. (23) In some cases, efforts of intelligence agencies in support of law enforcement efforts proved to be ill-advised. It is now making much greater use of open sources, i.e. , coordinating offices, in the Justice Department to interface with theCIA; new procedures to govern requests for intelligence-file searches that might result in the production of materials to be used in court cases; requirements for law enforcement agencies to provide notice to prosecutors when there is an intelligence interest; measures concerning the treatment of the identity of intelligence officers whose identities are classified; new procedures to protect classified information in situations not envisioned by earlier statutes, such as the Classified Information Procedures Act; a Memorandum of Understanding between the Attorney General and intelligence agencies that outlines the circumstances under which the agencies must report suspected criminal activity; and, an intercommunity training plan to facilitate coordination. Coordinative and consultative mechanisms--an Intelligence-Law Enforcement Policy Board and a Joint Intelligence-LawEnforcement Working Group (JICLE)--have been established at several levels in response to the 1994 assessmentof theJoint Task Force on Intelligence and Law Enforcement reached to ensure that exchanges of information are soundlyestablished and preserve the integrity of the judicial process, as well as the legitimate functions of the IntelligenceCommunity. Section 804 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act( P.L.104-293 ) established within the NSC a Committee on Transnational Threats to develop strategies to deal with suchthreatsand to assist in the resolution of operational and policy differences among Federal departments and agencies inrespondingto the threats, to ensure the effective sharing of information about transnational threats among Federal departmentsandagencies, "including law enforcement agencies and the elements of the intelligence community," and "to developguidelines to enhance and improve the coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement agencies and elementsof theintelligence community outside the United States with respect to transnational threats." The only official with authority over both intelligence and law enforcement efforts is the President, even though in someadministrations the National Security Adviser or the White House Chief of Staff may have significant, ifnonstatutory,responsibilities. (58) Although the absence of this information may not have complicated U.S. diplomacy in this instance, some observerssuggest that information regarding other countries' efforts to influence U.S. policies must be available to thoseresponsiblefor the formulation and execution of U.S. national security policy. Thestructure hasbeen maintained by the Bush Administration. These, they argue, also have significant drawbacks. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have been treated as military strikes against the United States rather than a felony. They further argue that it may be easier toaddresscomplex jurisdictional issues and oversight responsibilities at a time when relationships are malleable, rather thanto waituntil bureaucratic rigidities set in or undesirable precedents are set during grave crises that require immediatedecisions. Efforts to enforce international law and the extraterritorial provisions of domestic laws are increasingly important in theresponse of the U.S. Government to the transnational threats of the post-Cold War world. Very few observers believe that the two efforts can be simply conflated. Important constitutional distinctions will remain. Careful analysis of the campaign against Al Qaeda willundoubtedlyinform congressional oversight of the relationship between the two communities.

In the post-Cold War world, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and related money laundering are perceived both as criminalmatters and as threats to the nation's security. Often collectively termed transnational threats, these issues havebecome theconcerns of law enforcement agencies as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community. Two foreign banking scandalsin thelate 1980s led to efforts to ensure that information in the possession of intelligence agencies would, in the future,be madeavailable to law enforcement officials. In the mid-1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began assigningadditionalagents to newly created offices worldwide. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 provide a clear demonstrationof howlarge a threat international terrorism can become to national security. The Bush Administration and Congress havemovedrapidly to promote intelligence/enforcement cooperation among U.S. agencies in the campaign against Al Qaeda. This report looks at the separate roles and missions and distinct identities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Coordinating their efforts has raised significant legal and administrative difficulties that have been only partiallyovercomedespite the creation of elaborate coordinative mechanisms under the oversight of the National Security Council. Someobservers also have expressed concerns about the greater use of information derived from intelligence sources injudicialproceedings, fearing that it may lead to over-reliance on surreptitious means of information collection and, thus,underminecivil liberties. Other observers have cautioned that redirecting intelligence assets to collect information for legalcases mayreduce support available to military commanders and policymakers. Some others believe that there may also beanoveremphasis on law enforcement in dealing with problems arising abroad. The report notes the employment ofcovertactions by intelligence agencies in certain law enforcement efforts. This report also addresses congressional oversight of the law enforcement-intelligence relationship that is spread among anumber of House and Senate committees, each of which has only partial jurisdiction. Some observers believe thatthereshould be further efforts to base the evolving relationship in statutory law. They have argued that closer attentionshould begiven to coordinating the emerging relationship between intelligence and law enforcement efforts while practicesaremalleable rather than to wait until bureaucratic rigidities set in or unfortunate precedents are established duringcrises. Even with conscientious efforts at coordination, others have noted that fundamental differences remain between matters oflaw and of national interest in a world of sovereign nation states. Enforcement of international law and theextraterritorialapplication of U.S. law can be vigorously and, at times, effectively resisted by other countries. The necessity toadapt U.S.responses to transnational threats to specific situations can also undermine respect for law by making enforcementappearinequitable.

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Most Recent Developments On February 20, 2003, the President signed into law the FY2003 omnibusappropriations act ( P.L. 108-7 , H.J.Res. Of this amount,$17.545 billion is for discretionary programs. Not included in the total is $3.1 billionin supplemental disaster assistance provided by the measure, primarily for farmersand ranchers affected by a natural disaster in 2001 or 2002. Currently accounting for the vast majority of USDAmandatory spending are: the farm commodity price and income support programs(including ongoing programs authorized by the 2002 farm bill and emergencyprograms authorized by various appropriations acts); the food stamp program andchild nutrition programs; the federal crop insurance program; and various agriculturalconservation and trade programs. FY2003 Agriculture Appropriations Action Administration's Request. Within the budget,the Administration requested FY2003 budget authority of $74.062 billion for the U.S.Department of Agriculture and related agencies (which includes all of USDA exceptthe Forest Service, and also includes the Food and Drug Administration and theCommodity Futures Trading Commission.) Funding levels for USDA and related agencies in H.J.Res. 480 food aid. 108-7 containsbudget authority of $74.25 billion, of which $17.55 billion is for discretionaryprograms and $56.70 billion is for mandatory programs. 2 ), but $124 million above the Administration request and$1.27 billion above the enacted FY2002 level including supplementals. Spending for disaster assistance was offset by a comparablereduction in estimated spending for a mandatory conservation program over a 10-yearperiod. The appropriated totals do not reflect the effect of a 0.65% across-the-boardin almost all discretionary programs in the omnibus measure, which if appliedequally to all USDA and related agency programs, would reduce appropriations byapproximately $85 million. The omnibus appropriations act ( P.L.108-7 ) contains an estimated $3.1 billion in economic and disaster assistance foragricultural producers in a separate title of the act (Division N, Title II). Foreign Food Aid: Funding andIssues. 108-7 includes a supplemental appropriation of $250 million foremergency relief activities under P.L. Mandatory Trade Programs. Discretionary Programs. Congress rejected an Administrationproposal to move to a new funding approach. 108-7 amends the farm bill by specifically prohibitingthe use of discretionary funds to implement any mandatory conservation programs. The act: 1) limits FY2003 enrollmentin the Wetlands Reserve Program to 245,833 acres instead of the 250,000 acresauthorized in the farm bill (savings of $5 million); 2) limits FY2003 funds for theEQIP to $695 million instead of the $700 million authorized in the farm bill; and 3) prohibits the use of any of the $45 million in mandatory funds authorized in FY2003for the Small Watershed Rehabilitation Program. 2 ) and$2.379 billion in the House-reported bill ( H.R. 5263 ). The largest appropriation for marketing and regulatoryprograms goes to USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), theagency responsible for protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases. Food and Nutrition The FY2003 omnibus appropriations act ( P.L. (WIC is the only discretionary account that isexempted from the provision in P.L. Other Provisions. The amount of drug user fees to be collected each year is set in FDA'sannual appropriations act. 2 ) , which also added revenues from a new medical device user fees, provided$1.665 billion. 108-7 funded a number of initiatives related to food safety. (4) P.L.

On February 20, 2003, the President signed into law the FY2003 omnibus appropriations act( P.L. 108-7 , H.J.Res. 2 ), containing funding for agencies and programs within theeleven regular FY2003 appropriations bills that were unresolved in the 107th Congress. For the U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDA) and related agencies, P.L. 108-7 contains a total regular annualappropriation of $74.25 billion, of which $56.7 billion is for mandatory programs and $17.55 billionis for discretionary programs. The $17.55 billion in discretionary funds is $805 million below theSenate-passed version of H.J.Res. 2 and $56 million below the House-reported versionof H.R. 5263 , but $124 million above the Administration's FY2003 request and $1.27billion above the enacted FY2002 level including FY2002 supplementals. Not included in the totalsis the effect of a 0.65% across-the-board rescission to almost all discretionary programs funded by P.L. 108-7 , which could reduce USDA and related agencies appropriations by approximately $85million in FY2003. Also separate from the regular appropriations is a provision in P.L. 108-7 for$3.1 billion in FY2003 agricultural disaster assistance, primarily for farmers and ranchers affectedby a natural disaster in 2001 or 2002. The cost of the disaster assistance is offset by a comparablereduction in a mandatory conservation program over a 10-year period. Among its other major provisions affecting USDA agencies and programs, P.L. 108-7 : 1)provides $1.45 billion in foreign food aid under P.L. 480 Title II, including $250 million insupplemental funding that is available through FY2004, and requires USDA to supply a minimumof 400,000 tons of commodities under a separate mandatory food aid program; 2) prohibits the useof discretionary funds to administer any mandatory conservation programs; 3) limits spending oncertain mandatory trade, conservation and research programs and applies the savings from thesereductions to spending on discretionary programs; 4) rejects an Administration proposal to requireprivate crop insurance companies to absorb more of the cost of the federal crop insurance program;5) provides supplemental funding to help the Farm Service Agency administer disaster and farm billprograms; 6) funds special research grants proposed to be terminated by the Administration; 7)increases funding over FY2002 for food safety and animal and plant health inspection activities,reflecting increased government responsibility to protect the food supply from terrorist attacks; and8) increases USDA food and nutrition program spending by $4 billion over FY2002, in line with theAdministration request, including $3.2 billion more for the food stamp program. Included in the bill totals is $1.4 billion in appropriations for the largest related agency, theDepartment of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration. This appropriationincludes $159 million as requested by the Administration for FDA's counter-terrorism activities.FDA also is authorized to collect $270.5 million in various user fees to supplement its appropriation,including a new medical device user fee. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science and Industry; DSP= Domestic Social Policy.

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(These efforts may includeinvestigations, diplomatic actions, criminal prosecutions, designations, among otheractions); Capacity building programs to improve the domestic financial, legal, andregulatory institutions of U.S. allies; and Global efforts to deter terrorist financing. Implementing this strategy requires coordination of many different elements of nationalpower including intelligence gathering, financial regulation, law enforcement, and buildinginternational coalitions. Following a review of legislation on terrorist financing, this report providesan agency-by-agency survey of these U.S. efforts. (172) Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) within the Department of Stateimplements some key activities to help identify and stop terrorist financing and acts as the lead incoordinating U.S. government agencies in these efforts. Table 1. 2. 3. More importantly, whoshould author the U.S. Government terrorist financing strategy? Creating a legal and regulatory system islikely meaningless if it is not enforced.

Stopping the ability of terrorists to finance their operations is a key component of the U.S.counterterrorism strategy. To accomplish this, the Administration has implemented a three-tieredapproach based on (1) intelligence and domestic legal and regulatory efforts; (2) technical assistanceto provide capacity-building programs for U.S. allies; and (3) global efforts to create internationalnorms and guidelines. Effective implementation of this strategy requires the participation of, and coordinationamong, several elements of the U.S. Government. This report provides an agency-by-agency surveyof U.S. efforts. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Brief History of the Cloture Rule Proposals to limit Senate debate are as old as the Senate itself. The most important debate-limiting procedure enacted was the adoption in 1917 of the "cloture rule," codified in paragraph 2 of Senate Rule XXII. In recent Congresses—and perhaps especially in the 112 th (2011-2012) and 111 th (2009-2010) Congresses—some Senators have expressed renewed concern over the effect of extended debate on the Senate's capacity to act efficiently. The first category addressed below includes proposals that provide a non-rule-based mechanism by which the Senate could change its rules or precedents, or both, without needing to surmount the supermajority hurdle present in existing rules; specifically, these proposals hinge on a novel ruling by the Senate's presiding officer in relation to Senate rules on debate or the constitutionality thereof. Finally, some proposals would allow for a lower voting threshold to invoke cloture in only specific circumstances. The key phrase in the rule as applied to nominations is "the same legislative day." Increase Procedural Burdens Borne by Opponents of Cloture Many Senators who support changing the operation of cloture are chiefly concerned with the level of costs associated with threatening (or of conducting) a filibuster. In sum, to the extent that a hold on a measure by even one Senator may mean that a successful cloture process is necessary to proceed to the bill (and in some cases, also, to end debate on it and amendments to it), any efforts to limit the impact of holds should be assessed within the context of proposals to change the operation of cloture in the Senate.

Paragraph 2 of Senate Rule XXII, also known as the "cloture rule," was adopted in 1917. It established a procedure, amended several times over the intervening years, by which the Senate may limit debate and act on a pending measure or matter. Aside from unanimous consent agreements and statutory limits applying to certain types of legislation, cloture is the only mechanism by which the Senate can limit debate. In recent years, some Senators have expressed renewed concerns over the way in which extended debate is conducted in the Senate and the operation of the cloture rule. Proposals for changing the cloture process include the establishment of new precedents on amending the rules, changes in the threshold necessary to invoke cloture, reductions in the time costs associated with certain cloture-related actions, and new or additional restrictions on debate in certain circumstances. This report provides a brief history of the Senate cloture rule, explains its main features and the arguments made by supporters and opponents of these features, outlines a range of proposals to change its operation, and briefly explains the methods by which the Senate might change its rules or practices.

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Introduction The earned income tax credit (EITC), when first enacted in 1975, was a modest tax credit providing financial assistance to low-income working families with children. Today, the EITC is one of the federal government's largest antipoverty programs, having evolved through a series of legislative changes over the past 40 years. Since the EITC's enactment, Congress has shown increasing interest in using refundable tax credits for a variety of purposes, from reducing the tax burdens of families with children (the child tax credit), to helping families afford higher education (the American opportunity tax credit), to subsidizing health insurance premiums (the premium assistance tax credit). The legislative history of the EITC may provide context to current and future debates about refundable tax credits. An Overview of the History of the EITC Major legislative changes to the EITC over the past 40 years can generally be categorized in one of two ways: those that increased the amount of the credit by changing the credit formula or those that changed eligibility rules for the credit, either expanding eligibility to certain workers (for example, certain servicemembers) or denying the credit to others (for example, workers not authorized to work in the United States). Together, these changes reflect congressional intent to expand this benefit while also better targeting it to certain recipients. Before Enactment The origins of the EITC can be found in the debate in the late 1960s and 1970s over how to reform welfare—known at the time as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). During this time, there was increasing concern over the growing numbers of individuals and families receiving welfare. Instead, Senator Long proposed a "work bonus" plan that would supplement the wages of poor workers. The "work bonus plan" was renamed the earned income tax credit and was enacted on a temporary basis as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 ( P.L. 94-12 ). As originally enacted, the credit was equal to 10% of the first $4,000 in earnings. Hence, the maximum credit amount was $400. The credit phased out between incomes of $4,000 and $8,000. In addition to encouraging work and reducing dependence on cash welfare, the credit was also viewed as a means to encourage economic growth in the face of the 1974 recession and rising food and energy prices. This law also increased the maximum amount of the credit to $500. Subsequent increases in the amount of the credit in 1984 ( P.L. Eligibility for the credit was also expanded to include childless workers. 103-66 ). 104-193 ) and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 107-16 ) reduced the EITC marriage penalty by increasing the income level at which the credit phased out for married couples. Expanding the EITC for Families with Three or More Children In addition to expanding marriage penalty relief, ARRA also temporarily created a larger credit for families with three or more children by increasing the credit rate for these families from 40% to 45%. As previously discussed, a taxpayer must provide an SSN for themselves, their spouses (if married), and any qualifying children.

The earned income tax credit (EITC), when first enacted on a temporary basis in 1975, was a modest tax credit that provided financial assistance to low-income, working families with children. After various legislative changes over the past 40 years, the credit is now one of the federal government's largest antipoverty programs. Since the EITC's enactment, Congress has shown increasing interest in using refundable tax credits for a variety of purposes, from reducing the tax burdens of families with children (the child tax credit), to helping families afford higher education (the American opportunity tax credit), to subsidizing health insurance premiums (the premium assistance tax credit). The legislative history of the EITC may provide context to current and future debates about these refundable tax credits. The origins of the EITC can be found in the debate in the late 1960s and 1970s over how to reform welfare—known at the time as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). During this time, there was increasing concern over growing welfare rolls. Senator Russell Long proposed a "work bonus" plan that would supplement the wages of poor workers. The intent of the plan was to encourage the working poor to enter the labor force and thus reduce the number of families needing AFDC. This "work bonus" plan, renamed the earned income tax credit, was enacted on a temporary basis as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-12). As originally enacted, the credit was equal to 10% of the first $4,000 in earnings. Hence, the maximum credit amount was $400. The credit phased out between incomes of $4,000 and $8,000. The credit was also viewed as a means to encourage economic growth in the face of the 1974 recession and rising food and energy prices. Over the subsequent 40 years, numerous legislative changes have been made to this credit. Some changes increased the amount of the credit by changing the credit formula. Major laws that increased the amount of the credit include the following: P.L. 101-508, which adjusted the credit amount for family size and created a credit for workers with no qualifying children; P.L. 103-66, which increased the maximum credit for tax filers with children and created a new credit formula for certain low-income, childless tax filers; P.L. 107-16, which increased the income level at which the credit phased out for married tax filers in comparison to unmarried tax filers (referred to as "marriage penalty relief"); and P.L. 111-5, which increased the credit amount for families with three or more children and expanded the marriage penalty relief enacted as part of P.L. 107-16. Other legislative changes changed the eligibility rules for the credit. Major laws that changed the eligibility rules of the credit include the following: P.L. 103-66, which expanded the definition of an eligible EITC claimant to include certain individuals who had no qualifying children; P.L. 104-193, which required tax filers to provide valid Social Security numbers (SSNs) for work purposes for themselves, spouses if married filing jointly, and any qualifying children, in order to be eligible for the credit; and P.L. 105-34, which introduced additional compliance rules to reduce improper claims of the credit. Together, these changes reflect congressional intent to expand this benefit while also better targeting it to certain recipients.

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To address the turmoil in financial markets, Congress passed and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; H.R. 1424 , P.L. 110-343 ) on October 3, 2008. Well-designed auctions can help price such assets in an efficient manner. In mid-January 2009, Congress declined to block a Presidential request to release the second tranche of $350 billion in TARP funds. According to some experts, market pricing of such assets implies that reverse auctions would play an important role in the plan. In early February 2009, the chair of the EESA Congressional Oversight Board expressed concern that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) had overpaid for assets it had acquired. Dutch Auctions and Reverse Dutch Auctions In early October 2008, the Bush Administration proposed using reverse auctions to purchase mortgage-related securities from financial institutions, which are similar to the multiple-unit Dutch auctions that the Treasury uses to sell government securities. While the Bush Administration focused on other strategies to address continuing financial turmoil, a "Financial Stability Plan" outlined by President Obama's Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, may include reverse auctions as part of the proposed "Public-Private Investment Fund." In reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions, a buyer (e.g., the U.S. Treasury) buys a given number of units from private parties (e.g., financial institutions) at a price set by the last accepted bid. Auctions provide a means of selling objects whose value to potential owners is unknown to the seller. A large research literature in economic theory and experimental economics examines how different types of auctions work. Designing reverse Dutch auctions may present some tradeoffs between enhancing competition among bidders and overpaying for assets relative to their quality. Careful auction design, however, can help minimize these problems. Quality Differences of Troubled Assets Presents Challenges for Auctions As noted above, federal stakeholders bear the costs of risks caused by uncertainty about the value of troubled assets and by the possibility of overpaying for assets. The diversity or heterogeneity of troubled assets may present challenges to the Treasury auction program. Similar problems may occur with reverse Dutch auctions used to buy troubled assets. The reverse Dutch auctions used by the Treasury would need to be adapted to buy highly diverse and relatively small-volume securities, whose characteristics may not be well understood by many buyers. Reverse Dutch auctions may therefore be vulnerable to adverse selection, meaning that the average credit quality of submitted assets of a given type may be systematically worse than the average credit quality of all assets of that type. Auction mechanisms, however, might be designed that could mitigate these adverse selection problems. The reverse auction program essentially swaps Treasury securities for troubled mortgage-backed securities. If the prices at which Treasury securities are exchanged for troubled assets are close to current market prices for those assets, then financial institutions may gain liquidity, but might not receive much additional capital. Some economists have argued that other means of injecting capital into the financial sector, such as purchases of preferred stock or capital injections balanced by equity warrants (i.e., options to claim an equity stake), might be a better strategy. Auctions may capture higher revenues for governments and can allocate scarce resources more efficiently than traditional methods. Different policy issues, however, may require different types of auctions to achieve reasonable results.

To address the turmoil in financial markets, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; H.R. 1424, P.L. 110-343), enacted on October 3, 2008, authorizes purchases of "troubled assets." The act passed the Senate on October 1, 2008, passed the House on October 3, 2008, and was signed into law the same day. While the last Bush Administration Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, initially proposed using reverse Dutch auctions to purchase troubled assets—primarily mortgage-related securities from financial institutions—he soon chose to shelve the reverse auction program. A "Financial Stability Plan" outlined by his successor, Secretary Timothy Geithner, may include reverse auctions, according to some experts. Much of this plan would require Congressional authorization. Auctions are especially useful for selling assets whose value to potential owners is unknown to the seller. Reverse auctions are useful when a buyer does not know what value sellers place on assets. Auction results could clarify the market value of troubled assets. The price discovery properties of auctions could stimulate trading by reducing private traders' uncertainty about the value of troubled assets. The EESA Congressional Oversight Board expressed concern over asset pricing in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Well-designed auctions can reduce the chances of overpaying for assets. In reverse Dutch auctions, a buyer purchases multiple objects from private parties at a price set by the last accepted bid. The government has used reverse auctions since the Revolutionary War. Designing efficient reverse Dutch auctions may present some tradeoffs between enhancing competition among bidders and overpaying for assets relative to their quality. Careful auction design, however, can help minimize these problems. A reverse auction program essentially swaps Treasury securities for troubled mortgage-backed securities. If Treasury securities are exchanged for troubled assets at prices close to those assets' current market prices, costs to the taxpayer would be minimized. Financial institutions, however, may gain some liquidity, but might not receive much additional capital. Some economists argued that other means of injecting capital into the financial sector, such as purchases of preferred stock or capital injections balanced by equity warrants (i.e., options to claim an equity stake), would be a better strategy. Since passage of EESA, the U.S. Treasury has been working to design methods to inject capital into firms and restore market liquidity. In mid-January 2009, Congress declined to block release of the second tranche of $350 billion in TARP funds. The heterogeneity of troubled assets may present challenges to the Treasury auction program. The reverse Dutch auctions would need to be adapted to buy highly diverse and relatively small-volume securities, in a way that minimizes risks of trading manipulation. Reverse Dutch auctions may be vulnerable to adverse selection, meaning that the average credit quality of submitted assets of a given type may be systematically worse than the average credit quality of all assets of that type. Auction mechanisms might be designed that could mitigate these problems. Recent academic research in auction theory and in experimental economics has examined how various types of auctions work. Auctions may capture higher revenues for governments and can often allocate scarce resources more efficiently than traditional methods of selling or purchasing. Different policy problems, however, call for different types of auctions. Government economists involved in designing reverse auctions to buy troubled assets have drawn upon academic research and internal Treasury research. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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This report provides background on some of the key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. This is most evident domestically in the increased number of its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The FBI's post-9/11 transformation is particularly evident in four areas: The USA PATRIOT Act provided the FBI additional authorities and enhanced investigative tools. The FBI and DOJ altered the way the Bureau investigated terrorism with the 2008 revision of The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations . Critics have voiced broad concerns about the Mukasey Guidelines. In response to criticisms of its intelligence capabilities in the aftermath of 9/11, the FBI has introduced a series of reforms intended to transform the Bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on criminal investigations into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. To counter violent plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the "Al Capone" approach and the use of "agent provocateurs." Balancing civil liberties against the need for preventative policing to combat terrorism is a key policy challenge. In its oversight role, Congress may wish to examine the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations and culture to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. This report provides background information on key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. It discusses several enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided to the FBI through post-9/11 legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; the 2008 revision to the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey Guidelines); and the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout the country; intelligence reform within the FBI and concerns about the progress of those reform initiatives; the FBI's proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its terrorism investigations using preventative policing techniques such as the "Al Capone" approach and the use of agent provocateurs; and the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventative policing techniques to combat terrorism. This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role. These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives.

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Many U.S. policymakers have viewed the resumption of all U.S. beef exports to South Korea—the third-largest U.S. beef export market in 2003—as essential, but not necessarily all that is required, before the U.S. Congress considers legislation to implement the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Beef Imports After the first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease, was discovered in a Canadian-born cow in Washington State in December 2003, South Korea and many other countries banned imports of U.S. beef. Beef Access Became Intertwined with KORUS FTA Talks U.S. government efforts to regain partial access to the key Korean market took two years to negotiate. They frequently noted that the U.S. measures in place to prevent the introduction of BSE in U.S. cattle herds already meet international scientific standards as spelled out by the OIE. It allows for imports of all cuts of U.S. boneless and bone-in beef and other beef products from the edible parts of cattle, irrespective of age , as long as specified risk materials (SRMs) known to transmit mad cow disease are removed and other conditions are met. Reaction to April 2008 Agreement While the U.S. beef industry and U.S. policymakers welcomed the April deal, Korean TV coverage of the issue and Internet-spread rumors that questioned the safety of U.S. beef sparked large candlelight vigils in South Korea to protest the beef agreement. To respond to mounting public pressure, the Korean government twice pursued talks with the United States to find ways to defuse public concerns without "renegotiating" the beef agreement. On June 21, 2008, both governments confirmed a "voluntary private sector" arrangement that allows Korean firms to import U.S. beef produced only from cattle less than 30 months old, and announced some changes to the April agreement. Beef in the KORUS FTA Market Access Provisions Under the KORUS FTA, South Korea would eliminate over a 15-year period its 40% tariff on beef muscle meats imported from the United States. Promotional efforts to rebuild consumer confidence in U.S. beef and much lower retail prices for imported beef than for Korean beef contributed to the continued growth in U.S. beef sales throughout the year ( Figure 4 and Figure 5 ). Positions Heading into Final Talks Following President Obama's announcement on June 26, 2010, of his intent to present implementing legislation for the KORUS FTA to Congress "in the few months" after the November 2010 G-20 meeting in Seoul, the Administration consulted with Congress and stakeholders on how to resolve outstanding matters related to access for U.S. beef in the South Korean market. The U.S. beef sector would view such a scenario as undercutting the aggressive market promotion efforts made since late 2008 to assure Korean consumers of the safety of U.S. beef, which it views as having contributed to the increase in U.S. beef exports. No Change on Beef Issue After Talks In the negotiations on the supplemental agreement concluded on December 3, 2010, the beef issue reportedly received little discussion as both sides focused on revising the auto provisions. President Obama, in discussing this outcome the next day, indicated that the United States will continue to work toward "ensuring full access for U.S. beef to the Korean market." Meat industry groups again expressed support for this trade agreement that they expect over time will significantly increase their exports to South Korea, and urged Congress to move quickly to ratify it. Memories of the size and intensity of the 2008 anti-beef agreement protests in South Korea appear to have directly influenced the position taken on the beef issue by Korean negotiators. Their position was that this issue "did not fall under" the FTA concluded in 2007. In a letter to Senator Baucus, USTR's Ron Kirk committed to request consultations with South Korea on the "full implementation" of the protocol (e.g., opening Korea's market "to all ages and all cuts of U.S. beef") as soon as this trade agreement takes effect.

The Obama Administration had been pressed to resolve the terms of U.S. beef access to South Korea before the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) goes to Congress for debate. While Korea committed in the FTA to reduce its 40% tariff on imported U.S. beef over a 15-year period, its limits on such imports for human health reasons threatened to undercut this preferential benefit for U.S. exporters. In 2003, South Korea was the third-largest market for U.S. beef exports, prior to the ban its government imposed after the first U.S. cow infected with mad cow disease, or BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), was discovered. U.S. efforts to regain full access became intertwined with the subsequent KORUS negotiations, but did not yield results by the time those talks concluded in April 2007. In reaction, some Members of Congress stated their consideration of, and support for, KORUS depends on South Korea fully opening its market to U.S. beef. On April 18, 2008, U.S. and South Korean negotiators signed a protocol, or agreement, on sanitary rules that Korea will apply to beef imports from the United States. It allows for imports of all cuts of U.S. boneless and bone-in beef and certain beef products from cattle, irrespective of age, as long as specified risk materials known to transmit mad cow disease are removed and other conditions are met. Though the U.S. beef industry and U.S. policymakers welcomed this deal, Korean TV coverage and Internet-spread rumors that questioned the safety of U.S. beef resulted in escalating protests and calls for the beef agreement to be renegotiated or scrapped. U.S. officials countered that measures already in place to prevent the introduction of BSE in U.S. cattle herds meet international scientific standards. To address rising public pressure, the Korean government twice pursued talks with the United States to find ways to defuse these concerns without "renegotiating" the beef protocol. This culminated in the June 21, 2008, confirmation by both governments of a "voluntary private sector" arrangement that allows Korean firms to import U.S. beef produced from cattle only under 30 months of age. Both governments view this as a transitional step until Korean consumer confidence in the safety of U.S. beef improves. Since the resumption of U.S. beef exports in July 2008, U.S. exporters have worked to recapture this key overseas market. Beef exports to South Korea in 2010 totaled $518 million, about two-thirds of the record 2003 level. In 2011's first five months, exports (at $331 million) were twice the level recorded in the same period the year before. Promotional efforts to rebuild consumer confidence in U.S. beef, aggressive marketing efforts by large store chains, and much lower retail prices for imported beef than for Korean beef account for the continued growth in U.S. beef sales. Following President Obama's mid-2010 decision to present the KORUS FTA to Congress in 2011, Administration officials worked to resolve the beef and auto issues with South Korea. By the time bilateral talks concluded on December 3, 2010, the beef issue reportedly had received little discussion as both sides focused on revising the auto provisions. Korea's position was shaped by the memory of the size and intensity of the 2008 anti-beef agreement protests. President Obama, in discussing this outcome, stated that the United States will continue to work toward "ensuring full access for U.S. beef to the Korean market." To address lingering congressional concerns, the Administration in early May 2011 committed to request consultations with South Korea on the "full implementation" of the protocol as soon as KORUS takes effect, and to provide additional funds for U.S. beef promotion activities in the Korean market. Beef and meat industry groups have welcomed the steps made since to submit KORUS to Congress, have expressed their support, and have urged Congress to move quickly to ratify it.

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Introduction(1) On November 15, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued a memorandum tosenior staff regarding the implementation of the new base realignment and closure (BRAC) roundauthorized by Congress in 2001. Comprehensive Inventory Second, the Secretary of Defense is required to conduct a comprehensive inventory of U.S.military installations. DOD Sends Report to Congress On March 23, 2004, as part of the budget justification required by Congress each year, theSecretary of Defense submitted a detailed report on the need for a further BRAC round. He alsocertified that an additional round of closures and realignments would result in annual net savings foreach of the military departments, beginning not later than FY2011. (31) Two days later, on May 20, 2004, the full House voted 259 to 162 to delay base closings until2007. In response to this action, the White House immediately released a statement declaring thatthe Secretary of Defense, and other senior advisers, would urge the President to veto any bill thatweakened, delayed, or repealed the current base closure authority. (33) On October 8, 2004, Senate and House conferees reached agreement on the National DefenseAuthorization Act for FY2005, which included continued support of DOD's authority to conduct the2005 base closure and realignment round. These included (1) prohibiting anyrevision of DOD's force-structure plan or infrastructure inventory after March 15, 2005; (2) codifyingthe Secretary of Defense's criteria for selecting bases to be closed and realigned; (3) repealing theauthority of the Secretary of Defense to place installations in inactive status; and (4) prohibiting theCommission from changing the Secretary of Defense's selections -- unless at least two members ofthe Commission visit the installation involved, and at least seven members of the Commissionsupport the decision. The President selected Anthony A. Principi of California to be the chairman of the2005BRAC Commission. With its formal establishment, the BRAC Commission proceeded to conduct a series of local,D.C. -- area hearings to collect general information on DOD's force structure needs and goals for theBRAC process. It will also conduct regional hearings at locations throughout the country to provideaffected communities with the chance to express their views and concerns. At least onecommissioner, it has been said, will visit each base on DOD's designated list. Pentagon Delivers 2005 BRAC List On May 13, 2005, the new BRAC Commission received DOD's list of base realignments andclosures. The Pentagon announced that it planned to close 33 major U.S. installations and realign 29 others -- in a move to consolidate forces and save almost $50 billion over 20 years.

On November 15, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the first steps inimplementing the new 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) law. These includeddevelopment of a force structure plan, comprehensive inventory of military installations, andestablishment of criteria for selecting bases for closure and realignment. The Secretary of Defense submitted a report to Congress on March 23, 2004, confirming theneed for a further BRAC round and certifying that an additional round of closures and realignmentswould result in annual net savings, over a period ending no later than FY2011. On May 20, 2004, the House of Representatives voted 259 to 162 to delay base closings until2007. In response to this action, the White House immediately released a statement declaring thatthe Secretary of Defense, and other senior advisers, would urge the President to veto any bill that"weakened, delayed, or repealed" the current base closure authority. On October 8, 2004, Senate and the House conferees reached agreement on the NationalDefense Authorization Act for FY2005, which included continued support of DOD's authority toconduct a round of closures and realignments in 2005. Senator John Warner stated that it wasessential to allow DOD to complete its effort to reduce the size of its infrastructure. On March 15, 2005, the President appointed nine members to serve on the 2005 BRACCommission. In doing so, he consulted with leading Members of Congress. In addition, thePresident chose Anthony A. Principi to serve as the chairman of the new BRAC Commission. Once formally in-place, the Commission's next step was to institute a series of local, D.C.area hearings to collect general information on DOD's force structure needs and goals. It will befollowed later by regional hearings at locations throughout the country. At least one commissionerwill be required to visit each base on DOD's designated list. On May 13, 2005, the Pentagon announced that it would close 33 major U.S. military basesand realign 29 others -- in a move to consolidate forces and save almost $50 billion over 20 years. The overall number of existing U.S. major bases, according to DOD, is 318. In addition, 775 smallerfacilities are expected to be closed or realigned. This report will be updated as needed.

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Issues of public health and safety of CDs are tied to the regulation and oversight of CDs. This report includes brief information on federal, state, and professional efforts to increase the safety of CDs. Traditionally CDs are made in response to an individual prescription from a licensed health provider in the context of a pharmacist's and health care provider's professional relationship with a specific patient. Shortages of sterile generic drugs and hospital outsourcing are cited as causes of increased the reliance of health care providers on CDs. Some have suggested that certain activities not traditionally associated with compounding be considered compounding. Such activities include the large-scale production of drugs to ease certain drug shortages, to meet outsourcing needs of hospitals, and to supply physician-administered drugs. Non-traditional compounding may include (1) the production and shipping of large volume of drugs across state lines; (2) production of drugs that are copies of FDA-approved commercially available drugs; (3) production of drugs outside of a personal relationship with a patient and without a prescription for an individual patient to receive a compounded version; and (4) providing products to third parties, such as hospitals, clinics, physician offices, and home health providers. These activities may be considered more akin to manufacturing than traditional compounding, which is considered part of the traditional practice of pharmacy. The 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak led to greater scrutiny by federal and state authorities of sterile CDs. Traditional Compounding Traditional compounding is a process where a pharmacist or a physician "combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient" in response to a prescription from a health care provider. The lack of information on the current scope of compounding presents challenges for public health authorities and policy makers. Some non-traditional compounders have large numbers of customers. Existing Regulatory Oversight Drug compounding has historically been the focus of state governments through their regulation of pharmacies. Recently questions have arisen regarding the extent the federal government can regulate the practice of compounding through the FFDCA. Shortages of CDs Recalls of products from compounding pharmacies may also exacerbate drug shortages. Adverse Event Reporting and Labeling There is a lack of publically available information on the number and types of adverse events involving compounded drugs, as there is no requirement that compounders report adverse events to federal authorities, and state requirements vary. Due to the complexity of the supply chain and the growth of non-traditional compounding, patients and providers may not realize that a drug has been compounded. The Federal Role in Oversight Policymakers have raised questions regarding how best to improve the safety of CDs while maintaining patient access to needed medications, including the need for new legislation and increased accountability.

Compounding has been traditionally defined as a process where a pharmacist or a physician combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient. Traditionally compounded drugs (CDs) are made in response to an individual prescription from a licensed health provider in the context of a pharmacist's and health care professional's relationship with a specific patient. Some have suggested that certain activities not traditionally associated with compounding be considered compounding. Such activities include the large-scale production of drugs to ease certain drug shortages, to meet outsourcing needs of hospitals, and to supply physician-administered drugs. Non-traditional compounding may include (1) the production and shipping of large volume of drugs across state lines; (2) production of drugs that are copies of FDA-approved commercially available drugs; (3) provision of CD without a prescription for an individual patient to receive a compounded version and outside of a professional relationship; and (4) production of products to third parties, such as hospitals, clinics, physician offices, and home health providers. These activities could be considered more akin to manufacturing than traditional compounding, which is considered part of the traditional practice of pharmacy. Adverse events involving contaminated compounded drugs have drawn attention to the growing use of non-traditionally compounded drugs in health care delivery. Shortages of sterile generic drugs and hospital outsourcing are cited as causes of increased numbers of CDs produced by non-traditional compounders. Efforts to assess the risks and benefits of CDs on public health and safety are complicated by the lack of publicly available information, including the absence of a federal adverse event reporting requirement, and the lack of information about the number of drugs compounded, the types of drugs compounded, and the number of businesses in this market. Policymakers have raised questions regarding how best to improve the safety of CDs while maintaining patient access to needed medications. Drug compounding has historically been the focus of state governments through their regulation of pharmacies. Recently questions have arisen regarding the extent to which the federal government can regulate the practice of compounding through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Policy discussions include proposals to clarify federal oversight of high-risk activities and products, to improve federal and state coordination, and to increase use of existing federal authorities. This report provides background information on CDs and non-traditional compounding pharmacies relevant to policy discussions. This includes an overview of the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak, recent safety alerts and recalls of compounded drugs, definitions of traditional compounding and non-traditional compounding, information on the CDs produced and by whom, information on the demand for non-traditional compounding, including the role of shortages of sterile injectable drugs, hospital out-sourcing, and patient and provider demand, and information on adverse events involving compounded drugs.

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The Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of an 11 th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. Issues for Congress in 2011 included whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed funding request for the 11 th LPD-17, whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the design of the LSD(X) class of amphibious ships that the Navy wants to begin procuring in FY2017, and—particularly if the LPD-17 design is used as the basis for the LSD(X)—whether to fund the procurement of a 12 th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015. Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X). Navy officials do not stress this option and instead appear more interested in developing an all-new design for the LSD(X). If a decision were made to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), then procuring a 12 th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 would help keep the LPD-17 production line open until the procurement of the first LSD(X) in FY2017, which in turn might help reduce LSD(X) production costs. The ship had received $184.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requested the remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship's estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4 million.

The Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. The ship had received $184.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requested the remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship's estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4 million. The Navy's FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for the procurement of a new class of amphibious ship called the LSD(X) starting in FY2017. Some observers have suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X). Navy officials do not stress this option and instead appear more interested in developing an all-new design for the LSD(X). If a decision were made to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), then procuring a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 would help keep the LPD-17 production line open until the procurement of the first LSD(X) in FY2017, which in turn might help reduce LSD(X) production costs. Issues for Congress in 2011 included whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's proposed funding request for the 11th LPD-17, whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the design of the LSD(X), and—particularly if the LPD-17 design is used as the basis for the LSD(X)—whether to fund the procurement of a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015.

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Introduction The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has long been accused of unlawfully discriminating against minority and female farmers in the management of its various programs, particularly in its Farm Service Agency loan programs. Meanwhile, some minority and female farmers who have alleged discrimination by USDA have filed various lawsuits under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Pigford v. Glickman , filed on behalf of African-American farmers, is probably the most widely known, although Native American and female farmers also filed suit in Keepseagle v. Vilsack and Love v. Vilsack , respectively. In addition, a group of Hispanic farmers filed a similar lawsuit against USDA in October 2000. After nearly a decade of litigation and numerous rulings on procedural and substantive issues, the Garcia plaintiffs exhausted their final avenue of appeal to have their claims heard as a class action. As a result, the Garcia plaintiffs who wish to pursue their available claims in court must do so individually, or they and other eligible Hispanic farmers may participate in a settlement process established by USDA. This report also contains a brief discussion of some of the other discrimination cases that have been filed against USDA, as well as a section describing some possible options for Congress to consider if it wishes to respond to the Garcia dispute or provide additional assistance that goes beyond the current settlement. Specifically, the lawsuit, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2000 on behalf of all similarly situated Hispanic farmers across the country, alleged that USDA discriminated against the plaintiffs with respect to credit transactions and disaster benefits in violation of the ECOA, which prohibits discrimination against credit applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or source of income. The suit further claimed that USDA violated the ECOA and the APA by systematically failing to investigate complaints of discrimination, as required by USDA regulations.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has long been accused of unlawfully discriminating against minority and female farmers in the management of its various programs, particularly in its Farm Service Agency loan programs. While USDA has taken concrete steps to address these allegations of discrimination, the results of these efforts have been criticized by some. Meanwhile, some minority and female farmers who have alleged discrimination by USDA have filed various lawsuits under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Pigford v. Glickman, filed on behalf of African-American farmers, is probably the most widely known, although Native American and female farmers also filed suit in Keepseagle v. Vilsack and Love v. Vilsack, respectively. In addition, a group of Hispanic farmers filed a similar lawsuit against USDA in October 2000. The case, Garcia v. Vilsack, involved allegations that USDA unlawfully discriminated against all similarly situated Hispanic farmers with respect to credit transactions and disaster benefits in violation of the ECOA, which prohibits, among other things, race, color, and national origin discrimination against credit applicants. The suit further claimed that USDA violated the ECOA and the APA by systematically failing to investigate complaints of discrimination, as required by USDA regulations. After nearly a decade of litigation and numerous rulings on procedural and substantive issues, the Garcia plaintiffs exhausted their final avenue of appeal to have their claims heard as a class action. As a result, the Garcia plaintiffs who wish to pursue their available claims in court must do so individually, or they and other eligible Hispanic farmers may participate in a settlement process established by USDA. Settlement claims must be filed by March 25, 2013. In addition to an analysis of the Garcia lawsuit, this report also discusses several possible options for Congress to consider if it wishes to respond to the Garcia dispute.

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The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy, oversees the research, development, test, and acquisition programs that produce, maintain, and sustain the warheads. This report focuses on the portion of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill that funds NNSA's nuclear weapons activities. NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency operating within DOE. In addition to managing the nuclear weapons program, NNSA also manages the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors programs. The panel's recommendations included strengthening presidential guidance and oversight of the nuclear enterprise; establishing new congressional mechanisms for leadership and oversight of the enterprise; replacing NNSA with a new Office of Nuclear Security within DOE, renamed to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Security, with the Secretary responsible for the mission; and building a culture of performance, accountability, and credibility. The Trump Administration, in its budget for FY2018, requested an additional $1 billion for NNSA weapons activities over the level appropriated in FY2017. While the Administration had indicated in its "skinny budget" that this increase would support both deferred maintenance requirements among the NNSA weapons facilities and the warhead life extension programs in the directed stockpile area of the budget, funding for deferred maintenance in infrastructure and operations accounts remained essentially unchanged from the FY2017 appropriated levels. Congress enacted a budget of $10.642 billion for weapons activities NNSA in FY2018, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. The Trump Administration's budget for FY2019 continued to fund increases in NNSA's weapons activities, requesting $11.02 billion, an increase of nearly $400 million over the funding enacted in FY2018. Congress enacted a budget of $11.1 billion for weapons activities in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) includes 4,009.4 million for Directed Stockpile Work. The funding requests and enacted amounts for FY2019, along with the legislative direction for FY2019, include the following: NNSA requested $48.9 million for the W76-1 LEP in FY2019; Congress enacted this amount in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. These activities include Production Support; Research and Development (R&D) Support; R&D Certification and Safety; Management, Technology, and Production; and Plutonium Infrastructure Sustainment. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Programs According to NNSA's budget request, RDT&E includes five programs that focus on efforts "to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing." Engineering Program The Engineering Program is responsible for "creating and maturing advanced toolsets and capabilities necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile and enhance nuclear weapon safety, security, and use-control." 115-244 ). According to NNSA's budget documents, funding for this program "maintains, operates, and modernizes the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) infrastructure." The House committee added $5.2 million, returning the budget to the FY2017 level of 2,808.4 million. NNSA requested $115 million for FY2019; Congress approved $110 million. NNSA requested $427.3 million in FY2018, showing a reduction from the FY2017 appropriation. Other Programs Weapons Activities has several smaller programs, including the following. Secure Transportation Asset This program provides for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials.

The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill funds civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts research and development (R&D) into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which "is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work"; and Weapons Activities. The last is the subject of this report. The Weapons Activities account supports programs that maintain U.S. nuclear missile warheads and gravity bombs and the infrastructure programs that support that mission. Specifically, according to DOE's budget documentation, these programs "support the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapons components." Congress approved $11.1 billion for Weapons Activities, within a total budget of $15.29 billion for NNSA, in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244). NNSA's budget request for FY2019 had sought $11.02 billion for Weapons Activities within a total of budget of $15.09 billion for NNSA. The FY2019 appropriation represents a 4.3% increase over the $10.642 billion for Weapons Activities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) and a 19% increase over the $9.314 billion enacted for Weapons Activities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). Weapons Activities has three main programs, each with a request of over $2 billion for FY2018, as follows: Directed Stockpile Work supports programs that work directly on nuclear weapons. It includes life extension programs, maintenance, and other activities. The FY2017 appropriation was $3,308.3 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $4,009 million; the FY2019 appropriation is $4,658.3 million, an increase of 16% over the FY2018 appropriation. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Programs, which advance the science, engineering, computation, and manufacturing, support Directed Stockpile Work. The FY2017 appropriation was $1,842.2 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $2,034 million; the FY2019 request is $1,995 million. Infrastructure and Operations maintains, operates, and modernizes the National Nuclear Security Administration infrastructure. It supports construction of new facilities and funds deferred maintenance in older facilities. The FY2017 appropriation was $2,808.4 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $3,118 million; the FY2019 request is $3,002 million. Weapons Activities also includes several smaller programs, all of which are described in this report: Secure Transportation Asset, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions. This report will be updated as necessary.

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Although these bills contain a number of wide-ranging provisions, most provisions can be grouped into four broad categories: Changes to Fed g overnance. Changes to oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. Some proposals would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a Taylor Rule (described below) and report those findings to Congress. Changes to the Fed's emergency lending powers. Some proposals would reduce the Fed's discretion to provide emergency assistance under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. This report analyzes these provisions and the policy debate surrounding them. Legislative Activity The following bills affecting the Federal Reserve have seen committee or floor action in the 114 th Congress. 26 / P.L. 22 / P.L. The Fed's budget is not subject to congressional appropriations. 3189 and H.R. H.R. S. 1484 / S. 1910 would require the President of the New York Fed to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 3189 , H.R. 5983 and S. 1484 / S. 1910 would shift responsibility for setting the interest rate paid to banks on reserves from the Board of Governors to the FOMC. H.R. 3189 and H.R. Congressional Commission. H.R. 5983 . H.R. H.R. 3189 , as passed by the House, would permanently eliminate the Fed's surplus and transfer its balance to the Treasury. H.R. Criticism intensified following the extensive assistance provided by the Fed during the financial crisis. Policy Proposals GAO Audit. 24 and S. 2232 would require a one-time GAO audit of the Fed that is not subject to statutory restrictions. 3189 , and H.R. H.R. S. 1484 / S. 1910 , H.R. 3189 , and H.R. Release of FOMC Transcripts. H.R. H.R. 5983 would subject the non-monetary policy functions of the Fed's Board of Governors and 12 privately owned regional banks to the congressional appropriations process. H.R. 3189 would require the Fed's public rule-making to include quantitative and qualitative cost-benefit analysis and a post-adoption impact assessment. H.R. Disclosure of International Negotiations. H.R. 3189 and H.R. H.R. Policy Proposals S. 1484 / S. 1910 would require the Fed to include in a quarterly report to Congress on monetary policy and the economy a discussion of any mathematical rules or other strategies it uses in monetary policy deliberations and how policy has deviated from those rules and strategies. A monetary policy rule like the Taylor rule would presumably meet this requirement. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would amend Section 13(3) to limit the Fed's discretion to make emergency loans. Concluding Thoughts The various proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Whereas some provisions make very minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed's independence from Congress. To some extent, a tradeoff between independence and accountability is unavoidable.

The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 114th Congress. These bills contain wide-ranging provisions that can be grouped into four broad categories: Changes to Fed governance. Some proposals would change the Fed's institutional structure. H.R. 22 (P.L. 114-94) reduced the dividend paid by the Fed to large commercial banks that hold stock in the Fed and permanently capped the Fed's surplus at $10 billion. H.R. 3189 would permanently eliminate the Fed's surplus. H.R. 26 (P.L. 114-1) required at least one nominee for the Fed's board of governors to have community banking experience. S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the New York Fed President a presidentially appointed position. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would increase the voting weight of regional Fed presidents on the FOMC. S. 1484/S. 1910, H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and H.R. 2912 would create a congressional commission to recommend reforms to the Fed. Changes to oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. H.R. 24, S. 2232, H.R. 3189, and H.R. 5983 would require Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed that are not subject to current statutory restrictions. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would subject the Fed's rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements and require the Fed to publicly disclose information on international negotiations and the salaries and personal finances of certain officials and employees. H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the FOMC to publicly release meeting transcripts. H.R. 5983 would subject the Fed's non-monetary policy functions to the congressional appropriations process. Changes involving monetary policy rules (the Taylor Rule). H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule (Taylor Rule) and report those findings to Congress. Policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony in H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983. Changes to the Fed's emergency lending powers. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would reduce the Fed's discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to extend credit to non-bank financial firms during the financial crisis. The proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make very minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed's independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. Most research has found a positive relationship between monetary policy independence and economic outcomes. To some extent, a tradeoff between independence and accountability is unavoidable. This report analyzes bills that have seen committee or floor action and the policy debate surrounding them.

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Congressional Art Competition In July 1981, on behalf of the Congressional Arts Caucus, Representative Richmond proposed to the Speaker of the House, Representative Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., a program for encouraging nationwide artistic creativity by high school students through art exhibits in the tunnels connecting the Capitol to the House Office Buildings. A detailed proposal for the manner of display of the artwork was also requested. The artwork won the district competition and hung in the Cannon Tunnel for a full year without objection. Later the Ethics Manual specifically addresses the Congressional Art Competition in the following: "One instance when cooperation with private groups has been explicitly recognized is the annual competition among high school students in each congressional district to select a work of art to hang in the Capitol, referred to as the Congressional Art Competition. In their earliest years, the Congressional Arts Caucus and Congressional Art Competition were financially supported by a $300 contribution from the allowances of members of the caucus. At the culmination of the annual Art Competition, the winning entries from participating congressional districts are available on the House of Representatives website. Since it began in 1982, "over 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved with the nation-wide competition."

Sponsored by the Congressional Arts Caucus, and known in recent years as "An Artistic Discovery," the Congressional Art Competition is open to high school students nationwide. Begun in 1982, the competition, based in congressional districts, provides the opportunity for Members of Congress to encourage and recognize the artistic talents of their young constituents. Since its inception, more than 650,000 high school students nationwide have been involved in the program. Each year, the art of one student per participating congressional district is selected to represent the district. The culmination of the competition is the yearlong display of winning artwork in the Cannon House Office Building tunnel as well as on the House of Representatives' website. This report provides a brief history of the Congressional Arts Caucus and the Congressional Art Competition. It also provides a history of sponsorship and support for the caucus and the annual competition. The report includes copies of the original correspondence establishing the competition, a sample competition announcement, sample guidelines and required forms for the competition, and a chronological list of congressional co-chairs.

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The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) maintains considerable administrative autonomy under Iraq's constitution, and held a controversial advisory referendum on independence from Iraq on September 25, 2017. The Trump Administration has sustained a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi government and has requested funding to continue security training for Iraqi forces beyond the completion of major military operations against the Islamic State. U.S. assistance to the KRG since 2014 has been provided with the national government's consent, and the Trump Administration has not publicly signaled any planned changes in U.S. assistance programs for either the national government or the Kurdistan region. Iran and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces Since its founding in 2014, Iraq's Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) and its associated militias—the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—have contributed to Iraq's fight against the Islamic State, even as some of its leaders and units have raised concerns among Iraqis and outsiders about the PMF's future. U.S. Foreign Aid and Security Assistance Legislation under consideration in the first session of the 115 th Congress would provide for the continuation of U.S. military operations, foreign assistance, training, and lending support to Iraq on current terms ( H.R. 3354 , H.R. 3362 , and S. 1780 ). 2810 ) would extend the authorization for the U.S. train and equip program in Iraq through December 2019 and would modify the mandate of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq (OSC-I) to widen the range of forces the office may engage to include all "military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq." Since 2014, the United States has contributed more than $1.7 billion to humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq and more than $265 million to the United Nations Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS)—the main conduit for post-IS stabilization assistance in liberated areas. During his March 2017 visit to Washington, DC, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi reviewed progress in Iraq's campaign against the Islamic State and appealed for U.S. and international aid to help meet Iraq's short term humanitarian needs and longer term stabilization and reconstruction costs. Issues for the 115th Congress U.S. Strategy and Engagement Iraq's strategic location, its potential, and its diverse population's ties to neighboring countries underlie its enduring importance to U.S. national security policymakers. In general, U.S. engagement with Iraqis since 2011 has sought to reinforce Iraqi unity and avoid fragmentation. These various views are rooted in competing Iraqi visions for their government and for Iraq's relations with its neighbors and other foreign governments. To date, Prime Minister Abadi and other Iraqis have rejected requests by some Iran-linked militia leaders and fighters to formally pursue the fight against the Islamic State across Iraq's western border in Syria. For FY2018, President Trump requested a total of $347.86 million in bilateral foreign assistance and $1.3 billion in defense assistance to Iraq, most of which would support post-conflict stabilization in areas liberated from the Islamic State and the continuation of U.S. military train and equip programming ( Table 2 ). Through November 2017, Congress has appropriated more than $3.6 billion for the program and is considering President Trump's request for an additional $1.269 billion for FY2018 ( Table 3 ). The December 2016 CR authorized the use of FY2017 ESF-OCO funds for sovereign loan guarantees in support of Iraq's current IMF agreement. The United States provides humanitarian assistance specifically for programs in the KRI, with approximately $175 million in FY2016 funding having been directed for KRI-based humanitarian responses and comparable FY2017 funding planned. Iraq's fiscal resources are constrained, stabilization and reconstruction needs are daunting, and more robust reform efforts may prompt opposition from entrenched interests. Prominent considerations in this regard may include: the relative success or failure of national authorities in integrating and depoliticizing forces mobilized to fight the Islamic State, including the PMF; Baghdad-KRG disputes over territory, security, resources, and revenue transfers; the future of Iraqis uprooted by fighting, who are returning to damaged, underserved areas and some of whom may remain wary of empowered militias; re-emergent rivalries within the Shia Arab majority, some of whose members may fear a resurgence of Sunni radicalism and remain skeptical of Kurdish and U.S. intentions; and the future mission, extent, and terms of any enduring U.S. military presence.

The 115th Congress and the Trump Administration are considering options for U.S. engagement with Iraq as Iraqis look beyond the immediate security challenges posed by their intense three-year battle with the insurgent terrorists of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS). While Iraq's military victory over Islamic State forces is now virtually complete, Iraq's underlying political and economic challenges are daunting and cooperation among the forces arrayed to defeat IS extremists has already begun to fray. The future of volunteer Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the terms of their integration with Iraq's security sector are being determined, with some PMF groups maintaining ties to Iran and anti-U.S. Shia Islamist leaders. In September 2017, Iraq's constitutionally recognized Kurdistan Regional Government held an advisory referendum on independence, in spite of opposition from Iraq's national government and amid its own internal challenges. More than 90% of participants favored independence. With preparations for national elections in May 2018 underway, Iraqi leaders face the task of governing a politically divided and militarily mobilized country, prosecuting a likely protracted counterterrorism campaign against IS remnants, and tackling a daunting resettlement, reconstruction, and reform agenda. More than 3 million Iraqis have been internally displaced since 2014, and billions of dollars for stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been identified. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi is linking his administration's decisions with gains made to date against the Islamic State, but his broader reform platform has not been enacted by Iraq parliament. Oil exports, the lifeblood of Iraq's public finances and economy, are bringing diminished revenues relative to 2014 levels, leaving Iraq's government more dependent on international lenders and donors to meet domestic obligations. The United States has strengthened its ties to Iraq's security forces and provided needed economic and humanitarian assistance since 2014, but Iraqis continue to disagree over how U.S.-Iraqi relations should evolve. President Trump and Prime Minister Abadi met in Washington, DC, in March 2017 and, according to the White House, "agreed to promote a broad-based political and economic partnership based in the [2008] Strategic Framework Agreement," including continued security cooperation. Some Iraqis have welcomed U.S. engagement with and assistance to Iraq, whereas other Iraqis view the United States with hostility and suspicion for various reasons. Prime Minister Abadi has expressed the desire for the United States to provide continued support and training for Iraq's security forces, but some Iraqis—particularly those with close ties to Iran—are deeply critical of proposals for a continued U.S. military presence in the country. U.S. decisions on issues such as policy toward Iran, the conflict in Syria, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. relations with Iraqi Kurds and other subnational groups may influence future bilateral negotiations and prospects for cooperation. Congress has authorized a Defense Department train and equip program for Iraqi security forces through December 31, 2019, and has appropriated more than $3.6 billion requested for the program from FY2015 through FY2017, including funds specifically for the equipping and sustainment of Kurdish peshmerga. U.S. military operations against the Islamic State continue with the consent of Iraq's elected government. Congress has authorized the use of FY2017 funds for sovereign loan guarantees to Iraq and for continued lending for Iraqi arms purchases from the United States. President Trump has requested $1.269 billion to train Iraqis for FY2018 and seeks $347.86 million for foreign aid to Iraq, including $300 million for further U.S. contributions to United Nations-coordinated post-IS stabilization efforts. Appropriations and authorization legislation enacted and under consideration in the 115th Congress generally would provide for the continuation of U.S. assistance and engagement with Iraq on current terms (H.R. 2810, H.R. 3354, S. 1780 and S. 1519).

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Despite the huge increase in U.S. external debt, the investment income component of the current account has remained in surplus. The size of this surplus has varied, hitting a low of $4 billion in 1998 and a high of $37 billion in 2003, but over the past 25 years, the surplus has remained between $15 billion and $30 billion. Since 2003, the surplus has fallen, reaching $28 billion in 2004 and $11 billion in 2005. The significance of this enduring surplus of investment income is that the United States, although a large net debtor, has been borrowing free of any economically meaningful debt service cost. It argues that two factors have worked to limit the impact of large current account deficits on the nation's economic debt service payments. First is the effect of valuation changes that have caused the magnitude of United States net indebtedness to grow much more slowly than the size of the current account deficits would indicate. Second is the effect of asymmetrical capital returns —the United States earns a higher rate of return on its foreign investments than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments. The significance of the rate of return advantage of U.S. FDI for investment income is substantial. The sheer size of prospective U.S. current account deficits will soon overtake the several mitigating forces and cause the real debt burden to grow substantially. A more controversial interpretation of the paradox of the United States having large net external liabilities paired with an investment income surplus has been provided by economists Hausmann and Sturzenegger. They maintain that the official current account data have failed to record a large volume of service exports, so large that the United States has in truth remained a large net external creditor. The name they give to these invisible assets is "dark matter," for, like the astronomical phenomenon, they have a visible effect (generating investment income) but stem from a source that cannot be seen (hidden service exports). currency, U.S. sovereign debt, and U.S. FDI. A Bias in Data Collection? Looking at the sizable gap between the rate of return on U.S. FDI and that on FDI in the United States, the argument can be made that the anomaly is not the high U.S. yield (7.5%) but the suspiciously low foreign yield (2.5%). Why pour hundreds of billions of investment into the United States for a yield below that available from holding virtually risk free U.S. Treasury bonds? Or, given the high yield on U.S. FDI, it would seem likely that there are superior investment opportunities elsewhere. This apparent violation of rational economic behavior suggests there could be something wrong with the reported FDI earnings data from foreign firms operating in the United States. The tremendous size of prospective current account deficits will mean that if the United States is not now a net external debtor it soon will be.

Despite the huge increase in U.S. external debt, the investment income component of the current account has remained in surplus. The size of this surplus has varied, hitting a low of $4 billion in 1998 and a high of $37 billion in 2003, but over the past 25 years, the surplus has remained between $15 billion and $30 billion. Since 2003, the surplus has fallen, reaching $28 billion in 2004 and $11 billion in 2005. This means that the United States, although a large net debtor, has been borrowing free of any economically meaningful debt service cost. What is behind this apparent paradox? Attempts to resolve this paradox have considered special factors that tend to mitigate the effects of the current account deficit on the value of foreign debt, the role of unmeasured U.S. exports, and bias in data collection. A 2005 study by economist William Cline argues that two factors have worked to limit the impact of large current account deficits on the nation's economic debt service payments. First is the effect of valuation changes that have caused the magnitude of U.S. net indebtedness to grow much more slowly than the size of the current account deficits would indicate. Second is the effect of asymmetrical capital returns—the United States earns a higher rate of return on its foreign investments than foreigners earn on their U.S. investments. A more controversial interpretation of the paradox of the United States having large net external liabilities along with an investment income surplus has been provided by economists Hausmann and Sturzenegger. They maintain that the official current account data have failed to record a large volume of service exports, so large that the United States has in truth remained a large net external creditor. The name they give to these invisible assets is "dark matter," for, like the astronomical phenomenon, they have a visible effect (generating investment income) but stem from a source that cannot be seen (hidden service exports). Looking at the sizable gap between the rate of return on U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI ) and that on FDI in the United States, the anomaly is not the high U.S. yield (7.5%) but the suspiciously low foreign yield (2.5%). Why pour hundreds of billions of investment into the United States for a yield below that available from holding virtually risk free U.S. Treasury bonds? Or, given the high yield on U.S. FDI, it would seem likely that there are superior investment opportunities elsewhere. This apparent violation of rational economic behavior suggests that there could be something wrong with the FDI earnings data reported by foreign firms operating in the United States. While the rate of past debt accumulation may have been smaller than what the size of U.S. current account deficits would indicate, and while the size of the U.S. net debt position and investment income balance may be subject to significant measurement error, the sheer size of prospective trade deficits will mean that, if not now, the United States will soon be a net debtor and will also soon have a sizable deficit in investment income—incurring a true debt burden. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Introduction Congress has recently demonstrated significant ongoing interest in the issue of "patent assertion entities" (PAEs), which are popularly referred to as "patent trolls." The much-publicized proliferation of PAEs was among the central factors that prompted the AIA, but at the end of the day, Congress passed a few provisions arguably addressing PAEs while leaving several other PAE-related issues unresolved, apparently in light of lively debate over what, if anything, should be done about them. The PAE business model focuses not on developing or commercializing technologies but on buying and asserting patents against companies that have already begun using them, often after independently developing them without knowledge of the PAE's patent, according to a report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). PAEs emerged alongside the burgeoning tech industry around the turn of the 21 st century and gained notoriety with lawsuits claiming exclusive ownership of such ubiquitous technologies as wireless email, digital video streaming, and the interactive web. They have had the attention of Congress, the press, and the public since at least 2006, when a successful PAE suit almost caused the shutdown of BlackBerry wireless service. Such victories in court are rare for PAEs. According to one empirical study, they lose 92% of merits judgments, but few cases make it that far. The vast majority end in settlements because litigation is risky, costly, and disruptive for defendants, and PAEs often offer to settle for amounts well below litigation costs to make the business decision to settle an obvious one. Reform advocates fear that PAEs impede innovation, undermine the patent system, and wreak havoc on businesses that play a vital role in the American economy. According to one study, PAE activity cost defendants and licensees $29 billion in 2011, a 400% increase over $7 billion in 2005, and the losses are mostly deadweight, with less than 25% flowing to innovation and at least that much going towards legal fees. Defenders of PAEs argue that they actually promote invention by increasing the liquidity and managing the risk of investments in applied research and invention, as well as by compensating small inventors. The Federal Trade Commission and numerous scholars suggest that PAE activity does indeed have beneficial effects but that, under current law, these benefits are significantly outweighed by the costs. What remains unclear is the extent of the imbalance between costs and benefits and whether Congress should attempt to rebalance any disparity. This report reviews the current debate and controversy surrounding PAEs, examines the reasons for the rise in PAE litigation, and explores the legislative options available to Congress if it decides that PAEs are an issue that should be addressed. The more licensing fees PAEs obtain, the more these inventors earn from their patents, and the greater their incentives to invent. Legislation in the 113th Congress On February 27, 2013, Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz introduced the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013 ( H.R. It might also extend the use of an invalid patent and the number of defendants a PAE can assert it against.

Congress has recently demonstrated significant ongoing interest in litigation by "patent assertion entities" (PAEs), which are colloquially known as "patent trolls" and sometimes referred to as "non-practicing entities" (NPEs). The PAE business model focuses not on developing or commercializing patented inventions but on buying and asserting patents, often against firms that have already begun using the claimed technology after developing it independently, unaware of the PAE patent. PAEs include not only freestanding businesses but patent holding subsidiaries, affiliates, and shells of operating companies that want to participate in the PAE industry and/or a new means of countering competitors. The proliferation of PAEs was among the central factors raised in support of the most recent patent reform legislation, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). However, the AIA contains relatively few provisions that arguably might impact PAEs, apparently because of lively debate over what, if anything, should be done about them. In the 113th Congress, the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013 (H.R. 845) has been introduced in an effort to affect the number of lawsuits filed by PAEs. PAEs emerged alongside the burgeoning tech industry around the turn of the 21st century and gained notoriety with lawsuits claiming exclusive ownership of such ubiquitous technologies as wireless email, digital video streaming, and the interactive web. They have had the attention of Congress, the press, and the public since at least 2006, when a successful PAE suit almost caused the shutdown of BlackBerry wireless service. Such victories in court are rare for PAEs; they lose 92% of merits judgments. But few cases make it that far. The vast majority of defendants settle because patent litigation is risky, disruptive, and expensive, regardless of the merits; and many PAEs set royalty demands strategically well below litigation costs to make the business decision to settle an obvious one. For most PAEs, the costs of litigating and losing are more than offset by the licensing fees they can gain by demonstrating their tenacity to future defendants. According to one estimate, PAEs generated $29 billion in direct costs from defendants and licensees in 2011, a 400% increase over $7 billion in 2005, and some researchers suggest these costs are primarily deadweight, with less than 25% flowing to support innovation and at least that much going towards legal fees. Another study reported that 62% of all patent suits filed in 2012 were brought by PAEs. Critics assert that PAEs undermine the purposes of patent law—promoting innovation by providing incentives to invest in development and commercialization of inventions—and injure companies that play a vital role in the American economy. However, defenders of PAEs argue that they actually promote invention by adding liquidity options, managing risk, and compensating small inventors. The Federal Trade Commission and several leading scholars suggest that these benefits exist but are significantly less than the costs they impose. What remains unclear is the extent of imbalance between costs and benefits and whether Congress could recalibrate it to advance the goals of patent law while avoiding unintended consequences. This report reviews the current debate and controversy surrounding PAEs and their effect on innovation, examines the reasons for the rise in PAE litigation, and explores the legislative options available to Congress if it decides that these are issues that should be addressed.

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After Members of the House or Senate leave office, they are afforded certain courtesies and privileges. Some are derived from law and chamber rules, but others are courtesies that have been extended as a matter of custom. Some of these privileges and courtesies include the following: access to the floor of the chamber in which a former Member served. short-term franking privileges. access to parking facilities and athletic or wellness facilities, subject to some restrictions. access to House or Senate administrative services and dining facilities. access to materials through the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Library of Congress.

After Members of the House or Senate leave office, they are afforded certain courtesies and privileges. Some are derived from law and chamber rules, but others are courtesies that have been extended as a matter of custom. Some of these privileges and courtesies include the following: access to the floor of the chamber in which a former Member served; short-term franking privileges; access to parking facilities and athletic or wellness facilities; access to House or Senate administrative services and dining facilities; and access to materials through the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Library of Congress.

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Introduction Congress has considered, at various points in time, numerous pieces of legislation that relate to genetic and genomic technology and testing. These include bills addressing genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment; precision and personalized medicine; the patenting of genetic material; the privacy of health information, including genetic information; and the oversight of clinical laboratory tests (in vitro diagnostics), including genetic tests. The focus on these issues signals the importance of public policy issues surrounding the clinical and public health implications of new genetic technology. As genetic technologies proliferate and are increasingly used to guide clinical treatment, these public policy issues are likely to continue to garner attention. Understanding the basic scientific concepts underlying genetics and genetic testing may help facilitate the development of more effective public policy in this area. Over time, as translational obstacles are addressed, the value of and role for genetic testing in clinical medicine may increase. Policymakers may need to balance concerns about privacy and the potential use and misuse of genetic information with the potential of genetics and genetic technology to improve care delivery, for example by personalizing medical care and treatment of disease. In addition, policymakers face decisions about the balance of federal oversight and regulation of genetic tests, patients' safety, and innovation in this area. Finally, the need for and degree of federal support for research to develop a comprehensive evidence base to facilitate the integration of genetic testing into clinical practice (for example, to improve health care outcomes or to support coverage decisions by health insurers) may be debated. Background Virtually all disease has a genetic component. Experts note that "(w)e have recently entered a transition period in which specific genetic knowledge is becoming critical to the delivery of effective health care for everyone." Cells Contain Chromosomes Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes in the nucleus of most cells in their bodies. Chromosomes Contain DNA Chromosomes are composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and protein. DNA is composed of complex chemical substances called bases. DNA Codes for Protein Proteins are fundamental components of all living cells. They include enzymes, structural elements, and hormones. A gene is the section of DNA that contains the sequence which corresponds to a specific protein. Thus, variations in DNA sequence can manifest as variations in the protein, which may affect the function of the protein. Genotype Influences Phenotype Though most of the genome is similar between individuals, there can be significant variation in physical appearance or function between individuals. Many complex factors affect how a genotype (DNA) translates to a phenotype (observable trait) in ways that are not yet clear for many traits or conditions.

Congress has considered, at various points in time, numerous pieces of legislation that relate to genetic and genomic technology and testing. These include bills addressing genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment; precision medicine; the patenting of genetic material; and the oversight of clinical laboratory tests (in vitro diagnostics), including genetic tests. The focus on these issues signals the growing importance of public policy issues surrounding the clinical and public health implications of new genetic technology. As genetic technologies proliferate and are increasingly used to guide clinical treatment, these public policy issues are likely to continue to garner attention. Understanding the basic scientific concepts underlying genetics and genetic testing may help facilitate the development of more effective public policy in this area. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes in the nucleus of most cells in their bodies. Chromosomes are composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and protein. DNA is composed of complex chemical substances called bases. Proteins are fundamental components of all living cells, and include enzymes, structural elements, and hormones. A gene is the section of DNA that contains the sequence which corresponds to a specific protein. Though most of the genome is similar between individuals, there can be significant variation in physical appearance or function between individuals due to variations in DNA sequence that may manifest as changes in the protein, which affect the protein's function. Many complex factors affect how a genotype (DNA) translates to a phenotype (observable trait) in ways that are not yet clear for many traits or conditions. Most diseases have a genetic component. Some diseases, such as Huntington's Disease, are caused by a specific gene. Other diseases, such as heart disease and cancer, are caused by a complex combination of genetic and environmental factors. For this reason, the public health burden of genetic disease, as well as its clinical significance, may be large. Experts note that society has recently entered a transition period in which specific genetic knowledge is becoming more integral to the delivery of effective health care. Therefore, the value of and role for genetic testing in clinical medicine is likely to increase in the future. Policymakers may need to balance concerns about the potential use and misuse of genetic information with the potential of genetics and genetic technology to improve care delivery, for example by personalizing medical care and treatment of disease. In addition, policymakers face decisions about the balance of federal oversight and regulation of genetic tests, patients' safety, and innovation in this area. Finally, the need for and degree of federal support for research to develop a comprehensive evidence base to facilitate the integration of genetic testing into clinical practice (for example, to support coverage decisions by health insurers) may be debated.

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Introduction Section 100121 of P.L. 112-141 , the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21, enacted July 6, 2012) provides the authority for a new phased retirement option for certain employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS), the retirement plans that cover most of the civilian federal workforce. For eligible federal employees, phased retirement is a voluntary option that requires approval from their employing federal agencies. Employees participating in phased retirement generally must also engage in mentoring activities (except for U.S. Background Phased retirement allows certain federal employees who are otherwise eligible for retirement under CSRS or FERS to work a reduced schedule while receiving a reduced salary as well as a prorated percentage of their retirement benefits. Before P.L. 112-141 , federal law generally prohibited the concurrent receipt of a federal salary and a federal pension (i.e., dual compensation ). Phased Retirement Authority Section 100121 of P.L. Postal Service, are subject to a requirement that they spend at least 20% of their reduced work hours engaged in mentoring activities. Phased retirement is not an entitlement; it requires the mutual agreement of the eligible employee and the employee's agency. Under the implementing regulations, agencies may begin accepting applications from employees for phased retirement beginning November 6, 2014. Eligible employees must secure written approval from the employing agency to enter into phased retirement. Consequences of Phased Retirement for Federal Employee Benefits Currently, phased retirees are authorized to work 50% of their previous work schedules and receive 50% of their previous federal salaries.

On July 6, 2012, P.L. 112-141, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), was signed into law. Section 100121 of P.L. 112-141 provides authority for a new phased retirement option for certain federal employees. Phased retirement allows eligible, full-time employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) to move to a part-time work schedule while simultaneously receiving partial retirement benefits. Employees participating in phased retirement, with the exception of U.S. Postal Service employees, must spend at least 20% of their work hours engaged in mentoring activities. Phased retirement is not an entitlement; eligible federal employees must apply and receive approval from their employing agencies to enter phased retirement. Under the implementing regulations adopted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on August 8, 2014, phased retirement will initially be structured as a 50% work schedule, with the participating employee receiving 50% of his or her federal salary and about 50% of his or her federal pension benefit (also referred to as an annuity). Employing federal agencies may accept applications from employees for this new phased retirement option beginning November 6, 2014. This report provides background on dual compensation (i.e., concurrent receipt of both a federal salary and a federal pension); an overview of the phased retirement authority under P.L. 112-141; a summary of eligibility requirements for employee participation in phased retirement; and an explanation of the consequences of phased retirement status for employee benefits.

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A majority of Americans have health insurance from the private health insurance (PHI) market. Health plans sold in the PHI market must comply with requirements at both the state and federal levels. Many of the federal requirements described in this report were established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended); however, some were established under federal laws enacted prior to the ACA. The first part of this report provides background information about health plans sold in the PHI market and briefly describes state and federal regulation of private plans. The second part summarizes selected federal requirements and indicates each requirement's applicability to one or more of the following types of private health plans: individual, small group, large group, and self-insured. The federal requirements described in this report are grouped under the following categories: obtaining coverage, keeping coverage, developing health insurance premiums, covered services, cost-sharing limits, consumer assistance and other patient protections, and plan requirements related to health care providers.

A majority of Americans have health insurance from the private health insurance (PHI) market. Health plans sold in the PHI market must comply with requirements at both the state and federal levels; such requirements often are referred to as market reforms. The first part of this report provides background information about health plans sold in the PHI market and briefly describes state and federal regulation of private plans. The second part summarizes selected federal requirements and indicates each requirement's applicability to one or more of the following types of private health plans: individual, small group, large group, and self-insured. The selected market reforms are grouped under the following categories: obtaining coverage, keeping coverage, developing health insurance premiums, covered services, cost-sharing limits, consumer assistance and other patient protections, and plan requirements related to health care providers. Many of the federal requirements described in this report were established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended); however, some were established under federal laws enacted prior to the ACA.

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Introduction Levels of pay for congressional staff are a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 11 staff position titles that are used in House committees, and for which sufficient data could be identified. Pay data for staff working in Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014 , and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014 , respectively. Table 4 - Table 14 provide tabular pay data for each House committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay for that position, in constant 2016 dollars, to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between 2011 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 14.96% increase for communications directors to a -12.24% decrease for subcommittee staff directors. Of the eight staff positions for which data were available, two positions saw pay increases while six saw declines. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over the same period.

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 11 staff position titles that are used in House committees, and include the following: Chief Counsel; Communications Director; Counsel; Deputy Staff Director; Minority Professional Staff Member; Minority Staff Director; Professional Staff Member; Senior Professional Staff Member; Staff Assistant; Staff Director; and Subcommittee Staff Director. Tables provide tabular pay data for each House committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay of that position, to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay, in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (2011-2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 14.96% increase for communications directors to a -12.24% decrease for subcommittee staff directors. Of the eight staff positions for which data are available, two positions saw pay increases while six saw declines from 2011 to 2015. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over the same period. Pay data for staff working in Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014, and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014, respectively. Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016.

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Perhaps in response to such concerns, Congress established sunset provisions which apply to three of the most controversial amendments to FISA: Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), also known as the "lone wolf" provision, which simplifies the evidentiary showing needed to obtain a FISA court order to target non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, specifically by authorizing such orders in the absence of a proven link between a targeted individual and a foreign power; Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which permits multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps (i.e., wiretaps which may follow a target even when he or she changes phones) by adding flexibility to the manner in which the subject of a FISA court order is specified; and Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorizes orders compelling a person to produce "any tangible thing" that is "relevant" to an authorized foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or counter-espionage investigation. In summer 2013, media began reporting on several foreign intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), including the bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215. One day later, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, which placed new limitations on the scope of the government's foreign intelligence activities, while simultaneously extending the expired provisions through December 15, 2019. It both enlarged the scope of materials that may be sought and lowered the standard for a court to issue an order compelling their production. Roving Wiretaps Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. The grandfather clauses authorize the continued effect of the amendments with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the provisions' sunset date.

Two amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were enacted as part of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 enlarged the scope of materials that could be sought under FISA to include "any tangible thing." It also lowered the standard required before a court order may be issued to compel their production. A third amendment to FISA was enacted in 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Section 6001(a) of the IRTPA changed the rules regarding the types of individuals who may be targets of FISA-authorized searches. Also known as the "lone wolf" provision, it permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization. In summer 2013, media began reporting on several foreign intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), including the bulk collection of telephone metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. After a one-day lapse in the expiring authorities, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, which placed new limitations on the scope of the government's foreign intelligence activities, while simultaneously extending the expired provisions through December 15, 2019. Although these provisions are set to sunset at the end of 2019, grandfather clauses permit them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date.

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The federal budget is on an unsustainable path as a result of projected federal debt levels that will continue to grow relative to the size of the economy. Under baseline assumptions, deficit levels are expected to fall towards the middle part of the decade, as the economy recovers, before rising again by the end of the decade. Beyond this decade, however, the federal government's fiscal outlook becomes bleaker as spending on mandatory programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, and net interest consume an increasing portion of the total federal budget resulting in very large increases in federal debt. Various views and opinions exist about how to change the long-term fiscal outlook, specifically concerned with which programs should be prioritized or sacrificed. At the extreme, if no action is taken, the United States will likely face a significant economic crisis. Finally, this report briefly discusses the proposals of selected groups that have published detailed recommendations on how to return the federal budget to a sustainable course. Recent Developments Budget policy debates thus far in the 112 th Congress have centered on how to achieve meaningful deficit reduction and implementation of a plan to stabilize the federal debt. To achieve fiscal sustainability, cuts or reductions to favored programs and increases in taxes will likely be required. Spending and tax law changes made in the near-term can reduce the probability of a future crisis and help ensure an improved standard of living for future generations. Budgetary choices, particularly centered around the magnitude of changes that would be required to return to fiscal sustainability, have important economic, social, and generational impacts in the present and the future. A number of groups have published reports detailing possible ways that the federal government can put itself on a more sustainable fiscal path. Though the fiscal reform plans discussed here differ, they all have several things in common. They propose that implementation of their recommendations beginning around FY2012, with the goal of stabilizing the debt at 60% of GDP near the end of the decade. Over the longer term, they all propose to reduce this ratio further. Some of the reports focus on specific policy options that are available, while others focus on issues of accountability and transparency in the budget process, featuring recommendations for new budget procedures. Some plans also recommend implementing additional, immediate, short-term stimulus that would increase the deficit before beginning deficit reduction once the economy fully recovers. National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform As a policy initiative included in his FY2011 budget proposal, President Obama committed to create a bipartisan fiscal commission to be tasked with putting the nation on a sustainable fiscal path. The commission had two main goals: balance the budget excluding net interest payments by FY2015 (also known as primary balance) and examine ways to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run. The Fiscal Commission's final report, The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform , contained recommendations that would 1) reduce the deficit by a combined $4 trillion between FY2012 and FY2020; 2) lower the budget deficit to 2.3% of GDP by FY2015; 3) reduce tax rates and tax expenditures to collect more revenue on net; 4) cap revenue at 21% of GDP; 5) ensure the solvency of Social Security; and 6) reduce the federal debt to 60% of GDP by FY2023 and 40% by FY2035. In order to achieve these savings, the proposal included cuts to both security and non-security discretionary programs, health care cost containment, additional mandatory savings through cuts to agriculture subsidies and the civil service retirement system, Social Security reforms, comprehensive tax reform, and budget process changes.

The federal budget is on an unsustainable path. Though deficit levels are currently elevated, they are expected to fall towards the middle part of the decade as the economic recovery continues. Looking beyond this decade, however, the country's fiscal outlook becomes more bleak as spending on programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, and net interest are projected to consume a larger portion of the total federal budget. Budget policy debates thus far in the 112th Congress have centered on how to achieve meaningful deficit reduction and implementation of a plan to stabilize the federal debt. Various views and opinions exist about how to improve the long-term fiscal outlook, specifically centered around which programs should be prioritized or sacrificed. Delays in taking corrective action will exacerbate the size of the changes that need to be made. At the extreme, if no actions are taken, the United States risks a significant economic crisis and the government may be limited in its ability to address these challenges. Any choices that are made to address the budgetary imbalances have important economic, social, and generational impacts in the present and the future. In order to undertake any substantive changes to the federal policies and programs, sacrifices to favored programs and increases in taxes will likely be required. The sacrifices made today are essential to minimizing the size of potential programmatic cuts or tax increases, reducing the probability of a future crisis, and ensuring an improved standard of living for future generations. A number of groups have published reports detailing possible ways that the country can put itself on a more sustainable fiscal path. Though the fiscal reform plans differ, they all have several things in common. They recommend that implementation of their plans largely begin in FY2012, with the goal of stabilizing the debt at 60% of GDP near the end of the decade. Over the longer-term, they all provide plans to reduce this ratio further. Some of the reports focus on specific policy options that are available, while others focus on issues of accountability and transparency in the budget process. Some plans also recommend implementing additional, immediate short-term stimulus that would increase the deficit before calling for deficit reduction. In addition, other groups, including the Senate "Gang of Six" and a new group comprised of Members of Congress and led by Vice President Biden, are formulating additional bipartisan deficit reduction proposals. President Obama created a bipartisan fiscal commission tasked with putting the nation on a sustainable fiscal path. The commission had two main goals: balancing the budget excluding net interest payments by FY2015 and examining ways to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run. The Fiscal Commission's final report contained recommendations that would 1) reduce the deficit by a combined $4 trillion by FY2020; 2) lower the budget deficit to 2.3% of GDP by FY2015; 3) reduce tax rates and tax expenditures; 4) cap revenue collection at 21% of GDP; 5) ensure the solvency of Social Security; and 6) reduce the federal debt to 60% of GDP by FY2023 and 40% by FY2035. In order to achieve these savings, the plan includes cuts to both security and non-security discretionary programs, health care cost containment, additional mandatory savings through cutting agriculture subsidies and the civil service retirement system, Social Security reforms, comprehensive tax reform, and budget process changes. This report discusses why the federal government's fiscal path is unsustainable and provides an overview of proposals of selected groups that have published detailed recommendations on how to return the federal budget to a sustainable course.

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Since its inception in 1938, the program has evolved from an ancillary program with low participation to a central pillar of federal support for agriculture. From 2007 to 2016, the total net cost of the federal crop insurance program was about $72 billion, of which $43 billion (60%) was of direct benefit to producers, $28 billion (39%) went to private insurers, and $754 million (1%) went to the Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2 ), have proposed changes to the federal crop insurance program. Role of Crop Insurance in the Farm Bill From 2007 to 2016, the federal crop insurance title had the second-largest outlays in the farm bill after nutrition. As such, it would continue to operate in the event that Congress does not enact a new farm bill, although farm bills have been vehicles for modifying the program in the past. Historically, the agricultural insurance market has been underdeveloped compared to other insurance markets. La ck of crop data and actuarially based rates . Production and price variations . Geographically correlated risks . Adverse selection refers to higher-risk farmers being more likely to purchase insurance than lower-risk farmers at the same premium rate. In 1936, on the heels of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, the President's Committee on Crop Insurance recommended a plan of "all-risk" (multiple-peril) crop insurance. In the early years of federal crop insurance, polices were available for only a few principal crops (mainly corn, barley, oats, sorghum, wheat, cotton, and rice) and in a limited number of counties. Participation RMA reports that in 2015 the crop insurance program provided approximately $102.5 billion of insurance protection (liability) for over 100 crops (excluding hay, livestock, nursery, pasture, rangeland, and forage) on about 238 million acres, or 86% of eligible acres. Policy offerings and participation were much smaller for the livestock sector—$1.3 billion in liability for livestock (primarily cattle, swine, and dairy) on less than 3% of total eligible head or hundredweight. Total premium for crops (not including livestock and other policies) was about $9.8 billion with premium subsidies paid by FCIC amounting to about $6 billion. Program Operation and Finances The federal crop insurance program is operated through public and private entities and is funded by both taxpayers and producers. Private insurance companies, known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), are the primary insurers selling and servicing the insurance policies. 3. RMA drafts federal crop insurance policies, sets premium rates, and regulates AIPs. Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) The terms of the financial agreement between FCIC and AIPs are set out in a mutually negotiated document referred to as the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). Each AIP signs an SRA with FCIC every reinsurance year. (See " Delivery Expenses "). Given the program's significant cost and share of USDA program outlays, it is a frequent target for budgetary savings. Multiple bills introduced in the 115 th Congress would modify the main financial components of the program—premium subsidies, the division of underwriting gains and losses between FCIC and AIPs, and A&O and CAT LAE paid to AIPs. As with any large program, especially those with private sector involvement, congressional oversight has a significant role in ensuring that the federal crop insurance program meets its intended policy goals and operates efficiently.

Since its inception in 1938, the federal crop insurance program has evolved from an ancillary program with low participation to a central pillar of federal support for agriculture. From 2007 to 2016, the federal crop insurance title had the second-largest outlays in the farm bill after nutrition. The total net cost of the program for crop years 2007-2016 was about $72 billion, of which $43 billion (60%) was of direct benefit to producers, $28 billion (39%) went to private insurers, and $754 million (1%) went to the Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Historically, the agricultural insurance market has been underdeveloped compared to other insurance markets. Agricultural insurance can be challenging to price for several reasons, including lack of crop data, difficulty in calculating actuarially based rates, production and price variations, geographically correlated risks, moral hazard, and adverse selection (i.e., the tendency of higher-risk farmers being more likely to purchase insurance than lower-risk farmers). In 1938, on the heels of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, Congress created the federal crop insurance program as a potential alternative to supplemental disaster assistance payments. Initially polices were available for only a few principal crops in a limited number of counties. Few eligible acres were insured. The program underwent significant changes in 1980, when Congress authorized premium subsidies and brought private insurers into the program. Since 1980, federal crop insurance has operated through a shared public-private arrangement funded by taxpayers and producers. Three principal actors operate the program: 1. Private insurance companies, known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), which are the primary insurers selling and servicing the insurance policies; 2. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which reinsures the policies and subsidizes the delivery expenses of AIPs; and 3. RMA, which determines policy terms, sets premium rates, and regulates AIPs. The terms of the financial arrangement between FCIC and AIPs are set out in a mutually negotiated Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). Each AIP signs an SRA with FCIC annually. In contrast to the program's limited scope and low participation rate in its early years, by 2011 federal crop insurance was providing more than $100 billion of insurance protection (liability) for over 100 crops (excluding hay, livestock, nursery, pasture, rangeland, and forage) on about 238 million acres. Policy offerings and participation were smaller for the livestock sector—$1.3 billion in liability on less than 3% of total eligible livestock inventory. In 2015, total premium for crops (excluding livestock and other policies) was about $9.8 billion, of which FCIC paid about 62% and producers paid about 38%. From 2000 to 2016, four crops—corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton—accounted for 75% of enrolled acreage. The program is permanently authorized and would continue to operate if Congress does not enact a new farm bill. However, past farm bills have made changes to the underlying authority. Given the program's significant cost and share of USDA program outlays, it is a frequent target for budgetary savings. Multiple bills introduced in the 115th Congress would modify the main financial components of the program. As with any large program, especially those with private sector involvement, congressional oversight has a significant role in ensuring that the federal crop insurance program meets its intended policy goals and operates efficiently.

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U.S. world trade has grown steadily over the past decade. In 2017, the United States exported $2.4 trillion in goods and services and imported $2.9 trillion. Since 2009, when trade flows declined sharply in the midst of the financial crisis, U.S. exports have grown 48.5%, while U.S. imports have grown 47.6% in nominal terms. More broadly, since 1960, trade relative to GDP has risen markedly. U.S. exports as a share of GDP expanded from 5% in 1960 to over 12% of GDP in 2017, while U.S. imports expanded from 4% to over 15% of GDP ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). According to data from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis, China was the top U.S. trading partner in 2017, with $711.7 billion in total goods and services trade, followed by Canada ($679.9 billion), Mexico ($622.1 billion), Japan ($286.1 billion), and Germany ($239.8 billion). China was the largest source of U.S. imports, while Canada was the largest destination for U.S. exports. However, considering the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) as a single trading partner, the EU is both the largest U.S. export destination ($528.2 billion) and the largest source of U.S. imports ($629.4 billion). The majority of U.S. global trade—approximately 65%—is with countries with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement (FTA). The changes in U.S. trade patterns pose both opportunities and challenges for U.S. international trade relations. These developments have intensified congressional interest in U.S. trade policy and heightened its demand for information and comparative analysis of bilateral U.S. trade flows. In the coming months, Congress may face issues such as shaping U.S. trade policy to reflect this changing composition of trade; enhancing the competitive position of U.S. firms, workers, and industries; promoting access to new foreign market opportunities for U.S. businesses; and addressing tensions, trade barriers, and issues raised by the growing role of emerging economies in the global economy. In addition, questions affecting U.S. trade trends could also arise as the Trump Administration renegotiates FTAs and pursues new ones, and Congress debates and ratifies them. Congress is expected to closely monitor negotiations on other trade agreements and on developments at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade in Services with Leading Partners In 2017, the EU—as a single entity—was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) trade in services, while the largest single-country trading partners were the UK, Canada, Japan, China, and Germany ( Table 7 ). Trade in Goods and Services with Leading Partners In 2017, the EU was the United States' largest market for U.S. goods and services exports, accounting for $528.2 billion (22.47% of total U.S. exports, down from 24.97% in 2000), as well as the leading source of U.S. imports, which totaled $629.4 billion (21.68% of total U.S. imports, largely unchanged from the share in 2000). Canada was the second-largest U.S. export market, with $341.3 billion worth of U.S. exports (14.52% of total U.S. exports, down from 18.96% in 2000), and the fourth-largest source of U.S. imports, which totaled $338.5 billion (11.6%, down from 17.39% in 2000). The share of China in U.S. trade has increased dramatically over the past few decades. In 2000, it accounted for 2.00% of total U.S. exports and 7.14% of total U.S. imports. Last year, China's share had risen to 8.00% of total U.S. exports and 18.04% of U.S. imports. The U.S. trade deficit with the EU rose 3.01% ($4.5 billion), from $148.1 billion in 2016 to $152.6 billion in 2017. Trade in Services The value of U.S. two-way (exports plus imports) services trade with the 28 member states of the EU increased 5.06% ($21.0 billion), from $414.4 billion in 2016 to $435.4 billion in 2017. The U.S. services trade surplus with the EU declined 8.28% ($4.6 billion), from $56.1 billion in 2016 to $51.4 billion in 2017, lower than the U.S. trade surplus registered with the EU in 2014 ($52.3 billion) and 2015 ($54.9 billion). China Trade in Goods In 2017, China was the United States' largest, single-country trading partner based on two-way (exports plus imports) merchandise trade, accounting for 16.27% of total U.S. merchandise trade, up from 15.80% in 2016. U.S. two-way merchandise trade with China amounted to $636.7 billion in 2017, an increase of 9.93% over the $579.2 billion recorded in 2016. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China of $375.9 billion remained higher than the U.S. trade deficit registered with any other trading partner in 2017. U.S. two-way services trade with China amounted to $75.0 billion in 2017, an increase of 5.74% from the $71.0 billion recorded in 2016. The U.S. services surplus with China in 2017 amounted to $40.2 billion. Japan Trade in Goods In 2017, Japan was the United States' fourth-largest single-country trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) trade, accounting for 5.28% of total U.S. merchandise trade with the world, slightly down from 5.40% in 2016.

U.S. world trade has grown steadily over the past decade. In 2017, the United States exported $2.4 trillion in goods and services and imported $2.9 trillion. Since 2009, when trade flows declined sharply in the midst of the financial crisis, U.S. exports have grown—in nominal terms—48.5%, while U.S. imports have grown 47.6%. More broadly, since 1960, trade relative to gross domestic product (GDP) has risen markedly. U.S. exports as a percentage of GDP expanded from 5% in 1960 to over 12% of GDP in 2017, while U.S. imports expanded from 4% to over 15% of GDP. China was the top U.S. trading partner in 2017, with $711.7 billion in total goods and services trade, followed by Canada ($679.9 billion), Mexico ($622.1 billion), Japan ($286.1 billion), and Germany ($239.8 billion). China was the largest source of U.S. imports, while Canada was the largest destination for U.S. exports. However, considering the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) as a single trading partner, the EU is both the largest U.S. export destination ($528.2 billion) and the largest source of U.S. imports ($629.4 billion). The majority of U.S. global trade—approximately 65%—is with countries that do not have a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. The changing dynamics and composition of U.S. trade pose both opportunities and challenges for U.S. trade relations. These developments have intensified congressional interest in U.S. trade policy and heightened congressional demand for comparative analysis of U.S. bilateral trade flows. In the coming months, Congress may face matters such as shaping U.S. trade policy to reflect the changing composition of U.S. trade; enhancing the competitive position of U.S. industries, firms, and workers; promoting access to new foreign markets for U.S. businesses; and addressing new trade tensions, barriers, and other issues raised by the growing role of emerging economies in the global economy. In addition, questions affecting U.S. trade trends could arise as the Trump Administration renegotiates existing FTAs and pursues new ones, and Congress debates and potentially ratifies them. Congress may closely monitor negotiations on other trade agreements, as well as developments at the World Trade Organization. Key U.S Trade Developments with Major Trading Partners in 2017 Trade in Goods In 2017, the European Union (EU) was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way (exports plus imports) merchandise trade. The value of U.S. merchandise trade with the EU increased 4.7% to $722.2 billion in 2017. The U.S. trade deficit with the EU rose 3.0%, from $148.1 billion in 2016 to $152.6 billion in 2017. China was the largest single-country U.S. trading partner based on two-way merchandise trade. U.S. two-way merchandise trade with China amounted to $636.7 billion in 2017, an increase of 9.9% from the level recorded in 2016. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China of $375.9 billion remained higher than the U.S. trade deficit registered with any other trading partner in 2017. Trade in Services The EU was the United States' top trading partner in terms of two-way services trade in 2017, while the largest single-country trading partners were the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, China, and Germany. The value of U.S. services trade with the EU increased 5.1%, from $414.4 billion in 2016 to $435.4 billion in 2017. The U.S. trade surplus with the EU declined 8.3%, from $56.1 billion in 2016 to $51.4 billion in 2017. In 2017, China was the United States' fourth-largest single-country trading partner based on two-way services trade. U.S. two-way services trade with China amounted to $75.0 billion in 2017, an increase of 5.7% from the $71.0 billion recorded in 2016. The U.S. services surplus with China in 2017 amounted to $40.2 billion, increasing 3.4% over the previous year. U.S. Total Trade in Goods and Services The EU was the United States' largest market for U.S. goods and services exports, accounting for $528.2 billion (22.5% of total U.S. exports), as well as the leading source of U.S. imports, which totaled $629.4 billion (21.7% of total U.S. imports). Canada was the second-largest U.S. export market, with $341.3 billion worth of U.S. exports (14.5% of total U.S. exports), and the fourth-largest source of U.S. imports, which totaled $338.5 billion (11.6% of total U.S. imports). China's share of U.S. trade has increased dramatically over the past few decades. In 2000, it accounted for 2.0% of total U.S. exports and 7.1% of total U.S. imports. By 2017, China's share had risen to 8.0% of total U.S. exports and 18.0% of U.S. imports.

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The 110 th Congress is considering legislation or conducting oversight on many NPS-related topics. Several major topics are covered in this report: proposals to enhance NPS funding before the agency's 2016 centennial; the NPS maintenance backlog; science-related activities at national park units; security of NPS units and lands; and management of wild and scenic rivers, which are administered by the NPS or another land management agency. The National Park Centennial Initiative, first announced by President Bush in August 2006, seeks to add up to $3 billion in new funds for the parks over 10 years through a joint public/private effort. The initiative has three components: (1) a commitment to add $100.0 million annually in discretionary funds; (2) a challenge for the public to donate at least $100.0 million annually; and (3) a commitment to match the public donations with federal funds of up to $100.0 million annually. 2959 and S. 1253 ) has been introduced to create a mandatory program along the lines of the President's initiative. Under H.R. DOI estimates of the NPS backlog have increased from an average of $4.25 billion in FY1999 to an average of $9.61 billion in FY2007. It is unclear what portion of the change is due to the addition of maintenance work that was not done on time or the availability of more precise estimates of the backlog. The NPS has been defining and quantifying its maintenance needs. These ratings are used in part to determine the allocation of maintenance funding among NPS facilities. H.R. 1731 seeks to eliminate the annual operating deficit and maintenance backlog in the National Park System by the 2016 centennial anniversary of the NPS. One involves monitoring and protecting air quality—the regional haze issue. Another science-related issue is possible commercialization (bio-prospecting) of unique organisms found in some NPS units (notably Yellowstone National Park). The NPS completed a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on benefits-sharing (agreements for using the results of research on organisms in the parks) in September 2006. A third science-related issue is research in the parks. The Administration is seeking $410.4 million for FY2009. The NPS has taken measures to increase security and protection along international borders and to curb illegal immigration and drug traffic through park borders. Over the past several years, other entities have evaluated park police and security operations. Legislation pertaining to immigration reform and border security contains provisions affecting national park units along U.S. borders. S. 1348 , S. 1639 , and H.R. The NPS manages 37 of these river units, totaling 3,043.7 miles. Management of lands within river corridors has been controversial in some cases, with debates over the effect of designation on private lands within the river corridors, the impact of activities within a corridor on the flow or character of the designated river segment, and the extent of local input in developing management plans. The 110 th Congress is considering legislation to designate, study, or extend components of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System. The Lower Farmington River and Salmon Brook Wild and Scenic River Study Act ( P.L.

The 110th Congress is considering legislation and conducting oversight on National Park Service (NPS) related topics. The Administration is addressing park issues through budgetary, regulatory, and other actions. This report focuses on several key topics. Centennial Initiative. President Bush's National Park Centennial Initiative seeks to add up to $3 billion for national park units over 10 years through: (1) an additional $100.0 million annually in discretionary funds; (2) public donations of least $100.0 million annually; and (3) a federal match of the public donations with up to $100.0 million annually. Legislation to establish a mandatory matching program along the lines of the President's initiative has been introduced (H.R. 2959 and S. 1253), while H.R. 3094 and S. 2817 would take a different approach. Maintenance Backlog. Attention has focused on the NPS's maintenance backlog. Estimates of the backlog have increased from an average of $4.25 billion in FY1999 to $9.61 billion in FY2007; it is unclear what portion may be attributable to better estimates or the addition of maintenance work not done on time. The NPS has been defining and quantifying its maintenance needs through comprehensive condition assessments of facilities. The results are being used in part to determine the allocation of maintenance funding and to identify assets for disposal. H.R. 1731 seeks to eliminate the NPS annual operating deficit and maintenance backlog. Science in the Parks. Various science-related activities pertain to park management. One involves monitoring and protecting air quality—the regional haze issue. Another is possible commercialization (bio-prospecting) of unique organisms found in some park units. The NPS is developing a proposal on benefits sharing—agreements for using the results of research on organisms in parks. A third science-related issue is research in the parks. The NPS receives funds for natural and cultural research programs. Security. The NPS has sought to enhance security of park units, with efforts focused on national icons and park units along international borders. Evaluations of park police and security operations have been mixed. Several bills pertaining to immigration reform and border security contain provisions to enhance security at park units along U.S. borders. The President is seeking additional funding for FY2009 for park police and law enforcement. Wild and Scenic Rivers. The Wild and Scenic Rivers System preserves free-flowing rivers, which are designated by Congress or through state nomination with approval by the Secretary of the Interior. The NPS manages 37 river units, totaling 3,043.7 miles. The NPS, and other federal agencies with management responsibility, prepare management plans to protect river values. Management of lands within river corridors is sometimes controversial, in part because of the possible effects of designation on private lands and of corridor activities on the rivers. P.L. 110-229 established the Eightmile Wild and Scenic River. Legislation has been introduced to designate, study, or extend components of the system.

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Introduction Over the past decade, the United States has recognized the human immunodeficiency virus and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) as a key foreign policy priority. Congressional authorization of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 brought unprecedented attention and funding to the epidemic and established a new and central role for donor governments in the fight against HIV/AIDS, particularly regarding the provision of AIDS treatment. Since the beginning of the epidemic, more than 60 million people have been infected with HIV. In 2010, there were an estimated 34 million people living with the virus. Women make up 50% of all adults living with HIV. Incidence has fallen by more than 25% in 33 countries between 2001 and 2009, including in 22 sub-Saharan African countries. Legislation on Global HIV/AIDS, 2003-2011 On May 27, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act, P.L. 108-25 ). The Leadership Act authorized $15 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs from FY2004 through FY2008. On July 24, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde U.S. Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act, P.L. 110-293 ). As part of the act, Congress removed the recommendations that 20% of funds be spent on prevention efforts and that 33% of these funds be used for abstinence-until-marriage programs, and required the following: for each fiscal year from FY2009 to FY2013, at least 10% of funds be spent on orphans and vulnerable children; for each fiscal year from FY2009 to FY2013, more than 50% of bilateral assistance be spent on treatment and care of individuals infected with HIV/AIDS; balanced funding for prevention activities including those that promote abstinence, delay of sexual debut, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction and country-specific implementation of such activities; and a report to Congress should less than 50% of prevention funds go to activities promoting abstinence, delay of sexual debut, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction in any country with a generalized epidemic. U.S. LIFE sought to address HIV/AIDS in 14 African countries and in India and represented the first time agencies other than the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were included in the U.S. response to HIV/AIDS. At the time it was established, health experts were debating whether the international community had a responsibility to provide ART to HIV-positive people in developing countries and whether they could be safely administered in such environments. PEPFAR responded to calls from those advocating treatment for the world's poor and demonstrated that ART could be effectively provided in low-resource settings. Through the Leadership Act, Congress authorized the establishment of the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), at the Department of State. Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC) : CDC's Global AIDS Program (GAP) operates in 38 countries and four regional programs. U.S. The United States also supports global HIV/AIDS programs through contributions to the Global Fund, an international financing mechanism for the response to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria ( Table 2 ). Through authorizing legislation and annual appropriations, Congress provides funds to several multilateral organizations and international research initiatives that contribute to the fight against HIV/AIDS, including the Global Fund and the United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The United States is one of the largest contributors to UNAIDS. Key Issues in Global HIV/AIDS The 112 th Congress will continue to be faced with a number of issues regarding the U.S. response to global HIV/AIDS, including how much assistance to provide and how to best apportion global HIV/AIDS funds. Global health experts have increasingly debated the sustainability of HIV/AIDS treatment programs and how to use limited resources to both treat those in need while also preventing new infections.

The human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is one of the world's most pressing global health challenges. Since the beginning of the epidemic, more than 60 million people have been infected with HIV, approximately 30 million of whom have died of HIV-related causes. At the end of 2010, an estimated 34 million people were living with the virus, the vast majority of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa. Expanded access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) over the past decade, due in large part to U.S. support, has contributed to declines in deaths among people living with HIV. Nonetheless, new infections continue to outpace access to treatment. The second session of the 112th Congress will likely be faced with determining how, and to what extent, the United States should respond to the continued challenge of global HIV/AIDS. The United States has recognized HIV/AIDS as a key foreign policy priority. Congress has passed several pieces of legislation related to global HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care. In particular, in 2003, Congress enacted the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25), authorizing $15 billion to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), an initiative proposed by the George W. Bush Administration. In 2008, Congress enacted the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-293), authorizing $48 billion for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs from FY2009 through FY2013. PEPFAR is the largest commitment in history by any nation to combat a single disease and makes up the majority of donor funding for global HIV/AIDS. When PEPFAR was announced, health experts were debating whether the international community had a responsibility to provide ART in developing countries and whether they could be safely administered in such environments. PEPFAR responded to calls from those advocating treatment for the world's poor and demonstrated that ART could be effectively provided in low-resource settings. PEPFAR is coordinated by the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) at the Department of State and is implemented by a range of U.S. agencies that include, among others, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The United States also supports several multilateral organizations responding to HIV/AIDS, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) and the United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Due in part to the global response to HIV/AIDS, substantial progress has been made in combating the epidemic. New HIV infections fell by more than 25% in 33 countries between 2001 and 2009, and a total of 2.5 million deaths have been averted in low- and middle-income countries since 1995 due to antiretroviral therapy. At the same time, major challenges remain in the fight against HIV/AIDS. For example, with new infections outpacing available treatment, experts have increasingly debated how to best allocate limited resources. This report outlines basic facts related to global HIV/AIDS, including characteristics of the epidemic and U.S. legislation, programs, funding, and partnerships related to global HIV/AIDS. It concludes with a brief description of some of the major issues that might be considered by the 112th Congress in its response to the disease. The report will be updated as events warrant.

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The Child Protection Act of 2012, P.L. 112-206 ( H.R. 6063 ) authorizes the Marshals Service to use administrative subpoenas to track unregistered sex offenders. Administrative Subpoenas Generally Administrative agencies have long held the power to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum in aid of the agencies' adjudicative and investigative functions. In an early examination of the questions, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not preclude enforcement of an administrative subpoena issued by the Wage and Hour Administration notwithstanding the want of probable cause. The Justice Department reports that the Inspector General's administrative subpoena authority is mainly used in criminal investigations, and the courts have held that the act gives the Inspectors General both civil and criminal investigative authority and subpoena powers coextensive with that authority.

Proponents refer to administrative subpoenas as a quick, efficient and relatively nonintrusive law enforcement tool. Opponents express concern that they pose a threat of unchecked invasions of privacy and evasions of the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. The courts have determined that, as long as they are not executed in a manner reminiscent of a warrant, administrative subpoenas issued in aid of a criminal investigation must be judicially enforced if they satisfy statutory requirements and are not unreasonable by Fourth Amendment standards. The Child Protection Act of 2012, P.L. 112-206 (H.R. 6063) authorized the United States Marshals Service to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of tracking unregistered sex offenders. This report is an abridged version—without footnotes, appendixes, quotation marks, and most citations to authority—of CRS Report RL33321, Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations: A Brief Legal Analysis, by [author name scrubbed].

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The federal government, however, also has significant authority to regulate how elections are run, and in many instances it has directed how states are to administer the election process. Congress could also decide to regulate even more fundamental aspects of federal elections. This report focuses on Congress's constitutional authority to regulate how states establish and implement election procedures. Congress, however, also has authority to regulate elections, and that authority may vary depending on whether the election is for the Presidency, the House, the Senate, or for state or local offices. Further, there may be variation in whether a particular aspect of an election, such as balloting procedures, is amenable to congressional regulation. Consequently, evaluating the authority of Congress to establish standardized election procedures would appear to require a consideration of a variety of different proposals and scenarios. Article II, §1, cl. Power as Regards Different Types of Elections Although the Constitution is silent on various aspects of the voting process, the Constitution seems to anticipate that states would be primarily responsible for establishing procedures for elections. Federal authority to direct how states administer these regulations, however, is also provided for in the Constitution. Congress's power is at its most broad in the case of House elections, which have historically always been decided by a system of popular voting. The Court has stated that the authority to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections: embrace[s] [the] authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.... [Congress] has a general supervisory power over the whole subject. This helps explain why congressional power over Senate elections, while almost as broad as it is for House elections, contains one exception—that Congress may not regulate "the Places of chusing Senators." Presidential Elections The power of Congress to regulate presidential elections is not as clearly established as the power over House and Senate elections. First, the text of the Constitution provides a more limited power to Congress in these situations. 4 provides only that Congress may determine the "time" of choosing presidential electors. The case law on this issue is ambiguous, although Congress's regulatory authority over presidential elections does seem to be more extensive than it might appear based on the text of the Constitution. 1 and Article II, Section 1, cl. In addition, it does appear that Congress's authority over a particular type of election may extend to the primaries for such election. For instance, the Civil War Amendments, the Nineteenth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and the Twenty-sixth Amendment all seek to prevent discrimination in access to voting, and authorize Congress to exercise power over federal, state, and local elections to implement these protections. As noted, one might ask whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment would apply in this circumstance, so that directing state agencies to implement federal regulations would violate the "anti-commandeering" requirements of the Tenth Amendment. 1 which clearly contemplates that states will have the burden of administering federal elections. The court in Edgar did note that there may be some theoretical limits to how Congress exercises its power under Article I, Section 4, cl.

In the United States, states have primary responsibility for the administration of federal elections. The federal government, however, has significant authority to determine how these elections are run, and may direct states to implement such federal regulations as the federal government provides. This authority can extend to registration, voting, reporting of results, or even more fundamental aspects of the election process such as redistricting. This report focuses on Congress's constitutional authority to regulate how states administer elections. Congress's authority to regulate a particular type of election may vary depending on whether that election is for the Presidency, the House, the Senate, or for state and local positions. Further, there may be variations in what aspects of elections are amenable to regulation. Consequently, evaluating Congress's authority to establish election procedures requires an examination of a variety of different proposals and scenarios. Although the Constitution is silent on various aspects of the voting process, it seems to anticipate that states would be primarily responsible for establishing election procedures. Federal authority to regulate federal elections, however, is specifically provided for in the Constitution. There are two main provisions at issue—Article I, Section 4, cl. 1, which provides Congress the authority to set the "Times, Places and Manner" of congressional elections, and Article II, Section 1, cl. 4, which provides that Congress may designate the "Time" for the choosing of Presidential Electors. Congress's power is broadest in the case of House elections, which have historically always been decided by a system of popular voting. Congressional power over Senate elections, while almost as broad as it is for House elections, contains one textual exception—that Congress may not regulate "the Places of chusing Senators." On the other hand, the power of Congress to regulate presidential elections is not as clearly established as the power over House and Senate elections. As noted above, the text of the Constitution provides Congress only the limited power to designate the "Time" of the choosing of Presidential Electors. It does appear that Congress's regulatory authority over presidential elections is more extensive than might appear based on the text of Article II, Section 1, cl. 4. How much more extensive, however, remains unclear. There are also a variety of other constitutional provisions that provide Congress the power to regulate all elections. This includes Congress's authority under the Civil War Amendments—Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—and the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and the Twenty-sixth Amendments, which provide Congress the power to prevent various types of discrimination in access to voting. Further, to the extent that there are gaps in Congress's power to regulate federal, state, or local elections, Congress might use the Spending Clause to condition the receipt of federal monies upon compliance with federal requirements. This power would extend to nonfederal elections, over which Congress has little textual authority. It should be further noted that legislation in this area may require state agencies to implement federal election mandates. Such mandates, however, do not appear to run afoul of the "anti-commandeering" requirements of the Tenth Amendment, as the Constitution appears to contemplate that states will bear the burden of administering federal election regulations.